Migration and migration policies in the Netherlands

Dutch SOPEMI-Report 2003

Draft

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Chapter 1 The Changing Dutch Immigration Regime

1.1 A new integration policy approach

The Netherlands was a "reluctant country of immigration" for decades (WRR 2001; Muus 2004; Engbersen 2003). Although the Netherlands has had a positive immigration surplus since the early 1960s, successive governments never acknowledged it had become an immigration country. Only in 1998 did the Social Democrat / Liberal Cabinet at the time officially state the "unmistakable fact that the Netherlands has become an immigration country" (*Kansen krijgen, kansen nemen* [Getting Chances, Taking Chances]). Although it was merely a statement of fact, it led to heated debates in the Dutch parliament, since many of the political parties opposed the idea of mass immigration to the Netherlands. Since 2000, opposition to further immigration has increased. Populist icon Pim Fortuyn, who was later assassinated, simply stated that "the Netherlands is full". Public opinion polls shortly after his assassination in 2002 showed that a good two-thirds of the Dutch population felt or strongly felt that "there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands" (SCP 2003: 370). And for the first time in Dutch history, immigration and integration, played a dominant role in 2002 local and parliamentary elections. All winning parties advocated stricter immigration and integration efforts (cf. Entzinger 2004).

Another indictor of the changing climate was the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee on Integration Policy in 2003. Surprisingly, the first conclusion of the final report of this Parliamentary Committee on Integration Policy (2004) was that "the integration of a large number of immigrants has succeeded entirely, or partly, which is a considerable achievement on the part of the immigrants in question and of the part of the receiving society." However, this rather positive conclusion was severely criticised by many politicians and Dutch intellectuals. Many argued that the Parliamentary Committee had overlooked major integration problems (unemployment, crime, black schools, segregated areas, the increase in informal economies, illegality and the rise of fundamentalist movements) that exists in the large

cities in the Netherlands. Others, especially scholars working in the field of migration studies, interpreted these results as a confirmation of their own analysis that the 'integration machine' in the Netherlands functions relatively well according to common standards used in academic research. Due to this change in the political climate, Dutch immigration and immigrant integration policies have become more restrictive and demanding.

The Netherlands has had a Centre/Rightist Cabinet consisting of Christian Democrats and Liberals since 2003. The current government is making a strong every effort to combine restrictive immigration policies with more of an emphasis on integrating the immigrants and ethnic minorities already in the country. The more restrictive position on immigration is clear from the strict Dutch policy on asylum-seekers, the less lenient conditions for family reunification and marital migration and the current emphasis on remigration to stimulate and if necessary force undocumented aliens and rejected asylum-seekers to return to their countries of origin. The current emphasis on immigrant integration is particularly clear from the new and stricter system of compulsory introduction programmes for new immigrants and members of minority groups already in the country, as proposed by the Minister for Alien Affairs and Integration. All these new policies and proposals are described in this chapter.

In addition to the policy changes, the current Dutch cabinet also has a new philosophy on immigration and immigrant integration. This new approach, first described in the letter *Integration Policy New Style* (2003), can be characterised as a farewell to multiculturalism as the cornerstone of Dutch integration policy: "In this integration policy, a great deal of emphasis has been traditionally put on accepting differences between minorities and the native Dutch population. In itself, there is nothing wrong with that, but it is often interpreted to mean the presence of new ethnic groups is a good thing and automatically enriches our society. One loses sight of the fact that not everything that is different is consequently also good. Having newcomers cultivate their own cultural identities does not necessarily bridge any gaps. The unity of society should be sought in what the people who take part in it have in common with each other, in what they share."[1]

In the perception of the current Dutch Cabinet, integration policy should not stress the cultural differences between various segments of the population, it should focus on what they have in common. The main objective

[1] *Integratiebeleid nieuwe stijl*.(Integration Policy New Style). Letter from the Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration to the Lower Chamber of the Dutch States General dated 16 September 2004.

of Dutch integration policy is described as "shared citizenship". According to the government, this means immigrants should speak Dutch, respect the laws and regulations and abide by "basic Dutch norms". These norms pertain to earning a living, taking care of one's surroundings, respecting other people's physical integrity and sexual preferences, and accepting the notion of equality between men and women. The aim of all this it to enable everyone "to live in freedom, autonomously design an independent life and take part in society."[2]

In this introductory chapter to the 2003 Dutch SOPEMI Report, we describe recent Dutch policy initiatives on immigration and citizenship (Section 1.2), compulsory introduction programmes for immigrants (Section 1.3), the policies on labour immigration (Section 1.4) and the asylum policy (Section 1.5) and return migration policies (Section 1.6).

1.2 Immigration and citizenship

The current Dutch State has opted for more "selective and restrictive immigration policies".[3] Mainly due to the perceived discrepancy between the ongoing influx and the integration of newcomers in Dutch society, immigration is viewed as problematic. As is stated in recent policy documents, "Due to the continual arrival of considerable groups of non-integrated newcomers, it is impossible to see the progress immigrants and their children are making in integrating into Dutch society."[4]

As is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, the Dutch political debates view marital migration and family reunification as problematic. As a result of marital migration, new and often poorly educated immigrants are entering the Netherlands, where their chances on the labour market are limited. More generally, marital migration is often taken as evidence of the poor integration of immigrants in Dutch society. As long as young immigrants look to their countries of origin rather than the Netherlands to find prospective spouses, they are not well integrated in Dutch society. A number of measures to limit marital migration and family reunification were taken in the 2000 Aliens Act, focusing on the Dutch residents who want to bring in their relatives or spouses. They have to be above the age of 18, residents of the Netherlands for a certain number of years and they have to earn a certain amound of

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2 Idem.
3 *Hoofdlijnenakkoord* (Agreement on the Main Lines 2003).
4 Cabinet response, p. 13.

money. They are expected to have a steady job and an income of at least the official minimum wage. In 2003, the following new restrictions were added:

- the minimum age for marital migration was changed from 18 to 21 (also to prevent forced marriages);
- the minimum income requirement for marital migration was increased from 100% to 120% of the official minimum wage;
- the partner already living in the Netherlands has to have adequate housing (stipulated when marital migrants enter the country and when the permanent residence permit is issued);
- marital migrants need to pass a test of knowledge of a body of 500 common Dutch words before coming to the Netherlands.

The Dutch State has also made several proposals in the field of citizenship. Double citizenship is no longer feasible for third-generation immigrants. Double citizenship is now officially impossible in the Netherlands, but there are many exceptions. The rationale behind the new proposal is that third-generation immigrants should decide which nationality they want. Double citizenship allows too much leeway according to the Dutch cabinet.[5] Another recent proposal is to give the document granting Dutch citizenship a more ceremonial aspect. The aim of both proposed measures is to strengthen the immigrants' link and loyalty to Dutch society rather than stress their own history and background.

1.3 Immigrant introduction programmes

The Netherlands has had a system of compulsory introduction programmes for newcomers ever since 1998. The main aim is to teach immigrants enough Dutch to be able to take part in Dutch society in general and the labour market in particular. However, the ultimate aims are more comprehensive, as is demonstrated by recent official statements: "The introduction programmes focus on the skills immigrants need if they are to be able to take part in Dutch society and build an independent life for themselves here, i.e. mastery of the language and knowledge of the society, particularly of the values and norms in our country. The introduction

[5] Cabinet response, p. 13.

programmes are the start of an integration process that ultimately leads to the full-fledged citizenship they share with the rest of the Dutch population."[6] Ever since a legal basis was established for the immigrant introduction programmes in 1998, every newcomer in the Netherlands is obliged to take an introduction course. This does not however apply to EU citizens or certain categories of usually well-educated newcomers. An immigrant introduction programme starts with an *individual assessment*. New immigrants are called up for an interview with a civil servant from the municipality within four months after their arrival. One of the aims of the interview is to ascertain whether the immigrant needs to attend the programme and what the individual goal is to be. The main element of the programme is an *educational course* of 600 hours: 500 hours to learn Dutch and 100 hours to learn about Dutch society. After finishing the course, immigrants are tested on their command of the Dutch language. Immigrants who are living on national assistance benefits are expected to learn enough Dutch to either attend further training courses or get a job. This language command level is referred to as the "professional self-reliance level". Immigrants who are not expected to become professionally self-reliant in the Netherlands (e.g. female marital migrants) are expected to learn enough Dutch to cope with daily encounters. This language command level is referred to as the "social self-reliance level". The immigrant introduction programmes also include one or more *individual interviews* in which immigrants are advised on further activities in Dutch society (e.g. follow-up courses, paid or voluntary jobs). As is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, the results of the immigrant introduction programmes have been disappointing. The following three bottlenecks are often noted: [7]

- *Premature dropout*. A national evaluation study of the Dutch immigrant introduction programme estimates the premature dropout level at 15 to 20% . Some local evaluation studies, however, note a premature dropout rate of up to 30%. Although dropping out can be sanctioned by reducing national assistance benefits, in practice this is rarely done. There are several reasons for premature dropout: physical or mental heath problems, especially for refugees, pregnancies and care duties at home

[6] Ministry of Justice, 2005 Budget.
[7] Cf. M. Brink et al. (2002), *Verscheidenheid in integratie. Evaluatie van de effectiviteit van de WIN*. (Diversity in Integration. Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Introduction Act). Final Report. Amsterdam: Regional Plan (p. 91); City of Rotterdam (2002), Samen leven in Rotterdam. Deltaplan inburgering: op weg naar actief burgerschap (Living Together in Rotterdam. Introduction Delta Plan: On the Way to Active Citizenship), p. 27; Blok, S.A. (2004) Bruggen bouwen. (Building Bridges) The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers.

combined with insufficient childcare facilities, and the demands of looking for a job, especially for men. Although the introduction programmes are designed to stimulate labour market participation, they are not very effective in this respect. Participants who leave the programme to take a job that barely requires any qualifications are not apt to improve their position and will easily become dependent again on national assistance benefits.

- *Disappointing achievements*. Only a minority of all the participants (40%) who take the test at the end of the programme reach the "social self-reliance level". Immigrants who are on national assistance are however often expected to reach the "professional self-reliance level" that enables them to attend further courses and participate on the labour market. Only 10% of the immigrants who finish the introduction programme reach this level. If stimulating labour market participation is the main aim of the introduction programme, we can conclude that this goal is only achieved in a small percentage of the cases.
- *Limited differentiation in course contents*. A final shortcoming of the immigrant introduction programmes is that they are often too attuned to participants with very little or no education. As a result, well-educated participants often do not learn much at the course. The Dutch State intendss to diversify the courses by terminating the current exclusive rights of vocational schools to give the courses. In the future, immigrants will be able choose whatever program they want (privatisation). The only requirement will be that they pass the exam after finishing the introduction programme.

So far we have only discussed the compulsory introduction programmes for newcomers in the Netherlands. Since it became clear though that insufficient command of Dutch language also impedes the labour market participation of foreign-born residents already in the Netherlands, similar language courses have been developed for *oldcomers*. In the first instance, attending this course is not mandatory for oldcomers. Today's authorities are however propagating mandatory introduction courses and exams for certain groups, such as national assistance recipients.

In response to these shortcomings of the existing introduction programmes, the Dutch Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration announced that a complete

new system is to go into effect in 2006. The main components of the new system can be summarised as follows: [8]

- There is to be a new *introduction exam*. Newcomers wishing to settle in the Netherlands and oldcomers with a poor command of Dutch will have to take an exam. Passing the exam will be a pre-condition for a permanent residence permit.
- Marital migrants will have to start learning Dutch prior to their arrival to the Netherlands. Starting in 2005, passing a basic exam in Dutch will be a pre-condition for a visa to enter the Netherlands.
- The introduction programmes and language courses will be privatised. Institutions for vocational training will lose their current exclusive rights to give the courses. Every newcomer can freely choose any course that prepares for the exam. The government will regulate the introduction course market by creating an approval system for course suppliers to provide insight into their quality.
- Immigrants, newcomers and oldcomers alike, will also be responsible for their own training in a financial sense. Immigrants will have to pay for their own introduction course, which will cost an estimated €6,000. Immigrants who cannot afford it will be able to apply for financial aid. In addition, they can qualify for a maximised compensation of the costs once they have passed the exam. Passing the exam will also have other financial and legal significance for immigrants. National assistance recipients may face financial sanctions if they do not pass the exam. Passing the exam will also be a pre-condition for a permanent residence permit.

The proposed new system of immigrant introduction programmes with all its obligations and sanctions will be much stricter and less subject to alteration than the existing policies. The new immigrant introduction programme proposals also follow the liberal philosophy of the current Dutch Cabinet, stressing that immigrants are responsible for learning Dutch and getting to know Dutch society. As is stated in this year's budget, "In keeping with the Cabinet policy that emphasises the importance of individual responsibility, no rules will be stipulated on how newcomers are to acquire the minimal skills."[9]

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[8] Cabinet response, pp. 14-15; cf. Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration, *Contourennota herziening van het inburgeringsstelsel*, (General Memorandum on the Revision of the Introduction System). The Hague, 2004; Ministry of Justice, 2005 Budget.

[9] Ministry of Justice, Budget 2005

It is important to add that the immigrant introduction programmes are embedded in more general integration policies in the fields of education, emancipation (especially of women) and labour market participation.

1.4 Policy on labour migration

As is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, the Netherlands has a restrictive policy on labour migration. The government stated until recently that it has no official labour migration policy except for temporary migration to fill vacancies otherwise hard to fill. Rather than invite foreign workers to the Netherlands, the government prefers to reduce the economic inactivity of the existing Dutch labour force, especially as regards ethnic minorities.[10] However, recently the Dutch cabinet has announced that procedures for labour migrants coming to the Netherlands, especially knowledge migrants, are to be simplified and/or changed. There will be a special counter for foreign workers and new admission rules have been developed for highly qualified labour migrants. The Dutch cabinet wants to stimulate highly qualified labour migration to the Netherlands. Labour migrants who are able to earn more than 45.000 Euro for wage labour on the Dutch labour market are eligible for a residence permit for a maximum of five years. For labour migrants who are less than 30 years of age the income criterion is 32.600 Euro. After five years these labour migrants are authorised to receive a permanent residence permit. Surprisingly, no educational criterion is used, only a simple income criterion in order to select and attract highly qualified migrants. These new proposals show that different categories of labour migrants will be treated in different ways. The Netherlands is developing a selective labour migration system in which a more liberal entry policy is pursued for certain (highly qualified) labour groups who will get straightforward access to permanent residence, while at the same time the job and residence opportunities for low or medium skilled labour migrants are considered on a strictly temporal basis (Engbersen 2003).

The recruitment of temporary foreign personnel is feasible under the Foreign Nationals Employment Act. The purpose of this Act is to "selectively allow the entry of labour migrants within the framework of labour market policy and

[10] Information: Ministry of Justice, *Speerpunten* (Spearheads).

control the employment of illegal persons" (WRR 2001: 80). However, as the 2001 and 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Reports note, the number of temporary foreign workers coming to the Netherlands via the Foreign National Employment Act has increased considerably over the past few years. The total number of temporary work permits issued to foreign workers almost doubled between 1999 and 2002 from 20,000 to 35,000. In 2003, the number of temporary work permits for foreign workers increased to 38.000 (see Chapter 4). Given this growing number of temporary foreign workers in the Netherlands, one can hardly refer to them as exceptional cases. In addition, many of the current temporary foreign workers are not knowledge migrants. In 2003, more than a third of the temporary work permits were issued for unskilled or semi-skilled work in Dutch agriculture and horticulture. Many of the temporary work permits were given to foreign workers from Central and Eastern Europe, especially Poland.

As is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, the arrival of temporary workers from Central and Eastern Europe to do agricultural of horticultural work is partly the result of earlier state policy. In the past, much of the horticultural work was done by undocumented aliens (Burgers and Engbersen 1999). In the Westland, a well-known Dutch horticultural region, anti-fraud checks showed that one in four businesses employed undocumented aliens (WRR 2001: 81). The organisations in the agricultural and horticultural sector would be in favour of more lenient regulations to make it possible to legally employ Polish workers for seasonal work. In response, in 2001 the Dutch State made an agreement with the sector organisations that made it possible to formally recruit Polish workers. However, since most Polish workers now demand normal wages, which some businesses are not prepared to pay, undocumented aliens, now mainly Bulgarians, are once again being recruited (Leerkes et al 2004). In addition, in principle the government is open to efforts to cope with labour market bottlenecks by means of temporary labour migration. To this end, the Foreign Nationals Employment Act is available as a regulating instrument. The government plays a role in arriving at agreements in sectors where there is a temporary or permanent shortage of workers, such as health care, horticulture and Chinese restaurants. The recent proposal to amend the Foreign Nationals Employment Act should provide a legal basis for these agreements.

1.5 Dutch asylum policy[11]

As in other Western countries, asylum policy continues to be a thorny political issue in the Netherlands. Following the large influx of asylum-seekers in the Netherlands in the 1990s, the Dutch State adopted a new Aliens Act in 2000. Its primary purpose is to formulate a more restrictive and efficient asylum policy, e.g. by following previous European agreements on asylum policy. Two points in this draft European asylum policy are particularly relevant to Dutch asylum policy (see WRR 2001: 63):

- The principle of *safe countries of origin*, according to which an asylum request is declared unfounded if the asylum-seeker comes from a country considered safe by the country handling the request. "Safe" means the political, civil and human rights in the country are sufficiently guaranteed.
- The principle of *third countries of reception*, designed to stop "asylum shopping", refers to the situation where an asylum-seeker has entered a country via another EU or a non-EU country that is considered safe. Since that country is safe, the asylum-seeker should have requested asylum there and the receiving country is entitled to send the asylum-seeker back there. In Europe, these instances are referred to as *Dublin cases*.

One main problem associated with Dutch pre-2000 asylum policy was the lengthy procedure. It was often years before a final decision on an asylum request was made, especially if asylum-seekers appealed negative decisions of the immigration authorities (IND) or continued the procedure in an effort to obtain a better status. The 2000 Aliens Act aimed to shorten the asylum procedures in the following three ways:

a) Asylum decision within six months

In principle, the immigration authorities issue a decision on an asylum request within six months. This is not a strict requirement, but one that an effort is made to meet. A desire for faster asylum-related decision-making is nothing new, but in practice it has been undoable due to the mass influx of asylum-seekers to the Netherlands. The Dutch have taken numerous measures in recent years to limit the number of asylum-seekers and simplify and accelerate the asylum procedure. The first measure set up registration

[11] Our description of the current asylum policy in the Netherlands is largely based on: WRR, *Nederland als immigratiesamenleving* (The Netherlands as Immigration Society). The Hague: 2001 (in particular pp. 62-74) (www.wrr.nl).

centres, where rapid decisions were to be made on asylum requests (initially within 24 hours, later 48 hours). Asylum-seekers rejected at the registration centres would have to leave the Netherlands immediately. Secondly, criteria were formulated on which countries could be considered safe. A country is considered safe if it has signed the relevant human rights agreements and abides by them. The Minister of Immigration and Integration decides whether this is the case on the advice of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Asylum-seekers from countries considered safe according to the formal criteria are not immediately rejected. There is always an assessment of each individual case. A pre-condition is that asylum-seekers can make a plausible case that their personal safety is at risk in their home country.

b) Withdrawal of objection option

The 2000 Aliens Act eliminated the option of lodging an objection to a decision by the immigration authorities. Now asylum-seekers can only appeal to the Council of State, the highest Dutch legal body, which is required to make a decision within six months. In principle the asylum-seeker can remain in the Netherlands pending an appeal decision, though not in the case of a decision on a further appeal. If the asylum appeal is rejected, the alien no longer has a right to be at a reception centre or use any of the other facilities and is to leave the Netherlands. There is no way to appeal to the termination of the reception facilities.

c) Introduction of a single asylum status

However, the most important change in the 2000 Aliens Act pertains to the different asylum statuses. Prior to the Act, the Netherlands had various asylum statuses with different rights and privileges depending on the grounds for asylum. As of 1 April 2001, every asylum-seeker whose asylum request is approved receives the same temporary residence permit, regardless of the grounds for the asylum. Each asylum-seeker who is admitted first receives a temporary residence permit for a maximum of three years, which can be converted into a permanent residence permit after three years. Uniform rights and facilities are attached to this single status. All asylum migrants who have been admitted to the Netherlands (status holders) have the same rights as regards employment, national assistance, family reunification, study and study grants, refugee passports and so forth.

During the asylum procedure, asylum-seekers have a right to be housed at a reception centre or elsewhere. However, the basic principle is that asylum-seekers remain outside society. Asylum-seekers only have a limited

right to engage in paid employment and have no access to the Dutch national assistance system. Instead, there are pocket money arrangements at the reception centres. The reason for keeping asylum-seekers outside society and its dominant institutions is that in the end, some of them will not be allowed to stay. If they are integrated into Dutch society, it would only make it harder for them to leave again.

The state has announced its intention to evaluate the new asylum procedures in 2005. The new procedures are known to be very successful in the sense that the number of asylum-seekers coming to the Netherlands fell dramatically in recent years. However, the justice of the asylum-related decisions made in the fixed procedures is still being debated. In addition to the new procedures for handling asylum-seekers who come to the Netherlands, the Dutch have made several proposals to reduce the total numbers of asylum-seekers. For years the Dutch have been interested in a common European asylum policy to prevent asylum-seekers from moving from one country to the next, depending on where the procedures are less strict. The Netherlands is planning to use its role as chairman of the European Union in 2005 to further develop an EU asylum policy. The Dutch are also interested in better reception and protection for refugees in their own region to reduce the need to come to the Netherlands or other European countries.[12]

1.6 Return policies

An important change in the 2000 Aliens Act is that rejected asylum-seekers can be removed from reception centres much more quickly than in the past. If an asylum request is rejected, the alien is given 28 days to book his return ticket, which is his own responsibility. The Dutch state assumes that asylum-seekers come on their own and can leave on their own if they are not admitted. If asylum-seekers do not leave within 28 days and enforced return is not possible, if necessary they are taken by force from their homes or reception centres. Combined with the fact that many rejected asylum-seekers do not leave at all, the result of this policy is that some of them end up on the street. Informal social safety nets have been set up for them in many towns, often in conjunction with churches or other private organisations.

[12] Ministry of Justice, 2005 Budget. The same proposals were also made in last year's budget, as is noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report.

However, the Dutch State does not view these informal safety nets as justified and insists that rejected asylum-seekers should leave the country.

The current government has declared an effective return policy to be a "spearhead of Cabinet policy". The issue of rejected asylum-seekers who came into the country under the old Aliens Act and have been in the Netherlands for years, often illegally, is a central aspect of the return migration policy.[13]

For four weeks (28 days), an intensive investigation is conducted to see whether they can return to their country of origin, and if necessary they are put under supervision at a reception centre during this period. If it is "objectively determined" in the course of these four weeks that they can not return to their home country through no fault of their own, they can qualify for a residence permit. The Netherlands wants to stimulate the countries of origin to take back the rejected asylum-seekers by giving countries that refuse to do so less development aid.

28 days after notifying the asylum seeker that he must leave the country, an inspection follows by the immigration authority on the last recorded address, to check if the asylum seeker departed independently. The alien is registered as "administratively removed" when someone is not found at home. When someone is found in and enforced return is a possibility follows in principle an arrest and after that 'deportation' or 'departure under supervision'. In the case of deportation the alien is taken across the border under supervision and if necessary transported to the country of origin. In case of departure under supervision the alien can leave the country by oneself, but his travel documents are taken in only given back at the place where the alien leaves the country.

In 2003 the Dutch state announced it would give the illegal aliens in the neediest situations residence permits if they met the following requirements:

- Aliens who submitted their initial asylum request in the Netherlands before May 1998 and were still awaiting a final decision on their first asylum request in May 2003, including aliens awaiting a final decision on the prolongation, withdrawal or non-prolongation of a conditional residence permit in the framework of this initial asylum request
- Aliens who have continuously resided in the Netherlands from the date of their first asylum request to 27 May 2003.

[13] *Terugkeernota, maatregelen voor een effectievere uitvoering van het terugkeerbeleid* (Memorandum on Return Migration, Measures for a More Effective Implementation of the Return Migration Policy) (TK 29 344, no. 1)

- A residence permit is not granted if there are negative indications such as delinquency or false documents.

On January 23 2004, Ms. Verdonk, the Dutch Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration decided that 2,300 people awaiting a decision on their asylum request for five years or longer would receive a residence permit. Many welfare organisations, including the Netherlands Association of Municipalities, the Council of Churches and alien organisations unsuccessfully propagated a much broader measure that would apply to more than 6,000 people.

Most recent measures for a more effective implementation of the return migration policy are the following.[14] Firstly, measures for improving border control with the aim to prevent illegal residence, by e.g. enlarge the responsibility of carriers to remove aliens who have been refused at the border. Secondly, measures to promote the return of failed and rejected asylumseekers e.g. by expanding the capacity for alien detention. The new return migration policy means the introduction of new reception modes for asylum-seekers. The new structure has the following ramifications. The reception locations are to be divided into two kinds of locations, orientation locations and return migration locations, for two different categories of asylum-seekers. At an orientation location, asylum-seekers are housed who are awaiting a decision on their asylum request. Asylum-seekers at the orientation locations and the existing reception centres who receive an initial refection from the immigration authorities are then to be transferred to return migration locations. These return migration locations are not to house any asylum-seekers who are still awaiting the initial decision on their asylum request.
Another measure to encourage return is to ensure that aliens remain available for investigations into identity and nationality and explaining the possible outcome of the asylum procedure more explicitly and emphatically to asylum seekers.
Thirdly there are measures to promote the return of illegal migrants by intensifying supervision and conduct further research into the use of biometrics. Other measures concern generating more support for return and integrating departure and return into Dutch foreign Policy.
The Return Migration Memorandum stipulates numerous measures for a stricter approach to the problems related to illegal aliens within the policy on

[14] Idem.

aliens. In addition to this memorandum, in April 2004 the Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration presented the Memorandum on Illegal Aliens. In the policy on illegal aliens, the Cabinet focuses on four spearheads: the policy on aliens, premises rented to illegal aliens, the employment of illegal aliens, and trafficking in people. The memorandum announces a wide range of measures to deal with these four issues. The implementation of these measures was launched in 2004. These efforts are to be continued in 2005."

Chapter 2 Migration to and from the Netherlands

2.1 Migration to and from the Netherlands

Main trends in migration to and from the Netherlands

- In 2003, the number of immigrants entering the Netherlands dropped to 104,000. This declining trend was also evident in 2002. In 2000 and 2001, the total number of immigrants entering the Netherlands reached a record number of about 130,000 a year.
- Since the number of emigrants leaving the Netherlands, Dutch and foreign nationals alike, rose in recent years, the immigration surplus (immigration minus emigration) in 2003 was only about 36,000. Three years earlier, in 2000, the immigration surplus was twice as large (72,000).
- An important explanation for the declining immigration is the sharp fall in the number of immigrants from typical refugee countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Iran, Angola, former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. In 2003, there were 13,500 fewer immigrants from these ten countries than in 2001. This explains more than half (53%) the total decline in immigration from 2001 to 2003. The declining immigration from these countries is the intended result of the stricter Dutch asylum policies in recent years.
- In public opinion, the media, and the political debate, immigration is often associated with immigrants from Third World countries with a non-Western cultural background who find it hard to integrate into Dutch society. However this popular picture is only true of a minority of the immigrants entering the Netherlands. More than half (55%) of the 104,000 immigrants in 2003 are either Dutch nationals (including Antilleans) or immigrants from other Western countries such as other EU countries, the United States, Indonesia or Japan. Even if we exclude the immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles, 49% of the immigrants were still either Dutch nationals or

from other Western countries. The other half of the immigrant population in 2003 either came from Central and Eastern Europe (8%) or from non-Western countries (36%).

- The largest single immigrant groups in 2003 from Western countries were Dutch nationals from the Netherlands Antilles (more than 6,000), Germans (4,800), British (4,000) and immigrants from the former Soviet Union (3,400). The largest single non-Western immigrant groups in 2003 were Turks (6,400), Moroccans (4,400), Chinese (3,900), Surinamese (2,400) and Afghans (1,400). These non-Western immigrant groups consist of traditional guest workers or post-colonial migrants as well as immigrants from new countries. The fastest growing, larger immigrant groups since 1995 have been immigrants from China and the former Soviet Union.
- Almost half (47%) of the immigrants in 2003 came to the Netherlands for family reasons (marriage, family reunion). In some groups, the percentage of immigrants to the Netherlands for family reasons is significantly higher. This is the case for Moroccans, Thais and Surinamese (around 90%), Turks (80%) and Brazilians (77%). Half the Argentinean immigrants also came to the Netherlands for family reasons, the most famous being Princess Maxima, the wife of Dutch crown prince Willem-Alexander.
- About one in three immigrants to the Netherlands leave again within six years. The percentage of return migrants is larger among Western than non-Western immigrants. The percentage of return immigrants seems to be the lowest among immigrants coming to the Netherlands to seek asylum or for family reasons.

