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ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM AND POLITICS

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ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM AND POLITICS

Algis Prazauskas

The international community lives under illusion that the world consists of states, while actually it consists of peoples... There are about 5,000 ethnii, and only 180 of them have an internationally recognized statehood. The peoples are divided into several sorts, and that is not justice (Khakimov, 1992).

Probably, one of the most remarkable features of the last two decades of this century has been an unprecedented upsurge of ethnonationalism, metaphorically described as 'the third tsunami' by Fred Riggs (1994: 583). It is markedly different from both the early stage of nation-building in Western and Eastern Europe and from the basically supraethnic nationalism of anticolonial struggles, notably in India, Indonesia and a number of African countries. The previous wave of ethnonationalism came in the wake of the world wars (and the subsequent internal developments in the newly independent states) while its present upsurge began in stable Western democracies and later swept over communist polities of Eastern Europe. These developments, particularly the disintegration of the Soviet superpower, changed the world and, whatever the future developments, there is no return to a bipolar geopolitical and ideological world order. Thus, the impact of ethnonationalism is evident. Simultaneously it poses a new challenge to the existing theories of ethnicity and nationalism. Overtly Marxist approaches to the 'national question', which interpreted ethnopolitics as a variation of class, or economic struggles, became discarded overnight alongside with the Marxist hyper-theory, or rather ideology, of historical materialism. But, paradoxically, neo-Marxist economic reductionism, claiming that ethnopolitical phenomena and even the formation of ethnic groups and/or nations is the result either of elites' efforts to promote their particular interests or of rational choice by group members striving to use ethnicity as an instrument for social and material gains, remains prevalent. Simple substitution of Marxian ('petty') bourgeoisie for the 'elites' (since both terms refer to the same middle-class groups), and 'class interests' for unspecified interests of the elites, makes it evident that some of the current theories of ethnicity, notably the constructionist and instrumentalist approaches, in essence follow Marxist tradition of class struggles as the general driving force of social and political development.

It has to be admitted that in certain cases class approach, usually couched in fashionable terms of ethnoclasses, ethnic elites and entrepreneurs, can be applied for the purposes of analysis. But more often economic reductionism does not really explain anything for the simple reason that under similar conditions ethnic groups behave in strikingly different ways, while identical claims are not related to the economic conditions of the regions and groups concerned. Donald Horowitz (1985: 235), among other scholars, has straightforwardly rejected 'direct causal relationship between regional economic disparity and ethnic secession'. Socioeconomic disparities among different ethnoreregions and/or groups are typical for nearly all multiethnic countries, but there are few symptoms of ethnic nationalism in most countries of the world. Remarkably, among the estimated three to five thousand ethnic groups and even larger number of respective of minorities in different countries, the number of
ethnonationalist movements worth the name does not exceed several hundred. In the modern world, ethnic nationalism looks larger than life mainly because it has received wide coverage in the mass media and the lion's share of ethnopolitical research deals with secessionist movements and regions of ethnic strife rather than with progress of national integration in much larger areas.

The aim of this paper is to discuss several neglected aspects of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism relevant for the explanation of the emergence (or non-existence) of ethnic claims, and determining both their particular contents (linguistic and cultural claims, demands for a share of power, territorial autonomy, 'self-determination'), and mass response, if any, to the (ethno) nationalist appeal. Since the main purpose is reinterpretation of presumably familiar issues, specific subjects are dealt with only briefly and references to particular facts and developments are introduced only in cases where some argumentation of a controversial statement is necessary.

Structure and functions of ethnicity

In the *Ethnicity Intercosta Glossary* four 'content dimensions' of ethnicity are examined: ethnicity as politics, as psychology, as classification and as a field of study (Riggs 1985: 11-29). From different perspectives each of these aspects deals with identity, a sense of belonging to group defined as ethnic. For the purposes of this paper we need not to join the debate concerning the essence of ethnic group as such. Most researchers agree that typically ethnic group has several of such attributes as collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, association with specific 'homeland' and group consciousness. Anthony Smith (1979: 21) mentions also shared historical memories and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population.

A reservation concerning the proper name has to be made here. Numerous ethnic groups in different parts of the world (Apatanis and Juangs in India, Komis in Russia, many Indian tribes in North America) call themselves simply 'people', or 'real people', while referring to their neighbours in collective non-differentiated blanket terms such as 'enemies', 'barbarians', and in some cases even as 'real adders' (Algonquian term for Iroquois), 'little snakes' (Ojibwa reference to Sioux) etc. Quite often smaller and/or isolated communities have become known to the wider world under such derogatory names. At least originally, the names of the first type cannot be regarded as proper names since, unlike normal ethnonyms, they do not designate the 'we-group' as one among other similar groups. Self-images come into being simultaneously with the emergence of ethnic stereotypes - both negative and positive - of other groups. Myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and specific cultural attributes add up to form a collective self-image of the group, which forms the very core and essence of ethnic identity.

As a sociocultural community possessing a sense of identity, ethnic community in the modern world (and historically) is far from being a universal phenomenon. By using different criteria nearly every individual, except those undergoing assimilation and bicultural ones, can be perceived as being a member of a certain ethnic group. However, in vast regions of some countries the inhabitants do not possess a sense of ethnic identity, and 'ethnic' groups often do not have proper names (except for a range of territorial designations) and objectively it is extremely difficult to determine cultural and territorial boundaries of ethnic communities. In the Hindi belt of India cultural
attributes and dialects spoken change imperceptibly as one moves in any direction, the differences become quite marked between communities separated by several hundred miles. These communities might have some kind of local identity but generally caste and religious affinities are the central elements of identity structure and in most cases it is impossible to determine territorial boundaries of different groups which could be regarded as ethnic communities. In Papua New Guinea subtribal or, rather, pre-tribal identities remain prevalent. In the Americas among immigrants (usually those of the second or third generation) undergoing assimilation in their new homelands, ethnic identity tends to be diluted or at least irrelevant in their everyday life situations.

In order to understand political salience of ethnicity, especially ethnic solidarity as a platform for political mobilization, the central question is what does the sense of belonging mean for individuals and subethnic groups of any type (social, territorial, kinship, etc.), in what ways and how ethnicity affects attitudes, expectations and, especially, political behaviour of individuals and groups. Any discussion of ethnicity and its cultural, political, and other dimensions does not explain anything unless we get some idea about its subjective contents.

Frederick Barth (1969: 14) has stressed that 'ethnic categories are organizational vessels that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different sociocultural systems. They may be of great relevance to behavior but they need not be; they may provide all social life, or they may be relevant only in limited sectors of activity.' This observation cannot be questioned. However, it leaves open the question about the factors which determine the relevance or irrelevance of ethnicity both for individuals and at the level of larger society. Most research efforts have been concentrated on the examination of the situations where ethnicity is situational, optional, negotiable and even elusive. These might well be typical cases for some modern postindustrial societies, especially in the United States, at one end of the scale, and certain traditional societies, where ethnicity is diluted by local, kinship and other affiliations, at the other end of the scale. But in most parts of Europe, Asia and Africa ethnic boundaries are rather rigidly defined and ethnicity means an ascribed life-time status for an individual. Normally, at an individual level ethnicity forms one of the principal and durable elements of the identity structure, which is generally shaped by membership of the individual in, and attitudes towards, diverse groups, associations or other collectivities. Compared to other components of social identity (peer group, family and social status, association with particular locality, and even gender) ethnic identity is more rigidly fixed and less liable to change during individuals lifetime. Peer group and status change irrespective of the personal will, while profession, place of residence, social status become increasingly a matter of choice and achievement following the growth of social and territorial mobility. Ethnicity, on the contrary, remains an ascribed status which can hardly be discarded, if at all, as long as total assimilation has not taken place. In ethnically homogeneous areas, ethnicity may remain in a dormant state until awakened by direct or indirect (e.g. news reports) contact with members of other ethnic groups. However, in ethnically segmented societies durability of ethnic identity, and its association with culture and status are the principal factors which determine the high potential of ethnicity as a platform for political mobilization.

