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THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY
TOWARDS CRITICAL GLOBALISM

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

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Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author:
c/o Publications Office - Institute of Social Studies - P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague - The Netherlands
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Abstract
This paper presents, first, two arguments in the mode of development discourse analysis. Development thinking is usually regarded as an offshoot of the family of notions of evolution and progress and as part of western notions of change as growth. Using genealogy as a methodology for examining development theory, this perspective is questioned in several ways. It displays an essentialism of ideas, overlooks discontinuities within western thought, exaggerates the special status and character of western notions of change, and emphasizes endogenous over exogenous change. This leads into the second argument which is to view development theories in the plural – diverging in terms of development sociology and economics, development theory, ideology, policy and practice. In each of these spheres, with respect to different sectors, different theories and ideologies have been prevalent. In development theory, endogenous models of development have predominated to the neglect of diffusionist perspectives. This brings us to the closing argument which concerns the challenge of globalization. Here the outlines of an in-between position of critical globalism are sketched.

The prevalent note in development thinking nowadays is saying goodbye to paradigms. Many articles open by saying goodbye to modernization and dependency, while insisting that no new paradigm will be proposed. The objections to these paradigms are familiar enough and there's no need to restate them here. Still this is not just a time of ‘waiting for a text’. Several new departures in development thinking parallel general tendencies in social theory, such as the problematization of modernity, poststructuralism and postmodernism. Development discourse is examined in Foucauldian terms of power/knowledge (Sachs 1992, Marglin and Marglin 1990, Dubois 1991, Escobar 1985), deconstructed à la Derrida (Johnston 1991), subjected to archeological excavation (Sachs 1989), or juxtaposed to explorations of the postmodern (Schuurman 1993, Slater 1992). These contributions expand on the critiques of Eurocentrism, Orientalism, and occidental cultural homogenization in postcolonial and cultural studies. No doubt the debates on modernity and postmodernity carry major implications for development theory for they are concerned with redefining ‘development’ writ large.

On the other hand, these contributions are also limited by their preoccupation with discourse. While deepening our critical insight they do not offer alternatives. At the same time that postmodern interrogations provide the basis for a new critique of modernization theory, modernity as a theme is making a come-back, but now in the plural – as late or advanced modernity, modernity ‘reworked’, neomodernization theory, or ‘new modernity’. The latter involves the notion of ‘risk society’ and the argument of a ‘new modernity' in
which all societies, developed and less developed, are exposed to a globalization of ecological and other risks (Beck 1992).

A recurring feature of many discussions is that development theory is being attributed more coherence and consistency than it possesses. Thus in being criticized as the 'religion of the West' (Rist 1990) or as the 'myth of development' (Tucker 1992), developmentalism is being homogenized and discussed as if it were cut from a single cloth. Also the deconstruction of development texts is not the same as unpacking development theory, disaggregating its lineages, dimensions and projects.

At the same time, the very notion of development is increasingly being bracketed. The questioning comes from various directions: from deconstructions of development discourse but also from the momentum of globalization on account of which the special status of developing economies -- the original rationale of the development argument -- is gradually being eroded. In this context, structural adjustment represents a radical break with the development tradition, not even because of its neoliberal thrust but more importantly because of the implicit argument that all societies must adjust to global economic imperatives. The implication is that either development is gradually fading out as an outdated perspective belonging to a bygone era of economic apartheid, or is broadened to apply to all societies, as a global logic. If this is the case it would be logical to assume that also the content and meaning of development would be changing.

These various notions -- deconstruction of development, structural adjustment, globalization, global risk -- seem to point in a similar direction: the demise of 'development' and its gradually emerging reconstruction as world development. A related question is the relationship between endogenous and exogenous dynamics in development: this too, on different grounds, may point toward a reconceptualization of development as a global problematic.

This paper seeks to develop three arguments. First, it argues that development thinking has not been the single paradigm for which it has often been taken, but that all along it has been a heterogeneous set of approaches that has been not only variable over time but highly diverse at any given time. Secondly, it zeroes in on one particular unresolved dilemma in several forms of development thinking, the disparity and tension between endogenous and exogenous dynamics in development. Thirdly, it explores the current tendency to rethink development as a process that is not reserved to 'developing countries' but that all societies are developing, as part of a global process. Thus it juxtaposes development discourse and globalization. I argue that globalization should neither be blocked out or ignored, in the name of delinking, import substitution or neomercantilism, nor unconditionally embraced. The term I propose for this in-between position is critical globalization.

Part one of this paper takes the form of development discourse analysis. Part two continues this analysis with metatheoretical reflections. The strength of discourse analysis is to make subjectivities transparent which may offer grounds to renegotiate subjectivities; but it is limited in that it does not per se engage objective dynamics. In the third part therefore also the mode of argument changes. The closing argument on development and globalization seeks to gather the insights gained from analyzing development discourse and to combine these with changes in objective circumstances so as to arrive at critical policy orientations.

1. Notions of change
There is a tendency among users as well as critics of development theory to attribute to it a certain coherence and consistency, with the exception of one or another favourite cleavage. This easily produces a dichotomous view of development theory, as in marxism versus neo-
classical economics, mainstream versus counterpoint, etc. Development theories promote the façade of consistency as part of their singleminded future-building project. Critics contribute to it by following the logic of binary opposition. It may be fruitful instead to view development theory in the plural, not as the unfolding of a grand paradigm, neatly bifurcating in contesting models, but as a hybrid made up of uneven elements, of borrowings and incursions from alien sources, and improvisations spurred by crises; in a word, to consider the inconsistencies of what goes under the heading of development theory.

