UNDERSTANDING SOCIALIST AND
PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM
The impossible past and possible future of
emancipation on a world scale

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Abstract: The old heroic socialist and proletarian internationalism is dead, having been recently replaced by the pluralistic and multi-faceted internationalism of the new social movements. Attempts by leftist writers to come to terms with this process have proven unsatisfactory. Examination of the history of socialist and proletarian internationalism shows it to have been a more complex and richer phenomenon than socialist myth or contemporary analysis suggests. It also reveals that its decline was due to neither prematurity, mistakes or betrayals, but to the nature of the working class itself. There is, nonetheless, much to be learned from both the strengths and shortcomings of traditional proletarian and socialist internationalism. Classical internationalist theory, of Marx and Engels, was also responsible for the failure, saddling an ill-equipped working class with the central role in international emancipation. What they, however, both predicted and implied about the overcoming of alienation on a world scale, also speaks relevantly to both the new social movements and to the labour and socialist one. A new labour internationalism is already developing, implicitly learning from, and relating to, the internationalism of the new social movements. Socialists have not, in general, been able to come to terms with the new realities and the meaning of a specific socialist contribution to a new internationalism has yet to be spelled out.

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1. Introduction [1]

Socialist and proletarian internationalism seem to have had either a sad history or a bad press in recent decades. Possibly both. The Berlin Wall, Communism’s concrete answer to Churchill’s iron curtain, has finally crumbled. It tumbled down, however, not to the sound of the proletarian and socialist ‘Internationale’ but the bourgeois and democratic ‘Alle Menschen werden Bruder’ (anthem of an international of European liberal capitalist states). The proletarian internationalism of the presently-disappearing socialisms had, of course, nothing to do with either actually-existing proletarians or any meaningful socialism. As for international Social Democracy, its ideology and organisations have long functioned as the progressive wing of liberal democracy, and just as long ago traded in any universalistic, emancipatory or class orientation. It has opted instead for a utopian incrementalism that enables it, when talking of world development, to not so much imagine a world without multinational companies as to imply this already exists (Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 1990).

The purpose of this paper is primarily to settle accounts with classical socialist and proletarian internationalism. Such an account-settling is necessary if socialists are to give internationalism a contemporary meaning. And if such a contemporary meaning is going to have any appeal to proletarians. I have elsewhere argued that a ‘new internationalism’ is already taking forceful and significant shape out of the struggles of the new social movements (Waterman 1988b, 1989). These, however, initially expressed the interests and aspirations of democratic middle strata internationally. And neither the movements themselves nor their theoreticians seem to have much time for either the proletariat, socialism – even where they may have for internationalism.

I am going to here advance what may seem to be a paradoxical position. Standing on the ground of the new social movements and the new non-class and democratic internationalism, I will argue that it is possible to settle accounts with the ‘old internationalism’ but without writing off either the labour movement or socialism. Or, for that matter, I think, Marxism. Positively, I will suggest that there is coming into existence a new proletarian internationalism – one that is at least implicitly learning from the failure of the old internationalism and the relative success of the new. With socialist internationalism the matter is more complicated.
I will first (Part 2) consider recent left or socialist approaches to internationalism, classical or contemporary. I think that it will be shown that, even in the best of cases, the treatment is inadequate. In Parts 3 and 4, I will consider in turn classical labour internationalist practice and Marxist internationalist theory. As far as the first is concerned, I will argue that the decline was due to neither errors, distortions, nor to some prematurity of the project, but to the nature of the working class and its organisations. As far as the second is concerned, I will argue that it is possible to recuperate the more universal elements of Marxist internationalism (both ‘scientific’ and ‘utopian’) from those that were originally flawed, socio-geographically limited, or which are historically out-dated. The suggestion is that it is possible to liberate socialist internationalism from its 19th century chains. Since I have elsewhere argued at some length on the new internationalisms, I will devote Part 5 to some recent evidence and argument on the relationship of the proletariat and socialism to these. I will here try to make positive use of the texts criticised in Part 1, as well as my own position as developed throughout, to argue that there is a future for socialist and proletarian internationalism, in articulation with the presently dominant democratic cross-class ones. An extended bibliography covers literature relevant to the new internationalisms as well as the old.
2. Interpreting the old internationalism


Making playful use of the title of a pathbreaking work on nationalism (Anderson 1983), John Dunn (1985) writes on ‘Unimagined Community: The Deceptions of Socialist Internationalism’. Although he really only makes the one point, and makes it rather repetitively, Dunn forcefully presents an uncompleted theoretical task for socialists, both historical and contemporary. Of classical Marxism he says:

Neither in the German Ideology, where the main outlines of his conception of history were first set out, nor in the Communist Manifesto in which they were first offered to a substantial audience as the basis of the programme of immediate political action, nor indeed at any later point in his writings, did Marx offer much guidance on how exactly the proletarians of the world were in practice to unite to appropriate human productive forces on the world scale on which human production was already increasingly coming to be organised...– On the world scale, however, the idea of the collective appropriation of human productive powers by the vast exploited majority of the human population appears thus far to be entirely fanciful: a socialist or communist fantasy every bit as Utopian as the wildest flights of Fourier. (Dunn 1985:105)

Reflecting on the contemporary experience of the Communist world, Dunn notes the distortion and inequity of relations between richer and poorer Communist countries and regions within them, stating that

There is as yet no intellectually coherent socialist conception of how such distortions and inequities could in principle be avoided in the construction of individual socialist societies, still less in the construction of a credible socialist community of the world’s population as a whole [...] On these issues the debility of modern socialist thought is overwhelming. (114–5)
Dunn avoids facile conventional explanations for the failure - right or left. Thus he does not accept arguments in terms of Marxist wish-fulfilment, nor of the well-known 'obstacles' to internationalism represented by 1914 or Stalinism. The question in his mind is, rather, one of whether the Marxist aspiration is even conceivable. And conception seems for him the kernel of the problem. One would, he says, have to conceive the appropriate terms of economic exchange (115), political institutions unlike any previously existing (116), the overcoming of widespread and popular beliefs (e.g. the nationalism). None of this has been done and socialists thus remain baffled by issues which their 20th-century triumphs have forced on their attention. He concludes by stating that

unless this bafflement is dissipated intellectually, unless an intellectual solution is found for the puzzles which provoke it, the future of socialist or communist allegiance is certain to prove even more painful than its past in this century has been traumatic. (118)

One can only say 'amen' to all this. Dunn's critique would seem to apply, in all or in part, to at least the two following writers. But there are a number of reasons why one cannot satisfy oneself here with a simple amen. One is Dunn's failure to consider anything but the historical failures of socialist internationalism (1914, Stalinism, etc.) and not such relative successes as the campaign for the 8-hour day. The other is his failure to actually distinguish socialist and labour internationalism, and therefore to subsume the latter within the former. A third is that the conceptualisation he asks for is only of future internationalist arrangements, not of present international problems and internationalist strategies. The fourth, I suppose, is his failure to historically explain the theoretical failure he identifies. There is here an implication that if socialists had simply sat down and thought hard enough they might have come up with better answers. No doubt. But, since Dunn himself is apparently someone of the left who is actually paid to both sit down and think hard, and since he has nothing positive to offer, one is left with the distinct impression that, for him, socialist internationalism is not only unimagined but unimaginable.

Michael Lowy is a cosmopolitan (Central European Jewish origin, Brazilian birth and French residence) Trotskyist scholar and publicist with a particular interest in nationalism and internationalism (1988, 1989a,b). In his most recent contribution (1989b) his argument seems to consist of five basic elements (which I have drawn out of a rather confused and unstructured essay). These are: 1) The fundamental and, indeed, increasing truth of classical
Marxist doctrine on capitalist internationalisation and working-class internationalism; 2) Evidence for its popular appeal during certain historical periods as suggestive of its future potential; 3) An explanation of its lack of general success in terms of a) the mass appeal of nationalism and b) the shortcomings, errors or distortions of socialist theorists and leaders; 4) Hope for the future in terms of a growing internationalist culture worldwide; 5) A statement on the forces for, and nature of, socialist internationalism today. Let me deal with these in more detail.

1. **Fundamental truth.** Classical Marxism, according to Lowy, was internationalist for three reasons, all of which are of continuing contemporary relevance. These were (and therefore are): its identification with ‘an international historical subject (the proletariat)’ (214); for ethical reasons – ‘the universalist and humanist character of its values and aims (ibid.), and for material reasons:

   [P]roletarian internationalism draws its political force from **objective, concrete and material** conditions, already analysed by Marx in the **Manifesto**: the economic unification of the world by the capitalist system [...] As a matter of fact, far from being anachronistic, Marx’s analysis in the **Manifesto** is much more adequate in our times than in 1848... (215. Original stress)

2. **Mass appeal during certain periods.** Lowy makes only indirect reference to pre-1914 internationalism. But he mentions three other periods as evidence of the mass appeal of internationalism in the 20th century: the early years of the Communist International, the International Brigades in Spain, and the major wave of anti-imperialist, anti-war and anti-chauvinist youth protest movements in the 1960s.

3. **Lack of general success.** Lowy sees this primarily in terms of the failures of Marxists to understand or come to terms with nationalism. For Lowy, in the first place,

   Nationalism is...the choice of the nation as the primary, fundamental and most important social and political value, to which all others are – in one way or another– subordinated. (213–4. Original stress)

It is this to which ‘Marxist socialism is fundamentally opposed’ (214). But Marxism has not appreciated nationalism’s deep and complex roots. It is true, says Lowy, that nationalism is
a bourgeois ideology. But it is also one which expresses short-term interests of workers within concrete conditions of international capitalist competition; which appeals to irrational tendencies "similar in chauvinist nationalism, religious fanaticism, racism and fascism" (218); and which can have a progressive form in the struggles of oppressed nations. But it appears that Marxism has not only failed to understand nationalism. It has also erred in its assertions about the homogenising effects of capitalist growth and spread. And whilst Lenin was the Marxist who best understood the relationship of nationalism to internationalism, some of his formulations were mechanistic and dangerous, and he did not 'unfortunately' (219) hold to his own principles in invading Poland in 1920, and occupying Georgia in 1921. Stalin, finally, not only imposed on the national question a rigid and dogmatic ideological framework (213), he also "wasted the incredible capital of internationalist energy and commitment represented by the Comintern" (223).

4. A new internationalist culture in the making. Lowy seems to rest hope for the rebirth of socialist internationalism on the new internationalist movements or tendencies in Latin America and Europe. In Latin America he refers to a combination of the religious internationalism of Liberation Theology with that of the new Marxist left. And in Europe he refers to a combination of the remains of the old socialist internationalist tradition with pacifism, the ecological movement, anti-racism, feminism and Third-Worldism (225).

5. The social forces for, and nature of, socialist internationalism today. Lowy stresses that the force for internationalism today is not so much identity of conditions but the complementary of struggles:

To sum up: internationalism is not the expression of the identity in life-conditions of the exploited and oppressed of all countries, but of a dialectical relationship of complementarity between at least three very different kinds of struggles: the socialist labour movement in the advanced capitalist societies, the social and national liberation movement in the dependent (or colonial) capitalist countries, and the anti-bureaucratic movement for socialist democracy in the post-capitalist countries. (217)

And he sees no reason to deny
the possibility, in the future, of a new supra-national organisation of human society, a World Socialist Republic, which, unifying economically and politically the human species, would reduce the national essentially to its cultural dimension. The universal culture which would arise in such a framework would peacefully co-exist with the rich multiplicity of the national cultures.

(221)

If I give this argument more attention than the previous one it is not because I consider it more adequate or convincing but because of its Marxist theoretical pretensions, because of its apparently undogmatic character, and because it was published in a prominent socialist annual of the historical New Left, the Socialist Register. What strikes me primarily about Lowy's argument is its combination of Marxist-Leninist dogma, pragmatic concessions in the face of disastrous failures, and eclectic gestures in the direction of the new internationalisms.

Let me confine myself to a couple of points in reference to each of those identified above.

1. Even if one were to accept that international capitalism is today more Marxist than it was in 1848, and that the ethical arguments for internationalism remain the same, one would have to search with a laserlike Leninist lantern to find the international revolutionary proletarian subject today. Lowy, does not, in fact, provide us with any information at all about contemporary proletarians - excepting reasons for their persistent preference for short-term concrete nationalism over long-term theoretical internationalism.

