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**EAST-WEST REGIONAL DIFFERENTIALS IN THE
ROLE OF MALES IN THE DETERMINATION OF
FAMILY SIZE IN TURKEY**


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INTRODUCTION

Both in developed and developing countries, fertility surveys typically gather information on attitudes and behaviours from female respondents only. This practice may be based on the assumption that "actual childbearers" are more knowledgeable about past fertility behaviour than fathers. It is also argued that "woman being the childbearer, her attitudes about fertility related events are generally regarded as stronger predictors of future behaviours" (Mott and Mott, 1985). This understanding gives little attention to the important role played by husbands in the final determination of family size, especially in societies where the historical-cultural background is based on a male-dominant structure.

a. Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Paper

Historically, males have a crucial role in Turkish society across individual, family, community and national levels. As husbands, men are invariably the head of the family; as individuals they are leaders in the community and society, especially as a decision-maker. They are the decision-makers in political, social, cultural and religious institutions, and assume overall responsibility for fertility management (Eren, 1963).

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the male role as decision-maker in the family and its relation to fertility. As mentioned above, men in Turkey are generally the "head of the family". The Civil Code of Turkey, adopted from Switzerland, does not emphasize absolute equality between husbands and wives. According to the Code, the husband is the head of the family, and the wife legally can not represent the marriage, and must seek the permission of the husband if she wants to work outside the home or be active in her profession. In most cases husbands receive more education than their wives¹. Therefore, in terms of decision-making, they are not only culturally expected to provide leadership and guidelines, but are also "better equipped" to do so.

Another aspect of this paper is to highlight the differences between two contrasting regions of the country, the East and the West. In this context, these differences will refer to socio-cultural factors such as the type of marriage, differences

between the ideal and actual number of children, the prevalence of male decision-making within the household and its relation to fertility, and the attitudes of husbands towards gender equality and family planning. The third purpose will be an attempt to explain some possible causes of such differences between the two regions.

Turkey is a country in which important regional differences exist in terms of social, economic, cultural and demographic factors. Historical differentials between the two of its five regions, namely the West and East, have been the most pronounced. Only the differences between these two regions are studied in this paper. It should be noted that other important background variables exist apart from regional differentials per se, such as education, age, rural-urban residence, which might also be examined within each region to explain these differences. One of the main hypotheses of this paper will be that East-West differentials are not mainly due to these latter factors, but indeed due to regional factors that are deeply rooted in the historical-cultural backgrounds of the two regions. To examine this hypothesis, urban-rural differentials will be taken as an example and will be compared between and within the two regions.

To state the problem more clearly, it should be noted that in terms of cultural values and norms, the conflict of the "modern" and the "traditional" prevail between the two regions. "Traditional" norms and values remind women that their primary roles are being wives and mothers, while "modern" values stress that women should be more independent and autonomous. These norms are inevitably shaped by the structural inequality between the Western and Eastern regions in terms of socio-economic development and historical-cultural background (this point will be discussed in detail in Chapter I).

b. Hypotheses:

Within the context of the purpose of this paper, the main hypotheses to be tested are threefold:

1. There exists significant differentials between the Western and Eastern regions of the country in terms of socio-cultural factors such as marriage formation, attitudes towards women's role within the of husband-wife relationship, and decision-making within the family.

2. These differences stem from the historical-cultural past of the two regions, and are not mainly caused by some background variables, for example urban/rural

differentials.

3. As the husband's decision-making power within the family increases and as he acquires more authoritarian attitudes, the number of children in the family increases.

c. The Data and Methodology


The data used in this paper comes from the 1988 Turkish Fertility and Health Survey which was conducted by the Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies (HIPS). The Survey was conducted in the summer of 1988, based on a nation-wide representative sample selected by multi-stage, stratified, clustered sampling. During the Survey, 6552 households were interviewed in the five regions of the country (see Figure 1) and three questionnaires were applied: the Household Questionnaire, the Woman's Questionnaire (applied to ever-married women under the age of 50, where 5257 ever-married women were interviewed) and the Husband's Questionnaire. Husbands who had a wife in the reproductive age bracket (i.e. 15-49) were eligible for the interview. There were no age limitations for the husbands to be interviewed. As a strategy, husband's questionnaire was not applied in all clusters, but in nearly the half (in 213 out of 405) (HIPS, 1989). Data used in this paper mainly comes from the Husband's Questionnaire though the Woman's Questionnaire is also used in several cases.

Apart from the results presented in the final report of the Survey (HIPS, 1989), statistical tables presented in this paper have been produced using the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software programme. Tables using the data from the Women's Questionnaire refer to the responses of only "currently married women" (where the sample size is equal to 5090), as the Husband's Questionnaire refers to the sample of "currently married men". In cases where comparisons are made, the results are based on the responses of "currently married women" and "currently married men". No matching between the couples are made in this paper. Chi-square test has been used to test the independence of the variables presented in the statistical tables.²

As this paper is based mainly on questions of attitudes and decision-making, it must be noted that it is not easy to accurately "measure" who makes the decisions in a family. Decision-making responsibilities can be deliberately misreported by respondents or inadvertently misleading. For example, even when equality exists between wives and husbands, someone eventually has to say "yes" or "no" and this "someone" might not be chosen deliberately. The presence of "uncontrolled variation in decision-making due to

unconscious needs, ambivalent feelings, situational demands and habits and spontaneous emotional behaviour" (Kagitcibasi, 1982:5) implies that decision-making is a complex phenomenon. Possible biases accompanying responses should be taken into account in the evaluation of results.

Figure 1. Regions of Turkey and the Settlements where the 1988 Turkish Fertility and Health Survey was Conducted



SOURCE : HIPS (, 1989).



CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TURKEY AND EAST-WEST REGIONAL DISPARITIES

1.1. Some Background Information on Turkey:

Turkey, with a population of 55.5 million, is the largest country in South-West Asia and one of the largest countries in Europe. It covers an area of 780 thousand square km, with an average population density of 70 people per square km. Turkey is a developing country with a per capita income of approximately US\$ 1,150. Nearly half of the population lives in areas which may be classified as urban. The proportion of its population living in urban areas varies considerably by region, from two-thirds in the West to only one-third in the East. Internal migration from rural areas to urban areas and from the Eastern and Northern parts to the West may be regarded as the most important vital event shaping the demographic situation in Turkey. In addition, starting from the 1960's, within the context of bilateral agreements, large numbers of people have migrated abroad for employment, and it is estimated that around 2.5 million are currently living abroad, the majority being in West Germany (Tanyeri and Uner, 1987).

Turkey is divided into five regions, the West, South, Centre, North, and the East (this division is a socio-economic one, geographically the country is divided into seven regions). A great part of the country is mountainous and approximately one-third of the land is currently under cultivation. The most densely settled region is the West, which includes two of the largest metropolises, Istanbul and Izmir, and is the most industrialised and the most socio-economically advanced part of Turkey. In the South, the Mediterranean region has some of the richest farmland and the fastest growing industrial centers in the country. The agricultural sector provides by far the largest source of income in the remaining regions. Central Anatolia (which includes the capital, Ankara) specialises primarily in cereals, and the more mountainous Black Sea (the North) primarily in small-scale labour-intensive crops. Finally, the Eastern region is the least socio-economically developed area of the country. It has the highest proportion of

gainfully employed engaged in agriculture and the lowest proportion engaged in industry (Kocaman, 1989). One of the peculiarities of Turkey is the significant contrast between the East and the West, not only with respect to economic development, but also to social, demographic, and cultural factors. The results of the 1988 Turkish Fertility and Health Survey show that there are striking differences between the two regions, for example, in terms of education, fertility, contraceptive use and health indicators related to mother and child health (HIPS, 1989). Some of these results are summarized in Table 1.1.

**Table 1.1. Summary of Some Basic Socio-Demographic Indicators:
East-West Regional Differentials**

	WEST	EAST
Percent of women who are literate	84	55
Completed fertility	3	8
Mean Desired Family Size	2	2
Percent of Exposed Women Using Contraceptives	84	63
Infant Mortality Rate (per thousand)	45	103
Child Mortality Rate (per thousand)	75	117
Percent of women received prenatal care at the last live birth (within 5 yrs)	62	22
Percent of women who had their last delivery in a health unit (within 5 yrs)	72	36

Source: HIPS (1989); Turkish Population and Health Survey, Ankara.

1.2. East-West Differentials From a Historical Perspective

Wide differences in the social, economic, demographic and cultural structures of the Eastern and Western regions may be understood by looking at two background processes:

1. Historical-cultural factors;
2. The planned development and change.

It should be stressed here that these two factors are not easy to separate. Planned development and change is itself embodied in historical processes, but for points of clarification, these factors will be examined separately.

Planned development and change here refers to more consistent socio-economic development of the West than the East which has lagged behind considerably. Insufficient exploitation of natural resources, a failure to develop specialised sectors in coherence with the potentials of the Eastern region, and the concentration of population movements and manufacturing industry in the West have been major causes of such unbalanced economic and social development.

After the foundation of Republic in 1923 following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, economic development was pursued through a period of "etatism". However, the distribution of investment resources has been uneven between the East and the West since the beginning of the Republic. The West historically had a greater potential for development (which will be discussed below; here it is observed that historical and developmental factors are not so easy to separate, as pointed out above). In other words,

"...the new Republic, poor and all its energies engaged in the effort to provide basic elements of a modernized structure had left the (East) alone with its immemorial fate. Even if she had willed otherwise, in all probability she could not have succeeded. Her human and material resources could not effort a wider extension" (Eren, 1963:164).

Apart from the period of "etatism" where the state was the leading sector in the economy, the main development strategy in the country has been "state-induced capitalism" where the private sector took over the leading role of the state. The private sector has received several economic incentives to sustain development while the public sector has invested in areas which the private sector did not find "profitable", such as heavy industry.

Although in recent years deliberate efforts have been made to improve the level of socio-economic development in the East by creating "development priority areas" in the region, the traces of long-term negligence are difficult to eliminate in the short-run.

