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RURAL POLICIES AND CONTRADICTIONS IN PAKISTAN IN THE SEVENTIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EIGHTIES

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Introduction

This paper is the outcome of two study visits to Pakistan, the first in the first quarter of 1976, the second in the beginning of 1981. The analysis reviews developments until 1981.

An attempt is made to analyze the ways in which, in the context of its growing incorporation in the dominant world economy, Pakistan's rural and agricultural development strategies, since political independence, have grown out of existing social contradictions and how in turn the growth of these contradictions, once they had developed and had influenced the process of class and State formation, contributed to shape new policies and strategies in rural and agricultural development.

Special attention is given to the evolution of the institutional framework for rural and agricultural policy and local government and the way the military regime reacted on Bhutto's approach, upon his demise.

Finally an analysis is made of the way in which the military regime makes use of islamic ideology to legitimize its development approach and to mitigate the growth of social contradictions.
CHAPTER ONE

THE DYNAMICS OF RURAL TRANSFORMATION AND CONFLICT
IN PAKISTAN IN THE 1970'S

1.1 The Simultaneous Growth of Wealth and Poverty

As a whole, the people of Pakistan have, on average a higher level of income than the peoples of India and Bangladesh. Although the population of Pakistan continues to grow at a high rate (around 3%), the amount of land available per person is among the highest in Asia. Comparatively speaking, industrial growth has from the end of the 1950's been consistently high and has transformed Pakistan into a semi-industrialized country. Also since the middle of the 1960's, agriculture has on the whole been characterized by a continuous process of modernization and growth. Household and income expenditure surveys, made over the years, suggest however, that the total proportion of households and of people living in poverty (in terms of expenditure on food) has increased over the years (S.M. Naseem: (a),46). There is evidence that with the growth both in industry and agriculture, average incomes went strongly upwards. Nevertheless, poverty failed to decline. It may be concluded that the distribution of income and expenditure has worsened.

In November, 1980, the IMF granted a 1.7$ billion dollar credit to Pakistan, until then the biggest loan ever granted to a "developing country". Soon after that, almost all the restraints and disciplines introduced in Oct. 1979 to meet a disastrous balance of payments situation were (had to be) lifted. Dr. Schiller, the former West German Finance Minister, had just then completed a report on Pakistan's economy in which he recommended that Pakistan's entire economy be restructured in the direction of more exports and that the imbalance in external payments be met by long-term
foreign aid and capital inflows for investment. The 1.7$ billion should be used to boost exports in order to pay back debts. At the same time Pakistan would have to liberalize imports from the industrialised nations. Oil price hikes and inflationary prices of imports from industrial countries would have to be put up with, in Dr. Schiller's view. A wide ranging set of recommendations is given in his report to minimize government controls over the economy and maximize room for the private sector. Also a devaluation of 20% was recommended, to stimulate both exports and imports.

Strong opposition arose against the proposed devaluation, as it would further increase the cost of imports of oil and industrial goods and would not improve Pakistan's export position, in view of the relative stagnation of Pakistan's industrial sector as well as protectionism of the industrialized countries (Dawn, Overseas Weekly, 28 February-6 March, 1981).

Policies enacted by the Zia regime and imposed by IMF imply an intensification of the growth policies, pursued in the 1960's, whose disastrous implications in the field of distribution and the growth of mass poverty have been amply and cogently demonstrated, not in the least by Mahbub ul Haq, the principal economic coordinator of that policy in the Planning Commission at the time, who since then joined the World Bank and has in many of his writings and speeches shown the ominous implications of such a growth policy - which the World Bank has consistently promoted, in spite of the McNamara's radical rhetoric. The present "crisis" of the industrialized nations leads, as the Pakistan case demonstrates, the industrialized nations to tighten their grip on the dependent countries. As a result, contradictions between a wealthy minority and a majority getting poorer will grow. Basic reforms of the agrarian structure which is the principal source of Pakistan's underdevelopment are
perceived as superfluous and a hinderance to the pursuit of such growth.

1.2 Agricultural Growth and the Evolution of the Agrarian Structure

For an understanding of the underlying dynamics of Pakistan society which lead to the simultaneous growth of minority wealth and mass poverty, it is suggested that an understanding of the relations between agricultural growth and the evolution of the agrarian structure is essential, as the majority of Pakistan's population earns its livelihood by working the land. While the majority of families are engaged in cultivation, only a minority of them actually owns land. Of this minority of owners, the majority are small owners, while only a minority are large and middle owners. Thus large and medium scale ownership combines with highly fragmented small scale ownership. The big and medium owners have been the main beneficiaries of the growth strategy, pursued by successive governments from the end of the 1950's onwards. Agricultural modernization did not lead to the transformation of the pre-existing feudal agrarian structure. On the contrary, it was realized within that structure. That structure was only partly broken up in the most fertile irrigated areas of Punjab Province, the so-called canal districts. Although there have been impressive improvements in agricultural output in the past years (in the decade from 1976 to 1977, per acre productivity rose roughly 50% for rice, wheat and corn, the main staples), during the last decade as a whole, yields have tended to stagnate. Even for new varieties they have remained quite low. Much of the growth in output has been made possible by the continued expansion of acreage, especially in rice and wheat, as a result of large investments in the Tarbela dam and in public and private tubewells. Scope for further expansion in land
and water supply are limited. Substantive increases can only be realized through intensified production on existing land. However, the perspectives for this look at present dim, in view of the persistence of the pre-existing pattern of semi-feudal production relations in most parts of Pakistan, the growth policies of the past and present governments as well as the effects on Pakistan society from its deepened incorporation into the dominant world economy and the rise in the price of imports from the Middle East (oil) and from the industrialized nations (capital goods, conspicuous consumer goods and know how).

Policy prescriptions by the present government and the World Bank are only concerned with investment, management, pricing and subsidy policies, the promotion of productivity oriented research and of improved delivery systems. (IRDB Report 1980: 51). They do not touch upon the need for a transformation of the social and agrarian structure. Agrarian reforms in the 1960's during Ayub Khan and the 1970's during Bhutto were conveniently supposed to have created a sufficient basis for agricultural modernization to successfully take place, if only adequate attention were given to the above variables of a managerial nature.

The ruling elite which achieved dominance over the State and its institutions at Independence in 1947 were mostly urban migrants from India. They promoted an industrial policy based on import substitution and the development of the private sector (Burki 1980: 17). Promotion of export agriculture provided the foreign exchange, needed for early industrialization. Food production and export agriculture were carried on within the existing structure of land holdings. Ownership was highly skewed. Although the immigrant middle class took hold over the state apparatus, this did in no way affect the agrarian structure and the landed aristocracy continued to control the power-structure in the rural areas. In 1951, when elections to the Provincial assemblies were
held, the overwhelming majority of seats came to be controlled by the big landlords. In the subsequent period, close cooperation was established between the bureaucracy and the landlord-class. Industry was considered the engine of growth for which agriculture had to deliver the imports. In agriculture, the state concentrated investments on major irrigation projects.

Modernization without agrarian transformation led to a decline in agricultural production and with the rising demand for food and cash crops, food deficits caused also a stagnation in industrial growth. Already in the 1950's the growth of agricultural output was outstripped by the growth of the population and Pakistan became a food-importing country.

The agricultural growth policies, initiated by the military government of Ayub Khan in the early 1960's were designed to overcome the decline in production of industrial inputs from agriculture and of food production. This growth strategy was pursued by way of a wide range of subsidies to landlords and upper-middle farmers. The new technology mainly benefitted large and medium size owners. They were the main recipients of credit and highly generous subsidies to purchase tractors and install tubewells. Smaller owners and tenants who formed the overwhelming majority were omitted. An evaluation mission of FAO clearly recognized that it would be likely that tenants who continued to constitute the bulk of the regularly employed labour force would be displaced. It therefore recommended progressive farm mechanization "only in so far as an equal sharing of its benefits will accrue, if mechanization is not to run counter to the government objective of improved income distribution" (Farm Mechanization Report FAO: 12). However it proposed at the same time that priority be given in allocating foreign exchange to those who already used tractors and who already had installed tubewells (idem: 23). The ambiguity of these
recommendations clearly reflect a bias in favour of mechanization as well as the power of the modernizing lobby, both from within and from outside Pakistan.