Ethnic identity is neither a primordial and inscrutable sentiment of belonging to a group, neither can it, from the instrumental point of view, be compared with the possession of something like a driving license. People perceive different attributes of
the ethnic group they belong to, and the set of these perceptions add up to form the complex structure, or contents of ethnic identity. Generally it includes a certain self-image (consisting of physical archetypes, historical myths and cultural traits, language, non-verbal behaviour) of the group, symbols related to history (battles won, figures of outstanding military leaders, rulers), culture, and homeland (rivers, mountains, typical landscapes, plants, animals, etc.), and concept of 'external relations' with other ethnic groups and, in most cases, the state. The scope, contents, rational and emotional significance of these elements of identity structure are different in particular societies and can vary in different degrees within each ethnic community. In small semi-traditional ethnic groups, often described as tribes, the variations may be insignificant or even absent, while in large modern nations the perceptions of different components may be very different for particular social, professional, territorial, and other subdivisions. But even in these cases there is a certain level of consensus. Very few Russians, for example, will reject such symbols of group identity as language, vast territorial dimensions of Russia, the symbolic meaning of Pushkin, Suvorov, military glories. Unless one takes into account the contents of ethnic identity, political mobilization along ethnic lines may well look either irrational (particularly extreme claims to independence), or on the contrary, as pragmatically chosen camouflage of material and political interests of a handful of politicians or elites. Central importance of the structure of identity, its durability and relevance of particular components considered, one can but wonder why it has been given scant attention, if any, in ethnopolitical and ethnic conflict studies.

Complex structure of ethnicity determines its ability to perform a wide range of functions both at individual and group level. Their hierarchy is generally situational and their number varies in different multiethnic settings. Somewhat unexpectedly, in typical cases ethnicity is the first instrument providing basis for differentiation and classification of ethnic environment and thus performs cognitive function. Ethnic self-image, symbols, stereotypes of other groups and other collective perceptions, irrespective of their accuracy, provide for an individual a kind of interethnic communications map and behavioural hints, including the setting of social distance between oneself and members of other groups and, more generally 'have the function, which they share with many other kinds of generalizations, of rendering our world more tractable, more manageable' (Duijker and Frijda, 1960: 125). Typically, it is an ethnocentric view, laying stress on such features, which permit the group members to perceive themselves superior, or at least not inferior (generally in the form of victim syndrome), to members of other groups. Quite often ethnocentric attitudes and prejudices are stronger than attachment to, or membership in one's own group, and continue to be shared by individuals long after their social ties with the group have been abandoned.

Integrative and normative function provides social cohesion and a degree of cultural homogeneity among subethnic (kinship, territorial, class, etc.) segments, socialization of, and inalienable membership for individuals and sets certain modes of social interaction, verbal and non-verbal behaviour. Typically ethnic group, especially in compactly settled communities, determines many elements of person's culture. The crucial importance of culture has been stressed by Ernest Gellner (1994: 107) who wrote in one of his latest books:

For the average person, the limits of his culture are, if not quite the limits of the world, at any rate the limits of his
employability, social acceptability, dignity, effective participation and citizenship. They define the limits of the use of his conceptual intuitions, access to the rules of the game, and to the intelligibility of the social world; beyond these limits, he becomes gaffe-prone, inept, subject to derision and contempt, and seriously handicapped in any endeavour... His deepest identity is determined neither by his bank account nor by his kin nor by his status, but by his literate culture. He is not a nationalist out of atavism (quite the reverse), but rather from a perfectly sound though seldom lucid and conscious appreciation of his own true interests.

It hardly needs to be explained that culture in question is the culture of the of the social milieu and not necessarily the ethic culture of one's parents. The Indonesians or Turks born in the Netherlands or Germany respectively are more likely to acquire culture of these nations or become bi-cultural under the influence of their parents and of the larger society. But even for such cases, which are not typical for the vast majority of the population of the world Gellner's observation, remains valid.

*Emotional function* gives a sense of psychological security and 'belonging' to a larger, presumably eternal formation, thus placing him firmly in endless history of generations (Anderson 1983), provides the sense of being 'at home' and endows one with a sense of pride, however qualified in many cases. With the emergence of modern nationalism it is further reinforced by *ideological function*, which ensures a certain degree of social consensus and cohesion, a set of values, beliefs and attitudes, besides supplying the illusion of participation in "historical destiny" of the group. Finally, *instrumental function* serves a number of collective, segmental and individual aims: political, economic, social and so forth. Logically enough, it is the concentration on this particular function which provides evidence to the instrumentalist and constructionist approaches to ethnicity.

Variety of functions generally, and the wide scope of the instrumental function particularly, makes ethnicity to mean different things for both different members of the given ethnic group and varying relevance in particular situations. In ethnically homogeneous surroundings subethnic divisions and cleavages are likely to prevail over ethnic solidarity. During ethnic conflicts ethnic affinities form the principal cleavages up to the point, where even the attempts to remain neutral are considered as 'treason' by group members and a wide range of sanctions and any type of pressure are applied in order to impose total solidarity of the group.

Plurality of functions provides ample ground for different interpretations of ethnicity. Fred Riggs (1985: 25) wrote about competing approaches to ethnicity: 'The debate between "primordialists" and "instrumentalists" (ascriptive theorists versus situationists) is a central motif in studies of ethnicity. It centers on the nature of an ethnic group: whether it is to be conceived of as a primordially constituted entity based on ancestry or racial descent; or as a situationally constituted entity, an organizational design for the pursuit of collective goals'. It can be added that primordialist interpretations are more typical for research in cultural anthropology (and nationalist writings of ideological nature) while instrumentalist and constructionist approaches are prevalent in ethnopolitical research with its concentration on the activities and statements of political and intellectual elites, policy planning, power calculations.
Ethnicity cannot be labelled as exclusively 'primordial' or 'modern' phenomenon, although often it can be traced to distant past while in other cases looks much like a recent social construct. However, normally it is a combination of both during any specific period. Ethnicity can be perceived as primordial in the sense that objective cultural and linguistic differences among the populations of certain regions (or even small localities in hill areas) existed since times immemorial, irrespective of their identificational significance. Although the cultural origins of modern ethnic groups are generally not as ancient as their ideologues claim, nevertheless in very few cases their beginnings, particularly formation of languages, can be confidently traced to a relatively recent period. At the same time ethnicity is modern in many important ways: for large groups it has become more inclusive (due to incorporation, integration or assimilation of a number of ethnoterritorial groups), synonymous with modern nationality and its specific symbols, ideology and orientations, in other cases it has come to mean an interest, or pressure group, an electoral constituency, a cultural association and so forth.

