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ANTICOLONIAL REVOLUTION AND ITS IDEOLOGISTS

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BY

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INTRODUCTION

In the present text I have concentrated on an analysis of the ideas expressed by Sultan Galiyev and other Asiatic followers of 'Marxist nationalism' (Rodinson, 1970) as being representative of the early, pioneering phase in the development of Marxist-oriented revolutionary nationalism. However, a correct interpretation of these ideas demands that they be strictly related to the historical context in which they were formulated. Any other method of study would inevitably produce anachronisms. This explains why I have devoted so much space to the political strategy of the Russian centre of the revolution — a strategy oriented towards maintaining the territorial integrity of the former Tsarist empire and the 'national Balkanization' of the Muslim population — and to the conditions in which revolutionary change was introduced into the Asiatic hinterland. I believe that clarification of these questions will enable us to assess the political viability of Sultan Galiyev's ideas on the one hand, while on the other isolating those elements of supraregional significance, an essential task in any comparative study. I endorse the hypothesis put forward by Bennigsen and Wimbush (1980:109) to the effect that "it is likely that responses similar to those of the Muslim national Communists developed simultaneously in different parts of the colonial world into which socialism had been injected as a cure for imperialism and colonialism." And last but not least, it would seem important to analyse in this context the evolution of
Sultan Galiyev's views and the program of the Turkestani underground ERK Party presented in 1926.

THREE REVOLUTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF INCORPORATION

Analysed in terms of the seizure of power in October, the Russian revolution appears primarily as a great *journee revolutionnaire* - an urban and European one. Yet that same revolution, seen as a process encompassing not only October, but also the Civil War and the period during which the basic institutions of the new state took shape, appears as a complex combination of three types of revolutionary change: urban-cum-proletarian, peasant, and national-cum-anticolonial. Superimposed on this combination is an increasing degree is the process whereby the new state was created and institutionalized. This process is in part the revolution itself, in part a mechanism for eliminating the contradictions involved in the emergence of such an astounding combination: the new state gradually subordinates the goals of each partial (or 'regional') revolution to its own logic and dynamics.

During the destruction of the old order (*journee revolutionnaire*), this state-building aspect of the revolution is not yet so explicit; it has yet to become an acutely-felt restriction of the revolution's universal message. On the contrary, for the moment this message is strengthened, for example, by the presence of the so-called internationalist detachments (of Chinese, Koreans, Serbs, Poles, etc.) and of the Red Latvian Riflemen at the most dramatic moments in this phase of the revolution, e.g., the seizure of power, the dispersion of the Constituent Assembly, the guarding of Smolny Palace, etc. (Jansen, 1985). The transition to the phase of constructing the new state order takes place gradually; this is by no means a single act involving an immediate break with internationalism, seen as the firm desire for a revolution that goes beyond the
bounds of nation and state. This would in any case be impossible, given the dominant ideology, the atmosphere, the prevalent demagogy and - most importantly - the pragmatic requirement that political action be undertaken to protect the new order, including action based on the propagation of 'revolutionary fervor'².

The coming of the phase of constructing and stabilizing the new state could not therefore take on any other form than that of a process pregnant with internal contradictions. On the one hand, we still have 'eruptions of internationalism,' remaining true - to various degrees - to the tradition of the journée revolutionnaire: the spectacular dispute over the Peace of Brest-Litovsk; the Red Army's entry into Poland, regarded as an internationalist message to the Germans; the extraordinary political and military involvement in China right up to 1927; the operation in 1920-21 of what might be termed an 'international revolutionaries' bazaar' in Tashkent; the military operations in the Ukraine in 1919, with the objective of breaking through to revolutionary Hungary. On the other hand, we have cold calculations based on the exigencies of state diplomacy: support for the Government in Persia despite the revolution led by the 'Red Mullah,' Mirza Kuchik Khan, in the bordering province of Ghilan in 1920-21; similar support for the Turkish Government: Rapallo (above all!); the subsequent backing given simultaneously in 1923 to both armed insurrection in Germany and the German central government. An accurate representation of this duality is provided by Carr: "An out-and-out revolutionary foreign policy [...] continued to be practised side by side with a foreign policy which took account of 'the state significance of the revolution'"(1966a:79).

The process of étatizing the journée revolutionnaire produced parallel contradictions within the frontiers of the former Russian empire. The strength these contradictions acquired and the form they assumed varied, however, in different areas of public life and in particular regions. This uneven
development was rooted in the uneven pace of the three types of revolutionary change mentioned earlier. While the Central Russian part of the old empire was beginning to institutionalize the new order, the old order was still being demolished in the Euro-Asian part and the Asiatic hinterland; moreover, in the latter regions, this process was taking place alongside either foreign intervention, or attempts to reinstitute the old power apparatus (by the Whites), or in some cases even attempts to establish independent non-socialist state organisms.

This had a direct effect on the process of incorporating the hinterland within the new state. The uneven development of the 'regional' revolutions was expressed in a phenomenon that at first glance appears truly astonishing: the ideological coexistence of Marxism, in its Communist version, with revolutionary anticolonial nationalism of frequently explicit religious form. Yet this phenomenon was not restricted to ideology. Particularly in certain periods, above all before the introduction of War Communism and the policy of the Kombiede and subsequently also during the NEP, the uneven development of the various types of revolutionary change also expressed itself in the coexistence of Russian Communism and traditional forms of agriculture in large parts of the hinterland; in a limited instrumentalization of conflicts in the countryside and the associated expropriations; and in the relative tolerance shown towards religion, primarily towards Islam.

Consequently, in certain sections of the hinterland the Russian urban-cum-proletarian revolution was seen as a promise of national and social rebirth, as a positive factor in the struggle against the traditional representatives of 'the one and indivisible Russia.' Recollecting the situation in the Caucasus, the Bolshevik leader Anastas Mikoyan notes that "in the years of the Civil War, the Daghestani Bolsheviks frequently made use of active militants from the Pan-Islamic movement to support them in their struggle" (1985:370); he goes on to say that "there were Muslim clerics in Daghestan who took the side of the
revolutionary poor, often going so far as coordinating their actions with those of the Communists" (ibid.). In similar vein, the Tatar revolutionary Mir Said Sultan Galiyev wrote in 1921: "In the ranks of the Red Army of the Caucasus are found shariy'at squadrons and units (the shariy'at squadrons of the Kabardian mullah Katkakanov numbered several tens of thousands of combatants)" (Sultan Galiyev, 1921:156-7). Describing the situation among the Volga (Kazan) Tatars, Sultan Galiyev stresses that a group of "Red mullahs," linked to the movement for Islamic religious reform (jadids), had appeared on the side of the Bolsheviks (ibid.:153). Finally, let us note the example of the fanatically puritan group of Kazan Tatars that called themselves "God's Regiment of Vaisov" and which supported the Bolsheviks. An Islamic historian slightly exaggerates in thus generalizing these tendencies: "The majority of the Muslim in Russia, especially the intellectuals, believed in the religious and national freedom promised by the Bolsheviks, and started to support the Soviet régime" (Nimet Kurat, 1970:629). This opinion nevertheless corresponds to the conclusions formulated, for example, by Maxime Rodinson (1979) and Helene Carrère d'Encausse (1966) and other historians.

This coexistence and collaboration, a product of the uneven development of the revolutionary processes (and of the political skills of the Bolsheviks), was of course limited in nature. What was still implied was the principle of incorporation within a Russian state, albeit accompanied by an easing of the Russification of culture and a restriction of certain symbolic features of the domination of European Russia. When this basic principle was challenged, force sooner or later became necessary and the previous peaceful coexistence came to an end. The right to secede from the former empire, proclaimed in the Declaration of Rights of the Nations of Russia on November 15, 1917, and reaffirmed on December 3 that year in the appeal To All Toiling Muslims of Russia and the East, was treated in flexible fashion, in accordance with Lenin's interpretation that this right was comparable to the right to civil divorce. In extreme
circumstances a 'divorce' may perhaps be granted, but this does not mean it should be encouraged (cf. Deutscher, 1966:188). The years of the Civil War did nothing to convince the Bolsheviks that this analogy should be treated less literally.

In the Asiatic hinterland, factual incorporation as a basic tenet of state-building was applied with rigorous consistency; this is testified to by the brief histories of the independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and also by the fierce struggle for the Ukraine at Russia's European borderlands (see, for example, Pipes, 1954; Carrère d'Encausse, 1966; Olcott, 1987; Borys, 1980; Zenkovsky, 1960). Where diplomatic and military constraints led to the acceptance of the creation of formally sovereign states, this was regarded as an interim concession, as can be seen in the examples of the Republic of the Far East, a buffer state set up in 1920 and reincorporated into Russia in November 1922 (Lukawski, 1981), or the republics of Khiva and Bukhara (Carrère d'Encausse, 1966). Only in two cases in Europe was the principle of the unity of the former empire allowed to lapse fairly quickly (Poland and Finland). The newly-found independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, on the other hand, was never considered to be permanent phenomenon.

This does not of course mean that excessive emphasis was placed on the principle of integration during the phase when the old order was being destroyed; on the contrary, fierce battles were fought to moderate this principle and highlight the right to national autonomy. The national renaissance of the Asiatic peoples was at this time of prime importance in waging an effective struggle against the Whites. Any opportunities to gain these peoples' support on the main fronts of the war were utilized to the maximum (Kolchak was advancing from Siberia through the lands of the Bashkirs, Kazan Tatars and Kazakhs, while Denikin, the English, Turks and French were attacking via Crimea and the Caucasus). Thus, during preparations for the seizure of power in Petrograd, Stepan Shaumian, leader of the
Caucasian Bolsheviks, was sharply critical of the position put forward by his comrades from Baku, who were hostile to the idea of setting up autonomous nation-states in the Caucasus, federated with Russia. Shaumian's main argument against unitary tendencies was the following: "The social revolution is approaching, so we should be less afraid of decentralization" (quoted in Mikoyan, 1985:90). In the first period of the Civil War (up to the 6th Congress of the RCP), the Russian centre of the revolution pursued a similar tactical line and did not object to the creation of relatively autonomous national Communist parties (e.g., a Muslim one). The establishment of an Autonomous Bashkir Republic in place of the Tatar-Bashkir republic earlier envisaged was - in the context of the conflict between these two nationalities - one of the concessions that persuaded Zeki Validov's Bashkir detachments to break with Kolchak (cf. Zenkovsky, 1960). The mobilizing value and propaganda attraction of the slogan of 'self-determination' were enhanced by the fact that in the years 1918-20 the Asiatic hinterland was in practice either cut off from the Russian centre of the revolution or occupied by the Whites and armies of the Entente (see Carr, 1966b:236). In April 1923, during the Congress of the RCP, Stalin forcefully remained his Russian colleagues that "if in the rear of Kolchak, Denikin, Wrangel and Yudenich we had not had the so-called 'aliens,' the oppressed peoples, who disorganised the rear of these generals [...] we would not have nailed a single-one of these generals. [...] those are the factors which, although they are obscured by the victories of our armies, in the long run decided everything" (Stalin, n.d.:155).

KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKESTAN: DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE RUSSIAN EXPANSION

The uneven development of the revolutionary process took on extremely complex and dramatic form in Central Asia (mainly Kazakhstan and Turkestan). On the one hand, in Turkestan the
national renaissance of the Asiatic peoples not only failed to provide support - even tactical support - for the Russian centre, but also practically from the outset took on the character of an anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik movement, largely controlled by the traditional political and religious élites (the Basmachi movement centred in the Fergana Valley). The few exceptions to this included the grouping of Young Bukharans, influenced by reform Islam and Pan-Turkism, who sought Bolshevik support. On the other hand, it should be stressed that in those areas of Central Asia where White forces were operating, particularly in Kazakhstan, it proved possible to overcome the initial hostility and repeat the project of tactical cooperation between Muslims and Bolsheviks. The most obvious example here is the Kazakh national party Alash Orda, which until 1919 had attempted to function on its own, with assistance from the Whites. Disillusioned with the positions of Kolchak and the ataman Dutov, this party entered into negotiations with the Bolsheviks and subsequently began collaboration with them.

These differing reactions in different parts of Central Asia were partly the result of their history prior to 1917; in the main, however, they stemmed from the different forms assumed by Russian expansionism.