2.2 Immigration to the Netherlands

This chapter describes the migration flows to and from the Netherlands. What are the central trends? Who are the immigrants and why do they come to the Netherlands? After the Second World War, the Netherlands was a country of emigration. Officially encouraged by the Dutch government, many Dutch citizens emigrated to the United States, Canada or Australia. This situation only changed in the early 1960s with the arrival of guest workers from the Mediterranean. As the term *guest* worker implies, they were only expected to stay temporarily

in the Netherlands and return to their home countries once they had done their job. This myth of migrants returning home dominated official Dutch thinking about immigration and immigrant integration for many years. Only when the guest workers brought their whole families to the Netherlands did it became clear that they were here to stay. This became even clearer in the early 1980s when major flows of post-colonial immigrants from the Caribbean (Suriname, Netherlands Antilles) started to come to the Netherlands as well.

Figure 2.1 shows the numbers of immigrants to the Netherlands in recent decades. The figure clearly shows that immigration in the 1990s, although it differed from one year to the next, tended to be higher than in the 1980s. In most years in the 1980s, less than 100,000 immigrants, Dutch nationals and non-nationals alike, entered the Netherlands. In the 1990s the number of immigrants entering the Netherlands was above 100,000 in most years, with a post-war peak in 2000-2001 with more than 130,000. However, in the last few years the number of immigrants has been declining again. We noted the drop in the number of immigrants in last year's SOPEMI report. In 2003 the number of immigrants fell again to 104,000, about 20% less than two years earlier (Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1). If this continues in the coming years, immigration to the Netherlands will be back at the lower level of the 1980s.

In the same period as the fall in the number of immigrants, more emigrants left the Netherlands. The total number of emigrants increased from 59,000 in 1999 to 68,000 in 2003. Table 2.1 makes it clear that this increase in emigration is mainly due to the number of Dutch nationals who left the country. With declining immigration and rising emigration, of course the immigration surplus (immigration minus emigration) is declining as well. In 2001 the immigration surplus still was about 70,000, but in 2003 it was only half that much (35,000).

Figure 2.1 Immigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals to the Netherlands (1980-2003) (in absolute numbers)



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

Table 2.1: Immigration and Emigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals in the Netherlands (1980-2003)

Year	Immigration			Emigration			Surplus		
	Dutch nationals	Foreign nationals	Total	Dutch nationals	Foreign nationals	Total	Dutch nationals	Foreign nationals	Total
1980	32,684	79,820	112,504	35,837	23,633	59,470	-3153	56,187	53,034
1981	29,767	50,416	80,183	38,216	24,979	63,195	-8449	25,437	16,988
1982	29,810	40,930	70,740	39,413	28,094	67,507	-9603	12,836	3233
1983	30,321	36,441	66,762	32,810	27,974	60,784	-2489	8467	5978
1984	29,616	37,291	66,907	31,824	27,030	58,854	-2208	10,261	8053
1985	33,196	46,166	79,362	31,009	24,206	55,215	2187	21,960	24,147
1986	34,585	52,802	87,387	31,155	23,563	54,718	3430	29,239	32,669
1987	35,080	60,855	95,935	31,139	20,872	52,011	3941	39,983	43,924
1988	32,976	58,262	91,238	34,403	21,388	55,791	-1427	36,874	35,447
1989	33,529	65,385	98,914	38,218	21,489	59,707	-4689	43,896	39,207
1990	36,086	81,264	117,350	36,749	20,595	57,344	-663	60,669	60,006
1991	35,912	84,337	120,249	35,998	21,330	57,328	-86	63,007	62,921
1992	33,904	83,022	116,926	36,101	22,733	58,834	-2197	60,289	58,092
1993	31,581	87,573	119,154	37,019	22,203	59,222	-5438	65,370	59,932
1994	30,887	68,424	99,311	39,409	22,746	62,155	-8522	45,678	37,156
1995	29,127	66,972	96,099	41,648	21,673	63,321	-12,521	45,299	32,778
1996	31,572	77,177	108,749	42,921	22,404	65,325	-11,349	54,773	43,424
1997	33,124	76,736	109,860	40,278	21,940	62,218	-7154	54,796	47,642
1998	40,706	81,701	122,407	39,175	21,266	60,441	1531	60,435	61,966
1999	40,786	78,365	119,151	38,358	20,665	59,023	2428	57,700	60,128
2000	41,467	91,383	132,850	40,474	20,727	61,201	993	70,656	71,649
2001	38,897	94,507	133,404	42,921	20,397	63,318	-4024	74,110	70,086
2002	34,631	86,619	121,250	45,571	21,157	66,728	-10,940	65,462	54,522
2003	30,948	73,566	104,514	47,015	21,870	68,885	-16,067	51,696	35,629

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

Who are the 104,000 immigrants who entered the Netherlands in 2003? Where did they come from and why? About 30% of the immigrants are Dutch nationals coming or returning to the Netherlands (about 30,000 people in 2003, Table 2.1). The table also shows that the number of Dutch nationals coming or returning to the Netherlands was much higher at the end of the 1990s (about 40,000). Figure 2.2 gives a more precise picture of where these Dutch nationals entering the Netherlands come from.

Figure 2.2: Immigration of Dutch Nationals (selected categories) 1995-2003



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

A relatively large percentage of immigrants with Dutch citizenship have come from the Dutch Caribbean islands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. People from these islands have Dutch citizenship and more or less free access to the Netherlands. In the late 1990s more than an annual 10,000 Antilleans came to the Netherlands due to the poor economic situation there. In 2003 the number of Antillean immigrants declined to about 6,000 (20% of the Dutch nationals entering the Netherlands and 6% of the total immigration). Of the remaining 25,000 immigrants with Dutch citizenship, half came from other EU countries and the other half from other countries that remain unspecified.

Table 2.2 gives a more precise picture of who came to the Netherlands in 2003. The data in the table refer to their nationality and country of origin. First a distinction is drawn Dutch nationals including immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles and foreign nationals, whose country of origin is mentioned. Their country of origin is not necessarily their country of birth, but the country they said they came from when they arrived in the Netherlands. The various countries of origin are subdivided in Western countries (such as the EU, countries in Central and Eastern Europe and other Western countries) and non-Western

countries. With this subdivision, we are following the example set by Netherlands Statistics.[15]

Table 2.2: Immigration of Dutch and Foreign Nationals by Country of Origin and Gender 2003

	Male	in %	Female	in %	Total	in %
Total	**52,492**	**100.0**	**52,022**	**100.0**	**104,514**	**100.0**
Dutch nationals	**16,798**	**32.0**	**14,150**	**27.2**	**30,948**	**29.6**
including						
Dutch Antilles and Aruba	3,138	6.0	3,095	5.9	6,233	6.0
Non-Dutch nationals	**35,694**	**68.0**	**37,872**	**72.8**	**73,566**	**70.4**
Western Countries	**16,747**	**31.9**	**18,317**	**35.2**	**35,064**	**33.5**
including						
14 EU countries	**10,083**	**19.2**	**9,055**	**17.4**	**19,138**	**18.3**
Germany	2,311	4.4	2,523	4.8	4,834	4.6
United Kingdom	2,354	4.5	1,631	3.1	3,985	3.8
Belgium	835	1.6	956	1.8	1,791	1.7
Eastern Europe	**3,240**	**6.2**	**5,316**	**10.2**	**8,556**	**8.2**
including						
Soviet Union (former)	1,191	2.3	2,167	4.2	3,358	3.2
Poland	711	1.4	1,251	2.4	1,962	1.9
Yugoslavia (former)	531	1.0	651	1.3	1,182	1.1
other Western countries	**3,424**	**6.5**	**3,946**	**7.6**	**7,370**	**7.1**
including						
United States	1,395	2.7	1,395	2.7	2,790	2.7
Indonesia	452	0.9	905	1.7	1,357	1.3
Japan	612	1.2	566	1.1	1,178	1.1
Australia	342	0.7	359	0.7	701	0.7
Canada	228	0.4	303	0.6	531	0.5
Non-Western countries	**18,684**	**35.6**	**19,347**	**37.2**	**38,031**	**36.4**
including						
Turkey	3,730	7.1	2,659	5.1	6,389	6.1
Morocco	2,000	3.8	2,392	4.6	4,392	4.2
Angola	657	1.3	431	0.8	1,088	1.0
South Africa	263	0.5	424	0.8	687	0.7
Egypt	339	0.6	244	0.5	583	0.6
Sierra Leone	417	0.8	159	0.3	576	0.6
Suriname	1,024	2.0	1,393	2.7	2,417	2.3
Brazil	219	0.4	514	1.0	733	0.7
China	1,585	3.0	2,330	4.5	3,915	3.7
Afghanistan	754	1.4	653	1.3	1,407	1.3
Iraq	567	1.1	470	0.9	1,037	1.0
Thailand	174	0.3	772	1.5	946	0.9
Iran	387	0.7	476	0.9	863	0.8
Philippines	141	0.3	428	0.8	569	0.5
India	326	0.6	236	0.5	562	0.5
Vietnam	200	0.4	325	0.6	525	0.5
Pakistan	230	0.4	274	0.5	504	0.5
Centre for asylum-seekers	263	0.5	208	0.4	471	0.5

Source: Statistics Netherlands

[15] Statistics Netherlands distinguishes between Western and non-Western countries. Western countries are all European countries including Central and Eastern Europe except Turkey, North American countries, some Asian countries (Japan and Indonesia) and the countries in Oceania (Australia, New Zealand). Turkey and all the countries in Latin and South America, Africa and Asia are considered non-Western.

In our opinion, these figures put the current concern about immigration in Dutch society into the proper perspective. The Dutch public opinion, the media and the political debates often associate immigration with people from the Third World countries with a non-Western cultural background who find it hard to integrate into Dutch society. However, as Table 2.3 makes very clear, this popular picture of immigration is only true of a minority of the immigrants entering the Netherlands. Of the 104,000 immigrants in 2003, almost 31,000 were Dutch nationals (including Antilleans), 19,000 came from other EU countries and 7,400 came from other Western countries such as the United States, Indonesia (a former Dutch colony) or Japan. Together, these Western immigrants account for 55% of the total immigrant population of 2003. Even if we exclude the immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles, about half (49%) of the immigrants were still either Dutch nationals or from other Western countries.

The other half of the 2003 immigrants can roughly be divided into two subcategories: those from Central and Eastern Europe and those from non-Western countries. In recent decades, one dominant trend within Europe has been the growing migration from east to west. In 2003 more than 8,000 non-Dutch immigrants (8% of the total immigrant population) arrived from Central and Eastern Europe. In the 1990s the largest immigrant group from Central and Eastern Europe was from the former Yugoslavia, fleeing the war. The peak in immigration from former Yugoslavia to the Netherlands was in 1993 when 8,912 (Muus 1993) people from various post-Yugoslav republics entered the Netherlands. In 2003, however, only 1,200 non-Dutch immigrants from former Yugoslavia arrived in the Netherlands. Almost 3,400 non-Dutch immigrants came from the former Soviet Union, 3% of the total immigrant population of 2003. As is the case with other Eastern European countries, more female than male immigrants came to the Netherlands from the former Soviet Union.

Lastly, 38,000 immigrants (a little more than a third of the total immigrant population of 2003) came from non-Western countries. The five largest single immigrant groups among them in 2003 were Turks (6,389), Moroccans (4,392), Chinese (3,915), Surinamese (2,417) and Afghans (1,407). It is interesting to note that the more or less traditional immigrant groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese) still constitute a large percentage of the non-Western immigrants, although relatively new immigrant groups in the

Netherlands such as the Chinese and Afghans are relatively large as well. The same is true of the almost 3,400 immigrants from the former Soviet Union who came to the Netherlands in 2003. Many people in the new immigrant groups came to the Netherlands as asylum-seekers. The arrival of new immigrant groups to the Netherlands, in addition to the more or less traditional immigrant groups, can be interpreted as a sign of the growing differentiation in the flow of immigrants to the Netherlands. Figure 2.3 shows this trend in a historical perspective.

Figure 2.3: Migration Surplus of Non-Dutch Immigrants by Country of Origin, 1980-2003



Source: Statistics Netherlands

In the early 1980s, more than two thirds of the non-Dutch immigrants to the Netherlands came from just three countries, Turkey, Morocco and Suriname. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the percentage of these three immigrant groups steadily declined to around 30% of the total immigrant population in 1993. After that the percentage of these more or less traditional immigrant groups in the Netherlands remained at a much lower level (from 15 to 20%). The percentage of immigrants from other EU countries in the total immigrant population in the Netherlands remained rather steady at 15 to 20%. This means the percentage of immigrants from the other countries increased from less than 30% in the early 1980s to 70% or more in the late 1990s. All the

figures show an increasing heterogeneity of the immigrant population in the Netherlands.

What have been the fastest growing immigrant groups in the Netherlands over the past decade? Table 2.3 shows the pattern in the number of immigrants from selected countries from 1995 to 2002. Here immigrants are defined as foreign-born if they were born outside the Netherlands, regardless of their nationality. The countries of origin are again divided into Western and non-Western countries.

Table 2.3: Immigration to the Netherlands by Country of Origin (1995-2003)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total	**74,703**	**86,183**	**87,145**	**96,423**	**94,177**	**109,033**	**110,254**	**99,808**	**84,684**
including									
Western countries	**36,517**	**38,042**	**37,467**	**40,311**	**42,609**	**49,478**	**48,340**	**43,434**	**38,954**
including									
EU countries	**18,261**	**21,476**	**22,600**	**23,660**	**23,642**	**25,087**	**24,844**	**23,354**	**21,757**
including									
Belgium	2,087	2,461	2,809	3,036	2,882	2,718	2,609	2,459	2,364
Germany	6,470	6,362	6,374	6,261	5,892	5,939	5,826	5,625	5,487
United Kingdom	3,629	4,643	4,669	4,791	5,276	6,226	6,226	5,357	4,539
Eastern Europe	**11,531**	**8379**	**6595**	**7440**	**9581**	**14,531**	**13,571**	**10,572**	**8777**
including									
Yugoslavia (former)	7,352	3,387	1,591	1,463	3910	4629	3082	1713	1240
Soviet Union (former)	2098	2297	2061	2539	2906	5923	5965	4553	3387
Poland	1158	1410	1430	1562	1090	1762	2067	2155	2022
other Western countries	**6725**	**8187**	**8272**	**9211**	**9386**	**9860**	**9925**	**9508**	**8420**
including									
United States	2781	3571	3558	3920	3991	4051	3777	3811	3267
Canada	489	679	649	681	731	770	862	702	629
Australia	495	605	591	766	849	911	1048	1003	829
Indonesia	757	941	949	1477	1313	1533	1674	1641	1467
Japan	1212	1275	1221	1129	1209	1211	1240	1208	1194
Non-Western countries	**38,160**	**48,048**	**49,671**	**56,112**	**51,568**	**59,555**	**61,914**	**56,374**	**45,730**
including									
Turkey	4803	6274	6488	5765	4917	5363	5904	6103	6579
Angola	673	493	281	269	609	1161	1819	3428	1085
Guinea	57	67	88	186	252	517	889	1021	342
Morocco	3017	4219	4510	5079	4398	4170	4927	4849	4561
Sierra Leone	95	185	174	214	410	768	1518	1863	578
Sudan	211	287	571	928	785	1469	1337	783	393
Somalia	2691	3105	1397	1087	1360	1820	1397	742	307
South Africa	561	881	1047	1687	1307	1256	1334	1030	830
Suriname	2419	3338	3229	4231	2777	3113	3134	3098	3163
Argentina	98	108	109	126	102	147	231	283	212
Brazil	515	688	734	766	687	745	765	819	847
Afghanistan	1367	2637	3279	3449	4913	4244	4061	2410	1406
China	1340	1324	1668	1900	1845	2636	3643	3901	3998
Iraq	2412	4135	5544	6742	2925	4024	2807	1273	1051
Iran	2526	2713	1581	1051	1072	1596	2068	1344	876
India	540	607	730	874	742	666	693	607	599
Thailand	404	549	523	660	636	862	1045	1069	1004
Vietnam	187	214	244	290	285	388	563	706	533

Source: Statistics Netherlands

A comparison of data from 2003 and 1995 shows that the total number of foreign-born immigrants entering the Netherlands increased by some 10,000 from around 75,000 in 1995 to almost 85,000 in 2003, an increase of 13%. The total number of immigrants was much higher in 2000-2001. In the same period, the number of immigrants from other EU countries and other Western countries increased more than the overall average by respectively 20 and 25%. A striking feature is the declining immigration from Eastern Europe to the Netherlands. This is contrary to the expectation of growing Eastern European immigration due to the changed political situation in Europe in the 1990s. However, this declining Eastern European immigration can be explained by the sharp fall in immigration from the former Yugoslavia. In 1995, at the height of the war there, the number of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia (mainly refugees) reached its peak. The number of immigrants from former Yugoslavia fell, but the number of immigrants from the other Eastern European countries increased rapidly after 1995. The number of immigrants from non-Western countries increased in the same period by 7,500, an increase of 20% compared to 1995.

Table 2.4: Countries with the Fastest Growing Numbers of Immigrants (1995-2003)

	Increase since 1995 (1995=100)	Number of immigrants in 2003	% of immigrants in 2003
China	298	3,998	4.7
Spain	184	1,737	2.1
Poland	175	2,022	2.4
Soviet Union (former)	161	3,387	4.0
Morocco	151	4,561	5.4
France	140	2,056	2.4
Turkey	137	6,579	7.8
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	134	4,811	5.7
Suriname	131	3,163	3.7
United Kingdom	125	4,539	5.4
United States	117	3,267	3.9
Belgium	113	2,364	2.8

Source: Statistics Netherlands (processed by RISBO)

Table 2.4 summarizes Table 2.3 and shows the countries whose emigrants at least doubled since 1995 and that contribute a significant percentage of the foreign-born immigrants coming to the Netherlands (at least 2% of the total immigrant population). Twelve countries meet both criteria. China generates by far the fastest growing number of immigrants to the Netherlands. This is striking since China has neither historical colonial ties nor important contemporary economic relations with the Netherlands. The number of Chinese immigrants nonetheless almost tripled in the past decade and Chinese immigrants now account

for almost 5% of the l immigrants entering the Netherlands in 2003. Other countries with large and growing numbers of emigrants to the Netherlands are the former Soviet Union, Morocco, Turkey, Netherlands Antilles and the United Kingdom.

Table 2.3 also makes it possible to examine more carefully the declining number of immigrants since 2001. From 2003 to 2001 the total number of immigrants entering the Netherlands fell by almost 26,000. This drop in the total number of immigrants can be largely explained by the declining number of immigrants from what are considered typical refugee countries, i.e. Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Iran, Angola, former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union. In 2003, the total number of immigrants from these ten countries was 13,500 less than in 2001. This explains more than half (53%) of the total decline in immigration from 2001 to 2003. This leads to the assumption that the drop in immigration in the past two years is largely due to the declining number of refugees and asylum-seekers coming to the Netherlands, which in turn can be explained by the stricter asylum policies of recent years.

2.2.1 Migration motives

Another important aspect of immigration statistics pertains to why immigrants come to the Netherlands. When immigrants enter the country they are asked why they want to live in the Netherlands. This information is registered at the Central Register of Aliens of the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service. Statistics Netherlands publishes these data every year. Figure 2.4 gives an initial overview of the immigration motives of Non-Dutch immigrants since the mid 1990s.

Figure 2.4: Migration Motives of Foreign Nationals, 1995-2003



Source: Statistics Netherlands

Our assumption that the declining number of immigrants since 2001 can be largely explained by the decreasing number of asylum-seekers is confirmed by Figure 2.4. In 2000 and 2001 around 25,000 immigrants said they had come to the Netherlands to receive asylum, but in 2003 the number of asylum-seekers dropped to only about 9000. Chapter 5 of this report examines developments in the field of asylum migration in greater detail. It is also evident that the number of immigrants coming to the Netherlands to find employment is declining again. In the second half of the 1990s, when the Netherlands was experiencing a period of economic growth and increasing shortages on the labour market, the number of immigrants coming to the Netherlands to find jobs increased from 10,000 in 1995 to almost 20,000 in 2001. In 2003, however, the number of immigrants coming to the Netherlands to find jobs fell again to almost 17,000**.** Chapter 4 of this report examines labour migration to the Netherlands in greater detail. By far the most immigrants come to the Netherlands for family reasons such as marriage or family reunification. The number of immigrants coming to the Netherlands for family reasons steadily rose from 29,000 in 1995 to 34,000 in 2003. Almost half (47%) the immigrants in 2003 came to the Netherlands for family reasons.

Table 2.5: Immigration of Foreign Nationals for Family Reasons by Country of Birth, 2003

	Family reunification	Family members	Marital migration	Total	Percentage male	Percentage female
Total	**11,372**	**2325**	**20,654**	**34,351**	**36.9**	**63.1**
including						
Western countries	**4,925**	**1,758**	**5,506**	**12,189**	**31.6**	**68.4**
including						
EU countries	**3,135**	**1,010**	**687**	**4,832**	**40.8**	**59.2**
including						
The Netherlands	638	259	39	936	52.2	47.8
Germany	643	157	260	1060	37.5	62.5
United Kingdom	647	219	86	952	35.3	64.7
Belgium	273	61	65	399	40.1	59.9
France	211	84	61	356	37.1	62.9
Portugal	207	60	16	283	45.2	54.8
Eastern Europe (1)	**1,094**	**161**	**2,908**	**4,163**	**22.6**	**77.4**
including						
Soviet Union (former)	511	44	972	1,527	21.0	79.0
Poland	260	64	662	986	21.3	78.7
Yugoslavia (former)	171	21	500	692	33.8	66.2
Romania	65	10	328	403	21.1	78.9
Bulgaria	45	6	190	241	20.3	79.7
other Western countries	**696**	**587**	**1,911**	**3,194**	**29.3**	**70.7**
including						
United States	285	277	657	1,219	35.2	64.8
Japan	85	178	325	588	21.4	78.6
Indonesia	112	16	563	691	17.7	82.3
Australia	56	43	125	224	39.3	60.7
Non-Western countries	**6443**	**566**	**15,151**	**22,160**	**39.8**	**60.2**
including						
Turkey	1,120	56	3,881	5,057	51.5	48.5
Morocco	1,196	20	2,929	4,145	44.4	55.6
Ghana	69	,	282	351	42.7	57.3
South Africa	58	36	157	251	37.5	62.5
Suriname	724	12	1,373	2,109	41.4	58.6
Brazil	162	29	419	610	22.6	77.4
Colombia	142	6	197	345	28.4	71.6
Afghanistan	584	3	322	909	36.3	63.7
Thailand	207	11	640	858	15.0	85.0
China	187	11	493	691	31.3	68.7
Iraq	249	3	178	430	27.9	72.1
Philippines	90	6	270	366	19.7	80.3
Iran	116	16	195	327	25.7	74.3
India	43	23	210	276	28.6	71.4
Vietnam	49	2	172	223	17.9	82.1

Source: Statistics Netherlands
1) Albania, not included (missing data)

Table 2.5 distinguishes various family-related migration motives. Marital or family formation migration means an immigrant comes to the Netherlands to marry or live with someone already living in the Netherlands. Family reunification means a family already existed before the migration and one or more family members (spouse, children) are joining the immigrant who came to the Netherlands earlier. In 2002 more than 34,000 migrants came to the Netherlands for family reasons. The majority of this group (20,000 or 60% of the family-related immigration) can be categorized as marital migrants, in other words unwed individuals who came to the Netherlands to form a family or a couple with someone already residing in the country. Among immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe and non-Western

countries, the percentage of marital migrants is even larger, almost 70% of the family-related migration.

Unfortunately, the table gives no information about the partners of marital migrants who already live in the Netherlands. This means we do not know whether they are native Dutch with a foreign bride or groom coming to the Netherlands or first or second generation immigrants themselves. However, we do know from other research that marital migrants from the largest immigrant groups (Turks, Moroccan, and Surinamese) almost exclusively come to the Netherlands to form a family with earlier immigrants from these countries. The marital immigrants from the three countries jointly account for 40% of the marital immigrants of 2003 (more than 8000). Lastly, Table 2.5 shows the percentages of men and women among the migrants for family reasons. In general, family-related migration is a more female than male phenomenon. Almost two thirds of the immigrants for family reasons in 2003 were women. However, the two largest family-related immigrant groups (Turks and Moroccans) exhibit a difference. In the two groups, the percentage of male migrants to the Netherlands for family reasons is larger. In the Turkish group, men even constitute a small minority among the migrants to the Netherlands for family reasons.

We conclude this section with a breakdown of the data on immigration motives by country of birth (Table 2.6). Obviously, there are significant differences in the migration motives of different categories of the immigrant population. For immigrants from other EU countries, jobs are clearly the dominant reason for coming to the Netherlands. Family reasons are somewhat surprisingly the dominant immigration motive for immigrants from other Western countries, especially from the US (half the US immigrants to the Netherlands come here for family reasons). Family reasons are also the dominant migration motive for immigrants from Eastern Europe, although other reasons are also important for them. Almost half the immigrants from former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union (as is noted above, the most important upcoming country of immigration) come here to seek asylum. A considerable number of immigrants from Poland come for employment reasons.

For immigrants from non-Western countries, family reasons are clearly the main migration motive. Of the non-Western immigrants to the Netherlands in 2003, 55% came for family reasons. Of the non-

Western immigrants, 19% came to seek asylum, 12% to study and 8% to find jobs. In some immigrant groups, the percentage of immigrants to the Netherlands for family reasons is significantly higher: around 90% of the immigrants from Morocco, Thailand and Suriname, 80% of the immigrants from Turkey and 77% of the Brazilian immigrants. Lastly we see that slightly more than half the Argentinean immigrants came to the Netherlands for family reasons, the most famous one being Princess Maxima, since 2003 the wife of the Dutch crown prince Willem-Alexander.

Table 2.6: Immigration by Country of Birth and Motive, 2003

	Employment	Asylum	Family	Study	other
Absolute numbers	**16,621**	**9,272**	**34,351**	**8,773**	**4,549**
in %	22.6	12.6	46.7	11.9	6.2
including					
Western countries	**39.5**	**5.0**	**36.3**	**11.5**	**7.7**
including					
EU countries	**56.3**	**0.0**	**27.7**	**9.2**	**6.8**
including					
Belgium	50.1	0.0	26.4	6.5	17.1
Germany	46.8	0.0	25.5	13.9	13.9
United Kingdom	69.0	0.0	27.3	1.8	1.9
Eastern Europe (1)	**17.5**	**18.2**	**46.0**	**12.2**	**6.2**
including					
Yugoslavia (former)	5.5	28.9	54.9	5.9	4.8
Soviet Union (former)	8.9	33.5	42.3	9.8	5.4
Poland	35.9	0.2	45.6	10.8	7.5
other Western countries	**26.1**	**0.4**	**45.0**	**16.5**	**11.9**
including					
United States	32.1	0.0	50.2	12.1	5.8
Canada	29.1	0.0	39.9	11.3	19.0
Australia	24.3	0.0	32.7	4.4	38.0
Indonesia	3.8	0.9	49.1	31.9	14.2
Japan	38.2	0.0	47.6	11.2	2.9
Non-Western countries	**8.4**	**19.0**	**55.4**	**12.2**	**4.9**
including					
Turkey	13.3	3.6	79.4	2.3	1.4
Angola	5.8	87.0	5.2	0.3	1.4
Guinea	6.6	80.0	13.1	0.0	1.0
Morocco	3.2	1.2	90.8	3.2	1.5
Sierra Leone	1.4	90.7	6.5	0.5	0.9
Sudan	1.0	70.4	27.5	1.0	0.5
Somalia	1.5	62.5	36.0	0.3	0.3
South Africa	25.7	0.1	34.3	7.7	32.0
Suriname	0.9	1.2	86.9	9.0	2.0
Argentina	31.9	0.4	52.2	7.8	8.2
Brazil	10.3	0.1	76.9	6.2	6.1
Afghanistan	0.1	49.2	50.2	0.2	0.3
China	5.6	5.0	17.6	56.7	15.0
Iraq	0.4	63.9	34.5	0.1	1.3
Iran	6.3	44.4	38.0	8.5	2.7
India	35.5	0.7	40.3	16.5	6.9
Thailand	2.0	0.0	89.8	1.8	6.2
Vietnam	2.7	7.1	39.8	49.0	0.9

Source: Statistics Netherlands
1) Albania, not included (missing data)

2.3 Emigration from the Netherlands

The counterpart of immigration is emigration. Earlier in this chapter, Table 2.1 gives an overview of the emigration of Dutch nationals and foreign nationals since 1980. The total emigration from the Netherlands remained quite stable from the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s and fluctuated between 55,000 in 1985 and 61,000 in 2000. But as we noted in the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI report, the number of emigrants has

been growing in recent years. In 2002, almost 67,000 emigrants left the country and in 2003 the total number rose to almost 69,000. The latter figure is the largest number of emigrants in one year since 1980. Rising numbers of emigrants are visible among Dutch as well as foreign nationals, but more marked among Dutch nationals.

