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POLICY ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
An agenda for education and research

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CONTENTS

Table of contents i
Foreword ii

PART ONE
1. Introduction and overview 1
2. Development studies’ normative and policy concerns 3
3. Problems in policy analysis 7
   3.1. Limits of formal techniques for instrumental assessment 7
   3.2. Problems in wider policy discourse 8
   3.3. Weaknesses in the treatment of normative values 11
   3.4. Gaps in methodology 13

PART TWO
4. Requirements of policy analysis 15
   4.1. Meanings and appropriate scope 15
   4.2. Discussion agenda for policy analysis education & research 16
   4.3. Review of the argument so far 19
5. Disciplinary scope 20
   5.1. Politics, economics, behavioural sciences, ...
   5.2. ..... and philosophy 21

PART THREE
6. Insights from social philosophy and the history of ideas 23
   6.1. Critique of utilitarianism 23
   6.2. Critique of positivism 27
7. Some further directions 30
   7.1. The positive study of human values 30
   7.2. The positive study of planning 31
   7.3. Understanding policy argumentation 32

PART FOUR
8. Developing the curriculum 35
   8.1. Approaches to policy studies education 35
   8.2. Addition and selection of topics 37
9. Conclusion 39

Notes 42
References 47

Fig. 1: Some past emphases in development studies & practice 5
Fig. 2: Required components in policy studies 17
Fig. 3: Some areas in development studies research and training 19
Fig. 4: Sketch of the real world of appraisal & evaluation 31

Box 1: The "efficiency/equity" view of policy 10
Box 2: Essentialism in policy evaluation 11
Box 3: Normative criteria of distribution 25
Box 4: Fischer's model of the levels of policy evaluation 29
Box 5: Some formats for analyzing policy arguments 34

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Foreword

When beginning work as a research student and looking at some development policy debates, I felt a need for tools that could clarify the structure of the arguments and the nature of the values being used. How did the conclusions derive from the explicit inputs? Often the sources of differences in conclusion were unclear: were they differences in evidence, or in the concepts or techniques used, or in values, or in the overall structuring and management of the argument? Despite much of my university studies having been on policies and planning, they had not provided the tools I required. Welfare economics and a large dose of cost–benefit analysis were probably the most relevant material I had encountered; but these raised more questions than they answered. Even ex-post programme evaluation had not yet penetrated graduate training in development planning. I began looking for concepts and methods.

Gradually (indeed rather too gradually, since I had trained and was working as an economist) I became familiar with the emerging fields of "policy analysis", which had entered a phase of rapid growth in the 70s and have been partly consolidated in the 80s. Just as important, I was influenced by successive jobs. In Botswana and Malawi I learnt something about public sector organizations and decision-making, about how policy arguments and claims for resources are built up and accepted or rejected, how techniques are used and misused. In Britain, The Netherlands and Zimbabwe, working in multi-disciplinary teaching groups, I have thought about education for development policy and planning, and what materials one could add to economics (or any other single discipline) to adequately handle this policy and planning orientation. A Ph.D. thesis was the eventual outcome of these questions, lines of reading, and work experiences.

Since I completed the thesis, I have been preoccupied with other work; but I feel that it remains relevant. The present paper is based on its first and last chapters, together with some other material and updating. I wrote it for a presentation to postgraduate students in development studies at the University of Glasgow, in December 1990, and revised it in 1992. I hope it will be useful to colleagues and students who feel similar questions, as presenting one view of some of the important issues, ideas and literature for policy analysis. Let me add that the audience for studying policy analysis covers not only people in, or aspiring to directly contribute to, public decision-making; it includes those at the receiving-end of policies, and who may wish to understand, criticize or oppose them.

Lightly put, the argument comes in four parts. First, some bad news: policy analysis in development studies has had serious flaws, in several respects. Second, some good news: a range of relevant work exists to help us improve on the weaknesses. Thirdly, more bad news: the relevant work leads us into a very large set of areas and complexities. Fourthly, further good news: we can make progress in identifying and sifting out certain key bodies of analysis which are powerful, helpful, and that can feasibly be introduced to a useful extent despite the many constraints in education and training.

The level at which I will comment is that of the curriculum developer who has to consider principles for a curriculum that should cover a range of areas, and has to critically draw upon surveys of research in those areas. We should distinguish at least the following levels: (a) research on a narrow topic; (b) critical review of such
research across a whole area; (c) development of principles and broad themes for curriculum covering several such areas; (d) application of the principles, in definite curricula and teaching materials; and (e) actual training and education, which itself must be further broken down, e.g. into teacher training and student training. Choices in levels (d) and (e) must depend on trainees' particular backgrounds, roles, abilities, available time and so on. The commentary in this paper is instead at levels (b) and (c): very broad review of some relevant research areas (largely drawing on other people's surveys, but sometimes on my own), and discussion of principles for curriculum. The paper is not itself written as a teaching text.

I should underline that the discussion will be at level (b), reviews of research, as well as at level (c), themes for curriculum. The latter cannot be done without the former. Much of the paper surveys certain major issues and problems in policy analysis and evaluation, taken from both theory and practice. And in doing so, it jointly introduces questions and some current work that I consider useful in responding to the questions. This will be seen especially in Part 3 and in the text boxes. (The boxes contain detailed examples that have not been left as appendices, where their contribution to the presentation would be lost, but which can easily, if preferred, be skimmed or skipped or read later.) In Part 4, I then give illustrative suggestions about curricula, but purely in an indicative way, not as hard conclusions. I try there to indicate the sort of way that the research issues and approaches we have reviewed (i.e. level b) and the general principles for curriculum (i.e. level c) could be applied at the level of practical choices about course design. In other words, the final parts of the paper show the applicability in education of what is covered earlier, without trying to define a single blueprint that must be applied.

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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

In the typical social science publication, elaborate efforts are made to establish a causal relationship among some variables ... The discussion of the data and methods of investigation are careful and restrained. The current investigation is placed in the context of other theories and findings... Once the author has painstakingly established the existence (or nonexistence) of a relationship, however, he or she turns to the 'policy implications' of the finding. At this moment all the caution that characterized the analysis is often abandoned as the author rushes toward conditionally prescriptive propositions at a pace that would make a serious policy analyst blush. (M.H. Moore, 1983:278.) [1]

[In] my experience over the last 40 years... I found, as have many others, that in the last generation, many young economists, fresh out of the university, are ill-equipped to confront the economic problems of the real world. The brighter of these, if they wish to be effective, learn to discard as useless or misleading much of what they have been rewarded in the university for learning. (Kamarck, 1983:vii.)

I suggest that Moore's typical social scientists, who can make fools of themselves when they come to draw policy implications, and Kamarck's ill-equipped young economists, both need to add and not just discard some things in their training.

Part One of the paper, notably Sections 2 and 3, describes the problem area. Section 2 indicates a prevalence of evaluative and prescriptive activities in "development studies"—such that many of us pass much of our lives reading diagnoses of social "problems" and recommendations for action—and why this is not an accident. It sketches development studies as a frequently moralizing generalizing policy field, yet one rather poorly equipped or qualified for such purposes.

Section 3 considers common problems in development policy analysis, which are in general not special to it but instead perennial in policy analysis, and often reflect inattention to required elements. Subsection 3.1. notes limits of the formal techniques for appraisal and evaluation at programme and project levels: for they typically presume that goals can be stated in clear and consensual ways, as if the actors were uniform and lacked their own perspectives and interests; in practice the techniques provide numerous opportunities for these different viewpoints to exert influence. 3.2. illustrates four widespread and problematic patterns in assessment at policy- and strategy-levels: utopianism; over-eclecticism; misuse of the term "efficiency", typically in a way to further the interests of the economically powerful and to downgrade so-called "equity-objectives"; and "essentialism", the treatment of things as inherently appropriate or inappropriate. 3.3. identifies further some of the failings in development studies in handling values: too often casual, absent or (as a result) surreptitious, like in much social science, reflecting positivist and other notions that value analysis is unnecessary or impossible. This weakness is part of a longstanding wider deficiency in methodology when social scientists have turned from description and explanation, and tried to evaluate and predict (3.4). Welfare economics in particular combines technical sophistication with extreme methodological obscurity. However, especially since the 1970s, new work in ethics and political philosophy, psychological economics, logic, and other fields indicates avenues for improvement.

What are some of the skills, understandings, and tools for more literate policy
argument? In Part Two, Section 4 turns to recent appraisals of the nature and requirements of policy analysis (PA) in general, and offers a broad diagnosis and proposal. By probing the limitations of conventional rational-decision approaches, the appraisals give a set of areas to which PA must pay attention, in theory, practice, and education, including: (i) the methodology and logic of normative and practical argumentation, (ii) conceptions of "man", and of what constitute human flourishing and desirable "development", and (iii) the practice of planning and PA itself. These areas have long remained relatively neglected, as difficult, controversial, or embarrassing.

Section 5, which is optional, correspondingly discusses disciplinary scope and interdisciplinary relations in PA. Economics, with its focus on choice, has dominated mainstream PA; but is itself dominated by inadequate utilitarian models of human values and well-being, and of human agency and rationality. We need the more realistically and broadly grounded behavioural and political sciences, to educate economics; and we need some philosophy, for better handling of values and practical arguments (especially their beginnings and endings).

Part Three examines in more detail some aspects of the diagnosis (especially in Section 6) and of the proposed research and training priorities (esp. in Section 7). Section 6 illustrates the work of philosophy in clarifying values, and the profound, and partly deleterious, influences of utilitarianism and positivism on much policy analysis. 6.1. takes up in particular the utilitarian view of what is an appropriate resource allocation, which underlies most cost-benefit analysis. It illustrates the systematic deconstruction of normative economics that is underway, led by Sen, and its rebuilding into something non-economic. The work has a clarity and order that is persuading many economists too. Then, having seen examples of making better rather than worse value-judgements, 6.2. considers some of the fears, confusions, and evasions generated by positivist claims that valuations are purely matters of emotion. It introduces a more refined, post-positivist, view of normative argument and some of its areas.

This critique leads to a number of lines of work. Section 7 presents some for the three subjects highlighted in Section 4. 7.1. asks how more systematic positive study of objectives and human needs can be taught and studied in a way that matches the intellectual allure of economicist approaches. 7.2. sketches the real world of appraisal and evaluation that must be examined besides the bloodless textbook stories. 7.3. marks recent studies of how normative, positive, and methodological claims are organized in policy argumentation, and of the tactics through which policy positions are constructed and defended; these studies give a framework for raising all our other issues.

Finally, Part Four looks at options and limits in education. Section 8 returns to the relations between disciplines, by considering the associated views on policy studies education; and supports a citizen-orientation, in which economic and other "optimizing" techniques are subordinate to, and guided by, perspectives from politics, philosophy, and behavioural sciences; to try to combine rigour with relevance and principle. 8.2. discusses possible priorities in education, and reviews which areas I suggest can usefully be added to curricula in development policy analysis. Section 9 concludes by looking at what we can achieve within the constraints set by disciplinary pressures, curriculum capacity, and the politics of education. There is room for improvement.

Sections 4, 8 and 9, which identify necessary areas in policy analysis and priorities in education, might be the most central for a general reader; but no doubt each reader will have his or her own lines of interest.
2. DEVELOPMENT STUDIES' NORMATIVE AND POLICY CONCERNS

We should speak of "development studies" (DS) in the plural. Many modes of study at various levels are involved, shading into and crosscutting other fields. For our purposes here we can make an incomplete list of types.

First are studies on the meaning of "development". [1 - Note 1 clarifies central terms, including "development", "normative", "evaluation", "value", and "policy".] Some authors offer positive interpretations (A1), and others give normative ones (A2). Examples of positive interpretations are the extension of the world market or of "higher" relations of production or of off-farm employment share. Berger (1977) suggests though a division between "growth" (economic), "modernization" (i.e. institutional and cultural accompaniments of growth), and a normative concept of "development" (i.e. desirable growth and modernization). Normative interpretations include for example views of development as the increase of "welfare", or of freedoms and choice. Hettne (1990) provides a map of development theories, including a positive-normative dimension, and observes that it is desirable there be both types of theory. Accordingly we need both positive and normative tools.

Normative theories of value (B) are the source of the normative interpretations of "development" (A2), and of the normative criteria used in policy analysis. For example views on basic human "needs" and what are appropriate (or "human") mouldings of human nature. Kitching notes that: "the issues with which 'development studies' deals are some of the great issues (of justice, of equality and inequality, of the nature of the 'good' life) with which human beings have been preoccupied since the days of Plato and Aristotle" (1982:viii).

A third category of study is (C), positive analysis of development processes. This covers of course very many types. On examination, many of these studies too are partly moulded by concerns for prescribing for the future.

Fourth, drawing on both positive and normative theories, are attempts to assess particular situations (D) or measures (E). These latter can range from a road project to an entire aid programme or institutional type, say collectives or marketing cooperatives. The assessments may claim to be purely instrumental, i.e. to use clear exogenously-given criteria. But typically, criteria in practice are vaguer and partially emerge in the course of analysis. This is so usual, especially at broader policy level, that we might indicate a further sub-zone: policy debate. Material and social conditions influence these debates, but the arguments are important in their own right: ideas do not arise completely formed and fixed; they need to be articulated and worked out, and they compete and change.

These last areas -- the attempted application of evaluative criteria, and policy debate -- bulk large in development studies. (Is it coincidental that so many welfare economists have also worked in development economics? - e.g. Little, Mirrlees, Myint, Myrdal, Nath, Sen, Scitovsky, Streeten.) So, paralleling the attempts to diagnose doctrinal distinctiveness in DS (e.g. some authors proposed structuralism or populism), we can ask about possible methodological distinctiveness.

The high frequency of normative concerns in DS can be seen in the contents of university courses and of journals, textbooks and monographs. From the late 1960s there was also a spate of advances in project analysis and evaluation research: in publications and the operation of policy units, evaluation units and compulsory routines of assessment.
Here I want to probe not the exact relative frequencies of this normative work, but the possible qualitative significance, and also the moulding of other work by normative interests. A historical perspective will be helpful.

"Development studies" was born as part of the "Discovery of the Third World" (Sachs, 1976) that emerged from being a colonial hinterland peopled with "natives". The late colonial and post-colonial era was marked by a self-confident "North", divided by "the gap" from a newly perceived "South" that was seen as problematic. The world context included the extension of planning and of performance ethics: the once partly attractive example of Communist states; market failures and changing political balances in Western states; growing non-market allocation, of public goods and within giant organizations, and the action of these organizations in influencing as well as adapting to their environments.

Development studies' emphasis on evaluation and prescription partly reflected nationalist and Cold War impatience, and metropolitan assurance that LDCs can and must be drastically improved, in more or less known directions. The metropoli involved have been those of the South as well as the North. DS substantially arose as servant (or critic) of governments and aid agencies; the two have been especially prominent in the South, due to discontent with, and the relative weakness of, other forces.

