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Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the Development Studies Association conference, University of Nottingham, September 16-18, 1992, and at an ISS staff seminar, November 5, 1992. I received helpful reactions from participants in those sessions, especially Jocelyn Kynch, Bas de Gaay Fortman, and Paul van der Wel, and also from Amartya Sen, Shanti George, Martin Doornbos, and Raymond Apthorpe.
1. SEN. SENISM. POST-SENISM

Amartya Sen's "Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation" (1981) has stimulated great interest: including diffusion and criticisms of his concepts and emphases, testing of the approach on other cases of famine, its extension into identification and assessment of possible famine- and hunger-relief policies, and attempts to apply it to matters other than famine and hunger. The body of work that takes "Poverty and Famines" as a major starting point--whether for criticism, application, qualification, or extension--has thus become quite diverse. In de Gaay Fortman's phrase, we now have the work of Sen, Senists, and post-Senists. There is a danger of talking at cross-purposes, especially if differences in purpose are covered by ambiguous terms. I want to distinguish various foci in entitlements analysis, and to consider how they relate to each other and to other types of work.

We must begin, in Section 2, with specifying what entitlements theory has contributed in famine analysis, and what it leaves unanswered or unconsidered, often deliberately. It gives a valuable set of concepts and questions to apply in explanation and policy design; but it is an approach rather than a general theory or a thorough explanatory model, and hence is not a sufficient guide in policy-making. By considering de Waal and Osmani's exchange over the value of Sen's approach for explanation of famines, especially in Africa (Osmani, 1991; de Waal, 1991), and the nature of the WIDER programme of hunger policy analysis (Sen, 1987a; Dreze & Sen, 1989), we can start to identify various modes and substantive contexts of theorizing.

Section 3 builds on this, reviewing recent efforts to extend entitlement analysis's concepts and fields of application. Notable examples concern: general analyses of systems of distribution; present hopes for methods of "entitlements impact assessment"; and studies of environmental problems and gender issues in entitlements terms. Identifying the wide range of current types of entitlements analysis makes one doubt whether a single usage or approach can be adequate for all. Yet all use, and have been attracted by, entitlements terminology. Examination of a selection suggests that the references to "entitlements" sometimes add little and can become confusing.

Section 4 reviews Sen's terms and their evolution, starting from Gore's claim that he has moved between different meanings of "entitlement relations". I suggest that more problems instead stem from the term "entitlements" itself, from Sen's adoption of the labels "endowments" and especially "exchange entitlements", and his conceptualization of the latter. A growing penumbra of interpretations and misinterpretations can be traced to these aspects. The section ends with some cautions and suggestions on clarifying terms.

Section 5 concludes that, while Sen's conceptual model reflected, naturally enough, the purposes in his study of the 1940s Bengal famine and its specific conditions, and his terminology has weaknesses, his general approach--a socially disaggregated, institutionally aware, analysis of effective command over specific necessities--is invaluable, as exemplified in ongoing work by him and others.
2. ENTITLEMENTS ANALYSIS AND FAMINES

2.1. The contribution of "Poverty and Famines"

Sen began "Poverty and Famines" with a formal conceptualization of poverty, and two fundamental arguments.
(1) Reacting against the emphasis put on the social relativity of poverty by much postwar theorizing in the North, Sen emphasized that there is indeed absolute poverty—seen at its starkest in famines.
(2) However we certainly need a socially disaggregated view of poverty, and must distinguish different groups in terms of their degree of poverty and the security of their access to basic necessities.

Sen's analysis of famines applied this disaggregated approach to absolute poverty. The approach was first presented in the mid-70s (Sen, 1976), perhaps provoked in part by the three 1972-74 famines (in Ethiopia, the Sahel, and Bangladesh) which he analysed later (1981: Chs. 7 to 9). But his original concern clearly derives from "The Great Bengal Famine" of 1943-44 which led to the deaths of possibly three million people. He lived through it as a boy in Bengal (Sen, 1990).

A generation later, Sen argued that the aggregate availability per capita of foodgrains in Bengal during 1943, the main year of starvation deaths, was only 15-20% lower than average. (Availability was even higher than average in 1944, but by then epidemics were rampant.) Instead, groups without direct or assured access to food were hit by soaring rice prices, which were induced by inflationary wartime expenditure, food procurement schemes for people more directly involved in the war, and speculative hoarding. Government procurement and war-related restrictions on trading also greatly limited effective availability in many localities (Basu, 1985). While "the majority of the population of Bengal experienced little [or no] hardship over the famine period" (Sen, 1990:49; my addition), some vulnerable groups, such as landless labourers, rural artisans and fisherpeople, lost sufficient market command over food and lacked adequate alternative access (Sen, 1981, Ch.6).

Sen preferred two major, related, conclusions.
(3) The standard Food-Availability-Decline (FAD) explanation of famines was clearly insufficient, and could be devastatingly misleading.
(4) Most people died because they lacked definite socially sanctioned claims, effective legitimate command, over food that was available. Sen called a person's effective legitimate command his/her "entitlement". He presented the failure of entitlements to cover subsistence needs as the key cause of starvation and death in famines.¹

"Poverty and Famines" elaborated these conclusions, with desk studies along similar lines on the three 1972-4 famines we mentioned earlier. I will not enter the disputes over the details of Sen's case-analyses or their precise relevance to other cases, such as the 1959-61 Chinese famine. I accept the clear consensus in recent literature, that the book
at the least makes a major contribution to understanding of famines, and especially the Bengal famine. Of concern here is how far his concepts and emphases reflect his original focus, and whether they need adaptation when we consider different cases and concerns.

We can posit a number of features of the Bengal case which helped to simplify the conceptualization necessary for famine analysis; including:—
(a) a single overwhelmingly dominant staple food (rice); (b) a highly differentiated society, including groups who were dependent on wage labour or supply of specific services, lacked substantial convertible assets, and were very weakly protected by local rights and obligations for subsistence; (c) in addition, the absence of a social security system, and relatively little local charity; thus (d) overall, an example of, in Sen's own terms, the dangerous phase or conjuncture when groups without secure access to food have emerged, pre-existing local support mechanisms have declined, and national social security arrangements have not yet appeared; plus, finally: (e) an "iron frame" of colonial administration in a war-time setting, which allowed marginal rural groups little opportunity for voice or resistance.

Sen used a set of novel concepts and terms in his analysis:

(i) a person's (or household's) set ("bundle") of resources (which includes their own labour power); this is sometimes called the person's (or household's) "endowment" (Sen, 1981:45) or "endowments";

(ii) one's "exchange entitlement" (1981:3), or, in general usage, simply "entitlement(s)" (e.g. Sen, 1990b); namely, that set of commodity bundles that could legally be attained by using one's endowments and opportunities; in other words, a set of alternative possibilities facing the person/household;

(iii) the "E-mapping" (exchange entitlement mapping): the relation that specifies the set of possible commodity bundles that are legally attainable from any given ownership bundle, through 1. trade and/or 2. production (1981:3). The E-mapping thus reflects the rules, conditions, and processes which affect how one's entitlements are derived from one's endowments.2

Sen promptly elaborated the definition of entitlements to include 3. official social security (1981:6) and taxation (1984:454-5); and we similarly need to add 4. the use of public goods, and 5. the effects of other social rights and obligations (cf. 1981:154-5). These last two sets of effects are sometimes referred to as leading us to a concept of "extended entitlements" (Sen, 1989:10), i.e. extending beyond legal rights and obligations. The various extensions correspondingly extend the definition of the E-mapping too, to cover the associated rules and arrangements.3

(iv) Spanning parts of both categories (i) and (iii) is the notion of "relations of entitlement" (Sen, 1981:1-2), and the related "sources of entitlement", which concern the types of possession/acquisition/claim that are deemed legitimate in a given case. Corresponding to
these relations are "rules of entitlement", which in an initial definition "are legal rights, which relate to the private ownership of goods and factors of production, contractual rules governing exchange, and claims against the state..." (Core, 1990:6).

Box 1 relates the set of terms to their referents. This conceptual apparatus -- viz.: endowments; a mapping via production, trade, etc.; and a set of possible acquisitions, whose use is rather unproblematic -- is a generalization of models in micro-economics, including in "consumer theory". We will return to the concepts and terms in Section 4, considering possible reasons for their choice, and associated weaknesses.

Leading on from these concepts are two types of "entitlement failure" (Sen, 1981:50-1):
(a) "direct entitlement failure" - a fall of entitlement below subsistence needs because of a fall in the food produced for own consumption;
(b) "trade entitlement failure", a fall of entitlement below subsistence needs due to worse terms of trade between the commodities one sells (e.g. labour) and the food that one needs to buy.
People in Bengal seem to have died quietly, largely as a result of "trade entitlement failures": a "side-effect" of wartime mobilization and "legitimate" market activity. "...the authorities in British India did not see their way to initiating any large-scale public relief for nearly six months after the famine had begun" (1990:49), and they declined even then to declare an official famine. How, without any breakdown of order, could some groups be so marginal? And how could governments and officials remain insulated from the reality? Sen underlined arguments (4) and (3) above: the marginal groups lacked socially enforceable claims, and a remote government could complacently cite the apparently reassuring aggregate availability figures.

Analysis of different cases or issues might lead to somewhat different categories and foci. Sen himself proposed that he was offering "a general framework for analyzing famines rather than one particular hypothesis about their causation", meaning that he did not offer only one view of why people's entitlements may decline (1981:162), let alone a master-explanation that generates all the particular causes. In addition he recognised various factors that are not included centrally in his approach, like illegal transfers that violate poor people's entitlements, failures to make use of one's entitlements because of ignorance, fixed food habits or apathy, and unwillingness to sell productive assets (1981: 49-50, 164). Correspondingly he did make the broad hypothesis that these factors are not usually the main ones in famine, and therefore that we should instead emphasize study of entitlements.