Cultural-historical factors are more difficult to elaborate; they stem from the social, economic, political way of life of the Ottoman Empire. The regional differentials in Turkey reflect much earlier processes of social change, most likely extending back to the early 19th century during the rule of Ottoman Empire (Abadan, 1981). Since then,

the country has been engaged in the economic development process which was based mostly on trade. It was the first non-Western nation to seek a new existence within the economic, social, cultural, and political structure of the West (Eren, 1963). In the early 19th century, port cities, especially today's large metropolitan cities in the Western region, namely Istanbul and Izmir, established contacts with the Western Mediterranean world. In addition to trade linkages, the Western region was also in touch with the Western world for the provision of urban infrastructures and modern health facilities. Contact with the Western world led to the "Westernisation" of upper class men and women, who mainly lived in the Western region in Turkey, especially in Istanbul and Izmir. Wealthy families sent their children to Europe to be "exposed" to the Western culture and ways of living (Mardin, 1974). Within this context, "Turkish intellectuals of the late 19th century motivated by the constructive role of women in the Western world, began their assault on the seclusion of women, led by the Westernisation of the upper class men" (Eren, 1963:177). By contrast, conditions in Anatolia, especially that of isolated villages in the mountains of the East deteriorated due to the series of wars (resulting from the invasion of several Ottoman provinces and uprisings³) and the resulting shortage of males in the agricultural labor-force. The agricultural surplus was used to feed the troops as well as exported to meet the growing demand of the European trade (Erder, 1981). Eastern Anatolia was completely isolated from the social and political processes of the Western region, particularly the "Westernisation" process. This isolation continued even after the foundation of the Republic. While transition to the multi-party political system, the introduction of new technologies, urbanisation, internal migration and unbalanced industrialisation further affected women in the West, the people in the East who were mainly nomadic by this time were least effected and were practically cast outside the economic and political system (Abadan, 1981).

Ottoman society had a strong religious-Muslim character, where daily life was biased towards the freedom of men and the seclusion of women. In addition, the patriarchal structure of the society was always dominant. The relationship between the husbands and wives was confined to the "family hearth" and their social lives and amusements were completely separated from each other (Eren, 1963). Since women were not allowed in the company of men other than their husbands, the family could not entertain as a couple. Even in theatres, separate seats existed for men and women which also hindered social life for the family as a unit. "It was a patriarchal society under

the arbitrary rule of the husband" (Eren, 1963).

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic was founded (1923) by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who was the leader of the Turks in their War of Independence which started after the First World War ended and the country was occupied by the "Allied Forces" (The British, Italian, French and Greek). His aim was to publicize a "Western" style of living as a model for the whole society, especially for women. The Westernisation policy of Ataturk had its origins in the idea that the Turks have been shut out from the common civilisation of Europe. According to him, the main obstacle was the strict, unreformed rules of the religion under which the Ottoman Empire was ruled for centuries. "In the 18th and 19th centuries, Europe claimed that its superiority over the Ottomans resulted from the high virtue of its culture and not technology, armament, or economic power. The latter were considered to be the consequences of culture" (Karpat, 1973:14). Motivated from such understanding, Ataturk meant to uproot the whole system of law and social life. His aim was to built a secular, populist (which meant the abolishment of Sheria and the Sultanian government and replacement by a government elected by people and its National Assembly being based on the sovereignty of the people), industrial, literate and an independent Turkey free from foreign control and interference. His philosophy of social development and "modernisation" processes aimed at acquisition of "modern" values prevailing in Western societies. Ataturk introduced several radical reforms within the sphere of social life such as the acquisition of the Latin Alphabet instead of Arabic letters; adoption of the Gregorian calender; adoption of Swiss Civil Code; abolishment of religious courts; adoption of a new constitution adopted by the National Assembly which is formed in 1920; abolishment of the veil for women and the fez for men; abolishment of gender-differentiated legislation;abolishment of polygamy and easy divorce, (i.e. where men had the right to dissolve their marriage by repeating "I divorce you" thrice in the presence of two witnesses. Ataturk had ideals on equality between the sexes, equal opportunities for education and equality in the family life (He abolished "medrese" which were religious schools and unified the education system into a single one in terms of sexes, giving equal opportunities to girls and boys). According to him, emancipation of women would come about by itself with the help of egalitarian legislation (Abadan, 1981).

However, the Republican reform has not been able to remove wide national disparities and even after almost three quarters of a century, has left some sections of

the society almost where they were. Due to "traditional" socialisation patterns, attitudinal changes towards women in terms of spouse selection, marriage, inheritance, their position within the family and society are slow; resistance is frequently encountered and bride-price is still demanded in some parts of the country (Abadan, 1981). Furthermore, due to the "planned" unbalanced development process, the effects of poor infrastructure such as transport and communication were seriously felt in geographically disadvantaged villages of in the East (where, in some cases no communication is possible with villages which remain under heavy snow the whole winter), accounting for the persistence of such discrepancies both in social and cultural terms. This again reminds us of how difficult it is to separate factors related to development from factors related to culture.

Unlike the Western region, the East's failure to integrate the social and cultural changes derived from the "Westernisation" process, combined with a lower rate of economic development, left the "traditional" social and cultural values and norms rooted intact. These deeply rooted values and norms prevent the majority of women in the East from participating in discussions within the family or to freely express their views for fear of attempting to challenge the authority of their husbands. This authoritarianism in practice gives way to a wide lack of freedom of action among women. Thus, the relationship between husbands and wives is not egalitarian due to male domination in many spheres of social life. Within this context, the fertility of women is much esteemed and is also "managed" by the husband.

The above discussion of the cultural-historical background of the two regions suggests that this process also includes the "modernisation" process. The interlinkages of the cultural-historical past and the "modernisation" process become apparent and need to be discussed. "Modernisation" is a difficult concept to define; moreover, the linkages between economic and social development and the cultural background of a country are not very easy to differentiate. In other words, one has to find the answer to the question: "does socio-economic development necessarily imply the acquisition of "modern" values?". Acquisition of modern values in a society or community does not depend on socio-economic development per se, but also on changes in the underlying "superstructure" of existing ideology as well as the nature of socio-economic development. "Modernisation" in the context of this paper implies changes in social norms such as a decline in the practice of paying a bride-price at the wedding or marriages arranged for children by their parents. Moreover, changes in individual

behaviour, attitudes and values, especially equality in the husband-wife relationship as well as increased independence from "authority" within the context of gender relations, and changes in fertility norms are taken as the indicators of "modernisation". In turn, social development in this context implies improvements in health, education, standards of living, improved means of transportation and urbanisation.

Education, though not directly studied in this paper, needs a moment of attention. In Turkey, access to education depends highly on urbanisation, as well as on class differences, especially with respect to university education where high fees are demanded. Access to education depends on urbanisation, because apart from primary schools, and to a certain extent secondary schools, educational institutions are concentrated in big cities. Another aspect is the quality and nature of education which becomes important when cultural differentials between the East and the West will be discussed. Given the "dual" cultural structure of the country, "modern" values in the West vs. "traditional" in the East, the nature of education is affected by existing norms and values. The educational process reinforces two different types of socialisation processes. Although education is centrally planned and controlled in terms of curricula, the nature of education is also seen to be affected by the cultural background of the directors and teachers themselves. In the East, the nature of education stresses the importance of existing values and norms which are more "conservative". On the other hand, in the West, the young generation is more exposed to the "modern" thought and values through the educational process. Thus, education or higher levels of education do not necessarily imply the acquisition of "modern" values and the automatic replacement of "traditional" values. Transition to "modern" depends on the socio-cultural context and community the individual is living in. In other words, compared to the East, the educational process in the West, creates opportunities and new outlooks on life enabling successive generations to be more equipped to "break down traditional beliefs and customs and thus undermine several cultural practices and challenge traditional beliefs and be encouraged for a problem-solving approach to life" (Easterlin,1983:570).

As a conclusion, it can be argued that the time lag between the speed of economic development and social and cultural change, i.e. the slower process of cultural change compared to economic change, leads to a slower transformation into the "modern" in spite of deliberate efforts for the social and economic development of the East, in the "development priority areas". Therefore, "discrepancies arising from the

superimposition of modernisation on original historical and cultural patterns of the country" (Srikantan, 1973:275), can be considered as one of the causes of the "dual" social and cultural structure of the country, while the "planned development" may be a possible cause for "economic duality".

1.3. Regional (East-West) Urban-Rural Differentials:

In Turkey, as in many developing countries, wide rural-urban differentials exist as a result of unequal distribution of development resources. These differences inevitably exist also **within** regions due to "urbanisation" process and unbalanced development. However, what is important for the present context is to test the hypothesis as to whether the East-West differences are due to the urban-rural differentials **between** the regions. In other words, if the arguments in the literature that urbanisation leading to modernisation is taken into account, it might be argued that differences in proportions of urban population between the two regions might lead to such regional differentials and result in a more "modern" West compared to the East (as mentioned before, two thirds of the population is urban in the West, while only one third in the East). To serve such a purpose, the similarities between the West-urban and the East-urban, and the West-rural and the East-rural are analysed (see Appendix, Table A.1 for some social-demographic urban-rural differences). If urban segments of both regions show similar characteristics as well as the two rural areas, then it could be argued that these regional differentials might be due to different urban proportions rather than being rooted in the historical-cultural background of the two regions. It is also important to see how much difference exists between the urban and rural settlements within each region (These arguments will be analysed in Chapter II).

In Turkey, "rural" is considered less "modern" than "urban" so far as values and norms are concerned. Although this can not be ignored, it should also not be taken as granted. In the first place, "urban" and "rural" are usually defined in Turkey in relation to population size. Usually, "urban" defines settlements with a population over 10,000, while "rural" defines those with less than 10,000. This definition of "urban" and "rural" is considered arbitrary and inadequate as it does not take into account any other social, economic and demographic indicators. However, as the data provides only this criteria, this distinction is used (in Chapter II) in spite of its shortcomings.

Before going into further discussion, some information on selected aspects of

"rural" family life will be provided.

In rural areas, marriage is prepared by the "opportunities" that parents create for their children (e.g. creating the convenient settings to bring the children together or simply arranging the marriage). These "opportunities" are created by parents because in "rural" areas, parents have the "right" to control their children in social life. In such a setting, the decision to marry is not taken mutually by the couples themselves. Rather, marriages are arranged by the parents through the custom of being "in-laws" and thus being relatives and having close relations (in social and economic terms) between the two families. It does not necessarily mean that marriages take place in absolute opposition to the wishes of individuals to be married, however. While civil marriage is obligatory by law, religious ceremony for marriage is obligatory by religion. Therefore, religious marriages take place in most cases either with or without a civil marriage (see Section 2.1.1. in Chapter II and the Appendix, Table A.2).

In the "rural" way of living, inter-family relations and interactions are determined by age and sex. For example, as the socialisation process of the child is determined by the economics of rural life, the role of male and female children become segregated from each other. While male children are given privileges by their parents because of their physical power to be used in production and their role for the continuation of the family name through reproduction, female children are neglected in the family. In such a setting, the man is the single owner of "authority" and family possessions. He finds it his responsibility to preserve his dominance over his wife as he considers this the only way to preserve his "authority". As the household type of production does not usually allow economic independence for its members, absolute respect to the "authority" figure and acceptance of oppression becomes inevitable. Such an outlook on life requires both functioning of the authority and respect for it. In such a context, the one who is powerful is the one who is right; he becomes the "manager", handles the money, and makes the decisions (Balaman, 1985). In such a setting, women are oppressed by the husband as well as the social environment. They are always expected to obey the husband, be quiet, and "accept their fate".