**Growth of nations and nationalism: a parallel development**

Politically, the importance of ethnicity becomes particularly salient as the growing number of compactly settled ethnic groups claim to be recognized as nations. Therefore emergence of growth of nations by no means can be regarded exclusively as a subject for historical debate. On the contrary, for political and intellectual elites and even significant sections of the population in many parts of the world the claims of nationhood constitute a major political and status issue. In many cases the term 'nation' has been hardly more than a feature of political idiom and usage. In the communist states, where ethnic interpretation of nation formed part of the official ideology, claims to nationhood were not perceived as a major political issue as nearly all compactly settled groups except the smallest ones (say, below 100,000 persons) were either officially defined as nations or not recognized at all and regarded as 'ethnographic groups' within particular nations (e.g. Mingrelians and Talyshes as subgroups of Georgians and Azerbaijanis respectively). In Western Europe and their colonial dependencies the term 'nation' was almost synonymous with state, although closer examination has shown that so called territorial nations, particularly the classic French model, were characterized by a number of features typical for ethnic nations of Central and Eastern Europe and pursued vigorous policies of ethnic homogeneization (A. Smith, 1979: 141-150).

Confusion produced by efforts to draw a sharp contrast between territorial and ethnic nations is further exacerbated by the absence of acceptable criteria of nation in any of the two meanings. The titular nationalities of the former Soviet republics were not transformed in any substantial way after the dissolution of the Soviet Union but their present nationhood is not questioned while few experts not to mention politicians would consider the Kurds or Iranian Azeris as 'genuine' nations. Did the Armenians, Georgians, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians disappear as nations after their annexation by the Soviet power reappeared again in 1991? Several thousand citizens of Andorra or Nauru qualify as nations, but such large groups as Bengalis, Tamils or Marathas of India, each numbering over 50 million persons, do not. In several cases religious communities (the Sikhs, Bosnyaks) claim to be nations, and so does a collection of different Naga tribes each speaking different dialect and collectively numbering about half a million persons. This confusion has been aptly noted by
Walker Connor (1978) who entitled his article on the subject as *A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a...* In order to avoid this confusion, *Encyclopaedia Americana* defines 'nation' in ethnic rather than political terms.

The relationship between the categories of 'state' and 'nation' are of central importance for any discussion of nationalism and needs some comment.

The prevalent opinion seems to be that it is the state which creates nations, and not vice versa. Usually, the French, Italian and, with reservations, cases of Latin American and African countries are referred to as evidence, although among the latter there are many whose viability as nations is anything but certain. On the other hands, the list of ethnonations which came into being despite the assimilationist policies of the state, is hardly shorter. The Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian empires, not to mention the British, French, Spanish, Portuguese and the Dutch cases, never became nation-states in any sense of the term and disintegrated. So did the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, pre-1971 Pakistan. However, except for China and Taiwan, there are very few cases, nearly all of them an outcome of outside interference (Moldova, Korea, post-World War II Germany and Vietnam till their reunification) of homogeneous nations breaking into several independent states. Due to different, mostly external factors such as colonial divisions of the regions and geopolitical factors a number of culturally and linguistically close groups (notably of Spanish, Arab, English and German speakers) have failed to emerge as nation-states, but the number of abortive cases of nation-building by the state is impressive enough to preclude any convincing reply to the question, who creates what.

According to the constructivist/instrumentalist approach, nations have been either 'constructed' by the state (or, rather, its ruling elites) to counter the threat posed by mass political mobilization, or 'invented' by minority intellectuals and aspiring politicians, striving to promote their own sectional interests. It is these individuals and groups who 'invent' nationalism, common history and language, revise tradition, create identities and impose those attributes of nationality upon unsuspecting and malleable masses. Three decades ago Ernest Gellner (1964: 169) proclaimed the verdict that nationalism 'invents nations where they do not exist', and although later he modified his approach significantly, this judgment has been carried further to the point that 'ethnicity and nationalism [...] are social and political constructions', 'creations of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves' (Brass, 1991: 18). The idea looks very much like chicken-and-egg story: certain groups exist and even produce elites who 'invent' the very same groups they come from.

Probably, all types of human collectivities, associations and groups can be perceived as social constructions, but it definitely looks too far-fetched to regard ethnicity as a consequence of manipulation or scheming by certain elites, forming a negligible fraction of the population. Admittedly, there is ample documentary evidence of some kind of 'national awakening', progressing from philological and historical writings to the growth of vernacular mass media and the spread of nationalist ideas by cultural and/or political elites. Chronologically, the foundation of nationalist party seems to precede the emergence of nation as a constituency. However, this observation is hardly sufficient to establish a causal link between the two phenomena. 'Invention' theory has no intelligible answer to the crucial question: what determines the success or failure of nationalist appeal? Claims of being a nation had been raised
by some leaders and enlighteners centuries ago, but did not evoke response until the modern period which, in turn, cannot be reduced to the impact of ideas of the French revolution. In many regions even today the appeals of ethnic elites have been ignored, for instance, by a vast majority of Maithilis in India, Byelorussians in Belarus and numerous other groups in different countries.

Emergence of nations and formation of nationalism are parallel developments. This seems to be an obvious conclusion both from careful examination of virtually all successful cases of what has been somewhat misleadingly called 'nation-building', and form the analysis based on very different approaches and ideas: development of communications networks (Karl Deutsch 1979), ethnic components of nations (Anthony Smith), 'print capitalism' (Benedict Anderson), impact of modernization (Liah Greenfield). There has to be a population, sharing common territory and cultural features, which can be perceived as a group by both the nationalists and by other groups, and a certain degree of intragroup solidarity to respond to the nationalist appeals. In fact, a perception of collective identity, whether in terms of solidarity, common aspirations or external threats in principle one would say must be basic and prior even to state formation itself (Doornbos, 1994: 287). The Founding Fathers could articulate grievances, re-animate historical memories and offer a vision of the future, but in most cases they did not have any real alternatives to determine or manipulate the group boundaries of the emerging nation. It is hardly incidental that there is not much evidence of debates (except those between state or majority and minority elites) as to what groups had to be included in, or excluded from, the emerging nation. In most cases, proximity of the dialects spoken, cultural similarity, contiguous territory, and a fairly long history of interaction provided historical and cultural prerequisites for the emergence of modern ethnic nations within certain territory long before nationalist elites set themselves the task of nation-building. Centralization of power, economic integration and educational revolution had the effect of lowering the geographic, socioeconomic, cultural and political barriers to integration. A small locality or a unit, like a village community in many ways culturally, politically, economically -- increasingly became part of the emerging larger collectivity. This had a twofold effect of increasing cultural standardization and causing significant shifts in the identity structure. In the process, cultural and political elites, or rather those groups and individuals who were more involved in relations with other groups and had a more comprehensive view of the situation, were likely to become proponents of the national idea. Their success (and contribution to the national consolidation) or failure (and oblivion of their efforts) were determined not by the quality and quantity of their effort but exclusively by the general pattern of ethnoregional configurations, which emerged as the social and political horizons of the population expanded following the growth of communications, education and intercourse with other groups.

In multiethnic and/or multicultural context, the emergence of state generally produced what may be called political nations, which subsequently either consolidated into 'people' with distinctive political and cultural identity (Swiss, Indian, American), or increasingly split into a number of ethnic nations who subsequently raised the claims to a separate political status (the Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian empires, Yugoslavia). In the latter cases, ethnic nationalism was essentially a protest movement against the emerging nation-state which consolidated the domination of a single ethnic group, usually majority, in different spheres of life - economics, politics, culture and tended to reinforce the existing inequalities. As ethnic groups by definition
are sociocultural categories, the normative status of the majority culture with its corollary of reducing the minority cultures to 'backward' and 'parochial' position created the prerequisite for the development of intraethnic solidarity and added political dimension to ethnic identity of many groups.