Given the assumption that people make good use of their opportunities, the entitlements concept comes to refer not to the whole set of possible commodity attainments, but instead to its frontier cases, the best cases. Subsequent critiques have suggested that, before the starvation phases of a famine, people are significantly constrained--by culture, habit, skill, and preference--from using many of their opportunities. Even during "moderate" starvation, people may not use all of their food entitlements, but instead balance their own increased risk (through malnutrition) of morbidity and mortality, against their wish and need to maintain assets such as livestock (see e.g. de Waal, 1989; Woldeineskel, 1990). One might then view this as a chosen balancing of returns over time, more than as failure to use opportunities. Such cases lead us on to section 2.2. below, and to cases of famine less catastrophically intense than in 1943-4 Bengal.

The importance of the arguments we have highlighted [(1) & (2), and (3) & (4)], backed by Sen's incisive case studies, justify "Poverty and Famines" high repute. In Watts' terms (1991:16-17), Sen's contribution was to underline the centrality of power and of enforceable rights. His arguments were not new, but their manner and timing attracted attention. In a world of unprecedented food stocks and televised famines, the cool, precise, and lucid argumentation of a distinguished economist could have an impact in universities and donor agencies. The entitlement concept itself--legitimate command over goods--is simple but powerful, and gives a reassuringly scientific label in discussing disturbing themes.
The need to dethrone the FAD thesis remains vital in some countries. In Zimbabwe in the 1980s, government ministers declared that in a (then) food-surplus country there was little excuse for any family in which members were malnourished: it could only reflect ignorance of what foods to buy and eat. While ministers delivered these "common-sense" observations at the peak of post-independence pride, when the Zimbabwe government was receiving prizes for the phase of rapid--but highly unequally distributed--expansion of peasant output, a large proportion of the rural population remained well below the official poverty lines, and in severe danger in bad harvest years, such as arrived in the early 1990s.5

2.2. Famine theory beyond entitlements: Osmani and de Waal

Writing from a close involvement with 1980s famines in Sudan and Ethiopia, de Waal (1990) shows the importance of the gaps that Sen had acknowledged in entitlements theory, especially if we wish to explain recent famines in Africa. He indicates other gaps or biases too.6

Amongst de Waal's criticisms are these:--
(a) Sen treated only the extreme case of famine that involves virulent starvation causing widespread death (Sen, 1981:40); whereas there is a spectrum of cases, with no clear dividing lines.
(b) Sen presented famine victims as essentially passive - as they may have been in Bengal, but were not in the recent African cases. Partly related to this,
(c) Sen gave little attention (consciously - 1981:50) to the processes of change during a famine, not least the fact that most people die of diseases which have their own processes, rather than from sheer starvation.
(d) He neglected too the often fundamental roles of violence and associated social disruption in initiating and deepening famines.
(e) He focused centrally on the case of the assetless wage labourer, so prominent in Bengal but relatively rare in Africa; and similarly,
(f) he focused on the economic criterion of access to food, without much reference to other aspects of well-being - again because his paradigm case is of virulent starvation, as in Bengal.

Osmani (1991)'s defence of Sen admits, with respect to violence and the associated disruption, that entitlement theory (ET, as he calls it) does not examine all the specific causes of entitlement failures, and that famine dynamics involve many other factors (see points b, c, and d above). He claims though that all famines still involve at some stage a failure of food entitlements (p.591). Sen appears to say the same: "in the case of famines the collapse of food entitlements is the initiating failure in which epidemics themselves originate" (Dreze & Sen, 1989:66).

In Osmani's terms, ET identifies failure of food entitlements as the proximate cause of famines. ET does not itself indicate the deeper causes or the subsequent dynamics of famine, though it may help to direct our attention in particular ways. Osmani thus distinguishes three (or
four) foci for analysis, which I specify as 1, 2, 3 (and 4) in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1. [0 - Concepts used, including concepts on nature of famine]

1 - Proximate cause(s) <----- 2 - Deeper causes
of famine

\|/

3 - Subsequent dynamics <----- 4 - Further causal factors
of the famine

De Waal (1991) replies first that Osmani's claim is not correct in
general. Consider for example the role of violence; RENAMO bandits
clearly reduce peasants' command over food, but seizing food does not
reduce peasants' legal entitlements. And second, the claim is not very
substantial as a "causal theory" (Osmani, p. 588) even for those cases
where it is correct. De Waal sketches a more substantial theory: which
highlights the importance in famines of issues of destitution (asset-
loss) and not only issues of hunger; and which responds to the relative
weakness of the link from hunger or undernutrition to deaths, by
including the roles of violence and of collapsing social organization in
generating and spreading fatal epidemics. In his book he further
stresses that patterns of response are very locally specific, depending
on the social economy, ecology, and social values (1989, Ch. 9).

In effect de Waal argues that Osmani's model (Fig. 1, without level
0) oversimplifies, fails to clarify the nature and variety of famines,
and so can sustain the use of Bengal-type suppositions. Hence its
presumption that we only need to distinguish one "proximate cause".
Jaspars & Young (1992), like de Waal, offer a more complex and
empirically based model, that diverges from the one implicit in 'Poverty
and Famines'. We might thus add a level 0 in the diagram, concerning
the concepts used throughout. Here ET provides an important set of concepts
for analyzing famines, but not a sufficient set.8

To preserve his general claim that every famine involves a failure
of food entitlements, Osmani holds that violent removal of access (as by
RENAMO) is also removal of entitlement, in the sense of loss of ability
to acquire food using legal means. So "if such disruptions do cause a
famine, they can only do so by causing a failure of food entitlement"
(Osmani, 1991: 590-1). Is this definition acceptable?

Fig. 2. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEORETICALLY ATTAINABLE IN TERMS OF THE LAW</th>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<th>ATTAINABLE IN PRACTICE</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
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Cases A, B and D in Figure 2 are simple to handle. All of A is
clearly in the entitlements set. All B and D are clearly not: B concerns
real possibilities of acquisition by criminal means; D concerns impossible criminality. Case C concerns the harder case of legal rights that are, in practical terms, unenforceable. Entitlement theory seems to have begun with the assumption that cases of type C (or B, criminal acquisition) are in general not very important. This is highly questionable (see e.g. Duffield, 1992). Case C then raises problems of classification: do entitlements, in Sen's sense, refer to what is theoretically legally attainable, i.e. the sum of A and C, or only to what is both theoretically and practically attainable in terms of the law, i.e. only to A? We can call these respectively the legal and the practical definitions. Osmani highlights that illegal transfers (case B for the bandits) are in practice often not remediable through the law (which means case C for the victims). He proposes that entitlements refer only to A: the practical definition.

Note that Osmani uses the practical definition in order to protect ET's claims as a general explanation of famines. Sen himself was less concerned to distinguish the two definitions. Perhaps case C appeared unimportant for Bengal. In section 4.2. we also suggest he had an interest to assess the adequacy of formal legal entitlements, covering both A and C, i.e. the legal definition.

If one accepts Osmani's definition of "entitlement", de Waal suggests that the so-called "causal theory" of famines is then itself true by definition (1991:598-9). This makes it not so much a theory as an organizing framework. This helps us understand Osmani's further claim: "If ET has flaws, they must be sought in its own logical structure" (p.593).

"ET" thus reduces to a partial framework to be used in the analysis of famines, rather than a complex model of causation or a general theory in the real sense. We might better speak, with Sen, of "the entitlement approach" (1981, Ch.5) or entitlements analysis, rather than of the "entitlements theory" which de Waal criticizes and Osmani defends; EA rather than ET. As Sen said, it is a "general framework" (1981:162), which here means a framework of wide applicability, helpful for the analysis of many cases, but not for all aspects, and likely to be less useful for some cases than others. De Waal concludes that "Famines are sufficiently diverse...that what is required is a heterogenous approach" (1990:605).

Before looking at extensions of entitlements analysis, we need to sum up what this would be an extension of. The key elements are: (i) analysis of effective/legitimate command, and its various channels and determinants, including attention to (ii) the rules and institutions that control access, and to (iii) the distinctive positions and vulnerabilities of different groups. And our conclusions so far are: the entitlements approach provides a valuable framework for analysing famines, emphasizing the centrality of power and of enforceable rights, but it is not a complex causal theory; and its appealing central concepts inevitably need further definition as we face a wider range of cases.
2.3. Famine- and hunger-policy analysis: the WIDER project

After Sen's 1970s work on famines, in the 1980s he and associates extended the entitlements approach to cover hunger in general, and to identify and assess policy options. Their work for the World Institute of Development Economics Research (WIDER) has also responded to criticisms of "Poverty and Famines". What concern us here though are the extension beyond famines and the moves on to systematic policy analysis, to ensuring that people have and obtain entitlements.

The WIDER work makes no claim that hunger policy analysis requires only EA. For example, the lesson of the importance of political and media pressure upon governments is certainly not specific to EA. But the entitlement approach's merit (in comparison especially to FAD theory) is that:

"Seeing hunger as entitlement failure points to [a wider range of] possible remedies as well as helping us to understand the forces that generate hunger and sustain it. In particular this approach compels us to take a broad view of the ways in which access to food can be protected or promoted, including reforms of the legal framework within which economic relations take place" (Drez & Sen, 1989:24).

Entitlements analysis has major implications for famine anticipation and famine relief, not just famine prevention (Sen, 1987a). Both relief and prevention are conceived as involving the protection of food entitlements, which can be done in many different ways. The elaboration of these insights, summarized in Drez and Sen (1989), has received wide and deserved acclaim.

