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Foreign Technical Assistance: Prescriptions and Practice in a Public Transportation Development Programme in Trinidad and Tobago

Judith-Ann Walker
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Der Bundesminister Fur Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (Ministry For Economic Cooperation)</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Development Programme</td>
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<td>GOTT</td>
<td>Government of Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)</td>
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<td>GTIE</td>
<td>German Team of Integrated Experts</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Implementing and Coordinating Unit</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>PBR</td>
<td>Priority Bus Route</td>
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<td>PTSC</td>
<td>Public Transport Service Corporation</td>
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<td>SASC</td>
<td>Statutory Authorities Service Commission</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>TADI</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Development Intervention</td>
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<td>T&amp;T</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency of International Development</td>
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PART I

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

General Introduction

Since the Second World War, foreign technical assistance has secured a permanent place on the stage of development and reconstruction. This phenomenon has largely occurred because of the so-called 'brilliant' success of the Marshall Plan in rebuilding a war-shattered Europe. When it came to be applied to the newly emergent states, the programme of technical assistance from developed world nations found its basis in Resolution 222(IX) of the UN Economic and Social Council which outlined the basic principles for the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. It is of interest, therefore, to note that, as outlined in 1949, this Resolution was itself directly influenced by the bilateral technical assistance programme of the United States revealed just a few months before in the Inaugural Address of President Harry Truman. The American programme came to be known as the 'Point IV technical assistance programme to the underdeveloped areas' and was to set a precedent for continuing cross-fertilization in policies and techniques between bilateral and multilateral technical assistance programmes to the developing world.

In the early days of the technical assistance programme to the developing world both bilateral and multilateral agents held fast to the perception that technical assistance represented the answer to the problems of the developing areas. They argued that it would act as a catalyst for starting the engine of growth and building the human resource capacity upon which sustained development was to be anchored. The notion of transference of technical expertise between nations served to debunk the previously held Orthodox Marxist view that the dynamic for development must come from
within and could not be artificially induced.

In the forty years which have since elapsed, new perceptions have been added on the efficacy of this policy through the rich experiences of both bilateral and multilateral agencies. This fact notwithstanding, the overall belief in the potency of the formula for development remains unshaken. In a recent World Bank document entitled 'Success and Failures in Meeting the Management Challenge: Strategies and Their Implementation' (Kubr & Wallace: 1983), foreign technical assistance was once more endorsed as a most effective strategy for meeting the management challenge in the developing world. In short, one can advance the claim that foreign technical assistance was, and still is seen as an expeditor of development, a recipe for success in the development endeavours of the less fortunate countries. Indeed, the 1986 DAC Annual Report revealed that approximately one quarter of official development assistance (ODA) is directed towards technical assistance interventions and that in the year 1984 US$8 to US$9 billion was spent by both multilateral and bilateral financing institutions on technical assistance to the developing world.

In recent times, discussions on technical assistance seemed to have centred on engineering success through the receiving country accepting responsibility to discharge administrative, financial and human resource obligations (see, for example, the 1989 DAC Annual Report). It was largely due to the fact that Non Government Organisations (NGOs) were perceived to have a comparative advantage in this area that they were referred to in the 1986 DAC Report as 'the Growth Sector'.

In 1978 the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago could also be described as a 'Growth Sector'. Inundated with petroleum revenue it possessed sufficient capacity to discharge its financial obligations and with a literacy rate second only to that of Barbados in the region it also possessed much of the human capital to meet the requirements of a successful technical
assistance intervention. Moreover, its status as the first Crown Colony in the British Empire had endowed Trinidad and Tobago with the administrative know-how so necessary to meet the challenge of technical assistance.

It was against this background that the then government reserved US$280m in 1978 from the Exchequer's Account for a massive 'Public Transportation Development Programme' involving the acquisition of rolling stock (buses), the construction of new facilities and the introduction of new organizational structures and systems within an already existing public transport sector. In making this allocation of US$280m the central government also appreciated the fact that the scale of the venture meant that it could not be undertaken independently and that some type of foreign expertise was therefore required. It was at this point that the government looked around for a solution to its dilemma, the problematic posited then being: 'how could the transportation development programme be implemented with the 'best' foreign expertise under an arrangement where the government of Trinidad and Tobago (representing the national interest), would be treated as an equal partner with commensurate obligations and rights'?

Foreign technical assistance was immediately perceived as the panacea to this dilemma. If the government had the will then the foreign technical partners would provide the way. Without further delay a technical assistance contract was negotiated between the government of the Republic of Trinidad and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany to secure the services of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) to (i) appraise the design feasibility of a 'Public Transportation Development Programme', which was prepared in-house by the Public Transport Service Corporation, and to recommend a course of implementation action if the design was acceptable and; (ii) actually assist in the implementation of the programme. Qualified local counterparts were to flank the GTZ experts and with their combined effort it was anticipated that the programme would be successfully completed in
five years time, (1978 to 1983).

The Problem

Ten years later (1989) - more than half of the allotted sum has been spent, the GTZ experts have returned home, and the Programme's goal of an improved public bus transit system for Trinidad and Tobago has not been realized. In fact, present indicators now demonstrate that public road transportation in Trinidad and Tobago appears to be in a worse state than it was prior to the initiation of the programme. In his Final Report of the Transportation Development Programme (1987), the Director of Projects has assessed its performance thus:

The original concept of satellite bus maintenance depots, centralized Stores/Workshop, Passenger-handling facilities and appropriate fleet size in selected locations administered through relatively autonomous arms of the Corporation in an appropriately matched decentralized organization, has not been realized. In its place, the Corporation has implemented a series of disjointed projects, tinkered with an inappropriate organizational structure and acquired revenue vehicles in fits and starts. (PTSC,1987:vii).

Moreover, the various actors in this programme; the foreign experts, the counterparts and the respective governments have been busy blaming each other for what has been adjudged to be another colossal failure in the history of an ambitious developing country.

Why did this situation occur? Why is it that, after spending over US$140m and after securing services of highly rated technical experts, the people of Trinidad and Tobago are still relegated to commute on a public transportation system that is unreliable, inefficient and entirely ill-suited to the needs of specific constituencies among them? The essential problem this paper seeks to address is, simply put: what accounted for the gap between the expected and the actual performance of this programme. That is to say, why did failure occur when the programme appeared to have satisfied critical conditions for success prescribed by the
literature as a sure route to success in technical assistance programmes? Such conditions were, the existence of political commitment from the central government and the availability of human and financial resources. More specifically, however, the paper is concerned with exploring why the prospects held out for the foreign technical assistance component in particular came to naught?

Consequently, the objective of this study is two-fold; first, it attempts to explore how the insights provided by the literature on conditions for success of technical assistance development interventions contribute towards making sense of the practical management issues in the case study. Secondly, based on the findings on the first objective, the paper seeks to analyse the usefulness of the available literature in raising the relevant issues which help in explaining failure in this case.

**Methodology**

To comprehensively address the above-stated objectives it becomes necessary to structure the paper into two parts. In Part I, hypotheses of failure and prescriptions for success will be distilled from the literature while undertaking a comprehensive review of both bilateral and multilateral literature. In Part II of the paper the insights derived from the literature will constitute the frame of reference for the case analysis to follow.

The paper will conclude with a commentary on the findings and implications for the theory and practice of development cooperation. The methodology of the paper will be appreciated more explicitly when seen in terms of a series of steps.

Step 1. The paper will coin and advance its own working definition of the concept 'Technical Assistance Development Intervention', TADI (no pun intended through the use of this acronym!). Central to the discussion of
this concept will be some discussions of reasons for failure and prescriptive conditions for success on TADIs.

Step 2. The literature on technical assistance will then be reviewed and classified in accordance with the relationship it bears to the given definition in Step 1.

Step 3. The category of literature which comes nearest to the paper's definition of the working concept and its understanding of the causes for failure will be accepted and selected for application.

Step 4. For application to the case study, the selected body of literature will be operationalized into problem statements which are derived from hypotheses of failure and prescriptions for success presented in the literature.

Step 5. Finally, the extent to which this selected frame of reference is at all capable of explaining the reasons for failure on the case study will be assessed.

The data for this study was collected by the author over a four year period when she served in a professional capacity on this programme. Gaps in the data base were filled, however, through an interview with the ex-Corporate Secretary of the Public Transportation Service Corporation and through extensive discussions with the then Minister of Transportation under whose portfolio the programme fell. These primary sources of data were complemented through the use of Official Government documents such as Budget Speeches and Development Plans. Great efforts were also made to obtain documentation directly from the GTZ but despite persistent correspondence no such data was made available. The lack of direct cooperation from the GTZ, though, was compensated for by drawing heavily on original GTZ Project Reports and various Memoranda from the GTZ Project Coordinator, which were lodged either with the Ministry of External Affairs or the Public Transport Service Corporation in Trinidad and Tobago.
CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Trinidad and Tobago: Development Partnerships and the Public Transportation Sector

Before exploring the main substance of the paper it is first necessary to provide a much needed background on the Trinidad and Tobago state and its development partnerships (with particular reference to the public transportation sector).

In the post Second World War era, states of the developing world have been prompted to accept 'partners' in their development process, either through the insistence of the international community, or as a consequence of their own considered opinion. Such partners could have their origin in sources external to the particular country, for example another sovereign state, transnational corporations, international or regional institutions, or they could originate from within the boundaries of the state. Examples of the latter case are the indigenous private sector, non-political organizations and trade unions. States express a preference for certain partners rather than others, based on several factors, including size, historical linkages, geo-political realities and financial and economic independence.

Contrary to popular belief, Trinidad and Tobago are not the capital of Jamaica but rather a twin island state consisting of 1,486 square miles and 116 square miles respectively and located farthest South of all the other Caribbean sister islands. In fact, one could surmise that, were it not for the caprices of colonial history, Trinidad and Tobago might have retained natural links with mainland Venezuela with which they still share territorial waters, instead of falling under the rule of the British Crown for the full duration of one and a half centuries (1797 to 1956 when self-government was achieved).
It is possible to characterize the activities of the post-
colonial state of Trinidad and Tobago (hereafter referred to as
(T & T) in terms of the development partnerships established with
internal and external actors. These partnerships are as follows.

Firstly, with international and local private sector interests
during the period 1956 to 1970, while pursuing an industrialization
by invitation policy under the direct tutelage of Nobel laureate,
Sir W.A. Lewis.

Secondly, with indigenous 'progressive' elements such as the
Trade Union Movement and own-account entrepreneurs during the
period 1970 to 1973. This was essentially a conciliatory measure
in the wake of mass political uprising of February 1970. (See R.
Sebastien, 1982: 49 for a full discussion of this phenomenon).

Third, during the hey-days of the oil boom (1974 to 1981) a
partnership was first established with other nation states in the
region (Sutton, 1981: 448, 'US$4.1m was spent on regional ventures
sponsored by the T & T government over this period') and secondly
with governments of the developed world under government-to-
government technical assistance arrangements. Thus the Swedes were
involved in harbour development, the Austrians in steel production
and the Germans in transportation, water resources and secondary
roads maintenance during this period.

Fourthly, the contemporary period of 1982 to the present is
largely a repeat of the first, as, through privatization, economic
liberalization and other such measures the state in T & T has re-
entered into partnerships with local and international capitalist
interest.

In addition to the above, it is important to note that T & T
is a small island state (its population stands at 1.2 m. in 1989),
characterized by an open economy and an historical dependence on
an export staple (sugar, prior to 1973 and petroleum after 1974:
in 1977 the petroleum sector contributed 43 per cent to GDP). It
must be noted, however, that the contribution of the petroleum
sector is now falling due to a commensurate fall in world petroleum
prices and policies designed to increase revenue earning capability from the non-oil sector such as natural gas and steel production (see Auty & Gelb: 1986).

Although its political system has been characterized as Parliamentary Democratic (this characterization has been suggested by Auty, 1989 and Schuyler, 1988) the ethnic composition of population (42 per cent of African origin, 40 per cent Indians and smaller percentages of whites and mixed groups) has led to the dominance of the political system by a black nationalist party, the Peoples National Movement (PNM), for a period of 30 years between 1956 to 1986. The party which has replaced the PNM in general elections of December 1986, the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), was constituted at the time of formation as a coalition of ethnic and class forces. This 'alliance' has ruptured, however, as interest compatibility has proven to be impossible when public policies came to be implemented following initial success at the polls.

Public Transportation and International Partnerships
Historical Links

As was argued above, the T & T government in the post-colonial era explored various types of development partnerships while pursuing different types of public policies. With regard to public road transportation, though, the government exhibited a sustained preference for foreign partnerships, in an effort to solve the maladies of this industry, which all had their root in the colonial past. Meyer & Straszheim (1972) have argued that decisions relating to transportation planning are inherently problematic. They further adduce that this is so because any decision regarding public transportation permeates through the economy (having implications for both income distribution and redistribution). The four major problems of the road public transportation sector that faced the new government when they took office in 1956 were:
1. What would constitute the 'right' modal split between buses and taxis, and should each mode be consigned to particular routes?

2. Excessive urban traffic congestion. This problem was so acute that it was given special mention in the First Five Year Development Plan (1956:19) where it was attributed to the construction of narrow roads during the colonial era along with an 'uneconomical' use of existing roads.

3. What was the best mix of public and private ownership and what should be the extent of public regulation in terms of fare setting and safety standards for the private sector?

4. How to meet the specific needs of the rural pockets of the North and South Eastern Trinidad and of Tobago in particular (hilly and rural areas). In the colonial era these regions were largely neglected as roads existed only for staple extraction. (See Appendix I which demonstrates present land use patterns in T & T in accordance with regional distribution).

The system of public road transportation inherited by the new government in 1956 was constituted as follows: a railway service that had come into existence in 1874 and mainly restricted itself to a north-south route from Port of Spain to San Fernando in Trinidad (there was no railway in Tobago). A state-owned and controlled bus company (called, the Railway Ancillary Service), which performed so poorly on the two routes on which it had a monopoly (one in Port of Spain and the other in San Fernando) that it was denationalized in 1954. The takeover was initiated by the privately-owned Trinidad Bus Service Ltd, which then expanded its market share in 1955 to include eleven feeder routes in rural
Trinidad and Tobago.

Finally, the remaining major routes were divided among five concessionaires for a period of ten years, effective from 1 July 1952. In addition to these legitimate actors, there existed hoards of privately-owned or pirate taxis, commonly referred to as (PH) which offered competitive fares, particularly in the rural area.

Faced with this complicated public transport system, the new administration sought the expertise of Mr Guido Moss, an American Engineer with the International Cooperation Administration, whose services were obtained under a technical corporation arrangement in 1962. His terms of reference were: 'to investigate the problems of bus transportation in Trinidad and Tobago and to make recommendations for its improvement'. The report which resulted from this Moss study was to form the basis for future changes in the public transportation system over the period 1962 to 1965. Essentially, bus transportation, as against taxi or rail transportation, was the major recommendation and it was further suggested that such ownership should be public and not private. Between 1962 and 1965 the new government of T & T undertook to implement the recommendations of this report, finally culminating in the creation of the Public Transport Service Corporation (PTSC) in 1965 under Act No. 11 of 1965.

