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NATIONALISM, RACISM AND GENDER RELATIONS

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Nira Yuval-Davis

NATIONALISM, RACISM AND GENDER RELATIONS

Recently the arguments on nationalism have gained new vigour - unsurprisingly, given the developments in different countries, including Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. Even Hobsbawm has had to abandon, in a recent New Statesman article (1991), his previous thesis that nationalism is withering away. But once nationalism is recognized to exist, what should be our attitude towards it? Here opinions range from those who link social revolutionary and national liberation struggles to those who link nationalism and fascism. Eli Kedourie (1960) sees nationalism as always inherently illiberal and in constant tension with universalism. Anderson (1983), on the other hand, separates nationalism and racism as two completely different phenomena. For him nationalism and racism are opposites. He views nationalism as a positive sentiment, "which thinks in terms of historical destinies", while racist discourse is negative:

Racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time... On the whole, racism and anti-Semitism manifest themselves, not across national boundaries but within them. (p 136).

While it is clear that not all nationalist ideologies are equally racist, I do not accept Anderson's dichotomy. Wherever a delineation of boundaries takes place - as is the case with every ethnic and national collectivity - processes of exclusion and inclusion are in operation. These can take place with varying degrees of intensity and with a variety of cultural, religious and state mechanisms. Exclusions of 'the Other' can become a positive and inherent part of national ethnicities. Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa are two examples in which such exclusions became a major and an obsessive preoccupation of the national culture. But many, if not most, other ethnicities of hegemonic national collectivities include elements of racist exclusion within their symbolic orders. Britain is a case in point (See, for example, Sivanandan, 1982; Gilroy, 1987; Cohen, 1988; Yuval-Davis, 1991; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, forthcoming). Tom Nairn in his study of The Break-up of Britain (1977) described nationalism as a Janus with two opposite, positive and negative, faces.

In this paper I would like to examine the concepts of nation and nationalism and the ways in which they can become racialized. I believe that by disentangling the different dimensions of the nationalist phenomenon, and the racisms that can be associated with them, we can move forwards. Not only in debates concerning nationalism but also in those concerning the nature of the phenomenon of racism.1

Another purpose of this paper is to outline some of the main dimensions in which gender relations are crucial in understanding and analyzing the phenomena of nations and of nationalism. Until recently such attempts have been virtually absent from the literature (Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989; Walby, 1992), and no one has yet attempted a systematic
analysis which would interrelate gender relations and different dimensions of the nationalist project.

Before embarking upon such a task, which - of necessity in a short paper - will be highly condensed and schematic, it is important to briefly outline my general approach to nations and nationalism.

The notion of the 'nation'

There is a great controversy concerning what constitutes a nation. Is it primordial or cultural? To what extent is it a social phenomenon that is particularly modern, or even western? (see Shils, 1957; Geertz, 1963; Althusser, 1969; Samir Amin, 1978, and Tom Nairn, 1977.) Another debate concerns the question whether or not it is the state which homogenizes ethnicity into a nationality or the other way around (Smith, 1979, 1986; Zubaida, 1989). The common assumption in this debate is, however, that there is an inherent connection between the ethnic and national projects. While it is important to look at the historical specificity of the construction of collectivities, there is no inherent difference (although sometimes there is a difference in scale) between ethnic, racial and national collectivities: they are all Andersonian 'imagined communities'.

Different collectivities have been labelled as ethnic, racial or national by different agents and/or historical circumstances. What differs are the discourses and projects of ethnicity, racism and nationalism. Ethnic discourse involves the construction of exclusionary and inclusionary boundaries using myths of common origin and/or destiny, and providing individuals with a mode of interpreting the world based on shared cultural resources and/or collective positioning vis-a-vis other groups; racial discourse involves modes of exclusion, inferiorization, subordination and exploitation that can use for its purposes any signifiers of collectivity boundaries and construct these as immutable and hereditary; national discourse involves an explicit political project, a claim for a separate political representation of the collectivity which often, but not always, takes the form of a claim for a separate autonomous 'nation-state'. The extent to which a political movement focuses on a separate state can relate to the relative political strength of the nationalist movement and to the overall political project of the state(s) in which it is active. It can also relate, however, to the extent to which the boundaries of the collectivity can correspond to specific territorial boundaries and its percentage within the population. However, there is virtually no contemporary state in which the boundaries of civil society and the boundaries of the national collectivity which is hegemonic in that state are identical. (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1983; Anthias, Yuval-Davis & Cain, 1992)

