GLOBALISATION, CIVIL SOCIETY, SOLIDARITY.
The politics and ethics of a world
both real and universal

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Abstract: Contemporary radical-democratic theorising on 'globalisation' can surpass traditional discourses on development/dependency, interdependency or imperialism, without necessarily ignoring the processes these connote. Globalisation is here understood as multi-determined (by the market, surveillance, militarisation, industrialism, patriarchy, informatism, racism). Globalisation processes imply that hegemony no longer rests in a single territorial site (national, regional, bloc), any more than it rests with a single subject (the international capitalist class), on a primary determinant (economic, military), or level (the state-national). Globalisation processes sharpen the contradictions of high modernity, giving rise to democratic and pluralistic social movements which point beyond our present-day situation. But they also give rise to authoritarian social movements attempting to reject or escape modernity. Globalisation provokes international and extra-territorial identities as it does local ones, these being of different and often mutually contradictory natures. It implies the increasing centrality of the global level and global instances, and therefore the possibility and necessity for development of a 'global civil society' as a space for democratic struggle within multiple global terrains. The new democratic social movements therefore also operate globally. Their struggle is both cause and effect of a variegated, democratic and pluralistic global culture, itself in tension with a globalised (i.e. capitalist, Western, sexist, racist, etc) one. Globalisation creates a world (that can increasingly be experienced as) both real and universal, thus allowing for a universalism that is more than faith or obligation, a global solidarity that is more than a merely imagined community.

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1. Introduction: a new worldview

This paper makes reference to recent critical and radical writings in order to develop the concepts of 'globalisation', 'global civil society' and 'global solidarity'. The new problematic, it will be argued, is not centrally that of relations between nations, nationalities, states or blocs, nor of people or peoples so identified. It is of global processes and structures that reduce the centrality previously accorded the state-nation in emancipatory thought and action (Billington 1980:57-71). Or, to put it another way, relations between nations, nationalities, states and blocs (and of people and peoples so defined) will now be placed within a world - and a discourse - wider and deeper than those of nation and state, of nationalism and statism.

The old concept of internationalism could be adequately represented on a two-dimensional map, because it depends on a planar understanding of space - of space as place. For the old internationalism, the projected future is one in which the crossing of borders leads to the surpassing of the differences previously marking and distinguishing such places, to the 'annihilation of space by time' (Karl Marx, cited Massey 1991:24).

Within the new worldview, the locale does not disappear. But the notion of place is informed by an understanding of space, with this term itself being understood socially rather than territorially. The new universalisation is brought about not so much by the breaching of physical boundaries as by the penetration of a multiplicity of social spaces. The new terrain of reflection and struggle is indicated by the concept of 'globalisation' (Part 2), the new institutional framework by that of 'global civil society' (Part 3), the new movement ethic by that of 'global solidarity' (Part 4).
2. Globalisation: The world according to Giddens


Rather than surveying this burgeoning literature I am going to concentrate on the argument of Giddens (1990). This is because of its complexity (not to be confused with a fashionable obscurity), its depth (underlying analysis of globalisation with that of modernisation and modernity), its elegance (in using one basic model to cover a multiplicity of areas and levels) and its political engagement (address to an alternative future – and to the social, political and psycho-social forces for achieving such). Giddens' argument, moreover, bears at least a family resemblance to a number of other multi-dimensional approaches to globalisation that are, like his, concerned with its contradictions and its possible surpassing or transformation. ³

2.1. Radical modernity

Giddens offers a synthetic view in which modernisation is understood as the result not of one exclusive or primary force (e.g. capitalism) but of the interrelation of several. He identifies these four interdependent and mutually determining dimensions as 1) capitalism, 2) industrialism (the created environment), 3) administrative power (control of information and social surveillance), and 4) military power. Figure 1 shows this model and how it relates to the rest of his argument.
Figure 1: Globalisation According to Giddens

1. Institutional complexes of modernity
   - A: capitalism
   - B: industrialism
   - C: administrative power
   - D: military power

2. Dimensions of globalisation
   - A: world capitalist economy
   - B: international division of labour
   - C: nation-state system
   - D: world military order

3. Types of social movements
   - A: labour
   - B: ecological (counter-cultural)
   - C: civil and human rights
   - D: peace

4. A realistic utopia
   - A: post-scarcity system
   - B: humanisation of technology
   - C: multilayered democratic participation
   - D: demilitarisation

5. A new global order
   - A: socialised economic organisation
   - B: system of planetary care
   - C: coordinated global order
   - D: transcendence of war

Adapted from Hall, Held and McGrew (1992:Fig1.1)
Giddens sees our contemporary period and process not as a 'post-modern' or even a 'post-industrial' one but rather as representing a 'radicalising of modernity':

Its most conspicuous features – the dissolution of evolutionism, the disappearance of historical teleology, the recognition of thoroughgoing, constitutive reflexivity, together with the evaporating of the privileged position of the West – move us into a new and disturbing universe of experience. If the 'us' here still refers primarily to those living in the West itself – or more accurately, the industrialised sectors of the world – it is something whose implications are felt everywhere. (52-3. Original stress)

2.2. Globalisation

The four interdependent institutional aspects of modernity provide the basis for the four interlinked dimensions of globalisation. They are 1) the world capitalist economy, 2) the international division of labour, 3) the nation-state system, 4) the world military order (see Figure 1 again). The first of these is characterised much as in the customary terms of Marxist political-economy: the worldwide spread of commoditisation, the creation of a working class, the power of transnationals to operate autonomously and accumulate internationally. Secondly there is the global division of labour, understood by Giddens in terms of geographical specialisation and differentiation. This, again, has ambiguous consequences, leading simultaneously to differentiation and mutual interdependence, implying both the global spread of machine technologies or scientific agricultural production, and threats to the global environment. Since the third of these dimensions is seen as independent from capitalism, the nation-state system is seen as something other than an executive of executives of capitalist classes. The nation-state is seen as the sovereign controller of a certain territory, as the creator and guardian of national culture. But its increasing interaction with others in the general nation-state system is considered deeply ambiguous, implying a simultaneous push/pull process, in which collaboration can imply
(e.g. through UN recognition) both a confirmation and a loss of individual sovereignty. Although, fourthly, there are self-evident linkages between the military order on the one hand, the state and capital on the other, Giddens again treats the global military order as distinct, and identifies the globalisation of warfare in several senses. He begins with the military blocs, both strengthening and reducing the autonomy of constituent armies. He continues with the globalisation of arms production and sales, arguing that even ‘the possession of nuclear weaponry is not confined to the economically advanced states’ (75). He concludes here with the increasing global spread and scale of wars.

Giddens appends to his quadrilateral figure the process and effects of cultural globalisation, seen as a ‘further and quite fundamental aspect’ (77), underlying each of the four aspects of globalisation. The transformation of the technologies of communication is thus not simply an accompaniment of the other processes but a condition for them.

2.3. Alternative social forces

Giddens identifies a series of dispositions in the face of the risks implied by a globalised modernity, these being understood as individual and/or socio-political in nature. The first is ‘pragmatic acceptance’, the second ‘cynical pessimism’, the third ‘sustained optimism’, the fourth ‘radical engagement’ (134–7). ‘Pragmatic acceptance’ implies a concentration on survival in a world considered largely beyond control. ‘Sustained optimism’ is the disposition of the Enlightenment, the belief that reason, science (or, for that matter, providence) will ensure the infinite continuation of progress, and that solutions can and will be found to any of the world-threatening scenarios presented by doomsday thinkers. ‘Cynical pessimism’ is another manner of dealing with a dangerous or undesirable process or future, and implies either inaction or depression. Finally, there is
radical engagement, by which I mean an attitude of practical contestation towards perceived sources of danger. Those taking a stance of radical engagement hold that, although we are beset by major problems, we can and should mobilise either to reduce their impact or to transcend them. This is an optimistic outlook, but one bound up with contestatory action rather than a faith in rational analysis and discussion. (137)

Giddens, who apparently identifies with this orientation, concludes that its ‘prime vehicle is the social movement’ (ibid).

Giddens relates each of four types of social movement to each of his four institutional dimensions of a globalised modernity (Figure 1). The first two are ‘old’, in the sense of being related to earlier periods of capitalist development. Thus, against capital accumulation and a capitalist world economy there is posed the labour movement. And against surveillance, as expressed internationally in the nation-state system, there are posed democratic movements, whether of the bourgeois, nationalist or contemporary human-rights types. Unlike traditional Marxists, Giddens considers surveillance and the nation-state system as providing a distinct site of struggle, and the movements related to these as distinguishable from that of labour. Whilst the next two movements are new, Giddens recognises their earlier roots. Against the industrialisation of violence, and the world military order this implies, is posed the peace movement, concerned with the control or abolition of institutionalised violence – particularly as the latter has become a global threat. Against industrialism, problems of the created environment, and the inequalities of the international division of labour, he poses the ecological movement.

2.4. A realistic utopia

Since Giddens sees our present civilisation in terms of a ‘radicalised modernity’, ‘post-modernity’ would be a surpassing of the earlier-mentioned institutions and processes. Such a
post-modern civilisation is characterised in terms of a need for models (plural) of ‘utopian realism’. Giddens here both approaches and distances himself from Marx. He proposes a contemporary equivalent of Marx’s attempt to identify both tendencies immanent in the existing global system and transformative global forces. Like Marx, he does not present a detailed plan of a desired future society but he does indicate the broad ‘contours of a post-modern order’ (164) and ‘the dimensions of a post-scarcity system’ globally (166). Each of these relates to his quadripartite models of modernisation and globalisation (Figure 1, Column 4). Thus, the post-modern order implies: 1) the surpassing of markets in a post-scarcity system; 2) the humanisation of technology; 3) a multifaceted democratic participation, and 4) demilitarisation.

Extrapolated to the global level this implies: 1) a socialised (not socialist) economic system; 2) planetary ecological care; 3) a coordinated global order, and 4) the transcendence of war. Giddens also proposes an appropriate theoretical orientation for such a transformation:

It must be sociologically sensitive - alert to the immanent institutional transformations which modernity constantly opens to the future; it must be politically, indeed, geopolitically, tactical, in the sense of recognising that moral commitments and ‘good faith’ can themselves be potentially dangerous in a world of high-consequence risks; it must create models of the good society which are limited neither to the sphere of the nation-state nor to only one of the institutional dimensions of modernity; and it must recognise that emancipatory politics needs to be linked with life politics, or a politics of self-actualisation. (156. Original stress)

The distinction in the last part of this quotation corresponds roughly to the traditional one between ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’. By ‘emancipatory politics’ is here meant liberation from inequality or oppression. By ‘life politics’ action which surpasses the denial of the Other, and which provides conditions for the fulfilment of the needs of all.
2.5. Aspects and implications

1. Time-space stretching. Giddens rejects the notion of 'society' as the proper subject of sociology, in so far as society is traditionally identified with the nation-state – this being rarely theorised or interrogated (13). He rather proposes as subject matter that of how time and space are bound in a particular social system. The nation-state is here seen historically, as not only representing a novel social structure with distinctly defined borders, but also as a particular form, level or moment of a continuing 'time-space distanciation' (14). The process of separation of space from place (locale) is essential to modernisation:

In pre-modern societies, space and place largely coincide, since the spatial dimensions of social life are, for most of the population, and in most respects, dominated by 'presence' – localised activities. The advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between 'absent' others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction. In conditions of modernity...locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them. (19)

As a process that continues apace today it is also one that begins to question the significance of the nation-state as a society. However, this evidently does not imply the disappearance of the nation-state, the locality, or of face-to-face relations. The process by which significant relations are 'dismembered' from the locality is complemented by a 're-embedding' of such distanced relationships in the locale.

Globalisation, according to Giddens, is and always has been an essential characteristic of modernisation and modernity. It has, moreover, always had contradictory implications. The contradictory effect of globalisation is shown in the possibility of its both moving identification beyond the nation-state and of strengthening pressures for local autonomy or cultural identity.
This argument would seem to allow for the existence of regionalism/separatism and ethnic or religious affirmation, which can also lean in anti- and post-modern directions.

2. The relation with and to the Other. Reference to the global is not so much an implication or endpoint as the underlay of Giddens' argument throughout. He is also sensitive to the 'other' – the identity or identities so often negated, repressed or forgotten in traditional universalising discourses. He recognises that even movements and strategies that explicitly recognise such others this can be redefined in divisive ways (163). So how does he himself deal with the prioritised others of contemporary progressive discourses – the 'non-Western' and the women?

In specific recognition of his own concentration on the industrialised capitalist world, Giddens asks whether modernity (and his own post-modern radical utopia) is a Western project (Chapter 6). In terms of the impact of the nation-state and capitalist production, he answers in the affirmative. In terms of globalisation he implies that it cannot be, given that we are talking of forms of interdependence and awareness that are a response to the earlier-mentioned impact. And with respect to the permanent critical self-reflection fundamental to the dynamic of the system, he responds with a qualified affirmative:

Discursive argumentation, including that which is constitutive of natural science, involves criteria that override cultural differentiations. There is nothing 'Western' about this if the commitment to such argumentation, as a means of resolving disputes, is forthcoming. (176)

Whilst this general orientation might seem to provide space for non-Western perceptions, affirmations and demands, Giddens provides no examples of or references to such. We will have to confront this issue in the section on solidarity below.
Whilst the non-West receives at least a couple of pages, women (and feminism) receive but a footnote (161-2). Here Giddens admits the ‘conspicuous absence’ of feminism from his quadripartite model of social movements, whilst recognising the challenge of feminism to all past and present forms of social order, as well as to thinking about an alternative civilisation.