To ensure that the newly-created PTSC adequately addressed the transportation problems, in late 1965 the services of another foreign expert, Mr H. Weedy, a Transport Consultant, were made available to the government of Trinidad and Tobago under the United Kingdom Technical Assistance Scheme. Following an extensive survey of the operations of the nascent PTSC, Mr Weedy offered a series of recommendations, with specific implications for training and development in the Maintenance Department of the PTSC.

In order to implement these recommendations, in early 1966 another technical assistance arrangement was entered into, this time with the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development Corporation. Under this arrangement three technical experts were
recruited on contract to fill the posts of General Manager, Traffic Manager and Chief Engineer of the PTSC, and three local counterparts were simultaneously appointed to understudy these British experts.

Notwithstanding the permanent presence of these foreign experts the PTSC's annual operation deficit continued to climb and in 1967 it peaked at TT$6,179,936. In 1968 the railway service of the PTSC was finally discontinued because of its escalating cost and low level of service.

Between 1968 and 1972 the PTSC limped on with a slight increase in its market share due to a decision in 1963 to stop issuing taxi licenses for an indefinite period. With a fleet size of only 350 in 1972 the cost of providing public bus transportation far exceeded the benefits. It was against this background that central government again requested the assistance of foreign consultants (CIDA) to look into the transportation problems along the major east-west corridor of the country. The project was to be undertaken as a joint venture partnership between N. D. Lea & Associates Ltd of Canada and Trintoplan Consultants Ltd of T & T. In essence, the report submitted to a Transportation Inter-Ministerial Committee in 1975 recommended the use of bus transportation, in preference to any other mode of public transportation, and advised that a bus route be constructed along the path of the previously existing railway line.

In general, the recommendations of this report were adopted by the government and by December of 1977 the first section of the bus route from Port of Spain to San Juan (6 kilometres) was opened at a cost of approximately US$4.5m to the exchequer. In 1978, US$280m were allocated by the government for further public transportation development. A Transportation Development Programme based on the CIDA study was formulated by the PTSC's Planning Department. When it became apparent that the full component of technical and administrative capacity required for implementing this programme did not exist within Trinidad and Tobago, the
government again turned outward, by enlisting the services of the German government and its agents, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).

Thus it was that the central government of T & T enlisted American, British, Canadian and finally German foreign technical assistance to solve the public road transportation problems of T & T. It is, however, the last endeavour with the German expertise which will be examined by this paper, against the background of the insights derived from the literature in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The Concept: Technical Assistance

Writing on the issue of technical assistance administration in Tanzania, Green (1973) noted that, as with Alice in Wonderland, words have different meanings to different speakers.

This paper supports Green's view and therefore finds it necessary to articulate clearly its own working definition of the concept 'foreign technical assistance'. To this end, this paper will coin the term Technical Assistance Development Intervention, hereafter referred to as TADI. TADI is best understood when disaggregated into its constituent parts of technical assistance and development intervention. In this regard, technical assistance is seen as a partnership in development between two or more autonomous partners, each having rights and obligations and jointly working towards a situation where knowledge and skills are transferred from a supplier to a receiver (preferably, at below market rates). Development intervention, on the other hand is taken to be a purposeful course of action effected through the introduction of systems or institutions with the primary intention of initiating positive change in a sector which has the potential of improving the quality of life.

Consequently, TADI can be described as the introduction of some new or improved system through the joint actions of an external and a local partner with the desired intention of improving the quality of life in the territory of the local partner. The fact that the foreign partner possesses know-how in which the local partner is deficient does not however mean that the local partner is absolved of responsibilities or denied of rights. Instead, the system of rights and obligations, particularly of the local partner, should be worked out using a formula based on the objective fact that any successful TADI requires maximum
cooperation if the development aspect of the intervention is to be satisfied. In reality, however, this factor is conditioned by the objective endowment status of the local partner at that particular point in time. Based on this conceptualization of TADIs, in practice one would expect cooperation from the local partner to be a given condition for success (the extent of which will be determined by the availability of natural and human resources). For this reason, this paper recognizes that the conceptualization of TADI, as articulated above, is more suitable for application in cases where the local partner possesses sufficient resource endowment to discharge its obligations and the foreign partner possesses the readiness to function as a partner. These two conditions are present in the case selected for analysis.

TADI: Success and Failure: TADIs can therefore be deemed to be successful if the strategic collaboration between the local and foreign partner leads to an impact on development in the receiver's country which is sustainable after the TADI has been completed. This can occur at the policy, programme or project level, but in either case TADIs must be perceived as being imbued with the values of effectiveness, efficiency, and development significance. Efficiency is defined here in terms of the unit of output achieved per unit input employed in the achievement of set targets. Effectiveness refers to the attainment of set targets with specific instruments for achievement. Development significance refers to the potential for sustained positive impact of the TADI on the cultural, social or economic development of the country. It is clear that failure of the TADI can be seen both in terms of a failure of effective 'instruments' and in terms of a failure to achieve the projected impact.
Literature Review

As a preface to the literature review the following observations must be made:

1. Notwithstanding the preference of some writers (Surfin, 1966, Amuzegar, 1966 and White, 1974) to speak in terms of a theory of foreign technical assistance there is in fact no theory of foreign technical assistance. Though these three authors (especially White, 1974) have offered good definitions of technical assistance, in their usage of the concept they fail to offer an exhaustive body of explanation, based either on induction or deduction (as required by a theory). This observation can be extended to other works on this topic and can be traced to the fact that technical assistance is a policy issue, which changes its dimensions as the policies of bilateral and multilateral suppliers change. Writings on this topic therefore remain at the prescriptive level of how to improve policy performance, as opposed to building a theory which may not realistically square with an ever-changing empirical reality.

2. The literature betrays a bias in favour of the suppliers, in the sense that the trajectory employed accepts a supplier’s definition of the phenomena, their expectations and explanations as to the sources of failure. More importantly, the fact that much of the research in this area is directly undertaken or sponsored by suppliers or scholars from the supplier’s country shows the extent to which this bias is further entrenched.

3. The literature is characterized by an *ex post facto* normative/prescriptive orientation where many of the works whether they are authored by academics or practitioners, start by first reflecting on the reasons for failure of past TADIs and then go on to posit conditions for the success of future interventions. Thus, the literature on TADI can easily lend itself to application and analysis for specific case studies.
4. Although both scholars and practitioners contribute in equal measure to the literature in this area, because of the normative nature of the discourse one finds that postulations are highly subjective and representative of the specific constituency interest of the contributors.

At the outset, the paper recognizes these limitations in undertaking a case analysis, in terms of a body of literature not anchored in theory and patently biased in favour of one of the actors it professes to analyse objectively. Nevertheless, this paper holds fast to the view that it is in the critical application of a less than perfect framework that the peculiarities of the case will be fully explored and the utility of the literature further evaluated.

**Trends in the literature:** Against the background of these qualifying remarks three major trends can be said to exist in literature. (Appendix II deals with this point in detail).

The first trend is reflected in the body of literature which places emphasis on the supplier in TADIs. For writers in this classification, success is a function of the supplier's initiative and failure is occasioned by supplier's inaction. Examples of works falling into this group include Surfin (1966), Dore (1970) and Cunningham (1974).

Conversely, the second trend consists of works which place emphasis on the receiver and sees this actor as the key to both the success and failure of the TADI. Hurrell (1970), Tandon (1973) and the 1983 US Carlucci Report fall into this category.

The third trend represents a position similar to that adopted by this paper, in that the TADI is perceived as a partnership in development, with both partners having commensurate responsibilities and rights. Works representing this position include Harari (1974), Lethem and Cooper (1983) and Amuzegar (1966). These three trends will now be focused upon in more detail.
Trend One: Focus on Supplier
Contributions within this body of literature have been made by both bilateral and multilateral agents and by independent agents commissioned to undertake studies by these agencies (for example Surfin: 1966, whose research was funded under a grant to Syracuse University from US AID). Although all contributions falling within this grouping accept supplier superiority as a given variable, the works can be further sub-divided into those which perceive supplier failure in terms of, firstly, the foreign technical expert in the field; secondly, the structure and management of supplier agencies; and thirdly, technical assistance processes.

Problem with the Expert
Characteristic of the works of the late fifties and the sixties was a sharp focus on the performance, competence and suitability of the foreign technical expert in the field. If the assumption was that the responsibility for TADI success lay with the supplier's side then the feeling was that the field was representative of the supplier; the foreign technical expert was the embodiment of this potential for success.

'Don't send men. Send money!' read the opening sentence of a 1970 IDS Bulletin devoting itself exclusively to the idea of the expert as primary operator. In this volume, the contributions by Dore in particular and the research findings of the 1969 Lancaster study demonstrate quite clearly the emphasis placed on the field expert in British technical assistance policy. In summary, they both noted the importance of the 'right' expert with the 'best' training and natural abilities to effect success.

At this time (the late fifties and the sixties) there also came a rush of other studies focusing on the socio-psychological make-up of the American field expert and technical expert of the ILO and other multilateral agencies. Such works include for example, The Overseas Americans (Cleveland: 1960) and Economic
Structure and Management of Supplier Agencies

Contained in this sub-grouping of literature is a hidden desire for the failure of TADI to be seen in structural terms. One of the earliest evaluations on the structural capacity to deliver technical assistance came from Sir Robert Jackson in 1969 and dealt exclusively with the UN development system. In an incisive commentary on this report, Owen (1969) notes that a major finding was that the assistance programme of the UN was 'grafted on to structures never originally intended for that purpose'. (Owen, 1969: 51).

Largely due to the findings of this report 'country programming' was introduced within the UN in 1970. It is interesting to note that when Susan Gitelson came to address herself to the performance of the new UN structure in 1973 her observations endorsed those of Jackson, thus casting doubt on the ability of the UN to administer TADIs successfully in view of the continuing 'institutional and personal interest of the people in the UN...' (Jackson, in Tandon 1973: 203). She argued that, notwithstanding the introduction of the country programme, the structures of the UN system continued to reflect the influence of vested interests and was therefore inappropriate to the needs of East African countries.

In a 1974 work which dealt exclusively with the management of bilateral technical assistance agencies, Cunningham attributes the failure of TADIs to coordination problems within donor agencies and between these agencies and respective Ministries. This view came to be echoed in the 1988 work by van Ufford et al., which focused on the macro area of Dutch bilateral aid. The essential thesis of the 1988 contribution was that failure of aid interventions, which by definition also included technical assistance, was occasioned by a hidden crisis in development bureaucracies. According to these authors, this was manifested in
structural terms by 'lack of control, compartmentalization between policies and organizations and growing ignorance about the next stage once allocative decisions have been made' (van Ufford, 1988: 33).

Problems with the Process
In a 1987 work, Rondinelli tries to capture forty years of policy search in US bilateral technical assistance policy, as through trial and error great attempts are made to find the right and most effective implementation process or delivery system. In this work, Rondinelli recalls his own contribution to this search in his early advocacy for a 'continuous process model' as an effective delivery system.

Silverman (1984) has also focused on the issue of the appropriate delivery system for foreign technical assistance arrangements, without any complementary discussions on the role of the recipient country. For Silverman, the question of failure in technical assistance interventions is really a question of an inappropriate model of delivery employed by the supplier. He goes on to offer a scheme for success which matches the model with the peculiarities of the arrangement.

In all three of the sub-trends in this grouping of the literature the supplier has been identified as the independent actor and failure is perceived as a function of its action or inaction. Moreover, recommendations for success all require some direct course of action from the source of the problem, namely, the supplier or its agents.

Trend Two: Focus on the Recipient
Within this body of literature two sub-trends can be observed. The first focuses on the local partner as the dominant party in TADI arrangements and attributes reasons for failure to their sins of commission. The second sees the local partner as dominant and views failure in terms of its sins of omission.
Dealing with failure due to sins of omission first, in the 1970 IDS Bulletin previously mentioned, Hurrell of the ODA makes an interesting counterpoint to the overall tenor of the edition with its focus on the supplier. Essentially, Hurrell agrees with Dore (of the same edition) that many missions have failed because of what he calls the 'personality defects' of field experts. Nevertheless, he makes the point that 'it is easy to make the foreign expert the scapegoat for the failure of his mission while in fact much of the blame might rest with those who request his services without really thinking out why he was required' (Hurrell, 1970: 13) He goes on to recommend that recipients should take responsibility for technical assistance interventions and centralize their management systems, so that greater coordination can be attained from their side.

In a 1973 publication edited by Tandon, the individual contributions of Tandon, Green, Loxley and Bhandari generally uphold the view that TADIs have not been successful in East Africa because of the sins of omission committed both by those who make and those who implement policy (the politicians and the civil servants of recipient countries). Although these authors do recognize that the influence of suppliers can contribute to TADI failure, if unqualified or ideologically unsuitable foreign experts are on the job, they maintain that it is the failure of policy-makers to protect their interests which has led to failure in East Africa. Tandon sums up this position by pointing out that

The notion that foreign experts only 'advise' is a myth. They inscrutably and unobtrusively make policies, which are often inconsistent with national goals or obscurantist about the clear identification of these goals. But, if foreign experts begin to exert what may appear to be undue influence over the making of policy, the fault lies not with the experts but with the weakness in the decision-making structure of the recipient country. If there is a policy vacuum at the top, it will inevitably be filled by the advice of whoever is there to give it as an 'expert'. (Tandon, 1973: 146)
To turn to the second cause of failure, sins of commission, an early and most comprehensive examination of this issue was undertaken in 1970 when Nulty and Nulty revealed in their case study of Pakistan that the real problem with TADIs lay not with the quality of advisors but with the sustained efforts of the Pakistan government to manipulate and use advisors for their own political ends. They argue:

host governments will not go out of their way to support an advisory agency unless they consider that it will actually render services which they consider worth having. It goes without saying that what a host government considers 'services worth having' may have nothing to do with liberal western notions about development (Nulty & Nulty, 1970: 25)

As the era of the fourth development decade begins, the issue of technical assistance has been cast in wide terms, as it is now inextricably linked with evaluations of the ability of developing countries to manage their balance of payment and debt portfolio and to fully utilize Western aid (see, for example, the 1989 DAC Annual Report which looks at Development Cooperation in the 1990s). Evaluations on the past performance of developing countries have been especially harsh, as can be seen in current reports, both bilateral and multilateral suppliers. They have been embodied in works such as 'The 1983 World Development Report', the US AID sponsored 1983 'Carlucci Report', the IDS contribution, Does Aid Work, and the 1984 World Bank special report, 'Towards Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa'. In these contemporary works the failures of TADI have been seen in terms of the managerial incompetence of recipient governments.

In summary, both in the discussions on sins of commission and omission, the local partner has been seen as the most significant actor in TADI as they apply.
Trend Three: TADIs, the Foreign and the Local Partner
Of the three groupings of literature on this topic this third category is the only one which appears to accept the more balanced notion of TADIs as defined by this paper. Consequently, in its discussion of failure, this phenomenon is attributed to actions and inactions of both the local and the foreign partner. It is sad to note, though, that the lead in this approach has again been taken by both bilateral and multilateral suppliers (for example, Lethem and Cooper, 1983).