The conflation of 'state' and 'nation-state' is problematic (Yuval-Davis, 1991a). The right for national self-determination which has been, in different ways, part of the demands of both the liberal and socialist movements, has assumed an ideal type of a
nation-state, in which all citizens are members of the same national collectivity. Indeed, Gellner (1983, pp.136) has defined nationalism as a

theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state...should not separate the power holders from the rest...and therefore state and culture must now be linked.

However, such a 'pure' nation-state exists virtually nowhere in the world, if it ever did, and therefore there are always settled residents (and usually citizens as well) who are not members of the dominant national collectivity in the society. The continued existence of this automatic assumption about the overlap between the boundaries of the state citizens and 'the nation' is one expression of the naturalizing effect of the hegemony of one collectivity and its access to the ideological apparatuses of both state and civil society. This constructs minorities as assumed deviants from the 'normal' and excludes them from important power resources. (Somewhat similar exclusions also operate, as described later in the paper, in relation to women.)

If 'nations' are not to be identified with 'nation-states' - in reality or in potential - are there any 'objective' characteristics according to which nations can be recognized? A most influential 'formula definition' was developed by Stalin as 'the expert on the national question' among the Bolsheviks during Lenin's time. According to Stalin:

A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture" (1972 [1913], p.13).

A very different definition was developed by the Austro-Hungarian Otto Bauer. His definition dispenses with economy, language and territory (although in objecting to the Bund's adoption of his model for the Jewish collectivity, Bauer claimed that a certain territorial concentration is vital for the development of a nation (Bauer, 1940; Yuval-Davis, 1987; Nimni, 1991). He concentrated on a common culture and on what he called 'common destiny'.

As I have elaborated elsewhere (1992), this element of 'common destiny' (which can be a myth or a reality) is of a crucial importance as a complement to Anthony Smith's focus on the myth of common ethnic origins of nations. It has future, rather than just past, orientation and can explain more than individual and communal assimilations within particular nations. It can explain the subjective sense of commitment of people into collectivities and nations, such as in settler societies or in post-colonial states, in which there is no shared myth of common origin (Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis, forthcoming). At the same time it can also explain the dynamic nature of any national collectivity and the perpetual processes of reconstruction of boundaries which take place in them, via immigration, naturalization, conversion and other similar social and political processes.
Different kinds of nationalist projects

Nationalist projects, of course, are not all the same. There have been many moral and sociological attempts to classify the different kinds of nationalist movements and nationalist ideologies which have arisen in the world during the last two hundred years (Snyder 1968, Ch.4) and Smith (1971, Ch.8). An influential sociological typology has been that of Anthony Smith (1971;1986) which differentiates between the 'ethnic-genealogical' nationalist movement and the 'civic-territorial' one. In this he is continuing a German tradition which differentiated between Kulturnations and Staatnations (Stolke, 1987). These dichotomous divisions, however, conflate origin and culture. I would, therefore, differentiate between Staatnation, Kulturnation and Volknation: in other words, nationalist ideologies which focus on citizenship of specific states (in specific territories), for example American nationalism in its 'purest form'; those which focus on specific cultures (or religions) like classical French nationalism, or Pakistani nationalism; and those which are constructed around the specific origin of the people (or their race) like classical German nationalism, or white South Africanism.

Rather than attempting to classify all states and societies according to these different types, however - an a-historical, impossible and misleading mission as all such classifications of social phenomena usually are - these should be seen as three dimensions of nationalist ideologies and projects, which would play more or less central roles in different concrete historical cases, and be promoted by different members of the same national collectivities at any given time.

I shall now look at the different ways in which these three dimensions can be connected to racist exclusions. While doing so I shall point the roles gender relations play in each of these dimensions. I shall present each of them separately, and mention some of the main issues that have to be examined in this context.

