INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Working Paper Series No. 158

A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT AND ITS SOCIOCULTURAL ENVIRONMENT: LAND REFORM AND SETTLEMENT IN THE POMPENGAN INTEGRATED AREA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (PIADP), LUWU, SOUTH SULAWESI, INDONESIA

Dik Roth

September 1993

WORKING PAPERS

Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author:
c/o Publications Office - Institute of Social Studies - P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague - The Netherlands
## Contents

1. **Introduction**  
   
2. **The Project Environment**  
   Luwu district  
   The Project Area  
   Landuse and Land Registration  
   History of Migration and Settlement  
   
3. **The Project**  
   New Settlement in PIADP  
   Land Reform in PIADP  
   
4. **Limits to Project Implementation: The Political and Socio-Cultural Project Environment**  
   The black box of the project environment  
   Land Reform: national law and local reality  
   Local political processes  
   Peasants' land and planners' land  
   
5. **The Need for Sustainable Intervention**  
   
Notes  
References
1. INTRODUCTION

In the seventies, Indonesia still was a major importer of rice, staple food of the majority of its population. The country struggled with high population growth and a weak economy that did not allow for endless rice purchases on the international market. Therefore, one of the main macroeconomic goals of Indonesia was to attain self-sufficiency in rice production through the development, expansion and rehabilitation of schemes for irrigated rice under technical irrigation, largely funded by foreign donors.

Luwu district (kabupaten Luwu) in South Sulawesi (figure 1) was designated to become a major rice-producing area as well as a destination of transmigrants from the densely populated islands of Java, Bali and Lombok.¹ In 1977, a masterplan for irrigation development in the Luwu plain was issued.² From 1980 onwards, one of the sub-projects of the Luwu project that had been identified as suitable for further development of irrigated agriculture, the Pompengan Implementation Project (PIP), was implemented with development aid from the Netherlands. PIP was a project for the upgrading and expansion of infrastructure for irrigation, drainage, transport and flood protection in an area of 9,000 hectares, 4,450 of which were supposed to be irrigable. Apart from the so-called 'non-physical component' for the guidance of water users' associations in the tertiary irrigation units and reconnaissance of the feasibility of land settlement in the sparsely populated downstream part of the project area, attention to social aspects was restricted to minimizing the harmful side-effects of technical planning and construction.

In 1986 it was decided to continue Dutch development aid in the same area. Ambitious plans were formulated for an integrated rural development project, to be implemented in the sparsely populated downstream part of the former PIP. New points of attention were land reform and land settlement, beneficiaries of which could participate in programmes for housing and sanitation, development of houseplots and irrigated farmland, agricultural extension to farmers' groups and water users, and a women's programme. To distinguish the new project from its constructionally biased predecessor and to stress its 'integrated' character, it was renamed Pompengan Integrated Area Development Project (PIADP; figure 2).³

The case of PIADP is particularly interesting because it combines a number of important issues of development intervention. First, during implementation of PIP serious attempts were made to combat the technical bias of the project. This resulted in the ambitious 'integrated rural development' approach of PIADP, to be implemented in a relatively small area of 3,300 hectares. Second, it was combined with a programme for land reform (redistribution of land claimed by farmers), which is quite unusual in Indonesia under president Suharto's New Order government.⁴ Third, PIADP was implemented in a complex sociocultural and political setting. Local historical
processes, patterns of migration and cultural factors have decisively influenced the implementation of PIADP in a way never foreseen during the planning phase.

Even in PIADP, social aspects of project implementation have in many respects remained subordinate to technical planning. The technical and constructional bias of PIP proved too narrow a basis for making the shift to a more balanced and ‘integrated’ approach through PIADP. However, though the technical bias of the project was one of the factors contributing to the outcome of PIADP, it was certainly not the only one. As planning of social aspects of PIADP developed, especially related to land reform and settlement, social planning proved to have much in common with technical planning. Like technical intervention, the social component of the project was characterized by an ‘isolated’ style of planning, in which little attention was paid to aspects of the political and sociocultural project environment. It was first of all rooted in a naive optimism about the ability of planners to ‘make’ society — even one entangled in a complex process of social transition as PIADP — through ‘social engineering’.

Therefore, rather than reiterating the (still existing) need for more attention to the social factors as against technical inputs, in this article I will concentrate on some aspects of the relationship between the social goals of PIADP and the environment in which it was planned and implemented. After this introduction, in the second part of this article I give a description of the project environment and the project area, with special attention to land use and the history of migration and settlement. The third part is about planning and implementation of land reform and settlement in PIADP. In the fourth part, I will discuss factors from the political and sociocultural project environment that were of central importance to the outcome of intervention in PIADP, but were considered external to project planning. Specific attention will be given to the Indonesian Basic Agrarian Law as an instrument for implementation of land policy, to the reinterpretation of policy under the influence of local interests at the level of implementation, to local historical and political processes that are reflected in settlement patterns of PIADP, and to the gap between planners’ and farmers’ conceptions about land, with special reference to the sociocultural project environment of part of the farmer population in PIADP. In the final part of the article I will relate these aspects of the case of PIADP to some more general issues of development intervention. If development interventions are to become more compatible with the environments in which they are supposed to take shape, some fundamental questions about styles of planning for development will have to be asked.
2. THE PROJECT ENVIRONMENT

Luwu district

Luwu district is situated in the northeastern part of the province of South Sulawesi on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi (figure 1). It covers an area of 17,791.43 km², divided into 21 subdistricts (kecamatan). The greater part of the area is mountainous and covered with primary or secondary forest. An exception is the Luwu plain, a 2,500 km² coastal plain along the gulf of Bone, which used to be almost completely covered with tropical rain forest in the upper parts and mangrove forest in the coastal marshes. Since the sixties, however, most development-related activities took place in the coastal plain, which is most suitable for transmigration and local resettlement, irrigation development, estate farming, and fishpond development. Palopo, the district capital, is located at the southwestern edge of the Luwu plain. It is the centre of district administration and government agencies.

The majority of the population of Luwu district is employed in agriculture. Main food crops are rice, maize, soy beans and sago. Estate crops of great importance are cocoa, coconut, palm oil, and clove. Of smaller but growing importance are tea, coffee, bananas, vanilla, and others. The most important non-agricultural economic activities are nickel mining in the northeastern part of Luwu, and forestry, wood processing, and the exploitation of forest products such as rattan in all parts of the district. The economic growth of the past two decades has become a stimulus for other economic activities like the processing of agricultural products, construction, trade and the services sector.

Population growth in the 1971-1980 period was 4.9 percent, mainly due to the demographic effect of the state-sponsored transmigration programme and migration from the neighbouring district of Tana Toraja. In the 1980-1990 period, it dropped to 3.1 percent. In 1990, Luwu had a population of 683,083 people (Kantor Statistik Kabupaten Luwu, 1990).

When the Dutch colonial government expanded its power in South Sulawesi, Luwu was a kingdom under the datu (king). Center of the kingdom was Palopo (Errington, 1989: 98). Luwu had reached the summit of its power between the tenth and the sixteenth century (Andaya, 1981: 19). In the beginning of the 17th century the Luwu aristocracy converted to Islam (Andaya, 1981: 33). In those days, the sphere of influence of the kingdom stretched out to parts of the Toraja highlands west of Luwu, and of central and Southeast Sulawesi.

In 1905 the datu of Luwu was forced by the Dutch colonial army to sign the so-called 'short declaration' of allegiance to the colonial power (Sillars Harvey, 1989: 49). From that year,
Luwu was indirectly ruled as a 'self-governing territory'. It retained its status as a kingdom, but candidates for important administrative functions, including the *datu*, were all screened by the Dutch.

In the middle of this century, South Sulawesi went through a long period of war and political instability, beginning with the Japanese occupation in 1943. After the Japanese surrender in 1945 and the restoration of Dutch colonial power, revolution broke out against the Dutch. After independence had been gained in 1949, South Sulawesi and particularly Luwu entered one of the most turbulent phases in its history: the period of the Darul Islam separatist movement. Between 1950 and 1965 Darul Islam was in control of large parts of South Sulawesi, and was particularly strong in Luwu. Only administrative centers, small towns and most of the Javanese colonization settlements were controlled by the central government and under permanent protection of units of the Indonesian National Army. By 1955, the number of refugees in Luwu was estimated at more than 96,000 people (van Dijk, 1981: 201). Throughout the lower basin of river Rongkong, including the Pompengan area, were bases of the DI/TII guerrilla movement. Strong support for Darul Islam existed among the local elites and strongmen of the subdistrict of Walenrang, the later location of PIADP.

In Luwu, one of the main targets of the Darul Islam movement was the border area between Luwu (which had a mainly Islamic population) and Tana Toraja (the population of which was mainly animist or Christian). The mountainous border areas of Rongkong, Bastem and Southern Luwu, which had a considerable animist and Christian population, were hit by DI/TII actions from 1952 onwards. Under the threat of forced conversion, murder, and looting of villages, part of the population took refuge in Rantepao, district capital of Tana Toraja. Others ended up in refugee camps in Palopo and other towns in Luwu.

After 1965, when DI/TII had been defeated and the impact of Suharto’s New Order government became felt, Luwu entered a new period of development. Priorities were repair of the delapidated infrastructure, irrigation development, and transmigration of farmers from the islands of Java, Bali and Lombok. At the same time, a wave of spontaneous migrants from Tana Toraja started flooding the Luwu plain.

*The Project Area*

Twenty kilometres north of Palopo, the capital of Luwu district, the main road linking this town with the northern part of Luwu crosses river Lamasi in the small town of Batusitanduk. Turning
right after crossing the river one enters the project area of PIADP, an area of approximately 9,000 ha, bordered by the rivers Lamasi, Makawa, Rongkong and Kala-kala (figure 2). The upper part of the area is gently sloping, and entirely covered with irrigated and intensively worked rice fields (sawah), for which it is ideally suited.

