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**WHAT HAPPENED TO THE LAND QUESTION
IN ZIMBABWE?
RURAL REFORM IN THE 1980s**

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1. INTRODUCTION

"Land is the central issue in the Rhodesian conflict"
(Riddell, 1979).

"Our freedom struggle always recognised the question of land
as the principal grievance" (Mugabe, 1989a).

1.1. Issues and approach

In the late 1970s there was much discussion of Zimbabwe's post-independence development options. The focus was often on rapid and radical transformation. "The land question" was usually presented as the critical issue, namely the division of land between white capitalist and black peasant farmers; and a rapid major resettlement of people and reallocation of land - whether to individual peasants or collectives - was seen as imperative (e.g. Riddell, 1978.) At independence in 1980 there were over 6000 white-owned commercial farms, some abandoned, on 15.4 million ha. or almost 40% of rural land, much of it lightly utilized; and well over 600,000 peasant households in only a slightly larger area, with on average much poorer land and locations, and carrying double the officially estimated sustainable population for the farming systems then used. State lands and small black-owned commercial farms made up the balance.

This paper outlines the rural development policies and debates in the 1980s, with an emphasis on land reform. The decade saw great changes and achievements in Zimbabwe, judged by normal standards and by the record of most African countries, but less so if judged by some of the 1970s expectations. Views on the slow progress in land reform fall similarly mostly into two broad schools: those who see it as reflecting purely the current balance of group interests, and who tend to be disappointed at the rate of change; and those who see a rational choice by the government in terms of a broader national interest, given the actual opportunities and constraints it has faced. Auroi exemplifies the latter school:

"The case of Zimbabwe... refuses to disrupt a production system that worked relatively well...while at the same time it tries to correct its unbalanced structure of land distribution and access to resources in general. Zimbabwe also seems to withdraw from heavy collectivism... Like any model it is surely not transferable as such to other countries, but nevertheless it shows a high level of wisdom, prudence and shrewdness. These qualities are usually not amongst the most commonly encountered features of land reform processes" (Auroi, 1988:2).

There are complementarities and overlaps between the two schools, strengths in both, and too little research to give confident answers to all the issues. I will try to ensure that the issues are at least adequately posed; and will further suggest that policy makers became aware of a number of factors which could plausibly be felt to make much faster resettlement in the 1980s a relatively unattractive option. I will often cite the words used by policy-makers themselves, to convey their reasoning and perceptions. In the 1990s however, the balance of factors may change.

Section 1.2 gives general background information for readers not familiar with Zimbabwe, and section 1.3 sketches the national context limiting and influencing government policy in the 1980s. Section 2 then looks at resettlement to (former) white-owned commercial farms (which is conventionally called simply "resettlement"), at the various constraints on the programme - technical, economic and political, as well as legal or financial - and at options and dilemmas facing the policymakers. In the 1980s much of the government leadership came to accept arguments that non-agricultural sources of foreign exchange are too few to make resettlement on the scale discussed in the 1970s an acceptable risk in the short or maybe even medium term. It was decided to give main attention to social and economic programmes in the existing peasant areas (the so-called Communal Areas), including organizational restructuring and associated land reforms. These programmes are sketched in Section 3, in their own right and to appreciate in context the issue of resettlement to previously "white" areas. "The land question" seems to have become as much a matter of the internal organization of Communal Areas, and of movement from there to towns and newly cleared areas, as of movement of peasants to commercial farmlands. Section 4 notes though the reemergence in 1989 of resettlement prominently on the political agenda after six years. It then summarizes the 1980s debate and considers the 1990s prospects for resettlement.

1.2. Background on Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is a landlocked country with about 150,000 sq.miles (390,000 sq.km.) of territory and around 9.4 million people in 1990. It is bounded to the north by Zambia, to the west by Botswana, to the south by South Africa, and to the east by Mozambique. (See Fig. 1.) Per capita income in 1988 was around US\$650 at official exchange rates; real mean per capita income was more or less the same at the end of the 1980s as at the beginning, and less than the level of the mid 1970s, though it is now rather better distributed.


Zimbabwe's African chiefdoms were overrun in the 1890s by white settlers, coming from South Africa but under the authority of the British flag and the charter of the British South Africa Company. [1] When their expectations of a minerals bonanza were disappointed, the settlers turned more systematically to land acquisition and development of their own agriculture, heavily discriminating against African farmers. They appropriated around half the country, largely of the better quality land and on the central high plateau (highveld). African agriculture was mainly confined to poorer lower land in the flanking middleveld areas, subject to some important exceptions. Originally called "Native Reserves", these lands are now called Communal Areas, as they are to some degree under group control rather than formally individually owned, and since grazing areas are largely open-access. Measures were undertaken to establish a migrant-labour system, in which African workers in the towns and mines retained land in the Reserves. Part of family subsistence was then covered from this land, with the Reserves being largely populated by wives, children and the old and retired.

**FIG. 1. LAND CLASSIFICATION
AND TENURE (AS AT 1/6/82)**

SCALE : 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 km

AGRO ECOLOGICAL REGIONS	
I	SPECIALISED AND OVERSHAD REGION RAINFALL MAINLY ABOVE 1000mm p.a.
II	INTENSIVE FARMING REGION RAINFALL MAINLY 750 - 1000mm p.a.
III	SEMI INTENSIVE FARMING REGION RAINFALL MAINLY 650 - 800mm p.a.
IV	SEMI EXTENSIVE FARMING REGION RAINFALL MAINLY 450 - 650mm p.a.
V	EXTENSIVE FARMING REGION RAINFALL MAINLY BELOW 450mm p.a.

LEGEND	
LAND USE	LAND TENURE
COMMERCIAL LAND	COMMUNAL
COMMERCIAL FARMING LAND (large scale)	FREEHOLD
COMMERCIAL FARMING LAND (small scale)	FREEHOLD
FOREST LAND	STATE LAND
NATIONAL PARKS	"
RESETTLEMENT AREA	"
SAFARI AREA	"
SANCTUARIES, BOTANICAL GARDENS ETC.	"
URBAN LAND	MAINLY FREEHOLD



In 1923 the white settlers were given the choice of self-rule as a British colony or incorporation into South Africa. They chose self-rule, under the name Southern Rhodesia. From the early 1940s through to the mid-70s the formal sector economy grew dramatically, with emergence of large diversified capitalist agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and consolidation of a broadly-based mining sector. Foreign investment and markets were critical in this. The country became one of the largest exporters of Virginia tobacco. Its economy catered in the first instance only to a small minority (whites were never more than 6% and are now less than 1.5% of the population), who drew on the labour of the majority. Sutcliffe (1971) estimated that the income distribution in the 1960s was the most unequal of any country for which data was available. At the same time, a small but significant number of Africans progressed in agriculture, trade, a few professions and semi-skilled wage labour.

In 1965 the white government declared independence (UDI) under the name Rhodesia, rather than accept even a slow transition to majority rule. From 1972 on a liberation war intensified, fought from the peasant areas and neighbouring black-ruled states. The 1978 "internal settlement" between ruling white groups and some tamed nationalist forces led by Muzorewa failed to find foreign recognition. It was followed by a British-mediated settlement in 1979 between the internal groups and the guerilla forces (the Lancaster House agreement), and internationally recognized independence with majority rule in 1980.

The 1980, 1985 and 1990 general elections were decisively won by the main force in the liberation war, ZANU(PF), led by Robert Mugabe. It has pursued an extraordinarily magnanimous policy of reconciliation with whites and their former black allies. Not all whites have responded in equal measure, but fortunately the one third or more who left during the past decade included many of the more racist. In 1980-82 and again from 1988, ZANU(PF) has shared power with the other leading group that fought for independence, PF(ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo, which has been the majority party in the Matabeleland provinces. During 1982-87 a low-level insurgency smouldered in Matabeleland, but this ceased after the 1987 unity agreement between the parties. The two parties merged by the end of 1989.

1.3. The policy context in the 1980s

Several major factors should be mentioned as affecting policy in the 1980s. Different groups disagree on their relative importance.

The independence agreement of 1979 was in effect a compromise. The black independence movements were not able to obtain all that they had stated in their programmes. Important concessions were obtained by the white settler group, and by the international forces (led by the U.K. government) which arbitrated the agreement. The constraints here are not just the formal commitments embodied in the Lancaster House agreement, which expired in April 1990, but also those corresponding to the balance of forces that led to the agreement. The liberation war was at an impasse, with no major changes in position since mid-1978 and none immediately probable. For a variety of

reasons, all parties involved had an incentive to adopt a compromise rather than prolong the painful and costly war. The neighbouring black "Frontline States" were hard hit by the conflict, part of which was waged on their territory; and the guerilla movements were dependent on their support. Further, the Frontline States judged that even if the guerilla forces did eventually wear down their military opponents, the economic as well as human costs would be severe, undermining the value of victory, and that even military success could not achieve the full independence they aimed for (Thompson, 1985).

Subsequently in the 1980s, there has been a shortage of resources, especially foreign exchange, to risk revolutionary structural changes. The country's location would make any loss of its food self-sufficiency very expensive, both financially and (if South African food had to be bought) politically. Zimbabwe has advanced economic sectors that are heavily dependent on foreign capital, technology and markets, and on imported inputs for investment. Imports are around 25% of national expenditure, and are overwhelmingly of intermediate and capital goods. An important degree of priority thus attaches to maintaining and increasing exports, especially after very severe import compression in the productive sectors emerged from 1983. Both the white settler group and foreign capital remain powerful, as much of the country's production and ability to earn foreign exchange yet depend on them. The significant black middle classes, strongly and increasingly represented in the dominant party, are neither strong enough nor keen enough to "go it alone". These factors will not suddenly disappear after April 1990. [2]

1980s conditions in the world economy, several droughts, and the regional context set by South African destabilization, added to the constraints facing a small peripheral economy with long vulnerable transport lines. Apart from the costs of defence, including fighting a war in Mozambique, many resources have been preempted by expenditure for meeting basic needs (health, education, minimum wages, etc.) and trying to remedy Rhodesian neglect. The public sector deficit reached over 10% of national income and is still around 9%.

Established urban industrial and commercial sectors and a centralized administration set limits on decentralized rural development. Zimbabwe is a compact country with relatively good and improving transportation; most areas are within a few hours of the two major cities, Harare and Bulawayo. In marketing fruit, vegetables and handicrafts, rural people often bypass the smaller towns and come directly to the cities, travelling 200km or more. They can combine such marketing with other activities, given the concentration of so many functions and people in the metropoli.

Finally, the 1980s were a period of transition, reconciliation, reconstruction, and learning. White rule had excluded most blacks from training and responsibility, and so the 1980s involved much catching up, creation of institutions and gaining of experience. There has also been a great backlog of pent-up expectations and desires. One indicator is that the state sector has largely retained the salary scales which the settlers had established for themselves - which has had significant implications for overall distribution.

2. RESETTLEMENT TO FORMER "EUROPEAN" AREAS

"We had wanted to resettle some 162,000 families within three years, 162,000. It just proved impossible, because it was beyond, completely beyond, our management and our resources... And even if we had the resources, we just do not have the capacity to do it" (President Mugabe, 1989b).