In light of the disputes seen earlier over ET/EA, we should note a few features of Drez & Sen's book. Firstly, "Hunger and Public Action" does not rely on elaborate use, or further elaboration, of much of the apparatus in "Poverty and Famines", like the E-mapping and commodity space, which are almost conspicuous by their absence. This is not mainly because Drez and Sen aim at a wide audience. For their purposes, of identifying and reviewing policy options, the apparatus is unnecessary, and could be unhelpful (for example aggregating as an E-mapping those things one wants to separately focus on). Drez and Sen unpack the overloaded E-mapping. EA functions very well for them, as a generative schema, a set of prompting questions which encourages (rather than "compels") a broad view. They have no need for the greater pretensions of ET, important though those may initially have been in establishing tolerance of EA amongst economists.

Where theoretical elaboration is found useful is instead, secondly, in making connection to Sen's analysis of "capabilities", for those are the real focus of interest: what people can do and be with their entitlements. Thirdly, even a concern with hunger leads the analysis well beyond food, for "the capability to be nourished depends crucially on other characteristics of a person that are influenced by such non-food factors as medical attention, health services, basic education, sanitary arrangements, provision of clean water, eradication of infectious
epidemics, and so on" (Dreze & Sen, 1989:177). Therefore there must be a "broadening of our concern from food entitlements to more general entitlements" (p.178). The second half of the book thus has a much wider focus than hunger; and indeed treats health, education and so on as also of value in their own right, and as general basic needs, not only as aids to physical nourishment. Finally, this broadening seems to bring a further relative decline in the use of ET terminology, though there are new entrants too, notably "essential entitlements" (p.267) and "basic entitlements" (p.269), which return us to basic needs discourse.

Why this decline of ET, the earlier conceptual apparatus? Analysis focused on famine or hunger could work tolerably well by generalizing economics' "consumer theory": proceeding from endowments, with a mapping via production and trade, which generate an income to use on goods and services, in turn directly used. Amongst many real-world complications (ignorance, time, culture, etc.), public goods and other aspects of welfare (e.g. "self-respect, or freedom from social harassment"; Sen, 1984:500) may necessitate a different approach. Neither income nor legal rights give a good idea of the degree of effective access to vital public goods: "If there is no hospital in the neighbourhood or no school within easy reach - or if there are hospitals and schools but with highly limited capacity - the income [or constitutional rights] of the would-be purchaser may not give much of an idea as to whether the person can or cannot acquire these commodities" (Sen, 1984:520; my addition). Similarly, a school that provides classes but not skills may be little use; hence the need for attention to capabilities, not just goods and services. Jodha (1989)'s record of villagers' perceptions illustrates the importance of public goods and non-income sources of well-being. He found a very large proportion of the inhabitants of a Rajasthan village clearly worse off by official income criteria compared to two decades earlier, yet declaring themselves better off overall, because of improvements in social independence, variety in diet, ability to send children to school (even if it reduced family income), and so on.

WIDER's and related work has gone on to look at a variety of sources of entitlement decline/variation [see (2) in Fig.1 above], though without aspiring to grand theory. A recent paper by Teubal (1992), on food (in)security in Argentina, does try to relate Sen's earlier work to grander conceptualizations of causes (see Fig.3). (Teubal's own analysis is more at the level of 'regimes of accumulation'.)

\[\text{Fig.3. ACCESS TO FOOD} \]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
| /| \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ | /| \\
\end{array}
\]
\[
\text{REGIMES OF ACCUMULATION} \rightleftarrows \text{FOOD SYSTEMS} \\
\text{(Social articulation)}
\]

(Source: Teubal, 1992:14)

Proceeding in these directions, we move beyond analysis of food and hunger, and on to distribution in general.
3. NEW EXTENSIONS OF ENTITLEMENTS ANALYSIS

One frequently now finds work that describes itself as entitlements analysis and acknowledges a debt to Sen. It spans many different subjects and treatments. This section has three objectives: first, to elucidate the nature of the range; second, to show further that the entitlements approach is indeed a type of approach or problematique, not a single or precise or integrated theory; and third, to look at the various types of relation of such work to Sen's, and at the implications. Some work limits itself to elaborating Sen's formulations; some tries to build from but modify them; other examples consciously distance themselves from his specifics.

3.1. Theory and practice

(i) Towards a general analysis of distribution?

While Sen has taken the entitlements approach well beyond hunger and food, he remarked that "there is clearly little point in trying to develop a general theory of exchange entitlement determination" (Sen, 1981:174). The range of determinants is enormous. The "E-mapping" is thus a conglomerate of numerous factors, which can include for example public provision, such as social security or famine relief supplied as of right. The "practical definition" of the mapping will reflect the strength of pressures on government to make such public provision, and to enforce or implement legal rights (see e.g. Sobhan, 1990).

Such issues increase the possible gap between "entitlement" and receipt, compared to a 1940s Bengal situation with no supplementary rights or provision. Apthorpe comments unsympathetically:

...the somewhat legalistic idea of "entitlement" has been used of late... in Indian famine studies, and belongs mainly to the set of concerns that some schools in development economics call "social aspects". Concepts such as "entitlement"... may take the social development analysis of poverty further than approaches which are not thus informed. However, in [Asia's] prevailing social circumstances ... the acquisition of legal entitlement to a benefit is a rather theoretical gain. Being entitled to claim a benefit, after all, does not mean that such a benefit will be [known or] claimed, let alone obtained, where it is due. (UNESCAP, 1990:41; my addition)11

The E-mapping notion and the entitlements set can also become unhelpfully broad when we move outside the short term, so wide will the range of possibilities be. Even for the short term the range is more easy to define for, say, agricultural labourers (a main focus for Sen), than for speculators, who are another central player in famines and on wider stages. For speculative gains or losses can vary enormously.

Since the E-mapping covered so much, we should not be surprised that Woldeemeskel, for one, comprehensively misreads it. He berates Sen for supposedly neglecting institutional elements and market forces
(1990:492), and for incorporating institutional elements only as influences on what we possess (p.493). In reality, these factors are part of the E-mapping. I agree with Woldemeskel that the conceptual apparatus in 'Poverty and Famines' directed considerable attention to possession, people's endowments; but my explanation differs from his, and will be given in Section 4.

Despite these sorts of difficulty, many authors look to entitlements theory/analysis as one starting point for discussing distribution, given the strengths we saw earlier. Here in section 3.1. we look at examples framed at a very broad level, whether for purposes of explanation or of policy and planning. In section 3.2. we turn to more specific examples.

(ii) Theorizing acquirement

In an ambitious paper on "Entitlement and Development", de Gaay Fortman (1990) presents "An Institutional Approach to the Acquirement Problem". He notes that even legal entitlements are often not clearcut (p.5; and claims, rather unfairly, that Sen presumes they are). Vagueness and ambiguity still abound in formalized legal systems; nor are determinate legal rights always enforced or enforceable, as we saw. And beyond legal rights, for example within institutions, effective access typically depends not only on formal rules but on particular relationships of authority and influence. He warns that "analysis of institutions as bases of entitlement and commitment should not focus so much on rules [which are never complete, totally clear, or unfailingly applied] but rather on the sources of the rules and the sources of effective inducement, coercion and claiming" (1990:8; emphasis added). One must consider rules' actual backing and operation: the whole institution, not only the formally constituted organization.

De Gaay Fortman still finds EA useful, partly because of the emphasis on disaggregation. "Development means change and change produces conflicts in terms of rights and obligations. Entitlement analysis is a way of getting insight into such disputes..." (p.2). His own "approach is to concentrate on sources of entitlement" (p.5; emphasis added), not the supposed determinate link from rules to access. Indeed this is the approach of Dreze & Sen (1989) too. He specifies the sources as: 1. direct access to resources, 2. affiliation to institutions, 3. arrangements by the State, and 4. the international legal order. While the last of these may act only through the other three, he finds it worth highlighting. De Gaay Fortman thus considers that EA can give a frame for studying processes of acquirement, and he sketches a treatment. His emphasis on sources of entitlement shifts our attention from sets of income options, to rules and systems of entitlement.

He thus modifies Sen's problematique, back towards older senses of entitlements as rights; and in effect calls for an institutional economics subtler and broader than the current "new institutional economics", which mostly examines assumed maximizing behaviour by individuals under various sets of organizational rules. "Entitlement analysis may bring development policy back to its core: institution-
building" (p.29). He stresses for example the "importance of customary sources of law... as guarantees against growing inequality and marginalization. If traditional institutions really have to go, then they should be replaced by new entitlement processes, also rooted in firmly built institutions" (1990:24-5).

De Gaay Fortman then outlines a research agenda and a campaign agenda. The latter includes publicity for ideas of international human rights, as a basis for programmes of conscientization and mass pressure. As Watts (1991) says, empowerment must be the route to entitlement. The research agenda includes "proper analyses of the constraints in present entitlement processes" (de Gaay Fortman, 1990:27), and of the potential of various proposed State, NGDO, and community arrangements, planning procedures, and so on, for "operationalizing economic and social rights in terms of institutions, values and methods of valuation" (p.28). Here "we are still at the beginning of a long process" (p.28); for example if we wish to devise methods of valuation as serviceable as economic cost-benefit analysis and yet with a richer moral basis.

Gore (1991)'s project is more modest, and analytical rather than policy-oriented. It complements de Gaay Fortman's. He relates Senist EA to other lines of work:- on the negotiation and interpretation of the meaning of legal rights, both in legal judgements and bureaucratic practice, including access theory's work on the administrative allocation of public sector benefits; on conventions and negotiations within the household, or within peasant communities (at least as seen by the "moral economy" school); on provision of public facilities; and more. We return in section 4 to the criticisms he then makes of Sen's use of terms; and will look before that at discussion of entitlements in the household.

