MY PARADIGM OR YOURS?
ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT, POST-DEVELOPMENT,
REFLEXIVE DEVELOPMENT

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

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Abstract. The alternative approaches to development considered are alternative development, emerging from ‘another development’ in the 1970s, and the more recent position of ‘post development’, or alternatives to development. Alternative development has been concerned with redefining the goals of development and with introducing alternative practices of development - participatory and people-centred. Arguably in both respects it has been successful, in the sense that mainstream development is increasingly moving away from the preoccupation with growth toward a people-centred definition of development, particularly in the form of human development. This raises the question in what way alternative development remains distinguishable from mainstream development - as a roving criticism, a development style, a profile of alternative positions regarding development agency, methodology, epistemology? Increasingly the claim is that alternative development represents an alternative paradigm. The idea of an alternative paradigm is problematic, first because whether paradigms apply to social science is questionable, second because in development the concern is with policy frameworks rather than explanatory frameworks, third because there are different views on whether a paradigm break with conventional development is desirable, and fourth because the actual divergence in approaches to development is narrowing. Here it is argued that there is a meaningful alternative development profile or package but that there is no alternative development paradigm nor should there be. Mainstream development is not what it used to be and it may be argued that the key question is rather whether growth and production are considered within or outside the people-centred development approach and whether this could be rhymed with the structural adjustment programmes followed by the international financial institutions. Post-development is interpreted as a neotraditionalist reaction against modernity. More enabling as a perspective, it is argued, is reflexive development, in which critique of science is viewed as part of development politics.

Sections/ Keywords. 1 Alternative development. 1.1 Alternative development profile. 1.2 Alternative development paradigm. Agency. NGOs. New politics. Endogenous development. Ethnodevelopment. Methodology. Epistemology. Indigenous knowledge. Development cooperation. 1.3 Paradigm politics. 2 Mainstream development. 3 Post-development. 3.1 Alternatives to development. 4 Reflexive development. 5 Conclusion.

Human nature being what it is, while everyone likes to be a social engineer, few like to be the objects of social engineering. Ashis Nandy (1989: 271)

This is an inquiry into critical currents in development thinking. The objective is to go beyond the fraternity of rhetorical consensus in criticizing mainstream development and to hold the claims and aspirations of these critical positions themselves against the light. The focus is not only on the critical but also on the affirmative part of these positions. This exercise is not meant as a critique for critique’s sake; the question is what these positions tell us analytically and where they lead us in terms of policy.

My views on alternative development have been changing over the years. Initially my impression was that alternative development (hereafter: AD) presents a loose profile of critical sensibilities and alternative practices that leaves so many areas open that its claim to present an alternative model or paradigm to mainstream development thinking is exaggerated and misplaced. Further delving and
reading enthusiastic accounts (such as Korten 1990, Max-Neef 1991, Rahman 1993, Carmen 1996) persuades me that there is a profound and principled challenge to mainstream developmentalism. Possibly this can take the form of an AD paradigm, but closer reflection on this position and its ramifications causes me to question this. I wonder not only how such an AD paradigm should be conceived, in terms of analytics and politics, but whether thinking in terms of paradigms is appropriate at all.

Rather than write a paper which pursues a single line of argument I have decided to keep these changing positions and moments of reflection in the paper. Doing so enables me to look at AD from more angles and probe further than if I were just presenting a single case. Others may have experienced a similar process of questioning. The structure of the paper, then, roughly follows the logic of these three positions: 1. AD as a loose profile, 2. AD as a paradigm, 3. a post-paradigmatic way of thinking about AD. Each of these are different ways of constructing AD, the field of which it is part and the relationship between AD and mainstream development. Each of these have their chemistry, reasoning and limitations. During this stroll past AD positions my own views shift from critical to supportive to revisionist. Advancing three arguments allows me to say more than just presenting one, nevertheless the third position is the one I arrive at by traveling through the others.

The argument runs as follows. AD has been concerned with introducing alternative practices and redefining the goals of development. Arguably this has been successful, in the sense that key elements of both have been adopted in mainstream development. Even if not consistently practised it is now widely accepted that development efforts are more successful if they are shared and participated in by the community. NGOs now play key roles on the ground and in development cooperation. This success reflects not simply the strength of NGOs and grassroots politics but also the 1980s roll-back of the state, the advance of market forces and the breakdown of regulation. All the same, the goals of development have been generally redefined. It is now widely accepted that development is not simply a matter of GDP growth but that human development is a more appropriate goal and measure of development. By the same token, this means that AD has become less distinct from conventional development discourse and practice since alternatives have been absorbed in mainstream development (hereafter: MD). In the context of AD several pertinent positions and methodologies have been developed - views on the agency, methods and objectives of development. Arguably, however, AD has failed to develop a clear perspective on micro-macro relations, an alternative macro approach, and a coherent theoretical position. Yet it is often claimed that there is an AD paradigm. But is the concept of paradigm appropriate to contemporary social science? Besides, is formulating the relationship between AD and MD in terms of a paradigm break substantively tenable and politically sensible?

These reflections on AD are followed by queries on mainstream development, post-development and alternatives to development, and a closing argument on reflexive development. MD is increasingly caught on the horns of a dilemma between the aims of human and social development, and the constraints of structural adjustment and global monetarism represented by the international financial institutions. Arguably, in the 1990s, unlike the 1970s, the big hiatus no longer runs between MD and AD, but between human development and structural adjustment or, in other words, between two forms of MD.

Post-development articulates meaningful sensiblities but does not have a future programme. The core problem posed in post-development is the question of modernity. Post-development, in my view, is a neo-traditionalist reaction against modernity. However, to be 'for' or 'against' modernity is far too simple a position. This paper concludes with an argument on reflexive development, a new position developed as a corollary of reflexive modernity and sketched in outline. There are different stages
and arguably different kinds of modernity, and reflexive development offers a critical negotiation of development, short of rejectionism.

1. Alternative development
To start with there are different ways of conceiving of what AD is about and what its role is. AD can be viewed as a roving critique of MD, shifting in position as MD shifts, as a series of alternative proposals and methodologies that are loosely interconnected, or it can be viewed as an alternative development paradigm, implying a definite theoretical break with MD. It can be viewed as concerned with local development, with alternative practices on the ground, or as an overall institutional challenge to MD, and part of a global alternative. In many discussions this question of the status and scope of AD remains unsettled.

An elementary distinction, following Sheth (1987), runs between structuralist and normative approaches to development alternatives. This involves two basic differences. Structuralist approaches, such as dependency theory and the global Keynesian reformism of the new international economic order, emphasize structural macroeconomic change - just as mainstream modernization thinking does - whereas AD emphasizes agency, in the sense of people’s capacity to effect social change. The second difference is that dependency critiques of mainstream development do not usually question development per se but only dependent development (or underdevelopment).

A basic question is whether AD is an alternative way of achieving development, broadly sharing the same goals as mainstream development but using different means, participatory and people-centred. It would seem this way if we consider the enormous increase of development funds being channeled or rechanneled through NGOs during the past two decades (which now exceed the total annual disbursements through the IMF and World Bank). This suggests ample peaceful coexistence and continuity between MD and AD. Yet the usual claim is that AD refers to an alternative model of development. Let us consider how this claim runs.

In the 1970s dissatisfaction with mainstream development crystallized into an alternative, people-centred approach to development. According to the 1975 report of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation ‘What Now? Another Development’, development should be ‘geared to the satisfaction of needs’, ‘endogenous and self-reliant’ and ‘in harmony with the environment’. Whether this was meant to be an alternative practice of development apart from the mainstream or whether it was also to change MD was not quite settled. This approach has been carried further under the heading of alternative development. Over the years AD has been reinforced by and associated with virtually any form of criticism of mainstream developmentalism, such as anti-capitalism, green thinking, feminism, eco-feminism, democratization, new social movements, Buddhist economics, cultural critiques, and poststructuralist analysis of development discourse.

‘Alternative’ generally refers to three spheres - agents, methods and objectives or values of development. According to Marc Nerfin (1977) of the International Foundation for Development Alternatives, AD is the terrain of ‘Third System’ or citizen politics, the importance of which is apparent in view of the failed development efforts of government (the prince or first system) and economic power (the merchant or second system). Often this seems to be the key point: AD is development from below. In this context, ‘below’ refers both to ‘community’ and to NGOs. In several respects AD revisits Community Development of the 1950s and 60s. Community Development goes back to American social work which via British colonialism entered colonial development and in the 1950s supplemented modernization efforts (see Carmen 1996: 46-47). This genealogy accounts for the ambiguity of some of the key terms used in AD, such as ‘participation’.
AD is frequently identified with development-by-NGOs (an example is Drabek 1987). But given the wide variety of NGOs and NGO practices, the equation ‘AD is what NGOs do’ would obviously be inadequate. NGO ideology is organization-led and too limited to account for AD. AD involves further distinguishing elements with respect to development methodology (participatory, endogenous, self-reliant) and objectives (geared to basic needs). But is saying that development must be undertaken from within and geared to basic needs an adequate way of redefining development, or is it only a polemical position? The alternative referred to is alternative in relation to state and market, but not necessarily in relation to the general discourse of developmentalism. It would be difficult to maintain that AD has developed a theory, although among others Hettne (1990) has tried to make such a case, arguing that it represents a counterpoint to mainstream development.¹

Thus Friberg and Hettne (1985: 207) argue that ‘Opposed and dialectically related to the predominant paradigm, there has been a Green Counterpoint’. They relate this historically to the ‘populist tradition’, including narodnism, criticisms of the division of labour, the ‘return to Gemeinschaft’, as well as ‘Third World populism’, Gandhi, Maoism and Buddhist economics. Their premise is a radical questioning of development: ‘it is the development process itself which engenders most of our problems... If we have been floating along the stream of evolution, we are now starting to doubt whether it will carry us to the promised land. Instead we hear the roaring from the approaching waterfall. Almost all the traditional indicators of development have changed their emotional loading from plus to minus’ (Friberg and Hettne 1985: 215).

A critique of capitalism is part of this perspective: ‘The capitalist economy is in fact a parasite upon the non-capitalist economy’, capitalism is a form of ‘shifting cultivation’ (233-4). They anticipate the ‘possibility of a slow decline over the coming 500 years without any particular dramatic events as the turning point’ (234). They envision a post-capitalist world, to which there are two different roads: the Red road of continued modernization toward a socialist world order, and the Green road of de-modernization, informed by the values of cultural identity, self-reliance, social justice and ecological balance (234-5). The ‘global Green movement’, in their view, derives strength from three different sources: traditionalists in the peripheries, marginalized people at the middle level, and post-materialists in affluent societies at the centres. Nations founded upon ancient nations or civilizations such as China, Iran, Egypt, Vietnam and also also Mexico, Turkey, Japan and India can be ‘seen as the main sources, actual or potential, of alternatives to the Western model of development’ (238).