Table 2.7: Emigration of Dutch and Non-Dutch Nationals by Country of Destination and Gender, 2003

	Dutch			non-Dutch			total		
	male	female	total	male	female	total	male	female	Total
2003	**25,321**	**21,694**	**47,015**	**11,091**	**10,779**	**21,870**	**36,412**	**32,473**	**68,885**
in %	36.8	31.5	68.3	16.1	15.6	31.7	52.9	47.1	100.0
Including									
Western countries	**18,513**	**15,451**	**33,964**	**8,574**	**8,564**	**17,138**	**27,087**	**24,015**	**51,102**
Including									
14 EU countries	**14,709**	**12,243**	**26,952**	**5,408**	**5,355**	**10,763**	**20,117**	**17,598**	**37,715**
including									
Germany	4,017	2,964	6,981	1,362	1,479	2,841	5,379	4,443	9,822
Belgium	4,231	3,671	7,902	660	722	1,382	4,891	4,393	9,284
United Kingdom	2,535	2,361	4,896	1,110	1,014	2,124	3,645	3,375	7,020
France	1,195	1,072	2,267	566	540	1,106	1,761	1,612	3,373
Spain	1,326	1,015	2,341	527	479	1,006	1,853	1,494	3,347
Italy	285	303	588	370	316	686	655	619	1,274
Portugal	189	161	350	171	143	314	360	304	664
Sweden	225	146	371	129	148	277	354	294	648
Greece	99	125	224	175	83	258	274	208	482
Eastern Europe	**525**	**360**	**885**	**865**	**900**	**1,765**	**1,390**	**1,260**	**2,650**
including									
Yugoslavia (former)	134	131	265	260	223	483	394	354	748
Poland	101	57	158	211	253	464	312	310	622
Soviet Union (former)	118	67	185	154	182	336	272	249	521
other Western	**3,279**	**2,848**	**6,127**	**2,301**	**2,309**	**4,610**	**5,580**	**5,157**	**10,737**
Switzerland	384	357	741	127	119	246	511	476	987
Norway	180	135	315	63	114	177	243	249	492
United States	1,209	987	2,196	940	935	1,875	2,149	1,922	4,071
Canada	457	391	848	146	187	333	603	578	1,181
Japan	57	39	96	527	440	967	584	479	1,063
Australia	515	551	1,066	212	247	459	727	798	1,525
Indonesia	146	95	241	188	193	381	334	288	622
New Zealand	259	244	503	65	47	112	324	291	615
non-Western	**6,808**	**6,243**	**13,051**	**2,517**	**2,215**	**4,732**	**9,325**	**8,458**	**17,783**
including									
Turkey	228	253	481	407	237	644	635	490	1,125
South Africa	251	229	480	96	204	300	347	433	780
Morocco	199	147	346	180	127	307	379	274	653
Egypt	102	120	222	27	22	49	129	142	271
Neth. Antilles and Aruba	2,991	3,170	6,161	18	33	51	3,009	3,203	6,212
Suriname	453	351	804	71	81	152	524	432	956
Brazil	154	116	270	59	98	157	213	214	427
China	212	138	350	251	210	461	463	348	811
Thailand	176	69	245	34	93	127	210	162	372
Singapore	98	76	174	53	46	99	151	122	273
Israel	88	80	168	57	44	101	145	124	269
India	64	34	98	109	42	151	173	76	249

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table 2.7 shows the countries of destination for Dutch and foreign nationals leaving the Netherlands in 2003. Dutch nationals constitute a little more than two thirds of the emigrants in 2003 and foreign

nationals one third. For Dutch nationals, the percentage of male emigrants is slightly higher than of female emigrants. For foreign nationals, the percentage of male emigrants more or less equals the percentage of female emigrants. Dutch as well as foreign nationals predominantly emigrate to other Western countries. More than half (57%) the Dutch nationals went to other EU countries, another 15% went to other Western countries including Central and Eastern Europe. Only 28% of the emigrating Dutch nationals went to non-Western countries, almost half of them to the Netherlands Antilles (presumably native Antilleans themselves). For emigrating foreign nationals, the figures are not very different. Almost half (49%) the emigrating foreign nationals went to other EU countries, and another 30% went to other Western countries. Only 22% of them went to non-Western countries, even less than among Dutch nationals. This leads to the conclusion that although immigrants from non-Western countries form a considerable percentage of the immigrants to the Netherlands, only relatively few people leave for these countries.

Lastly, combining the Dutch and foreign nationals leaving the Netherlands in 2003 makes it clear that just nine countries attracted almost 60% of the emigrants in 2003. With the exception of the Netherlands Antilles, they are all Western countries: Germany, Belgium, the United States, France, Spain, Australia, Italy and Canada. Germany and Belgium are by far the most important destination for emigrants from the Netherlands: 28% of the Dutch and non-Dutch emigrants went tothese two countries. Almost 75% of the Dutch and non-Dutch emigrants went to other Western countries including Centeal and Eastern Europe, and only 26% of the emigrants leaving the Netherlands in 2003 went to a non-Western country.

The findings thus far raise a question about the significance of return migration. To what extent do immigrants to the Netherlands eventually return to their country of origin, and to what extent do they stay in the Netherlands? This has been examined by Statistics Netherlands in a cohort analysis (Alders and Nicolaas 2003).[16] The study, the results of which are presented here in an abbreviated form, covers the period from 1995 to 2001. The data are taken from the municipal population registers [Gemeentelijk Basisadministratie (GBA)]

[16] The following is completely based on: M. Alders & H. Nicolaas, (2003) a third of the immigrants left within six years. In: CBS, *Bevolkingstrends*, first three months (www.cbs.nl).

where all the legal residents of the Netherlands are registered. In addition to characteristics such as age, sex and so forth, the length of stay is also recorded (the period they have spent in the Netherlands since their last arrival) is also recorded for everyone who is of foreign descent. This information makes it possible to distinguish between migrants who are here temporarily and those who are residents of the Netherlands on a more or less permanent basis. The most important result of the analysis is that most of the immigrants remain in the Netherlands but a significant percentage also depart again within a fairly short period of time.

Table 2.8 shows the percentage of immigrants to the Netherlands in a certain year (a cohort) who depart again in subsequent years. The main conclusion of the analysis is that a little more than third of the immgrants who came to the Netherlands from 1995 to 1997 left again in the subsequent four to six years. In the following years, the return migration figures gradually fell. This does not mean immigrants who came to the Netherlands later have less of a tendency to depart again, it just meants they were less apt to leave in the period examined. It can be assumed that some of these immigrants will leave the Netherlands as well in the future. In the whole period from 1995 to 2001, a total of more than 650,000 migrants came to the Netherlands. Of this group almost 22% had departed again by 2001.

Table 2.8: Emigration of Foreign-born Immigrants by Years of Residence in the Netherlands

Settled down:	Total							Of which % left in :		Total
		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	
	x 1000	%								
1995	74.8	3.1	9.5	7.4	5.4	3.5	2.8	2.4	2.6	36.8
1996	86.2		3.6	10.2	7.9	4.7	3.5	2.9	2.8	35.6
1997	87.0			4.0	10.5	7.5	5.0	3.5	3.5	34.0
1998	96.5				3.8	10.1	7.1	5.0	5.0	30.9
1999	94.3					3.7	8.5	7.1	6.2	26.4
2000	109.1						3.4	8.5	8.2	20.0
2001	110.3							3.4	10.3	13.7
2002	99.9								3.8	3.8

Source: Nicolaas et al., bevolkingstrends 2004 (2)

Although the pattern for Western and non-Western migrants is similar, there are considerable differences in the departure percentages. For example, almost half the 35,000 Western immigrants who came to the Netherlands in 1995 left again within six years. Of the 40,000 non-Western immigrants who came in that year, a quarter left the Netherlands within six years. Of the 1997 immigration cohort, almost half the Western immigrants left within ony four years. This means

Western immigrants to the Netherlands in 1997 left even more quickly than their predecessors. For the non-Western immigrants this percentage is 20%, which is comparable to the immigration cohort of 1995.

Figure 2.5 shows the differences in return migration between immigrants from Western and non-Western countries. The figure shows that return migration is more common among Western than non-Western immigrants: whereas about 45% of the Western immigrants left the Netherlands in the years examined, this is only true of slightly more than 25% of the non-Western immigrants. However, there are significant differences between the two categories. The percentage of return migrants from Western countries is considerably lower than the overall average for immigrants from former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. However, the percentage of return migrants is significant higher than the overall average for immigrants from the United Kingdom, the United States and expecially Japan. There are similar differences in the category of non-Western immigrants. Immigrants from Afghanistan, Morocco, Iraq, Iran and Turkey tend are less apt to leave the Netherlands than other non-Western immigrants. Immigrants from India, South Africa and the Netherlands Antilles are more apt to leave the Netherlands than the average non-Western immigrants.

Figure 2.5: Percentage of Immigrants who Arrived in 1995 and Emigrated within 6 Years



Source: Alders and Nicolaas, Statistics Netherlands, 2003

The percentage of return migrants in each immigrant group seems to be related to the dominant group immigration motives (*cf*. Table 2.5). Immigrants who primarily come to the Netherlands for employment reasons tend to are be much more apt to return home than immigrants who predominantly come to the Netherlands to seek asylum of for family reasons. This distinction can be observed among Western as well as non-Western immigrants. Of the immigrants from Western countries, immigrants from former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union predominantly came to the Netherlands to seek asylum or in recent years for family reasons. They have the lowest percentage of return migration of all the Western immigrants. Immigrants from countries like the United Kingdom and Japan who mainly come to the Netherlands for employment reasons exhibit the highest percentages of return migration. (US immigrants seem to be an exception. Although half the US immigrants came to the Netherlands for family reasons, more than 70% of them leave in the next few years). There are similar differences among non-Western immigrants. Immigrants who mainly come to the Netherlands to seek asylum or for family reasons such as Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians, Turks and Moroccans exhibit the smallest

percentages of return migration. Typical non-Western labour immigrants such as Indians and South Africans tend to be relatively quick to leave again.

Appendices for Chapter 2

Net administrative corrections

Migration figures in the Netherlands need to be corrected by the number of net administrative corrections, a figure that is largely influenced by the unreported emigration of foreigners. If the net administrative corrections are deducted from the registered migration surplus, the result is a lower corrected migration surplus. Statistics Netherlands [Dutch acronym: CBS] presents the registered migration statistics as well as the net administrative corrections. The corrected migration surplus (1980-2003) as stated in this appendix should be regarded as an unofficial figure.

Table A2.1: Development of External Migration of Dutch Nationals and Foreigners, 1980-2003

Year	Dutch nationals			Foreigners			Total				
	Immi-gration	Emi-gration	Surplus	Immi-gration	Emi-gration	Surplus	Immi-gration	Emi-gration	Surplus	Net. Admin. Correct.	Corrected Surplus
1980	32,684	35,837	-3,153	79,820	23,633	56,187	112,504	59,470	53,034	-	53,034
1981	29,767	38,216	-8,449	50,416	24,979	25,437	80,183	63,195	16,988	-	16,988
1982	29,810	39,413	-9,603	40,930	28,094	12,836	70,740	67,507	3,233	-	3,233
1983	30,321	32,810	-2,489	36,441	27,974	8,467	66,762	60,784	5,978	-3,647	2,331
1984	29,616	31,824	-2,208	37,291	27,030	10,261	66,907	58,854	8,053	-2,920	5,133
1985	33,196	31,009	2,187	46,166	24,206	21,960	79,362	55,215	24,147	-4,260	19,887
1986	34,585	31,155	3,430	52,802	23,563	29,239	87,387	54,718	32,669	-5,889	26,780
1987	35,080	31,139	3,941	60,855	20,872	39,983	95,935	52,011	43,924	-8,833	35,091
1988	32,976	34,403	-1,427	58,262	21,388	36,874	91,238	55,791	35,447	-8,205	27,242
1989	33,529	38,218	-4,689	65,385	21,489	43,896	98,914	59,707	39,207	-12,356	26,851
1990	36,086	36,749	-663	81,264	20,595	60,669	117,350	57,344	60,006	-11,595	48,411
1991	35,912	35,998	-86	84,337	21,330	63,007	120,249	57,328	62,921	-13,311	49,610
1992	33,904	36,101	-2,197	83,022	22,733	60,289	116,926	58,834	58,092	-14,974	43,118
1993	31,581	37,019	-5,438	87,573	22,203	65,370	119,154	59,222	59,932	-15,566	44,366
1994	30,887	39,409	-8,522	68,424	22,746	45,678	99,311	62,155	37,156	-17,073	20,083
1995	29,127	41,648	-12,521	66,972	21,673	45,299	96,099	63,321	32,778	-18,874	13,904
1996	31,572	42,921	-11,349	77,177	22,404	54,773	108,749	65,325	43,424	-26,620	16,804
1997	33,124	40,278	-7,154	76,736	21,940	54,796	109,860	62,218	47,642	-19,755	27,887
1998	40,706	39,175	1,531	81,701	21,266	60,435	122,407	60,441	61,966	-18,848	43,118
1999	40,786	38,358	2,428	78,365	20,665	57,700	119,151	59,023	60,128	-19,756	40,372
2000	41,467	40,474	993	91,383	20,727	70,656	132,850	61,201	71,649	-17,776	53,873
2001	38,897	42,921	-4,024	94,507	20,397	74,110	133,404	63,318	70,086	-19,248	50,838
2002	34,631	45,571	-10,940	86,619	21,157	65,462	121,250	66,728	54,522	-30,190	24,332
2003	30,948	47,015	-16,067	73,566	21,870	51,696	104,514	68,885	35,629	-35,946	-317

Source: Statistics Netherlands, statline

Administrative corrections: Administrative corrections consist of inclusions in and withdrawals from the municipal population registers for other reasons than birth, death, migration or redefinition of municipal borders. Most of these administrative corrections pertain to people who have left the municipality, often to live abroad. Entries often pertain to people who reappear in the same or in a different municipality and are then included in the population register.

Chapter 3 Labour migration

3.1 Introduction

The desirability of labour migration is a much-discussed topic within Europe. Recently both the European Commission and some European governments have argued that labour migration in EU countries is an indispensable solution for existing and future tensions on the European labour markets. Proponents of further labour migration argue that the influx of labour migrants is necessary to compensate for the decreasing birth rates in most European countries and to restore the balance between the number of economically active and inactive citizens in the ageing European populations.

In response to these discussions the Dutch government has stated in the preceding years that labour migration is not opportune in the Netherlands. Despite the profitable economic development and job growth in the Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s there is still an unacceptably large number of job seekers and labour market drop-outs (especially people in disability schemes). According to the Dutch government, large-scale labour migration in the Netherlands will only become an option once Dutch job seekers have been reintegrated in the labour market. This standpoint that has been confirmed by the Dutch labour unions is even more relevant now that the economic situation in the Netherlands has worsened and the unemployment figures are rising. Yet this line of reasoning has ignored the specific need for certain workers on the Dutch labour market. On the one hand there is a need for qualified and well-educated workers (nurses, doctors, teachers, ICT specialists, etcetera) in specific economic sectors (health, education, personal and commercial services, ICT). Dutch job seekers are often not qualified for these jobs. On the other hand there is also a need for low-qualified workers in specific economic sectors in which Dutch job seekers are often not willing to work (especially in horticulture and to a lesser extent in the hotel and catering industry). Illegal foreign immigrants often find employment in these sectors.

Despite the official Dutch denial of the need for labour migration, Dutch employers are increasingly looking for qualified employees abroad. A well-known example of this was the arrival of nurses from the Philippines and South Africa. At present Dutch hospitals are trying to contract South African doctors on quite a large-scale. This paradox on the Dutch labour market (persistent economic inactivity on the one hand and labour shortages on the other) has also become apparent with the continual growth in the number of temporary work permits issued during the second half of the 1990s. Since 1 September 1995 the employment of non-EU foreigners has been regulated under the Foreign Employment Act (Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen or WAV). This system was generally seen to be satisfactory.

In reaction to national and international trends and practises in labour migration, the Dutch Cabinet has recently developed a programme to stimulate highly qualified labour migration to the Netherlands. Labour migrants who are able to earn more than 45.000 euro for wage labour on the Dutch labour market are eligible for a residence permit for a maximum of 5 years. For labour migrants who are less than 30 years of age the income criterion is 32.600 euro. After, five years these labour migrants are authorized to receive a permanent residence permit. Surprisingly, no educational criterion is used, only a simple income criterion in order to select and attract highly qualified migrants. These new proposals show that different categories of labour migrants will be treated in different ways. The Netherlands is developing a selective labour migration system in which a more liberal entry policy is pursued for certain (highly qualified) labour groups who will get straightforward access to permanent residence, while at the same time the job and residence opportunities for low or medium skilled labour migrants are considered on a strictly temporal basis (Engbersen 2003). The raison d'être behind this differential policy is to safeguard the Dutch welfare state and to prevent that groups of labour migrants gain easy access to public provisions.

3.2 Increase in temporary work permits

The WAV was described in detail in the SOPEMI-Netherlands report of 1995. A temporary work permit on the grounds of the WAV can be seen as an incidental solution for mismatches on the labour market. A Dutch employer who is unable to find an employee in the category priority workforce can

apply for a special work permit (TWV) for a foreign employee. The priority workforce consists of employees in the European Economic Area. These employees are not obliged to obtain a special work permit to carry out work. The TWV applications are assessed by the Central Organisation for Work and Income (CWI), which, among other things conducts a labour market check to assess whether the employer concerned has made sufficient efforts to hire an employee from the priority workforce. Employees who have been granted a work permit must apply for a residence permit for the Netherlands. In order to enter the Netherlands, they first require a temporary residence permit. This permit is granted for a maximum of three years.

Figure 3.1 shows that the number of temporary work permits has increased significantly in recent years.

Figure 3.1: The number of temporary work permits and 'declarations' issued on the ground of the Dutch Foreign Nationals Labour Act (WAV) in the period 1990-2003



Source: WRR 2001, unpublished data by CWI

This chapter gives a more factual picture of the number of foreign temporary workers coming to the Netherlands. It is important to note that these figures only provide insight into the labour migration of employees from outside the European Economic Arena. According to figures of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in 2003 16.621 labour migrants came to the Netherlands. A sharp decline compared to the period 2000-2002 when approximately 19.000

labour migrants came to the Netherlands (see also figure 2.4, chapter 2). Approximately 60% of labour migrants were from Europe, most of whom were from other member states of the European Union. See table A3.1.

From 1990 to 1997 the number of temporary work permits was fairly stable. In 1997 the number of temporary work permits exceeded 10,000 per year for the first time. In the following four years the number of temporary work permits tripled to reach 30,000 in 2001. In 2003 this increase in the number of temporary work permits continued, despite of the current economic recession. In 2003, a total of 38,000 temporary work permits were issued. Table 3.1 shows the countries of origin for labour migrants who came to the Netherlands with a temporary work permit. More than two-thirds of the temporary labour migrants came from Western countries (including Eastern European countries) and one-third came from non-Western countries. In particular, the number of temporary labour migrants from Eastern European countries has increased sharply over the last few years. In 1999 about 6400 temporary workers from several Eastern European countries came to the Netherlands. Four years later, in 2003, their number had nearly tripled to more than 17.000. This means that 45 percent of all temporary labour migrants who came to the Netherlands in 2003, came from Eastern European countries, whereas in 1999 this was only 31 percent. Moreover, the number of temporary workers from Poland has increased sharply due to the covenant the Dutch government concluded with agricultural and horticultural organisations that made formal recruitment of Polish seasonal workers possible. In 2001, the highest number most labour of labour migrants still came from the United States. In 2003 the five countries with the highest number of temporary labour migrants in the Netherlands were: Poland, the former Soviet Union, the United States, the former Czechoslovakian Republic and the People’s Republic of China. Remarkable is the severe increase in labour migrants from Sierra Leone.

Table 3.1: Number of temporary work permits (WAV) by nationality (1996-2003)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total	**9173**	**11,062**	**15,181**	**20,816**	**27,678**	**30,153**	**34,558**	**38,036**
Western countries	**-**	**-**	**-**	**11,994**	**16,234**	**17,633**	**20,184**	**22,658**
of whom from								
Eastern Europe	**-**	**-**	**-**	**6437**	**10,047**	**11,653**	**14,867**	**17,203**
of whom from								
Poland	735	928	1184	1501	2497	2831	6575	9510
Soviet Union (former)	-	-	-	2121	3572	3784	3562	2850
Czechoslovakia (former)	174	256	282	606	1058	1673	1487	1648
Yugoslavia (former)	-	-	-	746	1146	1098	1016	734
Hungary	275	349	502	662	718	1063	999	953
Romenia	287	193	299	458	643	741	858	1097
Bulgaria				317	387	427	326	381
Other Western countries	**-**	**-**	**-**	**5556**	**6186**	**5980**	**5316**	**5455**
of whom from								
United States	1945	2275	2603	2822	3133	2918	2594	2564
Canada	286	412	439	604	628	504	407	405
Japan	949	893	871	890	945	909	1008	1204
Indonesia	146	148	211	482	547	799	795	872
Australia	240	263	312	444	505	515	376	324
Non-Western countries	**-**	**-**	**-**	**8695**	**11,229**	**12,245**	**14,044**	**15,378**
of whom from								
Turkey	467	442	661	710	1007	931	1109	1276
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	31	81	222	1047	1252
Angola	-	-	-	31	110	268	589	757
Sudan	7	6	70	322	488	524	569	463
South Africa	197	223	588	479	566	646	376	402
Guinea	-	-	-	11	60	110	324	371
Somalia	-	-	-	158	273	321	241	142
Cameroon	-	-	-	45	92	144	222	322
Morocco	-	-	-	198	230	198	211	195
Suriname				261	364	445	387	25
China	578	489	512	701	980	1161	1743	2263
Afghanistan	8	15	238	651	580	699	979	1016
Iraq	12	30	964	1520	1627	1176	793	789
India	390	519	830	901	1006	974	778	843
Iran	-	-	-	160	300	448	545	474
Syria	-	-	-	95	188	196	285	210

Source: CWI

Table 3.2 shows the types of jobs for which temporary work permits were issued. Contrary to the popular idea that temporary work permits are primarily issued for better-qualified professions, the data reveal that the highest number of work permits is issued for work in the agricultural and horticultural sectors. In 2001 more than one-quarter of all temporary work permits were issued for agricultural and horticultural work and in 2003 this was more than one-third. The increase in the number of Polish temporary labour migrants from the year 2002 seems to be related to the growing need for agricultural and horticultural workers in the Netherlands. The increasing number of foreign agricultural and horticultural workers is striking, since the idea that Dutch unemployed persons can be employed in this sector is frequently discussed. Other lower-qualified professions that attract a

relatively large number of labour migrants are various industrial production jobs, chauffeurs and personnel for the hotel and catering industry.

In addition to these lower-qualified professions, labour migrants are also attracted to certain more highly qualified jobs. A relatively large proportion of temporary work permits are issued for the artistic professions and scientists.

Table 3.2: Number of temporary work permits(WAV) by type of profession (1999-2003)

	Absolute					in percentages				
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
agriculture / horticulture	5.040	7.694	8.046	11.749	13.225	24,2	27,8	26,7	34,0	34,8
artistic professions	3.616	4.324	4.408	3.971	3.569	17,4	15,6	14,6	11,5	9,4
production work	1.132	1.996	2.828	4.127	5.316	5,4	7,2	9,4	11,9	14,0
Science	2.377	2.851	2.715	2.576	3.246	11,4	10,3	9,0	7,5	8,5
computer specialists	1.725	2.209	2.291	1.193	900	8,3	8,0	7,6	3,5	2,4
executive professions	1.525	1.889	1.972	1.712	1.677	7,3	6,8	6,5	5,0	4,4
Advisors	1.962	1.919	1.749	1.443	1.510	9,4	6,9	5,8	4,2	4,0
Drivers	898	1.088	1.358	1.396	1.285	4,3	3,9	4,5	4,0	3,4
hotel and catering industry	410	672	1.019	1.543	1.557	2,0	2,4	3,4	4,5	4,1
other services	1.311	2.032	2.192	3.240	3.485	6,3	7,3	7,3	9,4	9,2
Construction	139	278	615	294	810	0,7	1,0	2,0	0,9	2,1
health care	182	291	429	605	722	0,9	1,1	1,4	1,8	1,9
Sports	261	256	210	199	203	1,3	0,9	0,7	0,6	0,5
unskilled work	44	43	111	310	295	0,2	0,2	0,4	0,9	0,8
Mechanics	55	59	91	125	99	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,3
other professions	71	76	119	75	137	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,2	0,4
Unknown	68	1	0	0	0	0,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
All professions	20.816	27.678	30.153	34.558	38.036	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: CWI

Table 3.3: Temporary work permits(WAV) by type of profession and region 2003 (percentage)

		Western countries				**Non-western countries**			
	Total (N)	Eastern Europe	Northern-America	Japan and Indonesia	Oceania	Turkey	Africa	Other America	Other Asia
agriculture / horticulture	13,225	55.0	0.5	1.8	0.3	8.9	33.8	1.8	20.6
artistic professions	3569	10.2	34.0	4.6	15.3	4.8	4.2	19.5	2.3
production work	5316	9.3	9.9	3.0	3.8	29.5	26.8	7.6	18.2
Science	3246	5.9	8.9	12.7	11.8	6.3	5.4	23.3	14.4
computer specialists	900	1.0	4.6	1.6	9.3	1.8	0.8	2.7	6.1
executive professions	1677	0.7	17.1	18.4	20.9	8.0	1.1	4.6	5.3
Advisors	1510	1.2	12.3	18.2	23.6	3.5	1.5	5.5	4.0
Drivers	1285	6.5	0.0	-	0.3	10.6	0.5	0.1	0.1
hotel and catering industry	1557	2.0	0.3	20.0	1.3	2.4	1.6	3.7	8.7
other services	3485	2.8	6.3	8.8	7.5	10.0	18.3	25.3	16.1
Construction	810	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.6	0.3	0.0	0.3
health care	722	1.1	1.5	9.6	2.3	0.6	2.5	2.1	1.5
Sports	203	0.2	3.8	0.5	2.5	0.0	0.3	1.4	0.2
unskilled work	295	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.0	1.3	2.1	1.8	1.2
Mechanics	99	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.5
other professions	137	0.1	0.4	0.5	1.3	2.4	0.3	0.6	0.5
Total		100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
(n)	38,036	17,203	2969	2076	398	1276	5627	958	7147

Source: CWI

Table 3.3 shows the types of jobs in which temporary workers from different countries are employed. Hardly surprisingly, there are clear differences between temporary workers from the more developed Western countries on the one hand and temporary workers from Eastern Europe and developing countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia on the other. Temporary workers from the developed Western countries (USA, Canada, Japan, Oceania,

including Australia and New Sealant) predominantly work in high-skilled jobs such as executive professions and advisors. American temporary workers are also frequently employed in the artistic professions. Temporary workers from Eastern European countries, in particular Poland, and from African countries predominantly work in the agricultural and horticultural sectors. Eastern European and Latin American temporary workers also frequently work in the artistic professions. African and Asian temporary workers frequently work in production jobs. African, Latin American and Asian temporary workers are also frequently employed in the so-called 'other services' such as cleaning jobs.

3.3 Dual system of labour migration

The recent Dutch labour migration policy proposals make clear that, when it comes to highly skilled workers, the adage of temporariness is increasingly less adhered to. The reason for this is the increased competition between OECD countries in attracting the necessary human capital to be internationally competitive. The worldwide shortage in highly educated, technical and medical personnel stimulates migration to countries where the conditions for taking up residence and perspectives are the most favourable. An important condition is guaranteeing a quick route towards permanent residence (and consequently access to comprehensive social rights). Such a policy is, however, without risk for the welfare state because these immigrants perform better on European labour markets than average residents. An inflow of such immigrants would positively affect the public budget (Roodenburg et al., 2003). It is also acknowledged that highly educated employees are geographically very mobile. A recent Dutch study estimates that highly skilled immigrants from western countries and countries such as Japan and India will leave again within six years (Statistics Netherlands, 2003).

As far as immigrants with a low or intermediate level of education are concerned, temporariness remains the basic principle in the Netherlands. This principle should enable a flexible labour market policy and prevent that temporary immigrants gain access to public provisions. It also prevents extensive forms of chain migration to follow in the wake of initial migration. In most West European countries employers have to look at availability within their own labour supply, i.e. within the national borders or within the European Economic Area (EEA), before they may hire (temporary) labour

migrants. This labour market test is applied in a permissive way due to the fact that in countries with substantial numbers of inactive and unemployed people, shortages in specific sectors still persist. Examples are the vacancies in nursing and other forms of care (requiring an intermediate level of education) and those in domestic services and agriculture and horticulture (requiring low and unskilled workers). These sectors give already an indication of the diversity of temporary labour migration, ranging from short-term labour migration in the case of seasonal labour (for three months) to long-term labour migration in the health care sector (for more than two years).

