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FOR THE LIBERATION OF INTERNATIONALISM:
A LONG MARCH THROUGH THE LITERATURES

Peter Waterman
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Synopsis

In order to understand and advance a new kind of labour internationalism it is necessary to understand the meaning of 'internationalism'. Whilst there is practically no contemporary literature directly on this concept, there are many different types of literature that deal with it indirectly. An examination of these literatures may reveal obstacles to an understanding and pointers toward such. This review article considers writings of the following main types: 1) traditional, labour and socialist internationalism; 2) contemporary Third-World solidarity movements; 3) Third-World aid and development policy; 4) international relations theory; 5) World Systems theory and its critics; 6) feminism. The paper concludes with some tentative definitions relating to a new internationalism in general and to a new labour one in particular.

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Introduction

Traditional labour internationalism, prioritising industrial wage-workers, strategically led by socialist parties, theoretically inspired by Marxist or Social-Democratic intellectuals, is moribund. There is, moreover, no such Marxist, socialist or even feminist debate on internationalism as one can find on capitalism, socialism, nationalism, patriarchy, the multinationals, or a dozen less politically relevant phenomena. Yet we are surrounded by increasing evidence of internationalisation – and even of internationalism.

By internationalisation I mean several inter-related phenomena: 1) the serial reproduction of features of the dominant capitalist societies and processes (including those of the nation state itself); 2) the global effects of local acts of capital and state (destruction of the Amazon region, Chernobyl); 3) the concentration of power in supra-national fora (multinationals, the International Monetary Fund, the European Economic Community).

By internationalism I similarly mean several inter-related phenomena: 1) recognition of the above processes by increasing numbers in all ‘three worlds’; 2) expression of such an understanding by new social movements or citizen organisations, locally or nationally; 3) the creation of an ‘alternative international relations’ or an ‘international civil society’, prioritising the ethic of solidarity and subverting the capitalist and statist style and practices of the dominant inter--, extra- or supra-state organs.

Now, whilst the first phenomenon has been subject to much attention, the second has not. And this means that internationalisation cannot have
been analysed from a virtually non-existent 'internationalist point of
view'. The creation of a new labour internationalism, however, requires an
understanding of the relative failure of the old 'class' one and the rela-
tive success of the new 'democratic' internationalisms. In the process of
trying to understand and advance a new kind of labour internationalism (see
bibliography), I have found it necessary to examine a whole range of very
different contemporary literatures that deal with one aspect or another of
internationalisation and internationalism, explicitly or implicitly. The
purpose of the review, therefore, is to remove obstacles to a contemporary
understanding of internationalism, to indicate possible openings and to
identify some of the remaining lacunae. The aim is to liberate interna-
tionalism from the shackles placed on it by a century and more of dynamic
capitalist and statist development - as well as those placed on it by the
Guardians of the Original Doctrine (GODs?). But this long march through the
literatures is just a beginning. What the review additionally represents is
an invitation. The liberation of internationalism is not so much a matter
of re-discovery as of invention. What we need is not an examination of the
Marxist entrails (though this may not be without benefit!) but reflection
and generalisation from the rich experience of the recent past and the
emerging future. And this must be the work of many.

My review examines writings of the following main types: 1) traditional, labour and socialist internationalism; 2) contemporary
Third-World solidarity movements; 3) Third-World aid and development
policy; 4) international relations theory; 5) World Systems theory and its
critics; 6) feminism. Since I wish to show the relevance of all this
discussion to labour, and since its implications for a new labour interna-
tionalism may be obscure, I conclude with some tentative definitions relating
to a new internationalism in general and to a new labour one in particular.
1. Traditional labour internationalism: is the people's flag still deepest red?

Dictionary definitions: as dead as dead can be

Dictionary searches for an understanding of internationalism are informative on history and historical uses but not on contemporary organisations and activities. Nor do they provide us with a strategy-relevant conceptualisation.

The item by Friedemann and Holscher (1982:367:97) in a German dictionary of basic social concepts is, perhaps, of most use in reminding us of the extent to which 'international' and 'internationalism' have bourgeois and liberal roots as well as socialist ones, and of a certain bourgeois re-capture of the term after it had been politically monopolised by the late-19th century labour movement. This is not only a matter of the short-lived racist concept of a 'golden international' of Jewish capitalists, but of the proposal of Karl Renner (earlier a leading Austro-Marxist and specialist on the national question) to conceive the new United Nations Organisation, in 1946, as the Fourth International! Unsuccessful in this specific case, the project has been successful in intent, 'international' being in the public mind today more associated with the United Nations than with any labour or socialist organisation. But this disarticulation has been assisted by the Marxists, as the next reference suggests.

The Dictionary of Marxist Thought devotes but one and a half pages to internationalism whilst giving four and a half to the internationals. Monty Johnstone's contribution on internationalism (Johnstone 1983:231-33), moreover, is itself a victim of the disease it diagnoses, being for one half devoted to Soviet state policies and relations between Communist Parties. The section on internationals, also by Johnstone (233-8), more or less ends with the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943, devoting five or ten disparaging lines each to the present Socialist International and the Trotskyist Fourth International, and none to the Cominform that continued the work of the Comintern. No space is given to the significant post-1945
array of international Communist front organisations for workers, women, students, youth, peace, etc. There is also no mention in either item of the international trade union organisations, past or present.

In case it might be thought that the above are shortcomings of metropolitan Marxists, whose Eurocommunist or Eurosocialist authors have become incorporated into a capitalist and nationalist order, a recent communist trade union dictionary from Peru (Oblitas 1986:73) suggests that the problem may be universal in nature. His definition is less remarkable for its content, which merely repeats a familiar and increasingly empty doctrine, than for its brevity: internationalism is disposed on in but five lines. Like the previously-mentioned dictionary, it devotes much more space (24 lines) to the now-dead institutions of internationalism. But the dictionary also gives much more space to concepts one would have thought to have been of rather less importance to communists: 'Inflation' and 'Inquisition' get 17 and nine lines respectively.

A Communist historian raises internationalism’s torn flag

Now for the view of a much-respected Marxist labour historian and lifelong Communist, Eric Hobsbawm. His opening address to a conference on internationalism (Hobsbawm 1988) is original, insightful and erudite in its historical analysis. But the item makes no real analysis of the decline of classical internationalism, shows little or no awareness of contemporary internationalism, and it offers even less perspective for the future. What Hobsbawm has to say about internationalism today is little more than that it has been undermined by racism nationally and that it is difficult for nationally-organised trade unions to fight internationally-organised multinationals. For the future, Hobsbawm offers no perspective other than raising again the flag of internationalism 'even today when the storms of history threaten to tear it to tatters' (12).

Given the multi-faceted and energetic growth of internationalism (peace, environmental, women’s, human-rights, etc.) over the last one or two
decades, and given the more recent but no less varied and energetic development of a shopfloor labour internationalism (Waterman 1984), this tragic image is surely either out of place or out of date. So, surely, is the single example Hobsbawm offers for a reviving labour internationalism. This is the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. Hobsbawm seems to have singled it out as a symbol of internationalism not because of its internationalist activities but because of its national anti-racism. It may well be that it is because of its consistent multi-racialism and its consequent appeal to a majority of South Africans, that the ANC has indeed become again a major object of international solidarity. But do we not need to recognise that we are here dealing with an object of solidarity, to specify and investigate the nature of its support? The ANC is not a labour organisation. Its own declarations or silences (Afghanistan, Poland) are surely neither inspired nor explained by internationalism except in a most problematic or partisan definition of the word. And if support for the ANC from abroad is characterised simply as internationalist, this is at the expense of a more specific understanding. We surely need to distinguish foreign state support for the ANC (Communist bloc, many Third-World states, in the future also industrialised capitalist ones) from its movement support. And, if we do characterise the latter as internationalist, then do we not need to distinguish anti-racist or pro-nationalist internationalism from labour internationalism in some more specific sense? And, if we are dealing with labour internationalism in respect of South Africa, is it not essential to deal with international labour solidarity with South African labour?

A baleful view from a particularist swamp

Tom Nairn, a Scottish socialist-nationalist and pioneer of the new Marxist theorising on nationalism (Nairn 1975) has addressed himself to internationalism in a manner that requires response (Nairn 1980). What Nairn appears to be doing is turning the anti-nationalism of much traditional internationalism upside down. He allows internationalism an epistemological existence only within 'the conceptual universe of nationalism' (105). He allows it a political existence only as check or
prompt. He holds intellectuals responsible for its reproduction. Now, whilst it may be true that traditional internationalism developed as resistance or opposition to nationalism and other such 'mediaeval particularism' (Lenin, cited Nairn 1980:103), it must, surely, be also seen as opposition to the rather more modern particularisms of capital and state. Whilst it may further be true that its universalism can be traced back to ancient religion and philosophy, this surely requires that we investigate both the source of such in mass experience and the widespread mass appeal of even such non-Judaeo-Christian universalisms as Islam down the centuries. And if internationalism is essential only to 'intellectuals', do we not still have to ask ourselves whether the contemporary spread of at least non-proletarian internationalism is due to the growing generalisation of intellectual labour, the spread of education, the increasing centrality of knowledge and communication to social development? We have, finally, to consider whether traditional internationalism was not - as Nairn (1975) suggests of the socialist project itself - not so much a misformed offspring or senile remnant as a premature birth.

If we understand Nairn's polemic to be directed towards what could be called 'received internationalism', then there is much to be garnered from it. I will here try to identify certain interesting elements which could be fed into a constructive effort elsewhere (see Conclusion and Waterman 1988a). Although I may here be doing violence to Nairn's argument I hope that I am not doing so to his thought. There are three areas in which he seems to me to make valuable or thought-provoking comments: those of conceptualisation, of received or traditional socialist internationalism, and of future prospects.

**Conceptualisation:** Nairn offers understandings of 1) 'internationality', 2) 'universalism', 3) 'cosmopolitanism' and 4) 'internationalism' itself. These seem to me well worth consideration or development.

1) 'Internationality' is the term Nairn uses for the worldwide effects of capitalist development. He points out that since this is an essentially
capitalist process (and one which has as its dominant political by-product nationalism) it can hardly provide an ethical or political foundation for internationalism. I am at this moment inclined to agree. 2) 'Universalism' is his term for ancient traditional spiritual doctrines of human nature. Since the 'great religious verities are counterposed to sin and evil, in the framework of an essentially unchanging universe' (105), he considers that universalism provides a problematic base for contemporary internationalism. I feel that - given the contribution of Christian churches to contemporary labour internationalism - this needs more consideration. 3) 'Cosmopolitanism' is for Nairn the doctrine of a pre-industrial elite which considered itself the bearer of a 'civilised internationality fed in from above' (106). Whilst it had some 19th century expression amongst intellectuals, particularly Jewish ones, and may have been drawn on by some internationalists, it was killed off by the nation state and inter-national wars. I would think that the term has important contemporary forms or uses. 4) 'Internationalism' is considered by Nairn both a liberal and socialist creed, though Nairn is primarily interested in the latter:

for both forms, internationalism is clearly at once antithesis and imagined transcendence [of nationalism and particularism - PW]. A fallen world stands condemned, in the name of values really present and active which have, as yet, failed to take charge. One day they shall. (106)

I think I would be prepared to take this condemnation by Nairn as an acceptable and attractive description/prescription! But when doing so it would be necessary to further reflect on similarities and differences between liberal and socialist internationalism. So much for his definitions.

Traditional socialist internationalism: I identify in or under Nairn's polemic an address to the internationalism of 1) the traditional proletariat, 2) socialist leaderships and 3) socialist intellectuals.
1. Nairn recognises the existence of internationalism amongst workers in the early period of alienation and exclusion from the capitalist nation states that gave them birth. Internationalism had a strong but narrow foundation amongst the 'artisanate that preceded the rise of the contemporary working class', where it was an expression of self-reliance and opposition to the state. But this artisan internationalism is seen as both specific and contingent, in the sense of disappearing with the changing nature of the class and the 'nationalisation of the proletariat' (112). I feel that here much more must be said.

