FROM ISLAMISM TO POST-ISLAMISM

A Study of a New Intellectual Discourse on Islam and Modernity in Pakistan

Husnul Amin
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FROM ISLAMISM TO POST-ISLAMISM
A Study of a New Intellectual Discourse on Islam and Modernity in Pakistan

Van islamisme naar post-islamisme
Een onderzoek naar een nieuw intellectueel debat over islam en moderniteit in Pakistan

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Dedication

This work is lovingly dedicated to my late father

Bahramand Khan

Who

Despite being part of a small, insular tribal community always pushed me to transcend all barriers. His loving guidance helped free my mind to explore avenues of reason and learning, religion and beauty I never imagined.
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And I am thankful to God Almighty for all His blessings and my loving mother for her mid-night prayers for my success.

Husnul Amin

April 2010
While leafing through Mawdudi’s *Islami Riyasat* (Islamic State) in 2006, as a doctoral fellow, I remembered first reading it in 1991, when I was a student-activist in an organisation that subscribed to Mawdudi’s ideology. This journey from reading Mawdudi’s seminal book as activist to an academic understanding of it has a self-referenced history, and the main underlying motivation for conducting this research.

Conducting research on the Islamic movement, the Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan, its ideology, historical trajectories and the perpetual dissent it spawned over time, is not merely an academic pursuit for me. The Jama’at and its deep imprints on society are personal for me, kindled deep in my heart and conscience. This discourse is an elaborate history of my childhood brought up in an overwhelming Jama’ati environment (a family or social condition shaped and deeply influenced by Mawdudi’s ideas and activities of the Jama’at).

Like most of his contemporary modern educated, middle class revolutionary friends (*inqilabi dost*), my late father embraced the Jama’at’s “revolutionary message” (*inqelabi dawat*) in the 1970s, wholeheartedly. His personal thinking, political, economic and social life and worldview were an embodiment of the new message. As a true believer in the supremacy of his newfound identity, my father preferred his mission of spreading the message to everywhere around his village to his family and social responsibilities. When I was born, my surroundings and family were dominated by the thoughts of Mawdudi, Qutb and Hasan al-Banna. Mawdudi’s books formed the dominant academic resource ruling and subdued all other household articles. A number of weekly and monthly politico-religious magazines further bolstered the intellectual dominance of the Jama’at literature and moral-story digests in my childhood home.¹ This rich intellectual resource centre, as my father would repeatedly remind us, was augmented further by frequent meetings of my father’s Islamist friends, missionary brothers, as brothers in movement (*tehreeki bhai*) at our *hujra* (guesthouse). We

¹ Like *Qawmi Digest*, *Zindagee*, *Takbeer*, *Chitan*, *Aayeen*, *Tarjuman al-Qur’an*, *Asia*, *Misaq*, *Tadabur* etc.
as kids would attend to the guests as waiters as per Pushtoon tradition of hospitality. My old, sane and traditional grandfather would, time and again, resent such alien activities of my father and exhort him to stick to the traditional Islamic school of thought prevalent in the village—Deobandism. Grandfather did not like my father’s intellectual subordination to Mawdudi’s teachings and the associated social and political activities. My father’s subscription to Islamism was Mawdudiyyat—a derogatory term for Mawdudi coined and popularized by traditional ulama—for many including my grandfather. The 1980s brought about an era of Zia’s ill-conceived Islamisation and Afghan jihad projects. More comfortable in the company of the new dictator than representative democratic governments, the Jama’at jumped on the Afghan jihad and Islamisation bandwagon. From my first introduction to these new subjects, I observed intrusion of a strong jihadi bias in the meetings of the Jama’at and its student wing, Islami Jami’at-e-Talaba Pakistan. In these meetings, jihad assumed primacy over all other positive/productive social, political and religious reformation as the space where these activities were hijacked by propagandist literature. My home library also suffered from this change. Books and pamphlets, posters and handbills on active jihad made their way onto bookshelves replacing mere ideological and religious material. The shift in the balance was considerable and was felt by everyone. The 1980s was also an important decade for the villagers because their incomes rose remarkably due to a flourishing timber business and remittances coming from the oil rich Arab countries. The rising incomes had a demonstrable effect with a construction boom, improved nutrition and modern consumption. Then the village received a telephone exchange and the number of TV sets increased. The Jama’at activists had now more sources of leisure, less time for friends and ideological discussions. Competition in business, jobs and grown up children demanded more attention leaving less time and resources for friends and relatives. Now even most urgent issues could be discussed on the telephone.

Nevertheless, the opportunities had different effects on income, lifestyle and consumption patterns of the Jama’at activists. This invoked a tension within the Islamists network. In the late 1980s and early 90s, the Jama’at central leadership changed, the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, in Pakistan democracy was restored, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) entered as more visible actors in controlling economy and economic policy, and armed struggle in Kashmir was launched. In addition, all of my father’s movement brothers transformed into new individuals in terms of age, profession, lifestyle, income, family size and pessimism with the arrival of an Islamic revolution.

2 A derogatory term to undermine Mawdudi’s ideology and thus to equate him with Qadiyaniyyat, Perviziyat or Natariyyat (also see Nasr 1996).
In 1989, I joined the Jama’at student wing (Islami Jamiat Talaba Pakistan) when I was in the ninth grade. From that point on, the Jama’at activism was not something that I would only observe as an outsider but an internal experience, which I was passing through. My father’s generation of Jama’at activists sowed the seeds of an Islamic movement, and it left a “rich resource centre of ideological books” for us as the most precious asset in inheritance (my father would tell us all the time) that we the sons were now dealing with the fruits of the Afghan Jihad project and were building on that. For us, not the USSR but the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and Dr Najeeb’s government in Kabul were the main hurdles in reaping the crops of Afghan jihad. The new goal was to liberate Kashmir from Indian occupation. I actively participated in all electoral campaigns held in the 1990s, fund raising schemes for Kashmir jihad and student activism on campuses. Today, most of my father’s’ friends have tired of this endless struggle, become grievous of the growing elitism in the Jama’at environment, or cried over Jama’at’s current leadership, which deviated from its original ideology and the path set by Mawdudi. Some negotiated space between Jama’at activism, their own business and politics and negotiated their current positions within the Jama’at by switching from more political activism to more dawah and social activism. Still others left of their own accord or were expelled over growing differences with the ideology and strategy of the Jama’at. I am witness to the introduction of Javed Ahmad Ghamidi and his students steadily making their way through their audio lectures and booklets in our home library. My father and his friends would never allow me to read Ghamidi’s books or listen to his lectures. These, he insisted, were based on a deviation from Mawdudi’s ideology and were based on an intent to harm the Jama’at cause. In this connection, in the mid-1990s, I faced the same attitude and response from my father as he confronted his father: to my grandfather, my father’s defiance was a serious offence because he was deviating from the traditional Islam as was told and narrated to them by the village imams and ulama. To my father, my defiance was substantial because I deviated from the most modern interpretation, ideology and strategy of an Islamist movement that is, Mawdudi and the Jama’at. My grandfather accused my father of creating havoc in the original religion; my father accused me not only of deviating from Islam but also from Mawdudi’s political Islam.