It is with this in mind that two recent documents of the West German Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMZ) entitled 'How Effective are Development Projects?' (1986) and 'Learning From Mistakes' (1987) shall be first considered. Both documents deal expressly with government-to-government technical assistance bilateral arrangements of the German government and attempt to analyse the reasons for failure.

In both of these documents failure of technical assistance or 'technical cooperation' as it is referred to by the German administration, is viewed in terms of three important categories Feasibility and Design, Implementation and Evaluation and Follow-up. With regard to feasibility and design, it is argued that TADIs fail when they are not integrated into an overall national development framework, or when they are overdesigned or forcibly introduced into an unreceptive environment. Moreover, if targets are not clearly defined and if the local partner is left out of the design process, this again will lead to failure. The 1986 document states:

The developing country and\or the local project executing agency and the target group must contribute to the planning as much and as early as possible. This kind of planning approach in a spirit of partnership means planning not 'for' but 'with' the developing country. A further advantage is that any difficulties the partner may have can be recognized reliably and at an early stage. (BMZ, 1986: 24)
With regard to implementation, inappropriate or inadequate counterpart contributions, together with improper structuring and location of the implementing agency, have been seen to be another cause of failure. The 1986 report, however, goes on to note that at the level of implementation, failure is also directly caused by the German field staff. It states that

The German personnel is generally well qualified. Nonetheless the evaluations have discovered considerable inadequacies in the qualifications of staff members in a number of projects. Above all, there are inadequacies with respect to the selection and secondment of staff; furthermore there are reports of inadequacies concerning area orientation training and preparation of personnel as well as sub-related problems. (BMZ, 1986: 30)

Failure to utilize a continuous planning model for implementation, together with incomplete or non-existent terms of reference to field staff from head office, also leads to breakdown and failure.

On the issue of evaluation and follow-up, the inefficient application of monitoring techniques, together with poor reporting practices and insufficient attention to the handing over issue, have all been problems of the supplier. Equally, lack of initiative and commitment from the local partner have equally contributed to failure at this level. Based upon the experiences of failure, both reports conclude by prescribing conditions for success, which essentially recommend the introduction of actions not present in the failed interventions reviewed.

Another work adopting a balanced approach to bilateral administered TADIs has been the 1966 study by Amuzegar, which focused on the failure of the US technical assistance programme to Iran under the Point Four Plan. Amuzegar's approach to this study is informed by his definition of TADIs, in the sense that he begins by elaborating preconditions for success requiring specific efforts and actions from both the local and foreign partner. His findings on the Iranian case study largely concur with the conclusions of
the BMZ documents, in that failure on TADIs is seen to be the result of the unpreparedness and inability of the supplier to offer technical assistance, together with the willingness of the local partner to receive this transference. Additionally, he also argues that the lack of integration of the TADIs into an overall national plan, coupled with a lack of consensus on the need for the programme, contributes to failure. Failure for this writer is largely a question of non-attainment of goals, the value of efficiency or development significance not being explored.

In another study on bilateral technical assistance Harari (1974) begins by arguing that technical assistance from one country to another can take place regardless of the 'relative development levels of the countries concerned'. She goes on to suggest, however, the following main reasons for TADI failure: 1) experts are not necessary and consequently have nothing to do; 2) experts are incompetent with unsuitable personalities; 3) political interference on the part of the host government; and 4) lack of or inappropriate resource disbursement from the host government. As with Amuzegar, Harari also sees the issue of failure in terms of failure to achieve set objectives. In a final chapter entitled 'Conditions of Success', she goes on to deduce conditions of success based on empirical cases she reviewed. Such recommendations include clear terms of reference, an accurate determination of the need for technical assistance and the receptivity of the local counterparts.

In a third study on multilateral technical assistance a World Bank (1983) document, called 'Managing Project-Related Technical Assistance', provides a complementary understanding of failure, which TADI viewed to be a supplier or local partner activity. The 1983 World Bank document by Lethem and Cooper has made a distinction between 'engineering' and 'institutional' technical assistance and has therefore argued that they each require a peculiar type of delivery mode from the supplier. Furthermore, these authors argue that, depending on the peculiar circumstances
of the specific institutional TADI, a more collaborative delivery mode should be employed. Above all, they recommend a systematic approach to technical assistance.

In essence, the reasons for the failure of TADI, highlighted in this study by Letham and Cooper, have been raised in the previous works of, for example Harari, Amuzegar, with the additional observation that failure also arises from a lack of continuity between design and implementation staff and the lack of periodical joint evaluations.

In summary, the postulates of this third grouping of literature are by no means perfect, as they do not fully square with the paper's definition of the TADI, its reasons for failure and its conditions for success. However, they capture the quintessential nature of TADI as a partnership in development and recognize the importance of both the foreign and local partners, and to this extent it will be accepted from among the literature applicable to the case study.

Framework for Analysis

The framework for analysis of the case study will be based on the third group of literature reviewed above. In developing the framework, hypotheses of failure and the corresponding condition for success will be extrapolated first from the works of Amuzegar, Harari, Letham and Cooper and the BMZ documents reviewed above. Care will be taken to extract the major conditions and hypotheses suggested by the five individual works and merge them into one holistic and integrated scheme for analysis. The hypotheses of failure and conditions of success which result from this process will then be subdivided into the three stages of the projects cycle to which they relate: Formulation (Design and Feasibility); Implementation; and Evaluation (and Follow-up). These three stages in the project cycle are more fully discussed in the project management literature by writers such as Love and Goodman (1979).
Next, the selected hypotheses and corresponding prescriptions for success will be operationalized into problem statements which seek to determine whether conditions for success existed in the programme and, if so, whether they lead to success. (Table 1 presents a complete list of twelve hypotheses, with corresponding conditions of success and problem statements derived from them).

These twelve resulting problem statements will be applied in the second part of the paper in order to understand how the literature contributes to unravelling the problems of the case study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HYPOTHESES OF FAILURE</th>
<th>CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS</th>
<th>PROBLEM STATEMENTS FOR ANALYSIS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEASIBILITY &amp; DESIGN STAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Design not feasible and poor problem statement leads to failure.</td>
<td>Design feasibility with accurate statement.</td>
<td>Was the problem accurately defined and design feasible?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure arises when the need for TA is not systematically assessed.</td>
<td>Systematic assessment of TA need.</td>
<td>Was the need for TA systematically determined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of gov't support leads to failure.</td>
<td>Support from government.</td>
<td>Was the Govt committed to the intervention?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear TOR leads to failure.</td>
<td>Clear, timely TOR.</td>
<td>Were the experts given clear and timely TOR?</td>
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### Table 1 Cont'd

<table>
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<tr>
<th>HYPOTHESES OF FAILURE</th>
<th>CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS</th>
<th>PROBLEM STATEMENTS FOR ANALYSIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When the TADI is not integrated into the national plan.</td>
<td>The TADI must be integrated into national plan.</td>
<td>Was the DP integrated into the national plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure is the result of lack of continuity.</td>
<td>Institutional and staff continuity.</td>
<td>Was there staff and institutional cont.?</td>
</tr>
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**ADMINISTRATION & IMPLEMENTATION STAGE**

| When the supplier lacks the ability to function as a partner failure occurs. | Supplier's ability function as a true partner in development. | Did the supplier have the ability to meet the requirements of a partnership. |
| Lack of role congruity with requirements of the TADI. | Role congruity with the TADI. | Was there congruence of counterparts and experts and the TADI? |
| Failure arises when factor commitments are not made available. | Availability of factor commitments. | Were factor commitments made available? |
| Failure arises when adaptive planning is not employed. | Use of adaptive planning. | Was an adaptive model used? |

**EVALUATION & FOLLOW-UP STAGE**

| Failure results when the evaluation system does not feed into the implementation process. | Integration of evaluation into implementation. | Was the system of evaluation integrated into implementation? |
PART II
CHAPTER 4 CASE ANALYSIS - FIRST STAGE

Detailed Description of the Case Study

Before beginning the case analysis it is necessary first to set the stage by reintroducing the following key elements of the case study. Under Public Transport Service Act No.11 of 1965, which brought the PTSC into existence, the organization was charged with the responsibility of providing a safe, reliable and effective form of public transportation in Trinidad and Tobago. The 1979-1983 Transportation Development Programme sought to realize this goal through the following sub-projects:

a) Acquisition of rolling stock. 1200 buses were to be acquired over the five year life of the programme, at an estimated cost of US$123.9m. It was hoped this measure would result in an overall fleet size of 1,400 by 1983 (taking into account the usual replacement rate for old buses).

b) The construction of eight new depots and a main workshop, the refurbishment of existing facilities, particularly the existing depot in Tobago, together with the development of a central compound, to house activities such as training and the acquisition of requisite equipment. The investment volume of this group of projects was estimated to be US$82m.

c) Structural reorganization of the PTSC into decentralized units and upgrading of the organization's human resources, together with the introduction of new managerial, information-gathering and operational systems as a complement to the new physical facilities.

The three separate sub-groups of projects were intended to produce a modern bus transit system with:

8 satellite bus maintenance depots at Beetham Arouca, D'Abadie, Tourere, Endeavour, Corinth, Point Fortin and
Tobago with a single one major central complex at Wallerfield to house a central workshop, central stores and training facilities for operators, administrative and security personnel. Each of the new depots was to be organized to support a fleet size of 250 buses on 9 acre parcels of land (PTSC, 1987: 21).

**Feasibility and Design Stage**

The six problem statements deduced in Table 1, with implications for feasibility and design raise the following issues when applied to the case:

1) **Was the problem definition based on an accurate empirical investigation? Was the design congruent with the problem definition and, more importantly, was the programme feasible?**

The essential problem that the central government hoped the Development Programme (DP) would redress was the general inadequate and inappropriate public transportation system in T & T. This was an age-old problem made worse by increased economic activity, due to the then oil bonanza and shifts in habitation and employment patterns. It was further compounded by a rapid growth in population. When operationalized by the central government the problem was defined thus:

[How to] provide an adequate bus service compatible with the demand in particular geographical and economic sectors of Trinidad and Tobago. [How to] cater for all transport demands in excess of that which can be met on a continuing basis by other existing modes of vehicular transport. [How to] cater for the transport needs of citizens who, on the basis of economic or geographical considerations, are disadvantaged with respect to other existing modes of transport. [How to] provide for the transport requirements associated with formal education; in particular to cater for the transportation of all secondary school children and adults attending institutions on a full time basis. (GOTT/ Demas, 1984:149)
Before embarking on any policy formation, the central government thought it necessary to be informed first on the precise nature and extent of the current transportation problem and its future implications. In this regard, an empirical study with terms of reference 'to look into the extent of the transportation problem' along the major east-west corridor of Trinidad was awarded in 1972 under a CIDA\Trinidad and Tobago joint venture. As designed, the study was to take in the planning period 1975 to 1995 and focused primarily on the east-west corridor of Trinidad because 33.3 per cent of the population of both T & T lived and worked in this area. As published in 1975, the report which contained the findings of this study first assessed the 'current' transportation problem, which it argued stemmed from the closure of the railway in 1966. As a consequence of the rail closure, the report argued, the annual rate of growth (between 1966 and 1973) in average daily road traffic had increased by as much as 17 per cent on some major routes. The report further revealed that in this situation of heavy road usage the typical traffic composition along the east-west corridor was as follows: '65 per cent private cars, 15 per cent taxis, 19 per cent trucks and 1 per cent buses'. It therefore concluded that the result of this configuration was excessive road congestion, inadequate service to commuters and inefficient utilization of the existing infrastructure.

Secondly, the report went on to forecast public transport demand, based on assumptions of population growth trends, employment opportunities, private car ownership and economic growth trends. A scenario of transportation demands in the year 1995 was then worked out and a recommendation offered that a Priority Route be constructed along the existing railway line at a cost of US$13.5m. It was suggested that this route should be designed for the exclusive use of buses and a recommendation was made for the construction of new bus depots and the reconstruction of the major down-town terminal in Port of Spain. The report concluded:

It is believed that if road transport is allowed to
continue to grow according to current trends then serious congestion will persist despite huge expenditures for highways. Unless the abandoned railway right-of-way is converted into a 'priority route' for transit, the opportunity will be lost for implementing a potentially very effective transit system. (CIDA\T & T, 1975: 12)

When, in 1978, central government informed the PTSC that US$280m had been allocated for public transportation development in T & T, the quantum of the allocation and the urgency with which it was communicated was based on the gravity of the transportation problem, as described in the CIDA report. Caught unprepared, with no action plan in hand, the management of the PTSC in turn responded by calling for the 1975 CIDA report, dusting it off and proceeded almost overnight to elaborate a Five-year Transportation Development Programme, which based its understanding of the transportation problem on this said report. It must also be noted that the programme was almost singlehandedly prepared by the then Planning Officer and the current Minister of Transportation, Dr Carson Charles, a career Transportation Planner.

Because the CIDA study had only focused on the east\west Corridor of Trinidad, omitting Trinidad North and South and all of Tobago, it had to be adjusted before its findings could be extended to other regions of Trinidad and Tobago. On this issue the then Corporate Secretary has commented:

This study [the CIDA study] extended and adapted to use ultimately the southern railway carriage way for servicing central and southern Trinidad and for Tobago was at the core of the outline Development Programme 1979 to 1983 prepared by PTSC and approved by the Central government. (Forbes, 1979: 3)

Nonetheless, the report's findings were adapted and formed the basis of the new transportation DP. In conclusion, it can be agreed that the programme was based on an empirically derived problem statement - the CIDA Report. Two interrelated questions remain to
be answered: firstly, was the problem statement accurate and, secondly, was the programme feasible?

Firstly, it is necessary to establish what is meant by the term 'accuracy', especially with regard to a transportation development programme. For this paper, an 'accurate' statement of a public transit problem must, above all, be judged on its ability to assess comprehensively the existing state of the industry and its ability to make reasonably accurate forecasts. The latter criteria is particularly important because of the extreme lumpiness of transportation investments which such forecasts inform.

A close perusal of the CIDA report reveals that a comprehensive appraisal of the then existing transportation system along the east-west corridor was undertaken. No area was left unexplored, the demographic, economic and topographic environment were all considered, an assessment was undertaken of existing infrastructure and the performance and market share analysis was undertaken of all modes of transportation (publicly and privately owned). It must also be added that even the performance of the illegal taxi sector (the PH) was evaluated.

Assessment of accuracy in terms of forecasting ability is, however, more difficult to determine. For example, a 1981 Ministry of Works document noted that 'the actual growth rate per annum of peak period public transport trips for 1980 stood at 1.9 per cent and not 4.5 per cent, as projected by the CIDA study. This finding does not mean, though, that the report was inaccurate, since its assumptions were based on the highly unusual condition of full employment, which characterized the T & T economy in 1978. Because its forecasts of demand were based on assumptions derived from this period it is not surprising that, while the World Bank 1988 Report records a negative GDP growth rate for Trinidad and Tobago (T & T) over the period 1980-1986, the CIDA report predicted a 4.4 per cent growth rate in GDP for the period 1980-1995. It also predicted a 2.7 per cent per annum population growth rate in the east-west corridor – in fact, this figure now stands at 1.7 per cent. It is
interesting to note that, in the 1981 Ministry study, the technocrats tempered their assessment of the report when taking cognizance of the unusual situation of the time. This paper adopts a view similar to that of the 1981 Ministry study, in that it believes the question of accuracy of the CIDA study must be seen against the background of the time.