Such sayings show the social values attributed to women:

- "Hit a woman on the head until her white scarf turns red" (which will show that you beat a woman);
- "Always make sure there are tears in her eyes and in her hair which will

prove your manhood";

- "There should always be a baby in her belly and bruises on her back";
- "Long haired-short minded";
- "the spoon enemy" (implies that women eat so much that they deteriorate the financial situation of the husband) (Balaman, 1985).

After having briefly described the context in which gender relations are determined in a "rural" setting, here we have to raise the question: "does urbanisation necessarily imply the acquisition of "modern" values (as contrasted to those described above) and more egalitarian relations between the sexes?" Traditionally, "urban" has been assumed to be more modern than "rural" and no distinction is made between "urbanisation" and "urbanism". While "urbanisation" refers to the "concentration of population in large urban places and is measured in terms of the proportion of population living in such places, by contrast "urbanism" refers to the distinct style of life, behaviour patterns and attitudes and values of urban residents which are reflected in the urban way of life" (Srikantan, 1973:276). Regarding this distinction between "urbanisation" and "urbanism" it does not necessarily mean that "urban" is always more "modern" than "rural" and "rural" more "traditional" than "urban". Moreover, the urban population does not necessarily acquire "modern" behaviour patterns, attitudes and values. Indeed, the regional urban-rural differentials between the West and the East have been determined by historical processes rather than the "privileges" of urbanisation.

As discussed in the above section (i.e. section 1.2), the socio-economic development of the East has historically been different from the West. The East was relatively much more neglected as a whole compared to the West, and not just its "rural" areas. The historical development of the East did not bring about pronounced urban-rural differentials compared to the West, and "urban" in the East is still very different from "urban" in the West. The "Westernisation" process in the West discussed earlier brought about two totally different settings, urban and rural, with distinguishable characteristics, urban being more modern, and rural being comparatively more traditional. In other words, "modernisation" and "urbanism" were integral parts of this process and changes in the social structure as well as changes in individual behaviour began with it. On the other hand, "urbanisation" in the East was limited to the "concentration of population in urban settings" and lagged behind the social and

economic changes taking place in the West. Therefore, urban-rural in the East did not become as differentiated as the urban-rural in the West. Indeed, development efforts and priorities to the Eastern region are quite recent. To put it in another way, differences in the urban and rural of the East and the West, respectively, can be explained by two processes of "urbanisation" within the context of processes discussed in section 1.2:

1. **Historical:** having its origins in the military and administrative needs of the Ottoman Empire and unaffected by modern industrialisation and economic development;
2. **Modern:** having its origins in industrialisation and economic development of the Turkish Republic (Srikantan, 1973:288).

Therefore, it can be argued that rural-urban differentials **within** a region "are generated by contemporary and on-going processes of industrialisation and economic development" while regional differentials "are survivors of the historical and cultural past" (Srikantan, 1973:289).

Thus, as far as regional differentials exist between the West and the East, differentials in urban-West and urban-East, and rural-West and the rural-East will remain as the "urbanisation" process in the East does not necessarily bring "urbanism" along. Historical-cultural factors are more resistant to change as they are deeply rooted in the norms and values and requirements of the Ottoman Empire, thus forming a barrier to the process of adopting the "urban way of life". As a consequence, modernisation and an urban way of life have had a greater influence on the big cities in the West than on cities and villages in the East due to their respective cultural-historical heritages. This phenomenon perhaps explains why "traditional" values and ways of life associated with "rural" characteristics persist in urban settings in the East.

CHAPTER II

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SOCIO-CULTURAL DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN REGIONS OF TURKEY

This chapter tries to reveal socio-cultural differentials between the two regions using empirical evidence. The data relates to "attitudinal" factors such as those associated with fertility, and equality in husband-wife relationships, as well as to "factual" factors like the husband's role in decision-making and its relationship to fertility and type of marriage. In specific cases, an analysis of the interaction of education with these "attitudinal" and "factual" factors is also presented.

The results of data analyses from the 1988 Turkish Fertility and Health Survey - Husband's Questionnaire (and in certain cases from the Women's Questionnaire⁴) are presented in section 2.1. Urban-rural differentials between the two regions are examined in relation to the hypothesis that East-West regional differentials are not mainly due to differences in urban-rural proportions. (Note: tables related to the urban-rural analyses are presented in the Appendix). In section 2.2, an attempt is made to establish linkages among the findings within the context of the socio-cultural background of the two regions presented in Chapter I, and their overall relationship to with the "power" of husbands in decision-making in two different settings.

2.1 Findings from the 1988 Turkish Fertility and Health Survey, Husbands' Questionnaire

In this section, analyses of survey data are presented mainly in two groups. "Factual" questions related to the authority and power of husbands and fertility: the type of marriage, how the marriage was arranged, the existence of bride-price, reasons for the differences between ideal and actual number of children, decision-making within the household, etc. are presented first. Questions related to "attitudinal" factors such as attitudes towards family planning, women's work outside the home, gender equality, educational aspirations for children, etc. are presented beginning with section 2.1.6. All presentations compare the survey results of two contrasting regions - the East and the West.

2.1.1 Differentials in Type of Marriage

It should be noted that in Turkey, in addition to the official (state-sanctioned) marriage, couples can also be married in a religious ceremony which is related to specific Muslim traditions. Religious marriage (performed by an "imam", i.e. a religious leader) without civil registration is not legally recognized, however. In religious marriages husbands have "the right" to wed another women without divorcing the first one. Women have no legal rights in this type of "marriage"; they are deprived of such institutional rights within the family as inheritance, or any say in the education of their children (HIPS, 1989).

According to the Survey results shown in Table 2.1, the general pattern of the type of marriage couples choose seems to be both civil and religious marriages together. While deviation from this pattern in the West is towards "civil marriage only", it shifts towards "religious marriage only" in the East where the percentage of couples who were "married" by religious ceremony only is seven times higher than in the West where "religious marriages only" is almost negligible.

Table 2.1 Differentials in Type of Marriage
(%)

	WEST	EAST
Civil Marriage Only	13.5	11.1
Civil & Religious Marriage	83.2	65.7
Religious Marriage Only	3.2	21.1
Other	0.1	2.1

(Chi Square = 262) (degrees of freedom = 3) (significance: .0000)

Source: Women's Questionnaire.

Urban-rural comparisons **between** regions (i.e. urban-West and rural-West with urban-East and rural-East, respectively) provides an interesting result. Although differences exist **within** each region, West-urban is rather different from East-urban, and West-rural differ with respect to East-rural (see Appendix, Table A.2). It is interesting to note, for example that "religious marriage only" is much higher in the urban-East than in the rural-West. In the West, both place of residences reflect the general tendency of the entire region, where "civil and religious marriage" predominates (the response of over 80 percent of urban and rural couples). Among all settlements, East-rural shows the highest concentration of women who were married by "religious marriage only" -more than four times higher than the rural-West (27% vs. 6%).

2.1.2 Differentials in How Marriage was Arranged

Historically, marriages in Turkey are arranged by the families, though the tradition is changing within younger generations. "Arranged marriages" mean women do not have autonomy in choosing their marriage partners. In some cases parents do not ask the approval of their daughters and even in cases where they do, the daughter might seldomly say "no" and must obey her father or grandfather, depending on who the authority figure is at home. "Arranged marriages", though not necessarily, usually take place between relatives, generally providing economic benefits to the families involved such as an expansion of land holdings, business, enterprises, etc.

Table 2.2 Differentials in How the Marriage was Arranged
(%)

	WEST	EAST
Family decided (did not consult daughter)	3.2	7.3
Family decided (consulted daughter)	56.8	64.7
Couple decided (consulted family)	32.7	20.5
Couple decided (did not consult family)	1.1	2.0
"Ran away"	5.8	5.1
Other	0.4	0.4

(Chi Square = 61.29) (degrees of freedom = 5) (significance: .0000)

Source: Women's Questionnaire.

Table 2.2 shows that in both the West and the East, the majority of "arranged marriages" were family decisions that involved "the consent of the daughter", but inter-regional differentials still exist. Marriages arranged by the family with or without the daughter's consent are higher in the East, while marriages decided upon by the couples themselves are higher in the West.

Urban-rural analysis shows that urban and rural areas in the East differ significantly from those in the West. Moreover, both urban and rural areas in the East show similar patterns in type of marriage arrangement and there is no significant statistical difference between the two, while significant differentials exist between urban and rural areas in the West (see Appendix, Table A.3). Even in the urban areas of the East, both the percentage of marriages arranged by the family is higher and those by the couples themselves lower than in the rural-West. In both the urban and rural areas of the East, marriages arranged by families without consulting the daughter appear to be more frequent than in the urban and rural areas of the West. Another interesting point is the higher incidence of "run away" marriages in the West, both in urban and rural areas. "Run away" marriages (i.e. elopements) usually describe cases where a daughter's parents do not agree with her decision to marry, and she "runs away" with her future husband. The higher incidence of such marriages in the rural-West than the rural-East might be due to two reasons: first, the couples, especially the women, may be more decisive and courageous than their counterparts in the rural-East. Secondly, "run away" marriages may be under-reported in the rural-East because they are usually socially unacceptable.

2.1.3 Differentials in Whether Bride-price was Paid at the Marriage

Another cultural tradition related to marriage is the payment of "baslik" (i.e. bride-price) to the bride's family by the groom's family. This tradition still exists in the Eastern part of the country in accordance with the norms of the communities. "Baslik" was paid in 60% of the marriages in the East, but in only 15% in the West, indicating a sharp cultural difference (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Differentials in Whether Bride-Price was Paid at the Marriage
(%)

	WEST	EAST
Yes	15.2	59.6
No	84.8	40.4

(Chi Square = 545.0) (degrees of freedom = 1) (significance: .0000)

Source: Women's Questionnaire.

Bride-price is significantly more frequent in Eastern urban and rural areas than in Western urban and rural residences (see Appendix, Table A.4). While bride price was paid in only 14% of the marriages in urban areas of the West, it was paid in half the marriages (51%) in urban settlements of the East. Moreover, the percentage of marriages in which a bride price was paid is strikingly higher in the urban-East than in the rural-West (51% vs. 18%). Similarly, a significant difference is observed between rural areas in the Eastern and Western regions. While the payment of bride-price is only slightly higher in the rural-West when compared to the urban-West, it is striking compared to the rural settlements of the East (18% vs. 66%).