3. Social democracy and socialism. Giddens does not see social movements as the fount of all transformatory wisdom nor the sole source of this power. He speaks of contradictions between the demands of the oppressed, the beneficial changes that can be brought about by the ‘differential power held only by the privileged’ (155), and even of those brought about unintentionally. Whilst he does not specify or exemplify – far less theorise – here he also considers public opinion, business corporations, national governments and international organisations as ‘fundamental to the achieving of basic reforms’, stating that

Sympathy for the plight of the underdog is integral to all forms of emancipatory politics, but realising the goals involved often depends upon the intervention of the agencies of the privileged. (162)

In a 1992 article directly reflecting on the possible future of socialism, Giddens proposes to reformulate socialism today to express humanity’s common concern for the stewardship of its resources. Socialism...would no longer be regarded primarily as an alternative method of managing and distributing the fruits of industrial production... The ‘one way’ of producing an economically effective, yet reasonably just, economic order within national states is social democracy, a workable mix of market and limited state economic intervention. (Giddens 1992:60. Original stress)
Giddens then relates this national-level formula to the global post-scarcity economic order mentioned earlier.

2.6 Radicalised modernity as a complex, globalised information capitalism?

The Giddens model would seem to provide an adequate underlay for my general argument. Yet it is important to treat it as a point of departure rather than one of arrival. It is also worthwhile suggesting other ways of understanding a globalised modernity, its dangers, its discontents and its possible surpassing. Below I will consider in turn: 1) the formal model as represented in Figure 1; 2) the subordination of information/culture, the non-West, and women; 3) Giddens's particularistic view of space and time; 4) his problematic relationship to capitalism; 5) his equally problematic one to socialism.

1. The formal model: weight beyond words. Let me start with the most formal but also the most striking part of the argument, the quadripartite model of modernity, globalisation, social movements, their aims, and a realistic post-modern utopia, as presented in Figure 1. Any such model, particularly if it can be represented graphically, carries a weight that goes far beyond words. Anthony McGrew (1992:69-74) suggests that globalisation theories fall into two camps, the unicausal (e.g. Capitalism, Technology, or Patriarchy) and the multicausal (as offered, e.g., by Sklair 1991, Ekins 1992). This may not be the most significant distinction but the implications of each bear consideration. A formal problem with unicausal models, it seems to me, is not simply their reductionism but their accompaniment (explicit or implicit) by equally reduced opposites: capital/labour, capitalism/socialism, patriarchy/matriarchy(?). And also perhaps their consequent invitation to either simple endorsement, or equally simple negation. Multifactor models lack such magical qualities and invite addition and subtraction, or other qualification. Here are some questions, addressed to the Giddens model: what is being included/excluded, and why? if four, why not five or three? are the four actually equivalents, equally autonomous, interdependent and determining, as such a diagram suggests?
2. **Sub-ordinations.** Important forces, institutions, contradictions, movements and counter-discourses either excluded or reduced to others would be those related to information/culture, to the non-West and the non-men.

- Giddens does not, firstly, give *information/communication/culture* any autonomous role, treating the increasing centrality of information simply as something underlying his four complexes and processes. This means that the former show up neither as autonomous, nor as significant in terms of (global) social movements, nor amongst the characteristics of an alternative (world) order. Such a subordination is implicitly or explicitly questioned by those who deal with ‘culture’ or ‘information’ as either the prime characteristic of contemporary (post, high) modernism, or as the cutting edge of capitalist modernisation and globalisation.²

Reviewing a number of writers on information and the current transformation of capitalism globally, John Allen (1992:182) insists that one thing they all agree on is precisely ‘the central importance of knowledge and information in the transition’ – even if the question of what the transition is to remains unclear or disputed. The diagram he presents of the movement from an industrial to an information capitalism (Figure 2), is not incompatible with the image of a radicalised and globalised modernity suggested by Giddens. Let us consider the matter further. Mark Poster (1984, 1990) offers us the concept of a ‘mode of information’, making explicit reference to Marx’ mode of production. He does not propose the abolition or dissolution of the former concept. He rather proposes that one can – as with the mode of production – use it as a significant way of looking at history. Furthermore, he suggests, the ‘mode of information’ is now at least as central to social processes as the mode of production (Poster 1990). Poster argues that one can no longer assume, as did Marx, that people working on things is the ‘basic paradigm of practice’ (1984:53). He further suggests that in the age of information capitalism, historical materialism ‘finds its premise in power that is the effect of discourse/practice’ (54). Complementary to this argument would be that of Alberto Melucci (1989:205–6) who considers
Figure 2: The new global capitalism: the centrality of knowledge and information

Source: Hall, Held and McGrew (1992:Fig.4.1)
struggles around information (revealing what is concealed, interpreting what is revealed) as one of the central characteristics of new social movements in contemporary 'complex' society.

The case would seem to be strong for the identification of information itself as an autonomous source of dominating power, and therefore of contradiction, discontent, social protest, and of an alternative democratic and pluralist order. And for adding it as a fifth horizontal Line E to Figure 1, perhaps as follows: 1. Information/culture concentration; 2. World information order; 3. Information/communication democratisation; 4) democratic and pluralistic communication; 5) Alternative communication order.\(^\text{5}\)

Does not the Giddens model, further, simply make North/South contradictions disappear? A strength of Giddens is precisely the undermining of such traditional binaries of radical international relations theory as Imperialism:Nationalism, North:South, West:East, the Three Worlds, Centre-Semiperiphery-Periphery, etc.\(^\text{6}\) Some of these have been, or are being, dissolved by social transformation rather than theoretical introspection. Thus the East, or Second World, of Communism has largely self-destructed, and an increasingly diversified and fractured Third World has been hastened to both logical and socio-political doom by the disappearance of the Second. But is not the conceptual death of such structures/ideologies as imperialism/nationalism, North/South somewhat premature? The recent work of Susan George (1992) simultaneously confirms the old binary oppositions and subverts them. Third World debt (exemplifying Northern/South exploitation/domination) is here presented as a boomerang, inflicting environmental, drug, tax, unemployment, mass immigration and war damage/threats on the North (or at least the peoples thereof). Consider the admittedly protean concept of imperialism, taking two familiar appearances, those of military intervention and economic domination. As David Slater has said (talking of the disappearance of imperialism in radical-geographic thinking), such an absence is
strangely out of touch with the geopolitical realities of world power. Prior to 1989, the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands War, the strategy of low-intensity warfare waged against Nicaragua, and the bombing of Libya were only some of the more overt and obvious examples of an imperialism which is hardly 'undermined' or moribund. (Slater 1992:314)

And, as Slater further implies, in so far as there is no recognition of the specificity of the (otherwise protean) South, nationalist movements there may be understood only within the traditional framework of an 'ethnocentric universalism' (307).

One binary opposition that Giddens does not seem to overcome is that between modernity and...pre-modernity?...tradition? In so far as one neither addresses the Third World, nor discusses its theorists, may one not implicitly perceive this world area as the depository of tradition? And its anti-modern movements as not simply re-actionary but reactionary? Latin-American thinkers have conceptualised their own situation in terms of 'mixed times' (Vargas 1992:196-7), referring to the simultaneous experience of the pre-, the modern, and the post-. Vargas herself draws on the writings of Calderon (1987, 1988), concerned, significantly, with how to think about modernity without ceasing to be Bolivian/Indian. Without entering further into this literature, it occurs to me that it raises questions about how we consider modernity/globalisation more generally. 'Mixed times', should perhaps be comprehended not as a particular moment, nor at a particular place, but as an essential part of our new worldview. In this manner we can see how it is that pre-capitalist or pre-colombian experiences or memories in Latin America speak to post-capitalist projects in Europe – as they do. And how we can see both liberal/socialist internationalism and contemporary global solidarity projects prefigured in the Christian ecumene (Tenbruck 1990:198). A contemporary Radical Modernity, and future Realistic Utopias, should therefore be seen less as alternative mappings than transparent overlays, through which earlier epochs can be seen, have to be accounted for, and make their marks.
In like manner we should consider 'globalisation' not as replacing 'imperialism/nationalism', or even 'East/West' but either over- or underlying them. One could begin to address the problem by giving the terms in Column 2 of Figure 1 more value-loaded and meaningful, titles. These could be such as: a) world capital extraction/accumulation; b) ecological despoliation; c) hegemonic regimes; d) military/police repression. Such terms would seem to allow for what is customarily handled in the traditional terms but without the logical singularity, historical permanency and geographical fixity the previous ones implied.

What of gender, women's movements and feminist strategy in the Giddens model? In his feminist footnote Giddens speaks of gender only in terms of feminism as a political movement. He further implies that the oppression of women predates modernity, that feminism provides a major source of critique of modernity, and that feminist movements are 'complex and crosscut the institutional dimensions of modernity' (162). That the problem predates, that it is implicitly non-institutional, and that the movement crosscuts, seems hardly enough reason to exclude it from a model containing other pre-modern elements (surveillance, military) and other problematically institutional ones (industrialism). In an early critique of capital and class reductionism in world-system theory, R.W. Connell (1984) identifies the reconstruction of gender, sexuality and domestic life as one of the three crucial aspects of capitalist internationalisation. More recently we find Sylvia Walby (1992:33) arguing that race, class and gender are the key mutually determining systems of modernity - nationally and internationally. She thus implicitly questions a model that excludes not only gender but also race/ethnicity. The case for identifying women, gender and sexuality within the figure is implicitly made by Giddens himself when he recognises the importance of the feminist movement and thought. It is not necessary to see 'patriarchal capitalism' as the name of the global game. But it is necessary to see the repeated and differentiated manipulations of sex-gender relations, the multifarious subordinations of women and sexual minorities, as both characteristic of modernity and a source of growing discontent with it (the same could be obviously be said for race/ethnicity).
3. A particularistic universalisation of time and space? Giddens' notion of time/space distanciation and its ambiguous effects is one of several recent attempts to understand the experience of modernisation/globalisation. A related one is that of Harvey (1989), although he uses the term 'time-space compression', which he also sees as accelerating at particular moments in the cycle of capitalist accumulation. McGrew (1992:68) generalises these in terms of two interrelated dimensions, 1) scope or stretch and 2) intensity or deepening. One similarity of both the Giddens and Harvey accounts is recognition of the relationship of space/time stretching/compression to a eurocentric universalism and hence a eurocentric globalisation project. There appears to be another similarity, an apparent acceptance of such as a universal, unavoidable, irreversible and unchangeable process - even if one with deeply contradictory and even dehumanising implications. The first problem with such an assumption is identified by David Slater (in a critique of Harvey rather than Giddens):

Meaning, including the spatial, is socially constructed. Hence the deployment of a particular universal concept such as 'class' or 'capital' or 'gender' outside a consideration of the discursive constructions which gives these concepts different meanings in different societies, will disguise the particularity being given to the 'universal'. (Slater 1992:318)

The point is generalised by Doreen Massey (1991), whose treatment suggests the need for a differentiation according to class, ethnicity and gender as well as 'world'. Her argument is not only that different social groups and individuals are differently placed in relation to time-space compression but that some have more 'initiative' whilst others 'receive' and yet others are 'imprisoned'. I will pick out three of her categories (which could in any case be infinitely extended). There are 1) those who are in charge of time-space compression and able to get most advantage from it - corporate investors, film distributors and currency dealers, the jetsetters and emailers; 2) those who have both contributed in one sense but are imprisoned in another - slum-dwellers of Rio, who may be a source for both global football and global music but may never
have been to downtown Rio (or, it occurs to me, to the UNCED global ecology conference in Rio), 9 3) a group on the fringe of the first category, including those Western academics and journalists 'who write most about it' (Massey 1991:26). Massey's third category - which needs to include many 'Southern' intellectuals ('Westernised' or not) is important for two reasons: 1) it enables us to see that theories of space-time compression are not ineffable emanations of social science but reflections/expressions of people occupying specific subject positions; 2) it enables those in such positions (including myself) to relate their experiences/ideas to those of the second category - which is what Massey herself is evidently attempting to do. Massey also recognises the way in which feelings of insecurity can lead people (including the right and left people) to a hypostatised notion of the locale as a bounded and unchanging space with a fixed meaning, identified with an equally unambiguous sense of community. She questions all these assumptions: locales are not so bounded; they are not unchanging; they have no fixed meaning; they do not necessarily coincide with community:

On the one hand communities can exist without being in the same place - from networks of friends with like interests, to major religious, ethnic or political communities. On the other hand, the instances of places housing single 'communities' in the sense of coherent social groups are probably - and, I would argue, have for long been - quite rare. Moreover, even where they do exist this in no way implies a single sense of place. (28)

She herself suggests the possibility for conceiving locales as meeting places - today as a consciousness of links that make each site a complex of the local and the global. What would seem to follow from all this would be a radical politics of global time and space that 1) criticised the exploitative and repressive implications of globalisation, 2) differentiated itself from dominant projects and conservative or merely--defensive alternatives, 3) proposed differentiated strategies for localities and categories, 3) made such different interests/aspirations visible and brought them into dialogue with each other. 10 Such an orientation is at least implied in the work of Chhachhi
and Pittin (1991) when they recognise the limitations imposed on women workers' self-organisaton by time (its availability), place (location of work/struggle) and space (the psychological or strategic room for manoeuvre, negotiation and challenge).

6. The problematic relationship to capital and labour. Simon Bromley (1991:143) identifies an ambiguity in Giddens' argument in so far as the latter has four analytically distinct forces yet also appears to prioritise capital and the nation-state (e.g. Giddens 1990:62). I would myself be inclined to argue that even if one was to accept Giddens' quartet, the most dynamic force is that of capital accumulation. It would be paradoxical if this should not be recognised in the epoch of 'Berlin, Baghdad, Rio' (Lipietz 1992). The visible hand of the market colours the transformations that these names evoke. This is so even if 'Berlin' is taken to signify the crisis of statist socialism, 'Baghdad' the crisis of statist populism, 'Rio' the crisis of global ecology. What is crucial to the still-vague Western ideas of a New World Order is primarily an extension of the market (plus competitive party politics, the ideology of possessive individualism, the culture of consumerism). Industrialism, administrative, patriarchal and military power have already been well established in East and South. Missing has been the unrestricted role of the market. The notion of a modernity that is not essentially capitalist, in other words, seems more suited to a pre-1989 period in which there existed a 'Socialist' and 'Third' World than to our present one.