2. Although Nairn does not distinguish socialist leaders (many of whom were or became intellectuals - or are conceived as such by Gramscians) from the intelligentsia in a more common sense, I wish to do so because most of his comments are addressed to socialist leaders in particular. He points out that their internationalism blinded them to the reality of mass nationalism, led first to dramatic oscillations in the face of this, then a means of pragmatic adaptation to it, later to the idea of a world party (the Communist International) as a guarantor against nationalism. As two major and now dominant expressions of this blindness to nationalism he identifies the metropolitan internationalism of those with power and the spiritual (export?) internationalism of those without. 'Seen from the particularist swamps', says Nairn of the first variety,

ninety per cent of what is trumpeted out as Internationalism is veiled, thinly-veiled or occasionally full-frontal metropolitan self-interest and aggression. The 'metropolitan' culture is one which functions by instilling the notions of centrality and responsibility, assumptions never so prominently on display as when (e.g.) somebody says 'Speaking not as an American but purely as a Socialist...’ (120)

I wonder whether this sort of internationalism should not be dubbed 'cosmopolitanism', or at least 'socialist cosmopolitanism'. Moving on, I cannot resist quoting Nairn at greater length on what I have called spiritual or export internationalism. This is not only because a certain
(guilty but gleeful) self-recognition it provokes but also because of its relevance to contemporary non-socialist, non-labour internationalism also:

Unfortunately, Internationalism in its reverential form encourages...schizophrenia. As All-the-Same-ism, it is a standing invitation to the notion that 'I' (the Subject of International Revolution, not the unshaven native of Aberdeen or Neusiedl-am-See) am better engaged supporting the Revolution where it happens to be at rather than where I (unshaven native) happen to find myself located. Fleeing from the inexplicable, leaden contingency of home I (Revolutionary Subject) discover necessity - the meaning of history, hence of myself - wherever that necessity discloses itself. Darkness enshrouds me, Reason thrives elsewhere. So it is only too easy for me (u.n.) to live an essentially vicarious existence through my (R.S.) unceasing 'solidarity' with those foreign triumphs ('solidarity' of the pilot-fish with the shark). Internationalism, in this sense, still keeps ones [sic] foot in Hegel's grave. (114)

3. Where it seems to me that Nairn is addressing himself to intellectuals as an intelligentsia is when he is discussing the relationship of internationalism to traditional universalism and contemporary culture. This has already been referred to above. Western intellectuals are seen as agents of universalism - from Greek antiquity, via Judaeo-Christian religion and enlightenment rationalism. Nationalist particularism is a threat, thus, not only to socialist intellectuals but to all modern intellectuals, as 'the living factors of cultural reproduction' (115). And whilst Nairn questions Marx's concept of a world literature, he accepts that most modern culture 'is highly inter-national in character...Internationalism can be an ingredient in this indispensable cross-fertilisation' (109). Given, finally, his view of the Western intellectual tradition and contemporary world culture, it is not surprising that Nairn sees internationalism as essential to intellectuals whilst it is merely contingent for workers. I now feel
obliged to come out as an unshaven, cosmopolitan, Jewish, intellectual, non-resident of the Netherlands. And then to repeat what I have already said: this essence may be interpretable in a more positive light.

Future prospects: Nairn, as a baleful socialist denizen of a particularist Scottish swamp, sees little future for metropolitan internationalism, but his allowances are nonetheless both revealing and suggestive. In the first place, he says, nationalism has not only become too general, permanent and important to be ignored, but the threat it poses to civilisation and reason has become less. It is difficult to rhyme this notion with the Iran-Iraq war, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Catholic/Nationalist versus Protestant/British conflict in Ireland. But ones takes his point that contemporary imperialism menaces us not with a regression to barbarism but 'the literal liquidation of culture' (123). In the second place, as already stated, he does allow for internationalism in art, as ethic and attitude. In the third place he allows for a 'non-metropolitan internationalism' symbolised by the annual pilgrimage to Amsterdam's Waterlooplein, commemorating the wartime strike against the deportation of the Jews. Although Nairn here reproduces the Hobsbawm syndrome (conflating anti-racism and internationalism), he does again draw our attention to the principle underlying both universalising acts - solidarity. Like internationalism itself, this concept is under-discussed and requires further examination (see, again, the Conclusion and Waterman 1988a).
2. First-World Third-Worldism: the pilot-fish and the shark?

Given the extent to which proletarian internationalism has been replaced in at least the industrialised capitalist world by some kind of non-proletarian variety, the literature on the latter requires attention. Whilst most, if not all, of the 'new social movements' appear to be actively internationalist, it is difficult to find debate on this important aspect of their work. The only movement in which some such debate seems to have been taking place over a period of time is the Third-World one. This is, evidently, 1) because the very object of such activities is international solidarity and 2) because of the repeated disappointments faced by First-World activists when the liberation movement they have extolled becomes a normal (sometimes even abnormal) Third-World state. From a growing literature on Third-World solidarity (Muto 1983, Harpo and van Swinden 1985, Menon 1986, Kossler 1986, Muller-Plantenburg 1986) I select for attention two items, one stressing the political and the other the attitudinal problem. In a sense, these two items also reflect the two aspects or moments just mentioned. Maybe they will tell us something not only about the Third-World movement but about internationalism more generally.

Beyond the ideology of aid

The first item, subtitled 'Ideology of Aid and People's Solidarity' (Muto 1983) comes from an international conference organised by the Pacific-Asia Resources Centre (PARC) in Japan. Although this organisation has previously been involved in much heart-searching over post-liberation developments in South-East Asia, this particular item is of a more positive and programmatic variety, summarised in a final Action Plan (AMPO 1983:12). This does not mean that it is necessarily a simplistic document. On the contrary, it seems to well express the concerns and aims of the movement in what might be called the post-Vietnam (or post-Che, post-Mao) period. Indeed, it represents a position well in advance of that common to the Third-World movement in Europe. I will consider the approach of this document to Third-World solidarity under the following heads: 1) aim, 2)
principles, 3) objects and subjects addressed, 4) relationship with Third-
World societies, 5) relationship with the home society, 6) activities, 7) 
organisational strategy, 8) ideology, 9) reference to labour.

Aim: The aim identified by Muto is the joint creation in the Asian-
Pacific sphere of a national and international order replacing the
'exploitative and repressive configuration of our region' (20). This alter-
native is not based on any existing model but something that is to come out
of the joint struggles and dialogue of the parties concerned.

Principles: These seem to be the following: 1) that there is a funda-
mentalist relationship between the internal and external situation of
capitalist Japan, between the international and external struggles to trans-
form these; 2) that Japan's advance to world-power status implies
increasing exploitation and repression both abroad and at home, creating a
potential common interest amongst people at both ends; 3) that a practice
of 'people's solidarity' must be developed to oppose the Japanese state's
'ideology of aid'; 4) that the sole force for the necessary transformation
is the people.

Objects and subjects addressed: In addressing himself to certain
problems, Muto seems to simultaneously address himself to active subjects,
at both ends of the relationship. Amongst the objects and subjects I can
identify are the following: 1) work and workers/farmers; 2) women's work
(including prostitution-tourism) and women; 3) industry (including nuclear)
and residents (including farmers); 4) autonomy/independence and oppressed
communities; 5) consumption and consumers; 6) human-rights and citizens;
7) culture and cultural activists; 7) official development aid and non-
governmental development activists.

Relationship with Third-World societies: Here we may identify at least
three significant subjects: 1) capital and state; 2) the people; 3) 
activists. 1) Muto does not address himself to capital in the Third World
except in so far as he opposes increasing social differentiation there.
With respect to the state, he both defends unconditionally the necessity for
national independence and self-reliance (even when these do not turn out so attractively) and the struggle for democratic rights within and against such states. 2) Muto's concept of 'the people' is rather in terms of a potentiality to be defined through self-activity than of an already-existing empirical reality. The importance of the 'potentiality' will become evident in the next point. 3) Muto argues that even if the people's 'power is still submerged and has not yet taken visible forms' we always find 'at least a few dedicated activists struggling to organise' (21).

Relationship with the home society: The most significant difference with Nairn's position is in respect to capital and state. Given that the primary enemies are seen to be Japanese multinationals and the Japanese state (including its US ally), both in their domestic and foreign activities, it is to be expected that these are opposed in all their multifarious emanations. Ichiyo, however, is more specific when speaking of activists at home than abroad, identifying not only himself and his group but also radical labour activists, the peace, environmental and consumer movements, etc. He does not, however, accept that these activists are - or should remain - spokespersons for 'the people'.

Activities: Here Muto addresses himself to the solidarity organisations rather than the movement more generally. Their main activities appear to be action-oriented research, documentation, publication and education. Muto gives examples of these primarily from the work of PARC, mentioning a number of campaigns and publications in Japan and internationally that have had a significant impact and that have been much appreciated in specific Third-World countries. An example would be the tape-slide programme exposing Kawasaki Steel's plan to locate a highly-polluting plant in the Philippines. This is said to have been seen by 40,000 farmers, even under martial law conditions.

Organisational strategy: Here I am referring both to strategy of and strategies within the movement. The Action Plan related to Muto's report lists four principles for relations between Japanese and Third-World movements: creating mutual trust; using exchange experiences for the
movement in Japan; establishing equal and lasting relations (AMPO 1983:12).

Either here or in Muto’s paper, however, one can also find certain other principles of organisation and action. One is that of international networking, though this is not spelled out. Another is that of face-to-face relationships, of which the PARC consultation was presumably an example. A third principle would seem to be recognition of necessarily different forms of struggle in the Third World and Japan, given that whilst there may be revolutionary situations in the former, this is not the case at home. A fourth principle is suggested by the PARC experience in training what they call ‘barefoot researchers’ (23), in other words, training Japanese workers and other ordinary citizens to themselves carry out in their own situations the function previously reserved by PARC. This then connects with two other implicit or explicit principles. One is that of transforming themselves from spokespersons to a ‘medium or facilitator’ (23) and the other is that of self-criticism: it is precisely through critical reflection on its own activity that PARC has developed its present positions.

**Ideology:** It may be felt that this aspect has been adequately covered in discussing aims, principles, etc. But by ‘ideology’ I here mean an organisationally-related political doctrine addressed to a mass audience. Muto makes specific positive reference to two of these, Liberation Theology and Marxism. But it must be noted that these references are in both cases passing ones, and that he appears to eschew any ideological or organisational identification, worldview or programme. In so far as one could put a name on his position, then one might suggest — and not only in joke — ‘Liberation Marxism’. In so far as it is possible to find organisational affinity, this might be with European green or environmental parties, although most of these ignore workers, attack unions, or are ambiguous about them (Muller-Plantenburg 1986).

**Reference to labour:** In the first place, Japan’s place in the international division of labour and the changing economic development model are treated as a primary point of reference (the other being the related political-military process). Secondly, of course, Japanese MNCs are seen as the most dynamic source of exploitation and repression, nationally and
internationally. Attention, thirdly, is focussed on increasingly repressive or manipulative labour-relations patterns implied by the state-supported union re-organisation plans in Japan and by Japanese management techniques in Asia. Fourthly, there is the research and action activity carried out by PARC and its allies in solidarity with workers in Asian Free Production Zones (FPZs). Fifthly, there is the recognition of the limitations of Japanese labour solidarity. This is suggested not only in the earlier quotation on the militant-but-not-internationally-conscious worker but in reference to Japanese workers who become supervisors in Japanese plants abroad. In some ways the Action Plan is both broader and more specific, proposing action not only against Japanese management methods but also against bad working conditions, and against the specific exploitation of women workers both in Japan and abroad. It is here, finally, that the demand is expressed for a strengthening of the 'international solidarity of labour' (AMPO 1983:12).

Let me here attempt to summarise the important points. The aim is an alternative national and international order to be created by common struggle and dialogue. The principles are recognition of the interdepen-dency of national and international spheres and struggles, of the increasing exploitation and oppression in both, of popular and common self-activity as the source of transformation. The objects and subjects combine, in fact, those of the old (labour, nationalist) and new social movements (women, human-rights, environmental, cultural, etc). The social and political relationships are those of opposition to state and capital (primarily in the metropolis), of address immediately to activists, of work with the people. The activities are primarily those of action-oriented services. The organisational strategy contains elements addressed to the Third-World partners, to the people at home and to the First-World Third-World movement itself. With respect to the Third World it is a matter of creating long-lasting and equal relations via networking and face-to-face contacts, and then using what is learned for application at home. The recognition of the necessity of reformist (I would say 'reform') activity at home means recognition of the present consciousness and capacity of ordinary people in the
metropolis, just as the training of 'barefoot researchers' expresses confidence in, and presents a stimulus for, self-activity. And the two main principles for the movement itself would seem to be those of playing a facilitating or service role and of subjecting oneself to self-criticism. In so far as it is possible to identify Muto's positions as, or with, an ideology, it has already been characterised as Liberation Marxism and seen as related to the green or alternative movement internationally. Given, however, the hostility or disinterest with which many ecological organisations or theorists consider workers and unions, maybe it represents a fairly original and distinct articulation of elements drawn from the Marxist, ecological and Liberation Theology traditions. That Muto refers frequently to workers and unions does not mean that he prioritises these. In line with certain trends in theorising the new social movements (thus in Laclau and Mouffe 1981 rather than Laclau and Mouffe 1985), he places worker struggles amongst those of other major collective subjects. He goes, however, further than other such writers because he deals with such subjects in general, and workers in particular, as forces for internationalism.

