Human Security and Social Quality: Contrasts and Complementarities

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Abstract

Two authors who have been leaders of the ‘social quality approach’ that emerged in European social policy circles in the 1990s, and two authors who have worked with the ‘human development’ and ‘human security’ approaches that emerged in international development policy circles in the 1980s and 90s, collaborate in this paper in order to outline and compare the two traditions. The ‘human development’ tradition has focused on the quality of individual human lives, understood as influenced by interconnections that transcend conventional disciplinary boundaries; its ‘human security’ branch goes deeper into study of human vulnerability and the textures of daily life. The ‘social quality’ tradition tries to understand individual lives as lived within a societal fabric, to identify and measure key elements of that fabric, and to develop a correspondingly grounded public policy approach. The paper is a first step in a project to assess the possible complementarity, in theorising and practical application, of these two streams of work.

Keywords

Quality of life, social quality approach, human security, human development approach, ‘the social’
Human Security and Social Quality
Contrasts and Complementarities

1 Connecting Human Development/Security Discourses and the Social Quality Approach

Conversations and collaboration between scholars and policymakers on human development and security and on social quality in the past few years indicate that the time is ripe for an exploration of the links between the concepts and theoretical premises of the two frameworks. These may have different historical and intellectual roots but they share some common aspirations. A key interest is to explore the added value that each approach may offer one another. An evident common concern shared by the two approaches is their critique of unfettered neo-liberal principles that are paving the way for a commodification of all aspects of the human world and nature and in doing so are generating unprecedented forms of insecurity.

The human development approach emerged in the late 1980s in response to the negative effects of structural adjustment programmes applied to countries in the South. Led originally by two South Asian scholars, Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen, in cooperation with a large international network, the approach is comparative in perspective and global in reach and has been incorporated into parts of the United Nations system, including the United Nations Development Programme. Over the years this approach has integrated three dimensions – human development, human rights and human security – into an interconnected whole, emphasizing the need to conceptualize people’s well-being or ill-being, security and insecurity, in the context of a set of issues arising from global interconnectedness and inequities. It has had significant influence and adoption, but has in its conception of ‘human’ a recognised gap in respect of ‘the social’ (Apthorpe 1997). In this paper we emphasise in particular the human security wing of the UN human development approach, as that may be less familiar but has provided the most opening from this family of ‘human’ discourses to issues of the ‘social’. Many international agencies, governments and social networks have taken up the human security language. These include the majority of UN agencies; the Human Security Network that includes Canada, Norway, The Netherlands, a dozen other countries and many NGOs; the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and development cooperation agency; the Thai government; and more recently departments in charge of EU foreign policy. The rationale of the human security discourse is to stimulate new analyses about the human impacts of globalisation and the consequences of interrelated economic, social and environmental changes.

The social quality approach emerged in the late 1990s within the European Union, seeking to find new ways to change the conventional asymmetrical relationship between a dominant (nowadays neo-liberal) economic policy and all other public policies, which distorts the daily life of citizens in the EU and indeed indirectly the lives of people around the world. Initiated with the first book on social quality in 1997 (Beck et al., 1997) and the Amsterdam Declaration on Social Quality – which was signed later by 1,000 European scientists – social quality work became institutionalized with the creation of the
European Foundation on Social Quality, located in The Netherlands. The Declaration, included in the second book on social quality, says:

Respect for the fundamental human dignity of all citizens [of the EU] requires us to declare that we do not want to see growing numbers of beggars, tramps and homeless in the cities of Europe. Nor can we countenance a Europe with large numbers of unemployed, growing numbers of poor people and those who have only limited access to health care and social services. These and many other negative indicators demonstrate the current inadequacy of Europe to provide social quality for all its citizens. (Beck et al., 2001: 385).

Supported by many universities in Europe, the task of the Foundation is to elaborate the social quality approach, theoretically and methodologically, and to connect it to various policy areas. By renewing the scientific debate on the nature and concept of ‘the social’ – a theme that partly vanished from the scientific agenda from the mid-twentieth century – the social quality approach has sought a new meta-theoretical basis to connect different sciences in order to address social and economic changes in Europe in a comprehensive way. Through collaboration with Asian scientists in recent years, efforts are being made to develop a common social quality approach between Europe and Asia.

An important focus of comparison will be to see how each approach understands the notions of ‘human’ and ‘social’ and brings this understanding to bear in its vision of ‘security’ as a policy field. Do the differences cause different trajectories, can they be resolved and can the approaches be made complementary to each other? The objective of this article is simply to begin this sort of exploration of the similarities and differences between the human development and human security discourses and the social quality approach. It hopes to pave the way for discussions with scientists and policymakers who are focussed on the adequacy of existing welfare regimes in all continents.

The article is structured as follows. First, we sketch the historical background and theoretical state of the human development discourse and the related human security discourse (we will refer to these jointly as HDS). Then we present the historical background and current theoretical state of the social quality (SQ) approach. We look in particular at its exploration of ontological and epistemological aspects of ‘the social’, which may help to strengthen HDS thinking in some areas. Finally, we make suggestions on how to continue the discussion.

2 The Human Development and Human Security Discourses

2.1 The Human Development Approach

‘Human Development’ refers to ‘development of, by and for people’ and to extending the range of favourably valued life-paths that people can choose. In contrast to seeing societal development centrally as economic growth, the human development approach offers a wider and re-focused conception of development. It has been popularized since 1990 by the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP)’s Human Development Report Office, in the annual global UN Human Development Report (HDR). This conception and the practice of human development reporting have been widely adopted by national and sub-national governments and other development organizations.

Like, for example, the traditions of humanistic economics and Aristotelian thought, which are amongst its sources, the human development approach sees societal development as the promotion and advance of human well-being. In other words, it uses ‘a welfare standard explicitly expressed in terms of human welfare rather than “economic welfare”’ (Lutz, 1992a: 103) and does not centre on a 'utility' category imputed from market choices. Its conception of human welfare / well-being is broad. We have already mentioned the most condensed version: human development as the extension of the range of welcome options that are accessible. More elaborately, it concerns also a series of other values, from fulfilment of basic material needs, through empowerment, to a range of higher aspirations for expression, self-realization and dignity. Lutz summarizes this welfare standard as ‘material sufficiency and human dignity for all’ (1992b: 166) and summarizes it further as respect for basic human rights. UNDP’s fuller definition covers empowerment (including a humanly normal life-span in a satisfactory state of health; possession of valued opportunities; community membership and participation); both equity and physical and economic security in access to those goods; and sustainability of this equitable, sufficient and secure access (UNDP, 1996). Gradually UNDP too has moved towards an integrative conception of human development as fulfillment of basic human rights. While integrated in that way, the concept of human development is fundamentally multidimensional with respect to ends.