The main argument in favour of modernization has been that it would lead to higher yields per acre. Also it would allow optimal timing of critical operations and increase cropping intensity. Opponents of mechanization have pointed out that the large four-wheeled tractors which have been the main ones imported in Pakistan are a large and indivisible input and that their efficient use requires a large operating area. There is evidence that mechanization has led to a growth in farm size. In fact 80% of the newly acquired land in the 1960's consisted of land already in use. Thus most large farmers increased their farm size at the expense of small owners and tenants. (World Bank/ADB Survey Feb. 1975). The fact that the second largest source of newly purchased land has been through rental land confirms what has been observed: marginal farmers lease out their land to bigger farmers and tenancy in a reversed form has become common. Although tractorization has mainly affected tenant farmers, it is likely that it also effects small owners and landless labourers. Upper-middle farmers who would use a medium size tractor of a capacity to cultivate up to 100 acres are likely to evict all tenants and reclaim land for self-cultivation. In the case of large owners, there is evidence that landlords reclaim only a portion of the land and keep part of their tenants on small below subsistence plots. While the tenants have to seek outside work, the owners can at the same time use them as a source of cheap labour particularly during the peak periods. So they can avoid having to pay dearly for external wage labour. (Alawi, Rahim: 129). It was also noted that the net labour displacement affects of tractorization were serious. When this became known, the World Bank withdrew. Vested interest had however become entrenched and the Pakistan government borrowed credit elsewhere (v.d. Laar: 163).
According to the President of the ADB (the Agricultural Development Bank) with whom I had an opportunity to discuss the small farmers strategy of his Bank during my last study-visit, until now only larger tractors of 45 HP are available for 7,000$ US. Thus tractors are either used by big farmers or medium farmers who then hire out the tractor or rent in land. According to the President, hiring out is a very profitable business. Recently Chinese and Japanese hand power tillers have been introduced for experimental purposes, but for the time being no break-through is likely. The cultural bias in favour of big tractors remains strong, "Walking" with a power-tiller tends to be viewed as a lowly activity. Although demonstrations in one of the Integrated Rural Development Centers close to Islamabad have proven that Japanese land power tillers are far more effective than the large tractors, they were not appreciated. "You cannot sit on them". Their use involves a loss of status. Group farming by small farmers, as practised in Taiwan and South Korea, was not considered practical by the President of the Bank in view of the prevailing constraints. The government imported 5 years ago 1000 small South Korean tractors. They have remained unsold. The President of the Bank argued that they might have been sold if a private company had imported them. He seemed however rather happy with the cultural constraint as it favoured more "rational farming" by the use of larger tractors. The well established commercial lobby for larger tractors is another factor which will slow down the use of small tractors. This excludes the small farmers from developing a more rational approach by way of unified management.

Loans are as a rule given on individual basis. This approach by the ADB induces the stronger farmers to take the initiative. The President did not openly admit that this would induce a process of concentration either in ownership or in operational holdings with as consequence eviction
and/or a decline in the need for labour. It was however clear from his other observations that he saw this as the only possible approach to agricultural modernization.

Over the past years the ceilings for eligibility for tractor loans in Pakistan have been continuously lowered, from a minimum of 100 acres in 1970 to 12½ acres at present. This means that the pressure for scale enlargement, given the unavailability of small cheap tractors, has greatly increased with the above observed consequences. The rise in the price of hiring a tractor has in one year doubled from 25 to 50 Rps. p.k. as a result of the rise in the oil price. This is another factor which is likely to induce scale enlargement. The 60 US$ million loan, 30$ by the World Bank and 30$ from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to the ADB serve to promote tractorization and tubewells. The ADB programme for small farmers which it launched in 1978 is in actual fact a programme for upper-middle and middle farmers. It does not touch the problems of the mass of the small peasantry whose problems will only aggregate by the ADB approach, given the nature of present production relations.

If farmers between 12.5 and 25 acres are taken to be the "small farmers" to which the programme would be directed, it would mean that 70% of the farmers, the really small ones, owning 30% of the land would be excluded, if the following table is taken as the basis for analysis. The Annual Report of the Bank 1979-1980 unmistakably shows that the overwhelming part of the loans (95%) go to the irrigated areas of the Punjab and Sind where the bulk of export crops are grown and that three quarters of the loans goes to farmers beyond 12.5 acres. In the irrigated areas these farmers surely belong to the elite, the upper 20 to 25%, as suggested by Provincial data (Naseem: (b), 170).
Number and Area of Private Farms, Classified by Size (1972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farms (Acres)</th>
<th>Farms Number (Million)</th>
<th>Farms Percent</th>
<th>Farm Area Total (Million)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 1.0</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0 to under 2.5</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 to under 5.0</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0 to under 7.5</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 to under 12.5</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.91</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.5 to under 25.0</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.06</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.0 to under 50.0</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.0 to under 150.0</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150.0 and above</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Farms</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>49.06</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-: Negligible


Although the President of the ADB said that in their "small farmers" programme a flexible approach was taken with regard to collateral, and assessment of credit worthiness was made on basis of the quality of the applicant, the manager of the regional office of the Agricultural Bank in Peshawar made it clear that loans were only given to owners and that tenants were excluded. One of his most serious problems turned out to be how to effectively prevent being pushed by their landlords to obtain loans for them. According to the regional manager, the record of repayment by middle farmers is close to 100% while landlords are the most serious defaulters who need to be pressed hard to repay.

Tractorization is also gaining ground in the barani (dry farming) areas. According to the General in Change of the programme of modernization of barani agriculture during the late seventies in the Punjab, this programme was built around the tractor. "First we got a Land Consolidation Order from the Provincial Government. The next step was to encourage small farmers to buy out their neighbours with the money they had received from the remittances of their relatives."
We formed groups of 15 to 20 peasants. Through the use of the tractor we were able to realize deeper tillage and thereby improve moisture conservation. The next step was to introduce the new seed and fertilizer technology. More efficient resource use and management was assured by better leadership." Group farming was by this General only seen as a step toward more concentrated ownership as a basis for modern farming.

It may be expected that as a result of chronic indebtedness, the process of buying out the small peasants and concentrating ownership in few hands will be rapid, once the technological revolution has started to erupt in the barani areas. The elite has little understanding of their own historical role in having contributed to stifling the productive and creative potential of the poor peasants by the very production relations it defends.

The perception by the modernizing elite of Pakistan of the village people is well exemplified by the General's views. Like most agricultural modernizers in Pakistan, he has a deep contempt for the "primitive backward" peasants whom he vehemently made responsible for all the ills of Pakistan and whom he saw as a major liability. "The 245,000 villages of Pakistan are economically redundant. What can we do with these people. The best thing is to get them as soon as possible out of the country so they help the country which they kept hitherto in a state of backwardness by their remittances. We better demolish the old villages and build one modern township for every 10 of them."

The strategy of the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan should not surprise. It is wholly consistent with the growth strategy to focus on the middle and upper-middle farmers who in view of their resource endowment can maximize productivity and who are under the circumstances the most productive ones, as many surveys have indeed shown.
There is however also an important political angle to this strategy. Support to the big landlords and large farmers has to be counter-balanced by loans to the middle and upper-middle class farmers. While the commercial banks take care of the first, the ADB focuses more recently on the second group. It may be argued that not only this is necessary from a productivity/export point of view. Politically the medium and upper-middle farmers are a strategic group which has a crucial function as a "buffer" between the big landlords and large farmers and the mass of the peasantry.

The President of the Agricultural Development Bank is known to be a major landlord in the fertile Multan District where he owns hundreds of acres of land on which he cultivates export crops. He still has many tenants, apart from the wage labour he employs. He also owns various processing factories.

The intention of the ADB to seek a US$30 million loan from the Asian Development Bank to promote integrated production/processing operations for exports are wholly in line with the interests of the big landlords and large farmers group to which he belongs himself.

Both large and middle farmers increased their area owned as well as that tenanted-in by them at the expense of all size categories of small owners and all size categories of tenants. When their plots become too marginal, many small cultivators mortgage or rent out their land. More recently they do so in order to obtain a permit for work in the Middle East. Others were evicted by landlords when the latter decided to go in for self-cultivation, either in order to mechanize or out of fear for land reform.

Thus in the 1960's, the land reform and the growth policies of the government not only brought about a growth in the concentration of ownership but also in the operation of leased-in area.
With land increasingly becoming scarce and with the tendency of larger farmers to shift to self-cultivation and rented-in land, next to the basic dychotomy between large and small farmers (the differences in sizes are narrowing down), another dychotomy arises between those who have access to ownership and/or leased-in land and those who do not.

Agrarian reforms during the regime of Bhutto (1971-1977) did not lead to any drastic change in the power and influence of the big and medium sized landlords (Herring). These were announced by Bhutto as a strategy of gaining power and obtaining the political support of the mass of small owners and tenants. Once in power, in order to retain power, he had to rely on the landlords. Thus the 1972 land reform law was formulated in such a way that it was full of loopholes. This enabled Bhutto to support the landlords, modern and upper-middle farmers and to pursue agricultural growth. On the other hand, his initial slogan that he who tills the land should owe it and his promises to protect tenants against their landlords raised high hopes and led in a number of areas, where modernization took place in the context of the maintenance of semi-feudal production relations, to large scale violent conflict. Also his decision to review the regressive revenue structure in 1975 and exempt all small owners of less than 12 acres from all land taxes and charge landlords progressively according to the size of the land, was designed to strengthen mass support. This measure, however, seriously antagonized the large and middle owners. His land-reform proposals of 1977 which brought down the ceiling for irrigated land to 100 acres and of unirrigated land to 200 acres as well as his proposal to introduce agricultural income tax for owners above 25 acres, while exempting all those below that size, turned all larger land owners sharply against him. If this proposal for land reform would have been implemented, it would have gone a far way in destroying the basis of semi-feudal ownership and of
the dynamics which feed the growing inequality in assets, power and income in the rural areas of Pakistan. As a result of the "green revolution" strategy, the political, economic and social power of the landlord class and modernizing upper-middle farmers had greatly increased. So had their real income, as a result of the growing capitalization in agriculture and the favourable price and subsidy policies. Land reform and progressive income policies would have enabled the State to significantly redistribute land to at least a portion of small owners, tenants and landless and utilize the largely unproductively utilized surplus gained by modernizing landlords and upper-middle farmers for more productive purposes.