Identity and sympathy: difference and learning

I will refer to Harpo and van Swinden (1985) only in so far as they stress certain elements that get little or no attention from Muto. Their book is entitled The Disillusionment. It is based on the conflict between the Sandinista regime and the Miskito Indians in Nicaragua and is an attempt to come to terms with the repeated disappointments of the Dutch Third-World movement as yesterday's freedom-fighters become today's bureaucrats. The analysis is primarily in attitudinal or moral terms but no less valuable for that. Amongst the shortcomings they identify in personal behaviour are 1) the displacement of dissatisfaction with a complicated and unchangeable home reality to the apparently simple and revolutionary one abroad; 2) feelings of self-hatred and guilt, leading to what I would call 'identification with the victim', this resulting in exaggerated expectations and consequent disappointments. Amongst the organisational shortcomings they note are those of the deliberate concealment or unconscious suppression of complex and unattractive Third-World realities.
The rejection of such individual or organisational attitudes leads Harpo and van Swinden to propose alternatives. Rather than guilt and identification, they seem to stress curiosity and learning. They further insist on the necessity of connecting declarations of political solidarity with personal behaviour, and of addressing oneself to the 'Third World at home' (racial discrimination, consumption of cheap Third-World goods). With respect to the relationship with Third-World struggles they propose the necessity of a critical stance that considers solidarity not as something self-evident but again and again poses questions, enters discussions and remains imaginative. Discussions naturally sometimes lead to harsh criticism, leading to the frontier of continuity [of the relationship]. So long as this frontier continues to be probed, however, solidarity will remain lively, combatative and unthreatened by the spectre of disillusionment. (61)

What, exactly, do Harpo and van Swinden add to Muto? It seems to me that, on the negative side, they reveal how even the new 'alternative' internationalism can reproduce the shortcomings of the old morality and politics, such attitudes (guilt, pity, self-subordination to the victim, deliberate concealment, self-delusion) actually being bourgeois or even pre-bourgeois in nature. The attitudes are, therefore, rather a part of the problem than a means to a solution. On the positive side, Harpo and van Swinden at least suggest that international solidarity is a mutual learning process. Differences thus become as important as identities. The suggestion, again underdeveloped, that international solidarity is or should be 'global communication' (60) provides yet another alternative to the 'ideology of aid'. The ideology of aid, it should here be pointed out, is inevitably one that reproduces inequality. It is also an ideology that touches, overlaps or penetrates the Third-World movement - a problem recognised as both important and threatening by Muto (1983). Aid ideology and practice imply an unequal exchange: finance, equipment and political support flow that way, information and moral approval flow this way. The notion of global communication suggests another type of relationship, an
exchange of information, ideas, experiences — and political support? — flowing both ways, to the benefit of both parties. The notion requires elaboration (see, again, the Conclusion and Waterman 1988c).

**Between fishy metaphor and adequate theory**

If nothing else, the material in Part 2 should have moved us beyond an image of internationalism as a relationship between us rich, powerful, guilty but impotent pilot-fish and those poor, oppressed, innocent but potent sharks. This does not, however, mean that we have an adequate understanding of internationalism, or even sufficient inter-related concepts to construct one from. We have some necessary elements but these are not yet sufficient. Even within their own sphere, moreover, the two works fail to confront certain fundamental issues. Some of these have been raised by two German contributors to the Third-World solidarity debate (Muller-Plantenburg 1986, Kossler 1986). I will list them briefly: 1) despite what I have said about internationalism as global communication and despite the peer-group relationship Muto is aiming at, what we now have is a relationship between people in countries hierarchically placed internationally. This is evidently a situation that is going to continue beyond our own lifetime and it therefore needs to be faced theoretically; 2) despite the reconceptualisation of First-World activists as ‘facilitators’ they remain intermediaries and, in Marxist terms, either simply middle-class or — in a more suggestive formulation — intermediate categories in a contradictory class location (Wright 1976:37); 3) who pays the pipers of Third-World solidarity, and how are we to conceive such an essential material base of this activity (an issue raised in the Indian context by Karat 1984)? Following Muto’s line of argument, the money should ‘ideally’ come from ‘the people’. In the meantime, it is probably coming in significant part either from the church directly or from one or other state indirectly. In so far as this is so, are we not involved in ‘the practice of aid’, if not in its ideology? And, if this is so, do we not need some concept of the ‘space’ that aid ideology and practice allow for the development of solidarity? 4) what is the relationship of Third-World solidarity to international solidarity? Muller-Plantenburg (1983) argues that British or Polish workers may be as much in
need of German solidarity as Third-World peoples, but recognises that Third-World solidarity has replaced the working-class one. Muto's paper reveals recognition of the repressive and even aggressive nature of communist states, as well as collaboration with social movements in industrial capitalist ones, but it self-evidently prioritises Third-World solidarity. What are the theoretical grounds and strategical implications of so doing? These issues must also be followed up.
3. Aid and development: a national ministry of international solidarity?

Muller-Plantenburg (1986) argues that the Third-World movement only moves in crisis situations, often only after a major attack by the dominant forces or heavy defeats for the popular movement. Reinhard Kossler (1986) points out that one of the problems of the movement is its largely oppositional stance, this meaning that its agenda is actually set for it by the dominant states or multinational capital. There is, however, one major tradition that interprets internationalism in primarily positive terms, addressed to a continuing situation in, and long-term solutions for, the Third World. This is the social-democratic tendency, and the connection it makes between development aid and internationalism is clearly expressed in the title of a French collection on the topic, National Liberation and New Internationalism (ISER 1983. Compare Brandt and Manley 1985, EVS 1985, Healey 1985, Michanek 1985. For a related Eurocommunist view, see Nickson 1987). To consider if this sort of literature makes any contribution to an understanding of internationalism, we will take 'A Socialist Strategy of Cooperation and Development for Britain' by David Seddon (1986). Seddon is a British socialist who has done research on workers and peasants in Nepal and written on popular protest against International Monetary Fund policies in Africa. He should be well qualified to propose an inter-state strategy expressing and furthering international solidarity. This is Seddon's fundamental position:

A socialist strategy for international cooperation and development should be designed a) to help promote effective measures for the reduction of material and social deprivation and disadvantage, recognising that poverty is a consequence of oppression and exploitation, b) strengthen international links between progressive governments and movements committed to implementing such measures and changing the conditions that give rise to material deprivation and social disadvantage, and c) to contribute to the growing pressure for a radical re-structuring of the international division of labour and of international relations to increase the chances of peace and welfare for all. (Seddon 1986:1-2)
In spelling out the above aims, Seddon gives space both to principles of action and policies to be carried out. The principles seem to be the following: 1) to overcome both North-South and East-West divisions (the latter by common development programmes with communist countries); 2) to address oneself primarily to progressive governments and social forces in the Third World:

[T]he countries of the South...are allies in the strategy here advocated. There is more in common between international Democratic Socialism and the kind of global Keynesianism advocated in...the Brandt Report than there is between either and the policies of fiscal conservatism...[T]here is some evidence that the existing Socialist International is beginning to construct the theory...of the kind of strategy here suggested as appropriate for a British socialist government... (11-12)

3) to further human rights in the Third World by applying a human-rights condition in granting aid; 4) to increase both the efficiency of and participation in development aid activity. The policies proposed seem to be the following: 1) to create a Ministry of Cooperation and Development, with greater power, more and better staff, taking advantage of development-studies centres and specialists; 2) to push the international multilateral agencies (IMF, European Economic Community, etc.) in a progressive direction; 3) to support non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs) that are 'clearly and completely independent of government control', eventually by creation of an 'independent but government-funded' development agency (14); 4) to increase participation in development policy within the state, the Labour Party and amongst the 'public at large' (17).

It may seem too early to take our not-yet-completed international socialist steamhammer to this International Socialist nut. But the position adopted by Seddon is a widespread one and its relationship with internationalism is problematic. It is therefore necessary to point out what this document does, doesn't do, and leaves to be done.
What it does is to construct a state policy within an aid discourse. Proposing a policy for a state (or a party hoping to 'control' a state) means accepting the basic relevant structures as practical parameters. Casting such a policy within an aid discourse means accepting the 'ideology of aid' with all its implications. In so far as 'aid' is a relationship between states, this argument reinforces the nation state. This is made explicit in several ways. The first is the proposed enlargement of state activity in this area. The second is by the incorporation of (primarily pro-Labour Party?) academics as (paid?) specialists. The third is by state-sponsored public participation. The fourth is by state-sponsored (if not directly controlled) channeling of funds through NGOs. By accepting, finally, the growth of international bilateral funding it furthers what I would call 'inter-statism' in the area of aid. There are related problems with even the most progressive proposal made, the human-rights criterion. In so far as this is a political condition applied by a major world capitalist and military power to Third-World regimes, it reinforces a long-standing liberal-paternalism going back to at least the late-colonial period. It should here be pointed out that what Seddon is offering us has been demonstrated and argued for in a much more systematic form in Sweden. The Swedish position is not only more systematic but also politically rather more advanced (which does not necessarily mean more socialist or internationalist) than that of Seddon (see Michanek 1985).

What it does not do may be already suggested by the above. But let me try to add to this. Seddon does not question - often does not mention - the fundamental structures and processes responsible for the 'North-South' division. The word 'multinational' is absent here, as so often in Social-Democratic thought (see, again, EVS 1985, and the critique in Waterman 1985). Also absent is the British arms trade and military alliances, surely not insignificant in the reproduction of 'underdevelopment' and the suppression of human rights in the Third World. The international division of labour is once mentioned but not discussed, though its changing nature is again surely reinforcing dependency. The second coming of Global Keynesianism is greeted, and allied with socialism. Seddon does not ask what was the nature - and what happened to the Global Social-Democratic Keynesian
Project - first time round (re-stabilisation of world capitalism, US hegemony, World Bank and IMF, neo-colonial dispensations, etc.). Nor does Seddon come to terms with the devastating critique of Brandt's utopian reformism by another British socialist (Elson 1983). The working-class, the labour movement, and internationalism itself, are left without consideration by Seddon - as so often by labour parties and governments.

**What is left to be done** is to develop an internationalist, and therefore anti-TNC and anti-statist, policy on development aid. The outlines of such a strategy are suggested by Diane Elson (1983:122-5): the principle should be not redistribution of resources but struggle against injustice and exploitation; there must be action also on British foreign, trade, industrial and educational policies because of their impact on the Third World; there must be movement away from relations between states to relations between people; anti-racism at home; shopfloor labour internationalism; worker - or alternative production - plans internationally; alternative financial structures and relations internationally.
4. International relations theory and beyond

One would not, perhaps, expect traditional international relations theory to be much help in developing an understanding of internationalism. But what of Marxist international relations theory? Or recent theorising specifically on 'transnational relations', 'global order' and suchlike?

Marxism-Leninism: from internationalism to international relations

Here we will look briefly at a number of writings on or by Marxist-Leninists and addressing themselves to international relations. To say that the writers or writings concerned are Marxist-Leninists means that they view international relations in terms of class oppression and working-class liberation (Marx), or of both this and national oppression/national liberation (Lenin). We are considering these writings, however, not for their general relevance to the theory and practice of international relations but to those of internationalism. The individual treatments will be brief because their treatment of this matter is similarly brief, sometimes to the point of ignoring the very word 'internationalism'.