This part of the Luwu plain is one of the places in Luwu where the Dutch colonial government resettled Javanese families under the colonization programme from the late thirties. Therefore, this upper part of the project area with its long settlement history, was already densely populated and used for intensive agriculture when PIP started in 1981.

While east of the Javanese settlements small indigenous Luwu settlements had already existed for a long time, large-scale settlement in this part of the area is of more recent origin. In the fifties Christian refugees who had fallen victim to the guerrilla operations of the Darul Islam were resettled in the area. Large-scale spontaneous settlement in the Pompengan area, mainly by migrants from highland Luwu and the neighbouring district of Tana Toraja, started in the sixties. Land was sparsely cultivated, mainly due to seasonal floodings of the rivers Rongkong and Lamasi.

For the purpose of project planning and implementation the total project area (9,000 ha) was subdivided into area A (the northwestern part, covering 5,700 ha) and area B (the southeastern part, covering 3,300 ha). The former corresponds to the gently sloping upper part most suitable for irrigated rice cultivation. It has a relatively long history of settlement, and was for the greater part densely populated and intensively cultivated when the project started. The latter more or less covers the almost flat, marshy part, threatened by seasonal floodings of river Rongkong before construction of a protection dike. It was only more recently opened up for large-scale settlement, and still extensively cultivated and sparsely populated before project implementation started.

Landuse and Land Registration

Until far into this century, land tenure in the Luwu plain, including the later project area, was largely determined by local customary law (adat). The most common form of agriculture was shifting cultivation (ladang) on communal land, the usufruct right of which could be given to farmers by local leaders. Hereditary land of the aristocracy in Luwu was rented out to tenant farmers who were in many ways the dependents of the landowning elite. Apart from this, land was used as pasture for cattle (especially water buffalo) and for hunting (deer). Control over land was exercised by local elites or directly by the Luwu royal family. While the upper part of the
later project area was customary land belonging to the local communities, part of the downstream area was directly claimed by the datu and used for hunting (Hartveld, 1989: 7).

In the upper part of the area, small indigenous settlements had existed since long. Apart from the land used for shifting cultivation (with rainfed rice as the main crop) by indigenous communities, the greater part of the area was covered with primary and secondary forest, bush and grass fields (alang-alang). In the lower parts, primary and secondary forest and marsh vegetation were predominant. For the inhabitants of the indigenous settlements in the delta of river Rongkong, floodplain and coastal marshes were a rich source of fish and sago, traditional staple foods of lowland Luwu.

The colonial period and, later, the egalitarian ideology of independent Indonesia gradually brought about changes in land tenure and the social relations between elites and their followers. The abolition of the kingdom of Luwu in 1959 and the enactment of Basic Agrarian Law in 1960 were decisive in further transforming land tenure in Luwu. Apart from the fact that the Luwu nobility had now lost its legal authority and ruling power (Errington, 1989: 20), land claimed by the Luwu aristocracy (tanah ongko) became state land and hereditary land (pusaka) was restricted by law.

Until 1960 land policy in Indonesia had been based on Dutch colonial law, characterized by a dichotomy between European law and customary law (Hooker, 1978: 19). The new law was meant to replace this dualistic colonial heritage with a comprehensive and unified national law for all citizens of the republic of Indonesia (Hooker, 1978: 1). Basic Agrarian Law states, among others, rules and regulations concerning land reform, upper and lower limit of landownership, the redistribution of excess land above the upper limit of ownership and payment of compensation, absentee landownership, tenancy and the position of tenants. Further, the importance of security of tenure by means of registration and certification was recognized. Registration of all land should result in the establishment of a national cadastre, distinguishing between privately owned land and state land. Attention was also paid to issues like agricultural credit, cooperatives and intensification of agriculture (MacAndrews, 1986: 21-47).

Land registration in the Pompengan area did not keep pace with processes of migration, land clearing and expansion of the area of land claimed. Systematic registration of land claims by government agencies is a recent phenomenon in the Pompengan area, especially in the downstream part. Apart from a small number of farmers who had obtained land titles before implementation of the project, land registration on a large scale by the Land Registry Office was lacking until a beginning was made with the implementation of PIADP in 1986. In the seventies, inventories of cultivated land liable to the payment of land tax (IPEDA) were made by
terrestrial survey. But before implementation of PIADP, unregistered transactions continued to be far more important than formal registration. As a result, transactions such as splitting-up of land claims among heirs of the first claimant or buying and selling of land have only in a few cases been officially registrated for payment of land tax. Land transactions were (and still are) in many cases related to sudden expenses for funerals, health care, school expenses, and weddings. Often, land was paid in kind (a pig, a buffalo or a sewing machine). The only proof of the existence of land claims or transactions were documents authorized by the village leader, or (oral) promises between the parties concerned.

History of Migration and Settlement

The first power to intervene in the land-use pattern of the later project area was the Dutch colonial government. Between 1939 and 1941, 450 Javanese families were resettled in the village of Lamasi within the framework of colonization. After their arrival, the settlers constructed an irrigation system receiving its water from river Lamasi, and gradually the dense forest was turned into irrigated ricefields.

The Darul Islam period was of decisive importance in determining further settlement patterns in the area. In 1952, plans were developed by the local authorities, leaders of the refugee groups and the army to resettle Christian refugees from highland Luwu in the Luwu plain. In what was to become the project area, this resettlement took place in 1953 on a forested site bordering on the Javanese settlements: the village of Seriti. The refugee settlers organized themselves into defense units against the guerrillas, and started clearing the settlement site and farmland northeast of it. Each settler family was allowed to clear a 0.25 hectare houseplot in the new settlement and two hectares of farmland. In the fifties, the refugee village grew fast due to the arrival of new refugee groups. After 1956, village irrigation was gradually introduced on Seriti village land by communal labour.

From the beginning of the sixties, new allocations of land by the local (subdistrict) government took place. To alleviate population pressure in the Javanese settlements, land north(west) of the original Javanese settlements was allocated to landless Javanese and Toraja families who lived in Lamasi. They received farmland to be cleared by themselves, and houseplots in the new settlement of Samelung, designed and staked out by the local authorities.

Similar processes took place in the downstream part of the Pompengan area. Seriti had become a stepping-stone for new settlers, who often had family connections in the refugee
settlement. In 1963, the subdistrict government allocated land northeast and east of Seriti to landless settlers. Under the guidance of Seriti village leaders, the land was cleared, coarsely surveyed and staked out. Part of the land, one hectare per family, was given to villagers of Seriti who had served in the defense units against the guerrillas. Other groups receiving land were village elders and church functionaries, members of the village administration and army personnel who had defended the Christian refugees against Darul Islam guerrillas or had supplied settlers with arms. Planned settlement took place in Tolemo, where a plan made by Public Works was staked out by the settlers themselves. In Sinangkala land was allocated to refugees from Tana Toraja and settlers from the catchment areas of the rivers Lamasi and Makawa. A site plan was made for settlement in Sinangkala.

In 1965, Darul Islam was finally defeated and peace in Luwu restored. Large-scale migration from highland Luwu and especially Tana Toraja then started to fill the area with land-hungry peasants. A hierarchical social system, high population density, shortage of land and high land prices in Tana Toraja were strong stimuli for outmigration (Bigalke, 1981; Volkman, 1985). The abundance of unclaimed land, low land prices, suitability for cultivation of irrigated rice, family ties with settlers in the refugee settlements, and its nearness to Tana Toraja were strong pull factors of the Luwu plain.

Migrants could obtain land in many ways. If it was still unclaimed, they could clear it after reporting to the village administration. If land was already claimed, compensation had to be paid to the claimant. Others entered into rental or sharecropping arrangements with Luwu farmers who claimed land, or cleared and worked claims of Luwu farmers that lay waste, an activity that later entitled them to half of the land.

The growing number of Christian migrants from highland Luwu and Tana Toraja settling in the area and their increasing control over land led to conflicts with the indigenous population of the downstream parts. Local leaders claimed land on basis of their customary rights or as former members of Darul Islam units that had operated in the area. However, such claims were not recognized by the local government. Stimulation of settlement by (mainly Islamic) indigenous Luwu became a tactic of local Luwu elites to retain their political and administrative grip on the area and prevent settlers from Tana Toraja and highland Luwu from further encroaching on their land.

To avoid further uncontrolled migration and to prevent the lowland Luwu and Toraja population groups from breaking into open conflict, it was decided by the local government to forbid further land clearing by migrants South of Tolemo. In order to form a buffer between the two communities competing for scarce land, the local government of the subdistrict of Walenrang
decided to parcel out to policemen some fifteen hectares of land along the border line (Hartveld, 1989: 13).

Through the sixties and seventies, spontaneous migration continued at high pace. Northeast of Seriti new migrants from Tana Toraja cleared Seriti village land and settled in Salu Pao, which became a settlement with an almost fully Christian Toraja population. Similar processes took place north of Seriti, where migrants from Tana Toraja bought farmland from Luwu on a large scale and settled in Salu Jambu, Kondo, Samelung and Topongo. Around Salu Jambu land was allocated on a small scale to former Darul Islam guerrillas who had given up struggle and come out of the marshes to settle down.

Foreknowledge of the plans for construction of an irrigation system and other infrastructure by the end of the seventies, and implementation of land reform and settlement in the eighties were new stimuli for migration into the area. In 1973 and 1980, river Rongkong had considerably changed its course causing severe inundations in the downstream area. Peasants left their claims to make a living as tenants in the upstream area, left in search of new land in Luwu, or returned to their area of origin in Luwu or Tana Toraja. But the prospect of the project and increasing value of the land aroused a new interest in land claims that had been left fallow for a long time and set off a process of remigration into the Pompengan area.