2.1.4 Reasons for the Difference Between the Ideal and Actual Number of Living Children

Important differences exist between the fertility levels of the two regions. In the West, the mean number of living children is 2, while in the East, it is about 4 (HIPS, 1989). In spite of these differences, the ideal number of children in both regions as stated by women is about two (2.05 in the West; 2.34 in the East). Husbands stated a higher ideal number of children in both the West and East (2.25 and 2.70, respectively), and a higher ideal number of sons than their wives (1.29 vs. 1.04 by men and women in the West; 1.8 vs. 1.32 in the East).

However, when the proportion of women who consider a certain number of children as "ideal" is taken into account, differentials still exist between the two regions. More women consider a higher number of children ideal in the East than in the West. In the West, 68% of women consider two children as ideal, while 49% do so in the East.

A much higher difference exists in the number of actual and ideal number of children (reported by women) in the urban areas of the East and the West (a mean of 2.19 living children and 2.21 ideal number of children in the urban-West compared to 3.45 and 2.72 in the urban-East). The same pattern is observed when the rural areas of both regions are analysed.

According to the analysis undertaken, the main reason for differences between the number of ideal and actual living children appears to be a lack of knowledge about contraceptives in both regions, with a higher proportion of women with lack of contraceptive knowledge and use in the East. Almost half the women in the East reported "lack of contraceptive knowledge" as the major reason for the difference between their ideal and actual number of children (Table 2.4). Further analysis shows that the percentage of women who stated "lack of contraceptive knowledge" is higher in the rural-East than the rural-West (48% and 34% respectively) and higher in the urban-East than the urban-West (37% vs. 27%). This might be one indicator of an inadequate and uneven distribution of health services in the rural areas of both regions as well as in the urban areas of the East when compared to the West.

Table 2.4 Reasons (stated by Women) for the Difference between Ideal and Actual Number of Living Children (%)

	WEST	EAST
Contraceptive failure	8.5	4.9
Lack of contraceptive knowledge	29.5	43.4
Desire for having a daughter	8.2	5.1
Desire for having a son	19.7	18.3
Husband wants (wanted) more children	5.9	7.7
God's will/fate	9.6	9.0
Changed ideal number	4.3	2.8
Don't know/no idea	2.5	2.6
Other	11.7	6.2
(Chi Square = 27.28) (degrees of freedom = 8) (significance: .0006)		

Source: Women's Questionnaire.

Son preference is equally important in both regions. The husbands' desire for more children is a more important indicator for the difference between the ideal and actual number of children in the East than in the West.

2.1.5 Differences in Decision-making About the Contraceptive Method Used

Table 2.5 shows that decisions about contraceptive methods are mostly made jointly by husbands and wives in both regions. However, decision-making by the husband alone is more predominant in the East. This influence of the husband on the wife has other implications. The decision to practice contraception in any form is highly male dominated. Women who do not practice contraception but do not want to become pregnant any more state their husbands' objection as one of the prime reasons (HIPS, 1989).

Table 2.5 Decision-making on the Contraceptive Method Used
(%)

	WEST		EAST	
Wife decides	18.2	(6.0)	19.0	(6.8)
Husband decides	19.4	(20.1)	24.0	(16.8)
Both decide	60.3	(69.4)	55.2	(72.6)
Other	2.1	(4.4)	1.7	(3.7)

(Note: Figures in parentheses are from the Husbands Questionnaire)

(Chi Square = 5.03)(degrees of freedom = 3) (significance: .1694)

Source: Woman's and Husband's Questionnaires.

An interesting point here is the comparative answers of husbands to the same question. In both regions, husbands appear to respond according to their perception of the social ideal. It appears that since decision-making by both husband and wife is considered the ideal and therefore what is expected, husbands tend to report accordingly. They do not report decision-making by "the wife" (alone) or "the husband" (alone) as frequently as their wives. Decision-making by the wife may also be under-reported as it could be regarded as undermining the husband's power. On the other hand, husbands may have reported decision-making by "the husband" (alone) less than the wives because joint decision-making is what is socially acceptable. This tendency toward over-reporting

of "ideal" is higher in the East than in the West.

Urban-rural comparisons across both regions are also interesting: As reported by the wife, decision-making on the contraceptive method used by the husband only is higher in the urban and rural areas of the East compared to the urban and rural areas of the West, respectively. Similarly, joint decision-making is reported less in the urban-East than the urban-West, and in the rural-East than the rural-West. Moreover, it is higher in the rural areas of the West than it is in the urban-East (see Appendix, Table A.5). It is interesting that differences in decision-making between the urban and rural areas **within** both regions are not statistically significant, implying no behavioral difference between urban and rural areas in either region.

2.1.6 Differences in Approving the Use of Family Planning Methods⁵

Use of family planning by couples either to limit family size or to space births is approved by a higher proportion of men in the West than in the East, though approval in both regions is high (92 per cent vs. 86 per cent. Similarly, **within** both regions' urban and rural settlements, approval of contraception is rather high (over 80%). However, a general approval of family planning methods for couples doesn't necessarily imply that respondents are in favour of actually using them. It should be remembered that husbands' refusal to use contraceptives is one of the main reasons women state for not using them.⁶

2.1.7 Differences in Timing the Start of Contraceptive Use

Starting with this section, the analyses of "attitudinal" factors, beginning with the attitudes of husbands about when to start using family planning methods will be presented.

Early use of contraceptives may be considered a "modernity variable" since it implies a systematic planning of the number of children from the very beginning rather than waiting until a desired number is reached (Kagitcibasi, 1982). In the West, the percentage of men who favour an early use of contraceptives (before the first birth and for spacing purposes) is much higher than in the East - where men generally consider that a couple should start using contraceptives after reaching their ideal number of children (Table 2.6). An earlier study reached the conclusion that those who begin using contraceptives at an early stage have more media exposure, are more decision-minded

(i.e. not fatalistic), share decision-making responsibilities at home, and do not have a salient boy preference (Kagıtcıbası, 1977).

Table 2.6 Attitudes on Timing to Start Using Family Planning Methods
(%)

	WEST	EAST
Before first birth	22.0	15.7
For spacing births	35.0	25.4
After desired number of children	41.8	57.7
Other	1.2	1.3

(Chi Square = 22.8)(degrees of freedom = 3) (significance: .0000)

Source: Women's Questionnaire.

Urban-rural comparisons reveal once more that the two urban and rural settlements, have rather different patterns from each other. Both in urban-West and rural-West, the percentages of husbands who think a couple should start using contraceptives for spacing purposes are much higher compared to East-urban and East-rural, respectively (see Appendix, Table A.6). Similarly, while half (52%) of the husbands in the urban areas of the East find it appropriate to start using contraceptives only after achieving their desired number of children, this percentage declines to 36% in the urban settlements of the West. A similar pattern is observed when the two rural settlements are compared.

2.1.8 Willingness to Learn (more) About Family Planning Methods

There exist important differences in knowledge and use of family planning methods between the two regions. In the West, knowledge and use of family planning methods is much higher than the East (HIPS, 1989). Accordingly, more men in the East state a desire to learn about family planning (92 per cent in the East compared to 77 per cent in the West) as well as expressing a desire for their wives to learn more (94 per cent vs. 79 per cent). However, it should be remembered that stating a desire to learn more about family planning, or already being knowledgeable about it, doesn't automatically imply that family planning is practised.

Urban-rural differentials once more might instead indicate an uneven distribution of services. This situation is indicated by several observations: First, a higher percentage of husbands in the rural areas of the West than in urban areas, desire themselves and their wives to learn more about family planning (84% vs. 75%). On the other hand, no statistical difference exists between the urban and rural settlements of the East in the percentages of husbands stating such a desire, indicating lower supply of services throughout the Eastern region. An uneven distribution of services between the regions may also be indicated by the higher percentage of those desiring knowledge in the urban areas of the East compared to the urban areas of the West (90% vs. 75%), and the higher percentage in rural areas of the East than rural of the West (94% vs. 84%).

2.1.9 Husbands' Approval for Women to Work Outside the Home

According to the Turkish Civil Code, wives must have the permission of their husbands to work outside the home and therefore to practice their professions. Indeed, the participation of women in the labour force has not gained wide acceptance by husbands responding to the Survey. In Turkey, in general, only 49 per cent of husbands approve of "unmarried" women working outside the home, with approval decreasing to 38 per cent for "married" women (HIPS, 1989).

As shown in Table 2.7, East-West differentials are once more striking; even an important proportion of husbands in the West, who historically have been closer to "modern" values and ways of living, do not approve of women working outside the home. In the East this attitude is more widespread, especially if the woman is married as the majority of husbands do not approve of their wives working which highly values a "home-bound" role for women.

Table 2.7 Husband's Approval of a Woman Working Outside the Home
(According to Her Marital Status)
 (%)

	WEST		EAST	
	<u>Unmarried</u>	<u>Married</u>	<u>Unmarried</u>	<u>Married</u>
Approves	52.7	42.0	46.5	28.6
Disapproves	27.9	33.0	42.7	51.9
Approves, if necessary	19.4	25.0	10.8	19.5

Unmarried:
 (Chi Square = 30.29) (degrees of freedom = 2) (significance: .0000)

Married:
 (Chi Square = 38.26) (degrees of freedom = 2) (significance: .0000)

This brings us to an examination of whether differences in educational levels affect men's perceptions of women "working outside the home". Results of this analysis are summarized in Tables 2.8 and 2.9, respectively, for both regions. It is generally observed that as a husband's level of education increases, his approval of women working in paid jobs increases.⁷ However, increased education doesn't necessarily imply that men approve of married women working outside the home. Once a woman is married, in all educational levels the percentage of men giving their approval to their wives being employed in a paid work decreases compared to women who are unmarried.⁸ This tendency is observed in both regions, which shows an overall approval of the traditional home-bound role for women. Differences are more

Table 2.8

Approval for UNMARRIED Women to Work
(by Men's Educational Status)
(%)

	<u>Approves</u>		<u>Disapproves</u>		<u>Approves, if necessary</u>	
	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST
Illiterate	45.5	57.1	36.4	38.1	18.2	4.8
Literate	38.2	40.0	40.0	51.7	21.8	8.3
Primary	45.7	41.9	31.3	48.4	23.0	9.7
Secondary (or higher)	69.3	62.2	18.3	20.3	12.4	17.6

West
(Chi Square = 43.30) (degrees of freedom = 6) (significance: .0000)

East
(Chi Square = 21.97) (degrees of freedom = 6) (significance: .0012)

Table 2.9

Approval for MARRIED Women to Work
(by Men's Educational Status)
(%)

	<u>Approves</u>		<u>Disapproves</u>		<u>Approves, if necessary</u>	
	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST
Illiterate	50.0	61.9	31.8	33.3	18.2	4.8
Literate	32.7	28.8	40.0	61.0	27.3	10.2
Primary	34.3	21.8	37.4	59.7	28.3	18.5
Secondary (or higher)	57.4	39.2	23.5	27.0	19.1	33.8

West
(Chi Square = 38.30) (degrees of freedom = 6) (significance: .0000)

East
(Chi Square = 41.11) (degrees of freedom = 6) (significance: .0000)

striking, however, in the East: Even men with higher educational levels (secondary level, or higher) do not generally approve of married women working outside the home, unless "necessary". This implies that the husband remains the "bread winner" in the family, while the wife can work only in the case of financial constraints.