Nationalism and 'biological stock'

The relationship between racism and the nationalist dimension of Volknation is the most obvious one. If membership in the national collectivity depends on being born into it, then those who do not share the myth of common origin are completely excluded. The only way 'outsiders' can conceivably join the national collectivity is by intermarriage. Not incidentally, those who are preoccupied with the 'purity' of the race would also be preoccupied with the sexual relationships between members of the different collectivity. Typically, the first (and only) law proposal that Rabbi Kahana, the leader of the Israeli fascist party, Kach, raised in the Israeli Parliament was to forbid sexual relationships between Jews and Arabs. However, as the Nuremberg laws in Nazi Germany demonstrate, even if children of such cross collectivities exist, the notion of 'racial contamination' can be carried through several generations.
Skin colour and other visible inherited characteristics have been of particular importance as signifiers of origin. (Anthias, Yuval-Davis & Cain, forthcoming, Ch.5; Tajfel, 1965). Although any marker of ethnic boundaries can become racialized, physical characteristics are not generationally specific attributes - unlike accents or modes of dress, for instance, which can be specific only to first generation migrants. Also assimilation is impossible as a coping strategy for the victims of such racism and their children, as long as the inherited characteristics continues to be used culturally as signifiers for racist discourse and practice.

Nevertheless, the inclusion in the collectivity is far from being only a biological issue. There are always rules and regulations about the cases in which children of 'mixed parenthood' would be part of the collectivity and the cases when they would not; about when they would be considered a separate social category, like in South Africa; part of the 'inferior' collectivity, as during slavery; or - although this is rarer - part of the 'superior' collectivity, as was the case with marriages between Spanish settlers and aristocratic Indians in Mexico (Gutierrez, forthcoming). When a man from Ghana tried to claim his British origin for the sake of the patriality clause in the British Immigration Act, arguing that his African grandmother was legally married to his British grandfather, the judge rejected his claim, stating that at this period no British man would genuinely marry an African woman (WING, 1985).

The worry about the quality of the 'stock' has been a major worry in the British empire and its settler societies. The Royal Commission on Population declared in its 1949 report:

> British traditions, manners, and ideas in the world have to be borne in mind. Immigration is thus not a desirable means of keeping the population at a replacement level as it would in effect reduce the proportion of home-bred stock in the population. (Quoted in Riley, 1981).

And it was concern for the 'British race' which Beveridge describes in his famous report as the motivation to establish the British welfare state system (Beveridge, 1942).

The control of women as producers of 'national stocks' begins with pre-natal policies. A variety of techniques and technologies, used by various social agencies, exist for controlling rates of birth. These can include allowances for maternity leave and child care facilities for working mothers; availability and encouragement of contraception as means of family planning; availability and legality of abortions; clinics for infertility treatment, and, on the other hand, forced usage of contraceptives and sterilization. Encouraging or discouraging women to bear children is determined, to a great extent, by the specific historical situation of the collectivity, and by no means exists as a laissez-faire institution even in the most permissive societies. Notions like 'population explosion', 'demographic balance' (or 'holocaust' or 'race'), or 'children as a national asset' are expressions of various ideologies which might lead controllers of national reproduction into different population control policies. These policies are very rarely, if ever, applied in a similar manner to all
members of the civil society. While class differences often play a major role in this, membership in different racial, ethnic and national collectivities is usually the most important determinant of the natal policies directed towards any given individual, and can affect differently - but as effectively - women of both hegemonic majorities and subjugated minorities (an extreme contemporary example of this can be seen in the case of Singapore (Heng & Devan, 1992); see also an analysis of Israeli policies in Yuval-Davis, 1989). These policies, however, are not used only by national collectivities that control states, but can be used also as a mode of resistance. A common Palestinian saying a few years ago, for instance, was:

The Israelis beat us at the borders but we beat them in the bedrooms (Yuval-Davis, 1987b).

However, it would be a mistake to see women as passive victims in such 'national/biological warfare', whether pro- or anti-natal. Older women would often play important parts in controlling younger women, and all women might be parties to these ideologies, as the active participation of women in various religious fundamentalist and fascist movements can show.