Secondly, with regard to the question of feasibility, it is also necessary to specify what is meant by this term. Feasibility can been viewed in financial, economic, design and even 'political' terms, as argued by Self (1975). This paper will concentrate, however, on financial feasibility, which appears to be the major focus of the literature on transportation programmes (See Meyer and Straszheim: 1972). Financial feasibility will be defined in terms of net benefits outweighing costs.

As with the discussion on accuracy, it is equally difficult to determine whether a lack of financial feasibility contributed towards the programme's failure, for the simple reason that financial feasibility was not an overriding consideration at the time of formulation. This was due largely to the fact that the programme was designed in an unusual situation, where national revenue grossly exceeded expenditure. Therefore, in conceptualizing the design of the Development Programme, the issue of cost recovery or maximization of net future revenues (profit) took second place to the need to maximize consumer use and redistribute income, through a policy of free bus service to old age pensioners and school children and to subsidize the cost of user charges to others (Auty: 1989 has discussed the uses of the subsidy in the T & T economy during this time). A fortiori, the issue of financial feasibility of the new development venture was made even more remote, since it was widely believed that the PTSC's existing service was so poor that it was first necessary to improve its level of performance before any realistic assessment of a user charge could be determined. In the 1981 Ministry of Works study just quoted, the following observation was made:
Bus fares are currently so low that the cost of collecting them exceeds the revenue they produce. The average bus passenger probably pays a fare of about TT 0.15 cents. The conventional wisdom is that fares should not be raised until services are improved. (GOTT, 1981: ii).

In summary, it is extremely difficult to address the given problem statement with any degree of affirmation, because of the peculiarities of this case. The intervention was based on an empirically derived problem definition that was as accurate as could have been reasonably expected and to compound this situation financial feasibility did not seem to have been an integral component of the planning considerations. To the extent that this led to overdesigned facilities, unsustainable in an economy characterized by slump, is a significant indictment of the programme, but it is not enough to answer that infeasibility, and a poor problem definition led to failure.

2) Was the need for technical assistance systematically established?
To establish the need for foreign technical assistance the literature suggests a procedure which requires a systematic needs assessment of the programme's requirements juxtaposed against a similar assessment of resource availability (Lethem and Cooper 1983).

When the central government ratified the PTSC Programme document in 1978, there was an implicit acceptance that both the technical and administrative capacity for implementing a programme of this magnitude simply did not exist. As far as can be determined, no attempt was made to ratify systematically this assumption, based on the type of investigation suggested by Lethem and Cooper. Ironically, the only 'systematic' justification of a need for technical assistance came in 1980, in the first report of the already appointed GTZ foreign experts. Thus the GTZ has stated:
It became apparent during the visit to Trinidad and Tobago that an extreme shortage of qualified engineers is prevailing. Therefore it appears to be indispensable – in order to realize the project successfully in the time given – in the most important areas to employ experienced German experts who are acquainted with the requirements of a modern transport corporation for the support and training of Trinidadian specialists. (GTZ, 1979: 3).

When the need for foreign expertise was first discussed in 1978, both the central government and the PTSC shared the view that sufficient local human resources for implementing the programme did not exist. However, the preferred means of obtaining foreign expertise advocated by the PTSC (through its non-executive Board), was for retaining the services of international consultants on contract through international advertisements. This recommendation was rejected outright by the government and the PTSC was redirected to explore and comment on the possibility of implementation under a government-to-government technical assistance arrangement. Three alternative options were suggested to the PTSC for consideration: the GTZ of the Federal Republic of Germany; the Volvo Company of Sweden; and London Transport of the United Kingdom.

In a comment on this situation, the then Corporate Secretary of the PTSC had this to say:

The Corporation argued stoutly for the retention of the services of London Transport expressing as the rationale for its preferences: (a) The absence of a language communication barrier which was a distinct possibility in other cases (b) Familiarity with the British system as a consequence of previous direct and indirect contact with that system certain senior PTSC officials having had periods of secondment with that organisation and (c) The prospects of a continuation of the relations into the future having regard to the existing pattern of trade relationship. (Forbes, 1989: 5)

The PTSC preference was, however, ignored and, in a Cabinet meeting of 2 October 1978, it was agreed, inter alia that:
(a) the consultancy services of the GTZ should be accepted
(b) the Ministry of Works, Transportation and
Communications, the Ministry of External Affairs and the
Ministry of Finance (Planning and Development Division)
should consult with the German Embassy with a view to
having the proposals made by the GTZ modified to suit the
special requirements of the PTSC. (GOTT, 1979: 3).

No reason was openly offered as to why the West Germans were
selected in preference to the Swedish or British competitors. On
19 February 1979 negotiations were concluded and the contract for
technical assistance to PTSC was signed between the government
of Trinidad and Tobago, represented by the Permanent Secretary of
the Ministry of Finance, and the government of the Federal Republic
of Germany, represented by the GTZ Regional Representative, Mr
Gerhard Engel.

The Contract
In this contract it was agreed that the GTZ would assist the PTSC
in improving its managerial, administrative, technical
and operational efficiency by seconding qualified experts
to advise and assist in the implementation of the
development programme. (GOTT, 1979: 1).

The contract was to be administered in two separate phases.
Phase one required the services of four GTZ consultants for a
period of 120 man months to appraise the design of the development
programme and, if acceptable, to prepare an action plan for
implementation. Phase two required 303 man months of technical
expertise in order to implement the action plan derived from the
successful completion of phase one.

At both phases of the programme, experts were to be assigned
local counterparts to act as facilitators in the first phase and
to act both as facilitators and under studies in the second. The
salary and allowances of the experts were based on the precedent
established with the GTZ in the 1978 contract of Secondary Roads
Improvement Programme, where the following was agreed – DM 22,204
per man month for the project coordinator and DM 19.473 per man month for professional staff. These amounts included salary, medical check-ups, overseas travel expenses, transportation cost in Trinidad and Tobago, per diem allowances and administration costs of the GTZ.

Although the need for foreign technical assistance was not systematically arrived at, some degree of consideration did precede the award of the contract to the GTZ. These factors will be revealed in the following discussions which seek to determine the five reasons why the GTZ was awarded the contract.

The first reason was, quite simply, a political one. Without a doubt, the central government of 1978 did its cost benefit analysis and logically decided that the national economy had more to benefit from a contract award to the West Germans than it did from an award to the Swedes or the British. In this regard, two 1983 Ministry of External Affairs documents, entitled respectively 'Country Profile of The Federal Republic of Germany' and 'Trinidad and Tobago\Federal Republic of Germany Relations', clearly reveal that the intention of the Trinidad and Tobago government in 1978 was to forge a closer relationship with West Germany, in the hope of realizing economic gains. In the first document just referred to, it was stated that

The Federal Republic of Germany takes second place in the world as a trading nation. It believes in the concept of free world trade, and as such, rejects all forms of protectionism. By maintaining close ties with the Federal Republic, Trinidad and Tobago would be able to penetrate its market. It is interesting to note that during 1980, 99,000 tons (Diesel Fuel, Heavy Fuel Oil and miscellaneous items) were exported to the Federal Republic of Germany. For the same period only 24,130 tons of various products were imported into Trinidad and Tobago from the Federal Republic. (GOTT, 1986: 6)

The second reason could be found in the aggressive foreign policy of the West German government and West German private sector
organizations towards T & T. For example in 1978:

Debt financing amounting to 60% was [secured] for the Iron and Steel Company of Trinidad and Tobago (ISCOTT) and a West German banking institution was involved in the US$330,000,000 project financing arranged by ISCOTT's financial advisors. Hessische Landesbank-Girozentrale committed a maximum of DM 2,381,600 to finance a German manufacturer's sale of equipment to ISCOTT. (GOTT, 1984: 6).

Moreover, on 4 April 1973 a Double Taxation Treaty was signed between the government of Trinidad and Tobago and the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Additionally, it is interesting to note that in 1978 T & T nationals wishing to be trained in Maritime Law at the World Maritime University in Sweden had to seek scholarships under a West German Government third country technical assistance programme, which offered a generous quota of scholarships to T & T.

The third reason why the Germans were awarded the contract was due to the missionary zeal with which officials at the German Embassy recommended the expertise of the GTZ (a perfectly legitimate activity, since Germany government policy did not allow for a GTZ country representative). It is interesting, however, to note that a Regional Representative; Mr Gerhard Engel was appointed by GTZ for the first time in 1979. However, when direct overtures were made to key functionaries within certain government departments the T & T government was obliged to observe that:

It has been emphasised to all Missions accredited to T & T that offers of technical assistance should be made through the government of T & T and not directly to nationals. The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany however has been guilty of circumventing this stipulation and officials of the Ministry of Finance and Planning have been forced to refresh the memory of the Embassy. (GOTT/21a, 1984: 2).
The fourth reason was that in 1978 the GTZ were already involved in TADIs in T & T, in which there was some degree of satisfaction with their performance. Such TADI's included the DM 2.8m Agricultural Development Project in Chaguaramas, Trinidad, and the DM 774 093 technical assistance project in Hydraulic and Coastal works, signed on 16 March 1978. Finally, it was the DM 422,677, Secondary Roads Improvement Programme, TADI, which tipped the scales in favour of the West Germans. When it came to the award of the PTSC contract, the link between road improvement and bus transportation was seen as organic.

Another organic link existed between public transportation in Trinidad and Tobago and the West Germans, namely, the acquisition of Mercedez Benz Buses. When the PTSC came into existence in 1965, central government adopted the policy, which only allowed for importing completely knocked down (CKD) rolling stock in order to generate value added within the T & T economy. Between 1965 to 1972, a total of 806 buses were acquired by the PTSC, all CKD, and these were assembled either by the PTSC or at private assembly plants. In 1972, however, an interesting phenomenon occurred. Two Mercedes Benz buses, at a total cost of US$19,400, were imported fully assembled into Trinidad and Tobago. In 1975, three more Mercedes Benz buses were again imported, at a total cost of US$51,000. In 1976, twenty-four more Mercedes Benz buses were imported, completely assembled, at a cost of US$785,000. (PTSC, Appendix I, 1978: 2)

The five reasons suggested above are by no means exhaustive—many questions are still left unanswered. However, as far as this paper has determined these are the major reasons which suggest themselves.

It is clear that the need for foreign technical assistance was not systematically arrived at; moreover, the fact that the instrument of this assistance (the GTZ) was selected against the will of the PTSC reduced the expert's effectiveness on the programme, as they later found it necessary to redirect their
efforts towards negotiating hostility in their working environment. It is interesting to note that, as late as 1986, three years after the departure of the last GTZ expert, they were still referred to in the PTSC as 'Little Hitlers'.

3) Was the central government committed to the programme?
The above problem statement will be seen in terms of financial and political commitment.

On the first issue, of financial commitment, the government's financial commitment to the development programme was evident, because, without being petitioned, it had reserved US$280m for exclusive expenditure on the programme. As a qualifier it must be noted that, under Act No.11 of 1965, Sub-section 29, the PTSC was not allowed to retain revenue or to discharge obligations incurred in the course of its affairs. So, it had no control over the allocated sum which, along with other allocations for infrastructural development, was constituted in the form of a development fund lying safely in foreign banks accruing interest and to be released only in accordance with established public accounts procedures. Interest accruing to this Fund for the years 1980 and 1981 was US$12.6m and US$11.1m respectively (GOTT,1984:12), a factor which made the central government extremely reluctant to draw on the capital sum.

Thus, on this issue of financial commitment central government did render financial support for the development programme, but it was not unconditional and was not outside the standard allocations procedure.

With regard to the issue of political commitment, it must be said at the outset that, at the time of design the government of T & T was not only committed but highly enthusiastic over the development programme of the PTSC in general and the technical assistance component in particular. If anything, it was not lack of commitment but overcommitment which emerged as a problem in this early period. This was manifested in the excessive dominance of
central government over the PTSC as executing agents and over the Germans as collaborators. In its relations with the PTSC, not only did the T & T government force the GTZ upon them, but it gave the organization very little autonomy in introducing its specific requirements into the contract as negotiated – all aspects of this process were centrally directed. This situation existed partially because the PTSC was a Statutory Corporation subject to the controls of the Minister of Transportation and also because of the unbridled enthusiasm of the then Minister, along with the fact that political capital could be made from this development intervention when completed. In this regard, the incisive comments of the then Corporate Secretary of the PTSC must be noted:

In effect the management of PTSC had to respond routinely to a wide cross section of central government officials starting with fairly lowly placed operatives and going all the way up to the Minister. What role the Minister played in this scenario of continuous interventions depended ultimately upon his idiosyncrasies and his perception of his own political needs and political fortunes. In the period of the formulation of the development plan the serving Minister introduced a series of monthly contact meetings between himself and members of the Board of Directors of PTSC (and sometimes involving the General Manager). To certain of the members this was a school-masterly approach and evoked a measure of chagrin. (Forbes, 1989: 3)

In respect of the central government’s dominance of the government-to-government arrangement, this was to manifest itself in the extent to which the contract, as negotiated, allowed the GTZ field officers scope for professional autonomy and the ability to exert influence over the course of affairs. On 19 February 1979, the government of T & T finalized and awarded the transportation development programme to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, with the GTZ being identified as the executing agency. As no memorandum of understanding existed between these two governments to guide technical assistance arrangements, the contract was awarded on the basis of Letters of Exchange. By 11
June 1979, however, a memorandum of understanding was signed with retroactive effect.

A close examination of the content of this memorandum reveals that the government of T & T had purposefully incorporated conditions, which protected its interest and mediated the influence of its German partner. Attention is therefore drawn to Article 1. of this memorandum (See Appendix III), which clearly states that individual technical assistance contracts should contain a joint definition of the project concept and specify the joint contributions to be made by both parties of the agreement. Not only did the letters of exchange for the GTZ\PTSC contract predate the memorandum of understanding, but it also appeared to run counter to it, in the sense that the notion of employer\employee relations appeared to be dominant in the contract, as opposed to the collaboration ethos of the memorandum.

Under the contract, central government retained the right to select the individual GTZ experts on the basis of CVs, which were to be sent in advance. The government also retained the right to terminate the expert's individual contract, if his performance or conduct came into question (Reference: Article 4, Sections 2 and 3). Experts were to be accorded temporary office accommodation in the PTSC and they were to have no line function or authority.

It should be noted that the existence of these conditions, though potentially problematic, did not inherently mean that the professionalism of experts would be circumscribed in actual practice. However, compounded by personality factors, the nationalistic orientation of the government led to a situation where experts perceived themselves as employees of the state and consequently attempted to do and say what was expected of them by their paymaster. The first and most obvious act in this direction was that the programme design was appraised and ratified within a period of three months (March to May of 1979) by the first team of GTZ experts under the first phase of the agreement, without any reexamination of the assumptions made by the PTSC planning officer
or, indeed, the CIDA study.