Besides multidimensionality, the approach is people-centred, concerned with development not only for a sub-group of society. First, to take the term ‘human’ as the basic category implies that humans have the most important things in common; these include vulnerability and potentials for concern and caring for others. Second, the approach rejects change that excludes or victimizes many persons. The predominant emphasis on economic growth has neglected questions of income distribution, the differing abilities and needs of people, the way in which expenditure on products and activities is distributed (e.g., whether on education or on arms purchases) and public goods like peace and security, which are not commodities and not primarily dependent on commodities. Third, the approach highlights empowerment: people are acknowledged as the key means as well as the key end of development.

The human development formulation consciously draws on diverse intellectual traditions starting at least from Aristotle, and including from both Adam Smith and Marx. It came to the fore in the 1980s in response to various influences, notably including negative experience with the extreme focus on monetary variables in economic programs of 'structural adjustment'. Mahbub ul Haq and his collaborators also drew on several sources of contemporary inspiration: new theories of economic growth, which indicate a primary importance of human capital; the record of dramatic success in East Asian countries that combined sustained rapid growth with increased equity; and evidence of low or declining quality of life in some high-income or fast-growing countries. The resulting conception of development focuses on ends –
improvements in the content of people's lives and in their access to valued 'be-
ings and do-ings'– not only on means and especially not only monetized
(proposed) means and their ever-expanded production and disposal.
Development is understood as a normative concept distinct from economic
growth or social change. Attention to the content of people's lives leads to a
disaggregated approach, looking at health and housing, work and recreation
and diverse other aspects such as seen in the wide-ranging tables of indicators
in the HDRs.

Only part of this conceptualization of 'ends' is captured by UNDP's
Human Development Index, which combines (i) the conventional indicator of
national per capita income (adjusted to reflect real purchasing power) and
measures of (ii) basic education and (iii) life expectancy and gives equal weights
to relative performance in these three areas. Even such a simple and
incomplete measure of human development gives rankings that show many
striking divergences from rankings according to GNP per capita alone and
highlight its inadequacy as a measure of progress.

Human development gives a comprehensive and hence quite often radical,
framework for policy analysis: not only economic, not only 'social', and not
only concerned with human resource development or basic material needs
(Drèze and Sen, 2002; Gasper 2008a). The framework is radical too in its
depth of attention. The HDRs treat all countries in the world on an
equal basis and address the responsibilities of rich countries and the impacts of
their policies, such as those of agricultural and industrial protection (Haq,
1999). They have stressed the need for structural adjustment in the West,
including by opening markets, in order to promote global social stability rather
than by sending expensive and ineffective peacekeeping forces to low-income
countries that have been excluded from opportunities and become mired in
conflict. The 1994 Human Development Report argued that rich countries
should see development assistance as an investment in their own human
security, rather than as charity. This HDR, with its stresses on two
fundamental aspects of being human – basic needs and global interconnections
– and on the ramifying implications of inhumane systems that marginalise basic
needs, has generated a sister field of work to that of human development:
human security studies.

2.2 The Human Security Perspective

Haq added the 'human security' theme for purposes of prioritisation within the
open-ended space of human development. The prioritisation purpose leads
human security thinking to probe further into the textures and
interconnections of daily life and of exceptional events. It brings more
substantive thinking about human personality and identity and their social
basis. It leads to a synthesis of concerns from thinking on basic needs, human
development and human rights. 'Human security' proves to be an integrative
theme that subsumes what basic needs analysis covers and adds more emphasis
on feelings. It gives also a sense of priority within rights language, which is
otherwise only about the form of a priority claim not about its content or
rationale; and it adds more substance to the language of ‘development’, a language of valued change that yet tells us too little about the contents and meanings of change.

Haq took the distinction between the security of states and the security of persons and extended it further. Security of persons comes to be seen as not only the physical safety of individuals but their ability to secure and hold basic goods. The human security concept as elaborated by the 2003 study Human Security Now (prepared for the United Nations by a Commission led by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen) therefore stresses, first, giving priority to truly basic functionings, to be guaranteed accessible for everyone, in the form of — its second feature — human rights. Third, among these basic functionings, is ‘freedom from fear’, both for intrinsic reasons and because physical violence and insecurity have such ramifying negative effects. Fourth, the concept requires stability of these basic capabilities, not merely adequate average levels, for everyone.

Human security, in this broad ‘United Nations’ formulation, means the security of people against important threats to the fulfilment of their basic needs. Introduced in the UNDP global human development reports, it has been followed up in many national human development reports (Jolly and Basu-Ray 2007). It refers to the security of all people, not just of the security forces or the state or people endowed with wealth. It covers more than a narrow formulation that refers only to the physical, bodily security of persons or even only to bodily security against intentional physical threats. It is broader too than, but close in spirit to, Picciotto’s definition: security in terms of quantity of years lived (adjusted for life quality), thus including security against all threats to life, whether physical or not and intentional or not (Picciotto et al. 2007); and broader than the widely used slogan ‘Freedom from fear and freedom from want’ (Gasper 2005, 2008b).

The term ‘human security’ conveys a message about basic life quality (and quantity) and a claim for its priority in policy. Even the narrower formulations of human security are radical in relation to traditional security studies thinking, since nowadays overwhelmingly most of the victims of violent conflicts are not members of armed forces and most violent conflicts are not between states. Security studies must look at the security of persons, not only at the security of national boundaries (ICISS, 2001). People seek security of various sorts: physical, material, psychological (in terms of their relations to family, friends and associates) and existential (in terms of systems of meanings). ‘Human security’ language thus extends the older language of ‘basic human needs’ as well as the language of security. It conveys the dangers of triggering fundamental damage when we lapse below certain thresholds; and it gives attention to feelings and subjectivity as well as to objective life circumstances. Losses can include not only the loss of things but the loss of major meanings and even identity.