Kubalkova and Cruickshank's Marxism-Leninism and the Theory of International Relations (1980) is an original and fascinating work that deals both with Marxist-Leninist theory and its relationship to Western international relations theory. It is a work of history, exposition and analysis which breaks ground in recognising what classical Marxism and Leninism have contributed to the historical body of thought here. It is also an argument for Western understanding of contemporary Soviet international relations ideology and strategy. The authors have no interest in internationalism as such. Indeed, even their attitude toward detente is ambiguous. But perhaps they thus better show the way 'internationalism' changed in meaning as it passed from the hands of Marx and Engels to those of Lenin and Stalin. They illustrate the last turn of the screw with this citation from Stalin in 1927:
He is an internationalist who unreservedly, unhesitatingly and unconditionally is prepared to defend the USSR, because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and it is impossible to defend, to advance this revolutionary movement without defending the USSR. Whoever thinks of defending the world revolutionary movement without, and against, the USSR, goes against revolution, and must slide to the camp of the enemy of the revolution. (139)

Despite changing Soviet uses of 'proletarian internationalism' or 'socialist internationalism' since Stalin, this position remains the fundamental one. Kubalkova and Cruickshank go, indeed, even further, arguing that there has been in the West a shift of theoretical attention from 'international relations to world politics' at the same time that Marxism, in its Soviet form, has been shifting from 'world politics to international relations' (302)! This may explain why neither Soviet theorists nor Kubalkova and Cruickshank have anything further to say on internationalism.

Unfortunately, non-Soviet Leninists seem to have little extra to say. The noted Polish sociologist, Wiatr (1974), is concerned with the value of sociology in general, and of Marxism in particular, for the study of international relations. His understanding of the fundamental approach of Marxism-Leninism is simply that

foreign policy is determined by domestic policy and, more specifically, by the socio-economic order. (112)

He considers this position to remain correct and fruitful but - in the manner of the more independent contemporary Leninist - to require contemporary specification and modification. This is to allow for the influence of 'national character', 'micro-factors of foreign policy formation and execution', and 'ideological and psychological conditions' (112). Given that Wiatr considers the determinants of foreign policy to be orders, factors and conditions, rather than contradictions and struggles (except as an
influence on the cultural or characterological factor), it should be unsurprising that he fails to mention internationalism - or, for that matter, workers.

New Left or Western Marxism-Leninism does little better. Krippendorf (1974) proposes we move 'Towards a Class Analysis of the International System'. Class becomes the primary - almost the only - concept for interpreting international relations. This does require Krippendorf to ask why 'class politics did not prevail over state politics' in the past and to offer as a 'rather simple answer' that it has been due to the recurrent defeat or crippling of the lower classes, which obstructed early-19th century bourgeois internationalism, that of the proletariat since 1871 and that of the Third World since the 1960s (5-6). This is not so much a simple answer as a tautological one: class politics did not prevail over state politics because state politics prevailed over class ones. It is, further, a question-begging answer. To make the question begged explicit rather than implicit: are bourgeois and Third-World internationalism (whatever these might mean) in any way analogous to or compatible with the proletarian variety?

Krippendorf does not feel obliged to deal with such petty matters since he is busy with a contemporary rebirth of bourgeois and proletarian internationalism and - although it is identified more broadly as 'ethnic' - possibly of a Third-World type also. The proletarian one is stimulated by the new internationalisation of production and 'in the long run' (10) by immigration. Krippendorf recognises that the second process is made problematic in the short run by its divisive consequences for working-class solidarity. But he is also unaware of the problematic nature of the first process. Here the internationalist response is said to be that of union leaders rather than workers, given the 'very real remoteness' of internationalisation 'from the concrete experience' (8) of national working classes themselves! As for the ethnic unrest, this has an even more tenuous relationship with internationalism. The argument appears to be the following. Ethnic protest, in the Third World, the West and even in the Communist East, is a result of inequalities imposed by the international
development of capitalism. But such ethnic discontent - even within the Soviet Union - articulates itself 'with hardly any exception' in socialist terms. It has, moreover, an 'internationally contagious quality' (12) which undermines the international capitalist system. We can ignore most of the heroic assumptions, logical leaps and empty assertions of this contribution to utopian fiction in order to concentrate on the main problems: 1) the internationalisation of production and international migration are shown, in the late-20th century, to be increasing ethnic rather than class consciousness internationally; 2) the global spread of ethnic discontent must, in Marxist-Leninist-Krippendorfist terms, surely be seen as different from, if not in direct contradiction with, the building of proletarian internationalism. It is a curious and revealing fact that the only 'internationalism' for which Krippendorf produces convincing evidence is that of corporate managers, whose links he admits to being 'more real and concrete than those of labour' (10).

Apparently less sweeping in scope and wild in claim is Gerd Junne's *International Division of Labour and Political Process* (1982). The first problem here is, nonetheless, heroic over-simplification. Junne sees the international division of labour as producing a single worldwide 'ladder, staircase or pyramid' (6) with all states placed on it and competing in the struggle for development. The second problem is that he sees no international actors other than states. The third problem is that he is interested in labour - well, actually, the labour force - only as victims. The fourth is that 'development' is treated as a positive, universal, homogenous and evidently unproblematic quality. Again, there is no place for working-class struggle, for working-class internationalism - or for an international and internationalist struggle over the meaning of development.

Unfortunately, there are related problems even with the most theoretically-sophisticated and thought-provoking 'Class Analysis of International Relations' I have been able to find (Resnick, Sinisi and Wolff 1985). The shortcoming may be due to its largely conceptual character and partly polemical purpose. RS&W are primarily concerned to refute the 'radical paradigm' in international relations. This paradigm (identified
with Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank and others) is criticised for suggesting that 1) the fundamental class contradiction in the contemporary world is between capitalists in the core and working class and peasants in the periphery, and 2) the creation of independent nationalist and/or socialist states implies a transformation of this class relationship. The details of their criticism cannot detain us here. What is of interest is their class alternative. This interest is in part because of the distinction they make between 'capitalist fundamental' (production) relations and 'capitalist subsumed' (distribution) relations and those of commodity exchange in which 'no exploitation and no fundamental or subsumed class positions result' (104). It is on the basis of such distinctions that they reject the radical paradigm. But their argument is attractive also because of their avoidance of an essentialist, determinist and single-factor line of argument. They rather see the overall social process as being determined by a complex of mutually necessary or supportive factors, including 'many non-class political processes' (101) such as that of commodity exchange internationally. The objective of Marxism, they claim,

is a revolutionary change in what we shall call the capitalist fundamental and subsumed class processes, the domestic fundamental and subsumed class processes, the domestic and foreign extraction and distribution of surplus value. (98)

Once again, we cannot enter into the detail of their conceptualisation here. What we have to note is their failure to apply their model outside North-South economic relations, or to mention internationalism, or indeed to in any way spell out the political implications of their theoretical analysis. This is how they end:

Marxist class analysis focuses on the distinction between class and non-class processes not only for purposes of precision in deciphering international relations but also to aid the efforts of those concerned to alter these relations in the direction of greater equality and justice among and within nations. (120)
One or two reasons for their shortcomings have been suggested at the outset. But one or two others may have been revealed along the way. Is the objective of Marxism only the transformation of class processes? Only among and within nations (i.e. states)? And, if the many 'non-class processes' are 1) homogenised and 2) characterised negatively in relation to class, does not this function anti-heuristically - make of secondary importance processes which are asserted to be of an equally and mutually determining character?

Increasingly it appears that the problem with contemporary Marxist or Leninist writing on international relations is its entrapment within an essentially bourgeois (and fairly conservative bourgeois) international relations discourse. This rules out not only an address to internationalism but also an original, profound or sensitive handling of relations between states and blocs. There is no lever with which to move this world (such as the critique of international relations theory). There is no point on which to rest such a lever (such as internationalist forces or subjects). International relations, moreover, are, at least for our Western writers, not so much class relations as production, consumption and exchange - i.e. economic - ones. What seems clear is that, whatever insights contemporary Marxist-Leninists might have, and whatever contribution they might make to the analysis of international relations, for an understanding of its surpassing we will have to look elsewhere.

International pressure groups or a new international force?

Willetts (1982) has edited a collection with the long but expressive title, Pressure Groups in the Global System: Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organisations. To the case studies he adds an introductory conceptualisation and a concluding analysis.

The introductory essay begins by separating out 'promotional groups' (welfare, religious, communal, party-political, specific-issue) from 'professional associations' and 'sectional economic groups' nationally and internationally. The latter category encompasses both multinationals and
unions, but they are excluded from further examination as not being 'issue-orientated'. The paper then concentrates on such examples of the latter as the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Amnesty International (AI), Oxfam, etc. Willets considers that such international 'pressure groups' can be understood within a broadly-defined 'Global Politics' paradigm:

Global politics covers the utilisation of coercion and the disposal of economic resources and the mobilisation of legitimacy by governments and intergovernmental organisations and pressure groups. Governments are important as loci of authority and in the possession of military capabilities. Sectional interest groups are important as transnational economic actors. In addition we must regard the five types of promotional pressure groups, along with intergovernmental organisations, as important transnational political actors, mobilising legitimacy. Indeed, all types of global actors may in principle engage in all three types of interactions. If we wish to explain political processes, we should not assume in advance that certain types of actors or certain types of interactions can be ignored. (24. Original stress)

Whilst this statement is partly polemical in intent, it is also a positive statement of a pluralist approach to international relations, taking account of all relevant actors and all types of activity (coercion, resource-mobilisation, legitimacy-mobilisation).

Armed with the above understanding, Willets evaluates, in his concluding chapter, the impact of his five types of promotional pressure groups. He notes, amongst other features: 1) the transnational origin of all the cases studied; 2) that they share the same targets - inter-governmental organisations, governments, societies - although with differing priorities; 3) that they are able to call on a membership commitment sometimes greater than that of parties or governments, to develop leaderships sometimes more expert than state officials, to reach the grassroots efficiently and
flexibly, to develop considerable information expertise; 4) that, despite
the hostility of Thatcherite regimes, groups like Anti-Apartheid have some-
times booked 'spectacular successes' (195).

Despite this pertinent conclusion, it is not difficult to note the
severe limitations of this work for our subject matter. Many of them are to
be found in the title: 'pressure groups' suggests operation within, rather
than against, a system; 'global system' is a verbal figleaf for a
capitalist-dominated one; 'issue-orientated' belittles the universalist
elements or aspirations of Friends of the Earth or Amnesty; 'non-
governmental organisation' is a non-definition, the analytical value of
which is revealed by its capacity to cover both Oxfam and the PLO. The fact
that Willets excludes unions from his analysis is probably for the best,
given that he includes these mass worker organisations with those of a tiny
capitalist elite as 'sectional economic groups'. But the general problem is
that he is trying to get his 'promotional groups' into international rela-
tions practice and theory rather than rethinking the latter in the light of
the former. Yet Willets himself reveals both the novelty, the power and the
specific strengths and strategies of the new phenomenon. And we may benefit
from his analysis here, if not from his theory. Borrowing from and adapting
his analysis, we may provisionally conceptualise these groups in terms of:
their origin in civil society, in relations between nation states; their
identifying new international problems and creating new collective interna-
tional identities; their primarily mobilising legitimacy; their addressing
themselves to national and international society as well as the national and
international state organs; their acting primarily as communicators of new
ideas; their potentially stimulating economic and political cooperation
against (rather than 'interdependence within') the capitalist-dominated
system.

The democratisation of international relations

Whilst there are various writers interested in some kind of alternative
'world order' (see Falk, Kim and Mendlovitz 1982 and Nerfin 1986), and even
several schools amongst them, we will here concentrate on their doyen, Johan
Galtung, and then on just one text concerning 'The Nonterritorial System' (Galtung 1980: Ch.7). Whilst some writers on international associations or networking confront neither the hegemonic states nor the TNCs, this cannot be said of Galtung. He by no means prioritises labour internationalism in the struggle against these, but what he has to say seems to help an understanding of both traditional and a possible future internationalism.

Galtung prefers not to use the word 'international' since he sees it as representing simply the 'system of states or countries...in cooperation and conflict' (306). He rather talks of the 'territorial' and 'nonterritorial' systems, recognising in the latter three types of actors. These are the 'intergovernmental organisation' (IGOs, such as the UN, IMF, EEC), the 'internongovernmental organisation' (INGOs, organising national political parties, unions, business associations, TNCs) and the 'transnational nongovernmental organisation' (TRANGOs, in which there is a direct relationship to individuals, as with some professional associations). The TRANGOs express and represent nonterritorial interests, values and identities.