At the time, it was not the academic argument that it would later become, that we are passing through competing understandings of Islam, and its relation to state and society—my grandfather’s insistence on traditional Islam, my father’s commitment to Mawdudi’s Islamism and my own introduction to Ghamidi and his ideas. These were religious tensions within and without. We experienced these tensions but could not describe them in academic terms. I see this incessant dissent, rupture, discontinuity, change, transformation, mutation and deviation as a normal pattern within my own lived Islam, and not an exception
found only in the modern Western world. The trajectory of post-Islamism ex-
amined in this thesis points to only one such seceding trajectory from a specific
standpoint. The rest of this story will be narrated in chapter 5 of this thesis.

This brief self-referential account of the arrival, proliferation and crisis of Is-
lamism in my village offers a microcosm of the changing understanding of Is-
lam at macro-social levels. What follows in this thesis is a seven-chapter inte-
grated account of Islamic contestations and its relation to individual, state and
society.
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<td>All India Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AINC</td>
<td>All India National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi</td>
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<td>CMP</td>
<td>Comparative Manifesto Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSC</td>
<td>Federal Shar’iat Court</td>
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<td>GC</td>
<td>Government College</td>
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<td>GML</td>
<td>Ghamidi’s Meezan Lectures</td>
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<tr>
<td>IJI</td>
<td>Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance)</td>
</tr>
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<td>IJT</td>
<td>Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>Islamic Research Institute</td>
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<td>IHF</td>
<td>Itmam-e-Hujjat Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUH</td>
<td>Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAO</td>
<td>Muslim Anglo Oriental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>Muttahedda Majlis-e-Amal</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRG</td>
<td>Manifesto Research Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Pakistan National Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan’s Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNSM</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shar’iat-e-Muhammadi</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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Abstract

The present study aims to explore and examine the emergence and development of a new intellectual discourse and community that conceptually-ideologically transformed from political Islam (Islamism) to a new understanding of Islam (post-Islamism). This small circle of emergent intellectuals has gained unprecedented coverage and momentum in the recent years through the new media in Pakistan. This research examines the ideas and worldview—specifically interpretative method, theory of social change, views on Islamic state, democracy, individual liberties and jihad—of this new intellectual circle that has mutated from its previous Islamic revivalist ideology. The study shows that the grand intellectuals (Amin Ahsan Islahi/d. 1997 and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi/b. 1951) and public intellectuals (researchers, writers, public speakers, TV anchors and teachers) in this discursive circle were once ardent believers in the Islamist ideology of Mawdudi (d.1979) that aimed creating an Islamic state. However, based on different grounds and at various points of time, these intellectuals seceded from Mawdudi’s Islamic revivalist thought and socio-political activism. In this thesis, I refer to the worldview of these intellectuals as post-Islamism and their circle as a post-Islamist discourse community. This small community of intellectuals has extended its message and influence, mostly among modern educated, middle and upper-middle classes at wider public level through their active participation in debates on diverse issues, such as Islamic state, Islamic punishments, gender, jihad and human rights. These debates are mostly held on the newly liberated electronic media in Pakistan.

In this study, I argue that these post-Islamist scholars in Pakistan, though unable to create a popular social movement, have instead inaugurated a unique interpretative method and line of ijtihad. Primarily, their treatment of the doctrinal sources and unique interpretative method, has mainly contributed to their conceptual and ideological transformation from Islamism to post-Islamism. Thus, the epochal shift in epistemology and hermeneutics, the articulation and proliferation of a counter-worldview to Mawdudi’s po-
Political reading of Islam, the nullification of his revivalist thought and the retreat in theory and practice from his initiated project of establishing an Islamic state constitutes the main project of post-Islamism in Pakistan. In lieu of conclusion, this thesis summarises that post-Islamists’ worldview has far-reaching implications for reformulation of the relationship between Islam and democracy, individual liberties, status of non-Muslims in a Muslim majority state and principles of waging of armed struggle—jihad. Towards the end, the study also identifies some policy implications and new avenues of future research.
Dit onderzoek richt zich op het ontstaan en de ontwikkeling van een nieuw intellectueel debat en een nieuwe intellectuele gemeenschap die conceptueel en ideologisch is overgegaan van de politieke islam (islamisme) naar een nieuwe opvatting van de islam (post-islamisme). Deze kleine groep intellectuelen heeft de afgelopen jaren in Pakistan in de nieuwe media ongekend veel aandacht gekregen en heeft aan kracht gewonnen. Deze studie onderzoekt de ideeën en het wereldbeeld—in het bijzonder de interpretatiemethode, theorie van sociale verandering, visie op de islamitische staat, democratie, individuele vrijheden en jihad—van deze nieuwe groep intellectuelen die is ontstaan uit voormalige aanhangers van de islamitische heroplevingsideologie. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat belangrijke intellectuelen als Amin Ahsan Islahi (gest. 1997) en Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (1951) en opiniemakers (onderzoekers, schrijvers, sprekers, televisiepresentators en leraren) uit deze groep ooit sterk geloofden in de islamitische ideologie van Mawdudi (gest. 1979) die gericht was op het creëren van een islamitische staat. Deze intellectuelen hebben echter om verschillende redenen en op verschillende momenten afstand genomen van Mawdudi’s ideeën over een heropleving van de islam en sociaal-politiek activisme. In dit proefschrift wordt het wereldbeeld van deze intellectuelen aangeduid als post-islamisme en hun groep als een gemeenschap van post-islamitische denkers. Deze kleine groep intellectuelen bereikt met zijn boodschap vooral moderne, hoger opgeleide leden van de middenklasse en hogere middenklasse en oefent invloed uit door actieve deelname aan debatten over diverse onderwerpen zoals een islamitische staat, islamitische
straffen, gender, jihad en mensenrechten. Deze debatten worden meestal gevoerd via de onlangs geliberaliseerde elektronische media in Pakistan.

