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**PROSPECTS FOR NGDO STRATEGIES IN CONFLICT-RIDDEN COUNTRIES:
THE CASE OF SECADEV IN CHAD**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	page
Chapter 1 CHAD AND ITS STRUCTURAL CONFLICT	4
1.1 The country	4
1.2 History of Chad	5
1.3 The present situation	8
1.4 Roots of the structural conflict	8
1.4.1 Ethnical differences	8
1.4.2 Religious aspects	9
1.4.3 Group favouritism	9
1.4.4 Resource competition	9
1.4.5 Dictatorship	9
1.4.6 External threats and geopolitical dependence	10
Chapter 2 SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER PERMANENT CONFLICT	11
2.1 The concept of "law" in Chadian perspective	11
2.2 Development	11
2.3 Development as an attack on poverty	12
2.4 Asset formation as empowerment for selfdevelopment	13
2.5 Entitlement systems and protection of assets	13
2.5.1 Institution-based entitlement	13
2.5.2 Direct resource-based entitlement	14
2.5.3 State-arranged entitlement	14
2.5.4 Human rights as a source of entitlement	14
Chapter 3 ACTORS IN THE CHADIAN SOCIETY	15
3.1 Actors in public life	15
- The military	15
- Political parties	15
- Public Administration	15
- The judiciary	15
- Civil society	15
3.2 The scene of nongovernmental (development) organizations	16
3.3 History of SECADEV	16
Chapter 4 EVOLUTION OF SECADEV'S STRATEGIES	21
4.1 First period: relief aid and selfhelp	21
4.2 Second period: food security and integrated development	22
4.3 Third period: decentralization and empowerment	23
Chapter 5 CONCLUSIONS	25
5.1 Customs are better than Kalashnikovs	25
5.2 Umbrellas are better than swords	25
5.3 Half an egg is better than an empty shell (Dutch proverbs)	25
5.4 Two are better than one (Ecclesiastes 4:9-12)	25
5.5 A gentle dew is better than violent rain (Indian wisdom)	25
5.6 Birds never fly on one wing (English proverb)	25
5.7 It is not the weathercock that turns, it is the wind... ..	25
NOTES	26
ANNEX 1 Map of Chad	29
ANNEX 2 Map of SECADEV's area of Operations	30
BIBLIOGRAPHY	31

INTRODUCTION

Chad is a large, landlocked and arid country, with little agricultural potential, few other economic assets, an ethnically divided population, a disrupted social texture and permanent political instability. As a result, violence has long assumed structural proportions, creating a situation of severe human insecurity, which in turn minimizes the already meagre chances of poverty alleviation.

In spite of all this, instances of modest but genuine development can be observed here and there, although many pessimists might argue that this is only the case in the eye of the beholder.

Part of this paper is devoted to a description of the prevailing unfavourable conditions. Another part consists in an attempt to substantiate the impression that escape from the vicious circle is indeed being effected in certain settings. This poses the central research question of how any development can take place at all in such a desperate situation of structural conflict. In operational terms the answer comes down to identification of the levers that set or could set a positive process going in Chad and, by extension, perhaps also in similar countries.

Chapter 1 offers a brief sketch of the country and an outline of its history. On the basis of this, it sums up the roots of the crippling structural conflict.

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework, in which the three factors of human insecurity, entitlement systems and asset formation are placed in a triad of interplay.

Chapter 3 describes the actors in the field, ending with a look at the NGO scene and singling out one particular NGDO, SECADEV, whose role with regard to influencing the dynamics of the above triangle is the practical focus of this paper.

Chapter 4 takes this up by tracing SECADEV's efforts through fifteen years of operation and by analysing its development impact in terms of the theoretical framework^{1*}. The conclusions in Chapter 5 follow from this.

The implicit research design, if one may call it that, has its obvious limitations. At the present stage and with the data now available, there is very little that one person can conclusively prove. The main endeavour of this paper is to render an exploratory account, to come up with a plausible analysis and to make a few tentative suggestions as to optimal approaches. Confronted with a country like Chad, nothing is gained by viewing it as a hopeless case on a lost continent. It is rather more productive to turn to a few inklings of possible development success and build forth on that. Much will already have been achieved if this paper contributes to greater visibility of admittedly narrow chances.

* Notes appear at the end of the paper

Chapter 1 CHAD AND ITS STRUCTURAL CONFLICT

1.1 The country

With its 1,800 kilometres from north to south, Chad stretches from $23\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}\text{N}$ to $7\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}\text{N}$. Thus it extends well into the Saharan desert, while in the opposite direction it almost reaches the wet, tropical zone. (See map in annex 1)

Chad is a landlocked country, the nearest seaport being Douala, on the Atlantic coast of Cameroon, about 1,600 difficult kilometres away from the capital N'Djamena. Going clockwise from the north, Chad is surrounded by Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger.

With the latter three of these countries, Chad borders on the lake after which it was named. The mythical drawing power of this former inland sea is well symbolized by the convergence of four states on its shores, each reaching out to their own piece of water. The lake may triple in size, expanding into the lowlands of Chad, and become nearly as large as Belgium when rainfall is abundant in the drainage area of the rivers that feed it. These rivers are the Chari and the Logone, flowing in from the southeast and joining each other at N'Djamena, about 100 kilometres before they empty into the lake. Along with their tributaries, the Chari and the Logone make up the country's entire network of permanent rivers. Their clay deposits also provide the country's only truly arable soil.

When the Congress of Berlin (1878) divided colonial access to the African continent among the European powers, the frontiers that were drawn only took account of resources, trade routes and fair shares for each, so that quite often they did not coincide with ethnic or natural boundaries. This is certainly true for Chad, whose wide array of tribes, cultures and languages is remarkable even amid the diversity on the rest of the continent, and whose differences between north and south are very striking in almost any respect.

With an area of 1,284,000 square kilometres, Chad is the fifth largest country of Africa. It would approximately cover all of Great Britain, Germany, France and Portugal, the four main contenders over the African map on the congress table in Berlin.

The reliable census of April 1993 counted 6,288,241 inhabitants, giving the low density of five persons per square kilometre. Although Chad's population growth exceeds the world average, it is less rapid than that of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. This can be explained by substantial emigration to neighbouring countries under pressure of drought, famine and insecurity, as well as by the very high mortality, both among infants and other age groups.

Urbanization is relatively modest in Chad, with 10% of the people living in the capital N'Djamena (600,000 inhabitants) and another 10% in smaller cities such as Moundou and Sahr in the south and Abéché in the central east. Lack of industrial development partly accounts for this pattern.

French and Arabic are the two official languages in the country, where no less than 100 local languages are spoken. French is the predominant vehicle of communication at government level and its mastery is almost exclusively tied to the educational system. As the national literacy rate is not over 20%, this poses one of the many constraints to democracy.

Arabic is mostly spoken in the form of a regional brand which serves as the lingua franca in the market place. Arab culture is important too, at least in the northern and central regions. But this influence has come about in the context of Islam and should not be attributed to ethnicity, as is often erroneously done. As a matter of fact, there are very few people of totally nonblack origin in Chad.

A nomadic muslim population of no more than 70,000 lives in the northern half of the country, with the Tibesti mountains (up to 3,000 meters in height) and the Saharan dunes. Apart from a few date palms in the oases, there is no useful vegetation. The true significance of this vast and empty area lies, as it has always done, in its trade routes.

The central region, one third of the country, is inhabited by slightly over three million, about 95% of whom are muslims. This includes the 600,000 residents of N'Djamena, whose working population is mainly involved in commerce and the civil service. The rural majority of people in the central region is chiefly engaged in raising livestock. They subsist on that, the associated milk products and the sorghum and millet from dry farming.

The southern region comprises one sixth of the country and is inhabited by more than half of the total population, giving a density of about 16 persons per square kilometre. The region contains the only 2% of the

country's land that is suitable for surplus farming. The best farming area is in the very southwest, where annual rainfall is up to 1200 millimetres and where the country's only export crop, cotton, is grown and manufactured. Livestock is hardly kept here, as the tse tse fly is active up to the tenth parallel.

The southern region also stands apart from the rest of the country in terms of religion: about 60% of the people are christians and some 35% are animists. The latter figure may also be put at 100%, a classic piece of statistical wit that holds enough truth to make it worth repeating, also in Chad.

Another difference is that the traditional institutional structures in the south are far less evolved and centralized than those to the north. This difference is an important constant in the history of Chad, as will also be clear in the next section.

1.2 History of Chad

In the precolonial era, three relatively large and politically sophisticated kingdoms variously gained the upper hand in the region. They had their bases in the broad strip of land that extends from Bornu in northeastern Nigeria, across lake Chad and Kanem, to Ouaddaï on the Sudanese border. They were the creation of Saharan Berbers, who were drawn southward by their continuous search for grazing land and who could easily impose themselves on the fragmentary indigenous societies of black farmers. This imposition frequently took the form of slave and food raids. The cohesive strength of these kingdoms was intensified by the spread of Islam and its missionary sects. These sects often drew party supporters rather than religious converts. This was clearly the case with the brotherhood of the Senussiyya², based in Libya, whose powerful performance as such had a much stronger impact on people than their puritan principles and mystic inclination. They acquired much influence in the central region and established themselves as the main political power in the kingdom of Ouaddaï, which had gained the upper hand in the region after 1840.

Even so, the power of the various kingdoms declined by the end of the nineteenth century and around 1890 they all fell to the Sudanese adventurer Rabih az-Zubayr, who became the Sultan of Ouaddaï, but who was in turn defeated by the French in 1900.

This marked the beginning of the colonial era. The French rapidly penetrated further to the south. In 1910 they set up the vast federal entity of French Equatorial Africa. Apart from Chad, this included the areas of present-day Gabon, Congo and the Central African Republic. After the First World War, half of Cameroon was added to this, by mandate of the League of Nations. The other half of the former German colony was entrusted to Great Britain.

The colonial policy of extraction of resources led to several useful investments in Chad. Massive campaigns against sleeping disease, lepra and tuberculosis were undertaken, mainly by the army health service. Administrative buildings arose. Schools were built too, at first only in the north, but after 1920 also in the south. Bridges and roads were constructed. This included the main connections from N'Djamena and Achébé to Sahr, linking up with the southern road to Bangui in what is now the Central African Republic.

Major export products from FEA were tropical wood, vegetable oils, rubber, cattle, skins and some cacao, copper, cotton and coffee. Chad's main export products were skins and meat, the latter mostly transported within FEA in the form of live cattle. Cotton became important in the late twenties. The French introduced cultivation of this crop as soon as they were confident that the region had been sufficiently pacified. For Chad this meant the first step away from subsistence farming, not altogether to the country's ecological advantage, while the processing of cotton brought a beginning of industrialization. All in all, this colonial innovation took Chad into the cash economy and it has remained the chief source of national earnings until today.