This has been quoted extensively because it shows how quickly sensibilities date, or at any rate their articulation, and because it brightly illustrates features that run through various forms of AD thinking.

- The tendency to represent AD as a counterpoint that unites all dissident social forces critical of development, which in turn reflects an underlying desire to forge a Grand Coalition of opposition forces.
- The tendency to equate development with modernization and AD with de-modernization, premised on the ‘incompatibility between modernization and human development’ (Friberg and Hettne 1985: 235).
- The tendency to view and represent AD as an alternative external to the mainstream, a counter-utopia carried by different social actors in the interstices of the mainstream and in countries supposedly outside the thrust of western developmentalism; in other words, an enclave or ‘liberated zone’ approach to AD.
- All forms of criticism of mainstream development are arraigned together as if they form a cohesive alternative, but all good things together do not necessarily make a great thing. Friberg and Hettne (1985: 220) mention ‘possible priority conflicts between the subgoals of development’ but maintain that they form a coherent whole.
This particular formulation of AD is clearly dated and marked by the 1980s upsurge of Green movements. It very much resembles the post-development perspective that has taken shape in the 1990s (discussed below). In later formulations Hettnre (1990, 1992) abandoned the de-modernization/anti-development perspective. Some of the weaknesses of this kind of position (anticipating the further discussion of post-development) are the following:

- ‘Mainstream development’ is simplified as a single, homogeneous thrust toward modernization and its diversity, complexity and adaptability are underestimated.
- While the theoretical claim is for a dialectical relationship between mainstream and alternatives, the actual argument takes the form of a simple dualistic opposition and the dialectics, the ways in which mainstream and alternatives shape and influence one another, slip out of view.
- In order to maximize the opposition between mainstream and alternative, the appeal of the mainstream to various constituencies is underestimated.

Several of these features resemble and replay the narrative of anti-capitalist opposition. The tendency to transpose forms of struggle opposing early industrial capitalism to late capitalism indicates a failure of oppositional imagination. It recycles a struggle scenario under different circumstances and envisions no path but that of rejectionism. This might be one of the problems of AD: postconventional ideas and approaches are straitjacketed in conventional political imaginaries. In the process AD is loaded with aspirations beyond its scope. Subsequent claims for AD by Hettnre and others have been more modest, while this kind of grandstanding has now taken the form of post-development. Broadly speaking, then, the development terrain seems to be marked out in three overall positions: mainstream development (which, I will argue later, is by no means a coherent position), alternative development (which itself involves a range of perspectives), and post-development.

At this point, a hostile criticism would be that inflating ‘alternative development’ this approach is pretentious because it suggests more than it can deliver, unclear because the difference between what is alternative and what is not is not clarified, and fuzzy to the point of hypocrisy because it sustains the overall rhetoric of development while suggesting the ability to generate something really different within its general aura. AD has been fashionable because it came upon a crisis in development thinking, because it matched general doubts about the role of the state, both among liberals and from the point of view of human rights. The ‘alternative’ discourse was a way of being progressive without being overly radical and without endorsing a clear ideology; it could be embraced by progressives and conservatives who both had axes to grind with the role of states. It was a safe, low-risk way of being progressive and its structural unclarity ensured broad endorsement. It was a postmodern way of being post-ideological. It was everyone’s way out except that of the last bureaucrat.

Hettnre (1990) presents Another Development as a combination of basic needs, self-reliance, sustainable and endogenous development. Attractive as this mélange looks it also presents a problem. All good things put together do not necessarily add up to a paradigm. Part of this is the problem of articulation, following Laclau and Mouffe (1985). To the extent that each of these discourses has its own logic and autonomy, there is no guarantee that they will blend well together. Their actual course depends on their articulation with other discourses, which may turn out to be progressive or conservative as the case may be. There is no preordained outcome to the politics of hegemony. At best this gives us an unstable articulation, which is too weak a basis to constitute an ‘alternative model’. Ethnodevelopment may clash with ecodvelopment, or may take an ethnonationalist turn. Self-reliance may require economies of scale which clash with ethnodevelopment. Feminism may clash with indigenous culture. Etc. Running the risk of flippancy, one might say that the kind of world in which AD works is a world that does not need it. Thus, while pertinent as an orientation, it is too unstable and narrow to serve as a ‘model’.

5
Hettne seeks to establish a sharp boundary between MD and AD but fails to do so. Hettne’s schematic representation of MD theory versus counterpoint theory overrates the coherence and consistency of ‘development’. Besides if AD is defined as a counterpoint to MD, it is reduced to a reactive position: if MD shifts, so would AD. Furthermore, the AD elements mentioned by Hettne are now no longer distinctive: basic needs, participation, sustainability have long been adopted in MD.2

The problem is that there is no clear line of demarcation between mainstream and alternative: alternatives are co-opted and yesterday’s alternatives are today’s institutions. The difference between mainstream and alternative, then, is a conjunctural difference, not a difference in principle, although it tends to be presented as if it is. In itself ‘alternative’ has no more meaning than ‘new’ in advertising. With Nandy (1989) we might term this the problem of the ‘standardization of dissent’. In this sense AD replicates ‘the value of the new’, which is a pathos intrinsic to modernity (Vattimo 1988); as such AD partakes of the momentum of modernity and the everlasting hope that the future will redeem the present.

So far, then, it would be difficult to claim that AD represents a paradigm break in development for it lacks sufficient theoretical cohesion. AD reflects certain normative orientations, follows disparate theoretical strands, is in flux, not fully developed, and its status remains unclear. Part of the polemics of development and situated on its cutting edge, it is made up as one goes along and remains intrinsically controversial and unsettled. Understandings of AD vary widely: whichever aspect of MD the spotlight is on, AD is held up as its counterpoint. If MD is viewed, as it has been through most of the career of modern developmentalism, as state-led, then AD is associated with the informal sector, social movements and NGOs. If on the other hand MD is viewed under the sign of liberalization, as has been the case since the 1980s wave of neoliberalism, then the alternative becomes … the state. Thus, under the heading of Alternative Development Strategies in sub-Saharan Africa, Stewart, Lall and Wangwe (1993) argue for import-substitution industrialization and state protection for industry, a strategy which, in other times and contexts, was itself part of MD repertoires.

This variability is intrinsic to AD to the extent that AD is by definition reactive, contrapuntal. At a time when there is widespread admission that several development decades have brought mainly failure, or at least many failures, while on the other hand the development industry continues unabated, there is continuous and heightened self-criticism in development circles, a constant search for alternatives, a tendency towards self-correction and a persistent pattern of cooptation of whatever attractive or fashionable alternatives present themselves. Accordingly the turn-over of alternatives becoming mainstream has speeded up; the dialectics of AD and MD have accelerated.

Green thinking about sustainability, a radical position 15 or years ago, has long been institutionalized as ‘sustainable development’. The informal sector, a twilight zone unnoticed by mainstream developers mesmerized by the state, has been put in the limelight by Hernan de Soto (1989) and embraced by establishment development agencies. The accompanying message of deregulation and government roll-back of course beautifully matched the prevailing neoliberal outlook. NGOs, after decades of marginality, have become major channels of development cooperation. Governments go nongovernmental by setting up Government Organized Non Government Organizations. In countries such as Mozambique and Bangladesh the resources of NGOs, domestic and international, exceed those at the disposal of government. Women’s concerns, once an outsider criticism, have been institutionalized by making women and gender preferential parts of the development package. Criticisms of foreign aid as development assistance has led to its being renamed ‘development cooperation’. Capacity-building which used to be missing in conventional development support is now built in as a major objective. Mega-summits - in Rio, Cairo, Copenhagen, Beijing, Istanbul - have been fora for the alignment of official and unofficial discourses.
In other words, forms of AD have become institutionalized as part of MD, and under some circumstances, have become or overtaken MD, to the point that MAD, or mainstream alternative development, might not be an odd notion. This turn of affairs is not at all incidental but a logical function of the way the overall development process is developing.

We can regard AD either as an open-ended poser, or as a set of ideas and practices which in time have themselves been institutionalized, and while critically scrutinizing the latter we can keep open the former. The advantage of AD as an open-ended poser is that it provides a flexible position of critique. Of course this principle can be adopted without any reference to ‘alternative development’, rather development itself can be defined as ‘constant consideration of alternatives’ (e.g. Coetzee 1989: 11). The disadvantage is that without a theory AD is like a ship without a rudder.

1.1 Alternative development paradigm

While much AD thinking makes a diffuse impression, this has gradually been making place for a sharper and more assertive positioning on account of several trends. 1. The enormous growth of NGOs in numbers and influence generates a growing demand for strategy and therefore theory. 2. The importance of environmental concerns and sustainability has weakened the economic growth paradigm and given a boost to alternative and ecological economics. 3. The glaring failures of several development decades add to unsettling the mainstream paradigm of growth. 4. The growing challenges to the Bretton Woods institutions lead to the question whether these criticisms are merely procedural and institutional (for more participation and democratization) or whether they involve fundamentally different principles.

These diverse trends generate various lines of tension. One line of friction runs between the general AD preoccupation with local and endogenous development and, on the other hand, the growing demand for global alternatives. Globalization under the sign of the unfettered market is denounced because it clashes with endogenous development, while the mushrooming of NGOs itself is a manifestation of the growing momentum of global civil society, in other words represents another arm of globalization. Another line of friction runs between diffuse AD and an AD paradigm, the former implying a soft and the latter a hard boundary with MD, and theoretical openness or closure. These tensions find expression in more or less subtle differences among AD positions.

In view of the holistic aspirations of AD it would be desirable for disparate AD knowledge pools to be grouped together; yet in view of the different functions that AD fulfills - animating local development, guiding international NGO strategy, informing global alternatives - this will not necessarily happen. AD serves dispersed discourse communities. International NGOs tend to look both ways, at local grassroots development and at global alternatives. These different functions overlap and intersperse and are not necessarily incompatible, but rhyming them requires making them explicit, which is not often done in the first place, and an effort at synthesis, which requires more reflection on local/ global and micro/ mega interconnections than is common in most AD literature.

