Values, Vision, Proposals and Networks: Using Ideas in Leadership for Human Development

The Approach of Mahbub ul Haq

Des Gasper

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ABSTRACT

Leadership is a matter that social scientists often are ambivalent about, but is important in knife-edge’ situations and when people choose direction within wide-open possibilities. ‘Good leaders’ need contexts that stimulate and discipline them, good ‘followers’/ collaborators, and ability to use good luck. The paper explores the work of Mahbub ul Haq, in relation to some ideas about factors that affect initiatives for social justice through new ideas: (1) ideas about values can be amongst the key ideas; leaders may express and embody inspiring values; (2) ideas about values may have little impact if not embodied in practical frameworks, methodologies and proposals; (3) ideas have real impact when they give a way of seeing, a vision; (4) ideas do little good if not propagated in places and ways accessible to significant audiences.

Haq’s methods as a leader for social justice included: a) lessons he learnt from the failure of his Basic Needs work at the World Bank (concerning lack of institutional protection; lack of a comprehensive vision; lack of a bridge to the mainstreams of economic policy and development policy); b) his operation as a wordsmith, providing appealing labels for big ideas, including an accessible value basis; c) his exemplification of two fundamental reorientations: ‘joined-up thinking’, analysis not restricted within the boxes of ‘national economies’; and ‘joined-up feeling’, global sympathy, concern and commitment; and d) a series of concrete, visionary proposals (like the Human Development indices, the 20/20 principle and the MDGs), which converted old talk about ‘progressive realization’ of economic and social rights into practical agendas and tools to try to keep leaders accountable.

Keywords

Leadership, social values, basic needs, human development, accountability
VALUES, VISION, PROPOSALS AND NETWORKS: USING IDEAS IN LEADERSHIP FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
The Approach of Mahbub ul Haq

The scene: a Europe-wide conference of development researchers at the start of the 1990s. Not included amongst its many plenary sessions is the presentation by the head of the new UNDP Office for human development reports, about the Office’s ambitions and its first product: the Human Development Report 1990. He is allocated a side venue, in parallel to other events at the end of a long day. As of 1990 no one has high expectations of the UN system as an intellectual powerhouse. It is a producer of hard to obtain publications of cautious and generally worded reportage and good intentions. It has been marginalized by the vastly better funded Bretton Woods institutions. The audience is still large, but rather sceptical. We have heard of the new Office’s creation of a Human Development Index that adds education and health aspects to per capita GNP—but surely this remains a grossly reductionist and unnecessary indicator, an inadequate synthesis of life? The head of the HDR Office is Mahbub ul Haq. He rouses and invigorates the hall, speaking with an energy and assurance, a freshness of insight guided by humour, and a combination of practicality, acuity and moral concern that make people think: Well, perhaps something of major importance can indeed come forth from the UN system. As it did.

By leaders we mean not only political and organizational bosses, but also creative thinkers, visionaries, and educators. Various examples of leadership good in terms of both ends and means can be found amongst the ranks of development policy practitioners and development academics. I will explore here the work of Mahbub ul Haq, in relation to some indicative themes about factors that promote the effectiveness of initiatives for human development and social justice. Working for an organization with almost no financial muscle, Haq led a movement of thinking that has had profound and continuing impacts, including through the global, regional, national and subnational Human Development Reports. The surprising degree of impact of the Human Development stream of work is largely taken as given here; it is discussed more fully in for example the first issue of the Journal of Human Development or Katoch (2003). The present paper tries to understand how Haq promoted and achieved this impact.

LEADERSHIP—HELPING SYSTEMS TO MOVE AHEAD

Leadership is a matter that social scientists often are ambivalent about. Yet leadership is demonstrably important in “knife-edge” situations and when people seek orientation and choose direction amongst wide-open possibilities. Leaders influence the decisions that groups and organizations make about directions, and whether and how they subsequently move. More generally, quite often single agents make a difference. Leadership training has become an industry proposing that there are identifiable and transferable required leadership skills: for strategic vision, conflict resolution, and so on. Goleman et
al., for example, differentiate their product by proposing that “The fundamental task of leaders…is to prime good feeling in those they lead” (2005, ix); for which task the leaders need various skills in self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationships management. Such private sector perspectives and training now reach well beyond the private sector. “The UNDP Learning Resources Centre is now focusing on leadership as a key theme for capacity development within the UNDP.” (UNDP 2005, 11). Jeffrey Sachs’s acknowledgements in his *The End of Poverty* cite the examples provided by many outstanding leaders around the UN system.

Yet there are reasons, both political and methodological, for disquiet about notions of leadership. First, leadership can be bad, not only in technical terms for furthering accepted ends, but in terms of the quality of ends by and to which it leads. Leadership cults cause great damage, unless “good feeling” means something broader than Goleman et al. discuss from their corporate management perspective. Hitler—Der Führer—was an inspirational, visionary leader, able to fan and mobilize feelings of moral outrage and use them as the oxygen for remoulding identities. Fortunately first amongst UNDP’s “seven principles for leadership programme design” is “A human rights based approach” (UNDP 2005, 19).

Second, agency is always constrained by structure, sometimes overwhelmingly so, even at the apex points in a structure. But opportunities for agency continually recur, particularly at apex points and other pivot points.