In dit onderzoek wordt betoogd dat deze post-islamistische geleerden in Pakistan weliswaar geen populaire sociale beweging op gang gebracht hebben, maar wel een unieke interpretatiemethode en vorm van *ijtihad* hebben gelanceerd. Vooral hun benadering van de doctrines en hun unieke interpretatiemethode hebben bijgedragen aan hun conceptuele en ideologische hervorming van islamisme naar post-islamisme. De baanbrekende verandering in epistemologie en hermeneutiek, het onder woorden brengen en bekend maken van een visie die tegen Mawdudi’s politieke interpretatie van de islam ingaat, het ongeldig verklaren van zijn heroplevingsgedachte en het in theorie en praktijk afstand nemen van zijn initiatief om een islamitische staat te vestigen vormen dus de belangrijkste kenmerken van het post-islamisme in Pakistan. Bij wijze van conclusie stelt dit proefschrift samenvattend dat het post-islamistische wereldbeeld vergaande implicaties heeft voor de herformulering van de relatie tussen de islam en democratie, individuele vrijheden, de status van niet-moslims in een land waar moslims de meerderheid vormen en de uitgangspunten van de gewapende strijd—jihad. Het proefschrift eindigt met enkele beleidsimplicaties en aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek.
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Post-Islamism is a new intellectual response and social trend in Muslim societies. This response and trend has emerged due to the multifaceted crisis of the idea and practice of creating an ideal Islamic state. Initially in Iran in the 1990s, this changing social and political trend emerged as a phenomenon that resulted from the crisis of Islamists’ experimentation to create an Islam state (Bayat 2007). Later, not only the term post-Islamism was refined but the number of such empirical examples also increased in Muslim societies. This dual process gave birth to a grand notion of post-Islamism that is deployable to various specific cases. This research concerns the articulation, refinement, nurture and proliferation of one such specific strand of post-Islamism in Pakistan.

The present study examines the ideas and worldview (specifically interpretative method, theory of social change, views on Islamic state and democracy, individual liberties, jihad and status of non-Muslim citizens in a Muslim majority state) of a new intellectual circle in Pakistan. This circle or community of intellectuals has gained unprecedented momentum in the recent past not only inside Pakistan but also in the Gulf region and the West (Ahmad 2010). The research shows that introduction of new electronic media and certain external conditions played a key role in the public outreach of these non-traditional scholars. However, the very ideas of these intellectuals that gave them unprecedented impetus, specifically, among the Pakistani youth and middle and upper middle classes, the research explores, were articulated, refined and matured prior to opening of these opportunities—post-9/11 debates, introduction of new media and general Musharraf’s state-led project of Enlightened Moderation. The study shows that at least three main phases can be discerned, in the articulation, refinement, nurture and public momentum of
this discourse. These are, generational dimensions that connects these intellectuals to early 20th century scholars Farahi and then Islahi; reconstructionist phase in which the building blocks of this discourse were constructed and interconnected, and finally, the public outreach phase in the recent past through the new media and external socio-political conditions.

The central articulators of this Islamic discourse mutated from its previous revivalist ideology—that is, the 20th century ideologue and revivalist, Sayyid Abul A’ala Mawdudi (hereafter Mawdudi). By examining this community of intellectuals, this research aims to fill a critical gap in studies on the Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan (hereafter the Jama’at). The articulators of this new discourse were once firm believers and ardent supporters of the revivalist thought of Mawdudi. Hence, Mawdudi’s thought and the Jama’at he founded in 1941 defines the immediate reference point for this study. After parting ways, not only were they conceptually-ideologically transformed to their own constructed Islamic worldview but also re-vitalised their connections with society through formal and informal channels. It developed into a discourse community—a medium-neutral and unconstrained by time and space intellectual circle that share a common worldview (Swales 1987)—which gained momentum and expansion in the recent past due to new media. The epochal shift in epistemology and hermeneutics, the articulation and proliferation of a counter-worldview to Mawdudi’s political reading of Islam, the nullification of his revivalist thought and the retreat in theory and practice from his initiated project of establishing an Islamic state constitutes the main project of post-Islamism. The present working definition of post-Islamism is intentionally kept narrow to define and refer to a very specific geographical strand of post-Islamism as defined by its proponents—Bayat (1996, 2007) and Roy (1994, 2004).

This thesis has a dual focus throughout. On the substantive side, it argues that the new vision of the post-Islamist intellectuals has taken on a variety of religious and social issues ranging from elaboration on epistemological principles to contemporary debates on jihad, women rights, hudood laws (Islamic punishments), fine arts, secularism and democracy, economy and social fabrics, although the current focus is on few of them. Methodologically, by using Euben’s dialogic model of interpretation, the thesis attempts to understand trajectories of Islamism and post-Islamism in Pakistan, in their own terms and categories. This approach
helps to enrich our understanding of the phenomena of revivalism (iḥya) and regeneration/renewal (tajdeed) through intellectual biographies and definition and description of the “self.” This methodological dimension situates this research in the interpretive tradition of social sciences. The study does not suggest nullification of the existing works based on causal analysis and explanations of Islamic revivalism. Rather, it adds an interpretive dimension to the existing stock of knowledge on Islamic revivalism. The study relies upon Ahmad’s (2005) pioneering work on transformation of the Jama’at-e-Islami North India to corroborate; Kamrava’s seminal study of intellectual discourses in Iran, Euben’s (1999) well-researched study, Sayyid (1997), Bayat (1996, 2007), Roy (1994, 2004), Kepel (2000, 2002), Masud (2006, 2009, 2010), Lauzieri (2005), and Metcalf (2004). Likewise, it departs from the unverifiable assumptions guiding studies by scholars of repute like Sivan (1985), Lewis (2002b, 2004) and Pipes (2003).