In this regard, the GTZ statement of ratification presented to the Minister of Transportation, upon completion of Phase I of the contract should be noted here:

After a thorough examination the experts came to the conclusion that the Development Plan put forward is best suited to achieve the objectives of the PTSC. Therefore the recommendations and suggestions given in this report are based on the targets set out in the Development Plan. (GTZ, 1980: 1)

From the above discussion it can be summarized that, at this stage in the programme's life, the central government of Trinidad and Tobago did exhibit a tremendous degree of political and financial commitment to the TADI. However, excessive political commitment, as opposed to its absence, negatively impacted upon the programme's efficiency and contributed towards its failure.

4) Were the GTZ given clear and timely terms of reference (TOR)? This problem statement can only be fully addressed if it is considered in terms of the two separate phases of the programme.

In the first phase of this contract, terms of reference were issued to the appraisal team of GTZ experts well in advance of their arrival in Trinidad and Tobago. Although clarity and timeliness in the terms of reference are desirable attributes in any programme, the propensity of the GTZ experts to be guided completely in these terms led to them undertaking only what was formally expected and nothing more. So, in a programme whose financial and economic feasibility needed to be appraised, the expert's TOR related only to design feasibility. The implications of setting such narrow TOR led to a situation where an otherwise unsustainable programme was expeditiously ratified. The presence of clear and specific terms of reference in this case, as opposed to its absence, therefore appears to be the more important source of the problems.

In respect of the second phase of the agreement, its terms of
reference could accurately be described as ambiguous. The second German Team of Integrated Experts (GTIE) were simply expected to implement strategies formulated by the team in the first phase without any other specific guidelines. The result of this ambiguity was that, instead of building new facilities, the GTIE interpreted implementation as rehabilitation and recommended the introduction of a rehabilitation plan, as a first step towards achieving the objectives of the overall programme. The intention of the rehabilitation plan, as recommended in 1980, was to upgrade the level of the existing infrastructure, thereby increasing the efficiency level of the PTSC in the short run. Thus the GTIE argued: 'It is recommended to launch and implement a Rehabilitation Plan before embarking fully on the Development Plan.' (GTZ, April 1981:9).

This interpretation of implementation did not meet with central government's approval and, by December of 1982, the Chairman of the PTSC was forced to resign after the then Minister accused the Corporation of wasting time rehabilitating facilities that the government had allocated revenue to reconstruct. The recommended course of implementation action was thus swiftly overturned, as the new Chairman immediately informed the GTIE and other officers that priority must be given to a Physical Facilities Construction Programme.

To summarize, while clear terms of reference in the first phase of the programme made for an incomplete appraisal of the programme, in the second phase ambiguity resulted in a waste of resources, as first rehabilitation and then construction implementation strategies were employed in an uncomplimentary manner in order to realize what were perceived to be the objectives of the programme.

5) Was the programme integrated into a national plan?
Integration here will be seen in terms of both forward and backward linkages, that is to say, the programme should evolve out of the
national plan and, when implemented, it should continue to reinforce the overall objectives of this plan. With regard to this case, it must be made clear that, during the oil boom period when this programme was formulated, the government of T & T had abandoned National Development Planning. This observation has been made by several other commentators, foremost of whom is the former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, who noted that: 'The former People's National Movement government was into regime survival in the oil boom years, spending on projects and subsidies for the purpose of staying in power.' (Trinidad Guardian, 16 November 1988.

This view has been echoed in a recent (1988) study which sought to review the independence experience in T & T. In an article entitled 'The Development Experience—Reflections' economist F. Rampersad has argued:

The country has had three development plans during the period of Independence - 1964-68, 1969-73 and 1982-86 and these have provided some of the guideposts for economic and social policy. The interregnum, 1974-81 was characterised, among other things, by a replacement of macro-economic planning by uncoordinated sectoral planning; and some of us believe that the inherent overheating of the economy (Rampersad in Ryan, 1988: 4).

It is therefore against the background of an absence of national planning, that the development programme must be perceived as an isolated endeavour, promoted to enhance the then government's political support. To the extent that the programme was not and could not be integrated into a national planning framework (because none existed), its logic of decentralization was naturally flawed. When the programme came to be implemented in 1980, it soon became obvious that the centres of transportation demand were not as predicted by the PTSC in 1978. In particular, the rural eastern region of Trinidad was being opened up to massive housing estates by both the state and private land developers.
6) Was there institutional and personnel continuity between the formulation and implementation stages of the programme?

With regard to institutional continuity, one of the most interesting issues which contributes to the explanation of the programme's failure was the fact that, while the formulation of the DP sprang from within the nerve centre of the PTSC (the Planning Unit), responsibility for its implementation was consigned to another organization, the Implementing and Coordination Unit (ICU). As conceptualized, the ICU was to comprise of the foreign technical experts and the counterparts, there was no organic relationship between the ICU and the Planning Department or indeed between the PTSC per se and the ICU. (Appendix IV elaborates this point). This resulted in tension and a dysfunctional use of resources as the rest of the PTSC resisted the ICU. Moreover, the learning curve of the programme was significantly affected by the fact that the experiences derived from undertaking the formulation function could not be formally transferred to the stage of implementation.

To take the second issue, of continuity of personnel, a peculiar characteristic of this development programme was the fact that the personnel who undertook programme formulation were not the same as those undertaking its implementation. What is more, the GTZ team undertaking the first stage of the implementation was not the same as the one which embarked upon the second. This peculiar situation was however compensated for by the following factors. Firstly, the German Team of Integrated Experts (GTIE) were given an opportunity to study and evaluate the programme as part of their TOR. Secondly, the first team actually lay the foundations for the second GTIE, through their preparation of an action plan. Thirdly another aspect of continuity in terms of personnel was also exemplified in the informal relationship which developed between the Planning Officer (the formulator of the programme) and the Director of Projects, after joining the implementing team in May 1981. As a consequence of this personal relationship, the counterparts had direct access to the 'wisdom and experience' of
the planning officer and some sort of continuity was established, albeit not in a formal or rational sense.

In summary, although a serious structural disjunction existed between formulation and implementation in this programme, some degree of continuity, especially at the level of personnel did exist. This was not enough in itself to ensure that the learning curve of the programme was sustained from the formulation to the implementation period.
CHAPTER 5  CASE ANALYSIS — SECOND STAGE

Administration and Implementation Stage

With regard to administration and implementation, five problem statements have been derived for application to the selected case (refer to Table 1). When applied to this case, they yield the following findings.

1) Did the supplier have the ability to offer effective foreign technical assistance to the local partner?
This is a most important problem statement which must be subdivided into two more specific questions to facilitate comprehensive discussions: firstly, did the West German government have the will, the competence and the policy basis, upon which to offer foreign technical assistance to the government of T & T in the public transportation sector; and secondly, was the structure of the West German technical assistance machinery capable of delivering this service, once it was clear that a basis existed?

On the first question, it must be noted that, from as early as the mid-1950s, when West Germany first entered the development assistance arena, they brought with them a commitment based on the expertise developed from reconstruction in the post Second World War era. Knusel (1968) notes that, from its inception Germany had its own understanding of development assistance, in which technical assistance was redefined as technical cooperation, with both sides having commensurate duties and rights under the technical cooperation arrangement (Knusel, 1968: 95) Because of this view of technical cooperation as collaboration, the West Germans perceive the host country as a partner and have long since used this terminology in their official policy documents. However, commensurate with this stated policy preference has been the
pursuit of technical cooperation arrangements as a business, where costs are minimized and profits maximized. Thus, from as early as 1968, Holbik and Myers note that the West German aid administration was quite proud to admit: 'their contributions to the World Bank have proved profitable; some of the country's producers of heavy industrial equipment having received substantial orders based on the bank's loans' (Holbik & Myers, 1968: 59)

Arnold (1982) traces the sustained approach to technical assistance as a business into the 1980s and notes the comment of the 1975 Minister for Economic Cooperation Egon Bahr, who stated that 'development aid today safeguards jobs.' Arnold further goes on to note that, to support this assertion, the Minister proved 'that at least 80% of capital assistance returned as orders to German Companies and as much as 90% of technical assistance expenditure returned to Germany.' (Arnold, 1982: 35)

Moreover, Arnold goes on to make the observation that the sectors to which technical assistance was supplied in the developing world were tied to sectors deemed by the West German administration to be suffering from 'structural difficulties', the most notable of these sectors being of course, shipbuilding and railways (Arnold, 1982: 32). Another interesting observation, brought out in Arnold's work, was that the notion of technical assistance as a business was formally incorporated into West German development policy when the '25 Theses', upon which this Policy was based, set out varied conditions for technical assistance to countries at differing stages of development in 1975. In the fourteenth of the 25 theses, it was stated that 'threshold countries', defined in terms of high income levels, would receive hard terms, as against the most seriously affected countries (MSAs). This policy came to be ratified as thesis No.17 in 1979, when the West German government revised its policy for development cooperation. It also forms the basis of the business-like policy the GTZ embodies as guiding principles in its 1987 handbook. Essentially, this handbook states that 'In addition to implementing
Federal government development policy the GTZ also takes direct commissions, subject to approval by the Federal government from developing countries and international organisations.' (GTZ, 1987).

With specific regard to cost minimization, West German technical assistance is carried out exclusively by the GTZ; an organization established in 1975 with the peculiar feature of a relatively small permanent staff component, complemented by a roster of about 1000 private consultants, to whom field work is siphoned off (Arnold, 1982: 41). This loose arrangement results in a situation of extremely low operating cost overheads and a marginalization of the GTZ in the arena of development cooperation policy-making.

Thus, it would appear that the entrepreneurial motivation behind the West German government policy to development cooperation infected the government-to-government technical assistance arrangement with the government of T & T and undermined the entire notion of partnership required for the development of a less fortunate country. It would be logical to deduce, then, that T & T was known by the West German government to be an oil-rich state with the ability to pay full market prices for technical assistance. It was focused upon therefore, not so that the West German government could become its partner in development, but so that it could become a shareholder in its national fortunes.

Furthermore, to compound the problems of West German technical assistance policy, unlike the British, French and even the Dutch, the West Germans have no historical familiarity with the problems of small island economies such as T & T. Against this background, it becomes easy to understand why the first team of GTZ experts readily ratified an over-designed programme in 1979. If it was the ambition of the local designers that led them to think that 'bigger is better', it was certainly the preference and contextual framework within which the West Germans operated which led them to endorse this feeling.
The second question now left to be answered is on the suitability of the West German technical assistance structure. On this issue the point must be made that the preference of the West German technical assistance programme to throw private consultants together haphazardly and expect them to function as a team in the field was highly unrealistic and, indeed, unworkable. In the case of the transportation programme of T & T, personality and professional conflicts arose and individual preferences overtook team effort. Testimony of this is evinced in both the observations of the Corporate Secretary and the Director of Projects:

Within the German team itself one sensed, and on occasions one could observe, an absence of cohesiveness—a direct result of the fact the team membership comprised persons drawn from an array of different agencies with different backgrounds and with different perspectives regarding the requirements of the task in hand. Indeed some elements of indiscipline escaped the GTZ screening process (Forbes, 1989: 7).

What is quite clear is the GTIE functions less like a team and more like individual members of the Corporation. (PTSC, 1981: 13).

In addressing the problem statement posed in this section, it has been clearly demonstrated that one of the factors contributing towards this programme’s failure was the inability of the West German government to provide the structure and policy base upon which technical assistance could be provided to the government of T & T. This phenomenon led to a reduction in the development significance of the programme.

2) Were factor commitments made available by central government on time and at the scale required?
For the purposes of analysis factor commitments will be divided into human resources, in the form of counterparts, and financial factors, in the form of revenue allocations.
On the first issue, it would be wise to note that up to the
time of the GTZ's completion of the first phase of the contract (May 1979), no steps had been taken by the central government to secure the local expertise required. On 5 February 1980, the two governments concluded discussions on the continuation of the technical assistance arrangement for executing the second phase of the contract. It was decided that the original request of the phase one GTZ team for 23 regular experts (with an assignment period of 12 to 24 months) and five short term experts contributing a total of 423 man months was impractical. Instead, it was agreed that an arrangement of 10 regular experts, each with 24 months personal contracts, complemented with short-term experts, contributing a total of 250 man months should be implemented. The expert's presence in the second phase was reduced without significant objections, largely due to the convincing arguments of the government representative. It was argued that qualified personnel existed in T & T and that the government was obligated to recruit locally. Agreement was further arrived at to reduce the experts' presence, because of the fact that the Ministry of Finance had earlier accepted the recommendation of the Ministry of Transportation, to create a grand total of 20 counterpart posts.

Between March and September of 1980, the full complement of GTZ staff (the first of whom was the project coordinator, Helmut Nicolay, and the last of whom was the procurer, A. Enderlein) were all on board and had assumed their respective duties.

A full year was to elapse before the first strategic counterpart; the Director of Projects, Tracy Wilson was to be employed under a three-year contract, commencing on 5 May 1981. The PTSC was subsequently informed, by the Organization and Management Division of the Ministry of Finance, that the financial burden of employing 20 permanent counterparts to the Germans was too high and that steps should be taken to assign counterparts from existing establishment personnel. As a last resort, it was further told that, if in-house employees could not be found, then short-term contracts for specific counterparts would be sanctioned by the
Statutory Authorities Services Commission (SASC).

Many of the experts therefore served their full duration of contract, without the presence of a single counterpart to whom the technology could be transferred. The most telling example of this occurred when the counterpart to the storekeeper was temporarily appointed two full years after the GTIE incumbent, A. Beck, had left the PTSC and T & T. (Table 2 juxtaposes counterpart arrival with that of the experts).