Third, “good leaders” need good contexts, that stimulate, prod, seed and discipline them, including good “followers” and collaborators, and the ability to make use of good luck. Leadership in complex systems exists at numerous levels and can be exercised by many different people.

Fourth, leadership is elusive and hard to generalize about. If leadership were not in some respects mysterious then it would not be leadership but a rule-following profession, a higher dentistry. What works in one case flops or is even disastrous in the next case. For “it appears to have more to do with invention than analysis, despite claims to the contrary” (Grint 2000, 6); and what is relevant leadership depends upon the situation and the match of person to situation, including the match of “leader” and “follower”. We must study followership as the inseparable twin of leadership.

What might be leadership requirements in the field of international human development? Possibly some of the following apply, amongst others:

- The ability to build bridges across disciplinary divisions. Provided it is combined with that ability, an affiliation to economics might become an advantage in such diplomacy since economists are perhaps the largest, most entrenched and sometimes most parochial of the relevant disciplinary tribes.
- The ability to build South-North (and South-South) bridges. Both some Northerners and some Southerners can do this, but the bridge building has be acceptable to the more mistrustful—in this case perhaps the weaker—side; and so in a world of immense international disparities a Southerner may be a more plausible candidate.
The ability to carry credibility in a wide range of audiences: with politicians, senior governmental and international administrators and managers, development professionals and activists. This requires a range of experiences and of personal qualities.

The ability to identify and address big issues—for example the arms trade—above small ones.

All these come in addition to the usuals: the passion, self-confidence, imagination and so on that are needed in order to act, and to act primarily on and through other people. The more distrustful the audience, the greater the needs for those usual unusuals.

Leadership discourse runs dangers of banality, overgeneralization and oversimplification. We can theorize about leadership, and we can look at cases; preferably both. Perhaps we can recognise and better understand leadership when we see it. Table 1 suggests some leaders of “human development” in the past two generations, including some from academe as well as “development managers” and “social entrepreneurs”. Examples of politicians are not included. Is theirs a harder craft? Besides, such examples are less consensual and each possibility listed might antagonize some readers. Instead the middle row in the table concerns figures who spanned academe and administration. Thus while Haq never worked as an academic, influence through his writings was of major importance in his case, unlike for the figures in the first row. His wife and collaborator, Khadija, belongs likewise in the middle row. Editor of

### TABLE 1
Some possible examples of individuals with major favourable influence on people-centred development in the post-1945 era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major impact</th>
<th>Significant impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>More political-managerial work</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fazle Hasan Abed (founder, BRAC)</td>
<td>Iqbal Qadir (GrameenPhone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II) Peter Benenson, founder of Amnesty International</td>
<td>Pandurang Shastri (founder of Swadhyaya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III) Bill Gates (Gates Foundation)</td>
<td>Bill Drayton (founder of Ashoka; support to social entrepreneurs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV) Eleanor Roosevelt (Universal Declaration of Human Rights)</td>
<td>III) Georges Soros (Soros Foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Draper (UNDP 1986-93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Grant (UNICEF 1981-95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Both</strong></td>
<td>Richard Jolly (UNICEF 1981-95, UNDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahbub ul Haq (UNDP 1989-95)</td>
<td>Khadija Haq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jeffrey Sachs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>More academic Work</strong></td>
<td>Barbara Ward (founder of IIED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Chambers (participation)</td>
<td>Denis Goulet, Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Pogge (development ethics).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amartya Sen</td>
<td>Joseph Hanlon (Jubilee 2000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
many of the books in which a Human Development perspective emerged in the 1980s, she was co-founder and Haq’s successor as director of the Human Development Centre in Pakistan. In contrast to Khadija Haq, some names mentioned in Table 1 could also rouse antagonism, concerning for example the means by which they acquired their influence. And not every leader is always a nice guy, or “a hero to his manservant”. Mahbub ul Haq himself could certainly be abrasive, sometimes arrogant.

Some hypotheses emerge from Figure 1’s listing of examples. All four involve a theme of connection, connection to a system, an “engine” of some sort (NGDOs, the UN, youth, …) that can put ideas to use. First, good leaders have strong communicative skills: in speech and/or in writing. Second, they need not just ideas, their own or those of associates, and the skills to present and use them; they need access to some power and resources, for follow up on ideas. Third, they can see and use opportunities but must have some opportunities: they must be in the right place at the right time. Chambers (2005) rues that while his work on sustainable livelihoods had an audience ready and waiting in the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and NGOs/PVOs, his work on “responsible well-being” has gained little attention. He has had major influence amongst willing, waiting audiences, but has not turned around and disarmed hostile or potentially hostile audiences. “Good leaders” need some good luck. Leaders don’t only lead followers, they rely on them. Lastly, they require good collaborators and partners. Sen and Haq needed each other, and Haq relied also on Khadija and on William Draper. Jim Grant and Richard Jolly sustained each other’s work at UNICEF (Jolly 2001). Keith Grint claims that all famous leaders prove, on examination, to have often messed up. “…the trick of the leader is to develop followers who privately resolve the problems leaders have caused or cannot resolve but publicly deny their [own] intervention … a ritual that followers appear to require” (Grint 2000, 420). In other words, the art of leadership is to acquire, empower and enable good followers.