After World War I, when Italy's position in Libya had become much weaker, France stabilized its power in the north. The army won a decisive victory on the Senussiyya in 1920, upon which the territory of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET), was brought under military administration. Together with the central region, this area had long been much wealthier, comparatively speaking, than the south. This was due to their stronger, centralized organization, their income from regular trade and also their traditional slave and food raids. In order to stop the latter practice and to protect colonial interests south of the tenth parallel, France recruited 4,000 local troops, adding them to their own peacekeeping forces.

Under the military rule over BET, the local social and political structures were largely abolished. Of particular consequence was the replacement of the traditional framework of muslim education by a western system with compulsory attendance. The population responded to this cultural onslaught by sending their slaves' children

to school instead of their own. This entailed a great relative lack of modern skills among northerners and thus led to their eventual exclusion from political and economic leadership in Chad.

The gap between the two extremes of the country grew larger yet when education did get off the ground in the south and when the resource base down there was strengthened and protected for the purpose of French economic advantages. A class of income-earning and trained southerners came into being and they supplied most of the second-rank bureaucrats in the public administration of the colonial era.

French pacification was no more than a superficial success, however. Raids of gangs from across the northern and eastern borders never really stopped, while strong feelings against white rule also resulted in troubles in the south. Fearing that largescale military repression would only create guerilla bands of exiles, the French decided to recognize customary law, encouraging local chiefs to join forces with the colonial judiciary and to punish local criminals in that context. A substantial instruction manual was drawn up for this purpose and came into effect in 1928.

By 1930, Chad no longer needed external support to balance its ordinary budget and it gradually proceeded towards a degree of autonomy. In 1946, it became an Overseas Territory, with its own political scene, in which three parties played an important role. The Democratic Union of Chad (UDT) was dominated by traditional chiefs, traders and former Chadian soldiers of the French army. This fairly conservative group was the favourite of the French government. The Progressive Party of Chad (PPT) formed the main opposition to this. It was led by Gabriel Lisette, a West Indian, and by Ngarta Tombalbaye, a Sara, from the main tribe in the south. The PPT was backed by the French socialists, who supported similar parties in all of francophone Africa. Finally, there was the Socialist Party of Chad (PST), set up in 1956. This was a progressive muslim party in the north, which advocated national separation of north and south.

These parties entered elections when a large measure of autonomy was granted to Chad under the constitutional law of 1957. The first territorial government was formed by Lisette. In 1958, an autonomous Republic within the French Community was proclaimed, and Chad gained complete independence in 1960, with Tombalbaye as its first president.

The new state had not inherited much of lasting value from French colonial rule³. The health care system was still rudimentary, while education had only trained a small group that was not a cross-section of the nation. On the positive side, some infrastructure, industry and agricultural development had been brought to the south, but the main result of this was that discrepancies within the country had only further increased.

President Tombalbaye did little to unify the nation. On the contrary, he ushered in the one-party state in 1963, withdrawing all muslims from higher positions in the administration and the army, while directing most investments to the south. And when French troops left the north in 1965, returning the BET territory to civil rule, many southern bureaucrats were installed there to run local affairs.

This put the northern people in an untenable position. Their social texture had already been severely disrupted by the French occupiers, and now they were ruled by their former slaves, who had meanwhile become French in their orientation. Sentiments of the northern people ran rather more in favour of their fellow muslims in surrounding countries, but most of them did not want to submit to the military power and aggression of the Libyan Senussiyya either.

After several uprisings, the National Liberation Front (Frolinat) was set up in 1966. It was formed with the support of Sudan and Algeria, both anti-Libyan. But while the Frolinat operated from its headquarters in the very north of Chad, a smaller rebellious faction, the Chad National Front, defended its own causes in the eastern central region.

The scene of civil war was thus set. The north sought to overthrow central power, as vested in their traditional enemies from the south, and they wanted to replace French, western influence by alliance with muslim Africa. At the same time, however, internal division among the population of the northern and central regions came to light. One issue they differed on was to what extent Libyan involvement could be accepted.

From the day of independence, alliances continually shifted and new factions arose. Meanwhile, the period of droughts (1972-1975) further weakened the country, triggering open Libyan aggression. The French were called in to repress rebellion in the north and to counter Libyan territorial claims and incursions in that area. Intervention or mediation from the side of the USA, Cameroon, Nigeria, Zaïre and the Organization for African Unity sometimes took the sharp edge of the internal political processes, but any sort of structural solution remained elusive.

There were moments of apparent improvement, for instance when Tombalbaye allowed 50% muslim representation at cabinet level in 1971, or when the Lagos conference of 1979 briefly united the eleven different political factions in Chad, but civil war never really stopped. The administration, and in particular the underlying bureaucracy, remained largely in the hands of southerners, who reacted strongly whenever schemes of better proportional representation were proposed or effected.

Tombalbaye's dictatorship (1960-1975) ended with a military coup that was inspired by the dreadful state of the national economy. President Malloum (1975-1979) faced the same forces of rebellion, but forged an alliance with the northern guerilla leader Hissein Habré, a lawyer educated at the Sorbonne. The two found common ground in their rejection of Libyan aggression. Habré became Prime Minister under Malloum, but their joint efforts to improve the ethnical balance at government level were thwarted by colonel Kamougué, the leader of the south. At the same time the rebels of the eastern central region, under the leadership of Goukouni, son of a Senussi family, restarted their attacks on central power, now in open collaboration with Libya. When Malloum and Habré split up again, resuming their old fight, Libyan-Nigerian manoeuvres eventually led to the formation of the National Unity Government of Chad (GUNT) in 1979.

Goukouni assumed the double role of President (1979-1982) and Prime Minister. Habré served as the Minister of Defence for seven months and then took up arms against the government once again. Chad exploded into fullscale civil war. In December 1979, Libyan artillery and tanks reached the capital, setting off "the first battle of N'Djamena" and forcing Habré to retreat to the Sudanese border. Eventually, however, the latter reappeared in "the second battle of N'Djamena" in 1982, driving Goukouni back to the north and duly taking power himself.

President Habré (1982-1990) initially enjoyed much support, both within the country, which had grown extremely tired of casualties and destruction, and in the international community, which hoped that the new strong man might finally bring peace to Chad.

It was not to be so. This time, the national battle ground was extended into the south, which had known relative security for the last sixty years. Although colonel Kamougué could rally only 20% of support among the southern population, he did challenge the rule of Habré, taking possession of Moundou, the economic capital of the region, while his troops went around plundering where they could. Habré retaliated in kind. His own irregular troops, dating from his guerilla days, and the official national army joined forces in massacring and looting the southern population.

Meanwhile, things hardly quieted down in the north. President Khadafi promised economic aid to Habré on condition that the latter would proclaim Chad an Islamic Republic and keep silent about Libya's occupation of the northern strip of the country. When Habré refused, he had to battle on all sides. But with military support from France and Zaïre, along with financial support from the USA, he managed to resist Libyan forces as well as Goukouni rebels in the north, while exercising simultaneous control in the south and even warding off other attacks from Nigeria, around Lake Chad. A strong man indeed, but utterly unable to break away from the use of force.

The conflict with Libya was gradually solved over a number of years, but rebel armies remained largely in control of the north and central east. The conflict in the south simply wore on and the situation was aggravated when serious drought occurred even there, in 1985.

In line with the traditionally low degree of broad organization, a multiplicity of splinter groups sprang up in the southern region. They all waged war against the central power structure and their only mode of ideological expression consisted in continuous attacks, mostly for personal gain, on the precariously narrow economic resource base. An important target was, of course, the cultivation of cotton, which contributed 60% to the GNP.

Habré's response to all of this was ever severer repression. He set up his personal security police, who arrested and killed real or potential opponents, acting very much on their own, also for private purposes, and grossly violating human rights in the process. Of course, Habré too had to make his alliances with various competing groups, who were obliged to pay their entrance fees in return, so that corruption became even more deeply engrained in society.

All in all, the scene was set for Habré's downfall. France and other donors abandoned him, and his chief of staff, Idriss Deby, took over power in 1990, with help from the Islamic Legion⁴. Habré fled to Cameroon with huge amounts of stolen public funds, and from there on to Senegal. At present he is still conducting war from Dakar, launching regular attacks in the area around Lake Chad, with troops that are based in northern Nigeria.

Upon his arrival, president Deby (1990-) promised a democratic regime. Giving in to pressure of the human rights movement, he released political prisoners and allowed a commission to be set up to judge the crimes of Habré's security police. He agreed to the formal existence of various political parties, including those from the opposition, and he officially recognized the Chadian League for Human Rights (LTDH). Furthermore, he announced a National Conference for the preparation of a new Constitution.

Very soon, however, old mechanisms reasserted themselves. Deby set up his own presidential guard, now called the Republican Guard, which looked suspiciously like Habré's security police. After proclaiming a freeze of recruitment into the civil service, he still increased the staff in the presidential offices from 232 to 1002 within

one year. Deby also started distributing favours among his own Zaghawa community, arousing the jealousy and anger of former allies who wanted to have their share of the advantages they associated with power. A group of potential competitors was thus perceived to surround and threaten the presidency, triggering, as always, repressive measures against actual or imaginary plots. Various assassinations duly occurred, while the hesitant beginnings of democratic processes have so far not been very successful.

1.3 The present situation

Chad has suffered progressive disintegration ever since its unfortunate conception as a unity. The country's natural resource base, weak as it has always been to begin with, is now being vastly underutilized. Activities such as mining natron in the north, for salt production, or exploitation of oil in Kanem and the south, where deposits have been identified near Doba, simply do not stand a chance of being put on a profitable footing under the prevailing conditions. The envisaged pipeline to Douala, for instance, would be an all too easy target for any dissatisfied faction. Similarly, a higher degree of industrialization, which is very desirable in itself, would also require a decently organized country, with, among many other things, a less erratic supply of electricity. Further development in the livestock sector is equally impossible, given the frequency of cattle raids, while upgrading agricultural production in the south cannot be contemplated either, as long as this region remains the scene of hopelessly fragmented interests.

All in all, Chad's natural resource base is meagre and underexploited. Its human resource base is severely damaged. With illiteracy already high, all education came to a virtual standstill for a period of fifteen years, from 1967 to 1982. Furthermore, much of the social texture got destroyed in the north during French rule, while it has been under heavy attack in the south for the past twelve years.