Two relevant comments need to be made with respect to labour migration (cf. ACVZ 2004). The first involves the *problematic maintenance* of temporary labour migration. There are several systems for encouraging migrants to return to their country of origin, but none of these systems actually guarantees this return. In actual practice, labour migrants find ways to stay longer or even permanently. Thus, temporary work and residence may result in permanent residence. Labour migrants can also lengthen their stay through marriage or may choose to remain illegally in a country once their permit has expired. Another comment is that regulated temporary labour migration only partially limits *illegal employment* at the underside of the labour market. This applies particularly to advanced Scandinavian and continental welfare states, and to a lesser extent to countries such as Spain and Italy. The idea that illegal labour at the underside of the labour market will be pushed back by regulating the recruitment of (temporary) labour migrants is dubious. Illegal immigrants are economically interesting for many employers because they are illegal and can be paid wages below the statutory minimum wage levels (cf. Engbersen 1999 en 2003).

Appendix chapter 3

Table A3.1: Immigration of foreign nationals by reasons of labour by country of birth 1995-2003

	1995	1997	1998	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total (count)	**10.208**	**12.652**	**13.193**	**15.379**	**16.304**	**19.014**	**19.948**	**18.520**	**16.620**
of which									
Western countries	**84,7**	**84,8**	**84,4**	**83,7**	**84,7**	**85,5**	**83,6**	**82,2**	**79,7**
of which									
EU-countries	**65,7**	**64,6**	**64,2**	**62,2**	**64,1**	**64,4**	**61,3**	**61,7**	**59,0**
of which									
The Netherlands	5,6	2,2	2,1	2,0	1,7	1,3	0,7	0,4	0,4
Germany	11,8	10,8	10,9	10,9	10,7	11,3	11,2	12,7	11,7
United Kingdom	18,6	20,3	19,6	17,1	18,1	18,7	18,3	15,6	14,5
Belgium	5,8	5,3	6,0	5,5	5,4	5,0	4,3	4,6	4,6
France	4,6	5,4	5,6	6,2	6,2	5,7	5,3	5,4	5,0
Portugal	2,1	2,1	1,9	2,1	3,1	3,6	4,2	4,5	4,7
Italy	4,8	4,8	5,1	4,9	5,3	5,1	4,9	4,8	4,6
Spain	3,0	2,9	2,9	3,5	3,4	3,9	3,8	4,4	4,5
Sweden	1,4	1,9	1,7	1,9	2,1	1,8	1,3	1,5	1,5
Eastern Europe (1)	**3,5**	**4,1**	**4,3**	**6,8**	**5,8**	**7,9**	**10,4**	**8,9**	**9,5**
of which									
Soviet Union (former)	1,3	1,2	1,1	2,0	1,9	1,9	2,1	2,0	1,9
Poland	0,9	1,6	1,5	2,0	1,5	3,0	4,1	3,9	4,7
Yugoslavia (former)	0,4	0,2	0,4	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,7	0,4	0,4
Romania	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,7	0,6	0,8	1,1	1,0	0,9
Bulgaria	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,5
Czechoslovakia (former)	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,8	0,4	0,7	1,0	0,6	0,6
Hungary	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,6	0,4	0,6	1,0	0,6	0,5
other Western countries	**15,6**	**16,1**	**15,9**	**14,7**	**14,8**	**13,2**	**12,0**	**11,6**	**11,2**
of which									
United States	6,2	7,6	7,7	7,0	6,9	6,0	4,9	4,4	4,7
Japan	5,0	4,3	3,6	3,0	2,9	2,6	2,4	2,8	2,8
Indonesia	0,2	0,2	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,3	0,5	0,3	0,3
Australia	1,1	1,1	1,1	1,3	1,6	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,0
Non-Western countries	**15,3**	**15,2**	**15,6**	**16,3**	**15,3**	**14,5**	**16,4**	**17,8**	**20,3**
of which									
Turkey	2,1	2,2	1,9	1,4	1,0	1,2	1,5	2,2	5,1
Morocco	1,2	1,2	1,3	1,1	0,8	0,9	0,7	0,8	0,9
Ghana	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,6	0,9	0,6
South-Africa	0,7	1,2	0,9	2,3	1,4	1,5	1,7	1,0	1,1
Somalia	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,0
Syria	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Sudan	0,0	-	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Suriname	0,4	0,3	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,1
Brazil	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,5
Colombia	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,4
Dominican Republic	0,0	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,1
Argentina	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,4	0,4	0,4
Afghanistan	-	0,0	0,0	-	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
Thailand	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,2	0,1	0,1	0,1
China	1,5	1,3	1,0	1,0	1,1	0,9	1,3	1,2	1,3
Iraq	-	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0
Philippines	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,1	0,2	0,5	0,3	0,3
Iran	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,3
India	1,5	1,4	1,6	2,2	2,1	1,4	1,4	1,3	1,5
Vietnam	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,1
Pakistan	0,7	0,5	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,4
Sri Lanka	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0
South-Korea	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,4

source: Statistics Netherlands

Chapter 4 Developments in asylum migration

4.1 Introduction

This chapter briefly describes recent developments with respect to the influx of asylum seekers and asylum policy. The most striking aspect is the sharp decrease in the number of asylum seekers over the past five years. The new Dutch Aliens Act, which came into effect in 2000, is held responsible for this decrease. In this chapter we will mainly focus on the influx of asylum seekers to the Netherlands and changes in the composition of this category. Finally, we will examine the concluding part of the asylum policy, the return policy.

4.2 Asylum requests

The Dutch government's restrictive asylum policy is probably the most important reason for the decrease in the number of asylum applications (especially the high percentage of rejections in the accelerated procedure and the strict policy for unaccompanied minors). The number of asylum requests decreased from more than 32,000 in 2001 to some 13,400 in 2003 (see table 5.1). In table 5.1 we can see the sizeable monthly differences between the years 2001 and 2003 and in figure 5.1 we can see the trends over a period of more than 10 years. The number of asylum request in 2003 was lower than in the beginning of the 1990s.

Table 4.1: Total number of individual asylum seekers who arrived, with monthly breakdown and percentage variation between years:

Month	2001	2002	2003	Variation +/-(%)	2002 tov 2003
January	3697	2377	1234	-48%	-1143
February	2805	1972	1042	-47%	-930
March	3086	1950	1398	-28%	-552
April	2781	1767	1570	-11%	-197
May	2549	1590	1391	-13%	-199
June	2219	1479	831	-44%	-648
July	2475	1419	1127	-21%	-292
August	2462	1350	989	-27%	-361
September	2551	1432	1103	-23%	-329
October	3401	1374	1015	-26%	-359
November	2399	1037	931	-10%	-106
December	2154	920	771	-16%	-149
Total				-28%	-5265

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

Figure 4.1: Asylum requests by country of nationality, 1991-2003



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

In 2003, almost all countries of origin except Iraq and Liberia exhibited a large absolute decrease in asylum influx in comparison to previous years (see table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Asylum requests by country of nationality, 1997-2003 (top ten countries 2003)

Country of nationality	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Iraq	9640	8300	3710	2780	1329	1022	3472
Soviet Union (former)	1960	3230	5520	4200	3235	1891	1100
Iran	1250	1680	1530	2550	1519	665	555
Yugoslavia (former)	3790	8330	8520	5700	2184	847	539
Afghanistan	5920	7120	4400	5050	3614	1077	492
Somalia	1280	2780	2740	2110	1098	538	451
Liberia	470	190	180	240	167	292	441
Nigeria	300	390	240	290	401	556	414
Turkey	1140	1220	1500	2270	1400	638	414
Burundi	60	150	200	330	427	452	402
Other nationalities	8630	11,830	14,190	18,370	17,205	10,689	5122
Total	34,440	45,220	42,730	43,890	32,579	18,667	13,402

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, Ministry of Justice

A closer examination of the figures from the former Soviet Union countries reveals that most of the asylum applications come from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and Georgia (see table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Asylum applications from Former Soviet Union countries in The Netherlands

Country of origin	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Armenië	1249	812	529	427	204
Azerbaijan	2449	1163	634	335	265
Belarus	40	113	115	131	55
Estonia	0	2	3	3	-
Georgia	321	291	298	219	116
Kazakhstan	102	180	133	43	8
Kyrgyzstan	6	119	71	55	21
Latvia	10	9	9	10	-
Lithuania	12	11	12	9	10
Moldova	31	28	20	31	36
Russia	960	1016	911	420	245
Tajikistan	21	42	56	12	8
Turkmenistan	0	1	1	0	-
Ukraine	306	218	191	156	85
Uzbekistan	13	197	252	40	47
Total	5520	4202	3235	1891	1100

Totals	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Applications from Former S.U.	5520	4202	3235	1891	1100
Total applications in The Netherlands	39,299	43,895	32,579	18,667	13,402
Percentage Former S.U.	14%	10%	10%	10%	12%

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

The proportion of asylum applications from (former) countries where a residence permit is granted on the basis of a categorical protection policy (former Provisional Residence Permit Policy) decreased from 56 percent of the total issued in the Netherlands in 1998 to just 34 percent in 2002. In 2003 it increased due to the war on Iraq (46 percent). The number of asylum seekers from, for example, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan decreased dramatically in 2002 and 2003. The decreases for Afghanistan and Sierra Leone were due to the general protection policies for these countries being terminated in the summer of 2002 (see table 4.4).

Table 4.4: Asylum applications from nationalities with current or former categorical protection policy in The Netherlands

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Afghanistan	5920	7118	4400	5055	3614	1077	492
Bosnia-Herz.	1968	3769	1169	1652	1026	221	103
Burundi	64	147	204	335	427	452	402
D.R. Congo	592	411	252	539	500	522	193
Iraq	9641	8300	3703	2773	1329	1022	3472
Liberia	471	193	175	240	167	292	441
Rwanda	192	415	422	334	222	118	50
Sierra Leone	390	482	1280	2023	2405	1620	314
Somalia	1280	2775	2697	2110	1098	538	451
Sudan	678	1875	1744	1426	869	513	293
Total	21,196	25,485	16,046	16,487	11,657	6375	6211

Totals	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Applications cat. prot.	21,196	25,485	16,046	16,487	11,657	6375	6211
Total applications in The Netherlands	34,443	45,217	39,299	43,895	32,579	18,667	13,402
Percentage cat. prot.	62%	56%	41%	38%	36%	34%	46%

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

The influx of indicated unaccompanied minor asylum seekers in the Netherlands decreased from 5009 in 1999 to 1216 in 2003. The figure of unaccompanied minors as a percentage of the total influx of asylum seekers was rather high and stable in the 2000-2002 period (17 percent). This has changed in 2003. The figure is now 9 percent. In 2003, the main countries of origin were Angola, China and Iraq.

Table 4.5: Influx of indicated unaccompanied minor asylum seekers in The Netherlands

Country of origin	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Angola	756	1.059	1.991	854	146
China	335	261	344	177	116
Iraq	793	942	117	56	108
Somalia	496	410	248	87	75
Guinea	380	819	668	199	70
Liberia	19	55	22	47	68
Sierra Leone	529	757	728	392	61
Ivory Coast	2	48	37	46	56
Afghanistan	215	303	228	141	41
Nigeria	24	31	43	70	40
India	0	6	11	28	40
Other	1460	2014	1514	1135	395
Total UMA	5009	6705	5951	3232	1216

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total UMA	5009	6705	5951	3232	1216
Total	37,921	43,895	32,579	18,667	13,402
Percentage UMA	13%	15%	18%	17%	9%

Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

4.3 Asylum requests in Europe

The decrease in the number of asylum seekers in the Netherlands is also clear if we compare the Dutch data with data from 13 other European countries with respect to the influx of asylum requests under consideration.

Table 4.6 presents the influx in asylum requests under consideration from 2002-2003. In 2003 more than 325,000 asylum applications were submitted in the countries stated, a decline of 20 percent with respect to the same period in 2002.

There were particularly strong decreases in the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. France was the only country in which the number of asylum applicants increased in 2003.

Table 4.6: Asylum requests in Europe compared; 2003 with 2002

	2001	2002	2003	mutation	mutation in %
France**	88,287	51,004	61,993	10,989	22%
United Kingdom	47,260	103,080	61,051	-42,029	-41%
Germany	90,244	71,127	50,563	-20,564	-29%
Austria	30,135	39,354	32,364	-6990	-18%
Sweden	23,499	32,995	31,355	-1640	-5%
Switzerland	20,633	26,125	20,806	-5319	-20%
Norway	24,527	17,480	15,613	-1867	-11%
Belgium*	14,782	18,768	16,940	-1828	-10%
The Netherlands	32,579	18,667	13,402	-5265	-28%
Ireland	10,325	11,634	7900	-3734	-32%
Spain	9219	6179	5918	-261	-4%
Denmark	12,512	5947	4593	-1354	-23%
Finland	1650	3443	3221	-222	-6%
Total	405,652	405,803	325,719	-80,084	-20%

* Data do not include accompanied minor dependants.
** Since 2003, minor dependants are included
Source: Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC)

4.4 Granted asylum requests

The submission of an asylum request is the first step in a process only some of the asylum requests are actually approved. Table 4.8 shows the number of asylum requests approved per year for ten different groups. The number of asylum requests approved has shown a marked decrease. In 1997 almost 17,000 requests were approved, whereas in 2003 less than 50 percent of this number was approved.

Table 4.7: Asylum requests granted by country of nationality, 1997-2002 (top ten countries 2003)

Country of nationality	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Iraq	4340	5990	550	510	660	1504	3506
Afghanistan	4240	3990	4380	3410	2440	277	798
Soviet Union (former)	650	530	510	480	410	833	550
Somalia	1180	880	1030	920	440	488	267
Burundi	30	70	50	170	300	296	249
Iran	1100	600	530	350	210	383	240
Angola	200	140	200	580	230	922	237
Yugoslavia (former)	2260	350	420	730	600	360	232
Sierra Leone	50	130	160	280	1410	1204	187
Sudan	530	820	300	420	380	345	172
Other nationalities	2410	1600	1360	1880	1160	1767	849
Total	16,990	15,100	9490	9730	8240	8610	7820

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, numbers rounded in units of five, 1997-2001,
Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2002-2003

Table 4.8 provides additional information about the type of status awarded. From the data presented it is clear that there has been a strong decrease in the number of 'A statuses' awarded during the period 1997-2000, whereas the granting of residence permits with a humanitarian status has decreased much less. The figures for 2003 concern statuses awarded under the new Aliens Act and they therefore cannot be simply compared with the situation in 2000.

Table 4.8: Refugees admitted and the humanitarian or refugee status granted 1997-2003 (1)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Before new Aliens Act 2000							
Refugees							
Individual requests 'A status' granted	6630	2356	1507	1808	444		
Humanitarian status							
Granted (VtV)	5176	3591	3471	4791	1567		
Provisional status temporary protection (VVtV)	5182	9152	8512	3127	806		
After new Aliens Law 2000 (april 2001)							
VV asylum fixed term					4906	4086	5626
VV asylum indefinite term					508	721	1402
VV regulier fixed term (2)					2325	4000	2715
VV regulier indefinite term (2)					24	25	6
Refused (old and new Aliens Law)	28,318	28,173	41,367	57,418	51,317	26,761	13,869

1) betreft zowel uitkomsten na beslissingen in eerste instantie als herziene beslissingen
2) De reguliere vergunningen die in asielzaken zijn verleend hebben ondermeer betrekking op alleenstaande minderjarige asielzoekers en op verblijfsvergunningen in het kader van het zogenaamde 3-jaren beleid.
Source: Ministry of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service

The figures presented in the previous tables concern the decision taken during the year in question (approved or rejected), irrespective of the year in which the asylum request was submitted. Therefore the figures presented about approvals cannot be directly compared with the figures presented in table 4.2 about the asylum requests submitted and thus do not provide any insight into the percentage approved. In order to delineate the percentage approved cohort studies are needed. In the 2001-Sopemi Study we have presented the results of a cohort study conducted by Van der Erf (2002). On the basis of material made available by the IND concerning the completion of asylum procedures according to the year of submission (1994-2000), Van der Erf concluded that the percentage of asylum requests approved in the Netherlands has significantly decreased. For asylum seekers who submitted their request in 1997, the approval percentage was 47 percent. For those who submitted their request in 2000 the figure was probably not be higher than 17 percent. The results of recent cohort studies show that the approval percentage is still decreasing. For 2003 the average approval percentage was 7,7 percent. We can distinguish three clusters of countries of origin: asylum

seekers from Afghanistan, Angola and Sierra Leone have a high approval percentage; asylum seekers from Iran, Nigeria and Turkey have a low approval percentage; and the approval percentage for asylum seekers from China, Congo, Iraq and Somalia is variable (Ministry of Justice 2003).

4.5 Return policy and the expulsion of asylum seekers

The majority of aliens who request asylum in the Netherlands do not receive a residence permit and therefore there is a constant stream of aliens leaving the Netherlands. Most of these aliens depart of their own volition and a small number need to be forcibly expelled. The return of legally removable asylum seekers is one of the most unmanageable parts of the alien policy. There are three basic assumptions in the Dutch return policy.

A first basic principle is that in the asylum procedure, the responsibility for self-reliant return rests on the asylum seeker. The idea behind this is that the asylum seeker managed to get to the Netherlands on his own initiative and must therefore return on his own initiative as well. After every negative decision in the procedure the asylum seeker will be reminded of his responsibility and encouraged to make preparations for his return.

A second basic principle is that the government's primary responsibility is to terminate the refuge provisions. If the asylum seeker does not leave of his own accord then enforced departure can be effected.

Finally there is a high level of cooperation between the various authorities involved such as the Aliens Police, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, the Central Council for the Reception of Asylum-Seekers [Dutch acronym: COA) and the Royal Netherlands Military Police. In the case of voluntary return the asylum seeker can request support from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

The main stages in the return process are:

For each negative decision in the asylum procedure of an asylum seeker the IND informs the COA of this by sending a copy of the judicial order or judgement.

- After it has received each copy of the judicial order of judgement, the COA invites the asylum seeker to an interview. In this interview the asylum seeker is informed of the possibility that in the end he will not be allowed to remain in the Netherlands and in that case the reception facilities will be terminated after 28 days. The asylum seeker is advised not to wait until after the 28 days have elapsed and to prepare for a possible departure during this 28-day period. In this he is reminded of his own responsibility. For help and advice in these preparations for an independent return he is referred to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). For legal information and support he is referred to the Dutch Refugee Council and his own lawyer. Before the asylum seeker can finally be expelled legally, the COA holds a final interview. In this interview (complimentary to the aforementioned information) the asylum seeker is informed that he must leave the reception facility within 28 days. If he does not do that voluntarily the accommodation will be cleared by the police or alien police.

- 28 days after the alien has been informed that he or she must leave the country, a check is performed to establish whether this has actually happened. The Aliens Department then carries out an *address check* at the last known address of the alien. The alien is considered to be "administratively removed" if he is not encountered at the address and it can be assumed that he has departed. In the majority of cases this implies "departure with unknown destination".

- If the alien is found at the last known address after 28 days and forced return as possible then the person is taken into custody before being *deported* or *leaving under supervision*.

The rejected asylum seeker can receive various forms of supervision for his return. For example, there are country specific projects in which the Dutch government cooperates with the countries of origin and a range of organisations who are active in the field of migration. Furthermore, there is supervision from the return office of the IOM which assists rejected asylum seekers in their return. In 2003, the number of people who were assisted by the IOM in their return to the country of origin or to migrate further increased with one-third compared to 2002 (this mostly concerned rejected asylum seekers). In 2003, 3028 persons departed voluntarily with help from the IOM.

The number of people that voluntarily departed with help from the IOM is relatively small compared to the total number of 'expelled asylum seekers' in 2003, namely nearly 22,000. From the table below it can be seen that the number of expelled asylum seekers rose considerably compared to 2001. In particular, asylum seekers from Iraq, (former) Yugoslavia, (former) Soviet Union and Angola were expelled on a large-scale (see table 4.9). However, we do not know the degree in which these groups actually left the Netherlands. In figure 4.2 the removals for the period 1992-2001 are detailed according to the type of removal.

Table 4.9: Expelled asylum seekers by country of nationality, 1997-2003 (top ten countries 2003)

Country of nationality	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Yugoslavia (former)	2910	3280	6210	4140	2180	2300	2183
Soviet Union (former)	1360	960	950	1420	1350	1880	2138
Angola	430	180	110	170	250	760	1618
Somalia	1120	680	850	890	940	1526	1354
Iran	1070	440	460	730	770	1012	1336
Iraq	1040	1190	1940	1310	1780	2421	1158
Sudan	160	150	280	350	420	700	944
Turkey	790	820	660	880	1250	1047	864
Sierra Leone	160	150	190	290	490	801	826
China	690	490	480	490	420	700	799
Other nationalities	9140	6000	6210	5950	6170	8108	8676
Total	18,870	14,340	18,340	16,620	16,020	21,255	21,896

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline, Ministry of Justice

Figure 4.2: Expelled asylum seekers by type of expulsion, 1992-2003



Source: Statistics Netherlands

The chart shows that the proportion of compulsory removals (Controlled departure and Expulsion) has strongly decreased during the past three years. In 1999, more than one-third of all removals occurred in this manner, whereas in 2003 less than 20 percent of the rejected asylum seekers were forcibly expelled from the country. Also in absolute terms the number of expulsions and the number of cases in which controlled departure takes place is decreasing. By far the greatest numbers of rejected asylum seekers are therefore removed by means of checking the address. Although this is in accordance with the policy's objectives, the asylum seeker bearing responsibility for his return, it is not clear whether these persons actually leave the country or continue to remain in the Netherlands as illegal immigrants. There are clear indications that a significant proportion will continue to remain in the Netherlands on an illegal basis (Engbersen et al. 2001; Leerkes et al 2004). Figures about detained illegal aliens in the period 1997-2000 reveal, for example, that substantial numbers of illegal aliens from 'asylum countries' such as Iraq, (former) Yugoslavia, (former) Soviet Union and Somalia were detained (Engbersen et al. 2002).

Due to the problems in returning, two tendencies are visible. Firstly, more use has been made of enforced return by means of building special centres. The capacity for alien detention is being expanded. The capacity to detain illegal aliens will increase in the period 2003-2007. In 2007 there will be a structural capacity of 2000 places for detained aliens. Furthermore, two expel centres for illegal immigrants and rejected asylum seekers are established in Rotterdam and Amsterdam-Schiphol. Secondly, use has also been made of the expertise of local organisations that offer help to rejected asylum seekers. We end this chapter by presenting some results of a local voluntary return programme in the city of Rotterdam.

4.6 Voluntary return

In 2002 a cooperative project was set up, financed by the European Refugee Fund, within the framework of the 'Return and Emigration of Aliens from the Netherlands (REAN)' programme. In this project, efforts are made to provide specific assistance to groups of illegal aliens and asylum seekers from the States of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus. Within the framework of this project 153 people returned to these countries with help from the IOM and Pauluskerk (Paul's Church) in

Rotterdam. In the majority of cases, however, this concerned illegal aliens and not rejected asylum seekers (cf. Weltevrede et al 2003).

The project objective, firstly, was to improve counselling by means of a more systematic description of the profile and migration motives of the target group and to provide more targeted assistance for the return and reintegration of (refused) asylum seekers from the Southern Caucasian states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and Belarus. The research objective was operationalised in the project indicator: 300 (refused) asylum seekers to be interviewed from the abovementioned countries. This project indicator was not achieved as only 173 people were interviewed. This was caused by: (i) inadequate grounds for the proposed 300 interviews; (ii) lack of clarity with regard to the control group of illegal immigrants, which meant people were 'careful' about interviewing this group and therefore did not achieve the desired number of respondents in the control group. Nevertheless the research goal was partially achieved. Insight was gained into the background and migration motives of people from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and Belarus.

The second project objective was an aid objective, operationalised in four indicators:

- to provide intensive supervision to 200 people from the target group (= (rejected) asylumseekers from the abovementioned countries);
- to have 50 people from the target group get in touch with their country of origin;
- to provide temporary shelter to 50 people from the target group;
- to have 150 people from the target group return to their country of origin and to assist these people to this end.

The first two project indicators have been realised. The indicators pertaining to shelter and (the provision of assistance to) return of (rejected) asylum seekers were however set too high (respectively 50 whereas only 8 realised, 150 whereas 43 realised). The principal cause of this was the fact that when the project started it was insufficiently realised that - compared to (refused) asylum seekers - much more illegal migrants returned to their country of origin via the Pauluskerk. If these two groups of illegal migrants and (refused) asylum seekers are combined, the project indicator pertaining to

return has been achieved. In that case the aid objective also seems to have been achieved: an increase in the number of people returning home in comparison to the preceding years.

The return project brought a number of success factors and a failure factor experienced by the Pauluskerk to light. The Pauluskerk's success factors with regard to return are connected with its *approachability* and the *trust* the institution emanates. Furthermore, the Pauluskerk offers its clients a *broad package of aid*, irrespective of whether a client is considering returning home or not. By being present for consultation at the Pauluskerk the IOM has been able to benefit from these factors (cf. Weltevrede et al. 2003).

Chapter 5 Foreign Nationals and Immigrants in the Netherlands

Main findings

- Non-native residents of the Netherlands are defined in Dutch statistics by their own and their parents' country of birth. The term *non-native* refers to people who were born outside the Netherlands of at least one foreign-born parent (first-generation immigrants) or in the Netherlands of two foreign-born parents (second generation).
- At the end of 2003, there were 3,000,000 non-native residents of the Netherlands, accounting for 19% of the Dutch population, about half from Western countries including those in Central and Eastern Europe, and the other half from non-Western countries. The largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands are Indonesians (398,000), Germans (384,000), Turks (351,000), Surinamese (325,000) and Moroccans (306,000).
- In 1995 there were 2,500,000 non-native residents. This means the non-native population increased by 24% in just eight years. The number of non-native residents from non-Western countries increased even more rapidly from 1,200,000 in 1995 to 1,700,000 in 2003, an increase of 42% in eight years. In 2003, non-Western immigrants accounted for exactly 10% of the total Dutch population. The percentage of non-Western immigrants is expected to grow to 12% in 2010 and14% in 2020.
- On the average, non-Western immigrants are much younger than the native Dutch population. Almost one in five of the native Dutch population is above the age of 65, which is only true of 2.5% of the residents of non-Western descent. The relatively young non-Western immigrants are a welcome counterweight to the aging Dutch population.
- Non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are heavily concentrated in the main urban centres. Only 13% of the total Dutch population live in the four main cities and 40% of the non-Western immigrants.

- There has been a sharp fall in the number of non-Dutch residents who obtain Dutch citizenship. The number of foreigners who obtained Dutch citizenship fell from 83,000 in 1996 to 45,000 in 2002. In 2003, the number of naturalizations fell to only 29,000. Moroccans and to a lesser extent Turks as well obtained or applied for Dutch citizenship less often. The reason for the declining number of naturalizations is not clear. Is it due to stricter naturalization rules or do immigrants find Dutch citizenship less attractive because of growing anti-immigrant feelings in Dutch public opinion?
- According to recent research, a sizeable number of undocumented aliens live in the Netherlands (112,000 to 163,000), most of them in certain multicultural districts of large cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which can have a negative influence on everyday life there. Although most undocumented aliens do not engage in criminal activities, there is a significant trend towards more forms of survival crime.

5.1 Introduction

We have described the immigration flows to and from the Netherlands. In this chapter we address the foreign nationals and immigrants living in the Netherlands. Before providing any specific data, we need to clear up the problem of definitions. Who are the foreign nationals and who are the immigrants in the Dutch statistics? International migration statistics usually provide information on foreign nationals or residents in a country with a different nationality, and the foreign-born or residents who - regardless of their nationality - were born in another country. In the Netherlands, a third, more complicated definition is used of immigrants or the non-Dutch. Let us first explain though why the two approaches noted above are not applicable to immigrants in the Netherlands.

The most obvious way to describe immigrants in a country is to say they are residents with a different citizenship (foreign nationals). However, there are several reasons why this would present an incomplete picture of the immigrant population in the Netherlands. As a former colonial power, the Netherlands has a relatively high number of immigrants from its former colonies. Many people from Suriname or the Netherlands Antilles have Dutch citizenship, so they would not be

considered immigrants if we only examine non-Dutch nationals. The same is true of other immigrants who have acquired Dutch citizenship, which is relatively easy in the Netherlands and not uncommon. According to the present regulations, children born in the Netherlands of at least one Dutch parent including naturalized immigrants automatically have Dutch citizenship, so this category of second-generation immigrants would not be considered non-Dutch.

A second approach to the immigrant population would be to include everyone born outside the country (foreign-born). Although this definition is often used in international statistics, it has its limitations. It includes the foreign-born children of Dutch parents and excludes the children of immigrants born in the Netherlands (the second generation). However, the Dutch authorities also want to keep track of this second generation of immigrants because so many of them are socially disadvantaged. For all these reasons, in Dutch statistics immigrants or the non-Dutch are defined by their parents' as well as their own country of birth. In Dutch official publications, immigrants are also often referred to as *allochtonous* or ethnic minorities.