Robert Nisbet is widely regarded, also by critics of many claims of developmentalism, as an authoritative source on the history of western notions of change, while he is also a spectacular representative of the tendency to ‘homogenize’ developmental thinking. In Social Change and History he maintains that ‘For twenty-five hundred years a single metaphoric conception of change has dominated Western thought’ (1969: 211).

The theory of social development, in his view, derives from the ancient metaphor of growth. With the Greeks this took on the form of cycles of change; in the Christian version formulated by Augustine, it was modified to an epic form, which was still cyclical but without recurrence; and by the 17th century it was again modified to produce the modern idea of linear progress. In the 18th century this set of assumptions engendered the idea of ‘natural history’, and in the 19th century, the theory of social evolution that was common to Hegel, Saint-Simon, Comte, Marx, Spencer, Morgan, Tylor. This theory, according to Nisbet, regarded change as natural, immanent, or proceeding from forces within the entity, continuous, directional, necessary, corresponding to differentiation in society, typically moving from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, and finally, as proceeding from uniform causes.

Nisbet concedes that in 20th-century social science there has been a revolt against evolutionism, replacing unilinear evolutionism with multilinear evolution, but he maintains that even the critics reproduced the underlying metaphor of growth: ‘although they were denouncing the schemes of social evolution, they were accepting at full value the concepts of change that underlay the theory of social evolution’ (1969: 225). That is, the belief in origins, immanence, continuity, uniform causes, etc. are reproduced in 20th century conceptions of social change. This bold thesis raises several questions: is this representation plausible, or does it reflect itself a belief in origins and continuity?

A different way of reading the development of development theory may be genealogy in the Nietzschean sense. Nietzsche, as Foucault reminds us, was opposed to the search for ‘origins’: ‘because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession.’ However, Foucault continues, ‘if the genealogist ... listens to history’ he finds behind things ‘not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms’ (Foucault 1984: 78). An example of the preoccupation with origins is Hegel: ‘The principle of development involves also the existence of a latent germ of being — a capacity or potentiality striving to realize itself. This formal conception finds actual existence in spirit; which has the history of the world for its theatre, its possession, and the sphere of its realization.’ (Quoted in Nisbet 1969: 159)

For Nietzsche this would be an example of the ‘Egyptianism’ of philosophers, the obstinate ‘placing of conclusions at the beginning’ (in Foucault 1984: 90). History is replaced by metaphysics, by neoplatonic essences beyond time. Let’s contrast this with Nietzsche
(1976: 470): ‘By searching out origins, one becomes a crab. The historian looks backward; eventually he also believes backward.’

Nisbet’s history of the idea of development as a continuous outgrowth of the Greek metaphor of growth exhibits not only the preoccupation with origins and continuity but also an essentialism of ideas. It lays claim to a grand cohesiveness of western thought, uniting the pagan and Christian, classical and modern notions in a single weave. On the one hand it sets the West apart from the rest of the world, while on the other it tacitly removes the main lines of cleavage within western thought, those separating ancients and moderns, religious and secular elites, elites and dissidents. An exercise in high humanism, it produces an elite representation of western notions of change, with the classics duly towering above subsequent thinkers, as the true ancestors of western thought.

What faithful conformism to begin with the Greeks, the proverbial ‘cradle of western civilization’. Why not consider the divergencies among Greek notions of change? E.g. among the Peripatetics, the followers of Aristotle, who along with the Neo-Platonists adhered to a cyclical notion of time, whereas the Stoics moved away from this, and historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides broke altogether with the doctrine of recurrence.

In his essay on Chinese ‘Attitudes toward time and change as compared with Europe’ Joseph Needham groups non-Christian Greek thought together with Indian thought and the Hindu and Buddhist notion of the endless repetition of the wheel of existence. Needham refers to ‘the intense history-consciousness of Christendom’ and contrasts linear Judaeco-Christian time to cyclical Indo-Hellenic time. With regard to China he concludes: ‘Strange as it may seem to those who still think in terms of the “timeless Orient”, the culture of China was, on the whole, more of the Iranian, Judaeco-Christian than of the Indo-Hellenic types.’ (Needham 1981: 107–31) This gives us a rather different view of the distribution of civilizational perceptions of change, and a totally different map of world history than Nisbet’s. The grounds for the singularity of the West as a special case, a deviation from the ‘general human pattern’, are eliminated.

Why not highlight, rather than continuity and uniformity, the discontinuities and divergencies in western notions of change? Western views, of course, have also been an amalgam, as we can see, for instance, in the mélange of Christian views in Augustine’s time and later in the return to cyclical thinking in Nietzsche (‘ewige Wiederkehr’ or eternal recurrence), Spengler and Toynbee (Needham 1981: 128). A reexamination of western notions of development may reveal a far more heterogeneous history, replete with moments of improvisation, dissonance, discontinuity. Leaving aside that Nisbet simplified the notions of change of Greeks and Christians – which to an extent he nuanced in a later work (1980) – let’s turn to the moderns.