Whilst other elements may be present, the IGOs and INGOs tend to reproduce or even intensify territorial elements and relations. The reproduction of big-state domination and social elitism is evident within the UN. It is even more evident, of course, within the TNCs as 'carriers of economic imperialism' (312). He goes into detail on how these reproduce a vertical division of labour, transfer capital from periphery to centre, propagate a capital- and research-intensive type of production, proliferate unnecessary and irrelevant products, and then support political forces locally which favour this pattern.

Galtung argues that the traditional territorial (nation-state and inter-state) system is static. All geographic space is today occupied and nothing can happen but fusion or fission within it. The nonterritorial system is essentially dynamic: 1) because it operates in social-functional, not geographic, space; 2) because of the comparative ease of creation of such socio-functional bodies; 3) because of the stimulus that dominant IGOs
and INGOs provide to 'anti-' organisations; 4) because of their tendency to extend themselves globally, to combine with others and to create higher-level coordination:

One consequence is predictable, and we are already living in the ever-growing confirmation of that 'prediction': the nonterritorial system will attract increasing attention, talent, and dynamism. An increasing number of persons will think, act, even live in terms of international networks of which they form some part, as pilgrims have done for millennia already. (318)

Galtung sees a movement occurring from government foreign policies to a 'world politics'. A democratisation of foreign policy (as proposed by Seddon above) is considered necessary but not sufficient since the customary model, 1) is of indirect, representational, democracy, and 2) gives no vote to the foreign objects of such democratically-influenced policy. The movement he describes or prescribes is from 1) inter-state relations, to 2) inter-state relations under pressure from non-state actors nationally, to 3) inter-state relations under pressure from TRANGOs nationally and internationally, and finally to, 4) the same but with multiple complex inter-relations between all parties involved. An important move for TRANGOs would be from 1) pressure on IGOs, including lobbying, demonstrations, parallel and anti-conferences, to 2) the taking over of traditional inter-state functions. In what follows I will deal with Galtung's terminology and analysis.

Terminology: We do not have adequate access, in this short piece, to Galtung's theory but we do to a quite distinct terminology, itself suggesting a certain view of the world. Whilst understanding his objection to 'internationalism' we will retain the word because of its historical and social movement roots. His specification of what we call internationalism in terms of nonterritoriality (negatively) and social-functional space (positively) is, however, highly suggestive of the potential of the latter. Whilst Galtung's acronyms may jar on the unaccustomed ear, the typology of
international actors is again highly suggestive. Here, however, the question arises of whether these types allow sufficiently either for the major conservative or the major radical force in international (or national) affairs. I would suggest the necessity to prioritise and profile the two such historically specific and unique forces, namely the TNCs and the new social movements. To include these within the other categories is unavoidably to homogenise them with others and to reduce them in significance.

**Analysis:** While it is difficult to separate this element from the prescriptive one in Galtung's piece, we can identify statements drawn from and applicable to past or present processes. His analysis of the reproduction of state elements and relations within IGOs and INGOs helps us understand the problems of past and existing labour internationals. His analysis of the source and growth of the 'nonterritorial' system helps us understand the revival of labour internationalism as being much more than just a revival and as having much more of a basis than that of personal conviction or political ideology.

What is particularly attractive about the argument as a whole is its sensitive and dialectical handling of the state and non- or anti- or post-state systems: the recognition that the inter-state system will continue, will remain in inter-relation with the alternative one, but with the latter becoming dominant. Or perhaps one should say, given Galtung's aversion to dominance, dissolving the dominance of the inter-state system. This leads to a last point. In so far as the argument implies a surpassing of inter-state relations it is by the same token subversive of international relations theory - a discipline which, like others, tends to assume the universality and immutability of its subject. This is an essentially and originally Marxist procedure (consider 'The Critique of Political Economy'). But it was not necessarily always followed consistently by Marx. And it does not, as we have seen, seem to have been much followed by contemporary Marxists writing on international relations.
Nationalist bureaucrats of the Third World, Unite!...Maybe?...

Robert Cox (1981) has made an original and thought-provoking attempt to surpass the limitations of both mainstream and Marxist approaches to international relations. His ambition is clearly expressed in his title: 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory'. This essay appears to synthesise much that is of value in the material previously examined. Cox draws quite explicitly from Marx (political economy, dialectics, historical materialism), Lenin (imperialism), Gramsci (hegemony) and the Frankfurt School (critical theory) in attempting to develop a 'political economy perspective of the world' (141). We may learn both from his effort and from his eventual failure to go beyond international relations theory. We will deal in turn with his theoretical framework, his historical analysis, contemporary analysis and his scenarios for the future.

Theoretical framework: Cox opposes 'problem-solving' theory in international relations with 'critical theory', arguing that the latter stands outside the prevailing order, questions existing power relations, looks at the totality of social relations, is historical, allows for normative choice and provides a 'guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order' (130). He recognises Marxism as such a critical theory and identifies himself with the historical-materialist tradition within Marxism. For him, the crucial elements of the latter are: 1) a dialectical logic and worldview; 2) recognition, through the focus on imperialism, of vertical power as well as horizontal rivalry between states; 3) recognition of reciprocal structure/superstructure or society/state relations as 'constituent entities of a world order' (134); 4) focus on the production process as a critical element in explaining particular state/society complexes, thus allowing for examination of 'connections between power in production, power in the state, and power in international relations' (135).

Historical analysis: Cox deploys his conceptual armoury to considerable effect in historical analysis of international relations. He
identifies three significant periods, each associated with a specific pattern of capitalist production, with a specific socio-political relationship nationally and with a specific type of imperialism. We thus have the 19th century Pax Britanica, linked to a manufacturing capitalism, the liberal state and a liberal (i.e. pre-colonial) imperialism. The necessity of incorporating the newly-created working class into the industrialised nation state gave rise to its welfare-nationalist form, to protectionism, to a new (i.e. colonial) imperialism, and to a 'non-hegemonic configuration of rival power blocs' (142) from the end of the 19th century to the end of World War Two. The rise of the new American hegemony, the Pax Americana, in this period, lies not simply in growing economic power but in the generalisation of Keynesian strategies from the national arena (New Deal of the late-1930s) to the international one (World Bank, IMF, OECD, of the post-WW2 era). The social forces awakened in the colonial periphery in the previous period gave rise to a new type of colonialism, the 'imperialist system' (144). This post-colonial system rested on a broad consent outside 'the Soviet sphere' but was eventually itself challenged at the periphery 'where the element of force was always apparent' (144).

**Contemporary analysis:** Cox proposes to investigate hegemony-maintaining and anti-hegemonic forces under a Pax Americana that is being increasingly questioned. What he actually does, however, is to concentrate on the character and disposition of forces under the present hegemony and then briefly offer three future scenarios. The present world order is presented as dominated by three processes, as follow below.

1. The internationalisation of certain crucial state functions, in the form of the World Bank, etc., in an 'imperial state system' (143) symbiotically linked to the MNCs, having parts of the US state at its core but also including parts of collaborator states at the periphery.

2. The internationalisation of production, with international integration of different phases of production, control through the production process rather than via share-ownership, but increasingly under the influence of finance capital.
3. An 'emerging global class structure', headed by a 'transnational managerial class'. Under this category comes the first hypothetically anti-hegemonic force - a national capitalist class torn between its urge for independence and the pressure for subordination. It is only under this category that Cox deals with industrial workers, these being seen as fragmented along two axes. They are divided firstly into 'established and non-established' categories, in terms of skill, pay, conditions, security, prospects, capacity for unionisation. But they are also divided into 'national and international' employment categories, according to the nature of enterprise ownership. These categories are differentially distributed between core and peripheral countries. But there is also the 'marginalised' part of the world's population, apparently existing only within the periphery. Each of these categories is seen as being subject to different forms of labour control by governments or states, although - implicitly - actual or potential radicalism increases as one descends the ladder. The 'major problem for international capital', thus, appears to be with the marginalised: with preventing 'its poverty from fuelling revolt' (149).

Future scenarios: We need to only deal briefly with the three alternative futures Cox offers us. The first is a new hegemony based on internationalised production. The second is a 'non-hegemonic world structure of conflicting power centres' (150). The third, 'more remotely possible' (150) outcome is thus characterised:

a counter-hegemony based on a Third-World coalition...The prospects of counter-hegemony lie very largely in the future development of state structures in the Third World.

[...A] state class is only likely to maintain the more radical orientation if it is supported from below in the form of a genuine populism (and not just a populism manipulated by political leaders). (151)

Commentary: We will deal here in turn with Cox's theoretical framework, historical analysis and future scenarios.
With respect to the first we need to note the nature of both his critical theory and his use of Marxism. Critical theory is a subversive but also a negative stance, implying no necessary commitment to a specific alternative, no identification with any particular social and political force. What Cox ignores in classical Marxism, further, is as important as what he picks out. We may list at least the following elements which would seem necessary to a historical-materialist view of world society: alienation as the human predicament; class struggle as motive force of history; socialism as the future; proletariat as revolutionary subject; theory as world-transformation rather than world-interpretation. Cox’s concept of hegemony, finally, differs from Gramsci’s not so much in his extension of it from the national to the international arena as in purpose: for Gramsci it was used not simply to analyse the intellectual and moral leadership of oppressive minorities but the winning of such authority over the masses by the proletariat in its struggle against such minorities.

Cox’s historical analysis is suggestive and one can imagine it being blocked out in detail. It seems, however, to conceal at least two elements crucial for even initial conviction. The first is that of ‘the Soviet sphere’. As with other imperialism-fixated views of international relations, it tends to treat the Soviet bloc either benevolently/ambiguously as deus ex machina (Krippendorf, Junne), or to ignore it completely, presumably as diablo ex machina (RS&W, Cox). The second missing element is the working-class and democratic movement within the core capitalist states. One can possibly deny the local origins of major pressures on – say – British and US foreign policy under the Pax Americana. But one can hardly ignore the way that contradictions at both peripheries (Southern and Eastern) worked through the Western labour and democratic movements in favour, for example, of withdrawal from Vietnam and detente with the Soviet Union. Here the limitations of Cox’s theoretical toolkit become apparent.

When Cox is analysing contemporary social forces it is essential to note where and how he places his hypothetically anti-hegemonic forces. This is within an international class structure, containing an international elite, national sub-elites in different and ambiguous relationship to them,
industrial workers differentially subordinated to the elites, and a marginalised mass concentrated in the Third World. The result of his analysis is to find anti-hegemonic forces not amongst the masses but amongst the national capitalists, national parts of bureaucracies and nationalist states. If there.

Given the foregoing, it is not surprising that Cox should end with an address to existing elites or counter-elites. This leaves labour (established, unestablished or marginalised) standing in the usual queue, again carrying history’s slopbuckets, waiting to have them filled at best by a ‘genuine populism’, the precise calorific value of which is not printed on the label. Critical theory thus ends up as grand problem-solving theory, most likely to appeal to such demagogic Third-World nationalists as ‘Alan Peru’ (President Alan Garcia of Peru), who are not averse to a few Marxist concepts and a little class analysis providing they put organisable workers in the upper class and make the unorganisable ones the only progressive mass force (Garcia’s famous social pyramid). The menu at Restaurant Cox offers us a surpassing of international relations theory. But what we get dished up is a modernised and internationally-extended version of 1950s ‘industrialising elites’ theory, with a little Fanonist sauce added. It remains to follow up elsewhere such provocative ideas of Cox as this:

Social forces are not to be thought of as existing exclusively within states. Particular social forces may overflow state bound-aries, and world structures can be described in terms of social forces just as they can be described as configurations of state power. The world can be represented as a pattern of interacting social forces in which states play an intermediate though autonomous role between the global structure of social forces and local configurations of social forces within particular countries...[P]ower is seen as emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of accumulated material capabilities, that is as the result of these processes. (Original stress. 141)
If social forces exist also beyond states and if the world can be described in terms of social forces, then we could possibly also conceive of these as operating internationally against international capital, the nation-state and the inter-state system.
5. From world systems models to international social movements

it is with some trepidation that I turn to world-systems theory for help in understanding internationalism. Immanuel Wallerstein, founder of the school, clearly considers himself within the Marxist tradition. He certainly shares with Marx a focus on world society that, as we have seen, later Marxists have lost. He has, on the other hand, been subject to an increasing barrage of sharp Marxist criticism and loud Leninist abuse. Some of the criticism has already been alluded to on these pages. As to the abuse, 'bourgeois renewer' (Pijl 1982:9) may be amongst the less offensive. Criticism has also been specifically directed at the school's handling of the working class, nationally and internationally. This has been not only from outside, but by Charles Bergquist and R.W. Connell in the school's own publications. Focusing on labour movements globally, Bergquist (1984:1) asserts that the world-systems approach to modern world history has failed to come to terms fully with the meaning of the struggles of working peoples.