Different development theories differed on the requirements of bridging the "gap", but they commonly shared a structure that involved first asking: what's wrong / going wrong in an LDC? and what's going right in a developed or fast developing country? And then: what should we/ you/ policy makers do to move from one to the other? Formulation and concepts were thus linked to evaluation and prescription. The confidence of this stance reflected the size of "the gap" that had been opened by generations of Western growth, further highlighted by the accelerated promoted Northern growth of recent decades, and that is now perceived in all the centres of today's "one world" of rapid communication of ideas and expectations.

The assurance and prescriptivism also reflect a judging for others who are widely separated from the judge. It is probably easier to make value judgements, often implicitly, for those far away, in space or in type of life. One is undisturbed by knowledge of the varied conditions, values and interests of "those people". Unitariness and corporateness may be presumed, in speaking of what "they" do, and what "the country" needs.

Strong policy concerns were often not matched by political sophistication. With policymakers or advisers conceived as standing outside a society, itself viewed rather unitarily and held to have a manifest general interest, namely "development", there comes a technocratic notion of policy as pursuing the requirements of "development", a goal that is assumed to override all division. "Political development" was sometimes viewed as one means to be promoted in pursuit of this prime apolitical goal. Little attention was given in DS before the 1970s (unlike in development politics) to the valuative content of "development". It has also been claimed from both Right and Left that the typical DS presumption was that without State intervention there will be little development: an interventionist bias, labelled "the dirigiste dogma" by Lal (1983).

Besides technocratic and interventionist leanings, one can note thrusts toward comprehensiveness and generalization. Apthorpe (1972/3) spoke of the rise of a "New Generalism". A stress on the inter-relation and significance for development of all
aspects of life -- production, consumption, distribution, attitudes, education, etc. -- brings a concern to evaluate every feature and every effect, and to improve them all. 1970s style "Integrated Rural Development" was one example. These features can be sensed already in notions like "social obstacles" or "political development". They link to DS's social engineering aspect, its sense of urgency and original relative self-assurance.

The thrust to seek prescriptive generalizations links to "the main characteristics of the [dominant] macro-economic planning approach -- centralized design, standard package, top-down administration", and so on (Hunter, 1982:45). A further factor was the wish of international financing agencies to have general models to apply.

Figure 1 links some of these features in development studies and practice; the arrows suggest directions of influence. The sketch of DS as a frequently moralizing generalizing policy discipline provides a menu for discussion, and digestion. "Development" in the figure means "intervention". Its links to policy administered for others, a sense of urgency, and concerns with need and distribution, are clear. Harriss (1982:15) even tried to stipulate "rural development" as a practice defined by distributive concerns. Also clear are the presence of international aid, and its requirements for demonstrative "performance"; Bauer (1981) amongst others asserted that there is an umbilical link between development economics and foreign aid. Aid organizations' requirements influenced both the genesis of formal appraisal and evaluation procedures, and their frequently ritualistic use (e.g. applied to fully designed projects already approved in principle; Tendler, 1975; Gasper, 1987a). Other factors tended to concentrate aid flows on rural development and on infrastructure (Healey & Clift, 1980). Finally, proneness to generalize, especially prescriptively, reflects feelings of urgency, and the natures of international aid, bureaucracies, and talking about others.

**FIGURE 1: Some past emphases in development studies & practice**

![Diagram showing the relationships between various development aspects and practices.]

While DS's concerns are often normative and practical, this still calls for a good grounding in description and explanation. According to Horesh:

the preoccupations of the leaders of the 'development' profession, in their role of experts [have] led to an over-emphasis in teaching and research on policy recommendation rather than empirical work and conceptual analysis, which
should properly include studies of the policy decisions of those in power. The

cost of this bias to the profession has been a tradition of un-rigorous concepts
and analytical methods. (Horesh, 1981:615.)

In largely agreeing with Horesh, I will emphasize the importance of empirical work
also on the nature of values, valuation, and planning processes, and the development of
more rigorous concepts and methods for policy argument, not just for pure explanation.

Horesh highlighted Dudley Seers's disillusion with the role of "high-level technical
assistance" and visiting expert; but Seers's own recommendation was not for academic
withdrawal. There are foreseeable limits to pure social science (important though it is),
both intellectually and due to its academic and disciplinary distortions; and there are
other valid and important professional roles. Much policy analytic work will exist to be
done and will be done, regardless of whether its practitioners saw themselves as part of
the same profession as, say, Horesh. Seers (1983) stressed the importance of, for
example, each LDC having its own "economic general staff": who should be not just
disciplinary specialists but instead able to respond to the demands of unfolding practical
issues. Kamarck (1983) in a similar end-of-career retrospective made parallel suggestions
on skill requirements for development economists. [2]

The question here is: to what sorts of materials, concepts, methods and issues should
actual or prospective "general staff", and similar practitioners and policy advisers, be
exposed? And their teachers and counsellors? There may be some disciplinary bias left
in even the end-career economists whom we just cited, though economists will indeed
be prominent in general policy analytic work. Streiten's call was wider:

[We need] an appropriate intellectual technology that is rigorous within the
bounds permitted by the subject [i.e.] a unification of the formal and
informal intellectual sectors, ... multidisciplinary work at the deepest
level...[and] strengthening [of] the historical dimension, so that we understand
how things came to be what they are... (1983:22).

What is required is more than the blend in the typical development studies text, of
which I take Kirkpatrick, Lee & Nixon (1984) as an honourable example. After several
chapters of general survey on industrialization in LDCs, they concluded that situations
are too variable to allow very much generalization; so situational analyses and case studies
are called for. But they did not provide them. Students need more on the arts and
techniques of selection, application and synthesis involved in such work. The final
chapter, on policies, offers a checklist of possible policies with some pros and cons, to
be combined with decisionmakers' objectives in any given case. This is better than
overgeneralized prescription, but is insufficient even when the objectives are clearcut
(which they frequently are not). While Kirkpatrick et al tackled the gap between
industrial and development economics, the gap between economics and politics-plus-
philosophy remained. [3]

Students and practitioners would benefit from more on the methods and flavour of
practical argument, including in the handling of values. Rather than only receiving a
combination of often questionable (and questionably) positive generalizations, or even
helpful checklists, and an instruction to feed in exogenous goals, they need more policy
analysis methodology, plus more cases with the methodology at work. In studying cases,
with a view to policy, economics will be be more clearly insufficient, and gap-crossing
will be less avoidable.
3. PROBLEMS IN POLICY ANALYSIS

Having introduced development studies' policy preoccupations, this section moves on to weaknesses in policy analysis in DS and more widely. It puts the problems into this wider perspective because DS is not a backward problem-child amongst the social sciences. Its weaknesses mirror more common ones. [1] The emphasis in the section is on raising questions, not on the exact frequency of each problem, and without necessarily fully accepting every criticism that is cited.

3.1. Limits of formal techniques for instrumental assessment

Reading the evaluation manuals and reports on evaluations undertaken in all sorts of countries, one is struck by the utter lack of awareness of most authors of how conditional are the methodologies and conclusions peddled. SCBA...and related methodologies, [concepts] and data are treated as if they possessed cross-cultural generality, as if they were politically and ideologically neutral and theoretically unambiguous. (Elzinga, 1982:5.)

Ad-hoc-ery in evaluation as a whole has been reduced at project and programme levels in the past generation by the spread of formalized assessment approaches such as social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA). This followed the loss of faith in simple supposed paths to economic growth or in growth itself as the sure road to all values. Also influential was the earlier assessment boom in DCs, matching a similar increase in public expenditures and a similar experience of puzzles and controversies. The techniques applied in LDCs have been the same, and likewise the problems experienced.

Attempts at instrumental evaluation -- i.e. specifying and applying given objectives -- have run into "the goals trap" (Deutscher, 1976) and the "Goals Clarification Game" (Patton, 1986). Agencies are not just instruments towards clear and given purposes: "Whatever activities are carried out tend to become synonymous with objectives" (Nay, 1976); "Goal language is ideological - its function is to gain support", both inside and outside an organization (Schaffer, 1973); and the goals stated in poorly understood and changing environments are likely in any case to be vague and ambiguous.

Secondly, in assessment using the selected or given criteria, much disappointment is on record over the performance of available techniques. [2] Wilson's two "Laws of Evaluation" exaggerate but do not jest. The First Law says all programmes are found to produce the desired effects - at least when one accepts an agency's own data and own formulation of the evaluation question; while the Second Law states that no programmes are found to produce the desired effects - at least when data is gathered independently of the agency, etc. ! (Gasper, 1987a, has a fuller discussion.)

Thirdly, the research on utilization of assessments indicated a level of use far below expectations, especially for ex-post evaluations, where there have been analyses of a "crisis of non-utilization" (e.g. Rondinelli, 1976, on aid evaluations); and the research on reliability of assessments indicated important variations between studies, and limited consensus on the sources of differences. [3] World Bank reviews of their projects showed wide variations between ex-ante, ex-post and audit estimates, but with a significant positive bias in general in the earlier appraisals.

SCBA has been more prominent in these ex-ante appraisals, where utilization may also be easier. Criticisms have been levelled at its whole approach: as a dubious
substitute for general equilibrium analysis; as biased in practice to monetary variables; as disguising — underneath nominal provision for qualifications to market power, and a presentation of choice as by a rational benevolent State — a practice that is class-biased and legitimates ruling elites (Lall, 1976; Stewart, 1975). Even within the approach, CBA studies "incorporate an enormous amount of judgement and intuition on the part of the evaluator" (Stewart, 1978:158).

This scope for evaluator judgement implies a need to consider the sociology of evaluation, and the real world of the "tradesman" planner. Stewart indicated how sensitive results are, not so much to the differences from one method to another but instead to often inexplicit choices of framing assumptions, e.g. the types of alternative that are considered. Yet despite planners' self-definition in terms of the analysis of alternatives, one theme in literature reviewing the use of methods is the very thin consideration of alternatives. Generating alternatives may be less congenial than sophisticated analyses along familiar disciplinary lines; or may be inhibited by set-ups which only bring in socio-economic assessment after the project concept has been settled by engineers, agriculturalists, politicians, or whoever. To understand the actual practice of assessment one must thus look at disciplinary orientations and the politics and organization of planning, matters that are little covered in most training. Training here needs more real-world reference before yet more technique. (Section 7.2. below.)

Section 4.2 will extend our diagnosis of these problems with formal assessment techniques, after we have looked at problems in other areas.

3.2. Problems in wider policy discourse

Coming to policy and strategy levels, the assessment problems are greater but methodologies weaker. The assessment can be informed but not replaced by project- and programme-level assessments or planning models, for those themselves must be guided by various strategic, theoretical and valuative considerations (Little & Mirrlees, 1974, Ch.VI). Yet training at these higher levels is often slight. One becomes used to encountering assessments that differ, without clarity on the sources of difference.

This sub-section briefly notes four very common but questionable patterns or formats in higher-level policy discourse: Utopianism, over-eclecticism, efficiency/equity, and "essentialism". None of the syndromes is peculiar to development studies, and they can be found in all political camps.

Utopian ruling—out of possible problems is well-known and needs no more discussion here. [4] The "fallacy of eclecticism" was marked by Griffin (1973): various policies, each successful in one or other political, ecological, etc. setting, are collected and proposed as being of general and joint appropriateness. Reformist strategies are especially liable to this, since they are often associated with coalitions and a correspondingly vague eclectic ideology. They then promise the bits that are liked from otherwise rejected policy models. We can note another type of eclecticism: the casual use of vague and supposedly consensual values, such as equality, utility, or liberty, without their clarification and interrelation into a tolerably consistent system.

"Efficiency" is a modern god, the criterion that is often treated as if it settles all policy arguments, and trumps all "other" considerations, such as "equity". "Essentialism" in the context of evaluation is treatment of things as inherently appropriate or inappropriate. The misuse of language in these two cases is pervasive and important, but
quite technically complex; we introduce them in Boxes 1 and 2. Both involve failings in the analysis of values.

3.3. Weaknesses in the treatment of normative values

Development economics...has never had any of the pretensions to 'purity' that high economic theory has had. Being a primarily applied and policy-oriented subject it has intermingled 'ought' and 'is' rather freely, without devoting too much thought to the premises on which its analyses and prescriptions were based. (Lall, 1976:182)

The valutative content of "development" has been too little examined, argued Goulet, who is now dubbed the founder of "development ethics" as a subject (Crocker, 1991). Policy abhors a value-vacuum. So one finds the surreptitious entry of value-judgements, not just in ad hoc or informal evaluations but in newer formal approaches too, since they still neglect their valutative content. Elsewhere, argument often moves without pause or distinction, let alone explanation, from supposedly value-free description and analysis, on to normative assessments and proposals. Often these are generalized recommendations that lack reference to which and whose values are being applied and how. (Test some textbooks! [8])

One finds presumptions of social unity, or of the absolute moral significance of national frontiers, or of the moral authority of effective demand; and so on, in an ad hoc way according to habit or convenience. The surreptitious judgements are commonly from variants of utilitarianism. We saw aspects of this in Section 2: the administration of welfare for and unto others. Also widespread are misconceptions such as that self-interest is neutral or necessarily unobjectionable (so that e.g. "one cannot blame a country for pursuing its interests"), or that development ethics is identical with altruism, so that development ethics means aid and redistribution. In fact a number of ethical theories reject redistribution. [9]

Deepak Lal attacked the famous 1970s studies "Redistribution with Growth" and ILO's "Employment, Growth and Basic Needs" as having "ethical preconceptions underlying [them that] are particularly shallow" (1976:737). Such criticism became popular in the 1980s, claiming that concerns with equality often rest on the flawed basis of envy. Others suggested that DS has involved a moral fallacy by being both transnational and prescriptive (Dore, 1978). [10]

It is true that equality has been an underanalysed value. Rein (1976) argued that contemporary commitments to equality draw incoherently on many different value theories. This neglect can however lead to underweighting of concern, as well as the now widely proposed overvaluing. It can leave the door open for crude anti-egalitarian positions (like those of Lal and Bauer) which are at least forceful and see the need for argument and theory. (Gasper, 1986a; Riddell, 1985, 1987.)