It can be concluded that from the colonial period onwards the settlement history of the later project area was largely determined by planned intervention, first by the colonial, later by the local administration. Settlement policy and land allocation were often inspired by political-strategical motives of the government and local power groups. Refugee groups were resettled in the area to clear the forest and force back the guerrillas. Local elites of the area, members of which had in general actively supported the Darul Islam movement and opposed the increasing encroachment of new settlers on what they considered to be their land, mobilized their followers to clear land and settle in the same area. These settlement processes brought together in the area of what was to become PIADP Javanese, Toraja, highland Luwu (sharing many cultural traits with Toraja), lowland Luwu from the coastal zone (having much in common with Islamic Buginese culture), and Luwu from the hills bordering on the Luwu plain, mainly from the catchment areas of the rivers Lamasi and Makawa.
3. THE PROJECT

New Settlement in PIADP

Before social research on the status of land claims in the later area of PIADP was carried out, the decision to implement a settlement programme for farmers in the downstream part of the Pompengan area had already been taken by planners of the Luwu Irrigation Project. The local authorities had developed plans for resettlement of farmers who lived in the catchment area of rivers Lamasi and Makawa and practiced shifting cultivation on steep slopes in the river valleys. These plans had been incorporated into the technical designs for the Pompengan Implementation Project (Luwu Irrigation Project, 1978; 1980).

But there was serious doubt about the amount of unclaimed land available for new settlers. In a mission report it was stated that 'to the best of the desa (village) people's knowledge, not much, if any, land is still available for settlement' (Agro-Economic Survey, 1978: 5). Another report states that 'almost all land that can be cultivated and even land in the swampy area seem to have been distributed by now' (Wagenbuur, 1981: 9). Therefore, according to the report, 'it seems logical to conclude that the resettlement of 1,000 families into the Pompengan area is not advisable' (1981: 16). Project planning for the area, including irrigation development and planned settlement in its downstream parts, had been based largely on technical and economic criteria. The most important goal was irrigating the largest possible area; in the planning process hardly any attention had been paid to social factors. This pressure for maximal expansion of the irrigation system is understandable. In the upper project area, where irrigation had been introduced some decades ago and double cropping was practiced, project intervention was restricted to replacing the old village irrigation systems of the Javanese settlers and the Seriti refugees with a system of technical irrigation. To adapt operation and maintenance practices to the needs of a technical system, water users' organizations for the tertiary irrigation units were introduced.

By expansion of technical irrigation to the downstream parts of the Pompengan area, project benefits in terms of production increase would be much higher. Land use in this part of the project was still largely restricted to extensive rainfed farming, characterized by single cropping and a low productivity per hectare. Hundreds of hectares had once been claimed but later left fallow again due to floodings of river Rongkong. In terms of production increase, the greatest benefits could be expected from turning this part of the project into an area for the intensive cultivation of irrigated rice.
Expansion of technical irrigation to area B without attention being paid to the issue of landownership, it was feared, would attract more spontaneous settlers from outside and possibly lead to large-scale speculation, increase of land prices and absentee landownership. In that case, the target group of shifting cultivators from the river catchments and small farmers, tenants and landless labourers from the densely populated area A would not be reached by the project. It was also feared that population density was too low to set in motion a quick and smooth process of land clearing and preparation, and thus guarantee the efficient future use of the irrigation system. Stagnation of the process would result in a gradual decay of the irrigation system, and thus in loss of capital and decreasing rates of return on investments.

Table 1: estimate of number of households in area A and area B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>area</th>
<th>number of households</th>
<th>total area</th>
<th>irrigable area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ha</td>
<td>ha/household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>4118</td>
<td>5700</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4823</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ha</th>
<th>ha/household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2614</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4574</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As construction activities reached the lower project area, the settlement question became increasingly urgent. In the meantime, it had become clear that those parts originally planned as future settlement sites had already partly become farmland and could not be used for settlement anymore. Therefore, alternative sites had to be looked for. In the meantime, the same uncertainty still existed concerning the status of land claims in the lower project area.

Land Reform in PIADP

To solve the issue it was decided to combine the settlement scheme with a land policy based on the regulations for land reform and redistribution of land in excess of the upper limit of landownership, as laid down in Basic Agrarian Law. Thus, existing land claims of farmers in area B could be systematically surveyed. After having been recognized by the project, claimants could
be given new project land in return, adapted to the new plot lay-out, land use (with a separation of farmland and settlement), and infrastructure (irrigation, drainage and farm roads). Claims could be redistributed in such a way as to make possible implementation of the settlement plan, designed to increase the farmer population of the downstream part of the project and fill up the 'empty' land in area B with new settlers (for an example of an inventory of land claims, new infrastructure and plot lay-out in one tertiary irrigation unit, see figure 3; note that all land is claimed). Land reform was also supposed to lift farm incomes above poverty level, result in security of tenure by land titling, and positively influence investments of labour and capital by the beneficiaries. In addition, by creating equality of landownership and viable farm units, it was expected that processes of marginalization, land fragmentation, and concentration could be avoided. Last, organized land allocation and settlement was supposed to facilitate the organization of farmers in farmers' groups, water users' groups, and neighbourhood groups.

In 1984, area B was given the status of land reform area. New land clearing, transactions, planting of perennials and settlement were declared illegal. In 1986, selection teams at subdistrict level were formed, headed by the district planning board (BAPPEDA), and attended by officials of the Land Registry Office and other agencies involved, subdistrict administration and village administration. The Land Registry Office started its survey of land claims in area B.

In 1987 implementation of land reform started. It was based on a combination of regulations of Basic Agrarian Law and rules for selection of farmers and allocation of land laid down in a land policy document specially written for PIADP. Each beneficiary of the land reform programme was entitled to one hectare of irrigated or, in some areas, rainfed farmland. Beneficiaries of land reform who did not yet own a houseplot in one of the villages in area B, could also take part in the settlement programme and receive a 0,25ha houseplot in one of the new settlements. Receivers of land were also candidates for the housing and sanitation programmes (packages of building materials for a new house or renovation of the old house, depending on the needs of individual farmers, and sanitary units), and for farmers' extension on farmland and houseplots. Farmers also received a twelve months' living allowance to bridge the period during which they had to invest labour in land clearing, land preparation and house construction.

Officially all claimants of more than one hectare were to receive one-hectare plots, the surplus being used for redistribution among claimants with claims smaller than one hectare, and for settlement. But in practice deviation from this rule usually occurred. If, for instance, a farmer originally claimed three hectares of land, apart from the claimant other persons (e.g. spouse, child, brother or sister) could register as separate claimants and become candidates for selection.
For the purpose of planning and implementation of land reform and settlement, area B was subdivided into four areas of implementation named Sinangkala, Seriti, Salu Jambu and Rongkong (B1, B2, B3 and B4; see figure 2 and table 2). After the ‘pilot project’ (Sinangkala) had been implemented, conflicts arose about the redistribution of land that was already intensively worked. Therefore, such parts were from then on excluded from redistribution. For these parts of area B, a consolidation programme was planned. Boundaries of land claims within the tertiary units concerned were to be adapted to the project infrastructure (irrigation canals, drains, farm roads), and small scattered claims of the same farmer merged into one larger plot, thus increasing efficiency of land use and water management without changing total farm size.

Table 2: sub-areas of implementation of land reform and settlement in area B of PIADP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sub-area of area B</th>
<th>consolidation</th>
<th>redistribution</th>
<th>houseplots (x0.25ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ha)</td>
<td>sawah (ha)</td>
<td>rainfed (ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sinangkala</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Seriti</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Salu Jambu</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Rongkong</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>1129</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Implementation of land reform and settlement soon proved to be far more complicated and time-consuming than had been foreseen during planning. In the pilot project Sinangkala a considerable number of farmers did not accept the results of the selection process and the lay-out of the allocation plan of one-hectare plots of farmland and 0.25ha houseplots. They felt damaged by project implementation and refused to accept the new plot boundaries because their landclaim had not been recognized as valid and consequently they had, at least administratively, lost their land. Others had been given land in return, but less than they felt themselves entitled to in view of the size of their claim. The majority of farmers who protested against the results of land reform in Sinangkala belonged to the group of highland Luwu and Toraja settlers.

In the meantime, it had become an open secret that irregularities had taken place during the survey of land claims and the selection of farmers. From the beginning of the project, a
coalition existed between some officials of the agencies concerned with project implementation at district level and local power groups of lowland Luwu in the Sinangkala area of PIADP. As a result, members of these local power groups and officials received land and other project facilities through the land reform programme. Land and project facilities of petani berdasi (lit. farmers wearing a tie; white-collar farmers) were often rented out to landless Javanese recruited by middlemen.

One of the results of these strategies by officials and local elites in Sinangkala was an enormous overregistration of land claims. To facilitate implementation of the settlement plan, claimants of land on the settlement sites had to give up their claim, for which they would receive land in return on another location. Effects of redistribution of excess land were limited due to the splitting-up of larger claims among family members. Furthermore, excess land was used to enlarge claims smaller than one hectare to the standard size of one hectare. Thus, in the end there was a shortage of land instead of the empty land and a shortage of claimants that had originally been predicted. The problem was solved by a questionable application of criteria for the selection of beneficiaries. Hence, many claimants who had lost (part of) their land claims did not accept the selection results.

As implementation went on, an increasing number of farmers boycotted the land reform in Sinangkala. Many farmers who in the beginning had accepted the new plot boundaries after land reform, came into conflict with the original claimants of their project land, and were forbidden to work their new plot. After one or more seasons without rice harvest, they had no other choice but return to their own original land claim, thus setting off a chain reaction of land conflicts.