Denying the existence of international classes, Connell (1984:413) helps us understand a more general weakness of the school:

World-systems approaches to theorising the international dimension of class confront us with characteristic problems: a tendency to treat classes as categories of economic actors; an a priori cast-list of classes; the appeal to a logic-of-the-system that carries a presupposition that there is a well-formed coherent system, and difficulty in grasping class formation other than through functionalism or through the distinction of class-in-itself from class-for-itself.

If one turns to this school for a contribution to our efforts this cannot be only because one is charmed by its willingness to publicise such apparently damaging criticism (even if one notes that such liberalism is not
shared by many Leninist Renevers). It is in part because of the global focus mentioned above. It is also because of the willingness to attempt those socially broad and historically long views proper to the Marxist tradition. (These are literal worldviews with which we all operate in our narrower interests and daily concerns, whether consciously or not). It is, finally, because of the school’s increasing interest in labour and other social movements, seen in relation to the shaping and transformation of the contemporary world order. In the following two sections, we will consider certain writings of Wallerstein and his colleagues, and the item by Connell just referred to. Whilst Connell cannot be identified with world-systems theory he has clearly contributed to its debates in ways relevant both to that school itself and to our own purposes.

Against a ‘global ruling class in formation’

The introduction above may help readers locate the two texts to which we are here going to confine ourselves. Jointly authored by Giovanni Arrighi, Terence Hopkins and Wallerstein himself, these are entitled ‘Dilemmas of Antisystemic Movements’ (1984) and ‘1886–1986: Beyond Haymarket?’ (1986). The Dilemmas paper deals with the success and failure of the classical social movements – labour and national, with their undermining in the present phase of capital accumulation, and with challenges to them by the new social movements. The Haymarket paper refers to the origins of May Day. It addresses itself directly to the traditional social movement – labour – and the dramatic shifts in socio-geographic centre, or socio-political content and form, in the present phase. Both papers are ‘essays’ in a quite traditional sense – thought-provoking reflections on a theme rather than logically-connected arguments or systematic analyses. Each contains ideas that are not grounded and suggestions that are not spelled out or followed up. Any summary is bound to ignore many of these ideas. But we may nonetheless find echoes of notes struck by other writers considered.

In discussing these papers we need to keep in mind our concern with internationalism. Our authors seem to allow for internationalism without
actually dealing with it. (Perhaps they feel that, as many of us do of socialism, it is better to travel hopefully than to arrive!). In my discussion I will deal with four points that relate more directly to an understanding of internationalism. These are 1) the conceptual and political priority and centrality of labour and labour movements, 2) the literally destructive (de-structuring) dynamic of the world capitalist system, 3) the new social movements as an international and potentially internationalist phenomenon, 4) further problems and possibilities.

1. The priority and centrality of labour: AH&W give labour and labour movements both conceptual and political priority. Unusually for those within the Marxist tradition, they actually begin both their analyses of contemporary social movements with movements. This is because they apparently wish to present social movements in general and labour movements in particular as co-creators with capital of the contemporary world order. This means that the movements are presented neither as the gods, devils or martyrs of history but as mass social forces both inside and outside the process of capital reproduction and state-building. Labour is presented historically, in terms of its changing internal composition, geographical location or origin, needs, capacities, and its local and international class relations. It is also shown currently as being de-structured locally, dispersed or displaced internationally, and as being disarmed or disoriented in ideological, organisational and strategy terms. They see the classical labour movement shifting to the semi-periphery as new social movements arise at the core. At the same time there is the clear insistence on labour and the labour movement as underlying other movements and demands. Labour, finally, is presented as an increasingly international and potentially internationalist force. This is seen, however, as requiring a surpassing of racism and even of nationalism.

2. The destructive dynamic of capitalism: AH&W suggest that capitalism is the most dynamic and dominant force today, but that this dynamism is both one of perpetual re-organisation and of a literally destructive and anti-human character. This comes out of the treatment in various ways. There is the dramatic centralisation of capital, allowing
small numbers of bankers from a handful of countries to over-ride traditional organs of sovereignty, and impose death sentences or life sentences on the people of—say—Poland, Portugal or Peru. There is what I would call the 'statification' or 'inter-statification' that is imposing state or inter-state controls on people, or in places, that were previously left to their own resources. They argue that

the central agency of capitalist accumulation on a world scale, a world ruling class in formation, is organising a relational structure for continually resolving the massive contradictions increasingly apparent between the transnational corporations' control over, and hence responsibility for, the interrelations among productive processes and the multiple states' control over, and hence responsibility for, the labour forces these production processes engage, more or less sporadically. (Original stress. 1984:24)

There is, further, the de-structuring, if not the destruction, of the nation-state as a meaningfully distinct and internally-determined organisation. There is the de-structuring and destruction of labour, increasingly treated as a worldwide resource open to repeated reshaping at the whim of an increasingly flexible and mobile—but also increasingly unstable and vulnerable—international capital.

3. The new social movements: These are presented by AH&W as essentially anti-bureaucratic in character, with this anti-bureaucratism being addressed to the traditional labour and national movements as much as to the state and inter-state organs. At the same time they seem to wish to see them as essentially expressing the demands of labour, albeit labour outside the union movement. And, again at the same time, these movements are somehow presented as moving beyond the proletariat. They are shown as potentially surpassing a labour movement self-defined or publicly revealed as eurocentric, chauvinist, racist, statist, sexist and—for that matter, it seems to me—age-ist and wage-ist (unrepresentative of the young, old and unwaged).
4. Problems and prospects of the analysis: Let us here deal with the listed elements or aspects in turn.

The prioritising of labour would seem acceptable providing one explicitly redefines it to include non-waged labour, and then to give 'non-waged' a positive meaning. AH&W would seem to allow for this in so far as they address themselves to women and the unemployed. But an explicit treatment of 'peasant', 'self-employed', 'household' or 'reproductive' labour would provide us with an essential conceptual base for solidarity strategies nationally and internationally.

In dealing with the centralisation of capital and of what I have called inter-statification, the trio talk of a 'world ruling class in formation'. Counterposed to their 'organised world proletariat' (1986:12) we have here, implicitly, that 'class formation on a world scale' which R.W. Connell is concerned to question. We will therefore have to return to this issue below.

AH&W present the new movements as simultaneously anti-bureaucratic, as expressing demands of non-unionised labour, and as potentially surpassing the limitations of traditional labour movements. It seems to me that 'anti-bureaucratic' is too narrow a term for movements against racism, sexism and multinationalism (consumer and environment movements), that the second point leans towards class-reductionism, and that we therefore need another basis for the crucial last point. A broader view of the new social movements would be that they are concerned with the struggle against alienation in all its multifarious contemporary forms - thus including the struggle against multinationalisation and the wage-labour relationship. It appears as if AH&W are trying to preserve the anti-exploitation struggle for the traditional labour movements and then to prioritise working-class over 'democratic' or 'anti-alienation' struggles.

Like AH&W we have been talking more about new social movements or global movements than about international labour or internationalist movements (see, however, my collection, Waterman 1988b). It has already been
suggested that their work brings us to the edge of the pool rather than plunging us in. But they even so raise a problem for internationalism we have not seen mentioned earlier. This is where they argue that the rise of the new social movements at the core has been accompanied by a shift of the traditional labour movement to the semi-periphery. Even if we recognise the continued existence — and possible transformation — of union movements at the core, and the growing importance of the new social movements at both the eastern and southern peripheries of capitalism, we still have to confront the differential nature and composition of the most dynamic social movements within different world areas. Whereas I might have myself previously argued that a meaningful solidarity relationship must be between 'concerned labouring people themselves' (Waterman 1986:20), the above realisation requires us to consider whether diversity between international partners is not going to be more typical of a new internationalism.

5. New forms for new movements internationally: Finally, two disconnected points from AH&W that are not addressed to internationalism but which nonetheless seem to me related to each other and of considerable import: social movement organisation; new means of communication. AH&W remind us of how recent is the birth of the organised and permanent social movement, and of how closely related this phenomenon is to the growth of capitalism and the nation-state. They also insist on old social movement bureaucratisation as a major problem and major target of the new social movements. They then direct our attention to the new means of communication as both problem and possibility for social movements internationally:

The kind of concern flagged in the Manifesto, the material means of unity among those geographically separate, remains central. The means themselves, and the very form of their materiality, have been fundamentally transformed. More and more antisystemic movements will find their own cohesion and coherence forged and destroyed by the newest of the means of mediating social relations. (1984:27)
The question that arises from these points is of whether there is not a possibility (since there seems to be a necessity) of surpassing a form that not only reflects or reproduces those of the oppressive nation state but even created them (the German Social-Democratic Party as both state-within-the-state and as the model for the modern bourgeois political party). Now, whilst the new media have often been developed by the military, mass produced by multinationals, and used by both state and capital to serialise, stupify and supervise, they have in-built possibilities for popular, cooperative, democratic and internationalist communication that Western capital and the Eastern state have the greatest difficulty in concealing or repressing (Waterman 1988c). Practice is here again in advance of theory, with experimental usages of electronic (as well as traditional) media for international communication between grassroots-oriented groups and movements. We do not even have to assume - even if we might wish for - the demise of the traditional, hierarchically-organised national or international union or party. The existence and use of the new communications media undermines the isolation, ignorance and dependency that permit bureaucratisation and have given it so much past weight.

Against global capitalist processes

The fundamental argument of R.W. Connell is the following:

while international class relations are real and important, and class exploitation and class struggle are global, it is empty rhetoric to speak of global classes. And it may be politically disastrous to act as if they existed. The international solidarity of exploited groups and progressive movements has to be constructed in a more piecemeal and painful way. (Original stress. Connell 1984:435)

Connell does not think, either, that there is a stable capitalist 'core'. Rather is there the continuing effort to build one amongst competing groups and despite protesting workers. The efforts of the dominant forces have given rise to the TNC, to an international market for stateless capital, to
the creation of international police and military forces, as well as to nuclear weapons and inter-state polarisations that serve effectively to control own and allied populations as much or more than the postulated enemy ones. These processes, some of which cross the East-West divide, do not amount to the development of a world bourgeoisie, either across this divide or within the West itself. Closer to such a global bourgeois class identity are such cultural institutions as Rotary International, Hilton Hotels, the Trilateral Commission and the international programmes of the Ford Foundation. But Connell points out that the Trilateral Commission has a limited geographical base (North American, Western Europe, Japan) and has come in for attack from the conservative right as well as the radical left. This leads him to conclude that what counts most

is not getting a world ruling class organised, but keeping the world's workers safely separated. (432-3)

For Connell, capitalism is more like a cancer than a machine. We need to identify the processes of its spread, and then understand class self-formation locally and specifically. Connell identifies the international spread of capitalist relations in terms of 1) the reconstruction of gender, sexuality and domestic life so as to produce the kind of people fit for a capitalist system, 2) concentration of social capital, expanded reproduction, 3) the rationalisation and expansion of the state, always crucial, always interventionist. Such processes lead to different local class structures, not simply because they have no homogenous starting point but also because of their internal and mutual contradictions.

Connell does not list the universalisation of the wage-labour relationship amongst his three crucial processes. But he does explore the potential of the international socialist movement for creating a world working-class identity. Briefly reviewing the Second and Third Internationals, he notes the collapse of the Second in 1914 and the way the Third eventually functioned to prevent class mobilisation in the interests of the Soviet state. Where communist parties have successfully mobilised on a mass scale this has been due to their nationalism rather than their internationalism:
The various internationals that remain are clandestine, or sectarian, or gutless; and in none of these cases serve as a means of class mobilisation. (434)

There remain the efforts at union internationalism, but these are limited, modest and confronted not only by repression, or their own sectarianism, but also by the profound shifts and changes in working-class structure and composition internationally. Connell ends on an optimistic note, if a cautious one:

This does not for a moment imply that there are structural reasons why solidarity cannot be built. The global mobilisation in support of the Vietnamese shows that a powerful and effective movement can be built from very disparate elements. But the total collapse of those alliances since 1975 shows how little we can take for granted. Solidarity is always an achievement, never a given. (435)

Internationalist struggle against alienation processes?