Nor is the 'national stock' dependent only on women in the country as national reproducers. In countries like Australia and Canada, for instance, there has been a constant debate between those who wanted to keep the 'Anglomorphic' character of the society and those who called to 'populate or perish' - in whatever 'least undesirable' immigrants there are who are available to settle. To let 'outsiders' share in the 'common destiny' is preferable to having no future at all.

The exclusionary nature of 'common origin' has undergone a transformation under what is known as 'new racism' (Barker, 1982). Martin Barker claimed that with the discrediting of nazism after WW2, some of the more vulgar forms of racism became unacceptable. These forms of racism have openly identified the non-European 'races' as biologically inferior. The 'new racism' on the other hand, merely identifies them as 'different' - and as such - as inappropriately located among the others. As Enoch Powell put it (speech in Eastbourne, 16 November 1968, quoted in Gilroy, 1987):

The West Indian does not by being born in England, becomes an Englishman. Balibar (1988, p.33), has called this phenomenon racisme differentialiste, in which 'cultural groups' need to be kept in their country of origin, in order not to harm or be harmed by the unmixable foreign elements. To understand this phenomenon of 'cultural racism' we need to analyse the relationships between nation and culture.

Nation and culture

Political divisions which are so easily and intuitively understood in relation to state politics become much more obscure when related to the nation. Patriotism is supposed to
affect everyone similarly, whether from upper or lower classes, man or woman. 'Our troops' have to be cheered, whether the 'national project' in hand is the Gulf war or an international cricket game.

This mythical unity, this 'imagined community' which divides the world between 'us' and 'them', is maintained and ideologically reproduced by a whole system of what Armstrong (1982) calls symbolic 'border guards'. These 'border guards' can identify people as members or non-members of a specific collectivity. They are closely linked to specific cultural codes of style of dress and behaviour as well as to more elaborate bodies of customs, literary and artistic modes of production, and, of course, language. These 'border guards' are used as shared cultural resources and, together with shared collective positioning vis-a-vis other collectivities, they can provide the collectivity members not only with the Andersonian 'Imagined Communities', but also with what Deutsch (1966) and Schlesinger (1987) call 'Communicative Communities':

Membership in a people consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders (Deutsch 1966:97).

It is important, however, not to reify these 'border guards' as 'the' national culture. They are cultural resources which are used in the struggles for hegemony which are taking place at any given moment, not only between collectivities but also within them. Different, sometimes conflicting cultural 'border guards' can be used simultaneously by different members of the collectivity. One example is the promotion of Hebrew vs Yiddish by Zionists and Bundists respectively; another is the use of different Suras in the Koran to argue for and against abortion in Egypt. Similarly there can be more or less inclusive interpretations of the boundaries of the collectivities. Although at certain historical moments there might be a hegemonic construction of the collectivity's culture and history, its dynamic, evolving, historical nature, continuously re-invents, reconstructs, reproduces and develops the cultural inventory of various collectivities. In extreme cases, these processes involve not only the redefinition of boundaries but also the complete dissolution and/or transformation of the collectivity and its positioning of difference vis-a-vis other collectivities. Two such examples are the 'absorption' of East Germany into the 'new' (and old) Germany, and the evolving category of the 'Black British'.

An important facet of the cultural 'border-guards' relate to images of 'the Others' as complimentary constructions to the images of the self. While these constructions can merely signify difference, very often they can become racialized and used to inferiorize. This signification which can be used for a variety of purposes of self affirmation, exclusion and exploitation can also include elements of envy which often includes an explicit sexual element and desire (Hooks, 1992). This can be an expression of an historical cultural tradition which operates on deeper, sometimes unconscious, levels. Daniel Sibony
(1974) and following him by Phil Cohen (1988 and 1989), discuss a Western historical cultural tradition in which:

the construction of The Other in racist discourses follows a route which is specific to its unconscious mode of functioning. Its surface structures of conscious reasoning are traced back to a phantasy system in which representations of sexuality and generation are organized in a peculiarly perverse way. Positions of racial superiority are associated with an ideal desexualized image of the body - an 'immaculate conception' of origins, an eternally regenerated destiny; whilst racial inferiority is associated with a degenerate or monstrous body, in which the power of sexuality, repressed at the other pole, returns as a purely negative principle. (1989, p.8)

This ideology of split mind/body as equalling superiority/inferiority and its racist/sexist double standards is but one example of the gendered nature of cultural symbolic border guards.