The rapid rate of growth of capital equipment in agriculture during Bhutto's regime was based on a very significant expansion of rural credit. This expansion was made possible by the nationalization of the commercial banks and insurance companies in 1974 which gave the government a decisive control over investment priorities, creation and disbursement of credit. In 1975-1976 alone US $165 million went into rural credit and to entrepreneurs in rural townships. The rapid rate of expansion can be seen from a table illustrating the growth of loans by the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>370.41</td>
<td>430.65</td>
<td>1800.30</td>
<td>1390.54</td>
<td>2200.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubewells</td>
<td>180.41</td>
<td>260.42</td>
<td>510.33</td>
<td>860.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other needs</td>
<td>130.53</td>
<td>470.25</td>
<td>1230.46</td>
<td>930.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: First nine months.

Although these loans were destined to go to medium
and small farmers, in view of the prevailing power structure and the requirements of collateral, it has been openly recognized in a recent publication of the Pakistan Institute of Bankers that the majority of these loans went to large landlords and upper-middle farmers. According to the President of the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan in 1972, only 2% of all loans of commercial banks went to agriculture. In 1980, the proportion had risen to 30%. The rise is partly a consequence of the obligation imposed by the National Bank of Pakistan on the commercial banks to increase their proportion of loans to agriculture. The rapid growth of loans into profitable ventures in agro-business is likely to further undermine the production of food for domestic use. The high rate of credit formation, heavily tied to borrowings from the State, led Pakistan to an untenable monetary situation, so that as of 1977, only 15% of Pakistan's currency was covered by foreign exchange or real assets.

1.3 The Growth of Rural Contradictions

The separation from Bangladesh had very serious consequences for Pakistan. Pakistan is estimated to have spent around US 2$ billion on its counter-liberation war in Bangladesh, the war with India and the subsequent re-organization of its armed forces. The 40% of its manufactures which had previously been absorbed by East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, could not be absorbed by its own home market. As it had not developed any export industry, it had to rely on the growth of export of primary agricultural products to finance its imports, debts and the deficit on the balance of payments. Thus food exports greatly expanded - from an export of 88,000 tons of grain in 1969-1970 to 596,000 tons in 1973-1974. The development of trade with the oil producing countries of the Middle East greatly boosted its food exports
of fruit, meat, vegetables, poultry and other items, at the expense of the internal food market (Feroz Ahmed: 1976). With the growth of food exports, both the quality and quantity of food on the home market declined sharply and prices of the three staple foods - rice, wheat and corn - which had shown the largest increase in productivity rose by close to 200% in less than 5 years.

A major push for food exports came from the International Monetary Fund which was only prepared to help Pakistan out of its crises, following the separation with Bangladesh, upon a devaluation of its currency by 130%, the liberalization of its import restrictions on over 300 commodity items and expression of willingness to boost its primary exports to meet the bill. The growth in conspicuous consumption by the high income groups in Pakistan is illustrated by the fact that, in spite of the critical shortage of essential capital goods and basic consumer goods, during 1974-1975, nearly 1300$ million dollars was spent on consumer items, nearly 4 times as much as on capital goods. This shows at the same time the urgency for the industrialized nations to export at all cost, to meet their balance of payment requirements.

The nationalization of Pakistan's basic industries in 1972 was carried out by Bhutto "to eliminate the concentration of economic power so that no single entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs would be in a position to control the strategic heights of the economy against the public interest". Since nationalization, industrial investment by government rose by more than 10 times from 1971-1972 to 1976-1977 to constitute 71% of total industrial investment. However, the private sector sharply reacted and its investment dropped from 93% of total industrial investment in 1971-1972 to 29% in 1976-1977. The effect of Bhutto's industrial nationalization on employment was small. The nationalized industries at the time only employed one tenth (60,000) of the annual
increase of the country's labour market. Apart from this, investments by Bhutto in basic industries were very expensive and highly capital-intensive (1.4$ billion for Karachi's steel mill and fertilizer projects for 200$ million each), so that the cost per working place created amounted to $100,000 to $300,000. The creation of these industries could only serve the production of inputs and goods at the benefit of the small industrial, agricultural and trade elite. Meanwhile, food prices rose as well as the price of basic consumer goods.

Also Bhutto tried to achieve control over the entire agricultural economy by nationalizing all agricultural processing enterprises and setting up corporations to control the supply of inputs and marketing. This would eliminate the middlemen on whom the majority of peasants depended and to whom they were indebted. As a result of this, they were obliged to sell their products for low prices or with a loss. Continued indebtedness obliged the peasantry to exchange their products against too expensive consumer items or accept the terms of the middlemen in exchange for further credit to buy inputs or food.

The section on Agriculture of the 1978-1983 Plan of June, 1978: 33/34 reveals that profit margins for the direct producers are quite limited. Studies on marketing of vegetables, conducted in the Punjab, North Western Frontier and Baluchistan revealed that of the final price about 44%, 34% and 22% were respectively received by the direct producers. A survey undertaken by the Agricultural University in Sind revealed that the direct producers only received from 31% to 46% of the consumer price of union, chillies and potatoes and from 22% to 32% of mangoes, dates and banana. With the policy of privatization of Public Corporations which the present government pursues, it is doubtful that profit margins will improve, particularly if representatives of the big landlords are allowed to take shares in the public corporations as contemplated. If may be noted that the President of the Agricultural Development Bank is also
Chairman of the Pakistan Agricultural Storages and Services Corporation (PASSCO). This is not to argue in favour of inefficient corrupt public corporations. But it is as little acceptable to praise the prevailing forms of operation of intermediaries for their relative efficiency, without paying attention to the exploitative nature of their practices. Where cooperatives exist, these are as a rule controlled by landlords and upper middle farmers who use their position to obtain a commission on the sale of inputs to peasants dependent on them. In other cases such cooperatives are controlled by traders. As to the sale of food assigned quotas to each village are provided by government to Agents who run the Ration depots. These are as a rule political appointees and profiteers who make big profits by manipulating the supplies to their advantage.

In the 1970 elections Bhutto was able to defeat the conservative parties. He sweepingly carried the elections with the help of a seemingly radical programme while using the slogan of Islamic socialism. From then on until his downfall in 1977, his ambiguous contradictory policies created growing class conflict which he was not able to control. On the one hand, he tried to win the support of industrial labour and the mass of the small peasantry by promises of reform and social development which would improve their livelihood. On the other hand, he made a compromise with the semi-feudal landlords and the upper-middle farmers while forcing them to support him. While supporting the demands of industrial labour for an increase in wages, he tried to contain their demands at the same time. Thus he unintentionally unleashed and promoted class conflict which rallied both the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie as well as the landlords and larger farers to seek his downfall. They united disgruntled urban labour and the petit bourgeoisie which had lost all hopes to maintain or improve their position, in view of the rapid inflation. Thus Bhutto became the victim of his own contradictory policies.
The emergence of peasant organizations to mobilize the landless, tenants and small owners, to combat the inequities of their landlords, to resist eviction or to occupy the land which they tilled, has only emerged very slowly in Pakistan. It can only be discussed in a regional context, given the significant variations in the nature of social organization as well as the nature of the prevailing production relations and the level of development of productive forces.

In Pakistan, like in India and Bangladesh, it has been far from easy for agricultural labourers and small peasants to unite and organize so as to articulate their demands and muster sufficient social, economic and political power which would enable them to participate in production, distribution and consumption on an equitable basis. It has been observed that in the Punjab, although organizations of farm labourers have existed for quite some time, they have not developed much political consciousness to serve them in their struggle to obtain social justice (Sayeed: 176). Such a potential has been clearly evident in those parts of the Punjab where capitalist modernization develops in the context of persistent semi-feudal production relations and small peasants have been evicted or are pressed to accept inequitable terms from their landlords. From a penetrating case study (Nigar:40 Ahmad) it appears that during the Bhutto period the state machinery was unable or unwilling to back up the tenants in their demands within the terms of the law, and that selective punishment was used by landlords who successfully sought the collusion of the police and the courts to deter other tenants from joining the peasant organizations. In that sense little change had taken place since the time of Ayub Khan. The collusion of the bureaucracy with the landlords played an important role in crushing the peasant movements in the case in question. In contrast to the relative weakness or defeat of peasant organizations in the Punjab are the relative successes of movements of small peasants and agricultural
labourers in North-Western Frontier Province. These were rather successful struggles during the 1960's and 1970's against their feudal or semi-feudal landlords in the Districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Swat, Dir and the Malakand Agency (Sayeed: 176). In many cases they refused to pay the rent, reduced the rent or opposed a deterioration in the terms of their tenancy. There is evidence that political mobilization by the tenants gains in strength to the extent that their class alignment is in line with their tribal allegiance. In the case of the successful struggle by the tenants in the District of Hashtagar in NWFP the Mohmand tenants have made a purposeful use of their solidarity, which springs from their primordial loyalties as a tribe, against their landlords, the Muhammedzai (Rahim: 131). While a minority tribe, these received the land from the British in the 19th century. When the value of the land increased and export and cash crops were introduced upon irrigation by the Muhammedzai, they were unable to dislodge the Mohmand tenants in spite of full backing by the forces of "law order". As a rule, opposition to the landlords remains underground but it is close to the surface. It shows that peasants do not need to "develop" political consciousness and that changes are not far away, as suggested by the following report from Peshawar District in 1976.