"The Government has repeatedly stressed that productive farmers of all races and colour will always find a place in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector and it is envisaged that mechanics of releasing land for resettlement will take due cognisance of this fact" (Minister Chikowore, 1987b:5).

2.1. Aggregate performance

The 1980s resettlement programme certainly fell well short of the targets stated in 1982, let alone goals announced earlier by the ruling party when in exile or in its 1980 manifesto. These also emphasized collective cooperatives, but the programme to date is overwhelmingly on a family basis (over 90% of the settlers). [1]

The famous, remarkably precise, figure of 162,000 families to be resettled, announced in 1982, seems to have had little or no basis in programme planning. [2] In fact the 1982/5 Transitional National Development Plan mentioned resettling eventually "at least some 162,000 peasant families", "subject to practical financial and economic constraints" (Zimbabwe, 1982:66); but the figure of 162,000 has remained frozen since then, as if conditions in the Communal Areas had not changed, or as if Government felt it was so remote as to make updating superfluous. Further, while the Plan only aimed to resettle "a large number" (loc. cit.) of the 162,000 during 1982/5, it was the latter figure that entered popular (and much official and academic) consciousness. [3] The figure of 35,000 families settled by 1985 was then widely treated as a mark of abject failure.

Zimbabwe's resettlement performance, with 52,000 families and perhaps 400,000 people resettled by late 1989, on around 3 million ha., is still impressive by the standards of official re-settlement programmes. As several authors have noted, it is also comparable to the rate of settlement envisaged in the programmes planned in the early 80s, before the appearance of the 162,000 families figure. Performance appears less impressive by the numerical standards of some land tenure reform programmes which were able to affect the bulk of the population in a matter of a few months or years. There are reasons for this.

2.2. Distinctiveness of the Zimbabwe case: the foreign exchange constraint

Zimbabwe's situation is different from many historic land reform cases, let alone Russia or China. Some aspects will be clear from Section 1's discussion of the national context.

1. The country is small and trade-dependent, but with little problem at present in supplying cities and industry with agricultural

produce. The purposes of land reform that have been to the fore are correspondingly different. They include rectifying past and present inequities, moving towards a new society, and alleviating conditions in the Communal Areas, while continuing to generate the present surpluses from the rural sector.

2. The large farms are not intermingled with the peasant areas and instead are on the whole in quite different parts of the country. (See Fig.1.) So redistributive land reform (other than to farm-workers) requires major re-settlement.

3. By the 1980s Zimbabwe's large farms were not labour-based semi-feudal estates or haciendas, that could be easily and rapidly annexed with no risk to production or with even an increase in production. Instead the large farm sector is post-"Green Revolution", and quite intensive in use of capital goods, purchased intermediate goods, and trained management. This pattern of factor-use has intensified in the 1980s after new minimum wage legislation. In the early 80s the sector generated 80% of all agricultural output, including well over 90% of marketings. In the late 80s it still marketed over 70% of the total, and had average yields for maize (the staple food) around seven times the Communal Areas average (5000 kg/ha v. 700) and over twice those of peasant farmers on comparable land. The gap can undoubtedly be narrowed and hopefully eventually closed by extension of credit and support, but this will take a number of years. (Zimconsult/Hifab, 1989).

What are now called the Large Scale Commercial Farms (LSCFs) also produce over 35% of national exports, especially still from tobacco, as well as from beef, coffee, tea and new horticultural lines. [4] Critically, flue-cured tobacco, a relatively demanding product, still generates almost 20% of Zimbabwe's exports, around US\$ 300 million or approaching Z\$ 700 m. p.a. (Karimanzira, 1989b,d). Some resettlement farms that earlier produced tobacco or beef for export no longer do so (Mushava, 1989). The sector further supplies almost a third of the raw materials used by local manufacturing, including for much of manufactured exports (Riddell, 1980), and saves foreign exchange that would otherwise go on imports, notably by producing all Zimbabwe's wheat, and nearly all sugar, oil and bean crops (Chung, 1989).

Settling 162,000 families using the original resettlement models might require almost 60% of the 1980 commercial farm area. No doubt part of that area could have been immediately annexed without severely impinging on exports or ecology (Weiner et al, 1985); but there were arguably major risks in trying to fast approach a 60% or 162,000 families figure and for example triggering a exodus of whites, both of farmers and other businessmen and professionals. That in turn would jeopardize prospects of attracting or retaining outside investment. The government could have adopted a low definition of "full compensation"; but, just as in 1979, it accepted that the economic costs of an apparent victory over the white settlers would outweigh the gains (Thompson, 1985). Stoneman (1988a:45) argues that: "Despite demonstrations of legal ways in which redistribution could have been brought about without violating the letter of Lancaster House, it can be inferred that a political decision was taken not to contest the

spirit of the agreement, tied in as it was with the whole complex of aid, trade and investment". Thus when around 1984 the successive droughts had driven many white farmers far into debt, the state's Agricultural Finance Corporation did not foreclose on them (ibid.:50).

In other words, the binding constraint perceived may have been need for foreign exchange, and foreign markets, contacts and technology, not the Lancaster House agreement itself. The government has no desire to jeopardize export earnings, even if only for a decade, and lose the valuable degree of policy autonomy from foreign donors that it has at present (Moyo & Skaines, 1989).

2.3. Constitutional constraints and logistical limits

The Lancaster House constitution broadly meant that land could be bought only under the following conditions:-

1. from willing sellers; for though government has some power to acquire lands when necessary for the public interest,
2. it has had to pay with funds that can if desired be remitted abroad, if it compulsorily acquires more than a small part of a property.

Even in domestic currency terms, Ministers have frequently complained at the prices at which land is offered for sale.

While the African Development Bank, Kuwait and the European Community provided support, donors have not been willing to provide funds for land acquisition, as opposed to land development. The exception is the U.K., reflecting its post-colonial obligations, but it has been somewhat chary; and besides requiring equal Zimbabwean contributions, it has set conditions on land suitability and for detailed advance planning. It provided 20 million pounds in 1980, 10 million a few years later to indirectly help with the Zimbabwean contributions, and, when these funds were finally used up, another five million in 1990. [5] The Zimbabwe government went ahead with buying land by itself, for example areas which were too small for a full-scale donor project. On much of this land it enacted the quicker but less carefully prepared Accelerated Resettlement programme.

Government has the right of first refusal on land that is offered for sale (but only for 30 days), thanks to the Land Acquisition Act of 1985. This also gave it power to acquire unused land without compensation, but it has hardly done so. Much underused land remained purchasable only with full compensation remittable abroad.

Surprisingly little is still known on levels of utilization, despite repeated calls for studies (e.g. DERUDE, 1987). No doubt commercial farmers are uncooperative, and no doubt there are substantial underutilized areas (Commission of Inquiry into Taxation, 1985). But calculating exactly how much is sensitive to agronomic assumptions about speeds of regeneration etc.; and a key issue concerns how to assess the use of good land for extensive grazing, partly for export beef. [6] Further, underutilized areas scattered farm-by-farm might be hard for government to use; and farmers will not sell to government even the land they cannot profitably utilize, if government does not meet the current market price. Many have also been innovating rapidly

in land use, e.g. establishing safari parks and game ranches. As with the moves into prime beef and horticulture, there may be underlying government subsidies, but in each case to help generate foreign exchange.

Active farmers, especially in the heartlands of commercial farming - i.e. the higher and more central areas - have been regularly told by government (if with various wordings) that they will be supported; and they have been investing. [7] Most of government appears willing to let transition be gradual, allowing time to build up the capacity of small black farmers, collectives and state farms, to enable eventual takeover or subdivision of most of the private commercial farms without risking major declines in production, profitability, exports and employment.

Finally, other constraints on the speed of resettlement were encountered:-

1. Logistical - i.e. administrative, planning and implementation capacities. These constraints arise from the decision, in principle, to reject resettlement that is not centrally planned (see 2.5. below). The current programmes call for considerable skilled manpower.

2. Problems of water supply for new settlers and their animals, especially in face of several droughts in the 1980s.

3. Armed conflict in the Matabeleland provinces during 1982-87. While these problems were less fixed or fundamental than the issues mentioned earlier, there were thus sometimes considerable delays in settling people on the land that had been acquired. By international standards though the rate of land development and settlement was still high (Cusworth, 1989).

2.4. The 1983-89 go-slow

Zimbabwe cut funding for resettlement sharply from mid-1983, when fiscal and foreign exchange crises struck. In later years land acquisition was fairly slow. This was also because little good land became available beyond the abandoned farms which were acquired in the early 80s. So by July 1989 it could be officially reported that only 10% of acquired land had not been resettled. [8] Rather less than 20% of former European farm lands have been acquired; with a small amount coming too from former State lands (Karimanzira, 1989a).

In 1985 the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement & Rural Development (MLRRD) was carved up between longer-standing Ministries, notably those of Agriculture and Local Government. While this partly reflected the downgrading of resettlement, the position of a separate Ministry responsible for helping the Communal Areas, directly or by resettlement, was difficult to sustain. Its forerunner Ministry had been hived off in 1978 from the Rhodesian Ministry of Internal Affairs, ruler of the "Reserves", and had worked on limited resettlement plans. After independence the expanded MLRRD overlapped with many other Ministries, still relied on Agriculture for technical work, and conflicted with the main successor to Internal Affairs, namely the Ministry of Local Government, patron of the new local committees and District Councils that are intended to be the democratic channels for rural development (see section 3.2 below). It offended many

Ministries by attempts to coordinate or duplicate their work. Possibly a Ministry of Resettlement alone could have been preserved, but that seemed unnecessary given the slowing down of the programme and the wish to integrate resettlement areas into the local government system. Instead the Department of Rural Development, which had the lead responsibility for resettlement, became just a relatively minor wing of Local Government. Many of its senior staff left. [10]

The carve-up of MLRRD followed the slowdown of resettlement but has probably helped to perpetuate it. From 1985 Local Government (now called Local Government, Rural & Urban Development) took over main responsibility for resettlement areas and policy. Yet responsibility for much of scheme planning and implementation, as well as for land acquisition, went to Agriculture, now called the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture & Rural Resettlement. This ambiguous and confusing arrangement has not promoted action. Resettlement, a complex task involving coordination of fifteen or more agencies, has organizationally shrunk down to sections in each of two massive ministries with numerous longstanding other concerns (Cusworth, 1989).

A 1985 study on agrarian reform options, commissioned by MLRRD, was officially submitted by FAO in 1986 (FAO, 1986). It was eventually debated in an October 1987 conference - and then re-debated in an August 1988 national seminar. Not until 1989 did any urgency emerge, for reasons we will see in Section 4. It was accepted during the 1987 conference that much faster resettlement would have to wait until 1990 and expiry of the Lancaster House constitution.

2.5. The rejected alternative of centrally unplanned resettlement; criteria of controlled settler selection

A way to have had faster resettlement could have been to allow "auto"-resettlement, including (1) unplanned settlement on purchased farms, and (2) toleration of squatting on other farms. In practice there has been some of both; e.g. many of the earlier squatters forced their way to the head of the line for selection for official resettlement, and constitute around half of the settlers to date (Weiner, 1989). The "Accelerated Resettlement Programme" of the early 80s, which involved settlement with little infrastructural investment, was partly a ratification of squatters. Correspondingly, the slowing down of official resettlement work from 1983 is exaggerated by the gross figures for numbers settled, especially since much of the mid- and late-80s work has had to be on upgrading the Accelerated schemes.