These broader associated messages imply that human security discourse contains not just a single concept. Underlying the definitional elements we mentioned are a series of other features:
• a focus, for both normative and explanatory purposes, on individuals, their life routines and life emergencies and on stability and instability in fulfilment of their basic needs and mitigation of their felt insecurities;
• special attention to ‘tipping points’ of various sorts, beyond which something ‘snaps’;
• an explanatory agenda that stresses the nexus between freedom from want and indignity and freedom from fear, and, more generally, employs a holistic perspective on individuals’ lives, on societies and on world society and that recognises the interaction of numerous types of factors that are conventionally but artificially separated between different academic and organizational mandates.

Human security thinking often has a stronger concern with directly felt experience than has been found in some of the legal-led work on human rights and economics-led work on human development. It adds not just a supplementary interest in the stability of people’s basic rights and capabilities, but a foundational concern with the (context-specific) priority capacities and vulnerabilities that form the grounds for the protection of basic rights. Human security thinking adds also to more individualistic human rights thinking an emphasis on the human species as a whole and its shared security, insecurity and fragility. By encouraging thinking deeply about individuals, all individuals, the human security perspective thus grounds human rights language in a way that helps to counter dangers that can arise otherwise through the selfish or myopic use of rights language.

We noted the dispute on whether to define human security in relation to a broad or narrow range of threats and possible types of damage. This dispute declines in significance once we adopt a perspective within which we recognise that environmental insecurity, health insecurity, economic insecurity, military insecurity, psychological insecurity and more can all strongly affect one another. Even users of a narrow physical violence definition of human security who adopt a transdisciplinary causal perspective are then led to consider many other types of insecurity and harm and how people value and react to them.

Which connections are strong, and are considered most important in a particular case, remains a matter for investigation and evaluation, case-by-case. Jolly and Basu Ray show this from the different national human development reports, which have taken human security as their theme. A human security perspective is differently elaborated each time, rather than being an instruction to study the effect of everything on everything or a fixed blueprint-like research design. The effect of this perspective is to help us break from the fixed habits of the traditional scientific disciplines concerning which factors should be analysed in relation to which others. The Gulbenkian Commission on the future of the social sciences warned that the existing organization of social science, which was established in Europe and North America in the late nineteenth century, as a series of distinct and disconnected disciplines, was shaped by a number of historical and political circumstances that in many ways no longer apply. In particular, each of the disciplines was moulded by and within a nation-state framework, which is now to an important degree superseded (Wallerstein et al., 1996). ‘Human security’ thinking offers a framework for connecting the deep but often narrow and unbalanced
disciplinary knowledges to each other and to everyday knowledge that is not captured within formal sciences. It may help similarly to span the boundaries between different organizational cultures and bureaucratic ‘empires’, such as those of ‘security’ forces and ‘development’ departments.

2.3 The Need for Deeper Attention to ‘Social’, ‘Human’ and Caring Relations

As the debate on human security deepens, new dimensions have emerged with regard to (1) this approach’s treatment of the ‘social’; (2) the place it accords to caring relations in the enhancement of security and human fulfilment; and (3) underlying both these issues, the way it conceives of human beings and situates them as subjects, its conception of the person.

(1) The Treatment of the Social

One source of the idea of human security lies in the Brandt Commission Report North-South (Independent Commission on International Development Issues, 1980). The report saw a world in which state and inter-state institutions failed to address human deprivation, environmental stress, political repression and the spread of armaments and disease. The global crisis in the 1970s demanded a deeper understanding of ‘security’, going beyond the sovereign right of a government, to consider multiple referents of security – institutions, communities and persons – and the relationships that link them. Achieving people-centred security (human security) must be a collective endeavour that recognises the significance of the quality of relations between nations, their citizens and the ecosystems on which they depend. The report brought to the fore the multi-dimensional and interconnected character of the vulnerability of human beings and their societies when viewed from the vantage point of relationality, albeit restricted to relations between nation-states. Re-reading the report in the light of subsequent contributions to the field of human development, human rights and human security, reveals a historical continuity of ideas and the growth of an understanding of the role of institutions as well as of the ‘social’ as something multi-layered, which transcends the boundaries of nation-states and requires a corresponding conception of ‘justice’.

Sen (2001) distinguishes between international equity and global equity. The former refers to relations of justice within and between nations as aggregates and the latter to relations of justice practised by diverse institutions operating across borders (firms and businesses, social groups and political organizations, non-governmental organizations of different types). In operating across boundaries, these institutions have to face issues of purpose, relevance and propriety – issues that cannot be dissociated from concerns of justice and responsibility. The contributions of these institutions to human capabilities and freedoms must be subject to evaluation. Sen seems to suggest a multi-scale approach to global justice relations, which requires the grounding of social practices of all institutions operating across borders: with reference to their contextual location, the values they hold and the legitimacy of their actions and outcomes. Going along this road would require more specificity on the questions of scale, actors, the evaluator, and situated standards of assessing
action in the light of security enhancement and human fulfilment. It requires an understanding of how the components and determinants of human insecurity are articulated and are capable of producing a specific situation that threatens the vital core of human lives.

Feminist critiques of development have found particular resonance with the type of reasoning in the human security discourse – its shift of security concerns from the state to society and its emphasis on democratization to build a meaningful commitment towards universal well-being. Concerns about the narrow understanding of group rights and one-dimensional understanding of identity lead to demands for the rooting of security concerns in particular geopolitical contexts and for a geopolitics of security which is more aware of the different framings and selection principles used by different actors (Hudson, 2005; Hyndman, 2003). The demand for situated understanding and action does not imply a wholesale rejection of universal norms, rather a more context-aware approach to the existing institutions and their performance and capacity to enhance human development and security goals.

(2) Caring Relations and Human Security
Deepening the human security approach along these lines benefits from a connection to ethics of care, much of which comes from feminist thinkers (Gasper and Truong, forthcoming). Hutchings (2000) argues that feminist politics – defined as an ever-evolving normative struggle against the gendered construction of society – when grounded in an ethic of care has great potential for social transformation. Caring as thinking/acting is oriented towards concerns and commitments that arise from relationships. A care ethic regards caring as relational and as a responsibility and need of persons. In this light, human beings are responsible for how relationships emerge and evolve. However, care is deeply tainted by essentialized gender constructs, which use the male prototype as the benchmark to validate ethical judgements. An ethic of care – embedded in relationships and responsibility – is marginalized in national and global affairs, because it goes against the dominant conception of a ‘fixed and stable subject’, and perhaps also against the universally accepted value of ‘universality of rights’, and since it remains persistently located in the private sphere. Yet, an ethic of care can inform intra-national and international relations by facilitating a notion of a ‘relational self’ – a ‘self’ constituted by its relations to others.