Leadership is at and via multiple levels in systems. It may be exercised by many different people, not only the great man or woman. In contrast to the conception of leadership as heroic mastery is the image of engaging with others, in order to engage their energies (Mintzberg 2006). This second conception does not mean a loss of focus on individuals, rather a recognition of agency at many levels. Leadership appears also at many scales of magnitude: in all the actions of giving a lead, doing the discretionary, the avoidable, the novel. Indeed, others warn that we have no shortage of leaders, they emerge, and the issue instead is how to discipline them. Figure 2 suggests a range of roles. The titles are jokey, to highlight a serious theme.

The seeders and weeders are often not the bosses. In Keynes’s famous words in his A General Theory: “Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back”. Influence may even come without charismatic leaders at all. Jubilee 2000, the successful campaign for international debt reduction, relied on historical research into international debts and debt waivers or defaults over the past two centuries, by authors such as Joe Hanlon, plus an insistence that
authorities must mean what they say by accession to declarations and covenants of human rights (Hanlon 2000; Gasper 2004).

### TABLE 2
Seeding and weeding—a taxonomy of roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Leaders”/Leadership roles</th>
<th>“Led”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Readers (of the led)</td>
<td>Readers (of the leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read (by the led)</td>
<td>Read (by the leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bleeders (leeches, who suck from)</td>
<td>Bled; Bleeders (the pathetic sufferers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bleeders (who themselves bleed/care and nurture)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeders (off the led), (of the led)</td>
<td>Feeders (of leaders), (from leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed (by the led)</td>
<td>Fed (by leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kneaders</td>
<td>Followers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeders (of ideas and of activities)</td>
<td>Weeder (of the leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heeders (of the led)</td>
<td>Heeders (of the leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needers (of supporters)</td>
<td>Needers (of support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleaders (for)</td>
<td>Pleaders (to)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### THE ROLES OF IDEAS

_Ahead of the Curve?_ by Louis Emmerij, Richard Jolly and Thomas Weiss assesses the UN system's leadership roles in development, through its ability to generate and foster ideas. We can, like them (Emmerij et al. 2005), now drop the question mark, for the contributions can be seen to have been enormous (Jolly et al. 2005). In a recent paper on “Turning Points in Development Thinking and Practice” Emmerij then asks: Why and when do turning points occur? How are they prepared? He asserts the centrality of leadership, but offers no analysis other than that leaders require courage and good fortune (Emmerij 2005, 12).

I would like to elaborate four important aspects of such leadership through ideas:

1. Ideas have much more impact when they provide a way of seeing, a vision, rather than only isolated observations.
2. Value-ideas are amongst the key ideas, since they motivate and help to organize other thought and action. One leadership role is to express and even embody inspiring values.
3. Ideas about values often have little impact if not incorporated into practical frameworks, methodologies and proposals; we need ways of doing as well as ways of seeing.
4. To have influence, ideas must be propagated, in places and ways accessible to significant audiences.
The roles of vision

By “vision” we mean not only an inspirational perspective, but more generally how people “see”: how they focus, frame and visualize situations. This includes their historical frame of reference, and thus the range of causal factors that they are aware of and their criteria for progress and possibility; and how they decide who is one of “us”. The UN Intellectual History Project shows “ways in which intellectual debates can have an impact on the framing of development issues”, including how “UN ideas can change the nature of international public policy discourse and debate and, as a result, can often help states to define or redefine their interests to be more inclusive of common concerns” (Emmerij et al 2005, 218). The Human Rights framework is perhaps the greatest example. In this paper we look at the Human Development approach.

Politics concerns more than the maneuvering—the bargaining, threatening, etc.—between different interest groups with fixed interests. A person’s or group’s “interests” are not something fixed in the same way as a person’s height. One’s values determine what one perceives as one’s advantage, and even what one perceives as “me” and “my”.

Because preferences are always being interpreted and because they can and do change, policy entrepreneurs are not limited to traditional brokering roles, but can and do trade in the currency of ideas and problem solving strategies to build coalitions and promote change. The lesson is that political conflict is less about negotiating clear interests and more about framing policy issues. (White 1994, 516)

The roles of values and exemplars

Values have a role in framing thought and directing attention and selections, as well as in motivating effort and mobilizing energies. Some leadership theorists stress then that while ideas and vision are important, emotional leadership is even more fundamental (Goleman et al. 2005). They refer to intra-organizational and face-to-face leadership but if we look at modern history we see that the point has wider relevance. Leadership varies from Hitler to Gandhi, from Rwanda to South Africa.

Identity is framed through the inclusion or repression of information and comparisons. Some of the core questions and recognitions required for human sympathy are these: How would I feel if that happened to me? Others are equally human. How do they feel when that happens to them? Privilege is largely not earned; those born into privileged circumstances have not earned it, but gained from the good fortune of who their ancestors were and often from the bad luck and dispossession of others.