The Accelerated Programme is adjudged to have been unsatisfactory. In the words of the Minister of Agriculture:

"Between 1981 and 1984 people were just put on the land with no infrastructure whatsoever, such as schools and clinics. This did not work and these areas are currently under reorganisation and upgrading... it is necessary that everything is there before resettling the land'... The minister confirmed that before any further resettlement took place, training of farmers to be placed on the land would be undertaken" (Financial Gazette, 4 Aug. 1989).

The President lately voiced similar sentiments, after a visit to Malaysia, where resettlement farmers arrive to find even their homes already built (Mugabe, 1989b). [10]

In principle and increasingly in practice government has rejected squatting. This is not just due to the Lancaster House constitution, which only affects the case of squatting on unpurchased farms.

(a) Squatters are not necessarily those most in need, or most deserving, or most able to use the land well. For example since the war was most intense in the east of the country, that is where most farms were abandoned, but it is not the area with greatest peasant pressure on land; and some of those who moved on to abandoned land were larger peasants who had the resources to expand their scale of cultivation and grazing (Herbst, 1990).

(b) Government wants to control not only who gets access to resettled land, but also who gets how much, where they settle, how they cultivate and graze, etc. This is consistent both with a selection approach that stressed need rather than farming ability, and with the traditions of the State's technical bureaucracies and their Ministers. Government believes that it can ensure better land use than would happen after squatting. "Every settler must work full-time in his field in order to produce the maximum possible yields of the crops recommended by the extension workers provided by Government" (Minister Chikowore, 1987a:2). There was talk of legislating to require "annual submission of production returns on the basis of which the settlers' performance will be judged"! (Chikowore, 1987b:6); "failure to achieve the planned production targets should lead to withdrawal of the [resettlement] permits" (Chikowore, 1988b:4). No doubt this has dissuaded some potential settlers. [11]

An option which has only gradually received attention is to involve local communities in the management of resettlement. The limits of rushed individual-centred approaches, such as the possible failure to create cohesive new communities, have become apparent. The idea of local management applies better though for communities which are adjacent to vacant commercial lands; and it can have the problem of local elite control of the allocation of benefits.

(c) Squatting threatens property rights, which troubles many leaders. It also threatens government's prerogatives of allocation and authority.

(d) Squatting, like most current resettlement, is an extension of individual peasant farming, about which some of the government have had mixed feelings.

(e) Many decision-makers have become concerned about not just the productivity of squatters (especially if on land that was previously used), but particularly about their environmental impacts, including on presently unused land. Indeed this applies to most settlers, even those originally officially selected. Such fears, whether well-founded or not, are widely expressed, including in Parliament and the official press (see Gasper, 1990). "Government has

noted problems and shortcomings in the initial stages of the resettlement schemes... and will not allow the creation of more communal lands where trees are indiscriminately cut" (Nkomo, 1990).

For all these reasons, the government has been committed to controlling the selection of settlers (Geza, 1986). Initially this was done directly by officials; later the District Councils have been involved, under supervision. Squatting has been rejected as an official selection criterion, whether as a proxy for need or motivation or ability. The main criteria originally used included poverty, landlessness or holding of insufficient land, and non-possession of an outside job, etc. These are need-based, and thus present-oriented, criteria. (But married women are not accepted for resettlement in their own right.) The criteria did not give priority to farming qualifications, farming record or possession of equipment and stock. With time there was a shift towards the future-oriented criterion of ability to use the land well, with progressively more weight being given to selecting trained "master-farmers". Past-oriented criteria, of pre-colonial tribal claims to an area, or of people's war record, have not moved up in the same way. Government has become increasingly intolerant of farm squatters, declaring them to be "a menace [who] wanted to destroy and plunder the country's resources" (Chikowore, 1987d). [12]

2.6. Collectives and state farms

Some leaders may have preferred to establish collectives or state farms, rather than first set up a more prosperous individual black farmer group. Socialist resettlement was indeed reavowed at the ZANU(PF) Party Congress of 1984.

In practice, most of the new collective farms (known as Model B) have had serious problems, despite being on large tracts of good land (Mumbengegwi, 1988). They have had transitory populations of youths, some ex-guerillas, and often uneducated, foreign, elderly workers left from the previous commercial farms. There has typically been "gross" under-utilization of land and labour, far above commercial farms, according to a Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies report to the collectives' umbrella body. It appears that some more successful collectives secretly kept most or all land as private plots. Many have been heavily dependent on foreign NGO aid. By rushing to promote a highly demanding form of organization - collective cooperatives - straight after independence, government seems instead to have discredited the idea in the minds of ordinary people as well as of officials and politicians themselves. Proponents of collectives complain of the low government support, but consoled themselves with the idea that, until South Africa is free, a big push to develop the collective sector could unacceptably increase the risk of foreign intervention (Sacco, 1988).

The state farming organization (ARDA/ADA) has had acceptable results overall, as well as some scandals and crises. The average monetary return on capital is low, but ADA provides essential agricultural supplies and exports. It may not operate very differently from capitalist estates (Weiner, 1989), or be able to handle much faster

expansion than at present. ADA supervises some smallholder resettlement, mainly of trained farmers to be outgrowers to an estate (this is known as Model C); but is in general not oriented to peasant agriculture. [13]

2.7. Assessing the cost-effectiveness of resettlement

In a situation of limited resources available for investment, a major factor has probably been that generally better returns were possible so far from supporting existing farmers in the Communal Areas, rather than from resettlement. In terms of the psychology of decision-making, the 1983 cut in the resettlement budget, made during the 1981-4 drought, was followed in 1985 by a bumper Communal Areas harvest after good rains.

Resettlement as done in the 1980s is expensive (though rather less so in the criticised Accelerated programme):- it involves the purchase of land, putting in new villages, houses, roads and water supplies, plot boundaries, storage facilities, etc., and clearing trees, building conservation works, and so on (partly at officially set wage-levels). It is also experimental, in terms of creating new communities which have to learn to live together as well as how to farm in new environments, and who were not selected in terms of ability to farm or willingness to be neighbours. Administrative costs per head are around six times those in Communal Areas (Cusworth & Walker, 1988:56-8).

Finally, it is low-density. Settler families have received an average of 65 ha., no more than 10% of which is cultivated in any one year (ibid.:195). Hazlewood (1985) amongst others queried the necessity of such low densities. Rather than being based on a wish to provide for descendants of the settlers, they reflect the productivity-levels and land requirements of the peasant farming systems prescribed in the mainstream set of models, the family farming Model A. Many of the technical coefficients used were taken from the land-extensive commercial farming sector, reflecting a relative ignorance of smallholder production (Cusworth & Walker, 1988:11). Model A relies on animal traction and needs large grazing areas, especially given the conservative stocking norms set by the agricultural bureaucracy (ibid:30,49). The approach used was largely inherited from pre-independence planning and/or staff; and the modest target levels reflect the bias in agricultural research over 90 years towards the needs of large commercial farmers. It also assumes that farmers must cover their own food requirements (which limits the adoption of crops that are more profitable in given areas), and that families do not have outside employment. This last restriction is supposed to be on equity grounds. In practice both restrictions may have been increasingly ignored. Other family members may be employed, and informal employment is also possible. Thus the yields assumed by the official resettlement models are low, compared too to estimated yields in high-potential Communal Areas (Weiner, 1988).

Results so far of farmers on the family-farm model A seem to have been satisfactory in terms of degree of fulfilment of the very modest gross output targets (Matanyaire, 1987; Cliffe, 1988a). The

programme's evaluation unit reports that the equally modest target net incomes have been largely achieved; and rural income figures are always liable to be underestimated. The settlers have moved in a big way into cotton cultivation, something unforeseen in the scheme plans. Further, there is reported to have been overachievement in the good rainfall years of the late 80s (Karimanzira, 1990b). Even in the mid-80s only 10% of settlers expressed an interest in leaving. [14]

Results may be less satisfactory in terms of return on public investment as compared to alternative rural programmes (Moyo et al, 1988; Cusworth & Walker, 1988). Resettlement areas have received not only higher per capita physical investment but also much more extension support than Communal Areas; yet "master farmers" in the Communal Areas seem to obtain often better results for less investment cost. [15] On the other hand, the British aid agency has evaluated the (non-Accelerated) parts of the Model A resettlement programme as clearly successful, even when costed in terms of the production foregone by not leaving the lands concerned in commercial use (ibid.). [16] It notes though major differences between settlers: three types - those in poorer natural areas, those without cattle, and dependent women - have done considerably worse than the average. And an important problem of settler indebtedness emerged, partly reflecting weaknesses in service institutions (Cusworth, 1989). [17] Critically, the British view is that broadly successful resettlement has been achieved through careful land-use planning and management, as they insisted on. They doubt whether much faster resettlement could have been effective.

The performance of resettlement farmers can be expected to improve with time as they settle in and adapt to their new, typically more favourable, environments. (Similarly the shift to recruiting more qualified or capable farmers should have an impact.) Some therefore argue that even if resettlement was not a top priority for the 1980s rural development budget, this whole budget and therefore the resettlement allocation should have been higher, at the expense for example of questionable public investments in Boeing 767s and high-cost power stations (investments which were made rather than use foreign airlines and power supplies). The average cost of land purchased in the exceptional conditions of 1980-85 was only Z\$21 per hectare (Moyo et al, 1989), but while later land could be ten times as expensive, for better quality and after market shifts, the cost of buying half the large farm area would be less than for example some of the power-system investments. However, apart from legal limits and unwillingness to rely on troubled neighbours for energy, a difference is that Zimbabwe can, and does, obtain foreign loans for such investments, whereas it cannot raise loans for land purchase. This is not in itself a justification of Boeings and the like, but restates the 1980s constraints on resettlement. Zimbabwe has chosen not to spend its foreign exchange on its own land.

2.8. Limits on the expressed demands for resettlement

Apart from economic returns, in the 1980s there were probably better political and social returns from programmes in Communal Areas, in terms of the number of people who benefit, than from official-style planned and controlled resettlement. As Bratton (1987) and Herbst (1990) stress, potential settlers are a scattered non-organized group. They have not been mobilized by either the ruling Party or the Communal Areas farmers' association (NFAZ). A high proportion are impoverished or women or both. Even squatters have often in contrast been quite organized (and punctilious in making donations to the Party headquarters building fund! - Herbst, 1990). The NFAZ is a still weak body, primarily of master-farmers, to whom it gives priority for resettlement. It is true that there are large numbers of landless in the Communal Areas. But apart from the question of their degree of influence, estimates based on 1980s surveys put the proportion of able bodied adults without land at around 15% (Moyo et al, 1989), much lower than some earlier guesses.

Besides the repulsion effects of the official selection criteria and the manner of regulation of settlers, extra land may not be cited by most farmers as their key requirement, and they have economic and emotional investments in their current holdings (Bratton, 1987). Master-farmers, the most organized group, have the most economic investment. Probably the prime demand of rural dwellers has been schooling. While the government has spoken of 162,000 families to be resettled, and set a long list of selection criteria, only 130,000 families had applied for resettlement by late 1989 (Chikowore, 1989).