The design of this introductory chapter is as follows: section two and three respectively provides rationale, background and justification for conducting this study; research questions are spelled out in section four, thesis arguments are laid out in section five and key terms are defined in section six; section seven deals with methodological issues. The end of the chapter briefly outlines and discusses the thesis plan.

1.2 Rationale for Selection of Cases

The following arguments form the selection criteria for why the intellectual trajectory of Jama’at and Ghamidi were chosen over others. The Jama’at-e-Islami is one of the two oldest Islamist parties (the other is the Muslim Brothers in Egypt) in the world. It also holds the distinction of being founded and led for around three decades (1941-1972) by the main Islamist ideologue—Mawdudi. The Jama’at literature was translated into more than 28 languages, and in this way, it inspired and attracted individuals across the globe towards political vision of Islam. Unlike, the Islamic revolution in Iran, which came about without any prior social movement, and Egypt where Islamic social movement triumphed without bringing a revolution (Bayat 2007), the Jama’at has been through multiple experiences. It remained in opposition and suffered from state repression in the 1960s and 1970s; co-opted with the military regime in power and benefited from opportunities in the 1980s; actively participated in the political process in the 1990s; participated in elections and
exercised power in 2002-2007. Although, it failed in realising its political dreams, the Jama’at was quite successful in achieving an Islamic constitution for Pakistan (Nasr 1994).

The leader and chief proponent of the case for post-Islamism as an intellectual movement, Ghamidi, is an ex-member of the Jama’at and student of Islahi. He is founder of the Al-Mawrid Institute of Islamic Sciences and is a leading religious figure in the public and private media. Unlike Dr Israr Ahmad, who failed to develop a different worldview from the Islamists, Ghamidi arrived with new a worldview and approach to understanding Islam and a strategy for social change. Like the Jama’at and traditional ulama, who engage mostly with the secular and liberal forces in society, Ghamidi and his fellow intellectuals are in debate with the Islamists and ulama. Both intellectuals, Mawdudi and Ghamidi, are an extension of the Shibli School (see chapters 4 & 5 for discussion of the Shibli School/Dabistan-e-Shibli).

The last aspect from a methodological standpoint is the justification of Pakistan as the geographical setting for the current study. At least three reasons justify the selection of Pakistan for the location of this study. First, Pakistan's current population is around 170 million (97 per cent Muslims and 3 per cent non-Muslims, mostly Hindus and Christians). The most popular political slogan during the movement for Pakistan was about the creation of a separate homeland for Muslims on the sub-continent where they could live individual and collective lives in accordance with the principles of Islam. Second, from the perspective of Islamism, Pakistan ranks equal with the Middle Eastern countries and Iran. Although, in this respect Pakistan has received little academic attention, yet, its importance stems from the fact that Mawdudi migrated to Pakistan from India and lived an active life. The Islamist Jama’at remained at the centre of all political and social activities. Pakistan and the Jama’at were also at the forefront of Afghan jihad in the 1980s, which subsequently shaped important world events. In other words, Pakistan is where the intellectual fragments and ideological frames of Islamism graduated in its various phases. The geographic location of Pakistan is such that “it lies close to the Arab countries, Iran and Turkey to its west, and Indonesia and Bangladesh to its east” (Khan 1985: 3). Likewise, Pakistan shares a border with Afghanistan along the northwestern tribal regions, close to the Central Asian Muslim states.
Historically, the Middle East is the cradle of major world religions including Islam. Since the end of Ottoman caliphate, this region has been often in the news for world politics and oil. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the incredible intelligence and human ingenuity applied to exploring new meanings and theories in the Qur’an and Hadith, first in the sub-continent and then in Pakistan, should be reason enough for selection of this location. A vast land of more than a billion people littered with amazing cultural, religious and intellectual diversity, the region deserves more attention from researchers and intellectuals of every ilk. To substantiate the argument the researcher will only refer to the formidable work done by the School of Shibli—Shibli, Iqbal, Azad, Farahi, Islahi, Mawdudi—in the sphere of Islam. Each one of them is a prolific writer, thinker, scholar, activist and historian and acquainted with modern and traditional trends in knowledge. There are also the competing schools in the Deobandi, Salafi and Barelwi traditions and Modernist scholars like Fazlur Rahman. To quote historian Ayyisha Jalal, “yet some of the key innovations in early modern and modern Islamic thought have taken place in the South Asian sub-continent” (2008: XIII).

1.3 Background and Justification

This section outlines the global and immediate local context, setting the background and justification for this research.

1.3.1 Global context: Muslim societies and the process of change

Informed by history, socio-economic conditions, new ideas and worldviews, and experiences of Islamic revivalist forces at different geographical locations of the Islamic World, the 1990s marked the beginning of a new awakening. In many respects, the resurgent voices championed by intellectuals and learned elite; closely resemble modernist responses of the late 19th century aptly labelled by Professor Fazlur Rahman as “classical modernism” (1984: 84). Scholars on Islamic revivalist forces have indicated these dispersed and multifaceted voices and avenues of reform—competing understandings of the sacred text, new interpreters vis-à-vis traditional authorities, the new media, fresh ideas, mutations and transformations within movements, and the emerging new societal forces vigilant to youth, gender and non-Muslims’ concerns (Ahmad 2005; Bayat 1996; Kamrava 2008; Khosrokhavar 2004; Masud 2007; Moten 2002; Sadri 2001; Wiktorowicz 2004; Zaman 2002). In some plac-
es, these voices are enmeshed within society enjoying institutional support and popular sentiments. Elsewhere they exist only in intellectual discourses making them potent for a silent revolution.

The argument threading through these scholarly studies is the identification of a new trend that has emerged in Muslim societies. This trend is characterised mainly by an informed consciousness to accommodate rights of the neglected sections of society; forging aspects of pluralism, democratisation and civil society; fostering socio-economic development and improved standard of living.