From a historical perspective the emergence of particular nations with their modern cultural and territorial boundaries can be interpreted as accidental exclusively in the sense that political factors, battles lost and won, decisions and actions of kings, regional lords and administrators have played their part in the genesis of political nations. Existence of some thirty nations in Europe has not been predetermined either in the tenth or in the eighteenth century. The number of nations could have been different, and even today it is is neither fixed nor clear: the Moldavians may well merge with Romanians, the fate of Bosnia with its three ethnic groups is unpredictable, and a number of other groups from Spain in the west to Caucasus in the east striving to become full-fledged nations is increasing. The situation is much more fluid and uncertain in many regions of Asia and Tropical Africa. However, all these particular developments can hardly be interpreted to mean that formation of ethnonations was some kind of deviation from the march of mankind towards cultural homogeneity or some other 'natural course of history'.

Structure of ethnonationalism and perceived group interests

All kinds of arguments have been offered to explain why nationalism is so attractive. Eric Hobsbawm (1992: 176) believes it is 'its very vagueness and lack of programmatic content', which does not sound convincing to say the least: people like the ideas precisely because is does not offer anything or is meaningless. Another scholar, on the contrary, thought nationalism expressed 'the passionate desire to live in a homogeneous national state' (Nimni, 1991: 1). Both these (and numerous other) ideas do no provide any reply to the question, why some ethnic groups are or become highly nationalist while others seem to be immune to the nationalist agenda.

Much of the confusion about nationalism is caused by differences of disciplinary (political science, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, geography, sociolinguistics) approaches and ideological (idealist, diffusionist, conflict theorist -- Marxist and non-Marxist) perspectives (Coakley, 1992: 2-3), the latter being particularly value-laden and teleological. Typically, an effort is made to reduce nationalism to some single feature, e.g. congruence of ethnic group and political unit (Gellner, 1983: 1) supreme loyalty to the nation, 'cultural artifact of particular kind' (Anderson, 1991: 4), etc. Such narrow definitions either miss the point, or have to replace the phenomenon of nationalism by a variety of specific types of nationalism. According to a more comprehensive approach the essence - and the bewildering variety - of ethnonationalism can be best perceived in terms of collective interests of creating (or preserving) the optimal conditions for the existence of the group and maintenance of its identity. Nationalism is composed of values and claims acceptable to the great bulk of the population while also setting it apart from the values and claims of other political communities (Haas, 1958: 6). The central role of interests as the unifying factor has been stressed also by Hermann Weilenmann (1963: 40), who wrote somewhat emphatically: "Every people has a common interest in defending and preserving its particular qualities, in applying them, and in passing them on to future generations. The greater the love felt by the members of the population for
their country, language, and state, the more these values become common good that binds them to the whole."

This kind of approach, shared by a number of scholars (A. Smith, 1991: 72; Kellas, 1991: 2-3), easily covers the aspiration for congruent ethnic and political boundaries, the claims of independence, autonomy and status, use of languages, distribution of resources and so on -- in fact, the whole range of claims as perceived and articulated by ethnic elites. It also does not in the least contradict the classification of nationalisms (those of the 'nationalizing state', minorities, and 'homelands') proposed by Rogers Brubaker (1996: 4-5, 55-69).

Nationalism is an attractive doctrine because it strives to formulate and express latent expectations and to uphold national interests, comprising the interests of both the major subethnic divisions, like class and territorial groups, and of the whole community, or nation. National interests include such overarching needs like security, collective status, economic welfare, social ecology, preservation of common system of values and certain elements of the way of life, relations with other nations and realization of certain external orientation. "Nationalism does not grow and develop like a mental epidemic, nor is it the result of the magic of propaganda. Nationalism corresponds to the needs experienced by the people, their receptivity to its ideas, and its appeal to organization and action. People grasp it as a solution to their predicament, as a way out of perceived crisis (Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1981: 63)

Interpreting nationalism as expression of group interests does not mean overemphasis on its rational nature. Among group interests, one of the top priorities is preservation of identity, whose core are self-images and ethnic stereotypes - a combination of emotional (often 'irrational') and rational components. Rationality itself is a relative judgment and depends upon the cultural context and the yardstick used. The 'rules of the game' in particular society may look irrational, but observing them and behaving in a conformist way can be very pragmatic.

The phenomenon of ethnonationalism as ideology can vary widely from a collection of several simple postulates to elaborate philosophical treatises and from xenophobia to messages of nearly universal (the notable exception being usually the immediate neighbors) brotherhood of nations. Often, these incompatible visions and attitudes, 'nationalism of the crowd' and nationalism of rational political, economic and other calculations coexist not only within the nation but also within a particular individual, especially if he or she happens to be a politician.

Ethnic nationalism either fails or succeeds depending upon how far the nationalists (who have to compete with other political, economic and cultural elites and, often, the state itself) succeed to monitor, interpret and articulate the latent expectations and interests of both the major subethnic divisions, like class and territorial groups, and the emerging community as a whole. It is precisely at this point that individual, class and ethnic expectations, calculations and interests intersect and interact, and not every nationalist project, however high-sounding, finds positive response. Even in the province of cultural and historical symbolics and myth-making, where most of the 'nation-construction' activities of the enlighteners and intellectuals are concentrated, not everything goes: among numerous myths and images very few are internalized and form part of the national identity of the masses. Most inventions are either rejected outright or forgotten shortly despite all efforts of nationalists or the state. The fact that after several generations of intensive
indoctrination the vast majority of the population in the post-communist discarded communist symbols overnight is a strong evidence that the scope for invention of symbols and tradition is very limited.

The degree of response to the nationalist appeals is a fairly good indicator of cohesiveness of the nation and the progress of the formation of national identity. 'Romantic nationalists... can create minority nationalist movements and keep them alive, but they cannot win widespread support in their community unless they can point to broken promises, material disadvantages suffered, or the prospect of tangible gain. Poetry may inspire the few, but the masses need to be persuaded of actual losses and potential benefits.' (Birch, 1989: 67).

The important issue, then, for both academic and practical purposes, is to set forth the causes which shape the attitudes and expectations of ethnic groups and, as a consequence, determine the contents of ethnic claims. This is the central problem of theoretical research in ethnopoltics and nationalism and implicitly or explicitly is present in all case studies from the earliest samples to the latest writings. Some kind of reductionism, especially its economic variety, has been generally prevalent during the century. Nevertheless, a number of factors, causes and variables, which in different ways shape the state of interethnic and ethnic group--state relations, have been taken into account and examined by many scholars. Thus, territorial distribution of ethnic groups is discussed in nearly every analysis and the standard conclusion is that nationalism of different diasporas generally concentrates on cultural, social and citizenship issues, while compactly settled indigenous groups may claim territorial autonomy or independence. Similarly, ethnodemographic structure, or the ratio of 'indigenous' population and 'immigrants', majority and minorities within states or particular ethnic homelands, ethnic stratification and pattern of social cleavages have become practically standard issues in the studies of ethnic conflicts. Therefore I skip them in the following paragraphs and concentrate on those elements of nationalism (developed from the respective components of ethnicity) and factors, determining relations between ethnic groups, which have been hardly mentioned, if at all, in literature on ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnic politics.

*Historical memory*

As mentioned above, collective historical memory, or folk memory, is one of the central elements in the structure of ethnicity, reflecting the perception by the ethnic community of its history. Besides historical myths and symbols, such as glorified personalities and important events, ethnic self-images and stereotypes should be also considered as part of historical memory, because they mirror in a condensed form important aspects of historical experience of the group, particularly its relations with other groups. However elusive, it is the historical experience as fixed in the collective memory, which largely shapes the perception by the group of the current state of interethnic relations, attitude to the multiethnic state and supra-ethnic ideologies, and of the alternatives available. Historical memories and past grievances are among the major causes, determining the responses of an ethnic group to the appeals of different factions, including the nationalist ones.