If Giddens appears to both want to eat his capitalism and still have it (and even if he does not), perhaps one can propose a more positive solution. It would seem possible to suggest a primacy to capital accumulation in the process of globalisation, without any simple determinacy, and without prioritising the labour:capital or imperialist:nationalist contradictions. We would then have a model of capitalist modernisation and globalisation, but in which this is increasingly dependent on management – of information/communication/culture, of ecology, of the military, of relations between genders, ethnicities, 'worlds'. In so far as one recognises the interdependency of these (or other spheres), in an increasingly intensive and delicately-balanced set of operations, and in so far as one recognises that dominating power is expressed at all levels within each, there
can and need be no prioritisation of struggle areas or levels. Weak links in the circular chain of a complex, globalised and informatised capitalism are no longer limited to a particular territorial site or position, nor to a specific social relation or contradiction. Nor can they be definitively identified by rational activity before the event. They are rather to be found by social movements, separately, in dialogue and alliance. And, as Giddens' suggests, they will rather be found by radical engagement related to contestatory action than by ratiocination.

It might seem churlish to criticise Giddens' model of capitalism for its lack of specificity, since — in a book of under 200 pages — the three other lines are traced in no greater detail. But if one believes that capitalist accumulation is the most dynamic of the four forces, it is necessary to specify the nature of its current global transformation. I believe it is possible to do this without undoing the Giddens model. Indeed, the nature of this change is one that may give it added force. And this specification is, in any case, necessary if we are to understand the possible future of global labour solidarity.

I will draw on Allen's (1992) overview of the debate on post-industrialism and post-Fordism, since this follows on his discussion of information and addresses the global economy. I will do this selectively, thus offering a limited image only of the transition. The nature of this is, in any case, disputed between theorists and recognised by a number as ambiguous. I believe, further, that the rapidity of changes in the amount of waged work; in its nature; in its separation by labour market; in the balance and distribution of such nationally, regionally and globally; and in the nature of its products — that all this suggests the necessity for radically rethinking labour movement strategies, from the local to the global level. Let us spell this out.

The key to the contemporary transformation of the capitalist economy and waged work is the leading role played by knowledge and information. In the form of information technology, or computerised equipment (both in production and as product), it is connected with a reduction in the total demand for labour, a shift in control within the labour process from the machine
operator to the technician, from economies of scale (mass production) to those of scope (batch production for 'niche' markets), from production to services, to decentralisation of production (whilst retaining central managerial or financial control), and to networking relations between such central controllers. Some see this leading to a new polarisation, 1) within national labour forces (skilled, secure, white, male versus unskilled, part-time/temporary, non-white, female), and 2) between an informatised North and an industrial (or at least partly-industrial) South. Such an image might suggest possibilities for a new kind of class-like alliance nationally and internationally. But others see this process as simultaneously undermining an identity based on labour and creating the basis for the new cross-class social movements (questioning the continuing subordination within, and enslavement by, work, the nature of products, the ethic of competition, consumerism, growth, etc).

Allen raises two interesting questions here, one relating to the increasing interpenetration of development and underdevelopment, the other the implications of unevenness in a world in which cities or national economies increasingly become interchangeable sites for production, finance and services:

Alongside the financial and commercial practices of New York and London, for example, we find the sweatshops and outworking practices that are more often associated with Third World economies. Yet they are not opposing developments and nor are they unrelated. There is no simple equation of finance with post-industrialism and the informal practices often undertaken by a migrant workforce with pre-industrialism. On the contrary, they are part and parcel of the same global economic forces which are eroding the identity of the West as the 'Rest', as it were, move to the centres of the modern world. (202)

And:
[I]f national economies increasingly become 'sites' across which international forces flow, with some parts of a country passed over by the new growth dynamics, then the new uneven global order will very likely be characterised by more than one line of economic direction within and between countries. (202–2)

To give an impression of a possible new model of capitalist accumulation, Allen presents the following diagram (Figure 3). This has no address to labour or other social movements. But it does provoke thought on the complexity of this brave new capitalist world. The implications for labour will be considered below.

The major question is the following: what possible basis or role is there for a labour movement - locally, nationally, regionally and globally - in a world in which wage labour is being destroyed, de-structured, re-structured, imported and exported, and in which any notion of a 'working-class culture' is being undermined not only by repeated changes in the amount, type and site of labour, but also in its consumption patterns and lifestyles? I have elsewhere argued (Waterman 1993a) for a 'social movement unionism', in other words for a unionism that not only allies with the new social movements but incorporates their demands, and which responds to their new organisational forms and practices. This proposal recognises that those who labour for or under capitalism do not only exist for and identify with wage labour and as wage labourers, but that they are also urban residents, women, have ethnic or racial identities, need peace, a healthy environment, etc. I have also proposed a strategy for a 'new labour internationalism' which expressed related principles for cross-national relationships (Waterman 1988). What is, perhaps, still necessary is a more direct address to wage-work, its changing nature, and changing experiences of this.

In so far as we accept that the model in Figure 3 does represent the latest phase in capitalist development, and is significantly different from the Fordist one, then we would seem to need a union strategy recognising this transformation. It would, however, seem to me an error
Figure 3: The new global capitalism: differentiation, decentralisation, coordination

Source: Hall, Held and McGrew (1992:Fig.4.2)
to suggest some kind of 'post-industrial', 'post-Fordist' strategy for 'New Times' (Hall and Jacques 1989), based on current changes and current experiences of labour, or - given its current disaggregation - on particular national or international segments/layers thereof. The new model, in any case, does not imply the disappearance of the old one. It can, in a country like India, even co-exist with bonded labour. Nor does the new model imply the disappearance of domestic labour. It would seem to me that what is here called for is a new understanding of work under a capitalism that is - admittedly - increasingly informatised and globalised. This means developing a strategy that will not be outdated by the rapidity of movement in the labour process, the product or the site. Nor by the possible appearance of yet newer models, yet more complex syntheses of ancient, old, modern and 'post-modern'. Here are three proposed elements of such a strategy, addressed respectively to 1) hierarchy and authoritarianism within waged work, 2) the nature of work as a multi-faceted human activity, 3) space-time compression as it affects the above.11

1. Struggles against authoritarianism within the wage-labour situation are traditional to the labour movement, expressed in terms of 'workers' control', 'workers' self-management' or 'workers' participation'. Recent writing here, however, is taking these beyond the traditional framework by recognising the crisis of socialist strategies, by taking a truly international comparative perspective (including, for example, tropical African experiences and South African union policy), or by making connections between labour demands and those of the new social movements (see Bayat 1991, and the review article of Webster 1991). The work of Bayat is exceptional not only in its historical and international scope, or its reference to the new technology, but in its address to democracy more generally, its awareness of the new social issues and movements, and its response to a range of contemporary literature on alternative social models. Bayat does not see democratisation within work as confined to 'advanced' countries or workers. He suggests the following possibilities even within the Third World: 1) 'natural' workers' control in the petty-commodity sector; 2) the democratisation of cooperatives; 3) state-sponsored forms resulting from worker pressure; 4) union attempts to influence enterprise
management and national development policy; 5) efforts of plant-level unions to counter employers' attacks resulting from changing industrial structures (172). Bayat suggests not only the revival of the intimate early relationship between the labour and democratic movements. He also suggests a little-explored terrain for international labour/socialist solidarity activity.

2. Liberation from work is the strategy of Gorz (1989) - who seems to believe there can be no such humanisation within it as suggested by Bayat. Gorz has produced a challenging critique of the ideology of work that dominates the international trade-union movement as much as it does the capitalist (or statist) media. This ideology holds that 1) the more each works, the better off all will be; 2) that those who do little or no work are acting against the interests of the community; 3) that those who work hard achieve success and those who don't have only themselves to blame. He points out that today the connection between more and better has been broken and that the problem now is one of producing differently, producing other things, even working less. Gorz distinguishes between work for economic ends (the definition of work under capitalism/statism), domestic labour, work for 'oneself' (primarily the additional task of women), and autonomous activity (artistic, relational, educational, mutual-aid, etc). He argues for a movement from the first type to the third, and for the second one to be increasingly articulated with the third rather than subordinated to the first.

Gorz points out that, with the new technologies, it will be possible within a few years, in the industrialised capitalist countries, to reduce average working hours from 1,600 to 1,000 a year without a fall in living standards. Under capitalist conditions, of course, what is likely to happen is a division of the active population into 25 percent of skilled, permanent and unionised workers, 25 percent insecure and unskilled peripheral workers, and 50 percent semi-unemployed, unemployed or marginalised workers, doing occasional or seasonal work. If the trade unions are not to be reduced to some kind of neo-corporatist mutual-protection agency for the skilled and privileged, they will, Gorz argues, have to struggle for liberation from work:
The liberation from work for economic ends, through reductions in working hours and the development of other types of activities, self-regulated and self-determined by the individuals involved, is the only way to give positive meaning to the savings in wage labour brought about by the current technological revolution. The project for a society of liberated time, in which everyone will be able to work but will work less and less for economic ends, is the possible meaning of the current historical developments. Such a project is able to give cohesion and a unifying perspective to the different elements that make up the social movement since 1) it is a logical extension of the experience and struggles of workers in the past; 2) it reaches beyond that experience and those struggles towards objectives which correspond to the interests of both workers and non-workers, and is thus able to cement bonds of solidarity and common political will between them; 3) it corresponds to the aspirations of the ever-growing proportion of men and women who wish to (re)gain control in and of their own lives. (224. Original stress)

Gorz shows no awareness of the existence of a world of labour outside the West. But, in case it should be thought that struggle against wage labour is the privilege only of ‘labour aristocrats’ in industrialised capitalist welfare states, it should be pointed out that it is with the struggle for the eight-hour working day that the international trade-union movement was born in the 1890s, and that similar national or international strategies have been proposed within Latin America (Sulmont 1988) and the USA (Brecher and Costello 1991). The importance of Gorz’ argument lies precisely in its rooting within international labour movement history and contemporary union concerns, and the explicit connections made with the new social movements – or, if you like, with those interests and identities of workers that unions currently ignore or repress.

3. A labour strategy on time-space compression. In so far as we recognise space-time compression as a crucial implication of a capitalist modernity, neither enthusiastic welcome, resigned acceptance nor angry denunciation would seem adequate. What would seem to be needed
is specific labour-movement strategies. Labour has traditionally had explicit strategies on time and implicit ones on space (in so far as it argued for regional industrialisation, housing and urban services or planning, and even for national protectionism). But restrictions of working hours have often been literally traded for cash or other benefits (Brecher and Costello 1990). And remaining state-endorsed limitations on capitalist control of these have been seriously undermined by neoliberalism and globalisation. In so far as there are strategies of dominant forces (military, industrial/environmental, administrative, as well as capitalist) for particular space-time compressions, there need to be alternatives from labour (and other social movements). Some such issues are implicitly being raised around the USA–Canada–Mexico Free Trade Area, a project which proposes a single space for capital and goods but separate ones for people and peoples. Some labour and associated democratic movements are beginning to question ‘fast-track’ decision-taking and the consequent movements of capital, industry and labour (but not of best-practice working and environmental conditions). An explicit awareness of time-space compression might, for example, help US autoworkers avoid the adoption of strategies which are not only based on a narrow spatial identity (US) and therefore possibly hostile to relevant others (Mexico, Canada), but which seem likely to be rapidly circumvented by a capitalism whose timing and freedom of movement here have been checked only at one place/time.12

4. Getting from social-democracy to a realistic utopianism. Giddens does not relate his social-democratic strategy to ‘actually existing social-democracy’, nationally or internationally. Nor does he explain how historical social democracy – both a significant creator and creature of the modernity and globalisation he criticises, can itself become a major political means for its surpassing. Adam Przeworski (1985) says of national social democracy that it has done much to civilise capitalism but that transforming it is another matter entirely. No more can be said of international social democracy, nor of international projects inspired by such, like the Brandt Report (Elson 1983) and the Brundtland Report (Visvanathan 1991). On the other hand – and to the evident chagrin of revolutionary socialists – social democracy is still around, in West, East and South, whilst revolutionary socialism appears largely confined to restricted parts of the South.
These are former dictatorships having limited mass familiarity with revolutionary socialism locally and/or knowledge of state socialism abroad – such as Brazil, the Philippines or South Africa. So socialists need to take social democracy as seriously as they need to take liberal democracy. Whatever its crimes and errors (such as its truly miserable record on colonialism), social democracy never permitted itself to be dominated by the ‘pie in the sky if you try’ socialism of its left competitors. It has retained or gained considerable mass following and influence, and it provides a contestable terrain for democratic socialists and social movements. Finally, as the socialists of Brazil, the Philippines or South Africa attempt to come to terms with globalisation, many of them may be drawn to social democracy also.