Many Marxists and others believe that values to be obvious or worth little attention: because, allegedly, they are arbitrary opinions and preferences (which are supposedly clear, consistent and very extensive); or are purely reflections of "interests" (again supposedly clear and comprehensive), so that all talk of wider principles is pointless; or because anything that refers to evidence and can be fruitfully argued about cannot, by fiat-definition, be "ethics". Or it may be held that variations in values would make
BOX 1: THE "EFFICIENCY"/"EQUITY" VIEW OF POLICY

Analysis in "efficiency"/"equity" terms often makes the following errors:

(a) An over-generalized presumption of important trade-offs between "efficiency" goals and "equity" goals. The 1980 World Development Report is one presentation of how the two types of goal are in fact quite often positively related. [5]

(b) More fundamentally, the underlying conception of "efficiency" goals is misplaced: they are seen as purely economic goals, notably as present and future production; in contrast to "equity" goals, which are seen as "social", i.e. concerning distribution and "non-productive" activities.

Some aspects of this second error should be highlighted.

1. The term "efficiency" is a concept that has meaning only in the context of an agreed set of objectives" (World Bank, 1983:41), which can certainly include "equity" and distribution objectives; therefore we cannot in general logically speak of "occasions when the goals of efficiency and distribution conflict" (ibid.:43 !). If one limits the scope of "efficiency" to an "economic" subset of objectives, then the restriction must be specified, and one must refer only to "economic efficiency" not to "efficiency" in general.

2. Even with respect to an "economic" subset of objectives, "economic efficiency" is not an apolitical criterion. [6]

3. Highlighting of commodity production is partly justifiable if economic capacity is transformable into anything else, whereas non-economic values (e.g. a rest, "spare" time with family or friends, a healthy old age) are not. Economic values would have special status as the key to more of everything else. But they are not so plastic, nor are they the sole key. Apart from questions of socio-political stability, economic development is also critically dependent on transformations via "human capital" and "social capital"/"culture", and these require not only commodity inputs but also much else. Since economics is thus in reality not a closed system with clear frontiers, nor can assessment be clear-cut regarding what will produce efficient outcomes within its frontiers.

4. Given current distribution and current preferences (#2 above), then economics goes some way (#3) to a consensual reading of narrowly economic efficiency (#1). Even then, economic efficiency is conditional on, for example, assessments of effects (where the problem of defining system-frontiers and boundaries to the analysis arises) and of uncertainty, and these are matters which are inevitably in part valuated. So it is not a sharply-defined operative criterion independent of political, theoretical, and value judgements. Shubik (1978) thus argued that "efficiency" could only be interpreted as what a socio-political process which meets agreed criteria decides that it is; and no complete or universal agreement on those criteria may be expected. [7]

Economists know some of the real trade-offs between objectives. They should address these matters directly, not via a prejudicial format like "efficiency/equity". Instead some economists compute possible trade-offs between "equity" and "efficiency" when they may not have adequately grasped the meaning of either. (See also Box 3.) These concepts are not sufficiently obvious or definite to be treated with so little care.
BOX 2: ESSENTIALISM IN POLICY EVALUATION

"Essentialism" in the context of evaluation is treatment of things as inherently appropriate or inappropriate. Capitalism and socialism are often treated so by their proponents: the advocated system is taken as inherently desirable and the rejected system as inherently undesirable. This typically involves reference to not just some proclaimed values, but also to a priori analytical constructs that claim to show the inherent efficiency/ rationality/ justice of the advocated system and the reverse for the rejected system. If actual system performance is referred to, this is often either a comparison of others' actual performance with one's own a priori inherent charms, or an assessment of one's own actual performance only after the other systems have been ruled out on grounds of "inherent" flaws or problematic actual performance.

The hallmark of this essentialism is that the advocated system cannot be condemned from its actual performance. It is always redeemed by its inherent virtues, with any shortcomings in practice being due to merely "contingent" errors and misuse; "good idea, 'only' bad implementation". One sees this pattern repeatedly, with policies and methods and whole social systems (Apthorpe & Gasper, 1982; Gasper, 1989a).

Bauer attacked the "axiomatic case" for international aid, indeed the very term "aid" which "prejudges the results [and ensures] that there is an automatic case for further and increased aid". Specific examples of damage caused by "aid" are dismissed by reference to the corrections and "reforms which are always promised" (Bauer & Yamey, 1981:2). The irony is that Bauer himself shies away from systematic survey of actual impacts, preferring the safe haven of an a priori logic of negative impact: firstly, specific results are held to be untraceable because of shunting (i.e. aid releases LDC resources for hard-to-identify other uses); but, secondly, what can be known is that aid channels resources through governments, which are (supposedly) inherently pernicious, and "therefore" it can be adjudged as pernicious too.

Complex systems of cost-benefit analysis have mixed impacts, many of them good, but also biases towards the persons and sectors that are well situated to manipulate their categories and procedures (Stern, 1976; Gasper, 1987a). In theory all such biases could be countered by case-by-case adjustments and supervision. So Alan Williams claims that biases are "not inherent in the method of analysis, but only in the way in which it may be used by some practitioners" (1972:529). He assumes no scarcity of planning resources, and fails to see the non-"inherent" bias which is inevitable given the constraints that are current and that will long remain in force. I do not argue that cost-benefit is "on balance" inherently bad, only that it inevitably has some bad effects, and that, contra Williams, it is not inherently and always desirable. Williams' position is typical amongst method proponents, as part of a congratulatory self-conception common in science—science is praised for the benefits with which it is associated, but not criticized for the disbenefits (Ravetz, 1973).

Essentialism of these types is important: for its prejudgements are the antithesis of evaluation, and its prevalence seems to reflect deep conceptual, psychological, and socio-political sources (Gasper, 1989a).
little difference to conclusions. Marx himself perhaps assumed "that his condemnation of capitalism was robust enough as not to... need a special ethical theory" (Phelps, 1973:26). Cornforth mistakenly claimed that "I have yet to meet anyone who admitted the truth of Marxist general theory...and at the same time denied the Marxist conclusion of the desirability of replacing capitalism by socialism" (1972:45). He assumed that "condemnation" and "desirability" are sufficient guides to action, a position that contrasts with the wide differences between avowed Marxists both before and after socialist revolutions.

A stance which might suffice in confronting an iniquitous ancien régime is inadequate for constructing a new society or for most historical or current comparisons. Berger (1977) presents some of the relevant "calculi of pain and meaning". Much Left criticism, in contrast, was partly based on intuitions of injustice, but having been taught that "injustice" is a diversion, ended up trying to prove too much: that contemporary systems "must" stagnate, "can never" provide jobs, etc. [11] Forms of this "Marxist anti-moralism" (Nielsen, 1981) and related views on valuation are worth identifying and assessing, given Marxism's status (at least to 1989) as the alternative orthodoxy in development studies. [12]

Peter Self (1975) noted a tension between two thrusts in modern economics, and in some Marxism: to be a value-free science, and also to be a science of policy and for human valuation, as in welfare economics and cost-benefit analysis. Not surprisingly then, as we saw: "It is by no means clear what this word [welfare] means... [or] what welfare economics is about" (Little, 1957:2). In general: "It is, quite simply, rather incredible that economists presume to discuss solutions for distributional problems without taking ethics into explicit consideration" (McKee, 1981:15).

The weakness is partly self-mutilation. Having "deliberately eschewed [discussions on values, economists] have largely denied themselves the analysis of value judgements as a fruitful area of research, [and are accordingly] rather poor at assessing other people's values" (Blaug, 1980:149). More widely: "Valuative assertions in much of the discourse of social science have been made in passing as it were, and thus without close attention to their clarity and consistency... [and show] characteristics of the use of language in everyday life - a usage that is vague and contains numerous potential contradictions" (MacRae, 1976:81). We look at this further in the next sub-section (3.4).

One notable common feature is an oscillation between presuming (a) that values are consensual ("of course we all believe in X"; this is usually said within a group), and (b) that values are totally individually subjective. The latter occurs when people, e.g. social scientists or other planners, try to sideline some other group, e.g. philosophers:

the social scientist "doesn't expect [the philosopher] to come back with a normative base for social policy. He doesn't expect [him] to come back at all; he's sending [him] to Siberia, or is it Coventry?... If [the philosopher does] come back with [a normative basis]...the social scientist will regard it as just one man's opinion. This is the social scientist's home-made philosophy, and he wants no exotic imports. (Alexander, 1967: 104 & 109.)
3.4. Gaps in methodology

Most students and even many professionals in the area have little grasp of the special character of policy analysis, and many major textbooks give it little or no attention. [13] Yet in contrast to natural scientists, who accept a clear division between their disciplines and the engineering professions, development theorists and social scientists commonly also claim practitioner status.

One aspect of this is a relative neglect of formal apparatus for considering normative and practical thought. People often think they know quite well what they are doing when it comes to values, and may be encouraged in this way by some philosophical schools. Critical literature (such as quoted here) remains marginal and barely penetrates training. Discussion remains as "everyday language"; this has merits as well as failings, but to see those well requires specialist apparatus. For example: "The language of behavioural science is often marked by normative ambiguity, allowing for interpretation both as reporting... and as making a valuation" (Kaplan, 1964:378; [14]). These "secondarily evaluative" terms are "not related systematically...to primarily evaluative terms such as 'good'" (MacRae, 1976:78). As a result "the literature of the social sciences... does indeed include many valuations; but except for political philosophy it involves very little systematic valuative discourse" (ibid.:5).

Political philosophy was long restricted in scope and methods, but revived in the past quarter-century (e.g. Rawls, 1972): "people are again attracted to the idea that a sustained argument, which begins with first principles, can come down and actually tell us what to do about tort law, or about the distribution of milk to schoolchildren" (Dworkin, 1978); or about national and international distribution. Whether or not the idea is sound, the field demands renewed attention from others interested in policy.

One can note two other areas of systematic value discourse. One is law, whose methodological relevance to policy studies is an important topic (Stretton, 1969; Ward, 1972; Berger, 1977). The other area is welfare economics, to which a paradoxical proviso attaches: that quite often it has failed to appreciate that it is valuative discourse. As we saw, its status has remained obscure.

When the foundations of the theory [of welfare economics] are discussed in print, one gets the impression that the author is impatient - to get on with the job of reaching ambiguous conclusions... Economists have used no methods of scientific research in arriving at their conclusions about economic welfare. (Little, 1957:1-4).

Whereas the normal way of testing a theory in positive economics is to test its conclusions, the normal way of testing a welfare proposition is to test its assumptions. (Graaff, 1957:3).

One possible implication worth examining is that valuative discourse is distinctive not merely in content but in its appropriate methods. A definite implication is that assumptions must be identified and assessed with particular care. Yet: "I know of no serious attempt to test [the theory's realism]" (Little, 1957:4). Only by 1976 did a study systematically compare economics' conception of welfare with the concepts of satisfaction which have emerged in experimental psychology. The results were not flattering to economics. The author - Tibor Scitovsky, previously a mainstream welfare and development economist - described in his preface the unanimous hostility he initially encountered from both Establishment economics and its radical-left critics. [15]
Little's puzzles certainly have life in them still: the "enigma... that welfare conclusions are important and influential... although few are clear as to what the word means, or what the theory is about ... [Why] has there been so little discussion... [over such] a long time?" (ibid.:3). Ng (1979) noted continuing dispute even over whether welfare economics is positive or normative. The questions can be extended beyond welfare economics, to other normative areas relevant in development studies.

The contrast between welfare economics’ technical sophistication and its methodological obscurity is just one illustration. One sees often in policy analyses a deep penetration in many areas of positive inquiry combined with weak normative tools. Commonsense sometimes suffices in normative argument, but again not always for perceiving when it is not sufficient, and not for a policy analysis education.

*****

We can now conclude Part One of the paper. I have not proposed that development studies (DS) be reduced to policy analysis. But within DS there is much policy analysis, which needs upgrading, including through reference to work on methodology, much of which has emerged fairly recently. Such work has a wide relevance; it is useful for students (e.g. even undergraduates studying DS in rich countries) to look at attempts to purposefully relate knowledge and action, and at policy analysis principles and methods. Policy analysis principles are not different for DS or in LDCs, though there are distinctive problems, situations and objectives, and usually more limited study resources.

Part One has described the problem area. Part Two, in particular Section 4, now outlines key requirements in policy analysis, as described by some reviews of the field. In noting limitations of conventional rational–decision approaches, these reviews generate an agenda of areas to which policy analysis should give more attention, in its theory, practice, and education (subsection 4.2). In particular, systematic attention should be given to aspects of: (a) positive theory on planning, as an activity that is constrained socially as well as analytically; (b) positive and normative theory on objectives; and to (c) policy analyses as processes and forms of argument. These areas will then be taken up in Part Three.
4. REQUIREMENTS OF POLICY ANALYSIS

4.1. Meanings and appropriate scope

The terms 'policy analysis' and 'policy evaluation' are used interchangeably in this study to refer to the skill, discipline or profession concerned with the evaluation of policy alternatives. The term 'evaluation research' is reserved for experimental program evaluation. (Fischer, 1980:15.)

Policy evaluation is [the process of making deliberate judgments on the worth of proposals for public action as well as on the success or failure of projects that have been put into effect. (Anderson, 1979:711.)

Policy analysis is analysis oriented to choice of action. In other words, it primarily considers -- even if sometimes at one or some removes -- "practical" problems, where the concern is with possible actions, as opposed to "theoretical" problems, where the purposes are purely explanatory and predictive. It takes in theoretical exercises (including the study of effects and actual decision making) insofar as they can contribute to drawing practical conclusions.

A related distinction is sometimes drawn between "political sciences" and "social sciences", with the former seen as having practical and normative purposes, and the latter having positive and explanatory purposes. A term similar to "political sciences" was "moral sciences". These terms and distinctions were largely lost during the advance of positivism in this century (Bernstein, 1979). Since drawing practical conclusions involves normative inputs, attention to their nature, derivation and justification is an important aspect of the "political" and "moral" sciences. These fields cover more than conventional "ethics", which has discussed abstract normative principles; for they are concerned with the whole evaluative process.

The rationalistic, or rational-decision, model asserted simply that one should identify all the effects of a policy, and assess them in terms of specified values. Self-styled "policy sciences", including for example cost-benefit analysis, then held much of the limelight from the 1950s onwards, partly through the glamour of high funding and from their suggestion that we might be on the eve of an intellectual revolution for practical and normative knowledge, in the same way that the 16th century was for non-normative theory. Some writers think such a promise is a mirage: "We are not here in the pioneer days of flight, because a normative 'science' is a contradiction in terms" (Self, 1975:202). But improved and more systematic normative argumentation and contestation -- for example as seen in law -- is a real possibility.

The rational-decision approach cannot offer a definitive optimizing method for policy analysis. A number of surveys comment on its limitations. [1] Carley gives a simple conspectus: "nobody is [now] arguing for fullgrown comprehensive rationality", but only for feasible rationality within some restricted purview (1980:15); so that, besides the pure analytic rationality of "policy science", policy analysis has to look in depth at the methods of restriction and closure of arguments, at value conflict and resolution, and at bureaucratic factors in decision-making and implementation.