2. The evidence for past mass proletarian internationalism offered by Lowy is confined to two movements. The first is support for the Comintern, an organisation which gave rigid, hierarchical, dogmatic institutional form to complex and cross-cutting divisions in the socialist movement internationally (a split which polarised the movement and marginalised all other tendencies - the Trotskyists amongst them). The second is international solidarity with Republican Spain, a movement which must surely be considered of a highly-problematic character given that both the Republic and the International Brigades were manipulated by a Soviet Union and Comintern Lowy himself recognises as having been Stalinised for a decade and more. As for the anti-war and anti-imperialist internationalism of the 1960s this could - despite the energetic efforts of some committed Leninists - be seen as much as the
forerunner of the new democratic non-class internationalisms as even the tail-end of the old socialist and proletarian one.

3. The Marxist-Leninist misunderstanding of nationalism is, surely, reproduced or even exaggerated by Lowy. He does not so much explain the phenomenon as simultaneously anathemise it and explain it away. Many of the criticisms he makes of nationalism – its totalising and prioritising claims, its irrational appeals, its class character – could be made of Marxism-Leninism (which certainly seems to have at least served a proto-or quasi-class, if not a capitalist one). In so far as ‘Marxist socialism is fundamentally opposed to nationalism’, indeed, might this not be part of the reason why the present score is something like Socialism 0: Nationalism 125? It is, finally, notable here that whilst Lowy spends pages defining nationalism, discussing interpretations of it, and pondering its ambiguities, he devotes little or none to defining, discussing or pondering any ambiguities of internationalism.

4. Lowy lauds the ‘new internationalist culture’ and asserts its affinity with socialism. But he does not consider the non-proletarian and – indeed – non-class character of the new internationalist movements that have created the new culture, nor why it is that they occupy the place of honour previously occupied by the proletariat and hegemonised by socialism. His treatment here could, indeed, be seen as an attempt at ideological imperialism – to incorporate the new internationalisms into the old one in a subordinate position. He certainly does not use the experience of the new internationalisms to reflect on the old, far less attempt to theorise from their experience – as is suggested by the next point.

5. Despite final gestures in the direction of the new internationalisms, the ‘complementary’ internationalist forces earlier identified by Lowy are but three, one only for First, Second and Third worlds, and each of a class or class-like nature. They are also each of a somewhat problematic character: his ‘socialist labour movement’ is actually more or less invisible in Lowy’s European place of residence, whilst it is clearly visible in his Latin-American place of birth (Alves 1990); the ‘social and national liberation movement’ is, perhaps, as marked today in the (ex-) Communist world as in the Third; the ‘anti-bureaucratic movement for socialist democracy in the post-capitalist countries’ is a pre-1989 phrase which appears risible, if not surreal, in the post-1989 era. As for Lowy’s ‘World Socialist Republic’, it surely springs from the same abstract universalism as did the Union of Socialist Council Republics (English translation of USSR). This was intended to do exactly what Lowy wants to do again, almost one century later. It is, of course, another unimagined community
and it seems as unlikely to appeal to French, Brazilian or Lithuanian proletarians as it would to pacifists, ecologists – and particularly feminists.

Eric Hobsbawm is a much respected British Marxist labour historian and a lifelong Communist. His position on labour internationalism is made clear in an introductory address to a historical conference on the topic held in Amsterdam in 1985 (Hobsbawm 1988). I make much use of that conference in Part 3. I also make much use of his contribution to it, particularly where it is concerned with the variety of forms and levels – and the ambiguities – of 19th century internationalism. I address myself here to certain crucial shortcomings (compare Waterman 1989). Hobsbawm, firstly, gives no real explanation for the decline of classical internationalism, except in terms of the rise of nationalism and the decline of internationalist socialist parties (14–15). This is an almost tautological position, and one that begs many questions about classical internationalist doctrine. He shows little or no awareness of contemporary internationalism, and he offers even less perspective for the future. What Hobsbawm has to say about internationalism today is little more that that it has been undermined by racism nationally and that it is difficult for nationally-organised trade unions to fight internationally-organised multinationals (8). One asks, again, why this is so, if the original doctrine was not in error. For the future, Hobsbawm offers no perspective other than raising again the flag of internationalism ‘even today when the storms of history threaten to tear it to tatters’ (12).

Given the multi-faceted and energetic growth of the new internationalisms over the last one or two decades, and given the recent but no less varied and energetic development of new kinds of labour internationalism during the same period (Waterman 1984,1988a), this tragic and somewhat literary metaphor is surely either out of place or out of date. So, surely, is the single example Hobsbawm offers for a reviving labour internationalism. This is the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. The passage from which the above quotation is taken runs more fully as follows:

[T]he flag of internationalism in labour movements must be held high, even today when the storms of history threaten to tear it to tatters. That is why movements like the African National Congress in South Africa deserve our admiration as well as our support: for against racist white rulers and racist or tribalist black rebels, it has won the leadership of the oppressed African people on the basis of a platform of non-racialism: of equality of African and Indian,
coloured and white in a free South Africa. In this internationalism there lies the only hope, small and faint though it is, for the future. (16)

Hobsbawm seems to have singled out the ANC as a symbol of internationalism not because of its internationalist activities but because of its national anti-racism and because of the international support it has inspired or received. But, whilst internationalism and anti-racism are theoretically and politically related, no connection is even suggested in this case. The ANC's own actions, declarations or silences on international issues (Afghanistan, Poland, the Horn of Africa) can be taken as internationalist only in a most problematic or partisan definition of the term. Whilst, secondly, international support for the ANC may tell us something about the internationalism of the donors, it tell us nothing about that of the recipient. It is curious, thirdly, that Hobsbawm rests his 'small and faint' hope for the future of labour internationalism on the ANC, which is not itself a labour organisation, but a cross-class, radical anti-racist and nationalist one. There is a rich and complex history of relations between workers and unions inside and outside South Africa, of which Hobsbawm appears to be ignorant. It seems likely, in sum, that we can obtain more benefit from Hobsbawm the historian than from Hobsbawm the theorist or contemporary analyst. It is Hobsbawm the historian who reminds us that a mass labour movement with an internationalist ideology could never have been created had not the ideology expressed something in workers' experiences of their class situation. And who urges the value of investigating the 'positive appeal of working-class operational internationalism' (9). One can easily go along with this, extending 'experiences' to 'aspirations' and addressing such investigation to contemporary workers - something no one, to my knowledge, has yet seriously done.

I know, unfortunately, nothing about Fernando Mires except that he appears to be a Latin American intellectual of the left. Mires' piece (1989) is entitled 'The Crisis of Internationalism'. Whilst addressing itself primarily to the recent history of 'Thirdworldist Internationalism', it places this within a more general history of the phenomenon. Mires offers a left critique of internationalism as a whole and proposes it be replaced by something more appropriate to our times. I find this position excessively radical and not necessary to what appears to be his purpose. The radicalism is due, perhaps, to Mires' treatment of internationalism in terms of 'discourse'. Whilst such an approach is original, powerful and suggestive, it ignores the political history of, for example, 19th century labour and socialist internationalism - something that was much more complex than the discourse that inspired
it or that it possibly itself produced. But let us consider his argument before returning to this matter again. I identify here several elements.

1. The meaning of internationalism. Internationalism, for Mires, means in the first instance

relations established between movements and parties of different nations, in function of commonly recognised historical objectives. In this sense...internationalism cannot be separated from...a universalist and ultimate vision of history, in accordance with which events and processes that occur in different countries are adjusted to the logic of a common history that transcends them both in time and space. In this manner, in each version of internationalist discourse, it is possible to recognise two planes: one is the plane of realisation of the historical event (which is nearly always national); the other is the plane of its universal transcendence (which is nearly always international). The mission of each internationalist is, thus, to deal with, try to understand and launch each national historical event to the level of its international transcendence. (17.

Original stress)

Internationalism, for Mires, is, secondly, not so much a closed ideology as a discourse:

that is, an articulation of objects that are constituted in successive stages by means of the overlapping of different layers continually added to each other in the process of its construction. (17)

The combination of the first element with the second means that the history of internationalism consists of various processes of adjustment, concerned with bringing about a coincidence between what has historically occurred and what is supposed to have been its universal transcendence.

2. Determinism, utopianism and totalisation. Mires further criticises internationalism for the practice of either ignoring all international contradictions but one, or of subordinating them to one ‘totalising antagonism’ (20) (such as proletarians/capitalists, socialist world/capitalist world, Third World/First World, nationalism/imperialism).
3. Types of internationalism and their crises. There are, for Mires, three successive types or phases of internationalism, each of which has undergone its own crisis. The first was 'Proletarian Internationalism' – which already in Marx's lifetime had difficulty finding more than a marginal and declining place for peoples 'without history'. But such problems were minor compared with those which followed the Russian Revolution. In order to fit national Russian realities into a universal history, Lenin proposed that Russia represented the 'weak link' in the capitalist chain, Trotsky that its revolution was a result of the 'uneven and combined development' of capitalism and, finally, Stalin the notion of 'socialism in one country' (18). In the light of this history, Stalin's adjustment

was in no sense a 'betrayal' of the discourse of proletarian internationalism but rather a supreme effort at its continuation under conditions in which its realisation was impossible. (ibid. Original stress)

Whilst, in the first period, it was necessary to adjust historical occurrences to a class logic, it was now necessary to adjust them to a geopolitical one. If socialist internationalism became, under Stalin, a 'Bloc Internationalism', the 'Thirdworldist Internationalism' of Mao and Castro was

not only...a reaction to the internationalism of blocs but...also a variant...consistent with its logic, the 'fundamental contradiction' having to be found in the differentiation between geo-political entities in which the notion of class – so central to the discourse of proletarian internationalism – occupied no more than a rhetorical place. (18)

4. Beyond internationalism. Mires argues that the present crisis of this latest type inevitably represents one also for internationalism as a whole. He hopes that this crisis may create the possibility for raising anti-imperialist positions in the Third World on the basis of concrete and felt antagonisms, rather than the reverse. He further hopes that the crisis of internationalism

in all its varieties, may open up possibilities for the rise of forms of international cooperation free of determinist utopias and based not only on respect for similarities, which is very easy, but...on respect for differences, which is much more difficult. (20)
This international cooperation could not, for Mires, be a new internationalism because

A terrain populated with multiple antagonisms, which additionally reproduce themselves incessantly, is not at all the most appropriate for the discovery of a common denominator which can interpret them to everyone — and simultaneously — as is the case for the internationalisms. The absence of a totalising antagonism does not, however, deny the existence of concrete forms of international cooperation between movements and social initiatives, which will discover common objectives underway. On the contrary, it is here being suggested that such cooperation will be more productive in the long run than any internationalism. (ibid)

In the process of creation, development and reproduction of the multiple antagonisms referred to, it will, in any case

always be possible to make signs of identity or simply gestures of sympathy and connection, initially indirect, which could, via a more intensive exchange of experiences, be raised to the level of international coordination. (ibid)

I implied, in introducing Mires, that discourse analysis was a powerful but inadequate tool for the analysis of internationalism. It seems to me that its evident power lies in its capacity to analyse internationalism as discourse (theory, ideology). The critique would seem, for example, to hit Lowy where it hurts. I think that it gets Marx in exposed places also. It seems to me, however, that internationalist theory/ideology need not necessarily be determinist and reductionist, even if it may have to be utopian (in the sense of proposing a new kind of humane world order that does not yet exist). The determinism, reductionism and totalising nature of Marxist internationalism are due to the gaps that have existed between utopian longings and social-scientific abilities, between mass rebelliousness and mass capacities, between intellectuals with international experience and vision, and masses rooted on national ground. All these limitations are in question today.