After complications with implementation in Sinangkala had become widely-known, farmers in the other sub-areas of the land reform programme (Seriti, Salu Jambu, and Rongkong) were on their guard. Though on a far smaller scale than in Sinangkala, in these areas of implementation similar attempts of appropriation were made by local power groups, especially at subdistrict and village level. As most land in these areas was claimed by Christian settlers from Tana Toraja and highland Luwu, and part of the village administrations were in the hands of local elites belonging to these groups, access of (mainly Islamic) district officials of lowland origin to the decision-making process of land reform was far more difficult. But this does not mean that land reform was more successful here than in the pilot project. From the beginning, implementation in these areas was characterized by a general unwillingness on the part of the claimants to leave their land claims and accept size, location and boundaries of the new project plots. Even in Rongkong, where a new approach to the selection of farmers was followed and the original one-hectare standard was left. Redistribution effects were restricted to the absolute
minimum necessary to absorb farmers who had to leave their land claims to make way for the settlement plan. The number of claimants who were not accepted as beneficiaries of land reform, could thus be kept as low as possible. In view of these changes of policy, it is significant that acceptance of land reform in this area was not higher than in the others.

Table 3: land redistribution PIADP, situation end 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>implementation area</th>
<th>plots (xlha)</th>
<th>in accordance with allocation plan:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of plots</td>
<td>percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinangkala</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriti</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salu Jambu</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rongkong*</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: field reports PIADP.
*   : only partly implemented due to drainage problems.

Selection, staking out and allocation of redistributed plots to beneficiaries in Seriti, Salu Jambu and Rongkong in the end became a purely administrative routine. After the surveyors of the Land Registry Office had gone, boundary stakes of the new plots disappeared and most farmers returned to their original land claims; hardly any traces were left of land reform. In all areas, the percentage of plots worked in accordance with the plot boundaries staked out by the Land Registry Office was low from the beginning and showed a decreasing tendency after land allocation (table 3).

As the situation grew more complicated, original priorities of land reform like security of tenure were pushed into the background. Farmers' protests against selection results were repressed, and attempts by some officials to improve the situation by reviewing the first selection results were effectively blocked by officials who were personally involved and afraid of their careers. Farmers who had lost their claims were promised land in one of the other areas of implementation (where land was already fully claimed, and new problems arose as a result of the allocation of land to them). Under the influence of the interests of local power groups, certification of land, theoretically the final stage in a process leading to security of tenure for
farmers, became a purely administrative by-product of other project targets. Increasing pressure was exerted from the national, provincial and district levels of administration to step-up the allocation of material project benefits (houses, sanitation facilities, living allowances) in accordance with the time schedule. It was stressed by officials that macroeconomic project benefits (increase of rice production, general improvement of farmers' level of living) were more important than the quality of land titling or the fate of individual farmers who lost their land. Land was titled as if no problems existed, even though data on the certificates differed widely from the field situation.

Thus, PIADP more or less ended where PIP, its predecessor had begun: as a project with a strong technical and material bias, and with hardly any grip on the social processes that had once been its reason for existence.16
4. LIMITS TO PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: THE POLITICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL PROJECT ENVIRONMENT

The black box of the project environment

In PIADP, serious attempts have been made to break away from the technical bias inherited from PIP, and pay attention to 'non-technical' factors like landownership, security of tenure, farmers' income, and the position of women. At the same time, control over the crucial processes of land reform and planned settlement have proved to be very limited.

In a way, of course, even after the change from PIP to PIADP the project remained technically biased. PIADP could never be completely released from the original macroeconomic and technical goals of increase of rice production through improvement and expansion of technical irrigation. This legacy of one-sided irrigation planning negatively influenced planning and implementation of PIADP in many ways. On the other hand, prospects for further involvement and expansion of social planning in PIADP were good. The importance of the social aspects of planning and implementation was more and more recognized, and as a result social planning for the relatively small 'integrated' part of PIADP had gradually been given more attention. Therefore, planning of PIADP and the goals and priorities laid down within it, were clearly a product of social engineering, be it in a project the boundaries of which had been determined by the priorities of technical intervention.

Though it is not my purpose here to evaluate PIADP simply by comparing original planning with its final output (which is a pointless exercise), nobody can fail to notice the enormous discrepancy between the overly optimistic pretensions of planning on the one hand, and the harsh reality of project results on the other. To explain the problems with implementation of PIADP, it does not suffice to point to the dichotomy between technical and social orientation and the supposed insubordination of the latter by the former. Though the relationship between the technical and social inputs of PIADP has never been a balanced one, at the same time technical and social intervention in PIADP had far more in common than being just two (incompatible) poles of the same project.

The kind of social planning applied to the downstream part of PIADP was naively optimistic in the extent to which it started from the presupposition that the sociocultural project environment could be moulded into the categories and designs of spatial planners, using a strictly blueprint style of planning. In both technical and social planning applied to PIADP, little consideration was given to other factors than those emanating from planning itself and from some
general policy guidelines of Dutch development policy. As a result, there was such a massive gap between the abstract goals and ideals of planners on one hand, and interests, priorities and interpretations of local actors within the project environment on the other, that implementation proved near to impossible. PIADP, in short, was severely lacking in what Kottak (1991: 432) calls ‘sociocultural compatibility’. The project environment remained a ‘black box’ from which all kinds of unexpected complications arose during implementation. The causes of these complications had — at least implicitly — been considered external to the project instead of being integrated into the planning process. In this part I will focus on some political, historical and sociocultural factors that have decisively influenced project implementation.

*Land Reform: national law and local reality*

The degree to which planned intervention in land tenure in area B through land reform and settlement would succeed, was crucial to further implementation of PIADP. Most other project activities were derivatives of land reform and settlement that could only be started after these key activities had been concluded. As I have made clear above, land reform in PIADP was based on Basic Agrarian Law, in combination with specific project rules. However, the recent history of land reform in Indonesia made this law a weak instrument for the implementation of land policy. Due to its many shortcomings and, above all, fierce political opposition against land reform, implementation of the regulations on land reform and redistribution of excess land to small farmers and the landless, led soon after enactment of the law to severe conflicts, especially on the densely populated islands of Java and Bali.

In the end, Basic Agrarian Law became a dead letter because of its strong association with the Indonesian Communist Party PKI. Implementation of land reform had become a vital issue of rural class struggle in the political programme of the Communist Party of Indonesia. From 1963, a new PKI-strategy called ‘aksi sepiahak’ (unilateral action) aimed at the enforcement of land reform by means of confiscation of excess land and redistribution to small peasants and the landless. Within short time, this new strategy led to violent confrontations between followers of PKI and opponents of land reform, especially landowners and the political parties representing them.

After the 1965 coup, which marked president Sukarno’s downfall and brought Suharto to power, the old social order in the countryside was restored. Especially on Java and Bali, where tension had mounted highest, members of Muslim groups and political parties, landowners and the
military took revenge on alleged members or supporters of PKI in a massacre leading to the complete elimination of PKI as a political force (Utrecht, 1969; Mortimer, 1972; Tjondronegoro, 1972).

Suharto’s New Order period shows a complete turning away from the priorities of Basic Agrarian Law. Necessary improvements or revisions of agrarian law have never been made since, and land policy was implemented on an ad-hoc basis without general and clear guidelines. And, as MacAndrews (1986: 69) remarks, ‘land and its value were seen in the context of the government’s overall development program, which placed prime emphasis on development rather than on the need for social equity’. At the same time, the need for a reliable land policy to support the profusion of development projects in which land is an important factor has increased. Mubyarto and Sutrisno (1989: 121) conclude that, as land reform has never been implemented, it is very difficult to reach the target group of the rural poor through integrated rural development projects.

In the case of PIADP, then, from the beginning application of the regulations on redistribution of excess land met with little enthusiasm at the level of implementation. It had been an initiative of the consultants rather than of their Indonesian counterparts, and remained so during implementation while the agency responsible for its implementation, the Land Registry Office, showed not the slightest inclination to apply its own regulations. This vacuum in decision-making was soon to be filled by other actors on the stage of PIADP.

The labyrinth of rules and regulations, moreover, left much room for different interpretations by the actors involved in land reform in PIADP. For example, about the legal status of land claims on state land (tanah negara) and the rights of its claimants. Area B had been given the status of land reform area, only insofar as no rights rested on the land (PIADP, 1987: 29). While the strongest right recognized in Basic Agrarian Law is of course the right of ownership (hak milik), proof of which is the land title, the law recognizes other rights like right of use (hak pakai) and right of opening up land (hak membuka tanah). In PIADP very little land was titled, but nearly all land had been allocated to settlers from the fifties onwards or spontaneously opened up. In the seventies, the validity of these claims had even been laid down in a decision of the district government. During implementation, members of the local administration and agencies were strongly divided on this issue. While some made a distinction between claimed and unclaimed state land, and took the view that rights on the first should be respected, ‘hardliners’ were of the opinion that claimants could derive no rights at all from their claims and could even be replaced by candidates who had never claimed land in the area before.

But here, another important factor determining the outcome of development interventions plays a role: processes influencing planning and implementation of state policy at the lower levels
of administration. Or, as Ladejinsky, who worked for many years in Asia as an advisor on land reform and rural development, stated with reference to Basic Agrarian Law of Indonesia: ‘No matter how good a land reform is, it is no better than its enforcement’ (Walinsky, 1977: 345).

State power manifests itself in every Indonesian village, but its arms are not equally long in every respect. The state apparatus is, for instance, quite successful in most parts of the archipelago in controlling political activity and in preventing farmers from organizing in independent peasant unions. But in PIADP the central authorities were unable to have land tenure regulated in accordance with the principles of Basic Agrarian Law by their local representatives. Moreover, when land conflicts threatened further implementation of PIADP, they seem to have been unwilling to enforce compliance by all actors. A strict application and enforcement of national policy guidelines at the local level may cause problems rather than solve them, and lead to political tensions between the national and the local level.