Comparisons, identifications and concerns are triggered through examples and exemplars. “I knew the Costa Rica of social injustice: a country of people without shoes or teeth, without [a] university, with scarcely half a dozen high schools…” declared one of the presidents of Costa Rica (Carazo) who built its welfare state (cited by Mora 2000). The image of a people without teeth conveys more than a volume of statistics. Similarly a personal example of service typically conveys more than any lecture on ethics: more than just illustration, it can inspire, motivate, and convey skills and values (Gasper 2000). Everyday heroes may be more relevant examples than moral supermen, for
their example can be connected to everyday lives. An effective leadership development programme “will support leaders in developing personal habits of reflection that expose contradictions between their professed and lived values. This personal process of reflection will be mirrored in the work the leader does with the group…” (UNDP 2005, 24).

The roles of practical proposals that embody values and reflect a vision

Several qualifiers are required. Individual value change is not sufficient or the end in itself, but complementary and supportive to the establishment of human rights standards, other standards, and countervailing forces against powers of privilege, to be organized in strong “learning organizations” (Hilhorst 2004). Further, it may be easier to change people by changing visions than by directly addressing their values (de Bono 1985); and a practical proposal may sometimes be the most effective way to influence vision. A vision is anyway of little use if we do not communicate it well, dialogue about it, and present concrete striking proposals that convey and realize the values and vision. Particularly important are methodologies to structure recurrent practice, and policy models that can serve multiple purposes.

Consider small-scale gender-based lending, reproductive freedom, primary education for women, and other elements of a quarter-century-old Women in Development agenda. All have been successfully mongered [sold] to a host of institutions whose primary concerns are not gender equity, but who have become convinced that these programs will reduce poverty, minimize costs of development assistance, placate an increasingly powerful Northern women’s constituency, expand consumer markets, and help clean up the environment. (Murphy 2005, 145)

The use of ideas: on networks, feeding and seeding

Craig Murphy indicates lessons from the history of the last two centuries, for groups concerned with social justice (2005, 68-71). At certain moments, system managers need new ideas in order to resolve or reduce conflicts, and they then look around. We can draw from Murphy’s book five crucial conditions for justice-oriented groups to make a difference (Gasper 2006a):

1. Have lots of ideas and proposals: keep on generating and promoting “an ever-growing array of possible (egalitarian) solutions to the conflicts and globalization problems faced by governments and powerful social forces” (Murphy 2005, 70), in the spirit of “reform-mongering” (Hirschman) and “model-mongering” (Braithwaite & Drahos).
2. Keep active contact and cooperation with progressive segments of ruling groups.
3. Maintain a transnational network—to share and build ideas, to give mutual support and lobbying, and to offer sanctuary when needed.
4. In particular, actively seek cross-regional learning—it is vital for building insight, morale, inspiration and momentum; as in the global meetings of NGO activists. Fomerand (1996) argues that this is one reason why
conservative US forces wanted to discontinue or downgrade the series of UN-led mega-conferences around which NGOs from the whole world congregate. The international women’s movement has been one important vehicle for, in Milanovic’s words, “rich people...to mingle, meet or even know about the existence of the poor” (Murphy 2005, 155). International education is another vehicle (see e.g. George 1997).

5. Connect to and engage with international organizations to adopt proposals from progressive social movements.

Networking means working through the net: to communicate and to catch. Unlike “Murphy’s Law” on the inevitability of farce within complex human systems—”Everything that can go wrong will go wrong”—Craig Murphy’s five lessons offer encouraging suggestions. We will see each of them exemplified in Mahbub ul Haq’s long march through the institutions.

MAHBUB UL HAQ AND THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

Emergence of the Human Development framework and its leader

Mahbub ul Haq was born in 1934 and grew up in British India and from 1947 Pakistan. He arrived to study economics in Cambridge in 1953 together with Amartya Sen, the start of a fortyfive year long association. From Cambridge he proceeded to a PhD at Yale, returning to Pakistan at the end of the 1950s to become a principal economic planner in the National Planning Commission. In the 1960s he was an outspoken but increasingly doubting proponent of overriding priority to economic growth.. To chronologically simplify somewhat: after spending the 1950s studying Northern economics in the North, he spent the 1960s applying it in the South, coming to see the need to extend and transcend such economics; in the 1970s he became a major figure in international development policy networks, and led the World Bank’s new work on poverty and basic needs; in the 1980s he returned to practice as a government minister in Pakistan; in the 1990s he launched and guided the global Human Development movement, from UNDP in New York and then in the final years of his life again in Pakistan, focusing also on the rest of South Asia, before his premature death in 1998.

Key elements of the Human Development approach can be found already in work from the 1950s such as by Paul Streeten (Streeten 1954), who was an associate of Haq from the 1960s on and his lieutenant at the World Bank in the late 1970s, and by Gunnar Myrdal, one of Streeten’s mentors (see Gasper 2006b). But the breakthrough to a widely graspable, appealing and workable reformulation of development took a generation more. Haq’s leadership role was pivotal as a bold man of affairs able to marshal the insights of a network of academics. In speeches from 1971-72 he declared that we should “build development around people rather than people around development” (1976, 28); and build a people-focus into each aspect of development design, not see distribution as a separate stage to be considered after and separately from production. But his version of basic needs thinking in the 1970s remained close to basic material needs (“the problem of development must be redefined
as a selective attack on the worst forms of poverty”, 1976, 43) rather than the richer “basic human needs” strand (e.g. Green 1976). Gradually through the 1980s insights from basic human needs thinking became more widely absorbed, under new banners like “human-scale development” given the now discredited image of “basic (material) needs”. Khadija Haq edited a series of books through the 1980s, including from 1986 (with Umer Kirdar) from a series of conferences that were co-organised by UNDP and the North South Roundtable of SID, the Society for International Development. The conferences began with a view of “human development” as human resource development but moved beyond that.