Historical memory is one of the major preoccupations of nationalists and founding fathers. Nearly all anti-colonial struggles, 'national awakenings' and 'revivals' begin with the re-writing of history. It is quite natural that ideologically motivated and mobilizing history-writing is highly selective, tendentious and involves much
invention. However, what looks like *la mythomanie nationale* (Liebich, 1997: 108) actually does not provide anything like *carte blanche* for ethnonationalist historians. Contrary to constructionist opinion, not everything goes. Most of the odious myths, such as tracing ethnic origins to some biblical tribes or ancient imperial 'nations', claims that Jesus Christ was a Croatian, Hungarian, Ukrainian, African, etc., have remained on paper without leaving a trace on the self-perception of the rank members of the ethnic group or emerging ethnonation. At each particular stage, myth-making, fiction and invention are bound to a certain extent by collective historical ideas, myths and memories. Some ideas and perceptions of historical events, particularly of the recent past, are deeply embedded in mass mind and render fruitless all efforts of opposite interpretation. The negative attitudes of Armenians to their Muslim neighbours are so strong that any attempts to introduce the theme of friendship are bound to fail. Similarly, hill tribes of Northeast India hold negative memories of their past relationship with the plainsmen, Poles and Balts have long lists of injustices committed by Russia, while Russians remain firmly convinced that their misfortunes began with the Tatar-Mongolian yoke. Similar examples can be drawn from the history of virtually every compactly settled community, and all efforts to revise folk version of history seem to have failed everywhere.

The principal sources of the current historical memory generally are oral tradition, school version of history, mass media and popular literature. Oral tradition is generally prevalent in pre-modern societies with their low literacy rate and among subjected minorities in states where authoritarian and totalitarian regimes permit only the official version of history-writing. In modern democratic (and democratizing) societies, the school, printed and electronic mass media play the major part in shaping collective historical memory in accordance with the postulates of the dominant ideology. In cases, very usual in multiethnic states, where oral version of the group history do not coincide, or are incompatible with the official version of history, it is rather difficult for an outside observer to form a clear idea about the historical memory of particular groups. Obviously, for this reason the subject is seldom mentioned in the analysis of interethnic relations and is usually by a presumably 'objective' and 'scientific' version of history, which in many cases does not explain anything or may even prove to be misleading for the purposes of ethnopolitical analysis.

As a rule, ethnonationalist interpretation of history concentrates on five major issues: (1) ancient origins of the group; (2) the 'golden age'; (3) events which lead to the incorporation the ethnoregion into the multiethnic state: was it the result of a conquest, dynastic union, treaty, etc.; (4) history of relations of a given ethnic group with other groups and consists mostly of ethnic stereotypes and symbolic past events; (5) popular historical memories about the relations of the given group with the state.

National history textbooks in many cases begin with the description of 'times immemorial', often of the Stone age, thus suggesting that ethnic origins of the nation go back to that period. In an Indian textbook of ancient history Indus Valley, China and Malaysia are mentioned as the regions inhabited by the earliest humans, and the description of Indus Valley civilization precedes the chapter on the Mesopotamian, Egyptian and Chinese civilizations (Aggarwal and Chowdhry, 1995: 10, 24-42). For decades, Uzbek and Tajik historians have been arguing about ethnic affinities of the earliest population of Central Asia, trying to prove that it was of Turkic or Iranian stock respectively.
The golden age generally is associated with military glories and cultural achievements in the remote past. Myths of the golden age are characteristic for both large nations and relatively small ethnic communities. Ossetians of North Caucasus, have traced their origin to the ancient Scythians and Sarmatians and have a special pride in being direct successors of the martial race of Alans. The modern historians of Ossetia stress that they are descendants of the people who left a visible trace in the history of nations from China to North Africa. In 451, a section of Alans allegedly played a decisive part in the battle at Chalons where the joint Roman-Visigoth-Alan force defeated the Huns, while another group of Alans ruled over Spain jointly with Vandals. A modern Ossetian historian concludes the subject: "The presence of Alans in Western Europe and North Africa, their political and military activity in those far-off lands constitute one of the glorious, amazing and beautiful pages in our history. At the sunset of the Roman Empire the Alans played a significant part in its destiny, proved themselves as brave warriors... While in France, the Alans contributed to the progress of martial arts of Western Europe, especially in the tactics of cavalry battle..." (Bzayev 1993) The nationalist historians are not worried by the fact that those Alans who moved West, never came back to their homeland in the Caucasus, while the Alan medieval state was crushed by Genghis Khan in the 13th century and since that period the Alans took refuge in the mountains and never reappeared again in history as a polity. They forgot their own common name, and the modern Ossetians call themselves in different localities as Iron, Digr, or Twal. It was the medieval Georgian chroniclers who baptized them as Ovs, or Oss, and this designation became their ethnic name. Although the modern Ossetes can hardly claim to be the descendants of those warriors, the present Ossetian republic has already been renamed as Alania-Ossetia alongside with one of the best football teams in Russia.

Often neighbouring modern nations lay conflicting claims to the past glories. As mentioned above, even during the Soviet period of 'friendship between nations' a debate was going on between the Tajik and Uzbek historians about the ethnic affinities of the inhabitants of the ancient states and of the prominent medieval scholars and poets. The modern nationalist Byelorussian writers are claiming that the principality of Polotsk and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were in fact Byelorussian nation-states, and the coat-of-arms of the Duchy was even adopted in the same capacity by the government of modern Belarus in 1991 (but was rejected in favour of the former Soviet-period symbols during the referendum in 1995).

Not every ethnic group can boast of ancient great empires, military glories or even modest medieval states. 'Absence of history' (and of the historical component of the identity structure) is a problem for many ethnonationalists in all parts of the world, particularly in Africa, parts of Southeast Asia, Siberia. Nevertheless, ideologues of some groups who never formed separate states in the past also tend to regard the pre-annexation period as a source of pride and inspiration. Subarctic communities are proud of their ability to survive in extremely harsh climatic conditions. The Chechens, who were not familiar with statehood until the neighboring Kabardinian chieftains imposed their rule, claim to be the only nation in the world history that was always free, never had princes, masters and slaves, and did not surrender themselves even to such great conquerors like Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane (Khasamikov, 1993). Similarly, Nagas in Northeast India draw pride from the fact that up till the advent of the British they had never been conquered and controlled by any of the Indian princes or the neighbouring Ahoms. The Bashkirs, whose ethnic area for several centuries prior to annexation by Russia, was divided between the Kazan,
Astrakhan, Nogay and Siberian khanates, find a certain pride in having contributed to the cultural achievements and military glory of those late medieval states. Many groups draw historical inspiration from the very fact of their survival under foreign rule. In some cases, notably those of Latvia, Estonia (Prazauskas, 1994: 161-161, Forced Migration Projects, 1997: 19, 39), partly also of Czechia and Hungary, the 'golden age' dates back to the recent period between the world wars.

The other major layer of historical memory is the story of incorporation of the ethnoregion into the multiethnic state. For the nationalists it is of crucial importance if the event was it the result of a conquest, dynastic union, bilateral treaty, or unification by such outside force as European colonial power. In this connection A.H.Birch (1989: 146) has commented aptly that 'the British, not having been conquered since 1066, find it impossible to understand the depth of resentment harboured by peoples who have been forced to submit to British domination'. This observation basically fits to characterize the perceptions of their past by majorities and minorities in China, the former Soviet Union, the present Russian Federation and some other states which had emerged as the result of territorial expansion of, and conquest by, the dominating core, irrespective of how long ago the event has taken place. The Tatar nationalists are as emotional about the capture and destruction of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible in 1552, as were their Baltic and Moldavian counterparts about the occupation of their countries by the Red Army in 1940, although the latter event was much more vivid in the collective memory and did not need much historical testimony to be revived. Historical memory of those peoples which were incorporated into a single state in the course of colonial expansion of European powers is generally less burdened with the negative perceptions of the aggressive core: in India, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the majority of modern African states the question of who conquered whom in the process of the state-formation is less prominent, although in some cases controversy is very much alive (e.g. over Muslim rule in India, Hutu-Tutsi relations in Rwanda and Burundi).