As regards the steppe territories inhabited by the Kirghiz and Kazakhs (including the region of Semirechiye), some authors estimate that 32-56m. hectares of the best land was transferred to Russian colonists and the Public Land Fund between 1880 and 1916 (Nimet Kurat, 1970:517; Wojna, 1977:35; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1964:146). Cossack settlers received some 43-45 hectares on average, while Russian peasants received some 11 hectares (Szczepanik, 1987:9). The effect of these land annexations and the arrival of some 1.5m. Russians - other estimates put the figure at 3m. (Nimet Kurat, 1970:517; Olcott, 1987:90) - were dramatic changes, usually for the worse, in the life style and husbandry of the Kazakhs, hitherto nomadic.
Attempts to rescue matters by a policy of encouraging the Kazakhs to settle on the land yielded no results for the same reasons: "Although the Kazakhs formed at least 50 percent, and in some areas 75 percent, of the farming population, they owned only 20 percent of the sown fields" (Olcott, 1987:98).

In contrast, Russian expansion in Turkestan took on different, indirect forms: "migration to Turkestan proper, where pressure of existing population was unfavourable to settlement by Russian peasants, was negligible" (Carr, 1970:553). In this region the white man's expansion and domination was primarily based on the state administration and Orthodox Church, and also on the penetration of merchant capital. The latter, drawn by the region's "white gold" (cotton), managed to give the local economy a strong commodity character within a relatively short time (particularly in the Fergana Valley), with the pauperization of part of the peasantry and the generalization of a system of sharecropping founded on new principles. As a result, Turkestan - especially those areas of commodity production – lost its self-sufficiency in food, the economy becoming dominated by cotton. The area under cotton in the Fergana Valley grew from around 57,000 hectares in 1890 to over 367,000 hectares in 1915, thereby leading to a huge increase in grain import from Russia (Szczepanik, 1987:11). This type of expansion on the one hand accelerated social differentiation in the countryside (with an increase in the numbers of sharecroppers), while on the other hand helping to reinforce the dominance of traditional political and religious/cultural structures. The latter effect was rooted in the role played by the élite controlling the basic socio-economic structures, in maintaining – in the face of growing social polarization and exploitation – what might be termed a system of collective social security. This system, partly thanks to Islam, operated relatively effectively, not only as an 'ideological superstructure,' but also as an important element in reproducing the 'economic base' (as was the case with communal and clan control over the irrigation systems).
As can be seen from the brief outline presented above, differing reactions to the Russian revolution in these areas of Central Asia were rather to be expected. Yet, given that the people of Turkestan had less dramatic experience of Russian expansionism than their counterparts in Kazakhstan, it might have been assumed that resistance in the latter region should hypothetically be stronger. Let us recall that less than two years had elapsed since the bloody, anti-Russian uprising of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and sections of the Uzbeks in 1916. This uprising took a toll of 7,000 Russians dead or missing and 9,000 burnt-cut colonists' farmsteads (Nimet Kurat, 1970:519).

However, the Kazakhs were hard hit by Government repression. Some estimates put the number killed at over 200,000, with a further 300,000 fleeing to China (ibid.). Even if the first figure is inflated, the losses were undoubtedly substantial. I believe this must have been a very significant factor in the history of the Kazakhs after 1917.

On the other hand, we shall note that, in its evolution towards collaboration with the Bolsheviks after 1919, the Alash Orda - a party enjoying widespread support among the Kazakhs - encountered no opposition from Islam, which had yet to sink firm roots here, having become the majority religion in the region fairly recently. It has been emphasized in this connection that the Alash Orda was largely the product of reform-oriented Muslim intellectuals and traditionalist clan leaders appealing to native, non-Islamic Kazakhs tradition (Olcott, 1987:passim). In this sense the party was to some extent open to the slogans of change and reform raised by the Bolsheviks and to their promises of national and economic equality.

In sum, the nationalism of the Alash Orda was not of the fanatically religious and reactionary type, geared exclusively towards the past. Hatred of the Russians and a feeling of being culturally alien were minor factors compared to the dramatic
impact of the land question, a question of survival in general. In this context, the practical evolution of Bolshevik policy in the final stages of the Civil War was of key importance. In addition to an awareness of the increasing military superiority of the Red Army, the most important consideration was that the policies of the Whites were even worse and held out little chance of either national autonomy, even limited autonomy, or a redistribution of the land grabbed by the Russians (cf. Carr, 1966a:330-31).

In Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva, the deep interpenetration between Islam and the basic living and working conditions and the continued existence, almost totally intact, of the traditional social and cultural/political structures (despite the rapid commercialization of agriculture mentioned earlier) made the local population rather unsuceptible to slogans of revolutionary change. Thus, writing in 1921, Sultan Galiyev stressed the exceptional power of traditional Islam in Bukhara and its influence on the whole of Turkestan, and also the fanaticism shown in struggling against religious reformers. In analysing the possibilities for antireligious propaganda in this region, he pointed out that conditions here were "completely different from those we encounter among the Tatars, the Bashkirs, or the Kirghiz. [...] Only recently, in 1918, the Bukharan clergy with the emir at its head, organized a grandiose pogrom against Tatars, massacring more than five thousand persons accused of being jadids" (Sultan Galiyev, 1921b:155). Underlining the role played by Tatar reform Muslims before 1917 in encouraging religious modernization in Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva, Sultan Galiyev notes that the reincorporation of this region after 1917 was in fact carried out jointly by Tatars and Russians. The figures he quotes indicate that Tatars constituted over 50% of the troops in the Red Army units on the Turkestani Front (Sultan Galiyev, 1921a)\(^8\).

In general, the demand for national autonomy in Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva, along with the opposition to Russian
penetration, took on the form of an irredentist force controlled by traditionalist élites. The short-lived Kokanda Government (in the Fergana Valley), dominated by the Ulama Association and subsequently smashed by Russians in February 1918, had set out a socio-economic program calling for "the maintenance of private property, of the shariat, and of the seclusion of women" (Carr, 1966a:336). In the modified version, this program — with its emphasis on Pan-Islam and its theocratic-cum-religious view of society — was later to become the program of the Basmachis.

So the question posed by a Russian historian: "Did Russia 'disintegrate' in 1917?" (Kuleshov, 1981:18), demands an affirmative answer as far as this region is concerned (insofar as the measure of this 'disintegration' is taken to be the consciousness of self displayed by the dominant élites, the direction of the policies they pursued and the influence they had over the population, and not exclusively the factual political and administrative separation). Turkestan's several years of isolation from revolutionary Russia and the local Bolsheviks' restricted zones of power, principally in the towns, allowed the traditionalist élites to consolidate their political domination in the countryside (along with their program of national independence). The crisis in agriculture, particularly in cotton, and the appearance of some 300,000 unemployed day-labourers and sharecroppers encouraged the spread of anti-Russian attitudes, demands for independence and religious fanaticism. Against a background of economic crisis and political chaos, Islam and the traditional structures constituted the last hope for the starving poor.

The Past as Present

In 1917 and in the first years of the Civil War, it was not however, the differences referred to above that were the primary factor determining the attitude of the population of Central Asia to the Russian revolution. This was above all the manner in which the revolution made its appearance in this region. The
decisive role was played not by the slogans of national freedoms and equality coming from Petrograd and Moscow (although they got a sympathetic hearing), but rather the concrete expression of these in the particular local situation.

The European peasant/Cossack population of Central Asia, which was politically - and to a certain extent economically - dominant, along with the Russian inhabitants of the towns, the bureaucracy and the army, were almost entirely in favour of first the February revolution and than the October one (until the appearance of strong White forces). This support was founded on the straightforward premise that any Russian government that guarantees law and order is a good one (cf. Caroe, 1967:98f.) As a result, the delegates to the 10th Congress of the RCP in 1921 learnt from an authoritative source that in Kazakhstan, for example, "our party includes in its ranks a Communist Orthodox priest, a Russian policeman and a kulak from Semirechiye who still employs dozens of farmhands, has several hundred head of cattle, and hunts down Kirghiz as if they were wild game" (RCP, 1970:261, speech by Safarov). Regarding Turkestan it has been pointed out that "the Russian soldiers who were sent to Turkestan to suppress the rising (in 1916 - H.Sz.) became the support of the Bolshevik revolution and played an important part in the Bolsheviks' victory and their control of Turkestan in 1918" (Nimet Kurat, 1970:519). In this connection, let us note the declaration made on 28 November, 1917, by the chairman of the 3rd Regional Congress of Soviets of Turkestan, the Bolshevik Kolesnikov: "one cannot let the Mohammedans into the highest organs of revolutionary authority on account of the uncertain attitude of the local population towards the power of the Soviets. and because the native population lacks a proletarian organization. We cannot therefore let them take part in the government" (Bennigsen, 1958:402; Safarov, 1921:70). The 15-person revolutionary government of Turkestan contained not one single Asiatic member.
It seems justified to conclude that in reaching Central Asia the Russian revolution acquired a very specific character, initially being seen primarily as a preemptive form of self-defence by the white minority, threatened by an explosion of dissatisfaction on the part of the Asiatic millions. The few Bolsheviks of the time sensitive to the problem of the East warned that the Europeans’ revolution had in its first few years basically changed nothing in the traditional pattern of relationships between the nationalities. Safarov, for example, declared at the 10th Congress of the RCP that Central Asia was witnessing “an automatic continuation of the former colonial relations under the guise and form of Soviet power” (RCP.1970:263; comp. Safarov.1921:86; and Rodinson.1979:130 for a contemporary view). In 1934 Safarov repeated once more: “Die zahlenmaessig kleine Arbeiterklasse in Turkestan, die selbst privilegiert [...] konnte nicht gegen die kolonisatorische Ausbeutung auftreten. Zu einem Industrie-Proletariat zu gehoeren war in der zaristischer Kolonie ein nationales Privileg der Russen. Deshalb hatte die Diktatur des Proletariates hier mit ihren Schritten typisch kolonisatorischen Charakter angenommen” (quoted in Hayit.1965:17).

Let us also note that fact that a substantial part of this area was cut off from the Russian centre in the years 1918-20 and that the Russian revolutionaries were under dual siege (the Whites and the Basmachie) could only aggravate these relations, which came to be symbolified by Red “cavalry raids” on Asiatic towns and villages. In fact, these raids were not an isolated phenomenon. The policies of War Communism, the attempts to nationalize both private and waqf land and also irrigation systems, in conditions of famine and with no means of ensuring the latter’s efficient utilization or even maintenance, the contemptuous attitude to religion and attempts at forced laicization— all these things contributed to a picture of the revolutionary authorities as a new version of the traditional colonial rulers. Even worse, in attacking traditional social
relations, the Russian Bolsheviks displayed serious ignorance: by undermining the mechanisms of communal social security, they deepened the desperation of the poverty-stricken dekhhans (peasants) and drove them into the camp of the Basmachis. On top of this came a peculiar mixture of revolutionary rhetoric and maintenance of the pre-revolutionary model of colonial relations in agriculture. Safarov, for instance, stated that in the Semirechiye region "the Russian kulaks have increased the share of land they hold from 53% to 70% during the revolution. [...] At the same time the number of Kirghiz who have died off in this district has risen to 35%" (RCP, 1970:263). On the other hand referring to the way the nationalization of great estates and the Land Decree were applied in Turkestan, Szczepanik notes that "the land confiscated from the local population was given to communes and artels composed of Russian settlers" (1987:104). I will return to the repercussions all this had later on.

FROM NATIONAL DEMANDS TO THE NATIONALITIES POLICY

The national-cum-anticolonial revolution in the Asiatic territories of the former Tsarist empire was a product of the February and October revolutions in the sense that those made it possible to pose and define the problem of national autonomy.

Before 1917, programs of national independence did not reflect the views of most politically active Muslims either in the Kazakh steppes or among the Bashkirs, or even in Ufa or Kazan, the religious and intellectual centres of the Tatar and Islamic renaissance. In the Caucasus, on the other hand, where the traditions of the Great Imam Shamil were still alive, and in Bukhara and Khiva, which had been incorporated into the empire only recently and had special status, the desire for national independence or a strong tendency towards regional separatism were by no means exceptional, although even here
these sentiments were already undergoing visible erosion. Other regions, however — those earlier and/or more thoroughly controlled and exploited by the Russians — were only witnessing the first beginnings of a reemergence of national thought, expressed in terms of either religious/political unity (Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism) or territorial autonomy (the 'Tatarism' of the emerging bourgeoisie among the Volga Tatars). The same applies to the attempts to develop such a thought among communities who had never come through the experience of possessing their own state organisms. The transition from a religious and cultural renaissance (begun among the Muslims towards the end of the 19th century and principally linked to the New Method of the Bey Gasprinsky, later also to the Young Turk movement) to political programs of national and social character had only just started after the revolution of 1905 (cf. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejuy, 1964:passim; and Zenkovsky, 1960:passim).