Mahbub ul Haq was in some respects in the background of this movement of ideas during the 1980s while engaged as a Minister in Pakistan, but in other respects he continued as the leader and a central driving force. Besides strengths of mind, spirit, and personality, he had several specifically relevant qualities, matching those mentioned earlier.

First, Haq’s combination of professional experiences conduced to authority and wide credibility: a book-writing economist and battle-hardened planner and statesman in both national and international fora. He had a strong belief in markets (and declared for example that pollution can only be stopped by the price mechanism, not by agreements on paper; Haq 1994, 4), which rendered him acceptable to national and international capital; and no self-idealization—“I lived through that experience [as Finance and/or Planning Minister] for eight years and I was not able to do very much” (1994, 5). At the end of his career he declined Ministerial posts in Pakistan and essayed influence instead through moulding the climate of ideas.

Second, of the economist-statesmen in circulation (a profile shared for example earlier by Myrdal or contemporaneously by Jan Pronk), Haq fulfilled some structural requirements which we identified earlier. As a man of the South, he could in some ways more effectively criticize it (as for example in his speech “What is real VIP culture”), as well as question a self-satisfied North: “...why do you make such handsome profits on your export of arms to poor, starved, disintegrating countries while giving them lectures all the time about human rights?” (Haq, cited by Arias 2000, 12). Haq positioned himself more emphatically as of the South than did for example Sen; as seen in his returns to settle in Pakistan in both the 1980s and 1990s. He saw the necessity to avoid intellectual domination by the munificently funded North and to establish intellectual independence from a condescending and self-important Northern mainstream (Haq 1976; 1980a), and thus led the formation of the Third World Forum from 1972-3. At the same time he was an unromantic realist, who saw a need to engage with and redirect, not vacate, the centres of power. He stressed that: “The central issue is the organisation of real countervailing power ["political, economic and intellectual" (p.141)] by the South to accelerate the process of change in the world order. All the diplomatic skills and rhetorical eloquence, taken together, offer no substitute…” (Haq 1980a, 141). Writing 25 years before the emergence of a working alliance of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, he faced the issue that “the South” did not exist in any seriously unified way, and that the realistic prospects for advance in cooperation lay more at regional level. He drew lessons from the fruitlessness of the NIEO
campaign of the 1970s which was presented “as a “demand” of the South. It should have been presented, right from the start, as a global need since the existing economic order is not working very well for any side” (Haq 1980c, 273-4). Thus he tried to provide a feasible framework for North-South negotiations: a principle of mutual benefit, on a basis of mutual need, as well as an appeal to other underlying shared principles: “…the North-South dialogue is presently concerned far too much with means rather than with ends” (1980c, 277); “The new order must be based squarely on the concept of equality of opportunity both within and among nations” (1980c, 276).

Third, he was an ambitious organiser, and drew lessons also from the demise of his Basic Needs Approach work in the World Bank. It had lacked institutional protection and could be easily swept away by a new Bank president; it had lacked a comprehensive vision that extended beyond the level of (material) basics, and thus failed to frame issues for the whole world (his 1980b paper tries to counter this accusation, but without much impact); and it lacked a natural bridge of language to the mainstreams of economic policy and development policy, to convince them that their deeper underlying principles were served rather than threatened.

Lastly, Haq was well equipped for such negotiations and maneuvering. He exemplified the Getting to Yes principle of “hard on the problem, soft on the people”. Completely lacking in rancour (in the words of his mentor Barbara Ward, 1976, xiii), he could yet be brilliantly sarcastic (see for example Haq 1976, 140-142). These combinations—sarcasm without rancour, criticism equally of North and South, and emphasis on the responsibilities of both—conveyed self-confidence, mutuality and balance.

Vision—I: Doing things with words

If vision means altering how people “see”, in large part through the use of words, a leader should be able to “do things with words”, or have partners who can help them do so. Haq wrote with exceptional lucidity and was able to combine depth with accessibility for a non-academic audience. He added an inspirational boldness, salted by humour—”The aim of this book is a modest one: to cover just a small part of such a revolution in mankind’s perceptions” (1976, xv)—and a flair for soundbites that truly bit. From “the Third World is not merely worried about the quality of life, it is worried about life itself” (1976, 107); via his (in this case borrowing Paul Streeten’s words) Human Development critique of “jobless growth”, “ruthless growth” that benefits some at the expense of others, “voiceless growth” that excludes the voice of the majority or the minority, “futureless growth” that exhausts resources and eco-systems, and “rootless growth” that destroys identities and cultures; through to his final insistence that “Security must be measured in the lives of the people, not by the weaponry of the state”, he achieved a notably high bite rate.