Post-colonial Muslim states ruled mostly by secular elites, monarchs and military dictators as well as their capitalist and socialist theories of development have failed to satisfy the most essential needs of masses in Muslim majority societies. Equally, a representative sample of conservative Islamist regimes in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan have largely failed to present an alternative model of socio-economic development. The regimes in these societies have shown less space for accommodation of growing voices of internal dissent. The ensuing suffocation resulted in fractures and secessionist tendencies. Thus, the intellectual articulations, reformist discourses, growing civil society and the new mass media are observable everywhere, though vibrant and manifest in some places, but passive and silent elsewhere. On the backdrop shaped by state’s repressive policies, besides, the neo-liberal economic agenda and modern lifestyle has contributed in equal measures to intensified radicalisation of splinter groups, the significance of growing voices and trends of moderation cannot be overemphasised.

Presently, a number of Middle Eastern societies are witnessing this trend. Egypt is witnessing the emergence of Hizb-al-Wasat with its counter-worldview to militant and authoritarian shades of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iran, a “silent revolution” has brought about secular-reformist and Islamic reformist discourses pioneered by activist-intellectuals. In Saudi Arabia, a slow and steady reform process has set in. In Turkey, numerous societal forces in politics, civil society and Sufi brotherhoods have risen and proliferated. In India, the political and conceptual-ideological transformation of the Jama’at-e-Islami is taking place. In Pakistan, a new thought-movement has emerged, brought about by a number of intellectuals that seceded from the Jama’at. In his PhD dissertation, based on ethnographic fieldwork, Irfan Ahmad (2005) showed that the Jama’at-e-Islami in the North of India has undergone a substan-
tial change against its own ideology. These specific examples indicate a brewing revolution visible in intellectual articulations and civil society mutations more than states’ policies and institutions. An emergent framework of post-Islamism explains the element of change in ideas, ideals, targets, strategies and focus both inside and outside Islamic movements.

For its proponents and those who applied it to empirical examples, post-Islamism is a project constituted of: 1) social and political conditions where the appeal of Islamism has dwindled due to multifaceted crisis from within and without (Bayat 2007; Roy 2004: 1); 2) exclusive, monopolist, puritan, statist and revolutionary account of political Islam is changing in favour of more inclusive, society-centric, vigilant towards individual liberties and concerns of women, youth and non-Muslims, and hermeneutically, a movement away from fixed scripture towards historicity (Bayat 2007); 3) a category of analysis that is not distinct but a “variant of Islamism” (ibid: 4) it is not anti-Islamic or secular but “secularisation of state and prevalence of religious ethic in society” (ibid: 5) it can become a pervasive argument only if an Islamist organisation retreats from establishing an Islamic state (Tibi 2008: 6) like many Islamist sects, there could be multiple post-Islamist views (Yilmaz nd). This thesis is well placed in this broader global context, although the local dynamics and conditions vary.

1.3.2 Local context: the Jama’at and its trajectories of dissent

The Jama’at in Pakistan and its founder Mawdudi are well known to the Western academic world. Mawdudi’s revivalist thought spurred Islamic political revivalist trends not only in South Asia but also in the wider Muslim world. At least five Jama’at groups in South Asia—Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and both sides of Kashmir—subscribe wholeheartedly to Mawdudi’s worldview of Islamic revival. His enormous influence on renowned ideologues-activists, Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, Iranian Khomeini, Tunisian Ghanoushi, and worldwide Islamic social forces and activists appears in studies on Muslim societies. Mawdudi’s articulations on Islamic beliefs and practices, and his blueprint for socio-economic order and educational system, as articulated in his major works, have been translated into more than 28 languages. In Pakistan, his vision of an Islamic state became a popular idiom and mainstream political discourse. The Jama’at emerged as the most well-disciplined and or-
ganised political party in Pakistan, which also inspired numerous sister professional organisations and trade unions among communities of teachers, doctors, engineers, lawyers and labourers.

Mawdudi founded the Jama'at-e-Islami in 1941 in pre-partitioned India. The main objective as envisioned by its founders was the establishment of God’s kingdom on earth, which he claimed to have derived from a prophetic career, specifically the prophet Muhammad. As the division of India in 1947 gave birth to the independent states of Pakistan and India, the Jama’at also split along national lines forming the Jama’at-e-Islami India and the Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan. Political and ideological history of this party reveals that like all other such movements, it has had its difficulties of internecine fissures at times leading to secessions and defections of loyal members and activists. Since its inception, a multitude of dedicated activists, leaders, professionals, business elites, scholars, writers and intellectuals have quit or been expelled from the Jama’at on various grounds. The lengthy list of such activists indicates that some of them revived their activism in various other social and political forms. Some of them excelled in public life as popular national figures, while others established separate Islamic groups, yet others joined various secular political parties. While certain dimensions of the Jama’at (ideology, history, organisation, political activism, relations with the state etc.) have been subject of academic scrutiny, the dissenting voices of defected and seceded activists have rarely appeared on the researchers’ radar screen. As such, this is a scholarly effort to fill in the visible gaps of knowledge on the work of Jama’at, the current mode of activism of its ex-activists, and their recent intellectual-social profile in Pakistan. Such an inquiry seems long overdue, for other aspects of the Jama’at have received wider academic attention (Adams 1966; Ahmad 2004; Bahadur 1977; Moten 2002; Nasr 1994, 1996).

To achieve its revivalist goal, the Jama’at initially adopted a strategy of social-educational reform with a bottom-up approach. However, after the partition of India, the Jama’at replaced this approach with a state-centric one—taking active part in politics, pursuit of state power and Islamisation of the state as a central goal through various socio-political means. The transition was far from smooth however. It caused internal fissures and ultimate fractures. Thus, the Jama’at ideology, change in strategy and internal tensions consistently gave impetus to disagreement and dissent among its activists. Some of these cycles of discontent cul-
minated in individuals seceding from the group (late 50s) and the creation of splinter groups (mid-1990s)

In the early 1940s, shortly after the birth of the Jama’at, some religious scholars left Mawdudi on the grounds of “slack observance” of Islamic life style; the length of his beard and socialisation of his wife. In the mid-1950s, alleged “impermissible” political tactics by Jama’at candidates in the elections to the Punjab Assembly created a new wave of disagreement. A number of influential scholars and ulama left or were dismissed from Jama’at during this period and some reputable scholars voiced their disagreements over the authority of the leader (amir) and non-democratic decision-making processes in the Jama’at. Thousands of other activists have quit the Jama’at, at various times for various reasons. The process of disaffiliation continues. Outside the Jama’at, various social and political activist groups proliferated into a plethora of social and political activism, joined these seceding voices with a separate story and trajectory of their own.