Oddly, in view of the claim to an AD paradigm and its growing appeal, attempts to theoretically develop AD have been relatively few. There may be several reasons why AD remains relatively undeveloped theoretically. AD tends to be practice oriented rather than theoretically inclined. The world of AD is not a ‘library world’. Part of AD logic is that as development is people-centred, therefore genuine development knowledge is also people’s knowledge and what counts is local rather than abstract expert knowledge. With the local orientation of AD comes a certain regional dispersion in the literature, which looks like a scattered archipelago of primary local knowledges, with little overarching reflection. Besides AD travels under many aliases - appropriate development, participatory development, people-centred development, human scale development, people’s self-development, autonomous development, holistic development; and many elements relevant to AD are
developed, not under the banner of AD but under specific headings, such as participation, participatory action research, grassroots movements, NGOs, empowerment, conscientization, liberation theology, democratization, citizenship, human rights, development ethics, eco-feminism, cultural diversity, etc. Such dispersion does not facilitate generating a coherent body of theory. Many AD sources do not in any methodical way refer to one another but keep on generating alternatives from the ground up, in the process reinventing the wheel without zeroing in on fundamentals or generating ‘expert opinion’ and debate. In part this may be a matter of the ‘alternative’ character of AD, alternative in the sense of a habitus of subversion, an intuitive aversion to method, to systematization and codification, which implies a distrust of ‘experts’ and even of theory itself. By the same token, this weakens the claim to deliver a different paradigm.

AD is not necessarily anti-theoretical but it is intellectually segmented. The work of several AD authors can be contextualized in terms of their social location. Thus, David Korten is an NGO strategist who contributes both to local development and global alternatives. John Friedmann is primarily concerned with local and regional planning. Anisur Rahman mainly addresses local and grassroots development. Manfred Max-Neef and Hazel Henderson are alternative economists, the former engaged with local development and the latter with global alternatives. Training, teaching and research are other contexts in which AD is being articulated, across a wide spectrum from small local institutes to university programmes.4

While AD is often referred to as an AD model or paradigm, which implies an emphatic theoretical claim, what is delivered on this score is quite uneven. Critics of the Bretton Woods institutions as bulwarks of mainstream developmentalism increasingly claim to present a paradigm shift in development. The same elements keep coming back: ‘equitable, participatory and sustainable human development’ (e.g. Arruda 1994: 139). ‘The new approach to development includes the values of equity, participation and environmental sustainability, as well as improving physical well-being’ (Griesgraber and Gunter 1996: xiv). Is this sufficient as the basis of a new paradigm? It concerns the ‘how to’s’ of development rather than the nature of development as such. It identifies aspirations rather than attributes of development. As such it can easily be ‘added on’ to MD discourse and indeed often is. Since MD nowadays embraces and advertises the same values, the outcome is a rhetorical consensus rather than a paradigm break.

Rahman (1993) contrasts a consumerist view of development, which treats people as passive recipients of growth, with a creative view, according to which people are the creative forces of development, the means as well as the end of development, for development is defined as people’s self-development. This refers to a set of normative orientations, rather than to a different explanatory framework. Such elements may add up to a distinctive AD profile but not to a paradigm. The distinguishing element of AD should be found in the redefinition of development itself and not merely in its agency, modalities, procedures or aspirations.

Dissatisfaction with development-as-growth is an increasingly common position, not merely since the Club of Rome’s report. Yet if development is not about growth, what is it? One option is to redefine development as social transformation (e.g. Addo et al 1985). In itself development as transformation is vague because it is like saying that development is change - change from what to what, what kind of change? ‘Good change’ according to Robert Chambers. Institutional transformation adds some concreteness but still needs context. Korten (1990) defines development as transformation towards justice, inclusiveness and sustainability. Again these are normative clauses, but ethics of development (e.g. Goulet 1992) does not necessarily add up to redefining development. Alternatively, might the character of AD be found in a distinctive development style? Max-Neef (1991: 86) mentions ‘avoiding bureaucratization’ and for Korten the surest way to kill a social movement is to throw money at it. But the downside of this position is the romanticization of social movements (as in post-development).
It may be argued that theory is a central concern of AD, for it is about the redefinition of development. Korten (1990: 113) notes that ‘it is impossible to be a true development agency without a theory that directs action to the underlying causes of underdevelopment. In the absence of a theory, the aspiring development agency almost inevitably becomes instead merely an assistance agency engaged in relieving the more visible symptoms of underdevelopment through relief and welfare measures.’ Indeed, ‘an organization cannot have a meaningful development strategy without a development theory’ (1990: 114). Korten (1990: 67) proposes a redefinition of development as follows:

Development is a process by which the members of a society increase their personal and institutional capacities to mobilize and manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own aspirations.

The same point in different wording: ‘The heart of development is institutions and politics, not money and technology, though the latter are undeniably important’ (144). ‘The most fundamental issues of development are, at their core, issues of power’ (214). The kind of issues that Gunnar Myrdal raised years ago in An Asian Drama (1968), issues of land ownership and distribution of power, issues that during development decades have been papered over by community development and other fads, which made little or no difference in relation to poverty, these fundamentals are now put centre-stage.

This position may be distinctive enough to establish a break with conventional development. For Korten it constitutes a break with the various approaches that coopt alternative values by ‘adding them on’ to the growth model. ‘The basic needs strategies that gained prominence during the 1970s, and are still advocated by organizations such as UNICEF, are a variant of, usually an add-on to, a classical growth-centered development strategy’ (1990: 44). The same applies to the approaches that have been concerned with giving structural adjustment a ‘human face’. ‘The basic services for which they pleaded were best characterized as a facade, putting a more palatable face on actions that are based on flawed analysis and theory, rather than coming forward in support of more basic, but politically controversial reforms’ (45). Also the Brundtland report is criticized for combining sustainability and growth in the notion of ‘sustainable growth’ (166).

A further question is whether, beyond an alternative definition of development, AD has a distinctive methodology, epistemology, policy agenda. A review of AD positions on questions of agency, endogenous development, indigenous knowledge and development cooperation, may serve to fill in and give substance to an AD paradigm or profile and also to detect whether there are contradictory elements among them. Since the literature is extensive, uneven and dispersed this is only a provisional review.

Agency
With regard to agency there have been marked changes over time in AD thinking. Generally AD combines the aims of development and emancipation. As development ‘from below’ it is part of the general concern with civil society. In 1970s AD manifestos the forces that were to carry and implement ‘another development’ were the community and informal sector, or the ‘third system’. Of the big three - state, market, society - the emphasis was entirely on society as the foundation for another development. Clearly at the time AD was a protest position against state-led development. The strength of NGO discourse on the other hand is also a weakness: neglecting the role of the state. As such the rise of NGOs may be viewed as de facto part of the neoliberal ‘counterrevolution’ in development (Toye 1987). When in the 1980s the private sector came to be viewed as the leading sector of development, the scope of AD widened to include the state. Thus Friedmann (1992) and others argue that a strong civil society and a strong state go together. A strong, activist state in this view does not necessarily mean a dominant state. In AD the role of the state is not viewed in the same way as in conventional development: the state is to act as an enabler, a facilitator of people’s self-development. For the state to perform such a role democratization is implied.
What about the third of the big three - market forces? Gradually this is being roped in, moving beyond not only anti-state but also anti-market understandings of people-centred development. 'Step-by-step we have moved to a recognition that government, business and voluntary organizations all have essential roles in development' (Korten 1990: 95). Not only practices but prescriptions increasingly involve synergies between government, NGOs and firms, and elements such as fair trade, corporate codes, socially responsible business and banking. Thailand's Five Star Partnership Programme integrates the efforts of government, NGOs, private sector, religious communities and academic institutions to facilitate community and provincial development. Sato and Smith (1996) present this as a practice exemplar as part of an AD paradigm. A trend at the other extreme is for the market logic to take over to the point that private aid, as part of the development industry, becomes a business undertaking (Sogge 1996).

NGOs
The struggle of AD, according to Smitu Kothari (1994: 50), is 'nothing short of reversing the conquest of society by the economy'. This calls to mind Sukhamoy Chakravarty's saying that the market is a good servant but a bad master (quoted in Hetne 1992). Where the state has little autonomy in relation to business interests, foreign or domestic, social forces can operate as a countervailing power. In a situation where various forces seek to influence or control the state - strategic business groups, foreign corporate interests, multilateral agencies - organized civil society can operate as a check on the 'privatization' of the state and the public sphere.

The political economy of dependencia involved Third World intellectuals relying on the state and on the emergence of a national bourgeoisie. As intellectuals of Third World nationalism and anti-imperialism, at times they played the part of alternative mandarins. What is the political economy of AD? Which political and social forces sustain the world of everyday and really-existing alternative development? Whom does AD discourse serve? Who are funding NGOs and AD consultants? (See e.g. Gow 1991, Sogge 1996)

NGOs have become part of the development industry, another strand in the package. The rise of NGOs during the 1970s and 80s was both a byproduct of and compensation for the wave of neoliberalism (Duffield 1996). Civil society, social movements and NGOs are a mixed bag, all the more because, mushrooming amidst the breakdown of regulation (or formalization), they are unregulated themselves. Some NGOs such as church organizations were active long before the development era. There are steep differences between NGOs as public service contractors and people-oriented NGOs (e.g. Korten 1990; Edwards and Hulme 1992). NGOs suffer similar problems (bureaucratization, hierarchy, scale, corruption, dependence) as any organization. If they are sites of power outside the reach of the state they are within the reach of donors, who in turn move within the orbit of their funders, state or private, and their cultural and discursive agendas (e.g. Black 1992 about the career of Oxfam). NGOs can function as parastatals, subcontractors of the state or Governmental NGOs, but outside the channels of accountability and control. NGOs can just as well be conservative agencies, such as evangelical movements broadcasting the theology of quiescence or the prosperity gospel of individual achievement, charismatic movements propagating new forms of ritualism; not to mention agencies such as the Summer Institute of Linguistics who are on record as having served as CIA conduits.

Development NGOs have been denounced as 'new missionaries' engaged in recolonization, as 'unguided missiles' (Hanlon 1991), or as 'the new East India Company' (Burne 1995). They have been accused of neutralizing popular resistance and facilitating popular acceptance of structural adjustment (Arreloa-Lopez and Petrás 1994). NGOs can contribute to democratizing development (Clark 1991), serve as vehicles of transnational networking building global civil society (Henderson 1993), as liaisons in 'innovation networking' (Mytelka 1993), or channels of outside interference.
beyond the controls of normalized politics and international relations (e.g. African Rights 1994). The role of NGOs is now viewed with less naivety and more discrimination concerning the institutional, discursive, economic and political constraints under which they operate.

New politics
AD literature is sprinkled with pleas for unity. In an Indian context, for instance, Smitu Kothari (1994: 51) notes: 'The pervasive fragmentation of the entire democratic spectrum has to be replaced by coalescing our dispersed efforts'. In part this reflects nostalgia, not so much for Gemeinschaft but for the 'old politics' characterized by clearly divided camps and neat ideological boundaries. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) contrast this with hegemonic politics, which is characterized by unfixed identities and fragmented space, in which nodal points nonetheless matter. In hegemonic politics coalitions are not stable as in the old-time coalitions because the subjectivities are not as stable. AD may involve novel coalition politics of new and old social movements, with a view to a new convergence of concerns and interests, both in relation to local and global politics. The case for a 'convergence of radicalisms' (Shiviah 1994) fails to persuade because in these kind of pleas the interests, identities and subjectivities involved tend to be taken as static and given, rather than as being constructed in the process of articulation.