Both Gore and de Gaay Fortman move outside Sen's own terms, though Gore focuses on relating them to other theories. De Gaay Fortman seeks rather to build on the new wave of interest generated by Sen, to invigorate the longstanding programme of socio-institutional economics. At the aid agency end of the programme there is a demand for clearcut planning procedures.

(iii) Operationalizing entitlements analysis?

Many agencies and researchers talk of operationalizing entitlements analysis. Yet Sen's concept of entitlement is sometimes problematic, and the determinants of entitlements are typically numerous and complex; so the results are often hardly computable - especially once we look at multiple time periods, and at situations marked by risk and uncertainty. In general: "Factual analysis of 'alternative commodity bundles' is not quite possible" (de Gaay Fortman, 1990:5). Such analysis is more manageable in the special case of a famine, for the issue of whether the access of very poor groups to a staple food allows them to subsist. Given the computability problems, we cannot produce a precise "entitlements impact analysis" comparable to cost-benefit analysis (or perhaps even environmental impact analysis).
Two things that operationalization of entitlements analysis can mean though are: (i) an enriched social impact analysis or Planning Balance Sheet Analysis; and (ii) pursuing the agenda of analysing and helping build institutions that will safeguard the interests of the poor and vulnerable. In the second case the challenge is to foster institutions that generate resources and responsibilities, not only expectations and demands. (The ANC in South Africa thus wishes to avoid creating "a culture of entitlement", according to its head of economic planning, cited in The Economist, 1993:20.) That subject requires other papers. Here I will comment briefly on the other case, impacts analysis.

Entitlements impact analysis is likely to be workable and useful for certain cases, not all. Often there are difficulties in distinguishing groups in a satisfactory way and in obtaining worthwhile data. While entitlements analysis is unlikely to give precise calculations of prospective, or actual, effects of certain measures, sometimes rough calculations will be feasible, enlightening, and enough. In addition we can think of a modified structuring of the assessment process, that promotes attention to, and representation of, the interests and voices of vulnerable groups. As in existing Planning Balance Sheet Analysis, we will not expect to sum the categorized and identified impacts to give an "overall" answer or conclusion. The exercise would instead be to inform political decision, and to guide the eyes of decision-makers, planners, and publics. In order to sustain and inform that attention, the analysis should provide a format and forum in which the interests and vulnerabilities of various groups can be presented and highlighted, by themselves and others, and so feed a public debate and exchange that influences decision-makers and perceptions more generally. In Watts's terms, in order for entitlement analyses to have much influence, they will have to become analyses for empowering as well as for enlightening.

3.2. Entitlements analyses of privatization, households, and environment

With these general studies of acquisition or procedures for "entitlements impact analysis", we move quite some way from the framework of "Poverty and Famines". In contrast many authors who look at specific topics or cases cite Sen and his framework as their starting point. However we see varying degrees of adherence in practice.

Fitzgerald's study of "Economic Reform and Citizen Entitlements" (1991) wishes to analyse the major shifts in access to goods in Eastern Europe since 1989. His concern covers all consumption, including use of public goods; and he proposes in particular the need to replace public goods provision that was previously handled by employers. He argues that, in order to attain the social acceptance needed for economic adjustment, one must recognize popular demands for minima in the overall private-plus-public wage, though this will only be feasible with major outside aid. In looking at requirements for social acceptance, he may need more attention to normative bases of 'entitlement'. Sen's positive version of entitlements analysis does not seem to take Fitzgerald's analysis anywhere new, but is carried lightly.
Closer to ET, in an article entitled "an application of Sen's theory of entitlements", Aslanbeigui & Summerfield (1989) describe the possible negative impacts on women's incomes of the decline of socialist organization in rural China since the 1970s. They use "entitlement" as a synonym for real income -- a reduced form of the practical definition. In other words they focus not on women's legal titles, nor on their moral claims in terms of local norms, but instead on their actual receipts, which may not well reflect either legal titles or local norms. Norms of intra-family division, for example, are undefined, disputed, and violated. So too of course are norms of intra-societal division (see e.g. Vandegeest, 1991).

Kabeer and Aziz (1990) more extensively probe intra-household distribution and rural women's entitlements, especially legitimated access to food, using rewarding case studies of Bangladesh and the Gambia. (See also Kabeer, 1991, for a version without entitlements language.) They test, refine, and qualify Sen's work (1984, 1987b) on how women's entitlements ("extended entitlements") depend on negotiations within the household. The outcomes reflect (a) women's degree of economic independence, (b) how far they neglect their own well-being for the rest of the household, (c) the culturally relative perceptions of what constitutes a (economic) contribution, and (d) how far women are subject to intimidation. For Bangladesh, Kabeer and Aziz come to contrast "kin-ascribed entitlements" -- transfers within the family, which can especially reflect factors (b), (c) and (d) -- with "own-labour [based] entitlements", which can be more independent of them (p.42). They stress too the unequal distribution of obligations, e.g. for household upkeep and child care; we may call these negative entitlements. Thus in the Gambia, even though women even have their own access to land, the weight of domestic obligations on top of their commitments on their own and other's land places women under enormous stress, especially those of child-bearing age.

So the same approach as in "Poverty and Famines" -- starting from the insight that availability does not imply access -- has to be taken further, by disaggregating also on lines of gender and age. Here again Sen's clear formulation has stimulated work by others, some of which then surpasses his.

Interestingly, in doing this sort of case work, Kabeer and others find it useful or natural to metamorphose Sen's distinctions between types of entitlement relation (1981:2) into distinctions between types of entitlement. "Exchange entitlements" now no longer refer to all that an agent can derive from their endowments (as in Sen, 1981:3-4); instead, for the case of entitlements to food it means "food acquired through sale", as opposed to "direct entitlements, that is, the acquisition of household food supplies through own production;.. and transfer entitlements based on state transfers, gifts, inheritance etc." (Kabeer & Aziz, 1990:4). The language of entitlements-from joins that of entitlements-to. Yet these new usages are presented as being Sen's own (loc. cit.). Similar patterns occur in other recent work (e.g. Cannon,
1991\textsuperscript{16}); including use of "entitlements" to refer to rights in resources, i.e. to what Sen called endowments. For example, Davies & Leach (1991) speak of "environmental entitlements--or access to natural resources" (p.2).

Our final example shows this evolution (or return) in full flood, in a major report prepared by two environment NGOs in Zimbabwe (ENDA and ZERO), with support from IIED in London, CIDA, and other donors. It was written for the Zimbabwe Government as background material for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio in June 1992; and is separately published as a book by the NGOs.\textsuperscript{17}

ENDA/ZERO rejected the stipulated format for UNCED reports, including the heavy emphasis on data capture and inventories. They give instead an ambitious survey of Zimbabwe's environmental problems, with an emphasis on sustainability and "a more critical analysis of the issues at hand" (p.ix), looking at socio-economic causes and not only at physical symptoms. Here they make heavy use of entitlements theory and terminology, in ways not always clear, as indicated in Box 2. My suggested equivalences are tentative; but certainly Sen's terms receive new twists, into for example "exchange entitlements on the supply side".

This sort of evolution has become typical in both popular and academic work. Once attention has focussed on patterns of rights and claims, which are complex and vary over time and place, the terms and formats irresistibly evolve beyond Sen's. In section 4.2. I try more fully to explain the reasons, both good and bad, for why and how this happens.

Fortified by their terminology, ENDA/ZERO probe development trends and environmental sustainability in Zimbabwe. They argue that "The essential problem is the failure of global and national systems to guarantee basic entitlements to the majority" (p.3), which drives ordinary people to unsustainably exploit their natural environments. Adverse "ownership entitlements" for peasant households lead to adverse "exchange entitlements", which reinforce the adverse ownership entitlements in various ways; peasants feel forced to resort to activities that degrade soil, forest, and water resources.

Here again entitlements theory is used not to analyse famine, or even hunger, but to describe entire patterns of distribution, social power, and environmental impact. How adequate or helpful is it for this purpose? In terms of clarity and consistency at least, the attempts in Box 2 seem unsatisfactory. Possibly Dreze & Sen's claim above applies: that EA has encouraged reference to a wider range of determinants than would otherwise receive attention. But the entire ENDA/ZERO analysis can probably be presented more accessibly without the terminology -- as indeed was done by two of the same authors in an earlier book covering similar material (Moyo, et al, 1991). The addition of the terminology may lead to confusion as much as to enlightenment, given the multiple associations of the term "entitlement". Perhaps the terminology lends scientific authority, and offers a new home for radical authors.

(1) "Disentitlement", used as both a noun and a verb (p.2).

(2) "Entitlements" in the sense of "rights", "resources", or "income streams", as in "the unequal appropriation of natural resources entitlements" (p.85), and "disenfranchisement of land and labour entitlements from rural households" (p.103);
(2a) "Entitlements" as meaning "rights", "title", or "access", as in "entitlements to resources such as land" (p.87).

(3) "Entitlements" as rules or principles of entitlement, such as "social conventions... including... communal entitlements" (p.87).

(4) "Ownership entitlements" (p.87), meaning "endowments" in Sen's sense; and similarly "land entitlements" (p.88), meaning specific rights in and over land.

(5) "Exchange entitlements on the supply side" (p.87), meaning the set of physical outputs obtained from endowments.

(6) "Exchange entitlements on the demand side" (p.87), meaning "entitlements" in Sen's sense, the set of attainable "consumption bundles", i.e. how the outputs and consequent income in (5) can be disposed of.

(7) "Entitlement" in a moral sense, as in "the inability of labour to realise its entitlement" (p.98).

(8) ENDA/ZERO cite Sen's "direct entitlement failures" (arising from inadequate endowments), change his "trade entitlement failures" (due to terms of trade) into "exchange entitlement failures", and add a third category, "policy failure", though they specify this as operating through one or both of the former types (p.88).