Comparison of attitudes of husbands living in Western urban and rural areas to those in Eastern urban and rural areas respectively, also supports the view that regional differences are much more fundamental than simple urban-rural distinctions. The comparisons reveal three important patterns (see Appendix, Table A.7):

First, within the Western region, significant differences exist between the attitudes of husbands living in urban and rural areas in terms of approving of women working outside the home, whether unmarried or married. A higher percentage of husbands in urban areas approve of women working than those in the rural areas, though approval decreases when the woman is married.

Secondly, within the Eastern region, **no statistical difference** exists in the attitudes of husbands towards women working outside the home, whether the husbands live in urban or rural areas. In both cases approval is low and doesn't diverge from the general trend. Over 45% of husbands in the Eastern region do not approve of unmarried women to work in a paid job outside the home, while their approval declines drastically to 28-29% if women are married.

Thirdly, as a consequence, urban and rural areas in the West appear to differ much more with urban and rural areas in the East respectively, in terms of such an attitude. Approval of women to work is significantly lower in urban and rural areas of the East compared to these same areas in the West. In urban settlements of the West, 58% of husbands approve of **unmarried** women working outside home, while the proportion declines to 45% in urban areas of the East. In terms of approval for **married** women, the difference is more drastic. While 47% of husbands approve of married women working in the urban-West, approval declines sharply to 28% in the urban-East. Rural comparisons show the same pronounced differences once a woman is **married**. However, in cases where she is **not married**, a slightly higher approval is observed in the rural-East compared to the rural-West (47% vs.42%). Even so, disapproval is much higher in the rural-East compared to the rural-West where husbands state some approval "if necessary".

Another interesting point to consider here is the higher percentage of approval for **married** women to work by husbands in rural areas of the West than the urban-East which further shows that the traditional "home-bound" role for women is significantly stressed throughout the Eastern region.

2.1.10. Differences in Aspirations for Education of Daughters and Sons

Another indicator of the expected sex roles in a society is the parents' aspirations for their children's education. The differences are two-fold: First, between the regions, second, differences between sons and daughters. Both in the West and the East, lower levels of education for daughters are desired compared to sons, with educational aspirations for the daughter much lower in the East.

Fathers' educational aspirations for their sons are strikingly higher than for their daughters. University education is desired for the son more than the daughter, especially in the East, where only 49 per cent of men state university education as their desire for their daughters, while the proportion increases to 71 per cent in the case of sons. This might be related to the ideal images of sons and daughters. While daughters are expected to move to another household after marriage, sons are seen as the source of old-age security for parents, thus, higher educational levels are aspired implying higher status jobs. In fact, an earlier study has showed that education, achievement, and work are often more aspired for the son than the daughter. The conjugal family role, i.e. having a happy marriage, on the other hand, is distinctly aspired more for the daughter. Women appear to put relatively greater emphasis on education than men, which means women aspire for their children to acquire the means for status improvement that they themselves lack to a great extent (Kagitcibasi, 1981). But still, the same study concluded that:

"... women's aspirations for achievement/work for their sons is greater than that of their husbands, but not for their daughters. This is evidence that the traditional familial role of the woman is well accepted by women" (Kagitcibasi, 1981:90).

Table 2.10 Educational Aspirations for Daughters and Sons
(%)

	WEST		EAST	
	<u>Daughters</u>	<u>Sons</u>	<u>Daughters</u>	<u>Sons</u>
None	0.4	-	1.9	0.5
Primary	4.0	0.9	13.6	1.4
Secondary (+ Lycee)	15.8	5.6	17.5	3.6
University	65.8	79.8	49.2	70.9
Indifferent	14.0	13.6	17.8	23.6

Daughters

(Chi Square = 58.0)(degrees of freedom = 5) (significance: .0000)

Sons

(Chi Square = 24.9)(degrees of freedom = 5) (significance: .0001)

Urban-rural differentials show somewhat similar patterns as discussed in section 2.1.9. In terms of educational aspirations for daughters and sons three main patterns can be identified: (see Appendix, Table A.8):

First, urban-rural differences become significant within the Western region in terms of the educational aspirations stated by husbands for both daughters and sons. In urban areas, higher aspirations are stated for children of both sexes compared to rural areas. However, urban-rural differentials become more striking when husbands' educational aspirations for daughters alone are considered. While 79% of husbands in urban areas state a desire for university education for their daughters for example, only 48% state such an aspiration in rural areas. Husbands generally state higher educational aspirations for their sons than their daughters in both urban and rural areas.

Secondly, in the East, no statistically significant differentials exist between the aspirations of fathers living in urban or rural areas, whether for their daughters or for their sons. In both areas, higher educational aspirations are stated for sons than for daughters.

Thirdly, when comparisons are made **between** regions (i.e. urban-West to urban East and rural-West to rural-East), it is observed that the level of education desired for daughters is much higher in the urban-West compared to the urban-East (74% in the urban-West state university education, while only 52% do so in the urban-East). Higher level of education is also desired for sons in the urban-West when compared to the urban-East, but the differences are not so striking (84% and 71 % respectively).

An interesting observation here is the rather high level of men who state an "indifference" in their educational aspirations for their children in the urban settlements of the East (21% in the case of daughters and 28% in the case of sons) compared to the urban-West (13% for both sexes). This might be due to the fact that education, indeed a high level of education, does not concern husbands living in the urban-East as much as it does to those in the urban-West. However, when the two rural areas are compared, the educational aspirations of husbands for their children are more homogeneous. Differences are almost non-existent between both rural areas; when boys and girls compared separately, the level of education desired is almost the same in both rural areas, higher educational aspirations are stated for sons, and husbands stating an "indifference" do not differ sharply. The heterogeneity of the responses between the two urban populations (urban-West and urban-East respectively) further support the view that the urban population of the East is not yet "urbanised" to a noticeable degree (as discussed in Chapter I), and still exhibit more "traditional" attitudes.

2.1.11. Differences in Attitudes Towards Gender Equality

Gender differentiation, constituting an important element in the social aspects of life, is quite strong in Turkey. The present analysis implies that attitudes towards gender differentiation is striking in the Eastern region, though prevalent in the West. Women are expected to obey their husbands completely, recognise their authority, and accept their "natural" superiority in intelligence. What is remarkable is that in both regions, husbands support the idea of beating their wives if they do not obey them. This provides strong evidence of the attitudes towards women in societies where authoritarian relations dominate among family members, especially between wives and husbands.

Table 2.11. Differences in Attitudes Towards Gender Equality

	<u>Agrees</u>		<u>Indifferent</u>		<u>Disagrees</u>	
	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST
As a rule, men are more intelligent than women	49.0	60.2	3.9	7.3	47.1	32.5
At home, the husband has definite authority and the wife should always obey him	56.3	73.4	2.2	3.5	41.5	23.1
When a wife does not obey her husband, he has the right to beat her	35.9	56.7	3.0	5.9	61.0	37.4
When a woman disagrees with her husband, she should keep silent and not argue with him	59.4	69.4	2.5	5.1	38.1	25.5
It is perfectly okay for a married man to go out alone when he wants, but a woman can not	60.5	75.3	2.4	3.5	37.1	21.2
At home, there is work that is a woman's and some that is a man's, and they should not be doing each others	61.3	66.4	0.9	3.5	37.8	30.1

It can be observed from Table 2.11 that the percentage of husbands who state that "they are indifferent" to the statements presented is higher in the East than the West. This may be due to the possible conflict of the "old" values and a growing desire for the "new". These men may be experiencing a process of transition between two sets of social values, as "ambivalence, indecision, or uncertainty may result from self-contradictory preferences" (Kagitcibasi, 1981).

When an analysis of urban-rural differentiation is made in terms of attitudes towards gender equality, it is observed that both in the West and the East, the percentages of husbands who express traditional or authoritarian attitudes are higher in

the rural areas compared to the urban areas (see Appendix, Table A.9). However, in the Eastern region, there are some exceptions. In terms of accepting the "natural" superiority in intelligence of men, a woman being able to go out alone only with the company of her husband, and a strict gender division of labour at home, no statistically significant differences exist between the husbands living in urban or rural areas. Husbands in both areas strongly express such conservative attitudes.

It is once more revealed that, in the context of this analysis, there are important differences in value judgements, attitudes, and social norms when urban and rural areas are compared between the Eastern and Western regions: The percentage of husbands with authoritarian and traditional values is higher in the urban-East than the urban-West, and higher in the rural-East than the rural-West. However, it is also true that the two rural areas do not differ as much as the two urban settlements do, showing a relatively more homogeneous rural population in terms of gender-equality attitudes (Table A.9). For example, about 80% of the husbands in the rural-East and 74% in the rural-West agree that the husband has complete authority and the wife should always obey him. Similarly, domestic violence against wives is approved of by a significantly higher (and similar) proportion of the two rural populations (58% in the rural-West and 67% in the rural-East), compared to lower and more differentiated proportions in the two urban settlements (26% in the urban-West and 43% in the urban-East).

2.1.12. Differences in Decision-making Within the Household⁹

In Turkey, an earlier study (Kagıtcıbası, 1982) has shown that communication between the husband and wife, and participation of women in decision-making process is rather low. The study has shown that, when a comparison is made among countries in which "Value of Children" Surveys were conducted, Turkey stands out as the one in which the phenomenon of "decision-making by males" is the highest.¹⁰ The analysis in this section of the paper has also indicated that male-dominance in decision-making is considerably high. Even in the West, where the "modernisation" of social life is historically longer, husbands reported that of all decisions presented in Table 2.12, 42 per cent was taken by themselves, while in the East, the percentage increased further to 57 per cent. Although joint decision-making is also reported in some cases, this might be due to the tendency to respond in a "socially acceptable way" (as reported in cases of the purchase of precious goods and decisions about marriage and education of children). In turn,

	<u>Differences in Decision-Making within the Household</u>							
	<u>(%)</u>							
	<u>Husband</u>		<u>Together</u>		<u>Wife</u>		<u>Other</u>	
	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST
Who decides to buy or sell precious goods like furniture?	23.3	41.3	56.5	42.4	20.0	16.0	0.3	0.3
Who decides to choose the people you are going to see?	38.6	58.6	59.3	39.5	1.0	1.4	1.0	0.6
Who decides how the family income will be saved (on real estate, gold, bonds, bank deposits, etc.)?	53.8	68.4	38.9	27.5	6.9	3.1	0.5	1.1
Who makes decisions about investments related to work?	77.2	78.3	22.1	19.0	0.4	0.6	0.4	1.2
Who makes decisions about the education of the children?	22.4	43.5	73.4	51.5	3.5	4.5	0.6	0.6
Who makes decisions about the marriages of the children?	14.8	30.5	80.4	63.6	0.5	2.0	0.3	3.9
Who decides if the wife is to work in a paid job or the place she is going to work?	61.9	79.1	33.2	15.4	4.8	4.7	-	0.8

savings from family income, people to be in contact with, investments be made to generate income and the wife's working in a paid job or the place she is going to work are the decisions which are highly male dominated (the latter finding is also in accordance with the attitudes of husbands towards women working outside the home), with a much higher dominance over women in the East (see Table 2.12).