In AD, agency can be defined narrowly or broadly; it can be defined loosely, in diffuse AD, or sharply, in AD paradigm. At any rate, what is more appropriate than a static coalition politics or a new kind of political 'unity' is the idea of synergies among pluralistic actors, synergies that are flexible and mobile and do not require ideological consensus. Thus, the World Bank's NGO desk is making tripartite negotiations between government, NGOs and international institutions a feature of its approach. Defining development policy as public action (Wuyts, Mackintosh and Hewitt 1992) is an approach that involves synergies among diverse actors and across sectors.5

Endogenous development
The notion of the 'endogenous' refers to a social, cultural and symbolic space. Endogenous development implies a refutation of the view of development = modernization = westernization. Self-reliance, then, does not simply concern the means but the end of development: the goals and values of development are to be generated from within. 'Development is endogenous- there are no front runners to be followed' (Rahman 1993: 217). An implication is that modernity is viewed not as imported from without but as generated from within. Modernization then is not a matter of importing foreign models but also the 'modernization of tradition'. Imported modernization means the destruction of existing social and cultural capital - as in the cliché modernization view of tradition as 'resistance to change', modernization as the development of enclaves (rooted in colonialism) and the resulting dualistic structure.6 By contrast, modernization-from-within means the revalorization and adaptation of existing social and cultural capital. Rahman (1993) relates how traditional self-help groups in West Africa, the Naam, have taken on other functions. A broad stream of literature discusses many instances of grafting development onto 'traditional' organizations (e.g. Carmen 1996, Burne 1992, Pradervand 1989, Verhelst 1990). These instances open up our understanding of development as well as modernity. The 'modernization of tradition' releases local and popular energies in a way that the modernization approach of top-down mobilization and outside-in imposition could never achieve.

An endogenous outlook is fundamental to AD. On the other hand, endogenism is difficult to turn into a 'hard' principle. Generally the boundary between inside and outside is one of the fundamental problems of development thinking (e.g. Gordon 1991). For one thing, what is the unit of development? The conventional framework used to be the 'society' (read nation; read state), a position that was challenged by Wallerstein (1979) who argued that the actual unit of development is the 'world system' (i.e. the zone integrated by a division of labour in the production of goods necessary
for reproduction). AD introduces a diffuse range of alternative sites of endogeneity: people, community, local, grassroots. Who are the people in ‘people power’? Is it ‘people’ or ‘the people’ - in which case we are back with ‘society’? Or does it involve a class element, as in ‘popular sectors’? If endogenous means within the community, it leads to the question of ethnodevelopment (see below). If endogenous means within society, it leads to the question of globalization and the blurring of borders. External change agents or animateurs often play an important role in stimulating local processes or acting as brokers: this is another limit to endogeneity as a horizon (a point made by Friedmann 1992).

How far to take endogenism? For instance, are Islamic approaches to development part of AD? They match the basic criteria of being endogenous, geared to basic needs, participatory and sustainable. Would this also apply to Islamist grassroots and social organizing (e.g. in Egypt, Turkey, or for that matter Algeria)? The community activities of Shiv Sena in Bombay - an extreme rightwing Hindustani organization - have been praised for their alternative development efforts (Esman and Upton 1984: 8). Organizations such as the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) are also known to be effective community organizers. After endogenism the next stop may be ethnochauvinism.

**Ethnodevelopment**

Endogenous development implies that each society should find its own strategy. But what is a society? An idea originally advocated by Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1986) with reference to the indigenous peoples in Latin America, and taken up by Hettne (1990) is ethnodevelopment. In the words of Friberg and Hettne (1985: 221), the argument runs that states are ‘artificial territorial constructions’ and that ‘small communities of human beings are the ultimate actors’. ‘The concept of nation-state implies that the territorial boundaries of the state coincide with the boundaries of a culturally homogeneous nation. This is the exception rather than the rule in a world with about 1500 peoples or nations but only 150 states.’ Therefore, ‘The tribes and nations of the world are much more basic units of development, because they allow for the forging of a genuine consensus between their members. Normative convergence can only be obtained where people share a framework of social reasoning.’ (221)

Under the guise of alternative radicalism, this is not merely a nostalgic and conservative but reactionary programme. It evokes false and illusory notions of ‘consensus’ and group boundaries based on a reification of ‘ethnos’ = community. Friberg and Hettne note that ‘Modernization always implies the decline and disintegration of natural communities’ (233). Firstly, this narrows modernization to exogenous modernization, eliminates the idea of modernization-from-within and thus denies the very idea of endogenous development. Secondly, should one accept these criteria as part of AD, it would mean AD upholding the same arguments as rightwing opponents of multiculturalism in the West (and not only in the West): in the name of ‘natural communities’, immigrants can be banned; in the name of ‘cultural homogeneity’ as a condition for sharing ‘a framework of social reasoning’, multiculturalism can be declared inoperable. ‘Natural communities’ is the terminology of blood-and-soil politics. It is the kind of terminology that the followers of Hinduutva in India would embrace. Endogenous development hardened to ethnodevelopment is a programme for separate development, for neo-apartheid and Bantustan politics, a programme for inward-looking de-globalization in the age of accelerated globalization.

This is AD at its worst. It evokes the spectre of ethno-fundamentalism. The reasoning is insinuating: 1500 peoples, therefore 1500 nations-in-waiting? Once ‘genuine consensus’ among group members is the working criterion, an infinitesimal process of fissure is on the cards. In the 1990s world of ‘ethnic cleansing’ this sounds unbelievably naïve. There may be constructive ways of valorizing ethnicity, e.g. in conjunction with local culture and policies of decentralization; but a prerequisite for reconstructing ethnicity is deconstructing it, in the sense of recognizing its constructed character
(Nederveen Pieterse 1996b), and not recycling static notions such as ‘natural communities’ and blood and soil politics.

‘Green authors tend to visualize the future as a world of cooperating and federated natural communities without strong centre-periphery gradients between them.’ (Friberg and Hetne 1985: 223) A further perennial problem of visualizing a future of autonomous communities, as in Green notions of bioregionalism, is that the relationship among communities or regions, which are inevitably differentially endowed in terms of resources, is not settled (cf. Young 1991). Friberg and Hetne are not unaware of the dark side of populism and the possibility of ecofascism: they mention the resemblance of the Green movement to fascist movements in the 1930s with a similar emphasis on nature and folk culture (1985: 226).

Methodology
The hallmark of AD methodology is participation. Participatory Action Research, Rapid Rural Appraisal as well as conscientization, critical pedagogy and empowerment are further elements in the AD repertoire. These elements are not specific or exclusive to AD. They have been developed in education (e.g. McLaren 1995), liberation theology and general development studies. Arguably what is specific to AD is the local and popular context in which they are applied. Participation is a deeply problematic notion; it is an improvement on top-down mobilization, but it remains paternalistic – unless the idea of participation is radically turned around, such that governments, international institutions or NGOs would be considered as participating in people’s local development.

Epistemology
Korten (1990) mentions the phenomenon of ‘believing is seeing’, or paradigms controlling perception. We tend to select and suppress information according to our beliefs. AD in this sense claims a ‘Copernican revolution’ in understanding development. The key resource becomes not the country’s aggregate GNP but people’s creativity. This would also imply, for instance, that ‘poverty’ as such disappears as a clear-cut development indicator. Poverty as an indicator follows from the development-as-growth paradigm: ‘the poor’ are the target of development because they lack economic resources. But if development is not about growth but about institutional transformation, then the concern is not merely with economic capital but as much with social, cultural, symbolic and moral capital and in these respects poor people can be rich. This introduces different distinctions such as the ‘rooted’ and the ‘uprooted’ poor (Carmen 1996). Stereotypes of poverty as wholesale deprivation, the ‘culture of poverty’ etc. are disabling elements of development discourse. They evoke the notion of development as external intervention. The keynote of AD epistemology is local knowledge.

Indigenous knowledge
A keynote in AD and post-development thinking is critique of science. In India, the work of Ashis Nandy, Shiv Vishvanathan, Claude Alvares and Vandana Shiva is part of a wider critique-of-science movement. Vandana Shiva (1991) criticizes the Enlightenment model and seeks to formulate ‘an alternative development paradigm’. Critique of science is well developed also in Latin America. According to Escobar (1992), western science in the form of development exercises a form of ‘cultural violence on the Third World’ and what is needed are ‘alternative conceptions of knowledge’.

Critique-of-science movements involve dissident intellectuals, popular organizations and NGOs who oppose MD expertise and policy, and network with movements in the West and Japan. Beck (1992) regards critique of science and technology as the main form of struggle in the ‘new modernity’ of ‘risk society’. In view of the globalization of risk - such as global ecological hazards, the export of polluting industries and waste materials, the risks of biogenetic engineering, the spread of
reproduction technologies - this is rapidly becoming a global contestation. In the South "indigenous knowledge" is a countervailing position against western science.

Tariq Banuri formulates a cultural critique of modernity focusing on what he calls the 'impersonality postulate of modernity: That impersonal relations are inherently superior to personal relations' (1990: 79). This yields a continuum of contrasting positions, with respect to ontology: from individualism to holism; with respect to cosmology: from instrumentalism to relational context; and epistemology: from positivism to hermeneutics. These contrasts parallel the distinctions which Carol Gilligan (1982) made between masculine/ feminine and impersonal/ relational perspectives. Banuri links a Foucauldian agenda of resistance and 'resurrection of subjugated knowledges' to a vision of the future in the South. He argues in favour of not only a 'decentralized polity, economy, and society' but also epistemological decentralization.

The problem, however, with the poststructuralist turn in development thinking is the same with poststructuralism in general: it verges on anti-intellectualism; more precisely, intellectual anti-intellectualism. The critique of the Enlightenment easily slips into adoption of the 'other Enlightenment': romanticism and unreflected reverence for tradition and community. Or a postmodern conservatism, which in the end is indistinguishable from anti-modern conservatism. Critique of science is inherent in late modernity and therefore also in development thinking in its present late phase; but it can take an unreflected or a reflexive form. I will conclude this paper by arguing for a reflexive development, which involves a reflexive, rather than a rhetorical and wholesale critique of science.