Baker et al. (2004) integrate care in an alternative vision for an egalitarian society grounded on four key policy objectives derived from a species-specific relational ontology. They treat dependency and autonomy as different moments in the human life-cycle rather than binary opposites. In this perspective an egalitarian society must pay attention to: (a) equality in economic relations and access to resources; (b) equality in the social and cultural domains where systems of communication, interpretation and representation (media, education, the churches) must ensure equality of respect and recognition of differences; (c) equality of power in public and private institutions (formal politics, on governing boards, committees, in work and family/personal relations); and (d) equality in affective relationships (being able to receive and provide on equal terms love, care and solidarity, which operate
at different sites: personal relationships, work relations, community and associational relations). Their proposed concept of affective equality integrates the concepts of dependency and interdependency into our understanding of equality and ‘citizenship’; it recognises the citizen as economic, social, cultural and political actor as well as universal caregiver and care recipient.

Engster (2007) similarly acknowledges interdependence as a feature of being human, with care giving and care receiving as universal and permanent features of human society. Echoing Hutchings, Engster demonstrates how Western political theories are deeply gendered and therefore create a dichotomy between ‘particularistic’ care and ‘universal’ justice. Yet, care is closely linked with natural law theory in the sense that it facilitates the most basic goals in life (survival, development and basic functioning). Bringing care back to moral reasoning is imperative because its erosion has the potential to generate chaos and anarchy. Engster offers a ‘rational theory of obligation’ to provide care, going beyond the dominant practice and provision of care for one’s immediate group. It seeks to produce collective caring arrangements and practices that address the needs of society as a whole (including the global society). This obligation is grounded in the reality of interdependence.

(3) The Understanding of Human Beings

As Giri (2000) points out, a key gap in the concept of human development from UNDP and Sen is the absence of a deep conceptualization of self and self-development. Sen’s idea of ‘development as freedom’ (Sen 1999) needs to be accompanied by a meaning of development as responsibility. Self-development means also openness to ‘otherness’ – something that cannot be totally dominated and controlled, nor made to acquire features of the self. ‘Otherwise there is no one with who to have a relationship and our own identity is jeopardized because it requires this relationship’ (Slife, 2005: 167). A friendly reading of Sen’s work on human security suggests that he seeks a thicker conception of the ‘self’ in which human subjects have ‘plural affiliations’ (Sen 2006), a conception that demands a corresponding conception of ‘justice’ and responsibility. The notion of ‘plural affiliations’ requires, however, historical and social dimensions that need to be made explicit.

Inter-paradigmatic communication is required in order to enrich understandings of the concept of human nature and offer a ‘thicker’ version of a concept so central to society yet for which it is so difficult to find meanings suitable to all creeds at all times. A plural and situated political ontology is desirable since it allows a conception of human nature as a social and historical product, without having to abandon awareness of basic biological imperatives such as interdependence and the life cycle. For diverse historical reasons, the rich debate on human nature was thinly applied in nation-state building, discarding many local forms of knowledge where the body and care play a central role in providing more realistic texture to understanding human existence and security. Recent debates on security have placed ontological issues to the fore in many spheres – international relations, the workplace, religion and vernacular versus state practices. Seeing security from the perspective of the state is just one aspect of a broader experiential canvas of international politics. A critical inquiry is needed into the concept of security as
more than just a problem of the state but also as one of care and psycho-social requirements. A socially embedded approach must find its way to express the meanings of care as a bridge between ‘being’ and ‘becoming’, the implicit and explicit, the local and the global. Such an approach would recognise the significance of emphasizing relatedness rather than atomism.

Slife (2005: 159) defines ‘ontological relationality’ as an approach that views the constitution of each and every entity as a nexus of relations: all entities have a shared being and are mutually constitutive. Applying such ontological relationality to care and caring requires a different approach to, first, the notion of the ‘self’, as being encumbered rather than unencumbered, embodied rather than disembodied, and second, to the philosophy of humanism, as something embedded in society rather than abstracted from it. A key message of this approach is epistemic humility as a condition for mutual respect. The task ahead, such authors suggest, is to find an alliance of ontological positions capable of fostering securitization as a process in which the values of care play a central role – reclaiming their place in interactions between humans and with their (ecological and social) environment. The significance of care as a fundamental feature of human life and social institutions must be given full recognition.

We should consider how the social quality approach might relate to this project and how the broad human development and security approach might connect to what was, until recently, a Europe-specific perspective.

3 The Social Quality Approach: Historical Background and Current State Of Theory

3.1 A Response to the Imbalance Between Economic Policy and Social Policy

The European Foundation on Social Quality emerged out of two initiatives in the 1990s. The first was the work of two European Commission Observatories, on Social Exclusion and on Ageing and Older People. These networks of European scientists connected empirical research findings on the social conditions of different marginalized groups in the EU with findings on the impact of social and economic policies in the Member States. The second source of stimulus was SISWO, the Netherlands Universities’ Institute for Coordination of Research in the Social Sciences, which organized three expert-meetings in the 1990s to discuss processes of socio-economic transformation in western and central Europe and its consequences for older people (www.socialquality.org).

From such work arose a strong recognition of the dysfunctional asymmetrical relationship between economic policy and so-called ‘social policy’. Social policy at the national level has, traditionally, been subordinated to economic policy and dominant economic values. In the European context social policy is equivalent to social administration by national states and regional and local authorities concerning income transfers for maintaining the socio-economic security of, originally, employees and later of all citizens. It
concerns in fact just one aspect of the whole range of what are public and non-
public policies emanating respectively from national states and non-profit
organizations, NGOs, companies and groups of citizens, oriented to the
domains of socio-economic security: financial resources, housing, health and
social care, work and education. The asymmetrical relationship between
economic policy and this whole range of policies has severely constrained the
development of a comprehensive approach (Walker, 1984). Related to this, the
separation between economics and other social sciences, following the break-
up of political economy, led to the conscious development of economics in
isolation from an understanding of social relations (Gough, 1979).
Furthermore, not only did the dominant Western economics unilaterally
determine the sphere of its own supposed competence, it defined the
boundaries of the subject matter of its binary opposite: the ‘non-economic’
sphere (Donzelot, 1979). Problems that arose in the operation of the economic
system were conveniently defined as ‘social problems’ and consigned to the
domain of ‘externalities’. Critique of the subordination of ‘social policy’ and (by
implication) the ‘social’ to the objective of economic growth was one of the
key factors behind the initiation of work on social quality. It derived from the
same sort of critique of the equation of national welfare with economic welfare
and the exclusion of social relations in development planning, including
questions of distribution (Seers, 1969; Conyers, 1982), that produced the
human development approach (Walker, 1984).