Mires takes the existence of multiple antagonisms, locally, nationally and internationally to mean that we can establish no single international identity such as is proposed by internationalist discourse. I would agree in so far as the identity proposed is simple,
exclusive, prioritised, opposed to an equally simple opponent or problem (proletariat/capital, socialism/capitalism), and futuristic (a World Socialist Republic). But not in so far as the identity implies a common recognition of – or search for – relations between the multiple antagonisms; of the increasingly global nature of local or national problems; of the struggle against alienation as worldwide and universal (i.e. not only or primarily for the Dutch, the males, the whites, the workers). And not in so far as one is seeking, precisely, for principles and procedures for the settling of differences between people and peoples in a democratic, tolerant and creative manner. It may not be without significance that Mires' alternative to 'internationalism' is 'international cooperation', and that this merely conventional and descriptive term is presented after he has argued that the Gorbachev phenomenon (such as it then was), opened up the way for the development of varied democratic movements in all three world areas (19). Mires' 'international cooperation' and 'coordination' are consistent with Gorbachev's view of 'universal problems of mankind' (Gorbachev 1987). Neither seems to recognise or prioritise major causes or sources of these problems (transnational companies? major capitalist powers or blocs? doctrines of national sovereignty?). Neither tells us much about how the people and peoples affected could themselves escape from the multiplicity of international antagonisms into which they are presently locked.

As I also said in introducing Mires, he does not look at internationalist history – which cannot be reduced (deterministically?) to a discourse, or even three successive variations on such. As we will see below, both the theory and practice of classical internationalism were complex and contradictory phenomena. I will argue that they articulated at least three traditions of action and reflection – religious universalism, bourgeois cosmopolitanism and proletarian internationalism. It was the attempt to purge classical labour internationalism of the 'foreign' elements which led to a doctrine and activity that would have been unrecognisable and repugnant to Marx – however limited and restrictive his own understanding might have been. Mires tends to reflect, with a magnifying mirror, rather than to penetrate this impoverished phenomenon.

Let us now see if it is possible to take a more comprehensive or fruitful approach. This cannot be a synthesis of the existing ones, since none of them (with the possible partial exception of Mires) is looking back at the old internationalism on the basis of the experience and theoretical insights engendered by the new ones. It is this that I attempt to. But such a position does not require me to write off the previous contributions. Even the contribution of Lowy should be recognised as an attempt to bring the old and the new internationalisms within a common framework. So my own effort below will also attempt to make use of Dunn, Hobsbawm and Mires, and to do more successfully what Lowy has tried to do.
3. History: the dramatic rise and strange decline of proletarian internationalism

2.1. From proletariat to internationalism

There was in the industrialising world of the 19th and early-20th centuries an intimate relationship between, on the one hand, proletarian status, working-class struggle, the labour movement and socialist ideology and, on the other, internationalist identity, organisation and action. This intimate relationship lay, however, in a unique combination of circumstances. The first was the creation of national and international labour markets, with truly massive national and international labour migrations, the labourers experiencing capital as disruptive, destructive and foreign - if not specifically international. The second was that the formation of working-class communities often preceded the consolidation or enforcement of national languages or cultures, with workers thus often unidentified with the 'nation' of their rulers. The third was the denial to workers of citizen rights, thus excluding them from the polity. A fourth was the non- or anti-communalism essential for labour if, in the absence of state regulation, workers were to establish any defence against labour-market competition. A fifth was the existence of a stratum of largely self-educated and skilled artisans, with their own culture and intellectuals, open to democratic and socialist ideas of national or foreign origin. Two final points. Unlike the typical political organisations and aims of the industrial or petty-bourgeoisie, the labour movement was originally conceived of as international in structure and internationalist in aim. And whilst the industrial and petty-bourgeoisie was primarily occupied with nation- or state-building, the labour movement was more concerned with social transformation. (Guerena 1988, Hobsbawm 1988, Johnson 1979, Logue 1980, Torr 1956).

A notable expression of this artisan experience, situation and consciousness can be found in an 1863 letter by a group of British trade unionists to their French opposite numbers (Beehive, December 5, 1863):

As a means to check the existing abuse of power, we echo your call for a fraternity of peoples. Let there be a gathering together of representatives from...all countries, where there exists a will, to cooperate for the good of mankind. Let us...discuss the great questions, on which the peace of nations depends...This would clear the way for honourable men with comprehensive
minds to come forth and legislate for the rights of the many, and not the privileges of the few.

A fraternity of peoples is highly necessary for the cause of labour, for we find that when ever we attempt to better our social conditions by reducing the hours of toil, or by raising the price of labour, our employers threaten us with bringing over Frenchmen, Germans, Belgians and other [sic] to do our work at a reduced rate of wages; and we are sorry to say that this has been done not from any desire of our continental brethren to injure us, but through a want of regular and systematic communication between the industrious classes of all countries, which we hope to see speedily effected, as our principle is to bring up the wages of the ill-paid to as near a level as possible with that of those who are better remunerated, and not allow our employers to play us off one against the other, and so drag us down to the lowest possible condition, suitable to their avaricious bargaining.

To do these things is the work of the peoples. The few liberties held by the masses were won by themselves, and recent experience has shown that, the more we trust to princes and potentates, the surer we are of being betrayed and sneered at. (Cited Rjazanov 1928:171-3. Emphases mine – PW)

This document is all the more significant for having been produced by a group of non-socialist and non-industrial worker unionists, including a painter, joiner, bookbinder, carpenter and shoemaker. And for preceding the creation of the International Working Men’s Association, better known today as the First International. The letter followed an international conference which had supported the Polish uprising against Russian rule and was itself followed by a massive worker turnout when the Red Republican Italian, Garibaldi, visited London (Collins and Abramsky 1965:Chs.2-3).

The force for such internationalism represented a quite specific combination. First we should mention the skilled urban artisans who had behind them a tradition of compagnonage – this including the practice of foreign travel and work as part of craft apprenticeship. Whilst the British artisans, such as those responsible for the letter above, may not have had this experience, they may have been more acutely conscious than their continental brethren (sistren were disregarded) of the onslaught of industrial capital and the internationalisation of
the labour market. It was this stratum of the working class that provided the base for local, national and international labour organisations. Secondly, we must mention the labour organisers, many of whom were involved in continental migration or re-migration. Consider two leaders of the late-19th century New Unionism of un- and semi-skilled labour in Britain, Tom Mann and Ben Tillet. The first migrated temporarily to the United States, South Africa and Australia. The second seems to have considered the organisation of transport workers in Antwerp or Rotterdam as a simple extension of his work in London. As for the socialist politicians/theoreticians, it is possible to identify both those like Rosa Luxembourg, simultaneously or consecutively involved in the Polish, Russian and German movements, and those who became leaders of a foreign movement, like Anna Kuliscioff in Italy (Hobsbawm 1988:12). The most famous cases are, of course, Marx and Engels, the theorists of socialist internationalism. It seems possible that it was their shared experience of international capitalism and state repression that enabled people with such different backgrounds or places within the labour and socialist movement to produce together classical labour internationalism. If we consider the itinerary of the anarchist Emma Goldman, we will see not only her successive exiles or migrations but her combined or successive movement roles as worker, organiser, political strategist and literary figure. This combination, in one person or one lifetime of geographical mobility and multiple social roles was not unique in the 19th century socialist movement and must have facilitated the articulation of proletarian and socialist internationalism. (Golding 1964, Goldman 1977, Hobsbawm 1988, v.d. Linden 1988a,b,c, Logue 1980, Torr 1956).

2.2 Types of labour and socialist internationalism

Even if we can for some purposes assume that labour internationalism involves one actor with one purpose, a closer examination identifies the variety of both. The multiple aspects of labour existence, its multiple needs and aspirations under the above-mentioned conditions, were increasingly given institutional form at international as well as local or national level. The First International (1864–72/6) was an all-purpose organisation of varied membership. It dealt with both industrial and political issues. It played an important role in the strike wave of that period – possibly at the cost of its other activities and aspirations.

Later, the working class as wage-labour was separately organised internationally [3]. In the decades following 1890 there was an astounding growth of international trade-union organisations and activities. The campaign for the eight-hour day was launched by the first
conference of what is now called the Second International. The first Maydays were truly mass, international and internationalist events. The period saw widespread victories in the struggle for limitations in working hours, the right to organise and to strike. And these victories went way beyond the industrialised capitalist countries. (Dutt 1964, Foner 1986, Sulmont 1988, Knudsen 1988).

Labour as a political force was increasingly organised by internationally-inspired or coordinated parties (Devreese 1988, Claudin 1970, Dutt 1964, Frank 1979).

Workers as consumers, and sometimes as producers, were independently organised in the International Cooperative Alliance. Cooperative internationalism was in the late-19th century more highly and intensively developed than that of the unions, and it involved working-class women and children as well as men. It not only attempted to set up international cooperative trading institutions but was prepared to discuss questions of peace and war and to support the Russian Revolution (Gurney 1988).

Socialist women were brought together in international conferences initiated by Clara Zetkin. Her paper, Die Gleichheit (Equality), was its organ. That such activities had their own independent base and autonomy is suggested by the efforts of the German Social-Democratic Party to abolish them (Mies 1983:144).

We can even see the creation of a specific international working-class culture, beginning with songs and the celebration of Mayday and reaching its most structured forms within the Socialist and Communist Internationals of the interwar period. There were international worker organisations for sport, theatre, youth, students, film, photo, nature-lovers, tourism and even Esperanto (Bouvier 1988, Guerena 1988, Jemnitz 1985, Jones 1988, Kramer 1988, Mattelart and Siegelaub 1983:153–64, 176–82, Samuel, MacColl and Cosgrove 1985, Steinberg 1988).

Finally, there were the international links of the theoreticians, represented in the late 19th century by the German Marxist journal Die Neue Zeit (New Times). Despite its limitation to the German language, this was intended to be an international Marxist journal and it attracted contributions from leading Marxists in France, Britain and elsewhere (Haupt 1986, Institut fur Marxismus–Leninismus 1986:86).
2.3. The different levels of internationalist activity

In understanding classical internationalism it is necessary to distinguish at least between the internationalism of the class, the national organisers and the theorists. Some idea of the range of attitudes between levels within the labour movement can be gained from consideration of European mineworkers. It is a far from 'senseless question' (Hobsbawm 1988:13) to inquire into the internationalism of, for example, the Welsh miners who both followed revolutionary syndicalist leaders and also poured into the army as volunteers in 1914 [and then] brought their coalfield out in a solid strike in 1915, deaf to the accusation that they were being unpatriotic in doing so. (11)

In the first place, it might have been different miners who did these things. But even if we assume it was not, it is important to understand the social base on which there arose mineworker union internationalism and the socialist internationalism of the ex-miner Member of Parliament, Kier Hardie. Workers in an industry early involved in the international commodity and labour markets, miners were also commonly isolated in communities which kept them not only from the factory working class and urban centres of national and international politics, but even from each other. If not a 'corporatist internationalism' (Michel 1988), theirs was certainly a sectional one, that combined a comparatively high level of international organisation and action with low levels of integration into national miners' and general labour movements. We can better understand why the anti-war Keir Hardie was nearly lynched in his Welsh mining constituency if we 1) record the hostility of Lanarkshire miners to Irish and Polish labourers then if we 2) note the peaceful absorption of English-speakers into Welsh pits. It would seem possible that, in traditional labour and socialist internationalism, attachment to the principle increases as we move away from the class basis. Internationalism would seem to have been most firmly adhered to by certain socialist organisers and theorists, attempting to graft the universalism, cosmopolitanism and democratic internationalism of European radical tradition onto the more locally-rooted discontents of the working class. (Herrmann 1988, Hobsbawm 1988, Michel 1988, Nairn 1980, Peterson 1988).
2.4. Relationship to non-labour internationalism

Classical proletarian and socialist internationalism relates to religious universalism, bourgeois cosmopolitanism and democratic internationalism in complex ways (Waterman 1988b).

The ancient desire for universal peace and community, made religious doctrine and moral imperative by Christianity, finds significant echoes within labour internationalism. That the British Independent Labour Party resisted the war hysteria of 1914, whilst most of the more-Marxist continental parties did not, is largely explained by such influences (Young 1986:194–7).

Bourgeois cosmopolitanism is closely linked with classical political-economic doctrines on the mutual dependence, the civilising and homogenising effects, of the international division of labour, industrialisation and trade. This tradition can be clearly identified within proletarian and socialist internationalism, including the Marxist version. Bourgeois cosmopolitanism, at least in its liberal free-trade version, was itself, however, an ambiguous doctrine. Given its own articulation with republican-democratic internationalism and Christian universalism, it was capable of winning the support of British textile workers for a self-sacrificing boycott of slave-produced cotton during the American Civil War (evidently easier for workers when they have little to lose but their chains). But the eurocentric, evolutionist and technological-determinist elements of bourgeois cosmopolitanism also influenced socialist internationalism, and certainly undermined anti-war and anti-colonial activity within the labour movements. (Claeys 1988, Harrison 1957, 1965, Kaarsholm 1988, Mergner 1988, Saville 1988, Tichelman 1988).