Of the many examples discussed above, the study focuses on the trajectory of dissent represented by Javed Ahmed Ghamidi (expelled from the Jama’at in late 1970s) and his loosely tied network of public intellectuals. The majority of these public intellectuals have their roots in the Jama’at or Islamist ideology at various points. A brief introduction of this intellectual trajectory is in order.

1.3.3 Introducing the new intellectual circle

Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahi (hereafter Islahi), Ghamidi’s mentor-teacher, and co-founder of the Jama’at with Mawdudi, resigned from the Jama’at in 1958. Islahi’s resignation was mainly an outcome of his disagreement with Mawdudi because; 1) the latter’s continuous attempts to concentrate power in his person as amir of the Jama’at; 2) overlooking/bypassing the consultative body (majlis-e-shura) in an undemocratic fashion, and 3) Mawdudi’s insistence on pursuing the wild goose of Islamic revolution through active political means and electoral processes rather than through societal reform as conceived by Islahi and recommended by Mawdudi in 1941 (Ahmad 1991; Islahi 1991). After his departure, Islahi wholeheartedly devoted himself to the completion of his nine-volume commentary on the Qur’an, in light of the hermeneutic approach of his teacher Hamiduddin Farahi. During this period, although Islahi withdrew from public life, he remained in contact with the society
through Qur’an circles. In the 1970s, these Qur’anic circles seemed like a kind of “solidarity network”. In 1973, Ghamidi was introduced to Islahi. At the time, the former was an Islamic activist and he simultaneously benefitted from Islahi and Mawdudi both. In 1977, Ghamidi was expelled from the Jama’at.

After falling out with the Jama’at, Ghamidi, like his mentor Islahi, turned towards academic pursuits of understanding Islamic sources afresh. For so many internal and external reasons, but mainly dissatisfaction with the ideology of Mawdudi, political activism of the Jama’at and failure of traditionalist and modernist frameworks to answer his questions satisfactorily, Ghamidi realised an entire intellectual shift based on his 35-years long academic career as student of Islamic sciences and a religious intellectual. Ironically, as implication of his epochal shift, Ghamidi also reached an understanding of social reform agenda with a “bottom-up” approach; exactly the recipe Mawdudi had suggested when he founded the Jama’at. He authored many publications expounding his own understanding of Islam and its implications for reform in economy, politics, society and religious thought itself. However, his public career exceeds that of merely an intellectual and religious scholar, one of the reasons for the interest in investigating his ideas and worldviews with this research.

Ghamidi trained, formally and informally, a number of modern educated youth, mostly associated with Mawdudi’s revivalist thought and activism in Pakistan. These individuals, as full-time direct students and intermittent visitors, learned and absorbed Ghamidi’s approach to Islamic sources and its significant socio-political implications. In the 1980s and 90s, the intellectual discourse of Ghamidi went through consistent refinement, revision and limited introduction to mostly learned, academic and religious communities. However, the wider appeal, appreciation and critique of Ghamidi’s intellectual discourse came about, at a phenomenal rate, only in the last eight years, after the explosion of new mass media during the military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf. For propagation of their ideas and worldviews, Ghamidi and his inspired writers, columnists, anchors, teachers and scholars liberally internalised all genres of the new media as an enormous opportunity. The new media also provided fora for debate between them and the competing authorities of Islam—mostly Mawdudi’s Islamists and ulama—on sensitive is-
sues like hudood laws, gender relations, jihad, non-Muslims and consumption of music and art.

Based on Islahi’s interpretive approach to Qur’an and Prophetic traditions, Ghamidi adopted his teacher’s tools of analysis and discovered an alternative interpretation of the Islamic text. He devised a strategy of social change entirely opposite to his earlier Islamist/revivalist approach (chapters 5 & 6). The definition and impact of this thought movement on social and political issues like jihad, democracy, terrorism and the discussion of Islamic vis-à-vis a secular state are the themes of interest in this dissertation. The thesis seeks to define this new intellectual trend, clustering round Ghamidi, as post-Islamism. To Professor Masud, “Ghamidi is running an intellectual movement similar to Wasatiyya in Egypt on the popular electronic media of Pakistan.” His debate is “with traditionalists on the one hand and the Jama’at and its seceding groups on the other” (Masud 2007). The discursive shift in the worldview of these intellectuals is yet far from becoming a popular social movement and distant from causing an “institutional transformation” in Pakistan. However, the discourse has made inroads in the religious and social landscape of Pakistani society. To borrow Bayat’s statement, though his analysis pertains to popular social movements in Iran: “Rather, they are prolonged multifaceted processes of agency and change, with ebbs and flows, whose enduring ‘forward linkages’ can revitalize popular mobilization when the opportunity arises” (2007: 14). In a society [Pakistan], where the Islamist idiom is so deeply entrenched that all other vocabularies—socialist, nationalist, liberal—have almost ceased to exist (Metcalf 2004, see chapter 5), some popular debates on electronic media between post-Islamists and ulama and Islamists strengthen Bayat’s expression.