In Dutch statistics, a distinction is drawn between native Dutch and non-native Dutch residents. In the latter category, a distinction is drawn between first and second-generation immigrants. People are non-native residents if they and at least one of their parents were born outside the Netherlands or if they themselves were born in the Netherlands but both their parents were not. A child born outside the Netherlands of two Dutch parents is considered native Dutch, but a child born outside the Netherlands of one foreign parent is not. A child born in the Netherlands of one Dutch and one foreign parent is also considered native Dutch, but a child born in the Netherlands of two foreign parents is non-native. Lastly, the official Dutch statistics draw a distinction between non-native residents from Western and from non-Western countries. This distinction is explained in Chapter 2.

In this chapter we refer to foreign nationals and non-native Dutch residents according to different definitions. In doing so, we see that the different definitions and approaches result in a variety of figures (5.2). We describe the various demographic characteristics of the non-native population in the Netherlands (5.3), and the naturalization figures (5.4).

5.2 Numbers of non-Dutch residents and immigrants in the Netherlands

Table 5.1 shows how much it matters which definition is used for the non-Dutch population. If we only look at foreign nationals, there are 700,000 non-Dutch residents, but if we look at foreign-born people, there are 1,700,000 including the foreign-born children of Dutch parents. Using the official Dutch definitions, the total number of non-Dutch residents in 2003 was a little more than 3,000,000 (first and second-generation immigrants). If we only look at foreign nationals, 4.3% of the residents of the Netherlands are non-Dutch. Using the official definitions, almost one in five (19%) residents of the Netherlands are non-Dutch. A little less than half the non-Dutch population are first or second-generation immigrants from Western countries (1,400,000 or 9% of the total Dutch population), a little more than half the non-Dutch population are from non-Western countries (1,600,000 or 10% of the total Dutch population).

We can conclude that definitions matter quite a lot in statistics. If we use the official Dutch definitions, the total number of non-Dutch or non-native residents of the Netherlands is four times as high as if we only look at people who are not formally Dutch citizens. Part of the difference is due to the fact that by definition the 130,000 people from the Netherlands Antilles have Dutch citizenship. The last column of Table 5.1 shows the percentages of each population category based on ethnic origin, thus second as well as first generation, who still have the nationality of their country of origin. The figures show that the vast majority of immigrants and their children or grandchildren in the Netherlands have the Dutch nationality. This is not only the case for older immigrant groups such as Indonesians, Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans, but also for newly arrived groups such as Somalians, Syrians, Angolans, Iranians, Iraqis, Ethiopians and Afghans. In each of these new migrant groups, less than one in eight people (12%) still have the nationality of their country of origin.

Table 5.1: Non-Dutch / Non-native Population in the Netherlands 2003 (= 1-1-2004)

	(I) Foreign nationals	(II) Foreign-born	(III) Ethnic origin	III as % of the entire Dutch population	% with nationality of their country of origin
Total	**16,258,032**	**16,258,032**	**16,258,032**	**100.0**	
Native Dutch	**15,555,847**	**14,526,244**	**13,169,880**	**81.0**	
non-native	**702,185**	**1,731,788**	**3,088,152**	**19.0**	**22.7**
Western countries	**294,376**	**662,342**	**1,419,855**	**8.7**	**20.7**
14 EU countries	**211,009**	**311,723**	**748,417**	**4.6**	**28.2**
Germany	56,466	119,002	389,912	2.4	14.5
United Kingdom	43,678	48,267	76,457	0.5	57.1
Belgium	26,223	47,052	113,081	0.7	23.2
Eastern Europe	**38,871**	**130,374**	**188,642**	**1.2**	**20.6**
Yugoslavia (former)	11,586	55,497	76,346	0.5	15.2
Soviet Union (former)	10,658	32,802	42,033	0.3	25.4
Poland	7,431	21,177	35,542	0.2	20.9
Czechoslovakia (former)	2,508	5,794	9,813	0.1	25.6
Hungary	1,886	5,618	12,564	0.1	15.0
Romenia	2,735	5,992	7,895	0.0	34.6
other Western countries	**44,496**	**220,245**	**482,796**	**3.0**	**9.2**
United States	15,075	22,594	30,161	0.2	50.0
Canada	3,456	8,829	12,660	0.1	27.3
Australia	3,383	10,203	14,221	0.1	23.8
Indonesia	11,185	158,804	398,502	2.5	2.8
Japan	5,813	6,111	7,215	0.0	80.6
Non-Western countries	**296,829**	**1,069,446**	**1,668,297**	**10.3**	**17.8**
Turkey	101,845	194,615	351,648	2.2	29.0
Morocco	94,380	166,607	306,219	1.9	30.8
Somalia	1,792	17,381	25,001	0.2	7.2
South Africa	3,321	12,292	15,164	0.1	21.9
Ghana	3,807	12,105	18,727	0.1	20.3
Cape Verde	1,364	11,443	19,666	0.1	6.9
Egypt	2,649	10,814	17,873	0.1	14.8
Ethiopia	1,194	8,050	10,236	0.1	11.7
Angola	993	10,124	12,281	0.1	8.1
Sudan	1,054	6,339	7,626	0.0	13.8
Congo	417	5,942	1,616	0.0	25.8
Suriname	9,406	189,732	325,281	2.0	2.9
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	-	91,332	130,722	0.8	-
Colombia	1,919	11,312	9,366	0.1	20.5
Brazil	3,298	9,783	11,638	0.1	28.3
Dominican Republic	1,141	6,949	9,546	0.1	12.0
Iraq	4,182	35,968	42,931	0.3	9.7
Afghanistan	3,923	32,143	36,043	0.2	10.9
China	13,330	31,455	41,694	0.3	32.0
Iran	2,589	24,171	28,438	0.2	9.1
India	3,592	11,829	13,363	0.1	26.9
Vietnam	2,496	12,006	17,536	0.1	14.2
Pakistan	2,541	11,054	17,990	0.1	14.1
Hong Kong	-	10,410	17,965	0.1	-
Sri Lanka	1,624	10,402	9,812	0.1	16.6
Philippines	2,841	8,366	12,401	0.1	22.9
Thailand	4,366	9,103	11,462	0.1	38.1
Syria	685	6,650	8,803	0.1	7.8
south Korea	1,477	5,779	3,328	0.0	44.4
Unknown/stateless	**110,980**	-	-		

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Tables A5.2 and A5.3 (Appendix) show the trends in the number of residents of the Netherlands of non-Dutch descent. In Table A5.2, their background is based on nationality (foreign nationals) and in Table A5.3 on ethnic origin (first and second-generation immigrants). The number of foreign nationals in the Netherlands surprisingly reveals that their numbers have decreased since 1995, despite strong increases in immigration surpluses in the second half of the 1990s (see Chapter 2). The explanation for this apparent contradiction is that so many immigrants have obtained Dutch citizenship. This is further examined in 5.4.

Table A5.3 shows the trends in the number of non-native residents of the Netherlands (first and second-generation immigrants) from 1995 to 2002. The number of non-native residents of the Netherlands increased rapidly from scarcely 2,500,000 in 1995 to more than 3,000,000 in 2003. This means that in just eight years, the number of non-native residents of the Netherlands increased by 24%, though the native Dutch population remained more or less stabile. The strong increase in the number of non-native residents of the Netherlands is mainly due to the growing influx from various Eastern European and non-Western countries. The number of immigrants (first and second-generation) from Central and Eastern Europe increased by almost 60% from 1995 to 2002 from 119,000 to 188,000. The influx from the former Soviet Union more than tripled in this period. Immigrants from the former Soviet Union are among the fastest growing immigrant groups in the Netherlands. The number of non-native residents with a non-Western background also grew rapidly in this period from almost 1,200,000 in 1995 to almost 1,700,000 in 2003, an increase of 42% in a period of eight years.

Lastly, Table A5.3 also distinguishes between the first and second generation of non-native residents in 2003, i.e. between people born outside the country who have come to the Netherlands and people born in the Netherlands of two foreign-born parents. Both categories are about the same size. Of the little more than 3,000,000 non-native residents of the Netherlands in 2003, 52% were first generation and 48% second generation. The percentage of second-generation immigrant children born in the Netherlands of two foreign-born parents is particularly high among the Western migrant groups such as Germans (74%), Belgians (68%), Indonesians (67%) and Australians

(65%). As a rule the percentage of second generation is much smaller in non-Western immigrant groups (39%) than Western ones (59%). Non-Western immigrant groups with the largest percentage of second generation are the Moroccans (45%), Turks (45%) and Surinamese (42%). Afghans are the immigrant groups with the smallest percentage of second generation (only 1%).

Population forecast

We conclude this section with a non-native population forecast in the Netherlands. The non-native population includes first and second-generation immigrants from Western and non-Western countries (Table 5.6). The number of non-native people from other Western countries is not expected to increase significantly in the coming decades (from 1,400,000 in 2003 and 1,500,000 in 2010 to 1,900,000 in 2030; this last figure is not included in the table). The number of non-native residents with a non-Western background is expected to increase more quickly, albeit somewhat less than in the 1990s. From 1990 to 2002, the number of non-Western immigrants and their children and grandchildren in the Netherlands almost doubled from more than 800,000 to 1,600,000. According to current forecasts, the number of first and second-generation non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands will continue to grow to almost 2,000,000 in 2010 and almost 2,500,000 in 2020. This means the percentage of non-Western immigrant groups in the total population in the Netherlands will gradually increase from 10% in 2002 and 12% in 2010 to 14% in 2020.

Table 5.2 Population Forecast: Western and Non-Western Non-native Population (1990-2020)

	1990	2003*	2010	2020
	X1000			
Western	-	1,419	1,502	-
Non-Western	831	1,623	1,974	2,425
Turkey	203	341	394	452
Morocco	164	295	359	432
Suriname	224	321	349	375
Neth. Antilles and Aruba	69	129	153	189
other Non-Western	171	537	719	978
Non-Western as % of the total population	8.3	10.0	11.8	14.1

*2003= 1 January 2003
Source: SCP, *2003 Report on Minorities*, pp. 17

Table 5.6 also shows that the older immigrant groups in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) will continue to grow in the future. However, the greatest increase will be among other non-Western immigrant groups. In 1990, people from

other non-Western countries were only a fifth of the total non-Western immigrant population in the Netherlands. By 2020 this percentage will increase to about 40%, confirming the previously observed increasing heterogeneity of the non-native population in the Netherlands. The number of immigrants and their children and grandchildren from Central and Eastern Europe will also increase considerably in the coming years. An annual influx of about 20,000 people is expected in the coming years from these countries, partly as a result of the expansion of the EU.

Table 5.2 does not distinguish between first and second-generation immigrants. If we do draw this distinction (expanded data in the Appendix, Table A5.3) we see that in the non-Western immigrant groups, the first and second generation are expected to grow significantly in the coming years. The first generation is growing due to continuous immigration: the number of first-generation migrants from non-Western countries is expected to increase by more than 160,000 from 2002 to 2010. This is a consequence of an estimated annual migration surplus of 20,000. Since first-generation immigrants will have children in the Netherlands, the second generation will also increase in size. In the coming years about 30,000 children a year are expected to be born of a non-Western mother or father in the Netherlands. This means that by 2010 the non-Western second generation will grow by more than 250,000 to 838,000. In 2010 more than 42% of the non-Western immigrant population in the Netherlands will belong to the second generation, a percentage that was only 38% in 2002. The second generation is growing more rapidly than the first. However, in the course of time, the growth rate of the second generation is expected to gradually decrease again. Non-Western women will gradually have less children and the first generation will gradually become older and no longer be of childbearing age.

5.3 Some demographic characteristics of the immigrant population

In this section we discuss some demographic characteristics of the non-native population in the Netherlands. We examine the distribution according to age and sex and region.

Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the native Dutch and non-native population according to age and sex. The non-native population, as usual, includes first and second- generation immigrants and is split into Western and non-Western. With respect to gender distribution, there are few if any differences between the population groups. In the Dutch population as well as the non-Western immigrant groups, the percentage of men is more or less half (49 and 51.5% respectively). This is striking in so far as typical immigrant groups might be expected to have a higher percentage of men than women. Yet this is not the case. In the Western immigrant population, the percentage of females is even slightly larger (52%) than the percentage of males.

Figure 5.1 Dutch and Non-native Population By gender in % (2003)



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

However, as Figure 6.2 shows, there are large differences in the age structure of various population groups. Non-Western immigrants are predominantly young. Almost half (49%) the residents of the Netherlands with a non-Western background are younger than 20, as are only about one in three in the native Dutch population. The percentage of elderly in the native Dutch population is however much higher than in non-Western immigrant groups. Almost a fifth (18%) of the native Dutch population is above 65, as are only 2.5% of the residents of the Netherlands with a non-Western background. There are scarcely any people above the age of 75 in the non-Western immigrant groups. The relatively young age of the non-Western immigrant groups is a welcome counterweight to the ageing Dutch population.

Figure 5.2: Age Distribution of Native Dutch and Non-native Populations (2003)



Another widely debated theme in the Netherlands is the regional distribution of the immigrant population (Table 6.3). Despite the public debate, the Netherlands can scarcely be termed a multicultural society. Only one in ten residents of the Netherlands are immigrants or the children of immigrants from non-Western countries. But since non-Western immigrants are heavily concentrated in the four main cities of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht), the country does have a number of multicultural cities. Although these four cities together only have a population of little more than 2,000,000, about a third of them are non-Western immigrants (660,000). Of the four main cities in the Netherlands, only in the smallest one, Utrecht, is there a smaller percentage of non-Western immigrants (20%). In the other medium-sized Dutch cities, the percentage of non-Western immigrants is significantly lower.

The concentration of non-Western immigrants is also clear in the last row of Table 5.3, which shows the percentage of the total population in each of the four main cities. Living in a large city is not particularly popular among the native Dutch; only one in eight live in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague or Utrecht. Immigrants from Western countries are slightly more city-oriented than the overall average. About one in six of the immigrants from Western countries live in one of these four large cities. Non-Western immigrants are much

more oriented to the main cities. Almost 40% of the non-Western immigrants live in one of the four main cities and this percentage is even higher among Surinamese and Moroccans. About half the Surinamese and Moroccans live in one of the four main cities. Turks and Antilleans appear to be more dispersed in other municipalities.

Table 5.3: Regional Distribution of Non-native Population (Western and Non-Western) (2003)

	Total	Western	Non-Western	Turkey	Morocco	Suriname	Neth. Antilles
Netherlands	**16,258,032**	**1,419,855**	**1,668,297**	**351,648**	**306,219**	**325,281**	**130,722**
Amsterdam	739,104	102,537	250,539	37,360	62,776	70,741	11,490
The Hague	469,059	58,346	146,159	30,830	23,372	44,883	10,749
Rotterdam	598,923	59,305	207,396	44,603	35,317	52,239	20,282
Utrecht	270,244	26,644	55,159	12,158	23,305	6,987	2,198
as % of the total							
Netherlands	100.0	8.7	10.3	2.2	1.9	2.0	0.8
Amsterdam	100.0	13.9	33.9	5.1	8.5	9.6	1.6
The Hague	100.0	12.4	31.2	6.6	5.0	9.6	2.3
Rotterdam	100.0	9.9	34.6	7.4	5.9	8.7	3.4
Utrecht	100.0	9.9	20.4	4.5	8.6	2.6	0.8
% total population in all 4 cities	12.8	17.4	39.5	35.5	47.3	53.8	34.2

Source: Statistics Netherlands

5.4 Naturalization

Most of the non-native residents of the Netherlands have the Dutch nationality, sometimes in addition to the nationality of their country of origin. Most of the Surinamese and Antilleans have always had Dutch citizenship. Two thirds of the older immigrant groups such as Turks and Moroccans also have Dutch citizenship. However, it is striking that most of the new immigrant groups such as Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and Somalians now also have the Dutch nationality. From 1996 to 2003, about 435,000 non-Dutch residents of the Netherlands acquired Dutch citizenship. The peak in the number of naturalizations was in 1996, when almost 83,000 non-Dutch residents obtained Dutch citizenship. In the following years the number of naturalizations gradually decreased to about 45,000 in 2002. In 2003, however, the number of naturalizations declined again quite drastically to 29,000, a decline of 36% in one year (Figure 5.3).

The trend in the number of naturalizations strongly correlates with Dutch policy changes. The peak in the number of naturalizations in 1996 was the result of the growing number of non-Dutch immigrants in the early 1990s and changes in the Dutch policy on aliens in 1992. From 1 January 1992 to 1 October 1997, non-Dutch residents who obtained the Dutch nationality were allowed to keep their original nationality. On 1 October 1997, this dual nationality option was replaced by a more restrictive policy. Dual nationality is now only possible in a number of exceptional cases, usually pertaining to nationals from countries that do not allow citizens to give up their nationality. Another exception is made for people for whom it would be unreasonable to give up their nationality (Muus, 2001). As a result of this policy change, the number of naturalizations fell sharply from 83,000 in 1996 to 60,000 in 1997. In particular, the number of naturalizations among Turks decreased sharply in 1997. The policy changes barely affected Moroccans, since Moroccan law does not allow them to give up their nationality. After this marked decrease, the number of naturalizations from 1997 to 1999 stabilized at about 60,000 and then fell to 45,000 in 2002 and 29,000 in 2003.

Figure 5.3: Non-Dutch Residents Obtaining Dutch Nationality by Year



Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

Table A5.4 in the Appendix specifies the country of origin of new Dutch citizens. It shows the largest decline in the number of naturalizations among Moroccans, and to a lesser extent among Turks. In 2003 the number of persons obtaining Dutch citizenship was more than 16,000 less than a year earlier; 40% of the difference can be explained by the

declining number of Moroccan or Turkish residents of the Netherlands who obtained or applied for Dutch citizenship. The number of naturalizations among Moroccan residents fell by 4,900 and the number of naturalizations among Turkish residents fell by 1,700. We can only guess the reason for this decline. Perhaps stricter naturalization rules prevented larger numbers of naturalizations. It is also possible that growing anti-immigrant feelings in the Dutch public opinion made Moroccan and Turkish residents less eager to apply for Dutch citizenship.

5.5 Undocumented aliens in the Netherlands

The Netherlands, like other Western countries, is confronted with growing numbers of undocumented aliens, i.e. foreign nationals who live here without a valid residence permit. Contrary to the common myth, the Netherlands is not flooded with undocumented aliens. Empirical research shows that not that many undocumented aliens live in the Netherlands. The same research also shows that contrary to another widely held myth, they are not necessarily criminals. In fact, most of the undocumented aliens in the Netherlands do not engage in crime.

This section summarizes the main findings of the study *Undocumented Aliens in the Netherlands* (Engbersen et al. 2001; a more comprehensive summary of this report can be found in the 2001 Dutch SOPEMI report). One objective of the study was to draw up an estimate of the total number of undocumented aliens in the Netherlands and shed light on the often assumed relation between illegal residence and crime. The study analysed police files on undocumented aliens arrested in the Netherlands from 1997 to 2000. The data were supplied by the 25 police regions in the Netherlands. From 1997 to 2000, more than 53,000 arrests were made involving more than 47,000 undocumented aliens.

The main finding of the study is that nation-wide, the Netherlands has a limited number (112,000 to 163,000) of undocumented aliens.[17] Although on a national scale, this number is limited, on a local or

[17] This estimate is somewhat higher than the one published by Netherlands Statistics of 46,000 to 116,000 illegal aliens living in the Netherlands.

regional scale the picture is quite different. In cities like Amsterdam or Rotterdam and in certain regions, there are relatively large numbers of undocumented aliens. Especially in certain multicultural neighbourhoods, the percentages are sizeable. These areas have large undocumented populations with a positive as well as a negative influence on everyday life there. A second finding is that most undocumented aliens do not engage in criminal activities, although certain forms of survival crime are becoming increasingly common.

The number of undocumented aliens in the Netherlands has been estimated using police data on the arrests of undocumented aliens. Of the arrests in the Netherlands from 1997 to 2000, more than 53,000 involved approximately 47,000 undocumented aliens. The total number of undocumented aliens who live in the Netherlands is annually estimated on the basis of these findings. However, police data are not always reliable. In addition, the data refer to undocumented aliens whose behaviour exposes them to the risk of arrest, for example they work in the informal economy or commit offences. Undocumented aliens who lead a shadow life, hiding at home, barely run any risk of being arrested and cannot be taken into account in the estimates. The real number of undocumented aliens in the Netherlands is thus higher than the figure in our estimates.

An annual estimated 65,000 to 91,000 undocumented aliens enter the Netherlands, excluding those from Eastern and Western Europe. The number of Eastern and Western Europeans is roughly estimated at 47,000 to 72,000 annually. However, these estimates are much less reliable than for the other groups. With this estimate included, the total number of undocumented aliens on an annual basis would amount to 112,000 to 163,000.

The population of undocumented aliens mainly comprises men and women between the ages of 20 and 40. Compared to previous studies, the percentage of women among those arrested has slightly increased. As regards country of origin, the group is very diverse. The arrested undocumented aliens come from no fewer than 200 countries or areas all over the world. This strong variation in the origins of immigrants confirms recent insights on the increasing heterogeneity of migration flows, including increases in long-distance migration and East-West migration. The largest groups of undocumented aliens come from Eastern Europe, Africa, Western Europe and Asia. The percentage of people from countries where numerous asylum-seekers came from in

the years in question has not exhibited a rapid rise, though it is on the increase. By now the percentage of people from asylum countries constitutes more than a third of the total number of arrested undocumented aliens and is slightly increasing.

On what grounds are undocumented aliens arrested? An examination of all the police arrests in the period from 1997 to 2000 (N=53,000) shows that more than half the undocumented aliens were not arrested for serious crimes, but for violating the Aliens Act or police regulations. More than a third of the undocumented aliens were arrested because they were suspected of committing offences ranging from shoplifting to manslaughter, but often theft-related and to a lesser extent drug-related, primarily survival offences in an effort to support themselves in Dutch society.

The 1997-2000 police statistics demonstrate a sharp rise in the category of minor offences (particularly property offences and unspecified offences) from 18.5% to 28.2%, and a fall in the total number of arrests in the same years from more than 14,000 to 13,000 (see Table 5.2). This seems to indicate a rise in the survival crime rate among undocumented aliens. As the total number of arrests has decreased, this finding cannot be explained by the fact that the police stepped up their efforts, which might have been a second explanation. A third explanation may be that the police are now sooner able to register an offence thanks to greater social sensitivity to crime and advanced computerization. However, this would not solely apply to undocumented aliens, but to the entire population.

5.6 Money transfers by immigrants

The final topic in this chapter is the transfer of money by immigrants to their country of origin. Since we did not obtain any new data, we can only repeat our data from the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI report. People have always moved to other countries to obtain better living conditions and financially support those who stay behind (immediate and wider family, fellow villagers and compatriots from the area). Migrants often maintain strong financial links with their country of origin. According to recent estimates, the total money flow from migrants to their home countries is at least 100 billion dollars. This is greater than the amount of money devoted worldwide to development aid.

Table 5.7: Private Transfers of Money to Selected Countries 1992-2001 (in millions of euros)

Millions of euros	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
former labour recruitment countries											
Morocco	85	88	100	101	106	117	124	151	169	180	191
Turkey	124	132	141	146	151	168	175	216	227	250	249
Portugal	18	17	19	20	22	23	25	28	36	39	28
Spain	57	56	61	23	29	42	43	68	75	94	48
Former Yugoslavia	1	5	5	11	17	22	20	31	48	37	
Greece	4	3	7	7	7	7	7	8	11	12	11
Refugee countries											
Iraq	1	0	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Iran	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	6	5	5	8	5	7	5	5	7	9	9
Vietnam	0	1	1	5	9	9	9	9	11	13	12
China	0	0	2	4	9	7	9	10	12	11	12
Somalia	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zaire	3	1	3	4	4	3	1	0	0	0	0
Congo-Kinshasa	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0

Source: The Dutch Central Bank, Statistical Information Division

In the Netherlands, Turks and to a lesser extent Moroccans transfer a great deal of money to their countries of origin. Further research indicates that the size of this financial support depends on features of the receiving as well as the sending households.[18] Households in Turkey or Morocco that are in a dependent position, for example because they are headed by women with children, receive more money than households headed by men. In most cases this kind of transfer involves men who came to the Netherlands as guest workers while their wives and children remained back home. Research also shows that more affluent migrants transfer more money to their country of origin than less affluent migrants. Migrants with a job send at least four times as much money to their country of origin as those on social assistance benefits. Lastly, there is the issue of whether the financial transfers encourage others to migrate. Generally speaking this is the case. People from households in Turkey and Morocco that received generous sums of money from abroad are significantly more apt to intend to migrate themselves than people from households that received little or no money.

[18] See T. Fokkema and G. Groenewold, De migrant als suikeroom (The migrant as rich uncle) in: *Demos* June/July 2003 (www.nidi.nl/public/demos)

Appendix for Chapter 5

Table A5.1: Population by Nationality (1995-2003) on December 31

	1995	1997	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total	**15,493,889**	**15,654,192**	**15,863,950**	**15,987,075**	**16,105,285**	**16,192,572**	**16,258,032**
Dutch nationals	**14,768,468**	**14,976,115**	**15,212,418**	**15,319,273**	**15,414,892**	**15,492,618**	**15,555,847**
Non-Dutch nationals	**725,421**	**678,077**	**651,532**	**667,802**	**690,393**	**699,954**	**702,185**
From							
Western countries	**275,372**	**271,112**	**268,345**	**275,265**	**285,645**	**291,423**	**294,376**
14 EU countries	**191,074**	**190,192**	**195,886**	**201,574**	**207,858**	**210,549**	**211,009**
Germany	53,922	53,914	54,272	54,811	55,572	56,060	56,466
United Kingdom	41,146	39,153	39,466	41,404	43,604	44,052	43,678
Belgium	24,111	24,443	25,382	25,860	26,148	26,306	26,223
Eastern Europe	**48,964**	**45,240**	**33,763**	**32,748**	**34,519**	**36,505**	**38,871**
Yugoslavia (former)	33,513	28,417	15,565	12,904	12,122	11,754	11,586
Soviet Union (former)	5,011	6,534	7,120	7,575	8,543	9,533	10,658
Poland	5,910	5,680	5,645	5,944	6,312	6,912	7,431
Czechoslovakia (former)	891	1,210	1,593	1,893	2,297	2,374	2,508
Hungary	1,133	1,272	1,385	1,538	1,719	1,832	1,886
Romania							2,735
Other Western countries	**35,334**	**35,680**	**38,696**	**40,943**	**43,268**	**44,369**	**44,496**
United States	12,769	12,980	14,074	14,751	15,217	15,412	15,075
Canada	2,574	2,702	2,892	3,130	3,398	3,435	3,456
Australia	2,013	2,031	2,522	2,802	3,201	3,352	3,383
Indonesia	8,159	7,970	8,717	9,338	10,127	10,786	11,185
Japan	5,347	5,369	5,507	5,626	5,771	5,747	5,813
Non-Western countries	**435,387**	**368,637**	**316,819**	**305,493**	**297,749**	**292,962**	**296,829**
Turkey	154,310	114,696	100,688	100,782	100,309	100,286	101,845
Morocco	149,841	135,721	119,726	111,396	104,262	97,843	94,380
Somalia	17,223	13,648	5,296	35,67	2,654	2,116	1,792
South Africa	1,444	1,769	2,512	2,864	3,230	3330	3321
Ghana	5,150	4,375	3,887	3,877	3,756	3,630	3,807
Cape Verde	2,111	1,786	1,567	1,404	1,352	1,289	1,364
Egypt	4,084	3,101	2,771	2,588	2,425	2,440	2,649
Ethiopia	3,653	1,870	1,280	1,203	1,161	1,166	1,194
Angola	1,633	1,679	1,184	982	946	1,009	993
Sudan	676	868	1,113	1,212	1,114	1,089	1,054
Congo	3,213	2,765	1,887	1,622	1,437	1,310	417
Suriname	15,174	11,760	8,665	8,469	8,491	8,573	9,406
Neth. Antilles and Aruba							
Colombia	1,569	1,718	1,790	1,636	1,668	1,743	1,919
Brazil	2,145	2,380	2,597	2,728	2,841	2,994	3,298
Dominican Republic	1,453	1,312	1,204	1,164	1,158	1,165	1,141
Iraq	9,694	13,008	10,025	8,639	6,919	4,771	4,182
Afghanistan	3,913	5,275	4,395	4,203	4,259	3,997	3,923
China	7,912	7,260	7,473	7,997	9,395	11,223	13,330
Iran	10,150	7,831	3,892	2,833	2,520	2,513	2,589
India	2,748	2,803	3,234	3,361	3,417	3,416	3,592
Vietnam	3,765	2,032	1,546	1,613	1,885	2,274	2,496
Pakistan	3,724	3,199	2,882	2,880	2,737	2,605	2,541
Hong Kong							
Sri Lanka	3,186	2,395	1,549	1,531	1,591	1,604	1,624
Philippines	2,363	2,428	2,351	2,417	2,427	2,597	2,841
Thailand	1,985	2,162	2,520	2,920	3,288	3,783	4,366
Syria	2,031	857	543	560	628	670	685
South Korea	722	910	1,079	1,193	1,280	1,421	1,477
unknown/stateless	14,662	38,328	66,368	87,044	106,999	115,569	110,980