Substantial numbers have moved instead to "frontier" areas in the north and west of the country (notably Gokwe and sections of the Zambezi valley), where they are less subject to regulation than in the state resettlement schemes. And, to an extraordinary extent, they have moved to the two metropolitan areas, Harare/Chitungwiza and Bulawayo. Half or more of the growth in national population during 1982-90 is matched by the growth of these metropolises (Hilhorst, 1990; [18]). The causes of this massive migration - with a doubling of metropolitan population in the 80s, representing growth of a million or more people - are not fully known. However, colonial restrictions had left the country considerably under-urbanized relative to its income level; and it is open to doubt how many of these migrants would have preferred to move to resettlement areas.

Finally, it is known that many senior politicians, civil servants and other leading blacks have acquired commercial farms, and various other businesses, sometimes through re-sale of the scarce foreign exchange now allocated to "emergent businessmen". [19] The ruling party has in any case lacked capacity to develop its own analyses or to mount major pressure on the land issue.

2.9. Overall options and comparisons

The 1987 National Symposium on Agrarian Reform "acknowledged that land acquisition for resettlement would only marginally improve the lot of the majority who would have to remain for the time being in the

Communal Areas, unless there was a vigorous effort to restructure [them] and promote their development" (DERUDE, 1987:15). There are urgent problems to be tackled directly in the Communal Areas. A recent study on erosion (Whitlow, 1989) claims there are only a few years left to stem desertification in some areas; and reported that "communal lands were five to seven times more degraded than...general lands with comparable settlement densities.. suggesting that 'land-use management, including conservation measures, was a key factor'". [20]

Even taking over all of the existing commercial farms would only absorb numbers equivalent to ten years growth of the population presently in the communal areas, if the resettlement densities of the official programme are used. Indeed, Kinsey (1982, 1983) claimed that the official programme would - at any rate at the outset - settle less than twice as many people as the number it could displace, i.e. the existing farm workers. Kinsey was much attacked, but his calculations can be read as concerning the current programme-design's implications rather than his own predictions or recommendations. The arguments also to an extent matched government thinking.

"..there is neither enough money nor enough land to purchase for purposes of resettling everyone who needs land, without destroying the basis of our present flourishing agricultural economy. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the nation to embark on a land use and land re-organisation programme" (Minister Chikowore, 1988a:10; emphasis added).

A British assessment argued that resettlement of the current type would show up less favourably if attempted on commercial lands that are more intensively used than those acquired earlier (Cusworth & Walker, 1988). While resettlement so far has indeed often been on lands previously used for grazing, or unused or abandoned, there should be ways to improve upon the official farm models, for example by tractor tillage in those more productive regions that might bear such input costs, or by developing reduced-tillage styles that require less animal inputs and therefore less grazing land (Cliffe, 1988a). The latter approach in particular though might take some years to research and promote, even if cattle's functions other than draught-power can also be replaced. As long as resettlement farms have both lower yields and no greater intensity of cultivation than the bulk of commercial farms, and assuming neither a glut nor a dearth of the staple maize crop, nor major new mineral exports, then the main commercial farm areas may feel safe.

The problems and constraints that have been mentioned in Section 2 are not so mysterious, even if they were not always seen during the rhetoric of a just liberation war. With the recent removal of some of the constraints (e.g. from 1988, the conflict in Matabeleland; and from 1990, the Lancaster House constitution), we will become better able to assess the weight of the other constraints. But as we cannot conduct controlled experiments, and as the weights change over time, the debate over the 1980s will probably remain alive even after new information becomes available. We look at these issues further in Section 4. In the 80s themselves, Government had more than enough on its plate with the numerous new programmes targeted to the Communal Areas, home of almost 60% of Zimbabweans in 1980.

3. IMPROVEMENTS AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE COMMUNAL AREAS

3.1. Production and social welfare

"I would like to inform you that the total or combined positive impact of the Hunger Project Prize on the psychology of our people and our status, socially, politically and economically, has reached immeasurable heights within Zimbabwe... Indeed, internationally, the people of Zimbabwe, their Government and esteemed President in particular, have become an exciting household subject of conversation. Like our Great Zimbabwe or the amazing Victoria Falls, we have, as it were, assumed the proportions of a tourist attraction and marvel. We are high on the agenda of international discussions" (Deputy Minister Manyonda, 1988).

"..food [and] physical amenities... are far from being the complete answer... we conceived education and health as most vital services for the enhancement of the personality of the individual" (President Mugabe, 1989a).

Following the rapid post-war reconstruction, there have been major improvements in many fields of production and welfare in the Communal Areas (CAs). Peasant farmers now supply over half of even the marketed maize and cotton (compared to less than 10% in the 1970s), as well as much else. Their share of total agricultural marketings rose from 6% in 1980 to 22% in 1988, plus the contribution of the resettlement areas.

This notable growth is related to the return of peace but mainly to the great extension of government services, incentives and infrastructure into CAs. Technical packages that were developed and disseminated for the "white" areas in previous decades have become better available outside them. Farmer groups have proliferated. Considerable attention is paid to pricing policy, and "in general Zimbabwe has not got its prices 'wrong'" (Thomson, 1988). They have been reasonably attractive to farmers, subject to a few product exceptions (Skalnes, 1989). [1] Beef pricing however continues to allow commercial farmers to graze on lands of good arable potential.

Leaders have been affected by their periods of exile in Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique. They seem influenced too by the manifest returns and wide acclaim for the policies of the 80s. Much government rhetoric followed President Mugabe's receipt of the Hunger Project Prize, for Zimbabwe's achievements in food production. (Some of it is cited at the opening of this section.)

There is evidence that the growth of CAs production and marketing is heavily concentrated amongst a minority (say 20%), who have the training and outside cash incomes, as well as the draught power and greater landholdings, to make use of the new opportunities. (E.g. one nationwide survey found that the top 10% of CA households have around 35% of total crop income, 45% of total livestock income, and 35% of total household income - Jackson, 1987, 1988. [2]) Perhaps only 10% of CA farmers receive government credit. In addition the growth is heavily concentrated in a few CAs, in the more central and better

watered regions (Bratton, 1987; Weiner, 1989); though Jackson found that similar extremely skewed distributions of income etc. were present in all geographical areas.

There is evidence too of significant malnutrition amongst lower deciles of the rural population (and amongst commercial farm workers) despite the presence in several years of large food surpluses (Davies & Sanders, 1987). Mainstream government discourse seems to insist on the homogeneity of the peasantry, and instead criticizes peasants as not knowing how to select a balanced diet for their families. According to Deputy Minister Manyonda "the abundance of food banks and reserves throughout Zimbabwe... therefore means the almost non-existence of hunger in our country" (1988). Querying of the current pattern of CAs growth is still relatively little heard; for the context is of a history of discrimination and the continuing presence of far larger white farmers. A group of 20% might also be big enough to become a hegemonic bloc.

It has at least been recognized now that labour intensive public-works programmes are necessary in normal and good years, not only drought years. Possibly a million people will be affected by the schemes in an average year. Increased funds were made available from 1987, but the programme was suspended in 1988, due to overspending and various abuses: "the worst problem has been the unnecessary interference by politicians... This has resulted in the over-expenditure on wages and inadequate materials to keep the project moving" (Chikowore, 1988a:9). Thus while 1980s programmes were fairly successful as relief, they had low effectiveness in terms of asset-creation and development. They have unfortunately not yet given a good name to labour-intensive approaches, and instead reinforced many professionals' preference for capital-intensity. Zimbabwe has so far not been able to imitate the sorts of programme established in Botswana, Malawi or Kenya for regular labour-intensive road construction and maintenance. After an inquiry and reorganization, the public works programme resumed in 1990.

There have been great improvements in rural health services, in mortality (though not necessarily in morbidity) rates, in access to schooling, and in rural roads, water supplies, sanitation, and so on (see e.g. Stoneman ed., 1988; Zimconsult/Hifab, 1989). For example, the locally invented Blair Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine is now internationally known. Nationally, the infant mortality rate has been halved from 120 per 1000 live births, primary school enrolment rose threefold to almost 2.5 m. by 1989 and secondary school enrolment almost tenfold to nearly 700,000.

It remains to be seen whether for example the water supply systems that are being installed, mainly with foreign support, will be sustained, i.e. whether Zimbabwe can do better than Tanzania and Kenya. (Approaches used in Malawi have been studied.) For while village participation has often worked well in the construction phase, where it is for a limited period only and under direct supervision, for maintenance and operation it is required indefinitely; and labour is less difficult to mobilize than cash. There is no rural willingness-to-pay for water in Zimbabwe, not least when far greater

government resources go to support middle-class life-styles (on a lavish colonial model) in urban areas (Robinson, 1989).

Population growth has fallen but is still near 3% p.a. There is a moderately active population control policy. More immediately, the vast extension of conventional formal education has contributed to a major and mushrooming problem of formal unemployment. Secondary education is irresistibly attractive, being the condition for entering the sphere of white collar jobs and chances of a post with a pension, vacations, access to cars and loans and so on. It is what all parents want for their children; and so was politically irresistible too. In the early 80s government took the easy road. In the late 80s a large majority of candidates were failing most of their matriculation ("Cambridge") examinations, and ending up unqualified for the formal sector but yet often uninterested in farming or rural residence. The secondary school curriculum is now being changed to include compulsory practical training. A considerable effort is underway to provide the trained teachers and equipment to make the curriculum a reality.

3.2. Communal Area Reorganization

"For effective and sustainable development to occur, Government and its officials ought to see themselves as listeners and facilitators of genuine local initiatives" (Minister Chikowore, 1987c:4).

"My ministry is resolved to phase out haphazard and scatter-based settlement pattern prevailing throughout the country and establish properly planned villages.. The households and their councillors must accept the concept of centralised villages" (Deputy Minister Marere, 1987:3).

A major programme of agrarian reform inside the Communal Areas has commenced. It is commonly known by the name of one of its components, villagization, but is officially titled Communal Area Reorganization. The three components are:

1. grouping together of homes into consolidated villages, at sites chosen for their suitability for providing infrastructure;
2. a village housing programme, with loans available for construction of permanent brick houses, subject to rather high government-set standards, in the consolidated villages;
3. land-use planning - including consolidation of not only residential areas but also of arable and grazing areas etc.; and preparation and implementation of grazing management schemes. In more densely populated areas this exercise will "leave some people unaccommodated...[who] would need to be resettled elsewhere" (Changunda & Muzarakuza, 1987:8). Here the movement of people to former white areas could be invaluable in providing breathing space for CAs reorganization. The 1987 national symposium on land reform noted that, while some could benefit in this way, "not all people will have access to this finite land resource on a viable basis. There is, therefore, a need for concurrent development of secondary and tertiary industry" (DERUDE, 1987:7).

Possible changes in land tenure are also under discussion. Officials have criticized continuing land-holding by those in permanent employment. The 1987 symposium recommended (i) withdrawal of unused holdings, (ii) a ceiling on individual holdings in Communal Areas, and (iii) that tenure there as well as in resettlement areas should be "on an individual permit (lease) basis [that] shall guarantee succession, prevent sub-division, [and] ensure protection of the environment and acceptable husbandry practices" (Chikowore, 1988b:2). Resettlement-style planning would be extended nationwide. Such changes were in principle referred for discussion to all the levels of sub-national government. Cliffe (1988b) thinks it a matter of major significance whether such permits/leases would be administered by the District Council or by the village committee. Gasper (1989b) and others note that village committees too seem elite-dominated; perhaps though they provide channels and incentives for democratic mobilization in the longer-term.