Analysis of urban-rural differentials in decision-making show significant differences **within** regions (i.e. West urban and rural; East urban and rural) as well as **between** regions (i.e. West-urban and East-urban; West-rural and East rural) (see Appendix, Table A.10). The husband's dominance in decision-making within the household is much higher in the urban residences of the Eastern region compared to that of the Western as well as being higher in the rural-East than the rural-West. Moreover, in decisions regarding the purchase of precious goods, education and marriage of children, and the wife's employment, joint-decision-making is higher in the rural-West than the urban-East. Another interesting comparison is that the highest percentage of decisions taken by the husband, especially the people to be in contact with, savings from family income, investments made, and the wife's working in a paid job (between 65% and 83% of such decisions) are observed in the rural-East, while in the rural-West, joint-decision-making exhibits a significantly stronger pattern.

2.1.13. Relation Between Male-dominated Decision-making, Conservative Attitudes Toward Gender Equality and Fertility

To examine such a relationship, the number of living children is taken as an indicator of fertility and divided into two groups: a) less than or equal to 3 children,

b) more than or equal to four children.

Then, decision-making and gender equality questions are ranked according to the number of attributes given by the husband; i.e. in the case of decision-making, male dominance is taken as the attribute and the number of decisions taken by the husband is scored. Similarly, in cases of gender equality questions, the number of authoritarian/traditional responses given by the husband (i.e. number of "agrees" responses to the statements at Table 2.11) are summed up. In both cases, the nature of decisions and attitudes in gender differentials are assumed to be of equal weight.

Table 2.13. Relation between Number of Living Children and Male Dominance in Decision-Making - REGIONAL DIFFERENTIALS
(%)

Number of decisions taken by the <u>Husband</u> alone:	<u>Number of Living Children</u>			
	≤ 3		≥ 4	
	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST
None	85.4	81.8	14.6	18.2
1	91.5	61.3	8.5	38.7
2	89.5	64.7	10.5	35.3
3	89.4	61.3	10.6	38.7
4	82.3	50.0	17.7	50.0
5	71.2	36.0	28.8	64.0
6	63.8	33.3	36.2	66.7
7	72.0	33.3	28.0	66.7

In both cases, there exists a clear relationship between the number of living children, male dominance in decision-making and the husband having more authoritarian attitudes about husband-wife relationships. In other words, the results imply that as the number of decisions taken by the husband increases, the percentage of families with higher parity increases, as well as higher parity being observed when the husband expresses more authoritarian attitudes towards women (Tables 2.13 and 2.14). Regional differences become apparent with a much more pronounced pattern in the East compared to some fluctuations in the West. The percentage of families with higher parities are considerably higher in the East than the West, as male dominance in decision making increases and the husband becomes more and more authoritarian.

Table 2.14. Relation between Number of Living Children and Gender Equality - REGIONAL DIFFERENTIALS
(%)

Number of statements agreed by the husband implying authoritarian/gender inequality values:	<u>Number of Living Children</u>			
	≤ 3		≥ 4	
	WEST	EAST	WEST	EAST
None	91.6	80.0	8.4	20.0
1	93.6	62.5	6.4	37.5
2	90.8	71.0	9.2	29.0
3	82.8	50.0	17.2	50.0
4	86.8	53.5	13.2	46.5
5	75.2	50.7	24.8	49.3
6	71.6	30.1	28.4	69.9

An attempt at analysing urban-rural differences in the relationship between husband-dominated decision-making, conservative and authoritarian attitudes toward gender equality and the number of living children show similar results. Although some fluctuations exist, the trend becomes clear in almost all areas (except the West-rural, with regard to gender equality): As the number of authoritarian values and husband-dominated decisions increase, the number of families with higher parity increases. West-urban and East-urban as well as the West-rural and East-rural comparisons show a sharp difference in the percentage of families with higher parity. The percentage of families is much higher in the urban-East than the urban-West and in the rural-East than the rural-West as the number of conservative and authoritarian attributes and decisions taken by the husband increases. However, it should be remembered that such differentials are strongly influenced by already existing fertility differentials between the two regions as well as between the urban-rural areas in each. But, still, what is important for the present purpose is the existence of such patterns and the differences in them rather than their actual levels (see Appendix, Tables A.11 and A.12).

2.2. Summary of the Findings and Linkages:

Long lasting historical-cultural values in Turkey prepare the platform for husbands' dominance over wives in many aspects of family life. Today, a "dual culture" persists composed of "traditional values", and "Western" or "modern" values whose origins can be traced to the "Westernisation" process which began in the 19th century.

Results of the analyses support the hypothesis that the Western region is closer to the "modern" values, norms, attitudes and behaviour in terms of husband-wife relationships and the equality of spouses within the family, while the Eastern region is to a great extent still bound to the "traditional" ways of family life associated with the past. Moreover, analyses on urban/rural differences **between** and **within** regions support the hypothesis that these regional differences are not simply due to urban/rural differentials, but rather are more fundamental and are strongly embodied in the historical past of the two regions. Especially the two urban, as well as the two rural areas differ from each other to a great extent. In some cases, the rural-West is found to be more "modern" than the urban-East.

One of the factors which determines a husband's dominance seems to be embodied in the type of family formation. In the East, "religious marriages" still exist to

an important extent. When a woman is "bound" to her husband only through a religious marriage, she does not have any institutional rights such as inheritance, and a say about on the education of her children. She does not have any "security" and other rights equal to her husband and such a lack of "security" leads her to place greater emphasis on her procreative role. Her only "safety" becomes her fertility and the number of sons she "gives" to her husband so that he won't desert her. Such marriages are significantly higher even in urban areas of the East compared to the rural-West.

In addition to the existence of religious marriages, the prevalence of "arranged" marriages is higher in the Eastern region than the West. Moreover, the percentage of arranged marriages is even higher in the urban settlements of the East than in the rural-West where marriages decided upon by the couples themselves become relatively more common. Arranged marriages do not grant any autonomy to women, which is evident at once by the failure to recognise the right of a woman to choose her own husband. In such a context, the daughter is raised with the idea that she must marry after reaching a certain age, and be a "good" wife and a "good" mother, which implies complete obedience to her husband. This notion is then linked with the parents' aspirations for their children. In general, fathers desire higher educational levels for their sons, with the differentials for daughters being much higher in the East (see Table 2.10).

Another factor which gives "power" to the husband is the existence of "bride-price" (baslik). The payment of a bride-price exists in almost half the marriages in the East, while it has nearly disappeared in the West. A remarkable comparison can be made between the rural-West where the bride-price was paid in only 18% of marriages, the urban-East where the percentage increases to 51%, and the rural-East where the incidence of bride-price rises to 66%. The payment of bride-price gives the groom and his family the right to "own" the bride, as money or property was used to "purchase" the wife. A bride-price can be regarded as a dishonour a woman as it serves to remind the wife of her "cost" to her husband and his family, in cases when she doesn't obey the husband or the mother or father-in-law, for example. It should be noted that it is also argued that the payment of bride-price "upgrades" women and is a sign of "giving value to her". This argument could be considered as a justification for payment of a bride-price and its actual results. It is important then, to look at how bride-price is actually used by the husband and his family. An interesting example in this context comes from

Kenya where the payment of bride-price is a very strong institution and entitles the husband to the children of his wife whether fathered by him or not (Frank and Mc Nicoll, 1987).

Predominantly male decision-making in the family can be considered as an indication of traditional sex-roles. One linkage is to women's participation in the labour force which has not yet gained wide acceptance by men. Half the husbands do not approve of women working outside the home and disapproval further increases if the women are married. This attitude is largely related to an acceptance of traditional sex-roles where a woman's place is considered to be in her home as a mother and a wife, and the man is the family "bread-winner". Wives working in paid jobs outside the home are seen to dishonour their husbands. This attitude is even valid in the West of Turkey though far more persuasive in the East. In the Western region, considered to be the most "modernised" region of the country, husbands' disapproval for married women to work increase in spite of higher educational levels (see Table 2.8). This shows that increased education does not necessarily accompany an adjustment to "modern" values, but that the more deeply rooted cultural-historical background of a society is a rather influential factor in shaping an individual's outlook. Still, urban-rural differences in attitude are apparent within the Western region, though in the East, living in an urban or rural area does not matter significantly in terms of approving women's employment outside the home.

This conservative attitude reinforces the tendency towards more authoritarian attitudes in relations between husbands and wives, and male dominance of domestic life in both regions, though it is more common in the East than the West. Wives are expected to obey their husbands and accept their authority as well as to follow traditional sex-roles at home.

Such a biased relationship in the family structure is obviously related to higher fertility. Half of the women state "lack of contraceptive knowledge and use" as a reason for the difference between their ideal and actual number of living children. Although family-planning program input is also important for explaining this lack of knowledge and use, the husbands' refusal to use family planning methods in cases where women do not use any family planning method and do not want to become pregnant (any more), should be recognised (see section 2.1.4 and 2.1.5). In both regions, though the East dominates, husbands state a higher number of ideal children than the women and

a stronger sex preference for boys.