"Peasants whom I happened to meet in several villages told me, after some initial exchange on the weather, their children and their work, "Without the landlords, we would be equal", "The landlords dominate us", "We have no water, as the landlord first irrigates his own land", "The Government favours the landlords". They believed that they could control the floods which every year ruins their land and threatens their livelihood. The idea of a federation of villages, mobilizing their joint forces, very much appealed to them. But they recognized that in the short run
this was impossible, in view of the multiplicity of conflicts between and within villages. But these conflicts turned all out to be directly related to the control and use of resources of land and water. The main problem appeared to be that of dependence on the landlords: "We depend on them", "We cannot do what he does not want", "We do not dare, we have to eat". One peasant said: "But one day we will dare". Thus, they see very well themselves that the source of their incapacity to unite does not lie in themselves but in the power of the landlords which keeps them divided." (Kuitenburg, 1976: 107).

Successive governments in Pakistan have traditionally attempted to establish close links with those who control the rural power structure, so as to promote modernization and not to drive them into opposition. It belongs to the strategy of any landlord family with self-respect to have at least one son in the army or the police and another in the bureaucracy. As a rule, they have more relatives in both, so as to protect and promote their interests. Apart from this, however, the use of goondas (gangsters or thugs) by landlords against their tenants and other small cultivators or persons who dare to resist their interests has been a common feature of the Pakistan rural scene. The growth of inequality and polarization in the countryside has tended to intensify the use of violence by landlords. Also the increasingly fierce competition among the mass of small peasants and landless for limited resources tends to aggravate conflict. This competition results both from the growing concentration of control over land and water as well as from the growing population pressure and the continued strength of the Islamic laws on inheritance. It is common knowledge to those well acquainted with rural Pakistan that villages are not really subjected to the law of the land. Most relatively isolated
Communities are prone to violence because the powerful can freely act without fear of opposition from any quarter.

Conflicts are frequently resolved by recourse to violence, by the gentry (the big absentee landlords) and the village landlords and by one village group against another to settle land disputes or other grievances. Thefts of property, harassment or threats on life are not uncommonly used by village landlords or the gentry to punish a political enemy or a disobedient tenant. The cooperation of the police is sought to secure the necessary freedom of action. It might be argued that the relative absence of open opposition in the villages is also induced by the advanced state of disintegration of the community as a tribal community as well as the more organized presence of the forces of "law and order". In the Northern Western Frontier Province, small peasants and tenants who resort to violence or are persecuted for presumed unlawfulness can easily seek protection and shelter in the mountainous terrain of adjoining tribal areas where the police are barred from seeking them.

Rural conflict has been greatly mitigated by the continuous emigration of marginal and marginalized peasants and landless to the urban centers as well as to the Middle East. Although the proportion of urban to rural migration is not dramatically increasing, the population of a few urban centers is increasing at a very rapid rate. Thus rural poverty is turned into urban poverty. In the absence of alternative gainful employment, emigration partly functions as a safety valve and lowers the political pressures among the marginal urban and rural artisan and peasant population for social, economic and political reforms. The following table shows the rapid massive growth of the emigration:
### Labor Force Emigration From Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>12,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>16,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>23,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>41,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>140,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>128,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data provided by the MANPOWER Division, Ministry of Labour

Labour has become Pakistan's chief export commodity. It earned Pakistan a 575$ million income in 1976-1977 as compared with the total receipts of $1.129 of all other export commodities. With the boom of emigrants since then, foreign exchange earnings from remittances reached in 1977-1978 1.149$ million against a record deficit of 1.503 million on the merchandise account (Ajiz Ahmad: 494). In 1980, it reached the 2$ billion. In view of this and the absence of employment opportunities at home under present socioeconomic conditions, the government strongly encourages this migration. Although emigration may temporarily alleviate the unemployment problem, it may also retard economic growth, both industry and agriculture. According to the director of the Manpower Training Institute of Islamabad, of around 120,000 migrant workers to the Middle East in 1979, about half were skilled and semi-skilled artisans, many of whom come from the villages. In 1980, of the 150,000, 60,000 were skilled and semi-skilled. The departure of these artisans has caused a sharp rise in the cost of construction activity as well as in many other services (e.g. electricity, plumbing, welding, auto repair).
Remittances sent home are mainly used in the rural areas for house construction, the purchase of conspicuous consumer goods and land as a security, in view of the galloping inflation. Thus the price of land is sharply rising. It is also not uncommon that land remains behind uncultivated, but it also happens that entrepreneurs make contracts with the women left behind and work the land with gangs of hired labour as a profitable business. Anthropological reports suggest that as a result of the prolonged absence of their husbands, the role of women in the family as well as in the community greatly change and oblige them to undo themselves from the highly prescribed narrow roles which have been imposed on them by the norms of the feudal patriarchal culture which has for centuries been legitimized by their presumed source in Islamic tradition (e.g. the purdah). The emancipatory implications of the migratory movement seem to be in sharp contradiction with the Islamization campaign by the Zia Government which attempts to restore or even intensify the woman's submission to rigid ancient customs.

According to official estimates made by the Manpower Division of the Ministry of Labour, the labour force is increasing at a rate of 3.2% per year, with a net addition each year to this force of more than three quarters of a million persons, seeking work. This means that between 1978 and 1983, as many as 3.8 million persons would enter the labour force. In view of the nature of the growth strategy, pursued by the present military government, the scope for absorbing even a modest portion of these job seekers is very limited.

If migration from the villages towards the cities does not dramatically increase, there is no reason to assume that poverty would somehow smoothly disappear in the villages. Continued mechanization and concentration of ownership through private "land consolidation" by way of the purchase or lease-in of land will be a major factor in the growth of a marginalized peasantry and of rural mass poverty. In so
far as agricultural modernization increasingly excludes the peasantry from gainful and productive labour, polarization between a rich minority and the large majority of marginal peasants, many of whom live close to or even below subsistence level, is bound to aggravate. In view of the growth policies, pursued by the present government, there is reason to assume that such a trend is likely. There are in fact many signs which point to its emergence. These are evident in the effects of government policies, dictated by the International Fund and which seriously affect the profitability of the hitherto dominant production pattern of food and export crops. The withdrawal of fertilizer subsidies coupled to other factors which affect profitability is likely to result in a decline in yields of basic staples. Also it stimulates a switch towards other more profitable crops, which will further reduce the availability of food for the mass of low income earners, be it rural or urban wage labour. In North Western Frontier Province and the relatively remote Himalayan valleys, it will re-activate the growth of poppy. Pakistan has again become the major world exporter of heroin. Anti-poppie programmes however which do not focus on the underlying causes of a switch to poppie are bound to be rather ineffective.
CHAPTER TWO

THE RESPONSE BY ZIA-UL-HAQ'S REGIME TO THE GROWTH OF SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS

2.1 Towards a strategy of Containment and Repression

Zia's policies are wholly consistent with his diagnosis of the problems, inherited from Bhutto's regime and policies. In Zia's view, Bhutto's policies have been the major cause of the growth of social contradictions and of class consciousness which could well lead to a social upheaval. As he pointed out in an interview in April 1978:

"If you stay here for a few more days you will find out the environment. It is now getting better but there is a tremendous polarization - polarization between the right and the left, the poor and the rich, the haves and the have-nots. This was all the intentional doing of the former Government that you have various elements which you could manipulate. We are a developing country and it is more important for us that we have no polarization. The objective must be one. The ideology of Pakistan should be in the forefront, and then people should have clean politics devoid of agitation." (Sayeed: 178).

This statement explains many of Zia's conservative policies as well as the intentions behind his proposals to islamizize Pakistan society.

The growth of social, political and economic contradictions in Pakistan are not seen by him as the outcome of the inequalities created by polarizing growth policies, but as the outcome of unlawfulness and rebellion against law and order. The unity of Pakistan is viewed by him as resulting
from the strict adherence by all to the "laws" of the Islam. All people from the different Provinces of which Pakistan is made up and which have such own distinct identities and "national" interests as "peoples", each with their own historical personality and identity are presumed by him to belong to the same tribe. His attempt to resolve the conflicts which result from the contradictions, created by the very process of modernization and the concomitant unequal distribution of opportunities and income has created much resentment not only among intellectuals but also among the majority of the people. Many workers and peasants realize very well that islamization is meant to control them and their demands for improved livelihood.

