Political Economy of Conflict

The Social Contract and Conflict in Pakistan

De politieke economie van conflicten.
Het sociaal contract en het conflict in Pakistan

Thesis

To obtain the degree of Doctor from the
Erasmus University of Rotterdam
by command of the
Rector Magnificus
Professor dr H.G. Schmidt
and in accordance with the decision of the Doctorate Board

The public defence shall be held on
Thursday 11 February 2010 at 16.00 hrs

by

Syed Aamer Abdullah
born at Mardan, Pakistan

ISS International Institute of Social Studies
Erasmus

Doctoral Committee

Promotor:
Prof. dr. S. M. Murshed

Other members:
Prof. dr. H.P.R.J. Dorussen, University of Essex
Prof. dr. A. S. Bedi
Prof. dr. P.A.G. van Bergeijk

Acknowledgements

Alhamdolillah, all praise to Allah. All my gratitude, to the people below, is an admission of the fact that Allah alone was responsible in making them come my way and in making this study possible.

This thesis could not have been possible without the generous funding provided by the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan. Prof. Ata-ur-Rehman deserves praise for envisioning the program which enabled thousands to pursue higher education. My thanks to the organization and its dedicated staff, especially Ishfaq Anwar who was singularly responsible for making my field work possible. I thank Loes Minkman of The Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education (NUFFIC) who was a constant source of support and facilitation during my stay in the Netherlands.

I am grateful to the Staff of Peshawar's national archives library who treated me like a guest and helped me make the most of four months. The sheer physical help in handling weighty newspaper folios warrants special thanks to the staff. I thank my research assistants Israj Khan, Majid Ali, Nosheen Shaukat and Khiyal Ghani, who helped me during one of those trying summer months with the mercury touching 50 C. Without their help I could not have attempted the primary database for this study.

The International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, where I was based for these four years has become a second home for me. The support I got from the faculty and staff is heartfelt. Louk de la Rive Box, Nynke Jo Smit, Ank van den Berg, Martin Blok, Lubna Sharwani, Dita Dirks, Lenneke Warnars, Almas Mahmud, Cynthia Recto-Carreon, Maria Grimilde and Maureen Koster, provided administrative support and much needed smiles. I have smiled back but I have always wanted to tell them how much I appreciated each one of those smiles. I thank them all. Joy Misa provided the excellent formatting template which made this thesis presentable. Linda McPhee commented and advised on how to write a technical narrative. Their support and advice is gratefully acknowledged.

My friends Moushira el Giziri, Husnulamin and Muhammad Saleem helped me think about my project. Maazullah Khan was a constant

source of guidance, help and encouragement. He was instrumental in pointing out mistakes and helping me correct those. Saleem Safi challenged me to come up with better than I could. I thank them all.

Prof. Scott Gates, Dr. Anirban Dasgupta and Dr. Karim Knio commented and advised me during my research design stage and it helped me to focus my research on sharper questions and firmer theoretical understanding. Dr. Håvard Strand advised me on the scheme of conflict score and Zulfan Tadjoeddin gave his excellent comments on the draft thesis. I thank all of them for their patience, time and thoughtful and invaluable advice. Prof. Arjun Bedi and Dr. Philip Verwimp gave their valuable comments during the final seminar. I thank both of them.

My field supervisor Prof. Sarfaraz Ansari helped me understand the intricacies of India's history. His guidance in theorizing about the historical context of this study was crucial in putting together a theoretical narrative which could talk to the analytical design. I thank him for his help and guidance. I also thank Abdul Samad, Muhammad Arif, Mushtaq Ahmed, Waqas ul Hasan, Zubair Bhatti, Muhammad Tariq and the many other friends in International Islamic University and federal and provincial civil services in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar who helped me get valuable data.

Despite being a novice in development studies I had the good fortune of being supervised by one of the best in his field. Syed Mansoob Murshed made this thesis possible with his help, guidance, patience, encouragement and sometimes blunt but necessary advice. Except the mistakes, everything in this thesis is due to his influence.

My parents have prayed for me all these four years as indeed they have all my life. Being a parent myself, I know now that they are happier about the completion of this thesis than I am. My Lord! bestow on them Thy Mercy even as they cherished me in childhood. (Al Quran 71: 28)

My kids Shifa, Ibrahim and Yermiyah made my life easier with their pranks and smiles and all that mischief that I could watch online from thousands of miles (And I do thank Yahoo and Gmail for connecting us). Baba is soon coming home to them but no one will be allowed to touch the chocolate till he says so.

The best thing that ever happened to me, Saadia, has been the inspiration and support for every success I had. I thank her; but how can I ever enough.

Dedication

To my parents
And
Saadia

Contents

List of Tables, Figures and Maps

Tables

Figures

Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ANP	Awami National Party
CCI	Council of Common Interests
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COAS	Chief Of Army Staff
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBR	Federal Board of Revenue
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation
FUs	Federating Units
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Horizontal Inequality
ICG	International Crisis Group
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IPCC	Inter Provincial Coordination Committee
IRSA	Indus River System Authority
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence
JUI	Jamiat e Ulama e Islam
KBD	Kalabagh Dam
MAR	Minorities At Risk

MMA	Muttahida Majlis e Amal
MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
MRD	Movement for Restoration of Democracy
NAP	National Awami Party
NFC	National Finance Commission
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OGDCL	Oil and Gas Development Company Limited
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PATA	Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPL	Pakistan Petroleum Limited
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
RD	Relative Deprivation
SE	Social Exclusion
SSGC	Sui Southern Gas Company
TTP	Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNDP	United Nations Development
US	United States of America
WAPDA	Water And Power Development Authority
WLS	Weighted Least Squares
ZAB	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Abstract

The main concern of this thesis is to analyze conflict in Pakistan, mainly the ethnopolitical conflict. It builds a case that conflict in Pakistan has been a product of the weakening of its social contract. This is both a qualitative and quantitative work which relies on both primary and secondary data as well as diverse techniques from historical interpretative analysis to econometrics. In addition to the ethnopolitical conflict, the thesis also contains an analysis of the factors leading to taliban recruitment in the current conflict.

The thesis attempts to link the historical evolution and composition of social contract and the struggles over identity in pre and post independence era of Pakistan. It sets up a theoretical framework which defines the relevant concepts of identity, ethnopolitics, conflict, social contract, institutions and the saliency of socio economic determinants of conflict. To test this theoretical framework, an analytical framework is proposed which operationalizes these concepts. Data about the violent and non violent ethnopolitical conflict from 1972 to 2005 is collected, coded and put into a data scheme which helps us build the composite and individual pictures of this conflict through time. This database is unique to the extent of Pakistan. The thesis finds that the intensity of the major individual conflict have mostly followed an inverted U curve through time. Except for Balochistan, this is true for both the violent as well as non violent conflict.

The emerging conflict is then explained with the help of the decay of institutions of conflict management. These include both the formal and informal types. Two political and two economic institutions are selected for analysis which are part of the fiscal federalist scheme of the constitution. The findings suggest that consociational federalism has worked to bring down the intensity of conflict among the federating units. To investigate the political power dynamics, an original scheme of quantifying the political power gap in the state structure is employed and the emerging picture is then contrasted with the picture of ethnopolitical

conflict. Analysis also suggests that democracies have worked better at containing the conflict inside the institutions that were created for its management.

The thesis takes up the saliency of the debate about the social and political horizontal inequalities, especially in Pakistani context and follows it with an econometric analysis of the data related to these inequalities and conflict. Linking grievances with the socio economic and political horizontal inequalities among federating units, the econometric results suggest that overall, larger inequalities led towards greater ethnopolitical conflict.

This thesis also takes up the issue of current conflict in Pakistan between the state and taliban. A brief history of events in Afghanistan and Pakistan from the early 1970s is given to contextualize the current debate. The structural and agency factors leading to taliban recruitment are analyzed in this historical context. Issues of identity, history, horizontal inequality and decay of institutions provide a fertile ground for taliban recruitment in FATA and NWFP areas of Pakistan. The taliban then employ techniques adapted to this structural strata to maximize their recruitment. This discussion is essentially contained within the overall theoretical framework of the thesis.

The saliency of the social contract in understanding the conflict in Pakistan cannot be overemphasized. A composite view of the explanatory framework of conflict in Pakistan is attempted in this thesis which will help formulate better policy options for conflict resolution, avoidance, mediation and management.

Keywords: Social Contract, Conflict, Ethnopolitical conflict, Ethnopolitics, Non-Violent conflict, Violent Conflict, Pakistan, Fiscal federalism, Institutions, Horizontal inequality, Taliban recruitment.

Samenvatting

De politieke economie van conflicten.
Het sociaal contract en het conflict in Pakistan.

In dit proefschrift staat de analyse van het conflict in Pakistan centraal, waarbij de nadruk ligt op het etnopolitieke conflict. In dit onderzoek wordt gesteld dat het conflict in Pakistan voortvloeit uit de verzwakking van het sociaal contract. Er is gebruik gemaakt van kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve onderzoeksmethoden, van primaire en secundaire data en de analysemethoden variëren van historisch bronnenonderzoek tot econometrische technieken. Behalve het etnopolitieke conflict behandelt het proefschrift ook de factoren die leiden tot rekrutering door de taliban in het huidige conflict.

Dit proefschrift beoogt de historische evolutie en opstelling van een sociaal contract in verband te brengen met de identiteitsstrijd in het Pakistan van voor en na de onafhankelijkheid. In het theoretisch kader worden de relevante concepten gedefinieerd: identiteit, etnopolitiek, conflict, sociaal contract, instellingen en de karakteristieke sociaaleconomische determinanten van conflicten. Om dit theoretisch kader te toetsen zijn deze begrippen geoperationaliseerd in een analytisch kader. Er zijn gegevens verzameld over het gewelddadige en niet-gewelddadige etnopolitieke conflict in de periode van 1972 tot 2005. Deze gegevens zijn gecodeerd en geordend om het conflict door de tijd heen als geheel en in onderdelen in beeld te brengen. Deze database is uniek voor Pakistan. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de intensiteit van de voornaamste afzonderlijke conflicten meestal een omgekeerde U-curve beschrijft in de loop van de tijd. Behalve in Baluchistan geldt dit voor zowel de gewelddadige als de niet-gewelddadige conflicten.

Het ontstaan van een conflict wordt verklaard vanuit de verzwakking van instellingen voor conflictbeheersing. Hieronder vallen zowel de formele als de informele instellingen. Voor het onderzoek zijn twee politieke en twee economische instellingen geselecteerd die deel uitmaken van het fiscale federalistische systeem van de grondwet. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat consociationalistisch federalisme de intensiteit van

conflicten tussen de federale eenheden heeft verminderd. Om de politieke machtsverhoudingen te onderzoeken is een model ontwikkeld dat de leemte in de politieke macht in het staatsbestel kwantificeert. Het beeld dat hieruit naar voren komt wordt afgezet tegen het beeld van etnopolitiek conflict. Uit het onderzoek blijkt ook dat democratieën er beter in slagen om het conflict te beperken tot de invloedssfeer van de instellingen die het moeten beheersen.

Het proefschrift haakt ook in op het debat over sociale en politieke horizontale ongelijkheid, spitst dit toe op de Pakistaanse context en bevat een econometrische analyse van de gegevens over deze ongelijkheid en conflicten. De econometrische resultaten brengen grieven in verband met de sociaaleconomische en politieke horizontale ongelijkheid tussen federale eenheden en wijzen erop dat grotere ongelijkheid veelal leidt tot grotere etnopolitieke conflicten.

Dit proefschrift gaat ook in op het huidige conflict tussen de staat en de taliban in Pakistan. Als achtergrond voor het huidige debat wordt een kort historisch overzicht gegeven van de gebeurtenissen in Afghanistan en Pakistan vanaf begin jaren 70. De structurele en institutionele factoren die tot rekrutering door de taliban leiden worden in deze historische context onderzocht. Zaken die met identiteit, geschiedenis, horizontale ongelijkheid en verzwakking van instellingen te maken hebben bieden een vruchtbare bodem voor rekrutering door de taliban in de Pakistaanse gebieden FATA en NWFP. De taliban stemmen hun rekruteringstactieken af op deze structurele sociale kenmerken. Dit thema wordt hoofdzakelijk binnen het algemeen theoretisch kader van het proefschrift behandeld.

Het belang van het sociaal contract voor het begrijpen van het conflict in Pakistan kan niet genoeg benadrukt worden. Dit proefschrift beoogt een samengesteld beeld te geven van het verklaringsmodel van het conflict in Pakistan als basis voor betere beleidsvoorstellen voor het oplossen, vermijden en beheersen van conflicten en voor het bemiddelen bij conflicten.

1 Introduction

This thesis is about conflict in Pakistan, mostly ethnopolitical conflict. It builds a case that conflict in that country has been a product of the weakening of its social contract. This is both a qualitative and a quantitative work which relies heavily on both primary and secondary data as well as diverse techniques from historical interpretative analysis to econometrics.

To explore the primary case, the thesis has to first define and lay out the problem and justify its relevance to academic and policy research. A theoretical framework of conflict and an analytical framework, which operationalizes the theoretical concepts, are then required to investigate the links between conflict and the components of social contract, the implicit agreement within a state that delineates the rights and responsibilities of the state and its citizens. It is therefore imperative to come up with a plan to measure and chart the course of conflict in an empirical set up. A major portion of this work relies on a primary conflict database which was constructed as part of this study and is unique, at least for Pakistan.

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins with the justification and relevance of this study. It then sets up a theoretical framework which defines the relevant concepts of identity, ethnopolitics, conflict, social contract, institutions and the saliency of socio economic determinants of conflict. To test this theoretical framework, an analytical framework is then proposed which operationalizes these concepts. For all its conflicts, Pakistan is a remarkably under researched country. Mostly this has to do with lack of data. A scheme of data is then envisaged taking account of both the violent and non violent character of conflict.

In Chapter 3, the origins of ethnopolitical conflicts in Pakistan are traced back to the earliest days of its struggle for independence. The make up of the social contract and the institutions that compose it are then described in some detail to give the reader an idea of the complexity

of the problem at hand and also to set a historical context for the description of these conflicts and their explanation. The thesis argues that historical fears of the future, struggles of competing identities and the constitutional history of post independence Pakistan shape the formal as well as informal social contract of Pakistan.

In Chapter 4, the primary ethnopolitical conflict database of this study is explained to help us describe the phenomenon. Since there is no uniform data about Pakistan's conflicts, the study would not have been possible without first collecting reliable data. The chapter describes data gathering techniques from newspapers, the construction of database and metrics; and the unfolding picture of conflict is given for each of the most important of these conflicts. The idea is to present composite as well as individual pictures of the nature, the stakeholders, the issues and progress of these ethnopolitical conflicts. This empirical core is important to quantify conflict and is put together after a reading of every page of 34 years of a major newspaper and supported by minor sources for periods of media censorship. Events have been noted, coded and tabulated. The period of study is from 1972 to 2005.

Since a social contract needs institutions to carry it out, Chapter 5 begins with a discussion of the formal and informal institutions created under the social contract. Important institutions in these categories, their health and the impact on the over all ethnopolitical conflict will be analyzed. Most important of these institutions are those created through the fiscal federalist scheme and the informal understanding among the federating units on the share in the power pie. Only leading institutions in each category will be discussed. To investigate the political power dynamics, an original scheme of quantifying the political power gap in the state structure is employed. It is argued that the health of these institutions influenced ethnopolitical conflict after 1972.

Chapter 6 investigates the proposition that horizontal socio-economic and political inequalities contribute to conflict by generating grievances. The saliency of the debate about these horizontal inequalities, especially in Pakistani context is followed by an exploratory econometric analysis of the data related to these inequalities and conflict. The results of this exercise suggests that the horizontal inequalities in political, economic and situations of social access have a bearing on the ethnopolitical conflict between provinces/regions and the central government.

The components of the theoretical framework can be found in the different narrative of the current conflict between the Pakistani state and Taliban. Chapter 7 of this thesis is about the talibanization phenomenon, the conflict surrounding it and the factors that influence the militant recruitment. Since this conflict involves the strands of identity, history, horizontal inequality and institutions, therefore these structural factors will be discussed to bring the context into focus. The chapter further discusses the agency level factors affecting taliban recruitment since leaving those out will not help in explaining the phenomenon from a policy practitioner's point of view.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by reiterating the saliency of the social contract in understanding the conflict in Pakistan. The results of discussions in the rest of the thesis are combined to construct a composite view of the explanatory framework of conflict in Pakistan which will help formulate better policy options for conflict resolution, avoidance, mediation and management. The potential and limitations of the current study are discussed. It is suggested that in order to minimize conflict, the policy options coming out of this thesis are to reinforce those institutions which have worked well, to enforce those terms of the contract which have been ignored and to work towards narrowing the horizontal inequalities which have had influence in increasing the conflict.

2 Through the Kaleidoscope

Men enter into conflict not because they are different but because they are essentially the same*

2.1 Introduction

An exercise in determining a fixed configuration of Pakistani sociopolitical taxonomy would have very little shelf life. The overlapping subdivisions do not lend themselves to easy categorization. Political, Ethnic, Sectarian, Economic classes; the list can stretch easily. The emerging picture is not stable either. A mere touch to the kaleidoscope and a new configuration appears. A single actor assumes and acts out multiple identities at the same time. Pinning a particular identity on an actor and then following him around the socio-political milieu would be a difficult scholarly enterprise. Through this maze therefore, one is forced to pick and choose a configuration for analysis; analysis which could help explain the forces pulling at the socio-political fabric in different directions.

Ethnopolitical conflicts are one such configuration and perhaps one of the most important in the particular context of Pakistan.[1] This introductory chapter is an attempt to build a theoretical framework for its analysis and the verification of the thesis that the health of the particular social contract in a multiethnic state has better explanatory power for these conflicts.

The first order of business in this chapter would be to determine the degree of the need to study ethnopolitical conflicts, anywhere, but especially in Pakistan. The social and policy relevance is important and needs demonstration. It would be imperative to agree on precisely what questions we want to answer and define the scope of our study. Since ethnicity, politics and conflict are too unwieldy concepts to be undertaken in a single study, we would therefore proceed to identify an

* Melson and Wolpe, 'Modernization' P. 1114, cited in Horowitz (1985) P. 100

appropriate interdisciplinary theoretical framework for our analysis. Such a framework needs a proper disciplinary embedding in order to benefit from the various strands of available literature on the subjects. All along this exercise, the particular Pakistani context will be used as a reference point to obtain internally consistent and precise theoretical and analytical frameworks which can help us define, describe and explain the problem.

2.2 Why do we need to study it?

Ethnicity and the conflicts defined by it are not for the abstemious. The 'birth principle' associated with it makes it particularly unpalatable to some.

> To the considerable extent that ethnic ties reflect the birth principle, they fall within the cartilage of those disagreeable phenomena disfavored by our ideals and therefore capable of securing only the reluctant attention reserved for distasteful subjects. (Horowitz 1985)[2]

It is interesting to note the communists, the socialists, (and the Americans) dislike the idea alike. Only a grudging attention is paid to it after it is no longer ignorable. Those who study and theorize about ethnopolitical conflicts almost enjoy this unease of those who do not (or who will not). If the social scientist is him/her self from an ethnic minority, the label of 'parochialism' is swift to follow in a country not much used to open discussions on sensitive subjects. Too often scholars associated with a particular school try to fit these conflicts into their favourite paradigms;

> Ethnopolitical conflict was often treated as if it were a manifestation of something else: the persistence of traditionalism, the stresses of modernization, or class conflict masquerading in the guise of ethnic identity. (Horowitz 1985)[3]

This reluctance has left us with many shortcomings in our understanding of ethnopolitical conflict. Horowitz (1985) thinks it is also due to the episodic character of these conflicts. Its sudden coming and going shatters the periods of tranquility and 'since the scholarship is reactive, the spilling of ink awaits the spilling of blood.' [4] Ethnic conflict is, of course a recurrent phenomenon. Horowitz (1985) gives a bird's eye view of the ethnopolitical conflicts in different parts of the world.[5]

The persistence and frequency of these conflicts is borne out by statistics. Gurr (1993) had noted that some twenty million refugees are

fleeing from communal or ethnically based conflicts around the world, although his 'Minority At Risk' project has been criticized for selection bias most notably by Fearon and Laitin(2003). The reasons for these conflicts may not be limited to ethnic nationalism and the conditions that favour insurgency may have more explanatory potential as Fearon and Laitin (2003) show but the fact remains that Yugoslavia, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have disappeared as we knew them. The ability of conflict entrepreneurs, the prime movers in a conflict, to harness groups on the basis of ethnicity, for conflicts which have diverse political agendas, only goes to show that identity and the politics around it play important roles in mobilization of groups.

The subject of this study, Pakistan, has herself passed the trauma in 1971. Rwanda, Aceh, East Timor, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Burma, Kosovo, Kashmir, Somalia, Nigeria and Balochistan have something in common; ethnopolitical conflict. Gurr notes that only 27 of the 233 communal groups in his study have no record of political organization, protest, rebellion or intercommunal conflict since 1945 (Gurr 1993).[6]

The international situation also plays a role in the emergence and then hibernation of these phenomena. After the Second World War the decolonization brought new issues and contexts for the ethnopolitical struggles. It now became more a question of possession of the state as against that of self-determination, though the rhetoric for these movements tried to copy from each other. The anti-colonial movements had created an appearance of unity that was slow to dissipate even after independence was won. Yet in a large number of ex-colonial states, the successful achievement of independence from colonial yoke was swiftly followed by ethnic conflict. It is not unusual to find routine administrative issues assume defining roles in ethnopolitics and result in protracted conflicts in these countries and regions.

2.2.1 Ethnopolitical conflicts and Pakistan

1971 was not the last time that Pakistan witnessed ethnopolitical conflict becoming the center of national debate. Balochistan in the 1970s and post 2003, assertion of Muhajir[7] ethnic identity in Karachi in the 80s and 90s, and Pukhtun nationalism during 1980s are uncanny reminders of a national nightmare. Ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan has been increasing and the need is all the more acute to come up with a good explanation. Only that will lead to successful resolution.

Earlier studies in Pakistan have guided this present research through some of its trickiest labyrinths, yet we find them lacking a hard empirical core to support their findings. One reason for these is the lack of a comprehensive theoretical container. An example is Feroz Ahmed's claim that 'ethnic movements are usually based on grievances of the disadvantaged groups concerning ethnic disparities', he may be striking the nail on the head in his quest to analyze what the groups are fighting over. It is the limitation of his analytical framework that there is no inbuilt degree of measurement in it. The result is that he comes up with a list of issues from provincial autonomy to allocation of resources to language and culture, but without an appropriate conceptual container to fit them in, with their proper weightage. Social contract as such has not been a subject of scholarly analysis in Pakistan and linking it to socioeconomic inequalities and the ethnopolitical conflict, in a verifiable way (something which this research attempts to accomplish) is non-existent.

A good diagnosis is a prerequisite to any prognosis and suggested remedy. Chapter 3 of this thesis thus describes the stakeholders, issues and intensity of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan since 1971. The separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) automatically sets the initial cut off date for this study. The second reason for this cut-off date is the constitution of 1973. This constitution provided a new, formal, social contract. In our chosen theoretical framework in section 2.3, the scope of analysis can only be broadened to include the impact of a single, uniform, contract on the conflict, throughout the duration of study. The analytical framework also requires that our units of analysis be uniform over time. Since we will be largely using provinces/regions as our units of analysis for data related to institutions, poverty and human development, therefore it was inevitable to exclude the data related to the provincial framework of pre-1971 period.

2.2.2 Questions all around

This thesis will therefore attempt to answer the question; did the weakening of the Social Contract, as a result of decay of institutions of conflict management and acting through the agency of grievances, lead to ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan after 1971 and the current conflict between the state and radical militants? The attempt at an explanation will have to first answer some important sub-questions; what exactly is

the social contract in Pakistan, composed of? What issues, history and ideas came together for the evolution of the Pakistani version of a social contract? What are the formal and informal institutions created by this social contract? To what extent was the Pakistani fiscal federalism successful in fulfilling the role assigned to it in the broader social contract? How did the social contract in Pakistan break down? Has it broken down? Which institutions of conflict management decayed and how? What do we mean by ethnopolitical conflict? What form, style and content did the ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan take, after 1971? What is the extent of regional imbalances that are supposed to generate grievances? What grievances were generated by the (as yet assumed) breakdown of social contract?

This study does not profess to (and could not be) a detached look at an observed phenomena. We need to know how to reduce the severity of ethnopolitical conflict (or any conflict for that matter) and maximize the likelihood of interethnic cooperation and conflict resolution. We also want to know about contextually adapted techniques of conflict reduction and the way to use them. This cannot be done without a proper diagnosis. The prognosis for a democratic, peaceful, prosperous and multiethnic political economy are at stake.

2.2.3 What do we need to answer these questions

For answering the above questions we need to come up with adequate theoretical and analytical frameworks. The theoretical framework is required to answer such abstract questions as the nature of ethnopolitical conflicts and the definition of terms like social contract, ethnicity and ethnopolitics. It is also required to answer the conceptual need for the study of this particular type of conflict as some scholars have questioned the very need of the field of ethnic conflict studies on a conceptual level (Gilley 2004). During this theoretical exercise the terms ethnicity, nation and nationalism will be used interchangeably to remain faithful to the words of the scholars quoted here.

Then, an analytical framework will be required to furnish us with empirical tools with which the theory can be tested. This analytical framework will discuss more tangible concepts like institutions, development and inequalities.

Both the above exercises will need to take into account the present work in general and that done in Pakistani context, in particular.

2.3 Ethnicity and Ethnic conflict, towards a theoretical framework

Before a peek at 'the kaleidoscope' and constructing a theoretical framework, it will be instructive to get some terms defined. This will guard against loose containers for highly complex abstractions. Since conflict in general and ethnopolitical conflict in particular is the explained phenomenon in this thesis, its definition and those of its antecedent terms are imperative. We therefore need to define ethnicity, ethnopolitical conflict and social contract. As Horowitz (1985) puts it;

> Ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to [be] innate. (Horowitz 1985)[8]

The minimal definition of an ethnic unit…is 'the idea of common provenance, recruitment primarily through kinship, and a notion of distinctiveness whether or not this consists of a unique inventory of cultural traits.'[9] This definition is employed to make better use of the data which is mostly available on a provincial/regional basis. F. Ahmed (1997), in applying the concept of ethnic group to the conditions of Pakistan, sets down language as the central defining feature of an ethnic group. But the unit of analysis in our study is the province/region or a dyadic setting as explained in chapter 4. The two are not, however, mutually exclusive as the politico-ethnic movements in Pakistan have themselves been employing the provincial typology, sometimes rather reluctantly, to articulate most of their demands.

The term nationalist movements and nationalism are sometimes used synonymously with ethnopolitical movements. 'Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983). The term 'nationality' has been in common use in Pakistan to denote ethno-linguistic communities. It has been in the vocabulary of nationalist and Marxist advocacy groups- and now even right-wing-politicians from different provinces, as well as Marxist and nationalist scholars.

> The problems of language, culture, regional autonomy, allocation of resources between ethnic communities, and political participation have been subsumed under the rubric of "national question" or "nationality question. (F. Ahmed 1997)

Yet nationalism is such an abstract idea that one finds it difficult to observe it empirically. The alternative proposed by A. Khan (2005) is that of studying national movements;

> [Miroslav] Hroch argues that one should not just analyze nationalism but rather study national movements, because the term national movement has a significant advantage over nationalism in that it refers to empirically observable activity by concrete individuals and therefore their goals and demands, their forms of organization, their numbers and their social composition can be analyzed. (A. Khan 2005)

Through an empirical approach we can analyze the ideology, the discourse, the rhetoric and the myth-making techniques and process of nationalism. But this empirical approach is required on two fronts. First, to evaluate how the politicized ethnicity has become a principle of legitimization of political systems and secondly to determine how effectively it has been used as an instrument for articulating and advocating the issues related to elite political competition. The terms 'nationalism' and 'national movements' provide for the first requirement but may not be used effectively for the second. To cater to both the requirements, we need a term which can cater to the nexus of political legitimacy and the day to day politics of power, status and resources. The term 'Ethnopolitics' will be used as it offers broader applicability than the terms 'ethnic movements' and 'nationalist movements'. The imagined and the real are thus combined into one definition which is essentially constructivist. As Robertson (1997) concluded;

> [The constructed nature of ethnopolitics]… makes it possible to assess ethnopolitics as both real and imagined, and allows us to better understand the world of our making. (Robertson 1997)

Ethnopolitical conflict then is *the incompatibility between, and expression of interests by, the stakeholder, who have ethnopolitical motivations*. This definition caters for the violent, non-violent, and institutional types of ethnicity based political conflicts. It also is general enough to take into account the conflicts over political legitimacy as well as those emanating from the more mundane politics within a state.

2.3.1 The Theoretical Continuum

This introductory chapter is not an attempt to present a new theory. It will rather attempt to give a broad outline of some of the most important

theories of conflict, pick up their salient elements and build up a case for their applicability to the Pakistan specific conflicts.

There are ways to categorize conflict theories and some of the scholars discussed in these pages have come up with their own categories, depending on the way their work is structured or a particular scholarly tradition. An example is Amin's (1988) work on ethno-nationalism in Pakistan, where he identifies three traditions of liberalism, Marxism and Islam and then analyzes the traditional, modern and post modern theories within each tradition. This style of taxonomy is adequate for ethno-nationalism but not for analyzing conflict in an ethnopolitical setting where the 'imaginary' and the 'real' are both part of the discourse.

Without aligning with a particular school, A continuum is proposed so that theories which concentrate on the role of the state are at one end and those looking at the role of the separatist (or rebel or ethnopolitical) leadership (or peoples) at the other end. Along this continuum are placed theories which might be presented in wholly other configurations in their respective birth places. For now, the term structure and agency are deliberately avoided.

Along the length of this continuum, we find the political science theories, described here mainly in the nomenclature used by Andreas Wimmer (2002), The Sociological School, The International relations approach, the Marxists and the Anthropological tradition. The border lines are not very sharp and it is easy to find some of these theories in another's domain. Some categorizations put theories together which address both the poles of this continuum. The grain of the argument runs thus; almost every theory has something to offer for this thesis, the endeavor will be to identify those elements which can prove helpful in the particular context of Pakistan. In doing so, theoretical and analytical frameworks will be built around the central thesis of this analysis. An unabashed openness for 'received wisdom' will be required to benefit from 'the state of the art'.

As an entry point into the discussion, Wimmer (2002) sees nationalist and ethnic politics not just a by-product of modern state formation or industrialization; rather, a bedrock for modernity itself,[10] He categorizes four approaches conceptualizing the relationship between modernization and the politics of ethnicity and nationalism. The first of these approaches is the theory of rational choice.

2.3.2 On Rational Choice

Starting at the people/separatist/leadership end of the continuum, the rational choice theory holds that under conditions of politicization of ethnicity, it makes sense for the individual to consider ethnic representation as meaningful when it comes to choosing political alliances.

Rational or, public choice theory emphasizes the capacity of agents to shape their environment. The proponents of rational choice 'recognize that structures determine the range of choices available to individuals, but, ultimately, they account for outcomes in terms of choices individuals make' (Hindmoor 2006).[11] Models are built around conflict entrepreneurs and the choices open to them. Each of these choices carries a utility or 'payoff' which accrues to the agent for pursuing that choice. The instrumental concept of rational choice also assumes that people act in self interest. It is more about means rather than ends.

On a conceptual level, among the 'rational left' Eric Hobsbawm makes the case for the 'imaginary' nature of nationalism. According to him, nationalism rarely reflects long term traditions or systems of life. It doesn't even need language or religion or common historical experience. All these are social or political constructions and in essence, imaginary (Hobsbawm 1992).

Horowitz (1985) criticizes the rational choice approach on the basis of what he says is the impossibility of organizing the increasing gains for everybody, in an economy of scarcity. He further contends that the ethnic conflict may not be motivated by calculations of material gain and that the rewards sought may lie in the area of psychic gratification, or if calculations of the participants are so relative that no benefit is considered a gain unless it comes at the expense of an opponent.[12]

Rational choice theory is not supposed to be capable to explain the emotional euphoria which characterizes the ethnopolitical struggles. This however is not accepted by some of today's rational choice theorists. They contend that an individual can derive utility from pursuing an ideology, in the same way, as another individual, deriving utility from the pursuit of a purely materialistic goal. Measuring this utility in an empirical study might pose some problems but should be regarded as the price paid for the advantages of a testable model with clear outlines. The 'woodenness' of this theory aside, it makes a good starting point in the quest for explaining the 'health' of the social contract in Pakistan. That

individuals base their decisions on calculations of gain and loss, is a straight forward and testable proposition. It answers, to a considerable extent, which components of a social contract are under consideration of an individual and even a group. The 'economy of scarcity' may be a consideration for an economist or the state's planner but is not always a consideration for an individual. It is inevitable that some questions will be left unanswered in an explanatory quest and hence the need for a look at other promising theories.

2.3.3 On Neo-Romanticism, Primordialism and Culturalism

The neo-romanticist approach, the primordialists and the culturalists, have much in common despite having different disciplinary embeddings. They all start with the assumption that ethnicity constitutes a basic factor of social life, ever present across time and space. The strength of ethnic identity and the myths of predestination and a historic mission[13] may partly explain the reconstitution, revival and enrichment of ethnic community in successful nationalist movements but fails to provide answers for the unsuccessful ones (Wimmer 2002). In the same vein, Ethnic conflicts are often labeled cultural conflicts because the division of ethnic groups has usually been ascribed to their cultural differences. Furnivall (1956) and Smith (1965) developed the theory of plural society. For Furnivall, the different ethnic groups only interact in the marketplace and such a society is held together by force supplied by the colonial power. This is a precarious social form. Smith (1965) emphasizes the cultural differences. The main characteristics of his formulation are;

> any institutional system tends towards internal integration and consistency, each of these differentiated groups will tend to form a closed socio-cultural unit, … [second] … where culturally divergent groups together form a common society, the structural imperative for maintenance of this inclusive unit involves a type of political order in which one of these cultural sections is subordinated to the other … [third, plural societies] are defined by dissensus and pregnant with conflict. (Smith 1965)

The absence of consensus therefore requires regulation by force and will tend towards a ranked system of subordination and super-ordination. Plural societies frequently undergo clash of values which threatens stability and leads to conflict. Identities at birth and the primordialist explanations may be significant in explaining group

formation but their value is more in the post facto 'imaginary' exercise in identity formation and justification for ethnic grouping rather than being the prerequisites for any identity formation, ab initio.

The belief in inevitability of subordination of some ethnic groups has fudged the relationships of ethnic groups among themselves. As Horowitz (1985) points out, many groups do not coexist in a ranked or hierarchical system at all.[14] Most societies are configured such that every ethnic group has its own elite; the position of a group varies from one domain to another, none of them able to establish subordination or super ordination. Such systems are easily seen at work in the Netherlands and Austria.[15] Horowitz even has a test question for distinguishing ranked groups from unranked groups. He asks whether each of the groups in contact possesses legitimately recognized elite. If so, the system is unranked. It is precisely this question that we ask ourselves of the Pakistani system and we find that the answer is in affirmative. This is in contrast to Ahmad's (1997) answer that;

> The different ethnic groups in Pakistan do not have an identical class composition. Nor do they have an equal or even proportional representation in the higher echelons of military and bureaucracy. Therefore, the venous elements of Pakistan's ruling class have a disproportionate representation of the various ethnic groups in society. This situation represents a case, not of cross cutting cleavages, but of overlapping of class and ethnicity to a large extent. (F. Ahmed 1997)

On the basis of conflict data analyzed in chapter 5 and 6, we find that this is an overly simplified view, unsupported by any empirical data on the composition of elite in each ethnic group. I argue that Pakistan has all the hallmarks of unranked ethnic groups. There are high status Pukhtuns who are (or have been) members of the ruling clique. There are high status Sindhis and Balochis who engage the elite in other groups as their equals. The relative share in power circles for each group has also been the subject of the historical and constitutional social contract. Hence the disproportionate representation of ethnic groups in power is not due to overlapping of class and ethnicity but is due to the politics of exclusion and inclusion in power circles that concerns these elite and the evolving nature of informal social contract among them. This is not the same thing as politics of subordination and super-ordination. Hence it is important to use a framework which separates the loci of the elite from those of the masses, in the ethnic conflicts. These separate loci are

clearly seen at work in chapter 6 of this thesis where we see that issues of elite motivation have a different impact on ethnopolitical conflict than those issues which are essentially of interest to the masses.

2.3.4 A Transitional Phenomenon?

Some models view ethnicity and nationalism as transitional phenomena on the road to state building, modernity or a classless society.

Ibne Khaldun (1332-1406) termed *Asabiya* as the natural feeling which exists due to blood relationship and the bonds derived there from (both political and religious). According to him these bonds were essential on the road to state building but were not enough to sustain the state and the power of this *Asabiya* or ethnicity invariably declines (Khaldun 1967).

The Marxists also viewed it as a transitory phenomenon and more as an irritant in their dialectic of class struggle and societal evolution. Marx and Engels saw the national differences and antagonisms between peoples diminishing with every day and the eventual proletarian international society emerging (Marx et al. 2002).[16] The second generation of modernization theorists within the Marxist tradition like Rosa Luxemberg and Bukharin were also of the same opinion but Otto Bauer and Karl Renner were notable exceptions who considered nation as the enduring form of society (Amin 1988).

The most sustained criticism of the above Marxist position came from within the post-modernization writers of Marxist tradition. Nairn (1975) considered nationalism as an inevitable feature of capitalist development while Wallerstein and Phillips (1992), negating the primordial origins of identity, termed this sense of identity as the outcome of political power play within the developing world system.

Contrary to this, Horowitz (1985) shows that ethnicity is often a more compelling and preemptive affiliation than social class is. He does that by utilizing Marxian assumptions against Marxian conclusions. These assumptions are 1) class is ascriptive i.e. given at birth 2) social classes are closed conflict groups, permanently composed. He argues that social mobility changes class but cannot change ethnicity and that more so than social classes, ethnic groupings are conflict groups (Horowitz 1985).[17] According to some other modernization theorists like Karl Deutsch and Ernest Gellner, modernization dissolves corporative and communitarian segregation; the resulting communicative integration brings more and

more people into contact and into competition with each other (Wimmer 2002).[18] This may not be the definitive word on the dialectic of class struggle but certainly puts forward a strong case that ethnicity based conflict is not a transitional phenomenon and needs to be probed outside the Marxist framework.

The Marxists of South Asia saw similarities between the nationality problem in the former Soviet Union and the linguistic and regional problems in the sub-continent. They had little difficulty in adopting the Marxist concept of nationality without critical re-examination (F. Ahmed 1997). Ethno-politics was viewed as a form of elite politics but the Marxists loathed admitting that there must be something which often converts these into populist movements. '[These] variants of Modernist [and Marxist] theories … refer to a fully differentiated, universalist society leaving no room for ascriptive criteria and communal forms of integration (Wimmer 2002).[19]

Besides South Asian Marxists, the other attack on the idea of ethnic nationalism came from the ranks of pan Islamists, the likes of Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), and Maududi (1903-1979); who resisted calls for unity based on an 'Indian' identity.[20] Both advocated Muslim nationalism. Some notions of this identity influenced the processes leading up to the creation of Pakistan and even afterwards. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

2.3.5 Functionalists, Modernists and Statists

The functionalists go whole hog on modernization theory and the position that nationalism (and ethno-politics by implication) constitutes an integral part of modern society as it is empirically known to us. This position may be seen as occupying the other extreme of our continuum where the process of nation-state building takes the center place in analysis. The functional needs of a modernizing society explain the success of nationalism. A modern state needs the political integration and intercommunication of large ethnic groups and this is what legitimizes the elitist attempt to congeal them together. Gellner (1983) maintains that this facilitates industrialization. This statist theory of nationalism, most consistently formulated by Breuilly (1994), 'stands in sharp contrast to the [primordialists and culturalists] … view[s]' (Wimmer 2002).[21]

The centralist state in Pakistan seems to have pursued this model to the extent that some scholars labeled it as a state-nation instead of a nation-state (A. Khan 2005).[22] The state facilitated the birth and nurturing of a new class, cutting across ethnic and linguistic barriers, which Alvi (1983) calls 'Salariat'.[23] The attempts of the state in this homogenizing project and its unequal rewards have sometimes been resented by the ethnopolitical elite who see it as yet another step towards the socio-economic inequality of their people and a threat to their own political survival. The nationalist discourse by the state and the counter-nationalism of minorities[24] put strains on the social contract and engenders conflict. This is a valuable piece for us from the functionalist theory.

Wimmer (2002) goes a step beyond this statist theory and holds that modernity itself is cast in nationalist and ethnicized forms.[25] For him, the politicization of ethnicity is the result of the overlapping and fusion of three notions of peoplehood, on which the project of political modernity is based, the people as a sovereign entity, the people as citizens of a state, and the people as an ethnic community.

> These three notions of peoplehood were fused into one single people writ large-replacing the Grace of God as the central point around which political discourse draws its circles. (Wimmer 2002)[26]

These three circles gave birth to democracy, citizenship and national self-determination in the world order of states. This trinity can also be seen confusing all but a few of the Pakistani scholars who have investigated ethnopolitical conflicts in their country. 'The Grace of God' never left the arena and democracy, citizenship and national self-determination had to contend with it in the limited space of political discourse and administration. Sometimes called the extra burden of the Pakistani politics,[27] it has been a part of the governance structure, legislation, politics, and even the raison d'être of the state as defined by the constitution.[28] Few analysts mastered the requisite complexity to factor it in. Jalal (2000) has dissected the origins of religious identity and traced it all the way back to Shah Wali-ullah (1703-1762) but in her comparative study of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Jalal 1995) she ignores this and evaluates and redefines democracy, citizenship, sovereignty and the nation state. Her argument for a more decentralized governmental structure to be better able to arbitrate between ethnic and regional movements, could have packed a little more punch with this

fourth 'indeterminate'. A. Khan(2005), in his very incisive (discussed below) analysis, has discussed at length the role of religion as a tool used by the state and centrist forces to de-legitimize the assertion of ethnic identities and the consequent strains in the political economy. Among the other few, Jahan (1972), Amin (1988) and Ahmed (1991) have studied the functionalist impact of religion on state formation and political economy of Pakistan.[29]

The 'collective fears of the future' engendered by an insistence on an identity supposedly under threat, has some explanatory potential as indicated by Lake and Rothchild (1996). Perhaps the only Pakistani modernist religious theorist who is not afraid of multiple identities sharing the same public space and allows religious sanction for ethnic identities and a basis of nationalism, within the religious discourse, is Javed Ghamidi;

> The consciousness of constituting a single nation on the basis of pigmentation, race, language, traditions and homeland has been woven into the nature of man. (Ghamidi 2008)[30]

2.3.6 Foucault's Schema

On a tangent from our continuum, it is perhaps the right entry point into this debate for A. Khan's (2005) approach to the question of ethnic nationalism. He used Foucault and Gordon's (1980) schema while looking at ethnic conflict as essentially a power struggle between dominant and non-dominant ethnic groups and at the same time highlighting the role the state plays in the lives of individuals. For Foucault et al, there are two major systems of approach to the analysis of power: the contract-oppression approach and the dominant-repression approach. In the contract-oppression approach power is 'an original right that is given up in the establishment of sovereignty' as a social contract. The second, domination-repression approach does not espouse any contract and therefore no abuse of power. Here;

> the pertinent opposition is not between legitimate and illegitimate, as in the first…, but between struggle and submission. (Foucault and Gordon 1980).