The three-part programme has not emerged recently merely as an alternative to resettlement, but is seen as partly complementary. It was long envisaged in the Ministries concerned, and has resemblances in technical content to what was attempted in the 1950s under the Native Land Husbandry Act. It is now pushed by a government with popular legitimacy. While the 1986-90 National Development Plan spoke of moving 20,000 families a year within the Communal Areas, besides its (equally unlikely) target of 15,000 families a year to former commercial farms, there has been no operative campaign timetable, unlike in Tanzania in the 1970s. Instead work has gone ahead in selected areas around the country. A 1986 directive required a pilot village in each of the 55 District Councils.

The official view is that: "[where] campaigns were carried out, overwhelming reception of the programme was witnessed and where there was no education, there was total resistance" (Changunda & Muzarakuza, 1987:S5). One retains a degree of scepticism at this reported total transformation, when the measure used is from mass meetings which leave the onus on critics to stand up and disagree with the party leaders and civil servants who have just spoken (and indeed chanted slogans for the masses to repeat). There are reported cases where villages that opposed the policy have been told that it is an order. [3] In any case the targets for mapping and planning are so colossal that as of early 1989 only around 0.5% of the required ward and village maps and reports had been completed (Karimanzira, 1989c). One hopes that impatience will not result in a commandist campaign.

There may be awareness of the failings of the Tanzanian approach, where villagization was pushed through far ahead of an already ambitious timetable. However, there is still a danger of priority being given, as in Tanzania, to the convenience of officials and of providing physical infrastructure, rather than to the needs of agricultural production. This is suggested by the village housing programme. The programme assumes: (i) that permanent sites for villages can be confidently fixed for the long-term; it is not expected that some villages will decline or need to be moved; and (ii) that it is a priority for peasants to invest Z\$4000 or more (perhaps two years' income for an average rural family) in non-income-generating assets. The report by Changunda & Muzarakuza argued that the housing scheme must give

precedence to the other components; but admitted that villages were being defined and established without real analysis of landholding capacity or water availability (1987:9-10).

There is a little evidence that the programme disproportionately benefits village elites who own many cattle, dominate the local party and development committees (having reasserted their position in the early 80s), and liaise better with the bureaucracy. Cattle-owners obtain improved grazing and save herding time. Part of the new grazing areas can be chosen from the homestead areas of poorer people, without good compensation (since communal land is in principle not individually owned). Poorer people may then get temporary employment in the public works programme, to put up fences for the grazing areas!

Villagization is the bottom-level of the national settlements policy, which proposes an elaborate hierarchy of seven levels:

- 1 - consolidated villages; 2 - local "business centres";
- 3 - Rural Service Centres; 4 - District Service Centres;
- 5 - "growth points"; 6 - existing towns; 7 - cities.

Levels 2, 6 and 7 emerged under colonial rule. Levels 3, 4 and 5 are intended to remedy imbalances in the colonial settlements pattern. The so-called "business centres" are just locations of a few commercial stores, to which trading in Communal Areas (CAs) has been officially restricted. Levels 1 and 2 could sometimes be combined, as the intended consolidated villages are at a higher level than the existing scattered hamlets or groups of homesteads (kraals). Level 3 involves upgrading selected "business centres", and Level 4 the upgrading of a CAs centre for each District and its Council. Level 5 consists in principle of a few CA centres which have good economic potential and can grow into towns. In practice it has been politically impossible to keep a sharp distinction between levels 4 and 5; in political language all the district centres are "growth points". In popular discussion, and even many official statements, level 3 rural service centres are "growth points" too.

The attractions of the policy have been that it seems to offer a rapid, manageable, relatively painless, easily visualized and highly visible way to advance both growth and equity. Injections of physical infrastructure are intended to create centres that will provide administrative, social and productive services, as well as be sites for rural industries. Much of the policy had already been devised (and parts of it piloted) in the 1970s, before independence, and was available ready-made for quick implementation before the first post-independence General Election.

Problems of the policy include its relatively high cost, inflexibility, and weak connection to a production development strategy. Given the limited growth at most of these centres, the post-independence optimism declined in the mid-to-late 80s, in a period of severe macro-economic and fiscal constraint.

The costs implied are high because of the large numbers of levels and of centres per level. About 430 Rural Service Centres are presently proposed (and a further 80 in resettlement areas), but this

programme remains substantially on paper. Priority has gone so far to 55 District Service Centres. It is still early to judge their impact, except compared to the very high expectations. In those terms many people have become disappointed. Some centres are stagnant, or even known as "death points". Centres which have grown are marked by outlets for liquor, building materials and urban goods, and by hotels of various types. The intensely hoped-for rural industries have been held back by urban competition, established preferences for urban goods, macro-economic problems which are limiting the whole economy, and official regulations and mistrust of the private and informal sectors. As a result in 1990 government at last conceded the demand from small businesses for title deeds on their premises at many Communal Areas centres.

In comparative terms, it may be costly to establish substantial new district centres and "growth points" when there already exist ex-"white" centres with good infrastructure in most Districts, even if they are not in the centre of the more populated areas. There is also a possible danger of trying to fix the settlement pattern at a time when future patterns of communication and of location of economic activity and population can be hard to predict.

The Rural Service Centres are 15-20 km. apart even in the more populous parts of the country. This is still rather remote from many people, who lack much effective access to motorized transport. It could be better to put part of the investment into building up lower-level periodic local markets. Provision of services by State and private agencies might also be coordinated on the same timetable. People would only have easy access to these mobile services say once a week, but that would be an improvement and sometimes all that they need at present. Pilot projects with rural markets and with supportive bodies for wholesale delivery and purchasing are underway. One key constraint is the established access to the cities of those rural people who have significant cash incomes.

I have analysed the overall programme for strengthening centres in rural areas more fully elsewhere, including the views of various economic and ideological groupings (Gasper, 1988, 1989a). For it offers a microcosm of developments in Zimbabwe in the 1980s:- of the old in the new, the vast hopes for Communal Area development, the urban-oriented aspirations, and the necessary compromises and new alliances.

The villagization and growth-point/service-centre programmes illustrate the strength of conventional physical planning approaches in Zimbabwe, as noted by Cliffe (1988a, 1988b). This is partly a continuation of the style of settler social engineering, though now harnessed to rather different objectives. The approaches contain a form of simple "do-it-yourself" development theory which is often palatable to politicians and bureaucrats. The fondness for neat simple static layouts (and for the term "properly planned") may also fit the political vision of many of the new leadership and professional classes. The vision is of a neat hierarchical social/administrative tree. We see the same commitment to "properly planned"

schemes - i.e. planned in detail, using models defined from above - in the resettlement programme.

The government Department of Physical Planning has considerable importance in both urban and rural development. Conyers (1987) reports that its degree of prominence in rural development is almost unique internationally. Its strength is in "development control", i.e. the restriction and channelling of individual property developers, and in "new town" development. In its detailed practice it often follows systems developed pre-independence and for Britain or South Africa. (E.g. 1980s urban expansion was primarily still in the form of new separate areas, formerly called "African townships", now called "high-density residential areas", often with plans inherited at independence or of the same ilk.) Neither type of strength may be so relevant to rural development in a poor country, where more attention may be needed to promoting production than to restricting it or investing in non-productive infrastructure. Physical Planning's Ministry, Local Government, acquired responsibility for rural development; but within it the Department of Rural Development has struggled to find a role.

Physical Planning has been the secretariat for the system of decentralized planning at district and provincial levels. Development committees have been set up at the following levels: 1. "village" (corresponding to the intended consolidated villages); 2. ward (i.e. sub-District); 3. District; 4. Province. Only the village-level committee is directly elected. The others are derived from the committees beneath them, and by ex officio appointment. The District level committee has links to the directly elected District Council; but it mainly consists of officials, and is chaired by the centrally appointed District Administrator.

It was originally thought that these committees would become vibrant centres of local planning and participation, despite their shortage of staff, funds and powers. So far their record, after the first flush of enthusiasm, has perhaps been more similar to that in other poor African countries (Gasper, 1989b). Levels of participation may have declined significantly in the last few years. [4] Some of the de facto functions of village and ward committees seem to be to listen to addresses by officials, endorse schemes and mobilize labour for them, censure "deviants", and provide legitimation and a safety-valve for minor proposals and occasional objections. Most of the "plans" prepared so far have been "shopping-lists" (or "stocking-lists") and have had limited impact. This applies to all the subnational levels.

Probably the most important of the subnational levels is the District, where there is a fair combination of local contact and central representation. Consolidated District Councils were set up in 1980 in each District, in place of the fragmented African Councils. In 1988 an Act for amalgamation of the District Councils and the Rural Councils (i.e. those in the commercial farming areas) was passed. In practice the Rural Councils and the resettlement areas will to an extent live on for the moment as rather distinct wards of the new Rural District Councils; and, within those wards, farmworkers remain

disenfranchised. Amalgamation raised complex issues of pay-scales, job descriptions, availability of funds to pay levelled-up salaries, and much more. It is proceeding slowly.

As a result of the amalgamation of Councils, some "District Service Centres" may be downgraded, since there often exist small towns better suited as district centre. The amalgamation should increase the strength of the former District Councils; but they will remain with very restricted incomes (Helmsing, 1990). They have been unable so far to have great impact, in a system which is highly economically and politically centralized. Any extra district planning staff may go instead into the District Administrators' office or to Physical Planning's provincial offices. It is still true that the Councils are more substantial bodies than those in many African countries (where in several cases elected Councils were simply abolished); and their continuing presence provides a basis for possible future expansion. Experiments are underway to establish feasible systems of district and provincial planning (Gasper, 1989b).

The provincial level is deliberately purely consultative, and so far without its own funds. It is feared that otherwise provinces might provide a base for tribal rivalry or political opposition. However it is a less unrealistic (even if still problematic) level than the district for the presence of many types of manpower. This is both on grounds of total availability of trained manpower and of what are considered acceptable places of residence. Coordination at this provincial level is therefore important, as well as because there are too many Ministries (and nearly 50 Ministers) and a proliferation of State and NGO agencies. Experiments are being carried out with teams of staff who are partly seconded from their respective agencies.

There has been ambivalence in government towards development NGOs. They fill many gaps left by state activity. On the other hand they often bypass the ponderous official machinery and any dreams of total coordination. Policies towards development NGOs and local government will be important indicators of Zimbabwe's future trajectory in rural development (Gasper, 1989b.)

These areas are vital for the hopes expressed for community-based planning, for example by Cliffe (1988b). He advocates this as an alternative to what he sees as the two most influential current options, namely privatisation-plus-population-clearance in the Communal Areas and attempts at state-controlled town-planning type administration of the rural economy. Cliffe stresses that even within a bottom-up option many of the Communal Areas in the drier southern parts of the country cannot advance much without more land. This leads us back to the idea of community involvement in management of resettlement onto neighbouring areas, and its possible limits. One advantage could be if the resettlement spotlight was then focused clearly on lands bordering Communal Areas, so that commercial producers both within and beyond those lands would know more clearly their prospects.