The fourth block reflects history of relations of a given ethnic group with other groups and consists mostly of ethnic stereotypes and symbolic past events. Traditional ethnic stratification, past battles lost and won, attitudes of the personalities who had become symbols of group's history continue to shape current attitudes to, and relations with, other groups. The Armenian irredentism in Nagorny Karabakh, secessionist movements of the Nagas and Mizos in Northeast India and Moros of the Philippines, the urge of the Baltic nations to become members of the European Union and the NATO are to a large degree shaped by the negative experience of their past relations with their more powerful neighbours.

The fifth block contains popular historical memories about the relations of the given group with the state. In cases where there is dominating majority, generally identified with the state by the minorities, this block largely overlaps with the historical memories of relations with the dominant group (English, Castilians, Russians, Serbs, Amhara, Sinhalese, etc.) and preserves its inertia despite the changes of the regime and its policies towards particular groups.

The impact of collective historical memory on interethnic relations and nation-building can be either positive or negative, depending upon the compatibility of memories of different groups. Myths of warfare among different groups, perception of some groups, particularly of the dominating majority, as an age-old source of threat, memories of suppression have proved to be a powerful divisive factor, which could not be eliminated readily by teaching a 'correct' version of history at school and by
intensive indoctrination efforts even in totalitarian systems. On the other hand, joint efforts in case external threats, glories achieved thanks to the pooling of energies and resources produce historical symbols shared by several ethnic groups and promote the development of supraethnic identity. 'Traditions of elite accommodation' (Lijphart, 1977: 99-103) and protracted anticlonal movements have proved fairly effective in promoting interethnic solidarity. The freedom movement in India, which continued for several generations, from its inception was all-Indian, and long before the achievement of independence served, along with the development of Indian political institutions, communications and the growth of economic integration, as a major source of cohesion (except for Hindu-Muslim cleavage) and symbols of all-India unity, besides arranging for accommodation of ethnic interests (e.g., territorial organization of the Indian National Congress along linguistic lines). In other Afro-Asian countries the anticlonal movement had a shorter history, and its integrative impact was less lasting. At the other end of the scale, in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as its successor the tradition of joint struggle against external threat was limited to the period of the World War II, and even then the effort was anything but unanimous as large sections of non-Russian nations at least initially perceived the war as an opportunity to escape what they regarded as the Russia rule.

Before concluding this section, it needs to be stressed that collective historical memory is not a static variable. Dramatic change of conditions and the sources of threat are generally followed by respective shift of accents in folk memory. Thus, the stereotypes of and attitudes to the Japanese in Southeast Asia or the Germans in Europe have become markedly different during the last few decades. However, such rapid changes remain rather exception that a rule.

External orientation

Most ethnic groups have some kind of a collective attitude towards the world outside the limits of the group itself. It is determined by history, geography, civilizational affinities of the given group and its traditional relations with the neighboring nations and is reflected in positive and negative attitudes, prejudices and stereotypes of ethnic 'friends' and 'enemies'. To a certain extent external orientation overlaps with historical memory. It has its own dynamics and inertia and does not follow automatically the process of state formation, international alliances and the changes of international borders. However, during a period of major changes of international environment and/or political system external orientations can be substantially be revised.

The type of ethnoregional claims, particularly the probability of secessionist trends, depends to a large extent on the positive orientation of ethnic segments towards the country as a whole and its dominant ethnic core, if any, or at least on the absence or presence of explicit gravitation to different core regions beyond the international border. Incompatibility of external orientations has two interrelated major consequences for the multiethnic states. The lesser one is that foreign policy of the state becomes a controversial issue and can provide additional reason for some groups to refuse loyalty to the existing regime and to insist on self-determination. However in many cases external orientation of peripheral ethnic groups presumes secession as the only alternative. Gravitation towards regions beyond the borders of the state has been one of the major causes of most claims to self-determination from the Baltic states of the former Soviet Union in the north-west to West Papua New Guinea in the south-east. Typically, ethnic minorities, whose traditional 'homeland' is divided by
international borders are likely to start irredentist movements, or the peripheral nations, cut off the 'core' area of the 'greater tradition' perceive secession as the only way to restore what they regard as their rightful place among other nations.

**Quality of ethnic heterogeneity/diversity**

During the last decades terms like 'levels of diversity' (Watts, 1966: 67), 'intensity of cultural distinctiveness', 'quality of ethnic pluralism' (Enloe, 1973: 20), and the 'degree of pluralism' (Lijphart, 1977: 18, 237) have been used. However, political scientists did not elaborate on what constitutes primarily the subject of cultural anthropology.

Although even minor differences may have a very great symbolic importance attached by members of a group, particularly under the conditions of interethnic conflict or ethnic polarization, some cultural features are more likely than others to create problems for cross-cultural communications and to become obstacles for the functioning of the multiethnic polity and emergence of a single people within the state. The folk traditions, mores and common law of particular groups can be too different to accept common ideology or to make uniform legislation successful. In many, particularly semitraditional societies religion, forming the basis of culture, is the major source of differences, easily leading to communal cleavages and even the split of linguistic communities (Serbian-Croatian, Punjabi, Bengali). Especially pervasive are the differences between ethnic groups which historically gravitate to different 'greater traditions' or civilizations. For centuries the 'greater tradition', generally associated with religion, has been regarded as the ideal type of culture and has shaped the value systems and orientations of diverse populations. Hence, discarding or modifying those elements of culture which are associated with the 'greater tradition' is often regarded more as a social taboo, than abandoning elements of folk tradition: shifting from yurta to an apartment house is less dramatic than renouncing basic prescriptions of the adalat and shariya.

A high degree of ethnic heterogeneity means that adoption of common norms and value systems, mutual adaptation and accommodation cannot be achieved unless all or at least some groups are pressed to renounce and forget most of their traditions, culture and the way of life. The experience of the Soviet Union, Cyprus, Turkey and numerous other cases show that this can hardly be achieved even by authoritarian regimes, which by definition do not favour articulation of intergroup differences and sectional interests and strive to impose homogeneity by all available means. Under the system of representative government the problem of cultural compatibility immediately comes to the forefront and, depending upon ethnodemographic and other variables, can undermine the stability of the political system. Thus, cultural diversity (unless neutralized by the overarching 'greater tradition' or significant social rewards) is generally a variable, negatively affecting the stability of multiethnic states and their national integration strategies. Two aspects of ethnocultural differences are particularly relevant for the stability of multiethnic states: external orientation of ethnic groups and their political culture.

**Political culture**
Cultural differences between various ethnic groups are reflected in many spheres, including political values and political behaviour. Therefore, existence of ethnoregional political cultures (or subcultures in a number of cases) and a number of problems, arising therefrom, does not need to be proved. Rather, the surprising fact is that the relevance of political dimension of culture in multiethnic societies has not been recognized by the researchers and the issue has been virtually ignored.