At an even more basic level the first approach can be traced back to Hobbes (1651), who argued for bringing man from 'a state of nature'[31] to constitute a state as a social contract and rule by an absolute sovereign.

Rousseau then saw the sovereign itself wholly constituted by the participants of a social contract;

> The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that, although they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised, until, on the violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it. (Rousseau 1762)[32]

The contractarian theory has been very flexible and has found application in a variety of traditions. Boucher and Kelly (1994) give a broad outline of the three main traditions of moral, civil and constitutional contractarianism and this present study will generally remain within the latter two traditions. Focusing on these, we find that while Locke and Rousseau were mainly concerned with the location of sovereignty as in a vertical contract between the ruler and the ruled (Hobbes) and that horizontal one between and among the community members (Locke), we can see that in both these situations the contract can be either formal and/or informal. Linking the formal and informal social contract in Pakistan, I prefer to take Foucault's first scheme as the broader theoretical grid for three reasons.

First I don't think that a domination-repression approach is appropriate for ethnic groups which are unranked. Ethnic groups, taken as indivisible entities, might work in a ranked system but it would be wrong to assume a uniformity of views among the elites and the people at large, on the ethnic question. In a way, A. Khan (2005) should rightly not be concerned with people's perspective since his framework sees ethnic conflict only as a power struggle among the elites. In an explanatory framework with the ambition of analyzing the *mechanism of conflict*, the issues which motivate the masses cannot be avoided.

Another reason for taking the contractarian route is the desired outcome of the study. Any study of conflict should be as much geared towards better conflict management as it is towards a better understanding of it. In fact the two are seldom mutually exclusive. For any theoretical framework with this ultimate goal, it should account for the mechanism of conflict. The plural society framework originally intended to explain conditions of instability but it failed to give a mechanism of conflict. The plural society model also envisions the

interaction of whole ethnic groups without taking into account the role of the political leadership and the nature of elite political struggle (Ranking and Un-Ranking). Taking the domination-repression approach (essentially a cultural pluralistic view of society) doesn't leave much in the course of managing the conflict. It shuts the door on attempts to find out as to what the ethnic groups are fighting over.

Thirdly, A. Khan (2005) asserts and correctly so that;

> [I]n colonial India, the British colonialists controlled the political unit, the state, whereas Indians inhabited the national unit, society. The relationship between the two was that of domination and exploitation ... With the passage of time, it turned into a complex web of networks in which the state and society were both found asserting themselves against each other. The concept of rulership in (Pre-colonial) India was not based on the idea of contract but of incorporation, in which rulers not only outranked everyone but could also encompass those they ruled. Local lords maintained a social order based on cosmological concepts and through ritual action. (A. Khan 2005)[33]

This is a true reflection of the state of polity before independence but this is not necessarily true after 1947. It is important to see if this relationship underwent any change. In my view it underwent a metamorphosis and assumed more of a contractarian nature.

Two important factors point to this change in the relationship. The post-independence shared elements in the polity may occupy a small place in the cultural whole but they may be the most relevant elements for determining relations among different ethnic groups. One such example in Pakistan is the claim of the conservative right regarding the place of religion and religious values in society (discussed above as the 'Grace of God'). The other element is the shared colonial experience of the people which imparted common conceptions of legitimacy, which impede conflict. There is a long history of constitutional struggles in the courts, in Pakistan, where the civil society and the politicians challenged (sometimes successfully) the dictatorial political dispensations. These two factors may not provide absolute protection against intense conflict (1971 case in Pakistan) but no attempt to explain conflict in today's Pakistan will be relevant without accounting for these centripetal forces. The constitution and its regulatory framework should be accounted for in this debate.

The intelligentsia in Pakistan itself prefers to cast the debate today in contractarian terms [34](though the nature and specifics of this contract are not under much discussion). It is on these bases that I take Foucault's first scheme as I believe that the question in Pakistan today is more of a contractarian nature than that of domination-repression. This approach also caters well for the right balance on our state-people continuum.

Having come thus far in our quest for a theoretical framework, Figure 2.1 is a snapshot in time, a conceptual container which can account for the many complexities of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan. The idea is not to show the causal links among the complex theories and concepts but to chart the direction of the flow of ideas. In Chapter 7, some of its elements will also be used to analyze the structural factors behind taliban recruitment. The elements discussed till now will differ from those following, in the sense that both these groups of ideas make a theoretical-analytical interface between them. The analytical elements of this conceptual container will be elaborated upon in the following pages.

Figure 2.1:The Conceptual Container for Ethnopolitical Conflict in Pakistan



2.4 The Analytical Interface

To put this theoretical debate into an analytical framework we need to employ empirical handles. For this purpose we start again from the people's end of the continuum, looking for analytical tools, collected from the elements of the theoretical frameworks just discussed. The focus is on mobilization phenomena and the central thesis of our project i.e. the social contract.

Social contract is the implicit agreement within a state that delineates the rights and responsibilities of the state and its citizens.[35] The most visible such concord to be found in a modern state is its constitution, a viable basis for operationalizing the otherwise abstract concept of social contract. The social contract of a state is arrived at through a context specific historical evolution. Historical experiences, Constitutional dispensation, the process of formation of state and the consensual points in the political discourse (Read above Wimmer's 'notions of peoplehood'), all help compose this social contract. However these social contracts do not always exist in a 0,1 binary mode. Most of these contracts may exist in a society but under some stress. Mostly they are meant to provide viable dispute settlement and sharing mechanisms with a degree of fairness. The institutions for these purposes are mostly part of the contract itself, the breakdown or inadequate functioning of which may lead to failure of the state. The state of health of this contract explains the nature and intensity of ethnopolitical conflicts. The more fragile the health, the larger the grievances generated and the greater will be this conflict.[36] It is the Pakistani constitution of 1973 that will be under scrutiny for the type of social contract it provides, the mechanisms enshrined in it to ensure that this social contract is enforced and the tools for conflict management in case there is a dispute vis a vis the social contract. In addition to the constitution, the pre-partition[37] events, the resolutions of the founding Muslim league party and the pledges of the founding fathers to different groups, will have to be factored into this social contract.

Of the above mentioned components of social contract, the constitution is perhaps the most important. The Constitution does not explicitly refer to a 'social contract' (in terms of rights and privileges), and no act of law or document has ever fully set out the social contract's terms. As Dixit (1996) argues;

> If constitutions are contracts, they are very incomplete ones…. The reasons are ... (1) the inability to foresee all the possible contingencies, (2) the complexity of specifying rules, even for the numerous contingencies that can be foreseen and (3) the difficulty of objectively observing and verifying contingencies so that the specified procedures may be put into action. (Dixit 1996)

Yet at the same time, constitutions enshrine certain immutable principles; a separation (and specification) of powers among the parties to the contract and a system of checks and balances over the contracting parties. A full treatment of the subject of social contract and its composition in Pakistan is undertaken in the third chapter of this thesis. There, most of the specifications of the Pakistani case are fleshed out.

Buchanan and Tullock (1962) emphasize the distinction between constitution that governs the whole policy process and individual instances of policymaking within this constitution. Dixit (1996) calls the outcome of any particular policy making exercise, a policy act. The framework used in this thesis will use the actual provisions of the constitution and the policy acts that flow from it as the constituent part of the formal social contract.

2.4.1 Measurement of both Violent and Non-Violent Conflict

Since this thesis is about conflict, it is important to specify what constitutes conflict in the analytical framework. The incompatible interests of different parties in a conflict can be expressed in more than one form therefore it will not be wise to remain confined to the conventional ideas of violent conflict. The latent conflict expressed in belligerent press statements, demonstrations, arrests and government's administrative actions are all indicators of a political conflict and as such will be part of our analytical framework.[38] This will be in addition to the more overt indicators of conflict namely injuries and deaths.

2.4.2 Institutions of conflict management

Good institutions may help reduce ethnic conflict (Easterly 2001). Social contracts need institutions to carry them out. These institutions are essential for management of conflicts arising out of the different interpretations of the terms of contract. The degradation of state institutions chips away at the social contract. In particular it is vulnerable to the weakening of those institutions which are meant for conflict

management in a multiethnic state. This weakening of institutions is both a cause as well as an indicator for weakening of the social contract. Conversely, the weakness of a social contract is manifested, inter alia, through the weakness or failure of these institutions. Murshed (2002) has traced the weakness of these social contracts to the;

> … legacy of colonialism which institutionalized mechanisms favouring settlers over indigenous peoples, … divide and rule favouring one ethnic group over another, … market controls to create rents for settlers to the cost of locals, … and the expropriation of land and resource rents, ... Precolonial ethnic rivalry over territory and assets, … and the failure of longstanding independent states to strengthen mechanisms of political representation, … also lie behind weak social contracts. A single ethnic group (or a subset) often assumed power in the immediate post-independence era (the 1960s), subjugating others and concentrating the fruits of state power – public employment, other public spending and resource rents – into its own hands ... A final complexity in fatally weakening social contracts was the interaction of these 'domestic' factors with external events. (S. Murshed 2002)

This thesis will look at the formal and informal institutions of conflict management. The constitution has given birth to policy making tools like the National Finance Commission (NFC) award. This tool and the subsequent individual awards are policy acts and children of the wider social contract. The constitution of 1973 spells out how the resources have to be apportioned, how the federation will compensate the federating units (FUs) for their natural resources, How the FUs are to be represented in the legislature and how jobs in the civil services are to be allocated. Taking cue from Azam and Mesnard (2003), the social contract between different groups can best be seen at work when the state fulfils its implicit promise to make a fiscal transfer to all of society's members. This brings us to the issue of fiscal federalism in Pakistan which, along with other institutions of conflict management, will be analyzed in chapter 5 of this thesis.

2.4.3 The patterns of Grievances and Horizontal Inequalities

There is yet another link between the breakdown or weakening of social contract, the failure of institutions of conflict management; and the expression of conflict. Substantive grievances at the elite and masses level are required to mobilize group expressions of conflict. These

grievances often arise due to perceptions of unequal treatment. Considering that parties in conflict act rationally, or within a bounded or myopic rationality (S. Murshed 2002), the expression of violent or non violent conflict becomes feasible to them. From the state end of the analytical continuum, institutional weakness is thus connected to conflict;

> Poor economic governance and state weakness are the critical mediating factors between resource abundance and vulnerability to armed [and ethnopolitical] conflict; the first engenders popular grievances, the second makes separatist and non-separatist insurgencies politically and militarily feasible. (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003)

At the analytical level, three similar approaches are found in literature regarding causality of ethnopolitical conflict. The first is the relative deprivation approach. Gurr (1970) defines relative deprivation as a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them.[39] Gurr (1993) identified four patterns of grievances of ethnopolitical movements which contribute to ethnopolitical conflict. These are 1) Political rights 2) Political rights other than autonomy 3) Economic rights and 4) Social and cultural rights. [40]

The concept which goes a step beyond the relative deprivation approach is that of 'Social Exclusion'. The processes which prevent a person from participating in the social, economic and political life lead to social exclusion (Beall and Piron 2005). Such social exclusion then leads to deprivations and grievances of the sort discussed above.

Another theory which has a different locus but ends at the same focal point of 'grievances' is that which takes stock of horizontal inequalities. Any dissatisfaction, regarding any of the above described rights, harbored by any ethnic group, is a result of two types of inequalities vis-à-vis that group; Socio-Economic Inequalities and Political Inequalities. Since these inequalities are across unranked groups therefore it would be wise to use the term Horizontal Inequalities.[41]

> '[T]heories of conflict that explain group mobilization for rebellion in terms of inter-group or "horizontal" socio-economic or political

> inequalities … have significant explanatory power.' (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003)[42]

Theories that stress the relationship between ethnic conflict and modernization are quick to call attention to the role of the differential modernization of ethnic conflict: the role of elite ambitions and the role of differential modernization of ethnic groups in fostering conflict (Horowitz 1985).[43]

Further differentiation between the two types of Horizontal Inequalities, therefore, also helps explain why some ethnopolitical movements develop and why some do not. The motivations inside an unranked group are different for the elite and the masses. To the question 'What else is needed besides the ethnic identity, for the politicization of ethnicity?', Rothschild (1981) has two answers; 1) elites with a capacity and an interest (religious, economic, or political) in mobilizing those who share the objective markers into such a self-conscious group and 2) competition over relatively scarce and valued resources and goals within the larger society.[44] Disadvantaged people do not necessarily think that inequalities are unjust, nor does their perception of injustice, once awakened, lead inexorably to political movements demanding redress of grievances (Gurr 1993).[45] Mobilization is catalyzed only when the elite are aggrieved and their motivation is Political Horizontal Inequality. Hence we come across one of Dahl's rules promulgated to keep conflict low enough for a 'polyarchy';

> [N]o group should indefinitely be denied the opportunity to participate in government. (Dahl 1971)[46]

The proposed analytical framework will need empirical handles to verify the link of grievances to conflict. The explanation will be attempted in chapter 6 in terms of horizontal inequalities.

To provide an empirical core to this study, this horizontal inequality will have to be measured. Langer (2005) suggests an approach which takes into account some criteria for measuring Socio-Economic Horizontal Inequality. In this thesis, appropriate indicators have been chosen in chapter 6, keeping in view the limitations of data availability. The Political Horizontal Inequality at the elite level can be measured in terms of the proportional share of the elite in the governance structures. Suitable indicators have been constructed and used in chapter 5 and 6 for this purpose. However it will not be enough to just look for these inequalities through time. Effort will be made to link it back with the

historical processes, and the controversies in which dominant groups' ideals of nation building and assimilation contend with subordinate groups' (the use of 'subordination' here is not in the sense of that used in section 2.3.3) advocacy of autonomy and multiculturalism, as suggested by Gurr (1993).[47] The contemporary conditions, contributing to maintaining inequalities, will also be explored.

2.4.4 The Greed versus Grievances debate

The discourse couched by Tedd Gurr in terms of Grievances of ethnopolitical movements has lately been turned into 'Greed versus Grievances' debate. "Rebel-centric" approaches seek to explain why, how, and when people rebel. The elite leadership may not only be acting under political motivation but also financial motivation.' This possible greed factor has been analyzed in some cross country empirical studies.[48]

The rational choice theorists have taken 'greed' as one of the motives for the rebel leadership in analyzing conflict onset, duration and prevalence. In almost all these studies, natural resource rents as 'booty' or 'greed' has a central role. This 'greed' factor has been proxied for with primary commodity exports ratio to that of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and found to be increasing the likelihood of separatist conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2002), and onset (Hegre 2002). This is in contrast to the weak or no effect found by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) for war prevalence, using a larger dataset. Others have used mineral exports as a ratio of total exports, oil production, oil reserves, natural resource stocks per capita, contrabands and mineral resources in conflict zones – as the proxies for this 'greed' factor. Ross (2004) has reviewed 14 such studies on the subject and concludes;

> [O]il increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; second, 'lootable' commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen existing conflicts; third, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and civil war; and finally, the association between primary commodities – a broad category that includes both oil and agricultural goods – and the onset of civil war is not robust. (Ross 2004)

Murshed (2010) points to opportunities for rebel groups in terms of financing, recruitment and geography but concludes that any empirical validity for greed in the above discussed econometric models is atheoretical and emphasised that there is greater need to specify the

conditions under which violence and predation is a more viable option than peaceful resolution of conflict. He posits that 'greed' and 'grievance' may exist simultaneously and one can mutate to the other. Both these may be necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict onset. While greed may be important in cross country studies, grievance comes up as the chief causal mechanism for conflict in country case studies, the latter better explaining the onset and former its persistence. There are mechanisms in the middle, the institutions which come to represent the social contract (S.M. Murshed and Gates 2005).

Since the 'greed' explanation is touted to have explanatory potential therefore it will partly be explored in chapter 5 and 6 where the issues of elite motivation are separated from those which motivate the masses. This will not be an exhaustive exercise though as 'resource reductionist' models generally do not account for the myriad relationships between economic and political factors. The mere association of presence of lootable resources, which is mostly all that is available to test the greed explanation of conflict, is often at the cost of more deep rooted explanations of conflict.

In my analytical framework, there is little scope for using the natural resource abundance or dependence as proxy for 'greed'. The only significant case of such a natural resource figuring in ethnopolitical conflict is that of Balochistan which provides about one third of the natural gas of the whole country. This natural resource is essentially unlootable but has some effect on generating grievances. It is also alleged that the tribal leaders getting appreciable surface rent for use of their area have often incited violence to get a better deal from the gas extraction companies and the federal government. Only this specific conflict will therefore be taken up in section 4.5.2 in a greed versus grievance framework.

2.4.5 Weakness of State and Geopolitics

Some studies of civil wars suggest that geopolitics have been at work in the ethno territorial conflicts like in Sri Lanka (Fuglerud 2001) and (Rotberg 1999)[49], Nepal [50], Indonesia(Regan 1996), Rwanda and Burundi (Solomon 2004), and Nigeria.[51]

> Contemporary intra-state conflicts have strong regional and even global linkages. By increasing the number of potential war profiteers and peace spoilers and multiplying the points of conflict, these broader dimensions

> … affect the character and duration of hostilities, [Conflict] analysis … need[s] to address these regional dimensions. (Ballentine et al. 2003)[52]

It is natural for Realpolitik to take advantage of ethnopolitical conflicts inside any state.[53] Ignoring its effects would be foolish. Pakistan is no luckier than most other states and the ethnopolitical conflicts are widely known to have geopolitical dimensions. In fact most of the conflict against Taliban militants today has a considerable geostrategic component and the war in Afghanistan has been and continues to be an explanatory factor. This will be discussed in chapter 7. The events of 1971 also have their links to regional and international players (K.K. Aziz 2003). As Figure 2.2 shows, each of the chief ethnic groups constituting today's Pakistan have presence across international borders. This has drawn her into unavoidable conflicts with some of her neighbours and has influenced her ethnopolitical conflicts.

Figure 2.2: Major Pakistani Ethnic Groups and Their Presence Across International Borders



Source: **http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_ethnic_80.jpg**[54]

Although the presence of this international geopolitical influence is admitted, it will be beyond the scope of the inward looking explanatory framework of this thesis to investigate this link in the conflict related to ethnopolitics. However it will be discussed in chapter 7, while looking at the structural factors affecting taliban recruitment.

2.5 Conclusion

In Pakistan, conflicts involving issues of ethnicity, nationalism and politics need a theoretical framework which can adequately explain its multifaceted and often perplexing causal intricacies. The term 'Ethnopolitics' fits most of these conflicts well. It is contented that these conflicts have their seeds in the breakup of social contract, greed and external intervention. This thesis is an attempt to explore the first of these mentioned causes. This shall also contribute to our understanding of today's radical militant's conflict between the state and the taliban.

An analytical framework is required to evaluate the above theoretical one. Social contract in Pakistan has to be defined and put to test in light of historical data on ethnopolitical conflict. The social contract requires some institutions for its implementation. These institutions are essential to reduce and resolve conflicts. Such institutions have to be identified and their course in history has to be charted. A break up of any contract generates perceptions of injustice and inequality, especially when the institutions created under the contract fail to correct for these perceptions and their underlying causes. This failure or weakness, of the institutions, and by implication, that of the social contract; then leads to grievances. The analytical framework, in addition to measuring the ethnopolitical conflict over the period of study, also needs to empirically verify inequalities (and grievances by implication).

The analytical framework is shown in Figure 2.3. Only the 'grievances' link will be explored in this thesis, with the 'greed' link providing depth to the analysis in chapter 5 and chapter 6.

Figure 2.3: The Analytical Framework for Ethnopolitical Conflict in Pakistan



Notes

[1] 1971, Ethnic conflict leading to dismemberment of the country, the first post World War II country to breakup, and creation of Bangladesh.

[2] pp. 88-89

[3] P.13

[4] Horowitz (1985), P. 13

[5] Horowitz (1985), pp. 8-12

[6] P. 7

[7] Muhajir, literally meaning a refugee, a term used for and by the Urdu speaking refugees of 1947, who mostly settled in urban areas of Sindh province.

[8] P. 52

[9] Horowitz (1985), P. 53

[10] Wimmer (2002), P. 1

[11] P. 1

[12] Horowitz (1985), P. 14

[13] Smith (1965) among others.

[14] For a simple distinction between ranked and unranked groups, Horowitz (1985) considers the coincidence or non-coincidence of social class within ethnic groups; where the two coincide, it is possible to speak of ranked ethnic groups; where groups are cross-class, it is possible to speak of unranked ethnic groups.

[15] In the Netherlands such systems are called 'zuillen' or pillars, In Austria they are called 'stamme' or tribes. Cited in Horowitz (1985), P. 23

[16] P. 25

[17] pp. 80-82

[18] P. 47

[19] P. 48

[20] Iqbal championed the cause of Indian identity in the early part of his political life but was a vociferous opponent of ethnic nationalism during the latter part. Similarly Maududi is criticized for his opposition to the Pakistan scheme on the basis of 'two nation theory' but he essentially stood for pan Islamism as against ethnic nationalism.

[21] P. 50

[22] P. 18

[23] 'Salariat' i.e. the salary owning class largely serving in the military, bureaucracy and judiciary. For details see Alvi (1983)

[24] For details see Alonso (1994)

[25] Wimmer (2002), P. 52

[26] P.2

[27] Cohen (2004), P. 163

[28] The famous 'Objectives Resolution' stating as the preamble of the constitution that sovereignty in the universe belongs to God and that no law shall be enacted which is against the injunctions of the state religion i.e. Islam

[29] The particular details are discussed in chapter 3.

[30] P. 173, Quote translated from Urdu.

[31] State of Natural or 'War of all against all'.

[32] P. 11

[33] pp. 55-56

[34] See for example Pakistan's most widely read and respected columnist Irshad Ahmad Haqqani's address to the Pakistan Administrative Staff College (Haqqani 2006). More discussion is in chapter 3.

[35] For more details on theory of social contract please see Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan (1651),* John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government (1689)*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau *The Social Contract (1762).* For a more comparative study of competing theories of 'popular sovereignty' against 'individualist sovereignty' read Pierre-Joseph Prodhon's *Individualist social contract (1851)* and Ronald Dworkin's *Law's Empire (1986).*

[36] This discussion about social contract owes its origins to Tony Addison and Murshed (2001)

[37] i.e. the partition of India in 1947 and the birth of the independent states of India and Pakistan.

[38] Discussed in detail in chapter 4.

[39] Gurr (1970), P. 13

[40] Gurr (1993), pp. 70-73

[41] This and the subsequent discussion employing the concept of Horizontal Inequalities, is informed by the following works, S.M. Murshed and Gates (2005), G. Brown (2005), Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007), Langer (2004), Østby (2008)and Stewart (2008).

[42] P. 3

[43] P. 101

[44] Rothschild (1981), P. 29

[45] P. 61

[46] Cited in Horowitz (1985) P.86

[47] P. 37

[48] Notably by Collier and Hoeffler (2000)and their recent improvements on the thesis, Collier and Hoeffler (2004)

[49] For Indian connection http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0706/p06s01-woap.html , the Norwegian intervention is now well recognized

[50] http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=29452

[51] U.S Deptt of State Report on Nigeria http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61586.htm

[52] P. 2

[53] For a wider study of the issue read Ryan (1990) and Moynihan (1993)

For geopolitical links of Pakistan's Ethnopolitics K.K. Aziz (2003), Breseeg (2004),

[54] Last Accessed on 06-09-2006

3 Identity, History and Ethno-politics

> The caterpillar and Alice looked at each other for some time in silence; at last the caterpillar took the hookah out of his mouth, and addressed her in languid, sleepy voice. Who are you? Said the Caterpillar.*

3.1 Introduction

As the process of constitution making unfolded in post 1971 Pakistan, it was all too evident that the framers had a difficult task ahead of them. Questions of history, identity, law and economy made them agree to compromises which drew from the experiences of the past and would shape the conflicts of the future.

Writing the formal social contract anew ought to be a time of hope for any people and yet the historical experiences of pre and post independence Pakistan engendered fears. These were fears of being dominated on part of the smaller provinces and the fear of losing the shape of the rest of the state after the secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh).

There also were struggles of identity. While the conservative right insisted on giving a distinct religious identity to the state in the shape of a state religion and associated markers, the ethnopoliticians were keen to make the social contract reflect the primordialism of the contracting parties; and some consolation for the absence of congruency between the ethnic and political unit. There was a third group which wanted the contract to reflect the distinct and unique 'Pakistani', nation-state identity. As compromises multiplied so did the potential for future conflicts.

---

* From "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland" by Lewis Carroll

The legal scheme of distribution of powers among the contracting parties was also a contested issue and compromises had to be reached among the parties. Connected to both fear and identity strands above, the debate drew on the shape of past constitutions (1935, 1956), the pre contract proclamations of 1940 and 1949 and the institutional scheme required to ensure management of potential conflicts.

And then there were the safeguards sought over a level playing field for all the parties to the contract. Guarantees had to be given that the state will look after all these parties with fairness when it comes to distribution of the costs and benefits of participating in a state. In short this was the discourse over the more mundane issues of development. The tools to bring this about with fairness were the same as were used in the pre partition independence struggle, namely quotas in legislatures, executive and all the other levels of administration.

The formal social contract which was put into the constitution of 1973 was thus largely a result of the interplay of fear, identity, legal history, bread and butter and the compromises over the same.

This chapter will introduce the country and history of pre and post independence Pakistan with a particular focus on how the social contract of the country evolved into its present shape. The history of political events, especially the constitution making process, the nature of federating units and their peculiarities and the nature of Pakistani federalism will be discussed. Of particular interest are the events of post 1971 secession of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), when the constitution of 1973 was put together by political leadership, and which is the period under study in the latter chapters of this thesis. In this context, this chapter is more about the evolution of social contract in Pakistan with a view to introducing the country and its political system to the reader. The attempt will be to show that both the struggle for Pakistan and its constitution making (and breaking) history has a strong relationship with the conflicts that later ensued. The chapter should be seen as a stepping stone to the rest of this thesis which attempts to explain the ethnopolitical and the current radical militant conflicts, not as a result of the domination-repression set up but that of a weakening of the social contact.

This chapter is therefore structured as follows. A brief pre-partition history will give account of the events which later became the rallying points for stakeholders (Actors) in 1973 and thereafter. The post-

partition history (1947-1971) will focus on the process of state formation and the behaviour of actors during this period vis-à-vis the four strands of interest identified above. The interplay of actors and a discussion of the compromises during the constitution making process will be followed by a discussion of how it all shaped the ethnopolitical conflict of the latter period (1972-2005).

3.2 Search for identity in the constitutional framework of Pre-Partition India

Pre-partition India was a mosaic of administrative divisions which came about as a result of conquests, experiments, reforms and political expediencies. At the turn of the twentieth century she had more than 675 princely states, eight major provinces and a few minor (William Wilson Hunter et al. 1907).[1] This made India, more like a bag of goodies which the English child had collected in haste; than a unified country. The ethnic make up of the country was even more diverse. In the following sub sections, the history of identity struggles of Muslims of India will be described. The purpose is to show the elements which transcended the time barrier of 1947 and were influential in shaping the conflicts of post independence Pakistan.

Nature of Identity struggles

The issue of identity in pre-colonial India isn't settled among historians. People like Beni Prasad called on the geographical unity of India to argue for their case of an Indian nation state (Prasad 1946).[2] A second school of thought argued that India had never been a single nation state; like Francis Robinson who start his book with 'The British united the peoples of India under one government, but left them under two' (Robinson 1974)[3]. A third school, mostly among Muslim writers of India argued that nations were formed by a common political consciousness and in India this consciousness could only be witnessed on the basis of religious identity.[4] An appreciation of this background of competing theories of identity is necessary to understand the constitutional framework of pre-colonial India. The colonial power had it in its interest to keep India united for as long as it could and saw itself as the paramount power in India which had brought the country together with its civil-military bureaucratic machine. The champions of Indian nation state saw eventual Indian independence as their ultimate goal and

therefore resisted any idea of a separate identity on the basis of religion. The protagonists of a separate Muslim-nation identity feared the dominance of a Hindu majority in an independent and democratic India.[5] They therefore fought all along for constitutional safeguards and a scheme of quotas in the executive and legislatures.

It is not that Muslims pounced on the idea of a separate communitarian identity when they were suddenly confronted with the idea of Westminster type of democracy in early 20th century. Jalal (2000)[6] stresses the difference of 'identity as culture' and 'identity as politics' in pre-partition India. The former had always been present in press, poetry and art, the latter, equally present since the second half of eighteenth century.

A prominent thread woven into this fear based identity discourse was the distinct economic conditions of Muslims of India. Muslims had a history of providing India its ruling socio-economic elite as recently as the Mughal Empire (1526-1857). With the empire, this economic pre-eminence as a community was lost. The result was economic backwardness and the realization of a separate 'Economic Identity'. Talha (2000) has painstakingly traced the development of this identity among Muslims, to as far back as the times of Shah Waliulah (1703-81). Through the writings of the likes of Hunter (1876), the colonialists had a fair idea, very early, that Muslim alienation in India and especially in Bengal was mainly due to economic reasons. Muslim Bengal had a tradition of peasant revolts in which the leaders used religious identity to mobilize support against the British. Among them, Haji Shariatullah (1781-1840), Dudu Mian (1819-1862) and Titu Mir (d. 1831) led the Faraizi movement which, in the guise of religious Puritanism, was also a revolt against the Hindu landlords by the peasantry and an affirmation of Bengali Muslim separatism (Khan 1985). There was the added frustration of economic backwardness especially against the backdrop of a prosperous pre-colonial Bengali economy. Successive Muslim thinkers, leaders and reformers of the latter period, like Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) were acutely aware of the disadvantaged economic situation of Muslims of India. As they articulated, they were afraid that Muslims will ultimately be reduced to 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'[7] if the situation remained unchecked.

This theory of economic backwardness contributing to the evolution of a separate identity has its proponents and critics but the fact remains that it was either backwardness itself *or the fear of it* which helped shape this separate identity.[8]

All these three struggles of identity; United Indian identity, a divided and fragmented identity on the basis of different languages and races; and the two nation theory of Hindus and Muslims; would latter define the nature of socio-political dialogue when it came to putting together the social contract in Pakistan.

Identity and Legal Framework

The period from 1857 to 1906 was a difficult one for Muslims of India as the British largely held them responsible for the war of independence of the year 1857. Persian, the official language was replaced with English, a new fiscal measure 'resumption' was introduced which called for showing title deeds of estates, deprived many Muslim land-holders of their lands (and many Hindus too). They were kept away from military service (a profession that was their traditional forte). During this period of official hostility, Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan, led, by trying to educate and organize the Muslims. It would eventually be his All India Mohammaden Association and the college at Aligarh that will provide a basis for the first Muslim political party of All India Muslim League and most of its leadership cadres. The change of heart on the part of the colonialists towards their Muslim subjects came during the mid seventies and eighties of nineteenth century (Sayeed 1968).[9] By 1906, the situation had changed to the extent that Muslim demands for separate representation in all levels of government and legislative councils were accepted by the colonial power. To counter the influence of All India Congress, (which was herself created with British support in 1885) the British now encouraged the Muslims to form their own political party (Sayeed 1968).[10]

With the avowed resolve to reform Indian polity and more out of the necessity of securing Indian support during world wars, the British wanted to bring about constitutional reforms in India. The process had started before World War I with the Minto Morley reforms of 1909 wherein Muslim demand for a separate electorate was granted. The process gained impetus with the introduction of Montague-Chelmsford

reforms of 1919 when Sikhs, Anglo Indians and Europeans were also granted separate electorate status.

All along this reform process the need to keep a united India under an effective and efficient colonial set up was important for the British. Therefore, while devolving limited powers of self rule to parts of administration in the provinces, the central authority of the colonial state was never left in doubt.

It is safe to assume that except for this narrow band of separate representation in legislatures and administration, Muslim politicians of India had no focus till 1930. Their aims and objectives changed with whatever the times dictated. In 1919 they had demanded the preservation of Ottoman Caliphate failing which they called for mass migration to Afghanistan. The campaign failed and the resulting disappointment kept Muslims from launching a similar pan Islamic movement for at least another decade and a half. They also felt ill at ease with Mr. Gandhi's politics, yet couldn't decide on the extent of their cooperation with All India Congress.[11] In 1928 the Congress committee on constitutional reforms, led by Moti Lal Nehru, recommended the abolition of the system of separate electorates. This was too much for some Muslim leaders and resulted in a parting of ways of Congress and Muslim league. The latter's only visible efforts now were to achieve economic security, mainly in seats in the legislature, judiciary and executive. This approach made the Muslim leaders oppose open competition in all these spheres.

It was the Government of India Act 1935, which would prove the most influential in determining the state of relations among different federating units of Pakistan after 1947. This act also became the basic framework for all the future constitutions of Pakistan. The system of separate electorates was reaffirmed in this act. Sindh became a separate province. Reforms were introduced in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and limited provincial autonomy was given to provinces.

The Government of India Act 1935, constituted the state as a federation and,

> [T]he provincial governments derived their powers by devolution from the central government and discharged their functions under the superintendence, direction, and control of the Governor-General and ultimately the Secretary of State of India. (H. Khan 2005)

Although a semblance of autonomy and responsible government was granted to provinces, the overriding scheme of constitution called for the paramountcy of British imperial power in all matters of final arbitration.

Some Muslim thinkers like Iqbal had already hinted, in 1930, at the establishment of separate autonomous regions for Muslims of north-west and eastern India. After 1935, a process of introspection among the Muslim league leaders led to the crystallization of demands which gained formal shape in the 1940 Lahore resolution. In 1939 the British needed Indian support in their war effort. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of Muslim league, called a general session of his party in Lahore on March 22, 1940. The much detested (by Muslim league) Congress led provincial governments had already resigned. The two and a half year experience had been very bitter for the Muslim league. She thought that the Muslims of India were in search of a viable cause. As their avowed representatives, the Muslim league came up with the scheme of a separate state for them. The raison d' etre of this state was to be the separate identity of Muslims of India; an identity based on religion.

> Mussalmans[12] are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state. We wish to live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free and independent people. We wish our people to develop to the fullest of our spiritual, cultural, economic, social, and political life, in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people. (Jinnah)[13]

The resolution, moved by a Bengali A.K Fazl ul Haq and adopted at the occasion, called for groups of independent states of Muslim majority areas in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign (Sayeed 1968). Although the word 'Pakistan' wasn't mentioned anywhere in the resolution, political adversaries of the Muslim League quickly dubbed it 'The Pakistan Resolution'. The Muslim League had no hesitation to adopt the name. As Jalal (1994) points out, the resolution was a masterpiece of Jinnah's gamesmanship. With little say in the Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal, he wanted the authority to speak on their behalf in the center, at the same time, preserving the rights of Muslims in the Muslim minority provinces. These seemingly mutually exclusive goals could not be accommodated in a single constitutional formula. The inherent inconsistencies of the Lahore

resolution will later come to the fore after 1947 when the religious right insisted on an Islamic character of the state based on the demands which were essentially made on the basis of a Muslim identity. On the other hand the ethnopoliticians would ask for rights of smaller provinces which were demanded of the British, in the same resolution.

At the start of the Second World War, Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to India with an offer which largely recognized the Muslim League's demand of strong provincial groupings. Such an arrangement would have given the Muslim League something approaching its demands contained in the Lahore Resolution but the latter sensed that it would be at the expense of minority Muslims elsewhere in India. The thrust of Cripps's offer on provincial rather than communal lines was now unacceptable to the Muslim League who had come to align itself with an identity based on religion. As H.V Hodson, the Reforms Commissioner would observe after speaking with many Muslims;

> Pakistan…was in essence a 'revolt' against the notion of minority status with safeguards. At best, such a status relegated Muslims to being a Cinderella with trade-union rights and a radio in the kitchen but still below-stairs.[14]

For Indian National Congress, the offer was unacceptable as it favoured the idea of strong provinces at the expense of a strong central government.

The arrangement of Cripps's offer replied to a communal question with a provincial answer. It will be seen in latter pages how the 1973 constitution of Pakistan dispensed the same legal framework when it came to address the ethnic question.

At the end of the war, the British Empire did not have the wherewithal to resist Indian demands for independence. The 1945 elections under the 1935 Act gave all the Muslim reserved seats to the Muslim league and resultantly the authority to speak on their behalf. As the three member mission of the British cabinet failed to convince Jawahar Lal Nehru and Indian National Congress, to lend unqualified support to their plan[15] to grant India independence and keep it in a lose dominion, the Muslim League changed its stance from one of unqualified support to an uncompromising demand for Pakistan. The British had to acquiesce and announced the independence and partition of India into two separate countries in June 1947.

Colonial state, Identity and the fear of becoming a disadvantaged minority[16] therefore were foremost in shaping the constitutional setup of British India. The 1935 Act had created a strong central government which provided checks against the centrifugal tendencies of the provinces. The Act institutionalized the system of separate electorate on the basis of religious identity, to assuage fears of becoming a powerless minority. It was also an attempt to give a semblance of devolution of power to the Indian subjects by the colonial state. The institutions created by this constitutional dispensation therefore catered to all the three needs of the stakeholders and would define the shape of latter day Pakistan, its own constitutional set up and its conflicts.

3.3 The struggle over identity in the 'Bonapartist' State (1948-1971)[17]

The cataclysmic events of 1947 gave birth to, in the words of Jinnah 'a mutilated, truncated, moth-eaten' Pakistan. Disregarding the fact that the movement for Pakistan had used separate Muslim identity as a justification for its demand, now Jinnah wanted the Pakistanis to shun their religious differences for running the state.

> You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State.[18]

This may have been a hint of the future of things to come in Pakistan but Jinnah's death a year later and the problems of Kashmir, refugees and division of assets with India, kept the government occupied. Later, when the famous objectives resolution[19] was adopted by the same legislature, it gave a distinct religious identity to the 'business of the state'.

A. Khan (2005) goes to the extent of making the accusation of 'ideological engineering' by the state elite;

> The Pakistan movement was the Muslim elite's project to capture state power and replace colonial control and coercion with their nationalist version. Therefore, instead of doing away with the coercive methods of the colonial state apparatus and its racist and discriminatory ideology, the postcolonial leadership indigenised them to build a nation-state. (A. Khan 2005)[20]

This exercise in 'ideological engineering' addressed itself mainly to state-building and economic development at the cost of – what Jahan

(1972) calls, 'nation-building'; and as a result, the Punjabis and the migrants from northern and western India became a national elite of Pakistan from the outset, at the expense of the majority 54% Bengalis (Jahan 1972).[21]

The 'politics of identity' soon took root with the language controversies of 1948 and 1952, when the Bengali movement for recognition of Bengali as a second national language, was brutally suppressed and their proponents branded as 'traitors to Islam and the enemies of our nation' (Rahman 1998).[22]

In 1954, the Fazlul Haq's United Front had won the elections in the province of East Pakistan. He had demanded satisfaction on the issues of language, constitution and provincial autonomy (H. Khan 2005).[23] His dismissal soon thereafter on the pretense of law and order situation had already alienated the majority of political leadership of East Pakistan. To the further chagrin and alienation of Bengalis (and indeed the Pukhtuns, Balochis and Sindhis), all the western provinces were combined into the single administrative unit of West Pakistan and parity was declared between the Eastern and Western provinces. This robbed the Bengalis of their legitimate expectation of due consideration in legislative rights and development funding.[24]

The constitution of 1956 saw four short lived governments and the military coup of 1958 sealed its fate. The government of the military dictator Ayub introduced a new constitution in 1962. This constitution changed the state structure from parliamentary to presidential. By all accounts, the social contract provided in the new constitution was an authoritarian one. The common man (and by implication the majority Bengalis) were deprived of their right to elect a leader through 'one man, one vote' and a complex system of 'basic democracy' ensured that only a handpicked lot of some eighty thousand 'basic democrats' were allowed to vote for a presidential candidate.[25] The constitution of 1962 concentrated such powers in the hands of the President that the position was commonly known as the 'clock-tower of Faisalabad where all the bazaars converged' (H. Khan 2005).[26]

The 'failure in national integration' was all the more evident in the enterprise of institutions building pursued by the Ayub dictatorship (1958-1969). These institutions failed to bring about structural and functional integration of Bengalis into the national body politic in the sense that these neither gave proportional (and due) representation to

Bengalis on the basis of their share in population, nor succeeded in giving them a sense of identity with the national political system. This failure in structural and functional integration led to the de-legitimization of these institutions in the country as a whole (Jahan 1972).

The ethno-politics and failure of institutions was compounded by the systematic gaps in development between East and West Pakistan. Such was the official bias that against Rs. 200 million development expenditure in West Pakistan only Rs. 70 million were spent in East Pakistan during 1948-1955 (Alqama 1997).[27] Despite a formal official commitment to reduce disparity, the gap in per capita income widened at an increasing rate between 1949 and 1970 and 'the commitment was only honoured in breach' (Alqama 1997).[28]

Continued military dictatorship, lack of a formal social contract in the form of an agreed constitution,[29] institutional failure and socio-economic disparities between the East and West Pakistan were compounded by the refusal of West Pakistani politicians and generals to accept the electoral verdict of 1970 elections. Against 151 seats won by Awami League, all in East Pakistan; the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won 62, all in West Pakistan (Noman 1990), yet the generals and the PPP were reluctant to transfer power to Awami League leadership. The resulting agitation led to a brutal army action in East Pakistan which triggered a refugee crisis. India, citing this crisis, invaded East Pakistan and helped establish independent Bangladesh on December 16, 1971. Ethno-politics, on the basis of systematic failure in national integration, triumphed; with a little outside help.