Furthermore, in cases where counterpart positions were filled from establishment personnel, not only were these officers unqualified, but the fact that they were simultaneously called upon to maintain their regular functions reduced their willingness and ability to serve. In the 1981 mid-year report of the director of projects, he noted this issue

the Phase II Agreement drew attention to the need for the transfer of technology as one of the objectives to be attained with the presence of the GTIE. Apart from the serious question of practicability which this raises, the framework of counterpart association through which technique and knowledge is to be transferred is absent. If the counterpart is described as: (1) one who is involved on a full time basis in the activities of his German associate (2) one who has the knowledge in diverse ways and (3) one who is motivated to acquire the increased skills to be transmitted. Then only one of the ten (10) German staff members can be said to have a counterpart and this is after some 15 months of the presence of the GTIE. (PTSC, 1981: 14)

The first project review report of the GTIE (1981) spelt out the consequences of the shortage of counterparts to the programme in this way

The lack of counterparts has a notable reduction of the multiplying effect. The second aspect relates to the transfer of technology: if there is no counterpart unto which the skills of the expatriates can be transferred, there is little lasting impact on the Corporation once the expatriates have left. (GTIE, 1981: 7)
Table 2
Assumption of Duty: Counterparts and Experts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German Experts</th>
<th>Contract Date</th>
<th>Contract Date</th>
<th>Local Counterparts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Coordinator H. Nicolay</td>
<td>3/80 to</td>
<td>5/31 to</td>
<td>Director Projects T. Wilson*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architect W. Horung²</td>
<td>5/80 to</td>
<td>4/84 to</td>
<td>Architect &amp; Civil Engineer R. Ali*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Engineer K. Neumann</td>
<td>6/80 to</td>
<td>3/79 to</td>
<td>Mech. &amp; Maint. Engineer N. Saladeen*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maint. &amp; Training Eng. R. Guthier</td>
<td>5/80 to</td>
<td>1/84 to</td>
<td>Mechanical Engineer Training M. Mitchell#³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Scheduler R. Cornelius</td>
<td>5/80 to</td>
<td>10/86 to</td>
<td>Job Scheduler D. Bartholomew#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban &amp; Reg. Planner W. Klement</td>
<td>3/81 to</td>
<td>9/81 to</td>
<td>Traffic Planner Z. Charles*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Planner H. Theis</td>
<td>7/80 to</td>
<td>5/81 to</td>
<td>Traffic Manager &amp; Engineer P. Subiah#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurer A. Enderlein</td>
<td>15/80 to</td>
<td>3/84 to</td>
<td>Manager, Supply L. Rayside*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org. Consultant G. Schmidt-Linder</td>
<td>5/80 to</td>
<td>7/81 to</td>
<td>Systems Analyst R. Balkaran*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storekeeper H. Beck</td>
<td>6/80 to</td>
<td>9/85 to</td>
<td>Supply Officer M. Stillman*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver Trainer G. Pantel</td>
<td>4/80 to</td>
<td>1/81 to</td>
<td>Chief Instructor R. Wilkinson#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ This sign (*) refers to newly recruited staff.
² Services terminated due to unacceptable conduct.
³ This sign (#) refers to staff deployed from within the PTSC.
One can only guess at the motives of the T & T government which was disposed to spending US$280m on a development programme, with an expressed preference for building new structures rather than training the human resources to manage these facilities. While the government appeared 'unwilling' to make human resources available when needed, after 1981, in respect of financial resources, it was in fact 'unable' to provide this factor on the scale required by the programme.

With regard to the revenue filled years of 1980 and 1981 (the period of the second oil boom), allocations of central government to the PTSC exceeded both the budgetary requests and the actual expenditure of the programme. However, 1982 marked a turning point, with expenditure exceeding central government receipts by almost US$2m. This trend peaked in 1983 as the PTSC requested US$14.4m and received only US$3.3m. Between 1984 and 1987 the average annual difference between the sum budgeted and the sum actually received was approximately US$36.4m (see Table 3).

The drastic shortfall in revenue to the PTSC between 1982 and 1987 was a direct consequence of the fall in petroleum prices, which in turn resulted in reduced revenues to the government of T & T. This new reality was immediately passed on to the PTSC notwithstanding the fact that an allocation of US$280m had been promised in 1979. Reduced revenue flows from central government made nonsense of any attempt at programming and resulted in legal action being brought against the PTSC for payments outstanding to consultants and contractors. In a document entitled 'Implications of reduced funds for the PTSC's Capital Development Programme for 1985' the director of projects clearly spelt out how reduced funding would result in programme failure. In this document it was stated that 'reduction in expenditure below the level of TT$32.8m would in effect be a total reversal of the implementation of an overall coherent physical facilities programme.' (PTSC, 1985: 31)
Table 3
Funds: Budgeted and Received on Development Programme (1984-1987).

All sums represented in US $ millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sum Budgeted</th>
<th>Sum Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>$30.0</td>
<td>$10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>$20.0</td>
<td>$07.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>$06.4</td>
<td>$03.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>$01.8</td>
<td>$00.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$58.2</td>
<td>$21.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Difference = Sum Budgeted minus Sum Received

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Difference} &= \text{Sum Budgeted} - \text{Sum Received} \\
&= \$58.2 - \$21.8 \\
&= \$36.4
\end{align*}
\]

A Note on Exchange Rate: US$ to TT$

- 1974 - 1985: US$1. = TT$2.40
- August 1988: US$1. = TT$4.25
In summary, it would appear that, while the Government of Trinidad and Tobago appeared to have supported this intervention at the stage of conceptualization, when it came to be implemented three years later, this so-called support was withdrawn, in the face of falling national revenues and other competing claims for state expenditure. Thus, the failure of the central government to make available human and financial resources on the scale and in the time frame required made nonsense of programming and impacted negatively on the efficiency value of the programme.

3) Was there role congruence of experts and counterparts with the specific requirements of the programme?

Letham and Cooper have sub-divided technical assistance (TA) programmes into engineering TA which they argue 'consists of professional architectural or engineering services for civil works and other hardware investment' and institutional TA, which they state 'consists of ...managerial, technical, or other direct operational support as well as staff training.' (Letham and Cooper, 1983: 1). In this case, the technical assistance requirements of the programme contained both engineering and institutional aspects.

In accordance with the programme design, implementation of the DP was to revolve largely around two main activities: the first being the construction of new facilities and the acquisition of new rolling stock, (hard) engineering related issues; and the second being restructuring of the PTSC, introduction of new systems and upgrading the performance level of the organization's functionaries, all (soft) issues. At the level of the contract, provisions were made for experts to be counterparted with local professionals to meet the collaboration requirement of the hard aspect of the programme and understudies to meet the advisor requirement of the soft aspect of the programme. This functional division was only at the level of design, though. As the programme came to be implemented, role congruence of experts and counterparts to the particular aspects of the programme failed to materialize.
To take the collaborative role first: it is interesting to explore what were the problems in meeting the requirements specific to the hard engineering related role. At the outset it must be noted that, because the GTZ staff took up office at the PTSC one full year before the first counterpart arrived, they were freed of meeting the role requirements of the collaboration model, as there were no counterparts with whom they could collaborate. So, during this time, they acquainted themselves with the very rudimentary aspects of the PTSC. In some cases this initiative took them out of the ICU, which at the time was constituted as a technostructure (see Mintzberg, 1979, for a full discussion of this non-line structure) and into the arena of line management.

To be sure, the Director of Projects observed this anomaly upon joining the implementation unit in 1981. He immediately drew attention to the implication of this act by noting:

Much of the general activities which appear to be consuming an inordinately large share of the time of the GTIE require less skills than obtained in the GTIE. Activities like the location and placement of scrap bins and the discarding of derelict buses, the survey of vehicles to be scrapped, the search for maps to identify PTSC's properties, along with the pervasive follow-up on discarding of scrap iron, etc. almost all of which are administrative matters at that point are indeed a poor utilization of expensive experts. The kind of substantive activities which the GTIE should be pursuing and are clearly spelt out in their job descriptions even where started, have not generally progressed much. In one case, the architect who is no longer with PTSC has left little by way of substantive activities after 12 months on the job. (PTSC, 1981: 14).

It must be noted, however, that this situation was not the fault of the GTZ, but was the result of the unwillingness and inability of the central government of Trinidad and Tobago to make good their promise to provide counterpart human resources.

This apart, when counterparts finally came on board in the 1982 to 1983 period, the collaborative role requirement of the
programme did not automatically materialize for two main reasons. The first was the inability of the selected incumbents to function as true equals to the GTZ professionals, as they were lacking in qualifications, experience and ability. In one case, for example an ex-schoolteacher, with a recently acquired first degree in economics and with no known prior experience in the transportation industry (save as a commuter), was made counterpart to the transportation planner, H. Theis. For reasons not entirely clear to this writer, although the competence of this counterpart was obviously questionable, in a memorandum, dated 28 July 1981, GTZ project coordinator, Helmut Nicolay, recommended that this counterpart be sent to West Germany to oversee the preparation of the electronic data processing package for the PTSC in Berlin. In this memorandum, Nicolay goes on to suggest that:

Moreover, the stay in Berlin offers splendid opportunities to pay extensive visits - which even might be extended to trainee programmes to the Berlin Transport Corporation (BVG) the operator of 1500 buses (and 1000 metrocars) and the 'mother' of BVG. Such visits could easily be arranged (by Dr. Janousch, BVG Director General) and guided (for instance by Mr. Patel, BVG). (GTIE, 28 July 1981)

The second factor, which precluded an effective collaborative effort between counterparts and the experts, lay with the reluctance of the director of projects to collaborate closely with the German experts. He chose instead to interface directly with the general manager and other functionaries, bypassing his West German colleagues.

The second problem concerns role congruence of the advisor/understudy model. As with the engineering aspect of the development programme, the institutional aspect also suffered from the non-availability of counterparts. Moreover, when some counterparts were redeployed from normal duty within the PTSC in 1982, it became apparent that they were untrainable, especially in the techniques of modern transportation industry. Many of these
counterparts were in fact ex-railway employees, with no more than primary school education and perhaps some in-house training within the PTSC. By dint of seniority, however, it was they who occupied middle line positions and were, therefore, the nominees to be trained. In the two years in which they were assigned to be trained, many of them expended far more effort resisting their trainers than they did trying to grapple with the new techniques they were being taught.

Additionally, training was made far more difficult because of the communication problems which the GTZ experts seemed to be experiencing. On this issue, the then Corporate Secretary had this to say:

Problems of communication did arise - noticeably so initially - some members of the German Team having a great deal less proficiency in English than others. On another dimension there was complete unfamiliarity with the work ethics and the general social dynamics of the work place. These were all factors which had implications for their central task, namely, the introduction and implementation of organization change. (Forbes, 1989:7)

It would seem that both the collaborator and the trainee or advisor role requirements of the development programme were not fulfilled and, consequently, the strategic combination of counterpart and expert efforts never quite came together to contribute to the programme's success.

4) Was the implementing agency optimally structured and/or located? This problem statement will be treated in terms of, first, the location and structuring of the implementation agency within the PTSC and, second, the location, structure and performance of the PTSC within the framework of the public sector and its various actors.

In the design of the programme the implementing and coordinating unit, the ICU, was to be the mechanism through which technology was to be transferred to the local staff by the GTZ, and
through which the programme would be implemented. It was not until
the assumption of duties by the director of projects in 1981 that
the structure and functioning of this unit was delineated by him.
The incumbent filling the post of Director of Projects was
considered the best man for the job: a national of T & T, trained
in planning techniques at PACE University and with practical
experience as a consultant with UNDP in Africa, Mr Tracy Wilson's
presence in 1981 was warmly welcomed.

The structure and functioning of the ICU was presented in the
director of project's '1981 mid-year report'. The report read:

The counterpart staff will report directly to the
Director(Projects) and will be directly assisted by the
technicians. The Director will of course coordinate their
activities. The Project Coordinator of the GTIE will
continue the existing relationship with his team.
Coordination of both the local team members and the GTIE
will be done through regular meetings of the entire group
and after general agreement on tasks to be undertaken,
time frames and tasks contents. Both the Director
(Projects) and the Project Coordinator will report to the
General Manager and where possible or necessary will make
joint presentations to Members of the Board, Members of
the Advisory Group and other Agencies of the Government.
(PTSC, 1981: 17)

Clearly, the structure of the ICU did not integrate the work
flows and functions of the GTIE with that of the counterparts. What
this meant was that the ICU was characterized as a matrix type
structure, which required flexibility and willingness as a
coordinating mechanism, on the part of both teams in general and
compromise and collaboration from their leaders, in particular.
Unfortunately, this did not occur. What did emerge, in fact, was
a situation where each team jealously guarded what they believed
to be their sphere of competence. It is interesting to note that,
in the 1987 final evaluation report of the programme, the director
of projects made special mention of the fact that the only GTIE
member working in close association with the counterparts was the
maintenance engineer, K. Neumann. The actual comment of the
director on Neumann went as follows: 'He assisted the ICU in formulation of design criteria for the Central Workshop' (PTSC, 1987: Table 1.) What this observation demonstrates is that the ICU, as it had evolved, excluded the GTIE. This fact is made even more apparent when the director remarked of the project coordinator that: 'This consultant was primarily engaged in coordinating the work of the GTIE and acting as liaison between his team and Management.' (PTSC, 1987: Table 1.)

A fact that is mentioned but not completely spelt out in the earlier statement of the director was that the ICU was situated at the very strategic apex of the existing PTSC organizational structure. To the extent that the director and the project coordinator reported directly to the general manager, they legitimately appeared to have more power than line managers. More importantly, though, the ICU was constituted as a temporary 'technostructure' (see Mintzberg: 1979). The scope of its endeavour required that it be literally absorbed into the organization structure of the PTSC at the highest possible level. To further complicate matters, the ICU was given no line authority, but its functionaries had direct access to the general manager who, if persuaded by a specific recommendation of the ICU could delegate its implementation to another manager, who was in turn obligated to work in concert with the ICU.

The implication of locating the implementing unit in such a precarious position, together with the internal difficulties within the unit, led to a situation where the ICU was fighting against itself and against other pockets of resistance within the PTSC. Needless to say, this resulted in reduced programme efficiency.

In respect of the location and functioning of the PTSC within the public sector, this issue raises the question of why the implementing organ was located within the PTSC and whether it was capable of giving the required support to the programme. To the political administration of 1978 any plan for public transportation development had to incorporate the PTSC, if only by virtue of the
fact that it was the only existing institution with exclusive responsibility for public transportation. Locating the programme within the PTSC, however, generated problems which invariably impacted upon the overall effectiveness of the programme. The root of these problems stemmed from: a lack of autonomy of the PTSC; roads that were not integrated into the purview of the PTSC; and the inherent inefficiency of the PTSC.

As a statutory authority subject to the controls of the Statutory Authority Services Commission (SASC) the PTSC lacked both the flexibility and autonomy necessary to implement such a programme. From as early as 1969 the then chairman of the PTSC recognized this to be a problem and commented on the implications of this situation on the Corporation's functions (see Ryan, 1977: 698). Lack of autonomy and close scrutiny by the minister and supervising ministries continued to be a problem up to the time of implementing the development programme. The implications of this situation to the programme was demonstrated in 1981 when the minister made known his displeasure with the rehabilitation programme then being implemented. On this subject of political and civil service intervention into the PTSC, the director of projects had this to say: 'PTSC finds itself in a position in which its efforts at Rehabilitation appear to be contrary to the wishes or desires of the Ministry of National Transportation and this poses very serious problems for the Corporation.' With regard to the issue of interference from civil servants, the director takes a harsher tone and goes on to warn that: 'unless so designated, the personnel of the Ministry including the Permanent Secretary, should not foist their desires on the Corporation.' (PTSC, 1981: 27)

The upshot of this lack of autonomy was that the PTSC could not hire or fire, retain its own revenue, contract the services of counterpart staff or efficiently manage a development programme. The implications of this problem were also clear to the GTZ project coordinator who noted:

There is an almost absolute dependency from outside. Not
only a dependency from one governmental body (which - in one way or another - the corporation could manage to live with), but - unfortunately - a dependency from various bodies. Among them are: The Central Tenders Board, The chief Personnel Officer, The Organization and Management Division, the SASC. It is to be stated that mainly due to this situation, practically a proper operation of PTSC is almost impossible.... Moreover, it appears that such manifold outside control does not necessarily produce a high quality decision. (GITE, 1981: 8)

(Appendix V captures the PTSC's lack of autonomy while implementing this programme).

It is to the credit of the then minister of transportation that in 1983 the PTSC was made autonomous of the SASC and the Central Tenders Board, though not of the organization and management division of the Ministry of Finance or of ministerial control.