The notion of indigenous knowledge (hereafter: IK) has developed out of the regard for local knowledge (Chambers 1983; Brokensha, Warren and Werner 1980; Hobart 1993). 'To ignore people's knowledge is almost to ensure failure in development' (Agrawal 1995b: 3). IK, or the practical knowledge of people in other cultures, gives substance and depth to otherwise rhetorical categories such as endogenous development. Yet it is difficult - as in the case of other AD orientations - to turn IK into a clearcut principle in view of the absence of a hard boundary between indigenous and other forms of knowledge. After all what is 'indigenous'? This is also a construction (like 'modernity') and one that is not devoid of romantic overtones. Agrawal (1995a,b) makes a persuasive case that there are no principled grounds on the basis of which IK can be distinguished from scientific knowledge. Rather than pursuing IK per se, Agrawal advocates the combination and blending of knowledge systems. This note of caution is not meant to neutralize criticisms from an 'indigenous' point of view but is the kind of qualification that is necessary if one wants to take these concerns seriously, for instance in relation to questions such as indigenous intellectual property rights or traditional resource rights (e.g. Posey 1994).

Development cooperation
With redefining development comes a different assessment of international development cooperation. The general trend is away from development assistance to cooperation and partnership. As Korten notes, the consequences of development assistance or international aid have all too often been anti-developmental: 'it reduces capacities for sustained self-reliant development' (1990: 139). Conventional development assistance is a matter of 'moving money' rather than 'building capacity'. This involves the familiar distinction between relief (welfare) and development: 'Where the needs are chronic, rather than temporary, increasing the amount of humanitarian assistance, especially food aid, is likely to exacerbate the problem' (1990: 139).

The principle of people's sovereignty or popular legitimacy as the basis of sovereignty involves a redefinition of development cooperation as principally a matter of people-to-people relations in which
governments play a mediating and enabling role. Development cooperation then needs to be redefined as a process of 'mutual empowerment' (see Korten 1990: 146-7; cf Duffield 1996).

If we would group the elements discussed above as an AD model in contrast to a conventional development model centred on growth, the result might be as follows (Table 1). Still the question remains whether this would constitute an AD paradigm or profile; for now the slightly more neutral terminology of models is adopted. Since the profiles in each model differ over time, in several boxes multiple options are indicated.

**Table 1. Development models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Social transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Accumulation</td>
<td>Capacitation, human development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Capital, technology, trade, foreign investment, external expertise</td>
<td>Human resources, social capital, local knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Features</td>
<td>Growth-led</td>
<td>Equity-led</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>State-led or market-led</td>
<td>People, community. Synergies society, government, market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>Critique of science, indigenous knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modalities</td>
<td>Exogenous examples, demonstration effect, modernity vs tradition, technology transfer</td>
<td>Endogenous development, modernization from within, modernization of tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Import substitution industrialization, export-led growth, growth poles, innovation, SAP</td>
<td>Participation, sustainability, democratization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social policy</td>
<td>Trickle-down Safety net</td>
<td>Trickle-up Social capacitation through redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development cooperation</td>
<td>Aid, assistance</td>
<td>Partnership, mutual obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Green GDP, HDI, institutional densities</td>
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</tbody>
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Accepting this as the contours of an AD paradigm would have several attractions. AD ceases to be **any** alternative in relation to MD. AD as a diffuse position might be effective for AD as critique but not as a programme to be implemented. An AD paradigm might help its chances to gain recognition and institutional support, which is necessary if AD is no longer about marginal local initiatives supported by NGOs but if it aims to be a large-scale overhaul of development as such. If AD is about
wide-ranging synergies between communities, government agencies, international institutions and business, then its profile must be both distinct enough and acceptable to generate support in institutional circles and diverse communities of interest. By the same token, this raises different questions. A serious discussion of AD as a paradigm would involve its negotiation, renegotiation and fine tuning in wide circles. This treatment cannot prejudge such a broad discussion; but what does arise is a more fundamental question: whether the notion of paradigm is applicable at all.

1.3 Paradigm politics

The world is tired of grand solutions. (Manfred Max-Neef 1991: 110)

To match Kuhn’s concept, a paradigm shift in development would have to meet three conditions: it must provide a meta-theory, be accepted by a community of practitioners, and have a body of successful practice, including examplars that can be held up as paradigms in practice. Sato and Smith (1996: 90) mention these requirements, but their brief paper fails to deliver a meta-theory. In my view more fundamental questions need to be asked. What is the status of a paradigm and is this concept and that of paradigm shift relevant to social science? A paradigm in the sense of Thomas Kuhn (1962) refers to the explanatory power of a theoretical model and its institutional ramifications for the structure and organization of science. The point of Kuhn’s analysis is a critique of positivism, particularly in the natural sciences. Kuhn’s position was that social science is ‘pre-paradigmatic’ because a scholarly consensus such as exists in physics or biology is not available in social science.

If we consider this more closely, in the social sciences positivism is largely a past station, except in some forms of economics. The interpretative character of social science has become widely accepted since phenomenology, hermeneutics and more recently the ‘linguistic turn’. Also if one does not accept discourse analysis and deconstruction as analytic instruments, the time of blind faith in models and grand theories is left behind. It is generally understood that social sciences are of extraordinary complexity because they involve political processes which are reflexive in nature, in the sense that social actors will act upon any theory itself, which is thus modified in action. Constructivism is widely accepted as a theoretical framework in relation to social phenomena as well as in relation to social science theories, which of course are also social phenomena. In constructivism, notions of paradigm and paradigm shift are built-in. Pierre Bourdieu’s analyses of social science in action are an example (Bourdieu 1988) and so is his notion of reflexive sociology (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). It follows that in relation to reflexive social science the concept of paradigm does not hold and that social science is basically ‘post-paradigmatic’ or, at least, non-paradigmatic. In social science ‘paradigm’ may be used in a loose sense but neither does it serve the same function of critique of positivism as in natural sciences, nor does it adequately describe the organization of science.


What is the point of these exercises in a general context of reflexive, constructivist social science? It does signal a watershed, at minimum a more reflexive mentality in social science. But is borrowing from the natural sciences an appropriate move? One impression is that the claims to paradigm shifts primarily serve a political purpose. What is at issue is a claim for political unity and convergence: by emphasizing the intellectual convergence of diverse elements, the chances for political cohesion of diverse constituencies may be enhanced. Part of the appeal of Kuhn’s paradigm shift is the element
of *revolution* or a drastic break in intellectual and therefore political practice. But in fact in current usages paradigm is used in a broad and loose sense of an ‘intellectual framework’, similar to discourse and *episteme*, and not in Kuhn’s more specific sense of an explanatory framework that defines the practice of ‘normal science’. More often it concerns normative values rather than explanatory and metatheoretical frameworks.

Development, even though it hinges on theory as the beacon of policy, is more concerned with policy than explanatory frameworks. In development, the claim of a paradigm shift means that a policy framework has changed. Thus, ul Haq’s human development paradigm refers to a set of normative orientations - equity, sustainability, productivity, empowerment - rather than to a different explanatory framework. There are still further reasons why the notion of a paradigm shift may not apply to development or AD.

The first consideration is diversity in the South. If conventional developmentalism (growth, modernization, neoclassical economics) is no longer acceptable because of its linear logic and universalist pretension, why would an alternative development paradigm hold? There are now ‘five Souths’ (Group of Lisbon 1995: 47) and a wide range of local variations within each of these: how could a single paradigm encompass such a diversity of development paths, needs and circumstances? Besides, would a new orthodoxy really be desirable? Is what is needed not rather a post-paradigmatic perspective? The diffuseness of AD may also be an analytical advantage. AD as a loosely interconnected ensemble of sensibilities and practices is more flexible in resonating with diverse situations than an AD paradigm. While a paradigm shift implies a revolution in relation to past work it means routinization in relation to future work. It would fix a practice of ‘normal development’. In view of the diversity and flux of the development field such routinization may precisely not be what is desirable. In other words, the urge toward paradigm renewal may itself be inappropriate.

Further considerations in relation to an AD paradigm are the following.

- **The various elements of the AD package are each meaningful but none of them can be turned into a firm, hard principle:** it follows that AD as a paradigm cannot stand up either. The strength of AD positions is critical, rather than programmatic.

- **The elements of the AD paradigm are contradictory.** In effect endogenism as a principle annuls any general formulation of AD. ‘If the people are the principal actors in the alternative development paradigm, *the relevant reality must be the people’s own, constructed by them only*’ (Rahman 1993: 220, emphasis in original). By this logic, how can there be a general AD theory, let alone a paradigm? There can only be archipelago of local alternative perspectives.

- **The valorization of indigenous knowledge has similar implications.** Giving the AD paradigm the status of a metatheory - the usual way out of ‘Zeno’s paradox’ (‘the Cretan says that all Cretans are liars’) - does not work in this case because it establishes outsiders as experts over insiders.

There is also an institutional dimension to this question. There may be political advantages as well as disadvantages to a sharp break with MD. Sanyal (1994) argues that AD has withered because it has not found institutional support, which it has not because agencies, bureaucracies and ministries cannot handle sharp discontinuities in principles and practices (discussed further under Mainstream development below).

The above considerations apply to the *broad* AD paradigm (à la Hettne, Rahman, Carmen and others) while the Bretton Woods challengers propose a much narrower AD paradigm of equitable, sustainable and participatory development. Here a different problem applies: the distinction between the *narrow* AD paradigm and MD exists as a rhetorical claim only for the sole distinctive feature is the insistence
that development be equitable. This implies a critique of the trickle-down principle of neoclassical economics; but that too, even in the mainstream, is nowadays hardly a controversial point. This, then, is a clear instance of ‘paradigm politics’.

2. Mainstream development

Mainstream development here refers to everyday development talk in developing countries, international institutions and international development cooperation. It now seems a long time since development was defined as growth and simply measured by means of per capita GNP. Gradually, starting with basic needs and other heterodox approaches in the 1970s, development has been redefined as enlargement of people’s choices and human capacitation (e.g. Sen 1985) and as if people, basic needs, health, literacy, education, housing matter. The Human Development Index (HDI) has become an influential standard. People-centred development is becoming a mainstream position.

This means that there is now considerable overlap between MD and AD, which share much the same rhetoric, ideals and definition of development: participation, work with the poor and vulnerable groups, local action. This overlap is not always apparent from AD discourses. ‘Alternative’ approaches often tend to stereotype and fix mainstream approaches. This may be a matter of institutional lag or ignorance about changes in the mainstream; or a proclivity to antagonistic posturing in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, building up the alternative appeal by emphasizing the backwardness of the mainstream. Adherents of AD hold different views on the nature of the relationship between AD and MD. Two extreme positions are that AD is to be as distinct and separate from MD as possible (e.g. most Bretton Woods challengers, Kothari, in some respects Korten), or that continuity between MD and AD both exists and is desirable (e.g. Wignaraja 1992). Most proponents of an AD paradigm posit a contradiction between growth and structural reform on the one hand and AD on the other. ul Haq, as a proponent of human development (hereafter: HD), does not see a contradiction between HD and structural reform. His HD paradigm is identical to the AD paradigm except that, characteristically, it includes production as a core value.