This does not mean that one need accept Giddens’ vision of social democracy – or revision of socialism – as humanity’s ‘common concern for the stewardship of its resources’ (1992:60). This is, surely, less a socialist than a humanist or ecological aspiration, and then of such an ethereal nature that one hopes contemporary humanists or ecologists will reject it for something with more teeth. An alternative would be to preserve the intimate relationship of socialism with the issue of labour, and therefore with the labour movement. But then to place this movement, with its ideology and institutions, in a dynamic and constructive relationship with others. This seems to be the vision of John Mathews (1989), in dealing with the new social movements and labour in Australia. In a more global view of a transitional strategy, Mary Mellor (1992) offers something slightly different. She attempts a synthesis between ecology, feminism, socialism (and a personal spiritualism). In both cases, a route is suggested from a recognisable empirical here to a desired utopian there. It may be that, in looking for such a route, various radical democratic movements will also reinvent the meaning of socialism. Self-identified social democrats will certainly contribute to the search. But, given the current condition of both socialism and social democracy, it would seem wiser to commit ourselves, here also, to contestatory action rather than faith in rational analysis.
3. Global civil society

3.1. A global civil society?

Here I am going to expand on the line of the Giddens model that addresses itself to administrative power and the struggle against it at the global level (Line C in Figure 1 above). I am concerned in particular with Box 5C, a ‘coordinated global order’, understood as the institutional requirements of a new kind of global order. I use ‘institutional’ in a broad sense, to refer not simply to organisations such as a hypothetically-reformed United Nations, but also to the principles necessary to ensure the growing response of such organisations to what we could initially describe as the non-state, non-capitalist sphere.

I will again consider the argument of a particular writer and then discuss it with the help of other literature. But first I need to both defend and explain my use of ‘civil society’ at the global level. There are in existence other terms, which may seem less eurocentric or more specific to the global. Less eurocentric would be ‘third system’ (Nerfin 1986, Friedmann 1992:3,6), applied to both national and international levels. Less eurocentric and more specific to the global level would be the Transnational Non-Governmental Organisations (TRANGOs) of Johan Galtung (1980). I find, however, such terms too much tied to particular organisational forms (NGOs in the first case, an individual membership base in the second). Recognising the European and even West European origins of ‘civil society’, I would nonetheless consider that globalisation has 1) tended to universalise the phenomenon, 2) tended to give it a new anti-capitalist content, 3) caused it to be thus increasingly applied at the global level! Let us consider this further.

The concept of civil society relates traditionally to the city- or nation-state and has developed alongside or against it throughout European history. In the bourgeois and popular struggles against authoritarianism (domestic or foreign-imposed) the concept tended to 1) include the market and domestic sphere alongside voluntary associations and public spaces, and 2) be
given a positive and anti-state connotation. The term fell out of use in liberal/reformist and socialist/revolutionary discourse at a period in which the first considered the ‘autonomous individual’ adequately represented through competing parties and parliamentary democracy, and the second considered the ‘masses’ as represented through a revolutionary party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In both cases, people were in fact obliged to see themselves in (or reduce themselves to) the identities indicated in order to feel represented. This has been an increasing problem for discriminated ethnics, women, immigrants, and for other communities of affect or interest, whose identities and aspirations might cut across party or nation-state lines. Use of the term revived, firstly in Eastern Europe and Latin America, as those protesting against Communist or capitalist dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s sought an expression for the active citizen self-expression and self-organisation they considered a necessary condition for and guarantee of a democratic polity. It was picked up in an India in which both state and left modernisation ideologies and strategies were running out of steam. And also in a Western Europe in which liberal democracy (also in its advanced social-democratic versions) was seen as increasingly representative (or increasingly empty), in which labour and socialism were losing popular appeal, and in which new social movements and citizen initiatives were raising new issues in new, extra-parliamentary and non-party ways.

Contemporary left usage tends to see civil society as both a non- or anti-capitalist and a non- or anti-state sphere – sometimes including households as well as new social movements, voluntary associations and public spaces. At times, particularly under repressive regimes, civil society is given a simply positive valuation and posed in equally simple opposition to the state – representing oppression, manipulation and alienation. More nuanced argument recognises the interpenetration of the spheres of civil society, market and state. It also recognises the complex and contradictory nature of civil society, in so far as this is understood as including the patriarchal family, religious fundamentalism, racism and other bodies and forces that may 1) be quiet independent of capital and state but 2) be neither democratic in operation nor pluralistic in

In using the concept 'global civil society' I am obviously suggesting that there is some such entity as a globalised capitalism and a global state-order to which it relates, and against which it is posed. Such an understanding is also beginning to find political expression, in some cases in explicit opposition to the (combined) operations of global capital and inter-state organisations (Hamelink 1990, Howard 1992). In so far as the term may not here be even minimally theorised, it requires some specification.

We cannot, to begin with, simply pose a global civil good against a global capitalist/statist evil. We need to do at least two other things. One is to consider the role of civil society (local, national, global) in struggles in and against those instances of the present global order identified by Giddens, and thus in the creation of his 'coordinated global order'. We must, secondly, recognise civil society as a contradictory and contested terrain, and therefore the need for the democratisation of global civil society. Let us see how such matters are handled by one writer paying increasing attention to the topic.

3.2. A 'cosmopolitan order' according to Held

David Held, who in two previous items has discussed the implications of globalisation for democracy (Held 1991a, b), has now conceived the problem of global democratisation in terms of a 'cosmopolitan order' (Held 1992).

Democracy, for Held, requires first of all the intimate articulation of two processes, the reform of state power and the restructuring of civil society. He here understands civil society in terms of what I might call 'bourgeois civil society' – a civil society under capitalist conditions of private capital ownership and its consequent inequalities. Such an understanding implies that civil
society is seen not simply as a structure but as a process – of what I might again call ‘the civilisation of society’ (the stress being on the word civil). To the hypothetical post-state-socialist question, ‘Is it possible to build democracy in one country?’, the answer of Held is clearly ‘no’.  

Democracy can result from, and only from, a nucleus, or federation, of democratic states and societies. Or, to put the point differently, national democracies require international democracy if they are to be sustained and developed in the contemporary era. Paradoxically, perhaps, democracy has to be extended and deepened within and between countries for it to retain its relevance in the 21st century. (11)  

Further recognising the decreasing spatial fit between decision-making and the national constituency in liberal democracies (they take decisions affecting unrepresented others; they are affected by decisions made by other national and international instances) Held proposes to show 1) that national-level democracy requires democracy within and between international bodies and relations, and 2) that this is blocked by the ‘deep structure’ (22) of a) the nation-state system, and b) by the addition to this of the United Nations system. Given this blockage, he proposes his own third alternative system, presented in Table 1.  

The two first models provide essential historical background. The first, the Model of Westphalia is drawn from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It expresses the emergence of a world of sovereign states, which settle disputes bilaterally and by at least the threat of force; which are involved in a low-level of cooperation; which put national interest above any other,  

and which accept the logic of the principle of effectiveness, that is, the principle that might eventually makes right in the international world – appropriation becomes legitimation. (24)
Table 1: Held's alternative cosmopolitan model of democracy

1. The global order consists of multiple and overlapping networks of power including the political, social and economic.

2. All groups and associations are attributed rights of self-determination specified by a commitment to individual autonomy and a specific cluster of rights. The cluster is composed of rights within and across each network of power. Together, these rights constitute the basis of an empowering legal order – a 'democratic international law'.

3. Law-making and law-enforcement can be developed within this framework at a variety of locations and levels, along with an expansion of the influence of regional and international courts to monitor and check political and social authority.

4. Legal principles are adopted which delimit the form and scope of individual and collective action within the organisations and associations of state and civil society. Certain standards are specified for the treatment of all, which no political regime or civil association can legitimately violate.

5. As a consequence, the principle of non-coercive relations governs the settlement of disputes, though the use of force remains a collective option in the last resort in the face of tyrannical attacks to eradicate democratic international law.

6. The defence of self-determination, the creation of a common structure of action and the preservation of the democratic good are the overall collective priorities.

7. Determinate principles of social justice follow: the modus operandi of the production, distribution and the exploitation of resources must be compatible with the democratic process and a common framework of action.

Source: Held (1992: Table 3)
The UN Charter Model does not so much replace the Westphalia Model as add to it an understanding of the multiplicity of international links, of rights of individuals and peoples (even without states), and pressure to solve conflicts through peaceful means. However, the de facto domination of the inter-state system in 1945 by a small number of powerful nation-states was built into the UN in terms of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, thus leaving the organisation exposed to pressure from its most powerful (or richest) members. Reform of the UN system, says Held, might be of some value, but it would still inevitably reflect the logic of the inter-state system and all its inequalities, and continue to minimise the role of ‘transnational actors, civil associations, non-governmental organisations and social movements’ (31). It would not, furthermore, meet the strains that globalisation (which Held understands more or less in the terms of Giddens) is placing on the Westphalia and UN systems. These stresses give rise to three requirements:

first, that the territorial boundaries of systems of accountability be recast so that those issues which escape the control of a nation-state – aspects of monetary management, environmental questions, elements of security, new forms of communication – can be brought under better democratic control. Secondly, that the role and place of regional and global regulatory and functional agencies be rethought so that they might provide a more coherent and useful focal point in public affairs. Thirdly, that the articulation of political institutions with the key groups, agencies, associations and organisations of international civil society be reconsidered to allow them to become part of a democratic process – adopting within their very modus operandi, a structure of rules and principles compatible with those of democracy. (33)

Held’s Cosmopolitan Model of Democracy is presented in Table 1. He stresses three elements. The first is the necessity for representative regional or continental (e.g. African) parliaments, transnational referenda of relevant constituencies on major transnational issues, the
opening to public scrutiny and democratic control of inter-governmental and functional bodies. The second is the entrenchment of civil, political, economic and social rights in national and international parliaments or assemblies, so as to specify the extent and limits to democratic decision-making. The third is the necessity for either a reformed UN or a complement to it, in the form of an assembly of specifically democratic nations, given equal voice (thus surpassing a UN which includes undemocratic states and in which some states are given superior rights). Held continues on the implications of his model for international civil society:

A democratic network of states and civil societies is incompatible with the existence of powerful sets of social relations and organisations which can, by virtue of the very bases of their operations, systematically distort democratic conditions and processes. At stake are, among other things, the curtailment of the power of corporations to constrain and influence the political agenda...and the restriction of the activities of powerful transnational interest groups to pursue their interests unchecked (through, for example...the enactment of rules limiting the sponsorship of political representatives by sectional interests, whether these be particular industries or trade unions). (35. Original emphasis)

It may be understood to follow from all the above that Held does not consider problems of global governance can be solved through grassroots democracy alone, for

the questions have to be posed: which grassroots, and which democracy?...Grassroots movements are by no means merely noble or wise...Appeal to the nature of inherent goodness of grassroots associations and movements bypasses the necessary work of theoretical analysis. (38)
3.3. Community, citizenship, culture

I would have thought, again, that Held provides an adequate specification for my present purposes. But this may simply be a manner of saying that his is one of the first adequate presentations of the matter. So let us, again, take it as such a beginning and tease out some of the possible implications and problems. I will begin with the key words 'order' and 'cosmopolitan'.

1. Order or community? In a symposium around the idea of an 'alternative world order' (Z Magazine 1991), a number of questions were raised about the concept. Stephen Shalom wondered whether the concept 'order' did not suggest a centralisation of power which would then be granted and controlled from the top. He proposes that decentralisation be a fundamental principle of any alternative to the present world order. Decentralisation, for him, is not simply a matter of instituting the 'participation in proportion to how much one is affected principle' (97). It is also a matter of decentralisation tending to imply more participation, initiative, experimentation and diversity.

For John Brown Childs, in the same symposium, the problem was again with the word 'order', with its implication of 'hierarchical elite-dominated command-systems' (97). He considers that the fundamental concept for the project should be 'planetary community'. This would, for him, evidently be a community of local communities: 17

The resilience of local groups can be the elemental stuff from which will grow a real community that can resist the deadening hand of international uniformity used to maintain the power of the few. This said, we still are left to wrestle with the classic dilemma of how to form unity with, rather than against, the real diversity of peoples. (98)
Indeed we are: the problem here is possibly the absence of a concept of global citizenship – a matter we will return to below. It would, however, seem to me that the challenges to an overly political or institutional orientation may justify my own preference for a focus on ‘global civil society’.