Nisbet rightly mentions that the 19th century theories of social development applied to different entities – to reason for Turgot and Condorcet, to knowledge and civilization for Comte, to freedom for Hegel, to democracy for Tocqueville, to the forces of production for Marx, to social institutions for Spencer, to kinship, property and civil government for Morgan, to legal institutions for Maine, to culture and religion for Tylor. Nisbet insists: ‘it was the entity… for which natural development in time was claimed. It was not the sum total of geographical areas on earth’ (1969: 167). But this is not the whole story of the theory of social evolution. Evolutionist stages theories, such as that of Victorian anthropology – primitivism, savagery, barbarism, civilization – were also taken to apply to human cultures, which were identified with societies (cf. Stocking 1987). Theorists of social evolution regularly applied their views to geographical areas – Hegel on Africa, Marx on Asia are familiar examples.
Nisbet’s focus is on development conceived as natural and endogenous to the entity or society, but another dimension to 19th century developmental thought which is glossed over in his account is development arising from exogenous influences and conditions – from diffusion, international influences, or what we would now call globalization. Marx’s theory is both: ‘the new grows in the womb of the old’ refers to endogenous, organic growth; while his statements on capitalism as a ‘permanently revolutionizing force’, on its progressive effects on the ‘rural idiocy’ of the countryside, and of colonialism on ‘stagnant’ societies refer to external dynamics.

Nisbet is sensitive to western ethnocentrism: ‘No one can miss the fact that in every instance – there is no exception – the direction of change found by the evolutionist was toward the specific set of qualities possessed by Western Europe alone’ (1969: 169–70). But, just as geography is missing, the imperial setting is absent from his account. In fact it has been argued that imperialism is marked by ‘the primacy of the geographical’, for it is after all ‘an act of geographical violence’ (Said 1993: 225). While this is a particularly narrow reading of imperialism that overlooks the political economy of imperialism (which may well transcend geographical, territorial boundaries), the element of geography should not be ignored either.

Nisbet’s argument of continuity overlooks the actual shifts in western developmental thinking, it papers over the dynamics over time of European views. Thus, briefly, 17th and 18th century views tended to be ambivalent as to Europe’s status in the world and looked up to non-European models such as China, Turkey, Persia, the noble savages of America, the Pacific and Africa. Only in 19th century theories of social evolution the European will to power prevailed; they took a more single-focused form which provided greater consistency, particularly during the second half of the century, than before or after.

If Nisbet’s representation is fundamentally flawed, how can we account for the fact that his kind of views have found such wide acceptance? A related question is to what extent we can recognize the same implicit model of endogenous, organic growth in contemporary development theory.

2. Development theories in the plural

If we consider 20th century development thinking and its theoretical lineages, does Nisbet’s metaphor of growth hold? Is the tenor one of continuity and consistency or one of disparity and improvisation? The term development theory suggests a coherence which in fact is hard to find. What we do find is a plethora of competing and successive currents, schools, paradigms, models, approaches, several of which claim to exclude one another. For a start development theory refers to two terrains which have tended to converge only at certain junctures: development sociology and development economics. Further more or less obvious distinctions run between theory and ideology, policy and practice.

Development sociology has been by and large the critical successor to the 19th-century theories of social development. Development economics, on the other hand, owes its origin to a deviation from late-19th century economic orthodoxy. Kurt Martin (1991) has made the interesting argument that development economics resuscitates and revisits the basic findings of classical political economy, of Smith, Ricardo and Marx, who were development economists in that their basic problematic was the transition from agrarian to industrial society. Neo-classical economics came into being only after 1870, as a theory of fully industrialized economies (FitzGerald 1991).

‘Development’ if understood as the problematic of the transition from agriculture to industry has been revisited and reinvented several times over: it has been a question facing
several generations of late developers. It was the question facing Central, Eastern and Southern European economies during the early 20th century: hence the involvement of Central Europeans in the early stages of modern development theory. Hence also Alex Nove's claim that development theory was 'born in Russia in the twenties' (Martin 1991: 28). Accordingly several modern development theories replicate earlier findings.

The formative period of 'modern' development economic theory was the 1940s and 50s (Martin 1991, Hettne 1990: Ch 2). The colonial economies were the terrain of development theory but the problematic was that of the transition or, in a word, industrialization. Thus, while 'colonial economics' was transformed into 'development economics', at the same time it borrowed from the existing theories of transition, either from classical political economy or from other 'late developers'.

Thus, the theory of unequal exchange was originally advanced in 1929 as an argument for protecting industry in agrarian countries (Martin 1991: 38). At the time unequal exchange was viewed as a feature of centre-periphery trade. In his 1928 analysis of European capitalism Werner Sombart applied this terminology to Great Britain as the dominant centre and Central, Eastern and Southern Europe as exploited and dominated peripheries. In fact the terminology of centre and periphery derives from an older, late-19th century discourse of German political geography, in which the term Randlage was used for periphery. For geographers such as Friedrich Ratzel this discourse carried definite political, nationalist overtones, as part of the rivalry between Germany and Britain. Via Dietrich Haushofer it entered the discourse of geopolitics of national socialism and informed the urge for Lebensraum (Nederveen Pieterse 1989: Ch 1). Accordingly the centre-periphery argument served nationalism in both offensive (national expansionism) and defensive (protectionism) modes. In the 1960s it was reutilized as a cornerstone of dependency theory. In Arghiri Emmanuel's contribution to dependency theory, unequal trade came to describe the dualism of the world economy between North and South.

The premise of modern (i.e. postwar) development economics was that it was a separate branch of economics, different from economics in the industrialized countries and from neo-classical equilibrium theory. State intervention and planning, along with accumulation and growth, were part of its 'founding discourse', which showed general affinities with Keynesianism. Foreign assistance, accompanied by the idea of mutual benefit, was another feature of the original discourse. In this respect it diverged from both neo-classical economics and marxism.

In relation to international trade, again radically different theoretical outlooks prevailed: on the one hand, liberalism and the tradition of the Manchester school, following the Smithian premise that free trade and the international division of labour based on comparative advantage would eventually benefit all countries; and, on the other, neomercantilism, arguing, in the footsteps of Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, that infant industries require tariff protection. In mainstream economic theory, from the 1870s onward, the free trade argument was promoted, while the neomercantilist policies which sheltered the late developers (the American Republic, later followed by Germany, France, Russia) were relegated to the margins, as deviations from the norm, to be reclaimed later as part of neomarxist theory. At that stage the theory of unequal exchange served as an argument for tariff protection in LDCs.