As a part of culture in wider sense of the term, political culture of particular ethnic groups has certain specific features which can be either of minor importance in the multiethnic context or add up to raise the issue of compatibility. Several combinations can be examined for analytical purposes:

(a) common supraethnic political culture without marked regional differences (Switzerland, Belgium);
(b) common political culture (generally professional and elitist) and a number of ethnoregional political subcultures (India, excluding northeastern hill states);
(c) several competing types of ethnoregional political cultures (former Yugoslavia);
(d) dominant political culture at the core and markedly different types at the periphery (the former Soviet Union, Sudan, Burma, etc.).

In case ethnoregional political cultures are widely different and represent different types, no overarching normative political culture can emerge. In extreme cases regional differences may well undermine the functioning of the political system by creating serious obstacles for the enforcement of uniform institutions and legislation and producing communications gaps. In other words, as long as incompatible and/or competing ethnoregional political cultures exist within a single country, such a polity remains inherently unstable and, depending upon ethnodemographic and other factors, its unity has to be maintained principally by power structures of the state or, more usually, by a combination of repressive methods and social rewards.

Incompatibility of ethnoregional political cultures is one of the major causes of authoritarian regimes in a number of multiethnic states. As soon as authoritarian control is relaxed, perceptions of politics and the patterns of political behavior of mobilized sections of particular ethnic groups become one of the principal variables shaping the political process in a given ethnic region. If ethnoregional political cultures are markedly different, this leads inevitably to the divergence of political process in different parts of the country and to the formation of incompatible ethnoregional political subsystems. Reinforced by other aspects of ethnoregional cleavages, this process is likely to cause irreparable fragmentation of the national political system and, hence, of the multiethnic polity itself. From this point of view, the Soviet Union disintegrated by the middle of 1990 as different political systems came into being following the elections to the republican legislatures. In such cases the regime either has to re-integrate political system by force and continue with the authoritarian system of government as the sole cementing force of unity, or find ways to accommodate diverse political subsystems by devolution of powers (thus coming dangerously close to disintegration) or accept secession of regions with markedly different political culture.

In many countries ethnoregional political cultures belong to the same type and can be more precisely defined as subcultures. Often it is not possible to draw a sharp dividing line between political culture and subculture, although by definition in the latter case there is overall consensus over basic political values and patterns of political
behaviour, and the existence of secondary differences does not threaten the integrity of the national political system. Somewhat more complicated are the cases of societies in transition with their unstable balance of competing types of political cultures. For instance, in Russia today the collision between authoritarian (parochial) and participatory political cultures has not been resolved either way, and this major cleavage crosscuts in varying proportions and pushes to the background the differences between ethnoregional political subcultures. However, even in such a fluid situation there are symptoms of consensus over attitude to more rigid authoritarian systems: there is remarkably little public enthusiasm over re-unification with Belarus, not to mention the Central Asian states.

Social, political and ideological cleavages

Pattern of cleavages has been considered by Arend Lijphart and other researchers as one of the most important variables determining the stability of plural, or ethnically segmented societies. The familiar argument is that cross-cutting cleavages tend to weaken the importance of ethnicity as they lead to the growth of supraethnic institutions and relations and enhance the relevance of non-ethnic components of the identity structure. Coinciding or overlapping cleavages, on the contrary, reinforce ethnic divisions and identities.

The reality often appears to be more complicated. Cross-cutting social cleavages, contrary to (neo)Marxist expectations, in many cases have failed to prevent ethnopolitical mobilization and polarization both in semi-traditional and modern (Belgium, Canada) societies. Ideological divisions in the majority of multiethnic states also crumble easily under the pressure of ethnonationalism. Religion seems to play rather an ambivalent part. In the Indian state of Assam the Hindu Mikirs preferred to not to join the new state of Meghalaya, carved out for ethnic, predominantly Christian minorities, while the Muslim Bengali settlers (mostly from the present Bangladesh) generally supported Assamese in their quarrels with Hindu Bengalis. In Bosnia, the Christian Croatians tend to align with Muslims against the Serbs, and in Lithuania during 1989-91 the leaders of the Catholic Poles did not side with the Lithuanian Catholic majority but rather adopted a pro-Moscow stance and joined hands with local Russian communists.

Comparative study of the structure of cleavages, particularly in stable multiethnic polities, is required for more precise generalizations concerning the impact of this variable. As of today, the conclusion seems to be that in cases where other variables are negative, the existence of cross-cutting cleavages can easily be replaced by ethnic polarization, and inversely, overlapping cleavages (end relative isolation of ethnic segments) do not by themselves ensure the stability of multiethnic polities.

Political system and regime.

In a multiethnic country, the political system has to meet two incompatible requirements: it has to be receptive of ethnoregional claims and expectations, so that the state is perceived as legitimate by all ethnic groups and can claim their loyalty, yet simultaneously it has to contain the growth of ethnic nationalism and such ethnoregional claims and demands that may lead to ethnopolitical polarization and undermine the stability of the system. From this perspective no political system or regime has proved perfect.
Much of what in Marxist idiom has been called nationalities policy is determined by the type of the political system and the regime. Hence, the policies towards particular ethnic groups and strategies of national integration cannot be regarded as a separate, let alone independent, variable determining the stability of multiethnic polities.

Authoritarian regimes by definition are likely either to reject legitimacy of any minorities' claims, or to regard them as exclusive sphere of governmental concern. It cannot be denied that authoritarian regimes in many cases may be very concerned about the actual situation and rights of minorities and may strive to eliminate discrimination. 'Nationalities policy' of the Communist regimes nearly everywhere (particularly in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) in several important ways was expressly paternalistic. However, the non-representative systems of government by definition set very narrow, mostly economic and to some extent cultural, limits for ethnonational interests and rely exclusively upon their own perception of what is good for the ethnic regions, in the best case using for reference the views of co-opted elites of the minorities. As numerous examples testify, this type of authoritarian paternalism sooner or later either is increasingly reversed due to economic, political or other reasons, or leads to the growth of dissatisfaction both among the minorities, whose political interests cannot be satisfied within the authoritarian system, and among the members of the majority who come to believe that the minorities have been given too much at the cost of the majority.

The absence of the mechanisms for the articulation of ethnonational claims, and the insensitivity of authoritarian regimes, both communist and non-communist, to ethnonational 'inputs' generally leads to the accumulation of discontent among ethnic minorities and to their alienation from the state. Ineffectiveness of authoritarian regimes in the area of national integration cause them more often than not to pursue policies aimed at elimination of ethnic minorities through forced assimilation, ethnocide, expulsion or 'ethnic cleansing', in the extreme cases engaging in genocide of particular groups as the only viable 'final solution' of the minorities issue.

Ethnopopitical issues become of crucial importance during transition from authoritarian to representative systems of government. Political liberalization opens opportunities for articulation of group demands and for collective political action and, in cases where ethnic groups have accumulated serious grievances, political mobilization proceeds along ethnic lines and may well become critical for the survival of multiethnic states. Unless the emerging democratic regime is capable to carry out radical reform to satisfy ethnonational claims, the alternative is between disintegration and restoration of the ancienne regime. This was the dilemma of virtually all multiethnic post-colonial societies (colonial rule being by definition authoritarian). With the notable exception of India, where linguistic states have been carved in a series of reforms (particularly the reorganization of states in 1956 and territorial arrangements in turbulent northeastern states in 1971), virtually all multiethnic states in Asia and Africa threatened by secessionist movements and interethnic conflicts returned to authoritarian rule as the only guarantor of territorial integrity and 'national unity'. In Europe, regional autonomy was introduced in Spain after Franco, while the post-Communist regimes in Yugoslavia, USSR and Czecho-Slovakia, despite essential differences between the political systems of these countries, failed to offer effective solutions to the 'nationalities question' and were doomed to fragmentation. However, the problem of minorities remains of central importance in the majority of post-
communist states up to the point where their territorial integrity has been effectively challenged by secessionist minorities (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Croatia, Bosnia).