2. Cosmopolitans or global citizens? In an earlier definition of cosmopolitanism (Waterman 1988:295–6) I tried to suggest its multiple ambiguities. I pointed both to its European bourgeois origin (implying a class- and ethnocentric universalism) and its articulation with earlier Christian universalism and later socialist internationalism. I also connected it with an elitist internationalism, whether of a capitalist or socialist variety. Such a critique is given much added weight by Ulf Hannerz, so much weight, indeed, that I feel I may now have to consider the cosmopolitanism of socialist internationalists as more problematic than heretofore. Hannerz distinguishes the cosmopolitan from the migrant, the tourist and the stranger. He considers cosmopolitanism to imply both a certain orientation and a certain competence – both of which seem to me to imply education, wealth and power:

A genuine cosmopolitanism is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity... At the same time, however, cosmopolitanism can be a matter of competence... There is... cultural competence in the stricter sense of the term, a built-up skill in manoeuvring more or less expertly with a particular system of meanings and meaningful forms [...] In its concern with the Other... [c]osmopolitans can be dilettantes as well as connoisseurs, and are often both at different times. (Hannerz 1990:239)

Whilst Hannerz treats cosmopolitanism in relationship to a globalised culture, Bart van Steenbergen (1992) deals with it, at least implicitly, in relationship to the global more generally. He also offers
an alternative to the cosmopolitan. Steenbergen considers four types of hypothetical global citizen, the 'global capitalist', the 'global reformer', the 'environmental manager' and the 'earth citizen'. Whilst I might not wish myself to reduce the concept of the cosmopolitan to that of the global capitalist, it is clear that the global capitalist finds a historical and ideological predecessor in the cosmopolitan:

[The present global capitalist...sees himself as a global citizen, with a certain global lifestyle. His guiding image is that the world is becoming unified around a common business elite, an elite that shares interests and experiences, comes to have more in common with each other than it does with the more rooted, ethnically distinct members of its own particular civil society [...T]he result seems to be a denationalised global elite that at the same time lacks any global civic sense of responsibility. (14)

Van Steenbergen's 'earth', or 'global ecological', citizen represents not only a contrasting but also, I would say, a post-modern type (in the sense of Giddens):

[Ecological citizenship emphasises the importance of the planet as breeding ground, as habitat and as lifeworld. In that sense we could call this type of citizen an *earth citizen* who is aware of his [sic] organic process of birth and growth out of the earth as a living organism. This is based on the notion of care, as distinct from the notion of control. The development of citizenship from the city, via the nation-state and the region to the globe is here not just a matter of an increase in scale. With the notion of the 'earth citizen' a full circle is made. The citizen is back to his [sic] roots; the earth as Gaia, as one's habitat. (17)

This account, once again, would seem to suggest the need for a central focus on citizenship and thus on civil society.
3. Global culture as the ground of global order/community. Here is a problem for myself as well as for Held. In so far as any economic or political system presupposes some kind of common language, commonly understood symbols and meanings – in other words a culture – what is the culture common to either a cosmopolitan order or a global civil society? Mike Featherstone (1990) argues that the existence of a unified global culture (on the nation-state model) is impossible, since

to contemplate this on the global level means imaginatively to construct an ‘outside’ to the globe, a sphere of global threat captured only in the pages and footage of science fiction accounts of space invaders, inter-planetary and inter-galactic wars. In addition the transnational cosmopolitan intellectuals (serving which masters we might ask?) would have a long way to go to re-discover, formulate and agree upon global equivalents to the ethnies. (11)

There are various ways in which the matter might be reconceived. In the first place, one can imagine (indeed describe, as van Steenbergen and many others have done) a culture or cultures which are not primarily territorial, or not primarily linguistic, in nature (Islamic, socialist, female or feminist). In the second place, one can increasingly recognise the ‘outside global threat’ intraterrestrially, as science fiction increasingly becomes science fact. One evident global threat is the ecological one, increasingly the stimulus to the development of a global community of ecologists, whose mutual debates and agreements increasingly penetrate the more general public consciousness worldwide.

What of the somewhat pathetic ‘transnational cosmopolitan intellectuals’, with no master to serve, no ethnies to which they can refer? Given the increasing centrality of knowledge and information to a globalised modernity, it is not necessary to assume that its bearers serve masters (or, if feminists, mistresses). Some thinkers even see the knowledge class or elites as themselves the new masters of the universe (Frankel 1987). I would see Featherstone’s category, or something
like it, on a cultural avantguard model (not a political vanguardist one), hypothetically involved in a democratic dialogue or dialectic with mass communities (of territory, interest, affinity), again hypothetically becoming globally aware. Do intellectuals need an ethnique or even a language? Only, perhaps, if one only conceives them on the model of Featherstone, as those operating primarily through the written or spoken word. There are other intellectuals, such as those artists whose stock in trade is global synthesis and syncretism, and who are also involved in the complex and contradictory process of creating various kinds of global communities. This is clear in the case of popular music, as when Reebee Garofalo (1992) not only shows rock as a medium for mass movements cross-nationally (from London to Rio and Peking) but as a music of global awareness or protest (from the Band Aid Concert to the Mandela one).

The matter of global culture must not be simplified. Arjun Appadurai (1990) is extremely thought-provoking here. Working with an understanding of modernisation and globalisation close to that of Giddens, he proposes to look at the complexity of global cultural transformations in terms of five ‘imagined worlds’, which do not necessarily move in parallel nor necessarily come together. They are: a) ethnoscapes, of moving persons and groups, such as guestworkers, tourists, refugees, exiles; b) technoscapes, the increasingly rapid and intense movements and conjunctions of technology, themselves determined by increasingly complex balances between money flows, access to low- and highskilled labour, political conditions; c) finanscapes, the increasingly rapid and complex movements of currency, stock and commodity speculation; d) mediascapes, both the capacity to produce and disseminate media, and the world images created by them; and e) ideoscapes, understood as the ideologies of state-oriented politics, whether of the dominating or the counter-movements. The suffix ‘scape’ is intended to indicate that these are not social givens but views much influenced by the historical, linguistic and political situation of the individuals or groups involved. Indeed, says Appadurai,
these landscapes are eventually navigated by agents who both experience and constitute larger formations, in part by their own sense of what these landscapes offer. (296)

Let me expand a little on the ideoscape, since it is the one that comes closest to Held’s cosmopolitan order and my global civil society. Appadurai sees contemporary ideoscapes as composed of varying combinations of an Enlightenment worldview – with terms like freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, and the master-term democracy – increasingly detached from such a common core as they might have classically had:

Thus ‘democracy’ has clearly become a master-term, with powerful echoes from Haiti to Poland to the Soviet Union and China, but it sits at the centre of a variety of ideoscapes...This creates ever new terminological kaleidoscopes, as states (and the groups that seek to capture them) seek to pacify populations whose own ethnoscapes are in motion, and whose mediascapes may create severe problems for the ideoscapes with which they are presented. The fluidity of ideoscapes is complicated in particular by the growing diasporas (both voluntary and involuntary) of intellectuals who continuously inject new meaning-streams into the discourse of democracy in different parts of the world. (301)

The implications of all this for Appadurai, finally, are ambiguous, though not without hope. For whilst the twin ideas of the Enlightenment, the ‘triumphantly universal’ and the ‘resiliently particular’ (308) can cannibalise one another, the dialectic of sameness/difference can also open up the world, as shown by ‘the growth of a wide range of progressive, transnational alliances’ (ibid). Even more is this possibility open if one recognises that ideoscapes are also produced by non-statist intellectuals and movements. And that, as argued earlier, intellectuals are privileged in terms of geographical mobility and capacity to visualise, interpret and represent. Intellectuals (understood as technical, artistic, professional, political, scientific, etc, specialists),
therefore do not have to await the creation of a common world culture as the basis for a new kind of political community or order, they are inevitably and simultaneously involved in creating this complex and multi-faceted culture. The question of the nature of their relationship with the masses in post-ethnic, master-less, and - for that matter - post-mass, world will be dealt with in part below.

4. Who whom - on a world scale? The question to Held here is: who is speaking to, for, or about whom, in proposing an alternative world order? In one sense it is obvious and therefore irrelevant: Held is a British academic - presumably white, definitely male, certainly leftwing, possibly middle-aged - writing in an academic journal largely read by Held look-alikes - though with the occasional youth, non-white, non-male, non-Anglo-Saxon drawn in. In another sense the question is highly relevant, because of the problem of agency. One can assume a sympathy of Held with the marginalised, impoverished, discriminated and alienated. And some kind of identification with the social movements that attempt or claim to articulate their demands. But in so far as these are not specifically addressed (in the sense of being spoken about, to or with) two problems arise. One is the possibility of the ideas being first picked up, incorporated and turned around by those intellectuals who do serve such masters of the universe as the World Bank (currently involved in much greenwash on the environment). The other possibility is that of an abstract utopianism, of producing a future unrelated to existing movements and their possibilities.

These are both real dangers with respect to Held (as to Giddens and, of course, myself). Let us consider them in turn. 1) Speaking to: if proposals are addressed to democratic global movements, responded to by them, and then picked up and responded to by the multinationals or inter-state agencies, this is part of a difficult but unavoidable learning process for the movements concerned. 2) Speaking about: major, fundamental and longterm projects, such as democratising the UN, or a democratic UN alongside the old one, require reference to what global civil society (however it may be defined) is presently doing with respect to the UN and its agencies. I suspect
such organisations and movements are simultaneously doing or proposing many different things. I am not sure that the two possibilities mentioned by Held feature prominently amongst these (although they may well do). I suspect that a model coming closer to their current behaviour is that of Johan Galtung (1982). Galtung, uses the language of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs – the UN, the World Bank), international non-government organisations (INGOs – such as nation-state based international union bodies) and transnational non-government organisations (TRANOGs, on the model of international individual-membership professional associations). He sees the present global dynamic as coming increasingly from the last type, which he understands as existing in 'socio-functional' rather than territorial space. I have made criticisms of his model (Waterman 1989) but what I appreciate is Galtung's suggestion of 1) moving attention from the IGOs to the TRANOGs and 2) of a continuing dynamic between the three. Galtung's model seems to be primarily oriented toward the self-empowerment of civil society and social movements, whilst allowing for the continued existence of the IGOs and INGOs, as well – no doubt – as their reform under pressure from outside and below. I do not see this model as necessarily incompatible with that of Held. But its putative address does seem to differ.

5. What about the workers? One point on which Galtung and Held seem to coincide is in a negative – or should one say merely a non-positive? – attitude toward trade unions. Indeed, both bracket them with corporations, Held presenting the unions here as a potential obstacle to representative democracy globally. This is not only regrettable, it is also paradoxical, particularly given the long trade-union experience in the International Labour Organisation – just such a standard-setting institution as Held (1992:35) seems to recommend as a model. One can only assume that Held is considering unions in their common Western appearance (and even self-presentation), as interest organisations of particular groups of workers, or of workers generally but understood in a particularly narrow way. This, however, is an appearance that has little relationship to either the known past, or a possible future, or to those present places, times or forms in which unionism manages to link itself with broader social concerns – or is seen by
broader social categories to encapsulate its concerns. We need not belabour (no pun necessarily intended) the point: it is made at length in the book to which this paper is intended to contribute.
4. Global solidarity as ethic

Here I want to deal, in particular, with the ethics of international solidarity in the era of globalisation. My initial position here is neatly expressed by Collier (1992:87):

The whole planet has become a shared world, even for those who never leave their village. Thus, a tie which is both real and universal has arrived; not yet in the form of a real collectivity embracing humankind, but of real relations of mutual dependence through the sharing of the world; and it is from just such relations...that values and obligations arise.

An understanding of a contemporary solidarity ethic requires, first, however, a consideration of the historical problems towards developing such.

4.1. Socio-historical problem

Solidarity, it has been somewhere said by Rajni Kothari, is the forgotten term in the Western trinity. Reference here is to the holistic – if not holy – trinity of the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. It was a 19th-century French social revolutionary, Pierre Leroux, who gave quasi-religious force to the concept of ‘humanity’ and who highlighted ‘solidarity’ as the doctrine that would unite it (Billington 1980:312). Yet, ‘fraternity’ came increasingly to refer to a national and statist brotherhood of blood and battle (57–71). Even the apparently cosmopolitan and non-sexist ‘solidarity’ had, by the late-19th century, become in France a state-oriented doctrine of corporatism and social reform (Hayward 1959). And, as is only too well-known, revolutionary socialist appeals to the international solidarity of the dispossessed had little or no weight in 1914 when balanced against capitalist appeals to the fraternity of nation and state.
The problem, it seems to me, is not that solidarity was forgotten but that it was differently articulated in the discourses of the liberal (or not so liberal) bourgeoisie and the socialist (or not so socialist) labour movement. The liberals subordinated solidarity (and equality) to liberty, as embodied in the liberal nation-state. The socialists subordinated solidarity (and liberty) to equality, to be embodied in a socialist or social-democratic economy (and nation-state). A tie which is universal but not real – such as the socialist international community of proletarians – is one which will be increasingly seen as unreal and universalistic. It would seem, further, that as long as the bourgeoisie or ruling elites of major countries and blocs were in evident conflict with each other (economic, political, cultural), they could appeal to nation-state identity and find a popular response. For the vast majority of workers and other common people, for the greatest part of the last one or two hundred years, the largest socio-geographic unit they have been able to identify with has been the state-defined nation or bloc. The wars over the Malvinas/Falklands, the Persian Gulf, in East Europe and Central Asia, show this to be a continuing reality.

It is because, however, many of these conditions are also changing that it is today at least possible to conceive of ties both universal and real. But the conceiving or reconceiving of such is problematic also.

4.2 Philosophical problems

One major contemporary philosophical challenge here is the widespread current condemnation of 'foundationalism', 'totalisation', 'universalism', 'essentialism', 'rationalism' and, any 'grand narratives' that offer universal statements of reality, value and obligation, based on initial assumptions or arguments about the universe, nature, man, society, etc. Such grand narratives are those that have descended from Judaism and Christianity, from the European Enlightenment, Liberalism and Socialism – the sources of most internationalist doctrine. They are suspect for presenting a particular 'story' as general truth, and for imposing this truth on others
(and an always excluded outsider or enemy – the Other). There are ‘right’ and ‘left’ versions of such criticism, sometimes directly targeting globalisation theories, humanist universalism or any general international solidarity ethic.

- On the left there has been much criticism of Marxism – classical and contemporary – in such terms. We may note the deconstruction of internationalist discourse by Fernando Mires (Mires 1989, 1991), a man who prefers the cautious language of ‘international cooperation’ and ‘coordination’ to that of internationalism. We may also note the related plea of the green economist Alain Lipietz (1989) for a ‘modest internationalism’, a ‘minimal universalism’. There is here an explicit or implicit fear of once again imposing on those from different (and less powerful) worlds the universalising claims of Western or Westernised intellectuals or movements.