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table A5.2: Population by Ethnicity (1995-2003) on December 31

						In 2003 of which	
	1995	1997	1999	2001	2003	First generation	Second generation
Total	**15,493,889**	**15,654,192**	**15,863,950**	**16,105,285**	**16,258,032**		
Native Dutch	**12,995,175**	**13,033,792**	**13,088,648**	**13,140,336**	**13,169,880**		
Of foreign descent	**2,498,714**	**2,620,400**	**2,775,302**	**2,964,949**	**3,088,152**	**1,602,730**	**1,485,422**
from **Western countries**	**1,327,601**	**1,341,947**	**1,366,535**	**1,406,596**	**1,419,855**	**581,656**	**838,199**
14 EU countries	**731,929**	**733,059**	**739,309**	**748,930**	**748,417**	**274,837**	**473,580**
Germany	411,503	405,991	401,119	396,316	389,912	103,256	286,656
United Kingdom	65,663	66,781	69,263	74,869	76,457	45,224	31,233
Belgium	111,228	111,537	112,604	113,239	113,081	36,116	76,965
Eastern Europe	**119,296**	**131,753**	**147,008**	**173,646**	**188,642**	**129,370**	**59,272**
Yugoslavia (former)	56,220	60,959	66,947	74,640	76,346	55,381	20,965
Soviet Union (former)	13,485	17,334	22,625	34,903	42,033	32,734	9,299
Poland	25,125	27,315	29,180	32,210	35,542	20,773	14,769
Czechoslovakia (former)	7,106	7,616	8,274	9,456	9,813	5,716	4,097
Hungary	11,454	11,742	11,917	12,359	12,564	5,503	7,061
					7,895	5,791	2,104
other Western countries	**476,376**	**477,135**	**480,218**	**484,020**	**482,796**	**177,449**	**305,347**
					0	0	0
United States	22,730	24,479	26,808	29,093	30,161	18,723	11,438
Canada	9,519	10,370	11,217	12,199	12,660	4,451	8,209
Australia	10,355	11,076	12,230	13,493	14,221	5,038	9,183
Indonesia	411,622	407,885	405,155	402,663	398,502	133,503	264,999
Japan	6,355	6,475	6,674	7,078	7,215	5,926	1,289
Non-Western countries	**1,171,113**	**1,278,453**	**1,408,767**	**1,558,353**	**1,668,297**	**1,021,074**	**647,223**
Turkey	271,514	289,777	308,890	330,709	351,648	194,319	157,329
Morocco	225,088	241,982	262,221	284,124	306,219	166,464	139,755
Somalia	20,060	25,842	28,780	28,979	25,001	17,368	7,633
South Africa	9,629	10,737	12,524	14,378	15,164	8,133	7,031
Ghana	12,480	13,973	15,609	17,232	18,727	11,903	6,824
Cape Verde	16,662	17,478	18,242	19,012	19,666	11,437	8,229
Egypt	11,598	12,738	14,398	16,108	17,873	10,709	7,164
Ethiopia	7,978	8,460	8,997	9,783	10,236	7,233	3,003
Angola	2,594	3,352	4,477	7,962	12,281	10,096	2,185
Sudan	943	1,936	3,919	6,935	7,626	6,319	1,307
Congo	4,546	5,147	6,115	7,657	1,616	1,075	541
Suriname	280,615	290,467	302,514	315,177	325,281	187,990	137,291
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	86,824	92,105	107,197	124,870	130,722	84,024	46,698
Colombia	4,937	6,002	7,025	8,122	9,366	6,369	2,997
Brazil	6,589	7,639	8,913	10,237	11,638	7,171	4,467
Dominican Republic	5,321	6,174	7,341	8,676	9,546	6,866	2,680
Iraq	11,278	22,295	33,449	41,323	42,931	35,909	7,022
Afghanistan	4,916	11,551	21,468	31,167	36,043	32,123	3,920
China	23,471	26,191	29,759	35,691	41,694	29,422	12,272
Iran	16,478	20,685	22,893	26,789	28,438	23,929	4,509
India	9,476	10,302	11,516	12,589	13,363	8,859	4,504
Vietnam	12,937	13,801	14,717	16,012	17,536	11,901	5,635
Pakistan	14,127	15,135	16,149	17,325	17,990	10,879	7,111
Hong Kong	17,147	17,304	17,510	17,789	17,965	10,119	7,846
Sri Lanka	5,636	6,463	7,685	9,053	9,812	7,122	2,690
Philippines	7,738	8,868	9,857	11,100	12,401	8,012	4,389
Thailand	5,576	6,503	7,701	9,450	11,462	8,374	3,088
Syria	3,604	4,324	5,397	7,736	8,803	6,623	2,180
South Korea	1,492	1,819	2,245	2,764	3,328	2,106	1,222

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table A5.3: Non-native Population Forecasts by Country of Origin in the Netherlands (2002 – 2050)

		2002 x1000	2010	2030	2050
Non-Western	1st generation	972	1,136	1,448	1,606
	2nd generation	587	838	1381	1852
	Total	1,558	1,974	2,829	3,458
Western	1st generation	575	636	915	1,065
	2nd generation	831	866	998	1,155
	Total	1,407	1,502	1,914	2,220
Turkey	1st generation	186	204	230	229
	2nd generation	145	191	265	318
	Total	331	394	495	547
Morocco	1st generation	160	178	209	217
	2nd generation	125	181	271	320
	Total	284	359	481	537
Suriname	1st generation	186	192	191	160
	2nd generation	129	158	197	220
	Total	315	349	387	380
Neth. Antilles and Aruba	1st generation	82	93	120	136
	2nd generation	43	60	105	151
	Total	125	153	225	288
Africa	1st generation	120	140	178	216
	2nd generation	58	95	178	253
	Total	178	235	356	469
Asia	1st generation	201	276	425	526
	2nd generation	67	121	288	458
	Total	268	397	713	984
Latin America	1st generation	37	54	95	122
	2nd generation	21	33	77	132
	Total	58	87	172	254
Indonesia	1st generation	137	121	85	65
	2nd generation	265	266	256	196
	Total	403	387	341	261
EER	1st generation	278	290	367	404
	2nd generation	476	474	462	496
	Total	754	765	829	901
Other European	1st generation	124	188	396	522
	2nd generation	59	89	213	361
	Total	184	276	608	883
Other non-European	1st generation	35	37	69	74
	2nd generation	31	38	67	102
	Total	67	74	135	176

Source: Alders, M., Statistics Netherlands, 2003

Table A5.7: Naturalization of Foreign Nationals by Country of Origin 1996-2003

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total	**82,687**	**59,831**	**59,173**	**62,093**	**49,968**	**46,667**	**45,321**	**28,799**
Western countries	**9764**	**11,257**	**11,927**	**13,746**	**8569**	**6214**	**5501**	**3956**
EU countries	**3520**	**2904**	**2419**	**2127**	**1848**	**1884**	**2049**	**1621**
Germany	776	567	558	580	508	573	608	445
United Kingdom	1,174	912	578	453	374	356	394	294
Belgium	287	183	200	189	164	189	223	250
Eastern Europe	**4,950**	**7,362**	**8,634**	**10,769**	**5,948**	**3,572**	**2,678**	**1,659**
Yugoslavia (former)	2,283	5,412	6,668	7,993	3,809	1,647	938	539
Soviet Union (former)	591	586	826	1,510	1,103	879	758	503
Poland	1129	827	677	688	587	597	530	318
other Western	**1294**	**991**	**874**	**850**	**773**	**758**	**774**	**676**
United States	489	410	261	161	160	168	225	181
Canada	121	109	108	74	51	65	66	54
Indonesia	436	314	368	514	456	416	380	291
Non-Western countries	**72,108**	**47,891**	**46,044**	**43,724**	**33,999**	**32,653**	**30,173**	**24,843**
Turkey	30,704	21,189	13,484	5,214	4,708	5,513	5,391	3,726
Morocco	15,598	10,478	11,252	14,217	13,471	12,721	12,033	7,126
Egypt	1,077	551	393	496	443	528	437	190
Somalia	3,002	2,141	4,918	3,487	1,634	873	378	180
Ghana	1,208	737	502	432	348	360	357	157
Nigeria	268	166	98	153	143	196	214	96
Suriname	4,445	3,019	2,991	3,194	2,008	2,025	1,957	1,242
Colombia	409	354	288	341	382	259	274	112
Brazil	319	279	227	257	231	290	249	137
Dominican Republic	387	207	217	235	200	206	143	91
Iraq	854	798	2,721	3,834	2,403	2,315	2,367	832
Afghanistan	360	217	905	1,847	945	803	1,118	982
China	1,394	975	800	977	1,002	1,111	908	722
Iran	2,299	1,285	1,806	2,560	1,375	754	336	180
Thailand	319	253	235	275	277	355	289	171
Philippines	401	279	298	295	300	348	263	159
India	407	249	234	235	242	309	250	138
Pakistan	630	296	287	277	237	255	241	132
Stateless	815	683	1,202	4,623	7,400	7,800	9,647	6,624

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table A5.8: Dutch and Non-native Population by Gender and Age in % (2003)

	Dutch			Non-native (Western)			Non-native (non-Western)		
Age	male	female	total	male	female	total	male	female	total
0 to 5	6.2	5.8	6.0	4.8	4.2	4.5	10.2	10.2	10.2
5 to 10	6.0	5.6	5.8	4.7	4.1	4.4	9.4	9.4	9.4
10 to 15	6.2	5.8	6.0	4.9	4.4	4.6	9.4	9.3	9.3
15 to 20	5.9	5.5	5.7	5.1	4.5	4.8	9.4	9.0	9.2
20 to 25	5.7	5.4	5.5	5.8	5.8	5.8	9.3	9.9	9.6
25 to 30	5.9	5.6	5.7	6.8	7.2	7.0	8.7	9.6	9.1
30 to 35	7.6	7.2	7.4	8.4	8.4	8.4	9.7	10.0	9.9
35 to 40	8.1	7.7	7.9	8.9	8.7	8.8	9.4	8.6	9.0
40 to 45	8.2	7.8	8.0	8.3	8.2	8.2	7.8	7.2	7.5
45 to 50	7.7	7.3	7.5	7.7	7.7	7.7	5.4	5.5	5.4
50 to 55	7.3	6.9	7.1	8.2	7.8	8.0	3.7	3.9	3.8
55 to 60	7.2	6.9	7.1	7.8	7.1	7.4	2.8	2.7	2.8
60 to 65	5.2	5.1	5.1	6.3	5.7	6.0	2.3	1.9	2.1
65 or older	12.9	17.5	15.2	12.0	16.2	14.2	2.5	2.7	2.6
Total (N)	6,510,578 (49.4%)	6,659,302 (50.6%)	13,169,880 (100%)	681,536 (48.0%)	738,319 (52.0%)	1,419,855 (100%)	853,800 (51.2%)	814,497 (48.8%)	1,668,297 (100%)

Source: Statistics Netherlands, Statline

Chapter 6 Labour Market Integration of non-Western Immigrants in the Netherlands

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the socio-economic position of first and second-generation non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands. Since the early 1980s, the Netherlands has had extensive policies in place to improve the labour market position of non-Western immigrants. They were first framed as minority policies, and since the mid 1990s as integration policies. More specifically, they focus on the two groups of former guest workers (Turks and Moroccans) and the two groups of post-colonial immigrants (Surinamese and Antilleans). These immigrants are also referred to as ethnic minorities or simply minorities. In this chapter we use the phrase non-Western immigrants, but the reader should bear in mind that in addition to the immigrants themselves, the analysis pertains to their children born in the Netherlands (first and second-generation immigrants).

The main issue in this chapter is the labour market position of non-Western immigrants. Since an adequate educational level is an important precondition for labour market participation, we first examine the changing educational levels of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands (6.2). We then describe various aspects of the labour market position of minorities such as the extent of employment or unemployment (6.3), various aspects of the employment position of immigrant workers (6.4) and the extent to which immigrants and the native Dutch receive social assistance and other benefits (6.5). We conclude with a more theoretical discourse on possible explanations for the poor labour market position of non-Western immigrants (6.6).

We start with some information about the empirical sources used in this chapter. Most of the statistics in this chapter are derived from two surveys. The Labour Force Survey (*Enquête Beroepsbevolking*)

conducted by Netherlands Statistics is an annual large-scale survey in which 80,000 to 90,000 people from 50,000 to 60,000 households are annually interviewed. The number of respondents is large enough to allow for statements about the labour market position of the four immigrant groups mentioned above (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans). In addition, the Labour Force Surveys distinguish a rapidly growing category of immigrants from other non-Western countries, including asylum-seekers from various parts of the world. The native Dutch respondents in the Labour Force Surveys are considered representative of the Dutch population as a whole.

The Social Position and Facility Usage of Non-Western Immigrants Survey (*Sociale Positie en Voorzieningengebruik Allochtonen* or SPVA) has been conducted every four years since the 1990s and is especially designed to monitor the social position of the four largest non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands. To reach respondents in non-Western immigrant groups, the survey is held in specific urban districts with large concentrations of non-Western immigrants. In the 2002 survey, a total of 8.321 respondents from the four major non-Western immigrant groups were interviewed. The SPVA contains no information about other non-Western or Western immigrant groups. The SPVA does give information about a native Dutch comparison group, but the native Dutch SPVA respondents are *not* representative of the Dutch population as a whole since they also live in the specific relatively poor immigrant districts of the Dutch cities.

In both surveys, members of immigrant groups are identified according to the standard definition formulated by Netherlands Statistics, according to which someone is an immigrant if they are born outside the Netherlands of at least one foreign-born parent *or* if they are born in the Netherlands of two foreign-born parents. As in earlier chapters, the term immigrant refers to the second as well as the first generation.

6.2 Educational level of non-Western immigrants

Although this chapter focuses on the labour market integration of non-Western immigrants, we would also like to say something about their educational level. The reason for doing so is obvious. In our type of society, a good education is a prerequisite for a good labour market

position. A major problem for immigrants from the Third World to countries like the Netherlands is often that they are not adequately schooled for the current post-industrial labour markets. One might however expect the educational level of younger members of immigrant groups, especially the second generation born in the Netherlands, to be significantly higher than that of their parents. This raises the question of how the minority educational level has developed in recent years.

Table 6.1 shows that the minority educational level, especially of the former guest workers (Turks and Moroccans), was still very low in 2002. It also shows that their educational level is slowly increasing. In 1998, 65% of the Turks and no fewer than 74% of the Moroccans had only completed primary school, if that. Four years later in 2002, the percentage of Turkish and Moroccan respondents with only primary school fell to 51 and 58%. The percentage of Turks and Moroccans with college or university degrees increased in the same period from 4 to 6 and 8%. This means that though Turks and Moroccans still tend to be poorly educated, there have been small improvements. The post-colonial migrants (Surinamese, Antilleans) are relatively better educated. From 1998 to 2002, the percentage of very poorly educated people with only primary school in both groups fell from 29 to around 20%. In 2002, 15% of the Surinamese and 20% of the Antillean adults had graduated from a college or university.

Table 6.1. Educational Level of Post-School Age Workers (14-65) by Ethnic Descent and Gender (1998-2002)

	native Dutch		Turks		Moroccans		Surinames		Antilleans	
	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002
All respondents										
primary school	18	12	65	51	74	58	29	22	29	20
lower vocational and general secondary school	27	25	16	23	10	14	31	33	30	32
intermediate vocational and general secondary school	26	41	15	20	11	21	24	31	27	28
Higher education	28	23	4	6	4	8	15	14	15	20
(N)	(2024)		(2880)	(1897)	(2234)	(1553)	(2404)	(1367)	(1157)	(906)
Male										
primary school	18	11	58	43	72	53	28	19	23	18
lower vocational and general secondary school	26	22	19	27	12	15	34	33	29	31
intermediate vocational and general secondary school	25	42	17	22	11	22	21	32	28	29
Higher education	30	24	6	8	6	10	16	15	20	23
(N)	(930)		(1521)	(1016)	(1297)	(851)	(1058)	(653)	(489)	(441)
Female										
primary school	18	12	71	61	79	63	30	25	32	22
lower vocational and general secondary school	29	27	13	19	8	13	30	32	30	33
intermediate vocational and general secondary school	27	40	13	18	11	19	26	30	26	27
Higher education	26	21	3	3*	2	5	14	13	12	18
(N)	(1081)		(1356)	(882)	(933)	(701)	(1340)	(714)	(665)	(465)

* small number of observations (N < 35)
Source: SVPA 1998 and SVPA 2002

However, the native Dutch improved their educational level as well and the question remains whether the non-Western immigrants were able to improve their educational position relative to the native Dutch. Are they slowly catching up or losing ground? The figures in Table 1 show a clear improvement. In 1998, the percentage of Turks and Moroccans with only a primary school education was 4 to 5 times higher than among the native Dutch. In 2002, Turks and Moroccans only had a primary school education 3.5 and 4 times as often. At the high end, these minority groups are also slowly improving their position. In 1998, the native Dutch still had a college or university education 7 times more often than Turks or Moroccans. Four years later, it was only 4 times more often than the Turks and 3 times more often than the Moroccans. Although very slowly, the Turks and Moroccans are catching up.

The educational position of the Surinamese and Antillean groups is much better. In 2002, the percentage of Antillean and Surinamese respondents with only primary school was around 70 to 80% higher

than among the native Dutch. In the same year, the percentage of well-educated Antillean and Surinamese was only 10 to 40% lower than among the native Dutch. As is clear later in this chapter, the improved Surinamese and Antillean educational position also means much better chances on the Dutch labour market than the still predominantly poorly educated Turks and Moroccans.

It might not be surprising that so many Turks and Moroccans have so little formal education since many of them came to the Netherlands to fill the vacancies at the time doing unskilled work at Dutch factories. Many of these former guest workers and their spouses did not have any formal education at all before they came to the Netherlands. In examining the changing educational position of non-Western immigrants, it is better not to look at the whole population but only the younger generation (15-25).[19]

Figure 6.1. Achieved Educational Level of 15-24 Age Group No Longer at School by Ethnic Origin (1988-2002) (in %)



Source: Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, *2003 Report on Minorities* (Social and Cultural Planning Bureau 2003: 46)

Figure 6.1 shows the changes in the educational level of the native Dutch and non-Dutch youth from 1988 to 2002. The figure only shows

[19] The remainder of this section on education is taken from: Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, *2003 Report on Minorities* (Social and Cultural Planning Bureau 2003)

the educational level of young people no longer at school. The darker colours stand for a lower educational level. The figure clearly shows rising educational levels, especially among the non-Dutch youth. The percentage of poorly and very poorly educated young people is especially high among Turks and Moroccans and to a lesser extent the Surinamese and Antillean youth. Although the percentage of well-educated native Dutch youths is still much higher, the various immigrant groups have been slightly catching up.

One important reason for the high percentage of poorly educated youth, especially Turks and Moroccans, is premature school dropout. Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of native Dutch and non-Dutch youths (15-34) who left school without a diploma. The figure shows that although premature school dropout rates have declined in recent years, they are still rather high among minority youths. In 1998, one in four young Turks and Moroccans left school without a diploma. For years, premature school dropout among these groups has declined, but it is still rather high, since 21% of the Turks and 17% of the Moroccans left school without a diploma. Premature school dropout rates did not decline in recent years among Surinamese and Antilleans, but are lower than among Turks and Moroccans. Premature school dropout occurs least among native Dutch youth (6% in 1998, no data available about 2002).

Figure 6.2. Premature School Dropout by Ethnic Origin, 15-34 Age Group (1998 and 2002)



Source: SVPA 1998 and 2002

A further examination of the figures drawn up by the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (2003) shows that the Turkish and Moroccan

premature school dropout rates declined more among young females than males. In 1998, young Turkish and Moroccan women left school without a diploma more often than their male counterparts. These differences had however disappeared by 2002. According to the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, this is another sign that young Turkish and Moroccan women are catching up. The Social and Cultural Planning Bureau also explains the differences between the ethnic groups in premature school dropout rates by noting that since non-Dutch youths do not do as well at primary school, they have less chance of successfully completing secondary school. Their poor performance at primary school can largely be explained by their parents' poor educational level and their own insufficient command of Dutch when they start school. Other risk factors explaining premature minority dropout include growing up in lone parent families and living in big cities. According to the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, (2003), a new explanation for the high minority premature school dropout rates is the tendency of primary schools to "over-advise" non-Dutch pupils. Given their performance at primary school, pupils sent to higher-level secondary schools run a greater risk of premature school dropout. Pupils who are unable to meet the standards at secondary school tend to leave school altogether rather than switch to a lower-level school.

6.3 Ethnic minority employment and unemployment

After a very favourable period of economic growth in the second half of the 1990s, sometimes referred to in international literature as the "Dutch miracle" (cf. Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Schmid 1999), the Netherlands experienced an economic downturn starting in 2001. As the job growth and historically low unemployment levels came to an end, the Netherlands had to face rising unemployment again. In the 2002 Dutch SOPEMI Report, we note that at first the new economic recession did not hurt the non-Western immigrants, especially Turks and Moroccans, as much as it hurt native Dutch workers, since the first dismissals predominantly pertained to high-level jobs. Most Turks and Moroccans have lower-level jobs and were less affected at first by the recession. In this section we examine whether this changed in 2003. We start however with an overview of the employment and

unemployment figures of native Dutch and non-Dutch residents of the Netherlands since the mid-1990s.

Changing minority labour market position in the Netherlands (1994-2002)

In the late 1990s in particular, the Netherlands experienced a very favourable period of economic growth and a continuous rise in the number of jobs. The number of employed people in the Netherlands (who work at least 12 hours a week, including part-time workers) rose from less than 6 million in 1994 to 7 million in 2002. This means an almost 20% increase in the total number of working people in eight years. In 2003 however the Netherlands witnessed a decline in the number of jobs for the first time in many years. From 2002 to 2003, the total number of working people decreased by more than 30,000. In this section, we analyse how the immigrant groups fared in this decade of economic growth and decline. Figure 6.2 gives an overview of the key indicators of the changing labour market position of native Dutch and ethnic minority workers in the Netherlands from 1994 to 2003. The tables the figures are based on are in the Appendix. The tables in the Appendix also show the differences in employment and unemployment between men and women for each population category.

Figure 6.2 distinguishes three key indicators to describe the changing labour market position of various categories in the Dutch population: gross labour participation, net labour participation and unemployment rates. For each population group, the *gross labour participation* shows the percentage of working age people in the 15 to 64 age group who are either working or unemployed but actively seeking a job and the *net labour participation* shows the percentage of working age people who are actually employed for at least 12 hours a week. The gross labour participation describes all the labour market participants and the net labour participation describes the actual workforce. For each population category, the *unemployment rate* shows the number of unemployed people as a percentage of all the labour market participants.

Figure 6.3: Gross and Net Labour Participation and Unemployment by Ethnic Descent (1994-2003)



Since the mid-1990s, the development of these three labour market position indicators presents a very clear picture. In the early 1990s the labour market participation of non-Western immigrants was still rather

low and their unemployment rates were dramatically high. If the Netherlands was a "welfare state without work" (Esping-Andersen 1996), this was particularly true of these two groups at the time. In particular, Turks and Moroccans exhibited a disastrous combination of low labour market participation and high unemployment. In 1994 only around 40% of the Turkish and Moroccan adults in the Netherlands were on the labour market and less than 30% were gainfully employed. The other two immigrant groups, post-colonial migrants from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles, were doing better on the labour market. In 1994, from 55 to 60% of the working age Surinamese and Antilleans were on the labour market and around 45% of them were gainfully employed. The native Dutch population exhibited a gross labour participation of 63% and a net labour participation of 58%.

The differences in the labour market participation of the various ethnic groups can be explained by several factors: the number of women who are not on the labour market, the age structure of the various groups (a group with numerous school-age children will exhibit low labour market participation) and the number of people who are no longer on the labour market (labour market dropouts), a category that includes the long-term unemployed no longer looking for a new job and the physically disabled due to health problems. All three factors influence the extremely low labour market participation of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands. Many Turkish and Moroccan women are not on the labour market because they work in the household. The Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Netherlands are relatively young and have numerous school-age children. In addition, there is considerable labour market dropout among the former guest workers due to persistent unemployment and widespread health problems. As is noted in this chapter, Turks and Moroccans are thus over-represented among social assistance as well as disability benefit recipients.

The question is however whether and to what extent non-Western immigrants were able to improve their labour market position during the period of economic growth in the second half of the 1990s. In other words, to what extent were immigrant groups able to benefit from this prosperous period in the Dutch economy? As Figure 6.3 shows, non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands were able to improve their labour market position during this period and in part were actually able to catch up with native Dutch. This is especially clear as regards the development of the net labour participation and unemployment rates of

various ethnic groups from 1994 to 2001. As noted above, the total working population in the Netherlands increased by more than 20% in a short period from 1994 to 2002. As Table 6.2 shows, the rise in the number of working people was much larger among various immigrant groups than among the native Dutch. In fact the number of employed immigrant workers in the Netherlands (Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans and other non-Western residents) more than doubled from 1994 to 2002.

Table 6.2. Number of Working People (at least 12 hours a week) (1994-2003)

	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2002	2003
	x 1000						1994=100	
Native Dutch	5,223	5,318	5,617	5,831	5,961	5,954	114	114
Non-Western immigrant	262	318	384	460	523	509	200	194
Turks	51	62	72	92	100	98	196	192
Moroccans	34	44	60	58	82	74	241	218
Surinamese	106	103	119	134	137	139	129	131
Antilleans	21	27	31	42	49	47	233	224
Other non-Western immigrants	50	81	102	134	154	151	308	302
Total	5747	5953	6385	6751	7006	6972	122	121

Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (Labour Force Surveys)

Although these figures may in part also result from population growth as such in the various communities (especially among immigrants from other non-Western countries), the net labour participation of non-Western immigrants also increased. The net labour participation is a more reliable measure for changes in the labour market position since it corrects for population growth as such. As is noted above, in 1994 the net labour participation of Turks and Moroccans was extremely low, with less than 30% of the adults gainfully employed, though by 2002 this figure had increased to around 45%. There are two ways to look at these figures. It can be argued that with less than half the Turkish and Moroccan adults gainfully employed, their labour participation is still very low. It should be acknowledged though that relatively speaking, the net labour market participation of Turks and Moroccans increased very quickly and in part, they have been able to catch up with the native Dutch.

The improved labour market position of immigrants in the Netherlands in the second half of the 1990s is especially clear as regards the third indicator, the unemployment rates. In 1994, unemployment among Turks and Moroccans as well as Surinamese and Antilleans was still very high (about 30 and 20% respectively). From 1994 to 2002 however, unemployment among non-Western immigrants fell to less than 10%. But here as well, there are various ways to look

at these figures. Since unemployment also fell among the native Dutch in this period, it can be argued that relatively speaking, immigrant groups did not improve their situation. In 1994 as well as 2002, unemployment was two to three times as high among immigrant groups as among the native Dutch. This did not change in the 1990s. Other observers stress the considerable or even "spectacular" decline in minority unemployment and argue that at less than 10%, minority unemployment had reached an "acceptable level" (Dagevos 2001 and 2002, Veenman 2003a).

Recent changes in the minority labour market position in the Netherlands (2001-2003)

The conclusion is thus that non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands were indeed able to benefit from the favourable economy in the late 1990s and improve their labour market position. Another question is, however how they fared in the recent recession. The *2003 Report on Minorities* drawn up by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office reported last year that non-Western immigrants (especially Turks and Moroccans) seemed to be less affected by the current recession than the native Dutch. The following table shows the most recent ethnic minority and Dutch unemployment figures.

Table 6.3. Number and Percentage of Unemployed by Ethnic Descent (2001-2003)

	Number of unemployed (x 1000)			Unemployment rate (in %)		
	2001	2003	Difference 2001-03	2001	2003	Difference 2001-03
Native Dutch	172	262	52.3	2.8	4.2	50.0
Turks	9	16	77.8	7.9	14.4	82.3
Moroccans	8	15	87.5	10.1	17.0	68.3
Surinamese	9	15	66.7	6.4	10.0	56.3
Antilleans/Arubans	4	9	125.0	8.6	16.6	93.0
Other Non-Western immigrants	19	29	52.6	11.1	16.3	46,8

Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)

The first two columns show the various groups' absolute unemployment figures for 2001 and 2003. They show that unemployment increased in all non-Western immigrants, but the increase in various groups (Turks, Moroccans and especially Antilleans) was larger than in others. The divergent unemployment rates of the various immigrant groups in the table are also interesting. The rates rose most among Turks, Moroccans and Antilleans (around 80 percentage points or more), and the Surinamese and immigrants from other non-Western countries were more similar to the native Dutch (an

increase in the total number of unemployed people of 50 to 70 percentage points).