Republican or democratic internationalism, aimed at oppression rather than exploitation and based on national rather than class movements, finds its expression within the worker declaration cited earlier, as well as in such major labour-based protests as the 1850 London brewery workers' attacks on the 'Butcher of Budapest' and in the 1864 welcome for Garibaldi. In this declaration of the significantly named (and short-lived) Democratic Friends of all Nations in 1844, the address is clearly to the oppressed, not to the exploited:

The Democratic Friends of all Nations being deeply impressed with the importance of cultivating a brotherly feeling among the people of all countries,
and of advancing their social and political rights, conceive that those desirable objects would be promoted if a few democratic friends belonging to different nations could be brought together monthly, for the purpose of friendly conversation; for reading such newspapers of different countries as may be desirable; for affording some assistance to such political offenders as may be driven from their country for advancing the cause of human liberty: as well as for calling public meetings, from time to time, for hearing the democratic opinions of different countries; and for adopting all legal means to create a public opinion in favour of the great principle of human brotherhood. (Cited Lattek 1988:271)

This organisation consisted primarily of socialists and it was clearly a forerunner of later labour, socialist and Marxist internationalism. It could also be seen as a forerunner of what today is called the human-rights movement. (Claeys 1988, Dutt 1964:42, Kramer 1988).

2.5. Relationship to proletarian nationalism

We must here concentrate on the relationship between the internationalism and nationalism of proletarians, rather than that of their unions, parties and theoreticians (for which see Jenkins and Minnerup 1984, Munck 1986, Nairn 1975, 1979, 1980, Vogler 1985). We have already earlier noted that mineworkers could move between, or combine, contradictory identifications. The problem is that working-class and national identity were developing simultaneously in the 19th century, that workers could choose these (or other ethnic and religious) identities according to circumstances, and that

working-class consciousness, however inevitable and essential is probably politically secondary to other kinds of consciousness. As we know, where it has come into conflict in our century with national, or religious, or racial consciousness, it has usually yielded and retreated. (Hobsbawm 1984:59)

In so far as this is so, and in so far as labour organisers and socialist theorists did not recognise the fact, this itself helps us to understand the failure of traditional internationalism.
2.6. The limitations and decline of proletarian internationalism

In so far as we are able to specify the situation, forces and features of traditional labour internationalism, it should also be possible to specify on its decline. Some suggestions may have already been made but these need to be spelled out. One way of so doing might be to reconsider some of the previously mentioned conditions, types and relations of proletarian internationalism.

1. Firstly, then, the conditions. The widening and deepening of capitalist internationalisation increased competition between, and consequent insecurity, amongst, proletarians from a European or industrialised-world scale to a truly global one. It simultaneously increased 'statification' – the national and international formalisation/hierarchisation of social relationships – also those amongst and between workers. This was accompanied by the consolidation of national cultures (compulsory education in a dominant language, dialect or accent) and the inclusion of the masses within the polity (Social-Democratic labour parties, Communist vanguard proletarian parties, populist people's parties). As inter-state and inter-bloc relations were militarised on an ever-more apocalyptic scale, the nature of modern warfare (both military and ideological) required increasing mass involvement with military-patriotic symbols and rituals. It also required concession of both political rights and social welfare to the working classes. The state, which even before industrialisation had been appealed to for protection against the market, was increasingly appealed to by labour movements for protection against international capital – now customarily perceived in terms of the capital of 'foreign' nations, nationals, or even nationalities. Ethnic or religious differences between workers nationally and internationally were now codified and enforced by the law, police and army. Labour movements, whether in their Social-Democratic, Communist or populist emanations, were increasingly involved in nation and state building. (Connell 1984, Hobsbawn 1982, 1988, Johnson 1979, Mann 1987, Vogler 1985).

2. Secondly, the forces. Such class or functional differences and levels as we have already identified within the labour movement, became formalised, with institutional status, employment situation, income level and life-chances differentiating intellectuals (increasingly professionals and academics), organisers (increasingly fulltime union or party officials) and the rank-and-file. This process also increasingly formalised the different interests in internationalism. The socialist intellectuals gained unprecedented international access and contact, the interested labour organisers could satisfy themselves with both the institutionalised
internationalism of parties and unions, and with those multifarious inter-state organisations – like the International Labour Organisation (ILO) or European Parliament – through which they could, and still evidently can, pursue their own interests. At the international level we can see the transformation of leaders with a popular national and international following into anonymous functionaries of international bureaucracies. We must also consider whether the changing nature of the labour process, the consequently changing composition of the working class, and the domination of the trade-union movement by unions of semi- or unskilled factory and public-sector workers was not of significance in the decline of proletarian internationalism. (Haupt 1986).

3. Thirdly, the types of internationalism. These require some detailing.

**Party internationalism** increasingly reproduced the model of diplomatic inter-state relations, with struggles for domination between parties and conflicts over national representation and sovereignty, reaching its apotheosis in a Comintern subordinated to Soviet state interests. The ideological split, principally between the Communist and Socialist Internationals, not only anathemised (as ‘reformist’ or ‘totalitarian’) major mass organisations and their followers within certain countries. It also increasingly coincided with inter-state and inter-bloc conflict, the internationals being largely identified with either of two ideological entities – the ‘socialist world’ or the ‘free world’. Particular international organisations, distanced as they already were from the members of their members, were now isolated from the experiences of actually existing proletarians in whole quarters, thirds or halves of the world.

**Trade-union internationalism** had always combined elements of national protectionism with those of international solidarity. And union internationalism must be seen historically as an instrument for the establishment of both national union movements and national union demands. 19th century internationalism was, thus, largely a ‘nationalist internationalism’. Just as it led to incorporation within the nation-state, so did the international demands eventually lead to incorporation within such inter-state organisations as the ILO. The desire of the Mineworkers International Federation (MIF) for an internationally-planned coal market led it, shortly after its foundation, to support the project of a Belgian mineowner for an International Ministry of Mining. When the British miners went on strike in 1925, the members of the MIF donated considerable sums of money, but industrial solidarity action foundered on the rocks of bureaucracy, nationalism and ideological division. (Herrmann 1988, Michel
1988). As for international solidarity with the British miners’ strike 60 years later, in 1984–5, this revealed that same complex articulation of the old and the new as the strike itself [4].

The cooperative strategy of gradually extending consumer power nationally and internationally was one which was not integrated with other forms of labour organisation and struggle. The movement was also incapable of confronting an increasingly monopolised world trading system, or the forces of revolution, counter-revolution and war (Gurney 1988).

As for the cultural internationalism of the labour movement (sport, nature, literature, tourism, youth, etc.), whilst it might be true that it was both wider in implication and deeper in impact than the political variety, it could not escape the politicalisation and statification process. The remarkable worker cultural movement of the inter-war years was largely a Communist cultural movement and by that token simultaneously sectarian, workerist, elitist and statist. What in the Netherlands had been an allegedly internationalist Association for Popular Culture had by 1931 transformed itself into an unambiguous Association of Friends of the Soviet Union. (Jones 1988, Kramer 1988, Mattelart and Siegelaub 1983:153–64, 176–82, Waterman 1990a).

Finally, the internationalist ‘theoretical practice’ of socialist parties. Here it would be necessary to trace the line of descent (in more senses than one) from the Neue Zeit at the beginning to the more contemporary Social–Democratic Socialist Affairs and the Communist World Marxist Review. Suffice it to say that the latter are the last places that any theoretically-minded socialist would look for any original thought or important debate, indeed for anything other than official declarations and partisan analyses. The one contemporary exception to the decline might seem to have been Socialism in the World, published in Yugoslavia from 1977. But, despite its apparently non-sectarian contributions and the importance of its themes, this journal related to no movement and was little known even among independent Marxists internationally. Moreover, it was in fact a state/party–subsidised substitute for the internationally reputed Marxist–Humanist journal Praxis, which the Yugoslav state was attempting to destroy at that time. (Conversation with Mihailo Markovic, October 1990). The decline of the state/party in Yugoslavia has also meant an end to this magazine.

4. Fourthly, the relationship to nationalism. The failure of the labour and socialist movement to understand the specificity and autonomy of the national and popular, and its tendency to reduce national to class interest, has been sufficiently demonstrated and critic–
ised. The left, like the liberals, also failed to understand modern militarism and its mass appeals, dealing with it simply as primitive and irrational rather than examining its contemporary bases and effects. It is these failures that led to the combination of high internationalist principle with low nationalist action, to either sectarian or opportunist policy swings as particular nationalisms and militarisms were judged to serve the class struggle of the national or international proletariat. It is one of history’s more bitter ironies that the most ambitious attempt to systematise and even codify a principled internationalism, in the Comintern, led to the most extreme and far-reaching subordination to nation-statism in the history of the labour movement. (Claudin 1970, Jenkins and Minnerup 1984, Mann 1983, 1987:40, Munck 1986).

5. Fifthly, relationship to non-proletarian internationalism. Given the Promethean characteristics accorded the proletariat either by the proletarian activists or by their socialist leaders/theorists, given the combination of scientific vanguard role and prophetic power that the socialists granted themselves, it is evident that they could allow religious universalism, bourgeois cosmopolitanism and radical-democratic internationalism only a historical place as predecessors, or an ideological existence as, perhaps, opiates of the peoples. The result, on the Communist side, was the creation of that complete set of party-controlled international organisations mentioned above. Whilst these movements sometimes played a pioneering role (Young 1986:198), their relationship to the other tendencies was at best diplomatic and at worst cruelly instrumental. On the Social-Democratic side, whilst there was some attempt at matching the Communists one for one, the problem was rather that of a merging with or subordination to bourgeois cosmopolitanism. At the apogee here is surely the proposal of Karl Renner, previously a leading Austro-Marxist, later President of Austria, to conceive the new United Nations in 1946 as the Fourth International (Friedemann and Holscher 1982). Unsuccessful in the specific case (Trotskyists still struggle between themselves over the copyright), this project has been only too successful in intent. ‘Internationalism’ in the West today is far more associated in the public mind with the UN and its activities than with any labour or socialist organisation. Social-Democrats have actually made the running in North-South ‘internationalism’, but it is noteworthy that their various reform projects are subordinate to bourgeois theories, structures, values and practices. This is particularly in their acceptance of an inter-state frame of action and in their reference to First-World self-interest, usually conceived of in national terms. (Brandt and Manley 1985, Court 1990, Elson 1983, Evers 1982, EVS 1985, Michanek 1985, Seddon 1986, Waterman 1989c).
There are two possible ways of coming to terms with the process sketched above. One is to refer to the underdevelopment of capitalism, of the working class, of the labour movement and of Marxism, and therefore to predict a Second Coming of proletarian and socialist internationalism. The other is to suggest that the problem is rather one of a misunderstanding of the nature of proletarian internationalism, of a misinterpretation of its activities, of erroneous strategy, with the consequent necessity for a fundamental rethinking. Whilst the two types of response do not necessarily exclude each other, it is evident that they have radically different political implications. It will be clear that this analysis is leaning heavily toward the second type of explanation. It is now necessary to make clearer why.
4. Doctrines: the social theory and utopian ideology of internationalism

Here we will concentrate on simply two documents of Marx and Engels. This is, in the first place, because of their richness in content. It is, in the second place, because unlike the case of nationalism - there was little if any major development in either the theory or strategy of internationalism after these early statements. What we seem to rather get is - as we have seen - either up-dated reproduction, pragmatic adjustment or successive attenuation.