Nor was the scope of the political demands in question readily apparent. In the case of the Volga Tatars, a group in a very specific situation, being scattered over the area between Baku, Kazan, Orenburg and Tashkent, these demands sometimes involved cultural autonomy, sometimes territorial autonomy (the concept of Idel-Ural, i.e., a Tatar state including Bashkirs as well, situated between the Volga and the Urals). Prior to 1917, demands of territorial autonomy among the nationalities and ethnic groups concentrated geographically, such as the Kazakhs and Turkmenis, were primarily expressed in concepts of autonomy within a federalist structure.10

Equally ill-defined was the social content of national programs. Or more precisely: this context was extremely heterogenous. In social terms, the national revolution was perceived both as a process of profound change in socio-economic structures and as one of restoring or preserving historical forms. This heterogeneity indicates the existence of a
differentiation in the levels of internal development attained by particular nationalities and ethnic groups and also in the social character of the leadership élites. Simplifying matters somewhat, one could say that the division between reform and traditionalist Islam (between jadids and gadjimis) was particularly acute in those ethnic groups which had already seen a differentiation in the communities producing their group élites (the bourgeoisie, intellectuals and modernist mullahs on the one hand, the traditionalist clergy, noblemen and traditional merchants on the other), just as the contrasting reflection of the Tatar or Azerbaijani new bourgeoisie and proletariat were the noblemen and peasantry of the ulus or kishlaks. In any case, there was a distinct interdependence between the level of development of the particular nationalities of the hinterland and the degree to which national demands were linked to programs of socio-economic reform.

In this situation, the concepts presented of state independence, national liberty or the desired socio-economic structure constituted a veritable 'periodic table' of the historical forms of organization assumed by human society. There was no one single model here, nor could there be. The social base for the programs of national independence (or autonomy) was composed of peasants, workers and intellectuals, the déclassé noblemen (the ragged murzas of the Tatars), mullahs and beys, nomadic clan chieftains, or even - as in the Crimea in 1917 - Russified Polish Tatars. Nationalism (whether 'private' and local or 'ideological'), the valuing of one's own religion, language, land and customs, and finally also of the opportunity to restructure society independently, found leaders and attracted support in every social group, albeit in different ways, to different degrees and with different social goals envisaged. As a political phenomenon normally associated exclusively with the development of capitalism, nationalism arrived in the towns and villages of the Asiatic peoples ahead of modern social structures. As a result of the brutal economic.
cultural and political intervention of the Russian empire, the development of national consciousness among the Asiatic peoples leapt over certain stages of 'natural' socio-economic and political evolution. To the outside world, this uneven development of 'base' and 'superstructure' seemed an alarming anomaly.

Seen from the perspective of the Russian centre of the revolution, the national aspirations and projects of the Asiatic peoples were highly suspect; the substantial part of the Bolshevik party apparatus either considered them incomprehensible or viewed them with outright hostility. It was not the done thing to mention this fact afterwards, in the late 20s or 30s. S.M. Dimanshtein, who had been in the East during the revolution and Civil War and in the 1920's edited the journal Revolutsiia i Natsionalnosti, found this out for himself in 1930 when he asserted that ignoring the national question had been the "fairly universal" practice of the Bolshevik organizations in the hinterland. Dimanshtein came under fire immediately (cf. Kuleshov, 1981:20).

The attitude Dimanshtein refers to was not just a question of the pressure of the political conjuncture and the fact that the Asiatic national parties were in the habit of allying themselves with the Bolsheviks' internal and external enemies, although these considerations should not be underestimated. In contemporary Marxist tradition, the gaining of relative independence by Russia's peripheral regions had never been considered desirable, even less so following the October revolution. The dominant views were expressed either in the naive conviction that the revolution would resolve the problem automatically and the 'national question' would become past history, or in the position that any disintegration or territorial weakening of Russia would constitute a historical step backwards. Of course, the socialist left had a slightly different approach to the Eastern dependencies of Western Europe.
(above all India and China). Nevertheless, measured by the criterion of independent statehood, Russian Asia—similarly as Ukraine—was seen as a collection of Kulturnationen, not Staatsnationen (cf. Luxemburg, 1974: 351).

In this situation there was little likelihood of Asiatic aspirations towards independence being given an understanding reception. Of course, the specific conjuncture— the Civil War—made it possible to conclude various forms of compromise, to accept concessions in order to gain tactical advantage in the struggle against the Whites. Nonetheless, as the destruction of the old order gradually gave way to the étatization of the journée révolutionnaire, the possibility of freely expressing these national aspirations in the new order became increasingly restricted.

In the end, the nationalities policy was counterposed to the national and anticolonial revolution. This policy's points of reference were: firstly, the principle of territorial unity of the former empire, and secondly, the principle of incorporating demands for national autonomy within the framework of a federal state structure. Everything within the bounds of this policy was acceptable (for a time, of course ...), while anything outside these bounds was not. Thus, Stalin wrote in October 1920 that "the demand for the separation of the borderlands from Russia as a form of relation between the centre and the borderlands must be excluded," and in a speech to Daghestanis a month later he declared that Daghestan "should be governed according to its own peculiarities, its own way of life and customs" (quoted in Borys, 1980: 350; and Carr, 1966a: 333). At the same time, mechanisms were established to ensure that the territory of the federation would not be reduced. The most important of these were the creation of a single, centralized All-Soviet Communist party rather than a federation of national Communist parties, and the construction of a unified multinational army and security police.
Taken as a whole, this nationalities policy, which involved multiplying the nations and nationalities existing in the hinterland (particularly in the Caucasus), was conceived as a specific form of mediation between the principle of self-determination in the literal sense and the tradition of Russian unitarism. And it made it possible to resolve the dilemma formulated at the 8th Congress of the RCP in 1919 by Piatakov: "Since we unite economically [...] this whole celebrated 'self-determination' is not worth a fig. This is either simply a diplomatic game, which has to be played in some cases, or it is worse than a game if we take it seriously" (quoted in Borys.1980: 348).

Variants of National Revolution and the Evolution of Situation in Central Asia

The development of the Asiatic national revolutionary movement in the former Tsarist empire was largely determined by its two principal components. The first, which we may define as Marxist nationalists, as Rodinson does (1979), was in favour of cooperating with the Russian revolution for both tactical reasons, and also ideological ones: the second, which Soviet historiography calls the nationalist counter-revolution, was radically opposed to this revolution, believing it to be in conflict with the Asiatic peoples' aspirations towards independence and also with the traditional social and religious order. The first grouping was undoubtedly exemplified in this period by the Kazan Tatar, Mir Said Sultan Galiyev, chairman of the Central Muslim Military Council of the Peoples Commissariat for Defence, a member of the central leadership (the so-called Inner Council) of Stalin's Commissariat for the Nationalities, and chairman of the Central Bureau of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East from mid-1919. In 1923, we are told by Soviet historiography closely following Stalin's accusations, Sultan Galiyev "was expelled from the RCP for nationalist, anti-Soviet and anti-party activities"
(Persits 1969:64). The second grouping had a number of important leaders, especially among the Turkistani Basmachis, the more than 60,000 strong guerrilla of the "soldiers of Muhammad" (including Toghay Sari, Madamin-bek, Qari-Abduljar, Parpi, Hail-Khodsha, Kurshirmat, Ibrakhim-bek and — from the end of 1921 to August 1922 — Enver Pasha). However, this grouping's aims and philosophy seem to have been best personified in the Chechen sheikh Hadji Uzun, leader of the Daghestani hill-tribesmen, regarded as successor to Shamil and characterized as a "pure conservative." Along with his followers, Hadji Uzun fought "on all fronts, against the White Armies of Denikin, against the Reds, and also against the more moderate members of (his) own religion" (Bennigsen and Wimbush 1980:209: on the chieftain of Basmachis, Toghay Sari, see Caroe, 1967:120-121).

Nevertheless, the factor which was to decide the fate of the national revolution and of both these groupings and determine how the national problem was resolved was undoubtedly the policies of the Russian centre.

Safarov, who played a large part in elaborating the Centre's policies in the Asiatic hinterland, stated at the 10th Congress of the RCP in 1921 that the Bolshevik Party "has taken extremely little interest in the national question. The result of this has been a series of unpardonable errors and checks on the process of revolutionary development in many border regions" (RCP 1970:260).

In my opinion, only the second part of this statement can be accepted without reservations; as to the first, a series of doubts arise. What Safarov terms a lack of interest was, in fact, the collapse of a particular concept (and practice) of the policy towards the nationalities. The aforementioned amalgam of naive internationalism and a theory of the historical superiority of large state organisms gave rise to specific
policy. This policy was well known to the Asiatic peoples—Russian unitarism, or more precisely, Russia's historic mission in the East.

What was important in Safarov's speech, however, was that he was warning the Centre that the revolution in the hinterland was gradually entering a new stage. What was occurring—largely as a reaction against measures taken by the Russians in 1918–20—was the gradual fusion of the two above-mentioned currents in the Asiatic national movement, thereby creating a qualitatively new situation which threatened the Russian revolution (a similar role was being played by the mounting wave of peasant rebellions in Central Russia, particularly Antonov's rising in Tambov province).

In September 1920 less than a year before the 10th Congress of the RCP, the Turkmen Narbutabekov had demanded a change in policy towards Turkestan while addressing the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East: "We demand genuine realization of the principles of freedom, equality and brotherhood, in fact and not merely on paper" (Congress, 1977:60). He declared to the participants: "I tell you, comrades, our Turkestani masses have to fight on two fronts. On the one hand against the reactionary mullahs in our own midst, and on the other against the narrow nationalist inclinations of the local Europeans. [...] Moslems come up to us and say that our beliefs are being trampled on, that we are not allowed to pray, not allowed to bury our dead in accordance with our customs and religion. What is this? It is nothing but a sowing of counter-revolution among toiling masses" (ibid., 62, 63-64). He also appealed to Zinoviev and Radek, present at the Congress: "Remove your counter-revolutionaries, remove your alien elements who spread national discord. remove your colonizers who are now working behind the mask of Communism!" (ibid., 63). This picture was reaffirmed several months later by Safarov, who asserted that "the Russian kulaks [...] who by a twist of fate have become the 'agents' of the
dictatorship of the proletariat in the borderlands, have driven the local masses into the camp of counter-revolution" (RCP, 1970:262).

It was obviously not only - or even primarily - the kulaks, i.e., the rural bourgeoisie, who were involved here; the problem was above all that of Russian peasants, functioning as colonists, and of the Russians as such. Placing the emphasis on the kulak problem, however, made it possible to prepare moves which on the one hand involved the return to Kazakhs and Uzbeks of the part of land they had lost, at the expense of Cossacks and wealthier Russian peasants, while on the other ensured the maintenance of the support of the majority of Russian peasants-colonists. Thus, in June 1920, even before the Baku Congress, the leadership of the RCP had advised the authorities of Turkestan to expel the Russian kulaks from Central Asia and grant equal land rights to the Asiatic peoples and also to Russian smallholders and landless peasants (Istoriia, 1986:257). (This move was accompanied by a devastating attack of the Russian TurkKomisiiia against all 'national deviationists' among the Muslim Communists in Turkestan.) And once again, the problem of Central Asia had not emerged by a "twist of fate," or as Zinoviev explained at Baku, due to deformations and abuses in applying a correct policy (Congress, 1977). Safarov realized this full well. The problem lay both in the position occupied by Russians within the colonial structure - and by "colonizing ideology," as one of the delegates from Turkestan put it (RCP, 1970:284) - and also in the policies of the Russian revolutionaries themselves (far from being kulaks). This produced arrogance and the national and economic discrimination of the Asiatic peoples.

This arrogance was exhibited, for example, in the work of the People's Commissariat for Food Supplies. Its agencies, observed Safarov, "get up to things like obliging Muslims to make compulsory deliveries of pork" (ibid., 265). I don't
believe this could have been ignorance — rather an arrogance
founded on contempt for local customs and Eurocentric
internationalism. The latter was exhibited at the Baku Congress,
for example, by a leading RCP expert in Eastern affairs,
V.M. Pavlovich (M. Veltman). In line with the prevailing theory of
the time, according to which Western Europe was the main source
of revolutionary change and the Russian revolution should be
interpreted primarily in an European context, this expert
lectured the Asiatic delegates as follows: "If the Eastern
peoples want to have the benefit of the sympathy of the
international proletariat, they too must fight for Soviet power,
for the principles proclaimed by Soviet Russia
(Congress. 1977: 101)\textsuperscript{13}.