The second problem with placing the implementing unit within the PTSC was that the PTSC had no control or links with the road construction or maintenance department. It must be recalled that the CIDA study, which recommended the development of bus transportation systems within T & T also recommended the construction of a bus route replacing existing railway lines along the major east\west Corridor of T & T. The development programme of 1978 was premised on the major assumption that this route would be completed in unison with the related sub-projects of the programme, foremost of these being the acquisition of new rolling stock. It also anchored itself on the assumption that road maintenance throughout T & T, especially in the rural areas, would be guaranteed.

The rehabilitation programme which constituted the first step in the implementation of the development programme, articulated a clear schedule for the acquisition and deployment of buses, based on a further assumption of project completion dates and the availability of new road infrastructure. To implement the decentralized aspect of the programme, staff development and deployment, together with a decentralized organizational system had
to be effected, so that the new vehicles were integrated into a complete network. However, central government disregarded the PTSC's schedule for bus acquisition and instead released funding in accordance with road completion executed by the Ministry of Works.

The fact that road construction and bus transportation were not coordinated further led to the acquisition of the wrong type of rolling stock in view of the existing terrain. In the 1981 PBR Port of Spain to Arima preliminary design report the disjunction between roads and transportation was commented upon:

The present division between the Ministry of Works, Maintenance and Drainage and the Ministry of Public Utilities and National Transportation is somewhat unusual in that the provision and maintenance of roads and the PBR is separated from the control of the vehicles that use them and format the provision of bus services. Buses and roads (different ministries) have more in common than buses and harbours (same ministry). This is not to say that the present arrangement is unworkable, merely that it poses problems of coordination. (GOTT, 1981: xiv)

The third problem which stemmed from locating the programme within the PTSC was that the Corporation was one of the most inefficiently run parastatals in T & T. Unable to manage its regular affairs, how then could it implement a development intervention with the investment volume as that of the present one? Nonetheless, it was the inherent inefficiency of the PTSC, which the government hoped would be addressed in the development programme. The fact that the programme failed demonstrates the extent to which inherited patterns of inefficiency worsened.

Prior to 1979, inefficiency manifested itself in an inadequate service which was largely attributed to underdeveloped operational systems, and sporadic industrial relations problems. Only three years after coming into operation an interdepartmental committee of inquiry was commissioned to investigate the gross inadequacy of the PTSC's service. This Committee, led by Mr J.E.N. Scoon, reported on 4 November 1968, making recommendations to improve the
time scheduling of buses on specific routes. By the following year, however, attempts to improve the PTSC's service were severely set back by a prolonged sympathy strike called in support of workers at Lever Brothers.

In addition to this setback, factor cost for bus transportation increased by TT$1.5m in 1968, due to a 6 cents wage increase, a contribution of TT$503,000 for a newly-introduced pension scheme, a 100 per cent increase in the price of fuel and oil and a 53 per cent increase in the price of tyres (PTSC, 1978: 39). The year 1969 was ushered in by another strike, which resulted in a loss of 7,000 man days per month and an overall fall in revenue of TT$1m. Between 1969 to 1979 the PTSC limped on, afflicted by industrial relations crises and an inability to locate service in the heartland of demand. Cost outstripped revenue by an average of 20 per cent, a factor also explained by exceedingly low user charges (between 1967 and 1983 the corporation had only one fare increase).

The result of this situation was that the corporation lacked both the operational background and the industrial relations climate to absorb the new changes with successful outcomes, as was observed in the preface to the 1981 rehabilitation plan:

Following the purchase of 100 new buses in 1980 the total fleet of the Corporation comprised approximately 800 buses. In spite of this the daily run out by the Traffic Department never went beyond a weekly average of 260 during 1980. Buses put on the 'ready line' by the Engineering Department reached a maximum weekly average of 310 during the same period. Buses defected by the Traffic Department commonly averaged between 10 to 15% of buses put on the ready line during the year 1980 preceding the period of industrial action by the Transport and Industrial Workers Union. (PTSC, 1981: 2)

Through the questions raised in this section, it has indeed been possible to explain the failure of this programme, in terms of two critical factors: firstly, inappropriate structuring and poor locating of the ICU within the PTSC, which led to gross
inefficiency on the programme; and secondly, inappropriate structuring and location of the PTSC, within the network of public sector organizations and in relation to ministerial control, to the extent where the effectiveness value of the programme was hampered by the organization's powerlessness.

5) Did the programme implementors utilize flexible continuous planning techniques as opposed to a blueprint approach?

The assumption of the above question is rooted in the well established position (see, for example, Rondinelli, 1987 and Berman, 1980) that the blueprint approach to programme implementation results in unresponsiveness to environmental uncertainty and failure. On the other hand, a flexible model that takes into account environmental uncertainty and responds to it by continuous planning, leads ultimately to success.

In addressing this problem statement, a distinction must be made between the pre-1982 period when the rehabilitation plan was being pursued and the post-1982 period when the physical facilities construction programme was being implemented. From the available evidence, it would appear that in the period of the rehabilitation plan the implementation team did utilize a process model of planning, which took into consideration the peculiar hostility of the implementation environment and made adjustments to grapple with them. During this period, the greatest source of hostility came from the workers of the PTSC in the immediate environment of the organization. As noted earlier, industrial relations conflict had become a pathological problem at the PTSC. In this regard the first project review of the GTIE notes that:

Since October 1980 there is an Industrial Action going on, which is termed by the media as 'go-slow' and 'work-to-rule'. The latest agreement between the bargaining union representing the weekly-paid employees on one side, and the employer on the other side, terminated in December 1979. Since then, no new agreement was concluded. This situation severely affects practically all activities of PTSC in general and that of the
expatriates in particular. (GITE, 1981: 7)

Faced with this situation, there was no certainty as to how workers would respond to a radical programme to restructure the organization and its operations. It was largely due to these reasons that a rehabilitation, instead of radical construction programme, was recommended and undertaken. Furthermore, when the director of projects later joined the implementation team the rehabilitation plan was purposefully adapted to take into account and neutralize environmental conflict. The major adaptation introduced took the form of 'worker committees', through which all aspects of the plan were raised and implemented. In 1982 when the rehabilitation plan was prematurely abandoned, following the minister's intervention, projects undertaken under this plan recorded a significant degree of success being largely completed within time and projected cost. Moreover, as an indirect consequence of worker involvement in the plan, the industrial relations climate of the organization had improved markedly.

During the second period 1982 to 1987, when the physical facilities construction programme was being undertaken, the implementors found it impossible to react to environmental uncertainty. It will be recalled that the physical facilities programme called for the construction of 8 satellite bus maintenance depots and one central workshop on 9-acre parcels of land throughout T & T. The first environmental constraint which presented itself was that in 1982 only 4 of the 8 parcels of land were available to the programme for construction. In the other cases the designated land sites were unavailable, because the owner of one acreage (Endeavour) refused to sell, and in another (D'Abadie) the land identified by the PTSC for depot construction was already earmarked for an airport expansion project by another parastatal.

The implementation unit (at the time commandeered by the director of projects) took the decision to carry on with implementation on the sites available to it. However, by 1982
another environmental problem appeared - the fall in world oil prices. The PTSC was immediately informed of this situation and instructed to adjust its programme accordingly, by the end of 1982, it had responded with a much altered variant of its original plan, which addressed the exigencies of the times. In the final report of the development programme the director of projects justified his decision thus:

What was of major concern to the Corporation was its ability to prioritize its development on the basis of project packages such that coherence was maintained over the long term while minimizing in the short and medium term the economic burden which would necessarily weigh heavily on a state whose financing capabilities was eroding. In this respect the recommended development approach was at variance with the initial conceptualization fostered during the halcyon days of windfall earnings. (PTSC, 1987: 26)

The details of the newly-adjusted programme, as presented in the document 'The Development Framework' called for an operating ceiling of US$67m between 1983-1986 to bring the programme to completion, with projected annual expenditures of US$23m in 1983, US$19m in 1984, US$24m in 1985 and US$3.4m in 1986. Generally, individual depot sizes were scaled down, the central complex project at Wallerfield was deferred and the acquisition of revenue vehicles project rescheduled. More significantly, wherever possible, existing facilities were being rehabilitated instead of new construction initiated. Most of 1983 elapsed, however, without any significant work being done on the programme. This delay was brought on by the fact that the recommendations for programme adjustment were only approved by the Cabinet in October 1983. Additionally, the implementing and coordinating unit now found itself in a situation where project designs had to be redone to reflect new realities.

In 1985, the third significant modification of the programme was undertaken, as revenue flows from central government fell far below those requested by the ICU. With US$8.8m in contractual
obligations carried over from 1984, US$20.6m were requested for 1985 and US$2.2m received. This situation led to a far more radical modification described by the director of projects in his 1987 final report as:

the virtual cessation of capital works since it required reneging on some contracts, the abandonment of several projects in train, the deferment of additional projects in train, the deferment of additional projects, the non-completion of some rehabilitation works and the attendant disruption of existing maintenance operations. (PTSC, 1987: 32)

Taken together, although the three modifications of the development programme did represent an attempt to introduce flexibility into the implementation process, they came too late and only as a reaction to a crisis situation. The director of projects sums up this situation thus:

In the general adjustment to smaller budgets and increasing uncertainty over receipt of funds from the Central Government, the Corporation lost control of its Development Programme. Facilities were not built as conceived, revenue vehicles were not purchased and acquisition of plant and equipment were suspended. (PTSC, 1987: 33)

To summarize, two critical points must be made here. One is that, if continuous planning is loosely defined in terms of adaptive planning for uncertainty, then in the early days of the rehabilitation plan this was successfully done. The second point is that, in the next stage of physical facilities construction, the programme was swept along by environmental factors, which the implementation staff could only react to. It is this second factor which has reinforced the DP’s present image as a quaint mixture of incomplete and incompatible projects.
CHAPTER 6 CASE ANALYSIS - THIRD STAGE

Evaluation and Follow-up Stages

The only problem statement to be derived in Table 1, which relates to the stage of evaluation and follow-up is this one:

1) Was the evaluation integrated into the implementation process and was there any follow-up of the experts on the programme?
Attempts at in vivo monitoring were made with a great deal of effort in this programme. In particular, velocity diagrams (a system developed and used largely by West German project managers) were used in order to determine the relationship between time, cost and output on individual projects. The overall programme was monitored, however, in terms of projects completed, time and cost (projected and actual). Because of the extreme uncertainty, which characterized the implementation environment, the findings of the monitoring system could not be integrated into the implementation process to affect decision-making.

An example of the futility of trying to integrate findings from the monitoring system into the implementation process is evident in the unpredictability of a project entitled: 'Construction of Depot Workshop in Tobago'. The contract was awarded to contractor George S. Williams in 1983 and it was estimated to be completed in 9 months at a cost of US$2.7m. In actual fact the project was only completed in 1985 at a cost of US$3m and only after the client had ejected the main contractor from the site and sub-contracted remaining works to hordes of small sub-contractors.

This project is typical of the difficulties faced in attempting to make projections on cost and completion date of
projects and to integrate these predictions into an action plan for implementation. In the 1987 final report the director of projects had this to say of the problem of evaluating projects:

PTSC found itself saddled with contractors who by and large were neither organized to undertake major rehabilitation works, nor generally capable of executing the works awarded to them. Moreover, in light of the many changes requested by the Client during construction and the Corporation's inability to make sites available to the Contractors in a timely manner, the results, both in terms of completion cost and construction duration, were unpredictable. Cost and time overruns became the norm as Contractors and Consultants pointed to all of the factors beyond their control. (PTSC, 1987: 10)

With regard to the issue of follow-up from the GTZ, two points must be made here. Firstly, Arnold (1982) has noted that as a matter of policy, the GTZ does not accept TADIs which require intensive follow-up action, as they lack resident field staff. Secondly, that the GTZ left T & T in 1983, before the completion of the programme. Moreover, since it was clear to all concerned that the major aspects of the construction activity were only undertaken after the GTZ had left T & T, the object of their follow-up action could not be determined. In any event, because this intervention turned out to be an embarrassment to both the West German and the Trinidad and Tobago partners, both parties were quite keen to sweep the issue of follow-up under the rug, in order not be reminded of their failure.

From the above discussions it is clear that there was no follow-up on this programme and that the monitoring system which existed did not feed into the implementation process. However, given the volatility of the implementation environment, monitoring became impossible and in its own way contributed to goal displacement. The lack of follow-up appears to be a moot point given the fact that the programme is not yet complete.
CHAPTER 7 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The fact that 'technical assistance' had its origins in the Second World War experience of Europe meant that, even when applied to the developing world, it has always been distinguished from 'aid'. So, while the modern day manifestations of 'aid' have come to be associated with short-term crisis relief and hopelessness, 'technical assistance' has retained its positive image, being seen in terms of self-reliance and institutional capacity-building. Because of this positive image, issues of management and administration have been the concern of those with an academic or other type of interest in the topic. In recent times, both bilateral and multilateral suppliers have agreed that the importance of technical assistance remains unchallenged and that its success can only be guaranteed if the receiver countries are also prepared to pull their weight (see the statement of the 1986 bilateral/multilateral Paris conference on technical assistance in the 1986 DAC Annual Report, p.123). Developing countries have also reaffirmed the importance of technical assistance in their various development interventions and, like the supplier, have concluded that the needs of their countries must be made central to the technical assistance process, if a successful outcome is to be realized. (See for example, the 1984 affirmation of the Group of 77 on Technical Cooperation). Notwithstanding the fact that both suppliers and receivers recognize the need to deepen the involvement of the receivers in the technical assistance process, this goal is far from being realized, for the simple reason that developing countries as a whole lack the capacity and the resource endowments required of them.
Therefore, in 1978, the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago was in a most fortunate position, compared to many other developing countries. In addition to its already existing strengths (an educated population, well developed infrastructure and stable political system), it was to benefit from a massive four-fold increase in the world market price of its major export, petroleum. When, in 1978, the central government of Trinidad and Tobago undertook to negotiate a technical assistance arrangement for its transportation development programme, it was not just another Third World nation begging for a soft loan, which it would be unable to repay in any event. The case of Trinidad and Tobago ran contrary to the experience of other developing nations. It was small, democratic, rich and characterized by a well-established modern sector (perhaps parallels can be drawn with the smaller OPEC Arab countries).

In this way, the experience of Trinidad and Tobago is a test case. In 1978 it represented the type of country dreamt of by 'results oriented' foreign experts. It was the prototype held out by the literature, where almost all the prescriptions for success were present. Other developing countries, especially within the region, were looking towards this one as a model. This was an experiment in public transportation development, with foreign technical assistance, relatively simple, complemented by well-defined objectives, based on a sound problem definition, and derived by Canadian experts. Nothing ought to have gone wrong, yet everything did.

Despite the uniqueness of Trinidad and Tobago (or because of it), the failure of the transportation development programme has tremendous implications for other developing countries who are less well endowed and are also aspiring to negotiate technical assistance arrangements on behalf of their nations under conditions of equality. The case also has tremendous implications for the technical assistance literature which has offered a series of prescriptions and advanced hypothetical explanations of failure.
Since many of the conditions prescribed for success were present in the case, it is imperative that the disjunction between the expected outcome, suggested by the literature, and the actual outcome, recorded on the programme, be reconciled. Moreover, for the experience of this programme to fully contribute to both the literature and the practice of technical assistance it is necessary to focus deeply on the findings of this case and its many implications.