The two documents are complementary in a number of ways. The first is philosophi-
cal, the second political. The first deals with the global level, the second with that of the nation-state. The first deals with communism primarily as historical transformation and social movement, the latter with it as programme and organisation. The first could be seen as reflective and theoretical, the latter as persuasive and utopian. Although I am already 'comparing and contrasting', this is not with the intention of praising the 'theoretical' over the 'utopian' one. Both combine rational-analytical and utopian-prophetic elements - a combination essential to any emancipatory social theory. Whilst Marx and Marxism have an ambiguous attitude towards utopianism (Geoghegan 1987), contemporary libertarian socialism, feminism and ecological movements have refamiliarised socialists with the necessity of an appeal to emotion, desire, and imagination in challenging the myriad inhumanities, indignities and banalities to which we are accustomed. I find these documents amazing and moving, dated in significant ways, yet nonetheless capable of throwing light 150 years forward and therefore worthy of the critical attention not simply of contemporary socialist social scientists but all democratically-minded people. Before consigning this doctrine to some garbage bin of early-industrial history or totalitarian discourse, we should consider the possible connection between Marxist internationalism and the new social movements. In the words of Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1990:67):

Emancipatory projects of our time - the new social movements, feminism, the movements of oppressed peoples and minorities throughout the world - are generally not cast in the framework of rationalist ideology. Usually they oppose policies which are conceived and presented as utterly rational, that is, given certain values and priorities. In an environment that advertises itself as utterly rational, where official rhetoric tends to conform to the standard of rational discourse, appeals to rationality per se need not be particularly libera-
ting. This is not to say that the arguments of contemporary emancipatory movements are irrational, quite the contrary, but the discourse has shifted from rationality to values, and direct appeals are made to values: to equality, solidarity, democracy, human dignity, quality of life, peace.

3.1. Communism as international social movement

We have here a passage from the German Ideology of 1845–6 which, whilst of some length, is short enough and interesting enough to be quoted in full. It is followed by a commentary.

This ‘alienation’ (to use a term which will be comprehensible to the philosophers) can, of course, only be abolished given two practical premises. For it to become an ‘intolerable’ power, i.e. a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily have rendered the great mass of humanity ‘propertyless’, and produced, at the same time, the contradiction of an existing world of wealth and culture, both of which conditions presuppose a great increase in productive power, a high degree of its development. And, on the other hand, this development of productive forces (which itself implies the actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise because without it want is merely made general, and with destitution the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced; and furthermore, because with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the ‘propertyless’ mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones. Without this, 1) communism could only exist as a local event: 2) the forces of intercourse themselves could not have developed as universal, hence intolerable powers: they would have remained home-bred conditions surrounded by superstition; and 3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples ‘all at once’ and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with
communism. Moreover, the mass of propertyless workers – the utterly precarious position of labour-power on a mass scale cut off from capital or from even a limited satisfaction and, therefore, no longer merely temporarily deprived of work itself as a secure source of life – presupposes the world market through competition. The proletariat can thus only exist world-historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have a ‘world-historical’ existence. World-historical existence of individuals means, existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world history.

Commmunism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence. (Arthur 1970:56–7)

I identify six main elements within this passage. I intend to rearrange them for purposes of analysis. I think this can be done without violence to the argument.

1. The international nature of the conditions for overcoming alienation. The contradiction between the propertylessness of the ‘great mass of humanity’ and an ‘existing world of wealth and culture’ has been increasing since Marx’ time. This has, however, been not only, and certainly not simply, in the form of a contradiction between capital and proletariat. We are witness to processes of mass proletarianisation (deprival of means of production) without creation of a majority proletariat, of situations in which it is a privileged minority of the proletarianised that becomes – or remains – a permanent proletariat. We are witness to deepening contradictions between worlds of wealth and culture and those denied this, today both between and within ‘creditor’ and ‘debtor’ states (Burbach and Nunez 1988, Sklar 1990). We are cognisant of a continuing or even increasing coincidence of propertylessness with female or minority (ethnic, religious) status. So this truly international contradiction has been accompanied not with a growing homogenisation of the propertyless but a continuing heterogenisation and one that is repeatedly restructured.

For Marx, the development of these international contradictions required such an increase in productive power and wealth that their resolution would permit a surpassing of want, destitution and a struggle for necessities. The computer-based technical revolution now advancing in the industrialised capitalist world is capable of ensuring rising productivity and
full employment with a decrease in labour time (in these countries, from an average 1,600 to 1,000 hours per year in the next 15–20 years, according to Gorz 1989:228). Although this development opens up the potentiality for overcoming the 'old filthy business' we know, of course, that it is currently being used to further fragment (industrially/occupationally), segment (by nationality, gender, ethnicity, religion) and stratify the propertyless.

For Marx, it was the above process that would ensure two crucial conditions, the 'empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local being' and the making of 'each nation dependent upon the revolutions of the others'. On the one hand, the absence of the earlier-mentioned requirements explains why the latter conditions have not yet come about. On the other hand, we can empirically identify the growth of these two processes. Increasing numbers of movements demonstrate mass awareness of global community (Hegedus 1990). And we cannot but note the increasing demonstration effect of national revolutions or uprisings, student protest movements, or even social reform waves.

2. The proletariat and communism as only existing internationally. That what we have so far witnessed are increasingly national proletariats and increasingly national communisms is accepted by more and more Marxists. There is, however, the temptation to escape from this leaden empirical contingency to the nebulous freedom of theory: the proletariat and communism do not yet fully exist because they have forgotten or never learned what Marx pronounced, but one day they will. Since neither historical nor contemporary social analysis reveals much evidence for such an assertion, we are left dependent on faith in an existing doctrine and ultimate authority — something orthodox Marxists reject in all other cases. I propose a radical solution: that we take Marx' position here as figurative rather than literal. It is clear why he attached his aspiration for the end of human alienation to the proletariat — the new, modern, mass, international class of the exploited and oppressed. I propose we should here take 'proletariat' as a metaphor for all the alienated, all those denied under capitalism their past rights, their present capacities, their future potential (this does not, of course, mean we should or could do this wherever Marx refers to the proletariat). For the increasing internationalism of those alienated in many different ways there is increasing evidence and argumentation (Waterman 1988b and the bibliography to this paper). That the overcoming of alienation ('communism' in Marx' language) is inconceivable nationally, is surely demonstrated by the collapse of 'socialism' not only in one country but also in one bloc. Increasing 'interdependence', moreover, seems to imply that you cannot today build, or preserve, even a capitalist welfare state in just one
country. My interpretation, further, implies neither writing off the proletariat as an autonomous contributor to such internationalism, nor abandoning appeals from outside or above (or below) that it consider the advantages and even the necessities of a global identity. It means only abandonment of any assumption that its internationalism is structurally determined and/or exemplary. On this understanding, the proletariat would also have to go to school, and not so much with Marx (or me) as with the other alienated categories. It would also have to opt for the untrodden but exhilarating world of internationalism rather than the familiar, well-trodden but imprisoning parish of nation-statism. The proletariat may still have a world to win, but it also has more than its chains to lose.

3. Communism as the real social movement. Here I feel we have the most valuable kind of theoretical formulation since it invites us to question its own formulator and its social forms. Communism has long been for the world primarily a 'state of affairs' - an affair of Communist states. It has also always been largely an 'ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself', increasingly an ideal in the heads only of socialist intellectuals, who should thus be literally named 'idealist socialist intellectuals' (Lowy?). If communism is meant in the first instance to be 'the real movement which abolishes the present state of things', then this requires us to address ourselves to such real movements (movements in the sense both of societal transformation and mass feelings, ideas, organisation and action). The real movements that are presently transforming the international order are the new social movements (Hegedus 1990). These do not have to be understood as replacing or in opposition to the labour movement (Melucci 1989:214). Amongst the real movements could also be counted the 'social movement unions' that have explicitly or implicitly, to a greater or lesser extent, for a longer or shorter period, surpassed the 'economism' and 'politicism', or the reformist or insurrectionary workerism, of their predecessors (Aronowitz 1989, Brecher and Costello 1990a, Laclau and Mouffe 1981, Waterman 1990b).

4. The necessity for simultaneous revolution by the dominant nations. The importance of this assertion is what it reveals to us of Marx' apocalypticism and eurocentrism. The latter was not so much surpassed as by-passed by Lenin's notion of the weak link, and by Trotsky's of uneven and combined development. What they understood, because Russia experienced it, is that the international spread of capitalist social relations is multi-faceted and uneven in essence. But this does not imply, as it did in part for Lenin and increasingly for some of his followers, that we can shift revolutionary primacy from 'advanced' to 'backward' nations, or revolutionary agency from the anti-capitalist proletariat of the industriali-
sed centre to the anti-imperialist masses of the agricultural periphery. It rather requires us to abandon any idea of countries or blocs that are either industrial/cultural models or revolutionary vanguards. Recognising the differential implications and experience of capitalist internationalisation rather requires us to: 1) identify the similar structures, processes and experiences in different countries that lend themselves to common internationalist action; 2) recognise that differential position and experience within an increasingly capitalist world order implies different movement priorities, discoveries, inventions and achievements; and 3) work out principles and forms of solidarity amongst and between the different significant movements of particular countries or blocs (e.g. both peace movement with peace movement and labour movement with women's movement). Finally, we need to ask ourselves why Marx had an apocalyptic vision of emancipation. I here suggest that apocalypticism is a requirement of a mass emancipatory ideology or movement in a situation in which the masses are capable of rebelling against existing conditions but not of fully conceiving or controlling a desired alternative. I will further suggest that the masses today are potentially capable of doing this, which is why apocalyptic visions and strategies are associated with early, undeveloped or (self-) isolated socialist movements (Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Communist Party of the Philippines, both inspired by Maoism). Visions of sudden and complete transformation to a land of milk, honey, where 'the people will rule' (as in the original ANC Charter), are declining in the more sophisticated socialist movements of the Third World, such as those of El Salvador, South Africa and Brazil. This does not, of course, mean that apocalyptic visions are not still present amongst large parts of the masses locally (a thought I owe to the Brazilian socialist, Maria Helena Moreira Alves, speaking at the Monthly Review conference on The Future of Socialism, New York, October 1990). Contemporary political apocalypticism, for the rest, appears increasingly a characteristic of reactionary, militaristic and obscurantist forces (religious fundamentalists, chauvinist nationalists, racists, global militarists).

5. The existence of the premises for communism. The reason why, almost 150 years later, these premises have not yet translated themselves into either empirical international reality, or even mass internationalist aspiration, has been sufficiently argued above.

6. What will happen in the absence of the necessary conditions. The value of this passage lies not only in its quite remarkable prescience but also in reminding us that such prescience is the outcome of a new theoretical approach linked with new emancipatory struggles (compare contemporary feminist or ecological theory). Marx says that if the
conditions are not ripe, capitalism and the market will continue to appear 'home-bred conditions surrounded by superstition'. He also says that the further extension of the world market will 'abolish local communism'. What we have, of course, witnessed over the last century and a half is working-class advances within capitalist states (by nationally self-defined workers, without or against others), and of anti-capitalist revolutions being repeatedly penetrated, de-radicalised and restricted by the dynamic growth of international capital. What we have so far witnessed internationally have, in other words, been working-class movements within, or national revolutions against, capitalism. Surpassing capitalism is another matter entirely. This requires the kind of internationalist strategy suggested just above, under Point 4.

3.2. Communism as international political movement

We turn now to the Communist Manifesto of 1848 (Marx and Engels 1935). Certainly the best-remembered part of this are the closing words 'Workingmen of all countries, unite!' (in less-sexist, and more-accurate, translations, 'Workers of all countries, unite!'). But it does not give so much place to internationalisation and internationalism as memory might suggest. What it does have to say is, of course, determinant for the Manifesto as a whole. The limited number of pages does, moreover, make it possible for us to again quote the material, this time presenting the relevant passages in original order before analysing them as we did the last quotation. They are presented under the relevant Manifesto chapter numbers (which are 1, 2 and 4) and headings.

1. Bourgeois and Proletarian. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionaries, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and
self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world literature. (Marx and Engels 1935:209)

The bourgeois[eie] has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West. (210)

...The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family relations; modern industrial labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests. (217)

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie. (ibid)

2. Proletarians and Communists. The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties.

They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.

They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.
The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1) In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independent of all nationality. 2) In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole. (218–9)

The workingmen have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end. (225)

4. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties. The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.
Workingmen of all countries, unite! (241)

Within this material I identify three main elements, once again re-arranged for purposes of analysis and discussion.