Not all the phrasemaking was effective. His title “The Poverty Curtain” echoed The Iron Curtain. But whereas “Iron Curtain” contained an internal tension—between a curtain’s human touch within the common European home, and the brutal rejection of that commonality—"Poverty Curtain"
contained no such internal resonance. Unfortunately most people in the rich world have preferred a poverty curtain, and have supported turning it into an electric fence.

Catchy labels should package big ideas, otherwise they may become counterproductive. The “Human Development” framework contains some very big ideas. These include the implicit claim that much previous development has been inhuman, and what Truong and I have called “joined-up thinking”, not restricted within the boxes of “national economies”, and “joined-up feeling”, a tacit global sympathy, concern and commitment (Gasper and Truong 2005). Thus the offshoot Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) “explicitly commit world leaders to a collective responsibility for all people irrespective of national borders” (Fukuda-Parr 2004: 397).

**Values—I: Human richness, to be prioritized in human deliberation**

Haq’s Human Development Approach (HDA) has a substantial but easily accessible value basis. Amartya Sen presents its starting point as the rejection of “a monoconcentrationist field: “in terms of what one variable should we sensibly judge alternative possibilities”” (Sen 2000: 20), and the return instead to a recognition of plurality when answering the general question: “how should we value alternative possibilities” (loc. cit.). Sen notes how monoconcentrationism led to the triumph of utilitarianism. This was in practice then operationalized in money terms (‘moneytarianism’, Gasper 2004); the utilities of those who lacked money were ignored. For underlying utilitarianism’s formal triumph was the real triumph of market society and the rules of capital. “It is to the credit of Mahbub’s integrating vision that he saw the possibility of harnessing [diverse] different discontents [with the single-minded concentration on GNP] into the development of a capacious alternative outlook which would be, at once, both practical and broad, and which could accommodate—however roughly—these different concerns” (Sen 2000: 21).

The variables to be included in assessment, their weights and forms of measurement, the format(s) of synthesis, are all to be explicitly considered and publicly debated before selection. This is the same lesson as arrived at by some streams in Northern policy analysis, including of multi-criteria evaluation and deliberative policy analysis (see e.g. Hajer and Wagenaar 2003), to which the HDA can profitably connect. But HDA goes further, adding elements of an explanatory theory of politics to these normative desiderata. It stresses that public provision of data, effectively done, as in the global, macro-regional, national, subnational and district Human Development Reports, can generate and feed public debates and bring pressure for informed public action (see for example Katoch 2003 on the role of state-level HDRs in India). The Human Development Reports in Vietnam have introduced values into national policy discourse that have helped to steer the country away from a purely free market path (Thanh-Dam Truong, personal communication).
Values—II: Humanity and mutuality

The Human Development movement has avoided adopting only a technocratic language: “But let me state quite clearly: building a compassionate society is not a technocratic exercise. It requires solid ethical and moral foundations. It requires entirely a new way of thinking of ourselves as a human family, not just a collection of nation states. It requires a new concept of human security, which is founded on human dignity, not on weapons of war.” (Haq 1997: 4).

The stress on being human brings reference to all humans within each state and sometimes, without shouting the fact, all humans worldwide too; something which is explicit in the human rights movement, to which the HDA has become increasingly connected. Thus, ironically, the Human Development Reports have had much more of a worldwide perspective than the so-called World Development Reports, whose progenitor has correspondingly lost intellectual leadership. The 2001 World Development Report (WDR) on poverty was led to adopt Sen’s capability approach, in imitation of the HDRs, and the recent WDR on equity flirted with a human rights basis.

Operationally, Haq interpreted humanity as a principle to imply equality of basic opportunity, or sufficiency of opportunity. He employed repeatedly the familiar slogan of equality of opportunity in contrast to equality of outcome, but real equalization of opportunity would imply vastly more equalization of outcome than he proposed. His practice, from the basic needs work through the HDRs to the International Development Targets (the earlier name for the MDGs), was focused on ensuring only some very basic—basic in both the material and ethical senses—but thereby agreeable and attainable opportunities for all. While one could probe this and other ambiguities and limitations, the point here is that Haq’s value framework is relatively clear, widely appealing and robust, and neither so minimal as to make no difference nor so demanding as to fail in the task of mobilization.

The rhetoric of humanity is accompanied by a constantly stressed mutuality, within and between nations. “The objectives of the 1970s were not wrong—of course we need more equity between nations and between people. But the tactics were wrong. Developing countries reached out for international justice while denying economic justice to their own people” (Haq 1994, 2), which rendered their claims unconvincing. Mutuality between nations, as well as within them, requires compensation for damage inflicted, including the damage from trade barriers and imposition of migration barriers (1994, 3). Haq drew these far-reaching implications as Kantian requirements of intellectual consistency, stemming not from a presumption of global citizenship but from the more basic common humanity which means that those who interact and can harm each other are bound by principles of global civility.

Vision—II: A historical perspective

Haq situated his ethic in a historical perspective of how things have changed and will continue to change. His earlier writings regularly drew an analogy from the historical evolution within many countries (though less so in Pakistan) of relations between the rich and the poor—a gradual narrowing of gaps and
building of political community—across to a predicted evolution of relations between rich and poor countries, an analogy that had been used by writers such as Myrdal from the 1950s (see e.g. Haq 1976: 164, 169). Later, as the world did not follow that track but showed even more dramatic inequalities, he switched to different formulations. But he had never envisaged the utopia or nightmare of a unified global state. The automatic resource transfers he called for in the 1970s were seen as a purely temporary requirement (1976, 209), with the analogy being instead to the Marshall Plan: “…in 1947….the Americans, with unparalleled generosity, gave away for five years about 2 per cent of a GNP less than half its present size” (Ward 1980, 265).