To this must be added the disrepair of the country's minimal infrastructure, the degradation of political norms, the violation of human rights and the total loss of the nation's confidence in the provision of basic security by its rulers. Outside the inner circle of power and its ill-gotten gains, this throws individual people back on their own devices. One such device is the Kalashnikov that nearly every peasant in Chad wants to keep within hand's reach.

1.4 Roots of the structural conflict

The above invites rephrasing of the central research question that was asked in the Introduction of this paper: *What devices, other than fire weapons, do Chadian people have to defy the altogether very realistic prognosis that development is impossible for them?*

Before this question can be transparently addressed in the next chapter, the factors that have presumably caused and perpetuated Chad's selfdestructive conflict should be singled out from the previous pages. To this end, the following subsections briefly cover some characteristics that have already been touched upon above.

1.4.1 Ethnical differences

Broadly speaking, the Chadian population consists of two groups: the people of the south and those who live north of them. This simplification overlooks the differences and tensions between the few nomads of the very north and the numerous residents of the central region.

The people of the south are engaged in arable agriculture, most of it subsistence farming. They are tied to their fields, thus forming small sedentary groups, whose organization is traditionally at the level of local power pockets. Their animism, never formalized and written down in the teachings of world religions, is a common characteristic but hardly a unifying force. Their christianity is not sufficiently widespread and deeply engrained to serve as an agent of cohesion.

The people of the north are chiefly engaged in keeping livestock. Less tied to ownership of land, they go where their cattle can graze, so that their dwelling places are less fixed. Subgroups mingle more with each other and identify with larger entities, with organization at a larger, more centralized scale. In addition, their shared islamic belief makes for greater unity.

For centuries, these two groups have clashed whenever seasonal scarcity of grazing land took the pastoralists to the fields of the subsistence farmers. As a result of their organizational advantage, the former could impose themselves on the latter and conduct slave and food raids among them.

For about 50 years (roughly from 1930 to 1980), the master slave relation was reversed when the better educated southerners became the ruling bureaucratic class, also in the north. This situation partly persists even now, with central power again in the hands of northern people, because the backbone of the civil service, just below the top, is still formed by southerners.

Traditional differences between the two groups have by now also assumed the dimension of opposition between French/American western influence and islamic political orientation on countries such as Nigeria, Libya and Sudan.

1.4.2 Religious aspects

Although religious differences served to intensify certain group differences in terms of homogeneous/heterogeneous organization, this never meant that people's beliefs were a divisive element as such. On the whole, Chadians reject fundamentalist or theocratic tendencies and their political factions never identify with religious positions. Habré's refusal to proclaim Chad an Islamic Republic is significant in this context. So is the resentment that many Chadian muslims feel against the widespread presence of Sudanese imams in the country.

The same tolerant attitude prevails in christianity, which was introduced in Chad without any cooperation from colonial rule. Churches did not wish to lean on such support either. Nor did they identify or sympathize with particular groups or political factions. In general, they were evenhanded in their attempts to bring faith, education, health and development to anyone who was interested. Their impartiality was recognized by the population inasmuch as the assets of churches were respected by people in the immediate environment and often also protected against external looters. When looting of church assets did occur, the mission crew in question usually had come across as arrogant and authoritarian in their attitude towards local people.

1.4.3 Group favouritism

After independence, each ruler that came into power gave priority to serving the interests of his own group at regional, ethnical, village or family level. All key positions in access to resources resorted to the kinship circles around the president and public funds came to be regarded more and more as being at the free and private disposal of the head of state and his appointees. State-related resources were the easiest and therefore the first target, which explains the lack of their proper development, so that the resources of private citizens soon came under heavy attack.

Ethnical favouritism tended to be exclusive to the point that even close allies, who had helped to secure the coveted power, often took second place. This caused alienation and prepared the scene for takeovers, with ensuing dispossession of the currently privileged group and establishment of a new inner circle that was ready to take its turn in the enrichment process. Over the successive power shifts, this created a mechanism from which it became more and more difficult to escape. This was sadly shown during the interlude of the Government of National Unity (GUNT: 1979-1982), when it turned out to be impossible to satisfy the group interests of each of the eleven different political factions that were represented at government level. Democracy ran aground on the experience that where the hogs are many, the wash is poor.

1.4.4 Resource competition

Resource competition is inherent in every society and as such it is a potential cause of conflict everywhere. Chad, however, has the additional problem of resources being very scarce. This is also the case with state-related resources, which are moreover badly managed, so that they were never developed to such an extent that regular exploitation and subsequent allocation of the revenues, according to market and welfare principles, became feasible. In combination with the sharp political division, this entails that resource competition in Chad virtually takes place on the battlefield. Politicians are synonymous to military leaders and their armies are synonymous to private guardians, as a truly national military force never got off the ground. Deby's announcement in the latter direction has so far come to nil.

The response of private citizens to the threat of armed looters is selfdefence, which may take the form of their own paramilitary organization, or of individual armament, or of group negotiation. The reciprocal armed violence for thirty years has deeply marked people's attitudes throughout the country and the phenomenon may now be regarded as a selfperpetuating mechanism. On the positive side, comparatively speaking, there is the innovative approach of alliances among traders, other civilians and NGDO's, striking up bargains with potential looters. The victims lose less that way, while the aggressors have easier access. This arrangement has become a standard practice with regard to the protection and distribution of food.

The competition over state-related resources has until now been focused on cotton production, but if the exploitation of oil does get off the ground, there will be a new target, with high stakes. At this point, it does not seem likely that peaceful distribution of the benefits would be realized.

1.4.5 Dictatorship

Dictatorship tends to be the corollary of a poor, illiterate and fragmented population. When, in such a situation, unity has to be forged out of many oppositions, group competition automatically results. This competition is first of all about the power that gives access to resources and it has no other mode of expression than armed struggle. Thus it is only military force that can secure and maintain central power, which will be vested in the group that has temporarily come out on top. The ensuing group favouritism intensifies the anger of those that have temporarily lost the competition, upon which the established power resorts to repressive measures. It has

all been described above. But it bears repeating that in Chad there is no politics that can be dissociated from military force and that the sense of temporary power leaves little room for visions of positive, national development within a democratic framework.

1.4.6 External threats and geopolitical dependence

Weak central power, locked in internal competition, invites external aggression. Consequently, raids out of Sudan and Libya have long been a normal experience in northern Chad. This reinforced the idea that armed violence was a necessary feature of national life. And when territorial claims of Libya led to open war, nominally about the Aouzou strip, there was even a brief sense of national unity, followed by national pride when the Libyans were defeated. However, the victory had become possible only because of substantial international support. The war between Libya and Chad was in reality a conflict between muslim expansionism and the western world. To a certain extent, this larger geopolitical conflict mirrors the hard feelings between northern and southern Chad. It is clear, at any rate, that the country's position as one theatre where international disagreement is being acted out, has yet intensified its internal inclination towards armed force.

Structural conflict in Chad creates a vacuum for feasible intervention at the macro-level. To identify any scope for development, the following chapters therefore focus on the micro-level.

Chapter 2 SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER PERMANENT CONFLICT

Human security, entitlement systems and formation of assets form a linear progression: entitlement systems can best be developed when basic human rights are respected, while assets can best be formed when their acquisition is somehow legally enabled or socially ratified. However, this linear progression turns into a closed triangle as soon as the asset formation has indeed taken place, because human security may then be threatened by those who wish to compete for possession.

In abstracto, the shape of this triangle is universal. But how this shape is coloured, depends very much on regional perceptions of *rights* and *law*, and on the extent to which these notions are directly linked to individuals and/or social communities or other larger entities. The African perspective in this regard is presented in 2.1, in the hope that western bias will not be directed at the subsequent main sections, in which the actual appearance and dynamics of our theoretical triangle in Chad are traced.

Section 2.2 briefly introduces the development angle from which the various processes may be viewed. Section 2.3 elaborates on this 'development as an attack on poverty'. Section 2.4 looks at the function of asset formation and on the scope for it in Chad. Finally, 2.5 deals with the structure and types of entitlement, again relating this to the situation of 'ungovernment' in the country. Through all of this, the role of NGOs is an important focus of attention.

2.1 The concept of "law" in Chadian perspective

For well-regulated formal settlement of disputes, societies can rely on state law or on customary law⁵.

With regard to customary law, Verdier⁶ distinguishes three juridical orders: parental, territorial and religious. Each applies to an organizational domain and its corresponding social group. These groups establish and change their own internal rules for how they should function. Decisions are made by ruling bodies and by general agreement.

These juridical orders are essentially communitarian. This implies that any member derives certain rights and duties from a designated position within the group. The framework of position-linked entitlements and responsibilities shapes the interdependence and solidarity of the members as well as the status of each. This ties in with the African perception, still prevailing today, that a person has no existence other than as a socialized individual. People can only be seen, by others and by themselves, as part of a larger context, never as the separate entity we have come to postulate in the west.

The isolated individual in the west was construed by liberal enlightenment in the era of industrialization, a process which destroyed traditional social links and triggered the emergence of a new generation of solidarity structures such as trade unions and mutual insurance arrangements.

The NGO target groups in Chad answer to Verdier's description. They have communitarian practices of reciprocal rights and duties. A characteristic feature of this is that the rights of individual persons cannot be equated with absolute and invariable entitlement to goods: they are always rights in relation and in proportion to the rights of other group members. The regulation of entitlement positions is not derived from a political construct such as state law, functioning over people's heads and entirely out of their hands. It is derived from customary law, which is an adaptable instrument, whose application arises within the group, varying with circumstances. This means that the group can flexibly respond to internal and external changes. This is true within each of the three juridical orders, but it also applies to the areas where these orders overlap.

Faced with grave external threats, grassroots groups in Chad intensified their internal cohesion, thus empowering members as much as possible. The broad lawless scene of ungovernment left space to be filled by customary practices, and the civilians developed their own legal mechanisms to meet the situation of military overpowerment. One might say that even the negotiations between sharply opposed groups thus came to be coloured by customary law.

NGOs can and should link up with such solution processes, and assist people to generalize their customary scope to ever broader settings. This enlarges customary law to 'living law', as a nonformal but effective way of regularizing power relations within and among groups. The threat of overpowerment may thus actually lead to empowerment.

2.2 Development

Intended as an attack on poverty, development is often envisaged as a measurable structural increase of income through productive activities. The efforts of NGOs in this regard are usually aimed at reaching a significant

level of impact. Starting work at the micro-level, they wish to secure sustainable results by eventually reaching the regional level.

A measurable structural increase of income can come about only on the basis of asset formation and subsequent use of the assets for longterm purposes. However, all assets are objects of potential attack. This is already the case in normal circumstances, and all the more in a situation of armed struggle in a random pattern of lawlessness, such as prevails in Chad.