1. Bourgeois internationalisation as progressive. Whilst it is evident that Marx and Engels by no means identify themselves with the bourgeoisie, they clearly consider its international role as progressive, as modernising, developing, homogenising and unifying the world. The violent ‘pain of extinction’ with which the bourgeoisie threatens ‘barbarian and semi-barbarian’ nations is presented as civilising. The bourgeoisie is even credited with undermining ‘national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness’ and of creating a ‘world literature’. It is hardly necessary, in the face of the last century and a half, to criticise this picture. Nor is it necessary to argue the linkage between the attitudes here expressed and those of European bourgeois racism, evolutionism, modernism and cosmopolitanism (Berman 1983, Horne 1986). What is necessary is to stress what is missing, since this helps us to understand why internationalisation has not led to internationalism: industrialism as not merely disruptive but destructive, the bourgeoisie as chauvinist and imperialist, capitalist statism as essentially militaristic, world capitalist civilisation as essentially divisory and individualising. Far from creating its own international and internationalist gravedigger in the industrial proletariat, for example, capitalism has divided the labour process of gravedigging technically, socially and geographically, assigning different parts of the task to the differentially proletarianised, of various gender, ethnic or religious categories, under diverse political and labour regimes. In addition to, or instead of, a world literature, it has created a commercialised transnational culture which simultaneously provides immense profits, homogenises audiences as consumers, spreads dehumanised bourgeois values, destroys local popular cultures containing elements of resistance or opposition and finally obstructs any such communication between these as would be necessary for the creation of an internationalist culture (Schiller 1990).

To add all the above is to qualify, not reverse, the evaluation. For it is, for example, equally evident that the development of railways and other technical channels of communication were determinant in the rapid organisation of labour nationally and internationally (Marx 1935:215). An interesting and important question follows. If the railways thus allowed labour organisation, did they not, perhaps, also restrict its shape? Railways are physically-fixed,
monopolistically or state-owned, hierarchically managed, centripetal channels. Their international connections mechanically connect the separate nationally-owned and controlled systems. Did not national and international labour organisations unconsciously reproduce the pattern, structure and management of such industries? Capitalist industrialisation and internationalisation is, in any case, a highly contradictory phenomenon, simultaneously denying, provoking and even stimulating possibilities for self-organisation and liberation. The effective use of computers in both individualistic sabotage of the computer society, or in collective struggle against it, would be one example (for the latter, see Downing 1989). Another would be the radical recycling of the white, North American individualist Superman myth by the apparition in Mexico of *Superbarrio*, the protector of urban squatters, who draws his power only from the collective (Alcocer 1990, TOSM 1987). *Superbarrio* (significantly for our subject), operates amongst Latinos/as in both Mexico and the US, declaring ‘We didn’t make the border, we don’t want the border’ (TOSM 1989).

2. The proletariat as a liberated, liberating and internationalist subject. The proletariat is endowed with positive and universalistic qualities. It is free of ‘every trace of national character’ and ‘bourgeois prejudices’. The workers ‘have no country’, they ‘have nothing to lose but their chains’. They have to complete the task begun by the bourgeoisie. By ending class antagonisms within countries they will end them between countries. And they must end them first within nations, become the leading class within the nation, become the nation. Although these phrases come from different parts of the Manifesto, they nonetheless amount to a clear argument: since the proletariat is free of bourgeois and nationalist prejudices, since it is free of any stake in existing society, it can therefore put an end to conflicts between nations, this requiring that it first take over the nation-state from the old ruling classes that are responsible for international conflicts.

In considering this view, it is necessary to make a number of points.

Firstly, the positive, progressive and Promethean characteristics the working class is here accorded have little or no correspondence with the early-19th century British proletariat as described by Engels (1953) four years earlier. In later political dealings with, and writings on, the British working class, its leaders and organisations, Marx and Engels identified national and stratum privilege, narrow self-interest, subordination to bourgeois ideas and institutions, and chauvinism (Marx and Engels 1953 *passim*).
Secondly, the argument is class-reductionist in assuming that state and nation are forms of existence, or expressions, of classes, or of secondary import to classes in determining social liberation. It would seem superfluous today to have to argue for the continuing, indeed growing, weight of state and nationality/ethnicity in determining relations between people and peoples. The commonly tense and sometimes violent relations between and within even culturally close Communist states — and the longstanding state discrimination against ethnic or religious minorities within them — is evidently due to these forces. Banas (1977) even characterises one of these regimes as ‘Ethno–Communist’. As the Communism disappears, it is often only ethnicity that seems to remain.

Thirdly, the argument is evolutionist in suggesting that the proletariat has to complete a task begun by the bourgeoisie rather than to criticise and transform all bourgeois relations and processes. The necessity for such criticism and transformation has been suggested just above under Point 1.

Fourthly, the argument is ‘stageist’ in so far as it suggests that national struggle somehow proceeds the international one, or that international conflicts cannot be ended without proletarian rule nationally. This implies a priority of struggles, or an order of separate levels, at odds with the 1847 document and with a dialectical understanding of interpenetrating and mutually-determining national and international spheres (Brecher 1987).

Fifthly, the argument is, of course, sexist. At a time when a large part of factory labour was carried out by women and children, the proletariat is assumed to consist of adult males — who presumably neither beat nor otherwise oppress their family members.

Given, in sum, the complex nature of both the 19th and 20th-century proletariat, given the complexity of social structures within which it existed and exists, the portrayal of the proletariat as a liberated, liberating and vanguard internationalist subject is precisely an ‘ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself’.

3. The communist role: The only thing that distinguishes communists from other working-class parties is that within national struggles they press the common interests of the proletariat internationally, and that at any stage they press the interests of the movement generally. The conclusion to the last section applies here with equal force. We are today confronted with the situation satirised by Tom Nair (1979, 1980): the metropolitan interna-
tionalism of those socialists with power and the spiritual internationalism of those without. The aspiration represented by the Marx–Engels assertion has evidently been disappointed by the nationalisation and statification of socialists and socialism. Once again, however, we have to abandon dependence on a Second Coming, a Last Really International International. We cannot today see, even in such internationalist traditions as those of the Trotskyists (Frank 1979a) or Anarcho–Syndicalists (Longmore 1985, Thorpe 1990, Waterman 1990d:23–5, 41–4) the embryo of a body which is not only internationalist but also possessed of the other characteristics required by the Manifesto – that it be not opposed to other working-class parties, that it be not separate from the proletariat, that it have no sectarian principles.

In their concept of the role of communists, Marx and Engels combined traditional religious notions of salvation (an Elect, possessing the Word, leading the Chosen People, via an Apocalypse, to a Promised Land) with the quintessentially bourgeois form of political organisation, the party! The power – or limitations – of this highly specific combination of forms (in relation to their ideal of a global movement to end human alienation) is witnessed by the way socialist parties have not so much failed to embody or further the project but to actually negate it. The two utopias socialist parties can offer us are represented, I suppose, on the one hand by the West European ‘social market’ society and, on the other, Ceaucescu’s mercifully uncompleted project for the totalitarian modernisation of Bucharest and the Rumanian countryside. But these were or are either national or bloc projects. The Ceaucescu type was, in any case, one of such anti-human bent that it has been (or is going to be) rejected by all subjected to it. And the social–market society, whilst currently exercising tremendous attraction for people in the East and the South, is one that cannot be reproduced internationally without despoiling the planet itself.

It is curious, finally, that the Manifesto, the more concrete and political of the two documents, should seem more dated or less relevant than the earlier, more abstract and philosophical one. This once again suggests that we have to liberate the project of internationalism from the politics of a 19th-century world dominated by the market, industrialisation, worker–capitalist conflict, nation– and empire–building, deification of the masculine and struggle for the control of the machinery of the state.
5. Conclusion: giving labour and socialist internationalism contemporary meaning

I have said earlier in this paper that I would here consider evidence and argument for a new labour and socialist internationalism. This is easier to do with labour than with socialism. The reason is that there has been a growing amount of writing on the former, and that I have myself to some extent clarified in my own mind on what I mean by it. There has been very little on the latter, and (although this might be what I am myself doing) I am not myself sure what I think about it.

In looking at labour, I will start with my own understanding, as set out elsewhere in a series of programmatic points (Waterman 1990f:43-51). These may help to summarise the implications of the comments scattered over the previous pages. They will also serve as a base for examining the new information and ideas on internationalism in the writings of two energetic and innovative writers on this topic, Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello. In the case of socialism, I may have to reverse the procedure, considering recent reassertions of the case for socialism to see what stimulus to reflection this might provide.

5.1 A new labour internationalism

1. 12 criteria. My understanding of the new labour internationalism comes 1) out of analysis of the new economic and political situation of labour in a period of world economic crisis, and of the fundamental restructuring of the labour force nationally and internationally; 2) out of analysis of the response of the state and inter-state organs to these crises; 3) from a critique of the inadequacy of the dominant traditional union, labour and socialist organisations and ideologies in confronting this situation. It comes, more positively 4) from reflection on the successes booked by the internationalism of the new social movements. Rejecting much of the form, content and procedures of the traditional union internationals, I would argue that a new labour internationalism implies:

1. Moving from the international relations of union or other officials towards face-to-face relations of concerned labouring people at the shopfloor, community or grassroots level;

2. Surpassing dependence on the power-alienating, centralised, bureaucratic and rigid model of the pyramidal international organisation by
stimulating the self-empowering, decentralised, horizontal, democratic and flexible model of the international information network;

3. Moving from an ‘aid model’ (one-way flows of money and material from the ‘rich, powerful, free’ unions, workers or others), to a ‘solidarity model’ (two-way or multi-directional flow of political support, information and ideas);

4. Moving from verbal declarations, appeals and conferences to political activity, creative work, visits, or direct financial contributions (which will continue to be necessary) by the working people concerned;

5. Surpassing an ‘export solidarity’ model by practising ‘international solidarity at home’, combating the local causes/effects of international exploitation and repression;

6. Generalising the solidarity ethic by combating national, racial, political, religious, ideological and gender discrimination amongst working people locally);

7. Basing international solidarity on the expressed daily needs, values and capacities of ordinary working people, not simply on those of their representatives;

8. Linking up with other democratic internationalisms, so as to reinforce wage-labour struggles and surpass a workerist internationalism;

9. Overcoming ideological, political and financial dependency in international solidarity work by financing internationalist activities from worker or publicly-collected funds, and carrying out independent re-search and policy formulation;

10. Replacing the political/financial coercion, the private collusion and public silences of the traditional internationalisms, with a frank, friendly, constructive and public discourse of equals, made available to interested workers;
11. Requiring of involved intellectuals, professionals and officials that they are open about their own interests, motives and roles, that they dialogue with workers and take on a service and training role, rather than that of political leaders or official ideologists;

12. Recognising that there is no single site or level of international struggle and that, whilst the shopfloor, grassroots and community may be the base, the traditional formal terrains can be used and can also be influenced.

Linked with these propositions is the following understanding: that the development of a new labour internationalism requires contributions 1) from West, East and South, and a dialogue between worker movements in each of these areas; 2) that a new internationalism requires contributions from many international movements (women, peace, ecological, etc.); 3) that whilst labour is not the privileged bearer of the new internationalisms it is essential to it. What sort of issues could such a new labour internationalism deal with? I propose the following possible agenda, in no particular order of priority: 1) struggle against and alternatives to multinationalisation; 2) struggle against and alternatives to indebtedness; 3) the international organisation of non-unionisable labour (for residents' associations, on the Latin-American level, see Ortiz 1990); 4) the self-organisation of women, waged or not, internationally; 5) the generalisation of democratic demands within - or without - all international instances; 6) ecological issues; 7) militarism, internal and international, of the left as well as the right; 8) the autonomy of local cultures and extension of the right to international communication (see Hamelink 1990); 9) trade union autonomy and worker democracy, up to the international level; 10) an internationalism of the shopfloor and networks; 11) an internationalism that begins at home, with immigrants and neighbouring countries; 12) a code of conduct for relations between richer and poorer labour organisations internationally; 13) international discussion on the relationship between trade unions and socialism.

3. Brecher and Costello [5]. These are not the only US writers on the topic, nor the first to have set out their recommendations in programatic form (see, for a pioneering position, Cantor and Schor 1987, particularly pages 78-82). But Brecher and Costello have done this most recently and extensively, in a series of linked journalistic essays on the
subject, several of these being quite original (1988, 1990b, 1991a,b). The US has had for many decades the most chauvinist, protectionist, militaristic and interventionist national trade-union leadership in the capitalist world (see NILS 1989, particularly the contribution to this of Kim Scipes). If new activity and ideas are coming from the US, that should be of much more than local significance. The reason for taking these non-academic writings is that few academics in the US seem to have become aware of the new labour internationalism (Dorman 1990 may be the single exception to the rule). I will here concentrate on a two-part essay of Brecher and Costello, the general title of which is 'Global Village vs. Global Pillage' (referred to as B&C 1991a,b). One minor problem with this article is that, possibly because it is both about and published in the US, extra information and explanation may be necessary for other audiences. Where both necessary and possible, such clarification will be provided within square brackets.