Gender symbols play a particularly significant roles in the cultural construction of boundaries. Just outside Cyprus airport there is a big poster of a mother mourning her child - Greek Cyprus mourning and commemorating the Turkish invasion. In France, it was La Patrie, a figure of a woman giving birth, which personified the revolution. Women often come to symbolize the national collectivity, its roots, its spirit, its national project. Moreover, women often symbolize national and collective 'honour'. Shaving the heads of women who 'dared' to fraternize, or even to fall in love with 'the enemy' is but one expression of this.

As Floya Anthias and I have written elsewhere (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1983, 1989), women are often the ones who are given the social role of inter-generational transmitters of cultural traditions, customs, songs, cuisine, and, of course, the mother-tongue (sic!). The actual behaviour of women can also signify ethnic and cultural boundaries:

Often the distinction between one ethnic group and another is constituted centrally by the sexual behaviour of women. For example, a 'true' Sikh or Cypriot girl should behave in sexually appropriate ways. If she does not then neither her children nor herself may be constituted part of the community' (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989, p.10).

The importance of women's culturally 'appropriate behaviour' can gain special significance in 'multi-cultural societies'.

Different national collectivities are constructed with varying degrees of tolerance to cultural difference. 'New nations' or states which from their inception have included more than one collectivity (like Switzerland), have some built-in mechanisms to deal with questions of cultural difference, at least of certain kinds, although their effectiveness depends on the specific historical context (as the examples of Lebanon and Yugoslavia can unfortunately show). There might be more than one national language (as in Belgium) or
interpreters might be offered as an institutional right for those who cannot speak the national language (as in Australia).

Other countries (or the same countries in relation to cultures of minorities outside the constitutive ones) might be much less tolerant of cultural difference. The recent debate in France around the school-girls who wore headscarves is but a symptom of the persistence of the French perspective, so prevalent during French imperialism, that living under French rule must involve becoming culturally French as well.

Even in countries where there is a formal policy of multi-culturalism, such as Britain, the USA and Australia, there are problems.

First of all, it is problematic to define the boundaries of difference between the actual different 'cultures'. How is it to be decided which 'cultures', or elements of 'cultures', would be 'legitimately' included in the multi-culturalist vision and which would not? Outlawing cultural systems like polygamy or the ritual use of drugs immediately come to mind, as well as, for instance, such issues as the Aboriginals' demands to apply their customary laws among themselves rather than the laws of the state. How tolerant the hegemonic culture is of various social practices clearly will determine what can or cannot be allowed.

However, hegemonic legitimacy is not the only factor. There is also what the Australian 'National Agenda for a Multi-culturalist Australia' calls 'the boundaries of multi-culturalism'. An important issue in allocating resources under multi-culturalist policies to different cultural 'needs' is the determination of what are considered to be 'private needs' and what are 'public collective needs'. The boundaries between public and private are socially determined, within specific cultural, class and gender contexts (Jayasuriya, 1990; Yuval-Davis, 1991). Whether or not facilities for specific religious needs, childcare facilities for working mothers or certain leisure activities are provided, depends, among other factors, on who has the decision-making power at a specific point of time.

An even more basic problem in the construction of multi-culturalism is the assumption that all members of a specific cultural collectivity are equally committed to that culture. This tends to construct the members of minority collectivities as basically homogenous, speaking with a unified cultural voice. These cultural voices have to be as distinguished as possible from the majority culture in order to be able to be seen as 'different'; thus, the more traditional and distanced from the majority culture the voice of the 'community representatives' is, the more 'authentic' it would be perceived to be within such a construction (Sahgal & Yuval-Davis, 1992).