In order to be able to realize projects such as PIADP, state officials at lower levels of policy implementation often have to negotiate and build coalitions with local power groups. Migdal (1988: 238-58) here speaks of the ‘triangle of accomodation’ between implementors, government and party officials, and local power groups. In this way, room for manoeuvre is created, which gives local officials and strongmen the opportunity to let their own ‘interpretations’ of policy in the light of private interests and local political pressures prevail above official policy goals. As a result, implementation may considerably differ from the original goals as formulated at the national level, or sometimes even be diametrically opposed to them.

This is what happened with land reform in PIADP. In the end, local officials and elites rather than the official regulations of land reform determined the priorities for redistribution of land. The consequences are no surprise: the interests of local power groups prevailed above the original target groups, and within the sociocultural and political environment of PIADP a target group orientation for land allocation to the landless, tenants and small peasants proved illusory. Sometimes, intervention in land tenure was even detrimental to small farmers. As all land was already claimed, and there was a shortage of land for settlement and the enlargement of small claims to the standard plot size of one hectare, it was these smaller claimants who sometimes lost their land during selection, their claims being judged ‘too small’ for them to become beneficiaries of land reform.

Here we have entered the socio-political project environment, which by planners of PIADP seems to have hardly been recognized as problematic. The same point is made by Quarles van Ufford (1987: 11) ‘It is often taken for granted that government policy actually reaches the lowest level....Theorists in this tradition do not raise the question as to the extent to which such
officials sought to modify, transform, or even neutralize the policy intentions imposed from above.

Local political processes

The majority of the farmer population in the project area originates from Tana Toraja district, west of Luwu and from the border areas between these districts (figure 1). Military intervention in the Toraja highlands by the Dutch colonial army started in 1906, after the occupation of Luwu. In those days the highland population was still mainly animist.

After colonial rule had been established in the Toraja highlands, the missionaries of the Dutch Reformed Church followed in 1913. While each had their own goals and motives, they agreed about one thing: the increasing influence of Islam in the highlands was a threat to both. Therefore, they became allies in the struggle against their common enemy. In order to form a Christian buffer against Islam, missionary activity concentrated on border areas like Rongkong and Bastem. Ultimate goal was to link up with the Christian parts of Central Sulawesi, where mission had been active from 1892 (Bigalke, 1981: 138-42).17

By the thirties, intervention by government and mission had created a new, predominantly Christian elite through education and missionary activity. This group of modern, educated and Christian Toraja became the source of weakly nationalist feelings, but especially of a previously non-existent Toraja ethnic consciousness (Bigalke, 1981: 268). Further development of Toraja ethnic identity was actively stimulated by missionaries and colonial government, as it fitted in neatly with the Dutch ideal of a Christian ‘Greater Toraja’ in parts of Central and South Sulawesi (Bigalke, 1981: 297-8).

In the beginning of this century, land in the highlands had already become scarce. Landownership in the hierarchical highland societies was, moreover, largely concentrated in the hands of elites. But under the influence of the rapid changes of the first decades, and further stimulated by the egalitarian ideology of the newly-born republic of Indonesia, the traditional social hierarchy began to erode. To prevent the ensuing social conflict, mostly about land, from exploding into ever more serious outbursts of violence, in the beginning of the fifties the local administration developed plans for large-scale organized migration of landless peasants to Luwu, where the problem of land scarcity was unknown (Bigalke, 1981: 393). Local transmigration of Toraja farmers to the Luwu plain became part of a policy to solve social conflict in Tana Toraja.
by exporting it rather than have the social order and the position of the landed elites challenged by leftist groups.

In Luwu\(^{16}\), from the beginning of the fifties, the position of the Luwu nobility had considerably weakened, split up as it was into supporters of Darul Islam, either active or as a strategy of risk-avoidance, and its opponents. The vacuum of power was soon filled by Javanese units of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) that provided towns in Luwu with protection against guerrilla attacks, and members of the civil service. Composition of the latter was for the greater part a heritage of the colonial period, with key positions filled mainly by Dutch-educated, Christian Toraja, who actively supported the ideal of a ‘Greater Toraja’.

The diffuse ideological character of Darul Islam made for a great diversity of possible targets. Under the banner of Islam it combined anti-Javanese, anti-aristocratic and anti-communist elements with a struggle against the Christian populations of highland Luwu and the Toraja highlands, which were accused of collaboration with the colonial power rather than resistance against it, and were considered to be a product of Dutch education and missionary zeal.

As guerrilla raids in highland Luwu increased and refugees looking for the protection of regular army units flooded towns in the Luwu plain, Toraja elements in key positions of the Luwu administration and supporting the ideal of ‘Greater Toraja’ found that time had come to consolidate and further expand Toraja power rather than passively wait for things to come. The outcome of negotiations between local government, moderate members of the Luwu nobility, and the Indonesian National Army was that Christian refugees from highland Luwu would be resettled in the Luwu plain: the village of Seriti and a settlement on the other bank of river Lamasi became first strongholds in Luwu on the way to a ‘Greater Toraja’.

Even after the defeat of Darul Islam, the issue of migration from Tana Toraja remained extremely sensitive. By the end of the sixties, migration from Toraja was given a less organized, more ‘low-profile’ and spontaneous appearance, to avoid any association between Toraja settlement in Luwu and political ambitions for a ‘Greater Toraja’ among Christian power groups in Tana Toraja and Luwu. But migration, stimulated by local administration, church and strongmen continued at high pace through the seventies and eighties.

At the local level of the Pompengan area, which concerns us here, the historical processes described above are reflected in the settlement patterns and local political processes in what became the area of PIADP. As a result of the settlement, the Pompengan area was gradually opened up for sedentary agriculture. The creation of new settlements, each with its own administrative area and village administration, together with the breakdown of claims based on
customary law under the influence of the fall of the kingdom of Luwu and the introduction of Basic Agrarian Law, led to the gradual crumbling away of the power base of local elites.

These local elites had actively supported or even played key roles in military operations and administration of the Darul Islam movement. In the hodge-podge of motives for joining the guerrillas, such as anti-Javanese and anti-Christian sentiments, the ambition of local strongmen to take advantage of the post-colonial vacuum of power in Luwu seems to have played a role here. But Darul Islam was forced into retreat while the reaction to it, the organization and stimulation of settlement in the Luwu plain, even accelerated the process of erosion of power of these local power groups. Whatever local elites did to consolidate their power in an area flooded by immigrants over which they could not claim any authority, such as stimulating settlement of farmers from lowland Luwu and the river catchments, ultimately they were bound to lose that struggle. On the whole, farmers from Toraja and highland Luwu, mostly Christians, were buyers of land, while farmers from lowland Luwu, mainly Islamic, were sellers of land they had claimed.

In the beginning of the eighties, competition for power between leaders of the lowland and highland Luwu groups in Sinangkala increased. As plans had been developed to split up the administrative area of the village of Lamasi Pantai, to which Sinangkala belonged, and create a new village with its own leadership (Pompengan), the position of lowland strongmen who claimed authority over this area was threatened by the ambitions of settlers from highland Luwu.

In the end, control over the new village of Pompengan, the future location of the pilot project of PIADP, remained in the hands of lowland elites. Later, project officials involved in planning and implementation of PIADP, all of them of lowland origin, dealt with the lowland elites of the Pompengan area rather than with leaders of Toraja or highland Luwu settler groups. The result was an ‘interpretation’ of land reform which tended to favour lowland elites and project officials above the target groups of land reform. The highland Luwu leadership, in its turn, which had not managed to come to power in the newly created village of Pompengan, also lost in the land reform. Some of the highland Luwu leaders had actively speculated with land before land reform, and tried to expand their following by stimulating the inflow of settlers. After land reform in Sinangkala, they were the first to protest its results and became the spokesmen for a large group of farmers from highland Luwu and Tana Toraja who felt damaged by the selection process and refused to accept the new land allocation that was the result of it.

The situation in Sinangkala was very complicated. While most farmers who felt damaged were Christians, some of the highland Luwu leaders who became their spokesmen were Muslims. Yet, the land conflicts soon assumed an ethnic character. Lowland elites stressed that their claims were based on customary law or traced their origins to the Darul Islam period. Local officials,
mainly engaged in trying to block complaint procedures and monopolize reporting about the results of land reform to the provincial and national levels of administration, were quick to blame 'landgrabbing' Toraja peasants for the problems. Sometimes, accusations were heard that stirring up land conflicts was the strategy of a Christian conspiracy in Luwu.

Peasants' land and planners' land

Due to the extensive land use in area B, the changes in the land use pattern under influence of seasonal floodings by river Rongkong, and the near absence of land titles, precise knowledge of land tenure was not possible. What was known about land claims was interpreted within the rather narrow framework of planners' categories, without reference to the sociocultural project environment. In 1984, a survey was held to investigate socio-economic conditions and farmers' opinions in the project area. In this survey the issue of the possible consequences for project intervention of the status of land claims in the context of local processes was not addressed. Doubts and objections expressed by farmers, who had only been asked whether they were willing to sacrifice part of their land claims for the construction of necessary infrastructure (irrigation, drainage and farmroads), were explained away by pointing to their lack of understanding, and it was concluded that the group of 'early adopters' among them formed a sufficiently strong basis for implementation of the project.

Planning in area B was based on a number of rather abstract goals emanating from planning itself and from general priorities of Netherlands' development assistance rather than being a product of interaction between planning and the project environment. Creating viable farm units for full-time farmers, prevention of marginalization and fragmentation, giving land to the landless, and reaching 'the poorest of the poor' may smoothly fit in with donor priorities and are in itself, of course, very desirable goals. However, they are not necessarily feasible in the project environment, or not even the best solution to needs felt and problems experienced by farmers at project level, at least within the constraints posed by the sociocultural and political context of implementation.

Sometimes mutual consistency of this profusion of planners' goals was far to seek. On the one hand, for instance, creation of viable farm units and prevention of land fragmentation were important goals, on the other the farm size per household was restricted to one hectare, a decision mainly based on considerations of efficiency of the use of land and water, and operation and maintenance of the infrastructure. Prevention of land fragmentation through planning is,
moreover, bound to remain an empty slogan if no serious attention is first paid to local inheritance practices.