4. REVIEW AND PROSPECTS

"There is now strong evidence that a maize-based farming system as a source of income growth for small farmers is no longer sustainable" (Minister Karimanzira, 1990:3);

"a land re-distribution revolution is not only inevitable but most imminent" (Vice-President Muzenda, 1989).

4.1. Summary of the analysis

Much of the earlier argument is summarized, in simplified form, by the first column of Fig. 2. There were many factors constraining resettlement in the 1980s besides the Lancaster House constitution (#1 in the figure), some of them perhaps more important than it. They included the paucity of good feasible resettlement models (#3b), the higher returns probably available by using limited government resources (especially of skilled manpower) instead in the Communal Areas (#5b), and fears that rapid resettlement could have serious economic impacts. Such impacts might have been through falls in agricultural marketings and exports (#4a, 4c), and by indirect losses of foreign exchange (#4b), investment and employment (#4d), due to international and domestic repercussions such as emigration of white professionals and businessmen. Politically, there was more support to be gained by Communal Area improvements (#6b); and given the overwhelming significance for Zimbabwe of events in South Africa, slow resettlement may even have been considered more favourable for developments "down South" (#6c). Some people may wish to separately list ecological fears, technical conservatism and a control-oriented policy style, factors that are unlikely to change in the 90s.

Many of the constraints or opportunities indicated above are subject to considerable uncertainty; so a key issue concerns responses to uncertainty. Clearly in the 80s the government lent towards caution on resettlement; and one should consider further which groups benefited most from the preoccupation with ensuring foreign exchange. One of the greatest constraints has been the shortage of knowledge and ideas (#3b), itself part of settler colonialism's legacy. There is still a lack of solid research on many of the issues at stake. Perhaps the major studies to date are by a foundation funded by local private business (Whitsun, esp. 1983), a foreign consultant (FAO, 1986), and an external aid agency (Cusworth & Walker, 1988). Valuable work has been done too at the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies (e.g. Moyo et al, 1988). But this institute for example, set up to generate ideas and data for policies of national transformation, has largely failed to fulfil that role, whether because it remained too much on the coat-tails of government, or for other reasons. It is now being appended to the University of Zimbabwe. There are fears that the ruling party's recently re-avowed goal of a one-party state could lead to intellectual stasis nationwide; however there seems to be major opposition to the proposal within the leadership itself.

The leading local researcher on land underutilization and reform options, Sam Moyo, accepts that "the economic arguments against land reform have by no means been fully rebutted" as yet (Moyo & Skalnes, 1989:1), and bemoans the lack of hard evidence on utilization,

Fig. 2: SOME INFLUENCES ON RESETTLEMENT IN ZIMBABWE

	1980s	1990s
1. Exogenous legal constraints	--	
2. Financial constraints		
a. on land acquisition	-	
b. on land development	-	-
3. Logistical constraints		
a. manpower	-	(-)
b. research base, planning capacity	--	?
c. water	(-)	(-)
4. Economic constraints		
a. fear of direct losses of forex	---	-- ?
b. fear of indirect forex losses	--	-
c. fear of direct domestic impact on marketings	-	
d. fear of indirect domestic impacts, on investment and skilled workforce	--	?
5. Economic attractions		
a. Direct returns	-	+ ?
b. Opportunity costs	--	+ ?
6. Socio-political influences		
a. Numbers that would benefit	-	?
b. Support that could be gained	+	++ ?
c. Popular demand	+	++ ?
d. Black elite interests	-	?
e. International political constraints	-	?

Key: "forex" is (hard currency) foreign exchange

- = unfavourable to rapid resettlement

-- = very unfavourable

--- = extremely unfavourable

(-) = mildly unfavourable

+ = favourable

++ = very favourable

= neutral

? = very uncertain; but some uncertainty attaches to all the rankings.

N.B.: the rankings in the table are not weightings to be summed; they simply attempt to compare the influence of different factors, in the 1980s and especially between the 80s and the 90s.

economic returns, etc. While admitting uncertainty concerning the balance of shorter-run considerations, Moyo and Skalnes are amongst those (e.g. Riddell, 1980) who emphasize long-term economic benefits from resettlement. By boosting peasant incomes, it may help move the economy to a less import-intensive pattern of demand and so a less import-constrained path of development. Authors here are sometimes over-optimistic in assuming that export growth is exogenously set by world market expansion, and is not also dependent on local skills in production and marketing (e.g. Robinson, 1988). In an economy clearly constrained by foreign exchange availability in the short run, this

pessimism-cum-insouciance on exports by many proponents of rapid resettlement has not rendered their case widely persuasive. Moyo & Skalnes (1989) are amongst the first of the proponents to stress that export markets can be both penetrated and lost, and that land reform must not be seen as an alternative to export orientation. After the probable exhaustion of easy import substitution options during the UDI period, and given the limits to further self-reliance when 85% of imports already go on production inputs and petroleum (ibid.), they hold that land reform must be presented and designed together with, and as part of, an export generation strategy. The failure to do this during the 80s was a factor undermining the chances of reform, for the government appears to accept that shortage of foreign exchange is the major constraint on domestic investment.

Moyo et al (1989) stress that government must also proceed with measures besides State acquisition of whole commercial farms. Taking an average of existing estimates, they posit commercial farm under-utilization as 30% or equivalent to say 3.75 million ha. [1] On the basis of existing rainfed-farming models, this land could only absorb about 90,000 families, equivalent to less than a quarter of the estimated Communal Area underemployment. Even this can be problematic to centrally design and implement, i.e. to identify, acquire and settle under-utilized land. It is therefore important to in addition consider the possibilities of:-

1. facilitating private purchase, e.g. of part-farms; [2]
2. State purchase of part-farms;
3. promoting access to underused private farms, without purchase; this is partly happening already; e.g. by outgrower tenants, or some lands can offer peasants access to grazing, water, wildlife and wood;
4. employing un- or under-used State lands, including on a similar basis of partial access; Moyo et al estimate here available land equivalent to almost 2 million ha.;
5. continuing movement to underutilized communal lands, which are being opened up thanks to tsetse eradication; they estimate a potential 2-3m. ha.

Possibilities 4 and 5, like resettlement to commercial areas, offer some breathing space, but may need supervision to ensure sustainable use of the land. The total estimated underutilized land, between 8 and 9 million ha., might "only" absorb 200,000 families on present lines, no more than half of existing Communal Areas underemployment. Therefore they go on to identify key areas for trying to intensify and innovate economic activity, especially in the locations where people already reside. These notably include:-

6. extension of large- and small-scale irrigation;
7. public works programmes and promotion of off-farm employment;
8. decentralized development planning and management.

In Section 3 we briefly referred to some possibilities and initial experiences in some of these areas.

4.2. Secular trends

From 1990 there are fewer constitutional restrictions. As long as there is significant agricultural progress in the Communal Areas, the less pressure may there be on government to emphasize the more costly and difficult option of resettlement. When that phase of lower-cost Communal Area progress comes to an end, then pressures will increase. Cliffe (1988b) felt that the phase could already be virtually over; and in a piece entitled "Peasant success amplifies call for land redistribution", Hawkins (1989) hypothesized that while the peasant contribution to crop sales grew from 4.5% in 1979 (a war year) to 22% in 1988 (a wet year), its share might be levelling off around 20% (and less in dry years). He left a question-mark over its ability to generate exports in dry and average years, even on better lands. On the other hand, with continuing rapid population growth and peasant sector improvement, the question could arise: why keep capitalist farmers if peasant farmers can get good yields? The question has more bite in the cases of maize and cotton than for tobacco and other specialist crops. Even for flue-cured tobacco, a few black farmers (partly from the small group with private tenure) are taking the first steps.

Further, the second half of the 1980s was a period of high debt-service commitments (reaching 33% of exports in 1987), due to heavy borrowing in the late 70s and especially the early 80s. By 1990 the figure has fallen to 25% and should fall below 20% in the mid-90s, which would widen policy options. However there is considerable pent-up demand in many areas. Industrial investment has long been constrained by foreign exchange shortages, and by a mass of controls on prices, imports, wages, remittances, etc., which often made real estate or government bonds more attractive. These bonds have helped cover the greatly expanded expenditures on defence, education, and loss-making parastatals. In 1989, after years of internal debate and disagreement, the government announced a programme of economic liberalization and took initial steps to encourage investment, especially from abroad. There is now a huge backlog of needed replacement or overhaul of industrial equipment.

Government deliberately chose to emphasize meeting basic human needs in the 1980s. The President went out of his way to defend this in his 1989 Heroes' Day speech. There is mounting criticism of the 1980s strategy as consumptionist and unsustainable. The criticism is overgeneral and debatable, but in certain areas the balance of policy may have been wrong; for example in the form of adoption of mass academic secondary education, or in peasant water supply programmes that neglected irrigation and income generation.

More generally through the 1980s there have been a variety of national trends, including gradual decline of white dominance, growth of black manpower and organization, and the consolidation of the ruling party, which before 1980 was never comprehensively organized across the country at the various levels. These trends seem likely to continue, as will the permeation of liberal and pragmatic influences and a tempering of many pre-1980 black views. A black bourgeoisie

continues to grow, but is certainly not necessarily opposed to creating small (or large) private farmers if there is reasonable compensation for land. One can hardly predict the overall outcome. For example, the ruling party has shown sclerosis as well as consolidation, with declines after the 1985 election in attendance at meetings and in active membership and subscription payments, and a collapse in election turnout in 1989-90. Government authoritarianism has persisted well beyond the liberation war (Ncube, 1989).

Some of the trends implied that major policy moves would eventuate, even if one could not be certain where or with what outcome. It was always to be expected that the 1980s would later be seen as a transitional period, and that the intensification of some problems and the growth of other opportunities would lead to significant changes. [3] Factors here include the social pressures from unemployment and mass secondary education, and the crises in urban housing and transportation; the growth of black middle classes, especially in the cities but also as a market-oriented private-farming profit-making rural group; and criticism from sections of the trade union movement and intelligentsia; as well as the changing economic and constitutional considerations mentioned earlier.

4.3. The revival of the land question, 1989-90

"Where we have seen that there are a lot of people without land, we will take those farms adjacent to them and give the land to the people" (President Mugabe, 1989c).

It was certain, in particular, that the question of resettlement, which had remained remarkably quiet from 1983, had to revive sooner or later. By the end of the 1980s around 4300 large scale commercial farms still held 39 per cent of the areas designated as agricultural, including most of the good land; while over 800,000 households in communal and resettlement areas held (almost all) the remainder (Karimanzira, 1990). Around 60% of the Communal Areas are understood to be deteriorating ecologically, and 70% of their farmers work arable plots of less than 3 ha. (Moyo et al, 1989).

In 1989 the spotlight returned to land distribution. One triggering factor was the emergence of ZUM, an opposition party whose leader, Edgar Tekere, is from the Shona majority group and has been calling for faster resettlement for several years. 1989 was also when a balloon of Party rhetoric was pricked by revelations of self-aggrandisement and deceit by many Ministers and senior Party members in the "Willowgate" affair, marked not least by the suicide of the Senior Minister for Political Affairs. While some Ministers at first tried to suppress the affair, the President ordered a commission of inquiry, most of whose work was reported and published.