The same pattern emerges if we examine the unemployment rates of various ethnic groups rather than the absolute numbers of unemployed people. These data are more reliable because they are not influenced by possible population growth in the categories as such. The large unemployment growth among the Antilleans is thus partly the result of population growth as such (more Antilleans on the labour market) and partly of the rising unemployment rates in the group. The data on changing unemployment rates clearly show that the current recession affects the various ethnic groups in different ways. Although all the ethnic groups have experienced higher unemployment rates in recent years, this was true for some groups more than others. Among the native Dutch, the Surinamese and migrants from other non-Western countries, unemployment rates increased by approximately 50 percentage points from 2001 to 2003. Among the Turks, Moroccans and Antilleans the unemployment rates increased by 70 percentage points or more in the same period. This means last year's finding that Turks and Moroccans were less affected by the current recession appears to be an anomaly.

All in all, the current labour market position of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands is far less favourable than we thought last year. Although we should not forget the major improvements in the minority labour market position in the late 1990s that actually lasted until 2001, most of the recent unemployment figures show that the improvements are rather weak (especially among Turks, Moroccans and Antilleans, though perhaps less among the Surinamese) and that unemployment rates are rising again, although fortunately not to the dramatic levels of the mid-1990s.

Explaining unemployment among non-Western immigrants[20]

Another question is how to explain the higher unemployment rates among non-Western immigrants. Are they due to a shortage of human capital, especially formal education, as human resource theorists tend to believe, or do other factors such as discrimination play a role? The *2003 Report on Minorities* drawn up by the Social and Cultural Planning

[20] This section is completely taken from: Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, *2003 Report on Minorities*, pp. 219-221.

Bureau addresses this question using empirical data from the SVPA and sophisticated statistical techniques. The analysis goes as follows. Regression techniques are used to calculate the extent to which the risk of unemployment among the native Dutch can be explained by general factors such as age, sex and education. The coefficients obtained by these regression analyses show the average chance of a native Dutch person with specific characteristics being unemployed. The coefficients are then used to estimate the unemployment rates among various immigrant groups, assuming that immigrants run the same risk of unemployment as native Dutch people with the same characteristics. This provides an estimated unemployment percentage for each ethnic minority that would apply if a certain age, sex and education meant the same risk of unemployment as they do for the native Dutch. Lastly, the estimated unemployment rates for each ethnic minority group are compared with the actual unemployment rates.

Table 6.4 Actual and Estimated Unemployment Percentages in Non-Western immigrants (2002)

	Turks		Moroccans		Surinamese		Antilleans	
	Actual	Estimated	Actual	Estimated	Actual	Estimated	Actual	Estimated
Total	14	5	14	6	10	5	12	5
Female	18	8	14	9	12	7	16	7
Young people (15-24)	18	10	17	11	30	11	27	11
Education in the Netherlands	9	5	11	5	6	4	7	4
Adequate command of Dutch	9	4	10	5	6	4	9	4
Well-educated (First degree+)	10	3	10	3	4	3	4	3

Source: Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, *2003 Report on Minorities*, p. 211 (based on several surveys)

The results of the analyses are shown in Table 6.4. For each ethnic group, the table shows an estimated unemployment rate, assuming that individual factors such as age, sex and education mean the same risk of unemployment as they do for the native Dutch. If the estimated unemployment rates of immigrants are the same as the actual ones, this means differences in individual characteristics such as age, sex and education are largely responsible for the unemployment differences between immigrants and the native Dutch. If the actual unemployment rates are higher than the estimated ones, the higher unemployment among immigrants cannot be attributed to the differences in individual characteristics alone and other factors play a role.

The data in Table 6.4 clearly show that the actual unemployment among non-Western immigrants is much higher than would be the case if they ran the same risk as the native Dutch of unemployment, given their individual characteristics. The differences between the estimated

and the actual unemployment rates differ however for each ethnic category. This difference is the greatest for the Turks and the least for the Surinamese. In everyday language, this means that even with the same education, non-Western immigrants run more risk of unemployment than the native Dutch. In other words, non-Western immigrants benefit less from their human capital than the native Dutch. This is most true of Turks and least true of the Surinamese. Another finding shown in the table is that minority women and younger people are much more frequently unemployed than one would expect on the basis of their individual characteristics.

According to the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, the differences between non-Western immigrants and the native Dutch can mainly be attributed to the fact that non-Western immigrants had most of their education outside the Netherlands and are less competent in Dutch language. The differences between the estimated and actual unemployment rates of immigrants are much smaller if the analysis only includes minority members whose Dutch and educational qualifications are good. However, even then the actual unemployment rate of Turks and Moroccans is higher than would be estimated based on individual characteristics such as age, sex and education. This is also the case with Turks and Moroccans with Dutch diplomas, a good command of the Dutch language or a higher education. Even then, the unemployment rate among Turks and Moroccans is considerably higher than among the native Dutch *with the same characteristics*.

There are however only slight differences between the estimated and actual unemployment levels of the Surinamese with favourable individual characteristics, particularly with high qualifications. According to the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, this is a clear indication of the improved Surinamese labour market position in recent years. Surinamese who speak good Dutch, are highly qualified and were educated in the Netherlands barely run a greater risk of unemployment than the native Dutch with comparable characteristics. Generally speaking, this is also true of Antilleans. However, these rather favourable outcomes do not apply to all the Surinamese and Antilleans. Young Surinamese and Antilleans are in a much less favourable situation. Given their individual characteristics, unemployment among young Surinamese and Antilleans should be about 10%. In reality this figure is much higher.

6.4 Non-Western immigrants and social benefits

Another way to describe the ethnic minority labour market position is by the extent to which they are on social assistance or disability benefits. The picture presented in this analysis differs slightly from the earlier analyses of the labour market participation and unemployment of non-Western immigrants. Figures on labour market participation only give information on people who either work or are actively looking for a job. Figures on social assistance or disability benefit recipients also provide information on people who have left the labour market and are no longer actively seeking a job. Many labour market dropouts have been on social assistance or disability benefits for years. One might say that in the Netherlands in the late 1990s, it was not so much unemployment (people not having a job but actively seeking one) as the large labour market dropout that has been the main socio-economic problem. A large percentage of the Dutch potential workforce (the entire 15-64 age group) has actually left the labour market, especially due to the extremely high disability rates in the Netherlands.

In this section we describe the distribution of social assistance or disability benefit recipients over various ethnic groups. As in the previous section, ethnic descent is defined by people's birth country or their parents' birth country. Non-Western immigrants are comprised of e all the first and second-generation immigrants from non-Western countries. In this section we also analyse how the first generation of immigrants differ in social benefit dependency from the second generation. In the analyses we examine three kinds of benefits, i.e. social assistance[21], unemployment and disability benefits[22]. In the analyses we only include social assistance recipients younger than 65.

At the end of 2002, the Netherlands had slightly more than 1.5 million social benefit recipients. This means almost 14% of the working age population (15-64) was on some kind of benefit at the time (figures from 2003 are not available yet). This high number of benefit recipients (given an employed working population of about 7 million people) is sometimes referred to as the dark side of the Dutch miracle. Although official unemployment was rather low in the Netherlands in

[21] National assistance (ABW) and special benefits for the long-term unemployed (IOAW/IOAZ).

[22] They include disability benefits for working people (WAO), entrepreneurs (WAZ) and people who were never able to work due to physical or mental health problems.

the late 1990s, there was a large labour market dropout. Given the high degree of ethnic minority inactivity, it is hardly surprising that they should be strongly over-represented among the social benefit recipients as well. No less than 12.5% of the working age Dutch population received some kind of benefit and the percentage of ethnic minority benefit recipients was almost twice as high (23.1%). Almost one in four ethnic minority working age adults was on some social benefit in 2002 (see Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4. Benefit Recipients by Ethnic Descent (1999 and 2002) (in %)



Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)

Figure 6.4 shows that in all the minority groups, the percentage of benefit recipients was slightly higher in 1999 than in 2002. This means immigrants were able to improve their social position at the end of the period of economic growth in the Netherlands and that in 2002 they had not been affected yet by the new recession. This may have changed in 2003. There are differences in the percentages of benefit recipients in the various immigrant groups. The percentage is highest among Turks and Moroccans. At the end of 2002, about 29% of the Turkish and Moroccan adults received some kind of benefit. For the Surinamese, Antilleans and other non-Western immigrants, the percentage of benefit recipients was lower (around 20%), but still significantly higher than among the native Dutch (13%).

Figure 6.4 also reveals the type of benefit involved. In the Netherlands the large number of disability benefits (almost a million benefits and a working population of only seven million) is a matter of

great political concern. Figure 6.4 shows that the percentage of disability benefit recipients is especially high among Turks. At the end of 2002, 14% of the Turkish adults received a disability benefit. The percentage of disability benefit recipients was significantly lower in all the other ethnic groups: 10% among Moroccans, 9% among the Surinamese and the native Dutch and much lower still among Antilleans and immigrants from other non-Western countries. Earlier studies show however that the over-representation of Turks and Moroccans among disability benefit recipients is much larger if one takes into account that the number of working people entitled to disability benefits is relatively small in these groups. The over-representation of Turks and Moroccans, male and female alike, among disability benefit recipients can be explained by a variety of factors:

- *Low educational level* of Turks and Moroccans, so that that they often do unskilled work with a relatively high risk of health problems and disability
- *Industrial restructuring*, so that many Turkish and Moroccan men lost their jobs when industries closed down and were offered a relatively favourable disability benefit instead of an unemployment benefit and social assistance after a few years
- *General stress* of being an unskilled immigrant in a Western country, causing mental heath problems among the Turkish and Moroccan population
- *Cultural factors* such as a different perception of illness and different behaviour during illness (Snel et al. 2002).

In addition to disability benefits, non-Western immigrants are over-represented among social assistance recipients as well. A total of 2.5% of the native Dutch adults were on social assistance in 2002, as compared with approximately 16% of the Moroccan, Antillean and other non-Western adults, 12% of the Turkish and10% of the Surinamese adults. In 1999, the percentage of social assistance recipients among these minority groups was even considerably higher. Here again, various factors can explain why non-Western immigrants receive benefits so much more often than the native Dutch:

- *Low educational level* and industrial restructuring. Since many of the former guest workers specifically came to the Netherlands to do unskilled work in factories, they often became redundant when the

factories closed down and due to the more general tendency in the West of upgrading the employment structure. Although unskilled industrial jobs have partly been replaced by unskilled service jobs, they are not jobs many Turks and Moroccans have.

- *Single-parent households*. One in seven Surinamese and one in four Antillean women are benefit recipients. Many of them are single mothers on social assistance, a fairly common phenomenon in these two population groups, due in part to the cultural tradition of matrifocality among Creole-Caribbean immigrants.
- *Illness*. As is noted above, many Turks and Moroccans receive disability benefits. However, because of the specific regulations of the Dutch disability arrangements, low wage-earners are often not eligible for disability benefits, in which case they often end up on social assistance.

Figure 6.5. Benefit Recipients by Ethnic Descent and Generation (1999 and 2002)



Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)

Figure 6.5 shows the percentages of benefit recipients among first and second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants are foreign-born and second-generation immigrants are born in the Netherlands of two foreign-born parents. The figure shows significant differences in the extent of benefit assistance dependency between first and second-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants are far more often benefit recipients than their children of the second generation. The differences can be partly explained by differences in age. Since the second generation is often much younger than the first,

although young immigrants are still coming to the Netherlands, they are less often unemployed or ill. The second generation is also more integrated into Dutch society. They are better educated, often in the Netherlands, and speak better Dutch than their parents and as a result are less often dependent on benefits. Both factors probably play a role.

Figure 6.5 also shows that the differences between the first and second generation in the percentage of benefit recipients are not the same in all immigrant groups. Moroccans exhibit the largest difference between the first and second generation: the percentage of first-generation Moroccan benefit recipients is four times higher than of the second generation. The fact that the second generation does so much better than the first may be less the result of the successful integration of Moroccan youth into Dutch society than of their parents' lack of integration. The percentage of Surinamese benefit recipients is only 2.5 times higher in the first generation than the second. This shows that the Surinamese youth are not doing so much better than their parents, but it also shows that first-generation Surinamese immigrants are not doing that badly in the Netherlands.

6.5 Labour position of non-Western immigrants

Our emphasis up to now has been on labour market participation as such and whether minority workers are on the labour market or not. But as we see in Table 6.2, the number of minority workers has increased considerably since the mid-1990s. This makes us wonder to what extent minority workers have been able to improve their social position in recent years. This is why we now address the development of the occupational levels of native Dutch and minority workers, the economic branches they work in, the type of labour contracts they have (steady or flexible jobs) and how many hours they work.

The best indicator of whether minority workers have been able to improve their labour position is to look at their occupational levels (Figure 6.6, tables in the Appendix).

Figure 6.6. Native Dutch and Minority Workers by Occupational Level (1996 and 2002) (in %)



Source: Netherlands Statistics, Labour Surveys 1996 and 2002 (our own computations)

As the figure demonstrates, Turkish and Moroccan workers are especially over-represented in unskilled and lower-level occupations and this only changed marginally in the 1990s. In 1996, 70% of the male and female Turkish and Moroccan workers were in unskilled and lower-level occupations, as compared with 32% of the native Dutch workers. Six years later in 2002, the percentage of Turkish and Moroccan workers in lower-level occupations had dropped to just above 60%. But since the percentage of native Dutch workers fell in these occupations as well, the over-representation of Turks and Moroccans at the lowest occupational levels remained more or less the same. At the high end, the percentage of Turks and Moroccans in high-level or academic occupations rose from 7% in 1996 to 10% in 2002, but was still very low, since the percentage of native Dutch workers in high-level and academic occupations rose from 27% in 1996 to 31% in 2002. As regards the figures by gender, Turkish and Moroccan women are even more over-represented in lower-level occupations than Turkish and Moroccan men (figures in Appendix).

Figure 6.6 also shows that other immigrant groups (Surinamese, Antilleans and other non-Western groups) are over-represented in the lower-level occupations, but to a much lesser extent than Turks and Moroccans. The percentage of Surinamese and Antillean workers in unskilled and lower-level occupations fell from 43% in 1996 to 39% in 2002 (1.4 times more than native Dutch workers in both years).

Surinamese and Antillean women tend to be less over-represented in lower-level occupations than Surinamese and Antillean men. In fact the occupational distribution of Surinamese and Antillean women is quite similar to that of native Dutch women (figures in Appendix). The occupational distribution of other non-Western groups is in between those of Turks and Moroccans and Surinamese and Antilleans. Although on the average the other non-Western groups came later to the Netherlands than Turks and Moroccans, their occupational position is better, mainly because of the highly educated immigrants among them, especially asylum-seekers.

Table 6.5: Working Population (15-64) by Ethnic Origin and Industrial Branch (1996 and 2002) (in %)

	All groups 1)	Native Dutch	Turks & Moroccans	Surinamese & Antilleans	Other non-Western groups
2002					
Total (x 1000)	**(7,125)**	**(5,961)**	**(182)**	**(186)**	**(154)**
Agriculture, fishing	2.9	3.3	3.8	0.5	0.6
Building and industries	20.6	20.7	25.3	17.7	18.8
Trade and repair of consumers articles	14.4	14.6	18.1	12.4	13.6
Hotels, restaurants, etc.	3.1	2.7	5.5	5.4	13.6
Transport and communication	5.8	5.6	6.6	7.0	7.1
Commercial and financial services	16.1	15.6	16.5	17.7	17.5
Local and other government services	7.7	7.8	4.9	11.3	5.2
Education, health and other public services	23.8	24.3	15.9	23.1	17.5
Other sectors	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.3
Unknown	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.8	5.8
1996					
Total (x1000)	**(6,185)**	**(5,318)**	**(106)**	**(130)**	**(81)**
Agriculture, fishing	3.9	4.3	3.8	0.8	2.5
Building and industries	23.2	22.9	37.7	20.0	24.7
Trade and repair of consumers articles	15.4	15.8	15.1	12.3	13.6
Hotels, restaurants, etc.	2.8	2.4	3.8	3.1	16.0
Transport and communication	6.3	6.4	4.7	8.5	4.9
Commercial and financial services	13.9	13.7	14.2	16.2	12.3
(Local) government	8.1	8.1	4.7	9.2	4.9
Education, health and other public services	22.2	22.4	14.2	23.8	14.8
Other sectors	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.5	1.2
Unknown	2.2	2.1	2.8	2.3	3.7

1)Includes ethnic origin unknown
Source: Netherlands Statistics, *Labour Surveys* (1996 and 2002)

Table 6.5 shows which industrial branches native Dutch and minority workers are in. As is expected, Turks and Moroccans still largely work in traditional industries and building. In 2002, one in four of the Turks and Moroccans worked in these branches. Six years earlier in 1996, the percentage of Turks and Moroccans working in traditional industries or building was even higher (37%). This illustrates the vulnerable labour market position of these minority groups. They still largely work in economic branches with fewer and fewer jobs. They barely have any access to branches with growing employment, such as the service industry. It is true however that in 2002, 18% of the Turks and Moroccans and 12% of the Surinamese and Antilleans worked in the retail trade. Another positive point is that all the minority groups

apparently found access to jobs working for local governments including subsidized job schemes.

Table 6.6: Employees with Steady and Flexible Jobs by Ethnic Origin (2003)

	All employees	With steady jobs	With flexible jobs		
			All flexible jobs	Via employ-ment agencies	On call for work
	x 1000	In %			
Native Dutch	5256	93.5	6.5	1.8	1.6
All minority groups	468	84.4	15.6	6.6	2.8
Turks	88	84.1	15.9	8.0	2.3
Moroccans	71	81.7	18.3	5.6	4.2
Surinamese	133	87.2	12.8	5.3	2.3
Antilleans	44	88.6	11.4	6.8	2.3
Other non-Western groups	132	81.8	18.2	7.6	3.0

Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)

Table 6.6 distinguishes employees with various ethnic backgrounds with steady and flexible jobs. Steady jobs are of unlimited duration and the employee works a set number of hours a week or a month. Flexible jobs are for a limited duration and/or irregular hours. Flexible jobs can be via temporary employment agencies or for work on call. Table 6.6 shows that flexible jobs are much more common among minority than native Dutch workers: 94% of native Dutch workers have steady jobs, as compared with only 82 to 84% of Moroccan and Turkish workers and 87 to 88% of Surinamese and Antillean workers. The percentages of flexible jobs among minority workers is twice as high for Surinamese and Antillean workers and three times as high for Moroccans as for native Dutch workers. Turks in particular often work for temporary employment agencies, which of course means a great deal of uncertainty, especially in recessions. People who work via temporary employment agencies are often the first to be dismissed when the economy gets worse.

Table 6.7: Employees by Working Hours and Ethnic Origin (2003)

	total	< 12 hours a week	12-19 hours a week	20-34 hours a week	> 35 hours a week
			x 1000		In %
Native Dutch	6,659	10.6	8.3	24.0	57.1
All minority groups	565	9.9	7.3	21.1	61.6
Turks	110	10.0	5.5	17.3	66.4
Moroccans	81	8.6	9.9	14.8	66.7
Surinamese	150	7.3	8.0	22.0	62.7
Antilleans	51	7.8	5.9	25.5	58.8
Other non-Western groups	173	12.7	6.9	24.3	56.1

Source: Netherlands Statistics, Statline (our own computations)

Table 6.7 shows the 'working hour regimes' of native Dutch and minority workers. Unexpectedly, we see that minority workers, in particular Turks and Moroccans, have full-time jobs (at least 36 hours a

week) more often than native Dutch workers. Native Dutch women in particular tend to work part-time at small part-time jobs (less than 20 hours a week) or larger part-time jobs (20 to 34 hours a week).

6.6 Explaining the weaker minority labour market position

Although non-Western immigrants did improve their labour market position in the 1990s, it is still weak. Non-Western immigrants participate less on the labour market, are more often unemployed and benefit recipients than the native Dutch. Minority members who do work tend to be over-represented in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs that are flexible and often uncertain. This persistent weak labour market position is particularly true of the former guest workers and their families from Turkey and Morocco and less so of post-colonial migrants from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. In this section we review some explanations for the weak minority labour market position. Although most minority research is descriptive, some studies make an effort to explain the weak minority position (see Veenman 1997, Dagevos 1998, Dagevos et al. 1999, Odé 2002). We would now like to present a brief summary of the research findings.

The most important finding is that no single factor can explain the persistent poor minority position on the labour market, since a combination of factors is involved. The most important one is probably the lack of *individual qualifications* (education, work experience, command of Dutch). The high risk of minority unemployment can largely though not completely be explained by the lower minority educational level and other supply characteristics. Generally speaking, this is also why non-Western immigrants are over-represented in less qualified occupations than the native Dutch. With a better education completed in the Netherlands and a better command of Dutch, some of the labour market differences between the non-Western immigrants and the native Dutch would disappear. Inadequate individual qualifications do not however completely explain the differences. If we compare the non-Western immigrants with the native Dutch using comparable characteristics, the risk of unemployment and the chance of a lower level of employment are both higher among immigrant groups. In other words, they benefit less from their human capital. This

is much more the case with Turks and Moroccans than the Surinamese and Antilleans.

Another factor to explain the poor minority labour market position pertains to *economic circumstances*. Minority labour market participation and unemployment generally fluctuates with the economic climate. The same is true of the native Dutch but there is one important difference. In the 1990s, the immigrant groups were relatively late to benefit from the improving economic situation and the first to suffer from the recession. This can be explained using the *theory of labour queuing*. Non-Western immigrants, in particular Turks and Moroccans, are at the back of the supply queue because employers view them as the least productive. In a period of economic growth, job-seekers who are considered more productive are the first to find a job. Only if the supply of preferred workers has dried up do those at the back of the queue get a chance. And in periods of recession, the less attractive jobs disappear first and those at the back of the queue are the first to become unemployed.

Structural factors also play a role in explaining the weaker minority labour market position. Many of the current non-Western immigrants originally came to the Netherlands as guest workers and found jobs at Dutch factories. This made them exceptionally vulnerable when the Netherlands got caught up in the process of industrial restructuring, particularly after 1980. When factories closed down and numerous unskilled and semi-skilled jobs disappeared in the Netherlands, the new immigrants witnessed high levels of unemployment. The growth in employment in the 1980s was mostly in the service sector and pertained to better-qualified jobs. Non-Western immigrants with their low level of education were not qualified for these jobs (labour market mismatch). In addition, there were increasing numbers of unskilled or semi-skilled service occupations – the Swedish sociologist Esping-Andersen (1993) refers to the upcoming *service proletariat* in the advanced Western economies – but women have greater access to these jobs than men. The result is that native Dutch, Surinamese and Antillean women are benefiting from the growth in employment in the unskilled or semi-skilled service occupations, but Turkish and Moroccan men are not. Turkish and Moroccan women are barely active on the labour market anyway.

Cultural factors also contribute to the weak position of non-Western immigrants. They are highly controversial, but it is only logical that the

sustained low labour market participation of Turks and Moroccans is partly a consequence of their cultural resistance to the notion of women working. More generally, the extent to which the unfavourable minority labour market position is due to the fact that these groups are generally less oriented to Dutch society has been investigated (Odé 2002). The study reveals that in addition to their poor educational level and poor command of Dutch language, the minority cultural orientation also affects their labour market participation and the occupational level they achieve. In this study, cultural orientation pertains to the extent to which non-Western immigrants support typically modern values such as individualization and emancipation. In addition, the level of contact with the native Dutch has an important influence on minority employment chances and the occupational level they achieve. Having typically Western or modern views and maintaining informal contact also affect the risk of employment and the occupational level achieved.[23]

Another factor contributing to the poor position of non-Western immigrants on the labour market might be that they have *less effective social networks*. In the Netherlands many jobs are distributed via informal social contact rather than employment agencies or advertisements. But to benefit from this, job seekers need to have informal contact with people who give access to jobs or provide useful information about jobs, and this means people who are actively engaged in the employment process and these are likely to be native Dutch. The study by Odé (2002) shows that contact with native Dutch people increases the chance of a job and the occupational level of non-Western immigrants.

One last significant explanation for the poor minority position is *discrimination* on the labour market (Veenman 2003b). Extensive research has been conducted to ascertain whether there is discrimination according to ethnic descent on the Dutch labour market (see overview: Veenman 2003). Bovenkerk conducted a classic study on labour market discrimination. He sent native Dutch and non-Dutch

[23] Of course the nature of the contact should be considered. Do some ethnic minority members have modern views and informal contact with Dutch people *because* they work and are highly educated? Or is the opposite true and do they work and are they better educated *because* they have modern views and informal contact with Dutch people? Only in the latter case can cultural orientation and social contact be considered a reason for the greater chance of a job and higher level of education of some ethnic minority members. Using panel data, Odé (2002) confirms this second scenario. Modern worldviews precede getting an education and having a job.

job applicants with exactly the same qualifications for a job interview. In 20% of the cases, a Surinamese or Spanish applicant did not get the job, but a native Dutch one with the same qualifications did. According to Bovenkerk this is indicative of discrimination. However, this conclusion has been contested. The employers might have had reasonable arguments to hire the native Dutch rather than the minority applicant (e.g. previous experience with Surinamese employees or the idea that customers would rather not be helped by minority staff).

Another way to investigate possible discrimination is via the decomposition method comparing, for example, the risk of unemployment among native Dutch and minority workers with similar individual characteristics such as educational level. Section 7.3 includes an example of this method. This method has been repeatedly used in the Netherlands and the outcome has always been a higher minority risk of unemployment and lower minority occupational positions, which can only be partly explained by an inadequate educational level. An unexplained remnant still remains that is not associated with the low minority educational level. This unexplained remnant was initially associated with discrimination, but this is not necessarily the case. In addition to their educational level and discrimination, the greater risk of unemployment and lower occupational level of migrants could also be due to other factors such as language proficiency, searching behaviour of job seekers, communication skills and so forth.

Veenman (2003b) notes that research shows that discrimination does occur in the Netherlands and has a negative effect on the minority labour market position, although we do not precisely know to what extent. He believes there are indications that labour market discrimination has decreased in recent years in the Netherlands, perhaps because of the favourable economic growth and resulting shortages on the labour market. If employers have a hard time finding employees, they cannot afford to reject people on the basis of ethnic descent. It remains to be seen whether discrimination will resurface in the present recession.