Protection of assets is therefore crucial. When those who are in the formal position of providing this protection, also turn out to be the ones who take the assets away by force, a particular problem arises. The solution is to be sought, preferably with the assistance of NGOs, in creative entitlement systems, in which the fierce competition for resources is somehow regularized.

2.3 Development as an attack on poverty

Early theories of economic development tended to be purely economic in character, also when they were applied to the poor countries. Often they were coloured by convictions that have turned out to be untenable.

An example is the trickle-down theory, which assumes that wealth spontaneously spreads by some sort of Keynesian multiplier effect. This overlooks the harsh political and social reality that there usually are certain compartments, blockages and biases in distribution mechanisms, all the way down to the intra-household level (where men's increased income does not automatically benefit wives and children), so that the spread of wealth halts at certain points and remains uneven.

Another example is Rostow's stages of economic growth theory⁷, which holds that after fulfilment of certain internal economic conditions, a critical point will be reached at which growth necessarily takes off. The transition from subsistence to market economy also occurs at that point and everything accelerates: incomes increase and the standard of living is raised.

These early theories share a good deal of optimism with regard to the perfect operation of certain economic triggering effects. It is as if the invisible hand, postulated by Adam Smith, is still presumed to be steering market affairs.

More realistic were the dependency theorists⁸ who focused on the Latin American context in the sixties and included the political dimension in their analysis. They described the chain of dependence which runs from the centre to the periphery, from the capital to the countryside and from the rich countries to the poor. Misuse and misdirection of resources, along with expropriation of economic surpluses make for an accumulation of wealth at the core and leave the periphery impoverished.

But these authors chiefly looked at global relations and hardly at unfair distribution within the least developed countries. Nor did they consider the large informal and subsistence sectors over there. The tendency to ignore what one cannot easily measure has long been a weakness of macro-economic development approaches.

In Chad, where 90% of the population works in the subsistence sector and where normal functioning of daily life belongs to a distant part of history, the above theories have little meaning. Macro-economic development approaches could have some impact only if a measure of political unity and fairness of government were achieved. Meanwhile, the alleviation of poverty can best be considered as an empowerment process that works upwards from the grassroots level and which takes account of prevailing insecurity. For the time being, therefore, intervention on behalf of the poor will be restricted to non-governmental structures. Churches, with their modest institutional presence in the country, may be one of the few significant forces in that regard.

The attempt of churches to alleviate poverty began as a straightforward charitable practice of christian values. Over time, however, christian NGOs became involved in the scene as NGOs with a non-missionary signature, but having inscribed the message of Pope Paul VI: "Individual nations must raise the level of the quantity and the quality of production to give the life of all their citizens truly human dignity. The complete development of the individual must be combined with that of the human race as a whole and must be accomplished through mutual efforts."⁹

The NGO world in general, christian or rooted in other values, adopted this emphasis on human dignity rather than human suffering and on fairness rather than compassion. In line with this they shifted their focus from basic needs to basic rights, from treatment of people as objects to involvement of them as vocal subjects, and from their dependence to selfreliance. These are hallmarks of what is termed Alternative Development¹⁰.

One implication of this is that objectives are not imposed but that target groups themselves define their real needs¹¹ such as ownership of assets and a fair(er) distribution of wealth. Another, related implication is employment of a participatory development approach, aimed at group formation, organizational capacity, larger institution building and, through all of this, empowerment¹².

However, in Chad, with its increasing deprivation at household level, this required as a first step that emergency or relief aid was turned into structural provision of basic necessities such as food and shelter, without which the further goals, summed up above, would have been left hanging in the air.

2.4 Asset formation as empowerment for selfdevelopment

Lack of assets, as necessary inputs in development, characterizes the situation of the majority of people in Chad. This is why, as a second step, the present focus of NGDOs is directed at primary areas such as shelter, health, education, food, availability of land, food production capacity, surplus production and marketing capacity. The latter two are of eminent importance for a genuine attack on poverty, because as long as asset formation just serves to maintain a vulnerable subsistence base, structural alleviation of poverty is not achieved. Two problems present themselves here: lack of security and lack of power.

Since asset formation is tied up with resource allocation and because assets always are objects of external greed, competition may be ugly, even within target groups among neighbours, but in particular between groups with opposed interests, a fortiori in Chad. Cohesive group formation, through participation processes, comes to the fore here as the best way to handle internal conflict and to counter external threats. As far as the latter are concerned, Chadian NGDO's have never encouraged people to take up arms. They have instead stressed the importance of forming alliances and, being better equipped to do so, they have often mediated (with the state, for example) to bring about such protective arrangements.

The second problem is that the sorely needed investments in production should become possible by virtue of people's own production efforts, if the chain of dependence on donor funds is to be broken. This is by no means easy, as it requires something not unlike the feat of pulling oneself up by one's own hair. Perhaps there is a remote chance of donor funds being directed so ingeniously, that a one-time injection would suffice to set the desired triggering effect into permanent motion, but on the whole such hopes had better be relegated to the phantasy of early development theories. More to the point are the efforts of NGDO's in Chad to improve the target groups' claim-making capacity with regard to such central provisions as food security programmes. This involves getting people acquainted with their entitlements and training them to handle the connected procedural requirements. Similarly, dispossessed people have been helped to gain access to land. The improvement of claim-making capacity as such is an integral part of empowerment.

Abjectly poor people tend to be left alone by looters and this provides a few pockets of relative tranquility in the work of NGDOs. In the case of surplus production, however, group cohesion and alliances with traders, armed looters and government gain special importance. The need for protection is greater then, while maximization of profits bears directly on the potential for further development. The efforts of NGDO's with respect to this situation are directed to broadening and strengthening the target group network, so as to improve their bargaining power in the area of prices as well as safety. These efforts are accompanied by lobbying among the various parties, in order to bring home to them the shared interest that everyone has in larger production.

For all that, the fact remains that much of the above concerns provisional arrangements in the face of civil war. The structural impact of this may chiefly lie in the growth of organizational capacity as such. But structural asset formation, rooted in solid entitlement systems, is a different matter.

2.5 Entitlement systems and protection of assets

Physical insecurity and lack of political and legal protection form major obstacles to development. If asset formation is to be the basis of selfempowerment of target groups, it has to be related to their entitlement positions. "Entitlement is the possibility to make legitimate claims, i.e. claims based on rights. It is a function of both power and law. Power means opportunity, actual command [...], law legitimizes and hence protects in case of dispute"¹³.

Four systems can be distinguished in which entitlement positions may be rooted: affiliation to institutions, direct access to resources, state arrangements and supra-state arrangements.

2.5.1 Institution-based entitlement

As part of a larger social matrix, institutions can be defined as 'semi-autonomous fields' with their own rule-making capacity and the means to induce or coerce compliance¹⁴. Tribes, political parties, trade unions, schools, universities and churches are such semi-autonomous fields, from which people derive security, simply by belonging to them. The extent to which these institutions are relevant to their members as an entitlement basis, varies in direct proportion with their relative power and the strength of their internal and external arrangements. In countries such as Chad, the analysis of institutions with regard to their rules, effective inducement, coercion

and claiming capacity is more productive than an analysis of state law, which is vain and ineffective. The majority of Chadian people can rely only on affiliation with their tribe and with a church. In this connection, churches are not seen as religious bodies, but as socio-economic actors in the form of their related NGOs. All other institutions in the country have come to be dominated by the military or by the highly personal circle of central power.

2.5.2 Direct resource-based entitlement

As long as the survival economy prevails and a market economy is still struggling to emerge, collective institution-based entitlement will move only slowly towards private entitlement, based on direct individual access to resources. Moreover, private law as the definition of individual rights, is poorly equipped to prevent the substantial socio-economic inequality which tends to accompany unequal distribution of power, nor can it deal with the relative poverty resulting from such conditions. This impotence is yet aggravated in countries where the judiciary is not independent and not impartial. In subsaharan countries, subject to civil war and malfunctioning government, it is customary law which steps in to fill the vacuum and which creates the scope for institution-based entitlement.

2.5.3 State-arranged entitlement

The types of entitlement discussed above are of a primary nature, offering access to resources on the basis of people's integration in a community. State-arranged entitlements tend to be of a subsidiary nature, affected by socio-political culture. The state regulates access to collective resources such as oil and public services such as education. The state also rearranges entitlements in order to implement its policy on income distribution (the taxation system). The arrangements often make people dependent on those who are in a position to wield state power, which in countries like Chad is strongly tied to an inner circle of a few persons and to the ethnical group of the dictator. This makes for patron-client relationships and for a type of law enforcement and dispute settlement that serves other purposes than the public good. Chad's permanent 'ungovernment' renders state-arranged entitlements practically nonexistent and, in case of their nominal occurrence, totally inaccessible by individual people at grassroots level.

2.5.4 Human rights as a source of entitlement

The global human rights discussion can play an important role in harmoniously linking the dynamics of law and power, to a certain extent even in countries that are torn by internal conflict¹⁵, and thus help to enable positive processes of entitlement. In Chad, a human rights movement has become active during the past few years, but it stands in great need of support from the international community, which should urge rulers to comply with UN principles¹⁶. What is needed even more is fruitful interplay with empowerment processes at grassroots level. The acquisition of economic, social and cultural rights at that level, through affirmative institutional action, creates new 'living law'. The Chadian human rights movement will have to plot its course on the meeting ground between this internally engendered living law and the external international pressure.

Chapter 3 ACTORS IN THE CHADIAN SOCIETY

This chapter first turns to five areas of public life: military, political, administrative, judiciary and civil. Then, after a brief look at the NGO scene as a whole, it proceeds to describe the history and function of SECADEV, an NDGO that was set up by the Catholic church as a non-ecclesiastical and non-missionary extension of its efforts to promote development as such.

3.1 Actors in public life

The military

Ever since independence, Chad never succeeded in forming an effective national army for the impartial protection of national interests. The political leaders never undertook any genuine attempts in that direction either. Their own rebel armies, recruited among their own ethnical group (also by force, if this was thought necessary) had brought them to power and they were also the only ones who could be trusted to keep them established there. The associated regular and high pay out of public funds, along with the tacit permission to loot at will among other ethnical groups, served to cement loyalty to the president.