Departing from the assumption that area B would be underpopulated after completion of irrigation, drainage and flood protection, and taking a farm size of 1 hectare per household, it was concluded that area B had a capacity to absorb another 1255 settler households (table 1), to be recruited among inhabitants of area A (smallholders, tenants, landless labourers) or from the Lamasi and Makawa catchment areas (shifting cultivators). PIADP, then, was planned as a land settlement project for farmers from 'outside'. Central question for planning in PIADP became 'how to fill an empty area with farmers' instead of 'how can intervention be successful in an existing, historically grown sociocultural environment'.

The approach of PIADP largely derived from the Indonesian transmigration programme: implementation was characterized by a strongly 'donative' orientation (housing, sanitation, living allowance, agricultural implements, seed packages), stemming from the assumption that the target group of PIADP would mainly consist of settlers moving in from other areas (possible target groups were only known in a very general sense, e.g. the poor, landless, shifting cultivators). From those farmers who already claimed land in area B (supposed to be a minority) no problems were foreseen. The exchange of part of their land claims against facilities offered by the project was supposed to silence farmers' protests.

But this donative policy did not fit the project reality, in which all land was claimed. Claimants had, in most cases, been part of the project environment for a long time, and thus were far less dependent on material project benefits as had been thought. This made them strong negotiators in land reform who would not let themselves be 'disciplined' by withholding their subsistence allowances. In PIADP, therefore, the assumption of 'facilities in exchange for excess land' did not work.

Olivier de Sardan (1988) stresses that the 'project logics' of planners, bureaucrats and implementors differs widely from 'peasant logics' of the intended beneficiaries. During project implementation peasants often react in a way never foreseen by the planners. Development 'packages' as they reach the 'target group' are never completely accepted or rejected. Instead, peasants select, transform and appropriate the 'integrated' packages that had been so carefully planned for them. Olivier De Sardan: 'The usual behaviour is to dismember the proposed packages' (1988: 221-2). This is what also happened in PIADP. While farmers accepted project facilities such as housing and subsistence allowances, they generally rejected any connection between the acceptance of facilities and their willingness to abide by the rules of land reform and recognize the new plot boundaries and ownership situation.
Planning of PIADP was based on the assumption that planners could freely dispose of land claims in area B for implementation of land reform, settlement, and adaptation of land tenure to the new infrastructure. It was simply taken for granted that old land claims could be reallocated or even confiscated, that claimants could freely be moved to another area, and farmers brought in from outside. Central to planning was, therefore, calculation of the absorption capacity of area B for new settlers, assuming the allocation of one hectare of farmland per household. It was, in fact, reminiscent of Chambers’ remark that ‘where people are taken into account, they are more often counted than listened to or learned from’ (1991: 516-7). These ‘project logics’ were far from realistic as a point of departure for implementation of PIADP, and the result was an enormous gap between the abstract goals of planners and the reality of the project environment. Here, other factors play a role that belong to the sociocultural project environment. With regard to land, farmers were driven by other forces than planners, and gave absolute priority to the avoidance of any risks emanating from land reform. Therefore, there existed among farmers a general aversion to changing the boundaries of their land claims and treading on land claimed by other farmers. An aversion so strong that even the land consolidation programme proved not feasible within the environment of PIADP.

In their attachment to original land claims, farmers were led by a factor which seems to be of the strongest heritages of customary law, that ‘all adat systems recognize that the effort and capital put into a piece of land by an individual create something of a personal tie between the person and the land. In some sense, as we would say, he had “rights in and over” the land in question’ (Hooker, 1978: 118). Among Toraja farmers in PIADP, changing the boundaries of land tenure without preceding agreement between the parties directly involved was called pemali (taboo). Land reform, however, was a product of meetings and coalitions between district officials, the subdistrict administrations and village leaders. In the decision-making process there was no place for neighbourhood leaders, even less for informal leaders and farmers with good knowledge of the history of land claims.

Land reform, therefore, placed farmers in a dilemma. Acceptation of project rules and the new plot boundaries would lead to conflicts with other farmers, and thus could be a severe threat to the economic basis of their households. Refusal to give in to the results of redistribution would lead to difficulties with the involved agencies. Being aware of the fact that representatives of the responsible agencies rarely show up at village level and cannot do very much to enforce their decisions, most farmers chose for a ‘cosmetic’ variety of the last option: while in daily life ignoring as much as possible the decisions of land reform, they paid lip service to them or promised better behaviour on the scarce occasions of the presence of officials at village level.
Wood (1985: 13) has pointed out that it is a characteristic of development interventions that potential receivers of scarce project goods are 'delinked' from the social networks they are part of: 'Identities (family, kin, clan, neighbourhood, age group) are broken, to be re-established on the basis of a person's relationship to an actual or potential category of state activity'. Land reform placed especially the migrant farmers from Tana Toraja in a dilemma against their kin. For these farmers, who had migrated into the area of PIADP from the sixties, the boundaries of the project area have little relevance with regard to the social networks they belong to. Or, to be more specific, their area of origin was, in a sociocultural sense, not only part of the project environment but part of the project. Farmers who had come down to the Luwu plain in search of agricultural land could, in many cases, leave their area of origin and buy land in Luwu by borrowing money from their kin, selling cattle or a parcel of hereditary land (tana mana'). As long as debts had not been paid off or inheritance matters settled, for migrants who had derived their investment capital from these sources it was impossible just to give up part of their land for land reform.20

Farmers from Tana Toraja and, in a lesser degree, from highland Luwu, were in another way tied to their area of origin: by ritual obligations. Rituals took a prominent place in the pre-Christian, animistic complex of beliefs and rules of the highlands known as the Aluk to Dolo. In ritual matters, a distinction was made between rituals of the East (rambu tuka') on the one hand, covering everything to do with life, fertility and prosperity, and rituals of the West (rambu solo'), associated with death on the other (Volkman, 1985: 33).

'Heathen' rituals were a thorn in the flesh of the Dutch missionaries. While most fertility rites were banned, the death rituals survived on the condition that Toraja would no longer regard the sacrifices of water buffalo during these rituals as a religious duty towards the deceased, but as a social duty towards the guests present at the ritual (Volkman, 1985: 36). Death ritual did not only survive, it even gained a new importance under the influence of social change in this century. While traditionally the staging of extensive death rituals belonged to the prerogatives of the nobility, social uplift of lower status groups through education, jobs and migration has made it accessible for prestige-seeking lower status groups (Volkman, 1985: 6).

Land transactions in PIADP were often related to these ritual obligations. Living close to their area of origin, many Toraja farmers in PIADP showed an ambivalent attitude towards the fulfilment of these obligations which often entail high costs. On one hand they were aware that by continuing ritual exchanges they may burden their children with debts. On the other hand they generally realized that withdrawal from ritual exchange networks would turn them into social outcasts in their area of origin.
The relative abundance of land in PIADP brought some relief. Apart from providing farmers with a basis for subsistence, land had another function: it could be exchanged for ritual capital (water buffalo) in case of the death of kin, while ritual capital could be turned into land. If land transactions that took place in order to fulfill the ritual obligations of the death ceremony were influenced by decisions on land reform, the ensuing conflicts were extremely passionate. If, for instance, a farmer had been given part of the land claim of another farmer in exchange for a water buffalo, but found his claim not recognized in the selection of candidates for land reform while the receiver of the buffalo was accepted as a beneficiary of the project, a serious conflict was born. These conflicts about buffalo, debts incurred for the purpose of ritual sacrifice, and meat distribution are particularly fierce, sensitive as they are to problem of stiri' (honor, shame) between the parties involved (Volkman, 1985: 73-6).

Every time a truck full of Toraja farmers left the area of PIADP for Tana Toraja to attend a death ritual, implementors could be sure to be confronted with new complications in land reform. Thus, under the influence of the sociocultural project environment, land transactions among Toraja farmers had their own dynamic, which in its turn deeply influenced land reform and settlement, regardless of the models of planners or the decisions of bureaucrats.
5. THE NEED FOR SUSTAINABLE INTERVENTION

In recent years, as social scientists engaged in research or implementation of projects penetrated into a field that had before been monopolized by engineers, economists and planners, the blueprint style of planning and its clearest manifestation, the project, have been increasingly criticized. We need only compare Honadle and Rosengard’s (1983: 300) definition of projects as ‘discrete activities, aimed at specific objectives with earmarked budgets and limited time frames’ with Bierschenk’s (1988: 154) definition of a project as ‘an attempt to isolate part of a social structure and submit it to control’, to make us realize that something has changed in thinking about development.

Since the eighties the enormous complexity of development interventions was gradually recognized. It is widely acknowledged now that a blueprint approach to development does not work. Many authors have especially criticized the project model of development intervention, based on the routine step-by-step progression of the ‘project cycle’. Mechanistic models like this presuppose a degree of control over the economic, sociocultural, historical, institutional and political project environment that is largely lacking in practice. The ideal-type of the project suggests a linear and logical progression, a ‘rational problem-solving process’ (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989: 229) that seldom takes place in the ‘real world’.21

In practice, the basis of planning, according to Hulme (1987: 428), is a rather chaotic process yielding a number of goals which are relatively unobjectionable from the point of view of the major actors. ‘Depending on circumstances and influences a portion of what is unobjectionable filters through policy and planning processes until it is unavoidable’.

In practice, projects are often characterized by inflexible procedures designed for control and accountability, based on input-output models and economic cost-benefit analysis rather than on the needs of target groups. Rondinelli (1983, 317): ‘The projects that are often promoted and approved meet donor priorities but are of little real interest to governments in developing countries or to the intended beneficiaries’. The project, Morgan (1983: 330) argues, is an ‘overarching engineering metaphor’ in which properties of planning and control become reified, and complex cultural properties simplified.