The subordinate relationship to economic policy was reinforced by the
ascent of neo-liberalism to a commanding position in Europe by the 1990s.
The neo-liberal transatlantic consensus holds that rising inequality is the
inevitable result of technological change that drives the liberalization of
international trade and increased competition, or of a combination of these
factors. From this perspective the nation-state is powerless in the face of rising
market inequality and can only intervene to offset its worst effects. In this
discourse the state must not go ‘too far’ in such redistribution because that will
endanger competitiveness. In other words, ‘social problems’ or ‘externalities’
should be addressed in such a way that the outcomes will stimulate
competitiveness and economic growth, thus subjugating the social and its rich
texture to a narrow conception of the economy as equated with growth. This
argument paved the way for the Lisbon objective to make the EU the most
competitive part of the world economy (EU, 2000).

The social quality project set out to counteract the prevailing neo-liberal
tendency to exclude the social and downgrade social policy. The initial
discourse focussed on the treaty governing the enlargement of the EU and the
need for it to enshrine social rights. The expert meetings mentioned above
produced collective demands for the social quality of daily life to be located at
the heart of the EU’s work (Beck et al., 1997: 6). The initial definition of social
quality expressed very clearly the central idea that individuals’ well-being and
potential depend on social relations: ‘the extent to which citizens are able to
participate in the social and economic life of their communities under
conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential’ (Beck et al.,
1997: 2).
The first book from the EFSQ presented a set of articles that demonstrated aspects of this interpretation. Its ‘leitmotiv’ was derived from the Comité des Sages, namely that Europe will be a Europe for everyone, for all its citizens, or it will be nothing. It will not tackle the challenges now facing it – competitiveness, the demographic situation, enlargement and globalization – if it does not strengthen its social dimension and demonstrate its ability to ensure that fundamental social rights are respected and applied (Comité des Sages, 1996).

The EU’s Lisbon Declaration further stimulated advocates of the social quality approach to argue against the handmaiden position of social policies in relation to economic growth, including the primary treatment of ‘social policies as productive factors for economic growth’ (Beck et al., 2001: 336). The social quality approach thus takes as its main subject matter the social relations of people. Its first assumption or principle says that people are essentially social beings. This implies a crucial rejection of the idea of people as atomistic parts of societies and of communities merely as the sum of individuals maximizing their own utility. Understanding this assumption requires a clarification of the adjective ‘social’, as for example by Sève (1978) in his theory of the psychology of personality. It is related to Hegel’s understanding of human beings, interpreted by Taylor (1975: 17) as ‘expressivism’, rejecting the dichotomy of meaning against being. The assumption implies also a new ontological understanding of economics, that extends its subject matter to include the genesis of values like social justice (equity), solidarity, equal value and human dignity: these form the normative factors of social quality theory, its ethical-ideological dimension (see below). This extended conception of economics implies a denial of the dualistic methodology of mainstream economics, which separates the normative dimension from behaviour and largely considers only individual ‘utility’ maximization and profit maximization (Giri, 2007; Van Staveren, 2004).

The social quality approach analyses these relationships, with reference to what it calls the constitutional factors that are central aspects of human actions (personal security, personal capacity, social recognition and social responsiveness) and the conditional factors that are central material and non-material resources that form the conditioning context for the actions (Beck et al., 2001, chapter 17). Both sets of factors are realised in the context of the interaction of two critical tensions: the ‘horizontal’ tension between the formal world of systems and the informal life-worlds of families, groups and communities; and the ‘vertical tension’ between societal development and biographical development, as shown in Figure 1.
3.2 Theorising the Social and the Determinants of Social Quality

A major impulse behind the development of the social quality theory is the realisation that a clear understanding of the social had vanished from social sciences. Gradually the scientific distinction between the social and the individual has become entrenched: ‘faits sociaux’ versus ‘faits individuels’. In recent decades the latter have taken strong analytical precedence over the former. According to Ferge, in Central Europe this has caused the individualisation of the social and leads to legitimating the decline in solidarity (Ferge, 2001). This supposition is eloquently underpinned by Juhász (2006). As a consequence, individuals, seen as the real ‘core’ of life, are confronted by a society that is seemingly superior and appears as an external power (Herrmann, 2006). Not surprisingly, therefore, Western social sciences today are preoccupied with individual life styles, individual happiness, preferences, consumption, well-being and quality of life of people as autonomous individuals, rather than as individuals-in-communities. Consequently the ‘individual’ – as a citizen with full rights or as a person who is excluded from mainstream society – has gained the centre stage in economic, educational, health, sport and cultural policies. Through her or his demands, needs and participation the individual comes to be seen as the shaper and target of such measures. Discourses on life styles, consumption, living patterns and conditions and well-being have taken on highly individualistic tones in line with utilitarian thinking. The unanswered challenge for both analysis and policy is how to address the current disjunctions in conceptualization; the rich texture of the ‘social’ is neglected and yet it is presumed that the concept can still fulfill
the task of ensuring that people respect and help others; and the ‘social’ is indirectly defined as an external entity outside people (Herrmann, 2005).

The necessity to rethink the social follows from the assumption that people are social beings. What meanings should be accorded to this adjective and how should they be translated into concrete policy templates such as ‘social justice’, ‘social protection’, ‘social security’, ‘social inclusion’, or ‘social cohesion’? Social quality analysts argue that ‘the social does not exist as such but it is the expression of the constantly changing processes by which individuals realize themselves as interacting social being’s (Beck et. al, 2001: 310). The entrenched distinction between the social and the individual is based on a false premise. In the words of Elias, individual and society are not in contradistinction:

‘to understand the obstruction which the predominant modes of thinking and feeling pose to the investigation of longer-term changes of social structure and personality structure … it is not enough to trace the development of the image of people as society, the image of society. It is also necessary to keep in mind the development of the image of people as individuals, the image of personality. As has been mentioned, one of the peculiarities of the traditional human self-image is that people often speak and think of individuals and societies as if these were two phenomena existing separately – of which, moreover, one is often considered ‘real’ and the other ‘unreal’ – instead of two different aspects of the same human being’ (Elias, 2000:468).