Deby's personal armed forces again dominate the scene, operating next to a weak national army which does not get the best equipment and which is paid just as badly as the rest of the public service. When the National Conference was opened, the various Chadian armed forces came to a total of 45,000. The participants in the Conference judged that their sheer number, their opposed interests and their tradition of greed and violence represented a serious threat to democracy and human security. They urged substantial reduction and simultaneous regroupment of the forces, so that a smaller but truly national army, impartially policing the country, could be formed. But the efforts of the National Council for Transition to implement this policy, only enjoying the reluctant support of Deby, have so far not been able to overcome strong resistance among present military factions.

Political parties

The one-party state came into effect soon after independence and negotiations to promote common goals or to settle internal conflicts have never had a decent chance ever since. The attempt of the Government for National Unity (GUNT: 1979-1982), to have unifying negotiations reinstituted, was not successful. The large number of political (i.e. ethnical) factions nominally recognized each other under the GUNT umbrella, but they never gave up their own military organization, which constituted their only real reliance with regard to getting what they wanted.

A multi-party system in Chad, such as halfheartedly pursued again at this point, is therefore not necessarily a better alternative than the single-party state. Negotiated mediation of social, economic and political dissension is simply not a function of parliamentary democracy as long as fragmented groups resort to armed resolution of conflicts and thus dictate what is really happening in society.

Public Administration

As of September 1975, the military regime discontinued the decentralization process of public administration that had got underway. Local communities were again administered by appointees of central power, who showed little concern for the common good but concentrated instead on extraction of local resources, for the private interest of the ruling group.

The judiciary

The Chadian judiciary is shaped by French tradition. Its codes and procedures exist side by side with three other systems: the traditional, the judeo-christian and the arabo-islamic contributions to culture. Antagonism and contradiction among the four confuse the practice of law enforcement. But this practice is very weak anyway, many judges having to conform with the wishes of the executive power and much of their appropriate domain being annexed by direct military invention in issues that should have been submitted to court.

Civil society

A remarkable feature in Chad is that civil society has always been able to take over where state-related structures collapsed. Mechanisms to ensure entitlement systems were thus developed in the framework of customary law. As a major part of this, bargaining capacity for survival has become an exceptionally fine art in many layers of society. NGDOs can yet enhance this capacity and thus make good use of one of the few favourable circumstances they encounter.

3.2 The scene of nongovernmental (development) organizations

At the time of independence, there were virtually no NGOs/NGDOs in Chad. The private social organizations that did exist, were a regular part of catholic or protestant churches and did not function as separate entities. Resistance of protestant churches against the ethnically biased regime of president Tombalbay led to their prosecution and to fragmentation of their socio-economic network. The effects of this persist until today.

The only autonomous NG(D)O in the early sixties was CEFOD (Centre d'Etude et de Formation aux Orientations de Développement), set up as a joint venture of the catholic church and the Ministry of Planning. Soon, however, several other NGDO's were established, among them the cotton research institute IRCT in Moundou and an ORSTOM branch for cattle research in the outskirts of N'Djamena. Later, at the end of the seventies, INADES (based in Abidjan and mainly working in francophone Africa) also appeared on the scene. As INADES-Formation-Tchad, it provided agricultural training for farmer groups as well as organizational training for peasant community leaders.

During the eighties, international organizations for bilateral development cooperation from France, Switzerland and West Germany entered the country, mainly to act in the fields of agriculture, education and health, where churches had already worked for quite a number of years. Multilateral development organizations such as UNICEF, FAO, WFP and WHO arrived too, along with relief organizations such as the Red Cross and Médecins sans Frontières. A mixed approach came from Care Africa, essentially an American organization, whose operations in the capital and eastern Chad were predominantly directed at relief aid.

The eighties also were the time of formalization of NGDOs. The government set up SPONG (Secrétariat Permanent des ONG), under the Ministry of Planning. This was done to align the involvement of various ministries in NGDO activities, but also to gain control of their operational impact. In 1983, churches were asked to register their socio-economic organizations. The different diocesan branches of the existing Secours Catholique Tchadien were registered in the north as SECADEV and as in the south as BELACD (Bureau d'Etude et de Liaison des Actions Caritatives et de Développement). Protestant organizations got together under umbrella's like Les Assemblées de Dieu, but many groups (in particular those around hospitals) remained un-associated.

Meanwhile Eirènè, an international NGDO based in Switzerland, linked up with christian development organizations and started work in mainly the southern part of the country. Other foreign actors attempted to forge a fruitful link with the framework of the Chadian government, as part of their bilateral approach. One of them was SNV, an NGDO with close connections to the Dutch government. It opened an office in N'Djamena in 1987 and started work in the rural sector of Mayo-Kebbi, a province in the very south-west, and in the pastoral sector of Batha, right in the centre of the country.

The end of the eighties, when political stability nominally prevailed, saw an explosion of Chadian NGDOs, many of them rather small and as yet with uncertain potential. No less than six human rights organizations were founded, but also many that set out to work in the field of socio-economic development. ASAILD was one of the first in the latter category.

This localization of development initiatives should, of course, be seen as a positive feature in itself. On the other hand, one cannot afford to ignore that part of the sudden NGDO proliferation was not primarily driven by ideological vision. The class of underpaid, unpaid or jobless bureaucrats and other educated people had substantially increased and the potential availability of donor funds must, as a logical consequence, have aroused personal motives among some of them. Even so, personal motives need not diminish the quality of performance, but a sober look at the Chadian NGDO scene, with realistic and objective criteria of assessment, becomes more important than ever.

Significant in this regard is that foreign NGDOs tend to draw closer together at present, not only by forming consortiums, but also by the recent establishment of CILONG, a common platform of approach in shaping relations with the government. Next to SPONG, where actual development experience can be exchanged and where emergency or relief operations should be coordinated, this may provide further structural support to a continued development role for NGDO's in Chad, where there is very little scope for other actors.

3.3 History of SECADEV

Christianity in Chad has a tangible foothold only in the south, where about 60% of the people belong to churches. But even there the imported faith is not really deeply engrained, as it goes back only two or three generations. Protestant missionaries arrived in the south in 1920, followed by their catholic counterparts in

1929. Conversion did thus not ride in on the strength of colonialization, which took place around the turn of the century. In fact, christian churches and colonial power kept a proper distance from each other right up to independence¹⁷. Their interests only coincided when army chaplains in the north also took care of southern military auxiliaries and civil servants posted in that part of the country.

The selective approach of mission efforts was also evident in the lack of noteworthy attempts to christianize the muslim population. Thus the archdiocese of N'Djamena, which covers the central and northern region, ministers only to pockets of christianity in a few parishes.

This archdiocese used to participate in the Caritas Internationalis network, with a Chadian Catholic Relief (SCT) office that was mainly occupied with channelling charity funds from its French mother organization. In the sixties, however, the latter proposed a framework of micro-realization projects as a beginning of more structural aid. But implementation proved to be difficult, due to strained communication with the target groups. The focus of SCT's activities was on parish areas, where they mainly worked through the Young Christian Farmers movement, which was renamed the Young Believers Farmers movement when muslims too were asked to join. Differences in faith and ethnical origins were explicitly ruled out as criteria to form target groups.

Around 1980, just before and under GUNT rule, when state structures and many other institutions collapsed, requests for relief aid increased drastically. Having learned from earlier experience with drought and famine in the Sahel, all through West Africa, SCT understood that relief operations were not merely a temporary necessity, but that they could be turned into a real beginning of sustainable development if they were managed properly. Participatory approaches were considered crucial in that regard. An important opportunity was grasped in 1981, when the municipality of N'Djamena asked SCT to channel 200 metric tons of food to displaced people in and returnees to the capital. The WFP had made this available in the context of their Food for Work programme and the archdiocese took charge of the implementation by starting a reconstruction and sanitation project in the capital. Thus, in the dry season of 1981/82, 5,500 families could rehabilitate their houses. A credit scheme was set up to revive the crafts sector, which had been completely destroyed by looting. In collaboration with the League of Red Crosses, an orthopaedic centre was established for war victims. At the same time, 50,000 returnees from Nigeria were spared the ugly possibility of living in camps around the capital and settled in Karal instead, close to Lake Chad.

SCT presented its philosophy and programme of action to a meeting of NGO donors in Lucerne. Soon after, its archdiocesan office was reorganized and SCT was renamed SECADEV: Secours Catholique et Développement. In the new set-up, the ecclesiastical hierarchy only played a minor role. The board was formed by prominent Chadian citizens, both christians and muslims. The archbishop also got a seat on the board and he retained a veto right regarding the appointment of the General Director.

SECADEV organized itself on a geographical basis, working with local delegations, whose number has by now increased to about ten. The organization's history since 1982 can be divided into three periods. The first period (1982-1985) was still characterized by highly centralized decisions and a predominant concern with relief operations. On the other hand, much emphasis was already put on selforganization of the beneficiaries. During the second period (1986-1989), activities were more and more directed to integrated development, while relief aid was restricted to occasional assistance in the area of early warning systems and the delivery of emergency goods. In the present third period, from 1990, the focus is increasingly on empowerment of local groups of peasants and women. This goes hand in hand with decentralization of decision-making to the regional level.

3.3.1 First period, 1982-1985

After the state recognized SECADEV as a Development NGO, in 1983, an agreement was signed with the Ministry for Natural Disasters. It contained the arrangements for SECADEV's participation in relief programmes from a wide range of multilateral, bilateral and nongovernmental organizations. It also delineated the areas of SECADEV's intervention, i.e. in the provinces of Guera (around Bokoro, Mongo and Bitkine), Ouaddaï (around Abéché) and North Logone (around Bousso), near the lake (around Karal) and finally in N'Djamena^{**}. The agreement furthermore defined SECADEV's particular target groups as returnees and displaced persons, victims of drought and war, who were to be resettled as autonomous groups. Among other things, this implied follow-up of the campaign already started in and near N'Djamena, where support to other vulnerable groups, such as students, was also started.

Involvement in more straightforward development work was covered in an arrangement of close collaboration with the National Rural Development Office (ONDR), whose staff in North Logone and Karal were to be

^{**} See map in annex 2.

offered certain incentives, as well as transport and training facilities. In Karal this led to the formation of forty-five peasant groups, totalling 1,700 people, who got started on subsistence farming but also on horticultural cash crop production for N'Djamena, and who became engaged in tree planting and pre-cooperative activities. Meanwhile, in the province of Guera, wells were dug in Bokoro, where the emphasis was on provision of agricultural implements and development of grain storage capacity. A group of displaced persons in Yao-Fitri*** received seeds in order to get them settled as farmers. Anti-erosion activities and health care prevailed around Mongo. In all of these activities, also around Bousso in North Logone, the relief task was given a structural dimension as much as possible, mainly through mobilization and organization of groups.