As regards the sources of discrimination against the
Asiatic population, Safarov situated these in the basic axioms
of an 'equalizing' (implicitly: ethnocentric) approach: he
informed the delegates to the RCP 10th Congress that "most
average, rank-and-file Russian Communists start from the
assumption that, since what is at stake is a class policy, you
have to hammer the Russian kulaks on the one hand, and on
the other hammer the native exploiters, the native kulaks, and
that this should be done simultaneously and uniformly. All
this simultaneous hammering leads to is national lawlessness
under the Soviet standard" (RCP. 1970: 267).

These criticism were taken into account in the Congress
decisions, although in a fashion that could not have satisfied
the Asiatic advocates of autonomy or independence inside and
outside the Bolshevik party. For in fact, the Congress
resolution entitled On the Party's Current Tasks on the National
Question formally and irrevocably dispelled all hope of
establishing independent Asiatic socialist republics. The
resolution stated that "the isolated existence of particular
Soviet republics is unfounded and transient, since their
existence is under threat from the capitalist states"
Generalizing from the case of Turkestan, the resolution speaks of two deviations: "great-power aspirations, colonization and Great-Russian chauvinism" and "bourgeois-democratic nationalism, at times assuming the forms of Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism (in the East)" (ibid.:818). Nonetheless, taking into consideration the dramatic course of the discussion on the "national question" and being unable to ignore the threat posed by the rapid increase in Asiatic resistance, the resolution goes on to say that "Congress considers it necessary to stress the particularly dangerous and damaging character of the former" (ibid.:819).

Following a meeting of the RCP leadership with 27 delegates from the Baku Congress, 'purges' of cadres in Turkestan were begun at the end of 1920, under the supervision of the central authorities: the purges reached a peak after 1921. It should be stressed, however, that the main target were the Muslim Bureau and local Muslim cadres suspected of being under the strong influence of Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkism (cf. Yusufov, 1987:82-83). But outside the ranks of the Communist party, in the years 1921-22 a radical turnabout was effected in relation to Islam and Muslim tradition. E.g.: religious land (waqf) was restored to the mullahs and mosques; obstacles to the development of schools run by mullahs were removed; Muslim holidays were recognized, as was the legitimacy of traditional courts and law; a fairly liberal attitude was adopted to the religious beliefs of Asiatic rank-and-file members of the Bolsheviki party (in Bukhara, 90% of the Asiatic members were practising Muslims); antireligious propaganda was restricted to the Russian urban population; and the attacks on traditional agrarian relations were curbed - acknowledging, for instance, the importance of clan control over irrigation systems (cf. Saidbayev, 1978; Szczepaniak, 1987; Hayit, 1965). Furthermore, in 1921 - according to figures cited by Soviet historians - some 246,000 hectares of land taken from Russian colonists and millions of hectares confiscated from the Orenburg Cossacks were redistributed.
principally to Kazakhs and Uzbeks, in the most conflict-ridden regions (Semirechiye, Syr-Daria and the Fergana Valley). In Turkestan and around Samarkand, the Asiatic population received some 66,000 hectares of land (Istoriia, 1986:262; comp. Zenkovsky, 1960:223 who as far as Kazakhstan is concerned presents even more rosy picture).

The goal of socially and economically transforming Central Asia was not abandoned, however, although the Bolsheviks now addressed themselves to the Asiatic poor rather than the Russian-dominated state apparatus. From September 1920, work was begun on organizing branches of the Koshchi (Ploughman) Union of Labouring Dekkhans (Peasants). The authorities' intention was that this union "should contribute to carrying out a class differentiation [of the countryside]." By 1921 there were already 6,000 branches of Koshchi, with a total membership of over 90,000 (Istoriia, 1986:258-9; comp. Yusupov, 1987:94-95). However, up until the mid-20's, Koshchi's work on agricultural relations involving the Asiatic population, like that of the state authorities', was extremely limited; the emphasis tended to be placed on political propaganda and education.

The aforementioned conciliatory measures taken by the Russian centre in relation to Turkestan and Kazakhstan did not, however, have a direct or immediate effect and failed to diffuse the crisis. An effect was nevertheless achieved in the long term, a fact admitted not only by the official historians of the revolution; other sources also stress that the work of the Bolsheviks in Turkestan after 1920 "greatly contributed to the destruction of the Basmachi movement" (Heller and Niekricz, 1986:125).

The most spectacular confirmation of Safarov's fears regarding the possibility of a gradual unification of the Asiatic national movement was the defection to the Basmachis in 1920 of Ahmed Zeki Validov-Togan, leader of the Bashkirs and
Commissar for War of the Autonomous Socialist Bashkir Republic in the years 1919-1920. This change of allegiance (the second, given that prior to 1919 Zeki Validov had been fighting the Bolsheviks) was connected with the aggravation of the political and economic situation and of national conflicts in Bashkiria in the spring of 1920 (for details see Zenkovsky, 1960). Almost at the same time, a powerful uprising broke out in Daghestan, while fighting intensified in Bukhara and the rest of Turkestan. Then, in January of 1921, an illegal Socialist Party of Turkestan was set up in Bukhara by a group of Asiatic Bolsheviks from Bashkiria, Turkestan and Bukhara. During this period, disputes also sharpened over the political and administrative structure of Russia's Asiatic lands (cf., e.g., Szczepanik, 1987:43-44).

In general, it seemed that after a period of disillusionment with the Whites and then of political and military collaboration with the Reds, the region was now entering one of mass Asiatic resistance to the Russian revolution. In this context it is quite understandable that the Turkestan delegation to the Bolsheviks' 10th Congress should have attacked the ideas of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism with such fury. The amendments tabled to the aforementioned resolution On the Party's Tasks stated: "We must firmly warn against any approach to Party and Soviet work that lumps together all the natives of the East in one homogenous Muslim or Turko-Tatar mass" (RCP, 1970:973). After all, it was Muslim unity that constituted the link between the two currents of the Asiatic national movement described earlier: true, this unity was defined in different ways (in conservative-cum-theocratic terms or in revolutionary and socially radically ones), yet this unity called into question both the revolutionary paternalism of Russia and Europe and the concept of the 'Balkanization' of Russian Asia.

I shall now endeavour to present one of the variant
concepts of Muslim unity — that represented by Sultan Galiyev and the other Marxist nationalists.

**ISLAM, LAND, AND NATION**

In the period under discussion, the case of Turkestan was undoubtedly an extreme one. Yet for this very reason it shows us the most dramatic consequences of the meeting of European Marxism (or Communism) and the concrete reality of Asia.

On reaching the Asiatic hinterland, the Russian revolution — which constantly took as its points of reference concepts reflecting the circumstances of European capitalism (workers, capitalists, the class struggle, the secularization of the state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc.) — came up against a situation whose internal differentiations were quite dissimilar, and as such was integrated dissimilarly as well. The difficulties involved in translating these concepts into the language of Asiatic conditions were demonstrated not only by the practice of the Russian Bolsheviks in Asia, as described above, but also by the theoretical and historical disputes over how to conceptualize the reality of the East. conducted in the early 20's both among Soviet scholars and — in terms of political strategy — within the Comintern (cf. Cheshov, 1969). At the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East, held in the autumn of 1919, the Tatar Sahibgiray made the following realistic observation: "Lack of knowledge [on the East — H.Sz.] — this is why we are circling round helplessly and no one is capable of saying anything concrete" (quoted in Persits, 1969:99).

It would be a truism to say that the socio-economic and ideological structure of Russian Asia was cemented together by Islam. More importantly, Islam performed an integrating function in the colonial structure, being the religion (and social system as well) of communities which were politically oppressed and at
the same time subject to the strong pressure of capitalist relations, exerted via the Russian colonists and merchant capital. For this reason, the power of Islam in the region cannot be seen as just the reflex reaction of centuries of tradition or the 'petrification' of social relations; its power was continually reproduced by relations of colonialism. Writing in 1921, Sultan Galiyev asserted that "Islam was and still is, at least in the eyes of the Muslims, an oppressed religion" (1921b:147); he also stressed that many injunctions of Muslim law (shariy'at) "have a clear-cut, positive character." while the Tatar mullah or Uzbek ulema "are more democratic and closer to the people, and exercise a greater influence on them than does the village priest over the Russian muzhik" (ibid., 146, 147). Furthermore, Islam was the religion of the Asiatic village and traditional town; in the new urban centres, the Orthodox Church reigned supreme. This line of division was a rather good reflection of the early phase of colonialism, where a significant element was the dichotomy between the exploited countryside and traditional artisan/merchant towns of the Asiatic peoples and the Russian administrative and industrial centres. Finally, this colonial socio-economic structure and its associated relations of European politico-military domination, with ambitions of cultural domination, produced a specific situation of 'overdetermination', one also experienced in other regions of European colonialism. What this involved was a strict binding of the "national question" (generally defined in religious-cultural categories) to the "social question", with the former distinctly prevailing as regards the planes of social integration. This was perceived during the revolution by S.M. Dimanshtein. Writing from the standpoint of the Russian centre, he stated that "[t]he principal danger that threatens us in the East lies in the fact that nationalism is developing faster there than the class consciousness of the workers" (quoted in Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 1960:165).

The Asiatic Marxist nationalists—who had largely been
participants in the Islamic reform movement at the turn of the century, subsequently (until 1917) becoming involved in left-oriented, socially radical, national organizations — were well aware that pursuing the politics of 'class struggle' could not be their topmost priority in Russian Asia, far less their sole task. The primary concern had to be resolving the fundamental national problem, i.e., ensuring political and economic relations of equality with the Europeans of the former Tsarist empire. This concern is clearly present in Sultan Galiyev's pronouncements regarding methods of antireligious propaganda in the Muslim community; echoing Narbutabekov's positions at the Baku Congress, he declared: "The age-old oppression of Russian czarism left deep scars. Let us recall, as an example, that even after the formation of autonomous republics the Muslims rarely participated in the administrative life of their republics. No antireligious propaganda will give the expected results as long as Muslims have not been liberated and made free and equal Soviet citizens, not only on paper, but also in fact" (Sultan Galiyev, 1921b:150). Zeki Validov when breaking with the Bolsheviks in 1920, wrote in the letter addressed to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky: "we have already explained [...] that the land question in the east has in principle produced no class distinction [between us]. For in the east it is the European Russians, whether capitalists or workers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil [yerli], rich or poor, are their slaves" (quoted in Caroe, 1967:113).

Needless to say, those Marxist nationalists did not reject agrarian revolution; however they saw it in a more complicated context than the one laid down by the established pattern of 'pure' class struggle. As they saw it, revolution had inevitably to be both an act of redistribution of economic resources and revindication of national rights. In certain parts of the hinterland that meant the same.
It is worth signalling here that even in those areas where social and economic conflicts already acquired the form of a struggle between landlords and peasants, as was the case with the Volga Tatars and the Bashkirs (cf. Wojna, 1977:39), the problem of national demands was by no means extinct. Even if the social structure of the Tatar or Bashkir countryside was in 1917 similar to that of the Russian countryside, the average property owned by Tatar peasants was smaller than the land owned and cultivated by Russian peasants in Tatarstan (see Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 1960:45). This is why although Sultan Galiyev pointed out factors favourable to the antireligious propaganda concentrated on social questions among the Tatars and the Bashkirs (which was not the case regarding Bukhara and Turkestan where the "antireligious campaign can only be waged [...] with the methods used by the jadids between 1905 and 1910 in the region of Volga"), he did not lose sight of either the fact "of national renaissance of the Volga Tatars" or of the complicated network of dependencies and national domination, which made Islam more attractive as a form of supraethnic consciousness (Sultan Galiyev, 1921b).

**Sultan Galiyev’s Main Ideas Up to 1923**

Sultan Galiyev saw the structure of the European-dominated East (including the Asiatic parts of Russia) as subject to pressures of two forces: of the external European imperialism/colonialism and of the native "clerical-feudal bourgeoisie." He saw that domination in a hierarchic manner, giving the prime importance to the outside domination. That was the meaning of his thesis, first formulated in 1918, about proletarian nations: "Tous les peuples musulmans colonisée sont des peuples prolétariens, et puisque presque toutes les classes de la société musulmans ont été autrefois opprimées par les colonialistes, toutes ont droit au titre de prolétaires" (quoted in Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 1960:105).
The consequences of the thesis were as follows. First, the pace of social revolution among the Asians had to comply, at least at the initial stage, with the requirements of national revolution. The struggle against external imperialism (which was the main point of the slogan of national revolution) meant accentuating the opposition between the oppressed and the oppressing, not the opposition between capital and labour. This thesis was upheld, for example, in the resolution proposed by Sultan Galiyev and adopted by the 2nd Congress of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East at the end of 1919 (Sultan Galiyev, 1919c). At the 2nd Comintern Congress in 1920, Lenin indirectly sanctioned the resolution as a basis of political strategy in the East. However, at the Congress in Baku, it turned out that representatives of the Russian centre and Asiatic Communists (of course, not all of them) were speaking in different languages. Pavlovich (Veltman) already quoted here, tried to convince the delegates that "the formation of national states in the East, in which power has passed from the foreign rulers who have been driven out into the hands of the local capitalists and landlords, does not in itself constitute a great step forward in the matter of improving the position of the popular masses" (Congress, 1977:102). Kazakh Communist Turar Ryskulov replied him in an indirect manner, arguing that "while in the West the socialist movement takes the form of a Communist movement, we certainly cannot count on a purely Communist movement. In the East the movement assumes a petty-bourgeois character, the form of a movement for national self-determination, for the unity of the East. But this movement will undoubtedly develop into a social movement, an agrarian movement" (ibid., 115).