What B&C are reporting and commenting on is a quite dramatic increase in international trade-union activity over the last year or so, primarily in the USA but also in Canada and Mexico, and even further afield. Their paper presents an analysis of US and (therefore) world economic development since before World War II, and the closely linked history of US trade-union foreign policy. Their general argument with respect to the unions is that foreign policies dependent on and subordinate to national capital are breaking down in the face of a dramatic globalisation, forcing an abandonment of protectionism, and leading to an exploration of the necessities and possibilities of imposing 'world-wide rules for work, life and the environment' (1991a:16). B&C give a thumb-nail sketch of union history, see as rising from the local to the national level and finally to the international one. This material provides the background for the three other elements I identify for commentary. The first is the wide range of labour activities reported, the second is the particular union or organisational actors concerned, the third is the principles B&C draw out for future labour action internationally. Let us take these in turn.

**New international labour activities.** B&C identify the following types of activities or demands in the USA and its immediate neighbours, over just the last couple of years: calls for international TNC codes of conduct; corporate campaigns pinpointing particular TNCs; demands for labour rights in countries or companies exporting to the US; increasing union and worker visits to and from the three countries named; conferences involving far more than national union centres or individual union leaderships; issue-specific international workshops (e.g. health and safety); international demonstrations; exchanges of information at company or plant level. They note the move from defensive to assertive strategies, with
national unions in the US, Canada, and some in Mexico, abandoning a failing protectionist campaign against 'Free Trade' in favour of demands for 'Fair Trade'. They further note that unions are taking up broader issues (environment, women's rights), that many of these activities are coming from or addressed to the grassroots, and that there is a trend toward alliance with community, women's, ecological and other such movements.

**Actors involved.** Those responsible for these demands or activities are from different union levels and and also from different kinds of non-governmental organisations or union-plus-other alliances. There is also a certain presence of opposition politicians or parties, and even sectors of capital seem to be addressed or involved.

As far as unions are involved, we can start at the top and work our way down. B&C mention the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs), the European and industry-based international organisations, closely aligned with the social-reformist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels. [Their activity in the US is already significant since the AFL-CIO has traditionally found them 'soft on Communism', and in any case had its own massive state-funded international operation]. Then there are the national trade union centres or confederations such as the AFL-CIO in the US and the Canadian Labour Congress. It is such organisations that have usually monopolised international labour contacts in the past. The AFL-CIO, however, now seems to be prepared to participate in lower-level initiatives and even, as we will see below, in labour-community alliances across the US-Mexico border. Then there are such national or 'international' [US plus Canada] unions as the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTU) [active for some years on Central America and South Africa]. One action began as solidarity between Ford workers in St Paul, USA, with others in Cuautitlan, Mexico, and moved on to a conference in Mexico where a week-long event involved 15 activists from the US and Canada, together with Mexican unions opposed to the state-approved CTM.

This last event was, in fact, organised by what B&C would call a non-governmental organisation (NGO) but could be better characterised as a labour support group. In this case it was something called the Mexico-US Labour Project. [Conference Organiser, Matt Witt, is better known in the US as editor of a left of centre quarterly, American Labour, which has for some years propagated solidarity links with Central America and South Africa]. Another major such organisation is the International Labour Rights Education and Research Fund. This has been heavily engaged in developing an international labour rights doctrine
and movement, demanding legislation against 'social dumping'. This body is presided over by Ray Marshall, Secretary for Labour during the Carter presidency. Closer to the ground we have the promise of a 'Maquiladora Coalition' on the US-Mexican border. The Maquiladoras are the 1,800 foreign cheap-labour factories, employing some half-million Mexican workers, 80 percent women, which pay one half of Mexican and one-tenth of US wages. The coalition consists of religious, environmental, labour, Latino and women's organisations, and its charter of demands addresses a wide range of abuses, discriminations and threats to life, health and liberty. A striking characteristic of the coalition is that it includes the AFL-CIO. There also appears to be some kind of international organisation or network of small farmers, itself allied with consumer and environmental groups, which has been taking action against GATT, including a well-publicised and effective demonstration in Brussels, December 1990 (1991a:18, b:26–8).

The presence of politicians and parties, around if not within, such campaigns and coalitions comes from the failure of protectionist strategies in Canada and Mexico. In Canada, the anti-free trade movement, supported by the pro-labour New Democratic Party, may be moving toward common international campaigning for Fair Trade and an upward harmonisation of working and living conditions (B&C 1991b:25). And in Mexico, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, former Presidential candidate who leads a coalition of opposition organisations, has been proposing what one might call a 'post-protectionist', social-needs oriented development strategy. B&C consider his strategy relevant to popular and labour movements in the West and East as well as in the South (b:22–3).

In the case of Mexico, it would seem that local capitalists are being addressed, since Cardenas sees a role for them alongside cooperative, self-managed and state enterprise. In the case of the US, the Fair Trade Campaign (a coalition of farm, consumer, ecology and some labour groups) is hoping to exploit contradictions between productive capital on the one hand and financial and trading capital on the other. B&C (b:28–9) state that senators representing textile, auto, telecommunications, farming and mining interests are resisting the deregulation and liberalisation policies of the US regime. They report, without comment, the belief of a leading campaign activist that such interests could serve as partners in a coalition with popular movements.

**Strategic principles.** Reflecting on the experiences identified, B&C end by proposing six strategic principles for what they call an 'incipient Pro-Communities Network or Peoples
Transnational Coalition' (1991b:30-33). These are: 1) Transnational cooperation, based on international networking, aimed at win/win policies for working people worldwide; 2) Social movement coalitions, based on cooperation among labour and other social movements, and aimed at integrating the needs of working people, oppressed groups, and environmental concerns; 3) Harmonisation of wages and conditions upward, via 'managed international economic interdependence, and local and national economic development' (b:30-31); 4) Coordination of different forms of pressure, meaning the linkage of action at different levels or in different arenas, and learning from or using particular experiences or struggles to generalise their impact; 5) Democratisation, meaning the necessity of 'democratically controlled public institutions' (b:31) at all levels, necessary in order to control the power of the corporations and to advance general social standards and interests; 6) A multi-level one-world economy, implying a surpassal of the present domination of national bureaucracies and TNCs by a devolution of decision-making both downward and upward.

Commentary. My aim in introducing this material has been to present both evidence and argument for a new kind of labour internationalism. It is, however, also relevant to my overall concern to come to an understanding of B&C.

It is evident to me, firstly, that there is a major wave of international solidarity activity taking place right now in and around the US. The focus of such activity is also changing, from a 'First-World Third-Worldism' (anti-war, anti-imperialist, anti-racist, anti-right authoritarian) to a 'Common Interests' one. This development is not to be simply and crudely interpreted as a shift from 'politics' to 'economics', far less from an 'ethical' to a 'self-interest' internationalism. It is, perhaps, to be better understood as a shift from a 'Substitution Solidarity' to an 'Identity' or 'Reciprocity' one (cf Vos 1976:Ch.1, Waterman 1988b). Some of the organisations and individuals active in the earlier phase or type are, by this token, now appealing to workers not simply as democrats but as wage-earners. They are also, implicitly, shifting from a relationship on a vertical plane (and a single direction) to a horizontal (and bi- or multi-directional) one.

Secondly, this would appear to be a new kind of labour internationalism in so far as it explicitly addresses, and is articulated with, the 'new' social issues, actors and movements. This is another reason it cannot be interpreted as economist or narrowly self-interested. Perhaps one should here distinguish this as labour internationalism from a more-specifically trade-union one, with the former potentially addressing a wide range of labouring people,
and addressing concerns way beyond those of a collective-bargaining type. Such a labour internationalism, however, is not to be conflated with a socialist internationalism. The evidence and argumentation of B&C belongs, rather, to a more specific radical-democratic or populist discourse. This is suggested in both the evidence and the conclusions B&C draw from it. Some of the campaigns involve, or are open to, sections of capital or populist politicians; the general objective seems to be some kind of green neo-Keynsianism – with specific allowance for various ownership forms. B&C rightly state that labour movements have always included those favouring state, cooperative and private ownership. And, as far as working people and labour activists in the US are concerned, this kind of programme would seem to be much more likely to appeal than would an explicitly socialist internationalism.

This is, thus, thirdly, a specifically North American labour internationalism. That does not necessarily mean that B&C have abandoned socialism for ‘liberal practicality’ (Foster 1990). In Foster’s critique of one left trend in the US, the pragmatic left is involved in a rejection of socialism in favour of ‘post-liberal democracy’, of class movements for the new social ones, in the production of blueprints for better management of a reindustrialised US, and a ‘retreat from internationalism’ (280–81). Rather can we see in B&C’s evidence and argument a way in which it might be possible to move (with) masses of ordinary working people from where they are now to where one might like them to be. The ‘might’ must be stressed because the B&C project could go in different directions. This is due to a number of factors. One is their failure to discriminate between, or comment on, the different phenomena presented. Another is their welcoming into the internationalist fold of ‘nationalist capitalists’ (part of a monolithic US anti-labour bloc, according to Dorman 1990) and top AFL-CIO bureaucrats (born-again internationalists?). Yet another is their stress – despite a claimed orientation to the grassroots – on lobbying and legislative activity, and on new international institutions and arrangements, which do not involve ordinary working people and which they are unlikely to be able to control.

In a pluralist understanding of internationalism, however, the new US activity, and the B&C strategy proposals, are evidently to be welcomed. They make an original contribution to what should be a continuously growing but changing project. They also provide both evidence for a new labour internationalism and a stimulus to reflection on its relationship with a socialist one.
5.2. A new socialist internationalism?

I said earlier that I would look at the attitudes of socialists towards a contemporary or future internationalism before myself attempting to take a position on the matter. It would seem not unreasonable to do this by taking a collection of essays — by prominent and independently-minded socialists from North America, Western Europe and the Third World — concerned to confront the current crisis of socialism internationally. The collection I have in mind would seem particularly suitable since part of it also covers the (ex-) Communist World, and another pays specific attention to ‘Socialism and the World System’. The collection (Tabb 1990) has been published by the veteran independent socialist publishers, *Monthly Review*, and was, indeed, released in time for an international conference with the same title as the book — *The Future of Socialism*. In so far as internationalism has always been considered a — if not the — fundament of socialism, one might expect this collection to address its past problems and future prospects, at least in part. Let us see how it does, before a few closing remarks of my own.

1. A still unimagined community. It must be said at the outset that there is, amongst the 18 essays, by authors from around 9 countries, neither an essay, nor a page on this topic. What we rather get is repeated searches for Lenin’s ‘weak link’ — the place where the capitalist chain is most likely to break [6]. East Europe specialist, Daniel Singer, thinks is as likely in the re-capitalised East as in the capitalist West (Tabb 1990:34–5). Samir Amin, veteran Dependency theorist, thinks, as always, that it will be in the Third World (113). Christopher Chase-Dunn, specialist on capitalism as a world system, thinks it may be neither in the capitalist core nor at the capitalist periphery but in the semi–industrialised ‘semi-periphery’ (80–82). Andre Gunder Frank, whose interests have been moving from Dependency to new social movements, doesn’t seem to think there is any such weak link anywhere (87–105). As for the contributors from Brazil, Central America and South Africa (Communist leader Joe Slovo), the only one who has something to say is the last, and his paragraph (54) belongs, of course, to the same discourse as that of the Trotskyist, Michael Lowy. Editor Tabb has, finally, even managed to find a representative of the ‘alternative’ who casts his presentation of ecologism, feminism and pacifism within a nation–state framework. Referring to the Amazonian forests, Phil Hill (1990) manages to separately mention a green–socialist alliance in Brazil, and Green policies in the First World, without recalling the international alliances and activities around this issue.
There are, however, some relevant notes struck by different contributors to the collection. There is 1) the suggestion that Western socialists can and should now create links with those - few - socialists in the East (32–3); 2) that, on the way to a ‘Socialist World System’, we should favour a world state, both in order to avoid the destructive results of inter-capitalist competition and because of the single focus it would provide for struggles (84–5); 3) that, for similar reasons, we should favour ‘embryos of a democratic world government’ (Amin 122); 4) that the end of Communism opens the way for international debate on the meaning of socialism (172). Whilst these suggestions are welcome, they evidently do not amount to even the beginning of a serious theory or strategy.