1.4 Research Objectives and Questions

The main objective of the current study is to enrich our understanding of the emergent phenomenon and trend of post-Islamism in Muslim societies. It does so by focusing on an empirical case of a discursive circle of intellectuals in Pakistan. The nature of this study, as evident from the thesis title, first entails examination and understanding of the ideas and discourse of this intellectual trajectory in its own terms and categories. Hence, the impact on society of this discourse is beyond the scope of the current study, although it will be briefly discussed in due course.
The current research theme and the questions examined are the outcome of a four-year process of trial and error. In 2006, I first read Bayat’s (1996) article on post-Islamism. At the time, it intrigued me because it was addressing some of the ambiguities I had come across in Pakistan about the politics of the Jama’at. However, at that time, I was investigating, half-heartedly, ulama’s role in development in Pakistan. In 2006, GEO TV channel organised a debate on hudood laws passed during the military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq era (1977-88). The debate, unprecedented in Pakistan’s history, brought traditional ulama, Islamists and Ghamidi, into an animated contestation over the status of Zia’s hudood laws: are these laws Divine or man-made? It was the first time that Ghamidi’s ideas and approach were appreciated and criticised at a wider public level. It was a moment of joy for the modern educated youth, women’s groups and human rights organisations in Pakistan who found intellectuals—Ghamidi and his fellows—who can contest with ulama and Islamists in their language and vocabulary. A columnist and a lawyer at apex court writing in the *Daily Times*, a daily newspaper representing liberal views in Pakistan, wrote that “the reformist Muslim approach, typified by Allama Javed Ahmed Ghamidi, is to take on the mullahs on their territory and challenging their interpretation of Islamic law” (Naqvi 2006).

The ulama and Islamists accused Ghamidi and his fellows of advancing/promoting general Musharraf’s “U.S.-sponsored agenda of Enlightened Moderation” to popularise and introduce Western values and immodest culture in Pakistan. After the debate aired, Ghamidi’s comment on these allegations was that he has won the support of secular and liberal classes, and in this way brought them closer to religion. At the time, I was interacting with social activists and professionals in NGOs and civil society organisations where I observed that Ghamidi’s lucid and ap-

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3 The state-led Islamisation drive by Zia’s regime focused on these areas: judicial reforms, an Islamic penal code, a new education policy and economic programs; See in Weiss’s *The historical debate…* 11–16.

4 This debate was named as *Zara Sochiay* at Geo TV.

5 Ghamidi’s response to a question in an informal discussion, Islamabad, January 2007.
pealing style and arguments were discussed with admiration. For Ghamidi, he had successfully made in-roads into these circles; for these circles, most of their ideas on human rights and related topics have found a religious argument in Ghamidi’s discourse.

In 2007, when I was doing fieldwork, discussions on jihad, gender relations and Islamic state had brought out Ghamidi’s ideas and worldview, and his close circle was capturing disproportionate airtime on public and private TV channels. This intrigued me to again read Bayat’s Coming of a Post-Islamist Society, and apply it on the discursive community of Ghamidi. This ambition to relate Bayat’s post-Islamism to Pakistan slowly pushed me away from my interest in ulama and development towards an academic understanding of these non-traditional scholars engaged in a debate with ulama and Islamists. I grew curious to know basic issues of my faith. However, over time, this process had unconsciously taken me towards questions that are more complicated also in a comparative fashion with other scholars like Mawdudi and Islamic modernist, Fazlur Rahman.

My academic journey of questioning began in 2007 with queries on what these intellectuals say about basic Islamic beliefs and practices, and gradually in 2008, moved towards formulation of the following central research questions:

What is the nature and scope of the post-Islamist intellectual project—discourse and intellectual circle—in Pakistan? Is it secular? Is it anti-religious? What are the historical roots of this intellectual discourse? How and under what conditions did this post-Islamist project come about?

The sub-questions are: is post-Islamism a response to the 9/11 conditions and General Musharraf’s enlightened moderation? How does this discourse relate with Mawdudi, his ideology and his Jama’at? Is it anti-Islamism? Is it a reaction to political Islam? Did these intellectuals develop a counter-worldview to Mawdudi? If so, how and why? What are the pillars of their discourse? How do they define themselves and their relationship with other competing Islamic discourses in Pakistan and the sub-continent? What are their arguments about jihad, gender relations,

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6 Personal interviews and informal discussions with civil society activists and professionals in Islamabad and Peshawar, July-August 2006 and June-August 2007.
Islam and democracy and, individual liberties? To what extent can a study of this post-Islamist discourse help in understanding post-Islamism as a broader social trend in Pakistan? Finally, in the given context of Pakistani state and society, what policy implications can flow from the public discourse of these intellectuals?

1.4.1 Conceptualising Islamism

Definition of the two key terms, Islamism and post-Islamism, depends on the context in which they are deployed. Their boundaries have been mutable and conceptualisation changing; hence any definition and operationalisation is subject to refutation.

The concept of “Islamism” is employed here as a phenomenon inspired by Mawdudi to revive Islam and uplift Muslims by establishing an Islamic state. The “Islamists” refer to those who associate themselves with the reviver ideology of Mawdudi and the political practice based on or inspired by him within the geographical boundaries of Pakistan. This specification narrows the focus in the given context of the study and does not assume that prevalence of Islamism or Mawdudi’s influence is confined only to Pakistan. Another important distinction is inspired by Tibi’s differentiation between institutional and militant Islamism (2008). In contrast to the latter, the former is a category that primarily opts for democratic means. Conceptually, it will be difficult to disentangle the Jama’at’s tacit and latent connections, moral approvals for and sympathies with various militant organisations across the Muslim world. However, within the boundaries of Pakistan, it has employed social, political and electoral means in its political struggle. Apart from occasional references to various kinds of Jama’at activism, including its role in the Afghan war and in armed conflict in Indian-held Kashmir, three main interconnected aspects of Mawdudi’s thought and the Jama’at socio-political struggle shape the conceptualisations of Islamism held by the researcher and within this study. They are: 1) political interpretation of the religious text and thus blurring of categories of collective obligation (farg-e-kifaya) and personal obligation (farg-e-’ayn) in Islam; 2) socio-political struggle to enforce Shar’ia law, pursuit of Islamisation programme through the institutional arrangements of the state, and reaffirmation of Islam as a “blue-print” of socio-economic order, and 3) Islamists’ openness to adopt and deploy all modern forms of propaganda.
machinery, technology, print and electronic media, and other opportunities opened by the market and politics.