Husbands' dominance in decision-making and their authoritarian values are clearly related to the number of children a family has. This final relationship between male dominance in decision-making and fertility, stemming from the above socio-cultural factors, is more apparent in the East than in the West. More power in decision-making and more authoritarian values lead to higher parities. However, it should be remembered that the same pattern also prevails in the West, although to a lower extent. This leads us to think once more that higher socio-economic development does not necessarily imply the automatic acquisition of "modern values". The socio-economic relations in a society or region may change, but there is less potential for changes in sex differentiation and cultural norms stemming from the historical experience of the society.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Turkey has been involved in the development process for more than a century. Historically, there has been an unbalanced development amongst different regions of the country, which is especially pronounced between the Western and Eastern regions. This unbalanced development persists today, although explicit attempts are underway to transform this historical process into a more "balanced" development through "development priority areas" in the Eastern part of the country. The Western region of the country has been a center for trade since the beginning of the 19th century and the place of residence for the upper class who, during the Ottoman Empire were involved in the process of "Westernisation" since then. Accompanied by higher level of socio-economic development, the process of Westernisation led to the acquisition of "modern" values in the West, while the East remained more bound to the traditional social and cultural values associated with the Ottoman Empire. Though not its only cause, lower levels of socio-economic development have helped perpetuate this dedication to the past in the Eastern region. Consequently, "Westernisation", in the long run, led to an urbanisation process in the Western region which complemented the industrialisation and economic development of the Turkish Republic. Urbanisation, in turn, brought about a social process of "urbanism" which transformed behaviour patterns, attitudes, and value-judgements of the people into (so-called) "modern". On the other hand, the general neglect of the Eastern region in the development strategy, and the specific "historical" process of urbanisation which was unaffected by industrialisation and socio-economic development, but which emerged as a result of the military and administrative needs of the Ottoman Empire, did not provide an opportunity for "urbanism" to develop. While urban and rural differentiation became more pronounced in the West as a result of "modernisation" and "urbanisation" processes which remain incomplete (as the Western region's uneven distribution of resources demonstrates today), the East remained less differentiated in urban and rural terms where people from the urban areas generally share the values and cultural norms of people living in rural areas. Urbanisation in the East has remained restricted with the increase in the proportion of

its population living in big cities, largely unaccompanied by "urbanism" as an integral part of the process. Therefore, East-West regional differentials can be expected to continue until some transformation of the "traditional values" of the Eastern region which survive from its historical and cultural past takes place. On the other hand, urban/rural differences within the two regions themselves are a result of unbalanced social and economic development and an uneven distribution of resources in favour of urban areas.

The dual socio-economic and cultural structure prevailing in the country has implications for relationships within the family, especially that of husband and wife. The results of the preceding analyses support the view that significant differentials exist between the two regions in terms of structures and values which contribute to the determination of family size. In the cases where women have less control of their lives due to the dominant role of husbands within the family, "traditional" values seem to be more resistant to change. In the Eastern region, husbands appear to have more power in family decision-making, favor more authoritarian and traditional attitudes in gender relations, and view a woman's role as wife and mother, while in the Western region more egalitarian attitudes and relations prevail. The implication of this pattern is that in both regions, but with a much more pronounced pattern in the East, as husbands acquire more authoritarian values and become more dominant in family decision-making, the number of children in families increase. This may be explained by the fact that husbands have a higher ideal number of children, and exhibit more of a sex preference for boys than women. However, this determination should not be regarded as the sole cause of higher fertility levels in the Eastern region, but should be considered within the context of this paper where other factors such as the benefits of higher numbers of children, the economic causes of high fertility, lack of family planning services, etc. were not discussed.

The findings of the present analyses have some important policy implications which become more apparent when considered together with the findings from previous studies. According to the 1988 Turkish Fertility and Health Survey results, about one quarter of women who were under the risk of pregnancy, not contracepting, and did not wish to become pregnant stated that their reason for not using contraceptives was their husbands' objection to practice family planning (HIPS, 1989). Another study on "unmet need"¹¹ in Turkey shows the need is rather high in Turkey, with significant East-West

regional differentials. Unmet need for family planning is highest in the Eastern region, and lowest in the West (34 per cent and 21 per cent respectively), (Akadli and Kulu, 1989).

It is important to note that one reason for the disparity in the distribution of women with unmet need for family planning is the uneven distribution of family planning services between the two regions. Family planning and mother and child care services in Turkey are provided as part of the health services system. As provision of these services has been concentrated in the West, the prevalence of unmet need and lower levels of contraceptive use in the East is also related to the regional bias of family planning programme input.

However, it should also be noted that there have been deliberate efforts to provide family planning and mother and child care services to the East in recent years within the context of co-operation between the Ministry of Health and the UNFPA which has led to increases in the contraceptive use in the region.

Yet, recognising that important fertility differentials still exist between the two regions and the level of unmet need is higher in the Eastern region, two specific **implications for policy** are suggested by this paper:

First, it should be recognised that there is little use in introducing large scale family planning programs without a consideration of the cultural differences in different regions of the country. Although Turkish society shares certain basic value judgements and cultural norms, the existence of a "dual cultural structure" and unequal socio-economic development levels in different regions should be taken into account before family planning programme can reach those "in need". Moreover, as the urban and rural areas in the Eastern and Western regions differ significantly, **inter-regional** cultural and institutional differences should be considered when designing family planning programmes. A "multi-regional" approach should be adopted and different programmes introduced according to the background and needs of the communities, rather than designing identical programmes for all urban and all rural areas.

Secondly, in a society where men have a dominant role in many aspects of family life, especially decision-making, favor "traditional" attitudes in gender relations, and have higher ideal numbers of children, family planning programmes designed mainly for women can not be expected to produce the desired results. Family planning programmes in Turkey have always chosen women as the target group and have

assumed that only women should be given education on family planning. Therefore, information and education within the context of family planning programmes should involve men as an integral part of the programme (Recently, training programmes have been introduced for male factory workers, but these remain isolated examples).

More general policy implications include the following:

1. Based on the husband's role in decision making on family size, and due to the slow process of transforming "traditional" values into "modern" ones, both formal and informal education on family planning and mother and child health should be given to boys before they begin raising families. However, in designing such programmes, cultural distinctions in different sections of Turkish society should be taken into account.
2. Detailed research should be conducted on cultural values, attitudes, behaviour patterns, and their combined impact on fertility. The research findings should be used as one of the major inputs for a multi-approach family planning programme.
3. Infrastructure should be improved in less developed parts of the country which would help in spreading information, education, and communication programmes. Apart from this element, more emphasis should be given to socio-economic development programmes in the East, as these processes help transform of sex-biased and authoritarian values. As an integral part of this process, the uneven distribution of resources between urban and rural settlements **within** each region should be taken into account, and rural areas should be given priority in the distribution of resources to improve their socio-economic development levels.
4. Finally, specific training and education programmes should be designed to increase the autonomy of women. Improving the position of women, both in the family and in society has received more notice on the international level since the 1984 Mexico International Population Conference. In Turkey, despite similar attention, more emphasis must still be given to increase the autonomy of women so that they can control their lives, and have equality in their relationship with their husbands. Women have to be "equipped" with the means to achieve

autonomy, such as higher educational levels and increased participation in the labour-force which in turn influences the transformation of socially-accepted norms concerning marriage formation, and age at marriage. Education and training programmes should be implemented larger scales and with greater emphasis, especially the Eastern region in general as rural and urban distinctions in this region are less noticeable in the limited degree to which women control their lives and have equal relations with their husbands within the family.

NOTES

1. For example, according to the 1988 Turkish Fertility and Health Survey results, of all currently married women, only 62 per cent had primary or higher levels of education, while 88 per cent of all currently married men had primary or higher levels of education.
2. "Two variables are by definition independent if the probability that a case falls into a given cell is simply the product of the marginal probabilities of the two categories defining the cell" (SPSS, 1988:B-97)
3. Ottoman-Russian wars in the 18th cc. (1768-1774); uprising in Arabia (1804-1907); Crimean War (1853-56); occupation of Tunis by French (1881); Russian invasion of 1876-1878; occupation of Egypt by British (1882); repeated uprisings at the end of the 19th cc. by Armenians, Macedonians, Yemenis, and Albanians (Rustow, 1973).
4. In this paper, for comparability reasons, findings from the Women's Questionnaire refer only to the category "currently married women", although the survey covered "ever-married women", due to the fact that the Husbands' Questionnaire covers "currently married men".
5. Starting with this section of the chapter, data is from the Husbands' Questionnaire.
6. A regional breakdown of responses is not available at the present due to an unavailability of data.
7. The fact that "literate" men reported less approval than "illiterate" men is a point that remains to be explained (see next page). A possible explanation may be that the "illiterate" group may be more inclined to give socially acceptable answers to the interviewers.
8. The "illiterate" group stands out clearly as an exception in both regions.
9. Though decision-making is a "fact" rather than an "attitude", because of the nature of the decision-making process discussed in the Methodology section of Chapter I, related data analysis is presented here.

10. The Turkish "Value of Children" (VOC) study was one of nine country studies comprising the total VOC Project. Other participating countries were Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, U.S.A. and (former) West Germany.

11. "Unmet need" refers to women who are currently married, and not contracepting, but who wish to postpone their next birth or terminate childbearing altogether.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1. Summary of Some Basic Socio-Demographic Indicators:
East-West Urban/Rural Differentials

	<u>West/urban</u>	<u>West/rural</u>	<u>East/urban</u>	<u>East/rural</u>
Percent of women who are literate	86.3	77.1	57.8	53.4
Children ever born	2.45	2.86	4.00	4.45
Mean Desired Family Size	2.22	2.46	2.72	2.91
Percent of Exposed Women Using Contraceptives	85.4	77.3	70.1	56.4

Source: Women's Questionnaire.

Table A.2. Regional Urban/Rural Differentials in Type of Marriage¹
(%)

	<u>West/urban</u>	<u>West/rural</u>	<u>East/urban</u>	<u>East/rural</u>
Only civil marriage	15.0	9.9	12.0	10.5
Civil and religious marriage	82.9	84.0	73.9	59.6
Only religious marriage	2.1	6.1	12.9	27.0
Other	0.1	-	1.1	2.9

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 26.14 degrees of freedom = 3 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 29.50 degrees of freedom = 3 significance = .0000

Source: Women's Questionnaire

Table A.3. Regional Urban/Rural Differentials in How Marriage was Arranged
(%)

	<u>West/urban</u>	<u>West/rural</u>	<u>East/urban</u>	<u>East/rural</u>
Family decided (did not consult the daughter)	2.7	4.4	7.6	7.2
Family decided (consulted the daughter)	55.7	59.4	68.3	62.1
Couple decided (consulted the family)	35.8	25.0	19.3	21.3
Couple decided (did not consult the family)	1.3	0.8	1.7	2.3
"Ran away"	4.1	9.9	3.1	6.6
Other	0.3	0.6	-	0.6

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 40.33 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 9.11 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .1046

Source: Woman's Questionnaire

¹ In our analysis, Chi-Square significance tests are conducted at 95% confidence level. i.e. if the significance level is equal to or less than .0500, the relation between the two variables are to be "statistically significant".