3.4 The New Social Contract: Constitution of 1973

The army junta transferred power of the remaining country to the elected civilians. The first task before legislature was to write a new constitution. This had to be accomplished in the face of the ideal and the real. The identities of the past had to be adjusted with the hopes and fears for the future. The colonial constitutional legacy worked both as a working model to be followed and as an unwanted burden of history to be shed. This political and legal dilemma was to be solved with the language of British constitutional heritage and yet a conscious effort was required to set the new state apart from the trappings of the empire. The conflicting viewpoints of sovereignty, identity, nationality and state had to be adjusted in the scheme of a heavily bureaucratized state with a

definite 'state ideology'. Writing about constitution making in Pakistan, Newberg (1995) explains the difficulties;

> The process of constituting a new state - literally, writing its constitution - involves both political and juridical tasks. In the first instance, writing a constitution provides a legal frame for the state, a method of organizing authority and adjudicating conflicts about power. It also speaks to the political pasts and futures of those who comprise it – establishing the sources, character and conditions of collective identity and sovereignty. These activities are mutually reinforcing. (Newberg 1995)[30]

As will be explained shortly, the history and issues, both pre and post partition - which are outlined above, had a powerful bearing on the exercise for writing a new constitution which had to be put together considering the not so distant past failures to have a workable constitution. The drafting committee noted:

> The committee was particularly conscious of the unfortunate constitutional history of Pakistan and past failures. It identified the causes which led, on more than one occasion, to the breakdown of the constitutional machinery. (Committee 1972)

Contesting identities vied for prominence in the new social contract. The three notions of peoplehood namely people's sovereignty, citizenship and ethnicity, which underpin the project of political modernity,[31] had to contend with that of religious identity. There was a sizeable presence of proponents of each of these contesting notions of peoplehood, in the legislature.

The extreme right[32] of Pakistani politics hoped to use this opportunity to get an 'Islamic State'. While it is easy to charge the state and the Punjabi dominated elite for the 'ideological engineering' in the context of a power struggle in a domination-repression setting, the fact is that there were powerful ideological forces at the negotiating table who wanted to draft the contract to their own wishes. These forces had a more suave and sophisticated approach to the nature of their demands than they are generally given credit for.[33] This sophistication aside, it was their chance to argue also that other identities and specially the ethnic – had contributed to the break up of the country.[34] In addition to certain other Islamic provisions, the objectives resolution was thus included as the preamble to the constitution.

Despite putting together coalition governments in the two smaller provinces of NWFP and Balochistan, the ethno-politicians were outnumbered in the national assembly.[35] They had a historical argument for modelling the state which guarantees the rights of its constituent ethnic communities (or nationalities as they preferred to call these) participating in a federal compact. This historic argument was largely Marxian and followed the domination-repression setting of looking at political chess board.

> [A]mong the political leaders, cadres, and intelligentsia of the Bengali, Sindhi, Pushtuns and Baloch nationalists as well as among Punjabi and Urdu-speaking leftists it became axiomatic that Punjabi and Urdu-speaking groups dominated the state while Bengalis, Sindhis, Pushtuns, and Balochs were oppressed nationalities.' (F. Ahmed 1997)

The majority PPP, which could frame the constitution on the strength of its comfortable majority, was not prepared to grant this demand of constituting the state on ethnic lines. A less than insistent ethnopolitical leadership led to a compromise. What emerged was the pattern envisaged in the 1940 Lahore resolution where instead of mentioning communities (religious or ethnic) the regional (provincial) framework was adopted for modelling the state as a federation and federating units.

The difference between the pre and post 1973 federations is apparent in the processes that led up to their specific configuration. Stepan (1999) has identified two broad processes of constituting federations. In 1947, the process of constituting a federation was the 'coming together' type like e.g. Argentina, Switzerland, USA or Australia, in which federating units come together by pooling their sovereignty. All the five provinces at that time had explicitly consented to be part of the federation. NWFP through its plebiscite, Sindh through its provincial legislature, Balochistan through it's vote of the municipality of Quetta and *Shahi Jirga*[36] Punjab and Bengal by agreeing to the sacrifice of as much as half their population and territory.[37] Such federations are configured to restrain the dominant power from over running the weaker sub-units. Instead the process in 1973 was that of, 'holding together' federation, as is the case in India, Spain, Belgium and Canada, where the states are configured to prevent the sub-units from secession; in Pakistan's case – further secession.

On another score, the 1940 resolution was one-upped by the 1935 Act. What little provincial autonomy was given in the constitution; was

taken away with a strong and meddlesome central government. There was no mention of ethnic identities in the constitution. As for 'nationhood' official decrees mandated that only the correct version should gain currency and any dissent on this score was a culpable offence, earning the offender seven years in prison.[38] The constitution had already declared it a principle of policy to discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices.[39]

Since the demographics of most of the ethnicities broadly followed the provincial setup therefore it wasn't difficult to satisfy the aspirations of ethnopolitical leadership. There was the added fact that the participating regions/provinces of the federation neither had a particularly strong tradition of self rule on the basis of ethnic identity nor the common belief that the groups once governed their own affairs. Such a belief is the common denominator for almost all autonomy struggles (Gurr et al. 1993).[40] The ethnopolitical leadership would later claim to have acted in good faith and having pulled the country out of its worst crisis by acceding to the 1973 constitution when 'it was so faulty in their opinion' (Qazi 2003).

The result of this arrangement is the composition of the social contract in such a way that ethnicities are not party to the contract directly. The contract is among 'federating units' or regions. This spatial configuration was broadly acceptable to the ethnopolitical leadership in 1971. With time, this spatial arrangement started creating a melting pot of ethnicities. Pukhtuns in Karachi, Punjabis in Quetta and Balochistan at large; are the two major examples. This was unforeseen by the ethnopolitical leadership. The quid pro quo for accepting the regional set up was the promise that most of the powers, then retained by the federal government, will be gradually transferred to the provinces. Nazeer Naji links the failure to honour this commitment with the conflicts of the latter day;

> The constitution of Pakistan was actually a ten year contract among the federating units of Pakistan. In these ten years, a blueprint of powers, between the federation and provinces, was to be completed; after which the major portion of concurrent list was to be transferred to the provinces and the saga of constitutional abrogation, martial law and sham democracies would have stopped automatically. (Naji 2007)

The instrument devised for this purpose was the two types of legislative subjects, the federal legislative list and the concurrent

legislative list. It was provided that after ten years the concurrent legislative list will be abolished and all the subjects will stand transferred to the provinces.[41]

The institutions of conflict management in the constitution also followed this spatial arrangement. These are there to resolve conflicts arising between and among the federating units and not between the ethnicities. A regional quota scheme to ensure fair, population based share to each region, number of seats in the legislature and public sector jobs, was enshrined in the constitution for a ten years period initially. The share in revenue was to be allocated to these federating units and not otherwise. The fears of becoming a minority in one's own home were therefore allayed to some extent.

Such a spatial arrangement of institutions was bound to come under stress from a direction for which no provision was available in the scheme of things, hence the insistence of constitutionalists to pose the questions of ethnopolitical conflict in terms of a provincial framework. The 'National Question', as scholars like Feroz Ahmed, Aijaz Ahmed and Akbar Zaidi would like to posit; therefore finds little sympathy with the formal social contract. Ahmed (1992) objects to this scheme of things arguing that while it is helpful in resolving some conflicts, it will always fail without recognizing that 'there are distinct nationalities which should have full freedom to develop their culture and national personality'.[42]

Having done with the demands of both the religious and ethnopolitical leadership it comes up as a singular failure of the writers of the constitution to identify a unique national, Pakistani, identity. The two-nation theory of pre-partition era only served to keep the new social contract tied up with agenda of the past, to the point that some argued that 'Pakistan's conceived nation-ness should be judged by its hatred of others, especially India' (A. Khan 2005).[43] This is somewhat similar to Cohen's (2004) assertion. However there were voices within the ruling PPP, like Aitizaz Ahsan who argued for a distinct Pakistani identity based on the geographical substrata provided by the river Indus. The 'Indus citizen', as Ahsan (1996) argues, has always had a separate political identity which was only interrupted by the three 'Universal States' of the Mauryas (321-185 BC), the Mughals (1526-1857) and the British (1857-1947). This view, however, was largely confined to a few academic circles

of Islamabad and Lahore and could neither gain popular acceptability nor political currency.

The downside of this continued failure and identity based on past fears was the obsession with a security paradigm which the country could ill afford and turned it into a 'security state'. This security state and the 'defence of ideological frontiers',[44] were later used to justify the army coups and alienate the ethnopolitical leadership. Newberg (1995) points out that the casualty in this situation was often the social contract itself;

> Administering the state became an endeavour separate from resolving problems of identity to the edges of the political agenda. Ideological issues were either set aside or manipulated - always present and contentious, frequently used to represent or disguise the pursuit of power, but rarely at the critical centre of state authority. The end of stability has been used consistently to justify the means of manoeuvring constitutions to suit the executive-oriented - and too often, praetorian - state. (Newberg 1995)[45]

The 'end of stability', so forcefully argued by the ruling army juntas, was always used in tandem with, the means of 'fear'. It was always argued that a failure to act (i.e. mount a coup) would have resulted in a failure of the state itself.[46] The courts shamefully agreed.[47]

In addition to the political compact between the federating units, an economic compact was also made part of the formal contract. This setup made it a responsibility of the state to ensure the freedom of inter-provincial trade, the promotion of social and economic well-being of the people by raising their standard of living and providing basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, housing, education and medical relief, irrespective of caste or race and to reduce disparity in the income and earnings of individuals. A scheme of mutually coordinating economic institutions was built into the constitution to carry out the contract.[48]

Both the political and economic compacts of the constitution dealt only with the upper two layers of federal and provincial governments. No local government scheme is part of the constitution itself. This may not have been a conscious choice however later attempts at giving this third tier a constitutional cover were met with resistance from almost all the political forces.[49] Such staunch and almost universal resistance indicates that the original omission of such a constitutional cover was by design.

Ethnopolitical Conflict after 1973

The security state and the authoritarian pedigree flowing from the 1935 Act combined to eliminate any semblance of provincial autonomy that was enshrined in the original constitutional draft. Civilian martial law, suspension of fundamental rights and the patently unjust removal of the opposition led provincial governments in NWFP and Balochistan, led to the uprising in Balochistan and heart burn in NWFP. Minority governments were foisted upon these provinces in all disregard of constitution and political ethics. A violent suppression led to armed insurgency in Balochistan, and the arrest and self exile of Pukhtun leaders of NWFP to Afghanistan. A state of emergency prevailed from 1973 to 1977 i.e. throughout the civilian led government of PPP. The ruling party cited reasons of national security, distrust of ethnopoliticians and the semi tribal-ness of the people for the authoritarian rule. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) thus justified his strong arm;

> The Muslims or the people from the North West have historically been more individualistic and have had greater sense of separateness. So although India is a bigger country, Pakistan contains four of the most difficult provinces of the subcontinent. To keep all these tribal people together- to keep people who just like to pull out their guns- under the umbrella of the rule of law is not an easy task. (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto)[50]

Amid this state of civilian emergency rule, the opposition cried foul over the results of elections of 1977. A country wide agitation led to another army coup and the PPP leadership was thrown in jail. The new army government promptly mended ways with the ethnopolitical leadership from NWFP and Balochistan, declared an end to the Balochistan army operation and took back the litigation pending against the ethnopoliticians of National Awami Party (NAP). This largely pacified the insurgency in Balochistan.

While the two smaller provinces of NWFP and Balochistan were quieting down, the Sindhi ethnopolitical passions were incited when the four Punjabi judges of the Supreme Court found Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the PPP and the former prime minister, guilty of murder and the army junta (mostly led by Punjabi generals[51]) hastened to send him to gallows. Zia ul Haq, the army chief of staff, imposed his version of a 'military theocracy' on the country.[52] The opposition launched the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) which, although could

not do well in the other three provinces, assumed violent contours in rural Sindh. Army's counter measures turned this largely political enterprise into a battle cry for the Sindhi ethnopoliticians. It is indeed remarkable that the PPP stood its federalist ground amid the temptation to use ethnopolitics in Sindh.

Violence in Sindh gained impetus from the unlikely source of the terrorist organization of Al-Zulfiqar, which the two younger sons of Z. A. Bhutto had created to avenge the death of their father. This organization assumed responsibility for many bomb explosions, train derailments and a plane hijacking. This campaign was more violent in Sindh and had more ethnopolitical undertones than would have been expected of a movement created by the sons of ZAB. However the roots of ethnopolitical discontent in rural Sindh ran deeper. As Siddiqui (1986) points out, the continuous trek of people from up country threatened to imbalance the demographics. Also after the construction of Ghulam Muhammad barrage on Indus in 1955, newly irrigated lands were allotted to ex-servicemen which created resentment among the local peasantry. The ethnopolitical conflict in Sindh in mid 1980s was thus a result of more deep seated grievances and the MRD merely provided the political strata for it.

When the Soviet tanks rolled across the Amu River into Afghanistan in 1979, Pukhtun ethnopoliticians found a sympathetic regime in Kabul. Pakistani alignment with the US set the left leaning leadership of NAP on a collision course with the state. Both violent and non-violent conflict flared up and continued right till the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the over throw of Najibullah led government there. The alliance between the military junta and Islamic extremists was bank rolled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Story 2007).

General Zia's rule (1977-1988) is marked by the ascendancy of religious right in Pakistani polity. Religious parties were enthusiastic in supporting his mission to 'Islamize' the state and society. They also participated with men and material in the Western supported war against the 'infidel' Soviets in Afghanistan. All this helped to undercut support for the ethnopoliticians who were regularly accused of being hand in glove with the 'red menace'. With state patronage, the 'ideological engineering' reached its peak. The counter to this came from a very unlikely source.

Islam and Urdu were the main arguments in the case for a religion based identity. Throughout Pakistan's history this case had found its staunchest supporters in the Urdu speaking migrant community from the Muslim minority provinces of undivided India. This community had also dutifully voted the religious parties to legislatures and city mayor ships. However, in late 1970s, the second generation of this community organized itself into Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) [53] under the leadership of Altaf Hussain. The party largely remained confined to Karachi and Hyderabad and a few other urban pockets of Sindh but within these, the hold of the party was complete and unchallengeable. At the same time the first ethnopolitical conflicts between Pukhtuns and Muhajirs, Sindhis and Muhajirs and Punjabis and Muhajirs converted urban Sindh into a multi-cratered volcano.[54] The roots of Muhajir grievances have been traced to unemployment, lack of control over local resources, absence of effective participation in provincial and national decision making (K. Bengali 1996) and a lack of articulation for perceived deprivation (Jaffar 1992).[55] Although these explanations for conflicts will be taken up later in this thesis, the purpose here is to remind the reader that all these explanations form part of a historical continuum in which new identities have been constructed on the basis of fears and grievances.

The institutional ethnopolitical conflict over resources was mitigated to an extent during Zia dictatorship (1977-1988). It had mostly to do with the fact that a single institution (army) was calling the shots and the others had to tow whatever line was thrown at them. Demands for provincial autonomy were loud but relegated to the fringes of political debate in the absence of freely functioning institutions of conflict management. The same institutional ethnopolitical conflict registered a marked increase in intensity with the onset of democracy in 1988. Issues like the distribution of resources, regional quotas and provincial autonomy were for the first time debated inside the institutions that were actually created by the contract for exactly this purpose.[56]

3.5 Revolving Doors, Democracy-Autocracy

Return to democracy in 1988 saw the return of Baloch and Pukhtun ethnopoliticians to the mainstream national politics. The institutional framework envisaged in the constitution was for first time put to test with strong opposition governments in the provinces. Although

institutions dealing with conflicts over development and funding issues among federating units[57] operated with a degree of success, the legislature, executive and judiciary could not shake the stranglehold of army. Successive civilian governments in the 1990s also faced ethnopolitical conflict in urban Sindh, particularly Karachi. The division and disappointments of the 1990s, sometimes called the lost decade for Pakistan, stemmed from the role of religion in society, democracy in polity and the 'transformative capacities ' of the state institutions' in economic management (Newberg 1995).[58]

Perhaps the biggest achievement of the era from 1988 to 1999 was the spluttering start of institutions of conflict management among the federating units, as given in the constitution. Although this start was marked by a rise in institutional conflict, this must be seen as inevitable given the long artificial suppression of issues during the Zia dictatorship. The issue of sharing of financial and natural resources was for the first time brought to the fore and discussed inside the institutions that were meant for it. Accords over these issues were arrived at, albeit after much acrimony; the sort that was perhaps desired.

There were times during this infant democracy when a need was felt to modify or improve the social contract. Moeen Qureshi, one of the many caretaker Prime Ministers during the 1990s thus opined;

> Pakistan needs to establish an understanding between the centre and the provinces, between the provinces and local bodies[.]… The armed forces too should be part of the social contract. A revenue sharing scheme could even out disparities between the provincial revenue base and needs, and ensure that all the country's citizens have the capacity to receive broadly similar services[.]…The social contract must involve the devolution of responsibility with power. Responsibility without the power to execute has been the problem of eunuchs throughout ages. (M. Qureshi 1993)

Instead of a new social contract or an improvement in it, which, it was hoped, would reduce conflict; the country had to face yet another dictatorship. The army coup of October 1999 witnessed renewed conflict in Balochistan. This time the apparent issue of contention was the income from gas produced in the province. The three tribal leaders of Marri, Bugti and Mengal led this uprising. Initial demands of the insurgents related to enhanced income from gas and stoppage of migration to Balochistan from other provinces. The Balochis feared that whoever comes to Balochistan from outside, the political rights and

leadership of Baloch people will be taken over by them. This, they feared, will lead to usurpation of jobs and an ultimate 'red Indian' status for the Balochis (Rehman 2006). While two parliamentary committees deliberated these demands, the initial low level conflict became decidedly secessionist with the death of its apparent leader, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, in an encounter with army in 2006. The attacks on gas installations, bombings, and kidnappings increased. The conflict is now, for the Baloch ethnopoliticians, the fight for the rights of Baloch nation.

The ethnopolitical conflicts in Karachi went dormant during Musharraf years (2000-2008). Most of this can be ascribed to the capture of political power in the city by the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM).[59] They also had a sizeable (some would argue, a controlling - 40%) share in the provincial government. The political power structures in the country had an overwhelming representation of their sympathizers as both the President and the Prime Minister belonged to the MQM power base of Karachi.[60]

As detailed in chapter 5 and 6, this period from 1988 to 2006 was one of widening economic disparities among the federating units. While Punjab and urban Sindh consistently scored average or above average for socio-economic indicators; the rest of the country, on average, lagged behind.[61] Failures to meet budgetary expenses by the two smaller provinces was a recurring annual disappointment. This was contrasted with the relatively comfortable financial position of Punjab. Heartburn followed in other provincial capitals which saw the distribution of resources on the basis of population as an unjust formula. The constitutional framework to resolve this situation frequently failed, particularly during the Musharraf dictatorship. The same pattern was followed when it came to other institutions of conflict management specially those of interprovincial trade, natural resources and autonomy.

This era is also marked by efforts to undo the changes made to the constitutional scheme during Zia's time. The parliamentary character of the constitution, in which the powers rested with the Prime Minister, was changed in 1985 by the dictator. He concentrated all the powers in the unelected presidency and got the constitutional amendment rubber stamped by the legislature. After 1988 two governments were dismissed by Zia's successor, Ghulam Ishaq under the same powers. The fourth civilian government which came in 1997, with the support of opposition, undid these amendments and restored the powers to the elected

legislatures and its leaders. The next dictator, Musharraf, again amended the constitution in Zia's style and his handpicked legislature again approved the changes. It is the single most agitated issue on the list of unresolved agenda of the political forces today. In this conflict over the form of polity, the ethnopoliticians essentially were in league with the mainstream political parties.

At the height of General Musharraf's power in 2006, dissatisfaction with the viability of the social contract was such that demands were raised for a new one. Failure to let the concurrent list of the constitution die its natural death after 10 years had now become a sore point with the ethnopoliticians. Demands started from smaller provinces, particularly from Balochistan, for a new social contract to 'protect and ensure equal rights' (Mengal 2004). Their leaders specially cited the unequal relationship between the Punjabi dominated ruling army and the helpless ethnopolitical leadership which found themselves shut out from the corridors of power. Army thus came to be associated with Punjab and vice versa and the might of a meddlesome and powerful federal government has become a symbol of Punjabi hegemony for them.

The need for a new constitution was also felt in the intelligentsia but they were afraid that the political leadership lacked the capacity to come up with one. Irshad Haqqani answers his own question; Do we need a new social contract?

> The present social contract i.e. the constitutional compact has become bereft of general agreement and therefore a new constitution should be enacted. This is to say that we definitely need a new social contract but remember that need of something isn't the same as its achievement and I think that in the given circumstances we, as a nation, are not capable to put together a new social contract.(Haqqani 2006)[62]

Since September 2001, a new and more violent conflict has beset the region. This involves the radical militants pitted against the state and society. This conflict also draws its recruits from those motivated by a religious identity and using their ethnic identity as a tactic. The issues of bread and butter may not figure prominently in the debate but remain important. Similarly the issues of history, geostrategic and external influence and the institutional structure and its weakness have its effect on that conflict too and will be discussed in chapter 7.

These years (1988-2006) can be seen as the harshest for the political economy of Pakistan. During this period, the social contract was put to

its first real test and just when its viability was about to be revealed, the ethnopolitical conflicts were reignited to begin the circumnavigation again.

3.6 Conclusion

In order to understand the nature of ethnopolitical conflicts of Pakistan, it is necessary to first learn of the key milestones of its pre and post independence history. The history of pre-independence search for identity is inextricably linked with its post independence ethnopolitical conflicts. What began as a search for a separate identity on the basis of religion and comparatively backward economic conditions was essentially an exercise in fear of becoming a minority; a minority which could lose its individuality in a democratic, Hindu dominated and independent India. Most leaders of Muslim community could only foresee a future of perpetual minority status with little political and economic leverage. An identity based on religion was therefore found convenient to bring the community onto a common political platform for a cause which soon metamorphosed into a call for a separate, independent country.

The British acquiesced to the demands for separate quota in legislatures and other forums on the basis of a religious identity but it was the authoritarian legacy of their legal enactments which would determine the lack of autonomy for provinces; an autonomy which was demanded by the Muslims of pre-partition India themselves in 1940.

The religious identity was not enough to keep the country together for long. Soon the failure of political elite to evolve a social contract was compounded by the military dictatorships which alienated the Bengali ethnic majority and exacerbated the conflict over resources. In the absence of more robust institutions of conflict management, these conflicts were soon amplified and a refusal of the West Pakistani ruling elite to respect the democratic verdict of the people of Eastern wing resulted in the war of 1971. Outside intervention also helped the cause of Bengali separatism.

The new constitution of 1973 was in effect a new social contract which again provided a stage for the identity dramas and fears of the past. The result was a compromise over the role of religion which 'tried to describe a state primarily of Muslims but not necessarily or fully defined by Islam' (Newberg 1995).[63] The compromise over the

configuration of the state led to a federal setup with the regions or provinces as the federating units, participating in a federal compact over institutions of conflict management.

The two cycles of democracy-autocracy of post 1973 Pakistan is a tale of the breakdowns of institutions of conflict management among the federating units; in essence, a weakening of the social contract provided in its constitution. As the single institution of army sought to establish its paramountcy over the rest, the ethnopolitical leadership found more issues with the federation and the benefits of participating in the contract.

The story therefore is that of a social contract which was entered into with hopes, fears, expectations and compromises. For various reasons these hopes and expectations were not fully met for all the parties to the contract. The resulting conflict had ethnopolitical vibes. The later chapters of this thesis are attempts to describe this conflict, measure its crests and troughs and come up with explanations for the same.

Notes

[2] "there is no country marked out by the sea and the mountains so clearly to be a single whole as India" Prasad (1946), P. 79

[3] Conveniently disregarding the fact, as A. Khan (2005) points out, that the British colonized Indians and not united them.

[4] See for example Durrani (1983).The history of this school in India goes back to, among others, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898).

[5] To quote Sherbaz Khan Mazari "There is no question that the desire for a separate Muslim entity arose from a great fear among the Muslims that they would be swamped by the Hindus" (Mazari 1999) p. 38

[6] p. 43

[7] Cited in Talha (2000)

[8] For a fuller treatment of the subject please see Talha (2000), W. W. Hunter (1974) and Robinson (2007).

[9] P. 20

[10] pp. 28-29

[11] An example is that of Jinnah's dual membership of the Congress and the Muslim league from 1913 to 1920.

[12] Mussalaman is another word used for Muslim in South Asia

[13] Muhammad Ali Jinnah's address to the Lahore session of All India Muslim League, 23rd March 1940, cited from Grahi (2004).

[14] Cited in Jalal (1994) P. 70

[15] Azad (1988), pp. 164-6

[16] For a first hand account of these fears please read the excerpts from the speech of Mohammad Ali Jinnah's address to the 1940 Lahore meeting (Annexe 3-B)

[17] Although Sayeed (1968) gives the term to the period starting from 1958, the characteristics of 'Bonapartist state' are visible right after the death of Jinnah in 1948.

[18] Jinnah's first address to the first constituent assembly (legislature) of Pakistan, on August 11, 1947, Jinnah (1948), P. 10. Cited in A.S. Ahmed (1997), P. 175

[19] Annex 3-A, It is now a part of the constitution itself.

[20] P. 60

[21] P. 6

[22] P. 93

[23] P. 129

[24] Almost all the other leaders of note from the smaller provinces also declared their opposition to the One-Unit Scheme.

[25] The actual scheme was introduced via 'The Basic Democracies Order' of 1959. The same was given constitutional protection in 1962.

[26] P. 257

[27] P. 182

[28] P. 203

[29] Two successive constitutions of 1956 and 1962 were abrogated by the military juntas in 1958 and 1969.

[30] P. 1

[31] As mentioned by Wimmer (2002) and discussed in chapter 2.

[32] Represented mostly by the Islamist parties of Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam and Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Pakistan had 18 members out of a total of 138.

[33] For a fuller exposition of the subject, please see Ahmed 1991, Rosenthal (1965) and A. Syed (1984) among others.

[34] A fascinating debate between Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, A.K Brohi and Feroz Ahmed on the editorial pages of daily Dawn (October 1978) captures the essence of arguments from both sides.

[35] Mostly the 6 National Awami Party (NAP) members and a handful of independents.

[36] Royal representative assembly

[37] For a detail of the number of votes in all these legislatures and plebiscites please see Jalal (1994) P. 290

[38] On 18-3-1972 Instructions were issued to TV and Radio to ensure that no programme went on the air which even remotely contained a reference to the idea of four nationalities (Dawn: 19-3-1972). Then on 22-11-1973 the prevention of anti-national activities ordinance was promulgated which defined as 'Anti national activity' to '…create regional fronts on the basis of race and language; to incite sectarian and parochial feelings and to propagate the idea that the citizens of Pakistan comprise more than one nationality.' (Dawn: 23-11-1973)

[39] Article 33 of the constitution.

[40] P. 76

[41] For more about these legislative lists and their content, please read chapter 5.

[42] Ahmed (1992), P. 175

[43] pp. 18-19

[44] A favourite mantra of every army junta in Pakistan, which is given as a justification at the eve of every military takeover.

[45] p. 4

[46] The first speeches of Generals Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf are remarkably similar on this score.

[47] Most notably in Moulvi Tamizuddin Vs Federation of Pakistan (1954), Begum Nusrat Bhutto Vs The Chief of the Army Staff and another (1977), and Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others Vs General Pervez Musharraf and others (2000). The judgment condemning the coup of General Yahya Khan was only announced after his resignation.

[48] For more about these institutions, please refer to chapter 5.

[49] Particularly attempts by General Pervez Musharraf in year 2000.

[50] Interview to A. M. Rosenthal; Dawn 2-5-1974.

[51] Noman (1990), P. 194 gives a list of eight senior most generals who were all Punjabis, including Zia ul Haq himself and the martial law administrators of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan and the air and naval chiefs.

[52] The term used by Noman (1990), P. 144

[53] Migrants National Movement

[54] Details of these conflicts are given in chapter 4 and 5.

[55] Our own attempt at explaining this conflict is undertaken in chapter 6.

[56] A fuller treatment of institutional ethnopolitical conflict is undertaken in chapter 4.

[57] Details in chapter 5

[58] P.3

[59] The party is now known as Muttahida Qaumi Movement

[60] The short stint of the Baluchi Mir Zafaraullah Jamali (Nov 2002-Jun 2004) was more of an aberration in the politics of the country.

[61] Please see chapter 5 for these widening gaps and their effect on ethnopolitical conflict.

[62] Translated from Urdu by the author.

[63] pp. 3-4

4 A Look at Ethnopolitical Conflict Data

> No I have no data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts [*]

4.1 Introduction

This chapter traces the history of ethnopolitical conflicts in Pakistan. A conflict score is calculated from the primary database. This tool is then used to observe the trend over the years since 1972, collectively as well as for individual conflicts.

Ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan has a history of ups and downs. Periods of relative calm are interspersed with intense violent conflict. During these calm periods, a low intensity conflict simmers below, ready to explode. In the ensuing melee it is difficult to chart the different and unstable coalitions of adversaries. The issues at stake are also myriad and one side may find itself in league with its adversary in connection with another cause.

We therefore need an empirical handle to chart these conflicts. This, I will attempt with a conflict score which is to be calculated with the help of my primary conflict database. The identification of various dyads in this conflict is needed. These dyads will serve as units of analysis in a cross dyadic comparison. We also need to identify issues which generate conflict. As Gupta and Gupta (1990) tell us, it is a classical problem of representing a multidimensional variable by a univariate one.[1]

It has to be kept in mind that this is not a historical narrative, but it is not possible to excise history out of it. Since the aim is to see the profile of ethnopolitical conflict as charted by the conflict score, derived from the coded primary data; history and context as explained in the last chapter are invariably called upon to help us explain the undulations in

[*] Sherlock Holmes to Dr. Watson in 'A Scandal in Bohemia' by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.

this conflict. Yet, this chapter is still about description and not explanation, per se.

It is also important to remind the reader again that the basic framework used in the present study is that of ethnopolitical conflict and that sets it apart from the works of scholars like Amin (1988), who uses a nationalist framework; or A. Khan (2005), who studied the politics based on identity.

The discussion below is arranged into six main areas: The problem of representing a multidimensional conflict, both violent and non-violent, will be defined, the methodology of collection of primary conflict data will be discussed and the conflict indicators will be grouped into a coding scheme which will yield the 'conflict score' for the dyads. Then these conflict scores will be charted out for the main conflict dyads. Lastly, the concluding section will discuss results of this conflict score as applied to different dyadic datasets. The potential and limitations of the analysis will be discussed briefly at the end.

4.2 The Problem

Several databases of conflict events are available for research. A good review of these databases is presented by Rodik et al (2003). These databases did not cater to the needs of this thesis as far as primary conflict data was concerned owing to the choice of studying ethnopolitical conflict dyads. However these databases provided guidance when I searched for my own conflict data and then at the stage of coding.

Conflict events are easier to log, code and analyze when their inherent nature is empirical. The death of a person is usually taken as a unit, in most conflict literature, as a verifiable measure of conflict. Even in a biased reporting environment it is less likely to be misreported.[2] It has therefore been found convenient by most researchers to use different combinations of this measure for analyzing conflicts and wars.[3] But using this measure alone will not help us capture the political side of ethnopolitical conflict. It was therefore necessary to use indicators which tell us more about the 'latent'[4] conflict, a conflict which is reflected in the day to day statements of the adversaries, the protest meetings, sit-ins, arrests, administrative actions, parliamentary proceedings, and bomb explosions which do not kill. Such events are significant contributories to overall conflict. As Horowitz (1985) rightly

puts it, these are the many less dramatic manifestations of ethnopolitical conflict.

Two types of conceptual problems are to be explained before attempting to describe the data. The first is the definitional problem of relationship of observed variables to ethnopolitical conflict. This will be analogous to questioning the relationship of level of literacy to Gini coefficient. A direct one to one relationship needs to be established between the observed variables and the explained variable. This will be the subjective test of the validity of conflict indicators that I chose and the phenomenon called ethnopolitical conflict.

The other conceptual problem linked to the determination of a score of ethnopolitical conflict is the qualitative difference among the observed variables themselves. Broadly these parameters can be categorized into violent and non violent incidents. In the category of violent conflict, although general agreement exists on classifying these into anomic violence and internal war;[5] This study shall not make such a classification. Instead the fault line of classification bisects all the conflict events between two general categories of violent and non violent conflict events. The term latent encompasses all my indicators of non-violent conflict. These non violent events include, from belligerent statements and speeches, to protest demonstrations and arrests. Violent conflict events include violence causing injuries to violence resulting in death. Further, an event which results in the death of a person is higher in intensity when either militia or army (as opposed to e.g. police) is involved. This is done for the manifest reason that armed forces are only called out when the conflict is more intense. More on this will follow in the next section.

There is another classification of these conflict parameters, based on the type of stakeholders involved. e.g. an event may be initiated by a state actor, say, an administrative step like declaration of a local language as the official one, the other side may initiate a response event like holding protest demonstrations. In this same classification, there is another category wherein both stakeholders operate to contribute to the overall conflict; For example, the arrest of an activist.

4.3 The Data

For the present analysis eight measures of violent and non-violent conflict are included (See Table 4.4). I also had to make a decision

regarding the cut-off point of this study. As discussed in chapter 2 and 3, it was the scope of the study which defined the cut off point for us. The fact that Pakistan functioned as one federal state, under a unanimously approved constitution, after 1972, made the task of choosing a cut-off date, easier. Using data before that date would not have been consistent because of the simple fact that data from the former East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) would not have fitted in the analytical framework.[6]

Since this analysis uses a primary dataset therefore it would not be out of place to describe the sources of data as well as the data itself. Events of ethnopolitical conflict since 1972 were logged from different newspapers. The resulting database contains information on 4456 events. The events capture this conflict in both its violent as well as non violent forms. The absence of projection in media is a well known issue while working with newspaper data. In this regard I recognize the concern of Danzger (1975) that a lack of conflict reports may not mean that conflict has not occurred. I compensated for it by looking up other sources, especially for the two periods of 1974-1977 and 1979-1984, when state censorship of news media was rampant under emergency laws (Niazi 1986). Despite this, I fear that state censorship of media was too much to help us paint an entirely accurate picture of conflict during these two periods.

Though not entirely accurate this study still maintains that newspapers should provide a reliable source of events of ethnopolitical significance. This is for the reason that the over all media sensitivity towards events is unbiased. This is demonstrated by Snyder and Kelly (1977) whose model specifies validity of newspaper data as a function of event intensity and media sensitivity. The fact that the media may overlook minor events e.g. small protests or big but mild demonstrations, may even be advantageous (Koopmans and Rucht (2002). In selecting the sources for data, I followed Filliule and Jiménez's (2003) advice of objectivity of quality and quantity. A list of these sources is given in Table 4.1.

The major source for this data had to be uniform over the years with characteristics such as a good reputation and editorial independence. With its general reputation for fair reporting and non-biased editorial board, I chose the oldest and most established English daily of Pakistan, namely 'Dawn'. This is also the only English language daily that continuously published throughout the period of study and as such

perhaps the only candidate. For important periods and known events other newspapers and internet sources were also consulted and used.

Table 4.1: Names of News sources

No.	Name of the Source
1	Dawn
2	Muslim, The
3	News, The
4	Nation, The
5	Frontier Post, The
6	Philadelphia Inquirer
7	New York times, The
8	Associated Press
9	Newsbank from newslibrary.com
10	Jang, the daily
11	Nawai Waqt, The daily
12	Asia Times

Data was aggregated on an annual basis for most of the analysis in this chapter. Coding was done for dyads of stakeholders in a conflict. For selecting the dyads, attention was paid to the event data itself. While making a press statement against a foe, the identity of that foe indicated the conflict dyad. There were events which indicated several dyads at work, e.g. a press conference in which one stakeholder has issued statements against a number of foes over a variety of issues. Such events were accordingly broken down to take into account all the possible dyads and issues raised. Efforts were made to capture all possible dyads which employ ethnic markers in their politics. Fifteen possible dyads are now a part of this data set in Table 4.2. The two sides in the dyad are separated by a small dash. The stroke signifies 'and/or'. The particular combination of Center/Punjab/Army figures prominently in these dyads and the reasons are discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, particularly section 3.5. All the other combinations have their origins in the historical narrative of conflict, sometimes addressed in this thesis, but mainly to be found in the details of the event data itself.

It is emphasized here that a conflict dyad represents the conflict that arises, or perceived by the media to have arisen, with ethnic overtones. This is quite subjective at times but judgment was exercised while coding each conflict event. In addition the four conflict dyads (1,2,3,4) which are mainly the axes of provinces and the federal government, are also the main dyads for analyzing the relations of provinces with the federation in chapter 5. Dyad 7 is also treated as a regional dyad as the data for it represents Urban Sindh almost exclusively. This means that an event does not need to involve the ethnopolitical leadership of that province to be categorized as an ethnopolitical conflict event. The 'dyad' does not demonstrate that the whole population of a particular province is against that of another or against the federal govt. It merely shows the origins of conflict in a configuration and the existence of a dispute that may lead to conflict.

Table 4.2: Conflict Dyads

No.	Dyad with Stakeholders
1	NWFP/Pukhtun-Center/Punjab/Army
2	Balochistan/Baloch/(Pukhtuns of Balochistan-Center/Punjab/Army
3	Sindh/Sindhi-Center/Punjab/Punjabi/Army
4	Punjab-Center
5	Pukhtun/Baloch and/or JUI/ UDF (To the extent of supporting NAP or their cause) –Center
6	Muhajir- Sindhi in Sindh
7	Muhajir-Center/Punjab/Army
8	Muhajir/Sindhi in Sindh-Punjabi/Punjab
9	Pukhtun-Muhajir in Sindh
10	Seraiki-Punjabi in Punjab/Muhajirs/Sindhis in Sindh
11	Pukhtun- Baloch in Balochistan
12	All Provinces-Center/Other provinces
13	Sindh-Balochistan
14	Pukhtun/Baloch/Sindh-Punjab

The data indicates two potential levels of analysis, the provincial level and the ethnic group level. This connects with the two different types of social contract demanded by the ethnopolitical leaders and supplied by the constitution, as discussed in chapter 3. These two levels are afforded by the dyadic nature of the data and also by the nature of issues. It can be seen that not all dyads are provincial in nature. Some transcend the boundaries of provinces and strictly deal with ethnic groupings e.g. dyads 1, 2, 7 and 9. Others such as dyads 3, 12 and 13 are at the provincial level. Similarly the issues can be grouped broadly into primordial and provincial categories. e.g. IDLE, REST, SEPR and MIN are essentially primordialist. On the other hand, some issues are strictly provincial in nature HDR, MNR and WATKB (See Table 4.3). It is felt that this categorization is important as it is commonly perceived that issues are lumped together which are essentially of different character.[7]

As discussed, a conscious effort was made to capture conflict in both its violent as well as latent forms, therefore those indices and scales which only used the number of deaths, were of little use for this study. The Minorities at Risk (MAR) project (Gurr 2002) uses a taxonomy of ethnic violence indicators which provided the primary motivation for my indicators.

Conflict type was coded for most of the issues which made the content of ethnopolitics since 1972. Issues were grouped into similar codes based on their affinity with each other. This process was updated during the course of data collection as well as data coding on the basis of grouping made by the conflict stakeholders themselves (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Conflict Issues

No.	Code	Conflict Issue
1	HDR	Hydal power profits.
2	MNR	Mineral Resources/Royalty, Rent on gas/Oil.
3	WATKB	Kalabagh and water share issue.
4	SEPR	Re-demarcation of boundaries/ Separate province in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan
5	PART	Participation in Governance structures/Trade bodies/Power organs
6	TRD	Free trade among provinces, especially in food products/Scarcity of wheat/Trade with Afghanistan

7	DEV	Development/ Development spending by Federal Government/ Loans to Provinces.
8	NFC	Share of Provinces in federal revenues/National Finance Commission Award/ Geographical concessions in taxes.
9	JOB	Quota system of jobs in Government services/ Share of jobs, Joblessness
10	POL	Type of Polity, Demands for Democracy.
11	REST	Resettlement/Repatriation of Biharis in Sindh, South Punjab/Afghans in Balochistan
12	PRT	Provincial Rights, General, economic rights, social rights, Provincial autonomy/Nationalities rights.
13	PAT	Backing Central policies/ Assertion of patriotic credentials by stakeholder 1, Condemnation of Nationalist/ anti state behavior by stakeholder 2.
14	SUB	Subversion/Terrorism/Secession.
15	MIN	Governance / General legislation/ Budget/ Foreign policy
16	INF	Infighting in a single ethnic group
18	IDLE	Identity/Language/Culture/Ethnicity
19	RITS	Rights to life, honour, freedom and property, Conflict with state agencies.
20	OTR	Other

An overall picture of the classification of Ethnopolitical Conflict events can be seen in Table 4.4. After deciding on these indicators, the data had to be reduced into a composite 'Conflict Score' so that it could be used in econometric analysis (to be presented in subsequent chapters). In the political science literature, various methods have been tried for construction of an index that can capture the essence of socio-political instability. Such indices frequently contain indicators of violence and non-violence which have affinity to some of the indicators used in this present work. (e.g. Almost all the indicators of non-violent conflict are present in the work of Gupta and Gupta (1990)).

The method of principal components is sometimes used to construct an index of mainly cross sectional data. Two leading examples stand out. Hibbs (1973) used the method of principal components to work out an index of mass political violence. More recently Alesina and Perotti (1996) used this method to construct an index of political instability on the basis of indicators of social unrest and political violence. However these techniques cannot always be adapted to every situation due to the nature of available data. The method of principal components is better suited to cross-sectional data which has more than at least 50 cases. There are many thumb rules for the least number of cases and this is the least

number available in all the thumb rules in practice. One obvious choice in my case could have been to treat dyads as separate cases but that would have still fallen far short of this number (which in itself is arbitrary). An alternative could have been to take the four or five yearly average scores of indicators while allowing for sufficient gap (five years) in between these periods. The assumption would have been that data is sufficiently spaced to make the yearly average scores independent of one another. This would have increased the number of available cases to more than 70 (In fact Gupta et al employ this technique to increase the number of cases for the purpose of cluster analysis) but it is far from convincing to assume that it would have removed the co-variation among individual cases in my work.

Another method used to construct such an index is the one adopted by Gupta and Gupta (1990). They first used cluster analysis to assign countries to groups with roughly similar levels of violence. In the second step, the same grouping was used as the dependent variable in discriminant analysis to work out an index of political instability. In the third step they calculated a logit model again using the cluster analysis results as the dependent variable. In their findings, both the discriminant analysis and the logit model yield similar results. This attempt to explain a dependent variable which is itself created with the help of independent variables is a hazardous approach (which Gupta et al also observe). The need for exogeneity, even weaker one in estimation and testing model, is not met in this case. The primary data in my case will later be used as the dependent variable in almost all analyses and therefore this method is not suited to my needs.