The main points in the critiques can be more fully summarized as saying that we must look at the methods of procedure or argument that are used to restrict and conclude analysis, including at the following areas:
(1) non-analytic and interactive procedures for achieving sufficient consensus or resolution (e.g. voting, trading, negotiation); and
- "the overriding political and bureaucratic aspects of policy making" (ibid.:7);

(2) "policy analysis has less to do with problem solving than with the process of argument" (Anderson, 1979:712), i.e. offering reasoned cases rather than mathematical demonstrations. Conventional rational-decision analysis neglected, in particular, areas a through e below.

(2a) The overall identification and clarification of problems, given for example the limitations of means-ends formulations (ibid.:17).

(2b) The definition and interpretation of constraints, and correspondingly of the requirements of implementation. Johnston & Clark (1982) for example identify frequent fallacies in development policy analysis in imputing feasibility from desirability (or vice versa; e.g. one current Washington dogma is that any form of privatization that can be pushed through LDC governments is desirable.)

(2c) The specification of goals and criteria. Past relative neglect of equity issues and belief in straightforward ex-ante specification of goals were associated with a backwardness in analysis of values. Some attention is required to the sociology of values and to normative philosophy.

(2d) Summatively: clarification of the overall guiding values in problem identification, definition, analysis, and closure. Prefacing a sober constructive presentation of rational techniques, Carley offers this Myrdalian advice: "no analysis is understood until it is clear what and whose value judgements are part of the analysis" (1980:7) – as opposed to assuming consensus on unstated criteria. (Note though that clarification is a matter of degree, which neither can, nor needs to be, total.) These guiding values typically draw from some tradition of social theory:

(2e) "...every social policy requires that the basic social theory used [in arriving at evaluative conclusions] should be revealed and assessed for its moral implications" (Churchman, cited on Carley p.27).

These points give an agenda of required areas in policy analysis, in theory and training as well as individual studies. Section 4.2. refines and consolidates the agenda.

4.2 Discussion agenda for policy analysis education and research

The table in Figure 2 is partly self-explanatory, but some themes deserve highlighting. Like all areas of social analysis, policy studies need and involve a "theory of knowledge" and a "theory of society" (Fig.2: # 2, 5a). In addition they have distinctive requirements.

(a) Within the "theory of knowledge", policy studies have to give attention to the differences between theoretical, technical, and practical problems (Ravetz, 1973), to the cognitive status of valuations, and to the distinctive patterns and issues in argument that arise in practical and normative problems (Fig.2: # 5, 12a, 13.) In contrast much present "evaluation" activity has been an attempt at mechanically applied positive social science, with "issues of social values [approached] in an unsystematic, uncritical and essentially arbitrary manner" (Dunn, 1980/1: 519).
FIGURE 2 – REQUIRED COMPONENTS IN POLICY STUDIES

(The remarks in brackets refer to the extent of coverage of the various elements in most education for policy analysis [PA] and in the theory which that education relies on.)

Topics directly required for policy analysis:

1. Use of analytical, explanatory, & predictive theories

3. Models of rational decision (Both 1 & 3 are standard.)

4. Limits of rational technique in practical problems (Sometimes relatively neglected.)

6. Application of assessment criteria (This is familiar.)

7. Advisory roles, and their problems and responsibilities. (Sometimes relatively neglected.)

10. Identifying goals and criteria, and problems therein. (Perhaps still receives inadequate attention.)

12. Assessing and choosing between goals and criteria. (This is often neglected.)

13. Specifics of normative discourse (Usually neglected.)

14. General methods of discourse—including problem formulation, channelling towards conclusions. (Often neglected.)

PA's theory and education should also give some consideration to:

2. Background theories of society (This is relatively familiar.)

5. Theory of different types of science (this is relatively neglected); as a part of 5a: theory of knowledge

8. Appreciation of politics (receives variable degrees of coverage)

9. Organizational, personal and political significances of evaluation (often neglected, but needs attention as a part of 9a: sociology of values)

11. "Models of man", and woman

12a. Theories, approaches and formats concerning 10. (Relatively neglected.)
The very words "policy analysis" suggest the two dimensions of value and argument. Hodgkinson's remarks for administration fit well here too:

... administration is in large part the clarification, declaration and objectification of value propositions. Certain components of philosophy therefore have significance... 1. a concern for language and meaning, since the administrative universe is semantic... 2. some of the disciplines of formal logic... 3. [more] general critical skills... 4. a major concern with value. This last presupposes some model of the universe and some theory of man. (Hodgkinson, 1978: 196–7.)

A problem in giving attention to language, logic, and general critical skills is that even most of the formal analysis of reasoning has "vastly underestimated the complexity of everyday reasoning", in particular that of practical reasoning about actual problems rather than about abstracted simplified systems (Scriven, 1976). These aspects often receive little attention in policy-oriented training. Our earlier discussion of essentialism showed one of the results. Section 7.3. below refers to possible remedies.

(b) Next, attention should be given to the nature of goals and values, the distinctive ways they may be identified, concealed, altered, refined, and interact with non-values; and to aspects of evaluation as politics and debate. People who recognize the need to invest many weeks or months acquiring some knowledge of, say, statistics or local languages or agriculture, are mistaken if they think that general value theory, ethics, political philosophy, and discourse analysis are self-evident. On the other hand, while they are specialist fields, it is possible and useful, as with statistics, to learn something of them without becoming a specialist. Unfortunately, some approaches are anti-analysis. Much Anglo–Saxon writing adopts the everyday life devices we saw earlier (3.3), treating values as either obvious or arbitrary. In the higher everydayism of some religious revelation, means and ends are jointly and absolutely given. In Utopianism and "anti-moralism", evaluation is held to be trivial because, allegedly, facts dictate action, or proper actions are directly obvious, or scarcity and conflict (will) have vanished, or all good things go together, or - back to Eden - values are obvious. Fallacies in these stances need careful examination. (Section 6.2. gives an introduction to the area.)

Social theory for policy analysis must include attention to conceptions of man, and woman, since views on human needs and characteristics will influence approaches to valuation (Fig.2: #11). (The same applies for views which reject the very notions of "human nature" or "need"). The available theories of man/woman are all imperfect, but the key requirement is to make assumptions more explicit, as against the inevitable alternative of otherwise inexplicitly adopting one or other theory: utilitarian, situationalist, utopian, or whatever. For: "any prescriptive political theory - and it is hard for social theory to be otherwise - makes assumptions, which may be tacit, about human nature" (Duncan, 1983:11).

Duhs (1982) illustrates differences here seen in development debates. He contrasts the tradition of possessive individualism with the Aristotelian emphasis on man's capacity for reason. The position of Peter Bauer or Harry Johnson makes individual preference an arbitrary matter, to be simply accepted in policy analysis; rationality is purely relative to such exogenous goals. The position of Myrdal holds that preferences can be assessed in the light of their formation, conceptions of species-being and -potential, and of corresponding rational goals. So there are links between positions on issues such as human nature, the status of values, and the meaning of rationality.
(c) A further area of sociology that deserves attention is study of the real practice of policy analysis itself (Fig.2: #9). Gurul for example stresses: "complications still inadequately covered...to do not with technical and methodological issues, but with the organizational context...and most of all [with the different orientations of managers and evaluators, whose interactions] have the most profound consequences for [the] success or failure [of evaluation efforts]" (1975:12-13). Section 3.1. noted that we have to look at the everyday real world of planning; 7.2. below will say something more.

4.3. Review of the argument so far

The rough sketch in Figure 3, of some zones in development studies research and training, extends the categories introduced in Section 2.

**FIGURE 3: Some areas in DS research and training**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meaning of &quot;devt.&quot;</th>
<th>Analyses of conditions &amp; processes</th>
<th>development policy &amp; planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>A1 C</td>
<td>F G (policy analysis methodology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>A2/ B D (evalve.) E (prescriptive)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DS contains a high proportion of evaluative judgements on situations and processes, and especially of prescriptive discussion of policies and planning; i.e. a high frequency in area D and especially area E. Work in area D, evaluating conditions or processes, logically requires inputs from normative theory (A2/B) and policy analysis methodology, (G), as well as from C, the positive study of those conditions or processes. Prescriptive work, in area E, logically requires inputs from all of these, and in addition from area F (the positive study of policy and planning themselves, their character and limits). Methodology is important because evaluation and prescription are not a straightforward adding up of inputs from the other areas. Instead, as in law, the work is complex, intricate, and often controversial, involving the interpretation of limited information, and the refinement of values and principles in the course of trying to relate them to cases. Our problem is that work in areas A2/B, F and G has been relatively neglected in the past in DS, and to an extent more widely, in both theory and training. (The areas largely correspond to (b), (c), and (a) respectively in the preceding subsection, 4.2.) So the evaluative and prescriptive work in areas D and E has often been weakly grounded.

In most DS training the main attention goes to C, positive analysis of development processes, and to E, prescriptions for planning. B, defence of goals, D, evaluative assessment of development processes, and F, positive analysis of planning/policy processes, do receive some attention, but frequently in relatively casual, incomplete or inexplicit ways. Compared to the scientific satisfactions of zone C, zones B and D on valuation can seem disturbing, controversial and underdeveloped; and similarly, compared to the free-will tones common in zone E on how and what to plan, zone F on the actual processes of planning can be disquieting. For better quality policy analysis we have to tackle these areas of weakness. Sections 8 & 9 will later discuss how far such work can be incorporated into crowded syllabi.
5. DISCIPLINARY SCOPE

In the previous section we identified some areas of work that are important for policy analysis, several of which are relatively neglected in practice, in education, and even in much theory. While some readers may now prefer to go directly to Section 6, we can usefully link Section 4’s listing to a look at the contributions and working relations of the relevant academic disciplines. Intra-disciplinary specialization and inter-disciplinary ignorance are particularly dangerous for policy analysis.

This section largely limits itself to the trio of politics, philosophy, and economics. They have been the traditional pillars of the "political sciences", not only in Oxford’s famous "Modern Greats" syllabus. Of course some other disciplines have essential contributions to make; notably -- if we are trying to observe and understand personal and social values -- the behavioural sciences of sociology, psychology, and cultural anthropology.

5.1. Politics, economics, behavioural sciences....

Much in the study of policy analysis can be recognized, naturally enough, as from the discipline of politics, even if sometimes refurbished and extended. Amongst these contributions are normative political theory and broad social philosophy, such as general conceptions of man and society, and perspectives on the methods (rational and extra-rational) of creation, definition, and resolution of social issues. We can see a spectrum of methods, from applied science, through other possible approaches to getting and using knowledge, to methods of merely getting agreed decisions, to non-consensual resolution, and open conflict. In these respects politics goes beyond economics; and is more pertinent than political philosophy alone, for it considers actual agreements and disagreements. [1]

Both economics and philosophy have tools though to offer to politics. Drawing on them helped produce the field of policy analysis. Indeed, mainstream policy analysis has long been dominated by micro-economics, systems analysis, and inferential statistics. Experience shows the associated limitations. Universities can produce graduates, teachers, even consultants, who are learned in labour supply functions (or modes of production) or so on, and yet ignorant of much of politics: value articulation, needs, value negotiation, bureaucracy, etc. Let loose upon policy advice, before or "after the revolution", they could be dangerous people.

An emphasis on economics is still justified by its experience in the modelling of choice. Its valuative discourse (even when not recognized as such) is usually more precise and systematic than that in other social sciences (MacRae, 1976), and it has always been the dominant social science input for policy and decision. Myrdal in the 50s and 60s described the other social sciences as having never generated broad policy proposals or plans or even seriously challenged economics’ approaches and policies; and while the situation has changed a bit, sociologists’ and political scientists’ concerns remain more ex post facto. Economics became the leading discipline in development studies for similar reasons. [2]

Much of economics however remains structured around inadequate utilitarian models of human values and well-being, and of human agency and rationality (Sen, 1982, 1984, 1987; Sen & Williams eds., 1982). One often sees: uncritical use of means-ends formats and concepts of "efficiency" (Box 1 above); the automatic imputation of individual
welfare from individual satisfaction from individual preference from individual choice, with these often indeed defined so as to be identical; the presumption that social welfare can only be (1) a function of individual satisfactions (regardless for example of whether those include elements due to jealousy, malice, and so on), and, further, (2) just the sum-total of such satisfactions; and the family of assumptions that constitute "economic man" -- stable exogenously-set preferences, marked by predominant selfishness, hedonism and materialism, and pursued by capitalist-style maximization.

Landy observed that "the dominant viewpoint of contemporary policy analysis... [is] the economists' effort to render utilitarian norms quantifiable" (1981:469). And yet utilitarianism has fallen from favour amongst most philosophers. While "economists [if amongst the few who are aware of weaknesses in utilitarianism] ...recommend at worst minor surgery, ... philosophers... suppose the patient dead already" (Hollis, 1983:417).

The blindness of mainstream economics in various respects necessitates attention to politics and philosophy, and to the more naturalistic social sciences. Without richer empirical reference -- to how individuals, institutions and governments hold and use values -- the modelling of choice in economics, and in philosophy, drifts off into formalistic fantasy. In late 1990 "The Economist" could still give George Akerlof's "willingness to take seriously the elementary facts of social life" the accolade of "a new way to pursue .economic research". "His work draws on psychology and sociology; it considers departures from rationality and self-interest, and the role of social customs and prejudices... only a handful of economists have followed his lead; few academics are comfortable in...uncharted territory. But Akerlofian eclecticism is perhaps the most promising way forward for economics" (17 Nov. 1990; 99-100). Better late than never. Section 7.1. touches further on the necessity for policy-oriented economics of linking more with the social and behavioural sciences. [3]

5.2. .... and philosophy

Philosophy is essential for policy analysis, in handling values and arguments; especially, in argumentation, for handling beginnings and endings. Yet as Hodgkinson noted for administrators - and his comment fits policy analysts and planners too - one cannot assume they have ever received instruction in the philosophical skills of argument analysis and value clarification.

Practical limits exist as to how much of philosophers' refinements one can introduce in other disciplines and in planning; but the criterion is adequacy to context. Certainly there is scope for clearing up misconceptions in the work of many planners, economists, et al. who have been affected by particular traditions, fashions or habits. We have evidence that philosophical skills have real value for practical analysis: Philosopher students do better in examinations for business and management schools than anybody except mathematicians - better even than those who study economics, business or other vocational subjects. Between 1964 and 1982, philosophy students scored at least five percentage points above average in admission tests for professional and graduate schools in America. No other subject matches that. ('The Economist', April 26, 1986, p.101).