Thus from the outset development thinking has been marked by an uneven and contradictory patchwork with divergent paradigms operating in different terrains and sectors: in industrialized economies, neo-classical economics coexisted with industrial policy; in trade, liberalism in theory coexisted with neomercantilism in practice; in finance, versions
of monetarism prevailed. Each of these divergent perspectives and policy orientations made their imprint on developing economies, simultaneously in different sectors, although usually articulated under the umbrella of an overarching development rhetoric. Which development posture prevailed reflected the historical bloc of class alignments that held the upper hand.

As a concept ‘development’ papers over the different interests involved in economic, social and political change. ‘Development’ suggests the possibility of a package formula in which all these interests come to some form of crystallization and convergence. As such it displays an intrinsically positivist bias. Obviously, at any given point in time and space social and economic change is a field of contestation among different stakeholders. Each of these will construct a history – of the past, present and future – to validate its claims. A political economy of development theory (as a subset of the general sociology of knowledge) might not have too much difficulty in identifying the shifting ‘historical blocs’ that have set the agenda of development ideology at different points in time, except, of course, that at no time it has been a single or uncontested agenda.

The political economy of monopoly enterprise (mercantilism, Old Colonial System) was contested by new trades and manufactures (Manchester school). The political economy of competition capital and manufacturing was contested by finance capital (monetarism). All along the political economies of capital in its different articulations has been contested by the political economies of labour (trade unionism, syndicalism, marxism, socialism). The claims of national firms and agricultural interests (protection) have been contested by internationally oriented enterprise (free trade). Etcetera. These various sets of contradictions have been played out through contestations between alignments of interests favouring either state intervention or market forces. Like masks in a puppet show, both ‘state’ and ‘market’ have themselves signified complex fields of forces and interests. Both ‘state’ and ‘market’ have been on either side of these contesting forces. The state has been the meeting place where a political and social contract among the diverging interests was fashioned.

Accordingly, development thinking implicitly carries two sets of meanings: an actual diversity of interests and perspectives, and a hegemony, i.e. an, inherently unstable, settlement of these differences resulting in a development posture. The hegemonic effect occurs both at national and at international levels (on hegemony in international relations see Cox 1991). In a sense there are as many ideologies of development as there are players in the field, but some players are better positioned than others.

In the 1960s what consensus existed in development economics was destroyed ‘so that it is no longer possible to talk of a mainstream of development economics’ (Martin 1991: 55). In the seventies the Chicago version of monetarism became dominant. Monetarism is not to be equated with neoclassical equilibrium theory: it is ‘little more than a revival of nineteenth century bankers’ principles of “sound money” – currency convertability, stable parity, fiscal thrift, low wages and minimal government influence in business’ (FitzGerald 1991: 15).

The wave of generalized neoliberalism which ensued rejects the ‘limitations of the special case’ and argues that poor countries are poor mainly because of mismanagement. Put in another way: the compartments which hitherto separated development economics from mainstream economics which prevailed in industrialized economies, international trade and finance, fell away, so that development economics is being integrated into general economics. Whether or not there is a ground for a separate theory of development is presently one of the key debates (Martin 1991: 55; Hettne 1990: 57-60). The logic of Structural Adjustment Programmes follows from the demise of separate development economics.
These shifts of alignment make for a second deep rupture in the overall history of ‘development’. The career of development has typically been one of state intervention. Presently in many parts of the world we witness the marginalization of the state and a new ascendancy of market forces.

A feature of this process is the renewed predominance of finance capital since the 1970s and the cycle of debt expansion and debt crisis, which turned the IMF and World Bank into leading arbiters of development policy, with the banking orthodoxy of sound money, or monetarism, being recycled as the newest beacon on the development horizon. Robert Kuttner notes that under these circumstances what public sovereignty remains ‘has been entrusted to perhaps the most conservative and market–oriented of all public institutions – central banks’ ‘... the triad of central bankers, IMF, and World Bank has been so thoroughly creditor–oriented that it might as well have been the House of Rothschild or the House of Morgan’ (1991: 260–1). In the alignment of the late–20th century, as in the late–19th century, finance capital predominates as the cement of the historic bloc of interests that frames ‘development’.

Along with the discourse the models shifted – no more United States and American Dream, no more China, Cuba, Tanzania, Nicaragua either, but the accumulation models of the NICs of East Asia. It spelled the ‘end of the Third World’ (Harris 1986) and of third worldism. In the process another contradiction emerges, another instance of development double speak, for indeed the East Asian experience is not a model of unfettered market–led development but, on the contrary, the model of the developmental state (Johnson 1982, White 1988). In other words, also current development ideologies are again a highly diverse and deeply divided range of discourses.

These divergencies can be observed on the level of development theory – which is increasingly diversifying (Booth 1994); development ideology – where neoliberalism appears to be over its peak; and development policy – which is inspired as much by ad hocism and pragmatism as it is driven by ideological posturing and on the spot manoeuvring. Here from time to time I use development thinking as a middling term, indicating the mixed character of development speak – an uneven mélange of theoretical precepts, ideological subscriptions, and political preferences.