There is ample evidence that the purpose of the military in seizing power in July 1977 was to contain and suppress the contradictions which had grown during the Bhutto regime but which have their deeper source in the growth policies which have consistently been pursued all along since Ayub Khan took power at the end of the 1950s. The two major planks of Zia's programme of action were to reassure the main proportioned classes (the industrialists, traders and landlords) that the military government would abandon all so-called radical policies of the Bhutto regime and discipline workers and peasants so that growth policies could be pursued without "unlawful" intervention. (Sayeed: 181). Thus Zia warned the workers to behave with strict discipline or face severe punishment. Any kind of industrial unrest would be harshly dealt with, in accordance with the "Islamic laws" of justice by way of flogging and imprisonment. Ruthless killings by the police of striking workers at Multan in January 1978 showed the workers that Zia would not tolerate any militant attempts by them to defend their elementary demands of livelihood. When in Peshawar, he threatened the assembled workers to physically break them, if they would dare to demand a rise in wages, and improvement
of social conditions. In all areas where tenants had seized the initiative in either occupying the land they had tilled or cease or reduce the rent, landlords have tried to regain their position and initiative under the protection of the regime.

There is evidence that in several districts of the Punjab thousands of tenants were forcibly evicted. In the Hashtnagar District of North Western Fronteer Province where the armed confrontation between landlords and tenants had been particularly intensive in the 1960s and 1970s, as reported above, the landowners brought about the eviction of the tenants from their land with the help of the police and the Frontier Constabulary. This action was justified by a High Court order from 1973 which ruled that landowners were legally entitled to evict tenants (Sayeed: 180). In the Districts of Mardan, Swat and the Malakand Agency, thousands of tenants have been brought before the Courts by their ex-landlords who claim back "their" land. In the Mardan District, where the tenants refused to pay the monetary rent, tenancy on the basis of share cropping has again been re-introduced by force. In other cases, faced with the threat of expulsion, tenants have again started to pay their rent to the old landlords.

Interviews with landlords in Mardan and Swat District suggest that they do not dare to press too hard and too fast. Also the government does not dare to back up the landlords too conspicuously, as by doing so, it even deeper antagonizes the poor peasantry. In spite of Bhutto's failed promises and "betrayal", the bulk of marginal peasants and landless still look at him as their hero who would liberate them from the exploitation of the landlords, merchants and the middlemen.

While the government pursued these policies, freezing labour and supporting the eviction of tenants, labor groups and a leftist political party, the Pakistan Mazdoor-Kisan
(workers and peasants) party, voiced its strong opposition. The Al-Pakistan Labor Conference, announcing labor's seven-point charter, declared that it was totally opposed to the denationalization of public sector industries and their return to private owners. The Conference also condemned the eviction of tenants and demanded that the evicted tenants should be allowed to reoccupy their lands. The Unity Congress organized to unite all leftist groups and parties by the Pakistan Mazdoor-Kisan party also denounced what it alleged as the anti-labor policy pursued both by the government and management and supported the strikes organized by the workers in various industries. Resolutions of the Congress demanded that the policy of evicting peasants should be ended forthwith (Pakistan Forum, August 1979).

The demand by workers for a rise in wages as well as by the bureaucracy, whose real income has been halved during the last six years, for a rise in salaries, in view of the inflation for the past year calculated by Dr. Schiller at 13% and of the sharp rise in the cost of living, remains unanswered. One serious effect of the decline in real income in the bureaucracy is that it stimulates corruption. Pakistan, hard hit by the soaring oil bill, benefits from a massive infusion of funds, coupled with a rescheduling of its huge debts. The IMF has approved a 1.7 US$ billion disbursement over the next 3 years (Far Eastern Economic Review, February 6, 1981). In return Pakistan has agreed to reduce and eventually eliminate key government subsidies on a number of essential items such as wheat, kerosine, oil and fertilizer and to raise prices on utilities, particularly electricity. When the military government, in line with the prescriptions of the IMF, announced the increase of duties on kerosene, and powdered milk and higher rates on gas for domestic consumption, it was forced to drop the proposed measures in the face of a united opposition by the poor and the middle class. By its attempts to strictly control a
rise in real income not only by the workers but also by the middle class of which the bureaucracy is the major component, the military government tends to alienate also the middle class and the sympathy it might have had among it. On the other hand, its obligation, imposed by the IMF, to sharply curtail the subsidy on fertilizer, is bound to estrange from it a significant part of the landlord class and the upper-middle farmers. These will be obliged, if they want to maintain profitability, to discharge the rising cost of their operations on their tenants and workers. This is likely to intensify the opposition of the latter to the military regime.

The generosity of the IMF and the Aid-to-Pakistan consortium which has agreed to reschedule Pakistan's debts is not so much inspired by confidence as well as by considerations of a political nature in view of the presumed Soviet threat from Afghanistan. Pakistan's debt service ratio stands at 30%, well above the 20%, which the Bank considers as prudent. The US 2$ billion p.a. in remittances brings Pakistan however under that safety limit. The liberalization of imports, demanded by the IMF against the wishes of its government, will contribute to a growing deficit on the balance of payments. It also has estranged sections of the industrial elite from Zia who formerly supported him to bring Bhutto down. A boost in agricultural exports has to be the principal way to offset such a deficit. In the financial year up to June 1980, a 40% increase in exports was almost entirely offset by the doubling of the oil import bill to US$ 1.2 billion. The pressure on boosting exports will further undermine Pakistan's need to give priority to food production for its home market. It means more work and less food, given the present social and agrarian structure. Plans by the Agricultural Development Bank to finance and clear the way for participating in agro-industrial ventures for fruit-processing are in line with this export approach.
The president of the Agricultural Development Bank observed during our interview: "If we combine western technology with our export opportunities to the Middle East (fruit, meat, flowers), the prospects are fantastic. "We can fly the meat early in the morning to Saudi Arabia and make sure that every Saudi can have it for breakfast at 7.00 a.m.".

Meanwhile farm mechanization has greatly accelerated during Zia's regime. During the years 1977-1979, close to 9000 tubewells were installed per year, 6000 more per year than in the years from 1970 to 1975. Also from 1976 to 1979, as many as 40,000 tractors had been imported. In 1972, the total number of tractors only amounted to 2,427. There was also a large increase in the use of fertilizer in 1977-1978, before the subsidy was dropped (Sayeed: 173).

Taking into account the analysis under chapter 1.2, the combined effect of these inputs are likely to speed up land concentration and the eviction of tenants.

The proposals by Zia's regime for a new Islamic social and economic order are clearly designed to diffuse the social contradictions which have developed since the last 30 years and to strengthen the social and political status quo. The Zakat (the state-administered assistance to the poor) amounts in theory to an annual 2½% tax on all visible assets but in practice it is only levied on those assets, which are left visible by their owners such as savings accounts. The effect of the Zakat proposal are not exactly inspired by the vision of a progressive Pakistan author: that the Zakat should serve to ensure a constant redistribution of the nation's wealth. Her view that the Zakat should be interpreted as a right of the poor to claim by force from the rich (Kuitenhouver: 96) is precisely opposite to the government's intention and is highly subversive. The Ushr (agricultural tax) to be collected at the rate of 5% of agricultural produce can only be collected with great difficulty. Taking into account the mechanisms of exploitation of the rural poor by landlords, rich farmers, middlemen) and tra-
ders, the seize of these two taxes would seem extremely modest if tenant/share croppers have to give half of the product to the owners. In some areas, tenants only receive 1/3 or 1/4 of the product. A decline in profitability for the owners, as a result of cost increase and the rising competition for jobs will put the tenants' share under further stress. The new laws which harshly deal with theft by way of flogging and other forms of corporal violence like the amputation of the right hand (which has yet to be introduced in practice) convey the concern of the present military government to at all price protect the interests of the propertied classes. Although the practical application of these threats has subsided in view of the adverse reactions in the world at large, the threat is still there.

The agenda for Islamic Economic Reform, written by four of Pakistan's distinguished economic scholars, unambiguously questions the unrestrained use of private property by its proposition that "the right to private property in Islam gets vastly qualified, limiting severely the sphere of ownership itself" and the need to make a "decisive move to redistribute the total property in the community, both rural and urban, is recognized (Agenda: 3 and 4). It is precisely the present government which has introduced measures to prevent or undo any restructuring of property relations, particularly in the rural areas. The proposal by the Commission of scholars that land reforms should be carried out on the basis of the size of the land held by the family and not by individuals, reflects concern with the failure of past land reforms, as family property was always distributed among relatives, so as to circumvent the law and make it inoperative. The proposals to introduce interest-free loans by Zia's government may well have an opposite effect. Few of such loans have been distributed. According to reliable information from within the Planning Commission, they amount
to less than 2% of all agricultural loans in 1979-1980. "It is to be expected that much of it will not reach the poor." There is evidence that in a number of cases they are not given to poor but to well-to-do farmers. In so far as the free-interest loan proposal would serve the government to extend loans to the private sector to produce wage goods (Agenda: 22), such loans easily could serve to boost private enterprise rather than serve the livelihood of poor workers and peasants.