I have mentioned two or three main areas from philosophy that policy analysts should look at. One area concerns the differences between types of science: pure and applied, natural and social, positive and normative, theoretical and policy. Much social
science was influenced by a questionable picture of the ways natural sciences and engineering have been successful. Further, the actual practices of engineering, social planning, and law may have better lessons for policy analysis method than does the philosophy of natural sciences and mathematics (Ravetz, 1973; Forester, 1989).

A second area concerns selected issues in normative philosophy. Political philosophy is our main concern, but it draws on ethics' tools. Often those tools are contributions to evaluation method in general (see e.g. Sen, 1987). Ethics and political philosophy anyway overlap, especially when ethics is seen widely, as in the older conception of "moral sciences", as the analysis and attempted generation of normative propositions. Policy analysis, or "policy evaluation" in Fischer's broad sense (given at the start of Section 4), must cover both evaluation seen narrowly (i.e. instrumental evaluation) and some "ethics"/political philosophy. Even narrow evaluation has to consider ethics insofar as these influence the types of values actually held.

The practices of "ethics" and instrumental "evaluation" are anyway not so separate, but exist in a continuum of "practical discourse". The two meet and overlap. Even apparently instrumental evaluation is more than just technical: for given the ambiguity of goals and the fact that policy environments are open systems, problems and values rarely arrive already well-defined (Dunn, 1981). The required initial problem-framing and final synthesis are then at least as important as the more technical intermediate stages. And on the other hand, in "ethics", the philosophies involve views of man/woman and society that are open to critical examination, and require reference to situational specifics in which values actually held.

So policy analysis covers the framing-of-techniques and the operationalization-of-philosophy. This reality stands in sharp contrast with positivism's dissolution of practical reason into two poles, of emotional "ethics" and purely technical "evaluation". Positivism's oversimplifications about value objectivity/subjectivity need to be faced: to defuse this issue, distinguish it from the so-called "Hume's Law" (which dichotomizes fact and value), and clear away false implications. Section 6.2 gives a brief indication. (B. Williams, 1972, is one accessible and fuller introduction.)

*****

Part Three of the paper now goes further into diagnosing some major sources of the problems we have seen -- in order to start building a relevant and solidly-based programme for improvement. Section 6 takes up some ideas from social philosophy and the history of ideas, though without itself offering an historical analysis. Of the various areas which Sections 4 and 5 suggested deserve more attention, it takes the analysis of values as its main example, since that remains perhaps the weakest area in practice.

Where can one begin to remedy the state of affairs we described? There are many fine works of philosophy, but, as Alexander mentioned, social scientists often have a thick disciplinary skin against outside criticism. I suggest that a suitable initial target is to probe two opposite poles of conventional "common-sense": first, "sum-ranking", which means seeking to maximize the sum-total of utility, and thereby rejects interpersonal distribution as having independent significance; and second, commitments to interpersonal equality. In the course of this analysis, one will draw out the range of other principles of distribution (including according to need, or desert, or fair process), and can start to query the utilitarian and related views which have so often dominated, and stunted, policy analysis. Section 6 outlines this approach.
6. INSIGHTS FROM SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

A familiar phenomenon pervades all branches of knowledge, that of the practitioners in one discipline taking over the theories from other disciplines only when they are thoroughly discredited in the original discipline. . . The most blatant examples are to be found in the trade between philosophers and economists. (Barry, 1981:107)

... a system of thought about man and society which has played a very great part in the intellectual history of the English speaking peoples, the positivistic–utilitarian tradition. (Parsons, 1937:3)

Since the same weaknesses are seen in wider policy studies as in development policy studies, attention to deeper sources and resources is called for. Historical analysis can be important here. When discussing politicians, economists often quote Keynes on the "practical men" who stay unaware of which dead scribblers provided their ideas. It affords "philosophers in turn some mischievous amusement to see the position of defunct philosophies in economics and the other social studies" (Alexander, 1967:102).

One can trace the changes in society and philosophy in the past one to two centuries that promoted the separation of the classical "moral sciences" into modern "evaluation" and "ethics" (see e.g. Bernstein, 1979). The conventional dichotomized view of ethics (as providing values, or nothing) and evaluation (as applying those values, or anything) is typically associated with positivist pictures of values' forms, and utilitarian (or other Enlightenment-style) views on their substance. An historically-linked critique of these views can usefully be combined with reference to approaches, such as pragmatism, which offer some corrective (see e.g. Handy, 1969; Johnson & Zerby, 1973).

So unlike other reviews of development policy analysis (e.g. Johnston & Clark, 1982), I think it often worthwhile in education to raise matters from the history of ideas: "-isms". While Sen has provided many new insights, he loses something by largely eschewing the history of ideas; formal analysis cannot clarify all the issues. [1] In the limited space here, however, I will concentrate on certain sections of the formal analysis, as a framework which would be enriched by some history (see e.g. Myrdal, 1958).

6.1. Critique of utilitarianism

Many authors trace difficulties in social and political studies to aspects of the Enlightenment's thought (e.g. Hollis, 1977; Bernstein, 1979; MacIntyre, 1981). Bernstein's review of contemporary theory identifies key mainstream legacies from the Enlightenment: first, acceptance of the goal of a naturalistic social science, which would identify the causation of human behaviour; second, a fact-value dichotomy, and often a view of values as simply emotions; third, a stance of social engineering. The first two are typical positivist features. So is the third (e.g. in Auguste Comte) even if not quite so central. It brings us closer to utilitarianism, which is not a philosophy of science but a conception of decision-making and policy-making — typically involving models of comprehensive rational calculation and, in some variants, a disinterested benevolent State; and relatedly, a view of woman/man and a view of society, basically as a collection of self-interested individuals who yet share some actual or potential harmony of interests. Some (not all) Marxism, a 19th century world-view, has similar features, especially for policy after the revolution.

Utilitarianism covers both "ethics" and "evaluation". It is a major strand in moral
philosophy, but also, even if usually unrecognized, in policy economics (notably in cost–benefit analysis; MacIntyre, 1977) and planning (Eversley, 1973; Thomas, 1982; Sillince, 1986). A number of writers have claimed that mainstream development economics is utilitarian in structure (Bauer, 1971; Lall, 1976; Ross, 1982; and, much earlier, Myrdal. All this reflects utilitarianism’s relative clarity and broad scope, and make it a good focus in discussion.

While known as an ethical theory, it is now less openly familiar as a broad approach to social and political theory. One can go through a social studies degree without hearing it mentioned: precisely because it has become accepted as a "commonsense". Thus: "the utilitarian view of people and society has entered the everyday political consciousness of most British citizens (often vulgarized..)" (Thomas, 1982:2.)

Utilitarianism is central to much of mainstream policy analysis because it represents an approach to social theory and evaluation that is strongly influenced by the styles of physical science. While it has many attractions as an approach to social choice, it is marked by thin theories of man, value, evaluation, politics, and society. Its 18th and 19th century components need upgrading or replacement.

The most influential modern criterion of appropriate distribution is utilitarian, as seen to a very large extent in cost–benefit analysis. It holds that policy should aim to maximize the sum of all individuals’ utilities. (The meaning of "utility" often remains conveniently ambiguous, as either satisfaction or preference–fulfilment; these two need not be the same.) The doctrine contains three logically separable elements (Sen, 1982):

(a) Consequentialism: we should assess options and actions in terms of their consequences/effects/results; i.e. we should not look to the past. (This element covers immediate results as well as those in the longer term, and can cover any type of result, e.g. need–fulfilment.)

(b) Utility-base: the results that we should consider are utility effects; all relevant results can be measured in terms of a common currency or denominator, namely utility. [2]

(c) Sum-ranking: we should rank options and actions in terms of the sum–total of utility that they produce in society.

Assessment of these three elements of utilitarian ethics is an effective way of surveying many key issues. Each element has attractions but shortcomings. Other criteria of distribution in effect reject some or all elements, as shown in Box 3. Let us take the three elements in turn, very briefly.

First, the utility-base premise (that all relevant effects can be reduced to a common base) is the key for an evaluation style of unified calculation. But this thin theory of man/(woman) faces strong counter-intuitions, which can be linked to the pluralism of human nature and experience (see e.g. B. Williams, 1972; Scitovsky, 1976; Gasper, 1987b).

Second, the sum-ranking of such utilities across individuals is part of implementing the style of unified calculation. It allows wide-ranging comparison, within an equality of formal respect to all but lack of substantive guarantees to any. But besides being dependent on the utility-base premise, it too appears to conflict with strong prevalent intuitions of value on inter-personal distribution, which are traceable again to deeper factors. Box 3 introduces alternatives to sum-ranking, each with clear claims to
relevance.

Third, moving to the instrumental-"evaluation" part of the structure: consequentialism (i.e. assessment by looking at effects) seems to offer an approach to evaluation which is both empirical and determinate. But even if we did have only one category of effect (social utility), which could hence be totally summed, the identification of the utility impacts proves often practically impossible, and always requires decisions which cannot themselves be made by consequentialist analysis (e.g. deciding which effects to trace and how far; see MacIntyre, 1977, 1981; and Box 1 above on "efficiency"). The limits to consequentialism are all the limits of social analysis and prediction.

Finally, the theory of the State used in Benthamite versions of utilitarianism -- namely, the State as disinterested societal manager, equally concerned for all, and motivated to maximize the sum of utilities -- certainly needs sceptical examination (see e.g. Schaffer & Lamb, 1981). In sum, utilitarianism fails to satisfy our intellects, not just our intuitions, in its models of calculation and argument, and of human nature and social organization.

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**BOX 3: NORMATIVE CRITERIA OF DISTRIBUTION**

...there has been little systematic inquiry into the requirements of distributive justice in developing societies. Thus it is difficult to give a coherent defence of the new emphasis on distribution, and there is little in the way of philosophical doctrine to fall back on when troubling or unexpected choices must be faced. (Beitz, 1981:321; my emphasis.)

Work by Sen and others has helped to upgrade understanding of distributive choices, beyond the state of affairs criticized by Beitz (or Lall in 3.3 above). This box, derived from Gasper (1991) develops the line of argument in Sen (1984), with some additions and modifications. Sen's growing influence on economists' and others' thinking about value theory (in the wider sense) reflects not just his high prior reputation within the economics fraternity; it is because he has developed clear tools that help connect many issues. The approach has a logical structure that helps us to see many possibilities.

**TABLE: SOME NORMS OF APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consequentialism</th>
<th>Utility-base</th>
<th>Sum-ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Utilitarianism</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pareto principle</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Relational principles</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Needs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other objectives</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(Yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Labour rights; deserts</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(No)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Historical rights</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(No)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Entries in brackets indicate that a norm might adopt either of the options.)

Sum-ranking implies that there is no direct concern with distribution. So utilitarianism has only a possible indirect concern, for example if one believes that increasing equality of distribution means transferring goods from people who obtain low marginal utility
from them, across to people who will get higher marginal utility. But if unequal distribution leads to greater total utility then it is to be supported. Utilitarianism is in principle willing to sacrifice individuals and generations for the greater good. (Some variants, including in practice most economic cost-benefit analysis, judge the greater good in a way biased towards market strength; i.e. aggregation is done according to people’s purchasing power.)

Many theories reject sum-ranking. The most minimal departure from utilitarianism is the Pareto criterion ( #2 in the table), which avoids summing the utility gains and losses of different people. All it can then say is that a move in which at least one person gains and no one loses is an improvement; and a corresponding banality about retrogression. But in real policy moves there are virtually always losers.

There are other more useful criteria that reject sum-ranking. One set are the relational or comparative principles ( #3), which give independent weight to the pattern of inter-personal distribution. An example is the equality principle. Another is the maximin principle, that we should choose the option that does best for its worst-off person (or group).

Principles of need ( #4) reject a utility denominator. They argue that some people have greater needs than others and should receive more resources, regardless of whether this produces more utility than the alternative uses. (For example: principles of utility could direct resources more towards the young; principles of need more towards the old.) Needs are different from wants; one can say that children need education, even if they don’t want it. Needs theories may still rank options according to their sum-total of needs fulfilment.

There are other consequentialist positions ( #5) which do not take utility or need-fulfilment as their objectives. Many other objectives are widely advocated: for example, to increase knowledge or freedom or participation or national greatness – for their own sake, not because they advance utility or another objective. Mixed positions are of course possible.

Positions 6 and 7 concern asserted rights that are important enough to be considered separately, not just as constraints but as independent claims to benefits. Both positions look to the past and so reject consequentialism. Position 6 covers claims that people deserve something because of their previous contributions. These contributions could be measured in terms of effort, money, effectiveness or so on.

In Position 7 people are entitled to things they obtained through fair processes, regardless of whether or not they deserve or have earned them. They may simply have been lucky, or have inherited goods from people (such as their own family) who were in turn entitled to them. This position holds that a person has a right to give their goods to whomever they choose... [3]

This sort of analysis, including that in Box 3, immediately deepens our insight, and has indirect pay-offs too. Methodologically, it illustrates the scope for systematic normative theory, and the importance in ethics of arguments about substantially factual issues, like the utility-base premise. It indicates too some of the limits to normative theory, given the inevitable scarcity of information and understanding. (Consider the
problems in applying theories that aim to define, identify and enumerate needs or utilities or past events.) The respective limits to the types of information that are needed to apply each of the norms in Box 3 suggests that each has a limited role.

In general, one can identify and tighten the value positions found in actual use, by drawing out their logic and use of evidence. The topics of equality and distribution are enough to illustrate this, besides being important in their own right. The topics of democracy and participation are equally important for planning theory and could be taken instead.

6.2. Critique of positivism

After considering some more foreground components of orthodox policy analysis, one can look at the positivist philosophy with which they are usually mixed. Much of the mainstream mixture goes back as far as David Hume and the 18th century: a radical subjectivism concerning values, yet also the idea that whatever subjective values individuals happen to hold are the obvious basis for social decision and happen to have a universal form and content compatible with utilitarian theory.

Hume's fact-value distinction does not necessitate value subjectivism or relativism, but it leads that way if combined with thin theories of man; e.g. that people are the same only in being creatures of arbitrary taste, or completely plastic conformist members of particular groups. One may then arrive at views that normative discourse has not only no distinctive characteristics but no content at all and requires no particular attention.

To try to distinguish facts and values is helpful advice; but to proceed as if the materials we face in policy analysis are already, or easily, or always attainably, partitioned into the two is an error. If values really were such a separate realm then ethics as a subject would have proved superfluous, in the face of clear and completely irreversible agreements or disagreements on "basic values". Milton Friedman and some other positivists (and some Marxists) proposed just this: on value differences all we can do is fight. We often can do do more than that; and we do.

The best basis for discussing the possibilities of making better rather than worse value judgements is by having seen it done. So in education one should introduce methodological ethics after a little exposure to systematic substantive ethics. That will prevent students being diverted by the issues of "objective versus subjective" values or "right or wrong" values, away from the key issue of better-justified versus worse-justified valuations. Similarly, exposure to some positive study of human valuation helps in avoiding the pitfalls of cruder positivism. It is no coincidence that the positivism which pronounces all valuations as arbitrary decisions or mere emotions is often associated with crude and a priori descriptive analyses.