French and Swiss NGOs of the Caritas network and the Dutch NGO Cebemo of the CIDSE¹⁸ network started supporting SECADEV to such an extent that the small staff of five increased to twenty persons within two years. Recruitment of new staff members was nearly exclusively undertaken among the local population. But in the early eighties, with the educational infrastructure severely affected by many years of war, it was hardly possible to find any sufficiently trained candidates, while the time pressure did not permit rapid provisional training either. Nevertheless, SECADEV consciously opted for appointment of Chadian people, both for its headquarters in N'Djamena and at regional level.

In the years 1983/84, SECADEV managed to resettle nine thousand displaced persons or returnees. In the years 1984/85, it took a fair share of handling the problem of half a million people who had been displaced by drought. At the end of its first period, SECADEV supported approximately one thousand groups, representing 150,000 beneficiaries in eight geographical areas, each with its particular cultural, climatic and physical conditions.

3.3.2 Second period, 1986-1989

Focusing firmly on integrated development, SECADEV rearranged its programmes and staff structure, again hampered by the shortage of trained people. Delegations (the teams per geographical area) consisted of one head, one or two deputies, one bookkeeper, one or two drivers, one radio operator and about a dozen or more extensionists. Technical cells were added to the administrative and logistical units at the main office. These cells were staffed by Chadian university graduates, whose task it was to provide counselling in their respective fields of expertise. These fields ranged from rural, hydraulic and environmental engineering to reforestation, pastoral and arable agriculture, primary health care and primary education. A multidisciplinary cell for coordination and evaluation was to monitor ongoing programmes. Chadian staff were entrusted with the very important contacts with government offices and ministries, the SPONG, other NGOs and bilateral and multilateral organizations, in order to align policies and share experiences and means. Through this three-year period of reorientation and expansion, the variety and number of activities increased and SECADEV's staff grew to 275.

SECADEV improved food production by testing and introducing new varieties of seed. Of particular importance was the introduction of Berbere, a sorghum variety that can grow after the wet season, so that a second harvest becomes possible, sometimes even on the same field. Seed packages were made available, so that farmers could produce their own new seed inputs. Credit schemes were set up for the purchase of agricultural implements and equipment and for the commercialization of cereal production. This was linked with training of peasant leaders, to enable local management of the innovations. Furthermore, the formation of women's groups around appropriate activities was encouraged.

In N'Djamena, SECADEV started a joint venture with the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Education by founding a technical school for the yearly training of 10 to 15 mechanics. A programme for pastoral development was initiated together with Oxfam, which led to setting up a new delegation in Oum-Hadjer, in Batha province. This activity resorted to the sole care of SECADEV in 1993.

The first conflicts around land tenure of new settlers arose at Kournari. Farmers from Cameroon had the customary right there to cultivate on either bank of the river Logone, which marks the territorial border between Chad and Cameroon. Because of the war, however, this right had not been exercised for years. The new settlers had innocently started farming with the consent of the local Chadian community, but they now had to bargain with people from across the border, not an easy process at all. The problem grew worse when bureaucrats from N'Djamena, at a mere distance of 35 kilometres, also became interested in gaining access to land in this area for their private use.

Substantial foreign funding, good political relations in the capital and relative peace in its areas of operation (the

*** Yao-Fitri appears on this map as N'Djamena-Bilala.

centre of fighting being near Libya) enabled SECADEV to expand and to reach remote corners of the country. At 1,000 kilometres from N'Djamena, for instance, SECADEV could take care of nearly five thousand refugees from the Sudanese Darfur province. Full collaboration with the target group in the area of Adre helped to make this possible.

At the end of its second period, SECADEV's development activities reached close to 27,000 households, organized in about 1,100 male and female groups and 17 mixed groups.

3.3.3 Third period, from 1990 to the present

Decentralization with concomitant empowerment of local structures marked this period. But this strategy was not a replacement of previous priorities, which were fully retained when they were in line with the development stage of the target group involved. To facilitate the growth to autonomy of those target group that were ready for this, the various delegations were aligned more closely with the particular conditions of each area and with the embryonic forms of pre-existing organization.

Through training and practical experience, everyone's ability, at all levels in SECADEV, had sufficiently increased to embark on this exercise. Cohesion of the overall network was meanwhile strengthened by annual workshops in which key staff of delegations, many extensionists and central staff meet to share experience and exchange views. An important part of these workshops are the reported results and assessments from representatives of the target groups themselves. The latter can in general not physically attend the meetings, partly for logistical and financial reasons, but mainly because this would arouse too much anxiety among the government.

SECADEV's work with the target groups of Mongo should illustrate the organization's present approach.

The target groups concerned live in an isolated, mountainous area of Guera province. The pre-SECADEV catholic parish already supported anti-erosion activities there, and provided agricultural training and health care. With a view to the family diet, it also paid attention to income-generating activities for women, to enable them to purchase ingredients for the daily cooking on the market.

The Guera is a largely demonetized region. In general, people's assets are only in kind, mainly in the form of cereal and cattle. But there is a seasonal exodus of men, who hire themselves out as labour in order to secure some cash income.

During the rule of Habré, the Hadjerai people of Guera, who opposed the dictatorship, suffered increasing persecution from the side of central power. It was at this time that SECADEV started its activities in the region.

SECADEV's reorganization in the second period, with the shift from relief aid to integrated development, resulted in a different selection of target groups and a substantial decrease of their number. The 302 groups with about 6,000 participants in 1989 went down to 68 groups with less than 1,200 participants in the next year. The total of cash assets of these groups amounted to less than 400,000 CFA, not much more than 1,000 dollars. But the collective storage capacity of over 55 metric tons was considerable. Group activities have picked up pace again in the present period. For instance, tree nurseries, seen as a source of cash income, increased from 3 to 7. And in 1992, the number of participating villages had risen to 85, while the number of individual participants had returned to over 4,000, one third of them organized in 80 groups for men and two thirds in 137 groups for women.

When financial constraints curbed the proper functioning of credit funds, acquired agricultural equipment was rented out so as to generate cash for repayment of loans. The existing agricultural training centre of Baro (which had previously concentrated on the dissemination of anti-erosion techniques) developed a new curriculum in which arable agriculture and livestock breeding were treated as component parts of one farming system. This was done to promote the idea that assets in kind, such as cattle, could be converted into cash for reinvestment in food crop production.

All health care activities were integrated in the national health plan and SECADEV was asked to set up and run three 'responsibility zones' in the region. This concept stands for community-based and costcovering primary health care, with easy access to nearby facilities and a smooth referral system up to the regional hospital. The earlier parish framework of activities and SECADEV's later additions were reorganized so as to fit the new integrated scheme, theoretically financed by the Ministry of Health. This involved 35 villages with a total of nearly 28,000 inhabitants.

Meanwhile, storage of cereal has still not been expanded, with a view to abiding low security. Looting has remained a regular occurrence in the area, much to the disillusionment of the population, which supported Deby in his fight against Habré. But rather than being treated as allies by the present central power, they are still

regarded with suspicion, so that state protection does not come their way.

SECADEV does what it can to pacify the situation. Partly for this purpose, it joined a programme of the International Fund For African Development (FIDA). This programme intends to boost the development of Guera by linking the region to the national economy, gaining better control of violence and abuse, setting up cheap cash credit facilities, improving the function of local markets, encouraging the formation of cooperatives and extending price guarantees for cattle and cereal.

Chapter 4 EVOLUTION OF SECADEV'S STRATEGIES

This chapter returns to the central question of this paper:

How can entitlement systems be (re)created in a situation of permanently threatened security, in such a way that asset formation, as a minimal condition for any development, actually gets off the ground?

The second half of the previous chapter mainly gave the factual outline of SECADEV's history. Now, a closer look is needed at the strategies that were evolved over the three periods, with the focus on their impact in terms of participation, group formation, training and asset formation. This should give some indication of what scope SECADEV managed to provide for the creation of new entitlement where regular rights were systematically ignored.

4.1 First period: relief aid and selfhelp

In the face of the complete impoverishment and disempowerment of its displaced and landless target groups, SECADEV had the acute logistical responsibility of delivering 'first aid' for survival purposes. This did not preclude, however, a simultaneous appeal to the groups in question to help themselves as much as they could, chiefly by getting themselves organized and collectively building a new life, taking advantage of the support that was offered. This was not an easy challenge for groups whose cohesion had been eroded under exceptional circumstances of loss and displacement. One requirement for SECADEV was that people were allowed to choose their manner of self-organization in accordance with what they were traditionally accustomed to. A requirement for the target group was that they had to pool all of their remaining assets, however scarce, and do the same with their new assets, received as relief aid. They also had to pool and align their various skills before they were in a position to benefit from external help.

This approach of insistence on proper group formation appeared to be an effective way of distributing relief goods and funds. But, more than that, it showed people that they were not utterly dependent. One might observe, in this connection, that sustainable development starts as a mental state of selfreliance.

While SECADEV concentrated on housing solutions in the capital city, mostly by aiming to revitalize human resources, it focused on food security elsewhere. In resettling displaced people in Karal, for example, the crucial point was to gain access to land. For this, the existing local community would have to act as a good host, cooperating towards selfreliance of the new arrivals. At the same time, however, the target group would have to earn the status of a respectable and trustworthy counterpart, which required first of all that they would have to shed their feeling of dependence.

On the initiative of SECADEV, the first new 'peasant' groups in Karal formed themselves out of volunteers who jointly built a store that was to serve as a stockage and distribution point of relief goods. The second step was to round up cash and kind for collective purposes. The third step was setting up a management system for the starting capital that had thus been put together, but also for the food supplies stocked in the store.

The resulting core of initial selfhelp activities was SECADEV's starting point for further group formation around longerterm goals. Everything, however, hinged on rapidly gaining access to land in a noncontroversial way. In its mediations for that purpose, SECADEV could rely on traditional African practices of land use¹⁹ which were also valid in Karal. In this value system, land is a communal resource and it is the customary moral duty of the community to grant tenure of it to all its members and allies, so as to enable everyone to produce their own food, essentially to the benefit of the community as a whole. SECADEV played an important part in securing recognition of the target population as allies. This was partly achieved by upgrading the cohesive performance of the landless people concerned.

When access to land had been secured, there was a proper basis for people's selfarranged food security, which depended on stock formation and seed production. Further steps were taken in the direction of integrated development. Tree nurseries, appropriate stoves, anti-erosion measures, use of compost, appropriate farming methods, seed banks, food security stocks, credit and saving schemes, access to water and primary education were advanced. This paper need not dwell on the enumerated elements, as their general development context is sufficiently known.