Rather than discuss Connell on his own, we might as well discuss him in relation to AH&W and, for that matter, to such writers as Krippendorf and Cox who toy with some notion of an international capitalist class.

In so far as we are talking of processes, organs and agents of negotiation, integration and even action by the dominating forces internationally, then it would seem to me that there is no necessary contradiction amongst our various writers. The processes of capitalist coordination, the inter-state organisations, the cosmopolitan ideology of managerialism, the growth, spread and spiralling of military deterrence strategies – all these are destructive enough without any need to assume a common capitalist, or capitalist-statist, interest or plan behind them. Connell’s notion of domination by ideologically hegemonising the relevant field, and by disorganising the dominated, also seems to me sufficient explanation.
We earlier noted that Connell did not prioritise the wage-labour process amongst his three crucial processes of capitalist internationalisation. The three that he did identify were those of sex, gender and family construction, of capital concentration, and of statification. These three processes allow us to identify as three main international struggles those against patriarchy, the TNC/IMF/bank complex, and those against statification (national and international). Expanded and spelled out, these processes would seem to allow for most of the new social movements existing internationally.

But what of working-class internationalism? AH&W refer to the possibility of an organised world proletariat within national locales (1986:12) but do not talk of working-class internationalism. Connell writes off the historical socialist internationalisms, considers even modest contemporary union internationalism problematic, and gives as his major positive example not proletarian, labour or socialist internationalism but a case of anti-imperialist, anti-war internationalism. And one that has now totally collapsed! Are we to be left with the rhetorical internationalism of Krippendorff, the possible nationalist internationalism of Cox, the hypothetical proletarian internationalism of AH&W? Or are we to follow up Connell’s idea that the international solidarity of exploited groups and progressive movements has to be constructed and re-constructed in a more piecemeal and painful way? That socialist internationalisms have failed, that wage-earner or union internationalism is weak, does not, it seems to me, necessarily rule out the future possible existence of a meaningful working-class internationalism. What it could be taken to mean is that such a project must abandon both the hegemonic aspirations of the early labour movement and the narrow internationalism of the unions. And then to see international labour struggles as neither separate nor leading but as a particular area of struggle that needs to demonstrate its integration with other international struggles against alienation at the same time as it expresses the felt needs and creative capacities of wage-labourers in their daily struggles in and against the wage labour relationship.
6. Some Women of Some Lands, Unite!

It is worthwhile examining directly the positions of feminists on internationalism. This is for a number of reasons. One is because of the subversive impact of feminism on the institutionalised labour movement and dogmatic socialist theory. More positively, feminism and the women’s movement could be seen as the paradigmatic ‘new social movement’, particularly in their insistence on connecting a desired future with present activity and of political position with personal behaviour; on the primacy of lived human experience over ideology and theory; on the necessary autonomy of distinct mass interests, demands and activities. On the international level, too, the women’s movement has exemplified a new kind of internationalism, with a multiplicity of contents and forms, surpassing the rigid structures, monopolising claims, ritualised positions and empty - or self-contradictory - activities of the traditional international labour and socialist organisations. It is worthwhile, finally, to examine feminist internationalism so as to avoid posing - even implicitly - a homogenous ‘democratic’ internationalism against an equally homogenous ‘class’ internationalism. Each hypothetical subject, area or type of international and internationalist activity has its own specific characteristics and can possibly make its own contribution towards the meaning of internationalism and a meaningful internationalism. All this should not be taken to suggest that feminist thinking on internationalism is more advanced than that of non-feminists. Despite its intense - too intense? - theoretical activity elsewhere, this area remains largely hidden from women’s history and feminist theory. It is nonetheless possible to find recent work which does address itself, explicitly or implicitly, to the international arena. It is to two such contributions that we must now turn. Both concentrate on the strategies of the women’s movement in the face of the dramatically changing international division of labour.

Women Workers of Some Lands, Unite!

Swasti Mitter is a woman of Asian origin but British residence, who specialises on forms of women’s work produced by the combination of new
technology, MNCs and the changing division of labour nationally and internationally. She has also been active in organising wage-earning women internationally. Her book is entitled Common Fate, Common Bond: Women in the Global Economy (Mitter 1986). It is more of an analytical than a theoretical work, being clearly oriented to political action, and ending with a list of relevant women’s networks in Europe. The book is concerned with the changing structure of employment worldwide, with the creation of a sub-proletariat of women workers, with the implications of this both in the Third World and in the First, and with the inter-relationships of class, gender and race in this whole new process. The last chapter is entitled ‘Women Working Worldwide’ (139-63). It summarises the argument of the book, shows how women wage-earners are responding to the situation organisationally, and considers possible strategies that could favour them. We will comment on this last chapter.

Stressing the implications of and for gender and race structures internationally, Mitter’s analysis shows us a radically transformed working class, or a radically transformed image of the working class. Identifying with the casualised female, black and Third-World workers, she argues that these are increasingly finding themselves and each other internationally, and surpassing the limitations of a union movement dominated by males and whites. Her critical discussion of ‘alternative left’ strategies in Britain and Europe ends with an insistence on the contribution to be made by the women and black workers at the grassroots. We have here, in other words, a socialist-feminist view on labour internationally and on labour internationalism. Even if one accepts, however, the notion of a polarised working class and the increasing importance of the peripheral workers, and agrees on the necessity of their specific internationalism, the evidence and interpretation of international organisation and strategy is thin and unconvincing. What it amounts to are some pathbreaking conferences and useful information networks, some critically-examined First-World strategies and some uncritically-praised Third-World models. The limited space devoted by the book to organisation and action itself restricts the attention given to internationalism. Nor is any relationship shown to either labour internationalism or women’s internationalism more generally. Nor does Mitter’s
model allow for a communist world, the existence of which might complicate her set of binary oppositions (male/female, core workers/periiphery workers, white/black, First World/Third World). What we do nonetheless see is a distinct subject and area of labour and women’s internationalism, an implicit challenge to both of these to allow for this, an implicit requirement that this internationalism be examined more closely and theorised more rigorously.

**Middle-Class Feminists of Some Lands, Unite!**

Maria Mies is a prominent West German feminist theorist and analyst who has been active in the women’s movement in Germany and worked extensively on India. Her most recent book is *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour* (Mies 1986). This is a wide-ranging book of some theoretical complexity and originality. It conceptualises and analyses the contemporary world as shaped by ‘capitalist patriarchy’. And it ends with a chapter entitled ‘Towards a Feminist Perspective of a New Society’ (205-35). Given the nature of the work, as well as the greater proportion of space allowed for consideration of strategy, it will be interesting to see how this chapter compares with Mitter’s. We will see it takes a quite different approach and comes to quite different conclusions.

Mies refers to the international feminist movement as a ‘truly anarchic’ one (210). Her own contribution to its discussions seems itself to draw less from any post-Marx socialism than from an anti-industrial anarchist or socialist utopianism, finding contemporary expression in the ecological movement. This remark is meant not to settle accounts with her argument but to orientate oneself toward it. I would like to first deal with the elements that seem to me helpful for an understanding of international solidarity before confronting those that seem to me more problematic.

Even those unable to accept Mies’ particular paradigm of the world as solely or simply capitalist-patriarchal are likely to find her metaphor of colonising divisions (man:woman, humans:nature, rationality:emotionality,
white: black, etc. 210) powerful and convincing. Thus, also, her counter-principles, rejecting such destructive oppositions and proposing relations of equality, reciprocity, collectivity, autonomy and of the production of life as the purpose of life (218). She seems to me here to not only specify aspects of a new internationalism but to extend these back, down and in to the national, inter-personal and personality level. The specification, further, of body-politics and consumption relations as priorities for internationalist activity seems to me to significantly extend the traditional range and understanding of internationalism (227-8). Body-politics specifies the human-rights struggle in a form significant to women. A 'consumer liberation movement' gives a cutting edge to an existing consumer movement that often compromises with modernising capital or sophisticated state bureaucracies.

The most provocative and problematic of Mies' ideas is that of a middle-class feminist internationalism. Although I have myself elsewhere suggested that contemporary internationalism is largely a 'middle-class' phenomenon, and that wage-earner internationalism is often sponsored or articulated by academics and professionals (Waterman and Arellano 1986), this is the first time I have found someone apparently prepared to come out of the closet as a middle-class internationalist! Or does she? The attitudes, interests and demands are expressed as general, if not universal, are given priority, and are even determinant for the Western end of the West-South solidarity relationship. This leads on to the question of the role of workers, or peasants, or prostitutes, in international solidarity activity.

It seems to me that Mies' dismissal of the possibility of solidarity between workers North and South is actually dependent on orthodox Marxist categories and attitudes, if not arguments. She characterises this as the 'sphere of economics or economic struggles', seen as 'almost fully controlled by the international and sexual division of labour' (232). She says there is here no material base for solidarity. She does not even address her Western middle-class consumer's solidarity to Southern women factory workers, since the two are related internationally in a 'contradictory, even
agonistic way' (232). It seems to me that this kind of argument accepts a capitalist concept of workers - sees workers as defined by and for capital. Only in liberal thought, surely, is the relationship between workers internationally seen as a zero-sum game in which higher wages for workers there mean a loss for workers/consumers here. And even if there are real difficulties in creating solidarity on wages/jobs issues (which, incidentally, are political issues), it is difficult to argue that improved women worker rights - including body-politics ones - there are at the expense of those here. It should, finally, be pointed out that whilst her argument against the possibility of women wage-worker internationalism is based on 'material' obstacles, her argument for the possibility of of a consumer-producer internationalism is based on a - somewhat iffy - surpassal of such:

if women are ready to transcend the boundaries set by the international and sexual division of labour...if they accept the principles of a self-sufficient, more or less autarchic, economy; if they are ready...to replace export-oriented production by production for the needs of the people, then it will be possible to combine women's struggles at both ends of the globe...(232-3. Original emphasis)

What of the peasants? The international relation she proposes is between a feminist-led consumer liberation movement in the West and a women's production liberation movement in the South. Without dismissing the possible value of such a relationship, it is clearly one of un-equals and un-likes: on the one hand Western/feminist/middle-class/consumers and on the other Southern/women/peasant/producers.

And what of prostitutes? The examples of solidarity mentioned by Mies are either between Western and Southern middle-class feminists or between Western feminists and Southern 'working-class' prostitutes. Both types of action are original, necessary and admirable. But should not the aim be international solidarity between the prostitutes?
Mies' attitude towards technology, furthermore, is one that seems to me hard to sustain either in logic or in political action and personal behaviour:

Computer technology...is destroying all productive human powers, all understanding of nature and, in particular, all capacity for sensual enjoyment. (218)

Faced with the horrors of such new technologies in the hands of greedy, shortsighted and vicious men the recourse to either anathema or Luddism is comprehensible. The problem, however, is not technology but technocracy, the latter signifying both a social elite and an attitude of mind. Without modern capitalist technology Mies would probably have never been in India, would be weekly engaged in sensually washing perhaps half of her household's clothes. And the international women's networking she wishes to further could hardly exist. Electronic technology makes it possible (not necessary) for creative workers, such as she and me, to do our own household tasks without household servants or housewives, our own typing, proof-reading, even printing and publishing, without consigning these manual tasks to a caste of routine workers. Mies' attitude here can be contrasted with that of novelist Marge Piercy (1980) who in her feminist utopian novel combines electronics and genetic engineering (babies can be born in laboratories, men can choose to breast-feed) with Mies' own direct relationship to nature and each other. International struggles over the new technology, internationalist uses of the new technology, are ones the international women's movement is already fruitfully engaged in.

A final problem is with the limited area of Mies' (and Mitter's) internationalism. This runs only on the North-South axis. Although Mies makes frequent reference to, and powerful criticism of, the Communist world, it is not theorised nor addressed politically/strategically. Hers is, in other words, another imperialism-fixated worldview.