This also implies a tension between AD and HD. The limitation of HD, according to some, is that critical concerns are being instrumentalized short of the overhaul of the development-as-growth model, so that in effect development business-as-usual can carry on under a different umbrella. What we see is still a ‘fetishism of numbers’ (Max-Neef 1991). Friedmann (1992) mentions, besides human rights and citizen rights, ‘human flourishing’ as the value orientation of AD, precisely to counteract the operationalization of AD in indices such as the Human Development Index. This affirms that AD is about something beyond merely another set of measuring standards, which is a point worth making - but only if we also consider the importance of indices such as HDI in influencing policy frameworks (Henderson 1996: 122; Haq 1995). Implementation is desirable, practicalities are prosaic, institutions need measurements. Human flourishing exceeds but also requires human development. In analogy with Moser’s (1991) argument on gender needs, one could perhaps say that AD is not only about practical but also about strategic needs, i.e. a profound redistribution of resources within societies and on a world scale - except that the AD paradigm stakes even a larger claim: the total overhaul of development.

According to Rajni Kothari (1993b) alternatives have been coopted, resulting in ‘The yawning vacuum: a world without alternatives’. Kothari complains of ‘deep cooptation’: not only organizations but mentalities have changed, a critical edge has been lost. He observes “the consumerism and commercialisation of diverse human enterprise, the basic crisis of vision - in a sense, an end of "alternatives" in the real and comprehensive sense of the term’ (Kothari 1993b: 136). This kind of pessimism, while understandable, seems somehow illogical: what reason is there to assume, short of a fundamental shift in human nature, that the creativity that has given rise to alternatives in one context will not find different avenues of expression, no matter the circumstances and indeed
prompted by them? That emancipation can be successful should not be held against it - although it often is, as if a Sysiphus task were a seal of purity. But of course Kothari views cooptation not as success but as capitulation - but doesn’t the record look much more varied? Cooptation, besides being logical in view of the way the development field is structured, may be desirable if it means a greater chance that once marginal views are implemented. There is cause to regret cooptation mainly if one regards AD as a position external-to-the-system; but this kind of island mentality is as sterile as delinking as a national development strategy. Governments and NGOs are factually interdependent in terms of agenda setting and funding. The entire field is changing including government organizations.

An intermediate option is the ‘growth plus’ approach: growth plus redistribution, participation, human development, or ‘sustainable growth’. ‘Redistribution with growth’ was a prominent position in the 1970s (Chenery et al 1974). Structural adjustment with a human face has been an in-between position (Jolly 1986). Korten (1990) views ‘adding on’ as a weakness of alternatives and he seeks therefore to establish as sharp as possible a break with conventional positions. However, from the point of view of policy implementation and institutional acceptance, ‘adding on’ may rather be a source of strength, because for bureaucracies in welfare ministries and international agencies total breaks are much more difficult to handle than additional policy options (Sanyal 1994). In view of such political ramifications, is it necessary or wise to formulate AD as anti-growth? ul Haq (1995) argues for continuity, rather than plain contradiction, between growth and human development (cf. Griffin and McKinley 1994). In his view the key issue is the quality of growth. ul Haq builds on the 1970s redistribution with growth position; the difference is that, while arguing for theoretical continuity and policy refinement, he also claims the status of a new paradigm and a ‘revolutionary’ role for human development. A different kind of consideration is that substantively the nature of economic growth itself is undergoing rethinking, also in the North. An increasingly prominent line of research concerns the links between growth and social development and the idea that social capital is crucial to economic development.

In many ways, development is not what it used to be. Arguably the big hiatus in development now no longer runs between MD and AD but within MD. MD now incorporates many AD elements and practices. It is the vast stretch of contemporary MD, from Bretton Woods institutions to grassroots empowerment, that makes for its cacaphonic, schizophrenic character. Broadly speaking the divide now runs between MD and AD, or what used to be AD, on the one hand, grouped under the general umbrella of human development, and on the other the number crunching approach to development, the positivism of growth. Institutionally this rift runs between the UN agencies on the one hand and the IMF on the other, with the World Bank increasingly - and precariously - straddled somewhere in the middle.

3. Post-development

The idea of development stands like a ruin the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crime have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work. Moreover, the historical conditions which catapulted the idea into prominence have vanished: development has become outdated. (Sachs 1992: 1)

Also referred to as ‘anti-development’ and ‘beyond development’, this is a radical reaction to the impasse of development theory and policy. Perplexity and extreme disaffection with business-as-usual and standard development rhetoric and practice, and disillusionment with alternative development are keynotes of this position. Development theory and practice are rejected because it is the ‘new religion of the West’ (Rist 1990), because it is the imposition of science as power (Nandy 1988), giving rise to ‘laboratory states’ (Vishvanathan 1988), because it does not work (Kothari 1988), because it means cultural westernization and homogenization (Constantino 1985), because it brings environmental destruction.
‘Post-development’ starts out from a simple realization: that attaining a middle-class life style for the majority of the world population is impossible (Dasgupta 1985). It has taken the form of a position of total rejection of development, crystallizing in the 1980s around the journal Development: Seeds for Change and among intellectuals in Latin America (Esteva, Escobar), India (Nandy, Vishvanathan, Rahmema, Shiva, Alvesares), Malaysia, France (Latouche), Switzerland (Rist), Germany (Sachs), England (Seabrook). It has become prominent since it coalesces with ecological critiques, in books such as Sachs’ Development Dictionary and has since become a postmodern development genre (e.g. Crush 1996).

Post-development (hereafter: PD) is by no means a homogeneous current. It shows many affinities and overlaps with western critiques of modernity, the Enlightenment and techno-scientific progress, such as critical theory, post-structuralism, ecological movements. It stands to development as ‘deep ecology’ does to environmentalism. It overlaps with cultural critiques of development and with AD. To PD there are romantic and nostalgic strands: reverence for community, Gemeinschaft, the traditional. There is an element of neo-Luddism in the attitude toward science and technology (e.g. Alvesares 1992). There is a strand of equating of poverty with purity and the indigenous and local with the original and authentic. It shows affinity with the lineage of the Franciscans, liberation theology and Gandhian politics, but the methodology, theoretical framework and politics of PD are Foucauldian. Its methodological premise is discourse analysis of development. PD’s programme is one of resistance rather than emancipation. Its horizon is made up of local resistance, local struggles à la Foucault, disavowing a universal agenda. Post-development generally belongs to the era of the ‘post’ - poststructuralism, postmodernism. It is premised on an awareness of endings, on ‘the end of modernity’. It involves, in Vattimo’s words, ‘the crisis of the future’. Post-development parallels postmodernism both in its acute intuitions and in being directionless in the end, as a consequence of the refusal to, or lack of interest in translating critique into construction.

According to Gustavo Esteva (1985: 78), ‘If you live in Mexico City today, you are either rich or numb if you fail to notice that development stinks... The time has come to recognize development itself as the malignant myth whose pursuit threatens these among whom I live in Mexico. ... the “three development decades” were a huge, irresponsible experiment that, in the experience of a world-majority, failed miserably.’ Escobar cites these views and concurs that development is a ‘Frankenstein-type dream’, an ‘alien model of exploitation’, and besides reflects urban bias (Escobar 1992: 419). ‘The dream of Development is over’ and what is needed is ‘Not more Development but a different regime of truth and perception’ (1992: 412-4). Escobar refers to a ‘group of scholars engaging in the most radical critique of Development’ viewed as the ‘ideological expression of postwar capital expansion’. The ‘discourse of Development’, like the Orientalism analyzed by Edward Said, has been a ‘mechanism for the production and management of the Third World’, ‘organizing the production of truth about the Third World’ (413-4). World Bank studies and documents ‘all repeat the same story’. ‘Development colonized reality, it became reality’. It ‘may be now a past era’. To ‘establish a discontinuity, a new discursive practice’ it is appropriate to ‘undertake an archaeology of Development’ (414-5). To effect change means to effect a ‘change in the order of discourse’, to open up the ‘possibility to think reality differently’. Recognizing the nexus between knowledge and power in discourse and the ‘politics of truth’, Escobar proposes ‘the formation of nuclei around which new forms of power and knowledge can converge’. Scanning ‘the present landscape of Development alternatives’ looking for ‘a new reality’, Escobar is ‘not interested in Development alternatives, but rather in alternatives to Development’. The grassroots orientation disrupts the link between development, capital and science and thus destabilizes the ‘grid of the Development apparatus’ (424).

Basic to Escobar’s approach is the ‘nexus with grassroots movements’. He evokes a ‘we’ which, following Esteva (1985), comprises ‘peasants, urban marginals, deprofessionalized intellectuals’. What they share is an ‘interest in culture, local knowledge’, ‘critique of science’ and ‘promotion of
localized, pluralistic grassroots movements’. In another passage, grassroots movements include: women, ecological movements, peasants, urban marginals, civic movements, ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, popular culture, youth movements, squatter movements, Christian base communities. Their common features, according to Escobar, are that they are ‘essentially local’, pluralistic, and distrust organized politics and the Development establishment. They are ‘not merely economic or class organized, also culture, power .. rely on their own knowledge’ (421-2). Escobar envisages a ‘new style of politics’ characterized by ‘less distance between intellectuals, activists and grassroots’, ‘interest in local/global problematic (a new dialectic of micro-practice and macro-thinking seems to be emerging), a ‘bottom-up codification of local struggles, parallel power networks’ and the formation of ‘new subjectivities, popular counterpower, PAR, popular power’.

The problem with ‘Development’, according to Escobar, is that it is external, based on the model of the industrialized world and what is needed instead are ‘more endogenous discourses’. As nodal points he mentions three major discourses - democratization, difference and anti-Development - which can serve as the ‘basis for radical anti-capitalist struggles’. What is ‘needed is the expansion and articulation of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-productivist, anti-market struggles’ (431). Again this is the aspiration toward the construction of a grand coalition of opposition forces, combined with a Foucauldian search ‘toward new power-knowledge regimes’ (432).

Strip away the exaggerated claims, the anti-positioning, and there is an interesting but uneven landscape. PD does make positive claims and is associated with several counterpoints, such as Ivan Illich’s conviviality, indigenous knowledge, cultural diversity, new politics. PD shares sensibilities with AD and with trends in MD. PD differs from marxist positions: the focus is no longer on class interests, the perspective is rather postmarxist, yet Escobar also falls back on radical anti-capitalist struggles. PD parallels dependency theory in seeking to disengage the local from external dependency, taking it further to development as a power/ knowledge regime. While dependency theory privileges the nation state, PD privileges the local, the grassroots. PD faith in the endogenous resembles strands in modernization and dependency theory - witness the recurrent emphasis on self-reliance. Like some forms of AD, PD involves populism, seasoned by an awareness of the articulation effect; yet it is populist in striving for a new articulation of great movements: anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, etc.