It has been pointed out that the slogan of "Islamic socialism" was in the 1950s introduced in Pakistan as a device to stress the supremacy of Islam and as a pre-emptive move to prevent the spread of "real socialism". It appears that the expression "Islamic socialism" was introduced to neutralize and counteract the danger of the appeal socialism had for the Muslim masses. Thus there is so to say an anti-socialist element in the slogan "Islamic socialism" as it proposes that there is no need of socialism as Islam has always taught social justice (Mintjes: 57). Dominant Islamic thinking by the mulla ideologues in Pakistan fully asserts the compatibility between Islam, private ownership and enterprise and free competition. Bhutto used the slogan of Islamic socialism to rally political support and achieve and retain power. Since Bhutto's downfall, the use of the term "Islamic socialism" has become taboo. It became clear that the majority of Pakistan's people showed too much interest for that interpretation of socialism which is incompatible with the philosophy of the conservative parties which formulated the programme of Zia's islamization campaign. These parties have core positions in Zia's cabinet, without any significant backing from among Pakistan's population. Attempts by Zia to gain popular backing so far have failed.
2.2 The Rise and Fall of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and of Local Government

2.2.1 The failure of community development:

The introduction and promotion of community development in India and Pakistan since Independence had two sources of inspiration: it derived from both British and American conceptions on rural and local development in the ex-colonies. Community development was designed to serve to improve rural living conditions in the countryside without intervening into or trying to alter the existing power structure and existing production relations. It was assumed in both conceptions that somehow someday modernisation would produce the required new leadership necessary for rural modernisation. Such a strategy for rural "uplift" and improvement would not be possible without establishing and promoting a proper administrative structure to coordinate the nation-building departments and their services at all levels. With the start of the growth strategy in the 1960's, when the sectorial departments of agriculture became increasingly powerful, both the theory and practice of Community development were gradually abandoned. The principal focus from then on was raising productivity and creating the necessary conditions for that purpose by the expansion of infrastructure and the supply of inputs to landlords and upper middle farmers.

The community development programmes served to a limited extent the village elites to mobilize with the help of the State the labour of the small peasantry and the landless. They contributed to some capital formation in support of agricultural growth. In that sense, they had a polarizing effect. At the same time however, they had the political function of creating an image and semblance of concern with the progress of the community as a whole. As the results were inversely proportionate to the cost, international support was withdrawn. There was another reason for a
declining interest in community development. To the extent that village organizations, created in the process, might serve the marginal majority to claim a more equitable distribution of local resources and assets and of services and inputs provided by governments, they constituted an impediment to "modernization". Production and productivity deserved strict priority. Once they had grown, it was conveniently assumed, distribution would naturally follow. The conception of an integrated approach was stripped of its potentially transformational and distributional dimensions and was reduced to that of the mere coordination of services and inputs in support of growth and modernization.

The training center for rural development Comilla was established in East Pakistan in the early 1960's to serve as the major center for developing an approach to rural community development in the subcontinent. It was planned to be a viable effective alternative of democratic rural cooperation to collective agricultural and rural development organization as promoted by the People's Republic of China. Under the inspired leadership of Akther Hameed Khan and with generous support from the American government and American Foundations, Comilla became a centre of social experimentation. Streams of American social scientists came to do research, write Ph.D. theses and papers to go home or to other countries to spread the Comilla gospel. Although much energy was spent on "innovative approaches", Comilla was a dramatic failure. It entirely failed to come to grips with the underlying social, political and economic processes and mechanisms which engendered, reproduced and intensified poverty. Capital formation by way of the mobilization of village labour and the promotion of cooperative organization and training of village leadership to meet the needs of improvement of the conditions of the peasantry were all undertaken, without a major challenge to the prevailing semi-feudal power structure. The problem was recognised by Akther Hameed Khan. In one of his speeches to the cadres of
the Peshawar Rural Academy, who were to be engaged in the IRDP Programme, he said: "By village leaders, I do not mean Khans (landlords), but I mean real workers (Kuijtenbrouwer: 134).

2.2.2 The Integrated Rural Development Programme

From the outset the Integrated Rural Development Programme which was launched by Bhutto in 1972 was marked by severe contradictions. The growth strategy followed since the beginning of the 1960's had greatly increased inequality in the countryside. The antagonisms engendered by it needed to be mitigated, without endangering the purpose of the strategy itself. Bhutto supported the landlords and middle farmers by boosting infrastructural facilities and inputs. At the same time however, he promised the poor peasantry to help them to improve their life. Thus he proposed to combine both helping the rich and the poor. His initial need to generate mass support to be elected led him to make the poor peasantry believe that he fully supported them to radically alter the rural power structure. Once elected, he had to forget his promise and dissociate himself from the implications of his populist rhetoric. The IRDP programme in its initial years contributed considerably to a major rise in expectations by the poor peasantry. It also raised hopes that the responsibility to local government would be rested in the political and economic institutions of the people themselves (Wanasinghe: 4). However, when Bhutto had to restructure his political support, he could not maintain these promises. From then on, all potentially transformational and redistributive dimensions which the IRDP claimed to promote were gradually erased both from the conception of the programme as well as from its practical implementation. Thus from then on the programme was reduced to the function
of providing coordination between services. But even this function it could not fulfil, in view of the effective opposition by the Ministries which from the colonial days onward had been organized on a strictly sectorial basis and which saw their sectorial function only hindered by the "arrogant" attempt by a new organ without any substantive function of its own to control and supervise their operations. The strongest resistance came from the Ministry of Agriculture, both at the Federal and Provincial level. Beneath the rivalry for bureaucratic power, there was a deep seated fear in this Ministry, since Pakistan's Independence controlled by the landlord class, that the Integrated Rural Development Programme might be used to challenge their power and interests and jeopardize its growth strategy, by mobilizing and organizing the peasantry. In terms of project management, the main task of IRDP originally was that of mobilizing and organizing the people for the purpose of identification of development needs, formulating action plans for development, developing local resources and ultimately to establish self-management by the local community (Wanasinghe: 11). This conception also created apprehension among the rural elites. There were good reasons for this fear. At the seminar in Lahore in November 1973 which served to define the tasks of the IRDP it was clearly and repeatedly stressed that IRDP should not only be concerned with production but also with distribution. Some United Nations advisers at the seminar successfully combined with the progressive representatives of the Peshawar rural academy to give pre-eminence to this position. Enough was said at the seminar by those who viewed the IRDP as the inspiration of a movement for rural transformation to frighten those who only were interested in the programme to improve it as a means to increase agricultural output and to improve the "delivery" of other economic and social services.

The seminar (Report on the International Seminar on Integrated Rural Development) stressed the people's participation as the mainstay of projects to be initiated under the
IRDP. There was at the Seminar an unambiguous critique on those who viewed IRDP only in terms of the coordination of services: "The promotion of genuine village organizations as expressions of a democratic people's movement at the grass roots was considered essential. Much concern and apprehension was expressed as to the persistence of the semi-feudal agrarian structure. This would hinder the growth of such a movement. The centers for promoting IRDP (called Markaz) in the absence of genuine democratic local government might only serve the landlords and wealthier farmers. The danger was recognized that powerful rural interest would capture the programme. It would be unlikely that a people's oriented fully democratic IRDP-Markar programme could ever evolve, if the semi-feudal between landlords and tenants would persist. The Markaz Council should constitute a body with equal representation of tenants and landowners''. Serious criticism was raised against the approach by the extension staff of the Ministry of Agriculture to only focus on the big "progressive" farmers and the practice of cooperation between the Ministry of Agriculture and the "progressive" farmers/landlords at the expense of the mass of the peasantry. While larger farmers should not be excluded from the cooperatives, neither should they be allowed to dominate or get control of them. Farmers who owned more than permitted by the Land Reform Act should not be represented on cooperative executive committees or hold operational positions in the cooperative. "The Seminar recommended that 70% of the total rural credit, to be advanced through institutional resources, should go to small farmers including tenants. The feeling was expressed that cooperatives represented the "wave of future" and the example of the People's Republic of China was mentioned. "If the cooperative movement would succeed, it would represent a new power structure and the basis for a viable political movement. Cooperatives could become a viable alternative to the socio-economic domination of rural feudalism which in too many instances throttled life out of
efforts to achieve rural development. The popularity of the IRDP would depend on achieving the massive participation in it by small farmers, tenants, share croppers, landless labourers and poor people generally". These extensive quotations are given to show to what extent IRDP was basically conceived by its progressive promotors, who at that time controlled the Peshawar Rural Academy, as a social and political movement for re-arranging the rural power structure by way of setting up people's organizations. These would have to serve to identify and articulate local needs as a basis to mobilize labour for capital formation and local projects, to be undertaken.

The views expressed at the November 1973 Seminar were with new vigour taken up again by a working group on Agricultural Credit, Cooperatives and Integrated Development which published its report in April 1975. This report emphasized, in line with the approach of the 1973 Seminar, the need to restructure the rural economy on a cooperative basis. Also this Report contained a devastating critique on the prevailing system of production, capital formation, marketing credit and advised that vigorous people's organizations had to be established in the form of production-oriented cooperatives and finally social cooperative farms (Report: 44) in which the people would make their own plans according to their felt needs under their own leaders" (Report: 41) and control the distribution of inputs (Report: 23). Local government should merge with the cooperative and political democracy with economic democracy (Report: 16). It was moreover agreed by the Working group that the confidential assessment of the performance of the representatives of the line departments would be done by the Project Managers" (Report: 18). These views, expressed at the two Seminars were enough to terrify the landlords as well as the growth-oriented Ministry of Agriculture. What was even more terrifying was that they were tried out in practice in the Markaz Daudzai, close to the Peshawar rural academy (Kuiten-
brouwer: 100). It did not take long before representations were made by the landlords as well as by the bureaucracy up to Bhutto himself to stop the Daudzai experiment. From that moment on, the Peshawar Academy as well as the Daudzai experiment were dismantled and subsequently declared a failure. In 1975, the director of the Peshawar Rural Academy, a close collaborator of Akther Hameed Khan, was transferred as well as most of his progressive collaborators. The Academy was inactivated and remains so until today. The approach in the Markaz Shadab in the Punjab which concentrated on the delivery of inputs to larger farmers became the model. It had been set up by the joint secretary in charge of the IRDP programme, a landlord from the area.