One line of thinking holds that the dividing line between development successes and failures in terms of growth does not run between models or theories, but that what matters most is not the ‘model’ but how it is implemented. For instance, what matters is not whether or not a state intervenes but what kind of state intervenes and in what political culture. Several Asian countries have sought to implement NIC strategies with strong doses of state intervention and this has generated high growth rates in several East and Southeast Asian countries, in Thailand, Malaysia and to a certain extent Indonesia. The formula however has not worked in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. To explain this variation factors have been brought in such as economic and political history, political culture, political institutions (Litonjua 1994) and issues such as ethnic politics and ‘crony capitalism’.

It might be difficult to oppose privatization in general if privatization can also serve as a barrier against corrupt politicians. This however does not settle the underlying problem of accountability, on the contrary, for market forces are likely to be still less accountable than state bureaucracies. The question, then, is not one of state versus market, but rather points towards democratization and democratic reforms of state structures, such as decentralization, which can make the state more accountable.

These insights have instilled a sobering awareness. Matters are not simply decided on the basis of models. Policy implementation is affected by factors such as political culture,
historical itineraries, location in the regional and international environment. This also affects the behaviour of the World Bank which in the actual implementation of its policies is more concerned with negotiation than with simply imposing its economic model (Mosley, Harrington and Toye 1991). In the process we are referred back to what development economists call ‘noneconomic factors’.

3. Modernization revisited

In development sociology the leading paradigm has been modernization. Modernization theory took shape in the 1950s in the US and bears an American stamp – if we recall that Dahrendorf called the US the country of *angewandte Aufklärung*, the applied Enlightenment. At the time the US entered its era of globalism and a ‘can do’ attitude characterized its approach, as in the functionalist modernization advanced by Hoselitz: ‘You subtract the ideal typical features or indices of underdevelopment from those of development, and the remainder is your development program’ (Frank in Worsley 1984: 18).

Most forms of evolutionism conceived of development as being natural and endogenous, whereas modernization theory makes room for exogenous influences. Modernization theory is usually referred to as a paradigm, but upon closer consideration turns out to be host to a wide variety of projects, some presumably along the lines of *endogenous change*, viz. social differentiation, rationalization, the spread of universalism, achievement and specificity; while it has also been associated with projects of *exogenous change*: the spread of market relations or capitalism, industrialization through technological diffusion, westernization, nation-building (nationalism as a derivative discourse), state formation (as in postcolonial inheritor states). If occasionally this diversity within modernization is recognized, still the importance of exogenous influences is considered minor and secondary.

I do not view ‘modernization’ as a single, unified, integrated theory in any strict sense of ‘theory’. It was an overarching perspective concerned with comparative issues of national development, which treated development as multidimensional and multicausal along various axes (economic, political, cultural), and which gave primacy to endogenous rather than exogenous factors. (Tiryakian 1992: 78)

This may be the steepest contradiction within modernization theory: between modernization as an endogenous and an exogenous dynamic. It may also be the most significant contradiction in development thinking generally: the hiatus between development as an endogenous process and as externally induced change, under the aegis of imperialism, capitalism, globalization.

The theory of dualism, developed in the 1940s and 50s by Boeke, Lewis and Kuznets, accommodates this contradiction with the idea of a traditional and modern sector. In effect the traditional sector represents endogenous growth and the modern sector the interaction with outside forces, in terms of production techniques, trade, values and aid. The diffusion approach was institutionalized in the ‘geography of modernization’, focusing on transportation and on core urban areas as the vehicles for the ‘mobilization of the periphery’ (Brookfield 1975: 110-16).

Phrased in another way, there is a hiatus between development theory as a *national* project and as an *international* or *global* dynamic. From the outset the main development theories, both economic and sociological, have been a national, or more accurately, a state project. Neomercantilism, ‘socialism in one country’, Keynesianism, self-reliance all represent state projects. By contrast, the market oriented approaches of neoclassical
economics and neoliberalism have been equally comfortable in national and international domains.

This may give us a clue to the impasses of development theories. The major turns in development have been shaped by supranational dynamics entirely outside the scope of standard development theory: the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the emergence of OPEC, the gradual shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific era, the shift to flexible production. Time and again crisis has been a greater teacher than theory: the energy crisis, the debt crisis, the ecological crisis, the crisis of currency instability – and each crisis concerns supranational dynamics.

Neomarxism, dependency theory, world-system theory follow the external model: capitalism flows in, travels from the centre to the periphery, ‘external areas’ are incorporated into the world system. Their positive programmes, however, at any rate in the case of dependency theory, defend development as a national logic. Cardoso with his notion of ‘dependent development’ represented a more sophisticated position which did take into account external influences. The difference between Bill Warren and most dependency thinkers was also that Warren followed a transnational and diffusionist approach to accumulation and development, whereas the dependentistas operated within a nationalistic logic. Likewise, the key concepts of critical or alternative development thinking implicitly echo and revisit endogenous development as the norm: self-reliance, autocentric development and delinking advocated in some forms of dependency theory, historicist views on modernization, polycentrism, indigenization, and ‘another development’.

The unit of development, however, is not a given or a constant. The boundaries between what is internal and external are by no means fixed. Development discourse and its implicit assumption of the ‘country’, ‘society’, ‘economy’ as the developing unit papers over this issue and assumes much greater nation-wide cohesiveness and thus state control than is realistic. This relates to the familiar question of the reach and strength of the state (Migdal 1988). The assumption itself has been questioned on several grounds. The by now classic argument of world-system theory maintains that not the society is the developing unit but the ‘world system’ (i.e. the unit integrated by a international division of labour of goods necessary for reproduction). Michael Mann (1986) contends that the very term ‘society’ is misleading and proposes instead ‘social networks’ that sprawl across borders. Cross border enterprises of various kinds such as the maquiladores at the Mexican–US border have also drawn growing attention. The unit of development is shifting further in light of the growing concern with regions and localities as the sites of development, which finds expression in the regionalist turn (Amin and Thrift 1993) and the ‘new localism’ (Goetz and Clarke 1993).