Escobar (1992, 1995) is among the more forward PD positions; his perspective is future-oriented and presents a mélange of vocabularies: discourse analysis, poststructuralism, social movement theory, development. This mix is both rich and uneven, with exaggerated claims sustained by weak examples. Rich in that he introduces Foucault, goes beyond class analysis and surveys relevant tendencies. Uneven in that it centres on the argument of anti-development but gives no clear delineation between anti-development and alternative development. Exaggerated in that his position hinges on a discursive trick, a rhetorical ploy of equating development with ‘Development’. This itself militates against discourse analysis, conceals divergencies within development, and caricatures and homogenizes development. His perspective on actual development is flimsy and based on confused examples, with more rhetoric than logic. For instance, the claim that the World Bank stories are ‘all the same’ ignores the tremendous discontinuities in the Bank’s discourse over time (e.g. from redistribution with growth in the 1970s to structural adjustment in the 1980s). And while Escobar and Esteva associate ‘Development’ with urban bias, World Bank and structural adjustment policies in the 1980s have been precisely aimed at correcting ‘urban parasitism’, which for some time had been a standard criticism of nationalist development policies (the classic source is Lipton 1977).

Escobar plays games of rhetoric: in referring to development as ‘Development’, suggesting its homogeneity and consistency, he essentializes ‘development’. However, even though particular constellations of thinking and policy at given points in time seem to present a solid whole and consistent façade, there are inconsistencies underneath and the actual course of development theory

Again, as in 1980s AD discourse, there is the desire for the grand oppositional coalition and the evocation of a ‘we’ that, in the desire for discontinuity, claims to capture all social movements in the ‘Third World’ under the heading of anti-Development. ‘Many of today’s social movements in the Third World are in one way or another mediated by anti-Development discourses . . . although this often takes place in an implicit manner’ (Escobar 1992: 431). In the West, social movements militate against commodification, bureaucratization and cultural massification; in the Third World, according to Escobar, they militate against bureaucratization achieved by Development institutions (e.g. peasants against rural development packages, squatters against public housing programmes), commodification, capitalist rationality brought by Development technologies’ (431). This is clearly a narrow representation: social movements in the South are much too diverse to be simply captured under a single heading. Many popular organizations are concerned with access to development programmes, with inclusion and participation, while others are concerned with AD approaches renegotiating development, or with devolution and decentralization. ‘Anti-Development’ is much too simple and rhetorical a description.

Dichotomic thinking, pro and anti development, underrates the dialectics, complexity of motives and motions in modernity and development. In relation to post-development AD occupies an in-between position: it shares the radical critiques of MD while retaining belief in development and redefining it. PD’s take on really-existing development is quite narrow. The instances cited in PD literature concern mainly Africa, Latin America and India; or reflections are general and no cases are discussed (as with Nandy). The experience of NICs in East Asia is typically not discussed.

Post-development takes critique of development to the point of retreat. Retreat from business-as-usual can be a creative position from which an alternative practice may grow. Thus, critical theory and its negation of the negation, though pessimistic in outlook, has served as a point of reference and inspiration, for instance to social movements of the sixties. Herbert Marcuse was a bridging figure between the sensibilities of the Frankfurt School and American dissidents. Wilhelm Reich’s work played a similar role within a smaller orbit. Paulo Freire translated Erich Fromm’s Frankfurt School humanism in context of Brazil.

If we read critiques of development dirigisme, such as Deepak Lal’s critique of state-centred development economics - which helped set the stage for the neoconservative turn in development - side by side with PD critiques of development power, such as Escobar’s critique of planning, the parallels are striking.15 Both agree on state failure, although for different reasons. Lal argues that states fail because of rent-seeking; Escobar’s criticisms arise from a radical democratic and anti-authoritarian questioning of social engineering and the faith in progress. Arguably the net political effect turns out to be much the same. In other words, there is an elective affinity between neoliberalism and the development agnosticism of PD.

The quasi-revolutionary posturing in post-development reflects both a hunger for a new era and a nostalgia politics of romanticism, glorification of the local, grassroots, community with conservative overtones. There are conservative elements to the communitarians such as Illich. On the one hand PD reflects anti-intellectualism in its reliance on depersonalized intellectuals and distrust of experts, while on the other it relies on and calls for ‘complex discursive operations’.

3.1 Alternatives to Development
Alternative development is rejected because ‘most of the efforts are also products of the same worldview which has produced the mainstream concept of science, liberation and development’
(Nandy 1989: 270). Serge Latouche (1993: 161) goes further: "The most dangerous solicitations, the sirens with the most insidious song, are not those of the "true blue" and "hard" development, but rather those of what is called "alternative" development. This term can in effect encompass any hope or ideal that one might wish to project into the harsh realities of existence. The fact that it presents a friendly exterior makes "alternative" development all the more dangerous. 'This echoes Esteva's fulminating against those who 'want to cover the stench of "Development" with "Alternative Development" as a deodorant' (1985: 78).

Latouche (1993: 161) examines 'three principal planks of alternative development: food self-sufficiency; basic needs; and appropriate technologies' and finds each of them wanting. As noted earlier, these are part of the 1970s programme of 'another development' but are no longer specific to AD in the 1990s, mainly because they have entered the stream of MD discourse. Latouche (159) maintains that 'The opposition between "alternative development" and alternative to development is radical, irreconcilable and one of essence, both in the abstract and in theoretical analysis. ... Under the heading of "alternative development", a wide range of "anti-productivist" and anti-capitalist platforms are put forward, all of which aim at eliminating the sore spots of underdevelopment and the excesses of maldevelopment.'

'The debate over the word "development",' according to Latouche (160), 'is not merely a question of words. Whether one likes it or not, one can't make development different from what it has been. Development has been and still is the Westernisation of the world.' This might be rhetorically satisfying but it is also one-sided and old fashioned. What about Japanization (as in the 'Japanese challenge', Japanese management techniques, Toyotism) and Easternization (as in the East Asian model)? Latouche uses the bulky historical category 'the West', which in view of steep historical differences between Europe and North America is untenable. His argument overlooks more complex assessments of globalization (e.g. Nederveen Pieterse 1995).

Attending a conference titled 'Towards a post-development age', Anisur Rahman reacted as follows:
I was struck by the intensity with which the very notion of "development" was attacked. ... I submitted that I found the word "development" to be a very powerful means of expressing the conception of societal progress as the flowering of people’s creativity. Must we abandon valuable words because they are abused? What to do then with words like democracy, cooperation, socialism, all of which are abused? (1993: 213-4)

Forming a position in relation to post-development might proceed as follows. Let's not quibble about details and take your points on board and work with them. What do you have to offer? This varies considerably: Sachs (1992) not much, but it is a reasonable refresher course in critiques of development. Latouche has more meat in his arguments which are in many ways perceptive and useful, although they can also be found in AD sources (such as Rahman 1993) and are mostly limited to sub-Saharan Africa. A common sense reaction may be: your points are well taken, now what do we do? The response of for instance Gilbert Rist is that alternatives are not his affair. The general trend in several sources such as Sachs is to stop at critique. What to do? Emery Roe's response is, in a discussion of sustainable development as another form of alternative managerialism: 'Nothing' (1995: 160). What this means is an endorsement of the status quo and in effect, more of the same, and this is the core weakness of PD (cf. Cowen and Shenton 1996).

PD claims to be more radical than AD critiques and the overall pattern is one of critique of critique. If a critique of critique would not push us over the threshold of tedium, it may be pointed out that some of the claims of PD are misleading. The history of development is misrepresented. Thus Esteva (1992) opens with Truman in the 1940s as the beginning of the development era. But this is only one of the beginnings of the application of development to the South, which started with colonial
economics; besides development has an older history - with the latecomers to industrialization in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Soviet development planning.

Escobar is one of the more forward PD positions also the most contradictory: on the one hand he carictures ‘Development’ and argues for ‘alternatives to Development’, and on the other he pleads for redefining development. Other positions, such as Sachs, are both more limited and more consistent - all past and no future. The Development Dictionary features critiques of the market, state, production, needs, etc., which are historically informed but overstate their case and offer no alternatives, and thus ultimately fall flat.

PD is based on a paradox. On the one hand it is clearly part of the broad critical stream in development, but on the other it shows no regard for the progressive implications and dialectics of modernity - for democratization, soft power technologies, network structures, reflexivity. Thus, it is not difficult to argue that the three nodal discourses identified by Escobar - democratization, difference and anti-Development - themselves arise out of modernization. Democratization continues the democratic impetus of the Enlightenment; difference is a function of the transport and communication revolutions, the world becoming ‘smaller’ and societies multicultural; and anti-Development echoes and elaborates the dialectics of the Enlightenment of the Frankfurt School. More generally, the rise of social movements and the activism of civil society, North and South, are also expressions of the richness of overall development, and cannot be simply captured under the label ‘anti’. PD’s source of strength is an anti-authoritarian sensibility, an aversion to control, and hence a suspicion of AD as an ‘alternative managerialism’ - which is probably correct in view of the record of many NGOs. But since it fails to translate this sensibility into a constructive position, what remains is whistling in the dark. What is the point of declaring development a ‘hoax’ (Norberg-Hodge 1995) without proposing an alternative?

In my view post-development and ‘alternatives to development’ are flawed premises - flawed not as sensibilities but as positions. The problem is not the critiques, which one can easily enough sympathize with, but the accompanying rhetoric and posturing, which intimate a politically correct position. ‘Alternatives to development’ is a misnomer because no alternatives to development are offered. There is no positive programme; there is critique but no construction. ‘Post-development’ is misconceived because in the prefix it reinstates the linear concept of time, which is being rejected in ‘development’. It attributes to ‘development’ a single and narrow meaning, a consistency which does not match either theory or policy, and thus replicates the rhetoric of developmentalism, rather than penetrating and exposing its polysemic realities. It echoes the ‘myth of development’ rather than leaving it behind. While the shift toward cultural sensibilities that accompanies this perspective is a welcome move, the plea for ‘people’s culture’ (Constantino 1985), indigenous culture, local knowledge and culture, can lead, if not to ethnochauvinism, to reification of both culture and locality or people. It also evinces a narrow view of globalization which is equated with homogenization. On a philosophical level we may wonder whether there are alternatives to development for homo sapiens, as the ‘unfinished animal’, that is, to development writ large, in the wide sense of evolution. The only alternative to development, then, remains alternative development.

AD primarily looks at development from the point of view of the local and grassroots; its looks at development along a vertical axis, from a bottom-up point of view. What sets PD apart from AD is that, on the whole, PD adopts a wider angle in looking at development through the lens of the broad problematic of modernity. Yet, although its angle is wide, its optics are not sophisticated. Its representation of modernity itself is one-dimensional and it ignores different options for problematizing modernity - such as dialectics, as in critical theory, ‘reworking modernity’ (Pred and Watts 1992), or exploring modernities in the plural (Nederveen Pieterse forthcoming). Reactions to modernity that are commonly distinguished are neo-traditionalism, modernization and postmodernism

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(e.g. McEvilley 1995). PD generally fits the profile of the neo-traditionalist reaction to modernity. More interesting and enabling as a position is reflexive modernity. A corollary in relation to development would be the notion of reflexive development.