Second, such national revolution would have to embrace all the East - not Russian Asia alone. At the 2nd Congress of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East just mentioned, Sultan Galiyev specified the tasks facing Asiatic
revolutionaries in the following manner: "Camarades, notre Congres doit [...] transporter en Orient l'énergie révolutionnaire du communisme née en Russie Soviétique" (Sultan Galiyev, 1919b:214). That thesis was a result of a more general concept of the role of the East in the world system, which I will discuss later.

Third, the leadership of national revolution in the East had to lie with Asiatic revolutionaries themselves (that applied to revolution in Russian Asia as well). Commenting upon Sultan Galiyev's ideas concerning this issue, Rodinson pointed out that Sultan Galiyev and his followers "wanted the Revolution to be their revolution as well, and to follow a course determined by their own actions, not by those of their somewhat over-paternal elder brother, the Russian proletariat" (1979:138). That aspiration found its expression in the resolution of the 2nd Congres of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East in the thesis stressing the need for the whole 'work' in the East to concentrate in the Asiatic part of Russia and in the hold of the Central Bureau of said organization, where Asians—advocates of radical revolutionary actions in the East prevailed (Sultan Gliyev, 1919c; Persits, 1969:90).

It was characteristic of those three theses that they expressed the conviction that a number of factors favoured the so conceived revolution. First, the decisive role of the East in the world revolutionary processes; second, consciousness of supranational or supraethnic community (ummah) resulting from Islam and the colonial practices of the Europeans; and third, the possibility of taking advantage of those Russian Asians, who had already experienced revolution, as the vanguard. Let us consider those factors.

1. The Role of the East

The manner in which Sultan Galiyev (and many other Asiatic revolutionaries) defined the role of the East in the revolution
was, in point of fact, repugnant to the theory of a revolutionary change that prevailed in the Russian centre and that stressed the primary importance of Western Europe. That theory either ignored the East whatsoever or saw it as a passive object ("dormant Asia").

Needless to say, during the revolution and the Civil War (especially at its final stage which coincided with the slowing down of revolutionary movements in the West), it was impossible to maintain the old dogmas in their unchanged form. Both Lenin and Stalin, each after his own fashion, began to give more importance to the possibility of attacking the 'fortresses of imperialism' in an indirect way, with the help of national revolutions in Asia. In Western Europe, Anton Pannekoek rationalized the new situation in the same manner, emphasizing that the "Russian revolution is the beginning of the great revolt by Asia against the Western European capital"; he stressed, somehow anticipating arguments of certain Asiatic revolutionary nationalists (e.g., Hanafi Muzaffar in Tatarstan and Ahmed Baitursunov in Kazakhstan), that in the East "the masses are not poisoned by the fug of a bourgeois ideology" and that there also, it was possible to apply "the most advanced technology inherited from capitalism for a renewal of the traditional forms of production" (Pannekoek, 1978/1920:137,138).

On the other hand, however, as far as the old dogmas ignored the East for rather 'theoretical' reasons, then the establishment of the revolutionary Russian state after 1917 set in motion mechanisms which to all intents and purposes blocked the ambitious (though not always realistic) projects of Asiatic revolutionaries. The new state's raison d'état - because this is what we talk about here - clashed with the vision of a general Asian revolution, forced upon from outside if need be. Irrespective of particular reasons favouring a quick étatisation of revolution, Asiatic activists rationalized the process as an obstacle to and one of the main causes of the failure of
revolutionary actions in the East. In their opinion stabilization of external relations was at variance with the ideology of internationalism. In March 1921, when Soviet Russia signed a trade agreement with Great Britain, a group of Asiatic revolutionaries protested in Moscow: "If England is an imperialist power against whom it is essential to wage war, how can Soviet Russia come to term with her?" (quoted in White, 1976: 175). Agreements with Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan in 1921 caused similar reactions.

Sultan Galiyev's position on the role of the East reflected all those problems and irresolutions. He expressed his position, first and foremost, in the unfinished series of articles published in autumn 1919, under a common title The Social Revolution and the East (Sultan Galiyev, 1919a). Sultan Galiyev presented some of the theses put forward in that series earlier, e.g., at the 1st Congress of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East (cf. Persits, 1969). However, the mentioned articles have a particular importance. First of all, they offer a coherent and frank assessment of the problem. A Soviet historian mentioning it, even today, cannot help commenting on it in a highly emotional and unfavourable manner. He writes about the "one-sided, narrowly nationalistic concept of the decisive role of the East in the world process of revolution." He also maintains that the economic aspects of that concept were "primitive and simply unscientific" (ibid., 97). Second, these articles are the only comprehensive and programmatic statement by Sultan Galiyev that has been preserved and available (excluding articles on detailed subjects). As results from the research by Bennigsen and Quelquejay, the only way to reconstruct today the later evolution of Sultan Galiyev's position is to resort to information and references provided by his political opponents. For obvious reasons, theirs is not the most reliable source. After all is said and done, the same applies to Sultan Galiyev's oppositional activity.
Like other Asian revolutionaries in Russia, Sultan Galiyev, too, found that "all the measures which we took in the business of the establishment of correct mutual relations between Soviet Russia and the East were, until recently [i.e., until the end of 1919 – H.Sz.], too accidental and palliative in character;" whereas in real point of fact, he argued, "the East, with its population of one and a half billion enslaved by the western European bourgeoisie, is forgotten" (Sultan Galiyev,1919a:5-7). He, too, was critical of the withdrawal of Russian centre's support for revolutionaries in Persia and the merely verbal support for the revolt in Afghanistan" (ibid.:6).

Such criticism, although inconvenient to the Russian leadership, did not go, however, beyond the accepted rules of the political game. However, Sultan Galiyev's conceptions went much further. According to him, the fundamental strategic choice made by the Russian leadership was wrong ("one-sided") as "almost all the attention of the leaders was turned to the West" (ibid.:7). The choice of such strategy was based on the premise that, from the economic point of view, the East was playing a secondary role in the reproduction of capitalism. Moreover, compared to the 'clarity' of class relations in Western Europe, social relations in the East were not only much more complex, but they also reflected the state of (social and political) stagnation. According to Sultan Galiyev, both the conclusion as well as its premise were mistaken, and therefore the whole of the Bolshevik's strategy was. If so, how should one rationalize the fact that it was the West who represented "the concentration of all the material and 'moral' forces of international capitalism"? (ibid.:7-8)

Sultan Galiyev's answer (I am not going here into the question whether a correct one) was as follows. First, under the then circumstances, the Western European bourgeoisie "appeare[d] to be international," and therefore the sphere of its activity expanded over the East as well. Second, the economic strength of
the West was a result primarily of plunder and force: "the invasion of Europe by the Tamerlans, Ghengis Khan, and other Mongol princes in all the cruelty of its devastating strength pales a good deal before that which the Europeans did in the America which they 'opened'" (ibid.:9). As a result, "[if] it were possible to compute the degree of exploitation of the East by western capital, and in connection with this its indirect participation in the might and force of the [...] bourgeois culture and civilization of the Europe and America [...] then we would see that a lion's share of all the material and spiritual wealth of the 'whites' is stolen from the East" (ibid.). Third, in line with the theory of 'labour aristocracy', which was prevailing among the Bolsheviks, Sultan Galiyev stressed the possibility that the Western bourgeoisie was resorting to political corruption, with the help of resources plundered in the East. In his opinion, that corruption was not confined to the 'aristocracy' alone, it was applied vis-à-vis economic demands of the Western proletariat as a whole. By the same token, the fact that the Bolsheviks were concentrating their attention on the Western proletariat, made them to leave "full freedom of action and freedom of manoeuvres in the East" to the Western bourgeoisie (ibid.:8).

The conclusion was obvious. As "the East on the whole appears as the chief resource of international capitalism's nourishment," in such situation - Sultan Galiyev argued - "deprived of the East, and torn away from India, Afghanistan, Persia, and the other of its Asian and African colonies, western European imperialism will be obliged to wither and die its own natural death" (ibid.:11). At the same time, the conclusion gave a warning to Russian Bolsheviks. Sultan Galiyev warned them that unless the Russian revolution concentrated both its attention and activities on the East, and master the East by means of social and national revolution, the same East - controlled by the Western capital and the native "clerical-feudal bourgeoisie" - would turn against revolutionary Russia. He repeated that
warning once again several days later, at the 2nd Congress of Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East, emphasizing the threat of a "march of the Blacks on Europe" (quoted in Persits.1969:97).

A short comment seems necessary here.

The concept of the role of the East Sultan Galiyev put forward in 1919, propounded a thesis on 'proletarian nations' which was somewhat tactical in its character. In his articles Sultan Galiyev took note of and emphasized the social and economic differentiations in the East. What is more, he saw Asiatic despotic élites as the main ally of the Western capital. In this sense, those interpretations which give emphasis to the literal meaning of the term 'proletarian nations' are wrong. The term has sense only in the framework of the theory of colonial expansion and of struggle against it. Certainly Sultan Galiyev did not share the idyllic view of the Tatar or Kazakh conflict-proof community; neither did he maintain the uncritical attitude to the Islamic tradition (even in its reformed version). Needless to say, he did not share the Russian centre's view on the need to carry a 'proletarian policy' in those communities where proletariat simply did not exist. He saw the need, however, of revolutionary changes of social relations in the countryside during (and by means of) a national revolution, of such changes which would eliminate foreign and local conservative élites. In sum, Sultan Galiyev was a Marxist to the extent sufficient to prevent him from being a mere nationalist.

Second, it is clear from Sultan Galiyev's texts that he was fascinated by the possibilities of revolutionary actions in the East. He was, however, uneasy and full of doubt about the political consciousness of peoples of the East. He simply was not convinced to the end that the Asians would accept the ideas of social and national revolution as their own. Of course, the relevant official propaganda, especially that spread by
Zhin' Natsional'nostei, was optimistic. But in his address to the 2nd Congress of the Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East, Sultan Galiyev voiced his doubt explicitly. Demanding the creation of an Eastern Red Army, he pointed out that it would "fight in the East [...] against international imperialism or against the East itself if imperialism [took] advantage of the East" (quoted in Persists, 1969:93).

2. The Problem of Islam/Pan-Turkism

The problem of Islam (and/or Pan-Turkism) as a problem of determining the direction of nation-building processes in Russian Asia faced the Russian revolutionary centre with an extremely difficult choice. Nearly all major Asiatic revolutionaries opted energetically for the concept of great Asiatic nations. That, however, involved the establishment of a relatively homogenous pole opposite to the white population of Russia, and implicitly - the acceptance by the Russian centre of a certain version of Pan-Islam and/or Pan-Turkism. A counter-proposal was to take advantage of Pan-Islam's weaknesses and internal contradictions and a policy aimed at strengthening ethnic and cultural differences among the Asiatic population, and creating nations which would be new in point of fact.

That was not an artificially invented problem in this sense that the 'natural laws of development' would imply only the first option as the prevailing and the only one to be taken up. The dramatic aspect of the situation and of the choice lied in the fact that the second option was realistic and historically justified as well: the fact that it was there did not result from Russian force and pressure alone. If today we recognize correctly as a primitive oversimplification the view according to which Islam was merely an obstacle to arousing national consciousness (as propagated by, e.g., Zhdanko, 1974:24), and which overlooked the nation-building aspects of that religion, then it is oversimplification, too, to advocate a view that ignores ethnic, cultural, linguistic and, last but not least,
economic differences occurring in Russian Asia. After all is said and done, those differences took dramatic forms sometimes, for example, the sharp conflicts between Tatars and Bashkirs, Tatars and Uzbeks, etc. It should be remembered that in May 1917 during the 1st All-Russian Moslem Congress the adversaries of Pan-Islam (and implicitly, anti-Tatar minded Asians) claimed that "we must realize that there is not a Moslem nation in Russia" (Bashkir leader A.Zeki Validov-Togan). Kazakh leader emphasized when criticizing defenders of the idea of a 'Muslim nation': "Do you have any idea what nationality is? It is the unity of blood, spirit, culture, traditions, language, customs and territory. You cannot create a 'Moslem' nation on the basis of a non-territorial, centralized autonomy. Are you not, incidentally, a Pan-Islamist? We know that behind Pan-Islamism there are concealed the machinations of one nationality [Tatars - H.Sz.] to dominate the other!" (quoted in Zenkovsky,1960:149,148).