One approach to try to transcend the accent on individuals as isolated entities is to think in terms of dual interactions between (individual) agency and (societal) structure, but which remain separate and different (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984). According to Bhaskar (1993:154), Giddens’ ‘tendential voluntarism prevents him from undertaking the negative generalization that dislocates structure from agency’. Hoggett argues that as a consequence of this neglect of the fundamental dialectic between agency and structure ‘Giddens’ later works are riddled with borrowing from popular [“Blair speak”] “how to do it” culture, particularly from the United States, which are essentially self-management guides about everything from physical fitness to negotiation skills’ (Hoggett, 2001: 43). More or less in this tradition, Latour seeks to redefine ‘sociology not as the science of the social, but as the tracing of associations. In this meaning of the adjective, social does not designate a thing among other things, like a black sheep among other white sheep, but a type of connection between things that are not themselves social’ (Latour, 2007:5). He refers to the etymology, namely, that the Latin ‘socius’ denotes a companion, an associate. However, the social quality approach follows Elias’ rejection of the separation of individuals and society but it does not completely conflate the two. Thus, in social quality theory, the social is realised in the interplay between processes of self-realization by individuals acting as social beings and processes leading to the formation of collective identities (see Figure 5, below). The duality between agency and structure is overcome by stressing dialectical relationality, as in the work of Bhaskar (1993). This position is congruent with Archer’s idea of analytical dualism that refuses to separate as well as to conflate agency and structure (Archer, 1995:66).
Three sets of factors play the key roles in the creation of social quality. First of all are the constitutional factors: personal (human) security, concerning the institutionalisation of the rule of law; social recognition, concerning interpersonal respect between members of the community; social responsiveness, concerning the openness of groups, communities and systems; and personal (human) capacity, concerning the individual’s physical and/or mental ability. These result in the constitution of competent social actors, hence the name ‘constitutional factors’. They are determined in the interplay of processes of self-realisation and processes concerning the formation of a diversity of collective identities. Each factor is mainly influenced by two aspects of the interaction between the two main tensions and is, therefore, indicated in one part of the quadrangle of the constitutional factors (Beck et al., 2001, chapter 17).

Once competent actors are constituted, the opportunities for and outcomes of social quality are determined, second, by four conditional factors: social empowerment, that delivers the conditions for social interaction; social inclusion, that paves the way for the accessibility of the infrastructural context; socio-economic security, that concerns the availability of material and other resources necessary for daily living; and social cohesion, that concerns collectively accepted values and norms that will enable community building. Each factor is an outcome of processes concerning the formation of a diversity of collective identities, strongly influenced by the interplay of processes of self-realisation across two main tensions and is, therefore also for convenience indicated in one part of the quadrangle of the conditional factors (Beck et al., 2001, Walker et al., 2004).
Third, a set of normative factors are used to make judgements about the appropriate or necessary degree of social quality, based on the linking of the constitutional and conditional factors at a specific place and a specific time. The normative factors are: social justice, in relation to socio-economic security; solidarity, connected to social cohesion; equal value, as a criterion in relation to social inclusion; and human dignity, in relation to social empowerment.

**FIGURE 3**
The Quadrangle of the Conditional Factors

The connection of biographical development and the genesis of groups, families and communities – the interplay between actions towards self-realisation and those leading to the formation of collective identities – inevitably influences the nature of both the constitutional factors and the conditional ones. Thus, methodologically, it is feasible to examine the interplay between these processes in order to explain changes in them over time in the same way that analytical dualism assumes that structures and agents are, at least temporarily, distinguishable (Archer, 1995, p.66). These dynamic interactions lead to the emergence of new relationships, social structures and, therefore, new expressions of the social. The concept of emergence comes from natural sciences and refers to a characteristic of dynamic systems that leads to structural changes and new complexities, as in evolution. Actions by people as social beings cause emergent processes leading to new complexities called societies. Thus the two quadrangles (Figures 2 and 3) are not in practice separate but mutually interact to construct the dynamic nature of the social (Figure 5). For example, we may hypothesise a critical relationship between personal (human) capacity at the individual level and the possibilities presented by social empowerment at the social one.
3.3 Evolution of the Social Quality Orientation: Empirical and Theoretical

The effective use of social quality analysis began with the development of indicators of social quality that measure the conditional factors. In other words, priority was given, as a first step, to the ‘hardware’ of social quality, the conditional factors, which determine the primary dimensions of the social. However, while measuring the outcomes of complex social processes is a critical step, it is also necessary to analyse and understand how, in different countries, regions or communities, these processes lead to social quality. In other words the ways in which the constitutional and the conditional factors are connected. For example, the meaning of family differs enormously across Europe. This is also the case with interpretations of national, regional or local governmental bodies and their political representatives. This has consequences for the way people operate as social actors in the context of the conditional factors. The linking of both sets of factors, together with application of the normative factors, is required in order to understand the production of social quality. Figure 4 gives an overview of the three sets of factors: the ‘social quality architecture’. In comparison to most ‘quality of life’ and ‘social capital’ approaches, the social quality theory distinguishes the three dimensions, as well as their respective methodological instruments (Walker et al., 2004; Phillips, 2006). It is hypothesised that there will be different ‘social quality regimes’, depending on the varying interactions between the constitutional and conditional factors, together with the particular normative context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONDITIONAL FACTORS</th>
<th>CONSTITUTIONAL FACTORS</th>
<th>NORMATIVE FACTORS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIMENSION OF RESOURCES</td>
<td>DIMENSION OF HUMAN ACTIONS</td>
<td>DIMENSION OF ETHIC/IDEOLOGY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socio-economic security</td>
<td>personal (human) security</td>
<td>social justice (equity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social cohesion</td>
<td>social recognition</td>
<td>solidarity</td>
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<tr>
<td>social inclusion</td>
<td>social responsiveness</td>
<td>equal value</td>
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<tr>
<td>social empowerment</td>
<td>personal (human) capacity</td>
<td>human dignity</td>
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Empirical work started with the application of the conditional factors to the area of employment, developing the idea of ‘flexicurity’ on the basis of the social quality approach (Walker, 2000). The balance of flexibility and security is the heart of the partnership for a new organization of work. The Foundation’s research project, with nine university partners, analysed the national employment situation in eight EU Member States and one candidate Member State and focused on the ‘adaptability pillar’ of the European employment objectives (EC, 2001; Gordon et al., 2002; Van der Maesen et al., 2002; Nectoux et al., 2003). Similarly, through a project financed by DG Research of the European Commission, the Foundation started a European Network comprising fourteen universities and two European NGOs to develop and test
indicators of social quality (Van der Maesen et al., 2005; Gordon et al., 2005). Both projects demonstrate a concern to connect deductive forms of reasoning (for theorizing the theory) and inductive forms of reasoning (for testing the outcomes).