Table A.4. Regional Urban/Rural Differentials in Whether Bride-price was Paid at the Marriage
(%)

	<u>West/urban</u>	<u>West/rural</u>	<u>East/urban</u>	<u>East/rural</u>
Yes	14.0	18.1	51.3	65.8
No	86.0	81.9	48.7	34.2

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 5.005 degrees of freedom = 1 significance = .0253
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 18.05 degrees of freedom = 1 significance = .0000

Source: Woman's Questionnaire

Table A.5. Regional Urban/Rural Differentials in Decision-making on the Contraceptive Method Used
(%)

	<u>West/urban</u>	<u>West/rural</u>	<u>East/urban</u>	<u>East/rural</u>
Wife decides	19.0	16.0	24.0	14.7
Husband decides	19.3	19.5	22.4	25.4
Together	59.4	62.9	52.0	58.0
Other	2.2	1.6	1.5	1.8

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 2.13 degrees of freedom = 3 significance = 0.5459
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 5.80 degrees of freedom = 3 significance = 0.1215

Source: Woman's Questionnaire

Table A.6. Regional Urban-rural Differentials in Attitudes on Timing to Start Using Contraceptives
(%)

	<u>West/urban</u>	<u>West/rural</u>	<u>East/urban</u>	<u>East/rural</u>
Before first birth	25.5	13.3	20.0	12.5
For spacing births	37.0	30.0	28.1	23.4
After desired number of children	36.3	55.2	51.9	62.0

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 25.13 degrees of freedom = 3 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 7.81 degrees of freedom = 3 significance = .0502

Source: Husband's Questionnaire

Table A.7. Regional Urban/rural Differentials in Husband's Approval of a Woman Working Outside the Home (According to her Marital Status)
(%)

	<u>West/urban</u>		<u>West/rural</u>		<u>East/urban</u>		<u>East/rural</u>	
	Unmarried	Married	Unmarried	Married	Unmarr.	Married	Unmarr.	Married
Approves	57.6	46.5	41.9	32.1	45.2	28.0	47.4	29.1
Disapproves	24.9	30.6	34.6	38.2	43.3	51.6	42.3	52.1
Approves, if necessary	17.5	22.9	23.6	29.7	11.5	20.4	10.2	18.8

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 16.74 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0002 (unmarried)

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 14.41 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0007 (married)

East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 0.24 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .8847 (unmarried)

East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 0.16 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .9227 (married)

Source: Husband's Questionnaire

Table A.8. Regional Urban-Rural Differentials in Educational Aspirations for Daughters and Sons
(%)

	<u>West/urban</u>		<u>West/rural</u>		<u>East/urban</u>		<u>East/rural</u>	
	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons	Daughters	Sons
None	0.4	-	0.4	-	1.3	-	2.4	1.0
Primary	1.5	0.2	9.4	2.5	11.0	1.3	15.6	1.4
Secondary+ Lycee	11.1	3.3	26.2	10.7	15.5	0.6	19.1	5.8
University	74.0	83.9	48.0	70.9	51.6	70.5	47.3	71.8
Indifferent	13.1	12.6	16.0	16.0	20.6	27.6	15.6	20.7

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 77.60 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0000 (daughters)

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 34.44 degrees of freedom = 4 significance = .0000 (sons)

East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 7.72 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .1727 (daughters)

East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 9.90 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0780 (sons)

Source: Husband's Questionnaire

Table A.9. Regional Urban/Rural Differentials in Attitudes Toward Gender Equality
(%)

	<u>West/urban</u>			<u>West/rural</u>		
	Agrees	Indifferent	Disagrees	Agrees	Indifferent	Disagrees
As a rule, men are more intelligent than women	42.8	3.7	53.5	62.6	4.5	32.9
At home, the husband has definite authority, and the wife should always obey him	48.3	2.0	49.6	74.0	2.4	23.6
When a wife doesn't obey her husband, he has the right to beat her	26.0	2.8	71.2	57.7	3.7	38.6
When a woman disagrees with her husband, she should keep silent, and not argue with him	52.0	3.1	44.8	75.6	1.2	23.2
It is perfectly O.K. for a married man to go out alone when he wants, but a woman can not	52.8	3.1	44.1	77.6	0.8	21.5
At home, there is work that's a woman's and some that's man's, and they should not be doing each other's.	55.9	1.1	43.0	73.2	0.4	26.4

	<u>East/urban</u>			<u>East/rural</u>		
	Agrees	Indifferent	Disagrees	Agrees	Indifferent	Disagrees
As a rule, men are more intelligent than women	54.8	7.0	38.2	64.2	7.4	28.4
At home, the husband has definite authority, and the wife should always obey him	65.0	3.8	31.2	79.5	3.3	17.2
When a wife doesn't obey her husband, he has the right to beat her	42.7	7.0	50.3	67.0	5.1	27.9
When a woman disagrees with her husband, she should keep silent, and not argue with him	59.2	5.1	35.7	76.7	5.1	18.1
It is perfectly O.K. for a married man to go out alone when he wants, but a woman can not	71.3	5.1	23.6	78.1	2.3	19.5
At home, there is work that's a woman's and some that's man's, and they should not be doing each other's.	61.1	3.2	35.7	70.2	3.7	26.0

Source: Husband's Questionnaire

Statement 1:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 29.02 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 4.06 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .1312

Statement 2:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 47.56 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 10.4 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0055

Statement 3:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 77.27 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 22.19 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0000

Statement 4:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 39.15 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 14.93 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0006

Statement 5:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 44.31 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 3.24 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .1974

Statement 6:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 21.44 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 3.99 degrees of freedom = 2 significance = .1358

Table A.10. Regional Urban-Rural Differentials in Decision-Making within the Household
(%)

	<u>West/urban</u>				<u>West/rural</u>			
	Husband	Together	Wife	Other	Husband	Together	Wife	Other
Who decides to buy or sell precious goods like furniture?	19.6	59.0	21.3	0.2	31.5	51.0	17.2	0.4
Who decides to choose the people you are going to see?	34.7	63.3	1.3	0.7	47.3	50.6	0.4	1.6
Who decides how the family income will be saved (on real estate, gold, bonds, bank deposits, etc.)?	50.3	40.7	8.9	-	61.2	34.7	2.4	1.6
Who makes decisions about investments related to work?	75.2	24.2	0.6	-	81.2	17.6	-	1.2
Who makes decisions about the education of the children?	16.7	78.7	3.7	0.9	35.1	61.6	3.2	-
Who makes decisions about the marriages of the children?	11.1	83.0	0.8	5.2	22.9	74.6	-	2.4
Who decides if the wife is to work in a paid job or the place she'll work?	57.5	36.2	6.2	-	71.8	26.5	1.6	-
	<u>East/urban</u>				<u>East/rural</u>			
	Husband	Together	Wife	Other	Husband	Together	Wife	Other
Who decides to buy or sell precious goods like furniture?	44.1	42.8	13.1	-	39.3	42.2	18.0	0.5
Who decides to choose the people you are going to see?	50.0	48.0	2.0	-	64.7	33.3	1.0	1.0
Who decides how the family income will be saved (on real estate, gold, bonds, bank deposits, etc.)?	56.6	37.5	6.0	-	76.8	20.4	0.9	1.9
Who makes decisions about investments related to work?	73.3	25.0	-	0.7	82.9	14.7	-	1.4
Who makes decisions about the education of the children?	38.8	55.9	4.6	0.7	46.9	48.3	4.3	0.5
Who makes decisions about the marriages of the children?	26.3	67.8	2.0	4.0	33.7	60.7	1.8	3.8
Who decides if the wife is to work in a paid job or the place she'll work?	76.3	17.1	5.3	1.3	81.0	14.2	4.3	0.5

Source: Husband's Questionnaire

Decision 1:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 17.38 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0038
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 12.24 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0316

Decision 2:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 14.25 degrees of freedom = 4 significance = .0065
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 12.52 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0283

Decision 3:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 26.24 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0001
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 30.83 degrees of freedom = 6 significance = .0000

Decision 4:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 12.37 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0301
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 15.60 degrees of freedom = 6 significance = .0160

Decision 5:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 35.71 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0000
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 8.59 degrees of freedom = 6 significance = .2000

Decision 6:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 25.55 degrees of freedom = 6 significance = .0003
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 6.92 degrees of freedom = 7 significance = .4372

Decision 7:

West-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 18.86 degrees of freedom = 4 significance = .0008
East-urban/rural: Chi-Square = 12.85 degrees of freedom = 5 significance = .0249

Table A.11. Regional Urban-Rural Differentials in the Relation Between Number of Living Children and Gender Equality
(%)

Number of statements agreed by the husband implying authoritarian/gender inequality values	Families with number of living Children with:							
	West/urban		West/rural		East/urban		East/rural	
	≤3	≥4	≤3	≥4	≤3	≥4	≤3	≥4
None	94.8	5.2	50.0	50.0	86.7	13.3	73.3	26.7
1	93.5	6.5	94.1	5.9	54.5	45.5	80.0	20.0
2	95.1	4.9	77.8	22.2	86.7	13.3	56.3	43.8
3	87.1	12.9	69.0	31.0	80.0	20.0	16.7	83.3
4	90.5	9.5	80.0	20.0	58.3	41.7	47.4	52.6
5	79.7	20.3	68.9	31.1	55.6	44.4	49.1	50.9
6	71.2	28.8	72.0	28.0	27.9	72.1	31.3	68.8

West-urban: Chi-Square = 31.31 degrees of freedom = 6 significance = .0000

West-rural: Chi-Square = 7.49 degrees of freedom = 6 significance = .2779

East-urban: Chi-Square = 30.08 degrees of freedom = 6 significance = .0000

East-rural: Chi-Square = 22.49 degrees of freedom = 6 significance = .0008

Table.A.12. Regional Urban-Rural Differences in the Relation Between Number of Living Children and Husband's Dominance in Decision-Making
(%)

Number of decisions taken by the husband alone	Families with number of living Children with:							
	West/urban		West/rural		East/urban		East/rural	
	≤3	≥4	≤3	≥4	≤3	≥4	≤3	≥4
None	91.4	8.6	63.2	36.8	78.6	21.4	87.5	12.5
1	91.1	8.9	92.9	7.1	78.6	21.4	47.1	52.9
2	92.7	7.3	76.7	23.3	60.0	40.0	71.4	28.6
3	90.7	9.3	87.0	13.0	82.8	17.2	42.4	57.6
4	84.0	16.0	79.1	20.9	44.0	55.6	52.5	47.5
5	83.3	16.7	56.7	43.3	50.0	50.0	29.4	70.6
6	72.7	27.3	56.0	44.0	34.8	65.2	32.1	67.9
7	77.8	22.2	65.2	34.8	38.9	61.1	30.6	69.4

West-urban: Chi-Square = 14.63 degrees of freedom = 7 significance = .0410

West-rural: Chi-Square = 20.94 degrees of freedom = 7 significance = .0039

East-urban: Chi-Square = 21.82 degrees of freedom = 7 significance = .0027

East-rural: Chi-Square = 18.87 degrees of freedom = 7 significance = .0086