Therefore, such a construction would not have space for internal power conflicts and interest difference within the minority collectivity - conflicts along the lines of class and gender as well as of politics and culture, for instance.

The whole notion of multi-culturalism assumes definite, static, a-historical and essentialist units of 'culture' with fixed boundaries and with no space for growth and change. As Yeatman (1992) observes:
It becomes clear that the liberal conception of the group requires the group to assume an authoritarian character; there has to be a headship of the group which represents its homogeneity of purpose by speaking with the one, authoritative voice. For this to occur, the politics of voice and representation latent within the heterogeneity of perspectives and interests must be suppressed. (p.4).

This liberal construction of group voice, therefore, can collude with fundamentalist leaderships who claim to represent the true ‘essence’ of their collectivity’s culture and religion, and who have high on their agenda the control of women and their behaviour - as campaigns like the forceful veiling of women by Muslim fundamentalists and the major anti-abortion campaigns by Christian fundamentalists demonstrate.

An alternative dynamic model of cultural pluralism has been developed by Homi Bhabha (1990). Emphasizing the constantly changing boundaries of the national ‘imagined communities’ and of the narratives which constitute their collective cultural discourses, Bhabha notes the emerging counter-narratives from the nation’s margins by those cultural ‘hybrids’ who have lived, because of migration or exile, in more than one culture. Those ‘hybrids’ both evoke and erase the ‘totalizing boundaries’ of the nation. Such counter-narratives do not have to come, of course, from immigrant minorities. The growing voice of Native Americans in Canada, for example, is an instance of a counter-narrative which is heard from within. On a much larger scale, such counter-narratives have disintegrated the ‘Soviet nation’. It is important to note in this context, however, that ‘counter-narratives’, even if radical in their form, do not necessarily have to be progressive in their message.

Nationalism and citizenship

It is not only in ‘new nations' that formal citizenship is used, at least in some ways, to indicate membership in a national collectivity. Theodor Shanin once remarked (1986) that in English (and French) - as opposed to East European and other languages - there is what he called ‘a missing term' that defines nationality in its ethnic rather than its civic meaning. For one product of the historical circumstances of the rise of the nation-state in western Europe is an inherent assumption that in the nation-state there is an overlap between the boundaries of civil and political society (to use Hegel's and Marx's terminology), the citizens of the state and the members of the national collectivity (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989). This creates both an ideology and an illusion of universality of citizenship. While the first can provide a basis for anti-exclusionist and anti-racist mobilizations - both political and legislative, the second can bloc and obscure them and construct institutional racism while using universalistic language. In Israel, for example, Palestinians are excluded from a variety of social rights which are given only to ‘Israeli citizens who have relatives who have served in the Israeli army' (Muslim Palestinians are prevented from joining the national service). In Britain, the patriality clause in the
Immigration Act also used a supposedly universalistic language for a very racist intentionality.

The most popular definition of citizenship which is used, at least in British social science, is that of T.S. Marshall (1950; 1975; 1981) who defines citizenship in terms of 'membership in a community'. This definition, as I have elaborated elsewhere (Yuval-Davis, 1991), assumes a given collectivity, with pre-defined boundaries.

This is not to say, of course, that Marshall and his followers assume that all those who are included in 'the community' also enjoy citizenship rights. On the contrary, Marshall's work constructs an evolutionary model in which more and more people who are members of the civil society gradually acquire citizenship rights. However, the boundaries of the 'society' and of 'the community' in the Marshallian model are virtually static. The differentiation between civil and political societies is a functional differentiation, relating to the same national collectivity or 'community' and the people within it, rather than marking, as is usually the case, two kinds of groupings whose boundaries partially overlap. Members of the national collectivity can also live in 'the diaspora' and be citizens of other states, while some citizens and permanent residents can be members of other national collectivities. In addition there can be cases in which a national collectivity is divided between several neighbouring countries (such as the Kurds, for instance). Moreover, there can be cases of disagreement about the boundaries of the membership in the national collectivity based on conflicting ideologies (e.g. Arab Jews; Black British).

As Stuart Hall and David Held (1989) point out, in real politics, the main, if not the only arena in which questions of citizenship have remained alive until recently, at least in the West, has been the discourse revolving around questions of race and immigration, questions which challenge any notion of fixed boundaries of 'the community'.