In sum, in 1917 communities of Russian Asia were perplexed. If, on the one hand, the continuity of their religious community told them to choose a solution towards ideological unity going beyond local patriotism, on the other hand - growing ethnic differences and antagonisms implied 'Balkanization'. In a word, nothing could be taken for granted and, theoretically, one could choose any of the paths. As it usually happens in situations of this kind, force settled the matter. Force of the Russian centre at that. In the eyes of Asiatic revolutionaries that was tantamount to a mere interference of the colonial type, no matter what historical justifications the Russians could have.

Yet, at the threshold and at the initial stage of the Bolshevik revolution, the first option seemed to prevail. After all, that was only natural in the period of the journée revolutionnaire. The appeal from December 1917 was addressed, as we remember, to the "Labouring Muslims," not to the Kirghiz or the Uzbeks. Saidbayev is correct to observe that "by turning to the Muslims, the [appeal] was assuming that religious attachment
meant here more that the ethnic status" (Saidbayev, 1978:64). Also later, the same author points out, more or less until 1920-21, the term did not disappear from the political language of the Bolsheviks. On the occasion of the amnesty for Basmachis, in May 1919, the Turkestani authorities issued an appeal "to the labouring Muslim population of Fergana." In May 1920, the commander of the Red Army in Central Asia, Mikhail Frunze, issued an appeal to "the Muslim population of Fergana oblast'." Such terms as "Muslim languages," "Muslim proletariat" or "Muslim Communists" and "Muslim Army" were in common use (ibid.) And what is more important, and about which the Soviet author makes no mention, in June 1918, on the initiative, among the others, of Tatar leaders Vakhitov and Sultan Galiyev, the Russian Party of Muslim Communists-Bolsheviks was formed. However, at the end of that year, it lost its autonomy and was transformed into a section (Bureau) of the RCP. After RCP 8th Congress, a statutory ban was enforced on the creation of national (Communist) parties independent of the Russian centre. And it is worth mentioning here that the mentioned party of Muslim Communists was showing strong 'independent' tendencies, claiming, for example, the right to join the Comintern outside the RCP structure. The fate of the Turkic Communist Party aiming at uniting non-whites only, created by Turar Ryskulov in Kazakhstan and Turkestan, was similar (cf. Olcott, 1987:200, 210). 

At the final stages of the Civil War and the institutionalization of the new order, experiments with revolutionary Pan-Islamism and/or Pan-Turkism lost their attraction for the Russian centre. Especially, that ambitions of Asian revolutionaries were difficult to stifle, whereas their aspirations at autonomy and resistance to the policy of 'accelerated' political differentiation of the Asiatic countryside, and demands of national justice, were increasingly often suspect. Increasingly often the Centre identified Islam with 'reaction' and the idea of Muslim (or Turkic) unity - with subversion of the revolution. In such situation, projects of
Sultan Galiyev and other Marxist nationalists to create an autonomous Asiatic pole of the 'world revolution' (Muslim or Turkic) could not find following among the Russian leadership. Let us quote two examples.

In November 1918, during the 1st Congress of the Communist Organizations of Peoples of the East, Sultan Galiyev and other Asians submitted a memorial to the RCP CC, in which they demanded taking the political and military offensive on the East. At the same time, they proposed Stalin as the foreign affairs commissar who should be "in charge of the whole of the Soviet authorities' internal and external policy in the East" (quoted in Persits, 1969:90). The course of events showed that, with the exception of the attempt to create a Turkish Red Army in the Crimea, the Central Committee confined itself to a mere taking note of the proposal — without trying to implement it.

During the 2nd Congress of the said organization, in November/December 1919, the Asians' demand acquired the form of a formal resolution which started with the following words: "Le Congress estime que, sans la participation de l'Orient [...] le problème de la révolution socialiste mondiale ne peut être résolu" (Sultan Galiyev, 1919c:213). Sultan Galiyev, the chairman and the main animator of the debates, came out with a project to make ready for "international civil war," especially that the prospect for victory over Kolchak and Denikin was quite immediate. He said: "We must make ready for such struggle and therefore out of the already revolutionized peoples of the East — Tatars, Bashkirs, Turkmen and Kirghizes [...] create an Eastern Red Army [...] which will fight in the East" (quoted in Persits, 1969:92).

The reaction of a representative of the Russian Revolutionary Military Council was typical: "When Comrade [Sultan Galiyev] was saying that we should concentrate Muslim

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detachments in definite spots so that they be at the disposal of the Muslims. I wanted to ask: have you forgotten that at the time when Yudenich was attacking Petrograd the Bashkirian Brigade gave [us] enormous help? [...] I want to ask also, where are we? Has Denikin been crushed yet? [...] By chasing Denikin away, aren't [Muslim detachments] aspiring at freeing Daghestan, Azerbaijan? [...] Muslim detachments should stay where the revolution needs them" (quoted in ibid.:93).

The above arguments did not convince participants in the Congress. Their resolution included a point which demanded: "to create an Eastern Proletarian Red Army as a part of the International Red Army" (Sultan Galiyev,1919b:214).

Needless to say, the Russian centre ruled out the project on the spot. Sultan Galiyev's thesis that "the East is this revolutionary cauldron which can sink the whole Western Europe in revolution" (quoted in Persits,1969:91) sounded — in the light of practical experience of Basmachis and other armed movements of the Asians — only too sinisterly. Russia could easily become a substitute for "Western Europe."

A telegraph conversation between Frunze, commander of the Turkestan Front, and Shalva Eliave, member of the Turkestan Bureau of the CC of RCP, held in January 1920, sheds some light on the debates of that Congress and its resolution. When Eliave asked Frunze about his opinion on projects to create a Muslim Army that would include, among the others, those captive Turkish officers who declared their readiness to fight for the revolution, Frunze answered: "There should be no separate staff and no Muslim army. Regarding this matter, I and Ilyich [Lenin] exchanged views once again [...] and any talks are out of the question. We will, of course, permit the creation of local [detachments], however, not on the religious but on the national basis" (quoted in ibid.,94).
3. The 'Vanguard' of Social Revolution in Asia

In Sultan Galiyev's considerations, the problem of 'vanguard' of the social revolution in Asia appeared primarily in the context of the role played by the Tatars. He stressed both their historical role as specific Kulturträger in Asia as well as their current role within the Red Army. The never-implemented project of establishing Tatar-Bashkir Republic, designed already in the years 1918-19 (which more or less corresponded with the conception of Idel-Ural, so dear to Tatar nationalists) was devised as a creation of a territorial, economic, political and military base to step up the revolutionary attack on the East. In 1921 Sultan Galiyev wrote that "the working masses and the poorer classes of Tatars did [...] help to spread [the revolution] in the East. We must continue their efforts [...] the Tatar Republic [created in 1920 alongside the Bashkir Republic - H.Sz.] should be the base of this work" (Sultan Galiyev, 1921a:144).

If one leaves Sultan Galiyev's specifically Tatar-oriented preoccupation out of account, his idea of organizing a march into Asia, which would be supported by the force of Russian Asians, was quite common at the time of revolution and Civil War. At the same time, it reflected the mentioned misgivings about the East's own revolutionary potential. In 1919 Zhizn' Natsional'nostei wrote about it in a fashion characteristic of that time: although Asia has waked up, however, "deprived of active assistance [...] from new forces of the Russian Muslims it can soon sink into a deep lethargic sleep of fossilization and apathy again. Let Great Britain who has always been hunted by the vision of the Cossack lance on top of the Himalayas, today see this historic lance in the hands of the Russian Muslim proletarian coming to help his brothers in Persia, India and Afghanistan" (quoted in Persits, 1969:90).

This 'militaristic' aspect of the revolutionary activity in the East was partly a result of the Asians' aspiration at
immediate success, and partly, it reflected their difficulties in defining those social forces which could under the circumstances of the East play the role of 'vanguard' of national and social revolution. Who could reach for power? Peasant soviets? That was what the Comintern maintained after 1920. However, Asiatic revolutionaries had their doubts whether that was the best instrument for the achievement of their goal. Peasant soviets as such would not achieve much. Hence to Sultan Galiyev and his followers the answer based on the experience of Civil War seemed to be at hand. The editorial published in Zhizn' Natsional'nostei in May 1919, suggested that "it is enough to give a strong army to Turkestan, and the cause of revolution in Asia will advance very quickly" (quoted in ibid.). In 1921 Sultan Galiyev emphasized regarding Russian Asia: "The Tatar combatants of the Red Army became the pioneers of social revolution in the East by carrying the red flag of class struggle to the distant kishlaks (villages) of Central Asia, to the yurts of Siberia, and to the auls of the Caucasus" (Sultan Galiyev, 1921a:143).

Similar considerations seemed not to be infrequent among Asiatic activists (from Russia, India, China or Korea). They found their reflection also in more theoretical discussions among Comintern activists and Russian researchers in the years 1921–23. In those discussions some authors undertook, for example, the problem of identifying 'substitutes' for the elements of social structure that were missing in the East (first and foremost modern bourgeoisie and working class). In this context, they pointed to the specific and extremely important role played by the army and bureaucracy. For example, Sultan-Zade and Gurko Kr'azhkin treated bureaucracy as a substitute for bourgeoisie. Other authors held similar views on the role of the army (cf. Cheshov, 1969:207 and passim). So the fact that Asiatic revolutionaries saw the army, the intelligentsia and other intermediate strata as politically and militarily mobile 'vanguard' was to some extent a
reflection of hypotheses that were widely discussed at that time.

The emphasis Sultan Galiyev laid on the problem of mobilization of the Asians' own forces, and his efforts to make Tatars take the lead in that endeavour, naturally led him into conflict with the Russians. Personal strifes were concealing a more fundamental problem: Who should be in charge of the Asians' problems in Russia and of preparations for revolution in the East? What is more, if such revolution was to take place, as a national revolution at that, why then was the Russian centre, to all intents and purposes, restricting the autonomy of national republics and eliminating non-Bolshevik revolutionaries? Last but not least, if revolution in the East was the main guarantor of success of the world revolution, why was the Bolsheviks' policy stressing the need of stabilization of internal and external relations, instead of laying an emphasis on political and military preparations?

Having asked such questions, Asiatic Marxist nationalists could not help running counter to the Russian centre. The post-1923 history of Sultan Galiyev showed that in the most dramatic way.

**Against Soviet Russia, for the Colonial International**

When Sultan Galiyev was arrested for the first time in 1923, Stalin accused him of collaboration with the Basmachis, of the anti-state and anti-party activities (Stalin, n.d.: 172-6). After strong protests of his fellow Asiatic comrades, Sultan Galiyev was released but, at the same time, politically marginalized. He "disappeared" in 30s.

In the version Bennigsen and Quelquejay presented after Carr, the charge of underground activity was without foundations.
What did indeed take place was an attempt by Sultan Galiyev, Ryskulov and other Asiatic revolutionaries to oppose the policy of the Russian centre at the coming RCP Congress, in order, as Sultan Galiyev wrote, "to create a common front and defence of our national interests" (quoted in Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 1960:167; cf. also 168-9). In such interpretation, the arresting of Sultan Galiyev would be Stalin's revenge for the Asiatic revolutionary's attempt at independent and politically autonomous activity, a warning to those who treated the slogans of equality and the world revolution too literally.

On the other hand, according to the later version of Bennigsen and Wimbush, Sultan Galiyev's disillusionment with the practical policy of the Russians already prior to 1923 found its expression in underground activities, in creating of secret groups planning a struggle against the Russian Bolsheviks in Central Asia and Tatarstan. However, the two authors do not refer to any new material and/or document that would not be known to Bennigsen and Quelquejay, in order to support this hypothesis. Therefore one can only take their word for their statement that Stalin's accusation "was probably true" (Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1980:87)17.