Vanhanen (1999) uses a scale of institutionalized ethnic conflict which assigns a conflict score according to a set scale, from 0 to 100. This scale bears some resemblance to my scale except that I don't put an upper cap on the scale and the method of my calculation of this score is quite different (explained below).

The good thing about all the above three techniques is that they take into account the non-violent indicators as well as the number of deaths and provide guidance on how these seemingly diverse indicators can be grouped into a single variable.

4.4 The Conflict Score

For my own conflict score I assigned weights to events of ethnopolitical conflict. The events were first divided into two broad categories of 'Violent' and 'Non Violent' conflict. The non violent conflict was then further decomposed into four categories with weights assigned from 1 to 4. The violent events were given weights from 5 to 8 (Table 4.4). The weight is assigned following a logical scheme as followed by Feierabend et al. (1969). The apparent arbitrariness of the weights, as Gupta and Gupta (1990) point out, could be worth the risk as will be shown by the logical ranking of the dyads from non violent to violent. The results are also intuitive and conform to the underlying theory. Further, I feel that subjecting my data to the limitations of principal component analysis or discriminant analysis would have entailed pitfalls as explained above. In essence my method is akin to using an ordinal variable as a scalar one. The use of an alternative method will add little to our understanding of these conflicts because of the inherent weaknesses of these methods.

The purpose of classifying injuries and deaths into two further categories was that conflict is definitely more serious when the army or militia is called upon to restore order. An injury or death in such a situation will therefore score higher on our scale as compared to one when only the police is involved. Using the above weights, the data is summed up on annual basis and then standardized to make the various indicators comparable. The resulting standardized data was linearly transformed (scaled) to remove negative signs. Now this data for the above eight indicators was multiplied with the corresponding weights to arrive at the annual conflict scores.

The main dyadic charts are part of the chapter (Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.8). The rest are presented in the appendix 4-A.

Table 4.4: Conflict Categories, Codes, Types and Weightage.

Category	Code	Type of Event	Conflict Weightage
Non Violent Conflict	Stm	Statements, Press Conferences, Interviews.	1
	Mtn	Public Meetings, Public Rallies.	2
	Adm	Court proceedings, Verdicts, Appeals, legislation/legislative process, Major administrative steps, Resignations.	3
	Ars	Strikes, Curfew, Protest day, Kidnappings, Arrests, Eviction, Exodus, Arson without deaths or injuries.	4
Violent Conflict	Inj_1	Violence with injuries Bomb blasts, Arson, and Action leading to injuries not involving armed forces or militias but may involve police.	5
	Dth_1	Violence with deaths, Bomb blasts, and Action leading to death not involving armed forces or militias but may involve police.	6
	Inj_2	Violence, Bomb Blasts and Action leading to injuries involving armed forces or militias.	7
	Dth_2	Violence, Bomb Blast and Action leading to deaths involving armed forces or militias.	8

4.5 The Total Ethnopolitical conflict score

Plotted over time, ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan has largely been a mixed bag of violent and non-violent incidents, although summing up the total conflict scores over the years reveals an overwhelming tilt towards non-violence, See Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: The share of violence and non violence in Ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan



The total conflict (Figure 4.2) increased dramatically in the early 1970s when army was sent in to Balochistan to rein in a secessionist movement (elaborated upon in section 4.5.2). The Mid 1980s saw a sharp climb in conflict due to the situation in Sindh. The upturn near the end of the study period is largely due to the events in Balochistan.

The apparent decline immediately after the spike in early 1970s can be ascribed more to the media censorship of ZAB's government than to a genuine lull.

In subsequent sections the main dyads of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan will be discussed individually. These include dyads 1, 2, 3 and 7. Dyad 6, 8 and 9 are studied as corollaries to dyad 7. It is therefore necessary to point out that readers who are already familiar with Pakistani ethnopolitics will feel that some parts of it have been left out in the first three dyads. These left out issues mostly fall into dyad 7 and will be discussed there. To get a visual feel for the overall trend of conflict in each dyad, polynomial trend lines have been added to the charts where appropriate. This is chosen to get a better fit between the trend line and the bar charts. Since the goodness of fit (R^2) value for the first, second and third order polynomials show

that the last one is consistently higher therefore these trend lines are of the third order in every case. Trend lines of higher order didn't contribute further to the R^2 value and therefore were not chosen.

The rest of the dyads are minor in their contribution to the overall ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan and are given a cursory treatment for reasons to be explained.

Figure 4.2:Profile of Ethnopolitical Conflict in Pakistan



4.5.1 Pukhtun Ethnopolitics

Over all, Pukhtun ethnopolitics is cited as a confirmation of the thesis that Pakistan can also successfully dissipate separatist and centrifugal tendencies, like India; although it lacks the democratic culture (Jaffrelot 2002). This is in contrast to the recent views presented by scholars like Cohen (2004) who thinks that the ethnic group that poses the largest threat to Pakistan is the Pukhtuns.[8] Another example of such a view is that of Kohli (1997) who argues that in contrast to India, since Pakistan does not have a working federal structure and democracy therefore she cannot assuage the centrifugal tendencies in Provinces. In light of my data (the main dyad 1, for Pukhtuns, Figure 4.3) we are forced to

disagree with this latter set of views. Notwithstanding the fact that the recent Taliban movement in Pakistan is overwhelmingly made up of Pukhtuns, it would be premature to link that with ethnopolitics.[9] The data shows that Pukhtuns have gradually toned down their ethnopolitics on the basis of regionalism and secession and are now mostly concerned with matters of rights, within the framework of Pakistani state. (See for example Figure 9 to Figure 18 in Appendix 4-A). Pukhtun Ethnopolitics subsided after the events of 1971, partly because the leading ethnonationalist party, NAP was a partner in the coalition in NWFP. Their style was largely non-violent. The extent of NAP's apparent change of heart was revealed by its leader Wali Khan when he declared that the long cherished goal of Pukhtunistan was 'no longer an issue' for NAP.[10]

Figure 4.3: Pukhtun Ethnopolitical Conflict (The main dyad NWFP/Pukhtun-Centre/Punjab/Army)



In 1973, immediately after the introduction of the new constitution, the provincial government of Balochistan was removed by ZAB. The NWFP government resigned in protest. Mr. Hayat Sherpao, the governor of NWFP was assassinated and NAP was blamed for this

murder. As a result, NAP was outlawed and its leaders jailed. Some of its leaders fled to Afghanistan from where they organized resistance.[11] The militant elements in NAP, numbering 700-1000 were led by Ajmal Khattak in Kabul (Amin 1988).[12] The political scene became rife with violence and continued to be so throughout the 1970s. The initial change of heart on part of NAP to embrace mainstream politics and her subsequent reversal to agitation and confrontation makes Jefferlot remark:

> After the victory of his party (the NAP) in the 1972 election and the formation of a government coalition over which he exerted a strong influence, Wali Khan tried to acquire a national stature. He put his Pakhtun nationalism on the backburner, to the point of forgetting his promises about the renaming of the province— the only one in Pakistan with a name that did not reflect any ethnic identity—and to elevate Urdu to the rank of the official language of the NWFP, a decision which was also taken to avoid confrontation with the local Hindko speakers. The Pakhtuns embraced a more radical form of nationalism as a reaction to the authoritarian methods of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. (Jaffrelot 2002)[13]

A tribunal[14] was set up for the trial of NAP leaders. NAP was banned on February 10, 1975 and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, on 30th October, held that the party was conspiring for secession of NWFP and Balochistan. Later, this tribunal was unilaterally wound up by General Zia.

After 1977, Zia-ul-Haq released NAP leaders and allowed them to organize again. We can see the effects of this policy on the style of ethnopolitcs of Pukhtuns. In early 1980s it became markedly non-violent. The apparent upward surge in violence during mid eighties should be read with caution. Most of this is due to attributing the bomb explosions, especially those in NWFP, to Pukhtun ethnopolitics (Figure 15, Appendix 4-A). No blame should be assigned here to NAP for these bomb explosions. This is merely due to incorrect but necessary attribution of events to one of the dyads and mostly the influence of events in Afghanistan. Briefly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had forced the Pakistani state to support Afghan resistance, popularly known at the time as 'jihad'. The Afghan government had been hosting Pukhtun nationalist leaders since 1970s. As a tit for tat, the Soviet supported government in Kabul wanted to force Pakistan to stop its support for the 'Mujahideen'. The Pukhtun nationalist cause was used to achieve this

aim, with little success, as on the Pakistani side, most of Pukhtun nationalist leadership did not support this campaign. They however spoke openly against Islamabad's support of the American backed resistance.[15] and hence the assessment that after 1990, the Pukhtun ethnopolitics were decidedly non-violent. The occasional spikes in violence are attributable to mild and occasional violence during street protests and/or demonstrations.

With the return of democracy in 1988 and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, more bread and butter issues came to the fore of ethnopolitics. The conflict over these issues was largely non violent. It can be seen that the issue of hydal power profits and Kalabagh dam (KBD) have assumed greater importance for the mostly Pukhtun province of NWFP (Figure 9 and Figure 10, Appendix 4-A). While the rise and fall of conflict over KBD has followed the announcements of federal government on her intent of building (or otherwise) of the dam; the issue of hydal power profits has gained strength once it became clear that the federal government has no intention (nor the money) to pay to the province.[16]

There is an interesting trend to be seen regarding the conflict over provincial autonomy, the Pukhtun ethnopolitical leadership's struggle over nationalist rights, and the conflict over the type of polity (Figure 13 and Figure 12, Appendix 4-A). Both charts show a remarkable amelioration of conflict over these issues, which was overwhelmingly non-violent to begin with. There is also a tendency of less conflict over the years when it comes to questioning the patriotic credentials of Pukhtun ethnopolitical leadership (Figure 14, Appendix 4-A). Since 1972, I have counted at least 28 occasions in the data set when the Pukhtun ethnopolitical leadership asserted their patriotic credentials and claimed to put the country before everything else, in their rhetoric. In contrast there are at least 43 events in which aspersions have been cast on the loyalty of the same leadership towards their country. A declining tendency is also witnessed in conflict with state agencies (Figure 18, Appendix 4-A).

The increasing assimilation of Pukhtuns into the wider Pakistani state structure is also borne out by the fact that since the early nineties, their ethnopolitical leadership has tried to focus more and more on issues related to governance, foreign policy and the economy (Figure 16, Appendix 4-A). This trend was reversed during the years since 1999, (the

year of General Musharraf's coup) but we can see an upward shift in the data related to latter years of this study.

The one conflict which seems to have grown in intensity is over issues such as Identity, Culture and language (Figure 17, Appendix 4-A). Most of it can be traced back to the mid eighties when ethnopolitical conflict in Karachi turned violent. This is discussed separately in the section on Muhajir ethnopolitics (Section 4.5.4). In tandem, the demand for renaming NWFP as Pukhtunkhwa also became central to the politics of Pukhtun ethno politicians. After Nawaz Sharif refused to cooperate to amend the constitution for the change of name of the province to Pukhtunkhwa in 1997, the Awami National Party (ANP) found that it had a new issue on its hands. As A. Khan (2005) remarks;

> Since then it has appeared that at last a nationalism that had virtually become nationalism only in name had finally become a nationalism for name alone. (A. Khan 2005)[17]

Jaffrelot (2002) asserts that Pukhtun nationalism has followed an inverted U. Although the framework of ethnopolitical conflict in this study is different to his 'nationalist' framework, our empirical findings generally agree with this statement. This ethnopolitical conflict has in fact followed an inverted U curve, at least since 1980, both in terms of violence and in terms of demands for autonomy.

4.5.2 Baloch Ethnopolitical Conflict

Balochistan is the province with the largest area (42.9%) and the least population (5%) out of the four provinces of Pakistan. It has two main ethnic groups of Balochis and Pukhtuns but it would be very difficult to decide on an accurate percentage of both due to numerous problems with census which could not be held regularly in the province. The general agreement seems to be a 50:50 ration for both with each side claiming to be in majority, that is if Brahvis, a significant ethnic minority, is grouped together with Balochis. Our second dyad is mostly concerned with the ethnopolitical conflict between Balochis and centrist forces, be they the central government, the army or the province of Punjab or its politicians. Figure 4.4 gives the profile of this total conflict over the years. The chart should be read with caution. The apparent dip in both violent and non-violent conflict in mid 1970s should not be interpreted as a decrease in conflict. The press is simply unable, due to massive censorship, during ZAB's years, to carry news of the armed

conflict in Balochistan. There had been a history of Baloch nationalism in the province leading to armed conflict in 1948, 1958 and 1973 (Grare 2006). The latest phase before 1972 was between 1958 and 1969, that Breseeg (2004)[18] calls the second uprising. With the establishment of a Baloch nationalist government in the province in 1971, most of those previously in conflict with the federal government were ushered into the power corridors. The three main tribal leaders Ataullah Mengal (who became the Chief Minister of the province from May 1972 to Feb 1973) Khair Bakhsh Marri and Akbar Bugti; were mostly reconciled with the overall scheme of the constitution. All this came crashing down when, the Federal Government of ZAB decided to sack the provincial government. To suppress the voices of dissent and to form his own party's government in the province (while the opposition was still in majority in legislature) he clamped governor's rule and sent in the army. All this gave a new lease of life to Baloch nationalism. Except for Bugti, who became the new governor, the other major opposition tribal leaders were jailed or fled to the mountains. What followed was a protracted civil war[19] which saw Balochistan descend into chaos. The media was largely kept under the thumb by ZAB. Most of the data from that period had to be gleaned from other sources.

The conflict was largely defused when General Zia ul Haq released all the political prisoners from Balochistan. There is a visible lull in the violent conflict through out the 1980s. This trend changes with the advent of 1990s. A steady rise in violence is witnessed since then. In fact the present state of violence which is largely thought to have started with the confrontation between General Pervez Musharraf and Akbar Bugti [20] can be traced back to the early 1990s. The cause here may not be Baloch ethnopolitics per se as was the case in Pukhtun ethnopolitics when we discussed the impact of the situation of Afghanistan in section 4.5.1. Again we may caution the reader that it is not assigning blame but merely an effort to discover the underlying factors of conflict. The fact that the declining trend in conflict over secession can also be attributed to the change in tone of the Baloch ethnopolitical leadership is also suggested by Tahir Amin's remarks;

> As the civil war was prolonged, the movement leaders became ambivalent with regard to the issue of secession. They chose to put the struggle as a first step towards the liberation of nationalities in Pakistan. (Amin 1988)[21]

In the start of 1990, the leaders from Balochistan gave a series of statements to underline the need for provincial autonomy[22] and rights of nationalities.[23] This set the tone for an increasing non-violent conflict in the next fifteen years. After 2002, the conflict with state agencies became overtly violent and during 2006 and later (which is beyond the scope of this study for ethnopolitical conflict) the conflict assumed proportions of a civil war of the same or greater intensity as that of 1970s. It can be safely suggested that the trend lines of both violent and non violent conflict at the end of this study's period, point towards increasing conflict in later years. With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that this happened indeed. I would also dare to suggest that the roots of the most recent, and current Baloch ethnopolitical conflict should not be expediently located in the type of polity (the dictatorship of General Musharraf), only.

Figure 4.4:Total Ethnopolitical Conflict over the years for Baloch/Balochistan



Further analyzing this dyad for the type of issues that made the content of this conflict we first see that the income from Gas produced in Balochistan could be a real source of conflict in the province (Figure 19, Annex 4-A). As discussed in section 2.4.4, the onset, duration or

prevalence of conflict have been variously attributed to 'greed'. This greed factor has been proxied for by the presence of natural resources, which offers opportunities to the rebel group. In Balochistan's case, there is a history of payments of large sums of money, made to the tribal leaders in lieu of the use of land for extraction of gas. Akbar Bugti and his tribe are known to have received the major portion of these payouts under agreements with state owned companies.[24] A chunk of the lower level jobs were also given to his appointees, under the agreement. This is also coupled with the fact that 12.5% of the royalty of gas is also required to be paid to the provincial government by the federal government. The latest conflict in Balochistan which started in 2004 is known to have its roots in the disagreements over the amount of these payments.

It may be tempting to readily believe this greed-conflict hypothesis in Balochistan's case, however there is powerful evidence to suggest that long standing grievances were a key factor in this conflict. As Murshed (2010) suggests, a proper greed-based theory of civil war must relate to the trade-off between production and predation in making a living. He also points to the fact that armed conflict implies the absence of contractual or consensual interaction. This is not the case in Balochistan where proper contractual arrangements existed for transfer of resources from the government to the ethno politicians. It is also important to note that if greed is ever a factor in a conflict, it will seldom surface in the pages of a newspaper. No ethnopolitical leader will be foolish enough to mention the money factor even in passing. The mere presence of lootable resources in the province only helps us to take advantage of the theory developed in this regard through the cross country studies and discussed in section 2.4.4.

This should prompt us to look towards other issues which made up the content of this conflict. We observe that some of the Baloch people have been in a conflict which can be described as subversive or secessionist (Figure 20, Appendix 4-A). We also see that there has been a conflict with state agencies over the rights to life, freedom and property (Figure 21, Appendix 4-A). Although both these are two sides of the same coin, yet it was necessary to separate the two for the simple fact that - 'one person's terrorist may be the other's hero'. There is an amazing tendency in both these conflict issues to move in tandem.

Almost the same is true for the conflict over general rights for the province (Figure 22, Annex 4-A).

The rest of the conflict issues in this ethnopolitical dyad are all overwhelmingly non violent. An increasing conflict over participation in governance structures and power organs of the state is witnessed in the shape of statements from the politicians. There has been a historic sense of frustration in Balochis about their non representation in power organs. This is also reinforced by the fact that Balochistan has often failed to secure its quota of jobs in the federal services (See Figure 26, Annex 4-A). Due to the fact that Balochistan was only granted the status of a province in 1970, the majority of civil servants in that province hailed from outside (A. Khan 2005). There is a sense that these factors have contributed to the over all underdevelopment of Balochistan (Quota system discussed in detail in Chapter 5). The conflict over federal help for Balochistan has therefore picked up steam (Figure 25, Annex 4-A), with the province demanding more from the resource pool on the basis of it's under development.

One would expect that those accused of indulging in narrow parochialism, the ethno-politicians, to be more belligerent on the issues of identity, culture and ethnicity. The absence of any violent conflict on this score in the Baloch case should be an eye opener (Figure 29, Annex 4-A). The rest of the conflict that is there, is non violent and of a periodic nature. I will examine the impact of such a finding on the institutional set up in chapter 5.

The Baloch case also follows the general trend in Pakistani politics when it comes to conflict with the state over the type of polity (Figure 27, Annex 4-A). The fact that this type of conflict has largely been non violent and has ebbed and flowed with the alternate dictatorial and democratic cycles in the country, should be a testament that on this score these ethno-politicians have not been against the entity of the state but against the way it has been run. To the extent of Baloch ethnopoliticians, this is no longer true as some of them now openly demand secession. This includes Hairbiyar Marri, Bramdagh Bugti and Akhtar Mengal i.e the second generation of tribal leadership. The significance of polity (democracy, autocracy) in determining the contours of ethnopolitical conflict will be discussed in chapter 5.

In a nutshell, we find ourselves in agreement with A. Khan (2005) who argues that the highly centralised state of Pakistan and its

unwillingness to allow regional and ethnic autonomy forced the nationalist forces to launch a guerrilla war against the state.

4.5.3 Sindhi Ethnopolitical Conflict

Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict has been largely non violent over the years, especially after 1988-89, See Figure 4.5. Like the Pukhtun case, Jaffrelot (2002) postulates that Sindh's political trajectory shows that, Pakistan could experience an inverted U curve, a trajectory ending with the defusing of ethnic tensions. Assuming for a moment that nationalism here is the same as the ethnopolitical conflict, we find from our data that it has indeed followed an inverted U curve (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5: Profile of Sindh/Sindhi Ethnopolitical Conflict



Ethnopolitics in Sindh have a rather short history as compared to Pukhtun and Baloch cases. GM Syed founded the Sindh Progressive party in 1947 which, in his own words, laid the foundations of Sindhi nationalism.[25] In 1953 he formed the *Sindh Awami Mahaz*.[26] In early 1960s it metamorphosed into the *Jiye Sindh Movement*.[27] Till 1970s the movement remained confined to articulating the grievances of the

people of Sindh, emanating from in-migration of large number of non Sindhis, and mainly in the realm of culture and identity (Wright Jr 1991). The emergence of PPP under ZAB (Who was himself a Sindhi), undercut the support for the ethno politicians.

The conflict in Sindh has largely been non violent in the 1970s except for a few sporadic incidents. 1980s saw an outburst of ethnopolitical conflict when the Sindhi nationalists became a part of the PPP led MRD. The effect of this movement is seen in the form of violent conflict in mid 1980s. It would be unjust to the politics of PPP to confine it to the narrow realm of Sindhi ethnopolitics but it is also a fact that Sindhis felt alienated and wronged when one of theirs (ZAB) was sentenced to death by a Punjabi majority Supreme Court under a Punjabi dictator, Zia ul Haq. When the PPP launched the struggle, the effect was mostly felt in Sindh. There was the added fact that Sindhis have a very small presence in Army. This makes A. Khan (2005) remark that 'For Sindhis military rule means rule by an occupying army'.[28] Jaffrelot (2002) notes that the anti Zia campaign in Sindh in 1980s was amply nationalistic. The subversive effect in the conflict is shown by Figure 33, Annex 4-A.

The conflict data shows that after 1988, ethnopolitical conflict in Sindh has largely been non-violent, with a declining trend. Most of this conflict during these years has been around the issues of Kalabagh dam and the water share from Indus river (Figure 30, Annex 4-A), the issues of rights of the province (Figure 31, Annex 4-A), issues related to general governance e.g. budget and foreign policy (Figure 34, Annex 4-A) and conflict with state agencies over the rights to life, freedom and property (Figure 35, Annex 4-A). All these conflicts were overwhelmingly non violent.

Apart from the ethnopolitical conflict over Sindhi language which started with the language riots of early 1970s (which we will discuss in the next section) this dyad has been remarkably mute during the period under study (Figure 36, Annex 4-A). Activity is only seen from mid eighties to the year 1999. After that it can be reported that there has not been any conflict over this issue.

4.5.4 The Muhajir Dyads

The advantages of studying ethnopolitical conflict in dyads are evident when it comes to analyzing dyads numbering 6 to 9. In all these dyads,

the ethnopolitical leadership of Muhajir community from urban Sindh, form one end of these conflict axes. Dyad 8 is a minor dyad with very little conflict (that too is non violent) in 1973 and 1987. There is therefore no need to discuss it to any length.

The Muhajir case also comes as a confirmation of the adoption of multiple identities by individuals and groups.[29] We see these multiple identities at play on several levels of ethnopolitical conflict when it involves Muhajir ethnopolitical leadership. They are Muhajirs, the sons of the people who made Pakistan possible and then migrated to it, they are Sindhis when it comes to demanding rights for the province and they are from the proletariat when it comes to demanding rights for the people against the elites. Yet there is more; namely the fact that Muhajirs have also seen most conflict on the basis of identity markers. There is very little over rights and grievances. Karachi and Hyderabad have seen the most urban violence during 1980s and 1990s. These conflicts have had more ethnic overtones than political, something borne by the data. As an example scholars are curious by the intensity of conflict between Muhajirs and Pukhtuns in mid 1980s (Figure 4.8) and the absence of any real conflict of interest (A. Khan 2005).[30]

The data shows that dyad 7 has exhibited the most violent ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan since 1972 (Figure 4.7). Seen in conjunction with dyads 6 and 9 (Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8), this violence is even more magnified. The infighting between the two factions of Muhajir ethnopolitical party, the MQM, has also been included in conflict dyad 7 because for most of this conflict, one side was supported by state forces or at least was perceived to be supported by it.

The Muhajir and Sindhi ethnopolitical conflict has its roots in the earliest post partition period in 1947, when the Sindhi expectations of getting land from Ghulam Muhammad Barrage[31] were not fulfilled. Instead most of the land went to Punjabi and Muhajir settlers and former and serving military officers (Waseem 1996).[32] Sindhis were also not happy with the small credit given to them in the struggle for Pakistan, in the school textbooks (Kazi 1988). The language bill of 1972, introduced by the provincial PPP government, became the starter for a short lived conflict which was mainly based on identity markers. The data shows that Muhajir ethnopolitics were born amid violent, almost simultaneous, conflicts in Karachi with Pukhtuns (Figure 4.8) Sindhis (Figure 4.6) and the Central Government/Punjab (Figure 4.7) [33]

The issues which pushed Muhajirs and Sindhis towards conflict were mainly related to language in the 1970s and the return of *Bihari*[34] refugees from Bangladesh.[35] The Sindhis saw this as a further threat to the demographic balance of the province. The flashpoint for conflict with Pukhtuns was the death of a *Bihari* girl in Karachi in a bus accident. Since most of the public transport is owned and operated by Pukhtuns, the incident soon became a rallying point for ethnopolitical conflict.

MQM leadership has been in intensely violent conflicts with state agencies the rhetoric for which was secessionist and subversive (Figure 39, Annex 4-A). The three army/militia led actions were all started by federal governments, which initially counted MQM as its coalition partner. These operations lost their momentum gradually with each cycle to the extent that General Musharraf's operation fizzled out in the end by appointing an MQM activist as the governor of the province. Since then there has been no violent conflict in any of the Muhajir dyads till the end of this study period.

Figure 4.6: Total Conflict between the ethnopolitical leadership of Muhajirs and Sindhis.



Figure 4.7: Total conflict between the ethnopolitical leadership of Muhajirs and the State, Army, Punjab



Figure 4.8: Total Conflict between the Ethnopolitical leadership of Muhajirs and Pukhtuns



4.5.5 Other Dyads

The eight dyads discussed above contribute the maximum to overall conflict. However, the rest of the dyads had to be studied in order to see a complete picture. Individually, all these dyads are mostly non violent (except for dyad 5 in early 1970s and dyad 11).

Dyad 4 (Figure 41, Annex 4-A) for Punjab is the most non violent and milder one among major dyads. There is a tendency that it shows activity only on the few issues of share of resources among provinces.

Dyad 5 has been active only during the early 1970s. (Figure 42, Annex 4-A).

Except for dyad 10, most of these dyads are linked to those already explained above in the sense that the parties in conflict (mostly ethno politicians) are the same. The difference is in the alliances they make and the multiple identities they acquire in different dyads. This gives rise to different configurations of stakeholders which are interesting in their own right to study. A broad picture is given by the charts of conflict in these dyads (See appendix 4-A).

4.6 Limitations and Potential of the Approach

The process of data collection can never be rigorous enough in a country with a history of media censorship and use of additional sources has its limits.

Another limitation of the data is its use of weights assigned to different orders of conflict, as discussed in section 4.4. An ordinal variable can be used as a scalar one only on the basis of good underlying theory, which is itself a subjective criterion. However the use of another method for assigning weights as discussed in section 4.4 would have entailed much the same problems, without any apparent addition to the understanding of the issue under study. The framework has given us graphical accounts of the different ethnopolitical conflicts – accounts which conform to the narratives of this conflict.

The framework of our present dataset can be used to add more events to the present dyads as well as the addition of more dyads and issues. This will allow us not only to see a more complete picture of the conflicts under study but also analyze the present conflict between the radicals (Taliban and their allies) and state agencies. It will also afford us

to see the cross linkages of these conflicts with others e.g. sectarian conflict and that over the emerging issues of environment.

4.7 Conclusion

To see the profile of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan I collected a dataset of events from 1972 to 2005. To get an empirical handle on the data a conflict score was calculated according to a weightage scheme. This scheme was applied to the annually aggregated data for the period of study. A dyadic scheme was followed to study the different combinations of stakeholders in these conflicts and on the basis of a given set of issues.

From the above, we get a sense that the ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan took a definite turning point after 1971. Till 1970, the one unit scheme[36] was largely responsible for most rhetoric from the ethnopolitical leadership. The dissolution of one unit was welcomed by all. This took out the sting from most of the ethnopolitical agenda. The 1971 elections gave this leadership a share of the pie in governments in NWFP and Balochistan. The issues that remained were largely side issues of day to day governance.

The current phase (1971 till now) of ethnopolitical conflict, excluding dyads containing Muhajirs, has a watershed starting point in the events of 1973 in Balochistan. Those events started a chain which led to Baloch uprising, a renewed Pukhtunistan movement and the interference from Afghanistan in 70s and 80s. This led to the banning of NAP and that in turn sped up the fragmentation of Sindhi ethnopolitical leadership who separated from the party.

1980s also saw the birth of Muhajir ethnopolitics, which were instrumental in some of the most intense violence in the period under study. This trend has been declining since 2003.

This description of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan since 1972 was necessary to get the overall picture. The next chapter will now attempt at an explanation of this conflict in the context of the health of federal institutions.

Notes

1. Gupta and Gupta (1990), P. 191

2 The number of deaths can always be updated from biographical material and triangulation of sources.

3. The UPPSALA conflict data program is one such example which defines armed conflict as 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths' (Strand et al. 2003)

4 Term taken from the Conflict Barometer by Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research.(HIIK 2008)

5 Among others by Hibbs (1973) and Rummel (1971)

6 Please read chapter 2.

7 Among others by Shahzad (2007), A. Khan (2005) and Amin (1988).

8 P. 217

9 This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

10 Dawn, 30-03-1972

11 Interview with Mr. Juma Khan Safi, Dated 01-05-2007, Peshawar.

12 P. 139

13 pp. 25-26

14 Which later became known as the Hyderabad tribunal (1975-79)

15 Jeffrelot asserts otherwise. 'The ANP also diluted its nationalist programme because its top priority was to support the war effort of Islamabad against the Soviets' (Jaffrelot 2002). This is pure conjecture and not based on facts.

16 More on this aspect in our discussion of Fiscal Federalism in Chapter 5.

17 P. 105

18 P. 286

19 Using the UPPSALA definition of civil war, a thousand or more deaths per year in a conflict.

20 Akbar Bugti was killed in an encounter with the security forces on August 26, 2006.

21 P. 151

[22] See for example Dawn: 26-3-1990, 02-04-1990, 28-05-1990, 07-07-1990, 09-10-1990, 22-10-1990. These are among the many statements wherein he demanded more provincial autonomy and due rights.

[23] See for example Dawn: 11-02-1991, when Ataullah Mengal demands rights for nationalities.

[24] The companies include Pakistan Petroleum limited (PPL), Oil and Gas Development company Limited (OGDCL), Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGC) and Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited (SNGPL). The companies claimed that in 2005 they were paying Rs. 10,000 per acre for use of 1,100 acres. The tribe insisted on being paid Rs. 17,600 per acre for the use of 7000 acres. See Dawn 29-1-2005.

[25] Cited by Amin (1988), P. 92

[26] Translated as Sindh People's Front

[27] Translated as 'Long live Sindh Movement'.

[28] P. 149

[29] For multiple identities please read A. Sen (2008)

[30] P. 175

[31] Became operative in 1958.

[32] P. 623

[33] For an account of Muhajir grievances in one place, see Haq (1995)

[34] Mostly with ancestral ties to the province of Bihar in India, speaking Urdu and are ethnically related to Muhajirs. In fact the MQM leadership takes umbrage if the term is used.

[35] 'Biharis' is the term used for the descendents of people from the Indian province of Bihar who migrated to the former East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh). Most of these people have been left stranded in slums in Bangladesh after 1971.

[36] One Unit scheme details in chapter 2. For more on this scheme please refer to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Unit

5 The Health of Federal Institutions and Impact on Ethnopolitical Conflict

> When I depart from the scene, I would like to see constitutional government entrenched and democratic institutions strengthened. I would like to see provincial autonomy functioning properly because in an underdeveloped country it is far more difficult to maintain a balance between the federal and the provincial governments than in the developed countries. *

5.1 Introduction

The connection between institutions and conflict is well theorized. This chapter discusses the formal and informal institutions created under the social contract in Pakistan. Important institutions in these categories, their health and the impact on the overall ethnopolitical conflict will be analyzed.

I will briefly discuss the institutions established by the social contract in Pakistan, mainly through its structured fiscal federalist scheme, the requirements of checks and balances, and the unstructured and informal understanding among the federating units on the share in power pie. The effects of these two types of institutions on the overall ethnic conflict will be analyzed by studying the quality of leading institutions in each category.

A system of fiscal federalism had to be devised in Pakistan to allocate and redistribute resources among the federating units. Among the institutions created for this purpose, The NFC, the Concurrent list of the constitution and the quota system of jobs in the federal government, stand out for their importance and will be studied for their impact on ethnopolitical conflict.

---

* Prime Ministers Z.A Bhutto in an interview with A.M Rosenthal. Dawn, May 2nd 1974.

The checks and balances scheme of the constitution provides judicial review and a bicameral legislature. Their independence and democratic credentials respectively, indicate their quality. It would be difficult to study both in a single undertaking. As a practical solution I intend to study the latter as the changes in polity directly affected changes in the independence of judiciary. The chapter will attempt to see the effect of changes in polity on the ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan.

Among the unstructured and informal rules of the game, a tacit understanding among the power stakeholders in the country about the share of each federating unit in the power cake is observed. A few power positions of note are considered part of this cake. We will see how the division of these positions impacted the overall conflict.

The relevant elements of social contract which will be part of the discussion in this chapter have been fleshed out in chapter 3. Here we are interested to see how those elements were practically implemented and answer the question; what was their effect on unfolding ethnopolitical conflict?

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, the theoretical debate linking institutions, their types and quality to the conflict inside a country will be presented. In section 5.3, the federal scheme of the Pakistani constitution and the institutions it creates will be linked to the emerging ethnopolitical conflict via the three tiers of NFC, the concurrent list of the constitution and the quota system of jobs in federal services. In section 5.4 the checks on executive and their link with conflict will be explored via the health of the two institutions of polity (the legislative check) and the share in power of each ethnic/provincial group. Section 5.5 discusses other institutions which were specifically created for conflict management among the federating units. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.

5.2 Institutions and Conflict-The Theoretical Debate

Institutions have been variously defined as scripts (Ridley 1975), games (Iversen 1999), the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North 1990)[1] and simply the equilibrium ways of doing things (Shepsle 2006).[2]

Shepsle further differentiates between structured and unstructured institutions. Simply put, institutions that are robust over time and lend themselves to comparisons across settings are structured (Shepsle 2006)

e.g. legislature, judiciary or a regulatory agency like the NFC in our case. For Shepsle, Other institutions which may be "described as practices and recognized as patterns they induce" should be classified as unstructured institutions.[3] In our case, examples of these may include the tacit understanding among ruling elites, to give representation to every ethnic group, in power (more on this in section 5.4.1).

The structured and unstructured institutions of Shepsle can be compared to the formal and informal institutions of North (1990). It may be easier to think of the formal constraints or institutions, but where do informal constraints come from? They come from socially transmitted information and are a part of the heritage that we call culture (North 1990)[4].

Like politics and economics, political and economic institutions are inseparable.[5] This gives the study, the motivation to study both as a single set of factors affecting conflict. Both types of institutions need to be differentiated as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), however my differentiation will be restricted to more formal institutions than theirs.[6] I will also refrain from an exhaustive analysis of these institutions and will take one or two examples from each category (See Table 5.1).

Why is it necessary to study institutions? Is there a theoretical basis for linking conflict with the quality of institutions? The literature suggests that this link is established through at least three channels.

First, the quality of institutions is linked to growth. This growth link is established in such cross country works as, inter alia, Acemoglu et al. (2005), Murshed (2010) and Easterly and Levine (2003). The underlying theory states that conflict over resources or rents will decrease if the over all size of available resources is increased. In other words, the bigger the cake, the bigger the share and the less will be the heart burn.

The second effect of good quality institutions is their leveling impact in terms of horizontal inequality among the contending groups.[7] Its biggest impact is felt on the elites and the share of power and wealth they enjoy in the informal political institutions (S.M. Murshed 2010). On a more general level these reduce horizontal inequality, relative deprivation and social exclusion, topics which will be covered in next chapter.

The third significant role of institutions is direct. Easterly (2001) finds that good institutions may mitigate ethnically based social conflict that

lowers growth. Most institutions are in one sense, attempts to manage conflicts. The presence of good working institutions is itself a sign of less conflict.

It will be the endeavor in this chapter to discuss Pakistani institutions in the light of the above mentioned links. To do this we first need to identify those institutions in this study, the composition and working of which had a relationship with unfolding ethnopolitical conflict. Since Nordlinger (1972)[8] and Snyder (2000),[9]argue for a case that federalism and its associated arrangements are not a suitable solution to ethnic conflict and that a federal dispensation will contribute to exacerbation of conflict and ultimately the failure of federation, therefore; a nuanced study of contextual factors that lead to particular make up of the federation and its resulting institutions in our case will be required. Such an analysis will therefore need to identify its place in the narrower theoretical discourse about the nature of federal structures, the fiscal federalism schemes; and their impact on conflict. This debate will also be a bridge for us to the study of our case.

5.2.1 Consociational Federalism, Fiscal Federalism and Institutions

When does a formal social contract or the constitution become federal. William Riker's classic answer remains valid today;

> A constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere. (Riker 1964)[10]

Federalism then is about the division of power between federal and regional governments (Wachendorfer-Schmidt and Wachendorfer 2000)[11] therefore there cannot be a single method for this division. Federalism thus comes in more than one flavour. This gives rise to a variety of institutions depending upon the context and need. Jennings (2007) asks the question that given that good institutional arrangements result in low conflict, then why we don't see more constitutional conventions aimed at eliminating conflict. Linking it with reducing conflict, McGarry and O'Leary (2009) point out that in order to be successful, federations not only need to evolve institutions of 'self rule' but also those of 'shared rule', or consociational rule. It should also have

an agreed regime for managing resources.[12] Many Scholars thus arguing have led to the consociational school, maintaining that "proportionality in…the allocation of public funds" is an essential element of successful power-sharing arrangements between ethnic groups (Lijphart 1977).[13.]

In other words, it isn't sufficient to grant a semblance of self rule to the federating units but also to take these units along in governing the federation as a whole. This takes us to the debate whether a democratic federal setup will be more amenable to reducing conflict.

As discussed in section 3.4, the nature of federation in Pakistan changed from that of 'coming together' federation in 1947 to 'holding together' federation in 1973. Such holding needed bonds which could only be supplied through the consociational means. Analyzing the case of Pakistan, Adeney (2009) argues that better representation of groups in the core institutions of state through consociational mechanisms would have alleviated many of the tensions and conflicts within Pakistani federation, whether or not it was a democracy. She does not agree with Talbot (1998) and A. Khan (2005) who argue that since the absence of democracy necessarily meant the centralization of power therefore in these periods of dictatorships ethnic tensions increase. Adeney's analysis questions this assumption, recognizing the argument that many of the conflicts took place after prolonged periods of autocratic rule. She then posits that the relationship between the nature of polity and ethnic conflict is more complicated than it is generally portrayed. Analyzing the two institutions of army and bureaucracy, she concludes that the proportionality (inclusiveness) element of consociational-ism has a direct relationship with the ethnic conflict in Pakistan.

There is also a case for decentralization of public expenditures in federations, leading to a reduction of conflict. Tranchant (2007) presents evidence that fiscal federalism reduces violence if different ethnicities are concentrated in the different geographic entities of the federation. As Murshed (2010) points out, fiscal federalism or the decentralized expenditure decision making is less of a factor, in reducing violence, than fiscal appeasement. The point is underscored by Alemán and Treisman (2005) who studied the cases of India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Yugoslavia and found that fiscal appeasement rather than fiscal decentralization has been more effective in reducing conflict. This finding in case of Pakistan will be the focus in section 5.3.1.

In a roundabout way the successful practice of a particular brand of federalism again comes back to the nature of institutions in a country. This is what Tranchant (2008) finds in a cross country study.

Drawing on the above discussion I propose to study Pakistani institutions and their impact on the ethnopolitical conflict. Two cases each of the unstructured/informal and structured/formal institutions will be discussed. Each case will be either a political or economic institution. Please refer to Table 5.1 for typology of these institution and our studied examples.

Table 5.1: Typology of institutions and studied examples for Pakistan

Type of Institutions	Political	Economic
Unstructured/Informal Institutions.	Share of Power for the elite	Appeasement through NFC
Structured/Formal Institutions.	• Legislatures. • The concurrent list of Constitution. • Council of Common Interests	• Allocation and Redistribution through NFC. • Quota system of jobs in Federal Government.

5.3 Federal Institutions and their impact on ethnopolitical conflict[14]

Wallace E. Oates, in his classic study on fiscal federalism presented the decentralization theorem.

> For a public good- the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central or the respective local government-it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments to provide the pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions.(Oates 1972)[15]

However, costs vary in the real world, and the central governments need to decide on their level of provisioning. In such a situation the

question of continued devolution to the regional governments is bound to become skewed in favour of some and will generate controversies and grievances in a federation. Resource starved regions will find themselves unable to provide even the most basic of public goods efficiently, without 'someone' picking the extra tab. Additionally, tastes and preferences differ from region to region (province). In such a situation a market type solution may not exist for public goods when it comes to determine the level of expenditure (Samuelson 1954). Tiebout (1956) argued that if the consumption of public goods and choice of region is bundled then we can obtain an approximate market type solution where people can 'vote with their feet' i.e. move to an area of low taxes and high public good availability. Bewley (1981) argued that for such a situation to hold and be efficient, the number of regions should match the number of consumer types, governments should be profit-maximizing and anticipatory, they should make zero profits in equilibrium, there is free trade among regions and that public services rather than public goods are the focus of government intervention. This is a tall order to meet and it will be seen in latter discussion that most of these conditions were not met in the Pakistani fiscal scheme and its implementation. The result was sometimes 'voting with the feet' as in the case of large scale migration to Karachi and northern Punjab, but mostly such inefficiencies led to generation of grievances.

The institution of NFC was proposed and set up under article 160 of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan, to apportion resources vertically between the center and provinces and horizontally among the federating units.[16] With its work cut out for it by the constitutional contract, the NFC should not have had much problem in arriving at agreed and acceptable formulae. Over the years this proved an elusive goal. The fiscal flavour of the scheme (with supposedly pareto-efficient output) was frequently overshadowed by the consociational one. The basis for this was provided by the same article of constitution (Sub article 2(b), See Annex 5-A). In section 5.3.1, this thesis will study how this came about and what was its impact on ethnopolitical conflict.