(9) They further distinguish: (9a) "direct entitlement failures with respect to labour", due to inadequate education, training, opportunities and experience (p.96), so that people's labour power is of poor quality; (9b) "labour exchange entitlement failures" due to poor wages or poor returns to labour (for reasons other than poor quality).

3.2. Distinguishing types of study:
- famine, hunger, and plenty: concepts, models, and evaluations

We can distinguish by this stage a range of contexts and concerns, with variation in at least three sorts of dimension:-
 a) substance: analyses of famine situations, or of wider food security, or of overall societal distribution;
 b) mode: positive analyses (whether descriptive, explanatory, or, as is common, both), or normative analyses (whether evaluative or
prescriptive); and associated provision of conceptual frameworks, whether for positive or normative work;¹⁸

c) location in time and place: for example, Bengal in the 1940s, Argentina, Bengal, China, Gambia, and Sudan in the 1980s, and Eastern Europe and Zimbabwe in the 1990s, as we have seen.

Box 3 indicates two of the dimensions, mode and substance, and roughly locates the major contributions of various authors we have mentioned, plus some who will figure in Section 4.

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<th>BOX 3 - THE VARIETY OF CONCERNS</th>
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<td>Dotted lines indicate spanning of more than one area; brackets indicate secondary foci.</td>
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Is it likely that such a range of concerns can be equally well served by a simple ET apparatus of the sort we introduced in Section 2.1., which was presented by "Poverty and Famines" as a conceptual frame for a primarily positive analysis of famines? The apparatus's ambiguities can foster such an idea. But the variety of contexts and purposes make the idea of a universally adequate, and yet manageable, working version of entitlements theory open to doubt. We probably need various different, situationally adequate, working simplifications.

In famine analysis, Sen used EA for two purposes: to improve on the FAD school, in both explanation and policy, and to criticize the inadequate legal entitlements of vulnerable groups. He succeeded in both these purposes, whatever the limits to his concepts. For other cases and purposes one's conceptualization may need to be significantly amended: for example, if one's purpose is a more comprehensive explanation of famines. Even for famine analysis, de Waal advised us that the "famine" category is not sufficiently homogeneous: there are too many significant differences between Sen's root case and many other famines. On the other
hand, if entitlements analysis proves useful in what is really a whole family of types of famine, perhaps it can be useful for other cases too. As we will see, Gore suggests that as over time Sen's own focus has extended beyond famine, so his emphasis in defining rules of entitlement expanded.

All of the work noted in this section is interesting and insightful. In some cases, "entitlements" language helps us toward the insights. In other cases it is innocuous, whether well-used or mis-used. However in a third set of cases its misuse could be pernicious, burdening thought under neologism, even malapropism.

Section 4 considers whether part of the problem goes back to Sen, for adopting terms that are open to misunderstanding, and for using vague and multiple definitions of "entitlements". It also asks whether such definitions explain why so wide a range of concerns all see themselves as forms of "entitlements analysis". We will proceed roughly in the sequence of Sen's problematique (see Box 1 or Box 4), from relations of entitlement, through endowments, to exchange entitlements.

4. CRITICISMS OF THE TERM "ENTITLEMENT" AND OF ITS USAGE

4.1. Loose definition of rules of entitlement?

In a paper on "Entitlement Relations and 'Unruly' Social Practices", Gore proposes that "Sen defines the rules of entitlement in various different ways", in particular in "three basic ways" (1991:1). He perceives these as follows:

Firstly, rules of entitlement are legal rights, which relate to the private ownership of goods and factors of production, contractual rules governing exchange, and claims against the state...

Secondly, rules of entitlement are these legal rights as they work in practice... [which] involves interpretative judgements in which certain social conventions and standards are used...

Thirdly, rules of entitlement include 'the totality of rights' a person faces in society... [including] firstly, legal rights; secondly, social conventions governing the application of legal rights, and thirdly, social rules which constrain and enable a person's command over commodities, but which are not legally formalised. (Gore, 1991:6)

By his sensitivity to this range of issues, Gore helpfully links entitlements analysis to several bodies of theory on the application of laws, social conventions and rules, such as Schaffer's access theory, and studies of intra-household distribution. He then argues that Sen oscillates between the three meanings, especially over time, and has generally emphasized the first (Gore, 1991:19). We saw though that Sen can distinguish the third meaning as "extended entitlement". Further, there is not a "basic" difference between the first two specifications.
in the quotation. Sen was well aware that laws must be interpreted in practice (1981:49; 1984:457). There is no law without context.

When Gore refers to legal rights "as they work in practice", he refers to the scope for legitimate interpretation of a law (1991:6), not to cases of suppression, abuse, or gross misinterpretation of legal rights: yet those are common and are where social practices become genuinely "unruly". His second definition thus differs from Osmani's, which concerns what one can in practice legally acquire given the way the legal system actually operates, for example given those illegal reductions in one's acquirement potential that the legal system will fail to redress (Osmani, 1991:592).

Sen indeed seems to have moved between legal and other definitions. However, often when he refers to acquisition through legal channels (as for example in the first two quotations used by Gore, 1991:1) this can be read as "channels permitted by law" (not "channels specified by law"); hence it has no difficulty in also largely covering the third sense that Gore highlights. In other words, it covers use of rights and conventions that are not specified in law but are not counter to law. At the same time, Sen certainly has an interest in what are the entitlements implied by legal specification alone. And in the Bengal case these were perhaps close to the total entitlement: the most vulnerable groups had no important other claims that were matched by a binding obligation on the part of someone else.

Sen does wish though to separate the legally permitted from the illegal. Osmani proposes that Sen must insist on legality in order "to ensure the definability of the 'entitlement set'" (1991:592). This is not the real reason. Senist entitlements are already hard to define: though certainly what one could attain from one's endowments, by resorting to robbery, fraud, and so on, would be harder still to define. The order of difficulty becomes greater if one introduces all relations of acquirement. While Osmani claims that illegality by others which has affected one's endowment should be taken into account in assessing entitlements, in this case there is no loss of definability.

Gore goes further, to suggest that Sen has a deeper preference for viewing rules of entitlement as only those rules formally stated by law. Referring to his set of three definitions of rules of entitlement, Gore first proposes that whereas the broader definitions are more realistic and provide better tools in explanation, "narrow definition is more congenial to an economic analysis" (Gore, 1991:21). In fact Sen does not essay fine-tuned economic analysis here. So "a more important reason, I would speculate, follows from the fact that... the work which 'rules of entitlement' do in some of Sen's philosophical arguments is best achieved with a narrow focus upon 'legal rights'" (loc.cit.).

Sen has criticized consequence-independent interpretations of rights, such as advocated by the influential libertarian American philosopher Robert Nozick (1974), i.e. views which say that rights are valid regardless of their consequences (even starvation). He argues that
rights should be seen as criteria of real but finite weight, to be balanced together with consequences and any other considerations. We look at this further in section 4.2. Gore proposes that in this criticism of consequence-independent rights "there is an advantage to defining the rules of entitlement narrowly as legal rights" (p.27), because that allows a clear identification of their consequences.

With a broad view of rules of entitlement which encompasses moral rules in society as well as legal rights, [Sen's criticism] becomes more difficult to sustain. The key conclusion that 'The law stands between food availability and food entitlement' is seen to be contingent on a particular definition of rules of entitlement as legal rights.... [For] The recognition that moral rules in society affect a person's command over commodities makes such consequential reasoning more complicated." (Gore, 1991:28)

Gore has placed entitlements analysis in a wider context, and has probed an undoubtedly grey area within it. But a number of objections confront his thesis, that Sen takes a narrow version of rules of entitlement (i.e. as only legal rights) because only that version allows derivation of precise consequences with which to then assess the adequacy of a person's rights.

One objection is that legal entitlements are in any case not in general sharply determinate, for reasons Gore himself noted and which are elucidated by de Gaay Fortman (1990:5). Next, predicting their consequences can also in no way be precise (de Gaay Fortman, pp.11-12). Sen was aware of these problems (1981:49) and implicitly held that the orders of magnitude were not such as to invalidate his approach, for the purposes and cases concerned - e.g. he held that he could indeed still ascertain whether the legal entitlements of specific vulnerable groups were enough to cover subsistence in his cases of famine, even though for other cases the adequacy of entitlements might be indeterminate. Furthermore, if the difficulty were so great, then the explanatory project which Gore outlines (3.1. above) could be in yet greater trouble, for it involves a wider range of determinants, and may need a greater level of precision than simply establishing whether one's legal rights suffice for subsistence.

Perhaps most importantly, if the inadequacy of legal entitlements is or could be counteracted in certain cases by the operation of moral rules that are outside, but not contrary to, the law, this does not mean that the legal entitlements are adequate, only that they have been outflanked. Assessing the legal entitlements is not the same as assessing the society, except where there are no other sources of entitlement (as may almost have been true in the Bengal case).

We can sum up by saying that a narrow version of "rules of entitlement" is appropriate for Sen when criticizing Nozick and extreme interpretations of legal property rights--necessarily so, since Nozick uses that narrow version, and that is what Sen wishes to assess, in a famine situation. But when it comes to explanatory purposes then we
Indeed need a broader conception of rules of entitlement, especially for cases different from 1940s Bengal.

4.2. Why "entitlements"? Why not?

The term 'entitlement' might not have been well chosen. It is liable to be confused with a moral right, though it was warned that this would be a mistake. The focus was more on legality... The term also suggested that... the concept itself, might be novel, which certainly it is not. (Sen, 1984:30)

Sen gave the food issue a normative content through formulation of the concept of entitlement. (Holmboe-Ottesen & Wandel, 1990:60).