Robertson (1984: 128) states that in its context, social and political processes are often reduced to technical categories. According to Cernea (1991b), due to its technical bias and inflexibility, hardly any attention is paid to cultural variables and social processes. During implementation, deviations from the original blueprint tend to be impossible. As project implementation stagnates due to the unforeseen complications existing in the real world, ‘main
goal of the management becomes the spending of allocated resources (funds) according to the schedule (blueprint)" (Bierschenk, 1988: 153).

Criticism of the project model has stimulated the emergence of a new attitude towards development intervention. Many authors now stress the limited extent to which we can 'make' society with the instruments of planning. Robertson (1984: 305) warns against the optimism of planners, and stresses that 'planners are obliged to display a great deal of confidence and technical competence about processes the outcome of which is indeterminable'. According to Long (1992: 270) a deeper understanding of the complexity of development intervention 'requires the deconstruction of orthodox views of policy and planning and of their capacity for steering change'. It is now generally recognized that development experts are part of the problem rather than of the solution (Chambers, 1983; Rondinelli, 1983; Edwards, 1989).

Development interventions are now generally seen as dynamic processes that should not be artificially isolated from their sociocultural, historical and political context by using the straitjacket of the project model. Planned intervention becomes part of a historical process of transformation, which entails interaction between actor groups or individuals competing for power, authority and access to resources in an 'arena of struggle'.22 As a result of negotiations or struggle between social actors, plans for intervention are reinterpreted or even completely transformed. Therefore, the outcome of these processes cannot be determined in advance, and there is no straight road from policy and planning via implementation to outcome and evaluation. As a consequence, if we accept this view, it is no longer useful to distinguish between the neat 'phases' of the 'project cycle' (Long, 1984: 179).

In this process, social actors ('target groups' of a project, for instance) are anything but the passive receivers of outside intervention that planners often hold them to be (or maybe even want them to be). Instead, they are active subjects creating 'room for manoeuvre' to adapt outside intervention to their own views and interests. Thus, according to Long and Van der Ploeg (1989: 227) 'local groups actively formulate and pursue their own "development projects" that often clash with the interests of central authority'.

Under influence of this new realism in development thinking notions of community solidarity and consensus were replaced by a new interest in faction, competition, and transformation of policy as a result of negotiations between interest groups, and struggle for power and resources.23 A greater interest in the project environment can also be seen. Chambers (1983), for instance, stresses the necessity of political feasibility studies and an analysis of interests. Van Dusseldorp (1990) distinguishes between the environment under project control, the influencable environment, and the appreciated environment. Kottak (1991) points out the
importance of knowledge of the sociocultural characteristics of the project environment for a better sociocultural compatibility between outside intervention and its environment. With regard to the historical context of intervention the same point is made by Crehan and Von Oppen (1988) and Elwert and Bierschenk (1988).

Process approaches gradually gained ground at the cost of the blueprint approach. Intervention should be flexible and proceed by small steps, gaining experience during the process, rather than being rigid and taking great leaps. It should offer concrete objectives of change based on local needs rather than on the abstract goals derived from planners' categories of thought, and beware of overinnovation (Kottak, 1991).

Though thinking about development processes has gradually evolved from a normative, mechanistic, inflexible and thus unworldly approach in the seventies to a more open, flexible and realistic one in the eighties, sometimes the impact of this evolution on the daily reality of development intervention seems to be minimal. In this respect, the road between theory and practice seems to be a one-way track only. While new approaches in the analysis of development intervention result from the confrontation with the 'real world' of peasants, local elites, bureaucrats and other actors, the practice of intervention processes still suffers from most of the diseases mentioned above. A case in point is the Pompengan Integrated Area Development Project in Luwu district, South Sulawesi, Indonesia. PIADP was the product of serious and necessary attempts to expand the scope of a purely technical project (PIP) to include social aspects of development. As a result, in PIADP an 'integrated' approach to rural development was followed, with land reform and settlement as key activities. However, like its technically biased predecessor, the social engineering approach of PIADP created its own version of a style of planning completely isolated from the environment in which it was to be applied. Basis of planning was the rather optimistic assumption of control by planners and bureaucrats over land and people. During implementation of PIADP, control over its complex project environment and the scope of planning as an instrument for guided social change proved very limited. As tensions caused by land reform mounted, increasing stress was laid on the allocation of material project benefits at the cost of the important social goals of land reform.

I have related the problems experienced with implementation of land reform in PIADP to a number of characteristics of the wider project environment that during planning remained external to the planning process. First, the national political environment and the recent history of land reform in Indonesia made Basic Agrarian Law a weak instrument for implementation of land reform in PIADP. In addition, it left much room for different 'interpretations' of national policy by local level power groups. Second, land tenure in the Pompengan area had developed under the
influence of local political and historical processes and the migratory movements resulting from them. PIADP, then, had an ethnically heterogeneous population consisting mainly of Islamic lowland Luwu and Christian highland Luwu and Toraja. During project implementation, 'interpretations' of land reform by local power groups took shape within the framework of these processes, and gave land conflicts in PIADP the character of ethnic confrontation between local population and settlers. Third, planning of PIADP was based on a number of assumptions about the degree of control over people and land that did not exist in reality. While planners were in the first place led by abstract goals deriving from planning itself, farmers were first of all driven by risk avoidance. Furthermore, the farmers who had migrated from Tana Toraja and highland Luwu were tied to their area of origin by social and ritual obligations towards their kin. Both were crucial in shaping their attitude towards land reform.

There existed, then, a lack of fit between development priorities and policy guidelines laid down in planning for PIADP on the one hand, and the environment of intervention on the other. In the confrontation between planning and the project environment with its specific sociocultural, historical and political properties, the last proved much stronger than the instruments for guided social change. All actors behaved in way never foreseen by planners, and created their own projects' on their own conditions, with local power groups and officials in a stronger position to do so, of course, than poor farmers.

Planning for development intervention entails change, of course. No change is possible without some degree of social conflict. Through the case of PIADP I have shown that change through intervention planned in isolation from its environment runs a unjustifiably great risk of not being sustainable, and may be even completely rejected by local actors. Therefore, and the more so in a world full of ethnically inspired struggle and local conflict, there are in my opinion three future priorities in development planning that until now seem to have hardly received due attention. First, rather than exaggerating the benefits of more social engineering in development intervention and creating high expectations about the degree to which society can be 'made' by planning, planners should start from the recognition that there are definite limitations to planning. In development practice these concern, above all, the sociocultural, man-made factors usually hidden in the backyard of planning models. Recognition of this fact should lead to more realistic, less abstract planning goals. Second, if development planning is to live up to at least some of the expectations it has created, it should show a greater interest in the issue of compatibility between development intervention and its environment. In the planning process, social scientists rather than social engineers should strike a balance between the ideals of planners and general goals of development policy on one hand, and the environment of intervention on the other. Third, rather
than making deals for development intervention at the highest level of administration of the receiving country and taking for granted the capability of the state apparatus to realize their implementation at the lowest (local) level, a greater interest is needed in the transformation of policy goals at lower levels under the influence of local power groups.
Notes

1. Transmigration ('transmigrasi') is a state-sponsored programme for resettlement of farmers from the most densely populated islands of Indonesia (especially Java, Bali and Lombok) to other islands with a lower population density. Predecessor of the transmigration programme was the colonization programme by the Dutch colonial government, which had started in 1905.

2. Luwu Irrigation Project was mainly sponsored by USAID. Dutch development cooperation in Luwu started in 1975 with preparation of the masterplan. Irrigation was part of a multisectoral rural development programme (irrigation, infrastructure, transmigration, agriculture, extension and marketing): the Luwu Area and Transmigration Development Project.

3. Consultancy for PIADP was supplied by DHV Consulting Engineers, Amersfoort, the Netherlands for the technical aspects, and Institute of Social Studies Advisory Service (ISSAS), the Hague, the Netherlands for its social aspects. Dutch involvement in PIADP was terminated as a result of the decision of the Government of Indonesia on 25 March 1992 not to accept Dutch bilateral development assistance any longer.

4. The only two examples of programmes for land redistribution in the New Order period, at least within the context of integrated rural development, are the Rawa Srangi Swamp Reclamation Project in Lampung province, South Sumatra, and PIADP.

5. When using 'Pompengan area', I refer to the whole area of what was later to become PIADP. It should not be confused with the village of Pompengan, to which I will refer later in this article.

6. In the colonial law system a distinction was made between natives, European citizens, and 'foreign Asians'. Natives were served by their own adat law, classified from the end of the 19th century onwards into 19 'law circles' by members of the adat law school, the most famous member of which was Van Vollenhoven (see Ter Haar, 1948; Hooker, 1978).

7. Basic Agrarian Law showed a great deal of ambivalence with regard to the position of customary rights. While customary law was the official basis of the new law, in fact it was subordinated to the principles of the new state. While general principles of customary law were recognized, specific customary rights were restricted by the principle stating that local customary rights can only be recognized as long as these do not contradict laws and regulations of higher order, that is of the Indonesian state. Hooker concludes that customary law had become dependent on the political ideology of the new state, and was especially used 'to find the underlying adat bases of a unitary legal system' (Hooker, 1978: 27).

8. In the light of these remarks about the Basic Agrarian Law it will be clear why in this article I speak about claims: on untitled land no ownership rights are recognized; it belongs to the category of state land (tanah negara).

9. Until 1988, the Land Registry Office (Agraria) was a Directorate General under the Department of Home Affairs. In that year, it was given the status of a 'government body'
directly resorting under the President; its name was changed into BPN (Badan Pertanahan Nasional).


11. In the PIADP land policy document, the following general criteria for selection of farmers were stated: beneficiaries should be inhabitants of one of the subdistricts in which the project area is located, full-time farmers and willing and able to work intensively the land allocated to them in PIADP. Apart from that, a number of specific criteria was formulated to determine the order of priority for land allocation.