When Lionel Robbins and others who were influenced by logical positivism redirected mainstream economics in the 1930s and 40s, they hijacked the term "utility", to simply mean Pareto's "ophelimity" (subjective preference and its fulfilment). They further claimed that interpersonal descriptive comparisons of this ophelimity were impossible. In reality there are a multitude of reasonable methods of descriptive comparison, especially across wide gaps in levels of living (Sen, 1982, Ch.12). To the positivist economists, all such comparisons were normative, which they usually further took - incorrectly - to mean purely arbitrary. In reality there are again many reasonable
(though non-identical) normative approaches to inter-personal comparison (ibid.). [4]

The attempt to avoid normative issues led instead typically to their confusion. Descriptive relativism, i.e. noting the variation of ethical beliefs with time and place, often led on to a tacit prescriptive relativism, which somehow drew prescriptions from a premise that all normative positions are equally arbitrary! - for example prescriptions that one should therefore stick with the values one has inherited, or adopt the values holding sway in each situation one enters. The latter position appealed to some anthropologists and colonial administrators (B. Williams, 1972); but it is logically incoherent when it is put forward on grounds of the absence of normative grounds. [5]

The idea that there can be no reasoning about values sometimes uses the ancient tag "de gustibus non est disputandum" [there is no arguing about tastes]. But even for tastes which are non-moral preferences, to which no inter-personal oughtness attaches, we spend much time arguing about them, for they are formed and reformable. One should distinguish choices that reflect simply habit or whimsy, from others that reflect consideration and experience (e.g. by having compared the implications of various desires).

And for values in general, there are many lines for criticism and testing. The claim that expertise is irrelevant in making value judgements (e.g. Simon, 1947) trades on an assumption that all of an agent's feelings are already clearcut, ranked, and consistent; whereas observation shows that they instead usually require ordering. Brandt (1979) and Korner (1976) list ways in which value judgements can be wrong - e.g. by dependence on false beliefs, by overlooking options or outcomes or other preferences, or by being based on false inferences or on obsessions produced by deprivation.

We therefore need a refined view of the types of normative analysis and their relations to and uses of positive analysis. Normative argument includes logical and empirical claims; and has both consequentialist reference to effects, and partly non-consequentialist argument on the scope, categories, and procedure to adopt. It is neither completely the same as nor completely different from positive argument; and involves various activities and styles which have to be studied and differentiated. Box 4 outlines one interesting proposed breakdown, by Frank Fischer. He has adapted work by some philosophers on normative argument in general (notably Taylor, 1961) to fit policy analysis interests.

So, normative arguments can be wrong, and often are, as are many claims about their methodology. We repeatedly find, for example, presumptions that "real" values must be absolute or unconditional. Also common are beliefs that values must be beyond all doubt, otherwise "nothing" has "really" been established. This is part of a questionable foundationalist view of validity, which contributes to the misleading dichotomy of supposedly absolute fact and emotional value. There are psychological reasons why such beliefs cluster around values. These and other features underline the need to treat values distinctively, and the importance of (up to a point) attempting value clarification. It is neither possible nor essential to overcome all resistances, but we can usefully generate some questioning and alertness in these areas.

In following up the critique of utilitarian and positivist orthodoxies, one line is to look for alternatives to the utility-base premise, and for more empirically based theories of ends (7.1. below). A second is to probe the assumptions made about the disinterested State and its tools for analysing consequences (7.2. below); and a third is to look at how
theories and values actually are combined in policy arguments (7.3.). These three areas are chosen because they respond to issues highlighted in section 4 (especially in 4.2.).

BOX 4 – FISCHER’S MODEL OF THE LEVELS OF POLICY EVALUATION

The model illustrates the scope for ordering and systematizing normative policy arguments, and is becoming quite widely used. I have paraphrased Fischer (1980: 206-12); comments in brackets are his, on how to tackle the various questions.

Level 1 (Technical verification of program objectives):—
1) Program Objectives – Is the program objective logically derived from the relevant policy goals? (Refer to logical rules.)
2) Empirical Consequences – Does the program empirically fulfil its stated objectives? (Refer to empirical knowledge of consequences.)
3) Unanticipated Effects – Does the empirical analysis uncover secondary effects that offset the program objectives? (Refer to knowledge of consequences.)
4) Alternative Means – Does the program fulfill the objectives more efficiently than alternative means available? (Refer to knowledge of alternative means.)

Level 2 (Situational validation of policy goals):—
5) Relevance – Are the policy goals relevant? Can they be justified by appeal to higher principles or established causal knowledge? (Refer to knowledge of established norms and goal-systems, and to causal conditions and laws.)
6) Situational Context – Are there any circumstances in the situation which require that an exception be made to the policy goal or criterion? (Refer to particular facts of the situation.)
7) Multiple goals – Are two or more goals equally relevant to the situation? (Refer to normative logic.)
8) Precedence – Does the decision-maker’s value system place higher precedence on one of the conflicting criteria? Or does it lead to some contradictory prescriptions? (Refer to normative logic.)

Level 3 (Vindication of political choice):—
9) System Consequences – comparison of goal-system’s consequences with accepted social ideals in the situation. (Refer to causal conditions and laws.)
10) Equity. (Refer to normative logic and accepted social ideals.)
11) Ideological conflict. (Ditto.)
   For questions 10 & 11, there should be discussion of how far the policy’s goals and the supporting social ideals are compatible with equitable resolution of conflicts.

Level 4 (Choice of social order):—
12) Alternative Social Orders – comparison with alternative social orders, if 10 & 11 so imply. (Refer to knowledge of fundamental needs and to normative logic.)

Some details of the model and of how it is being used are open to criticism (see e.g. Gasper, 1989a); but those are matters for another discussion, after the critique of positivism has been established.
7. SOME FURTHER DIRECTIONS

7.1. The positive study of human values

I suggested earlier that we need in policy analysis to look more empirically at values and valuation; that the empirical evidence is incompatible with utilitarianism, conventional neoclassical theory and also some Marxist views; that whatever presumptions are adopted should be better specified, to help focus arguments and differences; and that the discussion of normative theories and issues is not very effective without some positive background. How to cover these positive issues in education has its own problems. (I summarize here the arguments in Gasper 1987b.)

The sorts of stylized mathematicized theories so fashionable in economics, and now in politics, should indeed be exposed to empirical and methodological criticism; the economistic pictures of values and valuation are often impoverished. But McKee (1984) warns that this criticism is pedagogically insufficient if done in a piecemeal and reactive way. One has to offer students an integrated alternative that has a comparable allure to the economic "science". We saw in a related context how Sen is having more impact on welfare economics than generations of powerful criticism from philosophers and social theorists seemed to achieve; because he has presented clear formal tools, which link to what economists know, and extend it.

There is a role for, secondly, using more full-blooded materials to convey the range of human values and valuation. One can draw on individual and group case-studies, fieldwork, literature and journalism. There are limits though to the ability to digest other experiences at secondhand, which depend partly on one's previous exposure and training; nor can every teacher bring to life a wide range of experiences. In addition, such material remains anecdotal and non-cumulative unless one presents it in parallel with some theoretical frameworks. Standard education cannot centre on the exceptional case or assume an inspirational instructor. It require feasible teaching modules that offer durable intellectual structures, as well as existential punch.

My proposal is that one might reduce McKee's problem by some additional lines of approach. Thus - thirdly - one can try to demystify the supposedly scientific models of choice in orthodox economics, by drawing out their location in the history of ideas, identifying factors that moulded them, and introducing equally or more sophisticated lines of thought, from the behavioural sciences and humanities. Section 6 indicated how one might try to do this, through characterizing the positivist-utilitarian tradition and then linking in some empirical and methodological criticism from the first approach above. This third line of critique has its limits too, if used in isolation. Many students may fairly soon find it rather difficult, remote and abstracted. Its main role for them would be as a complement to other materials. For their teachers rather more coverage of social theory and the history of ideas could be necessary.

The next approach - fourthly - is to go beyond piecemeal criticism, to present alternative more adequate frameworks: equally "scientifically" glamorous, but now more empirically based, work on human nature and behaviours. Psychological economics has become a growth area (e.g. Lea et al, 1987). In particular the topic of human needs may be a useful and feasible module in education, not because any particular current view is firmly established but because views on it cannot be avoided, and discussion can help to displace tacit prejudices that are inferior to some of the available views. In several respects "Basic Human Needs" theory provides a useful framework, its limitations

7.2. The positive study of planning

Section 3.1. already mentioned some problems of the standard formal techniques for appraisal and evaluation. The limits to technique are both intellectual and social. The intellectual limits (such as problems in identifying consequences) leave much scope for judgement and discretion, and so for reflection of different group interests. We must therefore probe the nature of the State, with reference to the groups directly involved in planning and evaluation. In section 4.3.'s terms, this is work in zone F, the positive study of planning processes.

There is an increasing volume of empirically-based positive analysis of major government policy-making in LDCs, which provides vital material for policy analysis training. A relative gap remains in looking at how more routine planning, project appraisal and evaluation are done in practice, despite the example of Hirschman’s classic study of "The Hiding Hand" and other stories (1967). Elsewhere (Gasper, 1986c, 1987a/1989b) I start to characterize orthodox assumptions, both technical and socio-political, about this sort of planning; and analyse, in terms of divergences from the assumptions, some frequently observed practices in appraisal and evaluation. Figure 4 suggests some of the issues.

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**FIGURE 4**

Interplay of biases in project assessment.

A sketch of the real world of appraisal and evaluation

(Gasper, 1989b:48)

- Writing or unwitting executive/practitioner interest
- Wilson's "First Law": commission of type-II errors (supporting bad programs)—what outsiders fear
- Outside assessors' preoccupation with avoiding type-II errors
- Role of supervision, control, and rationing

- Theories of "Hiding Hand" or organizational necessity
- Practitioners' preoccupation with avoiding type-I errors
- Wilson's "Second Law": commission of type-I errors (rejecting good programs)—what practitioners fear
- Outsiders' biases, or even hostility

---

Wilson's "First Law" of evaluation — that all programmes justify themselves (3.1. above) — is well-known to external evaluators. Their fears therefore focus on the danger of bad programmes getting and retaining support. This preoccupation, plus their structural role of querying programmes and rationing resources, from an external position of limited knowledge, generates the "Second Law", or tendency: that all external evaluations are critical. Fearing this negativity, programme practitioners are reinforced in their glossy self-presentations, which they see as merely a defensive counter, and which (in the "Hiding Hand" theory) also reflect the need for self-belief in order to generate commitment and sustain action. These various biases in assessment reflect not
just differences in priorities and acculturation, but the different information that the
different groups have, and the different ways they respond to the uncertainties that are
faced on all sides, beyond the reach of the textbook methods.

Moharir raises the question whether the "politics and sociology of evaluation studies
should...be added to the curriculum" (1983:22), at any rate for lowlier "analysts" as
opposed to senior "advisers". I suggest that the topic is indispensable, for example if
analysts are not to fall into the belief that more sophisticated techniques are necessarily
(or essentially) better. The complications of such techniques, together with the inevitable
limits to supervision, and the limits of theory and data, may often permit interest groups
to use tactics that go outside the areas of acceptable difference in judgement.

One area where more technique therefore is needed in training is the critical
appreciation of moves and tactics in policy/planning arguments. Would one be spreading
dangerous knowledge? I do not think so. Motivations to sell or sink projects generate
these tactics without any need for instruction to the interested parties. It is the more
neutral parties and supervisors who need some protective tuition. Elsewhere I outline
a short course in self-defence (Gasper, 1987a).

7.3 Understanding policy argumentation

We saw that policy argument has to be more than just utilitarianism's identification
and summation of effects. Tools of argument complement the standard emphases on
measurement and calculation; they are vital when there is no time or capacity for new
empirical investigations, and important in every case. For policy reasoning involves
finding and selecting materials, drawing conclusions from varied and usually incomplete
information, and more extended argumentation than the brief syllogisms in logic texts.
Besides the clarification of terms and of how words combine in single sentences, we have
to look at how the single propositions link up in broader discourses.

The most relevant area then for us is not formal logic, which has not been
concerned with ongoing practical and policy debates and is instead a fundamental
discipline with its own concerns. Nor is discourse theory yet very helpful here; it
requires a considerable investment of learning but fails to go far into the specifics of
public policy. More relevant and less abstruse are various studies oriented to practical
argumentation (e.g. Thouless, 1974; Scriven, 1976). In America they are sometimes called
"informal logic" and are part of the work on "critical thinking". Some authors have gone
on to apply this to policy arguments (e.g. Goldstein, 1984). One can then present a
study module on basic tools of argument analysis, plus some major issues and tactics in
policy arguments. Box 5 introduces some formats used in describing argument structure.

Toulmin's schema (1958, 1979), as adapted by Dunn (1981) for policy argumentation,
adds some things needed for practical argument but not highlighted in the classical
syllogism: non-definitive inferences, layers of back up, exceptions to rules (Box 5, sub-
fig.2.) It helps highlight how policy arguments have structures, and the particular
caracter of "grounds", "warrants", etc. in various policy fields. Goldstein (1984)
illustrates the range of types of justification used in policy and planning arguments. In
drawing inferences from grounds (i.e. data about current or projected situations, such as
about needs and preferences), the warrants employed can include positive theories,
normative theories about appropriate allocations or procedures, and current laws. The
warrants' proposed backing may include views on method, broad positive and normative
conceptions of "man" and society, the legal constitution, established professional
approaches, and so on. Thus, in utilitarian arguments the grounds include individual preferences, market prices, etc.; the warrants can be from orthodox welfare economics; and the backing is utilitarian social philosophy. In procedural arguments, the grounds are facts about the procedure by which a conclusion was reached (e.g. majority voting held under certain conditions); the warrant is a purported principle of good procedure; and the backing is a supportive social philosophy.

The Toulmin/Dunn format is only an introduction. We need on the one hand more complex formats that highlight the specifics of policy — the characteristic nature of warrants, backings, rebuttals, and qualifiers in policy arguments. Hambrick (Box 5, sub-fig.3) stresses the roles of world-views ("grounding propositions"), normative inputs, and tests of the argument by reference especially to constraints and alternatives. His first stage, elaboration of means-ends links, is taken further in the "logical framework" approach. And the normative analysis in his second stage is elaborated in Fischer's model (Box 4), which looks at the basis of normative and grounding propositions. [2]

All such formats have dangers if seen as a universally valid template, into which any argument can be forced. So they must be complemented on the other hand by a flexible and exploratory approach such as Scriven's (Box 5, sub-fig.1). This emphasizes that both identifying an argument's content and structure, and then assessing them, are complex and require system; and allows for the likelihood that the detailed structure will differ from case to case.