The nation state is caught in a dialectic of subnationalism and supranationalism. Still the weakening of the state is by no means a straightforward process. ‘One of the paradoxes of the late twentieth century is that the tendency of the state to intervene in economic affairs has increased – political rhetoric notwithstanding – at a time when the effectiveness of its interventions has declined’ (Griffin and Khan 1992: 64).

There is no question as to the central and enduring importance of the state. In the words of Robert Kuttner: ‘until world government arrives the nation state is the necessary locus of social contracts between market and society’ (1991: 9). Unfettered markets increase inequality and in the age of information economies, which puts a premium on human resource development, inequality is an economic liability. Generally, then, current arguments go far beyond the ideological dispute of state versus market; the real issue is the kind of role that the state is to play. Martin Carnoy (1993: 91) contends: ‘The role of the nation–state in
creating an innovation society is thus absolutely crucial to the well-being of its citizens in the information age.'

The debates in development economics are closer to policy than those in development sociology. The policy options in most countries remain narrow: internationalization or globalization meaning liberalization; state-led internationalization with restrictions and regional cooperation; and alternative or 'another' development.3

4. Critical globalism
The argument of this paper is that an essentialist notion of development, of good, natural, endogenous development bedevils development thinking. What else is the notion of 'stunted development' (Marx on Ireland), 'stagnation' (Marx on India), underdevelopment (dependency theory), 'maldevelopment' (Amin 1990) but the deviation from a norm of good, that is natural development? This might explain the appeal of Nisbet's kind of approach for it asserts an organic model of development as the norm. Even modernization thinking which is highly diffusionist in policy, remains endogenist in theory. One reason for this is that as such it can be assimilated in the general strain of 'organic development'. In addition to the trend toward discursive consonance and consistency there are political reasons why endogenism is appealing.

The politics of development, from the earliest 'late developer' to the latest, has in the main been state politics. Endogenous development which is intrinsic to the developing entity is per definition controllable by the state. The career of modern development theory is synchronous with the career of decolonization and to a considerable extent it has served as a state doctrine of new nations. If endogenism is a powerful political tool, it is also a prism through which exogenous influences can be negotiated, a screen behind which contradictions can, in the name of the 'national interest', be papered over. In the age of globalization, however, endogenism backfires and a new settlement is required.

The weakness of the endogenous outlook on development is its single and narrow focus. In turning one's back to and seeking shelter from international turbulence one may in fact make development more vulnerable to it. Accordingly what is needed is to rethink development as a regional, transnational, global project, such that the international domain is not left to the strong players and their 'might is right' alone; in a word, to theorize world development. Hetnie (1990: 34) contends, 'In fact it may be argued that the crisis in development theory is a reflection of the disparity between the growing irrelevance of a "nation-state" approach and the prematurity of a "world" approach."

Part of the problem of development thinking is the hiatus between development economics and development sociology. Or, phrased otherwise, its lack of comprehensiveness: market oriented approaches marginalize the state; state oriented approaches marginalize market forces; both marginalize society; civil society oriented approaches marginalize the state and often the market as well, and international forces remain largely untheorized. Market-oriented globalism (neoliberalism, monetarism, structural adjustment, export-led growth) clashes with state-oriented endogenism or indigenization (delinking, import substitution), leaving social forces (grassroots, NGOs, informal sector) in no-man's land.

Critical globalism means theorizing the entire field of forces in a way that takes into account not just market forces but also interstate relations, international agencies and civil society in its domestic as well as transnational manifestations (cf. Scholte 1993, Nederveen Pieterse 1989). This is an argument for interdisciplinary in development studies. Secondly it means a critical position vis à vis globalization, avoiding the clichés of globo speak.
This brings us to the question of the relationship between globalization and development. If delinking is no longer a viable option (Nederveen Pieterse 1994a), neither is globalization tout court an attractive avenue. It might be argued that globalization is the successor paradigm to dependency, except that globalization is not a paradigm but a shorthand description of a set of processes. What is relevant is that there is an underlying shift in attitude: if from the point of view of dependency theory, exogenous influences have been viewed with suspicion, from the point of view of globalism, they are celebrated.

In relation to globalization there is a wide spectrum of positions. On the part of extreme globalization thinkers such as Kenichi Ohmae (1991), globalization is celebrated and presented as global destiny. A destiny that very much resembles a world wide duty free store. On the part of neomarxists, it is denounced as the ‘tyranny of globalism’. In making this case Petras and Brill (1985) in effect reassert the primacy of endogenous dynamics. But, even if market globalism is the issue, the alternative is not to retreat to statism or endogenism.4

The problems with this position are several. Firstly, globalization is narrowed down to globalism which in turn is identified with market internationalism. Globalization, then, is no more than a fashionable code word for advanced capitalism. It is neoliberalism masquerading as global momentum. Obviously this only captures one face of current globalizations. The second limitation is historical shallowness. Globalization is not a new dynamic – it would be so only and typically from the point of view of the endogenist reading of history. In reality globalization has been a long-term process and what distinguishes contemporary globalization is that it is an accelerated globalization (an argument made in Nederveen Pieterse 1994b). The third aspect that is overlooked in this position is that globalization does not come alone but in a package. Speed is not all that distinguishes contemporary globalization. Globalization presently is much more than merely intensified economic internationalization because it comes together and is interwoven with the growth of the information economy and the onset of flexible production systems (see e.g. Castells 1993).