The federalism theorem also has its application in the political institutions. Pakistani constitution provides for legislative domains (called 'lists'). Article 142 provides a federal legislative list and a concurrent legislative list (Annex 5-B). The former is the exclusive domain of the national parliament while matters in the concurrent list are

open to the provincial and federal legislatures.[17] An analysis will be undertaken in section 5.3.2 for studying the impact of this arrangement, on conflict.

The concept of power sharing by being inclusive has long been a favourite with consociationalist. It is supposed to dampen the appetite for conflict. However Murshed (2010) and Roeder (2005) consider these power sharing formulae bad for long term democratization because all issues risk becoming ethnicized. For long term solution they contend that power division structures should be built in the system with checks and balances, 'multiple majorities' and no veto power for any single majority. This may mean 'more layers of political and economic decision making than there are ethnicities' (S.M. Murshed 2010).

In addition to the layers of multiple majorities and separation of powers, an informal political contract among the federating units in Pakistan has typically been recognized. This informal/unstructured institution is the proportionate representation of units in the power circle. This is mainly a power sharing institution as opposed to the more formal institutions of power division. This institution is the implicit part of the elite level contract and the ethnopolitical conflict over it will be analyzed in section 5.4.1.

5.3.1 The National Finance Commission (NFC)

Redistribution

In accordance with the constitutional provision, the NFC award has been announced in 1974, 1979, 1990, 1996 and 2006.[18] In light of Oates's theorem we can see that the purpose was to redistribute the resources optimally and after every five years. This obviously could not happen regularly as intended, at least when it came to the 'regular' part.

Vertical Distribution and Fiscal Autonomy

The constitution does not provide any formula for vertical distribution of resources between provinces and the center. The issue of vertical imbalance between the two has dogged most of the discussion over the years since Pakistan's vertical imbalances are high by international standards (Asian Dev Bank 2004), see Figure 5.5 and Table 5.2.

Most of the revenue is directly collected by the central government. This may provide for efficient collection but it absolves the provincial

governments of the responsibility to the taxpayer; it leaves few incentives for the provinces to utilize the resources efficiently. Also, another potential drawback of the system is that the formula determining a province's revenue allocation bears little relation to the province's expenditure (Asian Dev Bank 2004). This creates inefficiencies in the over all system and is one crucial deficiency for the requirements of optimality.

In addition to inducing the above mentioned inefficiencies, the system also engenders the feelings of financial dependence. Whatever formula is agreed upon, it is bound to be seen as unsatisfactory to the individual stakeholders. With such vertical fiscal imbalance, the financial soundness of provinces remains dependent on the handouts from the center and all the undesired consequences are put at the doorstep of federal government.

Table 5.2: Vertical distribution under various NFC awards

Year	Federal /Provincial	Divisible pool[19]
1974	20:80	Income tax, Sales tax and corporation Tax+ Export duties on Cotton
1979	20:80	Same as above
1985	Interim Award	Same as above
1990	20:80	Same as above+ Excise duty on sugar and tobacco
1996	62.5:37.5	All taxes
2000 (Not Awarded)	Interim Award	Same as above
2006 (Estimated)	45:55[20]	Same as above
Source: Adapted from (I. Ahmad et al. 2007) and (Sabir 2001)		

As Qureshi (1991) points out, there is no single measure that can give an unambiguous idea about the financial soundness of sub-national governments and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by them. The one indicator that can give us some idea about the financial autonomy of these federating units is the degree of fiscal decentralization.[21] More precisely, the degree of fiscal decentralization can be measured as the proportion of aggregate subnational government expenditures that is

financed from non-central sources (Alemán and Treisman 2005). In theory, more fiscal decentralization should offer more potential for improved macroeconomic governance (A. Shah 1999). Translating this into practice has been particularly difficult in Pakistan.

From Figure 5.1, it can be seen that the provincial share of the federal taxes and excises, distributed according to the NFC awards from time to time, steadily decreased for all the provinces but especially so for NWFP and Balochistan. While Punjab's and Sindh's share dropped from mid 40 percentage points to 30s, NWFP's and Balochistan's share dropped from 50s to 20s and below. This drop is compensated to a large extent by a rise in revenue deficit grants from the federal government, see Figure 5.3. Similarly the share of provincial own revenues have steadily dropped for all provinces but more so for NWFP and Balochistan, See Figure 5.3. The trend continues to this day, See e.g. Figure 5.4. However since 1996 award, there is a tendency to shift from grants to getting more revenue share from the divisible pool (Jaffery and Sadaqat 2006). This was done largely in the name of stabilization but had its own negative consequences (Q.M. Ahmed et al. 2004). This also, in essence, does not change the autonomy equation. And we can surmise that financial autonomy over the years has steadily eroded and with it the notion of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, the case that fiscal decentralization is not effective enough in reducing violent conflict (S.M. Murshed 2010), cannot be investigated thoroughly because, to begin with, there has not been enough decentralization in Pakistan. This does not stop us from observing that while there has been a trend of decreasing fiscal decentralization, the ethnopolitical conflict over it has shown an increasing trend, see Figure 5.12.

Figure 5.1: Share of Federal Taxes and Excises as a percentage of total provincial current revenues



Source: Adapted from (Sato 1994)

Figure 5.2: Share of provincial tax revenues as a percentage of total provincial current revenues



Source: Adapted from (Sato 1994)

Figure 5.3: Share of Revenue Deficit Grants as a percentage of total provincial current revenues



Source: Adapted from (Sato 1994)

Figure 5.4: Provisional Percentage Share of different sources in Total Provincial Revenue for July-Dec 2008



Source: Govt of Pakistan, Ministry of finance[22]

Figure 5.5:International Vertical Fiscal Gaps



Source: (Asian Dev Bank 2004)

Horizontal Distribution and Redistribution

Going along the path of Oates's theorem, the second requirement for the optimality of fiscal federalism is its efficiency in redistribution of resources among federating units. In addition to the vertical distribution, the horizontal distribution among provinces has also been a squabbling point. The basic formula for this apportionment has evolved over the course of successive awards. Notwithstanding the grants and subventions for the provinces, the formula has come to depend largely on population as the basic criterion; while changing the composition of the resource cake. All the four provinces have historically proposed different and, at times, mutually exclusive formulae as basis for resource distribution, see Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Provinces and their demands for NFC Formula basis

Province	Formula Basis Demand
Punjab	Population
Sindh	Revenue Generation
NWFP	Backwardness + Population
Balochistan	Inverse Population Density

Source: (G. Ahmed 2007)

Population has been the only criterion on the basis of which all the past awards have been decided. This however has a catch. In the absence of any compromise formula, the recurring subterfuge has been to let the previous population based formula to continue, with some extra grants for the smaller provinces. This has caused heart burn and a sense of helplessness among the three smaller provinces. It is perhaps the biggest contributory factor to the overall ethnopolitical conflict over NFC and allied matters, see Figure 5.12. The population basis for this formula, in combination with grants, has the benefits of simplicity, objectivity and the transfer of resources in a predictable manner but lacks a specific equalization standard and therefore falls short of the professed goal of reducing regional inequalities (A. Shah 1991).

Sindh's case for consideration of revenue generation will take into account the sincerity of effort for resource generation. However the data

for this is not available (G. Ahmed 2007). The data that the finance department of the government of Sindh compiled[23] only gives the collection origin and not the incidence point of the taxes. Nor does the tax collecting authority, Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), compiles data on this basis. Further, as Anwar Shah points out, there seems neither to be equity nor efficiency argument for doing so.[24] In essence, this argument crumbles at the touchstone of optimal redistribution in fiscal federalism.

NWFP's case for taking 'backwardness' as the formula basis has equity and efficiency on its side but it would be very difficult for the two bigger provinces of Punjab and Sindh to accede to it as it would directly impact their own share of divisible pool. NWFP also supports giving part consideration to population.

Balochistan's case for Inverse Population Density will take care of the unique situation of that province as it is the largest and least populated of all four; however that will leave Punjab and Sindh, and to a certain extent NWFP, with too few resources.[25]

The redistribution scheme of Pakistani federalism is therefore good on paper but lacking in practice. We will see in detail in chapter 6, whether this redistributive scheme had any appreciable effect at reducing interprovincial and inter regional disparities in development and in turn had any effect on the course of ethnopolitical conflict.

Figure 5.6: Percentage share of each province in divisible pool



Source: (I. Ahmad et al. 2007)

Figure 5.7: Year wise allocation of percentage share for each province



Source: (I. Ahmad et al. 2007)

Fiscal Appeasement

Having a rigid population based formula did not deter decision makers from evolving a complex scheme of transfers, grants and budgetary help for the smaller provinces. Thus, in addition to the above fiscal redistribution formula, the appeasement was mainly done via two principal fiscal channels, straight transfers and grants.

Revenue collected from certain natural resources by the federal government was directly transferred to the provinces by the collecting agency, hence straight transfers. This gave the provinces a sense of entitlement and a modicum of control over their natural resources. Although the provision was there in the constitution, only excise duty and royalty on natural gas were included in the 1974 award. In 1990 the net profit from hydro electricity, gas development surcharge and royalty on crude oil were also included and hence the importance of these funds have steadily increased for provinces (Ghaus et al. 1996).

There have been problems with these straight transfers. The computation and payment of profits from hydro electricity has been random and non-transparent. These payments are sometimes blamed for creating financial viability problems for the state authority responsible for generating electricity, the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). Due to these problems the payments have sometimes been capped at a certain level leading to long drawn legal solicitation between the federal and provincial governments. The expectations after the NFC accord of 1990 were high and the provincial government of NWFP accordingly budgeted its resources. These expectations were not met in the subsequent years as the profit was capped at Rs. 6000 million, without assigning any reason, see Figure 5.8. This led to heart burn and the conflict over this issue can be seen following the trend of expectations, see Figure 5.9. A solicitation committee of all stakeholders recommended a compromise formula in 2006 but even that remains to be implemented as WAPDA has refused to agree to it. More recently however, the Prime Minister announced in November 2009, the implementation of the compromise formula but that too over a period of five years.

Figure 5.8: Expected (Budgeted) and Actual funds received for hydro profit to NWFP. (Rs in millions)



Source: Provincial Budget statements and AGPR reports for various years.

Figure 5.9: Conflict over Hydro power profits



In the case of Balochistan these straight transfers witnessed appreciable jumps in 1991 and 1999 and downturns in 1996 and 2001, See Figure 5.10.[26] Yet curiously, a rising trend is witnessed in conflict over the same, in Figure 5.11. However conflict indicators over this issue are few and far between and therefore cannot help us explain the recent rise in overall ethnopolitical conflict in Balochistan. This, we shall attempt in section 5.3.2.

Figure 5.10: Straight transfers to Balochistan



Source: Statistics compiled by provincial finance department of Balochistan.

The grants portion of federal help for the two smaller provinces can be divided into budget support grants and development grants. As for the former we saw in Figure 5.3, that the federal government has tried to appease the provinces on that score. For the latter, the story isn't different either, except that the two smaller provinces of NWFP and Balochistan were favoured even more than was due on a strictly population basis, See Table 5.4. It is interesting to note the trends when read together with the conflict data of the previous chapter. Balochistan received consistently larger shares for both categories of grants in late 1970s and early 1980s. At the same time the ethnopolitical conflict decreased (Figure 4.4) NWFP also received larger shares and a similar tendency of decreasing conflict is observed for the same period (Figure 4.3). Sindh got exceptionally large shares after 1983 and the ethnopolitical conflict (Figure 4.5) is seen decreasing over that period. A

'clear attempt by the federal government to appease' NWFP, Balochistan and to a certain extent, Sindh, is observed which suggests to have achieved the desired consequences for ethnopolitical conflict.

Figure 5.11: Balochistan Conflict over Mineral Resources



Table 5.4: Allocation of Central grants to provinces, (% of total)

		1976 to 1979	1979 to 1981	1981 to 1983	1983 to 1985	1985 to 1987	1987 to 1989
Revenue Deficit Grants	Punjab	30	8.5	11.7	34.5	42.8	40.1
	Sindh	13.7	9.5	5.1	17.2	20	21.4
	NWFP	27.9	35.9	42.6	28.5	22.7	23.9
	Balochistan	28.4	46.3	40.6	19.7	14.4	14.4
Development grants	Punjab		50.5	36.8	9.7	45.7	46.7
	Sindh		22.4	27.6	46.7	33.1	27.6
	NWFP		17.7	15.5	1.6	8.3	14
	Balochistan		9.4	20.2	42	13.1	12.1

Source: Adapted from Sato (1994)

Whither Fiscal Federalism!

While collecting conflict data from newspapers for this work, I got the distinct impression that the politicians and opinion leaders from the two bigger provinces do espouse the cause of consociational federalism and giving more resources to the two smaller provinces of Balochistan and NWFP.[27] When it comes to implementing exactly this, after every five years, the finance ministers and the bureaucratic machine gets bogged down in the nitty gritty of a few basis points. Then, as should be expected of partisan stakeholders, all talk of consociation and optimal redistribution vanishes. This tendency is slightly modified when the federal government has interceded, on behalf of the smaller provinces, to alleviate some of their financial problems. Although the overall conflict over these issues has increased (Figure 5.12), fiscal appeasement seemed to have worked at least in late 1970s and 1980s. The optimality of resource distribution and allocation will be more fully investigated in chapter 6, where we will study the regional and inter provincial inequalities.

Figure 5.12: Ethnopolitical conflict over NFC and allied matters



5.3.2 The Concurrent List of the Constitution

I come back to Oates's theorem and the three functions of fiscal federalism namely, redistribution, stabilization and allocation of resources. These were analyzed there in a fiscal setting in the previous section. Now I will analyze the same in a legislative setting.

The chief formal/structured institutions for the three functions have been the two legislative lists of the constitution (Annex 5-B, also see section 5.3). The lists have been an integral part of the constitutional social contract (Please refer to chapter 3). Here I will not attempt to analyze the lists themselves since that is a project in its own right. What I want to emphasize here is that it was the intent that the concurrent legislative list, the items of which are open for both the provincial and federal legislatures, will be abolished after ten years (c. 1983).[28] This couldn't happen for various reasons, some of which have been alluded to by Nazeer Naji (Partly cited in Chapter 3);

> The constitution of Pakistan was actually a ten year contract among the federating units of Pakistan. In these ten years, a blueprint of powers, between the federation and provinces, was to be completed; after which the major portion of concurrent list was to be transferred to the provinces and the saga of constitutional abrogation, martial law and sham democracies would have stopped automatically. But after ten years, General Zia ul Haq didn't execute, the contract upon which the 1973 constitution was accepted unanimously. The federation kept occupying the domains of the provinces and two martial laws were enforced to facilitate this. Constitution was abrogated, provisional constitutions were made and then the mutilated constitution, with disjointed amendments, was revived under the name of real constitution. The concerns and unrest in the federating units increased. Religious politicians were brought to the fore to sabotage those struggling for regional rights and sectarian tensions were encouraged. In short, non political forces were used catastrophically to undermine the movements for regional rights. (Naji 2007)[29]

This refusal to execute a vital part of the contract had its influence on ethnopolitical conflict as suggested by our conflict data, where a constant level of intensity is maintained right after 1983 (See Figure 5.13). The constant refrain of provincial rights and demands to abolish the concurrent list, are always audible in all the cacophony of ethnopolitical conflict. It was high at the initial stages of constitution making and understandably so, as all the stakeholders were trying to bargain over

their respective positions. The gradual declining trend in 1970s was broken in 1984, exactly as Naji states. Another rising trend in this conflict can be seen after 2003, during the era of the sham democracy ushered in by General Musharraf.

The concurrent list is still a part of the constitution and the demands for its abolition continue to come from Sindh and NWFP, however for the ethnopolitical leadership of Balochistan this issue has now become infractuous. To quote Irshad Haqqani interviewing one leading Baloch tribal leader Sardar Ataullah Mengal;

> Haqqani: …This has to be explained a little. Presently there is a federal list and a concurrent list. Do you want that the whole concurrent list should be transferred to the provinces?
>
> Mengal: Now we have no interest with the concurrent list. It wasn't done when there was time for it. Now it has become infractuous. Now we demand that all legislative powers should be with the provincial legislatures. And I am not saying this for only Balochistan…However the centre should only legislate for the (few) departments it retains (Haqqani 2004).[30]

Figure 5.13: Ethnopolitical Conflict Over Provincial Rights and Autonomy



Contracts and treaties are signals.[31] They require commitment. If there is no commitment then a contract is 'cheap talk'. To make the signals credible, one needs reputation. The incentive to renege on a

peace deal is due to short time horizons and there is impatience to consume the more immediate fruits of reneging on a treaty. The future cost of reputation when the other side will update its beliefs, as suggested by Baye's law, is discounted. Exactly the same happened in Pakistan where we can see that an institution provided in the social contract was not allowed to function as designed. We can also see that ethnopolitical conflict over this issue has not abated. The ethno-politicians, particularly from Balochistan, have moved on and have now demanded a new social contract which will incorporate the cost of reneging on the previous contract. In a way there was a high discount rate over the contract so that it was more profitable for those in power in center in 1980s and 1990s to renege.[32] The future ethnopolitical leadership updated their beliefs[33] and now there is a premium they demand in addition to the previously agreed terms.

5.3.3 The quota system of jobs

The fact that the state is the biggest employer in the country and because pubic sector employment is the principal avenue for personal advancement for many, has made the issue of jobs a public issue of significant proportions (Waseem 1997).

Yusuf (2006) asserts that ethnic cleavages are configured differently in different societies. He finds that relative horizontal equality has been achieved in the public sectors of countries that are highly fragmented, but not in those with ethnicity-blind policies. He advocates consociational arrangements in ethnic settings with a couple of main groups or in settings with strong ethnic/regional clusters. Almost all his recommendations apply to the Pakistani case.

Table 5.5: The Scheme of Quotas in 1973 constitution:

Category	Quota %
Merit	10
Punjab	50
Sindh	19 (Rural 11.4, urban 7.6)
NWFP	11.5
Balochistan	3.5
Northern Areas and FATA	4
Azad Kashmir	2

We see that it was the express wish of writers of the constitution to incorporate some affirmative action to bring the representation of various regions in fairer correspondence with their population ratio. This was attempted with an eye on the need to reward ability and merit, See Table 5.5.

Over the years the lopsided shares in jobs have been brought nearer to the over all share in population. This is suggested by the census data for the federal government's civilian employees, see Figure 5.14. The two smaller provinces of Balochistan and NWFP have gradually gained more representation in these jobs than was the case in 1973. The situation with senior level positions[34] is no different (Figure 5.15).

One criticism levelled against this system is that it takes the domicile of a district as the criterion and not the ethnicity. However when the data is viewed in ethnic categories, almost same conclusions were drawn e.g (Kennedy 1993). The critics point out that mere domicile does not guarantee that 'a son of the soil' will get the job, because of interprovincial migration. Although in the case of Sindh, a further split of 60:40 between the rural and urban areas is supposed to cater to the Sindhis and Muhajirs, yet since the system was not designed to cater specifically to the demand for ensuring ethnic representation therefore it will be unjust to hold it to that standard.

Keeping the above in view, it is no surprise to find that the ethnopolitical conflict over quota in jobs and joblessness has been non violent and mainly restricted to statements by ethnopoliticians. Not a single such statement could be found originating from Punjab, except in the case of the Seraiki speaking southern belt. Most of this conflict seems to have died down after 1999, except in the case of renewed activity in 2005 in the case of Balochistan. It suggests that the gradual convergence of representation figures, towards the percentage in total population, in the services had an effect on conflict. The formal institution of quota system seems to have worked in case of Pakistan towards mitigation of conflict.

Figure 5.14: Share of all federal Government Civilian employees for every province (On the basis of domicile)



Source: Data from several federal government civil employees census reports

Figure 5.15: Share of senior federal government civilian employees for every province on the basis of domicile



Source: Data from several federal government civil employees' census reports.

Figure 5.16: Conflict over Jobs and quotas



5.4 State of Polity and legislative Independence

People have likened the polity of Pakistan to that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire where one province has the most population and resources and as a result comes to dominate the rest. The problem arises when the ruling elite try to run it on the lines of that empire and not within a democratic framework (M. Ahmed 1989).[35]

The debate about the value of democracy in reducing conflict is more nuanced. In light of cross country studies there have been indications that nascent democratization heightens the risk of nationalist and ethnic conflict. In other words it is not democracy or autocracy but the switch from one to another or more precisely the *process* of democratization, which is more responsible for nationalistic conflict (J. Snyder 2000).[36] An out of sequence transition runs the risk of triggering intense nationalism and war (Mansfield and Snyder 2005)[37]. Tedd Gurr reaches almost the same conclusion;

> In democratizing autocracies (sham democracies), by contrast, the opportunities for communal groups to mobilize are substantial, but states usually lack the resources or institutional means to reach the kinds of accommodation that typify the established democracies. In these states,

> democratization (the process) is likely to facilitate both protest and communal rebellion. (Gurr et al. 1993)[38]

Here I would like to bring the debate between Adeney and Talbot (Section 5.2.1) into the discussion and ask ourselves, Was democracy instrumental in reducing ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan and what was the influence of *the process* of democratization on this conflict? To find the answer we first need to know the characteristics of different regimes in Pakistan for the duration of this study.

For the above I take the help of the Polity IV dataset which examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority'.[39] On a 21 point scale ranging from -10 (Hereditary Monarchy) to +10 (Consolidated Democracy), the data captures the type of regime authority. On this data score we can see the almost perfectly cyclical history of Pakistan alternating between autocracy, democracy and anocracy or as we would prefer to call 'Sham Democracy'. By this term, we mean specifically a regime in which absolute powers rest with the army general who mounts the coup. Afterwards a referendum of sorts is organized in which he 'gets' more than 95% of the vote and ushers in an 'elected' legislature which is empty of any effective opposition to his rule. The facade of democracy is maintained all the time.[40] Such systems were brought in by Generals Ayub, Zia and Musharraf and lasted for a combined 14 years.

The combined polity score of the Polity IV database is a measure of both the autocratic and democratic credentials of a state. In turn the democratic score is made up of the presence of institutions, the existence of institutionalized constraints on the executive (Competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment) and competitiveness of political participation.

Instead of lumping together all ethnopolitical conflict, I tried to separated the conflict which remained inside the institutions provided under the social contract, from the conflict which was over issues outside any (formal/informal) institutional framework (See Table 5.6). I have also distinguished between violent and non violent conflict in this setting. The trend lines for the four types of ethnopolitical conflict over the years are shown in Figure 5.18.

Comparing Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18 we discover that the conflicts outside an institutional setting (both violent and non violent), although present in democratic setups (1972-1977 and 1989-1999), had declining

trends. The same had inclining trends during outright dictatorships (1978-1985 and 2000-2002) and sham democracies (1985-1988 and 2003-2005).

For the non violent conflict which took place over issues inside the institutional setup; it is either low-keyed or there is an inclining trend during democratic setups (1972-1977 and 1988-1999). The violent conflict for this institutional type has either been absent (1972-1977) or had an inverted U shape (1988-1999). Gurr et al (1993) propose that institutionalized democracy facilitates non violent communal conflict. He thinks that this tendency is specially a feature of strong states which have the resources to respond to pluralist interests. Non violent conflict inside institutional set up during democratic regimes in Pakistan may therefore be a desired type of conflict during this type of polity.

An approach such as above enables us to see that conflict which is more benign (may even be desirable in some cases) has increased or levelled out during democratic regimes in Pakistan. During the same regime type both the violent and non violent conflicts which were outside the institutional setup, decreased.

The two sham democracies of 1985-1988 and 2002-2005 witnessed almost universal upward trends for all types of conflict but especially so for the violent type. The autocracies fared no better except that the violent institutional conflict was absent. This may be because effectively only one institution (i.e. army) was calling all the shots. To quote Zamir Ghumro;

> …the conflict-resolution within the constitutional parameters has been anathema to the military-led governments in Pakistan. They believe in brute State power and executive methods to cow down people fighting for their legitimate rights. (Ghumro 2006)

Table 5.6: Institutional and Non Institutional Conflict

Conflict Within the Institutional Framework	• Hydal power profits. • Mineral Resources/Royalty, Rent on gas/Oil. • Kalabagh and water share issue. • Quota system of jobs in Government services/ Share of jobs, Joblessness • Development/ Development spending by Federal Government/ Loans to Provinces. • Share of Provinces in federal revenues/National Finance Commission Award/ Geographical concessions in taxes. • Free trade among provinces, especially in food products/Scarcity of wheat/Trade with Afghanistan
Conflict Outside the Institutional Framework	• Re-demarcation of boundaries/ Separate province in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan • Participation in Governance structures/Trade bodies/Power organs • Type of Polity, Demands for Democracy. • Resettlement/Repatriation of Biharis in Sindh, South Punjab/Afghans in Balochistan • Provincial Rights, General, economic rights, social rights, Provincial autonomy/Nationalities rights. • Backing Central policies/ Assertion of patriotic credentials by ethnopolitical stakeholder (1), Condemnation of Nationalist/ anti state behavior by state sponsored or conservative stakeholder (2). • Subversion/Terrorism/Secession. • Infighting in a single ethnic group • Identity/Language/Culture/Ethnicity

Figure 5.17: Authority trends in Pakistan (1947-2007)



Source: (Marshall and Jaggers 2007)

Figure 5.18: Trend lines for Ethnopolitical Conflict Inside and Outside the Institutional set up.



5.4.1 Executive Quota System-The power pie

There has been an unwritten understanding among the political elites to give some representation, however token, to the regions and provinces in power corridors. This has been an unstructured/informal institution which has been the exclusive domain of elite politics and power struggles.

In the world of Pakistani power politics the term 'troika' has now come to occupy its own niche.[41] It means the three persons occupying the positions of President, Prime Minister and the Chief of army staff (COAS). I have attempted to trifurcate the origins of this power, in the way it is derived, perceived and projected.

Most of the power of each of these positions comes from their substance. By this I mean the constitutional powers entrusted in a position. A president does not enjoy these powers when he is a mere figurehead. Similarly a prime minister in a sham democracy (1985-1988 and 2002-2007) does not enjoy these powers.

A second type of power associated with troika comes from public perceptions. A prime minister with a heavy electoral mandate, a president who is also the figurehead of the ruling party and the COAS (all the time); have come to enjoy this power.

The third type of power is that of protocol. I recognize the fact that human egos need pampering and protocol inspires awe in others. To put it lightly, politicians aren't immune to this.

Based on these three types of powers associated with the troika, I have analyzed the total troika power enjoyed by the different provinces/ethnic groups in the country from 1972 to 2006. In a binary setting I assigned 1 to a group for the presence of a particular type of power and 0 for its absence. The total power in a year is the sum of all the three types. As a result we get the pictures shown in Figure 5.19 to Figure 5.21. It can be seen that while the shares of substantive power have roughly followed the population shares (Figure 5.20)[42], those of perceived power have been highly skewed to the disadvantage of certain provinces/groups (Figure 5.21).

I also did similar analysis for a sample of second tier of power positions. These include the speaker of the national assembly, the chairman of the senate, the finance minister and the foreign minister. Except the portfolio of defence minister which has been mostly held by the prime minister himself, these positions represent the immediate

second tier below the top tier positions, both in protocol and the power these positions wield. The first two carry mostly protocol power while the last two have mostly the substantive power. I have not assigned any perceived power to these positions. Once again the picture is highly skewed (Figure 5.22).

Figure 5.23 is difficult to comprehend in light of the above discussion. The Muhajirs have had a larger overall share in the power pie but their (ethnopolitical leadership's) share in the overall conflict over this score has been overwhelming. To help us understand this we turn to Figure 5.24, Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26. We can see that this conflict was almost non existent from 1974 to 1986. Then from 1986 to 1999, there is no appreciable representation of Muhajirs in troika except the two years tenure of General Aslam Beg, See Figure 5.25. This period also saw three army operations in Karachi, mainly against the ethnopolitical leadership of Muhajirs (MQM). Therefore all the conflict over this score, involving Muhajir leadership, is concentrated during this period.

In both Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26, it can be seen that Balochistan has almost no share in troika and second tier power positions. This partly explains the large share of Baloch ethnopolitical leadership in over all conflict over this score, Figure 5.23.

The informal institution of sharing out power in the state organs exists. The institution has however failed to work in the manner it is conceived by the political elite and this suggests that conflict over participation in governance structures has a basis. With this conflict at its peak in 1989, Mushtaq Ahmed remarked;

> Today…behind the politics of confrontation is the clash of personalities, conflict of vested interests and a scramble for place and power. (M. Ahmed 1989)

Figure 5.19: Total Troika Power in Pakistan (1972-2006)



Figure 5.20: Total Substantive Troika Power in Pakistan (1972-2006)



Figure 5.21: Total Perceived Troika Power in Pakistan (1972-2006)



Figure 5.22: Total Second Tier Power Sample (1972-2006)



Figure 5.23: Total Conflict over participation in Governance Structures.



Figure 5.24: Ethnopolitical conflict over participation in governance structures



Figure 5.25: Disposition of Available Troika Power Since 1972



Figure 5.26: Disposition of Available Second Tier Power



.

5.5 Other Institutions

In addition to the institutions discussed, the constitution provided for other institutions which were to cater for conflict management in various other spheres. There also were some institutions which were created by subordinate legislation through ordinary acts of parliament. These include, inter alia, the Council of Common Interest (CCI), the Inter Provincial Coordination Committee (IPCC), the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) and the free trade among provinces. In the following, only these four will be discussed, mainly because of their importance but also because the conflict over the rest has not been mapped in the primary conflict database.

The CCI has been created under article 153 of the constitution. The chief ministers of the four provinces are members while the Prime Minister is to be the chairperson. This institution was supposed to work towards conflict management between the central government and the provinces and among provinces. The working of this institution has remained a mystery as it has seldom met in decades. One reason for not meeting of the council during democratic regimes is the provision of the constitution that if the council fails to reach a decision then the joint sitting of the parliament (The national assembly and the senate) will decide the matter at hand. This, at least was the logic behind calls by the opposition which governed in Punjab and Balochistan (1988-1990) and had a numerical superiority in any such joint sitting. The Federal Government at the time did not want any embarrassing situation and therefore avoided the meeting all together. Even after that, meetings have been few and far between. The CCI was reconstituted in July 2007 to include four federal ministers from four provinces. The working procedure of the council and its mandate is still under a shroud.

The IPCC works under its own federal minister. Its mandate includes general coordination between the Federal Government and the Provinces in economic, social and administrative fields, promoting uniformity of approach in formulation of policies and their implementation by the provinces and the federal government in all fields of common national concern.[43] Such a wide mandate has never been translated into practice. In agreement with Anwar Syed (2004) I could not find anything that IPCC can do which the CCI cannot. The provinces may have more representation in the IPCC as compared to the

CCI but that is meaningless as the decisions of the former are non-binding on the federal government.

IRSA was set up as a result of the Water apportionment accord among the provinces in 1991. This conflict management institution has been effective in regulating the flow of water in the Indus river system and its tributaries. The conflict that there is on this score has been more due to a shortage of water in the system and the issue of Kalabagh dam. With two provinces (NWFP and Sindh) against this dam and Punjab in favour of it, the issue has been instrumental in periodically whipping up debate about water shares for the provinces, see Figure 5.27.

Figure 5.27: Ethnopolitical Conflict over Water share and Kalabagh dam



Another issue that brings up inter provincial ethnopolitical conflict is the free trade among provinces. This has been guaranteed under the constitution but in some years the compulsions of drought translated into less crops and as a result the main agricultural province of Punjab imposed controls over movement of grain. This irked the other provinces especially NWFP. Another reason for a ban over this free movement is the subsidy that the government of Punjab provides to its farmers. This subsidy, Punjab argues, has to benefit the people of the province first. They also argue that most of the wheat and flour provided to the other provinces, finds its way to Afghanistan. The result is that the

biggest province of Punjab purchases the wheat stock from the farmer through a monopolized system and imposes a ban during the harvest period. If the other provinces (mostly NWFP and Balochistan) protest then they are provided with wheat flour on controlled basis. This measure is hardly acceptable to the other provinces as they see it against the provisions of the constitution. They also argue that these measures effectively take the flour milling industry in their province out of business. The ethnopolitical leadership of smaller provinces mostly keep this conflict non violent, Figure 5.28.

Figure 5.28: Ethnopolitical conflict over free movement of goods especially food grains.



5.6 Conclusion

The social contract in Pakistan provided a federal framework with conflict management institutions in place. These formal and informal institutions have a mixed record in the political and economic fields.

The formal institutions for allocation and distribution of resources have followed a consociational logic in appeasing the smaller provinces. The financial dependence over the central government has increased the

conflict over provincial autonomy and the regional inequalities are blamed over its absence.

The conflict over the political question of legislative powers for the provinces has its roots in the non fulfilment of the contract provided in the constitution. The institution of concurrent list has not been abolished as promised and the stakeholders in the resultant conflict have now jacked up the original demands.

The rise and fall of democratic institutions influenced the ethnopolitical conflict. Mainly the non-violent conflict inside an institutional setting increased during democracies while both the violent and non violent conflict which was outside an institutional setting increased during autocracies and sham democracies.

The power distribution in Pakistan is institutionalized informally. The craving for power among the elite has frequently overshadowed the understanding to share power. Most of this comes back to the dominance of one institution (i.e. the army).

Among the other institutions for conflict management, the council of common interests has largely remained dormant. The interprovincial coordination committee has too ambitious an agenda and too few powers to do anything.

The water apportionment accord has worked well to contain the conflict in desperate times of drought but the issue of Kalabagh dam has kept the conflict alive.

The free movement of goods, guaranteed under the constitution, has been frequently ignored, only to stoke anger and conflict in the affected provinces. Once again a formal rule of the game (an institution) has been sidelined resulting in ethnopolitical conflict.

Notes

[1] P. 3

[2] pp. 24-25.

[3] P. 27

[4] P. 37

[5] The debate about the relative importance of politics and economics is well discussed by Dick Pels(Pels 1997).

[6] Acemoglu et al. (2005) puts property rights and contract enforcement in the category of economic institutions which affect growth.

[7] For more on Horizontal Inequality, please read chapter 5.

[8] Cited in G.K. Brown (2009)

[9] Cited in McGarry and O'Leary (2009)

[10] P. 11

[11] P. XIII

[12] McGarry and O'Leary (2009) also lists other conditions such as the presence of a 'statsvolk', democracy, and a sense of 'coming together' rather that 'holding together' and *ceteris paribus* the number of units to be sufficiently more than two.

[13] P. 120

[14] We limit our discussion only to the upper two tiers of government i.e federal and provincial. The local government devolution scheme introduced in 2000 does not form part of this discussion as spelled out in chapter 2.

[15] P. 35

[16] Read Annex 5-A for the text of article 160 of the constitution.

[17] For more detail please read chapter 3.

[18] The latest award was announced in December 2009 but is not a part of the analysis. For detailed historical account of all NFC awards to date, please refer to I. Ahmad et al. (2007) and for an aggregate analysis of trends and patterns of federal-provincial fiscal flows please see S.K. Qureshi (1991)

[19] This divisible pool is in addition to Special transfers and revenue that belongs to the provincial government but collected by the federal government.

[20] These are initial ratios at the start of the 5 year period and in most cases gradually change with each financial year.

[21] Even that is difficult to measure as Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) point out.

22Data-available-at http://www.finance.gov.pk/admin/images/phicalOperation/FT%20on%20Web%20July%20to%20Dec%202008.pdf. Last accessed on 16-04-2009.

[23] Officials in the finance department of Sindh kindly gave this author access to their compiled data.

24 Unpublished article of Anwar Shah. "Pakistan in the Millennium: Federalism Reform Imperatives, Restructuring Principles and Lessons", to be found at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206898/PakistanintheMillenium.pdf. Last accessed on 16-4-2009

[25] For a good discussion on the provincial bickering over NFC, please read Omar (2005)

[26] We cannot help notice the fact that both the big jumps were effected when a Punjabi, Mian Nawaz Sharif, was the prime minister. It was also during his tenure that NWFP started getting the share from hydro profits.

[27] A good example can be seen in S.A.A. Shah (2002).

[28] For more detail please see chapter 3.

[29] Translated from Urdu by this author.

[30] Translated from Urdu by this author.

[31] The 'signalling' concept developed by Spence (1973) is used now in the analysis of conflict and peace. A few of the works are Mock (1992) and Murshed (2010).

[32] For more reading on cost of commitment and discount rates please refer to T. Addison and Murshed (2002) and S.M. Murshed (2010).

[33] Updating beliefs, a notion of Bayesian choice based upon the work of Rev. Thomas Bayes (1702-1761); means updating one's prior beliefs in light of new evidence. For more discussion of its applicability to conflicts and peacemaking please see Murshed (2010).

[34] Jobs which are in Basic Pay Scale 16 and above on a 1 to 22 scale. The equivalent senior jobs in the previous system (used for 1973 system) were class 1 and class 2.

[35] It is hardly surprising when people recommend running Pakistan like the Austro-Hungarian empire e.g. Zakaria (2007).

[36] P. 31

[37] P. 265

[38] P. 138

[39] For more detail on Polity IV please refer to http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

[40] The term was so well coined by none other than General Musharraf himself. He used it derogatively to describe the system that he toppled.

[41] See for example Jalalzai (2002)

[42] For population shares please refer to chapter 2.

[43] From the website of the cabinet division, Government of Pakistan. http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/cabinet-test/aboutdivision/ipc.jsp

Last accessed on 21-4-2009.

6 Regional Disparities in Development: The Roots of Grievances

6.1 Introduction

There has been a debate within conflict researchers on the primacy of factors that help explain conflict. The advocates of 'motivational' factors hold that it is the gap between expectations and achievements that motivates parties to enter conflict. On the other hand, the proponents of the political process model of conflict stress the primacy of power resources in the explanation of conflict (Korpi 1974). In a way the Foucauldian schema used by A. Khan (2005) and discussed in Chapter 2 is an extension of this same debate. The 'motivational' factors model is therefore more akin to our chosen theoretical model as against that of the political process model. This chapter will discuss the role of motivational factors, the gaps in expectations and achievements and their impact on generating grievances which then lead to conflict.

The link between grievances and conflict is now well researched and established. An example is that of Gurr's (1997) classification of group grievances into those related to political autonomy, those related to political rights other than autonomy, economic rights and social and cultural rights.[1] These four dimensions of grievance were then correlated, by Gurr (1997), to indicators of cultural differences and political and economic disadvantages

Grievances are a result of perceptions, perceptions of unjust treatment, of artificial barriers to better life conditions or a reneging on a contract which had created rights in favour of the aggrieved. Parties enter social contracts by assuming some responsibilities and giving away some rights. All this is done in the rational expectation that there would be a corresponding quid pro quo. A weakening or a failure of these contracts means the non-fulfillment of the promises made to some

parties. This gives rise to perceptions of unjust treatment and resultantly grievances.

What is the mechanism of these perceptions? Three theoretical responses are found in the conflict studies literature. The Relative Deprivation (RD) approach, the Social Exclusion (SE) approach and the more recent Horizontal Inequalities (HI) approach. This chapter will briefly discuss the comparative merits of using one of these frameworks and then apply the same to the study of ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. A brief discussion of the three concepts of RD, SE and HI will be followed by the application of the concept of Horizontal Inequality to ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan and the reasons for choosing the HI approach. These regional disparities show different types of HIs in Pakistan. The grievances generated by these will be linked to the various issues in ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan.

6.2 Theoretical concepts of disparities and inequalities

The concept of Horizontal Inequalities (HI) is used for this analysis of grievances and their impact on ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan. However this will not be taken up in isolation as the concept draws on the theoretical base provided by the other two concepts of Relative Deprivation (RD) and Social Exclusion (SE). A discussion of these two concepts is necessary to delineate the way the concept of HI has borrowed and then built on them. It will also inform the empirical work in the latter sections in which the generation of grievances is discussed as a result of HIs.

6.2.1 The Concept of Relative Deprivation (RD)

The concept of Relative deprivation has its roots in post World War II research on American soldiers in the 1940s.[2] It has been used, among others observational studies, to explain the Quebec nationalist movement (Guimond and Dube-Simard 1983) and for the conflict in Northern Ireland (Birrell 1972).

In a more empirical context, Yitzhaki (1979) showed that the concept of Relative deprivation is connected to the inequality coefficient Gini; Specifically, that a measure of aggregate relative deprivation could be

expressed as a product of the mean income and the Gini coefficient of the reference group (Hey and Lambert 1980).

While the concept of relative deprivation seems adequate for probing the causes of domestic national unrests, the reasons for circumspection among the wider conflict research community are also understandable. As Gurr (1997) notes, the social origin of deprivation (Exposure to new modes of life, new ideologies, value gains of reference groups and value disequilibria) have made the intensity of RD a psycho-cultural variable where the basic unit of analysis is the individual. The measurement of this variable therefore requires extensive surveys and will be difficult to employ in a longitudinal study, except in a project of the depth, scope and resources of Gurr's. Another method would be to infer it from properties of the social system. This, however, should not keep us from gleaning valuable insights into the production of grievances at the group level.

Our major point of reference for this concept would be the pioneering work of Gurr (1970) who defined RD as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Where value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.[3] He cites the historical domestic comparisons of national aggregate measures, inter alia, poor economic conditions corresponding with overt protest in England between 1790 and 1850, bread prices and the extent of mob violence in revolutionary France, and the correlational evidence that the frequency of lynchings in the American South between 1882 and 1930 varied inversely with the indices of economic well being. Gurr (1970) concluded from his gathered quantitative evidence that degrees of deprivation or discontent are associated with degrees of disorder.[4]

Recent literature on relative deprivation has also alluded to the link between relative deprivation and civil war. Defining RD as the perception by one or more parties that they are being unjustly treated, Murshed (2010) shows that it is a major cause of civil war.

The concept of RD is not confined to economic well being. In fact for the elite this RD is more important in the distribution and uses of power values in a political system. Higher sharing of opportunities to lead will satisfy some of these elite. As Gurr indicates, a non-sharing of these power values will lead to higher participatory RD. This

participation in power echelons will also be used to remedy the sources of discontent, to increase the output of and reallocation of economic goods, to create and maintain security; and to reinforce ideational coherence (Gurr 1970).[5]

The above discussion indicates that the concept of RD is valuable in explaining internal conflict among groups. The limitation on its use in our case is the particular suitability of the concept to socio-psychological studies of conflict. This does not limit us to borrow from the concept in our quest to look up the process of generation of grievances. This concept will help this study to develop its use of the concept of horizontal Inequality in the latter pages of this chapter.