The deeper difficulties with Sen's use of 'entitlement' are that the term was already widely used with different intents from his.

(i) A term with strong normative connotations has been chosen (though not coincidentally) for a positive construct;

(ii) It is applied not to people's endowments but to the potential consequences of the endowments; and specifically to the most favourable amongst those potential outcomes;

(iii) The term 'exchange entitlement' has misleading associations, and has taken on a different meaning in the hands of many users.

(i) Positive and normative meanings

In everyday language, 'entitlement' has both descriptive and moral uses, often at the same time. Descriptive uses involve saying what applies in terms of the rules that hold in a given case, e.g.: "person X is not entitled to Y". Moral use implies approbation (or condemnation) -- often passionately -- of particular rules and their applications to claims, e.g.: "X is entitled to Y", meaning "X should have title to Y". Simon Schama's "Citizens" (1989) vividly records mass outrage at lost or threatened traditional entitlements in the years leading to the French Revolution. Moral usage is very widespread in ordinary speech; for example because often a descriptive use is also a moral use, if the speaker endorses the rules which she is describing as in force (i.e. authoritatively sanctioned) for the case. This indicates the virtual inevitability of 'secondarily evaluative' language, where a term is used with--at the same time--both positive and normative reference. One can still defend the descriptive usage, by reading 'entitlement' as meaning what one has title to in terms of current rules.

Sen's usage is open to dual reading by others when he discusses "entitlement to" and not "entitlement from"; e.g.: "his entitlement to the food he has grown", "the peasant's entitlement to the food grown by him" (1981: 156, 159); 'the entitlement to - and the actual use of - educational opportunities' (Dreze & Sen, 1989:262).

Compounding the problem, not long before Sen first published on entitlements analysis in 1976, Robert Nozick employed a moral usage of 'entitlement' in his widely read and debated "Anarchy, State and Utopia"
(1974). This was no coincidence: Sen's work reacts against Nozick's (cf. Sen, 1984:311-3). And Nozick's usage was no idiosyncrasy; it reflected one established usage in moral philosophy, stemming at least from the work of John Locke (1632-1704).

Nozick advocated a set of principles of entitlement which imply absolute sanctity to individuals' acquisitions--whether due to chance, inherited talent, bequest, acquired skill, or effort--as long as the acquisitions do not infringe a few principles, notably those of agreed contracts and voluntary transfers. Not even the subsistence needs of others establish a case, according to Nozick, for transfer of part of a person's acquisitions against their wishes.

Sen's work on famines analysed the extent, and consequences, of the legal entitlements of poor and vulnerable groups. He made a positive analysis of such entitlements, to draw out their implications; and as a result to allow us to draw our own conclusions on a set of normative principles which could legitimate the starvation unto death of millions, whilst food controlled by others sits by. This partly explains his retention of the term 'entitlement'. But a dual motivation--trying to be a vehicle for positive analysis, and at the same time give an indirect moral critique of possessive individualism--carries some price in terms of audience confusion, via the currency of an ambiguous central term. The normative associations of "entitlement" seem to almost inevitably influence the use of Sen's terms in practice.

The much quoted final sentences of "Poverty and Famines"' main text support this interpretation.

The law stands between food availability and food entitlement. Starvation deaths can reflect legality with a vengeance. (Sen, 1981:166)

The second sentence queries granting absolute validity to legal rights, and is justified by Sen's case studies. The first sentence suggests pitfalls set by the terms chosen. The law implies, and in the process constrains, the scope of a person's food entitlement (in the positive sense). Can we say though that the law stands outside the (positive) entitlement and "between" it and something else (such as another person's positive entitlement to more food than he needs) - even if we refer to the law as also protecting others' property? What the law clearly can stand outside, in the sense of not endorse, is a person's normative entitlement, to subsistence; and it can separate the person from available food needed to fulfil that, normative, entitlement.

(ii) Entitlements as present rights to resources, or as a set of possible resulting titles?

A second query concerning Sen's usage of "entitlements" is that he attaches it not to "endowments" but to his "exchange entitlements". But in Nozickian and common usage one can be entitled to what one has, and to what one legally gets, rather than to what one might conceivably get. (See e.g. Bromley, 1991.22)
We saw that some authors then adapt Sen's use of "entitlements", to include endowments. They speak of ownership entitlements or endowment entitlements (e.g. Cannon, 1991). "Environmental entitlements" (Davies & Leach, 1991) are a particular example: "rights attributed to groups or individuals confirming their control and management of given resources" (p.2). Entitlement now refers (again) to anything a person has title to, by legal or accepted rights (see e.g. Curtis et al, 1988).

Box 4 adds these and other growths to Sen's original terms.  

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<td>Entitlements (as relations that grant rights)</td>
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Second-generation terms seem to fall into three sets: synonyms for "entitlement relations", or for "endowments", and attempted subdivisions of "(exchange) entitlements". In contrast, the "E-mapping" is too much of a conglomerate to invite synonyms.
Nozick focused on endowments; he was less interested in estimating their consequences. True, what one one does with and obtains from one’s endowments can then change the endowments; but ET is not very useful to explain endowments. For Sen’s "exchange entitlements" are a set of optional outcomes which one, feasibly and legally, merely might acquire. Further, part of what one obtains is ephemeral and perishable, so exchange entitlements alone will not explain endowment change. However, if one wishes to assess endowments by estimating their consequences under various conditions, one must of course identify those possible consequences, namely the "exchange entitlement".

Next, the commonest usage of Sen’s ‘entitlement’ notion refers — restated in everyday language — to the most that people might become entitled to. It is a set of opportunities, and differs from what people actually obtain:— (a) people may fail to make good use of their opportunities, or to (b) claim their rights; (c) they may also lose or acquire in illegal or otherwise socially illegitimate ways; and (d) they may give away their own goods, or receive discretionary support from others, e.g. through the kindness of neighbours. No problem attaches to exclusion of illegality and charity (c & d) from the definition of ‘entitlements’ (Sen, 1981: 3, 49, 164.) Failure to claim one’s entitlements (e.g. social security) raises some problems, if associated with questions over whether rights are known, claimed, or respected. But bigger problems arise for reason (a)—failure to make good use of opportunities— as it is so widespread. The size of the resulting gap then between (exchange) ‘entitlements’, in Sen’s sense, and actual receipts is a further divergence from ordinary usage.25

We do need a set of terms, to describe what interests us in an ongoing process of acquiring and using; hence the set proposed by ENDA/ZERO, and Sen’s own distinctions. His “exchange entitlement” basically refers to the possible titles into which one could change one’s present titles (i.e. “endowments”), via production, trade, etc. But the gap between this usage inspired by micro-economics, and the everyday and traditional legal usages, produces problems. “Potential entitlements” would do better as a label for Sen’s exchange entitlements.

(iii) Problems generated by the “exchange”-entitlement label

We saw that though the E-mapping covers production as well as trade, Sen called his category (ii) - what one can obtain from one’s endowments via the E-mapping - "exchange entitlements" (1981:3). Responding to a Nozickian view in which people own bundles, to which they are deemed entitled (hence the appearance of a footnote on Nozick as early as p.2 of the 1981 book), Sen needed to distinguish what he was interested in (i.e. what one can obtain) from that sort of entitlement (i.e. endowments seen as ownership entitlements). Hence the "exchange" prefix. Intentionally or not, it also suggests trade and an exchange economy.

Some of those who employ the terms of "Poverty and Famines" openly or tacitly redefine ‘exchange entitlement’, to cover only trade. Since Sen had elsewhere talked of direct entitlement failures and trade
entitlement failures (1981:51), many writers have grown to speak of
direct entitlements, i.e. from own production, and of exchange
etitlements as what can be obtained via trade (e.g. Woldebeskel, 1990;
Cannon, 1991; Field, 1991). They shift from talking about entitlements-
to-something, to talking of entitlements-from-production/ trade/àc.
Swift makes this move explicit, and even annexes the entire term --
"entitlements [are] redefined more narrowly as exchange relationships"
(1992:2) -- taking it yet further from its origin.26 Naturally enough,
the next step is talk of "transfer entitlements" (see e.g. Valentine,
1993), to complete the trio of production, trade, and transfer, all of
which Sen originally covered by the "exchange entitlements" label.27
Here again his terminology appears unstable and subject to
transformation.

One might well conclude then that better terms than "entitlement" for
what Sen refers to would be "legitimate (or sanctioned) access",
"legitimate acquisition potential", or "legitimate effective command".
The last of these is the other face of "effective demand". Indeed at
many points Sen explains entitlement as command over commodities (e.g.
University textbook that will spread the concept more widely says:
"Entitlement is the command that people can exert over goods", legally
(Wuyts, 1992:22).

Why not take the referent - sanctioned or legitimate command - as the
label? Firstly because Sen's 'exchange entitlements' are only potential
effective command, which may or may not be achieved, depending upon a
person's actions, and upon other people's adherence to laws and
regulations. And secondly, perhaps because the referent is legitimate
command, not just command, Sen wished to retain the "legal associations
of the term 'entitlement' [which] also happen to have some directional
and suggestive value" (1987a:13). As we have seen, however, the term has
other associations too, of dubious value for his project.

So, for both words in the 'exchange entitlement' label, Sen's choice
is understandable, yet rather misleading. Overall, the combination of
an elusive referent and a label with multiple associations brings some
unfortunate effects.