In a recent formulation of Cardoso various elements, old and new, are represented. There is a note of frustration that has not changed: ‘the South is in double jeopardy – seemingly able neither to integrate itself, pursuing its own best interests, nor to avoid “being integrated” as servants of the rich economies’ (1993: 156). There is a note of recognition of change. Globalization, according to Cardoso, necessitates the ‘redefinition of dependency’. In this context two points are emphasized: the South has lost its great comparative advantage, the abundance of land, mineral resources and cheap labour, for these are no longer of vital importance to the globalized economy. The second major change is that economic development now affects all of society, for the democratization of society and state are now necessary conditions for organizational and technological innovation. The bottom line is that only one choice remains: ‘either the South (or a portion of it) enters the democratic-technological-scientific race, invests heavily in R&D, and endures the “information economy” metamorphosis, or it becomes unimportant, unexploited, and unexploitable’ (1993: 156).

Obviously not all developing countries are able to connect with the new global economic dynamics. Castells observes the emergence (or consolidation) of a Fourth World: ‘Within the framework of the new informational economy, a significant part of the world population is shifting from a structural position of exploitation to a structural position of irrelevance.’ (1993: 37) Cardoso concurs: ‘They will not even be considered worth the trouble of exploitation, they will become inconsequential, of no interest to the developing globalized economy’ (1993: 156). This is hardly a new theme. Decades ago a similar point
was made about the lack of interest of multinational corporations to invest in peripheral countries; but because of the structural changes in the world economy it has taken on a new gravity and a new, rough edge.

Globalism means either fostering or managing globalization. Critical globalism refers to the critical engagement with globalization processes, neither blocking them out nor celebrating globalization. As a general policy framework for developing countries it refers to a cautious but forward looking engagement with globalization processes, weighing the ramifications of different types of capital flow, financial transactions and technological transformations. If Samir Amin proposed selective delinking, critical globalism might be summarized as selective globalization. The keynote of globalization is that the nation state can no longer be taken for granted as the unit of development; crossborder transactions and micro- or macro-regionalization may well become major avenues of development. As a global agenda, critical globalism means posing the central question of global inequality in its new manifestations. As a research agenda, it entails, among other things, the identification of the social forces that carry different transnational processes and examining the varying conceptualizations of the global environment and the globalizing momentum; an analysis of global babble and whose interests are being served.

The overall situation raises a number of questions on one of which I want to focus. What, under the circumstances, is the meaning of world development? Because of the combined changes of globalization, informatization and flexibilization there is a new relevance to the notion that 'all societies are developing'. This is not just a nice sounding cliché but a reality confirmed by the transformations and transitions taking place everywhere, on macro as well micro levels. All the world is 'in transition'.

One way to read the current dispensation is that the gap between semi-peripheral countries, at least the most advanced among them, and core countries is narrowing, while the gap between peripheral countries and the others is widening. There is a new meaning to Trotsky's law of combined and uneven development. The scope of economic innovation combined with the operation of the 'law of the retarding lead' places new investors in technology, infrastructure and human resource development in several respects in virtually the same position as the conventionally industrialized countries. If we compare the profiles of economic renewal and industrialization strategies in the United States (e.g. Reich 1983, Kuttner 1991) with those of South Korea, or for that matter Brazil, there is considerable overlap. Thus, the 1986 Industrial Technology White Paper of the Korea Industrial Technology Association mentions as targets for the 1990s, as regards the direction of development, the realization of advanced industrial society and the establishment of knowledge-intensive industries; as regards technology strategies, the continuous supply of high quality brain power and R&D for future oriented projects and advanced high technology development; and as regards leading industrial sectors, information industry, advanced materials, bio-engineering and systems engineering (Lim 1995: 2). This is in other words the convergence thesis of industrial societies revisited, but on different grounds, and combined with new patterns of disjuncture.

At the same time, the unit of development is no longer what it used to be. The conceptualization of the unit of development that was relevant politically and economically under the previous dispensation, changes under the sign of globalization. The unit is no longer simply national (to the extent that this endogenous political fiction was relevant at all) but increasingly regional, local. Thus, the frostbelt of traditional industries in the United States has been decaying while Silicon Valleys are prospering. Within countries there are growing regional disparities. The stilted arrangement of core - semiperiphery - periphery -
all along an echo of geopolitics translated into economic geography – is even less adequate than it used to be.

In these circumstances the notion of world development takes on different meanings. One window is the growing awareness of global risk, involving ecological hazards but also phenomena such as currency instability. Accelerated globalization heightens the need for global governance. The fact that world development takes place at different speeds and makes for a world of 'variable geometry' (to borrow the term used for the European Union) itself calls for global engagement and management. For marginalized countries and regions do find niches in the interstices of the maelstrom of globalization – through labour migration, crime networks, drug trafficking, political and cultural defiance. Religious and ethnonationalist resurgence in a globalized world of instant communication, portable technological capabilities and two-way migration flows has become a neighbourhood affair.

Another window is the role of the state in relation to economic development in the context of globalization: this may well be a greater role but especially a different role considering that at the same time the state is no longer the same, it has been internationalized. A further window is that, among other reasons because of the new disjunctures, there is also a new relevance to the project of 'global Keynesianism' or international reformism. Represented at various junctures by the New International Economic Order project, the Brandt, Bruntland and South Commission Reports, supported by the 'middle powers', the Non Aligned Movement and G-77, this remains one of the key dimensions of reorienting development. International reformism is host to many projects. For instance the formation of an international public sector or the project 'towards an international social welfare state' (Pronk 1990). Global democratization is a vital part of this agenda. This involves the democratization of international institutions, the reform of the United Nations, the restructuring of the Bretton Woods institutions. Griffin and Khan (1992) see three possible scenarios in which global governance may develop. One, the gradual withdrawal of the United States from international governance. Two, de facto international governance by entities such as the G-7, bypassing established institutions and constituting a global plutocracy. Three, a consensus in favour of the reform of existing institutions or the creation of new ones, strengthening the multilateral approach to international governance. They favour the latter option and advocate better structures of global governance, including the reform and strengthening of the UN system, bringing the Bretton Woods institutions under UN supervision and introducing forms of international taxation. Even though political conjunctures have not been favourable to fashioning a global reform coalition, this remains a crucial agenda for development reconceived as world development.