6.2.2 Social Exclusion

In contrast to relative deprivation which describes a state, Social exclusion is a concept which describes both the condition and the dynamic process (Beall and Piron 2005). As a condition it describes groups or individuals who are unable to participate fully in society. As a process it is concerned with the interaction among groups. The concept of social exclusion is used to describe a group, or groups, of people who are excluded from the normal activities of their society, in multiple ways (Frances Stewart et al. 2005a). Exclusion from political, social and economic institutions is generally understood to make up the core of this concept A general working definition is;

> Social Exclusion is a process and a state that prevents individuals or groups from full participation in social, economic and political life and from asserting their rights. It derives from exclusionionary relationships based on power. (Beall and Piron 2005)

Social exclusion may lead to multiple deprivations (Frances Stewart et al. 2005a) and as such is related to the thread of discussion in the above section. But it is important to relate this process of exclusion to generation of conflict. Gellner (1983) assumes an omnipresent unequal distribution of economic resources within states leading to discrimination and conflict based on group identity. Here, grievances are a product of unequal group interaction, which is a multipath process in itself.

While drawing on the concept of Social Exclusion in ethnopolitical conflict analysis, one has to be cautious. As A.K. Sen (2000) warns, the concept is not for the abstemious researcher. Things like livelihood,

employment, earnings, property, credit, land, housing, consumption levels, education, skills, citizenship, democratic participation, public goods, respect, among others have been mentioned which the people or groups may be excluded from. In our study only a few of these will be considered for their impact on ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan and that too as part of the wider concept of grievances.

Social Exclusion is a product of disadvantages being faced by people or groups. These disadvantages are readily observable in the shape of Horizontal Inequalities among them. This leads us to our next discussion.

6.2.3 Horizontal Inequalities

Although sometimes used synonymously with Relative Depravation, The concept of Horizontal Inequalities draws on both Relative Deprivation and Social Exclusion and is distinguishable by its application by analysts.[6] I prefer to apply it to my case for the ease with which it can be applied to readily available regional data. We also observe that theoretically, it contains the dimensions of RD and SE as all three are concerned with conditions in which groups get unequal treatment and lead them to conflict.

To quote Kofi Annan:

> … simple inequality between rich and poor is not enough to cause violent conflict. What is highly explosive is … 'horizontal' inequality: when power and resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other ways – for instance by race, religion or language. So-called 'ethnic' conflicts occur between groups which are distinct in one or more of these ways, when one of them feels it is being discriminated against, or another enjoys privileges which it fears to lose.[7]

By definition Horizontal inequalities are inequalities among groups with shared identities – identities formed by religion, ethnic ties or racial affiliations, or other salient ways that bind groups of people together (Stewart et al. 2005b). These are different to Vertical Inequalities (VI) which are inequalities within a homogenous group, on the other hand HIs are a measure of inequalities between and among groups and not within groups. The notion of groups is important in this concept and has posed some problems[8] but in our case it would be a straightforward application to the provincial data for reasons discussed in chapter 2 and latter also in section 6.3.

Murshed (2010) has categorized HIs into four broad areas: political participation, economic assets, incomes and employment, and social aspects. Their relevance in a particular socio-economic set-up vary and I will not apply all of these to my case in section 6.3. The reason is mostly poor availability of data, for the whole period under study.

HIs have been instrumental in provoking conflict and the relationship has been suggested in both single country case studies and more recently in cross country studies. Based on the district wide data of Human Development indicators for Nepal, Murshed and Gates (2005) find that the intensity of conflict across these districts is most significantly explained by the degree of inequalities. Brown (2005) assessed the impact of Horizontal Inequalities on conflict in Aceh, Indonesia and the implications for economic policy. Langer (2005) assessed the role of political Horizontal Inequalities at the elite level and the socio-economic horizontal inequalities at the level of the masses to study its impact on ethnic conflict in Ivory Coast. In her cross country study Østby (2008) analysed data from 36 countries and suggested a positive relationship between horizontal social inequality and violent civil conflict.

The still evolving literature on measuring HIs has come up with two indices; the group based co-efficient of variation weighted by group size (GCOV) and the population weighted group GINI coefficient (GGINI)[9]. These indices are important if one has to analyze HIs in a cross country context. For single country studies a gap measure of different socio-economic or political indicators will suffice (S.M. Murshed 2010). A good example is as a gap with national average in the case of Nepal (S.M. Murshed and Gates 2005). In the Pakistani context I will follow this advice.

Horizontal Inequalities are influential in provoking conflict if these are sustained, widening over time and consistent across dimensions. A one size fits all solution doesn't exist (Stewart et al. 2005b). This calls for separate investigations of the social, economic and political dimensions of horizontal inequalities. As discussed in section 6.3 this is what this study will look for in the Pakistani case.

The reference point for these HIs can either be a national achievement (generally that of the capital city) or the national average of the particular metric. In the former case the difference to the reference point will be the difference to the ultimate level to which a group feels

entitled. In the latter it is the minimum standard attainable by the group in the given socio-economic conditions.

Use of horizontal inequality also challenged some of the earlier theoretical conclusions about inequality and its relationship with conflict. Using the framework of vertical inequality among individuals, several studies failed to find a causal link between inequality (particularly income inequality) and conflict.[10] Østby (2008) has criticized the approach on the basis that the explained variable in all these studies was 'group conflict' therefore the explanatory variable should also have reflected group horizontal inequality. Another problem she points out with all these studies is that only economic inequality was chosen and the other concepts like welfare inequality and social polarization were ignored. Correcting for these conceptual anomalies, she finds in her cross country analysis that it is still premature to dismiss the inequality-conflict nexus.

A. Sen (1995) has proposed at least three different categories of equality: income, welfare and rights and liberties. The political, economic and social aspects of inequality therefore come to the fore of the proposed analysis when this study explores the conflict-inequality nexus in our case in Pakistan in section 6.3.

Why I take horizontal inequalities as the analytical framework

A shared group based grievance is required to induce a group based conflict (S.M. Murshed and Gates 2005). The identity based ethnopolitical conflicts are therefore ideal candidates for analyzing the link between horizontal inequalities and conflict. The concept of group also forces us to distinguish between group and its leadership. Such leadership may have different grievances than the masses. With the HI framework it is easier to follow the different trajectories of elite (group leadership) and mass level grievances.

My preference for this framework over that of Relative Deprivation and Social Exclusion is also due to the fact that data is more easily available about group based horizontal inequalities than about group based psycho-cultural metrics and that too over the whole period of study.

6.3 Horizontal Inequalities in Pakistan

Based on the work cited later in this chapter, it can be said with confidence that the scholarly microscope has consistently found regional

disparities in Pakistan. The scope of these disparities was in the economic, social and political realms and these disparities have been both widening and sustained. I contend that these have been responsible for giving rise to grievances which influenced the ethnopolitical conflict over the period of study (1972-2005), see Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1: The scope of horizontal inequalities and their impact mechanism on ethnopolitical conflict in Pakistan



6.3.1 Horizontal Economic Inequalities, the theoretical and applied work in Pakistani context.

After 1971 secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) many scholars have investigated the regional disparities in Pakistan. These studies can be classified into three categories.

The first were studies on socio economy of particular provinces: These were mostly case studies of conditions inside individual provinces e.g. A.S. Ahmed (1980), and F. Ahmed's (1984b) study about NWFP, A. Ahmad (1973) about Balochistan and F. Ahmed (1984a) about Sindh. Most of these studies especially those by Feroz Ahmed only concentrated on the agrarian economy of these provinces.

Then there were studies related to economic disparities among provinces/districts. The existence of significant regional variation in level of development in Pakistan is a widely recognized fact. The two provinces of Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province are generally seen as relatively backward while the two other provinces, Sind and Punjab, are considered as relatively developed (Pasha and Hasan 1992). Pasha and Hasan (1992) recognized that simply taking per capita income will be inadequate for working out these disparities, because 75 percent of the population (In 1992) is rural and is characterized by subsistence farming. They therefore used crop cash value per capita, industrial value added per capita, the number of commercial bank branches per 100000 population and the number of livestock units per capita as the income and wealth indicators. They included 46 districts in their analysis and ranked these on the basis of composite indicators. These rankings (which are for the year 1982) are very similar to the later rankings arrived at by Pakistan HDI report of 1998 (Hussain and Kemal 2004).

Bengali (2000) provided a genuine base for assessing the disaggregated accounts of provinces and for the first time provided a total picture for looking at provincial disparities in GDP and, per capita GDP on the basis of UN conventions and international practices and the particular Pakistan related constraints. It has been shown that over the period 1973-2000, Punjab alone has increased its share of national GDP by about 2 percentage points. NWFP has maintained its share, while Sindh and Balochistan have reduced their respective shares by about one percentage points each (Bengali 2000). In the conclusion given by Bengali, the results tend to confirm the emergence of a north-south economic divide in the country and a sustained and sometimes widening gap in per capita GDP among the provinces. (See Figure 6.2)

Figure 6.2: Per capita GDP at constant factor cost of 1980-81 (Rs.)



Source: Adapted from (K. Bengali 2000)

The sustained nature of these gaps is also verified from the HDI report of the UNDP (Hussain and Kemal 2004). Figure 6.3 shows that while Punjab has no district in the bottom 30 districts in terms of Human Development Index, Balochistan makes almost half and NWFP almost one third of all these districts. A similar study by Jamal and Khan (2003) arrived at almost the same conclusions. Their analysis showed the situation further tilting against Balochistan and NWFP.

Despite these consistent findings of regional disparities there is surprisingly little study on its impact on the unfolding ethnopolitical conflict. Zaidi (1992) made the first real attempt to link these regional disparities to the political economy of regional nationalism (or in his words, 'the national question') in Pakistan. However since his empirical thrust has been concentrated only on one side of the issue, namely the economic one, the political economy of regionalism lacks the empirical punch. His conclusion mentions that:

'Based on the evidence presented…, it is quite clear that economic factors have played an important role in affecting national and ethnic consciousness and there is indeed 'national' economic exploitation which is manifested in varying forms and in varying degrees.' (Zaidi 1992)

Figure 6.3: Percentage share in districts in terms of HDI



Share in Top 31 districts of Pakistan in terms of HDI

Share in middle 30 districts of Pakistan in terms of HDI

Share in bottom 30 districts of Pakistan in terms of HDI

Source: (Hussain and Kemal 2004)

However these manifestations 'in varying forms and in varying degrees' are not operationalized empirically when it comes to 'national and ethnic consciousness'; something that this chapter will attempt.

The above narrative of the work on regional disparities in Pakistan is necessary to show that the scholarly microscope has not been focused on the impact of these regional disparities (in our case 'horizontal inequalities) on the ethnopolitical conflict.

Since this work uses the Horizontal Inequalities framework therefore it would be instructive to spell out some issues related to the data, before attempting to analyze it.

This study follows the advice of Stewart (2008), Østby (2008) and others; and distinguish among economic inequality, political inequality and the inequality of welfare. The preferred variable for the first type is the gap in per capita GDP. The data for this variable is taken from Bengali (2000). For political inequality, the work in the previous chapter about regional shares in the top and second tiers (selected power positions) is expanded to work out gaps in the regional shares. For

welfare inequality, the preferred variable is the regional gap in literacy ratio to that of the national average, since this data is available for all the groups over the total period of study. It would have been worthwhile to include some measures of life expectancy and/or infant/child mortality ratios but the paucity of regional data over the whole of the period of study was a limiting factor in this case.

The question of ascribing spatial data to a particular province/region or dyad in is straight forward in our case. The ethnopolitical leadership had itself been championing the cause of spatial quotas in jobs and in representation in governance structures. The provincial framework has been, by and large, adopted as a frame of reference for articulating their demands. The same method has been endorsed by Murshed (2006) who argues that we can impute group inequalities from spatial data also because certain groups chiefly reside in certain areas. This argument proved useful for this study in ascribing data related to urban and rural Sindh to the dyads 3 and 7 respectively.[11]

As mentioned earlier recent propositions to use GCOV and GGINI as single measures for HIs are gaining popularity but horizontal inequality will essentially remain a gap measure (Murshed 2006). This study constructed variables which capture the horizontal gaps to a benchmark. In addition the use of GCOV and GGINI would have required data at the district level, which in our case was non-existent for most of the period under study.

6.4 The Regression Analysis

What follows is an exploratory regression analysis of Pakistani conflict data and horizontal inequality measures. The data, methods and results will be presented in the following paragraphs.

Conflict data for the years from 1972 to 2005 was analyzed. Table 6.1 gives the variables, their description and sources. The data for four principle dyads (please see Table 4.2 for these dyads) was utilized for regression analysis. These included dyads 1, 2, 4 and 7. All these dyads are province/region based as also explained in section 4.3. In case of dyad 7, which has data of conflict exclusively from urban Sindh, the matching data for horizontal inequalities was taken on this basis. The rest of the dyads were excluded for need of comparable data for all the variables or the fact that they did not represent ethnopolitical conflict in a regional/provincial framework.

Table 6.1: List of Variables and their description

No.	Variable Label	Variable Description	Source/Methods for calculation
1	Year	Year (From 1972 to 2005)	
2	Province	Province/Region/dyad	
3	VC	Violent Conflict score	The conflict score arrived at with the help of procedure outlined in chapter 3.
4	NVC	Non-Violent Conflict score	
5	TC	Total Conflict score	
6	OVC	Ordinal Violent Conflict	The highest level of conflict attained by a particular dyad in a particular year, on an ordinal scale as given in chapter 4.
7	ONVC	Ordinal Non-Violent Conflict	
8	OC	Ordinal Total Conflict	
9	PGDPCG	Percentage Gross Domestic Product per capita Gap to that of the national average	Per capita GDP for provinces calculated from Bengali (2000). The values for Sindh have been assigned to those for Muhajir dyad. Extrapolation for missing years.
10	LitGap	Literacy Gap w.r.t national average	From the census reports of 1972, 1981, 1998. The (Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) reports, the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) reports and the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) reports.
11	GapAll_P	Population weighted Gap of all civil servants w.r.t the population share of the group, in total national population.	From the triennial census and survey reports of federal government employees. Extrapolation for missing years.
12	GapSen_P	Population weighted Gap of senior civil servants w.r.t the population share of the group, in total national population.	
13	PI_1	Political inequality gap in troika power w.r.t the share of Punjab province	The political inequality gap calculated for the years on the basis the scheme given in chapter 4.
14	PI_2	Political inequality gap in second tier power w.r.t the share of Punjab province	

Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 give the summary of means and standard deviations of these variables for two different time periods.

Table 6.2: Summary statistics for variables (Data from 1972-2005)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Non Violent Conflict	26.28	28.26	0.00	123.72
Violent Conflict	11.23	26.02	0.00	163.80
Total Conflict	37.51	45.99	0.00	280.10
Political inequality gap in troika power	2.37	3.49	-7.00	8.00
Political inequality gap in second tier positions	0.61	1.178	-2.00	3.00
Literacy gap	1.07	13.17	-29.50	16.00
PGDPCG	3.05	22.77	-39.84	45.94
Gap of all civil servants	-10.48	78.11	-380.94	75.06
Gap of senior civil servants	-5.66	87.03	-445.87	75.74

Table 6.3: Summary of statistics for variables (Data from 1986-2005)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Non Violent Conflict	34.03	28.38	0.00	123.72
Violent Conflict	13.33	25.13	0.00	123.54
Total Conflict	47.36	43.84	0.00	212.21
Political inequality gap in troika power	1.29	3.39	-7.00	8.00
Political inequality gap in second tier positions	1.00	1.20	-2.00	3.00
Literacy gap	1.20	12.36	-24.00	16.00
PGDPCG	5.55	22.77	-39.24	45.95
Gap of all civil servants	-2.03	42.34	-126.15	48.52
Gap of senior civil servants	6.93	34.85	-137.42	51.51

Table 6.4 gives the impact of these horizontal inequalities on the total, non-violent and violent ethnopolitical conflicts. The independent variables are chosen from the three aspects of horizontal inequality as discussed above, namely political, social access and economic (Also see Figure 6.1). However these present horizontal inequalities may themselves be due to the conflict and therefore only the lagged values for all these variables are included in the models.

It is also recognized that past conflicts do have an impact on the present conflicts and that conflicts create their own cycles. Therefore lagged values of past conflicts are also included as independent variables.

The separate results for total, non violent and violent conflicts are given both for the full range of data and for a trimmed version which includes data only from 1986 onwards. Table 6.4 gives two sets of regression coefficients and their standard errors. For the full range of data that we have, the results suggest that the horizontal inequality of senior civil servants, political inequality of second tier positions, and violent conflict from previous years are statistically significant for explaining both total conflict and violent conflict. On the other hand, the gap in all civil service positions has negative statistical significance for all three types of conflict. The gap in per capita GDP and gap in all civil service positions are statistically significant but has negative signs. This does not support the theory explained in earlier sections of this chapter.

In section 4.3 about the conflict data sources, it is recognized that some periods presented particular problems for data collection due to media censorship. Niazi (1986) has also discussed these media restrictions in detail. This means that some portion of conflict may be missing in our dataset despite our efforts and this limitation has been recognized previously. In regression analysis, to see the sensitivity of our results to this missing conflict, the period of analysis is trimmed. The data from 1972 to 1985 is dropped. The resulting regression coefficients and standard errors are reported in the second set of Table 6.4. It can be seen that income gap (per capita GDP), and political inequality at elite level are positively related to all types of conflict and the coefficients are statistically significant. Gap in senior civil service positions is statistically positively significant for total conflict and violent conflict. Literacy gap (social access) is also positively related and significant for total conflict.

Table 6.4: The impact of different horizontal inequalities on conflict with fixed regional effects

	Data for full period Time Series length = 33 years Number of observations=132			**Trimmed Data Time Series Length = 19 years Number of observations = 76**		
Variables	**Total Conflict**	**Non Violent Conflict**	**Violent Conflict**	**Total Conflict**	**Non Violent Conflict**	**Violent Conflict**
Percentage GDP gap to the national average	-0.71 (0.45)	-0.16 (0.27)	-0.51*** (0.17)	2.48*** (0.86)	1.29*** (0.28)	1.12* (0.58)
Literacy gap	-0.05 (1.68)	-0.64 (0.89)	0.55 (0.72)	5.24*** (1.29)	4.39 (2.65)	1.44 (1.70)
Gap of all civil servants	-1.27* (0.67)	-0.41 (0.33)	-0.81** (0.01)	-1.30*** (0.29)	-0.10 (0.19)	-1.13*** (0.16)
Gap of senior civil servants	1.09** (0.49)	0.39 (0.24)	0.67** (0.29)	0.87*** (0.18)	-0.08 (0.13)	0.89*** (0.10)
Political inequality gap in troika power	0.54 (1.13)	0.173 (0.54)	0.26 (0.65)	4.55*** (1.22)	2.81*** (0.96)	1.76*** (0.21)
Political inequality gap in second tier power	8.036** (3.17)	3.17* (1.74)	4.99** (1.99)	5.34 (10.56)	-0.06 (5.85)	4.92 (4.74)
Non Violent Conflict from previous year		0.08 (0.16)	-0.11 (0.15)		-0.10 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.15)
Violent Conflict from previous year		0.27** (0.13)	0.10*** (0.03)		0.12 (0.16)	0.02 (0.07)
Total Conflict from previous year	0.15 (0.13)			-0.05 (0.17)		
Constant	17.96*** (2.18)	15.06*** (2.32)	5.51*** (0.84)	17.35 (11.32)	25.91*** (6.39)	-3.89** (1.79)
R-Squared	0.38	0.39	0.3	0.43	0.41	0.36

Note: *** Significance at 0.01 level, ** Significance at 0.05 level, * Significance at 0.1 level.

Values in parenthesis are standard errors for the given coefficients

6.5 Conclusion

Conflicts do not arise in thin air. Rational choice theorists have long argued that opting for the path of conflict and confrontation involves more than primordial instincts and the primacy of power struggles. For the group based conflicts and especially those groups whose basis is a shared ethnic identity, the motivation to enter conflict is more often provided by perceptions of unjust treatment. They feel, as a group, entitled to minimum standard of political, economic and social benchmarks and the failure to attain those benchmarks often leads them to conclude that the benefits of entering a conflict would outweigh those of sitting silent over the perceived grievances.

Looking for the sources of these grievances in the three main spheres, the theoretical frameworks of relative deprivation, social exclusion and horizontal inequality have been variously prescribed. All three concepts essentially draw on the same core of the mechanism of production of grievances. Perceived and actual gaps in the social, economic and political milieu are believed to have led many to conflict.

There have been many case studies linking horizontal inequality to conflict as discussed in section 6.2.3. Recently some cross country studies have also shown the existence of this link. Examples of both these types of studies are discussed in section 6.2.3.Our endeavor in this chapter was to explore this link empirically in our case.

While regional differences in development have been linked to ethno-nationalism in the past, there has not been a study to link these differences in development, to any meaningful measure of conflict in Pakistan. In the particular Pakistani ethnopolitical context the data related to violent and non-violent conflict was regressed vis a vis the indicators for horizontal inequality. Most of our results suggest that the thesis that horizontal inequality is linked to conflict may indeed have some merit in our case. The statistical significance of positive influence on all forms of conflict has been detected for horizontal political inequality, income inequality and inequality of social access (for data from 1986-2005) among provinces and groups whose spatial configuration is largely representative of the demographics of our ethnopolitical groups.

Notes

[1] Gurr (1997), pp. 71-72.

[2] For a concise review of the construct of Relative Deprivation please read the Walker and Smith (2002).

[3] Gurr (1970), pp. 24-25.

[4] ibid, pp. 62-63.

[5] P. 143.

[6] See for example S.M. Murshed and Gates (2005).

[7] Address to the World Bank Staff, Washington DC, 19 October, 1999. Cited in Østby (2008).

[8] For a discussion of this aspect see for example S.M. Murshed (2010) and F. Stewart et al. (2005).

[9] For a discussion on the methodology and merits of these indices please read F. Stewart et al. (2005) and S.M. Murshed (2010).

[10] See e.g. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre et al. (2003).

[11] For a discussion of these dyads please refer to chapter 3.

7 Talibanization, Conflict and Recruitment

> And he wanted to tell me about history. He says, "You have to understand the history." And I said, "No, the history begins today.*

7.1 Introduction

But of course, history did not start on 9/11. Even if the two centuries of western colonialism in Arab lands, and the ideological background of Wahabism/Salafi-ism from the 18th century onwards in Arabian Peninsula are ignored, history still does not start with 9/11. Profound questions of political economy, ideology, identity and geo-strategy cannot be overlooked as they have so often been. The results of such a superficial black and white approach can only increase the risk of conflict as Pakistan has been discovering recently.

Conflict involving taliban has many identifiable elements in the theoretical and analytical frameworks of this thesis. History, identity, institutions and presence of large horizontal inequalities are all vital components in the previous chapters of this thesis. It will be seen in this chapter that these defining features of the social contract assume a different character in the taliban conflict and combine to provide a different narrative to a wholly different conflict. This chapter therefore draws upon these features of the theoretical framework to help us understand the structural features of taliban recruitment. And to complete the story, at the cost of drifting away from the central themes of this thesis, the chapter will also discuss the agency level factors which help taliban recruitment. In the process, reliance will be placed on journalistic sources, personal interviews and informal talks.

Protracted conflict in Pakistan today, in which the Pakistani Taliban are pitched against the state for almost six years now, is a complex phenomenon. Despite continuous recent setbacks on the battlefield and

---

* Ex-US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage on what he told Pakistani General Mahmud, DG Inter Services Intelligence, on September 11, 2001. (Frontline 2006)

numerous arrests, the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has found ever more sources of ready recruits. The scope of this chapter is therefore limited to the centrality of recruitment question.

Rebel recruitment is central for understanding the duration, intensity, and termination of a conflict (Eck 2005). Without a continuous stream of readily available recruits, the taliban, as a movement, will cease to exist. Which structures and agencies drive this recruitment? is a question seldom get asked. The importance of recruitment is clear when one thinks about the roots of the problem. Structures and agencies leading to recruitment also point to the divisible and indivisible cakes which are contested. This, in turn, leads to possible conflict avoidance or resolution policies. As Eck (2005) remarks 'Rebel recruitment processes may well prove to be key in unlocking the black box of conflict dynamics.'

There are some pre-requisites to understanding taliban recruitment. One must be able to distinguish between taliban as a body of people at war and talibanization as a process of their increasing sway. Drawing on the theoretical framework in chapter 2, the attempt in this chapter will be to trace the roots of talibanization to the history of religio-political activism and conflict in the region, the struggles over competing identities and the contribution of an overall marshal culture, the health of institutions and the socio-economic conditions which generate grievances. Apart from these structural issues, this chapter will also look at the agency related issues of taliban recruitment. The attempt will be to show that the 'grace of God', that recurring theme in this thesis, has had a nexus with the breakdown of institutions and its supplanting by taliban sponsored institutions for which the bulk of personnel were supplied by Madrassahs. These, Madrassahs are connected to religious political parties, which protected and sympathised with their own brethren in the TTP. The sectarian based Madrassahs also gave the TTP the option of outsourcing its talibanization project to other outfits in the country.

This chapter first gives a brief overview of the history and development of the taliban movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In section 7.2, the structural factors commonly cited in explaining talibanization and the current conflict in Pakistan, are discussed. Finally, the chapter looks at specific strategies employed by the Taliban in recruitment efforts, focusing particularly on their use of religious identity, supplanting state institutions and franchising the conflict to its subsidiaries and allied organizations.

7.1.1 Taliban and Talibanization

Taliban (plural) is from talib (singular), meaning a student, in Pukhtu language. Usually the word taliban is used for the students of religious schools (Madrassah). The name was given to the student militia which sprang up in Kandahar during the second Afghan war (1992-1994). This chapter mostly deals with the Pakistani taliban which is not a distinct organization but an alliance of different groups, which have common goals but different agendas (Rana 2009a).

In order to understand the TTP and the sources of its recruitment, it is necessary to understand the context of violence in Afghanistan since 1975. That neighbouring country of Pakistan has been in almost a perpetual state of war since that time.

7.1.2 History of Afghan taliban

It is difficult to separate the discussion about the history of religious extremism and conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan from that of the causes that explain the phenomenon. Afghanistan has seen five major wars since 1975. The first war was from 1979 to 1985. The signs of tension between the radicals (Mostly Afghan students returning from Egypt) and the Soviet supported government, had appeared in 1975. The former opposed the deployment of Soviet military trainers and the increasing Sovietization of society (Kemp 2009). The uprisings in Konar and Khost provinces gave the Soviets a ready excuse to deploy its 40th army to Afghanistan on the 'invitation' of Afghan government. The Afghan national resistance to this Soviet invasion initially had only Pakistani support but was later supported with arms, money and training by the US, Western Europe and most of the Arab states. For different sectarian and ideological reasons the 'mujahideen' organized themselves into seven major Sunni groups (based in Pakistan) and eight Shia groups (based in Iran). These groups were mostly led by either the Ikhwan ul Muslimun (Egyptian) and Jamaat e Islami (Pakistan) linked student groups or the traditional mullahs (prayer leaders in the mosques). This period of war lasted from 1979 to 1988. The Soviets agreed to withdraw as a result of the Geneva accord (1988). The Afghan and Pakistani governments were signatories to this agreement while the Soviet and US government signed it as guarantors.

This agreement initiated the protracted second war from 1989 to 1992 between the 'mujahideen' groups and Kabul government. The fall

of Najib government in 1992 was followed by the third phase of the war which the Afghans remember as the worse period for Afghanistan. Most of the country was carved into fiefdoms of warlords and most of Kabul was reduced to rubble. The fighting was on ethnic lines between the Tajiks, led by Masood and Rabbani occupying Kabul, and the rest led by the Pukhtun, Hikmatyar in alliance with Hazara Shias, bombarding it from the outside. The Uzbeks led by Dostam switched sides in 1994 and joined Hikmatyar.

At around the same period the post Soviet Central Asia was opening up its oil and gas reserves to the world. The government of Turkmenistan had signed an agreement with the Argentinean firm Bridas for exploration of gas. Both the Turkmen and Pakistani governments wanted to sign a deal for export of gas to Pakistan but the pipeline had to pass through Afghanistan. The wrangling between the American company Unocal and Bridas led to US arm twisting of both the governments. By that time, taliban had risen in Kandahar in response to the extreme state of lawlessness and had established their version of peace on the country side. With the active support from Pakistan and Arab countries, they finally took over Kabul in September 1996 and both the companies wooed them for the lucrative contract to build the pipeline. Ultimately the contract was awarded to Bridas but the competition to build the pipeline continued (Rashid 2001).[1]

During this period the taliban made an alliance with the remnants of Arab fighters who had settled in Afghanistan and had organized under Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. Taliban identified themselves with the Deobandi School of Islamic jurisprudence (Metcalf 2001).[2] Al Qaeda was influenced by the Salafis of Saudi Arabia and the Ikhwan of Egypt. The alliance between Taliban and Al Qaeda was initially considered a marriage of convenience by the outsiders but the post 9/11 events unfolded the intermarriage of radical philosophies.

The fourth phase of the war was between the taliban and the Tajik led northern alliance who were mostly confined to a handful of small northern provinces. Two days before 9/11, in the first suicide attack inside Afghanistan, two Arab operatives of Al Qaeda managed to kill the leader of the northern alliance, Ahmed Shah Masood.

Finally, after September 11, 2001 the US and NATO overthrew taliban and the fifth phase of war between taliban and the international allies still continues. The results of this continued warfare are killings,

refugees, ethnic divisions and rising influence of radical Islam (Kemp 2009).

7.1.3 History of Talibanization and Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

In December 2001, the US blitz in Afghanistan had driven the Al Qaeda core to the cave complex of Tora bora, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan international border. Resorting to aerial bombardment, the finishing was left to the Afghan allies of the US (Kerry 2009). Most of Al Qaeda leadership fled to the Pukhtun tribal areas of Pakistan, commonly known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), an area of 27220 sq km (Figure 7.1) and with a population of 3.17 million.[3] The region had a history of being a base camp for the 'Mujahideen' of 1980s. Bin Laden's original organization, *Masada tul Ansar*, had its base camp in Sadda, Kurram during the 1980s. The nature of these border areas, with their rugged hills, warfare and weak government controls still evoke stereotypes of Kipling (Kemp 2009).

Initially the Pakistani state, led by its army, was nonchalant to the presence of these elements in FATA.[4] The Arab militants were hosted by the local tribesmen under the Pukhtun tribal tradition of *Melmastya* or hospitality. These local tribesmen, bypassing the state institution of *Maliks* (Please see section 7.2.2) gave them shelter and provided them with their initial local recruits.

Pressed by US and NATO, Pakistani army first launched a military operation against these Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks and their local hosts in 2004 in South Waziristan. This was the first of a series of conflict-truce cycles. The conflict was escalated by US mounted missile strikes and unmanned piloted attacks in FATA. After the death of their leader Nek Muhammad in one such drone strike on June 18, 2004 in Waziristan, the mercurial Baitullah Mehsud rose to prominence among the Wazir and Mehsud tribesmen. In July 2007, taliban and Al Qaeda sympathizers in the Red mosque of Islamabad rebelled and the security forces had to storm the building. In the fight some girl students of the Madrassah were also killed. The incident galvanized Al Qaeda sympathizers in Pakistan and with the aid of Afghan Taliban, Mehsud wielded together the different factions and sympathizers across FATA and Swat to form the TTP in December 2007.[5] This led to the de facto control of the organization across most of FATA and Swat. The

government alternatively cut deals and launched operations till February 2009 that is when the final Swat deal collapsed and the military launched an all out operation against all the TTP groups in the country. The conflict still continues and has taken a heavy toll on the civilian population. The number of suicide attacks across the country has led to 2962 deaths and 7507 injured (Figure 7.2). The increase was directly related to an increase in the number of suicide bombings over the years (Figure 7.3). This increase in suicide bombings is an indication of the increase in recruitment for the TTP and suicide bombers, according to them are one of their most potent weapons.

Figure 7.1: Map of FATA and NWFP



Source: Election Commission of Pakistan

Figure 7.2: Number of dead and injured in suicide bombings in Pakistan



Source: Usmani (2009)

Figure 7.3: Number of Suicide bombings in Pakistan



Source: Usmani (2009)

There has been no systematic attempt at analyzing the composition of TTP. According to one source, Pukhtuns provide the bulk of the organization at 80%, there are approximately 5% Punjabis and the rest are Uzbeks in a total fighting force of about 20000-25000.[6] This estimate

does not count the TTP sleeper cells and sympathisers in their franchise organizations (Please see section 7.3.3 for detail).

7.2 The Structural determinants of taliban recruitment

There are three important threads related to the history of Islamic extremism in general and that of talibanization in Pakistan in particular; namely the ideological, the geo strategic and the socio-economic. For most part writers have concentrated on only one of these factors. An example is Rashid's (2001) thesis which only lays stress on the great geostrategic game going on in the region. The ideological and socio-economic structural determinants of talibanization, although acknowledged at the policy and public debate level, are only now emerging as an interest in the broader scholarly community. The following sub sections will discuss these two factors behind talibanization in Pakistan. This will draw on the history of conflict and talibanization in Pakistan and Afghanistan as discussed above and on the elements of theoretical framework developed in the second chapter of this thesis, namely the burden of identity and history, decay of institutions and horizontal inequalities contributing to the risk of conflict.

7.2.1 Identity, Culture and History

The 'grace of God' and the Pukhtun ethnic identity at last found a common ground during the days of Afghan 'Jihad', the former at a more strategic level and the latter as a tactical tool and supplement' in the fight against the 'infidel'. The phenomenon continues to this day's conflict. Kemp (2009) thinks that the rise of radical Islam in Pukhtun lands on both sides is due to the disintegration of Afghan social structure, the increased sway of political Islam especially deobandi and salafi versions and the radicalization of Pukhtuns. This process of 'Islamization' was encouraged by the Pakistani dictator General Zia ul Haq (1977-88), the way he thought fit. This included wholesale changes in school syllabi and the state sponsorship of a culture of 'Jihad' and outward religiosity. According to one estimate there were 104 violent jihadist and 82 sectarian groups of varying strength operating in Pakistan before September 9, 2001. Afterwards, their number shrank in mainland Pakistan and Kashmir to 21 jihad and 39 sectarian groups but grew in FATA and NWFP to more than 50 within six years (Rana 2009a).

The NWFP and FATA have always been the most religious and conservative regions in the whole of Pakistan. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the national resistance was aided by Pakistan and US. From 1978-1992, $ 66 billion worth of weaponry was introduced into the region, which works out at $.134 million per person (Coll 2005).[7] But the resistance also needed a battle cry and a basis in the social ethos of the land and its people. The most convenient and the most effective was found to be that of Islam. The increasing influence of radical Islamism in the NWFP in part parallels the events occurring in Afghanistan (Kemp 2009). The Afghan refugees who poured into camps in Pakistan were mostly settled in the Pukhtun areas. Mujahideen groups and the sponsoring governments wanted a regular supply of troops to replenish the fighting cadres. Besides hastily set up schools in these refugee camps, another cheap and effective method to educate the young refugees was the Madrassah. Their number multiplied and so did the funding and support coming from philanthropic sources and Arab governments. Most of these Madrassahs were based around the sectarian syllabi of particular juristic schools. Some were also sponsored by the religious political parties of Pakistan like Jamaat e Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI)[8]. After the fall of President Mohammad Najibullah's regime (1986-1992) in Kabul, Afghanistan descended into chaos. Most of Taliban leadership that arose in Kandahar in 1994 consisted of the graduates of these Madrassahs of NWFP and FATA. The theme of Jihad against the 'infidels' was briefly changed to Jihad against the 'hypocrites'. After 9/11, when the US invaded, the same old battle cry was re-invoked. While Taliban today on the Afghan side of the border are 'fighting jihad against the invading non-Muslims', the taliban on the Pakistani side are fighting against 'a hypocrite and oppressive regime which is colluding with the west'.

In Swat, the same 'grace of God' had been a part of socio-political life for the last two centuries. In 1915, Abdul Jabbar Shah was called from outside and installed as King of Swat partly because he was a Syed, a descendent of the Prophet (almost the same case as that of the Protestant William of Orange acceding to the throne of England in 1689), only to be replaced by another man of pious repute, Mian Gul Abdul Wadud in 1917 (Sultan-i-Rome 2009). To this day, the religious identity in politics is manifested through the electoral results. Jamaat i Islami has been getting most of its share of seats in the provincial

legislature, from this area. They also support a network of schools in the district.

Ethnic Identity at the tactical level

Taliban are mostly Pukhtuns. This ethnic identity may not be present in their overall justification of the war but is all prevalent on ground and in their tactics. They invoke the sense of Pukhtun brotherhood when calling for arms in their propaganda posters and pamphlets.[9] They also use the *paighor* or taunt, that famous article of the code of Pukhtunwali, [10] It is employed whenever one is seen to be lacking in marshal spirit. The initial catalyst for war in Afghanistan was Mullah Omar's refusal to hand over his 'guest' to the US. As he explained, this would have been against the Pukhtun code of *melmastya* or hospitality. Even Afghans who are part of the US supported Karzai government in Kabul are appreciative of this staunch adherence to the code of Pukhtunwali.[11] The initial emergence of TTP was itself a result of refusal of Pukhtun tribal leaders (mostly Mullahs) of Waziristan and Bajaur, to ask their Arab and Uzbek 'guests' to leave the area.

Some scholars have also mentioned the rapid pace of modernization as a perceived threat to their conservative culture.

> The violent reaction underway along the border, to the point of being a Pukhtun-based insurgency, may also be tied to the rapid imposition of modernity on what is essentially a rural, traditional, clan-based society. Some Pukhtuns may see insurgency as a way to fend off the inroads of foreign movies, liberal thought, drugs, and the relaxation of social restraints on women. (Kemp 2009)

The Pukhtun lands have historically resisted invading armies from Alexander to the current US led invasion. The terrain and history have combined to create a myth which is both romantic and surreal. Adeel A. Khan, a fellow Pukhtun is not impressed;

> Although the strategic importance of the NWFP as a gateway to India attracted invaders from the north, the inhospitability of the land was such that they would only pass through without establishing their rule. Cut off from the outside world, Pukhtun society remained dependent on non-productive economic activities like war and plundering, forcing Pukhtuns to be conscious of their survival and security on a daily basis, whereas social and cultural isolation made them inward-looking. (A. Khan 2005)[12]

The Pukhtun proudly call their land, the 'Graveyard of empires' (Bearden 2001). This has much to do with the mountainous and one of the most difficult of terrains in the world which is uniquely suited to the demands of guerrilla warfare. This aura of invincibility has instilled fearlessness in the Pukhtun which has less to do with the realities of modern warfare. The myth of the 'noble savage' has been created and sustained in Orientalist writings. Olaf Caroe was perhaps the first of them to cast the Pukhtun in this stereotype;

> The force of Pathan[13] character, the bravery of the Pathan soldier, the shrewdness of Pathan assessments of political realism, once carried the forefathers of this people to high positions of authority outside their own country. (Caroe 1983)[14]

Louise Dupree then takes this torch of stereotyping to new heights;

> The insolence of the Afghan (Pukhtun), however, is not the frustrated insolence of urbanised, dehumanised man in western society, but insolence without arrogance, the insolence of harsh freedoms set against a back drop of rough mountains and deserts, the insolence of equality felt and practiced (with an occasional touch of superiority), the insolence of bravery past and bravery anticipated.[15]

The same stereotypes are peddled, carelessly, even today;

> [TTP, a] rural, ultra-religious, nationalist movement fighting tooth-and-nail a corrupt, urban-based government as if they were a post-colonial fantasy of the noble tribal savage - a la Rousseau - fighting the colonialist West. (Escobar 2009)

And the Pukhtun has ever since tried to live up to this stereotype. From Mullah Omar to Baitullah and Hakeemullah Mehsud to Muslim Khan of Swat, their verbal bravado reflects this burden of history.[16] These two identities of ethnicity and conservative Islam were strange bedfellows from the start, something that stumped even the most perceptive observers;

> Being Pukhtun they (TTP) had the convenience of a common language, Pukhtun human force, Hanafi Islam, fundamentalist sympathizers, and well established financial and educational institutions already at hand. In addition to the popular perceptions of the Taliban as the religious movement driven by the zeal of Islamic fundamentalism, the ethnic undertones of the movement cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the analysis of its social support base. For the ethnic minorities, the Taliban

was both a symbol of Islamic conservatism as well as a reflection of Pukhtun chauvinism. (Rana 2009a)

However since the Feb 2008 electoral victory in the province, the relationship of the Pukhtun ethnopolitical Awami National Party (ANP)[17] with the TTP today is one of extreme animosity. Hundreds of ANP workers, leaders and legislators have been killed in ambushes and suicide attacks. The ANP has been branded as a traitor to the Pukhtun cause by siding with the invaders and their puppets (the Pakistan army). This intensified campaign was one of the factors that led to the increasing unpopularity of taliban and their allies, Al Qaeda. An August 2009 Pew survey finds that the Taliban and al Qaeda tend to be unpopular across regions, including the NWFP, and that people in Sindh and in the NWFP are considerably more likely to see the Taliban as a threat to Pakistan (85% each) than are those in Punjab (68%) and that concerns about al Qaeda and the Taliban are widespread across ethnic groups. More than eight-in-ten Pukhtuns (85%) say the Taliban pose a serious threat to Pakistan, as do 80% of Muhajirs, 77% of Sindhis and 71% of Punjabis. Al Qaeda is viewed as a serious threat by nearly seven-in-ten Muhajirs (68%), and about six-in-ten Punjabis, Sindhis and Pukhtuns (62% each) (Pew Global 2009). This is not something clearly visible to the casual outside observer. An example is that of Pebe Escobar who thinks that an increasing number of Pukhtuns living on both sides of the border have seized the opportunity and started to look to the Taliban as a convenient facilitator for the emergence of Pukhtunistan (Escobar 2009). The dual identities of Islam and Pukhtunwali have been influential in providing the taliban with their initial success, but the same Pukhtun identity has now boomeranged to hurt them, at least on the Pakistani side of the border.

7.2.2 Institutions (or the lack of it)

In this section the focus will be on the role of institutions of conflict management in FATA and Swat. Both these regions have a unique history of evolution of these institutions which is altogether different from the rest of the country. The institutions of interest here are the political and judicial setups of FATA and Swat.