12. In the Basic Agrarian Law a lower landownership limit of two hectares was established for the whole country. A target that could, even in the sixties, impossibly be reached, of course, on densely populated islands like Java, Bali and Lombok. The upper limit of landownership, above which all land is excess land available for redistribution, differs for each district, and is mainly based on data about population density (Departemen Dalam Negeri, 1981; MacAndrews, 1986: 24). For Luwu, an upper limit of 15 hectares of irrigated land (sawah) or 20 hectares of rainfed land are stipulated in Basic Agrarian Law, and still apply. In settlement programmes (transmigration), holdings of two hectares are allocated to the settlers. In PIADP, holdings of 1.25 hectare (farmland and houseplot) were planned, while in the project rules it was stated that total landownership of beneficiaries, both within and outside the project area, should not exceed two hectares.

13. One important aspect in which land policy in PIADP differed from rules and regulations in Basic Agrarian Law, was that in PIADP no compensation was paid to farmers who lost part of or even their whole land claim. For the first group, project facilities were supposed to replace compensation as stipulated in Basic Agrarian Law. Farmers of the second group were supposed not to be entitled to compensation, as their claims on land were so weak that they could not be considered to be damaged by project implementation.

14. Names of these areas of implementation do not correspond unequivocally to administrative units: Sinangkala derived its name from the *kampung* (hamlet) Sinangkala, Seriti from the village of Seriti, Salu Jambu from the kampung Salu Jambu, and Rongkong from river Rongkong. The situation is further complicated by the splitting up of villages. The villages of Salu Pao and Tolemo, for instance, split off from Seriti in 1990.

15. Originally, a one-year period had been reserved for farmer selection and land allocation. Provision of other facilities for settlement, organization of farmers, and extension were assumed to follow land reform (PIADP, 1986).

16. This account is borne out by later reports about the situation in PIADP: land is being titled in accordance with the boundaries of the original claims. Farmers who claimed land in the settlement areas demand compensation from the settlers. In some cases, settlers who cannot afford payment of compensation are reported to have moved out, taking their house with them.

17. In the colonial period, Sulawesi was still called Celebes. For the sake of unity, I continue using Sulawesi.

18. This account is based on interviews with informants in Luwu and Tana Toraja.
19. The socio-economic survey gives an average household composition of 6.9. Of the sample households, 56% has more than 7 members (Hartveld, 1989). As most settlers had arrived during the sixties and land was usually allocated to married couples, in the eighties most of these households had grown-up children. But project planning had started from the assumption that beneficiaries would be new settlers rather than claimants. In the Settlement Plan it was stipulated that for this ‘future population growth’ no land could be reserved. However, during the registration of claims, land was split-up and the children of claimants created their own place as candidate beneficiaries of land reform, thus reducing the ‘empty’ land.

20. In Tana Toraja, titling of this hereditary land is even impossible, unless all members of the kin group who have rights in the land, have agreed to divide it.


22. The aspect of control over resources is of special importance in the light of the preoccupation of many projects, including PIADP, with material ‘benefits’. This is recognized by many authors on development. Wood (1985: 8) uses the concept of ‘labelling’ in development policy ‘as an aspect of the donative political discourse associated with the Third World development agenda’. Long and Van der Ploeg (1989: 231) speak of the ‘cargo image’ of aid. Uphoff (1991: 503) speaks of approaches that ‘deliver the goods’. Brinkerhoff and Ingle (1989: 491) combine blueprint and process into the concept of ‘structured flexibility’, and stress the importance of ‘short-term service/product delivery targets’ to satisfy ‘the “deliverables” mentality of the funding organizations’.

23. In development practice, however, notions like ‘community solidarity’ still seem to be very much alive. Olivier de Sardan (1988: 220) considers such notions to be part of the ‘project logics’ of planners. Even in a setting sharply divided by land conflict like PIADP, the notion of community solidarity was the implicit basis of project activities related to settlement, such as land clearing and house construction by mutual assistance in farmers’ and neighbourhood groups.
References


Special thanks are due here for Aard Hartveld, my predecessor as a consultant on land reform and settlement in PIADP. He introduced me to the project area and part of its local leadership in a way I greatly appreciated. Apart from that, I often had the opportunity to discuss with him the settlement history of the PIADP area and reflect on its consequences for implementation of land reform and settlement. Part of the data on Sinangkala are based on his experiences, observations and analysis.

Dik Roth (Zomerdijkstraat 3", 1079 WX Amsterdam, the Netherlands) is a cultural anthropologist. From 1989 to 1992 he worked for the Institute of Social Studies Advisory Service (ISSAS) in the Pompong Integrated Area Development Project as an advisor on the implementation of the programmes for land reform and settlement that were the subject of this paper.
ISS WORKING PAPERS

Papers can be purchased or ordered by mail from:
ISS Bookshop
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

Note: For reference purposes, all Working Papers are in the ISS Library Document Collection and in the Main Reading Room.

*Papers marked with an asterisk are out of stock and will not be reproduced. If you would like to order copies, please contact either the author or ISS library.

GENERAL SERIES

2. S.J. Keuning: Distributive Aspects of Indonesian Agriculture (December 1982).
4. Bert Helmsing: Agriculture and Industry in a Regional Perspective (December 1982).
8. V. Benholdt-Thompson: The Sexual Division of Labour in Capitalism
26. Steven J. Keuning and Roger A. Downey: The Distribution of Sectoral Value Added and Employment by Factor Types in Indonesia (May 1985).
30. Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh: Great Power Rivalry in the Nuclear Age (August 1986).
34. Martin Doornbos: The Uganda Crisis and the National Question (April 1987).
36. Steven J. Keuning: A Note of External Economic Relations and Inequality in Indonesia (July 1987).
42. Peter Waterman: For the Liberation of Internationalism: A Long March Through the Literatures (September 1988).
Susan E. McDade: The Latin American Debt Crisis and the Canadian Commercial Banks (May 1989).  
Artien Utrecht: Women's Role in Rural Industrialization: The Case of Java (May 1989).  
John Markakis: Nationalities and the State in Ethiopia - An Interpretation (September 1989).  
Cristóbal Kay: The Latin American Contribution to Development Theory (June 1990).  
Gani A. Ojagbomohun: Institutionalization of Policy Analysis in Developing Countries, with Special Reference to Nigeria (June 1990).  
86. S. Sideri: European Integration and the Third World (July 1990).
87. Bas de Gaay Fortman: Entitlement and Development: An Institutional Approach to the
Acquirement Problem (August 1990).
89. Terry Cannon: Regions, Inequality and Spatial Policy in China (August 1990).
(October 1990).
93. Daniel Kostzer: Devaluation, Primary Exports and Wages in Argentina: An Unorthodox
Interpretation (December 1990).
94. Henny Romijn and Ton de Wilde: Appropriate Technology for Small Industry: A Review of Issues
(January 1991).
95. E.V.K. FitzGerald: Economic Reform and Citizen Entitlements in Eastern Europe: some social
96. Benjamin White: In the Shadow of Agriculture: Economic Diversification and Agrarian Change
97. Peter Waterman: Understanding Socialist and Proletarian Internationalism The impossible past and
possible future of emancipation on a world scale (March 1991).
98. Aart van de Laar: The Rural Energy Problem in Developing Countries: Diagnosis and Policy
99. F. Wils: The informal sector in greater Sao Paulo: a discussion of concepts and criteria, and a
100. Joy Mylène ten Berge: Towards an Understanding of the Dynamics of the Parallel Market in
102. S. Acharya: Agricultural Incomes and Rural Poverty: An Analysis at Crop-State Level in India
(June 1991).
104. Isik Kulu Glasgow East-West Regional Differentials in the Role of Males in the Determination of
105. Sarthi Acharya: Labour Use in Indian Agriculture: Analysis at Macro Level for the Eighties (July
106. E.V.K. FitzGerald: ECLA and the Formation of Latin American Economic Doctrine in the
107. Ashwani Saith: Absorbing External Shocks: The Gulf Crisis, International Migration Linkages and
109. Des Gasper: Equity, Equality and Appropriate Distribution: Multiple interpretations and
111. Francisco Uribe-Echeverria: Beyond the Informal Sector Labour Absorption in Latin American
112. Bas de Gaay Fortman and Paschal Mihyo: A False Start: Law and Development in the context of
a colonial legacy (October 1991).
113. Paul Peters and Nico Schrijver: Latin America and International Regulation of Foreign Investment:
114. David Dunham: Agricultural Growth and Rural Industry: some reflections on the rural growth
115. Jan J.P. van Heemst: The Treatment of the NGO Sector in the National Accounts: Guidelines,
116. Francisco Uribe-Echevarría: Small-Scale Manufacturing and Regional Industrialization: The Urban
and Regional Development Perspective (December 1991).
117. Francisco Uribe-Echevarría: Small-Scale Industrial Development, Policy and Strategic Issues
(January 1992).
139. Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh: *A World in Flux. The development of global power relations and order* (January 1993).


Liesbeth Heering: *Case Study on the Way in which an Urban and a Rural Community in Yogjakarta Participate in Health and Health Care for Children* (May, 1993).

Nira Yuval-Davis: *Women, Ethnicity and Empowerment* (June 1993).

Jan Nederveen Pieterse: *Globalization as Hybridization* (June 1993).


Elisabeth Mayer-Rieckh: "Beyond Concrete and Steel", *Power-Relations and Gender: The Case of Vietnamese Women in the Detention Centres in Hong Kong* (June 1993).

Ines Smyth: *Paid family labour in small scale enterprises: considerations from an Indonesian experience* (June 1993).


Dik Roth: *A Development Project and its Sociocultural Environment: Land Reform and Settlement in the Pompengan Integrated Area Development Project (PIADP), Luwu, South Sulawesi, Indonesia* (September 1993).