Thus his own focus from the 1970s was on trade and migration issues, not aid. “The vision of the 1990s is totally different from that of the 1970s. Basically aid is going to be phased out—it’s a reality of the past and not of the future; you can’t base the future of nations on charity” (Haq 1994, 3). His rhetoric of persuasion was designed to both inspire the South by a picture of the formation of self-respecting self-reliant agents, not permanent welfare clients, and convince the North to promote this, on several grounds. First, that open markets represent the principles that the North formally enunciates, as well as what the South should espouse if it believes in itself—“I believe that applying market principles internationally would favour developing countries”, declared Haq (1994, 3), a stance that seems now to have become a predominant view in much of the South. Second, the North is told that the MDGs are only a temporary and relatively modest call on their pockets, for great human benefit. And thirdly, the North is advised that this path is the cheap, safe solution and represents its enlightened self-interest, as compared to the path of indifference and short-run profit. “We looked back at 1980 to see which countries had the highest ratio [of military expenditure to expenditure on health and education]. Number one was Iraq—eight times more on military than on education and health…. Number two was Somalia… Number three was Nicaragua… Within a decade these countries could neither protect their national security, for which they were getting all these arms, nor their human security. And the countries that supplied their weapons in 1980 were itching to get in a decade later to collect them” (Haq 1994, 4). Selling arsenals of arms to Iraq no longer seemed such a smart idea.

The main historical vision which Haq articulated throughout his career derived from a robust belief in people’s potentials and in the capacity of Southern societies. His optimism might sometimes appear extreme—“In many ways I see the current situation, which is generally seen as collapse in Africa and elsewhere, not as dreadful but as a healthy sign of democratic change” (1994: 1)—but was grounded in an assessment of fundamentals. People have intelligence; people in the South have basically as much intelligence per person as in the North; and the South has many more people. The barriers to the unleashing of human potential in the South are major—in another of his phrases, for example, “if development is not engendered then it is endangered”—but they are not permanent. “I do not think that they [most people in the developed countries] realize that the Third World is the future international economic order and the developed countries have to start thinking today in terms of fashioning policies to come to some reasonable accomodation with it” (Haq 1976, 144; a speech from 1973). A generation
later, with the rise of China and India, this penny has finally dropped in the North.

Proposals: catching the eye and guiding the mind

Haq did not shun controversy, but was not interested in intellectual contestation *per se*. He sought ideas that could broker and sustain alliances, especially practical ideas that can attract support from various positions and on various grounds. He became a master of the concrete, visionary proposal: the family of Human Development indices; the 20/20 principle adopted at the 1995 Copenhagen summit on Social Development (a title that politely avoided trumpeting the rise of the new human development perspective); and the MDGs, which have converted the weary formula of “progressive realization” of economic and social rights into concrete agendas. Arms trafficking should be a criminal offence in the way that drugs trafficking is, he declared (Haq 1997). And, he would have added, for arms just as for drugs the proscription should apply to states not only to private individuals—and to rich states not only to poor ones.

The principle behind such proposals was to generate public attention, commit public action, and then keep leaders accountable. Haq knew: what gets counted, counts. The role of the HDI is as a tool in democratic politics, to open debate and dethrone moneytarianism and the fetishization of GDP, not as a precision tool of technocratic summation.

He was central in creating what later became the MDGs language, especially through the 1994 Human Development Report which set much of the agenda for the 1995 Copenhagen summit. Many worry that the MDGs are too crude, too top-down, and unreachable without rich country support that is not forthcoming. Again the assessment misreads a political strategy as a technical action plan. One of Haq’s achievements was to make plain, notably in the HDR of 1991, through attention to how both national budgets and aid budgets are allocated, that in nearly all cases lack of political commitment not lack of resources underlay the non-fulfilment of basic needs (Haq 1999, Ch.15). The MDGs are a tool in trying to generate and maintain that political commitment. They have focused attention on the real basics, “the people without teeth”, and opened a public space for discussion, on how to formulate, approach and implement the goals. And they provide a yardstick by which people will be judged, and against which if there is seen to be failure then there should be reaction. The underlying presumption is again optimistic: that the reaction will be of activist anger, not disillusioned withdrawal.

Haq was clear about what he was doing: “It is true that we may never be able to eliminate all social and economic injustices or to provide equality of opportunity to all the people. But we certainly can take a few practical steps … which can become a reality only if all of us start a global civil society movement for their achievement. … Let us get organized. Let us monitor the progress of each nation and each donor towards these goals every year and let us publicize it through NGO efforts and through all civil society initiatives so that the world does not forget the commitments it made only recently [at the Copenhagen summit]” (Haq 1997, 2-3). Haq’s “few practical steps” include
thus the building of a global network, to give “the world” self-consciousness
and conscience.