4.3. Claiming terms

Clearly we face several sets of problems for terminology in this
field. First are similar problems to those faced by most wide-ranging
concepts in social science, as they seek to span varied and complex
experience.28 Sen's conceptualization worked well enough for his
purposes in Bengal and similar cases, and can be seen there as suitable
simplification; it faces problems if we wish to build a general theory.
Second, mass social science, not least policy work in aid organizations,
has a large appetite for generalized simplifications (especially under
prestigious and evocative labels), perhaps more than for exploratory
approaches, and tends to cruden whatever helpful approaches arrive.
Third, in this case Sen's wide-ranging concepts are very prone to such evolution and possible confusion, given the labels he adopted. Even if we could improve the labels we would still face the first and second sets of problems; though re-labelling might yet be worthwhile.

A central sense of "entitlement" is "what one has title to". There are very many types of possible or proposed title -- moral, legal, de facto -- as we have seen:

(a) a claim of moral entitlement, without predominant social acceptance; perhaps one would label this as a claimed right; Nozick's entitlement theory of distributive justice is one set of such claims;

(b) a claim of moral entitlement, with predominant social acceptance; one could call this an acknowledged right;

(c) a legal entitlement;

(d) potential command over resources, consistent with the law; this is one reading of Sen's definition of exchange entitlement; in both cases the referent is hard to specify; in this case it might be re-labelled "legitimate potential command";

(e) de facto command / effective command consistent with the law, reflecting how far the law is actually known, enforced and enforceable; i.e. what a person can in practice obtain title to. This last is the main interpretation in the development literature on food security and income distribution; it might better be labelled "legitimate effective command".

Rein and Peattie (1983), writing on social policy in America and Europe, highlight a fourth set of problems, implicit above. We are in effect discussing "claims on consumption"; arguments over title. For industrial societies Rein and Peattie identify various systems of claims or "claims structures" (what others call "systems of entitlement"): within families, from employment, from government, and from capital. Such claims are partly in dispute, and evolve over time; and so, correspondingly, does language.

Since norms are argued over, and even agreed norms do not implement themselves, Rein & Peattie reject the term "entitlement" as too passive:

There is an element of right, entitlement, or "just deserts"; however these are not always automatically forthcoming, and there is also an active process by which individuals within institutions demand, extract, request, or enforce their bids for resources... [When these are] granted as a right, this must be understood as the outcome of an earlier process of claim-pressing... Because there is no sharp line of demarcation in this ongoing process, the terminology is often confusing. (Rein & Peattie, 1983:26)
5. CONCLUSION

Amartya Sen tackles big questions, matters of great theoretical and/or normative importance; such as the meaning of well-being and the causes of famines. His special quality is to combine strength in explanatory analysis with a feel for practical importance, and a systematic attention to normative analysis, where he has been a considerable pioneer, providing both a critique and an attempted rebuilding or replacement of welfare economics. He handles his big issues, whether positive or normative, with a combination of lucidity and system; and thus he attracts interest far beyond economists.

His entitlement approach has certainly had such attraction, for it is a way to look at distribution of benefits (and, implicitly, costs) within a society, and so raises, or can be connected to, very many issues. We have seen attempts to apply it for widely different places, topics, and purposes. The original version cannot function equally well for all of them. For example: de Waal and others hold that as a model for explaining famines it does not function as well for Sudan or Ethiopia as it may have done for Bengal; and Gore argues that Sen's interest in normative analysis encouraged him to stick to a narrow definition of entitlements, whereas his explanatory concerns, especially in work after "Poverty and Famines" (P&F), led him to a broader definition.

The paper has tried to illustrate and explain this pattern more widely: to relate concepts to contexts. We can now underline and consolidate the main arguments; though without attempting a full summary.

1. "Poverty and Famines" made a major contribution by effective critiques of the Food Availability Decline approach to famine-relief and -avoidance, and views of endowment rights as absolute, regardless of their consequences. The categories and foci of "the entitlement approach" reflected in some ways Sen's experience and assessment of the 1940s Bengal famine. (Sections 2.1, 2.2, 4.1.)

2. We saw that Sen, Dreze, and others in the WIDER programme have fruitfully applied and deepened entitlements analysis of a certain type (section 2.3. above). This is neither:
   - entitlements theory, ET, as a comprehensive causal model (i.e. spanning all cases, or giving a detailed explanatory schema); for de Waal and others have effectively queried the scope, force and sufficiency of the "Poverty and Famines" model of famines and their dynamics;
   - nor is it:
   - entitlements theory as a sharply defined, interlinking family of concepts; for we have seen that the concepts can sometimes be fuzzy (like "entitlement", especially "exchange entitlement") or overloaded (like "E-mapping").

Dreze and Sen make surprisingly little use of ET terminology; it is not vital for trying to identify policy options. They do not claim to draw exact lines from endowments and conditions through to access, but instead emphasize sources of entitlement and how to influence them. The WIDER work thus emphasizes substantive elaboration more than conceptual
elaboration, and unpacks much of the "E-mapping" into more concrete matters, empirically observable and open to policy influence (e.g. information, markets for food and labour, pressures on governments).

3. This type of entitlements analysis, can be seen rather as:
   - a problematique and approach, a procedure of questioning and investigation, that encourages wide attention; or as some authors say a partial "frame"; not a comprehensive causal model or a precise conceptual apparatus, and hence not a "theory" in certain senses.
   The **approach** involves, we suggested earlier: i) analysis of effective/sanctioned command, and its various channels and determinants, including attention to ii) the rules and institutions that control access, and iii) the distinctive positions and vulnerabilities of different groups.

   So we can better refer to EA than ET, entitlements analysis rather than entitlements theory. (Sections 2.2, 2.3.)

4. "Poverty & Famines"'s combination of conceptual and empirical penetration has stimulated much other work. This has not always combined similar conceptual and empirical force. Further, the vagueness and multiple associations of the term "entitlement" help to draw in a great variety of interests (Section 3, especially 3.3).

5. Experience with the "entitlements" **concept**, as defined by Sen, raises a number of distinctions and problem-areas, including these:
   (i) narrow definitions (legal rights only) versus extended definitions (including other social rights and obligations; 2.1, 4.1);
   (ii) the distinction between legal definitions (i.e. consistent with the law) and practical definitions (reflecting how far the law is enforced; section 2.2); which is a different point from saying that whatever is written in the law is subject to interpretation (4.1);
   (iii) positive definitions, such as Sen's, versus normative definitions, as in much everyday usage and political philosophy (4.2).

6. Amongst further reasons for evolution from Sen's **terms**, we noted crucial differences between his usages of "entitlement" and its everyday associations (besides the difference in 5(iii)).

   (iv) Everyday usage often focuses on present holdings, rather than on what might be obtained from those holdings (4.2), i.e. on actual titles rather than potential ones; and

   (v) "exchange" brings connotations of "trade", leading to various attempts to subdivide Sen's "exchange entitlements" (4.2).

7. For these and other reasons, Sen's terms have rapidly come to be used in ways distinctly different from his own. "Entitlement" has become a synonym for real income, or rights, or trade-derived income, or so on. Part of this evolution of terms is inevitable, given the differences between ET and everyday usages.

   Certain authors are well aware of their differences from Sen in usage (e.g. de Gaay Fortman; Swift), and some cite other, older, sources as justification. But in many cases the authors appear to think they are using Sen's concepts. (Sections 3.1, 3.2, 4.2.)
8. Has then Sen's specific terminology contributed little, apart from some confusion? Not necessarily. Possibly its rich ambiguity (similar to say the term "value" in economic theory) has served to mobilize and marry positive and normative concerns, and hence to generate much interesting new work. New work is sure to generate new meanings. Further, most of Sen's original insights have not been lost but instead widely diffused.

While the new work is now securely launched, novel and mis-usages grow apace and may later hinder communication. This seems a good time for clarifications: confirming certain distinctions, pruning unnecessary or mistaken growths, sorting out differences in purpose and context (3.3), and perhaps re-labelling a few concepts (4.3). The last of these is easy on paper but hard to bring into effect. Simply increasing the awareness of some key distinctions should still be helpful though. I hope this study contributes here.

9. Any problems with Sen's entitlements theory as a conceptual structure do not jeopardize his other work. The concept of entitlement is not central in his critiques of utilitarianism, extreme libertarianism, and the untrammelled market (Gore, 1991:31; as the reader can easily check via tables of contents and indexes).

10. Sen's entitlements work has stimulated one new wave of interest in institutional economics and economic anthropology. Some of it tries to use his apparatus, often changing it in doing so. Another part links to broader institutional analysis, which adapts its detailed approach according to the problem considered, rather than taking one approach as universal.

Returning to de Gaay Fortman's provocative labels - "Sen, Senists, and post-Senists" - 'Senism' refers to those who stick with, and sometimes mutilate, or elaborate the concepts in 'Poverty and Famines'. Deriving from and disputing with the 'Senists', but often with similar limitations, are 'anti-Senists', some of whom we saw, and secondly, other richer critiques which lead into 'post-Senism'. For the more general entitlements approach as applied in the WIDER project usefully systematizes important themes: the socially disaggregated analysis of concrete aspects of poverty and of the wide range of influencing factors, notably those that can be affected by public action. In this 'post-Senism', the emphasis is on substance, evidence, and policy relevance, more than on maintaining the original terms beyond their area of usefulness. Prominent and continuing to innovate in such work is Sen himself; 'post-Senist' does not mean post-Sen. Some of this work is critical of 'Poverty and Famines', some is highly approving. All has benefited and been stimulated by his example of profound, creative examination of vital real-world concerns.

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1. In a recent reiteration: "Famines are caused by the inability of some sections of the population to command adequate food for survival. The vulnerable groups face starvation as a result of declines in their 'entitlements' (i.e., the set of commodity bundles over which a family can establish operative control)" (Sen, 1991:4). Sen acknowledges that entitlements are influenced in various ways by availability (e.g. 1987:9); but his argument on the insufficiency of the FAD model remains robust. Basu (1986) implies that the government-induced absolute scarcity in parts of rural Bengal meant better-off people were also liable to starvation; and others point out that famine-induced epidemics hardly respect income and degree. Yet Sen established that the recorded mortality amongst some vulnerable social categories, e.g. agricultural labourers, was far higher than for other groups.