But a few actual arrangements deserve being singled out from the particular context of SECADEV's intervention:

- SECADEV made relief goods available and extended subsidies and loans only if equal efforts and/or contributions came from the target groups.
- Much in the above category was in reality part of a gift structure, as was the case with the provision of seeds,

for example. But the gifts were deliberately disguised as loans or as somehow 'belonging to SECADEV' for two reasons. The first reason, valid towards the target group, was the consistent emphasis on quid pro quo dealings. The second reason, usually valid towards the surrounding world, was the creation of a protective cover under which the precarious base of built-up assets would be less vulnerable to external attack.

► This double role of SECADEV -on the one hand both provider and reclaimant in facing the target group, on the other hand divertor of external danger and claimant in the direction of the state- recurred in many settings. Sometimes protests against looting or bureaucratic abuse were lodged with higher authorities, on behalf of target groups, which were not yet in a position to attract state anger themselves. Of greater structural significance was the foundation of 'spontaneous' primary schools, with intense involvement of target groups and again a disguised subsidy structure, but also accompanied by exacting the government promise that the Education Department would take over the school as soon as the situation was regularized.

► SECADEV staff continuously assessed the legitimacy of target group representatives, the genuine character of participation and the effectiveness of people's management capacity. Assessment was based on measurables such as collection and repayment rates, increased production, the build-up of savings and stock, etc. But the all-encompassing criterion was the extent to which everything fitted in the customary rule structure, so that disruption and exclusion mechanisms could be avoided. Occasional adaptation of traditional rules was cautiously pursued when the introduction of innovations made this necessary, but such adaptation always had to be internally engendered.

► The formation of assets among the initially landless target groups noticeably improved through the first few years. Access to land, water, agricultural inputs and education was realized to a satisfactory degree and preservation of acquired assets, under SECADEV's diversionary umbrella of nominal ownership, was on the whole an evident success.

The relevance of SECADEV's strategies in this period may be summed up in two points:

1. Participation of the beneficiaries and group formation among them was a regular function of SECADEV's appeal to them to pursue their own interests along lines of cooperation. This function was carefully embedded in customary structures of direct resource-based, community-based and institution-based entitlement. To a certain extent this served to fill the vacuum that was left after the collapse of state-based entitlements, while it paved the way towards eventual reclamation of state services. At least as important was that the embedding in customary structures strongly enhanced people's sense of 'being on the right track', within a system of proper rules that turned alienation into membership, conflict of interests into consensus and dependency into self-engendered food security.

2. SECADEV's role of provider and diversionary protector was in principle directed at its own eventual redundancy, as should be clear from the lack of imposition of alien values. However, this temporary role was highly necessary in Chad, not only in the context of relief aid but also concerning the permanent threat to insecurity and the country's abiding state of 'ungovernment'. The sustainable elements in SECADEV's approach, apart from common steps towards integrated development, lay in the less common priority that was explicitly given to customary entitlement bases, with built-in bridging possibilities towards eventual acquisition of respected rights in the framework of state law.

4.2 Second period: food security and integrated development

When resettlement had got underway and when SECADEV also became involved with established populations, the relief dimension faded to the extent that integrated development could be placed foremost in the organization's strategy. For the time being, however, all the situations confronted were very much on the level of mere survival economies, which meant that food security still had to take precedence. Group formation thus continued to hinge on improvement of production and storage capacity, in combination with entitlements that might preserve the asset base.

Although farmers could easily be convinced of the value of forming seed stocks, they tended to be less certain about stocking food. Possible theft was one consideration, falling market prices were another. A few successive droughts and locust plagues, and the ensuing scarcity removed their doubts. Their own survival was at stake and they saw that prices could actually soar. Under the SECADEV programme, which promoted group cohesion and offered some protection against looting, their confidence was sufficiently restored to return to proper practices and to improve their capacities as producers, preservers and sellers.

While earlier schemes had often disappointed the target groups, because of too many programme arrangements that did not fit their traditional way of handling things, SECADEV managed to link up with prevailing customs, inserting improvements only gradually, on the basis of mutual consent and under general acceptance of accountability procedures.

Meanwhile, the exclusive approach of male heads of households was abandoned in favour of approaching all

men and women. Membership of groups could from then on proceed on the basis of custom as well as relevance. This led to a significant growth of the number of mixed groups. But the need for separate male or female groups remained. Many women, for instance, felt that they were left behind in the area of credit allocation and they had a valid interest in focusing on their own claim-making capacity.

One of the most important features of this period was SECADEV's growth to a considerable size with increased implementation capacity and, moreover, its development into an organization that commanded widespread respect in Chad and the international donor community. There was also a lingering and not entirely erroneous perception that SECADEV could still whisper in the ear of the catholic church. The NGDO's strong international connections put it in such a position, anyway, that the government preferred having its positive testimony, as this might be important for foreign investments, chiefly from the side of international development cooperation.

As a result, the protective cover that SECADEV could extend to its target groups was of a very real nature. Of course, there were other powers to contend with, mostly in the form of armed rebels. But the stronger groups under the SECADEV umbrella could now counter this by negotiation. The potential looters, after all, also had an interest in sustained agricultural production, and half of a sizable stock was definitely more interesting to them than all of a practically depleted stock. When traders were also included in the various deals, a curious system of entitlements provided a measure of peace and some genuine scope for development. In the background of this, SECADEV acted as the mediator and assumed more or less the status of the absent state.

SECADEV's growth in size was accompanied by an increase of experience and competence, even though properly trained staff were scarce. This resulted in greater implementation capacity and sometimes target groups were too much imposed upon, so that they no longer had enough time to evolve their own approaches. This posed a serious threat to the principle of selfhelp. A conference of all staff members explicitly reasserted that SECADEV's proper task lay in the development and proposal of initiatives, acting as a supportive organization and emphatically not as an implementation agency.

4.3 Third period: decentralization and empowerment

The fact that overeager imposition on the part of staff members became an important point of discussion, showed in itself that signals had come from target groups who felt uncomfortable with the situation and who preferred to proceed more along their own lines. This was a symptom of their increased strength and SECADEV recognized that the gradual withdrawal of central intervention would be appropriate. By and by, some target groups could take over key positions and a number of SECADEV staff at the local level actually had to be dismissed. They were helped to set up their own activities or to undergo additional training, so that they might be enrolled as technical counselors by rural associations.

Retaining earlier approaches to target groups that had not yet progressed very far towards autonomous performance, empowerment of advanced groups became SECADEV's explicit strategy of the third period. In Chad, this concept had the additional dimension of training people to handle civil insecurity and to recreate entitlements in the vacuum of malfunctioning state law and hardly operational state structures. Protection of assets, for example, remained very important during the troubles that attended Deby's takeover attempt and successful coup in 1990.

But the basic tenets of current general development theory fully applied in the first place. Empowerment was thus chiefly seen as a transfer of technical and management skills and promotion of financial selfreliance. In the regions concerned, this was almost exclusively placed in the perspective of agriculture, the only area of production that offered any viable chance of creating marketable surpluses. Agricultural training, associated skills training, precooperative activities and credit schemes became SECADEV's main cluster of provisions. Hand in hand with the structural decentralization, great care was also taken to develop differential application of the general strategy. This took the form of specific packages that fitted the particular physical, climatic, economic and cultural conditions of each region.

Funds from headquarters, for credit schemes and other purposes, were also allocated per region²⁰. This depended on approval of a three-year plan of activities and its budget, followed by annually updated plans, which each delegation had to submit.

Having received the funds, delegations had to take full responsibility for their allocation within the region and also for the collection of repayments. Contracts had to be drawn up for any transfer of funds to associations, unions or smaller groups. The same applied to further transfers, down to individual recipients, groups always remaining accountable as a group towards the next-higher level.

SECADEV's gender approach became more subtle. Activities in this regard had long been restricted to health

activities and mother and child care, but women's economic needs were now also addressed through better allocation of credit. Women were integrated in the overall development strategies of delegations and many of them participated in mixed groups, something quite unusual in islamised environments.

When group formation became progressively stronger and when the asset base had been somewhat improved, new activities could be tackled. Literacy training for adults was introduced. The course contents were adapted to the types of people's daily activities. Access to relevant reading material such as forms, instructions and reports was considered of vital interest for genuine selfreliance and accountability of the groups. Literacy, numeracy and primary education as such were seen as prerequisites for future autonomy in modern society.

In Chari-Baguirmi, just as in Guera, health care activities were integrated into the national health plan. SECADEV maintained its own health staff, however, because in addition to their technical skills, these people had been trained in promoting participation. Without such participation, any health care system is largely devoid of practical meaning.

Introduction into the modern cash economy was regarded as an important condition for asset formation. Increased production and marketing capacity were therefore consistently pursued. People experienced that collective bargaining, for instance at the level of unions, assured them of better prices. To create more acute awareness on this point, SECADEV initiated weekly broadcasts of current prices on different markets. Credit schemes were also restructured to conform more closely with realistic economic principles. A modest interest rate of 4% was introduced. This prepared people for the world of regular banking practices.

In 1991, SECADEV contributed substantially in the organization of a National Congress for the Autonomy of the Rural World, proposed by French bilateral development cooperation. This congress was to prepare planned support to administrative reform of the state. SECADEV played a role in the intermediate regional seminars, inviting its target groups to participate and to send representatives to the national level. SECADEV's knowledge of the rural scene as well as its good contacts with key figures in the central administration put it in a position to advise and be heard in the matter of drawing up cooperative law, an essential piece of the legal framework that is so much in need of restoration.

SECADEV has by now grown into a fairly large NGDO with a few hundred staff, among whom the number of Europeans or other western people is negligible. In spite of its recognizable catholic origins, it is in practice a non-denomenational organization, catering to christians and muslims alike. It aims at improving the capacity of poor Chadians to survive, to acquire entitlements and assets, and to function properly in a society whose development has halted. In doing so, SECADEV plays a role as initiator and protector, not only in its direct approaches of target groups, but also in its attempts to influence and soften the political climate around them.

The above should not create the impression that SECADEV's evolution was a straightforward success story. The target groups are to a certain extent still financially dependent on SECADEV, which in turn must rely on foreign donors. Similarly, the NGDO is not yet in a position to operate without the substantial input of knowledge and experience that the donor community, among others, can offer. Finally, the most important weakness remains that SECADEV must continuously guard against upsurges of implementation efforts where a modest attitude of rendering services and support would be more appropriate.

Chapter 5 CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Customs are better than Kalashnikovs

In a situation of structural conflict, armed violence, dispossession, displacement, lawlessness, state hostility, collapse of modern institutional structures and threatening erosion of the traditional framework, in a country, moreover, where physical conditions are harsh and natural resources meagre, the scope for development, which may seem to be nonexistent, is to be sought in working upwards from customary structures towards new and creative bases of entitlement, by virtue of which asset formation may again be pursued.