Ethnic politics in democratic states have been examined in many studies and there is a very balanced summary of 'multiethnic democracy' by Arend Lijphart (1995: 853-865). On the positive side, democratic regimes are responsive to ethnoregional 'inputs' and provide mechanisms for maintaining stability. Belgian, Spanish and several other cases provide good examples. However, the integrative capacities of democracy are simultaneously circumscribed as it offers opportunities and incentives for ethnopolitical mobilization. In cases where different variables and their combinations examined in this paper do not leave much room for interethnic consensus and mutual adaptation, the situation is likely to turn critical (as in Quebec, Northern Ireland, Basque region in Spain, Kashmir, Punjab and several 'tribal' northeastern states in India). Democracy, interpreted as majority rule in many societies, is more likely than not to exacerbate ethnic tensions, and in any case does not provide universal means and strategies of national integration. Public and international concern with human rights issues, impact of mass media, the technical ease of political mobilization and numerous other modern factors have made obsolete the 'nation-building' devices used by France or Italy in the nineteenth century totally unacceptable at the end of the twentieth century.

External factors

The obvious general conclusion which can be drawn from numerous studies dealing with international dimensions of ethnoregional conflicts seems to be that in most cases external factors are a highly ambivalent variable whatever the differences between the attitudes of particular states and international community as a whole. Since World War I, and especially during the last decades, the rights of minorities to preserve their identity, culture and language have increasingly become issues of concern for international community. However, the right to self-determination, despite the break-up of several states (Pakistan in 1971, USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia in early 1990s) or of the merger of ethnic homelands divided by international boundaries, remains rather as an abstract principle. Due to obvious considerations of security and stability, the international community as a whole tends take the side the existing states, however conflict-ridden and hopeless (Bosnia), and rather support - at least indirectly - oppressive authoritarian regimes, rather than advocate the secessionist cause of ethnic periphery, e.g. the Kurds of Iraq. Even claims to territorial autonomy for compactly settled groups have not found place among internationally recognized rights of ethnic minorities. Particular governments and, occasionally, regional or transnational organizations, in a number of cases have extended material and moral support to movements and even armed struggles for self-determination in other, often remote countries. However, the volume of such support, except for very few cases of direct military involvement, has not been adequate to achieve secession of particular regions even in cases of initial success of ethnic rebellions (Biafra in 1967). Instances of diplomatic recognition of self-proclaimed independent countries are a rare exceptions. Even in the cases where central governments have virtually lost all control over break-away regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Transdniestrian region of Moldova, Chechnya in the Russian Federation), the rebellious local governments have not been recognized officially by any foreign country. In the best case, diplomatic recognition has been granted by a single country, either due to direct
involvement (recognition of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' by Turkey) or as a symbolic gesture of solidarity (diplomatic recognition of Lithuania by Iceland before the de-facto break-up of the Soviet Union).

For leaders of secessionist minorities, the international community looks like a conservative and exclusive club, unwilling to admit thousands of new members. This has been plainly stated by a Tatar scholar quoted in the opening paragraph of this paper. However, besides the oft-repeated arguments about the potential chaos and considerations of international security, there are at least two important circumstances justifying the continued existence (and gradual evolution) of the present international system. First, the on-going process of globalization which has gained momentum after the collapse of the bipolar world system, especially the elimination of communications barriers, and the growth of transnational NGOs offer new opportunities and alternatives for minorities and may serve to dispel some of their fears. Ethnic groups have become much more 'visible', and the blanket terms, such as 'Russians' and 'Yugoslavs', used to denote multiethnic conglomerates, are giving way to more differentiated perception of multicultural societies. The second argument is of an opposite nature: the figures of 3,000 to 5,000 ethnii, are a poor guide to assess global ethnic diversity and provide a highly distorted idea of the global ethnodemographic situation. Two-thirds of the global population belong to some two dozen largest groups which can be regarded as ethnonations, while several thousand of ethnic communities, each numbering less than 1 million people (but in most cases far below that number) constitute less than 3 percent of the global population. Significantly, the growth rate of small ethnic groups is lower than that of the large groups, so the share of small communities among the total global population is decreasing. The proposals to restructure the existing international system of states to the satisfaction of a small fraction of population, especially in the context of on-going globalization and regional integration, cannot be expected to be taken seriously anywhere outside these small groups.

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The structure of ethnicity and of ethnonationalism and a number of variables, including those not examined in this paper, combine to determine ethnopolitical mobilization (or its absence) and the contents of ethnic claims. Ethnoregional demands can be classified in different ways, but broadly they fall within one of the following types (Coakley, 1993: 6-7):

1. A demand for equality of citizenship, generally meaning the equality of individual rights;

2. A demand for cultural rights, ranging from symbolic use of minority language in public to the right to receive an education at all levels through its medium;

3. A demand for institutional recognition, ranging from symbolic autonomy in local government to symbolic representation in state institution to full-fledged confederalism and consociationalism;

4. A demand for secession, ranging from frontier adjustment to allow the minority to be incorporated in a neighboring state to independence as a separate state.

The choice of particular demands and the ability of ethnic leaders to mobilize the group members for the achievement of proclaimed aims depend upon the contents and the 'load' - positive or negative from the perspective of national integration,
intensity of different variables and their particular combinations. In most cases they pull in different directions thus causing ambivalent attitudes to ethnonationalist appeal and producing factionalism among ethnic elites. This accounts for the absence of mass-based ethnopolitical movements in many ethnoregions. Bengalis of West Bengal, India do not strive neither to independence, nor to 're-unification' with their kinsmen in Bangladesh. In some cases the load of two or three variables is sufficient to produce a strong impact on ethnic politics (Quebec, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Indian Punjab), although generally the aims and consistency of the ethnic movements in such situations are less predictable. Finally, negative load of all components definitely predetermine the failure of national integration, or nation-building efforts of the multiethnic polity, unless it takes recourse to ethnic massive cleansing and genocide, i.e. solves the problem of sociocultural diversity not by integrating peripheral ethnic segments but by eliminating them. The only viable, albeit temporary, alternative is suppression of minorities and consolidation of coercive authoritarian regime. On the basis of the variables, examined in this paper, the dilemma of either fragmentation of the state or preservation of authoritarian regime, has been set forth some time before the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Prazauskas 1990, 1992).

The approach outlined in this paper is opposite to any kind of reductionism - cultural, historical, economic or otherwise - and presumes a careful and impartial analysis of a number of factors in order to provide a more detailed and sophisticated understanding of ethnopolitical phenomena. However, an important reservation has to be made about historical 'incidents' which in so many cases play the crucial role and override the logic of 'natural' or 'pre-determined' development. Majority of the modern multiethnic states, particularly in Africa and Asia, appeared as the result of colonial conquests by the European powers and can be regarded as historically incidental polities. Similarly, the break-up of the Soviet Union, although inevitable in the long run, has been precipitated by the unimaginative policies of the regime in late 1980s and the attempted coup in August 1991, paving the way for the emergence of independent polities years before ethnic elites of Central Asian and several other nations initiated any struggles or movements for independence. At this juncture, called Sternenstunden der Menschheit by Stefan Zweig, historical 'accidents', although produced by a number of other causes and factors, determines which of several possible alternatives will be realized. However, after the star hour is over, the subsequent ethnopolitical developments will be largely shaped by the long-term factors, discussed above.
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