The Network on indicators led also to enhancement of the level of theorizing of social quality. In contrast, many quality of life approaches lack theoretical groundwork (Hunt, 1997; Raphael, 2001) and some even seem to actively avoid any in-depth theoretical discussion (Fahey et al., 2002). The theory of social quality will be further elaborated in the Foundation’s forthcoming third book, which in particular seeks to more fully articulate the concept of the social. Figure 5 summarises this work.

FIGURE 5
The Constitution of the Social

![Diagram of the Constitution of the Social]

The oval illustrates the outcomes of the interplay (or dialectic) between processes of self-realisation (1) and processes of the formation of a diversity of collective identities (2). In the context of this relationship, social beings will develop their self-referential capacities (3), through their everyday life. This contributes to the development of the competence to act as social actors (5). Thanks to these processes on the left-side of the figure and the existing nature of the opportunities on the right side of the figure, the framing structure will be produced as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions (4). It
concerns an outcome of emergent processes and itself forms a major part of
the context of human interrelationships (6).

The social quality approach thus understands the social as the outcome of
the interactions between human beings (constituted as social actors) and the
constructed and natural environment. With this in mind, the subject matter of
the social refers to the relationships between people in the spheres of
production and reproduction, condensed in structures, practices and
conventions. This approach goes beyond both the individualist fallacy and the
collectivist fallacy, because social wholes (and society) consist of neither the
collective nor the individual but of social relations (Herrmann, 2007). In other
words, the social is not an entity, that is fixed in time and space but an organic
outcome of a complex interplay of individual and collective processes as
illustrated in Figure 5.

3.4 The Need for a Holistic Framework

Recent years have seen a huge expansion in the statistical data available to
policymakers and the general public in Europe, including statistical digests
from Eurostat, DG Employment’s Social Situation Reports and the Quality of
Life in Europe series from the European Foundation on Living and Working
conditions. Such information is part of the life-blood of democracy, but its
explosive growth has a paradoxical aspect. It tends to reinforce policy
fragmentation, making it hard for policymakers to tackle problems in a holistic
way and for citizens to comprehend what is happening to society. This is
where the social quality approach may contribute. Its aim is to overcome the
present fragmentation of policy, for example at the EU level, between
economic, educational, employment, urban and other domains. By creating a
coherent, theoretically grounded, concept that embraces all policies and all
stages of the policy process it is intended to furnish policymakers and the
general public with an analytical tool with which to understand society and to
change it. In other words, the outcomes of education policies or health care
policies may be analysed with help of the same conceptual framework by
asking to which extent they influence the socio-economic situation of citizens,
their social cohesion, social inclusion, socio-economic security and social
empowerment. These are overarching questions with which to connect the
outcomes of the plurality of policy areas with each other as expressions of
elements of the social space. In order to understand these expressions the
approach also demands a transcending of the existing fragmentation between
fields of knowledge.

The application of the concept to the field of sustainability is discussed
elsewhere in this issue; here we consider it with respect to urban spaces. Global
transformations – economic, political, cultural, and demographic – are realised
especially in urban spaces. In the EU at least 80 per cent of citizens are living
in an urban context. The complexity of mechanisms driving these processes
will create an ever changing comprehensive totality. Large cities are places for
internationally and locally oriented companies, advanced technology and
international competition. They are the sources of the global economy,
knowledge and concentration of technology. They are also locations for
extreme poverty, crime, traffic problems and pollution. The EC says that in
large cities traditional forms of solidarity are decreasing, inequalities between the rich and the poor are growing and that to address these negative phenomena is the most urgent challenge for the EU (EC, 1996, 2004). The ambition of the social quality approach is to provide a heuristic instrument with which to address this complexity, as sketched in Figure 6.

Policy areas such as health care or housing are aspects of the urban space and are intrinsically related to other policy areas. They concern the daily circumstances of different social categories such as younger people, disabled people or migrants. The respective disciplines have to create interdisciplinary fields to explore the interrelatedness of policy areas and categories as aspects of urban space. This space may be defined as a concentrated crystallisation of processes of interaction between physical structures, the material and non-material elements of human relationships and related agencies and the activities of social actors. To comprehend urban space we need a conceptual framework for a reflexive understanding of the ‘social’ at a specific place at a specific time. Questions about socio-economic security, social cohesion, social recognition or social justice increase in relevance as a result of recent and ongoing processes of transformation. These include the revolutionary change of technologies and new forms of communication; increasing mobility; the related strengthening of global mechanisms that are changing financial, production and distribution systems; migration in and between countries as a response to these changes; and new forms of human exploitation and other criminal behaviour at international and national levels. These changes are not a matter of ‘natural development’. They are largely directed by the application of one type of utilitarian worldview, paving the way for politically determined neo-liberal guidelines that aim to add on some principles of welfare to rigidly unilateral principles of competition as a presumed condition for economic growth and welfare. It concerns the misleading subordination of the demands of welfare to the demands of competition, or of the social to the economic.

If the urban space of the twenty-first century is the most prevalent environment for people as social beings, the question is how to understand social processes and their outcomes in the urban space at a specific place and a specific time. Areas such as education, commercial activity, health and social care function as intermediaries (and as contexts of human relationships) between the evolving social actors and the physical expressions of the urban space. They exemplify the transcending of the duality between the physical and non-physical expressions of urban space. We may suggest that an added value of the social quality approach for studying urban processes is in transcending
this traditional duality between the so-called physical dimension of urban circumstances and their social dimension. As long as that duality is accepted, the social is without any meaning, for it refers to forms of cooperation between people in an individualistic way, according to the main assumption of a utilitarian worldview. The urban space does not, in reality, have a social dimension. Instead, the social is the non-material substance of the urban space. The social quality’s conceptual framework provides a way to connect different disciplines to address interrelated aspects of policy areas and categories by exploring the domains of the conditional factors with help of the social quality indicators (Figure 6). It also delivers possibilities for analysing the cognitive, emotional and rational experiences of citizens, by linking the exploration of the constitutional factors to that of the conditional factors. By applying the normative factors a judgement can be made on these outcomes, to assess policies by public, private and commercial agencies. This architecture (Figure 4) transcends the fragmentation of social research as well as the fragmentation of policy areas and the failure to connect conceptual categories.