In FATA the tribal structure of society was given a formal recognition by the colonialists in the shape of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in 1848. The same was amended in 1873 and 1876 and

then re-enacted in 1901. British policy towards the tribal belt was based on a mix of persuasion, pressure and armed intervention (Rakistis 2008). The legislation was designed to mollify Pukhtun tribesmen and establish a system of principal and client in which the responsibility to maintain law and order fell upon the tribal elders or *Maliks*. These Maliks were the state sponsored elite under an elaborate system of *nikat* or hereditary entitlement, in which they and their tribe was eligible for government cash handouts in proportion to the strength of the tribe, the importance of the area and the past record of loyalty to the British. In case of any offence against the interests of the British Raj, the concept of 'Collective Responsibility' was introduced. So for any misdemeanour of a member of tribe, the whole tribe was liable to punishment with blockade, property seizure, razing of the house and indefinite detention.[18] The system called for a 'Council of elders' or Jirga which only had a recommending role. While giving their recommendations they were not required to consult any statute except that of the code of Pukhtunwali. The Government appointed executive official (or a hierarchy of them) constituted all the courts of final appeal. The high courts had no jurisdiction in FATA. The law still exits and is often applied. It is given constitutional protection in Article 247 which states that no Act of Parliament applies to FATA unless the president so desires. Only the president is authorized to amend laws and promulgate ordinances for the tribal areas. The state justifies its failure to meet its obligations to the citizens there on the grounds of Pukhtun tribal customs and its ancient code (ICG 2006).

In the past, in case of conflict between the government and the tribes, the Maliks would be the first people to intervene, be accused, apprehended and set free. Each and every dispute would finally end with a jirga between the tribes and the government in which the terms of the agreement would be finalized. When the hostilities started in 2004 in South Waziristan, the government asked these Maliks to intervene and eject the 'foreigners', a term used for Arab, Uzbek and Chechen fighters among the taliban ranks. The problem with the approach was that the Maliks were not made party to the deal. The government withdrew from the area[19] despite the absence of any guarantee for future good conduct. With this first agreement the government assumed that things will return to normal. This was a mistake on part of the government and a factor that allowed the TTP to swell ranks with new recruitment (Abbas 2008).

FATA has always had its representation in both the houses of the legislature. Before 1996, these representatives only needed to secure the few hundred votes of Maliks to make it to the assembly. In 1997, the people of FATA were given adult franchise for the first time. This was done without making other adjustments in the FCR. As a result, the political parties were not allowed to enter FATA but the religious parties had no such practical bar. De facto, they already had the pulpit in every mosque and could turn the Friday prayers into political meetings. Only *their* message could be heard in FATA from 1997 till date. The result was all too evident in the elections of 2002 and 2008 when the religious political parties swept FATA. With the provincial government of neighbouring NWFP in their hands, the alliance of religious parties known as Muttahida Majlis e Amal (MMA) was unchallenged in Pukhtun lands. Khalid Aziz thinks that the removal of chief district executive official, the Deputy Commissioner, by the local government reforms of General Musharraf in 2001, was another factor that weakened the state apparatus in the area (K. Aziz 2007).

With the traditional local leadership sidelined and the government negociating directly with the militants and cutting deals, the Pakistani Taliban effectively established themselves as an alternative leadership to the traditional tribal elders. By the time the Pakistani government realized the changing dynamics and tried to resurrect the tribal jirga institution, it was too late. The Taliban had killed approximately 200 of the tribal elders under charges of being spies (Abbas 2008). The Pukhtun intelligentsia raised its voice against this wholesale slaughter for the benefit of an agreement which had no enforcement mechanism but the MMA led provincial government would always resist any enforcement of the agreements by the government as it would lead to direct pressure on their protégés.[20] It was convenient for the dictator to keep the mainstream parties out of the political system and the regime had no interest in introducing full fledged democracy with political parties to FATA. The presence of the two religious governments in NWFP and Balochistan raised eye brows; many observers were further surprised by the military's use of JUI (F) influence in Waziristan for brokering two agreements with the hostile Taliban in South and North Waziristan (K. Aziz 2007).

The institutional structure erected by the British in FATA served the purpose of closed frontier policy against Russian influence in the

nineteenth century. It was no match for the asymmetrical warfare of 'rebels without borders'. The collapse of the political institutions was hastened with the incomplete reforms which were introduced to the area without the requisite environment to sustain them. According to one poll conducted in FATA, 34% sought integration with the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and 20% voiced a preference for a separate province. Over 50% wanted the 'Political Parties Act' to be extended to FATA. Only 23% preferred things as they were (CAMP 2008). Such high dissatisfaction with the prevailing institutional structure weakened the social contract between the state and its people. The resulting implosion of institutions was a factor which created the taliban myth in these areas. It gave them the legitimacy of a victor who could defeat the system as old as almost two centuries. The supplanting of these institutions with those laid by taliban will be discussed in section 7.3.

Institutions and conflict in Swat

The institutional story of Swat is no different than that of FATA. In the pre-Swat state era (i.e. before 1917) the region was part of the autonomous state of Swat from 1917 to 1969. Between 1947 and 1969, the state had internal autonomy while matters related to foreign affairs; legislation, defence and currency were dealt with by the state of Pakistan. The ruler called Wali then signed the instrument of accession with the government of Pakistan. Swat thus became part of Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA) which was governed under the PATA regulations of 1975.

The pre 1917 era (also known as the Pukhtu era) is knows for the absence of a central government in Swat. The people lived under Pukhtunwali. The lawlessness and continuous anomic violence of Swat was anecdotal and Swat was full of sedition but was greatly moderated under the policies of the Swat state rulers after 1917 (Sultan-i-Rome 2009). There is a commonly held belief today that under the Walis, the judicial system was 'Islamic'. Sultan-i-Rome (2009) finds little evidence for that and concludes that the people's nostalgia for that judicial system was due to its cost effectiveness and prompt disposal.

After accession to Pakistan, the constitutional status of this area has had a close nexus with conflict. The area's constitutional status created legislative and administrative confusion as it was under the administrative control of the provincial government, but the provincial

legislature could not make and promulgate laws for the area. This could only be done by the governor of the province and president of the country; both of whom are neither part of the provincial government nor answerable to it. This created anomalies and institutional inefficiency. In 1994, PATA regulations were declared null and void by the Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the government's appeal. While the government was mulling introduction of the general laws of the rest of the country to the area, a segment of Swatis, under the leadership of Maulana Sufi Muhammad, head of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), demanded the imposition of 'Islamic laws'. This pitted the TNSM in an armed conflict against the security forces which led to several deaths on both sides. In the end, the provincial government agreed to institute new and separate laws for the region. These new regulations which mainly dealt with court procedures and nomenclature failed to completely satisfy the TNSM and the resentment simmered. A further set of regulations were introduced in 1999 but those too were of little help to pacify the movement for the same reasons.

The current conflict in Swat started around 2004 when the alliance of religious political parties, the MMA, got political control of the province. Many of today's Swat's taliban had voted for them and the MMA was more tolerant of their activities as it recognized that like the taliban, it was also engaged in a struggle for an Islamic system and could not be seen obstructing those advocating the same (Sultan-i-Rome 2009).[21]

As Fazlullah, the son in law of Sufi Muhammad started his firebrand sermons on his illegal FM radio, the MMA's provincial government announced that it could not legally stop him from doing so. Since Sufi Muhammad himself was in jail for fighting against NATO in Afghanistan, the TNSM cadres gathered around Fazlullah which now started calling themselves the Swat chapter of TTP. Now the ostensible demand of this chapter was the introduction of 'Sharia' in Swat. The MMA provincial government supported the demand and did not do anything to stop Fazlullah from his funds collection and arms acquisition. In fact the police superintendent of the district was asked to desist from arresting Fazlullah in 2006.[22] After a few months it became impossible even if they wanted to arrest him. The civilian head of the administration in the district, appointed by the MMA government was so sympathetic to the cause of TTP that he would often be found praying in

congregations led by Fazlullah himself.[23] A cycle of conflict-negotiations-conflict ensued exactly as happened in FATA. The last accord was signed in February 2009 when the government asked Sufi Muhammad to intervene. The accord was roundly condemned by human rights organizations for its contents but even that could not bring peace to the area. It broke almost immediately after the TTP Swat took over the district, announced their intention to move to the other parts of the country and refused to disarm.

Now that the army action in Swat has succeeded in restoring peace, state institutions and rehabilitation of internally displaced people, a pattern of the building and collapse of institutions of conflict management emerges which closely follows that of the rise and fall in conflict intensity. The period before 1917, one of institutional absence (or degraded institutions in the shape of primitive tribal codes) was marked by continuous conflict. From 1917 to 1969, the period is known for good working state institutions and peace. There was general peace till 1994 as the PATA regulations worked but conflict ensued immediately as the courts struck down the laws. The legislative vacuum existed from 1994 to 2002 and when the capture of political power in the province gave an opportunity to the TTP sympathizers in the provincial government, they exploited it in order to attain their goals by violence.

7.2.3 Deprivation and Inequality

There are some studies which present evidence to suggest that poverty does not seem to be the main determinant behind terrorist attacks (Krueger 2003), and there are other studies by Krueger and Maleckova (2003), Krueger and Laitin (2008) and Sageman (2004) which suggest that terrorists are predominantly recruited from a relatively wealthy and educated family background. Yet more studies suggest that militants are mostly in their twenties with some post-secondary training, mostly in technical or engineering fields. After a brief survey of this literature, Azam and Thelen (2008) conclude that terrorists are not recruited among the poorest segments of their society of origin however at the same time they provide empirical evidence for the case that the level of foreign aid, especially in education sector, reduces the supply of terrorist attacks.

In the Pakistani context, since there is little comparative data of FATA with the rest of Pakistan, as none of the major household surveys

included FATA, therefore it would be premature to conclude that poverty has a definite connection with militant conflict in FATA. In the same vein, Aftab (2008) concludes her study with the observation that the data on spatial distribution of poverty does not suggest a link between poverty and intense militant activity. She however admits that other studies would suggest that poverty is a contributing factor provided there is an existing enabling environment.

Table 7.1: Top TTP commanders and their educational background

No.	Name of TTP Commander	Rank	Education
1	Nek Muhammad	Former Chief of tribal taliban	Attended Madrassah for five years.
2	Baitullah Mehsud	Former Chief of TTP	Never finished formal schooling, Received some instruction in Madrassah, Some reports suggest he attended higher secondary level.[24]
3	Hakeemullah Mehsud	Current Chief of TTP	Never attended school, Only attended Madrassah.
4	Maulana Fazlullah	Chief of TTP Swat	Attended Madrassah, attended school up to secondary level.
5	Qari Hussain	Top Commander and trainer for suicide bombers	Never attended school. Attended Madrassah,
6	Faqeer Muhammad	Vice Chief of TTP and Commander of Bajaur TTP	Never attended school, Attended Madrassah.
7	Mangal Bagh[25]	Chief of Lashkar-e-Islam	No education whatsoever.
8	Waliur Rehman Mehsud	Chief of South Waziristan TTP	Attended Madrassah, Never attended school
9	Hafiz Gul Bahadur	Chief of his own faction of TTP	Never attended school, Attended Madrassah
10	Tariq Afridi	Commander of Khyber (Bara) TTP	Attended Madrassah
11	Abdul Wali	Commander of Mohmand TTP	No education whatsoever.

Source: Wiki profiles, Interviews with Pakistani journalists.

Contrary to the general agreement on the absence of hard evidence linking lack of education and poverty to militant conflict, a cursory look at the profiles of the top leaders of TTP (Table 7.1) suggests that almost

all of them were either drop outs from school or never attended one. None of them come from a wealthy family. Although there is no single dataset with comparable statistics for both FATA and the rest of Pakistan, yet data made available by the FATA secretariat reveals a gulf of horizontal inequalities (Table 7.2). Aftab (2008) points out that similar inequalities exist for example between rural Sindh and the rest of Pakistan but the same areas have not provided any appreciable number of recruits to the militant conflict. She is right but then there is also no history of failure of institutions, 'Jihad' and state encouragement of radical ideas in these other areas. It is the enabling environment which makes the combination so combustible. In view of the profiles presented in Table 7.1, it is difficult to de link the absence of formal education from militancy in FATA.

Table 7.2: Horizontal Inequality between FATA and the rest of Pakistan

Development Indicator	In Pakistan	In FATA
Over all literacy Rate	56 %	17.42%
Female literacy	32.6%	3%
Population Per doctor[26]	1225	6993
Population per hospital Bed	1517	2325
Percentage of Population below poverty line	35%	60%
Income per capita in FATA	is half of $500 national figure.	
Per capita development expenditure in FATA	One third of national average	

Source: FATA (2009) and ICG (2006)

In addition to the horizontal inequalities as indicated in Table 7.2, the economy of FATA is underdeveloped. The region is rich in mineral resources but remains under exploited. Most locals depend on subsistence agriculture since there is little industrial development and few jobs. This has given rise to a vast black economy which largely depends on smuggling of goods from and to Afghanistan. 15% of the population is between the ages of 15 and 22 which makes this an even more enabling environment for propaganda as Aziz (2007) and Rakistis (2008) point out. Most of the taliban recruits in FATA are poor and strongly feel that 'exploitative system is against them'.[27] According to a poll of

2000 adults (with 29.1% women), conducted in seven tribal agencies and three Frontier Regions of FATA and using proportionate stratified sampling, over 50% respondents expressed dissatisfaction with life in FATA. The poll indicated that the people would like the government to provide basic services like Justice, education and health (CAMP 2008).

These structural factors of; a history of conflict, state sponsored conservative radicalism, weak or non existing political and judicial institutions and the horizontal social inequalities, point towards important policy options in reducing militant recruitment. These options include the use of force as against more social spending, the carrot and stick policies as Frey (2004) calls it. The Pakistani government seems to be taking both the routes at the moment as it launched a nine year, $ 2 billion Sustainable development plan in FATA, in 2006 with substantial aid from the US.

7.2.4 Recruitment and its nexus with Madrassahs

Taliban use the Madrassahs as their chief recruitment pool. There is considerable controversy among researchers regarding the number of Madrassahs in Pakistan, the number of students in these Madrassahs and their socio-economic background. With the estimates about the number of Madrassahs ranging from 7000 (Khalid 2002)[28] to 45000 (Singer 2001), the most authentic study about the number of these Madrassahs is that of Rahman (2004). His estimates, based on government and Madrassah sources are given in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3: Madrassahs, their affiliation, numbers and growth between 1988 and 2002

School	1988	2002
Deobandi	1779	7000
Barelvi	717	1585
Ahle hadith	161	376
Shia	47	419
Jamaat e Islami	97	500
Total	2801	9880

Source: Rahman (2004)

Refuting an International Crisis group study in 2002, which erroneously claimed that one third of all students in Pakistan attended Madrassah, another study by Andrabi et al (2006) found that the number of students in these Madrassahs is less than 3%. However they neither incorporated the data for FATA and some conflict hit areas of NWFP, nor adjusted for it.

There is a general view about Madrassahs being the breeding ground for radicalism. Most of these are affiliated with political, sectarian and militant organizations (Rana 2009b). The TTP have found the Madrassahs a fertile ground for recruitment. They recruit in Madrassahs through sympathetic teachers, their syllabus and their role in acting as alternatives after the breakdown of state's institutions. Tariq Rehman has given us a good insight into the worldview of these Madrassah teachers and their students. He found that both these groups are considerably more intolerant and sympathetic to using violence for their political aims, than their counterparts in public or private schools (Rahman 2004). Fair (2008), however theorizes that the relationship between Madrassahs and these intolerant views may not be so simple and that 'Madaris might not simply *produce* these students; rather intolerant families might *choose* madaris' (Emphasis in original). She suggests that the work of Andrabi et al (2006) mitigates this concern.

How does the Madrassahs become breeding grounds for TTP? Consider this; A study based on interviews and survey of Madrassah teachers found that although the Madrassahs' administration were reluctant to disclose their sectarian and militant affiliations, still 18% owned up to this connection. With hundreds of students in some of these Madrassahs that is a very high number of potential recruits for these Jihadi organizations. 100% of Jamaat e Islami's, and 82% of Deobandi Maddrassahs were inclined towards politics. They routinely condemned terrorism as evil but at the same time 103 out of 115 Madrassahs opposed the military operation in FATA (Rana 2009b). Most of the time its not the syllabus but the ideas of right and wrong that the students pick from their teachers, from critical incidents and situations and the way a particular behaviour is classified as acceptable or unacceptable (Vazir 2007).

The link of present and past TTP leadership with the Madrassahs network is evident from Table 7.1. Except some, all the others have either been to a Madrassah or have been dropouts from one. However,

not all the Madrassahs supplying TTP with its leadership and foot soldiers are of the same sect. Those appearing in the above mentioned table have all been to the Madrassahs operated by the Deobandi or Salafi tradition or its subclass of Panjpiri School. The Barelvis are almost non existent in these cadres.

The TTP has mostly used Madrassahs as their staging points and gathering places where they interact and get religious sanction from the 'learned' for their extremist ideologies. In Bajaur, North and South Waziristan, Swat and Orakzai, there is anecdotal evidence that a few of these Madrassahs have been used as training camps and for preparing suicide bombers.[29] The TTP also used the Madrassahs as a counter institution to those representing the state as all the parallel courts which operated in TTP occupied areas were invariably staffed with Madrassah graduates as Qazis (judges) and were mostly run inside these Madrassahs.

7.3 Agency Factors

> Contextual factors may provide insight into why individuals are easier to recruit, but it is necessary to go beyond them to examine the strategies and dynamics of recruitment if we are to better understand this crucial process (Eck 2005).

The fact that all the above discussed factors are structural, begs the question if the Taliban themselves have any role in expediting or facilitating recruitment in their ranks. The contextual factors not only give them their motivation but also give them a fertile ground for further recruitment. They have thus developed tactics and strategies which maximizes the recruitment in the given conditions. To provide a more wholesome picture, in the following sub-sections, the focus will be on these agent level strategies. They include the exploitation of the Madrassah institution, the networking and outsourcing of talibanization, supplanting the state institutions and indoctrination of young recruits through propaganda and theological training.

7.3.1 Replacing the State Structure[30]

The TTP used a carefully choreographed method for expanding their influence inside FATA and then in NWFP. This involves creating Robin Hood like affinity with the common people by acts of vigilante justice, the demonstration and reinforcement of the perception of weakness of

state institutions and local elite, the creation of a parallel institutional structure and the consolidation of this structure by creating and assigning supporting roles to those who are co-opted.

In all the seven tribal agencies of FATA and Swat, the first acts of Taliban constituted a call for ban on the 'degenerating' influence of television, drugs and all things 'un-Islamic' from barber shops to courts. In the first step the people involved in these professions are warned to desist. Failure to comply results in blowing up the premises of these businesses with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Almost at the same time, drug peddlers, kidnappers and other criminal elements in the area are warned through public announcements that 'Sharia' has now been introduced and they must not indulge in these activities again. A few of those accused of such crimes are hunted down and killed after summary proceedings. This has the dual effect of creating terror and garnering sympathies of the local population.

In the second step the influential of the area are asked to contribute to 'jihad' with men or money. Some comply, others who dare not to, are assassinated. Either way, the TTP scores success. Their compliance gives the TTP valuable support, influence and foothold among the local population while a successful assassination sends out the signal that those supporting the state are no longer safe and the state cannot protect its supporters. Almost in tandem, the schools become a target, especially those set up for girls. According to a latest count, at least 473 schools have been destroyed in Swat alone (Allbritton 2009). Similar school destruction has been witnessed in Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber and Orakzai. Peshawar has also borne the brunt of this tactic which is mostly used to terrorize and announce the arrival of a challenge for the writ of the state.

The third step in this talibanization process is the setting up of parallel institutions e.g. taliban courts. These courts are all run by 'muftis', graduates of Madrassahs, and housed in one such Madrassah of the area. Due to summary 'justice' dispensed in these courts, the disposal of cases is quick. This is a strong attraction to the locals who almost always find it cumbersome to approach the legitimate courts, have to pay the lawyers and will often wait for a generation to get a verdict. Rana (2009a) reports that the taliban court in Bajaur had registered 1400 cases of disputes among the local population till August 2008 and had decided 1000 out of them. In addition to these courts, a parallel system of police

and vigilante public morality squads is organized. Any remaining foes are rounded up through the morality squads and made to appear before these courts.

The final act in this process is the consolidation and entrenchment of talibanization. This involves the setting up of a rudimentary public welfare system which is then financed through various taxes. These taxes are mostly levied and collected from smugglers plying between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mining is also taxed. People are asked to contribute their 'Zakah', Islamic charity, to the TTP. In Orakzai and Buner, the TTP asked the non-Muslims (mainly the Sikh community) to pay a special tax, 'Jizya'. Failure to comply makes them liable to punishment including death and exile. Another source of funding for these campaigns is through predatory attacks (mainly kidnappings for ransom and looting the banks) into the border areas. The 'taxes' which are collected are mainly spent in warfare but a small portion is also reported to have been spent sometimes to co-opt the local population. Rana (2009a) reports that in June 2008, the Taliban in South Waziristan distributed 15 million Rupees to help the victims of the military operation. According to one government claim, the TTP spent about 3 billion Rupees a year on these activities (Khattak 2008). Such a consolidation strategy routs the last vestiges of state institutions. In Bajaur in 2008, the Political Agent in charge of the area and all his subordinate staff were essentially trapped inside the small military camp and those visiting the officials were killed by the taliban.

7.3.2 Indoctrination and Propaganda

> And then I asked my fellow teachers and school administrators "what have we been teaching these kids for all these years? What was the strength of the message that we imparted to them? All these kids are easily influenced now by an ignorant talib and brainwashed in a few days to the extent that he becomes a fanatic and a suicide bomber." [31]

The dilemma of one school principal is understandable. He is up against formidable odds. The TTP has an elaborate system of propaganda and indoctrination. This system includes dissemination of timely information through nominated spokesmen for each of the seven tribal agencies and Swat, the recording and distribution of militant songs and videos and setting up of indoctrination schools for suicide bombers

The TTP has a spokesman appointed in each of the tribal agencies and even in some districts of NWFP. Almost all of them are fluent Urdu speakers and a few can speak English and Arabic. They keep in continuous touch with the journalists, TV anchors and opinion makers. They are quick to take responsibility for any act of violence and describe it as their victory over 'the hypocrites'.

The TTP videotape almost every suicide bombing from a distance and these short, often mobile phone quality videos, are then distributed. All of these are accompanied with 'Jihadi' songs and music in the background in which the bomber and his deed is eulogized. Most of these bombers are ideologically motivated and indoctrinated in the schools set up for them by the TTP. Qari Hussain, was in charge of one such school in South Waziristan (Roggio 2009). A similar camp was captured in Swat (Waraich 2009).

Another favourite with the TTP is the use of cheaply available FM radio transmitters. Their whole campaign in Swat was built around Fazlullah's daily sermons. Every tribal agency and even some areas in the NWFP had its own TTP radio transmitter which were difficult for the government to trace. In areas where the TTP managed to extend appreciable control, the people were forced to listen to these radio broadcasts out of fear as the Taliban would routinely name people in these broadcasts who were liable to be punished for working against them. Nobody wanted to be caught off guard.

7.3.3 Outsourcing, Franchising and Networking

From a motley crowd of tribal fighters in FATA to a highly organized force across the rest of the country, the TTP's transition within five years relied on many deliberate strategies. Since these tribal elements shared its ideology of 'Jihad' against US and NATO in Afghanistan, with other militant elements already present across FATA, NWFP and a few pockets in Punjab; they found it convenient to expand by merging, networking, outsourcing and franchising its activities and tactics, without compromising on its basic ideology or its goals. As many as 40 such organizations are now estimated to have become part of the larger TTP (Rana 2009a).

After its formation the TTP has been trying to absorb the cadres and services of its ideological allies. The goals of the TTP have been to destabilize the state's security apparatus, to force the government not to

interfere in TTP controlled areas and to force the government to change the law according to their interpretative paradigm of Islam (Rana 2009a). The last mentioned goal has always been the stated objective of most of the militant organizations in Pakistan. To make itself more appealable to sectarian outfits, the TTP also targeted the Shias and the Sufi orders of the areas.[32] The rivals of these sects and orders existed in these areas before the arrival of TTP and there was quite a bit of animosity especially in Kurram, Hangu and Orakzai. The sectarian militant outfits in these areas quickly allied themselves with the TTP and were branded as the local chapters of the organization. The smaller groups, by merging with the bigger TTP, suddenly found a very powerful ally and in Kurram, Hangu and Orakzai, they forced a militant solution on the long standoffs with their local rivals. All they had to do was to express their allegiance to the ideals and cause of the parent organization. This was essentially a franchising strategy for expansion.

This franchising strategy gained rich dividends for the TTP's fund raising efforts. The newly established chapters were instructed to send half of all the collected funds to the headquarters in Waziristan and most of them often resorted to crime to meet the target (Rana 2009a).

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter was an attempt to explain the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan by looking at the structural as well as agency level factors contributing to its recruitment. The structural factors are mostly similar to those which have been a constant refrain throughout this thesis and which were employed in the previous chapters to explain ethnopolitical conflict. These find relevance in this chapter as well and despite a paucity of data about the conflict hit regions of Pakistan, especially FATA, a connection can still be made between the history of the region, the conservative religious outlook of its population, its proximity to Afghanistan, the weakness of state's institutions of conflict management and the socio economic conditions of the area. All these structural factors provided a fertile ground to the TTP which were able to exploit the conditions for more effective recruitment efforts. Both of these have to be kept in context for any policy option.

The discussion about ideology and the preeminence of the 'Grace of God' in the life of the people of FATA and NWFP has been a topic of much debate and this thesis is not the place to resolve it. As David

Kemp observes, this is a debate which is for the larger Muslim world to undertake and decide and may take decades (Kemp 2009). One is but constrained to observe that without settling this critical debate, the long term peace of the conflict hit zones of Pakistan and Afghanistan will be an elusive goal, especially given the long history of warfare on the basis of these ideological conflicts. Without confronting ideas with more powerful ideas, the tribal Pukhtun with his simple, ancient code of Pukhtunwali, the history of his region and his black and white world around him, is not going to lay down his gun any time soon. For this purpose there is a need to desist from immature and hasty conclusions about the ethnic aspirations of TTP like for example Escobar's (2009) observation that an increasing number of Pukhtuns living on both sides of the border have started to look to the Taliban as a convenient facilitator for the emergence of Pukhtunistan.

Equally important is the stability of functioning, efficient and adapted institutions in the region for resolution and prevention of conflict. For it is the weakness or absence of these state institutions which have represented the breakdown of the centuries old social contract of the people of these areas with the state and has given an opportunity to the TTP to play upon the poor socio economic conditions of the populace and recruit them in their cause. While it is important to put out the fire in the house immediately, counter violence by the state can never be the only option for building anew.

Finally, it is important to look at the agency level TTP recruitment strategies for formulating an effective policy response. Again, the power of counter ideas cannot be over stressed. It has been a failure of the educational system of the area which has given a walkover to the taliban in projecting their worldview and finding ready recruits. The semi controlled Madrassahs have been allowed to mushroom for too long. It has been and still is politically incorrect in Pakistan to question the very raison d'être of this institution but the regulation of their syllabi, student population and funding should not be under estimated.

Notes

[1] For a detailed narrative of events please read Rashid (2001). For a concise timeline of events please go to http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/pipeline_timeline.htm

[2] Dar ul Uloom Deoband is a religious schools of eminence in Utter Pardesh, India in the town by the same name. Established in 1866, the school represents one of the largest denomination of Indian and Pakistani muslims.

[3] 1998 census.

[4] Interview with Brig (Retd) Mehmood Shah, The ex-Secretary for Security of FATA.

[5] Interview with Journalist, columnist and TV anchor Saleem Safi.

[6] ibid

[7] P. 238

[8] Both the Fazlur Rehman and Sami ul Haq factions of the party.

[9] Interview with Dr. Tariq Rehman.

[10] Pukhtunwali is the code by which Pukhtuns live. It includes, among others, Hospitality, Honour, Revenge and Taunt.

[11] Interview with Waheedullah Sabawoon, minister in Karzai's cabinet.

[12] P. 85

[13] Pathan is a name given to Pukhtuns mostly by Urdu or Hindustani speakers. The word is never used by the Pukhtuns themselves for self identification.

[14] P. 437

[15] Quoted in A. Khan (2005), P. 87

[16] As a sample of peddling of this historical stereotype, Consider Mullah Omar's message of felicitation of Eid, November 25, 2009.

"The people, whom you have chosen for confrontation, have the honor of dismantling the arrogant empires. They have good capability and historical experience. Our believing people will not allow the Western colonialism to make our country a hotbed against our independence and vital values and aggressive designs against regional countries. These are the people who before you, have wiped out two empires – the British and Russians empires-- from the map of the world."

http://www.alemarah.info/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=623:message-of-felicitation-of-the-esteemed-amir-ul-momineen-on-the-eve-of-eid-ul-odha&catid=5:statement-

[17] Formerly known as NAP

[18] Section 21-24 of FCR(1901).

[19] Interview with Brig (Retd) Mehmood Shah, Ex-Secretary Security FATA.

[20] Interviews of Pukhtun intellectuals and academics Fazle Rahim Marwat and Afrasiyab Khattak with the International Crisis Group (ICG 2006).

[21] Journalist Shaheen Buneri narrates an interesting conversation with Qari Abdul Bais (MMA's member, National Assembly,from Swat) who contended: 'Many of the Taliban voted in favor of the MMA in the 2002 elections; we can't annoy them, as they are our vote bank.' (Buneri 2008).

[22] Interviews with Police officials of the district

[23] He was later arrested in 2009 for colluding with TTP.

[24] ibid

[25] Mangal Bagh Afridi is not formally allied to TTP but there has been recent police evidence to suggest that his organization is providing shelter to the TTP men attacking Peshawar with suicide bombers.

[26] Year 2007 figures from
http://nwfp.gov.pk/nwfpgov/Departments/BOS/fatadev-stat-abs-health.php

[27] Interview with Saleem Safi

[28] Cited in Fair (2008)

[29] Interviews with civilian and military officers who served in the area. Notable among these are Fazlullah's Madrassah in Swat, Faqeer Muhammad's in Bajaur, Muhammad Amin in Hangu/Orakzai and Qari Hussain's suicide training camp in Waziristan.

[30] The discussion in this section is guided by interviews and talks with local journalists Mr. Aqeel yousafzai, Mr. Saleem Safi, local administrator Mr. Yousaf Rahim, ex-police heads of district Swat, Mr. Yameen Khan and Mr. Akbar Nasir and local politicians of ANP Mr. Saqibullah Chamkani and Mr. Hussain Shah.

[31] Mr. Ziauddin, Principal and owner of a private school in Swat in his television interview to Dawn TV program 'Equinox'.

[32] Notable such cases are those of Pir Samiullah of Swat, whose village was attacked and pillaged and the Pir was killed alongwith scores of his disciples; and the attacks, kidnappings and killings of shias in Kurram, Orakzai, Hangu and Khyber agency.

8 Conclusion

Jingoism and a lack of critical self reflection have long occupied the minds of many fellow Pakistanis. There is plenty of blame to share around and nobody seems willing to look inwards. The security state perceives any such attempt a direct threat to its own existence. Threat it is, to the misplaced notions of state formation in general, to the fears that have reigned for too long now over the hearts and minds, to the timid and weak state apparatus, its minions and those insisting on constructing new national personas out of thin pious air; that seeks unity in uniformity. To come out of their shell, they need only peek at the beautiful kaleidoscope and realize that diversity of ethnicities, languages, nationalities and races is a gift, not to be feared but to be celebrated. For that to happen and for that to be enjoyed, words written and spoken, contracts signed and implied; will have to be honoured. Will primordialism die? Perhaps not, but honouring contracts is the only solution to keep it rational.

This thesis began with formulating the question of conflict as a product of societal interaction and state construction. The notions of peoplehood namely democracy, citizenship and national self determination clashed with the 'Grace of God' to give rise to ethnopolitical conflicts. This societal interaction, according to Foucault, could be seen in two settings, the dominant-repression or the contract-oppression setting. This thesis investigated the Pakistani conflict in the context of the second paradigm.

The reasons of taking the contractarian route are Pakistan's pre-independence history, the history of its many constitutions and constitutional crises. The period under study starts from 1972 because that is the cutoff point for a new constitution. The cutoff date is also chosen because prior to that, the data for ethnopolitical conflict would not have been comparable simply because of the secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh). A short account of this history shows that the processes which led to the particular shape of its institutional structure and the interplay of contesting identities, fears, compromises and

conflict not only produced ethnopolitical conflict but also the one between the state and the radical militants today.

There has been conflict and the intensity of it has varied over the years; one could only go thus far in a quest in any meaningful analysis of this conflict without a dependable database of conflict. A gap existed in our understanding of the empirical nature of this conflict. Hopefully, this thesis will pave the way for more such databases.

The undulations in conflict score for each individual dyadic conflict needs further investigation. The issues which make up these conflicts are also those which feature in the story of social contract. Since this contract gives an institutional structure therefore the conflict over institutions was separately studied from that which is outside institutions. Violent conflict was separated from the non-violent conflict and that over the formal and informal institutions was studied separately for political and economic institutions. For the fiscal federalist scheme, the NFC and its failure to always evolve a compromise, has led to conflict but the trend suggests that the greater the appeasement through the NFC, the lesser the conflict. Consociation therefore…has worked in Pakistan. The same approach has not been followed in case of provincial autonomy and therefore there has been more conflict over this score. This is essentially an informal institution for the distribution of legislative powers between the centre and the provinces and the non fulfillment of the contract provided in the constitution has led to conflict over it.

Periodic stumbles in democratic process have also influenced this conflict. The trend indicates that democracies are better at controlling the violent and non violent conflict which is outside an institutional setting. To measure the political power an original scheme was devised which takes into account the different ways in which political power at two levels is substantiated, perceived and projected. The particular intricacies of Pakistani political culture and history are taken into account while devising this scheme. In addition to these, some other supporting formal and informal institutions of conflict management and the conflict over these was analyzed. These included the CCI, the IPCC, the water apportionment accord and the constitutional guarantee of free movement of goods through out the country. The conflict score indicates the conflict over these institutions showing their health.

The decay of institutions leads to grievances. These grievances arise because of perceptions of unjust treatment. These perceptions social

exclusion, relative deprivation and horizontal inequality have been linked to conflict. Most of the results suggest that political and socio-economic horizontal inequality are linked to conflict in Pakistan.

Finally in chapter 7, the current conflict in Pakistan between the state and radical militants is analysed in terms of the structure and agency factors facilitating taliban recruitment. The structural factors of identity, history, geopolitics, institutions and socioeconomic inequalities largely follow the analytical framework of chapter 2; however the agency factors are specific to the problem at hand and are given to arrive at a more holistic explanation of taliban recruitment. It is found that almost all the structural factors mentioned above contribute to TTP's recruitment in the sense that these provide fertile ground to them. This situation is then exploited by the TTP who employ the widespread Madrassah network, the media and indoctrination to get their message across to their potential recruits.

Potential and Limitations

This thesis attempted to find the political economic explanations for conflict. Since it is *both* a qualitative and a quantitative attempt therefore there are bound to be issues with the very nature of the attempt.

To start with, the dual nature of this methodology is both the strength and the limitation of this thesis. Without getting into any argument with the competing camps, the study takes double shots at the problem at hand. If a more complete picture is wished for, then this technique should be desirable. If however, the purpose is to look into the miniscule crevices of each of the individual corner of this conflict, using only one technique would invariably come recommended. That will perhaps be more vigorous but may not help us distinguish between the forest and the trees.

In the end it is mostly the scope of the problem which dictates the methodology and since this study wanted to keep the canvas wide, the resolution of the pixels is a trade off which may well be worth the view.

Looking Ahead

One wishes conflicts could go away one day. Since this is not happening any time soon therefore conflict analysis will always have the luxury of forecasting on the basis of Murphy's law and then wait for it to come

true. Pakistan has a history of conflicts but she also has a history of some things work out well. Contracts have been broken but some have survived. The democratic regimes have consistently demonstrated a superior skill in making the institution of NFC work. Consociational federalism has worked to bring down conflict and there is no reason why it should not in the future. This will need careful policy options which take account of the horizontal inequalities among provinces and allocate resources to bridge the gaps. Perceptions of unjust treatment will not arise and grievances will be minimized. Similarly the institution of job quota in the constitution has worked to a degree in bringing down the particular conflict over jobs, but more remains to be done when seen in the context of overall conflict. Initially, a narrowing of the gap among groups in civil service jobs may exert influence on conflict but with passage of time and adherence to the policy may pay dividends in reducing conflict.

Provincial autonomy is an area in which the policy options on the table are limited to either carrying out the contract or continue to silence the dissenting voice. The challenges to the contract will come from within as well as from without. It will be a continuous process of choice for the policy makers and practitioners in the future. Water and environmental issues are quickly gaining prominence and something happening in the waters of south pacific (El Nino) will not satisfy the farmer getting less water for his crops. The will to stick to the contract will be tested. Jobs will continue to be apportioned according to the terms of the contract in a culture of political favouritism. Trade will have to be free among the provinces as has been agreed in the contract, even in times of scarcity and droughts.

In addition to the things that worked, there are things that did not or were not allowed to work. The penchant of a particular 'institution' for dominating all the rest has contributed to the country becoming a security state which is occupied with the agenda of the past, for its own benefit. This callous disregard for the nation's formal social contract has been justified in the name of national interests and an identity which is anathema to the recognition of diversity in the Pakistani society. Terms of the contract which relate to provincial autonomy have been blatantly violated to serve vested interests. In order to minimize conflict, the illegitimate influence of one particular institution in the political affairs of the state will have to be curbed. This cannot be done from the outside

and it will be a choice for the army leadership if they want to continue with the policy of the past or are prepared to let the nation put her social contract in practice.

The above choice for army leadership also underwrites some of the future conflicts for Pakistan. The ideological polarization in society is strong. The current conflict with Taliban is one outcome in which one can clearly see the results of decades of state encouragement of hate for all competing identities. In the foreseeable future and without taking the bull by its metaphorical horns, piety will continue to be worn on sleeves, lashed onto the bodies of women and cut through the jugular of the not so pious. All this will invoke the identity that was once based on fear and is now based on hate, the identity that is read into the contract by one party and disputed by the other. In that case it will not only be a question of how to carry out the terms of the social contract but more importantly; whose contract?

3-A: Text of the Objectives Resolution, 12 March 1949.

1. Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust.
2. The State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people.
3. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed.
4. Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Qur'an and Sunnah.
5. Adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures.
6. Pakistan shall be a federation.
7. Fundamental rights shall be guaranteed.
8. The judiciary shall be independent

3-B: Excerpts from Mohammad Ali Jinnah's Address to the Lahore session March 23, 1940 wherein he, for the first time uses the term Social Contract.

We want another kind of declaration. You must declare now and at once that India is free and independent with the right to frame its own constitution by a Constituent Assembly to be elected on the basis of adult franchise or as low a franchise as possible. This Assembly will of course satisfy the minorities' legitimate interests." Mr. Gandhi says that if the minorities are not satisfied then he is willing that some tribunal of the highest character and most impartial should decide the dispute. Now, apart from the impracticable character of this proposal and quite apart from the fact that it is historically and constitutionally absurd to ask [a] ruling power to abdicate in favour of a Constituent Assembly. Apart from all that, suppose we do not agree as to the franchise according to which the Central Assembly is to be elected, or suppose the solid body of Muslim representatives do not agree with the non-Muslim majority in the Constituent Assembly, what will happen? It is said that we have no right to disagree with regard to anything that this Assembly may do in framing a national constitution of this huge sub-continent except those matters which may be germane to the safeguards for the minorities. So we are given the privilege to disagree only with regard to what may be called strictly safe-guards of the rights and interests of minorities. We are also given the privilege to send our own representatives by separate electorates. Now, this proposal is based on the assumption that as soon as this constitution comes into operation the British hand will disappear. Otherwise there will be no meaning in it. Of course, Mr. Gandhi says that the constitution will decide whether the British will disappear, and if so to what extent. In other words, his proposal comes to this: First, give me the declaration that we are a free and independent nation, then I will decide what I should give you back. Does Mr. Gandhi really want the complete independence of India when he talks like this? But whether the British disappear or not, it follows that extensive powers must be transferred to the people. In the event of there being a disagreement between the majority of the Constituent Assembly and the Mussalmans, in the first instance, who will appoint the tribunal? And suppose an agreed tribunal is possible and the award is made and the decision given, who will, may I know, be there to see that this award is implemented or carried out in accordance with the terms of that award? And who will see that it is honoured in practice, because, we are told, the

British will have parted with their power mainly or completely? Then what will be the sanction behind the award which will enforce it? We come back to the same answer, the Hindu majority would do it; and will it be with the help of the British bayonet or the Gandhi's "Ahinsa"? Can we trust them any more? Besides, ladies and gentlemen, can you imagine that a question of this character, of social contract upon which the future constitution of India would be based, affecting 90 million of Mussalmans, can be decided by means of a judicial tribunal? Still, that is the proposal of the Congress.

4-A: Ethnopolitical Conflicts For Different Dyads and Issues

Figure 9: Pukhtun Ethnopolitical Conflict over profits from Hydro power



Figure 10: Pukhtuns and the conflict over Kalabagh and Water Share



Figure 11: Conflict over inter provincial trade (Wheat)



Figure 12: Pukhtuns and conflict over the type of polity



Figure 13: Provincial Rights, Autonomy and Rights of Nationalities



Figure 14: Pukhtun ethnopolitical leadership and the Conflict over Patriotic Credentials



Figure 15: Subversion, Terrorism and Secession (Done or alleged in the name of Pukhtun ethnopolitics)



Figure 16: Pukhtun Ethnopolitics and the conflict over Governance, Budget and Foreign policy



Figure 17: Pukhtuns and the conflict over Identity, Culture and change of name of the province

Figure 18: Pukhtun ethnopolitical conflict over Rights to life, honour, freedom and property, Conflict with state agencies.



Figure 19: Baloch Ethnopolitical Conflict over royalty/Control over the income of Natural Resources



Figure 20: Subversion, Terrorism and Secession in Baloch ethnopolitical Conflict



Figure 21: Baloch ethnopolitical conflict and the rights to life, freedom and property



Figure 22: Baloch/Balochistan and the conflict over Provincial Rights, General, economic rights, social rights, Provincial autonomy/Nationalities rights.



Figure 23: Baloch ethnopolitical conflict over Participation in Governance structures/Trade bodies/Power organs



Figure 24: Baloch/Balochistan Ethnopolitical conflict over Development/ Development spending by Federal Government/ Loans to Provinces.



Figure 25: Baloch/ Balochistan conflict over Share in federal revenues/National Finance Commission Award/ Geographical concessions in taxes.



Figure 26: Balochistan and conflict over Quota system of jobs in Government services/ Share of jobs, Joblessness



Figure 27: Baloch and conflict over Type of Polity, Demands for Democracy.