Unable to settle this question, I take for granted only that after 1922-23 Sultan Galiyev and other Marxist nationalists found any further cooperation with the Russian revolution impossible. In their opinion, the latter became a conservative and oppressive force, contrary to the interests of the East and national revolution. In this way I take as proven the suggestion by Bennigsen and Quelquejay (based on official Soviet sources) that Sultan Galiyev wrote a manuscript Considerations on Foundations of Socio-Political, Economic and Cultural Development of Turks, and I also recognize as probably authentic the document quoted by Bennigsen and Wimbush (although without giving any source or other bibliographic data), including the program of the Sosialist ERK Firkasi (Socialist Party of
Turkestan ERK-Freedom), adopted in 1926. The two materials show the evolution Marxist nationalists in Russia underwent since the end of the Civil War. The ideas put forward in these materials seem to be a recapitulation of the path of political development of the activists who tried to look at the realities of the East from their own perspective, and to give their own answers to the problems of their nations. Those answers could be correct or not — but their own.

1. Consequences of NEP

The ideas expressed by Sultan Galiyev after 1923 are first and foremost an evidence of his disillusionment with the everyday national and economic policies of the Russian leadership. That disillusionment was made even stronger by the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP) carried out since 1921, and to be precise — the effects of that policy on the Asiatic hinterland and on foreign policy. In my opinion, in the analyses of the political evolution of Sultan Galiyev and other Marxist nationalists presented so far, that aspect has not been sufficiently emphasized. After all is said and done, that timing of their evolution decided on their ultimate defeat and also on the growing disparity between the idea of Pan-Asiatic revolution and the Asiatic population of Russia's quest for political and economic stability. One should not forget that although struggles with the Basmachis in Turkestan and hill-tribesmen on the Caucasus were fought until the end of the 20s, after 1922 they constituted no real threat to the integrity of Soviet Russia.

There arises a question therefore why the radical evolution of Sultan Galiyev's political views took place precisely at the time of NEP.

From the point of view of Asiatic revolutionaries, NEP was a multifarious phenomenon, dangerous both to the Asiatic unity as well as to the strategy of revolutionary transformation of
Asia and the Middle East. From the point of view of the majority of Russia's Asiatic population, NEP meant a relative stabilization and peace, although it also carried a number of negative phenomena in the sphere of contacts with the Russians. But it was important at that particular moment that the policy of 'proletarian' assaults against the traditional structures of the countryside and farming was abandoned, that attacks against religion were no longer so fierce, etc.19

Of course, the threats the Asian Marxists nationalists perceived in NEP were not illusory, although they failed to notice the positive effects of gradual stabilization. The transition to NEP was first received in Central Asia as a trend to abandon activities aimed at the revindication of land grabbed by Russian peasants. As I already mentioned, at the end of the period of War Communism, the Russian leadership forced the Russian administration in Kazakhstan and Turkestan to carry out a policy favourable to the Asiatic population (Agrarian-Water Reform). The announcement of the principles of NEP was received in the Asiatic hinterland as a signal to return to the policy of backing those groups which were economically strong, i.e. the Russians. The activities toward that end were so energetic that in 1922 the RCP CC felt compelled to instruct the Turkestan authorities that "the line of the national policy in Turkestan has not changed in connection with the so-called 'new line' of the economic policy. Utterly wrong are [...] those comrades who think that the implementation of NEP in Turkestan should lead to a change in the agrarian policy of the Soviet Government, for example, to a change of the agrarian reform in Semirechiye, which returned to the Kirghiz population the land previously grabbed from them" (quoted in Istoriiia, 1986:264).

Another aspect of NEP in the Asiatic hinterland, closely connected with the one mentioned above, was a marked increase in chauvinistic moods among the Russians and the resulting anti-Russian sentiments among the Asians. You can hardly find a
better witness to that process than Stalin. At the 12th RCP Congress in 1923 he argued that "as a result of the New Economic Policy, a new (?) force is being engendered in the internal life of our country, namely, Great-Russian chauvinism, which breeds in our institutions, which penetrates not only into Soviet institutions, but also into Party institutions" (Stalin, n.d.:149). What is more, when attacking Sultan Galiyev in 1923, Stalin was ready to admit that "the Rights" (i.e. the Asiatic Marxist nationalists) had arisen "in connection with the New Economic Policy;" he was also ready to admit that a continuation of the supremacy of the Russians and of the "Russian model" would cause that the so-called Leftist policy "may prove to be the most dangerous danger" (ibid.:180). Yet those warnings or verbal concessions by Stalin were not convincing to the Marxist nationalists, let alone Russian activists. According to the latter, as Morozov put it during the 1924 Party conference in Kazan, "[t]es tendances chauvinistes [among the Russians - H.Sz.] sont une pure invention des 'droitiers' tatars" (quoted in Bennigsen and Quelquejay,1960:1987). Representative of the RCP CC summed up the situation in 1929 when assessing the moods among the Asiatic activists: "Dans la question nationale, il n'y a plus chez les communistes non russes, ni droite ni gauche. Les fractions se mêlagent, toutes pensent 'national'" (ibid.:188).

As regards the ideological and political sphere, NEP meant primarily a confirmation of the centralized structure of the RCP, and an attack against all kinds of 'deviations' (including national). At the same time, the purging of the Communist Party from those activists who continued to think in the categories of the Muslim (or Turkic) unity was complemented by the end to the practice of searching for similarities between the doctrine of Communism and Islam. This kind of experiments, carried out in good faith by Asiatic intellectuals-nationalists, had played a significant role in the pacification of Central Asia in the years 1919-22; they had also offered a political and ideological alternative to radical jadids and weakened the
resistance put up by mullahes. The end to those experiments went hand in hand with a consistent implementation of the policy of national 'Balkanization' of the Asiatic hinterland.

Last but not least, in the sphere of external relations NEP meant a switch toward the policy of "peaceful coexistence" with European powers and Soviet Russia's neighbours. This postponed the issue of the export of revolution eastward until some undetermined future and reduced the importance and 'bargaining power' of the Asiatic revolutionaries. Together with the already mentioned attributes of NEP, that factor made those revolutionaries find themselves in a sort of blind alley. Some of them chose a coexistence with the Russian leadership, and in the following years tried to defend the increasingly limited autonomy of national republics and to struggle for a continuity of their historical and cultural tradition. The others, as Sultan Galiyev, clashed with new Russia in the name of Pan-Asiatic revolution in the possibility of which they started to believe in 1917.

2. Toward the Colonial International

Analysing the post-1923 political evolution of Sultan Galiyev and other Asiatic Marxist nationalists, one should keep in mind the fact that they were not any kind of spokesmen for democratic or liberal political tradition (as it is understood in Europe): "Like the Russians of Stalin's time and after, Muslim national communists fought for a socialism with a national face, for a 'socialism with tubeteika' [traditional cap - H.Sz.], not for a 'socialism with a human face'" (Bennigsen and Wimbush,1980:124). The Socialist Party of the East (or Turan) that Sultan Galiyev tried to establish after 1923 is described as "monolithic, authoritarian and centralized" (Bennigsen and Quelquejay,1960:181). It could not be otherwise considering that at stake was the preparation of the revolution whose democratic sense was reduced to the demand to abolish the dependence of the colonized world of non-whites on the white
metropolises. As a rule, such revolution is horrible in its manifestations - not only and not even primarily to the white.

According to Sultan Galiyev, upon entering the stage of NEP, Soviet Russia lost its revolutionary legitimacy. Such Russia resigned from the mission to carry out the world revolution (and to free the Asians both politically and economically), and at the same time, readmitted 'capitalism' into its internal economic order, thus permitting the flourishing of Russian nationalism. The scenario of events as presented by Sultan Galiyev was the following: "Je prévois deux possibilités de liquidation de la révolution socialiste en Russie: 1. La transformation progressive du Parti Communiste et du pouvoir soviétique en capitalisme d'état et en démocratie bourgeoise; 2. La destruction du pouvoir soviétique à la suite d'un conflict armé avec la bourgeoisie occidentale" (quoted in Bennigsen and Quelquejaiy, 1960:179). One should not set much hope on such Russia, Sultan Galiyev argued: "Old Russia, still alive under the new mask of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, cannot last forever. Soviet Russia is a transitory phenomenon. The hegemony of the Russian people over other nations necessarily must be replaced by the dictatorship of these same nations over the Russians" (quoted in Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1980:47).

His argument contained a certain new element which explained the state of affairs, so to say, 'genetically'. We remember Sultan Galiyev's argument on the 'aristocratic' working class of the West; he used the same arguments (an opposition between the industrialized and non-industrialized world) in reference to the opposition between Soviet Russia and Asia. He wrote: "We think that the plan to replace one class of European society by the world dictatorship of its adversary - that is, by another class from this same society - will bring no significant change in the situation of the oppressed part of humanity. Even if there would be a change, it would be for the
worse, not for the better" (quoted in ibid.,58). So, the development of 'capitalism' in Russia in the NEP period appeared as a merely specific, 'regional' variant of a broader problem of an unequal relation of economic and civilizational forces of Europe (Russia) and Asia.

These inequalities, Sultan Galiyev argued, could not be levelled down in any other way but by political force of the non-white world: "a dictatorship of colonial and semi-colonial countries over the industrial metropolises should be enforced" (quoted in Bennigsen and Quelquejay,1960:180). At the same time, he drew a political plan how that could be achieved. The first step toward that end should be the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Turan which would unite all Asiatic territories of Russia where Muslims prevailed; the second – the formation of the Colonial International: "Pour que les pays coloniaux soient en mesure de réaliser ce plan grandiose il fallait, les unir en une Internationale Coloniale, communiste, mais indépendante de la Troisième Internationale, voire même opposée à celle-ci qui, comme les précédentes, était dominée par des représentants des sociétés industrielles. Cette Internationale Coloniale devrait comprendre tous les peuples opprimés [...]" (quoted in ibid.).

Now, let us pay attention to another variant of this theory, presented in the ERK Party's program. The history of that Party is obscure. From the information provided by Bennigsen and Wimbush it results that ERK was formed either in parallel with or as a continuation of the Turkestani socialist (and at the same time Pan-Turkic) opposition, Ittihad ve Taraggi (Union and Progress), about which Ya.Peters, representative of the CheKa (secret police), informed the Russian leadership as early as in 1920. Certain Ittihad ve Taraggi activists are also mentioned as founders of the Party ERK, which suggests a political and personal (if not institutional) similarity of the two.
Nine years after the revolution, the program of the Party ERK repeated all the basic arguments and accusations Sultan Galiyev and other Marxist nationalists formulated at the beginning of the 20s. Thus, the situation of Turkestan was interpreted as the colonial situation: the cultural and political dominance of the Russians was leading to economic backwardness and monocultural economy; winning political independence was the first condition of the national development, etc. An important novelty was a clear self-identification of the party: "ERK aims to be a political organization uniting the classes of the revolutionary workers and the dekhhans (peasants) in Turkestan" (ERK, 1926:167). Accentuating that independence could be won only as a result of common struggle of all classes, the authors of the program said at the same time: "even at this stage and while accepting a temporary union in common strife for a common object, the workers cannot renounce their class profile. The native bourgeois intelligentsia can no longer lead the popular masses, leaving aside the economic questions and replacing them by slogans common to the nation as a whole. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie of colonial and semicolonial countries is acquiring a clear class conscience and is openly engaging in the defence of its interests [...] Some of these [bourgeois] groups openly express in their propaganda literature the necessity to develop national capitalism. These factors which are an undisputable and characteristic symptom of the cultural development of these countries make it an absolute necessity for the representatives of the workers of Turkestan, for the young people and the members of the native intelligentsia who had, during the revolution, assimilated the ideas of socialism to organize themselves into a socialist party" (ibid., 171).

Another novelty involved laying a strong emphasis on economic questions. The key issue to ERK activists was breaking Russia's monopoly in trade and industry. Hence, the program provided for building the railway system uniting Turkestan with
the neighbouring countries; this way "its markets" would be freed "from the monopoly of the Russian railways. It is only thus that Turkestan will be able to probe the as yet unknown and unused treasures hidden in its underground, and develop its internal economic resources" (ibid., 170). As regards the problem of industrial development, the program saw it in the following way: "the development of city life, of industry, and of a native workers' masses [...] depends entirely on the political independence of the country, which would ultimately allow it to utilize its own raw materials and cotton and exploit its metallurgical resources. It will thus become again what it has been in the past, a producer of textiles and metal products" (ibid.).

Unlike Sultan Galiyev, authors of the ERK program did notice the importance of the democratic organization of society and the political system, and they emphasized the role of the parliament and free elections. The ERK program, on the other hand, gave much less emphasis to the 'Messianic' aspect of the Asian national revolution, and the proposed concept of Socialist International as a mediation between workers in developed countries and the masses of underdeveloped countries was closer to the socialist than communist tradition. What is more important, noticing the conflict of interests between European and Asian workers, ERK did not demand a new domination à rebour, as Sultan Galiyev did, but a proper system of representation of interests of colonial peoples: it saw the need and advantage of cooperation with metropolitan workers.