This Joint Secretary was a most skillful and international salesman of his programme. He presented it at international forums and at embassies as the most advanced and successful rural development programme in the world, as the only viable alternative for a socialist collectivist approach and as the only way to save Pakistan from a social revolution.

2.2.3 The decline of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) since Zia's regime

Although Bhutto had soon to give up his promises to the poor peasantry, IRDP provided a semblance of his concern for them. It was an important propagandistic device to show his support to them. After his demise, the opposition against it finally came into the open and the sectorial ministries, particularly agriculture, took the opportunity to take revenge. It is indeed not surprising that with the downfall of Bhutto a variety of interest groups have sought to dismantle IRDP altogether. Motivations of these groups vary.

There is a continued concern among landlords (and their representatives in Federal and Provincial Governments) that,
although Bhutto is dead, his followers may revive his movement. With contradictions in the rural areas growing, also the need to contain pressures from the peasantry is increasing. If ever new civilian leadership arises, it would have to seek inspiration in the populist approach of Bhutto. It would be likely to move both liberal and socialist-inspired intellectuals and professionals to come up with propositions similar to those voiced during the Seminar in 1972. Also the need for new leadership to establish a political basis, in the event of fair elections, would require such new leadership to make promises. This might serve to set up a IRDP approach in which the more radical institutional dimensions could be prominent.

It would be simplistic to identify the continued existence of IRDP as a Ministry or Department with a perspective of progress. The present Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Local and Rural Development which has no cabinet Minister any more and which is seriously understaffed and without budget, is one of the largest feudal landlords of Sind whose family owns thousands of acres and who still retains more than 100 tenants on his land. His land is adjacent to that of the late Bhutto, who was himself one of the largest landowners of Sind. In the same vein is the chief secretary of the Provincial Government of North Western Frontier Province one of the Provinces' big landlords. His strong opposition to the earlier orientation of the Peshawar Rural Academy is therefore not surprising. Rather would it be an exception if officials in leading positions had no connections with landed interests.

However, the opposition from landed interests to the IRDP programme was not the only one.

A second line of opposition to the "intervention" by the Federal Government came from the Provincial Governments. This opposition partly coincides with the first one, in so far as even more than at the Federal level the land-owning
families and rural traders are well entrenched in the Provincial Executives. They strongly resented Federal government interference. In so far as the IRDP programme with its populist content was designed by Bhutto to gain mass support, it was also resented by the provincial bureaucratic elites, as it might bring popular pressure to bear on them to alter their authority and defense of entrenched interests. More than the sectorial programme, the IRDP had a federal dimension and was as such experienced as an interference in Provincial autonomy.

A third line of opposition originated in the Sectorial Ministries both at the Federal and Provincial level. Both experienced the prominent coordinating position of the IRDP programme and its representatives as incompatible with their own jurisdiction. Wherever coordinating centers (Markaz) were set up, to take revenge, the Sectorial Ministries sent as a rule their weakest officials. With or without reason the officers, delegated to a Markaz, tended to perceive the Project Manager as an inspector who had no right to infringe upon their autonomy. This reaction was certainly re-inforced by an often inflated self-image. In so far as project managers were able, if even modestly, to organize some active village associations which would request cooperation from the sectorial Departments, this was likely to create resentment. As a rule both project managers as well as sectorial representatives were too closely associated with the Khans (landlords) to have a real willingness. If however, the project managers attempted to "institutionalize people's organizations at the project level" (Wanasinghe: 13) as was attempted at Daudzai, then they would both have the Khans and the sectorial representatives against them. If such people's organizations would come about in a genuine sense, project managers as well as sectorial representatives would have to become accountable to them. The scope for manipulation, particularly with regard to inputs, marketing and infra-structure (e.g.
deals with contractors) by project managers, sectorial representatives as well as the rural elite, would then be substantially reduced. Conflicts generated between Project Managers and line representatives cannot be explained however without reference to the strongly feudal hierarchical relationships in the old Sectorial Ministries whose culture and procedures date from the colonial days. Any move by "inferiors" at the Markaz level, in spontaneous support of a request for cooperation from the peasants or by a Project manager which would fall outside the scope of the sectorial programme, would be risky from a career perspective.

Also a great deal of resentment was created in the sectorial bureaucracy against Bhutto's attempts to create new posts by-passing the traditional avenues of the civil service, and appoint his followers in order to break the rigid mold of an unproductive bureaucracy, more concerned with self-maintenance than with down-to-earth fieldwork. While the IRDP only appointed a project manager, it obliged the sectorial Ministries to commit what in their eyes were "additional" resources to the Markaz programme. This conflict conveys a deeper one: it is in the very nature of a feudal/colonial bureaucracy not to develop its programme and activities in sensitivity to the people's basic needs but to follow its own requirements.

The end of the IRDP programme was sealed with the resurgence of "local government" after the elections of September 1980. From then on, the Markazes came under the authority of the District Councils. Since then, support to the Markaz programme ceased functioning.

2.2.4 The evolution of local government

Field marshal Ayub Khan (1958-68) introduced his receipt for local government, which he called "basic democracies" in order to secure political support for his programme of
agricultural modernization. Thus he relied on the rural elites in helping the bureaucracy in the development of infra-structure and to make a start with using modern inputs in line with their own interests and also to support import substitution industrialization for which a food surplus was required (to keep the wages under control) as well as inputs from agriculture. Ayub's programme of basic democracies basically strengthened the village elites at the expense of the mass of the peasantry. Thus it facilitated the modernization at the existing feudal structure.

Bhutto (1971-1977) introduced a People's Local Government Ordinance in all provinces in 1972, providing for the election of People's District Councils, but no elections were held. Below the District, no other local government organs were contemplated by him. The absence of local government during the Bhutto regime reflects his style of politics: to manipulate the various interest groups, while retaining and strengthening his personal power. It enabled him to appeal more directly to the mass of peasantry for political support. Once elected, he carefully played out the poor peasantry against the landlords. At the same time he supported the landlords against the more radical demands of the poor peasantry. The latter could however not always be contained. The absence of local government enabled him to more effectively penetrate the feudal structure and accelerate at the same time rural modernization.

The majority of candidates chosen in the elections for local government organized by Zia in September 1979 turned out to have belonged to Bhutto's Pakistan's People's Party. Although numerous candidates of the PPP had been barred from the elections which were formally held on a non-party basis, the result was a resounding defeat for Zia. One may ponder as to why Zia organized the elections. One answer given is that he only wanted to sound out the views of the electorate. It is more likely however that he thought that after the
campaign against Bhutto and his hanging, Bhutto's popularity would have vanished and the coalition of political parties which brought him to power by orchestrating the campaign to destabilize Bhutto would be victorious. The outcome of the elections was not only Zia's defeat but also that of the conservative political parties, led by the ultra-rightist Jama'at, which together only gained 15% of the votes in 1970, the only year reasonably fair elections were held in Pakistan.

The economic policies of the government, imposed by the IMF and inspired by Friedman's prescriptions of "sanitary" management have since then estranged most partners of the coalition which supported Zia's coup. The recent new coalition, composed of the PPP and the above Parties which call for Zia's departure suggest an increasing isolation of his regime.

In case Zia attempted through the local elections to create a grass roots base, he failed. By his claim to set up democratic local government to which the bureaucracy at the district and union council level would be accountable, he has not endeared himself to the bureaucracy.

Like in the past, the composition of the elected District and Union Councils is hardly democratic. Representatives are overwhelmingly landlords and upper middle farmers and traders. Representatives of the Districts have directly been elected and there is no representation in them from the elected Union Councils. If at the village level, any peasants would have been chosen representing the interests of the poor majority, they are barred from any significant intervention in proposing programmes and projects at the District level which would meet their needs and interests. One well informed agricultural officer from a representative farming District in the irrigated area of the Punjab informed me that the proportion of representatives of the various interest groups in the 50 Union Councils of his District was roughly
as follows: big landlords and upper middle farmers - 60%, upper middle farmers - 40% of seats, small farmers and peasants - none. If however small peasants occupy a seat in these councils, they invariably have been put there by "the big men".