2. Sen calls category (ii) "exchange entitlement" (1981:3), even though the E-mapping explicitly covers production as well as trade (1981: 3, 172) for he talks of production as "exchange with nature" (e.g. 1981:172). Later however, "exchange entitlement" is generally simply called "entitlement", or "overall entitlement" (1984:516). So we can simply refer to "E-mapping", rather than "exchange entitlement mapping".

3. In some cases people have legal "rights" to goods or incomes which cannot feasibly be provided, i.e. cannot be "entitlements" in Sen's sense; e.g. a right to universal secondary education, or to physical security, which cannot be realized. We may include such rights in the endowment bundle, but they are undermined by the economic and other constraints in the E-mapping. Curtis (1988) reminds us that effective entitlements have to be backed by obligations on the part of someone else; but further, such obligations must be both feasible and enforceable.

4. One common economic explanation of not selling assets when starving is insufficient. It refers to: (i) balancing present risks versus the future benefits of holding assets, e.g. "people attempting to sustain some future security at the cost of present hunger" (Wuyts, 1992:25); this will be done according to one's "attitudes to risk" and "discount rate". More sufficient is (ii): "safeguarding their assets so as to preserve their way of life, i.e. their autonomy as producers" (ibid.:36). For what is the "one", or the "they", that seeks benefits or preservation ? - a flexible omnivore for "benefits" in general ("utility"), or an actor committed or tied to a specific identity, so that "one" will in effect risk death rather than risk losing one's identity? Especially so if (iii): the death would be of a weaker member of one's household, not one's own. In the utilitarian model of the household, the objective is household welfare maximization, i.e. a system in which each member's welfare is weighed equally, but aggregated, and where any member may be sacrificed for the overall benefit. In reality only certain members are liable to be sacrificed - because of their structural position, or because the utilitarian rule is not (equally) applied.

5. See e.g. Jackson & Collier (1991), on the levels and distribution of rural incomes in even a bumper harvest year.

6. Swift (1989) makes a partly similar set of criticisms. However Swift goes further in arguing that Sen's categories mirror Indian experience, and he may underweight the general scope of Sen's theoretical framework.
Thus he designates Sen (1981)'s discussion of extended entitlements "almost...an afterthought" (p.10), and reduces entitlement theory to a model of how declining terms of trade for vulnerable groups can generate famine. His recent redefinition of "entitlements"--as purely concerning access through trade--reflects this (Swift, 1992), and appears more eccentric after WIDER's work extending entitlements analysis.

7. Swift (1989) prefers to talk of three "proximate causes": failures in the spheres of production, exchange relationships, and household access to assets (including legitimate claims on others). He distinguishes three types of asset: investments, stores, and "claims" (by which he means claims with some sanction, legitimacy, and effectiveness).

8. Note though that Immink & Ahmadi-Esfahani (1993)'s quantitative analysis of the 1984-5 Sudan famine finds ET still a far better explanation than FAD.

9. E.g. perhaps even an epidemic can be seen as reducing people's capacity to command food, in the sense of their body's ability to make use of nutrients. Others will dispute the practical definition, as a definition of entitlement, for it ignores the legal right of those preyed upon to regain their property. See 4.2 (i) below.

10. Osmani's response is defensive. His preoccupation with supposed 'blaming' of ET 'as such' for what it does not achieve, and with non-'proper' criticism (viz. for failure to answer questions that ET may not have tried to answer and was 'not meant for') fit a pattern of defensive defence by (re-)definition, analysed in Apthorpe & Gasper (1982).

11. We have now distinguished these meanings for "entitlement": (i) legal guarantees of receipt; (ii) potential command consistent with the law (one of Sen's senses); (iii) de facto command consistent with the law (Osmani's sense). iii) is a subset of ii). In section 2.1. we noted the distinction between i) and ii): some legal rights may not be feasible, due to lack of resources, etc. Osmani (section 2.2. above) and Apthorpe underline the further gaps between ii) and iii), since rights may not be known or respected. Both these gaps are particularly relevant in the case of public goods, as we noted in section 2.3. Two further meanings are listed in section 4.3.

12. In a related paper, de Gaay Fortman & Mihyo (1991) analyse the loss of entitlements through the displacement of customary law and by other actions of the colonial and post-colonial developmentalist State.


14. The reduction is that Sen's "exchange entitlements" refer to the set of possible receipts/attainments; whereas Aslanbeigui & Summerfield refer to the actual receipts.

15. Vandergeest describes how mid 20th century Thai governments promulgated the idiom of "gift" for government development expenditures, with corresponding norms of obligation (negative entitlements) for villagers. These definitions were increasingly disputed, as villagers came to claim development as a citizen's right.
16. To distinguish between a household's command over consumption - via production, exchange, and transfers - and the consumption command of individuals in the household, notably women and girls, Cannon uses "consumption entitlement" for the latter (1991:303). This is an entitlement-to, not one of his set of entitlement-from's. His "reserve entitlements", for resources accessible in emergencies, could be either (1991:304). Elsewhere he refers to entitlements as relations that grant rights.

17. The three lead authors were the head of ENDA, the head of rural development in the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, and the Director of the Forestry Commission. Purely coincidentally, the first author is also a Charles Gore, like the author of Gore (1991).

18. An example of prescriptive analysis is advocacy of cash-for-work programmes as an effective form of famine relief. Evaluating Nozick's proposed absolute property rights (section 4.1.i. below) can be taken as a case of building a conceptual frame for applied normative work.

19. Swift too suggests that in societies where one's property or income are subject to many legitimate claims from others--kin, friends, acquaintances, and fellow group-members in need--but conversely are also potentially supplementable, by right, from many sources, then the "entitlements" implications of a person's endowments become yet harder to define. He argues that Sen's concept of entitlement is only workable given "the classical liberal economy view" of private property, where property excludes nearly all claims by others (Swift, 1989:12). However Sen's work can also be seen as applying at a more aggregate level, assessing adequacy for a whole group, within which transfers cannot counter inadequate overall command.

20. See e.g. Paul (ed., 1982) and Gasper (1986) for more direct critiques of Nozick's theory of distributive justice.

21. E.g. Kaber & Aziz speak of "entitlements to be well nourished" (1990:76), when they mean entitlements to (i.e. effective legitimate access to) nourishment. Footnote 2 in Sen (1981) underlined that his usage is descriptive, unlike Nozick's; however, Gore (1991:7) centrally reads that note to instead suggest that Sen consequently excluded non-legalized moral rights and obligations from rules of entitlement.

22. Bromley is neither Senist nor Nozickian. He takes the common meaning of entitlements as rights to particular resources or goods. His section on "Property Rights and Entitlements" specifies five types of entitlement, corresponding to different property rules. Contrary to libertarian and everyday ideas, these rights are never complete and absolute; different degrees of scope are possible, according to the type of property rule. His Ch.9 on "Presumptive Policy Entitlements" argues that the assiduously cultivated presumption, that farmers in Western Europe and North America have absolute rights to do as they wish with their land, is a residue from an earlier era of needs to constantly increase food and fibre production. It has spawned a further presumption: that farmers are now entitled to policy measures that compensate them individually for not contributing to overproduction or doing environmental harm; including compensation even for the grants that they would thereby forego! Grants to encourage national food security have turned into income entitlements by tradition. For these farmers at least, entitlements concern what they might conceivably have got, in a
world of unending demand for their produce!

23. These rights are focused on by "Using the theory of entitlements within the natural resource management context" (Toulmin, 1991:22). Entitlements theory seems to add nothing further in the study, but helps legitimize a concern for effective rights (i.e. that are enforceable and will be enforced) and a return from neo-classical fantasy to a substantive legal-institutional economics. Toulmin (p.22) and Davies & Leach (p.3) contrast "environmental entitlements" with "food security entitlements", not "food entitlements" (ibid., p.2), continuing the move back to an everyday usage of "entitlements" as rights, not a set of options.

24. Kynch & Sibbons (1992) for example use "exchange food entitlement" (p.2), meaning command over food, and "wage entitlement to food" (p.11), meaning command over food from one's wages.

25. We can at least distinguish: 1) potentials at the moment of allocating one's endowments/resources, 2) potentials when later allocating one's resulting income, and 3) the actual resulting titles. (E.g. Hubbard defines exchange entitlement as 2), purchasing power; 1988:5.) For in reality, outside "economic man" models, one often does not (know or) fulfill the greatest potentials in either allocation stage, e.g. if in the second stage one buys goods and services at a greater price or of lesser quality than necessary, and thus ends with title to a poorer set than was possible.


27. See note 2 on Sen's rationale. Valentine defines entitlements by citing Sen, i.e. as a set of attainable options; but in the same sentence he talks of "entitlement guarantees", apparently meaning rights to income (p.109). By "transfer entitlements" (as in his title, or on p.116) he sometimes refers to income transfers, sometimes to opportunities, sometimes to rights; and he employs a range of labels: (i) "public transfer entitlements" (pp.114, 122), i.e. transfers from government as a right; (ii) "public entitlements" and "public entitlement support" (pp.116, 117); (iii) "transfer entitlement guarantees" (pp.121, 122) and "entitlement guarantees", i.e. guaranteed income transfers.

28. Desai indicates further complications in the definition of entitlements, comparable to those in defining income: are entitlements the maximum that one can obtain immediately, or the maximum one can obtain without impairing one's endowments?; and under what assumptions about how other people are behaving? (1988:4).

29. Elsewhere they use "contributory entitlement" for entitlements based on desert or contribution (Rein & Peattie, 1983:28).
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