Figure 28: Baloch and the conflict over Governance / General legislation/ Budget/ Foreign policy

Figure 29: Baloch Conflict over Identity/Language/Culture/Ethnicity



Figure 30: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Kalabagh dam and Water share from Indus river



Figure 31: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Provincial rights



Figure 32: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Quota in Jobs



Figure 33: Sindhi Ethnopolitics and the elements of Secession/Subversion and terrorism



Figure 34: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Foreign policy, Budget and governance.



Figure 35: Sindhi ethnopolitical conflict over Rights to life, honour, freedom and property, Conflict with state agencies.



Figure 36: Sindhi Ethnopolitical conflict over Identity/Language/Culture/Ethnicity



Figure 37: Muhajir ethnopolitical conflict with the state/Punjab on the basis of identity



Figure 38: Muhajir ethnopolitical conflict with Pukhtuns over issues of identity



Figure 39: Subversive/ Secessionist Muhajir ethnopolitical conflict with the state/Punjab



Figure 40: Muhajir ethnopolitical conflict with the state agencies



Figure 41: Ethnopolitical Conflict between Punjab and Federal Government.



Figure 42: Total Ethnopolitical Conflict Pukhtun/Baloch and/or JUI/ UDF (To the extent of supporting NAP or their cause) –Center



Figure 43: Ethnopolitical conflict Seraiki-Punjabi in Punjab/Muhajirs/Sindhis in Sindh



Figure 44: Ethnopolitical conflict between Baloch and Pukhtun in Balochistan



Figure 45: Ethnopolitical conflict all provinces -Centre



Figure 46: Ethnopolitical conflict between Sindh and Balochistan



Figure 47: Ethnopolitical conflict with Pukhtun/Baloch/Sindh -Punjab



5-A: Article 160 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

National Finance Commission

(1) Within six months of the commencing day and thereafter at intervals not exceeding five years, the President shall constitute a National Finance Commission consisting of the Minister of Finance of the Federal Government, the Ministers of Finance of the Provincial Governments, and such other persons as may be appointed by the President after consultation with the Governors of the Provinces.
(2) It shall be the duty of the National Finance Commission to make recommendations to the President as to
(a) the distribution between the Federation and the Provinces of the net proceeds of the taxes mentioned in clause (3);
(b) the making of grants-in-aid by the Federal Government to the Provincial Governments;
(c) the exercise by the Federal Government and the Provincial Government of the borrowing powers conferred by the Constitution; and
(d) any other matter relating to finance referred to the Commission by the President.
(3) The taxes referred to in paragraph (a) of clause (2) are the following taxes raised under the authority of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)], namely:
(i) taxes on income, including corporation tax, but not including taxes on income consisting of remuneration paid out of the Federal Consolidated Fund;
[(ii) taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, produced, manufactured on consumed;]
(iii) export duties on cotton, and such other export duties as may be specified by the President;
(iv) such duties of excise as may be specified by the President; and
(v) such other taxes as may be specified by the President.
(4) As soon as may be after receiving the recommendations of the National Finance Commission, the President shall, by Order,

specify, in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission under paragraph (a) of clause (2), the share of the net proceeds of the taxes mentioned in clause (3) which is to be allocated to each Province, and that share shall be paid to the Government of the Province concerned, and, notwithstanding the provision of Article 78 shall not form part of the Federal Consolidated Fund.

(5) The recommendations of the National Finance Commission, together with an explanatory memorandum as to the action taken thereon, shall be laid before both Houses and the Provincial Assemblies.

(6) At any time before an Order under clause (4) is made, the President may, by Order, make such amendments or modifications in the law relating to the distribution of revenues between the Federal Government and the provincial Governments as he may deem necessary or expedient.

(7) The President may, by Order, make grants-in-aid of the revenues of the Provinces in need of assistance and such grants shall be charged upon the Federal Consolidated Fund.

5-B: Fourth Schedule, Article 70(4) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Federal Legislative List
PART I

1. The defence of the Federation or any part thereof in peace or war; the military, naval and air forces of the Federation and any other armed forces raised or maintained by the Federation; any armed forces which are not forces of the Federation but are attached to or operating with any of the Armed Forces of the Federation including civil armed forces; Federal Intelligence Bureau; preventive detention for reasons of State connected with defence, external affairs, or the security of Pakistan or any part thereof; person subjected to such detention; industries declared by Federal law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war.
2. Military, naval and air force works; local self- government in cantonment areas, the constitution and powers within such areas of cantonment authorities, the regulation of house accommodation in such areas, and the delimitation of such areas.
3. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements, including educational and cultural pacts and agreements, with other countries; extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to Governments outside Pakistan.
4. Nationality, citizenship and naturalization.
5. Migration from or into, or settlement in, a Province or the Federal Capital.
6. Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, Pakistan including in relation thereto the regulation of the movements in Pakistan of persons not domiciled in Pakistan; pilgrimages to places beyond Pakistan.
7. Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communications; Post Office Saving Bank.
8. Currency, coinage and legal tender.

9. Foreign exchange; cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes and other like instruments.
10. Public debt of the Federation, including the borrowing of money on the security of the Federal Consolidated Fund; foreign loans and foreign aid.
11. Federal Public Services and Federal Public Service Commission
12. Federal Pensions, that is to say, pensions payable by the Federation or out of the Federal Consolidated Fund.
13. Federal Ombudsmen.
14. Administrative Courts and Tribunals for Federal subjects.
15. Libraries, museums, and similar institutions controlled or financed by the Federation.
16. Federal agencies and institutes for the following purposes, that is to say, for research, for professional or technical training, or for the promotion of special studies.
17. Education as respects Pakistani students in foreign countries and foreign students in Pakistan.
18. Nuclear energy, including:-
(a) mineral resources necessary for the generation of nuclear energy;
(b) the production of nuclear fuels and the generation and use of nuclear energy, and
(c) ionizing radiations.
19. Port quarantine, seamen's and marine hospitals and hospitals connected with port quarantine.
20. Maritime shipping and navigation, including shipping and navigation on tidal waters; Admiralty jurisdiction.
21. Major ports, that is to say, the declaration and delimitation of such ports, and the constitution and powers of port authorities therein.
22. Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; regulation and organization of air traffic and of aerodromes.
23. Lighthouses, including lightships, beacons and other provisions for the safety of shipping and aircraft.
24. Carriage of passengers and goods by sea or by air.
25. Copyright, inventions, designs, trademarks and merchandise marks.
26. Opium so far as regards sale for export.

27. Import and export across customs frontiers as deemed by the Federal Government, inter-provincial trade and commerce, trade and commerce with foreign countries; standard of quality of goods to be exported out of Pakistan.
28. State Bank of Pakistan; banking, that is to say, the conduct of banking business by corporations other than corporations owned or controlled by a Province and carrying on business only within that Province.
29. The law of insurance, except as respects insurance undertaken by a Province, and the regulation of the conduct of insurance business, except as respects business undertaken by a Province, Government insurance, except so far as undertaken by a Province by virtue of any matter within the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly.
30. Stock exchanges and future markets with objects and business not confined to one Province.
31. Corporations, that is to say, the incorporation, regulation and winding- up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations, but not including corporations owned or controlled by a Province and carrying on business only within that Province, or cooperative societies, and of corporations, whether trading or not, with objects not confined to a Province, but not including universities.
32. National planning and national economic coordination including planning and coordination of scientific and technological research.
33. State lotteries.
34. National highways and strategic roads.
35. Federal surveys including geological surveys and Federal meteorological organizations.
36. Fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters.
37. Works, lands and buildings vested in, or in the possession of Government for the purposes of the Federation (not being military, naval or air force works), but, as regards property situate in a Province, subject always to Provincial legislation, save in so far as Federal law otherwise provides.
38. Census.
39. Establishment of standards of weights and measures.

40. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any Province to any area in another Province, but not so as to enable the police of one Province to exercise powers and jurisdiction in another Province without the consent of the Government of that Province; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any Province to railway areas outside that Province.
41. Elections to the office of President, to the National Assembly, the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies; Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissions.
42. The salaries, allowances and privileges of the President, Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Senate, Prime Minister, Federal Minister, Ministers of State, the salaries, allowances and privileges of the members of the Senate and the National Assembly, and the punishment of persons who refuse to give evidence or produce documents before committees thereof.
43. Duties of customs, including export duties.
44. Duties of exercise, including duties on salt, but not including duties on alcoholic liquors, opium and other narcotics.
45. Duties in respect of succession to property.
46. Estate duty in respect of property.
47. Taxes on income other than agricultural income;
48 Taxes on corporations.
49. Taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, produced, manufactured or consumed.
50. Taxes on the capital value of the assets, not including taxes on capital gains on immovable property.
51. Taxes on mineral oil, natural gas and minerals for use in generation of nuclear energy.
52. Taxes and duties on the production capacity of any plant, machinery, undertaking, establishment or installation in lieu of any one or more of them.
53. Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on their fares and freights.
54. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this Part, but not including fees taken in any court.
55. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this list and, to such

extent as is expressly authorized by or under the Constitution, the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the conferring thereon of supplemental powers.
56. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this Part.
57. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters in this Part.
58. Matters which under the Constitution are within the legislative competence of Majlis- e-Shoora (Parliament) or relate to the Federation.
59. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in this Part.

PART II
1. Railways.
2. Mineral oil and natural gas; liquids and substances declared by Federal law to be dangerously inflammable.
3. Development of industries, where development under Federal control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in the public interest; institutions, establishments, bodies and corporations administered or managed by the Federal Government immediately before the commencing day, including the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority and the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation; all undertakings, projects and schemes of such institutions, establishments, bodies and corporations, industries, projects and undertakings owned wholly or partially by the Federation or by a corporation set up by the Federation.
4. Council of Common Interests.
5. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this Part but not including fees taken in any court.
6. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this Parts.
7. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters in this Part.
8. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in this Part.

Concurrent Legislative List

1. Criminal law, including all matters included in the Pakistan Penal Code on the commencing day, but excluding offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in the Federal Legislative List and excluding the use of naval, military and air forces in aid of civil power.
2. Criminal procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the commencing day.
3. Civil procedure, including the law of limitation and all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure on the commencing day, the recovery in a Province or the Federal Capital of claims in respect of taxes and other public demands, including arrears of land revenue and sums recoverable as such, arising outside that Province.
4. Evidence and oath; recognition of laws, public acts and records of judicial proceedings.
5. Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption.
6. Wills, intestacy and succession, save as regards agricultural land.
7. Bankruptcy and insolvency, administrators- general and official trustees.
8. Arbitration.
9. Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of carriage, and other special forms of contracts, but not including contracts relating to agricultural land.
10. Trusts and trustees.
11. Transfer of property other than agriculture land, registration of deeds and documents.
12. Actionable wrongs, save in so far as included in laws with respect to any of the matters specified in the Federal Legislative List.
13. Removal of prisoners and accused persons from one Province to another Province.
14. Preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; persons subjected to such detention.

15. Persons subjected to preventive detention under Federal authority.
16. Measures to combat certain offences committed in connection with matters concerning the Federal and Provincial Governments and the establishment of a police force for that purpose.
17. Arms, firearms and ammunition.
18. Explosives.
19. Opium, so far as regards cultivation and manufacture.
20. Drugs and medicines.
21. Poisons and dangerous drugs.
22. Prevention of the extension from one Province to another of infectious or contagious diseases or pests affecting men, animals or plants.
23. Mental illness and mental retardation, including places for the reception or treatment of the mentally ill and mentally retarded.
24. Environmental pollution and ecology.
25. Population planning and social welfare.
26. Welfare of labor; conditions of labor, provident funds; employer's liability and workmen's compensation, health insurance including invalidity pensions, old age pensions.
27. Trade unions; industrial and labor disputes.
28. The setting up and carrying on of labor exchanges, employment information bureaus and training establishments.
29. Boilers.
30. Regulation of labor and safety in mines, factories and oil-fields.
31. Unemployment insurance.
32. Shipping and navigation on inland waterways as regards mechanically propelled vessels, and the rule of the road on such waterways; carriage of passengers and goods on inland waterways.
33. Mechanically propelled vehicles.
34. Electricity.
35. Newspapers, books and printing presses.
36. Evacuee property.
37. Ancient and historical monuments, archaeological sites and remains.

38. Curriculum, syllabus, planning, policy, centres of excellence and standards of education.
39. Islamic education.
40. Zakat.
41. Production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph films.
42. Tourism.
43. Legal medical and other professions.
43A. Auqaf.
44. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not including fees taken in any court.
45. Inquiries and statistics for the purpose of any of the matters in this List.
46. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this List; jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.
47. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in this List.

References

Abbas, H. (2008) 'A profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan', *CTC Sentinel* 1(2): 1-4.

Acemoglu, D. and S. Johnson (2005) 'Unbundling institutions', *Journal of Political Economy* 113(5): 949-995.

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson (2001) 'The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation', *American Economic Review*: 1369-1401.

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson (2005) 'Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run economic growth', *Handbook of Economic Growth* 1: 385–472.

Addison, T. and S. Murshed (2002) 'Credibility and reputation in peacemaking', *Journal of Peace Research* 39(4): 487.

Addison, T. and S.M. Murshed (2001) 'From conflict to reconstruction: reviving the social contract', *World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University. Wider Discussion Paper* No. WDP 2001/48: 1-17.

Adeney, K. (2009) 'The Limitations of Non-consociational Federalism: The Example of Pakistan', *Ethnopolitics* 8(1): 87 - 106.

Aftab, S. (2008) 'Poverty and Militancy', *Pips journal of conflict and peace studies* 1(1): 65-86.

Ahmad, A. (1973) 'Balochistan's Agrarian Question'. *Paper presented at the conference, Pakistan Forum*. Middle East Research and Information Project 3 (8/9): 19 - 29

Ahmad, I., U. Mustafa and M. Khalid (2007) *National Finance Commission Awards in Pakistan: A Historical Perspective*: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.

Ahmed, A.S. (1980) *Pakhtun Economy and Society*. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.

Ahmed, A.S. (1997) *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic identity: the search for Saladin*: Routledge.

Ahmed, F. (1984a) 'Agrarian Change and Class Formation in Sindh', *Economic and Political Weekly*: 149-164.

Ahmed, F. (1984b) 'Transformation of agrarian structure in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 14(1): 5-47.

Ahmed, F. (1992) 'Pakistan's problems of national integration', *Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan*: 156.

Ahmed, F. (1997) *Ethnicity, State and National Integration*. Karachi: Dawn.

Ahmed, G. (2007) 'Fiscal Federalism: Resource Sharing Issues'. Paper presented at the conference', Islamabad. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.

Ahmed, I. (1991) *The Concept of an Islamic State in Pakistan: An Analysis of Ideological Controversies*: Vanguard.

Ahmed, M. (1989) 'Autonomy issue in retrospect'. *Dawn*. 3-10-1989.

Ahmed, Q.M. and M. Sabir (2004) *Burden of Stabilization on Provinces and Its Implications on Social Sectors*: Karachi. Social Policy and Development Centre.

Ahsan, A. (1996) *The Indus saga and the making of Pakistan*: Oxford University Press, USA.

Alemán, E. and D. Treisman (2005) 'Fiscal Politics in "ethnically Mined," Developing, Federal States: Central Strategies and Secessionist Violence', *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars*: 173–216.

Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1996) 'Income distribution, political instability, and investment', *European Economic Review* 40 (1996): 1203-1228.

Allbritton, C. (2009,) 'The Pakistani Taliban's War on Schoolchildren', *Time*. 4-12-2009.

Alonso, A.M. (1994) 'The politics of space, time and substance: state formation, nationalism, and ethnicity', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 23: 379-405.

Alqama, K. (1997) *Bengali Elites Perceptions of Pakistan, The Road to disillusionment: Uneven Development or Ethnicity?* Karachi: Royal Book Company.

Alvi, H. (ed.) (1983) *Class and State*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Amin, T. (1988) *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors*: Institute of Policy Studies.

Andrabi, T., J. Das, A.I. Khwaja and T. Zajonc (2006) 'Religious school enrollment in Pakistan: A look at the data', *Comparative Education Review* 50(3): 446-477.

Asian Dev Bank, W.B., DFID (2004) 'Devolution in Pakistan: Annex II, Technical Considerations': Asian Dev Bank World Bank, DFID.

Azad, M.A.K. (1988) *India Wins Freedom*: Orient Longman.

Azam, J.P. and A. Mesnard (2003) 'Civil war and the social contract', *Public Choice* 115(3): 455-475.

Azam, J.P. and V. Thelen (2008) 'The roles of foreign aid and education in the war on terror', *Public Choice* 135(3): 375-397.

Aziz, K. (2007) 'Causes of Rebellion in Waziristan', *Peshawar: Regional Institute of Policy*.

Aziz, K.K. (2003) *World powers and the 1971 breakup of Pakistan*: Vanguard Books.

Ballentine, K. and H. Nitzschke (2003) 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict': International Peace Academy.

Ballentine, K., J. Sherman and International Peace Academy. (2003) *The political economy of armed conflict : beyond greed and grievance* Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Beall, J. and L.-H. Piron (2005) 'DFID Social Exclusion Review': LSE
ODI.

Bearden, M.A. (2001) 'Graveyard of Empires', *Foreign Affairs*: 17-30.

Bengali, K. (1996) 'Defining Mohajir Grievances'. *Dawn*. 13-2-1996.

Bengali, K. (2000) *Regional Accounts of Pakistan: Methodology and Estimates 1973-2000* (Vol. PhD). Karachi: University of Karachi.

Bewley, T.F. (1981) 'A critique of Tiebout's theory of local public expenditures', *Econometrica* 49(3): 713-740.

Birrell, D. (1972) 'Relative Deprivation as a factor in conflict in Norhtern Ireland', *The Sociological Review* 1(3): 317-343.

Boucher, D. and P.J. Kelly (eds) (1994) *The social contract from Hobbes to Rawls*: Routledge.

Breseeg, T.M. (2004) *Baloch Nationalism, Its origin and development*. Karachi: Royal Book Company.

Breuilly, J. (1994) *Nationalism and the State*: University of Chicago Press.

Brown, G. (2005) 'Horizontal Inequalities, Ethnic Separatism, and Violent Conflict: The Case of Aceh, Indonesia', *Background paper for Human Development Report*.

Brown, G.K. (2009) 'Federalism, Regional Autonomy and Conflict: Introduction and Overview', *Ethnopolitics* 8(1): 1 - 4.

Buchanan, J.M. and G. Tullock (1962) *The calculus of consent, logical foundations of constitutional democracy*. Ann Arbor,: University of Michigan Press.

Buneri, S. (2008) 'War on terror, Taliban and Pakhtun nationalists ' [electronic version], *The Khyber Watch*. http://khyberwatch.com/nandara/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=522 (accessed 12-11-2009).

CAMP (2008) 'Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas'. Peshawar: *Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme.*

Caroe, O. (1983) *The Pathans, 550 BC-AD 1957*: Oxford University Press, USA.

Cohen, S.P. (2004) *The idea of Pakistan*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Coll, S. (2005) *Ghost wars: the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001*: Penguin Group USA.

Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2002) 'Greed and grievance in civil war', *Centre for the Study of African Economies. Working Paper Series* No. WPS/2002-01: 1-43.

Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004) 'Greed and grievance in civil war', *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-595.

Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2000) *Greed and grievance in civil war*. Washington, DC: World Bank Development Research Group.

Committee, C. (1972) *Report of the Constitutional Committee*. National Assembly Secretariat Report No. PCPPI-NS-2438-NAS--31-12-72--500

Dahl, R.A. (1971) *Polyarchy; participation and opposition*. New Haven,: Yale University Press.

Danzger, M.H. (1975) 'Validating Conflict Data', *American Sociological Review* 40(5): 570-584.

Dixit, A.K. (1996) *The making of economic policy : a transaction-cost politics perspective*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Durrani, F.K. (1983) *The Meaning of Pakistan,* Lahore: Islamic Book Service.

Easterly, W. (2001) 'Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?*', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 49(4): 687-706.

Easterly, W. and R. Levine (2003) 'Tropics, germs, and crops: How endowments influence economic development', *Journal of Monetary Economics* 50(1): 3-39.

Ebel, R.D. and S. Yilmaz (2002) 'On the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization', *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 2809.

Eck, K. (2005) 'Recruiting Rebels: Indoctrination and Political Education in Nepal', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(3): 319-336.

Elbadawi, I. and N. Sambanis (2002) 'How much war will we see?: Explaining the prevalence of civil war', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(3): 307.

Escobar, P. (2009) 'Under the Afpak Volcano, Part 1, Welcome to Pashtunistan '. *Asia Times Online*. 06-11-2009.

Fair, C.C. (2008) *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan*: United States Inst of Peace Pr.

FATA (2009) FATA development statistics (Publication. Retrieved 29-11-2009, from NWFP Bureau of Statistics: http://nwfp.gov.pk/nwfpgov/Departments/BOS/main-menu-fata-dev-stats.php.

Fearon, J.D. and D.D. Laitin (2003) 'Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war', *American Political Science Review* 97(01): 75-90.

Feierabend, I.K., R.L. Feierabend and B.A. Nesvold (1969) 'Social change and political violence: cross-national patterns', *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives: A Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence*: 632.

Fillieule, O. and M. Jiménez (2003) 'Appendix A: the methodology of protest event analysis and the media politics of reporting environmental protest events', *Environmental Protest in Western Europe*: 258–279.

Foucault, M. and C. Gordon (1980) *Power-knowledge : selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. Brighton: Harvester Press.

Frey, B.S. (2004) *Dealing with terrorism: stick or carrot?* : Edward Elgar Publishing.

Frontline (2006) Interview: Richard Armitage, in Frontline (ed.), *PBS*: PBS.

Fuglerud, O. (2001) 'Time and space in the Sri Lanka-Tamil diaspora', *Nations and Nationalism* 7(2): 195-213.

Furnivall, J.S. (1956) *Colonial policy and practice: a comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India*: New York University Press.

Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ghamidi, J. (2008) *Maqamat*. Lahore: Al Maurid.

Ghaus, A., R. Ghaus, A.R. Khan and M.A. Iqbal (1996) *National Finance Commission: 1995 Inter-Governmental Revenue Sharing in Pakistan*. Islamabad: Social Policy and Development Center.

Ghumro, Z. (2006) 'Why the federation is at odds with provinces?' *Dawn*. 10-03-2006.

Gilley, B. (2004) 'Against the concept of ethnic conflict', *Third World Quarterly* 25(6): 1155-1166.

Grahi, P. (2004) *India's Partition The Story of Imperialism in Retreat*: Routledge.

Grare, F. (2006) 'Pakistan: the resurgence of Baloch nationalism', *Carnegie Papers* 65.

Guimond, S. and L. Dube-Simard (1983) 'Relative Deprivation theory and the Quebec nationalist movement: The congnition-emotion distinction and the personal-group deprivation issue', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 44(3): 526-535.

Gujarati, D.N. (2003) Basic Econometrics 4th edition McGraw Hill: New York, NY.

Gupta, D.K. and D.K. Gupta (1990) *The Economics of Political Violence: The Effect of Political Instability on Economic Growth*: Praeger.

Gurr, T.R. (1970) *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gurr, T.R. (1993) *Minorities: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Gurr, T.R. (1997) *Minorities Rights at Risk: A Global Survey of Political, Economic and Cultural Discrimination in the 1990s*. Paper presented at the conference 'Seventeeth World Congress of International Political Sceince Association'.

Gurr, T.R. (2002) 'Minorities at Risk Dataset and Codebook', *Center for International Development and Conflict Management*.

Haq, F. (1995) 'Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: politics of ethnic mobilization', *Asian Survey*: 990-1004.

Haqqani, I. (2004) *'Interview with Sardar Ataullah Mengal'*. *Jang,* Lahore 10-04-2008.

Haqqani, I. (2006) 'The 1973 Constitution- Do we need a new social contract?' Lahore: *Jang*, 16-8-2006.

Hegre, H. (2002) 'Some Social Requisites of a Democratic Civil Peace: Democracy'. Paper presented at the conference 'Development, and Armed Conflict'. Boston: *98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*

Hegre, H., R. Gissinger and N.P. Gleditsch (2003) 'Globalization and internal conflict', *Globalization and armed conflict*: 251–275.

Hey, J.D. and P.J. Lambert (1980) 'Relative Deprivation and the Gini Coefficient: Comment', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 95(3): 567-573.

Hibbs, D.A. (1973) *Mass political violence: a cross-national causal analysis*: Wiley.

HIIK (ed.) (2008) *Conflict barometer 2008. Crisis, wars, coups d'état, negotiations, mediations, peace settlements*. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.

Hindmoor, A. (2006) *Rational Choice* (First ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hobbes, T. (1651) *Leviathan* (2008 ed.): Published online by forgottenbooks.org.

Hobsbawm, E.J. (1992) *Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality*: Cambridge Univ Pr.

Horowitz, D.L. (1985) *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. CA: University of California Press.

Hunter, W.W. (1876) *The Indian Musalmans*: Trübner and Co.

Hunter, W.W. (1974) 'The Indian Musalmans, are they bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen? reprinted from the 1871 edition', *Premier Book House, Lahore*.

Hunter, W.W., J.S. Cotton, R. Burn, W. Meyer and Great Britain. India Office. (1907) *Imperial gazetteer of India* (New ed.). Oxford,: Clarendon Press.

Hussain, A. and A.R. Kemal (2004) *Pakistan national human development report 2003: poverty, growth and governance*: Oxford University Press, USA.

ICG (2006) 'Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the militants'. Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Iversen, T. (1999) *Contested economic institutions*: Cambridge University Press New York.

Jaffar, I. (1992) 'Isolation of Mohajirs'. *Dawn*. 3-10-1992.

Jaffery, N.B. and M. Sadaqat (2006) 'NFC AWARDS', *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* 44(2): 209-234.

Jaffrelot, C. (2002) *Pakistan: nationalism without a nation?* : Zed Books.

Jahan, R. (1972) *Pakistan: failure in national integration*: Columbia University Press.

Jalal, A. (1994) *The sole spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan*: Cambridge University Press.

Jalal, A. (1995) *Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia : a comparative and historical perspective*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jalal, A. (2000) *Self and sovereignty: individual and community in South Asian Islam since 1850*: Routledge.

Jalalzai, M.K. (2002) *The Crisis of State and Security in Pakistan*. Lahore: Dua publications.

Jamal, H. and A.J. Khan (2003) 'The Changing Profile of Regional Inequality', *Pakistan Development Review* 42(2): 113-123.

Jennings, C. (2007) 'Political Leadership, Conflict and the Prospects for Constitutional Peace', *Economics of Governance* 8(1): 83-94.

Jinnah, M.A. (1948) *Speeches of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnal as Governor General of Pakistan*. Karachi: Sindh Observer Press.

Kazi, A.A. (1988) 'Ethnic Nationalities, Education, and Problems of National Integration in Pakistan', *Asian Profile* 16(2): 18.

Kemp, R. (2009) 'Religious Extremism and Militancy in the Pashtun Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan', *Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs* 12.

Kennedy, C.H. (1993) 'Managing ethnic conflict: The case of Pakistan', *Regional & Federal Studies* 3(1): 123-143.

Kerry, J.F. (2009) *Tora Bora Revisited: How we failed to get Bin Laden and why it matters today*. Retrieved. from http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf.

Khaldun, I. (1967) 'The Muqaddimah: an introduction to history'. translation ', *Franz Rosenthal.*

Khalid, S.M. (2002) 'Deeni Madaris Main Taleem [Education in Religious Schools]'. Islamabad: Institute for Policy Studies.

Khan, A. (2005) *Politics of identity : ethnic nationalism and the state in Pakistan*. Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Khan, H. (2005) *Constitutional and political history of Pakistan*: Oxford University Press, USA.

Khan, Z.R. (1985) 'Islam and Bengali Nationalism', *Asian Survey* 25(8): 834-851.

Khattak, I. (2008) 'Mehsud spending up to Rs 3bn on militancy annually: Ghani'. *Daily Times*. 30-5-2008.

Kohli, A. (1997) 'Can democracies accommodate ethnic nationalism? Rise and decline of self-determination movements in India', *Journal of Asian Studies*: 325-344.

Koopmans, R. and D. Rucht (2002) 'Protest Event Analysis', *Methods of Social Movement Research*: 231-259.

Korpi, W. (1974) 'Conflict, power and relative deprivation', *The American Political Science Review*: 1569-1578.

Krueger, A.B. and D.D. Laitin (2008) 'Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism', *Terrorism, economic development, and political openness*: 148-173.

Krueger, A.B. and J. Maleckova (2003) 'Education, Poverty, andTerrorism: IsThereaCausalConnection?' *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(4): 119-144.

Lake, D.A. and D. Rothchild (1996) 'Containing fear: the origins and management of ethnic conflict', *International Security* 21(2): 41-75.

Langer, A. (2005) 'Horizontal inequalities and violent group mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire', *Oxford Development Studies* 33(1): 25-45.

Lijphart, A. (1977) *Democracy in plural societies*: Yale University Press New Haven.

Mansfield, E.D. and J.L. Snyder (2005) *Electing to fight: why emerging democracies go to war*: The MIT Press.

Marshall, M.G. and K. Jaggers (2007) 'Polity IV Country Report 2007: Pakistan': Political Instability Task Force.

Marx, K., F. Engels, S. Moore and G.S. Jones (2002) *The communist manifesto*. Published online by Socialist labour party of America: Penguin Classics.

Mazari, S.K. (1999) *A journey to disillusionment*: Oxford University Press, USA.

McGarry, J. and B. O'Leary (2009) 'Must Pluri-national Federations Fail?' *Ethnopolitics* 8(1): 5 - 25.

Mengal, A. (2004) 'New Constitution for equal rights needed - Mengal'. *Dawn*. 5-3-2004.

Metcalf, B.D. (2001) Traditionalist'Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs. Leiden: ISIM.

Mock, W.B.T. (1992) 'Game Theory, Signalling, and International Legal Relations', *Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.* 26: 33.

Moynihan, D.P. (1993) *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Murshed, S. (2002) 'Conflict, civil war and underdevelopment: an introduction', *Journal of Peace Research* 39(4): 387.

Murshed, S.M. (2006) 'Turning Swords to Ploughshares & Little Acrons to Tall Trees: The Conflict-Growth Nexus & the Poverty of Nations', *Background paper for the United Nations (Department for Economic and Social Affairs) World Economic Survey, 2006*.

Murshed, S.M. (2010) *Explaining Civil War, A Rational Choice Approach*. Surrey: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Murshed, S.M. and S. Gates (2005) 'Spatial-horizontal inequality and the Maoist conflict in Nepal', *Review of Development Economics* 9(1): 121-134.

Nairn, T. (1975) 'The Modern Janus', *New Left Review* 94(1): 3–29.

Naji, N. (2007) 'Mumkina Buhraan'. *Jang,* 2-12-2007.

Newberg, P. (1995) Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Niazi, Z. (1986) *Press in chains*. Karachi: Karachi Press Club.

Noman, O. (1990) *Pakistan: a political and economic history since 1947*: Kegan Paul Intl.

Nordlinger, E.A. (1972) *Conflict regulation in divided societies*: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

North, D.C. (1990) *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*: Cambridge university press.

Oates, W.E. (1972) *Fiscal Federalism. - New Edition*. Hampshire-England: Gregg Revivals.

Omar, K. (2005) 'Provinces and Islamabad still deadlocked over NFC award formula'. *The News*. 26-5-2005.

Østby, G. (2008) 'Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict', *Journal of Peace Research* 45(2): 143.

Pasha, A.H. and T. Hasan (1992) 'Development ranking of districts of Pakistan', in S.A. Zaidi (ed.), *Regional Imbalances & the National Question in Pakistan*. Lahore: Vangaurd.

Pels, D. (1997) 'Mixing metaphors: Politics or economics of knowledge?' *Theory and Society* 26(5): 685-717.

Pew Global (2009) 'Pakistani Public Opinion: Growing concerns about extremism, Continuing discontent with U.S'. Washington D.C: The Pew global attitudes project.

Prasad, B. (1946) *India's Hindu-Muslim Questions*: G. Allen & Unwin ltd.

Qazi, R.R.K. (2003) 'Nationalist Nuances - An interview with Mahmud Khan Achakzai'. *Dawn*. 16-3-2003.

Qureshi, M. (1993) 'Moeen Qureshi's Agenda Speech to the Convocation at LUMS, Lahore'. *Dawn*. 19-7-1993.

Qureshi, S.K. (1991) 'Trends and patterns in federal-provincial fiscal flows in Pakistan: a preliminary analysis', *Pakistan Development Review* 30(Winter).

Rahman, T. (1998) 'Language and politics in Pakistan'. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Rahman, T. (2004) 'The Madrassa and the State of Pakistan: Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan', *Himal South Asian. February*.

Rakistis, C. (2008) *Pakistan's Tribal Areas; A critical no man's land*. Paper presented at the conference 'Webster University Forum'.

Rana, A. (2009a) 'Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan: A Counterinsurgency Perspective'. Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies.

Rana, A. (2009b) 'Mapping the Madrassah mindset', *Pips Research Journal Conflict and Peace Studies* 2(1).

Rashid, A. (2001) *Taliban: militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia*: Yale University Press.

Regan, P.M. (1996) 'Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(2): 336-359.

Rehman, S.u. (2006) 'Nothing but provincial autonomy- An interview with Hasil Bizenjo'. *Dawn Magazine*. 12-2-2006.

Ridley, F.F. (1975) 'Political Institutions: The Script Not the Play', *Political Studies* 23(2-3): 365-380.

Riker, W.H. (1964) *Federalism: Origin, operation, significance*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Robertson, L.R. (1997) 'The constructed nature of ethnopolitics', *International Politics* 34(3): 265-283.

Robinson, F. (1974) *Separatism Among Indian Muslims*: Cambridge University Press.

Robinson, F. (2007) *Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860-1923*: Cambridge University Press.

Rodik, P., D. Penzar and A. Srbljinovic (2003) 'An Overview of Databases on Conflicts and Political Crises', *Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems* 1(1-2): 9-21.

Roeder, P.G. (2005) 'Power dividing as an alternative to ethnic power sharing', *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*: 51-82.

Roggio, B. (2009) Attacks will increase in Pakistan: Qari Hussain. *Threat Matrix*, from http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/11/attacks_will_increase_in_pakis.php.

Rosenthal, E.I.J. (1965) *Islam in the modern national state*: Cambridge University Press.

Ross, M.L. (2004) 'What do we know about natural resources and civil war?' *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 337.

Rotberg, R. (1999) *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*: Brookings Institution Press.

Rothschild, J. (1981) *Ethnopolitics, a conceptual framework*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rousseau, J.J. (1762) *The social contract: or, Principles of political right* (G.D.H. Cole, trans.): Available online in public domain.

Rummel, R.J. (1971) 'Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations', *Macro-quantitative Analysis: Conflict, Development, and Democratization*.

Ryan, S. (1990) *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*. Hants, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited.

Sabir, M. (2001) 'Dynamic consequences of the 1997 NFC award: provincial social sector expenditures', *Pakistan Development Review* 40(4; PART 2): 967-986.

Sageman, M. (2004) Understanding terrorist networks: Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Samuelson, P.A. (1954) 'The pure theory of public expenditure', *The Review of Economics and Statistics*: 387-389.

Sato, H. (1994) 'Author Uneasy federation: the political economy of central budgetary transfers in South Asia/by Hiroshi Sato', *Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1994*.

Sayeed, K.B. (1968) *Pakistan: the formative phase, 1857-1948*: Oxford University Press, USA.

Sen, A. (1995) *Inequality reexamined*: Oxford University Press.

Sen, A. (2008) 'Violence, identity and poverty', *Journal of Peace Research* 45(1): 5.

Sen, A.K. (2000) *Social exclusion: Concept, application, and scrutiny*: Asian Development Bank.

Shah, A. (1991) *Perspectives on the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations*: Country Economics Dept., World Bank.

Shah, A. (1999) 'Fiscal federalism and macroeconomic governance: for better or for worse?' *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series*.

Shah, S.A.A. (2002) 'Fair NFC award vital for federation'. *Dawn*. 03-06-2002

Shahzad, A. (2007) *The issues of ethnicity in Pakistan (1972-85)*. Islamabad: Higher Education Commission.

Shepsle, K.A. (2006) 'Rational Choice Institutionalism', *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*:

Siddiqui, M.A. (1986) 'A look at the nationalities question'. *Dawn*. 10-1-1986.

Singer, P.W. (2001) 'Pakistan's Madrassahs: ensuring a system of education not Jihad', *Brookings Institutions Analysis Papers* 41.

Smith, M.G. (1965) *The plural society in the British West Indies*. Berkeley,: University of California Press.

Snyder, D. and W.R. Kelly (1977) 'Conflict Intensity, Media Sensitivity and the Validity of Newspaper Data', *American Sociological Review* 42(1): 105-123.

Snyder, J. (2000) *From voting to violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict*: Norton New York.

Solomon, H. (2004) *'The role of external intervention in ethnic conflicts'*. Paper presented at the conference 'Keeping the peace in a tough neighbourhood: The challenges confronting peacekeepers in Africa. Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria and the Royal Netherlands Embassy. Pretoria: South African Defence Intelligence College

Spence, M. (1973) 'Job market signaling', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 87(3): 355-374.

Stepan, A. (1999) 'Federalism and democracy: beyond the US model', *Journal of Democracy* 10: 19-34.

Stewart, F. (2008) 'Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: An Introduction and Some Hypotheses', *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan*: 3–24.

Stewart, F., M. Barron, G. Brown and M. Hartwell (2005a) 'Social Exclusion and Conflict: Analysis and Policy Implications' (CRISE Policy Paper).

Stewart, F., G. Brown and L. Mancini (2005b) 'Why Horizontal Inequalities Matter: Some Implications for Measurement'. Paper presented at the conference '. Available online.

Story, A.R.G. (2007) 'Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History', *Army Lawyer*:

Strand, H., L. Wilhelmsen and N.P. Gleditsch (2003) 'Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook', *Oslo: PRIO*.

Sultan-i-Rome (2009) 'Swat, A Critical Analysis', *Institute of peace and conflict studies, New Delhi*.

Syed, A. (1984) 'Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity'. Lahore: Vanguard Books.

Syed, A. (2004) 'Provinces' Grievances'. *Dawn*. 29-2-2004.

Tadjoeddin, M.Z. and S.M. Murshed (2007) 'Socio-Economic Determinants of Everyday Violence in Indonesia: An Empirical Investigation of Javanese Districts, 1994 2003', *Journal of Peace Research 44(6): 689*.

Talbot, I. (1998) *Pakistan: a modern history*: Palgrave Macmillan.

Talha, N. (2000) *Economic Factors in the Making of Pakistan (1921-1947)*: Oxford University Press, USA.

Tiebout, C.M. (1956) 'A pure theory of local expenditures', *The journal of political economy* 64(5): 416.

Tranchant, J.P. (2007) 'Decentralization and Ethnic Conflict: The Role of Empowerment'. *Working Paper* CERDI-CNRS and Université d'Auvergne.

Tranchant, J.P. (2008) 'Fiscal decentralisation, institutional quality and ethnic conflict: A panel data analysis, 1985-2001', *Conflict, Security and Development* 8(4): 491-514.

Usmani, Z.-u.-h. (2009) Pakistan Body Count. Retrieved 06-12-2009, from Online Database, PakistanBodyCount.org: http://www.pakistanbodycount.org/.

Vanhanen, T. (1999) 'Domestic Ethnic conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis', *Journal of Peace Research* 36(1): 55-73.

Vazir, N. (2007) 'Researching Students' Lived Experiences: Challenges and Responses', in D.K. Behera (ed.), *Childhoods in South Asia* (pp. 166-180). New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley.

Wachendorfer-Schmidt, U. and U. Wachendorfer (2000) *Federalism and political performance*: Routledge.

Walker, I. and H.J. Smith (eds) (2002) *Relative Deprivation: Specification, development, and integration*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wallerstein, I. and D. Phillips (1992) 'National and world identities and the interstate system', *Geopoüitics and geoculture: essays on the changing world system. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge*.

Waraich, O. (2009) 'Taliban running school for suicide bombers'. *The Independent*. 29-7-2009.

Waseem, M. (1996) 'Ethnic conflict in Pakistan: the case of MQM', *Pakistan Development Review* 35: 617-630.

Waseem, M. (1997) 'Affirmative action policies in Pakistan', *Ethnic Studies Report* 15(2): 223–244.

Wimmer, A. (2002) *Nationalist exclusion and ethnic conflict : shadows of modernity*. Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Wright Jr, T.P. (1991) 'Center-periphery relations and ethnic conflict in Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Punjabis', *Comparative Politics*: 299-312.

Yitzhaki, S. (1979) 'Relative Deprivation and the Gini Coefficient', *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 93(2): 321-324.

Yusuf, B. (2006) 'Ethnic Inequalities in the Public Sector: A Comparative Analysis', *Development and Change* 37(2): 299-328.

Zaidi, S.A. (1992) 'The economic bases of the national question in Pakistan: An indication', *Regional Imbalances and the National Question in Pakistan*: 90.

Zakaria, F. (2007) 'The Real Problem with Pakistan' [electronic version], *Newsweek*.
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/062507.html
(accessed 3-12-2007).

Syed Aamer Abdullah

On 11th February 2010, Syed Aamer Abdullah will defend his Doctor of Philosophy degree at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands. For the last four years he has been working on his thesis titled "Political Economy of Conflict: Social Contract and Conflict in Pakistan".

Mr. Abdullah was admitted to the Doctoral programme in 2006 on the basis of Masters in International Relations completed from the University of Peshawar, Pakistan in the year 2004. He also has also done Bachelors of Engineering from the NWFP University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar in the year 1998.

Mr. Abdullah has been a part of the civil service of Pakistan since the year 2000. In that same year he became only the second member of the service to be awarded the President's gold medal for best performance as well as the gold medal for top position in academics, at the civil services academy, Lahore, Pakistan. He worked on various positions from 2001 to 2006 in indirect taxation and also became a part of the tax administration reforms project in the year 2004. In a multinational training project on the implementation of World Trade Organization rules and procedures, he worked as a master trainer for Afghan customs officers.

Mr. Abdullah is at present engaged in drafting academic papers from his doctoral thesis as well as drafting a research proposal for studying the causes of taliban recruitment in Pakistan.

Contact: 1, Street 1, Rahatabad, Paloosi Road, Peshawar, Pakistan.
Email: aamer.abdullah@gmail.com

Syed Aamer Abdullah was admitted to the Doctoral programme in the Institute of Social Studies (now the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University, Rotterdam) in the Hague in February 2006 on the basis of:

Master of Arts in International Relations, University of Peshawar, Pakistan, 2004.

Declaration:

This thesis has not been submitted to any university for a degree or any other award.