We should give special attention to tactics, not least in the opening and closing of arguments, which are as important as any complex techniques that come in between (McCloskey, 1985). Important choices arise however not just at a prior stage of "paradigm"-selection, but throughout the process of argument — deciding how far to trace causes or effects, which alternatives to consider, what are "constraints", what "base case" to use, how good a fit is good enough, where to lay the burden of proof (Gasper, 1989a). Tactics build structures, not only fill in details. Argumentation theory gives us tools for unpacking how various elements are tied together towards conclusions. One can build up a typology of those tactics which are of questionable validity — excuses, fudges, and other such steps (in Section 3.2. we took the example of "essentialism"), in addition to the standard supposed "fallacies" listed in texts on argument (e.g. Hambrick, 1978; and applied to planning by Sillince, 1986).

The way normative and positive claims are combined needs closer attention. Riddell (1986) well illustrates, from foreign aid debates, the several types of claim, positive and normative, involved in making a policy case. At a more general level, Fischer's model has been found useful by various authors, in both research and teaching (e.g. Graaf & Hoppe, 1989; Hoppe et al. 1990). It emphasizes distinguishing four levels of argument. While subject to criticism, in its details and if taken as a universal format, it has considerable merit in helping us identify, clarify, systematize, extend, and compare policy positions. It gives a useful framework for raising and pursuing on a regular basis many of the issues that arose earlier in this paper.

Overall, some of these issues and tools in argumentation can be introduced early in a policy analysis course, and then discussed further at various stages, as one deals with particular topics and case studies. In contrast to teaching appraisal and evaluation methods, where often one needs to stress that they cannot do everything, here in teaching policy argument (or ethics) the stress at present should be that we can achieve something, and that manageable yet helpful tools are available.
8. DEVELOPING THE CURRICULUM

8.1. Approaches to policy studies education

How shall we go about teaching the practical art of evaluative judgement?... [policy studies are] primarily teaching professions... [involved in] forming citizens and preparing those who would seek vocations in the conduct of public affairs. (Anderson, 1981:385–87).

The last two sections of this paper, which make up Part Four, review the suggestions from earlier sections, with reference to their coherence and feasibility in curriculum design, teaching, and learning.

Education in policy analysis and evaluation faces the problem that several areas and modes are involved. In curriculum development, let alone in education itself, one can never reach the research frontiers of the full range of relevant areas. But one still has the job of deriving a critical overview from available literature. In doing so one may incur the displeasure of various specialists. Overviews devised to orient people who will work outside the fields that are being surveyed almost never satisfy the specialists inside the field. This is probably inevitable. But also many people when reading outside their own specialties now feel the orienting surveys to be overrefined, as compared to their own "commonsense" or prejudices! One must try to overcome that resistance, and to widen horizons.

The appropriate benchmarks in the exercise are the practices, literature, and education in the field one is aiming to influence: in this case, development policy analysis. We noted weaknesses there, especially in Section 3; and this was not as specialists seizing on minor inconsistencies, even though some offenders might claim so. It was precisely the assumption by many authors that policy analysis and normative argument are trivial -- with no particular logic, distinctiveness, requirements, and theory with which they need to acquaint themselves -- that was so significant.

The specialist literatures are necessary sources in upgrading DS, and one has to draw from them a suitable menu. But for example in recommending some attention to methodology I am not suggesting that people read philosophy texts or listen to philosophy lecturers; very few of my references are to philosophers. What is required is more custom-built, selective, and practical; though to define, establish, and provide that, policy analysis methodologists themselves have to look at some philosophy (and at policies and policy analysis), and teachers have to look at the methodologists. It is often unwise to rely on specialist lecturers to teach generalists. Not only would very many be required but their whole orientation is different (Eversley, 1973). Instead they can comment on materials used by generalist teachers. The priority is to tools that can be used in policy-making and policy studies.

Fortunately, much very relevant literature began to appear in the 1980s. Several subjects' time seemed to arrive (or return), such as: the modes and scope of policy analysis (e.g. Fischer, 1980; Dryzek, 1982); the rift between economists and philosophers over utilitarianism (e.g. Sen & Williams eds., 1982); the centrality of "human nature" in political argument (e.g. Forbes & Smith eds., 1983); and a revival of work on Marxist ethics (e.g. Geras, 1985), and on the organization of policy arguments (e.g. Pen, 1985). Amartya Sen's work is having considerable impact. This and more recent literature allows a better handling of many issues, and eases the preparation of reading lists.
However, relatively little of it has yet got through to the level of textbooks (even to helpful ones like Dunn, 1981, or Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Graaf & Hoppe, 1989, is a partial exception); and edited volumes of readings are needed for more effective availability.

Development of teaching materials is thus an area for further work. Moharir's comment remains almost as valid now: "Textbooks on public policy [analysis] have just now started being written... Textbooks on the Third World countries do not exist at all" (1983:22). Current initiatives through the Policy Studies Organization and the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration hopefully will improve the situation.

How can one go from a list of desirable areas of knowledge and skill, to a viable educational approach? Reflecting the range of modes of policy analysis there is a range of conceptions of policy studies education (Anderson, 1981):-

1. The classical conception, of training in derivation of practical prescriptions from truths about "man", the universe, and reason. This conception declined in the modern era, although in some contemporary "policy science" there is again a connotation that analysis alone is to settle policy choices.

2. At another extreme, the predominant modern conception of training in purely instrumental reason, with at best a self-conscious "conditional normativism" ("give us the values and we will give you the evaluation"); this approach derives from economics and especially operations research.

3. A politics approach, concentrating on pragmatic problem-solving and on means to achieve working agreements; an approach which tends to be underdefined and hence perhaps inefficient: "muddling through".

4. "Marketplace of ideas": presenting multiple differing schools, and leaving students to choose - but without training in how to choose.

5. A sociology-of-knowledge approach: demystify the various schools, reveal the factors influencing their formation, and then invite choice. There is sometimes a presumption that choice will then be obvious, which is false.


The tools of instrumental reason, in approach (2), are indispensable, but their limits should lead one to treat the environing philosophical and political systems and issues, as attempted in approaches (1) and (3). While there is a longstanding controversy between the technicists in (2) and the political theorists in (3), both streams often lack deliberative skills. The instrumental reasoners can be weak in the areas of goals and wider intellectual frameworks, and the muddlers--through perhaps in other areas too. This is where the other conceptions of education come in - but as supplements, not in isolation. It is worth noting intellectual alternatives, as in (4); their backgrounds, as in (5); and tools for considering them, as in (6). Anderson's own emphasis was on (6), the analytic philosophy approach (as opposed to conception (1)'s synthetic philosophy).

We thus have bids for the primacy in policy studies of economics (and other
technical planning approaches), as in conception (2); politics as in conception (3); and philosophy, more grandly as in (1), or more narrowly as in (6). There is a valid role in education for non-exclusive (and therefore in some cases adapted) versions of each conception. The relative weightings given to them can vary with context. [1]

Anderson also leans towards seeing policy studies as a profession that prepares citizens, not slot-in technician ciphers with tunnel vision. One reason, is that instrumental hand-maiden analysis, "even when it is ethically innocuous enough, is typically pedestrian because it is conducted within a narrow conceptual and empirical framework" (van den Berghe, 1971:334-5). Like others, I have drawn an implication that some of the philosophy needed is from the wider synthetic conception, in (1), not only the more narrow analytic conception in (6). Thus I support a "citizen"-orientation. And in agreeing with the importance of politics to policy analysis education, I take it to cover not just an awareness of conflict, bargaining and power, but also tools of rigour and principle from political philosophy. In turn the practicality of politics should keep the philosophy relevant and realistic.

### 8.2. Addition and selection of topics

... [a] larger view, [in which] tedious questions about research and policy-making are transformed into challenging questions about man, his brain, politics and society. It is on these questions that inquiry is required no less than on immediate questions of research design. (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979:3.)

We can now pull together the proposals made in the paper. (The reader may first like to refer back to Figure 2 and especially Figure 3.) I have suggested areas where curricula could be strengthened and extended; and specifically that students, teachers, and practitioners of development policy analysis can benefit from knowing something about the following topics. After each topic I indicate the sections in the paper where it was introduced.

1. The structure of policy analysis; common gaps in attention, and related failings in practice. (Sections 3 and 4.)
2. The nature and range of styles in policy-relevant sciences. (Sections 4 and 5, but only extremely briefly.)
3. Utilitarian theory (both as a social theory and a planning theory), given its wide influence and scope. (Section 6.1.)
4. Alternatives and supplements to utilitarian theory; helping us to (re-)tool for normative and practical argument; including from more substantive and scientific welfare theory. (Several sections above, including 6 and 7.)
5. As an extension of 4: distributive ethics and the status of equality. (Section 6.1.)
6. Positivism and the status of argument about values: a key methodological issue, and a key influence on its conventional treatment or neglect. (Sections 3.3, 5.2., 6.)
7. Positive analysis of planning and evaluation, noting both the social and intellectual constraints. (Several sections, including 3.1. and 7.2.) While we should add some techniques to training, for argumentation and normative analysis (# 4-6 & 8 in this
list), we have to note the limits to techniques for assessing consequences in programme appraisal and evaluation.

8. Tools and formats in policy debate and discourse. (Section 7.3.)

9. The nature and dilemmas of policy studies as an activity and training. (Sections 4, 8 and 9, to some extent.)

In each area, one's main aim would not be to settle one "best" view, even though some views may be rejected, and positions that appear promising can be noted. Rather one could identify and compare different views, widen awareness and people's range of questions and tools, and extend their critical and constructive capacities. A methodological survey helps one to read methods-catalogues which constantly change. In education as opposed to narrower training, preference should be given then to issues that will date less quickly if at all, rather than to a cookbook of current methods.

We noted earlier that one must distinguish a number of levels in talking about research and education: (a) research on a narrow topic; (b) critical review of such research across a whole area; (c) development of principles and broad themes for curriculum covering a number of such areas; (d) application of the principles, in definite curricula and teaching materials; (e) actual training and education, which must be further broken down, e.g. into teacher training and student training. The choices in levels (d) and (e) must depend on trainees' particular backgrounds, roles, abilities, available time and so on. The commentary in this paper has instead been at levels (b) and (c): very broad review of research and of principles for curriculum. We can however make some suggestions on how the selection and sequence of topics will depend on the audience.

I will differentiate here between three broad audiences: (i) postgraduate policy and planning students, i.e. including many mid-career or prospective practitioners; (ii) their teachers; and (iii) policy analysis methodologists, actual or prospective. [2]

With reference to a postgraduate student audience, an example of a list of priority sub-topics within the above set of broad topics (with the exception of no.2) is this:

1. components and modes in policy analysis;
2. the contents, attractions, and limits to utilitarian planning and ethics; and a critique of conventional utilitarian assumptions on means, ends, "efficiency", hedonism, "social welfare", and the benign and potent State;
3. human needs;
4. alternative normative views of distribution; the status of the equality criterion;
5. possibilities (and necessities) of normative discourse;
6. indeterminacy, professional identities, and group relations in assessment work and planning;
7. argument analysis; essentialism;
8. roles for policy analysts.

Students in an M.Sc. that was primarily on policy analysis, or doing course work in a comparable doctoral programme, might do more than in this list. The listing above is simply a suggestion to stimulate discussion.

Various alternatives are certainly possible in the sequence of materials, and the
choice is often not vital. In the student context one can consider taking first the more familiar and/or directly relevant matters, before digging back to whatever source issues the time available permits. Some degree of to-ing and fro-ing, in exposition as well as learning, is inevitable, especially for methodology; and it helps the learning, by providing reinforcement and new applications and contexts.

The selection can change somewhat as one goes on to further prioritize between the broad topics, rather than only within them. For the case again of a postgraduate planning-orientated programme, extensive discussion of mainstream planning and of distributive ethics seems relevant. For lecturers and practitioners, relatively less planning material is of priority, since outcome assessment has (compared to, say, distributive ethics) been better covered in their professional literatures. The teachers might read more critiques linked to the history-of-ideas (e.g. as indicated here in Section 6), for those help frame a range of other topics. They will also read further on planning, since "managerialist" training and analysis has been so short on understanding "real organizational life" and on ability "to cope with politics" (Minogue, 1982: 22, 9).

Incorporation of aspects of philosophy would be a shock in some milieux. For the student context I suggest a priority to the issues in distributive ethics, to fallacies in extreme positivism, and to tools of argument analysis (including awareness of essentialism), because they have very direct application; rather than to discourse theory, or the latest critique of utilitarianism, or theorizing on types of science. In the teachers context more of those matters might come in. [3]

As between the different audiences, this paper itself has in effect been most oriented to the case of teachers, as was noted in the Foreword. Little qualification has been offered according to students' different capacities or their past and prospective training and experience. That is a further level of detail, for other work.

9. CONCLUSION

Several commentators a decade back talked of the decline of development economics. Theofanides (1988) has shown how misleading this was. Perhaps the number of simple general models has declined, but detailed work on concrete issues has grown enormously, consolidating a range of new sub-disciplines. Two aspects of this deserve underlining.

First, in many of these areas there has been "a tendency to acquire a more comprehensive and multidisciplinary subject matter" (p.1457), as we noted in Section 2. In linking up with other disciplines, development economics (or should we now say development studies?) may be well ahead of mainstream economics, whose traditional inbred deformity we noted in Section 5. Any trend of re-integration of development studies into general social science, such as proclaimed by Hirschman (1981), could then have positive aspects (see e.g. Streeten, 1983; Hettne, 1990). Some of the most fruitful recent interdisciplinary social theory has come from writers like Sen, Scitovsky, Bernard Schaffer, or John Friedmann, all leading figures in DS. The U.N. World Institute for Development Economics Research, blessed with the acronym WIDER, has become a centre of interdisciplinary work, with, under Sen's influence, a strong representation of philosophers as well as economists.

Second, and related to its multidisciplinary leanings, "Development Economics has
a praxeological-concrete orientation, rather than a theoretical abstract one" (Theofanides, p.1460); it is concerned with guiding action in specific real-world cases. Positive theories of "development" may inevitably over time feed back into general social theory (and thereby enrich and refine it); but normative and policy-oriented approaches to development inevitably tend to link development studies to policy studies (which become widened as a result). The paper has reflected this latter orientation. Since policy studies need a good basis in (relevant) positive theory, I also stressed the trend to multi-disciplinary deepening.