5.2 Umbrellas are better than swords

The progression of target groups towards those new entitlements, and to subsequent acquisition and preservation of assets, rests in part on external creation of a protective setting, whereby potential hostility is turned away from the embryonic beginnings of development. NGDO's are particularly suited to provide this protection. They may engage in diversionary action by posing as the real owners of assets. In the absence of state protection, they can hold up an umbrella over ongoing activities and thus legitimize them in a sense. They can also acquire such stature that their voice is internationally heard, which may lead central state power to treat them and 'their' target groups with caution. Finally, where other parties cannot afford to become formally involved, NDGOs can make alliances even with rebels.

5.3 Half an egg is better than an empty shell (Dutch proverbs)

In line with the pragmatic attitudes that often characterize customary perceptions, a measure of protection can be achieved by negotiated compromises which might seem 'unprincipled' in western eyes. NGDOs can reach many parties with diverging interests and make them more aware of the shared interest that everyone has in a properly functioning food production system. Even potential looters realize that the bargained half of a sizable stock is better than the stolen total of nearly depleted assets.

5.4 Two are better than one (Ecclesiastes 4:9-12)

The African view of individuals essentially being group members, and in no way definable as separate entities, already makes the strategy of group formation a sound one. From this point of departure in the customary structure, NGDO's can do much to counter the fragmentation that threatens a conflict-ridden society. They can go on to promote larger cooperative structures at regional level, enhancing the collective strength of target groups and enabling them, through phased introduction of innovation, to increase their production and marketing capacity.

5.5 A gentle dew is better than violent rain (Indian wisdom)

At the microlevel, at which NGDO's initiate their operations, a cautious and respectful bottom-up approach is essential. Processes will have to be rooted in customary perceptions and dealings or they will not grow at all. SECADEV realized that innovations could only be offered as a gentle dew, not imposed as a violent rain.

5.6 Birds never fly on one wing (English proverb)

NGDOs' essential concentration on the micro-level should not blind them to the need of introducing target groups into the modern economy and higher, eventually countrywide levels of social organization. Micro-realities and macro-context are two wings that require one another for development to take sustainable flight.

5.7 It is not the weathercock that turns, it is the wind...

Intervention may move into communities with the announcement that the state of affairs must be changed. But he who wishes to turn the weathercock of economic indicators had better first learn about the wind in the target area concerned. Grave underestimation of the knowledge, the good sense and the vast experience of local people has all too often destroyed projects before they were started.

NOTES

1. Although the description of SECADEV's activities and strategies in chapters 3 and 4 clearly shows that a step-by-step approach is in fact employed, this aspect remains underexposed in the theoretical framework of chapter 2. In this connection, attention deserves to be drawn to an article which offers valuable insight into the importance of sequencing development processes:

Korten, David: Third generation of NGO strategies: A Key to People-Centred Development. World Development vol.5, supplement. Pergamon Journals 19..

2. Senussiyya: Muslim Sufi (mystic) brotherhood, established by Muhamed ibn Ali as Sanussi in Saudi Arabia in 1787. As a reformist movement it aimed at a return to the simple faith and life of early Islam. After being repressed in Arabia, the brotherhood moved to Cyrenaica in 1859, founding their capital in Kuffra. Under Muhamed Al Mahdi, the Senussiyya moved into the Libyan desert of Egypt, southern Tripolitania, Fezzan, central Sahara and the Hejjaz for missionary purposes. By the end of the 19th century, the brotherhood spread by conversion into Sudan and towards Lake Chad, where they came in conflict with France. Turks, who occupied present-day Libya at the time, welcomed the brotherhood's opposition to the spread of French influence north from Chad and Tibesti. During the Italian-Turkish war (1911-1912), Senussiyya fought against Italy. They kept up their resistance to Italian presence in Libya, later with support from the British, and opposed any western contamination of their area up to 1949, when the UN voted in favour of Libya becoming a united and independent Kingdom not later than January 1, 1952. The pro-british Mohamed Idriss al Mahdi, then ruler of the Senussiyya brotherhood, was chosen as the king by the National Assembly in 1950. Until the coup of Muhamar Khadaffi in November 1969, Libya defended pro-western views on international affairs. After the coup it became passionately Arab and puritanically Muslim, while the brotherhood was more and more turned into an instrument in Khadaffi's international politics.
3. Antonetti, Gouverneur Général d'Afrique Equatoriale Française. Discours et rapports sur la situation générale de l'AEF de 1927 à 1931. Revue L'Afrique Française: Janvier 1927, Février 1928, Janvier et Décembre 1929 et Janvier 1931. CEFOD, Fonds Dalmais, N'Djamena, Tchad.

Expenses for new investments in Chad in ordinary budget years in Fr. Francs.

1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
216,122	319,266	358,173	637,459	707,752	1,156,000
218,122	319,266	358,713	637,459	707,752	1,156,000

(op. cit.: December 1929, p 690)

Chad's 1930 budget expenses totalled FF 8,608,384. Resources produced FF 11,574,689. The surplus was added to the Chadian reserve of AEF, rising to FF 11,671,230. Total AEF reserves in 1930 were FF 43,171,235. (op.cit. January 1931, p 29)


4. The Islamic Legion was organized, trained and equipped as a military force by Khadaffi in the mid-eighties. Recruits were young men and opponents of their own government from all over muslim Africa, such as Tuareg of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, who felt excluded in their respective countries and who hoped that the Legion might one day support their cause. The Legion helped Deby on the instigation of Libya, which was very much opposed to Habré.
5. *Entitlement and Development: An Institutional Approach to the Acquirement Problem.* ISS Working Paper Series No 87 1990, p 1.
6. *Verdier R.: Problématique des Droits de l'Homme dans les Droits Traditionnels d'Afrique Noire.* Droits et Cultures No 5, p 100.

Nyerere J.: Freedom and Development (1979). In this essay, the president of Tanzania singles out three components of freedom. There is national freedom, which is the ability of citizens to determine their

- own future and to govern themselves. There is freedom from hunger, disease and poverty and personal freedom of the individual. Nyerere focuses on two separate but interrelated levels: the level of political and economic independence and the level of the individual vis-à-vis the state in his political rights but also in his right to get a fair share of available resources. Here President Nyerere anticipates on what will later be called 'Development with a human face'.
7. Rostow describes the five stages of economic growth, including the transition to the surplus and cash economy (the 'take-off' point), as totally internal to the economies concerned. He thus offers an alternative to modernization theories which hold that the stimulus arrives from outside.
See *Political Change and Underdevelopment*, p 106.
 8. One dependency theorist points out that precapitalist relations such as feudalism continue to play a significant role at all levels of political and economic activities. The appropriation of surpluses by the employer is an example.
See *E. Laclau: Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America*, 1971.
The above is also true for countries in subsaharan Africa and particularly for Chad.
 9. *Pope Paul VI: On promoting the Development of Peoples*. Encyclical letter, Rome 1967, p 20.
 10. Alternative Development focuses on people and their environment, rather than on production and profits. It is based on the life spaces of civil society and aims to improve conditions of life and livelihood produced by households. Increase in social power may be understood as an increase in a household's access to the bases of its productive wealth and as an increase in voice and collective action, strenghtening political power. Alternative Development is a process that pursues the empowerment of households and their individual members through their involvement in socially and politically relevant actions.
See *John Friedman: Empowerment: The politics of Alternative Development*. Blackwell, London 1992. pp 31-35.
 11. Ivan Illich points out that for many people today the recognition of their systemic requirements is externally determined by an exclusivist professional hegemony, which shows the power of professional prestige and pedagogy but also the final loss of personal autonomy.
See *Ivan Illich: Needs* on pp 88-101 of *The Development Dictionary*, edited by W.Sachs. Zed books, London 1992.
 12. The power of civil society is gauged by the differential access of households to the bases of social power. Being reduced to extreme poverty, households lack a defensible life space, surplus time, knowledge and skills, appropriate information, social organization, social networks, instruments of work and livelihood, and finally financial resources. These eight bases of social power are distinct yet interdependent, because all refer to means for obtaining other means in a spiraling process of increasing social power.
See *John Friedman: Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development*. Blackwell, London 1992. pp 66-71.
 13. *De Gaay Fortman B. and Kortekaas Chr: Conflict susceptibility in a socio-economic context: An Entitlement Systems Approach*. Paper for the UN Academic Council meeting, The Hague 1994.
 14. *De Gaay Fortman B.: Sitting back in Horror: Intra-State Conflict in a Global Context*. 42nd Dies Natalis Address, ISS, The Hague, 10 October 1994. pp 8-9
 15. *Van Benthem van den Berg G.: Paper for the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations System*. The Hague, 23-25 June 1994. p 7, note 2.
Although this paper is about inter-state security (World Society and the World of States), the developed concepts apply very much to the (intra-state) civil society of Chad. Needed is a broad definition of 'security', which does not only include the physical dimension, but also the economic, environmental and social components of life.

16. Chad has not been very forthcoming in committing itself to human rights documents. Only the 1948 UN Convention against genocide, the 1954 UN convention and the OAU Convention relating to refugees and the 1979 UN Convention on elimination of all forms of discrimination against women were signed. This was done in the early eighties, under Habré. But the gesture was largely empty, because the rights involved were not incorporated in national law.
17. The anticlerical attitude of the French government was reflected in legislation under president Combes in 1904. This compelled churches to work independently and separate from colonial power. The lack of links between church and state was evident to the population. As a result, after independence churches were not seen as a suspicious colonial heritage.
18. CIDSE: Cooperation Internationale pour le Développement Socio-Economique, headquarters in Brussels: a platform for fundraising and conscientization, mostly resorting under the catholic hierarchy of the UK, Ireland, France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
19. *Magnant J.P.: La terre sara, terre tchadienne.* L'Harmattan, Paris 1987. Chapters 14, 15, 16.
20. The table below recapitulates SECADEV's credit schemes in Chad.

ANNEX 1 Map of Chad



ZONES D' ACTIONS DU SECADEV

LEGÈNDE

Cours d'eau intermittent ————
 Limites sud de la zone d'intervention - - - -
 Zone d'action ————
 Région de projet BECADEV [ADRE]
 Chef-lieu de préfecture [ATI]
 projet d'irrigation [Y]

Échelle: 1:100,000

BECADEV DEC. 88

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- Conseil National d'Appui au Mouvement Associatif et Coopératif(CONAMAC)
Statuts, Règlement Intérieur, Règlement financier).
- Croissance des Jeunes Nations, Paris, France.
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