**Interpretation of Findings**

First, it must be stated that the frame of reference derived from the literature and employed as the basis of the case analysis has been enormously useful in capturing the peculiar dynamic of the case. Table 4 summarizes these findings and demonstrates how the performance of individual factors each contributed to the overall failure of the programme. Overall, the programme seemed to have failed because of the following five major reasons.

The central government of Trinidad and Tobago was more motivated by the political potential of the programme (as an instrument of domestic income redistribution policy and as an instrument of foreign policy with the West German government), than it was concerned with rational issues such as design feasibility and systematic determination of the need for foreign technical assistance. Thus, a hand-picked team of GTZ experts were foisted upon the unwilling Public Transport Service Corporation and the result was, that they were either obstructed or isolated by their hostile hosts. More importantly, it soon became evident that the West German experts could not meet the requirements of the job, as they had difficulty understanding the dynamics of the work environment in which they were called upon to function. Additionally, their communication skills were poor and in one exceptional, but serious and embarrassing case, it is reputed that the expert (the architect) was more concerned with exploring the
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<td>Led to failure</td>
<td>Proved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release of factor commitments</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Led to failure</td>
<td>Proved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuring and location of implementation unit</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Led to failure</td>
<td>Proved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive plans: Phase 1</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Led to success</td>
<td>Partially Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive plans: Phase 2</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Led to failure</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EVALUATION &amp; FOLLOW-UP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation in implementation process</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Led to failure</td>
<td>Proved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-up action</td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>DP Incomplete</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
potency of the locally produced libation than he was with producing designs for passenger-handling facilities, with grave consequences for the image of the West German team as a whole.

Although the government of Trinidad and Tobago did pay tremendous sums for the services of the GTZ experts the full extent of the expert's knowledge and skills were not utilized. The counterpart system failed to work, because counterparts with the skills base necessary to effect technology transfer were not made available at the time (see Table 2). Moreover, the government's concern with protecting the national interest led to the activity sphere of the experts being constrained, to the extent that they were relegated to perform as lower line functionaries (following orders and spending their time relocating garbage bins). It was, in part, nationalist sentiments that explains the display of hostility which the professional counterparts exhibited towards the experts. Additionally, because the structure of the implementing unit did nothing to foster harmonious working relations, what eventually emerged was a quaint phenomenon of two and not one implementing unit, that is, one unit headed by the director of projects and the other by the project coordinator of the GTZ. It is not at all surprising that group allegiance soon developed within the implementing teams and the potential of a partnership in development was not to be realized.

Assigning responsibility for implementing the transportation development programme to an organization such as the PTSC, which was known to be a 'low performer', before first preparing the way, was another significant factor that contributed to the failure.

Lack of coordination between the implementing unit and other governmental agencies largely led to obstruction, delays and internecine strife within the public bureaucracy over this programme. Against this background, it must be recalled, both the PTSC and the airport authorities had targeted the same parcel of land as a development site, without one knowing of the other's claim until it was too late.
While the programme appeared feasible in the height of the oil bonanza days, when first conceptualized, its feasibility became questionable in the period 1982 to 1987, when the bulk of the physical facilities construction programme came to be implemented in an economy characterized by slump. Thus the programme suffered from a lack of funds and what was manifested to be political commitment by central government soon waned. It was at this point that the programme was subject to a series of modifications, to the extent that four out of the eight proposed facilities were deferred, buses were not acquired and a new proposed organizational structure was shelved.

Qualifying Remarks

The five major reasons just discussed led to the programme's failure. A closer look at the summary of findings in Table 4 reveals two very important issues: the first one is the unexpected finding that the programme was not a complete failure, and the second is the revelation that, in some cases, prescriptions in the literature that were said to lead to success have actually resulted in failure. Both these findings qualify judgement of this case as a failure and its acceptance of the literature as useful. On the first discovery, it was revealed that the use of adaptive planning techniques, in the first phase of the programme, resulted in the implementation of a rehabilitation strategy, instead of the massive construction of new facilities. This strategy was implemented between 1979 to 1981, during which time 24 rehabilitation projects were successfully completed and the industrial relations climate of the PTSC significantly improved, due to the involvement of workers in worker implementation committees.

On the second discovery, of conditions of success actually leading to failure, this was largely due to the peculiar circumstances of the programme. For example, on the issue of political support, this paper argued that it was not lack of
political support which led to problems. Rather, it was the over-
zealous expression of this support, which led to excessive
influence by the politicians and the exclusion of the professionals
from the decision-making process. With regard to the issue of terms
of reference (TOR), whereas clear TOR were predicted by the
literature to lead to the programme's success, in this case it was
used by central government to contain the influence of the GTZ
consultants. Thus, the government had no intentions of paying for
advice they did not wish to hear. Finally, the paper also
discovered that, though the programme's design appeared feasible
at the time of formulation, a condition for success suggested by
almost all the works reviewed in the selected body of literature,
the programme nonetheless failed. This was due to the extreme case
of uncertainty and volatility which characterized the planning
environment of developing countries dependent on the export of a
single commodity. Thus, in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, the
fall in world oil prices, subsequent to the design of the
programme, rendered so many of the assumptions untenable.

Implications for Future Technical Assistance Policy

From the above discussions of findings it is clear that the
central government of Trinidad and Tobago must take responsibility
for the failure of this programme. Though political and financial
support was rendered to the programme at the time of formulation,
at the time of implementation the programme was never given the
administrative, organizational and human resource requirements
needed to achieve success. Moreover, because of the preponderance
of revenue in 1978, the central government disregarded rational
considerations and willingly adopted the programme proposal without
giving much thought to cost recovery requirements and the future
revenue earning capability of the Trinidad and Tobago state. It is
these sins of omission and commission which must be closely focused
upon, if other developing nations are not to follow this same path.
From this experience of failure, it therefore becomes possible to distil the following implications for future technical assistance interventions.

As far as possible, receivers must recognize the importance of technical assistance interventions, as a relatively uncomplicated means of building capacity and engineering development. Consequently, units with responsibility for technical assistance arrangements should not be sequestered away in a ministry of foreign affairs, but should instead be accorded a high profile and be allowed to coordinate with other critical state agencies such as the planning department. Moreover, this case also demonstrates the need to incorporate (as early as possible) representatives of the proposed implementation unit, so that their specific requirements can shape the selection process of the experts and influence the terms and conditions of the eventual contract document.

Secondly, White (1974: 186) has spoken of the costs, 'real and opportunity costs', of bad technical assistance arrangements. Developing countries, therefore, should be extremely mindful of over-zealous embassy representatives, who extol the virtues of their respective technical assistance units. The words of the West German minister for economic cooperation, Egon Bahr, quoted earlier, must be recalled. He says that '90% of technical assistance expenditure returned to Germany'. Technical assistance is not aid, it is a business arrangement and, unless receivers are systematic in their determination of the need for technical assistance and in the award of technical assistance contracts, they will be in no better position than their fellow aid receivers, as they too will be lacking in autonomy and freedom of choice.

Another critical issue raised in this case, with implications for future technical assistance programmes, is the need for a clearly identifiable head of an implementation unit. Whereas a matrix type structure may serve its purpose, particularly with regard to engineering TA, a clearly identifiable and accountable
head is necessary for steering the programme and minimizing direct political influence on a day-to-day basis. Notwithstanding the inherent nationalist sentiments of the head, this functionary should possess the type of personality necessary to mould the teams of experts and counterparts into one functional unit.

Finally, this case teaches that, in a planning environment fraught with uncertainty, a good rule of thumb for central governments to follow is to be conservative and to introduce a measure of design flexibility into the intervention that will allow for adjustment to the unexpected. It is most instructive that the only aspect of the development programme to achieve success was the rehabilitation plan, an implementation strategy which sought to prepare the way for the more far-reaching changes to come. These are but a few of the more significant findings of this case with implications for future technical assistance policy. The equally important implications for the literature are still to be explored.

**Implications for the Literature**

The first implication for the literature from the case analysis is that there appears to be an argument for re-conceptualizing technical assistance, to include the critical role that the receiving country must play, in order to ensure its success. While it might still be possible to maintain the conceptualization of technical assistance as a partnership in development, it must be recognized that it is only through the efforts of the local partner that the supplier's contributions can be translated into a positive outcome. Consequently, the literature which focuses on both the local and the foreign partner (Lethem & Cooper amongst others) should be broadened to include the works of, for example, Tandon, which focus primarily on the local partner as the key functionary in successful technical assistance interventions.

Secondly, the literature which speaks of role requirements of both counterparts and experts (Letham & Cooper, 1983) has made a
significant contribution towards explaining failure in this and other technical assistance interventions. However, as was revealed in the case study, it is not enough to focus on the nature of the intervention and the expected role requirements. If both the behavioural and normative facets of the literature are to be developed, then the focus on role requirements needs to be complemented by what Paul (1982) refers to as the 'strategic management' issue, that is to say, how to manage for optimal outputs. It is this point of focus that is best capable of revealing what went wrong and will allow one to offer recommendations for improving future technical assistance undertakings.

Thirdly, although the literature suggests that commitment from central government is a condition for success (a view held by Waterston, 1965, and other early researchers into planning problems in the developing world), in this case the overlap between political commitment and interference contributed to the programme's failure.

This seems to suggest the need to reinterpret what is meant by commitment again, taking into consideration the insights offered by Paul (1982). For Paul, 'political commitment' is a precondition for success but it is also 'the degree of flexibility given by the government to a programme leader in evolving his strategy...' (Paul, 1982: 233). In short, this understanding of commitment will also take into consideration management issues such as accountability, while at the same time paying attention to politics.

Finally, the fact that non-rational considerations so obviously affected the decision-making on this programme leads this paper to suggest that the behavioural literature on technical assistance should be broadened to incorporate the political considerations that appear to affect these and other development interventions. Recognizing this fact, Grindle et al. (1985) have recommended that the literature should now be taken in the direction where both the influence of politics on decision-making
and the policy space available to policy-makers are considered as part of the process of understanding development assistance intervention.

Conclusions

The case of the Public Transportation Development Programme in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago has raised issues of relevance both at the level of the literature and at the level of the practice. It has demonstrated that, while the literature might be useful for understanding what went wrong on this programme, there is still a case to be made for the further expansion and re-focusing of some issues. The case has further shown that there is much to be done at the level of practice, if other developing countries are to be spared a similar experience of failure. It is interesting to note, however, that the discussion on the development of both the literature and the practice of technical assistance converge at the point where the suggestion was made that technical assistance should be seen as 'a partnership in development', in which the receiver country has a far more critical role to play in ensuring the achievement of successful outcomes. It is the contention of this paper that, if pursued, this approach could lead to the development of a much needed theory of foreign technical assistance, that adequately merges the need to make prescriptions with the dynamics of empirical reality. Ideally, this theory should begin with the receiver. It should explore the receiver's needs, its endowments and its decision-making capabilities and orientation.
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APPENDIX I

Land Use Patterns in Trinidad and Tobago
### APPENDIX II

#### Classification of Literature Reviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus on Supplier</th>
<th>Focus on Receiver</th>
<th>Focus on Both</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Role of the expert</td>
<td>Sins of omission</td>
<td>BMZ (1985 &amp; 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster study in MacBean (1970)</td>
<td>Bhardari &amp;</td>
<td>Lethem &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loxley (1973)</td>
<td>Cooper (1983)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Focus on structure
  - Jackson report (1969)
  - van Ufford et al. (1988)

- Focus on process
  - Rondinelli (1987)
  - Silverman (1984)
APPENDIX III

Memorandum of Understanding

The Government of..........................

and

the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany,
on the basis of the friendly relations existing between the two
States and their peoples,

considering their common interest in promoting the economic and
social progress of their States and peoples, and

desiring to intensify their relations through technical cooperation
in a spirit of partnership,

have agreed as follows:

Article 1

(1) The Contracting Parties shall co-operate with a view to
furthering the economic and social development of their peoples.

(2) The present Agreement embodies the basic conditions for
technical co-operation between the Contracting Parties. The
Contracting Parties may conclude supplementary arrangements
regarding individual projects of technical co-operation (here-
inafter referred to as 'project arrangements'). Each Contracting
Party shall be responsible for projects of technical co-operation
in its own country. Project arrangements shall define a joint
project concept, specifying in particular the project objective,
the contributions to be made by the Contracting Parties, the
functions and organizational positions of the participants, and the
time schedule.
Article 4

(2) The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shall ensure that, before an expert is seconded, the consent of the Government of ..................... is obtained. The co-operating agency shall forward the curriculum vitae of the expert selected by it to the Government of ..................... together with a request for consent to his secondment.

(3) If the Government of ..................... wishes a seconded expert to be recalled, it shall in good time contact the co-operating agency and give the reason for its request, it shall also inform the relevant German foreign mission. Similarly, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shall, when a seconded expert is to be recalled by the German side, ensure that the Government of ..................... is informed thereof at the earliest possible date.

(Reproduced from Original Document dated 11 June 1979)
APPENDIX IV

Relationship of the Implementing and Coordinating Unit to the Public Transport Service Corporation (PTSC)

Chairman & Board PTSC

Corporate Secretary

(ICU)
Implementing & Coordinating unit

Countersparts

Experts

General Manager

Director Projects

Architect

Project Coordinator

Architect

Maint. Engineer

Maint. Engineer

Deputy Gen. Manager

Other Staff

Other Staff

Public Relations

Planning Dept.

Internal Audit

Engineering Dept.

Traffic Dept.

Personnel

Accounts

Security

Bus. Maint. Units

Traffic North & South

Records

Stores

Industrial Relations

General

Building & Maint. of Structures

Traffic, Tobago and East

Training

Force

Force Personnel
APPENDIX V
Network of Organizational Relationships Demonstrating Lack of Autonomy of the PTSC

Prime Minister

SASC  Min. Transport  Min. F. Affairs  German. Emb.

Chairman & Board
PTSC

Implementing & Coordinating unit

General Manager

Director Projects  Project Coordinator
Architect  Architect

Maint. Engineer  Maint. Engineer

Deputy Gen. Mngr.

Other Staff  Other Staff

Public Relations  Planning Dept.  Internal Audit


-Bus Maint. Units
-Building & Maint. of Structures

-Traffic North & South
-Traffic, Tobago & East

-Records
-Industrial Relations
-Training

-Stores
-General
-Force
APPENDIX VI

Significant Dates in the Life of the Development Programme

1965     PTSC came into existence as a public corporation under Act No. 11 of 1965.
1975     CIDA report submitted to Inter-Ministerial Committee.


Oct. 1978 Cabinet agree to award contract to GTZ.

Nov. 1978 Development Programme adopted by central Gov't.

May 1979 First GTZ team complete and submit report of appraisal to Cabinet.

June 1979 Memorandum of Understanding signed.

Feb. 1980 Negotiations concluded on extension of GTZ contracts to include second phase of contract.

Mar.-Aug. The first nine GTZ experts arrive.

1980

May 1981 The first counterpart (director of projects) arrive.


1982-87 Implementation of construction programme.