I began this discussion by tentatively relating the feminism of Mies to anti-industrial anarchist utopianism. We could now add that it is also
explicitly middle-class and Western. Again, this is a characterisation, not a castigation. Perhaps, as Mies implies for the international feminist movement, we need all these class, national, group, gender and ideological internationalisms before we can see what internationalism is. Perhaps we also require what Mies attempts to offer – a model of a future society based on a surpassal of the principles dominating present ones – to guide our present internationalist activities beyond urgent but short-term and often defensive needs. Speaking from such a position, in any case, she is able to see and say things about internationalism that have not been said before. If one feels that Mies over-generalises or universalises from this position, we are still confronted with the problem of how a worker, women’s, prostitutes’ or peasants’ internationalism could be articulated without ‘paternalistic rhetoric or charity’ (??). Or its maternalistic equivalent, for that matter.

All Women of All Lands, Unite!

In comparing these two pieces we have to first deal with the most obvious difference, that between a socialist-feminist working-class internationalism and an anarchist/ecologist-feminist middle-class one. Although Mitter makes no reference to Mies-type positions in her chapter, it is clear where she thinks priority should be placed, where the main liberatory agent is to be found. And whilst Mies makes passing reference to wage-worker or union action, she is quite explicit in prioritising the middle class. We would seem to have to choose between Postion A, Position B, Position A+B or, of course, Position X. It would be in the spirit of letting 100 internationalisms bloom to opt for A+B plus, of course, any future hypothetical X. But if I am not to be accused of levity, opportunism, ecleceticism – or adherence to the Judaeo-Christian tradition – I need to have a more specific and principled reason for my option. My argument would begin, I think, with a rejection of the ‘classism’ explicit or implicit in both items. Mitter’s women workers are evidently only partially or temporarily proletarianised. They also have been, are, or will be, petty-commodity producers and housewives. Mies’ middle-class women are, presumably, to a considerable extent wage-dependent either through their own wages or those of male
family. 'Middle class' and 'working class' may, it seems to me, be taken in one sense to represent not so much existing social categories as the competing claims for social hegemony of the bourgeoisie and proletariat respectively. In so far as we are concerned to surpass both capitalism and proletarianisation (also post-capitalist), a transformative project needs to surpass these categories. The women of Mitter and Mies are all differentially involved in contradictions concerning body-politics, commodity production and consumption - not to mention others. The creation of a transformative force surely requires both the separate and joint struggles of both categories. In and beyond 'their' class. Nationally and internationally.

The logical similarity between the apparently opposed positions does not end here. Both are opposed, explicitly or implicitly, to the White Male Northern Worker and his Hierarchical, Bureaucratic, Sexist, Racist Union. In so far as they are here visualising not a project, tendency or ideology, but permanent social categories and institutions, they are echoing labour aristocracy theory. Crudely (but it is a crude theory) this is the idea that rich, secure workers are conservative, pro-capitalist, pro-imperialist workers. The argument cannot be empirically substantiated. But it doesn't need to be since it has another function - that of conceptual foil in the presentation of the really oppressed/exploited, those who are - and are therefore really revolutionary, at least potentially. That the most oppressed or exploited are the most revolutionary cannot be substantiated either: they are customarily passive, sometimes actively reactionary, and in progressive movements often volatile and without the social psychology or technical skills necessary to sustain alternatives. We should not fall into the equal and opposite error of lumpen-proletarian theory: the Russian Revolution was arguably the product of a combination of distinct labour categories into something that, at least temporarily, was a revolutionary working class. It seems to me to follow that whilst the autonomous organisation and action of women is essential, this is opposed to hierarchy, sexism, racism, bureaucracy, etc., to their primary sources and promoters (capital, state, patriarchy) not to the more-privileged categories of the oppressed and exploited.
There is a further similarity between the two positions, one to which I have drawn attention in my titles and subtitles. This is the invisibility of the Communist third of the world and, inevitably, one-third of the world’s women. This absence is not due to the subject matter of their respective pieces and, as Mies would no doubt agree, this world area is itself increasingly being drawn out of any primitive communist isolation or autarchy and into the world capitalist market. Nor is it - on the evidence of the Mies book - due to lack of knowledge of or sympathy for women under Communist regimes. It is due to something I have already suggested, that it does not fit easily into the set of ‘colonising divisions’. More specifically, it does not fit easily into the core-periphery model of dependency theory that forms a crucial part of both analyses. On such a model, Communist countries are either another (semi-?) subordinate (semi-?) periphery, or are in some Hegelian sense - if not in their present somewhat problematic non-Hegelian appearance - representatives of a future world socialist commonwealth. Neither option is particularly satisfactory for feminists. So they remain with their dependency paradigm. And inevitably fail to adequately conceptualise or politically address their sisters under communist rule, whether middle or working class.

Underlying this problem is a deeper one which we may as well deal with even if it seems irrelevant to understanding internationalism. This has to do with what I have elsewhere castigated as ‘dichotomic oppositions’ (Waterman 1983a:351-2). It appears in Mitter as opposition between male and female, core and peripheral workers, organised and unorganised, white and black, First and Third Worlds. In Mies it is theorised in terms of ‘colonising oppositions’, against which she offers as antidote a holistic view of the world, nature and self. It seems to me that if one wants to surpass these in political action one must surpass them also in thought. Mies does not do this consistently. Sometimes she only reverses the dichotomy, as with her rhetorical symbol of the White Man. The problem is that this is not solitaire: it is more like hide-and-seek, a game everyone can play. I have done so myself, playfully, above. And Mies herself no doubt has had the experience of being - less playfully - opposed and condemned by Black Third-World Leninist Women as a White European Bourgeois
Feminist. So we need a holistic logic to understand a holistic world and to create a holistic society (Hartsock 1987). I think such a view would allow us to understand that new technology is both this and that, and that we need to combine Mies' visible communal autarchy with the mutually-beneficial international trade relationships sought by Mitter.

Finally, I would like to return to the 'middle-class' feminist internationalism of Maria Mies. As someone who, like Mitter, has been primarily concerned with what should properly be called 'internationalism for workers', I feel that it is now more than time that we spoke for ourselves and not in the name of others. Contemporary internationalism, including wage-worker internationalism, is largely the affair of professionals, academics and organisers. We would certainly further internationalism if, when relating to those we are trying to persuade or assist, we made this explicit. In attempting to create a new kind of internationalism it is essential that we speak in our own voice, and that in this voice we dialogue with others.
Conclusion

Every long march requires its Yenan, a period for reflection and consolidation. As I struggled to complete this literature review, I continued to discover new—or previously unknown—resources. There is the third paper of Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein (1987), which refers directly to international action against international indebtedness and asks how working-class action can avoid increasing the power of national capitalist or bureaucratic elites. There is a highly original, relevant and challenging book by Carolyn Vogler (1985) which insists that the working class is a national, not an international, category, that its behaviour is largely determined by inter-state conflict, and which illustrates this with a comparison of British union nationalism/internationalism in the 1930s and ’70s. There is a historical and theoretical essay by two exiled Hungarian socialists on the concept of the Left and on relations between its East- and West-European protagonists (Feher and Heller 1987). There is the ecological view of nationalism by Jeremy Brecher (1987) that seems to propose international law and organisations as central to internationalism. There is an extensive historical collection on labour internationalism which will open up new vistas for contemporary reflection also (Holthoon and v.d. Linden 1988). There is conventional liberal scholarship which, like the work on international communication of Hamid Movlana (1986, critiqued Waterman 1988c), draws our attention to areas little touched by Marxist, socialist or libertarian writers.

One could continue. More important, however, is to show how the somewhat random reflections above could be consolidated into concepts useful for both the analysis and the political advance of a new kind of labour internationalism. I have done this at some length elsewhere (Waterman 1988a) and here select four crucial definitions that I consider relevant to an understanding of the new internationalism in general and to labour internationalism more particularly. The key terms are the following:

1. Internationalisation: The global spread of modernisation in a capitalist-dominated world, in terms of the following: commoditisation,
industrialisation, proletarianisation and capital concentration; bureaucratisation and statification (nationally and internationally); particular gender, sexual and family patterns; cultural centralisation and standardisation. The most dynamic process is that of capital accumulation, with, as its most dynamic institutions, the transnational production, trading, servicing and financial concerns. Bureaucratisation means the centralisation of power first nationally then internationally. The bourgeois family model is propagated alongside competitive, commoditised and dehumanised sexuality. Cultural industrialisation means the global spread of North-Atlantic norms and forms. The increasing importance of inter-state agencies can be seen as expressing and extending the increasing 'interdependency' of humankind, or even of exercising a civilising influence on nation-states and TNCs. But they tend to express the interests of dominant states, to reproduce the forms of capital and nation-state, and to remove control even further from ordinary people and daily life.

2. Internationalism: Classically a critique of the nation-state and of capitalism. A recognition that the capitalist nation-state was too limited to deal with basic social problems and human needs. Positively, the urging of cross-national, global or non-territorial solidarities, communities and organisations of an egalitarian and democratic nature. Internationalism emerged out of the experience of capitalist industrialisation and the construction of centralised, modern but undemocratic states. These were destroying old loyalties and communities without providing the masses with any satisfactory alternative. Internationalism developed particularly out of the relationship between the new artisan-based labour movement and cosmopolitan socialist intellectuals. The generalisation of internationalisation processes has meanwhile enabled numerous other social categories to recognise themselves as global subjects (teachers, women, and even ethnic and regional minorities). Internationalisation processes have also created increasing social problems of an increasingly global nature (indebtedness, threats to the ozone layer, AIDS, state-terrorism, Chernobyl). Increasingly, also, these problems are being dealt with in international fora, and the popular interests are expressing themselves in internationalist terms. Contemporary internationalism is highly complex and
differentiated. Whilst the absence of mass internationalism (workers, women, peasants, ethnic minorities) remains a problem, the multiplicity and diversity of internationalism represents a considerable potential. It is necessary today to talk of internationalisms in the plural and to recognise this plurality as essential to the meaning of a contemporary internationalism. Internationalism is not opposed to nationalism or to any other identity of a non-dominant and non-exploitative nature. It is, on the contrary, increasingly a condition for the existence of national specificity and independence, and even for such 'sub-national' identities as those of ethnic and regional minorities.

3. Solidarity: This is the general ethical value and human relationship underlying internationalism, allying it with struggles for identity and liberation by the oppressed and exploited throughout history. Solidarity (see Vos 1976) has customarily been understood either in terms of identity or of substitution (taking the part of the other). These are part of its meaning but identity can imply uniformity and exclusion of the other, substitution can imply the confirmation of material or moral inequality. Solidarity must therefore be also understood in terms of reciprocity (mutual advantage), affinity (shared feelings) and complementarity (differential contribution). If we take liberty, equality and solidarity as the democratic trinity, then we can see that the bourgeoisie and liberalism prioritised political liberty, the proletariat and socialism prioritised economic equality. In both cases solidarity was subordinated to the other term and became exclusionary in practice, if not in doctrine. Concerned with the preservation, rediscovery or invention of community, in terms free of capitalism and statism, the new social movements tend to prioritise solidarity as a social and human relationship, or at least to re-assert its significance alongside the other two terms.

4. Labour internationalism: This concept needs to be deconstructed and periodised. Labour internationalism as a general term includes that of workers at shopfloor level, of working-class communities, of trade unions and labour-oriented parties and of socialist intellectuals. Labour internationalism, even in its 19th century form, was related to what we would now
call the human rights and national-independence movements. It also had a relationship to bourgeois cosmopolitanism and religious universalism. It is possible that, even during this period, labour internationalism was most effective when it was least 'proletarian' (i.e. least to do with the worker as labour power). Solidarity is imbedded in wage-worker existence and union struggle to a greater degree than amongst many other mass social categories. Given the extent to which daily self-defence and assertion requires solidarity amongst workers, this provides a historical and even a possible institutional base for a revival of internationalism amongst workers. Such a revival takes place where and in so far as labour rejects subordination to capital, statism and imperialism, and recognises the interpenetration of its national and international interests.

It remains only to say this. A new labour internationalism is not just a matter of theorisation or aspiration. There are many significant cases, of many different types, some of which can be found in the literature listed below. Some of the most interesting ones are ‘hidden from history’, and still have to be identified and described. Other cases – such as solidarity with the British miners or with the Guatemalan Coca-Cola workers – are quite well known. The problem so far has been that we have had no language in which to talk about these. There has been no discourse on internationalism. So that international solidarity with the British miners became ‘foreign solidarity’, a second-order heading beneath ‘solidarity’. And solidarity with the Guatemalan Coca-Cola workers was subsumed within a Third-World-solidarity or human-rights discourse. It is to be hoped that my paper might contribute to changing this situation.
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