There are subjective dimensions to these concerns as well. The concern with cooperation, rather than conflict, in international relations has been termed an 'institutionalist' approach. In this context, institutions are understood as 'recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge' (Oran Young in Keohane 1984: 8).

It is not obvious how this relates to the grassroots, small-scale, small is beautiful approach of 'alternative development'. The weakness of the alternative development approach as it stands is that the role of the state is neglected while the local/global nexus is undertheorized. The key question that often looms in the background is whether social movements, old and new, and NGOs should serve as buffers against globalization, providing shelter from the storm, shielding local culture, local identity, or whether their role should be to help connect regions and communities to the globalized economy. This is not a time for easy answers. But it bears pointing out, first of all, that NGOs, especially international NGOs, are part of globalization – globalizations in the plural and viewed multidimensionally
(Nederveen Pieterse 1994b). If this is the premise, then for NGOs to block globalization tout court would be one hand doing what the other doesn’t know. As NGOs carry a globalizing ethos, what they do and can do is negotiate the kind of globalization which they are willing to be a part of. They can use their influence to make and shape the case for social development, not just as a matter of tinkering in the margins but as representing the very cutting edge of contemporary development. (Social development is here used in the substantive sense, not in the disciplinary sense.) What NGOs have stood for all along, that ‘development is for people’, now figures higher on the agenda than ever. A case can be made – it cannot be developed here but only hinted at – that the lessons of East Asia and the combined package of globalization/informatization/flexibilization converge on several of the same elements that NGOs have all along been pleading for: human resource development, social infrastructure, social institution building. One distinction is that in East Asia this has generally been done by development states while NGOs flourish within a democratic climate. NGOs can play key roles in the development of social institution building which, according the new institutional economics, is part of the crux of development success or failure.

In my view then the question whether the role of NGOs should be to connect with or disconnect from globalization is a non-issue. NGOs are part of globalization. The position of specific NGOs within globalization processes depends on their role in the wide spectrum of types of NGOs. International lobbying NGOs can contribute to shaping national and international opinion climates in favour of global governance. (An example are several articles in the collection on the Bretton Woods institutions by Cavanagh, Wysham and Arruda 1994.) Part of this horizon is transnational collective action and social movements operating across national and zone boundaries, along with the project of transnational civil society. Arguably the agenda of global democratization requires several intermediate steps, conceptually and strategically, but that is not the subject here.

In recent years there has been an outpouring of books in western sociology concerned with the problematization of modernity (e.g. Giddens 1990), inspired by poststructuralism, the theme of the postmodern and the new historicism. This carries a potential for the renewal of development thinking and a new critique of modernization theory, especially if taken in combination with nonwestern studies interrogating modernity. What development thinking needs in making the transition to the postmodern epoch is to part from totalizing paradigms, from totalities and total orders, and choosing for diversified and combined strategies and polyphonic approaches, building on the critical resources that are available. This means, first of all, recognizing the polyphous, heterogeneous character of development theories. This ties in with the current premise in development research of no longer homogenizing the ‘Third World’ and seeking general theories and explanations, but to focus instead on the diversity of third world countries (Schuurman 1993, Booth 1993). One way forward is to work with typologies. The regulation school offers neostructuralist typologies based on regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation. Mann (1986) focuses on different forms of organizational power. Mouzelis (1988) is concerned with modes of domination. These typologies differ from the bloc or zone approach (North–South), from the continental or regional approach (Europe, Asia, etc), as well as from the determinist, base–superstructure categories used in neomarxist (mode of production), dependency and world system theories (core, semiperiphery, periphery), for they are neither geographical nor economistic. Along such lines globalization and diversity can be combined, and globalization be conceptualized as, among other things, changing patterns of diversification.
Notes

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1. This is discussed at greater length in Nederveen Pieterse 1989: Ch. 15 and Nederveen Pieterse 1994.

2. This relationship between interests and development discourse is suggested for development ideology, not for development theory, which has much greater autonomy.

3. I will discuss alternative development and 'alternatives to development' in an essay on 'Toward a theory of alternative development'.

4. Cf. Hettne (1990: 244): 'there have been two kinds of bias in development theory: endogenism and exogenism. Both approaches are, if carried to their extremes, equally misleading. The obvious remedy is to transcend the dichotomy and find a synthesis.'

5. The historicist approach to modernization and the notion of multiple paths of modernization have been well-established in China, Japan and India (Singh 1989). In a broad way this parallels the theme of polycentrism - as against Eurocentrism (Amin 1990). Of some relevance also is the older tradition of comparative political studies, which tends to be overlooked in the present discussion (e.g. Macridis and Brown 1964).
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[Biodata: Jan NEDERVEEN PIETERSE is author of White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular Culture (1992) and Empire and Emancipation (1989), for which he received the JC Ruijgrok Award of the Netherlands Society of Sciences in 1990. He is editor of Christianity and Hegemony (1992), Emancipations, Modern and Postmodern (1992) and, with Bhikhu Parekh, The Decolonization of Imagination (1995). He is presently Research Coordinator of the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague.]