5 Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Work

We have seen several important parallels between these two streams of work – the social quality approach and the human development and security approaches. They share a similar spirit:

- a human focus, a focus on the well-being of persons, rather than a primary focus on ‘the economy’, the sphere of monetary values;
- an explicit normative basis, beyond values as expressed only through wants backed by purchasing power in markets;
- strong multidimensionality in their conception of human well-being, rather than a reduction to a single denominator of money or ‘utility’;
a holistic analytical style; which leads to concerns about interconnections which can overstep boundaries and threaten sustainability;

- a dissatisfaction with the nineteenth century pattern of disciplinary and professional divisions;
- an underlying preoccupation with relationality: an open or implicit realisation that every entity is a nexus of relations and that entities are mutually constitutive.

Both streams can be seen as reactions to a utilitarian worldview and both try to bring integration across boundaries, with reference to priority criteria of human well-being.

They have emerged, however, for different contexts and levels. The social quality approach has emerged within the world of EU social policy and, therefore, reflects discourses concerned with long established welfare regimes and ideas about how to build and maintain ‘the good society’. The human development-and-security perspective has emerged on a larger and less fortunate stage. It is guided by concerns with critical threats and risks of life-destroying crises. The boundaries it crosses are also national and inter-continental. It aims to bring integration within the thinking of international organizations, notably the United Nations, which are vested with multilateral tasks of negotiations for a better world. It contains correspondingly strong attention to themes of human rights and democratisation. In contrast, most work on social quality has not been directly guided by concerns about threats of war, pandemic, climate change, or massive population movements driven by different forms of human insecurity. The citizens it describes are not the people fighting to enter Fortress Europe, sometimes in container trucks and small boats. In fact, it developed within that fortress and only recently has been introduced to contrasting conditions in Asia.

The approaches could have a worthwhile potential complementarity, beginning from their respective concentrations on ‘the human’ and ‘the social’. This article has given more space to social quality theory, not only because it is a less familiar story, but because of an interest in how human-development-and-security theory needs to draw on a richer conception of the social. Humanism must think in terms of humans who are embedded in societies rather than of abstracted individuals. While HDS work has stressed interaction and even relationality, it has perhaps not yet sufficiently acknowledged and absorbed that this interaction involves processes of co-learning and co-transforming among persons, not merely the provision of sticks and carrots for fundamentally unchanging human atoms. Social quality work offers a deeper conceptualization of the social and its relation to the human and a structured investigation of the constitution of the social, with reference to social inclusion, social cohesion, social empowerment, social recognition and more. It can perhaps help to place HDS work in the real, social world.

At the same time, the social quality approach has emerged in high-income countries with more covert than overt conflict and has much to learn from other social polities. Social quality approach is beginning to extend itself intellectually beyond Europe. It can benefit from further excavation of its ontological grounding, to identify roots of commonality and difference with Asian scholars who may inherit an ontology or ontologies that accord different
meanings to notions of ‘state’, ‘human’, ‘social’ and ‘security’. HDS thinking provides attention to a global context, including through global networks of scholars and practitioners; it pays central attention to prioritisation, in the face of vulnerability and fragility; and it perhaps gives more attention to fundamental issues of emotions and of caring (not only ‘care’; the social quality indicators include the latter). So HDS work can in turn perhaps help to place the social quality approach in a wider real world, in which there is global society, not only national societies, a world that includes tipping points and explosions as well as evolution and emergence.

In their analysis of the social construction of the EU as a civilian power, Nicolaidis and Howse (2002) refer to how the imagination of Europe as a political community reflects a crucial subterranean current in the European project: the act of ontological will to reject nihilism, by the best and the brightest in Europe who survived the Second World War. They write: ‘with the self-destruction of European culture in the war, one is left with only Anglo-Saxon materialism and pragmatism, spiritually empty if comfortable, or Soviet Communism, bankrupt by 1956 even for the intellectual left-wing’ (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002: 781). The European ideal of political humanism was seen to have faltered not because of its intrinsic groundlessness, but rather due to its approach to the nation-state – viewed as locked permanently into actual or potential relationships of contestation with other polities. EU enlargement in a competitive global environment has generated a renewal of this will to create a distinctive ethos of political humanism, but one now more open to diversity. However, as Nicolaidis and Howse point out, the EU concept of civilian power must seek greater consistency between its proclaimed external objectives and its internal practices.

Similarly, the HDS approach needs to find more common ground to foster a transnational democratic dialogue, in search for an agreed conception of global distributive justice and security that, as suggested in the Brandt Commission, is real at the level of inter-societal interaction. The HDS framework, as illustrated by Fukuda-Parr (2002), may be best treated as an ‘emerging paradigmatic change’, in which the understanding of the social is not pre-determined but evolves with the monitoring of social changes, interacting with and learning from other perspectives to shape ethically responsible behaviour. Sen (2004: 5) suggests that ethics can change what we see and have reason to value. Likewise a different way of seeing things can change ethical behaviour. For both approaches, in constructing an alternative worldview that gives meanings to ‘relationality’ (including to feelings, emotions and sense of affinity), sensitivity must be exercised when naming and framing issues. Changing and avoiding the language of abjection in categorization may help to prevent seeds of violence from settling in human consciousness.

Thus finally, one direction for understanding the social is through comparative sociology and comparative ethics. Previous understandings of the social did not describe a world with the internet as a conduit for social construction of meanings, for example. Many of the boundaries of the social that are being formed by the new technologies are new. Renewing a political humanism must involve exploring the ‘social’ as a multilayered entity open to
transformation by diverse transnational forces, such as transnational families, transnational social activism and new transnational spaces of communication.

We are convinced of at least a prima facie case for further exploration of common ground and potential cross-fertilisation between the human development-and-security and social quality approaches. An obvious challenge for human security advocates is to (re)introduce the social into a concept that is deeply embedded in international policies and programmes. For its part, social quality faces the challenge of engaging with the rich concept of human security that, it must be said, seems more resonant of social quality’s intellectual roots and well-being orientation than the idea of ‘personal (human) security’. The even more daunting challenge of confronting the European formulation of social quality with diverse Asian circumstances is currently in hand. Together the human security and social quality projects could develop a joint programme of work focusing, for example, on the purpose and adequacy of the human development and social quality indicators and how they might be mutually complementary. The two approaches in combination may bring new insights into the relations between economic, environmental and social sustainability.

**References**