It is ironic that (with a handful of honourable exceptions) socialists have forgotten internationalism at a time in which much of the original socialist insight and inspiration would seem to be necessary, possible and attractive to millions. And at which the creation of international solidarity and ‘international civil society’ is not only more urgent than ever but is actually occurring. Ironic, also, is that many socialists, such as Brecher and Costello, have been busy thinking about or working to develop these new phenomena without referring to socialism (preferable though this is to talking about socialism and failing to develop internationalism).

2. A yet-to-be imagined community. I said earlier that I was myself puzzled about what socialist internationalism meant. I believe that over the last 5–10 years, most socialists concerned with international solidarity have actually been doing pretty much what Brecher and Costello have been doing – looking around for evidence of a new kind of democratic international activity amongst workers and others, attempting to make sense of it and then to advance it (see, for example, Dorman 1990, Garver 1989, Mackay 1988, MacShane 1989, Muto 1983, Thompson 1988, and contributions to Waterman 1984 and 1988a).

If international discussion on the relationship between unionism and socialism is earlier listed on a possible internationalist agenda, this is only because the list is drawn from a paper on a new Third–World labour internationalism (Waterman 1990f). And because of the socialist self-identity of the three union movements identified at the beginning of that paper (the Philippines, Brazil, South Africa). These movements, it seemed to me, might be interested to discuss this matter amongst themselves, could possibly introduce into the international labour movement some ideological and even theoretical discussion, and themselves possibly benefit from the response to their ideas and aspirations of largely anti-socialist
Polish and a-socialist British unionists. Providing such discussion was carried out in a friendly spirit, it might help move labour internationalism beyond its current non-reflective style. But even this marginal mention of socialism may be exceptional in the recent literature on 'real movement' internationalism.

Implicit in the orientation of most socialists interested in labour internationalism, I suppose, has been the understanding that a revival of socialist internationalism can come only from a revival of democratic worker and popular self-activity internationally. And that, as socialists, at least in the West or East, one should rather try to demonstrate an internationalist socialist analysis and ethic, than preach a socialist internationalism to the disinterested or actively hostile unionists. But this still begs the question of why it is so difficult to think about socialist internationalism.

I suppose that the problem here is the series of chasms that have been created in the past. In the West they have been between the workers and the socialists, and certainly between the workers and the Marxists. This leaves the latter in the position of mourning the decline (Hobsbawm) or predicting the Second Coming (Lowy). In the South the chasm may be between worker-linked socialists and any but a poverty-stricken, partisan, one-sided, uni-directional, or merely rhetorical internationalism (see Mires). In the East, it would be both, with the phrases 'proletarian internationalism' or 'socialist internationalism' calling up images of Soviet tanks, or being simply the butt of popular humour. In all three major socio-economic areas most socialists have, for decades, been as locked into the framework of the nation state, or bloc of such, as the workers themselves. Small wonder, then, that many otherwise independent, humanist and even cosmopolitan socialists either forget, avoid, or repress the memory of, the internationalist essence of their doctrine.

Yet, in so far as socialism is an anti-capitalist theory and ethic, which has traditionally had an intimate relationship with the labour movement, and with internationalism, then it could bring these elements into, or draw them out of, the 'real movements'. I said in the Introduction to this paper that the new social movements and their theorists often had little time for either the proletariat or socialism. Both Alberto Melucci (1989) and Zsuzsa Hegedüs (1990), for example, are acutely conscious of the international awareness or activity of the new social movements. And Melucci even implicitly recognises the 19th century labour movement connections of both the movements and the internationalism (205,214). But, whatever concessions the one or the other might make to the continued existence of the
labour movement, neither addresses it directly as a significant emancipatory force, nationally or internationally. And both have coined new terms for our present civilisation. For Melucci this is 'complex' and for Hagedus it is 'self-creative'. It may seem paradoxical, to TNC managers as well as socialists, that at the very moment that a triumphalist technocratic, militarist and consumerist capitalism is imposing or re-imposing the 19th century logic of the world market and the 19th century philosophy of possessive individualism in, or on, Budapest and Baghdad, that world capitalism has disappeared, even conceptually.

In the face of such 'post-modern internationalism', socialists evidently have a theoretical task. This, it seems to me, must be to attempt to synthesise the old understandings with the new, the old emancipatory strivings with the new ones, the old proletarian and socialist internationalism with the new democratic cross-class ones. Such an effort evidently cannot mean a reiteration of eternal 19th century verities (satirised by one unsympathetic critic as 'come back vulgar Marxism, all is forgiven'). Nor can it be a merely pragmatic concession to new realities, problems and movements (satirised, in the case of feminism, as 'add women and mix').

What it most of all requires from socialists, curiously enough, is an understanding of contemporary capitalism, national and international. This means, for example, that what is being done in or to Budapest and Baghdad cannot be simply interpreted in terms of capitalism and imperialism. And certainly not in terms of simple victories for national and international capitalism (intelligent supporters of capitalism and imperialism know better - which is presumably why the British Conservative ex-Prime Minister, Heath, was against the war in the Gulf). What it also represents is a crisis of our civilisation, with roots earlier and deeper than capitalism, a civilisation shared by Kadar's Hungary and Saddam's Iraq. An understanding of capitalism, moreover, means an understanding of the fundamental transformations capitalism is undergoing, as it moves from the industrial to the information mode. So far, the nature and potential of such transformations have possibly been better understood by pro-TNC computer utopians, like John Naisbitt (1982), than by socialists. And the former have certainly been better able to capture the public imagination with their interpretations than has any socialist. It means, thirdly, an understanding not only of 'the capitalist world system' and its (logically required? historically inevitable?) replacement by a 'world socialist community', but of the operations of world capitalism/statism in particular sectors (e.g. commodity trading, finance), industries, companies and even individual enterprises in specific communities. This is because workers (as workers, or as women, consumers, citizens or
humanbeings) do not experience 'capitalism' or 'imperialism' and - even if they do - they can only dream of their international defeat. What workers experience, and what they are collectively capable of doing, is imposing themselves against specific capitals/states, or specific capitalist/statist behaviours. It is a revealing and damning fact that if one wants to understand the internal contradictions of TNCs one has to turn to managerial literature, and that the possible uses of this for struggles against TNCs have been pointed out not by Marxist political-economists but sociologists (Haworth and Ramsay 1986). Workers and unions are simply not getting from socialist economists the ideas, information and services they need in order to impose themselves effectively against international capitalism. A similar criticism can be made of Marxist specialists in international relations, who continue to understand this in terms of states and capitals at a time when even liberal specialists are making concessions in the direction of 'non-governmental' forces (Waterman 1989). The problem is revealed in the latest socialist contribution to the international relations literature, entitled 'Intellectuals and Transnational Capital', an 18-page article that mentions the necessity of a 'counter-hegemonic project' only in its final paragraph (Gill 1990:308).

There is, on the other hand, no reason why socialists should not attempt to provide a general internationalist theory, or strategy, or political leadership, as long as they do not consider these an 'ontological privilege' of socialists - to borrow a phrase from Laclau and Mouffe (1981:22). They would, then, of course, find themselves on an equal footing with Lowy's internationalist Liberation Theologists. Or with Feminist internationalists (for whom see Waterman 1990g). Or with the New Social Movement theorists, or 'even' those from the tradition of World Federalism! All these are making serious and significant contributions to the 'critique of international relations', or the creation of a 'new international civil society', or even to working-class internationalism (church people in particular) whilst the Marxists are desperately defending Marxism from the encroachment of ideas coming out of either the crisis of left thinking or of the new emancipatory struggles (Miliband and Panitch 1990). And - in one case we have seen - actually accusing the non-Marxist left of a 'retreat from internationalism' (Foster 1990:280)! In this situation, any assertion that socialist internationalism is superior to that of others would seem spurious - and that is putting it with an excess of politeness..

The implicit challenge here is addressed as much to socialists leading major national labour or popular movements (as they do in South Africa, Brazil, the Philippines) as to those who don't (people like myself). Whilst there are Third World leftists, such as Mires, who
have made significant contributions to thinking on internationalism, this seems not yet to be the case with these socialist-led or socialist-oriented labour movements (Waterman 1990f).

The future of internationalism, and even of labour internationalism, it would seem to me, finally, is assured. That of socialist internationalism remains to be demonstrated.
Footnotes

1. The two central sections of this paper were originally drafted around 1986, as part of a long planned essay on the past, present and possible future of internationalism. Sections of that draft have appeared as separate ISS Working Papers and/or as journal articles. They are mostly referred to in the text of this paper or listed in the bibliography. The original inspiration for the historical part of the 1986 draft was provided by a 1985 conference at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, a conference that eventually led to the unique collection of essays edited by Frits van Holthoon and Marcel van der Linden (1988). My debt to that conference should be evident from the copious references. My personal gratitude to Marcel, for his contributions, his assistance with references and offprints, must be expressed here. Appreciation must also be expressed to a number of commentators on an earlier draft of the present paper, these including Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Ken Post, Andre Gunder Frank, and an anonymous reader for my Institute’s Working Papers. Kim Scipes provided the initial stimulus for the critique of Brecher and Costello. This re-draft will, no doubt, fail to satisfy any of them. Maybe it will provoke one of them, or another reader, to do better.

2. I use a capital ‘C’ when referring to Communism in its party and state forms, a lower-case one when referring to it in its more general sense. Readers (not to speak of proof-readers) may be confused by finding ‘Communism’ followed by ‘communism’, or vice versa. To add to the confusion, my major Marxist texts, or translations, also vary in their use. I have preserved the style of my sources here. I have resisted the temptation to vary the size of the first letter with the rise and decline of communism – or Communism.


4. Here is a thumbnail sketch, based on available materials. The situation was the following. The leadership of the National Union of Mineworkers had recently almost destroyed the ‘free world’ MIF by pulling out of it and creating a ‘peaceful coexistence’ International Mineworkers Organisation (IMO), together with the official unions of the Communist world and their friends in the West. In the absence of any preparation or effective leadership from the NUM leadership, an international campaign of solidarity, unique in size, extent and variety, was organised at pit, community and movement level (Howells 1986, Saunders 1989). Meanwhile, funds collected from poverty-stricken and politically-repressed Soviet miners were deposited by the NUM leadership with the IMO in Paris, apparently to defend them against sequestration, but perhaps also for a rainy day – in the UK or elsewhere. When Soviet miners were eventually able to speak internationally for themselves, they began asking – with more than a little encouragement from the NUM’s rightwing British enemies – what had happened to their funds. It was at this point that international solidarity with the British miners hit the national media for the second time (the first was when an NUM representative met those of the authoritarian-nationalist Libyan regime). Evidently, a leadership strategy switch from ‘free-world’ to ‘peaceful coexistence’ or ‘anti-imperialist’ internationalism had not implied any extension of membership information about, control over or involvement in the new relationship. It is against this background that we can understand why the extraordinary wave of international solidarity during the strike appears to have had no continuing effect. The case requires research that would update the excellent work of Saunders (1989), which only goes up to the end of the strike, and is of a non-theoretical nature.

5. Thanks must be expressed to Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello for permission to refer to a manuscript draft. My commentary will be updated in the light of the final version, intended for publication in Z Magazine (Boston) during 1991.

6. The continuing Leninist search for the Weak Link more and more reminds one of that of a medieval European vanguard (knights) for the Holy Grail. The Holy Grail, my dictionary informs me, is the ‘cup or platter used (according to legend) by Christ at Last Supper, and in which Joseph of Arimethea received Christ’s blood at the cross’ (Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 1982:431). That the Weak Link is just as legendary does not, evidently, prevent Leninists from endlessly seeking it. Since in neither case has the sought-for object been discovered, one is obliged to recognise that travelling hopefully continues to be better than arriving.
Extended bibliography

In addition to references, this bibliography contains selected items on the old and the new internationalism from a much more extensive one, presently part of a personal database. It is hoped to eventually put this alphabetical listing on a proper database programme, thus making keyword selection possible. Contributions to, or collaboration with developing a database on internationalism and internationalism would be welcome.


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