1980s policy seems to have been closer to pre-independence ZAPU's than to ZANU(PF)'s, and the principal government spokesman initially for the new resettlement push was Joshua Nkomo, perhaps felt to be a voice that white farmers and foreign donors may listen to. [4] In a series of speeches, Nkomo and subsequently President Mugabe warned that government would legislate to acquire land if not enough was made

available through the willing seller/willing buyer system for the resettlement of the 110,000 families remaining in the 162,000 families target. They called on commercial farmers to enter negotiations to make land available. (Tekere and others in turn called on them to speak first to farm-owning colleagues.) Government is looking for large blocks of land suitable for Ministry-planned resettlement.

The elements of the new policy, in particular as presented to Parliament at the end of July 1990, appear to be these:

1. An indicative target of acquisition of around 50% of the remaining large commercial farming area ([5]), in contiguous blocks that are yet to be designated, for resettlement predominantly on a family basis, but with a component of state farms. This target reflects the still extant figure of 162,000 families, in which political capital has been sunk. No timetable is yet specified, though the previous Plan figure of 15,000 families per year is still sometimes officially endorsed, implying 7 or 8 years. (Moyo et al (1989) perhaps more plausibly proposed 15 years, for up to another 100,000 families.)
2. Forbidding absentee landlordism by Zimbabweans, and ownership of more than one farm per individual or company (though government will have the right to grant exemptions).
3. Rights of compulsory purchase when necessary, even of fully utilized land, in order to obtain large blocks for resettlement; but always preceded by efforts at negotiation. [6] Evicted active farmers will if possible be assigned underutilized land elsewhere.
4. Compensation in local currency, but not at market prices; instead at "realistic prices" yet to be specified, plus the value of permanent improvements. (The Commercial Farmers' Union claims that Government has pencilled in funds equivalent to only about one-sixth of the current market values.)
5. A requirement of government approval of all land transfers, and extension of the periods for government review and negotiation over lands offered for sale (from 1 month to 3 months, and from 2 weeks to 4 weeks).
6. A land tax based on production potential is promised, to encourage utilization or sale.
7. Land ceilings are also promised.
8. Greater priority to selection of qualified farmers for resettlement; proven knowledge and ability seem now to be necessary conditions for selection. [7]
9. Eventual granting of secure title in resettlement areas.
10. Promotion of black large-scale commercial farmers, "to ensure continuity in production as well as the establishment of a more balanced racial composition of the large commercial sector" (Mangwende, Minister of Lands &c., 1990a).

Some people lulled by the quiet of recent years may be surprised at the scale of the government's stated intentions, as if the quiet could have lasted forever. The Minister announced willingness to trade-off some growth for equity. But he spoke too of an "attempt to strike a realistic balance between the two objectives" (Mangwende, 1990b:1). From the perspective of the late 1970s, the surprise would be that as much as half of the large private farm sector, including most of the more active and productive farms, is to be spared in what

is presented as the final phase of land redistribution. The figure could be higher if there is a tacit provision for future concessions. Terms of compensation will leave much room for dispute and litigation. Further, the increased government powers implied by points 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 above are little or no more than those found in many countries; though one must add that measures like land ceilings or prohibition of multiple ownership are often observed mainly in the breach.

The land ceiling measure can be seen partly as an alternative to the difficulties of defining and identifying underutilized land, and a response to the fact that underutilization seems proportionately greater on black-owned private farms (Palmer, 1990). Thus an earlier proposal in the bureaucracy, that underutilized small-scale African commercial farms should also be subject to resettlement, was vetoed. Instead, there is the goal of identifying "a suitable cadre of committed potential black large-scale commercial farmers [and] appropriate financial and training programmes to ensure that these farmers succeed" (Mangwende, 1990a). Government support for a Kenyan-style "chef" sector in agriculture has become open. "Emergent businessmen" and Minister's brothers who were having difficulty in running large newly acquired farms to full potential will now receive special assistance. We wait to see how far government will exercise its intended powers over all land transactions to approve further purchases of large farms by blacks.

It appears that priority will go to acquiring farms close to existing communal or resettlement areas. Government now thinks: "we cannot take a group of settlers and go and throw them away somewhere where they will be isolated from the rest of the people" (Mugabe, 1990). Separation from traditional ties was in fact an explicit aim of the earlier policy (Geza, 1986), but belief in that type of social engineering has withered.

What opens up now is a process of negotiation with the commercial farmers, who have not been recently consulted on the policy. Their union's strategy includes to look for inconsistencies within government policy (which continues to talk of willing-seller-willing-buyer, and is offering assurances to new foreign investors in other sectors); and to ally with the other farming unions in a call for modification of the resettlement farming models (perhaps to make them more intensive) and for opening-up areas in the south-east of the country. That government has allocated funds sufficient for buying just 50,000 ha. in 1990/91 should be read only as indicating that it may be able to later buy land at more favourable terms. Government seems in any case to envisage a fairly drawn-out process of attrition rather than a rushed forced buy-out. While the reactions of foreign agencies will no doubt be monitored, Zimbabwe can probably expect somewhat greater understanding and acceptance than a decade back.

Amongst the unknowns is how many sons of white farmers would even wish to continue farming. Cliffe (1988b) and Herbst (1990) expect rather few, whereas Bratton (1987) reported the appearance of a new generation. Fairly clear now is the answer to how far the Party will push collectives, or instead accept peasant farms with forms of co-operation. Zimbabwe has not been immune to the spreading disillusion

with collectivized agriculture. For example, in June 1989 the ZANU(PF) magazine Zimbabwe News published an article on "The Stalin Years: Bitter Fruits of Forced Collectivization", something unimaginable a few years earlier. [8]

There seems little point in attempting further prediction at this juncture. (Interested readers can enlarge on the suggestions in Fig. 2 above.) While there has been considerable local cynicism or scepticism, there are also the underlying secular pressures noted earlier, and the support of the President. As often in policy studies, our basis of knowledge is limited and we are dealing with unique cases not statistical averages, and with chains of events and decisions that are not guided only by cool informed calculations. The purpose of analysis though has been both to satisfy our curiosity about the past and to give us more reliable expectations and a checklist of issues by which to orient ourselves towards the future.

The time to review the analysis made above will not be after a few months, on the basis of policy pronouncements alone, but perhaps after eight or ten years, on the basis of policy achievements. Constraints that were not emphasized during policy choice may become highlighted later during implementation.

4.4. Conclusion

Whereas pre-1980 literature emphasized "the land question" and called for dramatic post-independence policy shifts, 1980s experiences in Zimbabwe have been more complex, less openly dramatic and yet still very striking. They suggest at least the following: a) the difficulties in the late 20th century in redistributive land reform in a dependent yet fairly complex economy highly integrated into world markets; b) the equal importance of other areas in rural development policy and design; c) the range of constraints - political, legal, financial, economic, administrative, technical - needing attention in policy analysis, including to how they change over time; and, d) compared with some other experiences in Africa, the advantages of phased non-dramatic change, which can lay a basis for further steps in the future, but also carries socio-political implications that may mould and in some cases even abort the future steps.

The achievements of the first decade of independence, while indeed flawed, are substantial, compared especially to what was seen before or in most of the rest of Africa. The government has not been diverted from them, even if that required waiting over "the land question". It came to see that there were more than just legal constraints to rapid resettlement, and that better social and economic returns would be reaped by an initial concentration of efforts in the Communal Areas. That parts of the 1980s strategy may not be sustainable, or necessary, in the 90s does not imply that the strategy was bad for the 80s. Zimbabwe's main strength may have been in avoiding imitating overgeneralized strategic models, and in analysing its own specific circumstances at each given time.

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NOTES

The Zimbabwe dollar gradually fell in value through the 1980s, e.g. from over US\$ 1.5 to US\$ 0.45, and in UK pounds from over 0.7 to 0.28.

Notes to Section 1: Introduction

[1] Chennells (1989) analyses relations and tensions between British, South African and local white Rhodesian interests and identities.

[2] See e.g. Green & Kadhani (1986) on the binding foreign exchange constraint; Hastings (1985) on the black middle classes; and Davies (1988) for a systematic assessment of the thrust of 1980s policies as being reformist nationalist and not socialist.

Notes to Section 2: Resettlement to former "European" areas

[1] Of 52,000 people resettled, only 3,000 are in the Model B collectives. About 4,000 are outgrowers and the rest on family farms. ZIG Bulletin (1978) gave a survey of nationalist leaders' opinions before 1980. Muzorewa's UANC and the internal wing of ZAPU supported buying out white farmers and introducing private land tenure in the peasant areas. External ZAPU supported giving land to those who need and till it, and registering individual land rights in peasant areas, but without granting right of sale; similarly white farmers who were using land might be able to lease it from the State, who would own all land (interviews with Joshua Nkomo in New Africa Development, Oct. 1977.) ZANU(PF) declared that "the cooperative farm will be their foundation in the agricultural sector... [and that] the masses will appropriate and control the means of production" (Robert Mugabe, in Facts and Reports, Jan. 1977). White farmers would be allowed to remain as managers on collectivized farms (Hamadzaripi, ZANU Central Committee member, in ZIG Bulletin).

[2] Associated with the 162,000 families figure were the conventional estimates of overpopulation of the Communal Areas (e.g. that 17x as much land is cultivated as is desirable - ! - Riddell, 1980:3; though in 1980 only 8% of CA land was cropped, rising to 10.5% by 1988). These figures may derive from conservative guesstimates of Rhodesian agriculturalists and their attempt to prescribe for African farming systems of which they knew rather little (as seen for example in their attempts to ban cultivation of the low-lying and well-watered vleis), by assessing land in terms of the requirements of white commercial

farmers' systems. Many radical critics still use such estimates (e.g. Sibanda, 1988) even when discarding the rest of Rhodesian conventional wisdom (such as on appropriate densities in the commercial areas). Bush & Cliffe (1984) are notable for querying their basis and the associated numbers game of trying to divide the Communal Areas population into three: a) those to be transferred to towns or "growth points" as permanent worker families, b) those to be resettled on acquired "white" farms, c) those to remain in Communal Areas as full-time farmers. What have appeared to be feasible figures for these three summed to far less than the existing and projected population. Bush & Cliffe therefore further queried the premise that people must become either full-time workers or farmers.

[3] Even Vol. 2 of the 1982-5 Plan, published the next year, then treated the 162,000 as a 1982-5 target. 162,000 happens to be 9x the 18,000 in the planned programme that was inherited in 1980 (Calleary, 1981); that figure was trebled in 1981 and then trebled again the next year. (See e.g. Palmer, 1990.)

[4] Horticulture exports grew from less than Z\$1 m. in 1985 to Z\$40m. in 1989 (Karimanzira, 1990).

[5] In 1977, in the context of a possible negotiated settlement, there were discussions of a U.K./U.S.A. funded Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF), part of which would be for land resettlement. According to a U.K. House of Commons Committee (1981), the proposal lapsed with the failure of the negotiations; and was followed at Lancaster House by only an unspecific UK commitment to help on land purchase, and unspecific USA support for this. The ZANU/ZAPU Patriotic Front assumed that the sums would be the same as spoken of in 1977 for the ZDF, and that these amounts would come solely from the UK and USA, and without conditions: as pure grants, without reference to project proposals or absorptive capacity. Apart from being disappointed on each of these matters, they had to face British insistence on using some of its grants for subsequent land development, not just land purchase, explicitly in order to have "a voice on development matters" (U.K. Foreign Office, 1981). In 1984-5 when there were unspent U.K. funds for acquisition, but a shortage of counterpart Zimbabwean funds, the U.K. approved use for land development purposes of the local funds generated by its commodity aid.