Debates concerning the citizenship of ethnic and racial minorities have developed in relation to all levels of citizenship - civil, political and social (to use Marshall's categories). However, the primary concern of many relevant struggles and debates has centred on an even more basic right: the right to enter, or once having entered the right to remain, in a specific country. Boundaries are constructed according to various inclusionary and exclusionary criteria which relate not only to ethnic and racial divisions but also to those of class and gender. This central arena of struggle concerning citizenship remains completely outside the agenda of Marshallian theories of citizenship. The 'freedom of movement within the European community', the Israeli Law of Return and the German nationality law - are all instances of ideological, often racist, constructions of boundaries which allow unrestricted immigration to some and block it completely to others.

Racist boundaries of citizenship and freedom of movement do not always relate to outside immigrants. In settler societies such inhibitions apply also to the indigenous people. For example, the Australian Aboriginals received right of citizenship only in 1967, and Black South Africans are only now in the process of achieving it. The same can apply to stateless minorities, as has been the case for Jews and Gypsies in large parts of Europe.
Even when questions of entry and settlement have been resolved, the concerns of people of ethnic minorities might be different from those of other members of the society. For example, their right to formal citizenship might depend upon the rules and regulations of their country of origin, those of the country where they live, as well as the relationship between the two. The USA, for example, has allowed dual citizenship with certain countries but not with others. Concern over relatives and fear of not being allowed to visit their country of origin prevent others (such as Turkish migrant workers in Germany) from giving up their original citizenship. Thus, although they might spend the rest of their lives in another country, they would have, at best, limited political rights in it. Also, given specific combinations of nationality laws, children can be born stateless in countries like Israel and Britain. Such countries confer citizenship on those whose parents are citizens rather than on those born in the country.

Immigrants can also be deprived of social rights enjoyed by other members of the society. Often, the right of entry to a country is conditioned on a commitment by immigrants that neither they nor any member of their family would claim any welfare benefits from the state. Proof of a sizeable fortune in the bank can be used to override national/racial quotas for the right to settle in a country. Class difference, therefore, can sometimes override ethnic and racial difference.

Gender differences are important in this context. Women of majority and minority groups are affected differently by sexist limitations to their citizenship rights. This can concern their right to enter the country or bring in their husbands, their right to receive child benefits or their right to confer citizenship on their children — to mention just a few examples (WING, 1985). Similarly, men and women of ethnic and racial minorities suffer from gender specific racisms: they can have different legal rights — for instance for getting permits to bring their families into the country; they often have different rates of participation in political organizations, and similar differences exist between them on a whole host of civil and social rights (see Southall Black Sisters, 1990).

The problematic nature of women’s citizenship, however, goes beyond this, and relates not only to minority women. As Carol Pateman (1988) has shown, the whole social philosophy at the base of the rise of the notion of state citizenship was constructed in terms of the ‘Rights of Man’, a social contract based on the ‘fraternity of men’ (as one of the slogans of the French revolution states — and not incidentally). Ursula Vogel (1989) has shown as well, that women were not simply late-comers to citizenship rights, as in Marshall’s evolutionary model of the development of citizenship rights. Their exclusion was part and parcel of the construction of the entitlement of men to democratic participation which:

conferred citizen status not upon individuals as such, but upon men in their capacity as members and representatives of a family (i.e. a group of non-citizen). (Vogel, 1989, p.2).
Unlike in Marshall's scheme, where political rights followed civil rights, married women have still not been given full civil and legal rights. And, as Vogel points out, the image of the Thatcherite 'Active Citizen' of the late 1980s in Britain, remains personified in the image of the man as responsible head of his family. The construction by the state of relationships in the private domain, i.e. marriage and the family, has determined women's status as citizens within the public domain. There are many countries in which women's basic citizenship rights - including, for instance, her right to work and travel in the public domain, is dependent on formal permission of a 'responsible' male relative (Kandiyoti, 1991).