There are indications that in the North Western Frontier Provinces in such Districts as Mardan, Malakand Agency and Swat the majority of seats were occupied in roughly the same proportions. Invariably the chairman of the District Council would be a large landlord. I interviewed several of these chairmen of District Councils. Although they were not politically aligned with Zia, they were very grateful to him for backing them up in their demands for restoration of their full property rights against their "unlawful" tenants. Also they strongly supported his islamization campaign. In one case (Malakand Agency), the Chairman of the District proudly showed the MK 47's which he had just acquired for 20,000 Rps for his heavily bandoliered bodyguard. He turned out to be a rich merchant and big landlord (200 acres of irrigated land). As one of the first acts upon his election, he had bought new arms to form a proper bodyguard who should protect him. He was said to have spent more than 100,000 Rps. on his election.

Depending upon the area, candidates for the Union Council Elections in this Province were said to spend from 10,000 to 15,000 Rps to get elected, to reward those who would support them. Candidates for the District Council would spend amounts ranging from 50,000 Rps and upward up to a few hundred thousands Rps. As the District Council selects the projects to be carried out, membership carries great weight. In view of the absence of a National Assembly since Zia, representation in the District Council carries additional weight. Representatives of the sectorial ministries at the District level are not represented in the District Council proper but sit in the District Coordinating Committee in
which they review with the Council members the budgetary and
technical aspects of the programmes and projects proposed.
Until now, in view of the political stalemate and the serious
shortage of financial resources, only limited funds have
been made available to the local governments. The chairmen
of all District Councils received in 1980 25,000 Rps and for
1981 40,000 Rps for use at their own discretion. Critical
observers of the Zia regime have explained this gesture as a
modest attempt by Zia to improve his rapport by his political
opponents but ideological supporters.

The opposition by the landlord and upper middle farmers
to Zia is ambiguous. They seek adequate representation at
the center so as to protect their interests. This would
explain why most of them have recently joined the demand for
national elections which Zia cannot allow as that would
bring an end to military rule. The rural elites subscribe
to Zia's repressive use of Islamic ideology to contain the
pressures by the poor peasantry. They resent however the
measure by his government to start taxing their surplus and,
in accordance with the demands by IMF, to raise input subsidies.
This has brought landlords of all parties together against
Zia, except those from the small extreme-rightist Jama'at.

If Zia wants to stay in power, he will somehow have to
make a deal with them. In actual fact, this deal was already
initiated by him directly after the coup by immediately
bringing to a halt all inroads by peasant movements into the
prevailing property relations. It may well be that on
balance, military rule in spite of its drawbacks has more
advantages for the rural elites than securing civil government
and representation at the center.

If the basis for profitability of farming further
erodes, then the ruling elites have two avenues to secure
continued profitability. Either they accelerate modernization
and evict their tenants to contract them back as labour for
less cost. Or they re-activate feudal productions relations,
by intensifying services by tenants and wage labour to pay back debts. In both cases, "stability" and repression is a fortiori needed and hence the need for strong rule. Therefore a compromise and a search for accommodation between landed interests and the military is not unlikely. At the local level, District Councils will by and large be controlled by the rural elites. Far more than during Bhutto's time, they enjoy inaccountability vis-a-vis the poor peasantry. More than before they are free to decide by themselves how to define their own interests and seek the support of the bureaucracy on their own terms. As the Union Councils have no representation in the District Councils, they can hardly be expected to generate some countervailing power against the District Councils. As the process of modernization advances and contradictions become more severe, in spite of relative divergencies in interest, representatives on union Councils (as a rule smaller landlords and middle farmers) are likely to ally with the bigger landlords and upper middle farmers in the District Councils. In terms of controlling labour, they share a common interest.

The re-activation by Zia's regime of the role of private enterprise in the supply of inputs and in marketing has brought back in full force the corrupt and exploitative practices of Agents and middlemen/traders. There is evidence that the Corporations set up by Bhutto to replace these practices were inefficient as well as marked by corruption. The return of the private sector into rural trading will make it more difficult for village cooperatives of the poor peasantry to be organized and even modestly seek a way out of their predicament. The only way out promoted by the Government is emigration to the Middle East. Under the present circumstances, the poor peasantry can hardly expect any benefit from local government. Only major alterations in the agrarian structure are likely to open up possibilities for genuine democratic participation. Such alterations are
as little likely as substantive alterations in the semi-feudal islamic culture which, reactivated, serves the elites under the protection of the present military dictatorship to legitimize modernization and protect their interests and the advantages which accrue in the process. The reactivation of hegemonic islamic culture is increasingly urgent in view of the deeply marginalizing effects for Pakistan's urban and rural majorities of the process of modernization, so as to prevent the growth of opposition and rebellion.
CHAPTER THREE

SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Given Pakistan's constraints engendered by its ever deepening incorporation in the dominant capitalist world order, continued and more intensive repression is likely. It is probable that the large support given by the industrialized nations to Pakistan is to a significant extent inspired by the real or supposed threat of Soviet Russia in Afghanistan. The long term threat of Soviet Russia to Pakistan and other Islamic countries does, it is proposed, not so much stem from the military threat of Soviet Russia in Afghanistan but from the intentions by the Communist Afghan regime to introduce a radical land reform and abolish rural debt and usury (The Economist, September 5, 1979). It should be noted that many of the mullas who spearhead the revolt against the present Afghan regime have been closely associated with the large landowners, be it tribal chiefs or feudal landlords. Zia's policies serve to even oppose moderate land reforms in Pakistan, the need for which is clearly stipulated by the team of Islamic scholars in their Agenda for Islamic Economic Reform in Pakistan. Directly or indirectly, the industrialized nations support him in this opposition as this suits their own interests. They therefore contribute to intensify the deep seated contradictions in Pakistan society itself which contributes to promote a social revolution which Soviet Russia is paradoxically allowed to support in the name of justice and democracy. Meanwhile the industrialized capitalist nations, led by the United States, support the repressive military dictatorship, opposed to any return to a policy favouring the poor majority. There is an immediate relation-
ship between the repressive policies towards the poor peasantry and the growth of customers for the increasing inflow of Russian arms into Pakistan's most feudal regions.

An old Punjabi proverb says: "He who cuts the grass must always cut the grass". It unambiguously conveys the dominant ethos which sustained the old feudal structure. Also it is common for the rural elite to say "Man is greedy by nature. We need the Qur-an to teach us to be content with what we have". This observation again reflects the dominant ethos. Holy religion is relied on to tame the poor. This reveals how those who favour the status quo tend to use religion as a form of social control, to contain the aspirations of the poor majority.

The new more naked forms of self-interest which are inherent in the pursued growth policies destabilize time-honoured ways of sharing. Although the latter were unequal, they contained also a modicum of protection to the poor. The former are likely to induce the poor to realize that those who preach the Qur-an are not the ones who practise it. This may lead them to question the legitimacy of the position of those who dominate them. The more intense become the new forms of pursuit of self-interest, the greater will become the need for the elites to make use of religion as a means of social control and maintenance of the status quo. But also the more difficult it may become to conceal its use against the livelihood and well-being of the people. Hegemonic social control is then likely to loose its efficacy and the direct use of violence and of even more repressive forms of control will become inevitable. But these are also likely to intensify resistance and the quest for new social relations by those who suffer. (Kuitenbrouwer: 112). In the pursuit of their short-term interests, Pakistan's elites have let the opportunity to timely introduce reforms pass by. By doing so, they have created a dynamic which has its own momentum. No amount of foreign aid nor any internal
policies will protect the elites from the pressures of the poor which they create by their "development policies", supported by the industrialized nations.

These propositions should not be understood as inevitably leading to a social revolution. The process of evolving contradictions should not be understood in a "linear" way. Such a position would not take into account the ways in which the ruling class can manipulate ideology and in which dominated classes internalize it.

In Pakistan the use of Islamic ideology no more serves the reproduction of "the old society", based on "feudal" production relations, but the production of a new society which combines the partial maintenance of the old production relations with the promotion of new capitalist ones which have become dominant. Rather than disappearing, as was to be expected, according to the orthodox marxist thesis, the activation of pre-capitalist islamic ideology plays a crucial role in making possible and facilitating the penetration and expansion of Pakistani dependent capitalism (Kuitenbrouwer, The New Capitalist World Order). In that sense it may be argued that the "superstructure" rather than simply reflecting the evolution of the "infra-structure" is a condition for it. In that sense the monopoly on the means of reproduction of ideology, contrary to Marxist orthodoxy, precede the growth of monopoly of the visible material means of production (Godelier: 767). As long however, as the poor experience prevailing forms of ideological domination as an inevitable "equivalent exchange of services" in which they receive compensation for their suffering and exploitation thanks to the accretion of spiritual security and protection, it may be assumed that society functions on the basis of a relative "consensus" between the dominating minority and the dominated majority even if the use of ideology by the dominant minority may be qualified as a particular form of violence from the perspective of the interests of the poor.
The combination of the manipulation of the religious superstructure with that of nationalism by the present military dictatorship in Pakistan, used to rally and unite the dominant and dominated classes against the threat of communism and its "godless ideology", may well serve as a powerful means to contain and conceal for some time the growth of class contradictions and the breakdown of the contrived ideological consensus which has deep roots in the history of the country. In that sense the suffering by the poor majority is the very soil which provides the nutrients from which the ideologies of the ruling class can forge the ideological weapon to be given to the poor to oppress themselves. But both the weapon and its effects are bound to erode and then an uprising against the dictatorial regime is likely to erupt.
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