4. Reflexive development

Since some time modernity has resurfaced as a central theme in social science and has been reproblematized from various angles - witness terms such as high, late, advanced, neo, reflexive, radical, post modernities. A common strand that runs through these forms of questioning is that modernity has become its own problem and theme. Ulrich Beck (1992) contrasts ‘simple modernity’ concerned with ‘mastering nature’ with reflexive modernity, the condition in which the moderns are increasingly concerned with managing the problems created by modernity. Reflexivity also figures in social theory, social movement literature (new social movements are said to be reflexive in the sense of information oriented, present oriented and concerned with feedback), and in political economy (as in Lash and Urry’s thesis of ‘reflexive accumulation’, 1994).

Beck refers to the ‘new modernity’ as risk society, emerging in conditions in which scarcity no longer dominates as a consequence of the growth of productive forces. Risk distribution society, which emerged in Germany in the early 1970s, is contrasted to ‘scarcity society’, which still predominates in the South, where the primary concern is with modernization through techno-scientific development. All the same, scarcity society and risk society also interact and overlap in various ways: 1. Through the globalization of risk: through generalized effects such as the erosion of the ozone layer; through the commonality of anxiety; and boomerang effects of crisis in developing countries on developed countries (as in Susan George’s argument of the Debit Boomerang). 2. Through the export of risk to scarcity society. The relocation of traditional industries is affected by different trade-offs between accumulation and risk in scarcity societies (witness the Bhopal disaster). The Third World serves as an ecological waste dump, also on account of rural naivety in relation to industrial risk. Beck concludes that extreme poverty and extreme risk attract one another. 3. In addition there is a North-South transfer of risk awareness, among others as mobilization arguments for social movements. Critique of science and of corporate policies and public relations, for instance of oil companies and pharmaceuticals, are increasingly being transnationalized (witness the Nestlé baby formula campaign, campaigns concerning Shell in Ogoniland in Nigeria).

These forms of interaction are reflected in ongoing debates. Can we understand these debates better in light of the notion of reflexive development? Is there an emerging pattern of reflexive development and how does it relate to AD? Arguably, after several development decades, development thinking and policy have become increasingly reflexive in relation to the failures and crises of development. New policies are increasingly concerned with managing the hazards, risks, unintended consequences and side-effects brought about by development itself.

This questioning is also reflected in development theory: for instance, in the rejection of developmentalism and linear progress. Critiques of the role of science and techno-scientific development lead to appeals to indigenous technical knowledge and local knowledge. These turns are logical also in view of the crisis of ‘western’ models.

There probably is an emerging pattern of reflexive development. Critiques of development follow from and lead to critiques of modernity and its consequences, and from the crisis of development policies. A feedback pattern is emerging in which development policy increasingly becomes concerned with the management of development itself. Features of this feedback include:

- The crisis of techno-scientific progress translates into a crisis of development. ‘Progress is a blank check to be honored beyond consent and legitimation’ (Beck 1992: 203). There is a breakdown of faith that technical progress = social progress. It is no longer being taken for
granted that the negative effects of technical progress can be treated separately, as social consequences of technological change. A parallel questioning in development concerns the equations of growth = development and economic growth = social development.

- The ‘anti-development’ position parallels western critiques of progress and is in part inspired by it. Post-development resembles the aprogrammatic, directionless, extreme scepticism of (most forms of) postmodernism. Risk society, according to Beck, is a ‘catastrophic society’, replete with dystopias and subject to apocalyptic mood swings. In the South expressions of extreme pessimism are not uncommon - on account of negative growth, the failure of trickle-down and the consequences of development (e.g. Esteva 1985, Kothari 1993b).

With regard to the political ramifications of reflexive modernity, Beck observes a ‘role reversal behind unchanged facades’: ‘The political becomes non-political and the nonpolitical political’. A ‘revolution under the cloak of normality’ is taking place. The political system is being eroded while the democratic constitution remains intact. In risk societies key decisions are being taken in boardrooms and laboratories, and the state has but a limited capacity to intervene in industrial modernization, research and technological change; yet the political system remains responsible for the decisions taken in industry and the corporate sector, through political legitimation and responsibility for the side-effects of technological and industrial transformation. The decline of the role of parliament, the growing proportion of swing voters and the rising influence of corporate interest groups are symptoms of this political transformation. A new political culture is taking shape in which the separation between politics and nonpolitics becomes fragile and nonpolitics gives rise to subpolitics.

How does this relate to AD? AD may be viewed as the tip of an iceberg of a larger change that is imperceptibly taking place in political systems and cultures. It reflects a disempowerment of states and political systems in relation to development and technological change, a depoliticization which is partly made up for by technocracy. As both cause and effect of democratization, civil societies are empowered and the boundaries between political and nonpolitical, public and private spheres have become fluid. A repoliticization is taking place through the emergence of subpolitics, in its various manifestations such as special interests, social movements and localization. In the South the religious resurgence and ethnic mobilization are part of this. These changes form part of the larger context of formalization, liberalization and a gradual transfer of responsibilities from GOs to NGOs. This involves the emergence of parallel structures, for instance in welfare and public health. Only, what is not being replaced are the mechanisms of accountability, inadequate as they have been. Hence the new democratic culture, of which AD is part, also involves new democratic deficits. Alternative development, then, is one of the spearpoints of reflexive development.

5. Conclusion

Arguably the differences between AD and HD are small and mostly of a situational nature. HD is better positioned institutionally, from the UN system to economics and social welfare ministries in the South; on the other hand, it is more bureaucratic in outlook. To AD there is a protest element, a polemics against development-business-as-usual which may increasingly be overtaken by changes in the development field, but also represents a ‘local’ and grassroots take on development that is probably irreplaceable, witness contributions such as participatory action research. AD brings anthropology into development. It is a matter of judgment, both analytical and political, whether AD is worth keeping and hanging on to as a distinct position. After all, what matters more is the direction and character of overall development. In comparison to this question the differences between AD and HD are relatively minor. The key issue is probably the relationship between social and human development and the policies followed by the Bretton Woods institutions.

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Notes
I thank Peter Waterman, Mohamed Salih and Martin Doornbos for comments on an earlier version. The usual disclaimer applies.

1. The notion of counterpoint has been inspired by Wertheim’s theory of emancipation. See Wertheim 1974 and Nederveen Pieterson ‘Counterpoint and emancipation’, Ch. 3, 1990.

2. In the 1995 edition of his book, Hettné finetunes his position on alternative development in terms of three principles: ‘The principle of territorialism as a counterpoint to functionalism. The principle of cultural pluralism as a counterpoint to standardized modernization. The principle of ecological sustainability as a counterpoint to “growth” and consumerism.’ (1995: 199) These reformulations are hardly improvements. Territorialism involves a spatial demarcation of development which is as problematic as the ideas on ethnodevelopment (discussed below). Cultural pluralism is now widely accepted and thematized in the culture and development approach (cf Nederveen Pieterson 1994). Contrasting sustainability to growth is crude; Mahbub ul Haq’s (1995) point that what matters is not growth but the quality of growth is more to the point (discussed below). I owe these quotes to an unpublished review of Hettné’s book by Des Gasper.


4. This is the context of Carmen (1996), Coetzee (1989), Guha and Vivekenanda (1985) and also of my work. I teach in an MA programme on Politics of Alternative Development Strategies at the Institute of Social Studies, a graduate school in development studies. As an anthropologist by original training and after years living in countries in the South, my interests span the range from local development to global alternatives.

5. Brown and Ashman 1996 discuss various factors that make intersectoral cooperation fail or succeed.

6. New modernization theory as So (1990) notes does take into account traditions as sources of innovation and not just as ‘resistance to change’.

7. Sundaram (1994) draws a distinction between ‘development from below’, which he views as the domain of local, district or regional government, and ‘development from within’ as the terrain of the village or grassroots. This distinction between endogenous (local government) and within (village) is rather unusual. I owe this reference to Aurora Galindo.

8. Independent of these sources Somjee (1991: 153-7) also uses the term ethnodevelopment but with him it means as much as people’s development.

9. This point is made by Carmen 1996. See also critiques of participation by Estava 1985b and the treatment by Stiefel and Wolf 1994. The concepts of participation, empowerment, resistance and emancipation are critically discussed in Nederveen Pieterson 1992.

10. Western social theories, according to Banuri (1990), view everything - exchange, production, jurisprudence, education, political science, etc. - through the prism of impersonality. The cognitive shift from the personal to the impersonal parallels a shift from internal to external constraints: it

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represents an advantage for centralized institutions, structures of surveillance and control in knowledge, politics, and architecture. Banuri cites Ashis Nandy’s definition of progress as ‘an expansion the awareness of oppression’ (91). Gilles Deleuze said about Foucault: ‘You have taught something absolutely fundamental: The indignity of speaking on someone else’s behalf’ (96). From this follows a critique of the role of the expert: ‘It is not for the outside expert to insist that the goals which he or she thinks worth pursuing are the ones which should be pursued by all societies.’ ‘the crisis if any stems precisely from the centralized intervention itself’ (97). He concludes that ‘the main task of the theorist .. is to help strengthen resistance against oppressive institutions’. See the critique of Cowen and Shenton (1996: 453-461) on the ironies of this position.

11. A relevant journal is Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor. In 1993 a Foundation for the Promotion of Indigenous Knowledge Based Development has been set up in Mysore, India, along with a Centre for Advanced Research of Indigenous Knowledge Systems. See also Goonetilleke forthcoming.

12. Tony Chiejina (1993) compares Kothari’s earlier articles as founding editor of Alternatives in 1975 and subsequently, with his 1993 position. In other publications Kothari (e.g. 1993a) is much more positive about citizen movements and organizations, recognizing their socially innovative contributions.

13. This argument will be developed in a sequel paper on socioeconomics and social development.

14. In an earlier work Alvares (1979) proposed appropriate technology as an alternative approach.

15. Both papers are reproduced side by side in Corbridge 1995.

16. At a seminar at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
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About the author. Jan Nederveen Pieterse is at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague. His books include White on Black: images of Africa and Blacks in western popular culture (Yale), Empire and emancipation (Praeger/ Pluto), which received the 1990 JC Ruigrok Award of the Netherlands Society of Sciences, Development and modernities (Sage, in preparation), and edited volumes on The decolonization of imagination with Bhikhu Parekh (Zed), World orders in the making: perplexities of 'humanitarian intervention' (Macmillan, in preparation), Christianity and hegemony (Berg), Emancipations, modern and postmodern (Sage).