The recent changes in Eastern and Central Europe have given rise for attempts to theorize them in terms of the reconstruction of civil society. This is defined as a presence of a social sphere which is independent of the state. Many western feminist analyses of the relationships between women and the state have shown this 'independence' to be largely illusory, as it is the state which constructs, and often maintains surveillance over the private domain (especially of the lower classes: see, for instance, Wilson, 1977; Showstack Sasoon, 1987). However, in Third World societies often there is only partial penetration of the state into civil society, especially in its rural and other peripheral areas. In these cases, gender and other social relations are determined by cultural and religious customs of the national collectivity. This may also happen in 'private domains' of ethnic and national minorities in the state.

There is one characteristic that specifies women's citizenship in all societies: its dualistic nature. On the one hand women are always included, at least to some extent, in the general body of citizens of the state and its social, political and legal policies; on the other hand there is always, at least to a certain extent, a separate body of legislation which relate to them specifically as women. These policies can be constructed to express different ideological constructions of gender - such as allocating different age categories for women and men to retire; they can discriminate against women - such as in cases when women would be forbidden to vote, be elected for certain public posts, etc.; or they might privilege women - such as in cases when they would be granted maternity leave, special 'privileges' in labour legislation and so on.

Marshall defines citizenship as 'full membership in a community', which encompasses civil, political and social rights and responsibilities. This has led some feminists to think that the only way women could gain full equality would be if they were to share equally with all citizenship responsibilities and duties. This has been the debate especially in relation to women's participation in the military (Enloe, 1983; Yuval-Davis, 1991b). In many ways this debate is similar to earlier debates on the entry of women into the waged labour market - especially in modern, highly technological armies which are professional, rather than based on national conscription. As in the civil labour market, the entrance of women to the military has usually proven to introduce a new arena rather than to change the principle of the sexual division of labour and power. The latter can change only when men as well as women are defined in a dualistic manner as both reproducers
and producers of the nation - a project which has barely begun in a few western countries and even there generally in a virtually symbolic way. Nevertheless, the participation of women in the military can erode one of the most powerful cultural constructions of national collectivities - that of 'women and children' (Enloe, 1990) as the reason men go to war.

Differential access to the state and its resources can exist among different ethnic and racial minorities within the same state just as their location within the labour market can be very different. Some minorities may have high access to welfare benefits and low access to employment, while others, in the same state, may be employed as cheap labour with almost no access to welfare benefits.

Of course, it is not only ethnic and racial minorities that have differential access to the state. Various regions within the boundaries of the same 'national collectivity' can sometimes have such different levels of access to the state, that Hechter (1975) and others developed the model of 'internal colonialism' to analyze the relationship between them. These, together with class, gender, age and other cross-cutting differences within the civil society that affect access to the state, highlight the fact that the state should not be seen as a neutral, inclusivist institution. Neither can the 'national projects' of the state (both in times of peace and in times of war) be seen as equally representing the interests of all members of 'the nation'.

The analysis of the interrelationships between the various forms of racist exclusions, as well as of the economic and political contexts in which they are embedded, is vital for the understanding of any concrete form of nationalism. Ethnic, racial and national divisions are not mutually exclusive categories, although the linkages between them can be complex and are indeed historically specific and undergoing continuous, though not arbitrary, change. The struggle against racism should take this into account. Understanding the ways all this relates to gender relations is vital to both anti-racist and anti-sexist struggles.
NOTES

1. For a full elaboration of the theoretical framework within which this paper has been written please see my book written with Floya Anthias, in association with Harriet Cain, Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle. Routledge, 1992. This paper expands on part of ch.2 in the book.

2. This paper is in a process of being developed into a full scale book by the name of Gender and Nation, to be published by Sage.

3. Or is it more apt to say these days that it was only a 'temporary discreditation of nazism after WW2?'
Bauer, O. (1940) *The National Question* (Hebrew), Hakibutz Ha'artrzi, Rehavia.
Southall Black Sisters, (1990), Against the Grain, SBS, London.
Stasiulis, D. & Yuval-Davis, N. (eds.) (forthcoming), Beyond Dichotomies: Gender, Race, Ethnicity & Class in Settler Societies, Sage, London.