[6] Weiner (1988) makes these assumptions for Mashonaland, the prime arable area: 1. 45% of total land is arable (this would be similar to the figure for India, though Mashonaland is comparable to the Deccan plateau); 2. 40% of crop land needs to be kept fallow (he later adds that long rotations are needed for nematode control in tobacco). Weiner concludes that 35% of the commercial farm area in Mashonaland is "high quality land [that] is not being used for agriculture" (p.76). Cliffe in FAO (1986) made a similar estimate for the country as a whole. The earlier study by Weiner et al (1985) made rather higher estimates for Mashonaland. Weiner does not pursue why commercial farmers may leave good land unused on such a scale, though clearly lower-cost peasant farmers would use the land more fully. Apart from possible limits to managerial and market capacity, land may be an appreciating asset. Later Weiner recognizes non-arable agriculture, and a key issue: that good land is being used for grazing,

partly to supply beef to the EEC. Strikingly, the President has claimed that the medium-scale black commercial ("purchase area") farms probably "have the highest incidence of underutilised land [and] negligent farming" (cited in The Herald, 19 Aug. 1989).

[7] E.g.: "The Government has reaffirmed its intention to protect the interests and welfare of dedicated farmers" (The Herald on the acting Prime Minister's speech to the 70th annual Harare Show, 31 Aug. 1985).

[8] Recently the Minister of Lands, Agriculture & Rural Resettlement reported that there are still over 200,000 ha. of land acquired but not settled, mostly in the semi-arid Matabeleland South. "The major delaying factor in the resettlement of the land was the lack of a suitable and acceptable model" (The Herald, 2 March 1990). The so-called model D is supposed to give adjacent Communal Area farmers access to these grazing lands and to central livestock services.

[9] Cusworth (1989) tries to relate the carve-up of MLRRD to the problems experienced by resettlement farmers during the 1983 and 84 droughts, and the unwillingness of the agricultural credit parastatal to give loans in the face of rising default rates. Changes have since been made to smooth the provision of credit and inputs. A key issue remains the lack of organizations representing the resettlement farmers themselves.

[10] In over 40 years Malaysia has resettled just 115,000 families in this way. Zimbabwean officials have looked further into the Malaysian case and noted its high cost and stately pace.

[11] While complaining at the speed of resettlement, The Herald editorial writers note a Minister's complaint of shortage of staff, and accept the premise that "this is a massive programme which needs proper planning" (6 Oct. 1988; emphasis added).

[12] Gasper (1990) looks further at selection criteria, as an illustration of the dilemmas of resettlement policy. Kinsey (1984) found almost no ex-landless in his sample from the schemes, suggesting either that there are fewer than thought in 1970s discussions, or that they were neglected in selection; and that 60% of settlers had no cattle and 40% no access to them, despite their essential role in the prescribed farm models. By 1989 the Agriculture Minister complained that: "'Even in Parliament we answer criticism daily on why we resettle people who destroy the existing infrastructure on farms...' 20 per cent of the settlers were productive farmers with a proven track record and the rest needed to work harder to compete with their counterparts" (The Herald, 13 Oct. 1989). Surprisingly, the President's response to nepotistic tendencies in selection has been to include the chiefs in selection teams (The Herald, 27 March 1990).

[13] E.g. the dairying resettlement component of the Rusitu valley scheme has run into major problems.

[14] In fact the comparisons given are of gross incomes of slightly lower than Z\$100 per person in 1986 prices, versus a target of around Z\$50 in 1980 prices, which could be roughly half those of 1986. An appendix in Cusworth & Walker eventually admits as much (1988:152).

[15] Stoneman (1988b) asserts that returns from resettlement are higher, merely noting the higher average fertility of those lands than the Communal Areas, and without any consideration of the costs and

current design of resettlement. The Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union, representing medium/small-scale black commercial farmers, published a report in 1988 arguing that resettlement productivity is on a par with Communal Areas, but resettled master farmers outyielded others by nearly 40 per cent (The Herald, 15 Apr. 1988). The report followed squatting on some of the several hundred farms allocated to ZNFU members under a new scheme (Sunday Mail, 30 Dec. 1987).

[16] Cusworth & Walker's study, largely written in 1987, analyses performance in 1982/3-1985/6. An expected economic return of 21 per cent on the programme was estimated, but on the basis of production figures in the record 1984/5 season. The results are very sensitive; e.g. a mere 10% reduction in output levels reduces the rate of return to 11% (Cusworth & Walker, 1988:19; but an appendix says that 1985/6 not 84/5 figures were used to estimate production in later years - p.181 - and that the calculations tried to be conservative). Cusworth & Walker were sceptical of negative environmental impacts, but noted the flouting of permit conditions on herd size by some settlers. Later the joint UK/Zimbabwe review committee warned against the marked preference for growing maize in drought-prone areas, and the "limited rotations [and] little use of fallow and fertiliser. In most of the soils seen this will rapidly lead to decreasing fertility" (cited in Financial Gazette, 15 Sept. 1989).

[17] "By removing women from the support and vigilance of their kin and neighbours, it is possible that the resettlement programme will seriously affect women's independent access to resources... the evidence suggests that they do not have direct access to returns from their labour, or independent access to land" (Cusworth & Walker, 1988:35).

[18] Hilhorst's figure is 46%, based on an estimated growth of Chitungwiza, Harare's dormitory town, from 172,000 people in the 1982 census, to 322,000 in 1990. However, most estimates for 1990 are at least twice as high, and there is also the smaller dormitory town of Epworth. On the other hand, the 1982 figure is probably too low as well, and there are some inconsistencies in the data base.

[19] A widely cited estimate of commercial farms owned by blacks in the late 80s was 300 (e.g. Africa South, May/June 1990, p.15); Palmer (1990) now refers to 500. "Scores of workers at Togarepi Property Investments - a farm in Shamva belonging to Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze, a Minister of State in the President's Office (Political Affairs) - have gone without pay since February this year, labour officials have said... Recently, the minister's wife...was reported to have not paid her Porta Farm labourers from February to June this year. However the Porta farm workers received their wages on July 2 and were subsequently fired" (Financial Gazette, 4 Aug.1989). In 1990 Comrade Ushewokunze has returned to full Ministerial level. The 1989 Sandura Commission reports were informative on Ministers' business dealings, which are typically in contravention of the ruling Party's leadership code. Lately one of the MPs nominated by the President alleged that: "the major culprits (of hoarding land and farms) are our politicians, not the white commercial farmers" (The Herald, 13 Dec. 1989).

[20] As reported in The Financial Gazette, 2 June 1989. Perhaps less menacingly: "A recent study on desertification in Zimbabwe has shown that soil loss in the communal areas is so severe that arable soils currently in good condition may not be able to continue to sustain good yields in 35 to 50 years" (The Herald, 12 March 1990).

Notes to Section 3: Improvements and Restructuring in Communal Areas

[1] Cabinet can reject the Ministry recommended prices. For dry-land grains (important in e.g. Matabeleland) it gave large extra increases before the 1985 election. Until serious oilseeds shortages emerged, it rejected increases for groundnuts, apparently feeling this was a "woman's crop" produced by target-income farmers (Herbst, 1990).

[2] See also Marijsse (1988) on the extremely unequal income distribution within Communal Areas. For Mutoko CA he reported that the highest decile earns 49 times the income of the lowest decile, and argues that land availability is the most important determinant of variations in agricultural income. Surveys typically show that between a third and a half of peasant households do not own cattle.

[3] Findings by Drinkwater (1985) and Kufakweimba (1987) support this scepticism. E.g. at one Mutoko village reported to have accepted villagization, 55% of those who were later asked denied this, and others expressed reservations: they had been told the programme was an order, or they didn't know its nature, or agreed with only part of it.

[4] 1989 conferences on decentralized planning, held by Midlands Province and the Dept. of Physical Planning, reported that ward and village plans often reflect just the opinions of committee chairmen, and that attendance at meetings has much declined. Chiefs and headmen lately regained local judicial powers, except in land allocation, which they continue to press for and for powers in resettlement areas.

Notes to Section 4: Review and Prospects

[1] The Commission of Inquiry into Taxation concluded though that the available studies overestimate underutilization, because they include land in farms that are only temporarily abandoned and inactive, e.g. while in the process of sale or inheritance, or during illness (1985:226).

[2] Reynolds (1989) similarly calls for a flexible approach to acquisition, with individual small farmers taking loans from government to buy land - as a recognition, like a land tax, that land is a scarce resource.

[3] There are claims that HIV virus is now so widespread in Zimbabwe that Aids deaths could reach 2000 per day by 1997. These would be disproportionately heavy amongst the middle classes and elite.

[4] Senior Minister Nkomo is reported to have lately received back five farms belonging to his (or the former ZAPU party's) Walmer Ranching company, seized in the 1982 ZANU-ZAPU conflict. (Financial Gazette, 2 Feb. 1990).

[5] There is unclarity over the exact figures: the statement to Parliament, and the Minister's later speech to the Commercial Farmers' Union, spoke of 5m. ha. to be acquired, and a residual 5m. ha. for large private farms; yet the large private sector is presently around 12m. ha. Elsewhere the CFU has spoken of 6m. ha. to be acquired.

[6] The British government apparently made further funds available for resettlement this year only after receiving assurances that the willing-seller condition will not be repealed (Financial Gazette, 9 Feb. 1990). However, even at present there is also the proviso that government can acquire land if necessary in the public interest; and it is expected that this power will be used more extensively in future, to obtain large blocks for resettlement, with the pure willing-buyer condition applying outside them. The new British funds are so small that they might be used in only in those cases.

[7] See especially Financial Gazette, 5 Jan. 1990. The 18 May 1990 issue reported a Zanu (PF) M.P. as saying that the Central Committee proposes resettlement be targeted at qualified and master farmers only, and that "We realised that collective resettlement was erroneous as it would result in sub-standard crop production". In its editorial for the tenth anniversary of independence the state-owned The Herald held that "without modern peasant farmers being sufficiently well-educated to understand modern scientific methods, the large-scale resettlement now planned would be a disaster" (April 19, 1990). And Minister Fay Chung, previously a writer on socialist theory for Zimbabwe, lately advocated a 4-fold division: 1. Perhaps half the commercial farms can be left as large-scale high-tech farms on leasehold tenure; 2. Blacks with good formal qualifications in agriculture can lease family commercial farms; 3. Poor peasants who pass a training period can lease "peasant resettlement farms"; 4. Those who cannot meet minimum productivity requirements can be settled on small plots suitable for their ability (Chung, 1989).

[8] As late as mid-1987 a series of guest articles in the state-controlled Sunday Mail extolled the virtues, personal and political, of J.V. Stalin.

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NB: (1) All Press Statements cited are from the government Department of Information, Harare; (2) The Herald, Sunday Mail, Financial Gazette, are newspapers published in Harare.

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