- On the right we can find criticism that is both more forthright and more extreme. I am thinking in particular of the position of Richard Rorty, which has the advantage (for us) of directly posing local ‘solidarities’ and Western ‘cosmopolitanism’ against – respectively – universalist notions of ‘common humanity’ and ‘emancipation’. Considering solidarity, Rorty argues that those Europeans who hid Jews from the Nazis during World War Two did not primarily do so on the universalist humanist grounds that they were ‘fellow human beings’ (Rorty 1989:190) but for more parochial reasons – that the helpers shared some more local, real or direct identity with those they aided. He likewise argues that it is more politically and morally persuasive to urge attention to the misery of American blacks because they are ‘our fellow Americans’ (his stress) than because they are ‘our fellow human beings’. The point is that our sense of solidarity is strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed are thought of as ‘one of us’, where ‘us’ means something smaller and more local than the human race. (1989:191)
As far as cosmopolitanism is concerned, Rorty evidently considers that it is represented in and by the West, requires extending, and that it implies that the 'pre-literate native' (1991:218) should be invited to accept the political institutions and philosophical language of the West. For a dialogue to occur does not – as humanist universalists may suggest – first require the emancipation of said non-Western natives. And whilst the West should remain open to new information and values that might come from such contact, this does not imply any abandonment of Western values or discourse procedures. In Rorty's own particularist words:

> We cannot leap outside our Western social-democratic skins when we encounter another culture, and we should not try [...] for there is no supercultural observation platform to which we might repair [...W]e want narratives of increasing cosmopolitanism, though not narratives of emancipation. For we think that there was nothing to emancipate... There is no human nature which was once, or still is, in chains. (212-3)

It would be easy to dismiss this argument as representing the self-satisfaction and self-interest of those rich white American males satirised by novelist Tom Wolfe (1989) as 'the masters of the universe'. It would be little more difficult to point out the literally amoral and self-contradictory nature of its logic. Nor to research its empirical assertions, given that many (most?) Europeans and US whites may have well defined their anti-racist activities precisely in abstract humanitarian terms – religious or humanist! I prefer, however, to take Rorty’s statement as presenting, in philosophical terms, the attitudes of many of the ‘slaves of the universe’ also, at least where and when traditional religious, secular or socialist universalism and humanism loses out to the ethics of national, ethnic, religious, class, familial or individual self-interest. I also recognise it as presenting, in extreme form, lines of argument that are either shared by left post-modernists or adjusted to by them. In so far, in other words, as the arguments of Rorty undermine, or provide evidence of the failure of, the old logical, ethical or social grounds for international solidarity, we need to provide new ones. I propose to do this by considering in turn the grounds
for a post-Marxist universalism, its relationship to emancipation, and how we can ensure that this includes the voices and needs of the Other(s).

A contemporary universalism. Two arguments may be relevant here, an abstract one relating to universalism and civil society, and a concrete one, relating to globalisation and universal responsibility.

Jeffrey Alexander (1991) suggests that cultural universalism is essential to the development of liberal democracy, its place of residence being civil society. He recognises, with Weber, how traditional Christian universalism provided the basis for surpassing family, ethnic and caste ties and therefore in widening the notion of citizenship, in principle, to all males. He reveals how the themes of ‘civility, civil society, universalism, and citizenship’ (167) have been central to the development of the Western nation-state, as well as in the expansion of concepts of citizenship from the legal to the political and social spheres. He suggests the manner in which ‘societal community’ can expand beyond the nation-state. He continues:

With the construction of a civil society...particularistic definitions of membership are broken through; they are replaced by abstract criteria that emphasise simple humanity and participation... Citizenship, then, can be understood as a form of social organisation that is anchored in universalistic bonds of community that define every member as equally worthy of respect... Members of a civil society can refer to these universalistic values to gain distance from their immediate relationships, in order to change or criticise them. (168)

Civil society implies not the existence of public consensus or consent but the very existence of a public, and therefore the possibility of political scepticism, criticism and moral outrage.
It seems to me that Alexander’s essentially liberal argument not only reveals the limitations of the equally liberal one of Rorty but cedes (as Rorty’s does not) its historical place to traditional universalism and humanism. It also provides, in principle, a conceptual basis for notions of global citizenship and civil society. What Alexander does not do is to relate his model to actually-existing capitalist society, nationally or globally.

Andrew Collier (1992), as the earlier quote might have already suggested, presents a case for an ethical universalism which is related to capitalism in general and to internationalisation processes in particular. Collier recognises that Marxists have tended to argue for an ethical universalism either despite or as the self-interest of the working class. He is concerned to escape the horns of this dilemma for the contemporary Marxist universalist: that is of appearing either as a ‘shamefaced altruist or a shameless collective egoist’ (76). He does so on the basis of what he calls Marx’s relational ontology. For Marx, he argues, society is not a collection of individuals, a group or organism, it is a network:

Such a network – ‘society’ – is not a count-noun. it does not make sense to ask how many societies there are in the world – nor is there only one society. There is society – not societies or a society. Society is an open-textured network, which can be divided in various ways for the purposes of description and analysis, but these divisions are always more or less artificial. (82)

The ethical implications of this understanding are that it is the lattice of all the relationships within which one is enmeshed that are the source of values and responsibilities. Relating to others is to be understood not so much as something we do as what we are. Collier’s position, again, would seem to allow us to see that in so far as global society exists, it provides a source of values and responsibilities to be weighed against those coming from membership of a nation-state, class, ethnic group, etc. It is, for Collier, the worlds we share with others that provide the social basis for morality. Whereas existence in the world of the market may push us in the direction of
individualism and egoism (or to splitting and opposing egoism and altruism), we also exist in other social worlds, which allow us to be moved by the needs of significant others.

Collier’s next move is a historical one. He argues that in 1600 there were only minimal relations between the peoples of England and India, and that this therefore provided an equally minimal basis for any sense of mutual obligation. But today even those who live in villages exist in one shared capitalist world:

Emancipation from the world market can only be achieved by sharing in the collective power of humankind over planetary resources, and so passing from a universal tie which is only that of interdependence, to one that is also one of joint management of that interdependence, collective self-direction. This is made much the more urgent by the second, ecological aspect of the shared world... (87)

Convincing as we might find this argument, attractive as we might find the vision offered, we have to recognise, with Rorty, that we cannot leap outside our Western liberal, bourgeois, social-democratic (read: Marxist, feminist) skins when enunciating our new universalism, and that there is, indeed, no supercultural observation platform from which to enunciate it. We have to also reassure Alain Lipietz that we are not visiting another European universalism on the world. This requires us to recognise: 1) that there are others who (having failed to read Rorty) still feel they need emancipation; 2) that a condition for conceptualising and creating global solidarity is global dialogue between ourselves and ‘ourothers'; and 3) that such a dialogue implies relevant procedures.

From emancipation to emancipations – and back. If a contemporary cosmopolitanism is to mean more than an invitation from Rorty to mount his mono-cultural observation platform, we must recognise that it belongs to those who are, or feel, emancipated. And therefore allow for those who still feel a need for such. It is possible to do this without repeating traditional myths
about an original condition of freedom, an essential human nature, homogenous human needs and desires, or a future condition of perfect freedom. We can do this by reconnecting Liberty (emancipation) with Equality and Solidarity, in other words, by connecting it with conditions that allow others to emancipate themselves.

In a discussion of modern and post-modern understandings of emancipation, Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1992c) argues that the latter highlights autonomy as aim, the network as preferred organisational form, and self-limitation as a mentality. The problem is, he says, that such a minimum definition of emancipation can match that of chauvinism, fundamentalism and other particularisms: emancipation, by such groups, may therefore appear no different (to the rest of us?) than a change of elite. This suggests, for Nederveen Pieterse, the necessity for a contemporary articulation of emancipation with 1) a ‘democratic universalism’ or ‘radical democracy’ (he is here citing Ernesto Laclau), and 2) some general notion of human emancipation:

It follows that emancipations plural must in some fashion refer to emancipation in a general sense: not every process of empowerment is emancipatory. A working definition...is that emancipation refers to collective actions which seek to level and disperse power, or seek to install more inclusive values than the prevailing ones. (32)

The way to avoid this implying a disguised return to a singular and totalising emancipation is to recognise that the development of a general sense of emancipation requires a certain attitude toward, and dialogue with, others.

The needs and voices of others. Nancy Fraser (1986) is interested in ‘a discourse ethic of solidarity’, which she also characterises as an ethic of discourse for social movements. She points out that means of interpretation and communication (vocabularies for pressing claims, the idioms for communicating needs, the narrative conventions for constructing individual and collective
histories, the paradigms of argument considered authoritative for judging competing claims, etc) cannot be value-neutral. These means of interpretation tend to express the experiences, interests and self-images of dominant social groups. In the case of the West the dominant vocabularies constitute people as rational, self-interested individuals, engaged in exchange with others in utility-maximising relationships. Such a standpoint is characteristically that of white European male bourgeois property owners. She argues that this vocabulary can hardly express relationships of on-going dependency, such as that of mother and child, nor account for such experiences and feelings of connection as exist in 'more extended networks of community and solidarity', as are to be customarily found in the subcultures of the subordinated. The latter are going to be hindered from participating on equal terms with the dominant groups in communicative interaction:

Unless they were to contest this situation and organise to win a greater measure of collective control over the means of interpretations and communication, it would appear that members of subordinated groups would have only two options: they could either adopt the dominant point of view and see their own experiences repressed and distorted; or they could develop idiolects capable of voicing their experience and see these marginalised, disqualified and excluded from the central discursive institutions and arenas of society. Or they could do both at once. (Fraser 1986:426)

Given this situation, and assuming there is a desire to surpass it, what is necessary is the replacement of a 'monological ethic' by a 'discourse or dialogical ethic'. The latter implies: recognition of the unequal relationship to the dominant means of interpretation; making such means themselves a matter of negotiation; and allowing the subordinated to propose alternatives to such. Fraser here provides an effective critique of, and alternative to, precisely such a monological ethic as that represented by Rorty. And, for that matter, her argument suggests how, globally, one could avoid any leftwing Rortyism.
Fraser goes further, proposing not only a form of discourse but a content for it - a solidarity ethic. And, whilst she develops her argument in relationship to the women's movement, she herself argues that it is equally appropriate to other social movements of the subordinated or excluded. She also considers it necessary to avoid basing her ethic on either the 'individual' or 'humanity':

Here one would abstract both from unique individuality and from universal humanity to focalise the intermediate zone of group identity. The most general ethical force of this orientation would be something like this: we owe each other behaviour such that each is confirmed as a being with specific collective identifications and solidarities. The norms governing these interactions would be...norms of collective solidarities expressed in shared but non-universal social practices. (428)

The reference here to group identity and shared practices provides a further defence against universalistic and humanistic moralising.

Supposing we are agreed that: 1) globalisation processes provide the ground for a realistic contemporary universalism; 2) this is understood as related to specific emancipatory projects of a democratic orientation; 3) this requires both principles of solidarity and procedures for the development of such. At least two moves are still necessary. One is to turn these general philosophical principles into political statements. The other is to specify them in a manner relevant to potential collective actors of a quite specific nature – for example, semi-skilled white male factory workers in industrialised capitalist democracies.
4.3. Political problems

The question that arises here is of how a movement from an old understanding of internationalisation (as in Waterman 1988) to the new one of globalisation might influence an understanding of solidarity.

Perhaps I can demonstrate this by responding to recent Marxist writing that directly or indirectly addresses questions of international solidarity. One such is that referred to above, by Andrew Collier (1992) on 'Marxism and universalism'. The second is that of Stuart Corbridge (1991), who is concerned with 'the claims of distant strangers'. That of Collier is quite classically Marxist (though explicitly non-teleological in nature); that of Corbridge is explicitly 'post-Marxist'. That of Collier is implicitly addressed to the working class; that of Corbridge is not. That of Collier is implicitly dependent upon imperialism theory; that of Corbridge is aware of and open to the globalisation model of Giddens. Yet both present the issue of ethical universalism and global responsibility solely in terms of North and South, as if this were the only relevant axis, as if universalism were primarily a responsibility, and as if it were so only for the North. Despite, in other words, sensitivity to internationalisation processes, and considerable originality in their handling of ethical universalism, such arguments are restricted by traditional liberal, humanist or Marxist assumptions. Sometimes it is, indeed, difficult to identify which of these discourses is the disabling one. This difficulty is, no doubt, due to the extent to which dependency theory itself incorporates traditional Western political and religious dualities (rich v. poor; guilt v. innocence; the West v. the Rest), and the extent to which it has fed back into the dominant Western – increasingly the dominant global – discourses opposing North and South. Let me respond to Collier's argument, since this allows us to consider the relationship of an international solidarity ethic to our hypothetical white, semi-skilled, Western, male, factory worker.

Collier apparently considers ethical universalism as a problem only for Western workers and socialists. Whilst, for Western workers, 'their interest in emancipation and their interest in
material consumption pull opposite ways' (88), there is in the South (which seems at this point to be workerless) 'no question...of any conflict between self-emancipation and human emancipation in general' (78). Collier argues that proletarians in what he calls neo-imperialist countries occupy 'contradictory class locations'. And he concludes that, recognising this, Western socialists can, in the last instance, only say to them something like this:

[In so far as you want your class to be emancipated, work for universal human emancipation through common ownership of the world. (88)]

I would like to hope, both for Collier's sake and for that of the new global solidarity, that he is not going to try out this argument on any group of Western workers or unionists, whether white, male and semi-skilled or not. It is, in large part, an old internationalisation discourse that has landed Collier back on the horns of binary oppositions from which he initially appeared to have escaped. He is here assuming the real/universal contradiction. And this leads him to also reproduce the moralistic attitude Western socialists have traditionally had toward Western workers. (It is, significantly, a common, longstanding - and no doubt global - attitude of the moral middle-class towards the material poor). 28

Our previous analysis of globalisation enables us to see the position of workers rather differently. In the first place, we can see globalisation as a multi-faceted, multi-levelled and multi-directional process, affecting all people in all parts of the world, although evidently in different ways and with different effects. One crucial aspect is, as we have seen, that of the changing and moving nature of work internationally, this creating highly changeable, differentiated and interdependent working classes. Workers in the West are less secure and less homogeneous than they have been for many decades. But this can also mean less isolated from workers in other countries, or from other local social identities and concerns. Struggle against the effects of globalisation is, as we have seen, something confronting women, ethnic minorities, socialists, and people in the South and East as well as the West. In so far as the worker has other
identities, interests and aspirations (as s/he always has had) – as urban resident, as churchgoer, as gay, as species being – these are also being challenged by globalisation. In other words, the real and inevitably particular worlds of workers are increasingly invaded/interconnected/interdependent.