As said at the outset, the level at which I have commented is that of the curriculum developer who has to consider principles for a curriculum that should cover a range of areas, and has to critically draw upon surveys of research in those areas. One is aiming for a mutually complementary mix of approaches, which even though imperfect could improve on current curricula. Education always faces gaps between desirability on the one hand and capacities and motivations on the other. The gaps are in some ways more acute in education for planning and policy studies (Eversley, 1973; Minogue, 1982). But the problems are not here of a different order; and one should look at the gap between the actual and the possible, not only that dividing the possible and the ideal.

For each of the subjects mentioned in Section 8, one can give a worthwhile introduction in four to six classroom hours, supported by outside reading; though more time is in many cases desirable, certainly for prospective teachers. The outside reading would be facilitated by compilation of collections of articles. Certain topics might even be covered mainly through outside reading, with only supportive discussion in class or tutorials.

Four or five classroom hours might often reach students' short-run absorptive capacity; but education is not necessarily one-off, and consists of more than formal courses. Additional material can come in later courses and reading, and there are many forms of exposure and own study. Further, the relevant target often is awareness rather than expertise: to see that particular questions or techniques are important and worth further attention; and that expertise in those areas sometimes needs to be called on or worked with. When one aims for stimulation rather than just awareness, thus hoping to influence or encourage further work in the area, it can be appropriate to concentrate on matters of more immediate appeal to teacher and students, subject of course to the requirements of overall coherence and context.

On all these grounds the curriculum capacity issue is more manageable than it can appear at first sight. Section 8 illustrated how overall selections according to need might be possible and viable.

Education in policy analysis - especially in development studies - faces difficulties apart from the issues of scope and curriculum I have concentrated on. Problems include the strains of transdisciplinarity; the intellectual and career thrusts which encourage disciplinarity instead; tendencies sometimes to shy away from normative analysis or from positive analysis of planning; and the desire to 'get one's teaching out of the way' by repeating stock material.

Thompson (1979) has extended the sociology of education's theory of the curriculum cycle, to show why "integrated curricula" tend to be unstable. They may be periodically re-established, but then typically resettle out into standard "collection
curricula". I have no objection to a collection curriculum, provided it is a relevant collection and that integrating links are drawn. The problem is that the elements of the collection instead often tend to reflect disciplinary specializations which have their internal concerns and habits. Facing uncertainty, the typical career social scientist plays safe (Earl, 1983): "gets teaching out of the way", follows the leaders, plays with techniques that convey status, fills in details that ensure publications, and ignores unconventional thinkers, let alone other disciplines.

Others have analysed the consequent problems and possibilities in organizing policy studies, within existing or new departments (e.g. Wildavsky, 1979; Moharir, 1983). Despite the constraints there is proven scope for activity and for improvement. The gap between the actual and the possible is substantial.

A particular barrier is the uneasiness over discussing social and political values. The instrumentalist view of policy analysis, namely that it merely treats the implementation of given values, is widespread because it is more comfortable for teachers, students, and employers (Cohen & Rakoff, 1978). Amy (1987) suggests for example that, while the intellectual battle in America over whether to incorporate ethics into policy analysis was won in the 1970s, the practical battle was being lost in the 1980s, with declining interest amongst practicing analysts and graduate students. The opposing political, professional, and psychological forces are strong: clients dislike having their purposes questioned, and have the power to hire and fire; analysts too are unwilling to face the demands of self-questioning, especially if there are few easy answers, and instead seek to legitimize their influence by pretending to be purely technical.

Narrowly technical analysis often leads to bad decisions, for example as people fail to grasp some of the implications of their actions, especially concerning how others (and even they themselves) will react. Seeking to understand value systems should allow a better assessment of implications and reactions, and better decisions. Amy proposes that one way to change policy analysts' behaviour is to make clients aware of this pragmatic rationale for value analysis, while secondly having wider public pressure on both analysts and clients to show that they are facing value issues. His argument relates to a North American context, but we can extend some of its general thrust. The rise of an effective human rights lobby illustrates his second line.

Some authors query how much wider material should be attempted with most students, and for example whether some of what I have outlined here applies only for the more senior "adviser" rather than to the technician/assistant "analyst". I have mostly considered overall requirements of how to approach policy studies, more than questions of who should concentrate on which parts and when. But in line with Amy's and Anderson's stress on the role of wider civil society, I support approaching students as citizens and educators, not only as technicians.
NOTES

1: Introduction

[1] Moore continues: "Suddenly, goals are being suggested and... action conditionally prescribed all on the basis of one more or less firmly established empirical finding. The policy analyst would ask why the goals suggested by the social scientist were the 'right' ones for considering policy... what set of policy alternatives had been considered and how the empirical finding proudly displayed by the social scientist might shed light on the likely consequences of governmental action" (1983:278).

2: Development Studies' Normative and Policy Concerns

[1] (a) "Normative" covers both evaluative and prescriptive. "Evaluation" in the philosophical literature covers both the ex ante "appraisal" and ex post "evaluation" spoken of in the management literature; and indeed often spans prescription too, including ethics. I sometimes use "evaluation" in these broader senses instead of always using "normative". The formal similarities between "appraisal", ex post "evaluation", and "prescription" are anyway so thorough as to justify joint treatment.

(b) Value - relevant meanings for this paper are: 1) worth/ desirability/ goodness; sometimes used in a general/summative sense, sometimes in the sense of worth/etc. in terms of a specific property or properties; 2) to assess the worth etc. of something; 3) a principle or standard used in valuation, i.e. in 2).

(c) I am using "development" here to refer to processes, outcomes, or states of affairs; rather than interventions. But interventions too can be discussed positively or normatively.

(d) Relevant meanings here of policy are: 1) principles which guide the actions of public agencies; 2) the deliberations and actions of public agencies.

[2] Kamarck (1983) stresses introducing students to the feel and limitations of raw data available to policy analysts, and how it is gathered. Economists are very weak in this area; see also Bowbrick (1988). Similarly relevant are rapid assessment methods, including skills for drawing on the knowledge of people directly involved.

[3] One of the authors, in a later review of a set of detailed case studies, acknowledges their essential role in provision of new insights (Nixson, 1991).

3: Problems in Policy Analysis

[1] Johnston & Clark (1982)'s Ch.1 on "The Development Mess" is a recommended discussion of development policy analysis alone. Note that besides academic social science, we can refer to "professional social inquiry" more widely, covering work in governments and by consultants and other bodies (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979), since these are highly relevant in policy studies and development studies.


[3] See Lele (1975) for glaring examples even with semi-systematized evaluations at a more "programme"-level, despite less difficulties of sampling than in many cases and despite all evaluators being selected by the World Bank.
[4] A good example of Utopianism is a book by the Director of Economic Research in the Central Bank of one LDC, supervised by a committee of planners, economists and clergers: "In the new society, with no confusion and where peace and harmony prevail, the path to progress would be clearly demarcated... Economic planning in a country with high moral values and a modest concept of living would be relatively easy... planning may not be necessary because automatically man would use his good sense to act correctly.. [so that thankfully] moral values or ethical attainments need [not] be quantified" (Karunatilake, 1976: 49,75,118,50).

[5] Evaluation of the Kenyan 1960s land reforms indicates that smallholdings and densely settled cooperatives were more economic than lightly settled large holdings, contrary to the prejudgement that guided policy (MacArthur, 1976). Not infrequently, the policies hiding behind an "efficiency" label are less economic as well as less equitable, and "efficient" only for elites.

[6] Saying that a resource allocation is economically "efficient" is typically taken to mean that, given this allocation as a competitive market equilibrium, $1's worth more of anything is as valuable to "society" as $1's worth more of anything else. But these money weights reflect the distribution of effective demand, which may not be necessarily normatively acceptable; and other similar factors.

[7] The sharpness of the efficiency concept will vary with the case, according to how sensitive the "efficiency prices" and allocations are to the variations in distribution, discounting, and attitudes to uncertainty and fair process, etc.

[8] A few examples: (i) Livingstone (1981), after noting in his Introduction that the "volume is...like development economics itself, policy-oriented and issue-oriented", lacks discussion of goals and criteria, despite a heavy preoccupation with normative outputs from analysis. (ii) Lipsey's famous "An Introduction to Positive Economics" (my emphasis) has chapters on policy, without a serious prior treatment of criteria. (iii) The influential symposium edited by Martin & Knapp (1967) on the teaching of development economics likewise had no normative theory. (iv) Perhaps the most widely used study of African rural development, Lele (1975), is replete with evaluations and prescriptions but has no explicit normative methodology.

[9] I prefer use of "ethical" to refer to (a), what is appropriate, rather than to (b), what is against preference or self-interest, for these are often appropriate. But in some contexts one uses sense (b).

[10] Criticism of 1970s redistributivism came from Left as well as Right. Kitching (1982) is one who saw redistributivism as part of a populist current in DS, having a "petit-bourgeois/"peasant" concern with equality. In reality, Lipton, Schumacher and basic needs theorists — who were all lumped together by Kitching with Nyerere, Slavophiles et al — focussed on poverty, not on equality per se.

[11] "..the Marxist neglect of ethics prevented Marxists from attacking reformism for its [utilitarian] elevation of rewards and security: the orthodox Marxists had to argue instead, quite implausibly, that the reformists were bound to fail" (Kamenka, 1962:x). And contra Conforth, one might see Schumpeter and some reformists as non-socialist Marxists.

[12] Cole et al (1983)'s widely used Marxist economics text for DS students states that economics is about value, but hardly probes the concept's normative aspects, and is often
mistaken on normative theory. Thus p.97 presumes that "subjective preference supporters" judge distributions "in welfare terms", which is often not true - e.g. for Hayek, Bauer, and Lal; and p.156 presumes "cost-of-production" theorists use basic-needs theories, but in fact such theorists are often connected to utilitarian and other ethics, rather than to ethics of need.


[14] See e.g. Myrdal (1969) on the ambiguity in much usage of "normal", "equilibrium", "function", and "development"; and Fesler (1965) on "decentralization".


4. Requirements of Policy Analysis


Dillon (1978)'s portrait of orthodox policy analysis synthesizes several themes: (i) the utilitarian background; (ii) the preoccupation with rational action, seen as the pursuit of clear premeditated goals by organizations and individuals; (iii) the belief in fully objective knowledge; (iv) preoccupation with formal techniques; (v) viewing policy making as effecting "solutions"; and (more penumbraelly) tendencies to (vi) corporatist thought and (vii) thinking of single optima.

Dryzek (1982) distinguishes six types or models of policy analysis. Model 1, rationalistic/technocratic policy evaluation, stresses problem resolution; and sees itself as "policy science". Model 2 covers uses of a single framework for enquiry (e.g., welfare economics or law). Model 3, moral philosophy, analyses values; it is a special case of model 2, but worth highlighting, for reasons we saw earlier. Models 4 to 6 take us on from where proof and demonstration end. Model 4, hermeneutics, stresses methods for communication and mutual understanding. Model 5, advocacy, stresses methods of persuasion; and model 6, social choice, stresses all political processes. (We could also add: 7. the ad hoc unselfconscious mode of policy analysis.) We need to give attention to each of these types, not only the first, and to their complementarity and different areas of applicability.

5: On Disciplinary Scope

[1] So, in covering some positive theory of planning and normative theory of criteria, university courses in politics and government usually do better than those in economics and planning. Professional "planning" courses usually do a little better than economics courses.


[3] Anderson (1982) contrasts (i) the liberal and utilitarian mainstream in economics, which is however now expanding into political science in public-choice theory etc., and (ii) the pragmatist mainstream in (American) political science, legatee of the "anti-
formalist revolt", which has also long been established on the economics periphery (institutional economics).

6. Insights from Social Theory and the History of Ideas

[1] E.g. MacIntyre (1981) argues that whereas contemporary radicals have presumed that the language of values was available in sufficiently good order for the denunciation of present systems, in reality we are left with an incoherent mix of fragments from the value languages of many past eras; and so the radicals ran into problems when they turned from denunciation to attempted reconstruction.

[2] "Utility-base" is from Gasper (1986b). Sen uses "welfarism"; but, especially outside economics, "welfare" has too wide connotations, as for example in "Welfare State".


[4] Robbins' method was to discredit comparison, by, firstly, taking the difficult case of pairs of named individuals not far apart in income (see Cooter & Rappoport, 1984); and secondly, presenting an image of broadminded awareness of other cultures' drastic otherness, and our supposed inability to refute a Brahmin who assures us "that members of his caste (or his race) were capable of experiencing ten times as much satisfaction from a given income as members of an inferior caste (or an 'inferior' race)" (1932:140). In making comparisons though, the Brahmin adopts comparability conventions, and so cannot rule them out per se. One can then assess different conventions, as better or worse grounded. Gellner (1974) has commented on the "scandalously selective use of ethnographic material" by conservative theorists.

[5] Better grounds for accepting local practices might be the presumptive functionality of any existing code, the special value of each society's unique experience, or the pitfalls in attempting engineered change.

7. Some Further Directions

[1] Good longer treatments include Goulet (1971), Scitovsky (1976), Moore (1978), Forbes & Smith (eds., 1983), Doyal & Gough (1991). Awareness of "basic needs" (meaning especially: in explanation, source needs; and in evaluation: prerequisite needs) can still go with rejection of the idea of fixed clear "basic values". Pragmatist theorists sorted out that paradox (Handy, 1969).

[2] The logical framework approach (LFA) and the Fischer–Taylor model are both increasingly popular, even if amongst different audiences. They prove to be complementary: the top two levels of the prevalent USAID version of LFA broadly correspond to the bottom two Fischer–Taylor levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FISCHER levels</th>
<th>USAID levels</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher principles</td>
<td>Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant social ideals</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy goals</td>
<td>Outputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme objectives</td>
<td>Inputs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Thus two of the current "big pictures" are easily combined, into a bigger one.
8. Developing the Curriculum

[1] Anderson's preference for analytic philosophy matches his political science background, which allows more to be already taken for granted in several of the other areas — (1), (3), (4), and (5) — than one can with most students from economics, geography, planning, management and so on.

[2] The methodologist category covers those with a special interest in methodology; and, for example, those doing postgraduate dissertations on methodology, or involved in postgraduate policy methodology courses (e.g. within a public policy doctoral programme, or a Masters programme in philosophy that emphasizes philosophy of social sciences or the booming field of applied ethics.)

[3] So for the postgraduate student context a possible set of overall priorities amongst the topics we have mentioned is this: (1) critique of instrumental evaluation / "conditional normativism"; (2) critique of the utilitarian paradigm of rational decision-making and synoptic planning; (3) theories of human needs; (4) normative criteria of distribution; (5) nature of policy argument; (6) roles for policy analysts. In contrast, teachers and methodologists would naturally go more deeply into background areas. For example, possible lessons from philosophy of science seem to me a relatively low priority for a postgraduate development policy/planning class, but more important for teachers and of course for methodologists.
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