Appendices for Chapter 6

Table A6.6: Gross Labour Participation by Ethnic Descent* 1994-2003

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total population										
Native Dutch	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	69	70	70
Of foreign descent	55	57	57	58	59	59	60	61	61	62
Western	61	62	62	64	64	65	66	66	66	68
non-Western	49	51	51	52	53	53	54	55	56	57
Turkish	42	43	45	45	45	46	49	52	51	54
Moroccan	40	43	43	45	48	46	39	47	51	56
Surinamese	59	61	62	61	66	65	69	66	67	68
Antillean	55	57	58	58	57	62	60	59	63	64
other non-Western	50	49	51	53	49	50	52	53	53	53
Total	62	63	64	65	65	66	67	68	68	69
Male										
Native Dutch	77	78	78	79	80	80	80	81	81	81
Of foreign descent	68	69	69	69	70	70	71	70	71	72
Western	74	74	73	74	75	75	77	76	77	78
non-Western	61	63	63	63	64	64	65	65	66	67
Turkish	58	59	59	61	60	61	67	67	66	69
Moroccan	53	59	59	60	63	63	54	61	65	64
Surinamese	67	70	71	65	72	71	77	71	72	75
Antillean	67	69	67	62	70	76	66	68	70	72
other non-Western	61	59	61	64	59	61	63	63	63	61
Total	75	76	77	77	78	78	79	79	79	79
Female										
Native Dutch	48	50	51	53	54	55	56	57	59	60
Of foreign descent	42	45	46	47	47	48	49	51	50	52
Western	47	51	52	53	53	55	56	58	56	58
non-Western	36	38	38	40	41	40	41	44	45	46
Turkish	23	27	29	27	27	30	30	36	35	36
Moroccan	25	21	22	27	29	27	22	31	34	34
Surinamese	50	52	54	56	61	61	62	62	61	62
Antillean	44	47	50	53	48	49	54	51	57	57
other non-Western	35	36	38	40	38	36	39	41	40	43
Total	48	49	50	52	53	54	55	56	57	58

* first and second-generation immigrants = of foreign descent

Table A6.7: Net Labour Participation by Ethnic Descent 1994-2003

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total population										
Native Dutch	58	60	61	63	64	66	67	67	68	67
Of foreign descent	46	47	48	50	53	54	55	57	56	56
Western	54	55	56	58	60	62	63	63	63	63
non-Western	37	37	40	42	44	46	48	50	50	49
Turkish	29	30	34	35	37	40	44	48	46	46
Moroccan	29	29	31	35	38	39	34	42	46	41
Surinamese	47	49	53	52	59	59	63	62	61	61
Antillean	43	44	46	45	50	53	55	54	57	54
other non-Western	35	33	38	39	41	42	45	47	45	44
Total	57	58	59	60	62	64	65	65	66	65
Male										
Native Dutch	73	74	75	76	78	79	79	80	79	78
Of foreign descent	56	57	59	60	63	64	66	66	66	65
Western	67	67	67	69	72	72	74	73	74	73
non-Western	45	46	49	49	53	56	58	59	59	57
Turkish	41	43	46	49	51	53	61	61	59	61
Moroccan	36	41	44	45	51	53	47	56	59	53
Surinamese	54	56	62	57	63	63	71	66	67	68
Antillean	53	56	53	50	60	66	60	61	64	57
other non-Western	42	41	46	47	49	53	55	56	54	50
Total	70	72	72	74	75	76	77	77	77	75
Female										
Native Dutch	43	45	46	48	50	52	54	55	56	57
Of foreign descent	35	37	39	40	42	43	44	47	46	47
Western	40	44	45	47	48	51	51	54	52	54
non-Western	28	28	30	32	34	34	36	40	40	40
Turkish	16	17	21	21	22	26	26	34	32	29
Moroccan	20	14	15	23	24	22	19	26	31	28
Surinamese	40	44	45	48	54	54	55	59	56	56
Antillean	34	33	39	41	39	42	50	48	50	51
other non-Western	25	24	28	30	31	28	34	36	35	38
Total	42	44	45	47	49	51	52	54	54	55

* first and second-generation immigrants = of foreign descent

Table A6.8: Unemployment Rate by Ethnic Descent 1994-2003

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total population										
Native Dutch	7	7	6	5	4	3	3	3	3	4
Of foreign descent	17	17	15	14	10	9	8	7	8	10
Western	11	11	10	9	7	5	5	5	5	7
non-Western	25	26	22	21	16	14	11	9	11	14
Turkish	30	31	24	22	16	13	9	8	9	14
Moroccan	29	32	28	22	20	16	13	10	10	17
Surinamese	19	19	15	14	12	10	9	6	8	10
Antillean	22	23	21	21	16	14	9	9	10	17
other non-Western	31	32	25	26	17	16	14	11	14	16
Total	8	8	8	7	5	4	4	3	4	5
Male										
Native Dutch	5	5	4	3	3	2	2	2	3	4
Of foreign descent	17	16	14	13	10	8	6	6	7	11
Western	9	9	8	8	5	4	3	3	4	7
non-Western	27	26	22	21	16	13	10	9	11	15
Turkish	30	28	23	21	15	12	8	8	10	12
Moroccan	33	31	26	24	20	16	12	8	10	17
Surinamese	19	20	13	13	12	10	7	8	7	9
Antillean	21	18	20	20	14	13	8	10	8	21
other non-Western	32	31	25	27	17	14	13	11	14	18
Total	7	6	6	5	4	3	3	3	3	5
Female										
Native Dutch	10	10	10	8	7	5	5	4	4	5
Of foreign descent	18	19	16	15	12	10	10	7	8	10
Western	15	14	12	11	9	7	8	6	7	7
non-Western	23	27	23	20	16	15	13	9	10	14
Turkish	31	39	27	24	18	14	13	7	8	20
Moroccan	18	37	34	17	19	17	16	15	9	18
Surinamese	20	17	16	14	12	11	11	5	9	11
Antillean	23	29	22	23	18	14	9	7	11	11
other non-Western	27	33	25	25	18	21	14	12	13	13
Total	11	11	11	9	7	6	5	5	5	6

* first and second-generation immigrants = of foreign descent

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Appendices

Table B.1.1. NETHERLANDS, inflows of foreign population by nationality

Thousands

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
United Kingdom	6,496	4,971	3,537	3,650	4,341	4,327	4,741	5,018	5,855	5,886	4,829	4,079
Germany	7,107	7,446	6,146	4,655	5,695	5,693	4,746	4,491	4,855	5,064	5,091	4,814
Turkey	9,146	7,757	4,280	4,757	6,399	6,522	5,120	4,215	4,517	4,804	5,434	6,193
Morocco	7,150	5,877	3,192	3,100	4,272	4,500	5,310	4,427	4,160	4,900	4,919	4,497
United States	2,910	2,606	2,209	2,202	3,145	3,112	3,274	3,343	3,365	3,118	3,042	2,533
France	1,795	1,549	1,433	..	1,719	2,052	2,059	2,022	2,166	2,158	2,037	1,850
Suriname	6,885	7,840	2,890	1,716	2,755	2,595	3,200	1,802	2,067	2,196	2,171	2,390
Belgium	2,248	1,987	1,699	1,309	1,949	2,213	1,933	1,995	1,953	1,834	1,800	1,667
China	..	1,098	1,024	..	1,305	1,643	1,388	1,273	1,824	2,816	3,428	3,772
Italy	0,970	1,013	0,870	..	1,153	1,244	1,381	1,503	1,525	1,524	1,447	1,333
Poland	1,426	1,310	0,758	..	1,385	1,397	1,464	0,891	1,316	1,437	1,593	1,530
Japan	..	1,011	1,103	..	1,253	1,206	1,220	1,317	1,291	1,302	1,310	1,265
Spain	..	..	..	..	1,011	1,264	1,157	1,182	1,286	1,362	1,394	1,303
Iran	..	..	..	..	..	1,576	0,290	0,307	0,392	0,466	0,381	0,427
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	1,392	0,285	0,182	0,137	0,780	0,058	0,033
Former Yugoslavia	4,856	8,912	8,449	7,349	3,383	1,578	1,421	0,735	1,392	1,135	0,845	0,849
Indonesia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,443	1,563	1,585	1,386
Other countries	32,033	34,196	30,834	38,234	37,412	34,422	42,712	43,662	51,839	52,162	45,255	33,645
Total	**83,022**	**87,573**	**68,424**	**66,972**	**77,177**	**76,736**	**81,701**	**78,365**	**91,383**	**94,507**	**86,619**	**73,566**
Of which: EU	22,251	19,725	15,995	14,794	19,225	20,287	19,909	20,439	22,060	22,412	21,044	19,126

Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

1. EU: European Union 15 for all years.

Year 2000/2003 Note Former Yugoslavia : contains immigrants with nationality of Bosnia, Croatia,FR Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Slovenia

Table B 1.2. NETHERLANDS, outflows of foreign population by nationality

Thousands

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Germany	2,880	2,998	3,185	2,858	3,530	3,060	3,047	2,995	3,219	2,956	3,081	2,811
United Kingdom	2,424	2,589	2,796	2,932	2,480	2,320	2,617	2,468	2,363	2,101	2,202	2,433
United States	1,879	1,913	1,832	1,527	1,940	2,201	1,789	1,836	1,747	1,667	1,782	1,687
Japan	..	0,865	0,920	..	1,098	1,081	0,997	1,113	1,067	1,054	1,234	1,085
Belgium	1,325	1,099	1,344	0,853	1,215	1,145	0,970	0,955	0,990	1,000	0,996	1,046
France	0,834	0,699	0,789	..	0,773	0,786	0,773	0,787	0,961	0,861	0,974	1,058
Turkey	1,814	1,744	1,630	1,581	1,472	1,130	0,930	0,686	0,627	0,522	0,445	0,664
Italy	0,502	0,433	0,498	..	0,503	0,520	0,550	0,612	0,640	0,644	0,682	0,818
Morocco	1,027	1,099	1,151	1,100	1,049	0,843	0,602	0,500	0,404	0,436	0,372	0,379
Poland	..	1,192	0,217	..	0,311	0,368	0,398	0,341	0,304	0,360	0,307	0,407
China	..	0,121	0,165	..	0,179	0,196	0,212	0,212	0,194	0,209	0,355	0,452
Suriname	0,661	0,625	0,520	0,392	0,327	0,317	0,255	0,172	0,167	0,109	0,126	0,154
Former Yugoslavia	0,306	0,332	0,322	..	0,350	0,359	0,387	0,143	0,354	0,306	0,301	0,354
Indonesia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0,240	0,259	0,362	0,401
Other countries	9,081	6,494	7,377	10,430	7,177	7,614	7,739	7,845	7,450	7,913	7,938	8,121
Total	**22,733**	**22,203**	**22,746**	**21,673**	**22,404**	**21,940**	**21,266**	**20,665**	**20,727**	**20,397**	**21,157**	**21,870**
Of which: EU	10,017	10,497	10,444	10,034	10,659	10,023	10,286	10,126	10,810	10,154	10,645	10,830

Note: Data are from population registers. For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

1. European Union 15 for all years.

Table B.1.4. NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign-born population by country of birth

Thousands	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Turkey	..	165,960	165,977	167,498	169,284	172,662	175,476	178,027	181,865	186,204	190,488	194,615
Suriname	..	182,921	180,894	180,961	181,568	182,234	184,184	184,979	186,469	188,002	189,007	189,732
Morocco	..	139,402	139,772	140,734	142,683	145,753	149,618	152,693	155,819	159,757	163,422	166,607
Indonesia	..	183,651	180,426	177,668	174,762	172,134	170,327	168,011	165,781	163,853	161,443	158,804
Germany	..	129,385	131,223	130,127	128,048	126,797	125,540	124,237	123,110	122,074	120,573	119,002
Former Yugoslavia	..	29,726	37,172	43,779	46,094	46,717	47,541	50,535	53,865	55,878	56,157	55,497
United Kingdom	..	44,841	43,251	42,306	41,714	42,312	42,677	43,627	45,670	47,937	48,502	48,267
Belgium	..	44,038	43,216	43,252	43,329	43,954	44,600	45,343	46,003	46,473	46,847	47,052
Iraq	..	4,753	7,426	10,206	14,446	20,356	27,297	29,892	33,748	35,981	35,793	35,968
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	7,184	10,754	14,619	19,842	24,277	28,470	30,959	32,143
Former USSR	..	5,651	6,612	8,380	10,138	11,707	13,721	16,131	21,559	27,062	30,791	32,802
China	..	15,219	15,218	16,106	16,910	18,019	19,386	20,629	22,706	25,786	28,686	31,455
Iran	..	10,840	12,657	14,879	17,264	18,488	19,267	20,082	21,469	23,246	24,154	24,171
United States	..	16,955	17,120	17,443	17,923	18,618	19,464	20,349	21,356	22,051	22,543	22,594
Poland	..	12,422	12,887	13,550	14,348	15,073	15,933	16,319	17,351	18,627	20,095	21,177
Somalia	..	11,931	14,904	17,171	19,819	20,611	21,047	21,433	21,720	21,084	19,560	17,381
France	..	15,347	15,354	15,422	15,784	16,494	17,240	17,923	18,657	19,302	19,518	19,570
Spain	..	17,488	17,478	17,399	17,439	17,622	17,886	18,047	18,273	18,570	18,666	18,624
Italy	..	15,571	15,383	15,463	15,583	15,936	15,933	16,741	17,207	17,587	17,749	17,666
South Africa	..	..	..	..	..	..	10,141	10,639	11,286	11,984	12,264	12,292
Ghana	..	10,206	9,685	9,617	9,783	10,204	10,637	10,880	11,201	11,484	11,798	12,105
Vietnam	..	9,935	9,578	9,671	9,830	9,984	10,216	10,389	10,646	11,098	11,656	12,006
India	..	9,477	9,165	9,318	9,483	9,878	10,405	10,735	11,074	11,421	11,616	11,829
Portugal	..	9,136	8,951	8,975	8,908	8,975	9,222	9,685	10,218	10,969	11,510	11,954
Cape verde	..	..	..	..	10,632	10,813	10,972	11,012	11,053	11,227	11,340	11,443
Pakistan	..	9,552	9,620	9,791	9,987	10,154	10,268	10,512	10,827	10,991	11,096	11,054
Colombia	..	..	..	..	..	..	8,584	8,956	9,588	10,215	10,820	11,312
Hong Kong (China)	..	..	..	..	..	..	10,457	10,451	10,442	10,450	10,458	10,410
Sri Lanka	..	7,178	7,432	7,868	8,048	8,401	8,789	9,231	9,720	10,135	10,418	10,402
Egypt	..	7,779	7,607	7,824	8,003	8,331	8,807	9,156	9,459	9,908	10,381	10,814
Australia	..	..	..	..	8,645	8,687	8,967	9,209	9,529	9,932	10,141	10,203
Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,867	3,474	4,646	6,451	9,804	10,124
Brazil	..	..	..	..	..	..	7,400	7,833	8,301	8,800	9,258	9,783
Canada	..	..	..	..	..	..	8,045	8,203	8,427	8,718	8,817	8,829
Thailand	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,637	6,089	6,793	7,522	8,329	9,103
Ethiopia	..	6,379	6,740	7,034	7,052	7,119	7,198	7,341	7,592	7,874	8,059	8,050
Philippines	..	4,997	5,115	5,462	5,836	6,182	6,492	6,726	7,117	7,522	7,959	8,366
Greece	..	6,632	6,565	6,477	6,470	6,720	6,861	7,110	7,375	7,682	7,917	7,995
Dominican Republic	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,286	5,639	6,107	6,519	6,819	6,949
Austria	..	..	..	..	..	..	6,798	6,797	6,746	6,755	6,683	6,615
Sudan	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,712	3,470	4,836	6,065	6,533	6,339
Syria	..	..	..	..	..	..	3,556	4,094	4,961	5,979	6,490	6,650
Japan	..	5,309	5,457	5,515	5,520	5,584	5,678	5,734	5,879	6,038	6,035	6,111
Congo	..	..	..	..	..	..	4,226	4,530	5,020	5,580	5,950	5,942

Table B.1.4. NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign-born population by country of birth (continued)

Thousands	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Switzerland	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,394	5,664	5,792	5,858	5,883	5,918
Former CSFR	..	..	..	..	..	..	4,568	4,730	5,172	5,661	5,707	5,794
Korea	..	..	..	..	..	..	4,924	5,098	5,305	5,479	5,675	5,779
Hungary	..	..	..	..	..	..	5,228	5,193	5,333	5,525	5,628	5,618
Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	3,794	4,070	4,554	5,093	5,510	5,992
Ireland	..	4,803	4,530	4,424	4,359	4,400	4,226	4,288	4,425	4,545	4,558	4,587
Other countries	..	237,877	239,965	242,766	226,725	237,362	153,806	164,559	179,048	193,157	204,090	208,293
Total	**..**	**1 375,361**	**1 387,380**	**1 407,086**	**1 433,601**	**1 469,035**	**1 513,917**	**1 556,337**	**1 615,377**	**1 674,581**	**1 714,155**	**1 731,788**
% of total population		*9,0*	*9,0*	*9,1*	*9,2*	*9,4*	*9,6*	*9,8*	*10,1*	*10,4*	*10,6*	*10,7*

Note: For details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

Table B.1.5. NETHERLANDS, stock of foreign population by nationality

Thousands													*Of which*: women			
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2000	2001	2002	2003
Turkey	212,450	202,618	182,089	154,300	127,000	114,700	102,000	100,700	100,782	100,309	100,286	101,845	50,761	50,790	50,890	51,524
Morocco	165,138	164,567	158,653	149,800	138,700	135,700	128,600	119,700	111,396	104,262	97,843	94,380	53,089	50,204	47,507	46,254
Germany	49,333	52,053	53,363	53,900	53,500	53,900	54,100	54,300	54,811	55,572	56,060	56,466	27,650	28,116	28,502	28,949
United Kingdom	44,117	44,672	43,008	41,100	39,300	39,200	38,800	39,500	41,404	43,604	44,052	43,678	16,532	17,234	17,465	17,384
Belgium	24,023	24,164	24,135	24,100	24,000	24,400	24,800	25,400	25,860	26,148	26,306	26,223	13,627	13,765	13,975	14,016
Italy	18,809	17,450	17,461	17,400	17,300	17,400	17,600	17,900	18,248	18,559	18,730	18,503	6,303	6,490	6,597	6,514
Spain	17,284	16,790	16,831	16,700	16,600	16,600	16,800	16,900	17,155	17,449	17,505	17,418	8,179	8,433	8,539	8,557
United States	13,002	13,382	12,761	12,800	12,600	13,000	13,389	14,074	14,751	15,217	15,412	15,075	7,236	7,470	7,632	7,501
France	..	..	..	10,532	10,575	11,152	11,873	12,524	13,326	14,113	14,469	14,529	6,810	7,157	7,284	7,339
Portugal	9,352	9,622	9,230	9,100	8,800	8,700	8,800	9,200	9,765	10,585	11,257	11,844	4,419	4,738	5,018	5,331
China	..	..	..	7,912	7,322	7,260	7,480	7,473	7,997	9,395	11,223	13,330	4,331	5,109	6,213	7,484
Indonesia	..	..	..	8,159	7,945	7,970	8,377	8,717	9,338	10,127	10,786	11,185	6,060	6,559	7,008	7,374
Suriname	..	..	..	15,174	12,015	11,760	10,497	8,665	8,469	8,491	8,573	9,406	4,573	4,651	4,733	5,178
Poland	..	..	..	5,910	5,642	5,680	5,906	5,645	5,944	6,312	6,912	7,431	4,475	4,683	5,094	5,422
Serbia and Montenegro	..	..	..	16,868	14,519	11,523	8,889	7,173	6,822	6,645	6,425	6,277	3,264	3,194	3,135	3,073
Greece	5,554	5,790	5,627	5,400	5,200	5,300	5,300	5,500	5,692	6,015	6,244	6,314	1,978	2,087	2,206	2,254
Japan	..	..	..	5,347	5,336	5,369	5,460	5,507	5,626	5,771	5,747	5,813	2,911	3,007	3,021	3,074
Iraq	..	..	..	9,694	11,355	13,008	12,747	10,025	8,639	6,919	4,771	4,182	3,802	3,137	2,251	2,012
Russian Federation	..	..	..	1,898	2,318	2,578	2,840	3,070	3,348	3,791	4,052	4,450	2,139	2,474	2,686	3,002
Former USSR (other)	..	..	..	2,412	2,561	2,767	2,917	2,619	2,632	2,915	3,323	3,794	1,713	1,915	2,200	2,549
Bosnia-Herzegovina	..	..	..	14,436	15,974	14,616	11,165	6,146	3,745	3,006	2,777	2,683	1,846	1,502	1,429	1,402
Ukraine	..	..	..	0,701	0,945	1,189	1,378	1,431	1,595	1,837	2,158	2,414	1,103	1,262	1,503	1,715
Croatia	..	..	..	1,718	1,766	1,685	1,639	1,602	1,582	1,632	1,650	1,679	0,810	0,827	0,852	0,877
Tunisia	2,560	2,415	2,124	1,900	1,900	1,500	1,400	1,300	1,300	1,276	1,242	1,312	0,504	0,524	0,511	0,550
Former Yugoslavia (other)				0,491	0,551	0,593	0,655	0,644	0,755	0,839	0,902	0,947	0,391	0,448	0,492	0,528
Former Yugoslavia	16,788	24,678	29,577	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Stateless	..	..	..	14,662	24,558	38,328	52,157	66,368	87,044	106,999	115,569	110,980	34,896	42,670	46,119	44,651
Other countries	178,998	201,641	202,279	122,986	111,618	112,222	106,831	99,417	99,776	102,605	105,680	110,027	53,574	55,721	58,359	61,657
Total	**757,408**	**779,842**	**757,138**	**725,400**	**679,900**	**678,100**	**662,400**	**651,500**	**667,802**	**690,393**	**699,954**	**702,185**	**322,976**	**334,167**	**341,221**	**346,171**
Of which: EU	189,035	193,913	193,100	191,100	188,300	190,200	192,200	195,900	201,574	207,858	210,549	211,009	93,834	96,636	98,324	99,158
Total women	343,744	356,939	348,305	335,396	318,800	320,800	316,200	313,900	322,976	334,167	341,221	346,171				

Note: Data are from population registers and refer to the population on the 31 December of the years indicated. For details on definitions and sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.
1. United Kingdom Including Hong Kong. 2. European Union 15 for all years.

Table B.1.6. NETHERLANDS, acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Morocco	7 990	7 750	8 110	13 480	15 600	10 480	11 250	14 220	13 471	12 721	12033	7 126
Turkey	11 520	18 000	23 870	33 060	30 700	21 190	13 480	5 210	4 708	5 513	5391	3 726
Iraq	..	..	..	..	854	798	2 721	3 834	2 403	2 315	2367	832
Suriname	5 120	4 990	5 390	3 990	4 450	3 020	2 990	3 190	2 008	2 025	1957	1 242
Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	360	217	905	1 847	945	803	1118	982
China	..	..	..	..	1 394	975	800	977	1 002	1 111	908	722
Germany	380	330	310	500	780	560	560	580	508	573	608	445
Poland	..	..	..	..	1 129	827	677	688	587	597	530	318
Egypt	30	350	540	810	1 080	550	390	500	443	528	437	190
United Kingdom	670	490	460	820	1 170	690	580	450	374	356	394	294
Somalia	..	..	..	..	3 002	2 141	4 918	3 487	1 634	873	378	180
Iran	..	..	..	..	2 299	1 285	1 806	2 560	1 375	754	336	180
Former USSR (other)	..	..	..	..	289	298	537	1 021	681	544	411	296
Bosnia-Herzegovina	..	..	..	..	127	2 056	3 873	5 416	2 646	883	400	216
Russian Federation	..	..	..	..	302	288	289	489	422	335	347	207
Former Yugoslavia	1 060	2 090	1 880	1 700	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Former Yugoslavia (other)	..	..	..	..	2 156	3 356	2 795	2 577	1 163	764	538	323
Stateless	210	180	170	610	820	680	120	4 620	7 400	7 800	9647	6 624
Other countries	9 260	8 890	8 720	16 470	16 188	10 419	10 479	10 424	8 198	8 172	7 521	4 896
Total	**36 240**	**43 070**	**49 450**	**71 440**	**82 700**	**59 830**	**59 170**	**62 090**	**49 968**	**46 667**	**45 321**	**28 799**

Note: For details on sources, refer to the notes at the end of the Annex.

Table B.2.1. NETHERLANDS, inflows of foreign workers by nationality (thousands)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Poland	0,7	0,9	1,2	1,5	2,5	2,8	6,6	9,5
Former USSR	..	..	..	2,1	3,6	3,8	3,6	2,9
United States	1,9	2,3	2,6	2,8	3,1	2,9	2,6	2,6
China	0,6	0,5	0,5	0,7	1,0	1,2	1,7	2,3
Former CSFR	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,6	1,1	1,7	1,5	1,6
Turkey	0,5	0,4	0,7	0,7	1,0	0,9	1,1	1,3
Sierra Leone	..	..	..	0,0	0,1	0,2	1,0	1,3
Former Yugoslavia	..	..	..	0,7	1,1	1,1	1,0	0,7
Japan	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,9	0,9	1,0	1,2
Hungary	0,3	0,3	0,5	0,7	0,7	1,1	1,0	1,0
Afghanistan	0,0	0,0	0,2	0,7	0,6	0,7	1,0	1,0
Romania	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,5	0,6	0,7	0,9	1,1
Indonesia	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,5	0,5	0,8	0,8	0,9
Iraq	0,0	0,0	1,0	1,5	1,6	1,2	0,8	0,8
India	0,4	0,5	0,8	0,9	1,0	1,0	0,8	0,8
Angola	..	..	..	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,6	0,8
Sudan	0,0	0,0	0,1	0,3	0,5	0,5	0,6	0,5
Iran	..	..	..	0,2	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,5
Canada	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,6	0,6	0,5	0,4	0,4
Suriname	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,0
Australia	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,3
South Africa	0,2	0,2	0,6	0,5	0,6	0,6	0,4	0,4
Bulgaria	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,3	0,4
Guinea	..	..	..	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,3	0,4
Syria	..	..	..	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,2
Somalia	..	..	..	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,2	0,1
Cameroon	..	..	..	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,2	0,3
Morocco	..	..	..	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2	0,2
Other countries	2,5	3,6	4,6	2,9	3,9	4,4	4,4	4,7
Total	**9,2**	**11,1**	**15,2**	**20,8**	**27,7**	**30,2**	**34,6**	**38,0**

Note: Numbers refer to temporary work permits.

Table III.22. Current figures on flows and stocks of total population and labour force in the Netherlands (Figures in thousands unless otherwise indicated)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Migration flows[1]						
Total population						
Inflows	122,4	119,2	132,9	133,4	121,3	104,5
Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections)	79,3	78,8	79,0	82,6	96,9	104,8
Net migration	62,0	60,1	71,6	70,1	54,5	35,6
Adjusted total net migration[2]	43,1	40,4	53,9	50,8	24,3	-0,3
Persons born in the Netherlands						
Inflows	26,0	25,0	23,8	23,2	21,4	19,8
Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections)	35,8	35,8	37,4	39,4	43,6	45,9
Adjusted total net migration	-9,8	-10,8	-13,6	-16,2	-22,2	-26,1
Foreign born						
Inflows	96,4	94,2	109,0	110,3	99,8	84,7
Outflows (incl. Adm. Corrections)	43,5	43,0	41,6	43,2	53,3	58,9
Adjusted total net migration	52,9	51,2	67,5	67,1	46,5	25,8
Stock of population[3]						
Total population	15760.2	15863.9	15987,1	16105,3	16192,6	16258,0
Total foreign population	662,4	651,5	667,8	690,4	699,5	702,2
Of which:						
Morocco	128,6	119,7	111,4	104,3	97,8	94,4
Turkey	102,0	100,7	100,8	100,3	100,3	101,8
Germany	54,1	54,3	54,8	55,6	56,1	56,5
United Kingdom	38,8	39,5	41,4	43,6	44,1	43,7
Belgium	24,8	25,4	25,9	26,1	26,3	26,2
Total foreign-born population	1 513,9	1 556,3	1 615,4	1 674,6	1 714,2	1 731,8
Of which:						
Surinam	184,2	185,0	186,5	188,0	189,0	189,7
Turkey	175,5	178,0	181,9	186,2	190,5	194,6
Indonesia	170,3	168,0	165,8	163,9	161,4	158,8
Morocco	149,6	152,7	155,8	159,8	163,4	166,6
Germany	125,5	124,2	123,1	122,1	120,6	119,0
Naturalisations	59,2	62,1	50,0	46,7	45,3	28,8
Of which:						
Morocco	11,3	14,2	13,5	12,7	12,0	7,1
Turkey	13,5	5,2	4,7	5,5	5,4	3,7
Bosnia Herzegovina	3,9	5,4	2,6	0,9	0,4	0,2
Iraq	2,7	3,8	2,4	2,3	2,4	0,8
Suriname	3,0	3,2	2,0	2,0	2,0	1,2
Naturalisation rate (%)	*8,7*	*9,4*	*7,7*			

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Refugees and asylum seekers						
New requests for asylum	45,2	42,7	43,9	32,6	18,7	13,4
Total requests for asylum heard	38,9	..	..	..	..	
Total grants of asylum	15,1	13,5	9,7	8,2	8,6	7,8
Expulsions	55,7	69,2	49,1	40,9	50,4	55,6
Of which: asylum seekers	14,3	18,3	16,6	16,0	21,3	21,9
Employment						
Total foreign employment[4]	235	..	..	..	..	
Employment of Dutch nationals						
born abroad and foreigners	579	..	..	..	..	
Total "allochtonous" employment[5]						
(new definition)	972	1 032	1 083	1 152	1164	1159
Labour force indicators according to the new definition of "Autochtonous" and "Allochtonous" populations						
Total						
	6 957	7 097	7 187	7 314	7427	7510
Activity rate	*66*	*67*	*67*	*68*	*68*	*69*
Unemployment rate	*5*	*4*	*4*	*3*	*4*	*5*
Autochtonous[6]						
Total labour force (thousands)		5 943	6 013	6 079	6167	6216
Activity rate	*67*	*68*	*69*	*69*	*70*	*70*
Unemployment rate	*4*	*3*	*3*	*3*	*3*	*4*
Allochtonous[5]						
Total labour force (thousands)	1 086	1 130	1 173	1 232	1260	1293
Activity rate	*59*	*59*	*60*	*61*	*61*	*62*
Unemployment rate	*11*	*9*	*8*	*6*	*8*	*10*
Surinam[7]						
Total labour force (thousands)	135	135	148	146	150	154
Activity rate	*66*	*65*	*69*	*67*	*67*	*68*
Unemployment rate	*12*	*10*	*9*	*6*	*8*	*10*
Turkey[7]						
Total labour force (thousands)	84	90	101	112	111	115
Activity rate	*44*	*45*	*49*	*52*	*51*	*54*
Unemployment rate	*17*	*13*	*9*	*8*	*9*	*14*
Morocco[7]						
Total labour force (thousands)	71	74	67	83	91	89
Activity rate	*45*	*45*	*40*	*47*	*50*	*50*
Unemployment rate	*20*	*18*	*13*	*10*	*10*	*17*
Antilles/Aruba[7]						
Total labour force (thousands)	37	43	46	49	54	56
Activity rate	*57*	*61*	*60*	*59*	*63*	*64*
Unemployment rate	..	..	*8*	*8*	*10*	*17*

1. Data are taken from population registers, which include some asylum seekers.
2. The administrative corrections account for unreported entries and departures on the population register.
3. Data are from population registers and refer to the population on 31 December of the years indicated. Figures include administrative corrections.
4. Estimates are for 31 March and include cross-border workers, but exclude the self-employed and family workers.
5. "Allochtonous" refers to persons who have at least one parent who is born abroad.
6. Autochtonous refers to persons who have both parents who are born in the Netherlands.
7. Persons who have at least one parent who is born in the mentioned country.

Sources: Statistics Netherlands; Ministry of Justice; Labour Force Survey.