The need for solidarity in this globalised world does not, furthermore, have to primarily confront the Western worker as a moral responsibility. I mean this in several senses. In the first place, since the worker is no longer conceived of as the privileged revolutionary subject s/he cannot be conceived of as having a primary moral responsibility for internationalism. Recognition of this can reduce tension. In the second place, in so far as interdependency is a global condition, any appeal to such a responsibility must be addressed to workers and labour movements also in the non-West (although the nature of the appeal would have to be relevant to the local experience and possibilities). This can also reduce the moral demands on and expectations of Western workers and movements. In the third place, in so far as we recognise that globalisation is equally a condition and a recognition, appeals to workers from above or outside (and these will continue) can be increasingly expressed in terms of stimulating worker self-activity, exploration, imagination and creativity. Global solidarity can thus be seen less as a duty, of ourselves or others, than as an adventure in which all are potentially involved. Let me, in conclusion, and as Conclusion, clarify this point by referring to a case and an experience. This will enable me to put myself, specialist on internationalism and an internationalist specialist, within the same political and ethical field as my subjects.
5. Conclusions: for internationalist intellectuals

Putting myself within my subject matter is not done for the sake of either self-praise or self-flagellation. It is certainly done for the sake of a personal stock-taking. And it is also done in the spirit of Giddens' specification of the appropriate disposition in the face of globalisation—that of 'radical engagement' (2.3 above). In view of some criticism of Giddens' failure to demonstrate the basis of or political implications of his argument, I have found a recent collection on US psychologists' responses to global challenges (Staub and Green 1992) both enlightening and encouraging. It reads almost as if it were a direct response to Giddens. But it is the more hope-giving because this is not the case. The work rather represents the response of socially-committed professionals to a world of global risk, to a world in which there is (thanks to nuclear weapons, ecological and other threats) no Other. The need, one contributor argues, is to move humanity from a genocidal to a species mentality. He does not so much preach this as practice it. He reveals that this move is, in our globalised world, not so much a moral requirement as a practical need. He suggests that one can become a species being without abandoning one's local or personal identities (Staub and Green 1992:26–7). Another contributor recognises the contribution that non-Western—in this case Buddhist—psychology can make to overcoming the negative or ineffective attitudes to global threats (68–9)—what Giddens would call 'pragmatic acceptance', 'cynical pessimism' and 'sustained optimism'. I find that this work not only enables me to feel less isolated in my own efforts but also suggest how intellectuals in other fields and other countries could respond to the threats (and, indeed, promises) of globalisation. But now to the matter of how I have tried to do this.

The case to which I will refer is that of international labour communication in Peru, a study I carried out, with the assistance of a Peruvian colleague, in 1986 (Waterman and Arellano 1986, Waterman 1992). This was an exploratory study of the 'transmission and reception' of international labour information, carried out between other preoccupations, during a seven-week period, and with minimal conceptual and methodological means. The study nonetheless came up
with quite surprising findings – for my Peruvian colleagues as well as myself. One was on the transmission side: the dramatic drop in the amount and breadth of international (and international labour) coverage in the pro-labour press in Peru in 1986, compared with Labor, a famed labour paper produced in Lima in 1928–9. Another was on the reception side: the nonetheless extensive and varied knowledges, amongst workers and union officers, of labour and unions in South, West and East, their varied sympathies for these, and their definite interest in more information concerning the daily-life issues facing workers and unions abroad. A third was on the relationship between the information transmitters and the information receivers, since the expressed interests of the workers and unionists were hardly addressed by the local socialist media. One of the conclusions of the initial report was subtitled, 'towards a collective worker knowledge on international labour':

We have not concealed our own values in this piece, nor our particular sympathies. But we do not wish to repeat a traditional socialist procedure which implies that our particular knowledge and values are superior to those we have interviewed. We would rather consider that they are different, coming from people of another class, with a different training, background, technical qualifications, life chances, interests... What the findings prompt us to do is rather to recognise a 'potential collective worker consciousness' on international issues in Peru. It would be difficult, on the basis of the evidence, to argue that a collective worker consciousness already exists here. We have seen a variety of knowledges and attitudes and interests between and within unions. But this individualised or small-group awareness represents, it seems to us, an unused resource, a potential that once released – or, rather, collected – might develop its own dynamic. It is, surely, in facilitating such a development, rather than as permanent intermediaries and interpreters that professionals can best contribute to a new labour internationalism. (Waterman and Arrelano 1986:49)
So much for a case, the political conclusions of which seem broadly compatible with the ethic specified above.

But what of the experience? This is one that makes me: 1) realise my privilege in gathering international information and developing solidarity ideas; 2) aware of my responsibility for making these available to others, and taking relevant solidarity action; and 3) conscious of my need for much more intensive dialogue with not only those I was directly studying but also relevant others.

Let us start with privilege. I could not get funding for this project from my Institute and thus had to pay my own way (using my vacation allowance), and take advantage of the generous invitations and hospitality of Peruvian friends and colleagues. For me this was a voyage of discovery and self-discovery, as painful and frustrating in some ways as it was stimulating and fruitful in others. Being in Peru gave me the possibility and necessity of improving my meagre knowledge of Spanish. It required me to develop some familiarity with Peruvian history and society. I came into contact with the Peruvian trade-union movement, with Peru's extensive network of NGOs, its socialist and feminist intelligentsia. I was introduced to the Jose Carlos Mariategui (1894-1930), the 'Peruvian Gramsci', editor of Labor, with his Marxist ideas on proletarian internationalism and his cosmopolitan insights into internationalisation and communication. I first heard of Flora Tristan, in her two emanations - as an early-19th century French-Peruvian socialist, feminist and internationalist, and as the name of a major Peruvian feminist NGO, deeply involved in global networks of interdependency and solidarity. The research report was published in The Netherlands and Peru. These presumably confirmed or advanced my privileged position as an academic specialist on international labour communication.

What of responsibility? I had hoped that the findings would be fed back into some kind of participatory action research project in Peru, but this was not to be, and I doubt whether many, if any, of those I studied have had access to the Peruvian research report. On the other hand, I
did eventually manage to feed ideas developed during this research into an article on the new labour internationalism, published in the *South African Labour Bulletin* (SALB) (Waterman 1991). Since these ideas were challenging both to the South African unions (with which SALB is intimately connected), since the journal is widely read in South Africa and widely respected internationally, and since putting them in a relevant form and getting them published required considerable effort on my part, this is something in which I take some pride. I was also pleased to be able to introduce the South African labour movement to Mariategui, and to present them to him not as Saint Jose Carlos but — historically — as someone also a prisoner of his international insights. Then, in early 1992, Peru’s *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) Maoist fundamentalists assassinated Maria–Elena Moyano, Peru’s best–known ‘popular feminist’, Deputy Mayor of Lima’s largest squatter settlement, Villa El Salvador. And, in late 1992, they assassinated Pedro Huilca, General Secretary of one of Peru’s largest union federations, the CGTP. Beyond feelings of immense regret, rage and frustration there now arose questions of the relevance of my ideas on a collectively–developed labour internationalism: 1) to a country so isolated by globalisation (yes, this is included in the model), so turned in on itself; 2) of which the legal left is still seeking nationalist solutions to problems shared by near neighbours and distant strangers; 3) of which the powerful terrorist left evidently considers its isolation from any significant movements at home and abroad as demonstrating its unique role as a source of the coming revolution, first national then international. Well, I have to conclude that, whatever the relevance of my ideas to ‘the new global solidarity in general’, they have little or none to Peru. Which is evidently why, in 1986, no one was interested in collaborating in the longterm research–action project I was proposing. It was no less Zukunftsmusik (music of the future) than Collier’s appeal to the British proletariat to realise its need for universal human emancipation through common ownership of everything.

So let us, lastly, consider my needs as revealed by this case: that is the needs of an academic specialist on internationalism who is also an internationalist academic. I need, in the first place, a broader and deeper understanding of specific societies, their social forces, their particular experience of the old internationalisation and the new globalisation, their (potentially)
internationalist activists, their (hypothetically) internationalist masses. It is this last information I most need, given that I am most interested in the problem of facilitating the global solidarity awareness and activity of these. Here the circle is complete — although one would like to hope for a virtuous spiral rather than a vicious circle. For I cannot myself take relevant action, nor propose such to workers, unless and until they are willing and able to express themselves.

All this implies the necessity, also, for a research-action methodology relevant to the development of the new global solidarity. But I feel I have fulfilled one responsibility by writing this paper. The rest must be left for later — or for others.
ENDNOTES

1. An illustration would be the collapse of the Communist system. This did not begin with the breaching of the Berlin Wall but with its economic, political and – above all – informational and cultural circumvention. And when the Berlin Wall eventually was breached, this was because the logic that inspired its construction had already been condemned and ridiculed in the public imagination and undermined by a multiplicity of spontaneous and creative mass activities (such as travelling as tourists to another Communist country that had no wall). These mass understandings and acts were inspired by new implicit views of the world. These overlap with mine only in part. By trying to turn my also largely implicit ideas into a new ‘worldview’ the hypothetical possibility of a public dialogue arises. For a more elegant and complex formulation of the issue here, see that of Arjun Appadurai below.

2. Of these works the most useful one, in many respects, is that of Hall, Held and McGrew (1992), of which I will be making much use in this paper. Both impressive and significant, at least to me, is the extent to which a work on modernity concentrates on globalisation. This is addressed explicitly in only one of seven long chapters but it is present, at least implicitly, throughout. The work also represents a commentary on a number of authors I was already familiar with, as well as on a series previously unknown to me. In so far as I specialise on bibliography in this area, the existence of such a body of unfamiliar literature is simultaneously depressing and exhilarating. The book is a teaching text of the Open University in the UK, and is marked by a high level of coherence between, or cross-reference amongst, the authors, with extensive additional readings, these often being from virtually unobtainable sources. One cannot, finally, fail to be impressed by a 1992 publication that contains a number of 1992 references! Modern left analysis of globalisation may have begun 15 years earlier with Alan Wolfe (1977), and a pathbreaking chapter entitled ‘Globalising Contradictions’. A very different kind of work, which I only had access to as I was completing this paper, is that of Robertson (1992). Given that it appears to be the latest book on globalisation, it must receive at least a footnote. Subtitled ‘Social Theory and Global Culture’, this book is one that has not even an index reference to multinationals (even the cultural ones) or to social movements (even their cultural aspects), thus contrasting with authors mentioned in Endnote 4. It doesn’t have much to say about ‘actually existing’ global cultures, either, for that matter, being apparently much more interested in sociologists of culture than in cultures! On the other hand, Robertson does make one aware of the extent to which sociology has been a product of globalisation and producer of ‘globalisation’. He has an interesting discussion of Albrow’s (1990) five stages in the history of sociology: universalism (Saint-Simon, Comte, Marx), national sociologies (connected with academic professionalisation, mostly in industrialised capitalist countries), internationalism (post–World War Two, with its US and Soviet universalisations), indigenisation (thirldwoldist), and globalisation (contemporary). Robertson offers a thought-provoking typology of possible globalisation models, cast in gemeinschaft/gesellschaft (community/society) terms (78–9). He allows more space than most globalisation theorists to feminism (105–8). But his most interesting and original chapter, at least for me, is that addressed to ‘The Search for Fundamentals in Global Perspective’ (Chapter 11). This forcefully raises the issue of new reactionary, fundamentalist or conservative social movements – and internationalisms. The latter have not yet received in my work the attention they evidently deserve.

3. A point made, at least implicitly, by Anthony McGrew in the Open University collection (McGrew 1992:69). In interpreting Giddens I have been further provoked and helped by Simon Bromley’s (1991) review of four major socialist works on postmodernism. Bromley, however, gives Giddens’ treatment of globalisation little direct attention and considers his book ‘for the most part’ empty of political relevance (145). I consider it richly suggestive
and, in so far as it is not detailed, I think it is possible to work out implications. I will try to do this later. A commentator more sympathetic to Giddens is Stuart Corbridge (1991:26–30). Like me, Corbridge evidently considers the encounter between a contemporary Marxism and Giddens a productive one. Corbridge, unfortunately, does not discuss the implications of Giddens for social movements globally but remains locked within the discourses of development and aid, something I will also return to later. Robertson (1992) devotes a chapter to Giddens, and rightly points to the peripheralisation of culture within his model. He further considers that Giddens fails to provide empirical evidence for his 'politics of self-actualisation' (145). Evidence, here again, seems to lie in the mind of the reader. I know of, and can add, plenty of evidence to what Giddens suggests in outline. By dismissing Giddens' 'institutionalist' approach to globalisation, Robertson merely puts his own 'culturalist' one in question.

4. Amongst those emphasising the cultural dynamics of globalism are the contributors to the volume edited by Featherstone (1990). These tend to see cultural globalisation as intimately related to that of capitalism. But for Bergesen (1990), pre-capitalist culture provided the conditions for the creation of the modern inter-state system and therefore, presumably, for capitalist globalisation. For Leslie Sklair, the 'culture-ideology of consumerism' is one of the three defining characteristics of globalisation (Sklair 1991:72–81). Walter Truett Anderson (1990: Part 5) presents global civilisation as so far representing a show one can watch rather than a civilisation in which all do, or might, participate (232–3). Understanding culture in its broadest sense, as knowledge, we can find Manuel Castells (1992:207) talking of a 'new informational mode of development', suggesting that 'knowledge' is replacing capital and labour as the source of productivity (206).