**Instead of Conclusions**

As it is easy to notice, both in the concepts of Sultan Galiyev and in the ERK Party program the domineering perspective is the one of a peculiar immobility of the socio-economic system established in Russian Asia before 1917 and, in principle,
unchanged in the 20s. Hence, in the eyes of the Marxist nationalists, the revolution of 1917 was first and foremost a change of a political nature, and not very important at that as regards the overcoming of the structures of backwardness. The liberal attitude of the Russian leadership toward the traditional socio-economic structures of the Asiatic republics, combined with intensified Russification and Bolshevization of some of the Asiatic party and state administration officials, seemed to be a logical confirmation of the thesis on a return to the traditional tsarist policy toward the region.

It occurred neither to Sultan Galiyev nor to the ERK Party that Stalin and the Russian leadership could treat the situation as temporary. Although? The careful reading of Stalin's statement at the 12th RCP Congress in 1923 could indicate that for him the policy of Russification or the spread of education were not the end to but only the beginning of the 'second revolution' in Asia. He said: "Talk of schools and language is not enough [...] Apart from schools and language, the Russian proletariat must take every necessary measure to establish centres of industry in the border regions [which] were formerly looked upon as sources of raw materials" (Stalin, n.d.:156). His statement echoed both the doctrine of industrialization (so dear to Russian Bolsheviks) as well as the Asian's experience of the problem of backwardness. This is something that the Marxist nationalists did not take into consideration at all.

Of course, the industrialization of the Asiatic republics proceeded according to the pattern not very much different from the dramatic experience of Russia. That was a Stalinist industrialization. However, in the historical perspective that industrialization has produced effects we are unable to fully appreciate even today. According to any standard, the Asiatic republics are today enclave of well-being in the sea of the Afghan, Pakistani, Iranian or Indian 'poverty in development'.

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In the Soviet Union itself, the development of those republics is looked upon by the Russian population with growing envy and the sense of deprivation. The Tashkent of today is no longer a town where, as Saltykov-Shchedrin would say, "they bash your face" (i.e., a remote, backward place). From this point of view, the Stalinist industrialization was a crude, in its forms and costs, fulfilling of the economic demands of the Marxist nationalists.

Much more complicated is the evaluation of the degree to which the same Stalinist system questioned (or confirmed) the Marxist nationalists' ideas concerning the role of Islam.

In the context of the Iranian fundamentalism and the intervention in Afghanistan, demonstrations in Kazakhstan and national conflicts in the Caucasus, there arise theories which stress the possibility for the renaissance of political Islam in the Asiatic republics, and even for irredentism. Such opinions are not alien to the Russians themselves. In a very interesting article recently published in the Moscow weekly, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Alexander Prokhanov justifies the rationality of the Russian intervention in Afghanistan - despite the fact that the main goal (i.e., socialist Afghanistan) has not been achieved - in the following manner: "fundamentalism after the fashion of Iran is no longer possible in [Afghanistan] and the Soviet Union no longer faces the danger that an extremist Muslim regime can appear on her frontier, threatening to spread its propaganda and methods onto the territory of our Central Asiatic republics" (quoted after Trybuna Ludu, February 27-28, 1988).

I do not think the above theories give a correct picture of the situation. (Prokhanov's remarks should be analysed as arguments for internal consumption in the Soviet Union, rationalizing the entrance into and withdrawal from Afghanistan. A glance at the map of the U.S.S.R. is enough to see that present Turkmenia shares the whole of its southern border with
the "extremist Muslim regime," i.e., Iran. And what? Nothing.) Neither Iran nor Afghanistan can provide an example to fascinate the majority of Russian Asians. The nationalism of the latter is a result of the internal situation of the U.S.S.R., not of the imported examples. What is most important here, it is inward-oriented, free of any Messianism. The ideas of the Colonial International or a supra-national Muslim umma can hardly appeal to the relatively affluent Russian Asians. In this sense, the anticolonial ideology of Sultan Galiyev seems to be dead to these people. National conflicts are on the agenda now. But this is quite another story.
NOTES

(1) Skocpol(1979) puts this etatist aspect of the revolutionary process to the front.

(2) E.g. the activities of Joffe as a representative of Soviet Russia in Berlin in 1918, including the detail "that Joffe sent out ten 'expert propagandists' to tour Germany on bicycles" (Carr, 1966b:85).

(3) *Kombieds*, i.e. Committees of the Poor which united poor and landless peasants and were the mainstay of the policy of *War Communism* in the villages.

(4) That was an episode of serious consequences in the activities of Communist parties in the countries with Muslim majority. For Indonesia, see McVey(1965) and Palmier(1973).

(5) "In September of 1917, the Bolsheviks of Kazan armed the *Vaisites* and in October they became the only Tatar group to fight alongside the Russian workers and soldiers. In February 1918, the *Vaisites* fought once more on the side of the Russian Baltic sailors against their Tatar compatriots when the Tatars tried to create an independent Muslim government in the Transbulak part of the city of Kazan" (Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1980:223; cf. also Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 1960:83-84).

(6) The dispute between Lenin and Stalin in 1922 over the constitutional framework of Soviet Russia not only failed to undermine the principle of factual incorporation but actually transformed this into the sole valid interpretation of the principle of 'self-determination' (cf. Chlebowczyk, 1983). The 'national liberalism' of which Stalin accused Lenin, the latter's attacks on 'Great-Russian chauvinism' and Russian 'despots' – all this was significant in itself, yet the entire dispute did not go beyond the limits laid down by the principle of maintaining territorial integrity within the frontiers of the former empire (cf. Levin, 1975).

(7) The guidelines for tsarist policy in relation to this region were set out by P. Stolypin and Minister of Agriculture Krivoshein in a report in 1910: "The essential is to organize not the Kirghiz (i.e. Kirghiz and Kazakhs – H. Sz.) themselves, but the Kirghiz steppe, and to think not of the future of individual nomads, but of the future of the whole steppe" (quoted in Carr, 1970:553).

(8) Let us note that the contemporary Soviet historiography indirectly admits that the reintegration of Turkestan was impossible without external intervention; moreover, the
role played by the 1st Volga Brigade of Tatars in the
Fergana Valley is also stressed (Istoriia, 1986:151).
Nevertheless, to maintain a sense of balance, a rosy
picture is painted of the rapid creation of peasant
soviets after 1917, both in Kazakhstan and Turkestan,
without stating precisely whether Russian or Asiatic
peasants were involved (ibid., 44-45).

(9) Given all this, there is good reason to be sceptical when
one reads that right after the February revolution "a
Soviet of Muslim Workers' Deputies was formed in Tashkent,
operating in close cooperation with the town's Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies" (Saidbayev, 1978:135). It
was not until May 1918, that the 5th Congress of Soviets
of Turkestan "formally removed the ban on the admission of
Muslims to governmental posts" (Carr, 1966a:338).

(10) At the All-Russian Muslim Congress in Moscow in May 1917,
where representatives of the Tatars suggested adopting a
project of national and cultural autonomy, the majority
of delegates pushed through a program of territorial
autonomy on a federal basis. A similar program had been
adopted in April 1917 at the All-Muslim Congress in
The Bolsheviks made the absence of programs for
independence prior to November 1917, their main argument in
the political struggle against the advocates of national

(11) Borys (1980:74) observes that "rightist or conservative
Ukrainian parties were a rarity, and most political groups
bearing the epithet Ukrainian were - in fact or in name -
socialist." This description could be extended to cover
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia or, to a lesser degree, Volga
Tatars; it could be difficult, however, to apply it to the
movements of Basamachi or Daghestani hill-tribesmen.
According to Caroe (1967:118,101), among "the local
nationals [in Bukhara] there were really three parties, the
Conservatives, the Innovators (who were not Socialist) and
the Socialists. The Conservatives [...] had most influence
with the tribes and their strenght was underrated:" in
consequence, as far as the modernizers were concerned, the
"scales were weighted against them and in the end they
failed." Cf. also Zenkovsky (1960).

(12) Another example is that in Turkestan it was not until "the
winter of 1920-21 [that] Friday was substituted for Sunday
as the weekly rest day, and the postal authorities for the
first time accepted telegrams in local languages" (Carr,
1966a:341).

(13) An indirect reply was given by Narbutabekov, who underlined
that, despite numerous appeals, "up to now the West
European proletariat has shown no active support"
(14) According to some estimates, in 1924 "befanden sich in allen zentralen Stellen Turkestans nur 17% Turkestaner, dagegen aber 83% Russen" (Hayit.1965:18). One should remember, however, that following the 1920 purges in Turkestan, for a short period of time the Muslims who came from the jadids took the majority of key positions. A new TurkKomissiia put a stop to their activities. Cf. Zenkovsky(1960:243f.).

(15) He added: "our fruitless expectation of revolutionary help from the West in the course of these two years of revolution in Russia eloquently confirms this thesis" (Sultan Galiyev,1919a:8). In 1923, Sultan Galiyev elaborated on this subject further: "if a revolution succeeds in England, the proletariat will continue oppressing the colonies and pursuing the policy of the existing bourgeois government: for it is interested in the exploitation of these colonies. In order to prevent the oppression of the toiler of the East we must unite the Muslim masses in a communist movement that will be our own and autonomous" (quoted in Bennigsen and Wimbush,1980:46).

(16) According to the official history of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan published in 1963, Ryskulov's demands were as follows: "1. Formation of a Muslim Turkestan Army; 2. Formation of a Turkic CP; 3. Expulsion of Russian and other 'European' colonizers from Turkestan or at least limitation of their rights in using the land; 4. Creation of a federal union or all Turkic-Muslim territories of the Soviet Union, free of both West European capitalism and Soviet Russian imperialism" (quoted in Bennigsen and Wimbush,1980:233). For a contemporary opinion on the short-lived activities of the Turkic Communist Party, see M.Frunze's notes (quoted in Zenkovsky,1960:247). To give a flavour of the ideas expressed by the Muslim Communists in Turkestan, see the following quotation: "[we should act] in the interest of the international organization of workers and oppressed peoples, to infuse, through Communist propaganda, the idea of eliminating the inclination of the Turkic peoples to separate in name and substance into Tatars, Kirghiz, Bashkirs, Uzbeks, etc., and to form separate local republics. Instead, we should unify them for the purpose of consolidating and attracting other Turkic nationalities – even those that did not constitute a part of the RSFSR – around a Turkic Soviet Republic" (quoted in ibid.,244).

(17) I am not convinced that such a conclusion follows from Stalin's 1923 speech – full of implied meaning and insinuations. Once he treats the question of Sultan Galiyev's connections with the Basmachis as a political and military plot, on another occasion – as a problem involving ideological relations (which could not be examined from the point of view of the penal code). He stressed the latter in his attacks against Ryskulov and 'Rightist'
communists in Asiatic republics. One should remember also that contacts with Validov-Togan were not tantamount ipso facto to contacts with the Basmachis, as the jadids or Marxist nationalists neither led the Basmachis nor had any strong following among them (see note 11). Let us also quote here an opinion voiced in 1929 by the secretary of the CP in Tatar republic, arguing against Stalin's accusations: "De 1917 à 1923, le sultangalievisme formait un groupement au sein du Parti Communiste et travaillait à assurer ses propres positions" (quoted in Bennigsen and Quelquejay, 1960:169).

(18) Cf. Istoriia (1986:336-337) for a confirmation of the lack of any substantial changes in Central Asia's agrarian structure in the 20s (Russian settlers excluded).

(19) Zenkovsky (1960:277) quotes after Safarov the following example: "At one of the first Communist Party congresses in Tashkent, a Tatar Communist, M.Klevlev, announced that he became a Communist after attentively reading the Koran, whose teaching, in his opinion, was nearly as cosmopolitan and socialistic as that of Marxism." The Soviet historian, M.Vakhabov informs that the said Klevleev organized several Muslim-Communist groups and some of them "bildeten sogar freiwillige militärische Einheiten gegen die Basmachi-Bewegung, die dann mit dem Koran in der Hand gegen diese wirkten" (quoted in Hayit, 1965:37).

(20) "In 1922-1924 the Soviet government sought to appease Ulema's hostility [...] and won their support in the struggle against the Basmachis. Quoting suras from the Koran which prescribe obedience to any authority, Central Asian mullahs helped the Soviets to appease the Basmachis" (Zenkovsky, 1960:276-277).

(21) For a careful analysis of this problem, see Carr (1966b). Caroe (1967:142-143) seems not to understand this question at all.
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