Networks and systems

Leadership task number one is to build; leadership task number two is to hand
over. Haq was not possessive about ideas or organizations. He kept moving
on. Already in his 1976 book he enunciated an implied warning with a picture
of the three stages of a successful idea: first it encounters organized resistance
because it endangers old distributions of authority; second it is deified as the
new orthodoxy; third it is applied, tested, refined, and reinvigorated or
replaced. He repeated the warning in the second edition of his Reflections on
Human Development and called for vigorous debate, criticism and new departures
(1999: 225, 228 ff.) In his own work he led the enrichment of human
development discourse by the perspectives of human security (Gasper 2005),
ensured good successors in the Human Development Report Office, and
returned to Pakistan to promote the next stage, spreading the debate in “all
institutions of learning, think-tanks, and intellectual [and policy] circles” (1999,
225). He avoided the trap of personalization, deification and petrification of a
movement of thought and action.

Effective leadership energizes and liberates others, both as a powerful
means and as a priority end. In that sense it inherently networks: building a net
and stimulating others to catch with it. But this is very difficult, as anyone who
tries it knows. To build something one needs to go step by step, and then
somehow construct or see and take an opportunity for “take-off”: from a
“tipping point” where one’s network and one’s partners’ networks can connect
to a wider world. Haq worked steadily in various overlapping networks—the
world of development planners and development economists, the world of
government policy makers, the worlds of development critics and of rethinking
from the South—through the World Bank, the Third World Forum which he
co-founded in 1972, the Society for International Development in whose
activities he and his wife participated regularly through the 1980s thereby
deepening his link to UNDP, and more. From the end of the 1980s, when the
opportunity arrived, he used his organizational and intellectual network of
networks to make the breakthrough.

Vision, values, network and proposals: the United Nations
and global civil society

Haq’s moment of greatness was his period at the United Nations (1989-95). He
acted on the lessons drawn from the period in the World Bank. The Human
Development Report Office (HDRO) obtained editorial independence. It
could thus function as a genuine think tank and therefore in turn help UNDP
to learn. It presented a comprehensive vision beyond only the level of
(material) basics. And it maintained a bridge to the mainstreams of economic
and development policy—through use of Sen’s languages of choice and
effective freedoms—and has thereby been able to influence them. In the
process, Haq’s HDRO contributed to the revival of the idea and principles of
the United Nations.
The UN was created as a follow-on to the association of wartime allies and friendly neutrals known as “the United Nations”, to be a well-behaved reference group for the new dominant power, the United States, and its closest allies. Tension arose between the rhetoric of the UN’s charter and the intentions of the hegemons, the self-perceived “capable actors” of the global scene (Steele and Amoureux 2006). Was the UN the world at work democratically setting rules and making decisions for itself, or the victorious wartime alliance continued, a committee of the big powers with their dependents in tow?

Haq took up the potential within the foundational rhetoric. He could do so, by the 1990s, thanks to the combination of qualities which we have seen. He was a Southerner who could speak for the poor and historically marginalized, but at the same time an assured confident insider in the North, who criticized both sides forcefully and was a strong critic of the UN for being so fragmented and disunited. He sought “to create a ferment of ideas” in the UN “and to make policy makers uncomfortable” (Haq 1994, 4).

He dared to speak for the UN, from within. “I think the UN has to do a number of things”; for example “the UN must move aggressively on disarmament in the developing world” (1994, 2). He pointed a finger at the permanent members of the Security Council who supply nearly all of the vast global arms trade, often involving state promotion and subsidy. Implicitly he used the conception of the United Nations as the world’s democratic forum, not as the Great Powers’ consultative chamber to be ignored when unruly. Indeed he explicitly called for a two chamber UN: one for governments “and the other chamber elected directly by the people and by institutions of civil society” (Haq 1997, 4).

He challenged endemic UN timidity by speaking out freely, not only via UN channels. Just as a political strategy underlay his legacy of the Millennium Development Goals, so a particular perspective of historical dynamics underlay Haq’s use of his period in the 1990s as spokesman not just for the South but for human development as a whole. The hypothesis was that, even if blocked directly in the worlds of the UN and Washington, his sort of language could resonate in the new corridors of global civil society, corridors that were totally absent when the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions were set up in 1944-45 by the then masters of the world (Sen 2004), but which are now vibrant and able to affect global politics.

Leadership for human development and social justice thus seems to involve a type of leadership through ideas, ideas that 1. provide a vision (or set of visions) that 2. embodies values of social justice into a way of seeing and into 3. concrete proposals, and that 4. builds and uses networks to share and support these ideas and proposals. The notions are interlinked. Thus one builds a network through values, vision, and inspiring ideas; though not sufficient, they are necessary, especially to maintain and energize the network.

The paper was not a call for MBAs or MPAs in Leadership Studies, but an attempt to look at catalyst roles in movements of progressive change. As remarked earlier, we are interested not only in the great-man/woman model of leadership, but in all the actions of taking a lead, an initiative, doing the discretionary, the avoidable, the novel. Abraham Maslow would ask his
students: “If not you, then who?”. Examples of leadership help in acceptance of responsibility, of moral agency, while recognising structure: the acceptance of being in our situation in both senses—being constrained by it and yet responsible within it.

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