5. For critical accounts of global communication, concerned with its possible transformation and humanisation, see Frederick 1992, Mowlana 1986, Waterman 1990.

6. The three-part triangle and spectrum turn out on closer inspection to be binaries also. East–West–South actually suggests opposition/attraction on each of the three axes. The insertion of a 'semi-periphery' into the other figure turns a binary opposition into a spectrum but no more undermines the polar logic of the original than would the addition of a 'semi-core'.

7. Giddens' 'international division of labour' seems in any case an eccentric way of expressing the global implications of industrialism, itself specified in terms of the created environment.

8. Regrettably, I have been able to find neither a feminist critique nor a feminist alternative to contemporary globalisation theory. Hall, Held and McGrew (1992), with its male-voice editorial and authorial choir, hardly mentions gender. Grant and Newland (1991) seem to be more concerned with getting gender into international relations theory than getting women out of them. Runyan and Peterson (1991) seem likewise more intent on breathing feminist life into 'realist' international relations theory than in creating an alternative to such. And Cynthia Enloe (1990), whose work represents the most powerful feminist critique of commonsense understandings of international relations, addresses herself explicitly neither to globalisation nor to theory more generally. For an interesting comment on such feminist theories, see Robertson (1992:105–8).

9. A similar point was also made to me by Argentinean social–movement specialist, Elizabeth Jelin, who, whilst herself evidently sympathetic to earlier versions of my argument, wondered what it could mean to that majority of the poor in Buenos Aires who never move beyond a five kilometer radius from their homes. We will have to address this crucial problem.
10. The theoretical basis for a radical global politics of time is provided by Jeremy Rifkin's *Time Wars* (1987). Rifkin considers this struggle to be the 'primary conflict in human history'. It is certainly a vital one. He sees it also as cross-cutting traditional conflicts between Right and Left (a classical spatial metaphor). Faster, he argues, does not mean better, it only means more efficiency for those who stand at the top of the social hierarchy. The growing tension between natural or body time and what he calls artificial time, is now being increasingly challenged by movements that say, at least implicitly, 'slow is beautiful'. He spells out political implications for the workplace (235–6) as well as for other domains.

11. The first two arguments below are taken from Waterman 1993a.

12. The case I have in mind is a successful strike against 'outsourcing' at the Lordstown plant of General Motors in Ohio, USA. As one commentator pointed out:

   For a union to specify which plant will take the brunt of a sales slump is unprecedented and seems likely to accentuate – rather than alleviate – rivalry between competing workforces. It could well put a dent in future efforts at international solidarity. (Slaughter 1992:5)

13. Not, therefore, in a country like the United Kingdom. I recently scanned a wide national and international range of revolutionary socialist publications in a British bookshop – a depressing experience. There were so many of them, so like each other, with so little to say, especially about the proletarian and socialist internationalism that each claimed to best understand and truly represent. One of them was presenting a carefully sanitised image of Peru's Shining Path Communists – itself a demonstration of what happens to a socialism that isolates itself and its followers from other social movements and socialists nationally and internationally. The papers reminded me of a riddle: 'It sits in a corner and gets smaller and smaller. What is it?' The answer in this case is 'a group of r-r-revolutionary socialists with a journal'. An alternative image might be the Cheshire Cat in *Alice in Wonderland*. In the wonderland of revolutionary socialism the last thing to disappear is the newspaper...and its doctrine on the inevitability of international proletarian revolution.

14. The traditional question (referring to the dispute between Stalin and Trotsky) was 'Is it possible to build socialism in one country?'. In the East Europe of the Stalin era there were both optimistic and pessimistic replies: 'We don't know: no one has ever tried', or 'Yes, but it's better to live in another one'.

15. Elsewhere, Held (1991a:153) has distinguished two types of international agency. The first is the technical, efficient and non-controversial, providing simple extensions to services offered by nation-states – such as the International Telecommunications Union. The second type, occupied with key questions of global resources, have been highly politicised, like the UN, World Bank, etc. It is interesting to note that it is precisely the ITU that is identified for its undemocratic control over information policy by Hamelink (1990). Held points out that industrial bodies have recently changed their status within the ITU from being observers to members of its key consultative committees. In a globalised world, bodies like the ITU cannot, in other words, be simple extensions of nation-states, nor efficient (except by their own dubious criteria), and they only remain uncontroversial until their immense power, and the collusion within them of powerful states and multinationals, is revealed by such campaigns as that proposed by Hamelink (1990):

What I propose is the setting up of an international coalition of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) that are active in such fields as human rights, consumer protection, peace, gender, race, communication, research and the environment. The main purpose of such a coalition should be to define and articulate civil concerns in the
appropriate multilateral fora [...] A first step in the civil initiative would be the convening of an international conference of interested INGOs...This conference would begin to formulate a Charter for the Protection of Citizen Concerns in Global Communications.

16. The problem has found political expression in current debates about the European Community. This has been trying to manage it, from the top, by using the a concept of 'subsidiarity' incomprehensible to most outside its own charmed circles. So far use of this term seems to have only increased public suspicion of the 'Brussels Bureaucracy'.

17. One needs, on the other hand, to guard against the notion that all wisdom, energy and transformatory power is concentrated in the locality. In John Friedmann's concept of 'alternative development', the focus is on the local territorial community, but he himself warns us that small and local is not necessarily beautiful (Friedmann 1992:139-43).

18. This is the mistake of Samir Amin (1988) who, between the Scylla of Eurocentrism and the Charybdis of Thirdworldism, pleads for a 'Truly Universal Culture'. The nature of this can evidently be found by examining the tea-leaves of neo-Marxist political economy. Not only does political-economy tell us that 'Socialism is at the end of this long tunnel' (152), but the 'primary contradiction' of neo-Marxism tells us that: 1) the initiative for the creation of a socialist universal culture rests with people in one world area only, 'the peoples of the periphery' (149); and 2) that their route to the socialist universalist stage lies beyond an unavoidably nationalist 'national popular democratic' one! Amin's problem seems to be that, whilst fascinated by Europe, its socialist thinkers, labour and social movements, he has a manichean, imperialism-fixated, worldview. This requires him to find universal emancipatory agency amongst the masses of the periphery (the actual political beliefs and behaviour of whom he hardly even refers to). He thus reproduces a myth of the revolutionary peripheral masses every bit as romantic as that of the noble savage of the 18th century European imagination. His message is therefore more likely to appeal, for better or worse, to romantic intellectuals of the centre or periphery than the prosaic masses of either.

19. The problem is revealed in this presentation of the matter by 'alternative developmentalist' John Friedmann (1992:166), even if he does not serve the Bank:

It does not come as a surprise...that the World Bank has created an office dealing with environmental questions and has begun to assess its projects in environmental terms and even to make loans for environmental education...Or that it is concerned with such questions as 'making the poor credit-worthy'...And the World Bank is not alone in its receptivity to the concerns of an alternative development....Although mainstream economic doctrine continues to prevail, it is increasingly being challenged. In truly dialectical fashion, the counter-hegemonic model must work its way into the mainstream and there begin the long process of transforming both the mainstream and itself.

Now, I discovered, whilst still a Communist, that 'dialectical processes' were the Communist word for God. I am not at all sure that I like dialectical processes that hover over events, blessing them, rather than underlying emancipatory attitudes and informing transformatory strategies. That the World Bank adapts itself to the ecological movement is an indication of the strength of the latter, but also creates a major continuing problem for it.

20. It is curious that workers and/or unions should become the disappearing, absent or negative Other of 'alternative', 'radical-democratic' and 'post-modern' discourse (see Friedmann 1992, Hall, Held and McGrew 1992). Or perhaps it is not curious at all.
critique of this kind of dismissal by ‘post-industrial utopians’, such as Gorz and Bahro is made by Frankel (1987:206–226).

21. The relationship between the trade-unions and the ILO has been highly ambiguous. In the first place, these are government-approved unions. In the second place, their presence within the ILO implies acceptance of the liberal-pluralist ideology of tripartism. Whether, finally, the ILO advances, reflects or constrains autonomous labour self-organisation internationally is a matter requiring investigation.

22. Billington (1980:312) misleadingly suggests that Pierre Leroux ‘coined the word solidarity’. This despite his own reference to Hayward (1959) who reveals its presence in pre-Revolutionary French jurisprudence and suggests its basis in Roman and Greek law. Hayward, on the other hand, ignores French 19th century revolutionary socialist doctrine and practice. This is, presumably, because of his interest in the origins of solidarisme. Solidarism, however, is not to be written off, solidarismo being a significant national-corporatist trade-union tendency today at least in some Central American countries.

23. Which explains the rapidity and ease with which the trade-union internationalism of World War II years was turned into its opposite. The international collaboration was largely an echo of the wartime alliance of states against Nazi Germany. Once this broke up, the traditional ideological conflicts between the Western unions (and even between the Americans and the rest of the West) once again came to the fore. For scholarly interpretations of this period see (Koch-Baumgarten 1988, MacShane 1992, Weiler 1988).

24. Done with panache by Terry Eagleton (1990). Says Eagleton, embroidering on the argument concerning the blacks:

Rorty's case here seems to me unworkably global... It is almost as though 'Americaness' operates here as some sort of meta-discourse or metaphysical essence, conflating into some unitary phenomenon the vast variety of creeds, life-styles, skin-colours, and so on which go to compose the United States. Better, surely, to found one's ethics on a genuine localism, such as, for example, the city block. This is still perhaps a little on the homogenising side... One could demonstrate compassion towards those in the next apartment, for example, while withholding it from those a mile down the street. (84)

Unfortunately, Eagleton is not interested in giving us his alternative to Rorty on solidarity, being more concerned to re-assert the revolutionary role of a proletariat,

so objectively located within the capitalist mode of production, trained, organised and unified by that very system, as to be able to take it over. (90)

It may therefore be well that Eagleton does not define international solidarity: it would presumably have to be best represented by his entirely theoretical proletariat.

25. I think it is possible to take account of post-modernist arguments – or analytical techniques – but without such a defensive adjustment. This would seem to be the posture of Nancy Hartsock (1987) in a critique of earlier work of Rorty. She first recognises that his attack on a transcendental knower with privileged access to truth seems to favour those thus marginalised, and to allow these others a place in philosophical conversation. At the same time, however, she notes that he insists that these others respect the rules of such conversation. She concludes that
despite its appearance of allowing space for many voices in the conversation, the effect of ideas like this is to smuggle back in the authority of the transcendental ego. (91)

The more general limitations of what one might call fundamentalist post-modernism are indicated, in the process of a discussion of the ethics of development theory and action, by Stuart Corbridge 1991:28-9):

[T]here is within post-modernism an inconsistency and a playfulness which might promote an unhealthy politics of voyeurism. By refusing a commitment to speak for others, post-modernism is in danger of allowing a politics of deconstruction – of pointing up the various linguistic tropes by which the West has imprisoned its Others – to stand in place of (as opposed to in relation to) a more grounded politics of engagement/transformation...Post-modernism can seduce us into believing that the transitory nature of the ‘post-modern’ world is accessible only to a discourse which seeks to mimic its seeming incoherence. It is a seduction we should be wary of.

26. I share Mary Hartsock’s belief that Marxism has represented a falsely universalistic theory:

That is, Marxism’s race-blind and gender-blind categories rely on false assumptions about the homogeneity of interests and experience in the working class across lines of race and gender. In turn, these assumptions about homogeneity reflect and express the interests and experience of the dominant group – in this case the white, male, industrial worker [...] I want to argue that one reason for the failure to develop viable social movements has been that too many strategies rest on falsely universalistic premises. (Hartsock 1987: 84)

I would only add here that Marxism did not express the interests and experience of the white, male, industrial worker either. If it had, then surely these would have identified themselves with it in larger proportions and for longer periods than has historically been the case.

27. Except, surely, for self-limitation, since these movements, which are re-actionary where not simply reactionary, customarily do claim to represent everybody and to occupy the total available social space.

28. There are other limiting assumptions in Collier’s paper. One is the archaic notion of a homogeneous working class. And, indeed, that it now forms the majority of humankind (77). Another is his belief that ‘contradictory class locations’ applies to ordinary workers in neo-imperialist countries – rather than to middle-class wage-earners like himself (see Wright 1976:37). A last one is that he, as author, does not form part of the same analytical and ethical field as his subjects, thus projecting himself, in traditional bourgeois academic fashion, as a disembodied intelligence and the articulator of an advanced morality. These are all regrettable shortcomings, but not fatal ones. (I live in hope that critics will say the same of shortcomings of mine).

29. I do not wish to be coy about the personal aspect, since I have always found it difficult to separate it from the professional and the political parts of my life. I intend to write about this at more length on another occasion, either as part of a work on ‘The Red Internationalists’ or independently. The first part of my ‘Itinerary of an Internationalist’
is being published (Waterman 1993b) but has been compressed from a longer draft and
only goes up to around 1970.

30. More bitter ironies of internationalism here. Pedro Huilca was assassinated less than one
month after I had met a North American trotskyist, who had just returned from Peru with
what I believe to have been the first-ever appeal for the dispatch of a US labour
delegation. This was to support union struggles against the authoritarian regime of
President Fujimori. I expressed some shock that his proposal contained no mention of
Sendero – the most violent current threat to labour and democratic movements in Peru.
He said 1) that the regime was the ‘main enemy’, 2) that although their tactics were
mistaken, Sendero were in some sense ‘our terrorists’, and 3) that armed struggle was the
only possible strategy for liberating Peru. It is evident that this man (and, possibly, his
Peruvian counterparts) was operating with traditional left notions of liberation, of
internationalism and solidarity. I would like to hope that the murder of Huilca, if not my
counter-arguments, have given him cause to reflect.
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