The preference here for Islamism, over other labels in vogue such as “fundamentalism,” “extremism” or “radicalism” and others, is premised on my intention to avoid pejorative connotations and Euro-centrism associated with these terms, mostly in the mass media. As a useful “heuristic device,” the concept of “Islamism” can better encompass Mawdudi’s revivalist Islamic worldview—that Islam is an ism/system of life vis-à-vis capitalism and socialism, a top-down change strategy to actualise this—and socio-political activism in Pakistani society. Conceptualisation of Islamism in this way helps to sharpen the focus on the other key term—post-Islamism. The latter, even if taken literally, denotes an important development in the biography of Islamism that a new trend has emerged. Following Bayat (2007) and unlike Roy (1999), post-Islamism is not the end of Islamism and thus not a historical but analytical category. Although, Roy later revisited his position (2004: 8).

Islamism, Islamists, Islamic activists, Islamic activism, Islamic revivalism, political Islam and the Jama’at are interchangeable terms referring to the same idea unless defined and explained otherwise. I admit and acknowledge inter-regional and intra-regional variations in the Islamist movements. Therefore, the thesis rejects approaches that lump them together. By implication, the dichotomy differentiates between Islam, as religion limited to personal piety and Islam as political order. Islam for Islamists is “the blueprint of a social order.” Such an approach to social change in society may be called a “state-centred” or “top-down” approach (Yavuz 2003).

Terms like Islamism, Political Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism, Islamic Activism, Resurgent Islam, Islamic Extremism and Islamic Revivalism represent Islamic revivalist movements around the world. Problematically, these terms are used interchangeably to indicate the same phenomenon and making it a threat to the West. Such conceptualisations fail to distinguish between various approaches and strategies adopted by the Islamic movements (Ahmad 2005; Bayat 2007). Scholars overlook the underlying variety and complexity within Islamism across the globe. Recent scholarship has called such a monolithic approach into question (Bayat 2005; Esposito 1999; Yavuz 2003).

In his article, Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?, Martin Kramer has shown the historical journey the two terms have gone through
in the French and American academia: fundamentalism in America (since 1920s) and Islamism in France (since 18th century). This journey also traces the “history of changing Western perceptions of Muslim reality” (2003: 1-2). In Kramer’s view, the term Islamism made its way from French academia into America replacing Islamic fundamentalism in the late 1980s. In the former case, Islamism resurfaced as a more comprehensive term than its original use in the mid-18th century when its aim was to refer to the religion of Muslims or religion of Muhammad—Muhammadanism. “Muhammadanism” appeared in the works of Orientalist scholars like Ignaz Goldziher (late 19th century) and Joseph Schacht (mid-20th century). The emergence of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 popularised the term “Islamic fundamentalism” specifically in the American media. In media, the use of the term Islamic fundamentalism in relation to the Iranian revolution also “evoked the antimodernism that Ayatollah Khomeini seemed to personify” (Kramer 2003: 4). The term thus acquired new meanings reflecting the arrival/emergence of an Islamic opposition to modernity, an opposition that is reactionary, medieval and irrational in narrative and disposition (Bayat 2007; Masud 2007; Yavuz 2003). Moreover, Edward Said has rightly put it that “[t]he deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism ensure that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the same thing” (Said 1997: XVI-XIX). The role of Western media was crucial. Journalists instead of scholars appropriated and popularised such extravagant statements (ibid).

American scholar of Islamic movements, John Esposito (1999: 5-7), has criticised the indiscriminate use of the term “fundamentalism.” In his view, the term is ‘pejorative’ and ‘derogatory’ even for mainstream Christians. The term becomes the basis for the usage of other such loaded labels like terrorism, extremism, fanaticism, militarism, rejectionism and the rest even if the intent is unclear. Thus, Islam and Islamic movements naturally becomes antithetical to global peace and universal progress. Instead of fundamentalism which is “too laden with Christian presuppositions and Western stereotypes,” Esposito prefers to use Islamic revivalism or Islamic activism (ibid: 6). For Nikke Keddi, “Islamism refers to twentieth century movements for political Islam, usually aiming, overtly or covertly, at an Islamic state that would enforce at least some Islamic laws and customs…” (Alavi and Halliday 1988: 15).
The Islamists belief and practice of creating an Islamic order, Islamisation of state institutions and social organisation has created enormous confusion, ambiguity and crisis, giving birth to a new trend called post-Islamism. Depending on local context, conditions and resemblance to this general notion, a specific trajectory of post-Islamism can vary across time and geographical location.

1.4.2 Conceptualising Post-Islamism

The main postulates of Bayat’s conceptualisation and its operationalisable features guided my understanding of the post-Islamist phenomenon. In this study, I found that only some postulates can relate to the post-Islamist project in Pakistan.

In their seminal work explaining the Islamists’ failure to establish an Islamic state, scholars of repute conceptualise an emergent intellectual and social trend, which translates into post-Islamism: 1) a category of analysis, as a substitute/stand-in project for Modernism in Muslim societies—specifically Iran (Bayat 2007); 2) a historical category announcing the dead end of Islamism (Roy and Volk 1996).

The main proponents of this category, Bayat and Roy, reference a broad spectrum of intellectual and socio-political trends and activism in Muslim societies, which have come about due to the diminishing/exhausting energies of Islamist project. The project is spearheaded, for example, by youth and women activists in Iran, a moderate band of ex-Islamists—Hizb-al-Wasat—in Egypt, and a giant political force, AKP in Turkey. Yilmaz applied a post-Islamist framework to Islamist movements in Turkey. He argues that the Turkish Islamists’ ability to transform themselves into post-Islamism was shaped by the “opportunities provided by the pluralist tradition in Turkey” and the historical democratic experience (nd: 19). Post-Islamism in Islamist politics in Turkey was a result of not only their coming into power but also a physical and discursive interaction with diverse communities, thinkers, business elites and intellectuals. According to Yilmaz, ‘multiple post-Islamisms’ like ‘multiple Islamisms’ are possible (ibid: 7).

I employ the term post-Islamism for this thesis to denote a discourse community of intellectuals that has emerged to prominence in the recent past in Pakistan. Although, the community has taken upon an array of hermeneutic and social issues yet one of its most salient facets is its forceful criticism on Mawdudi’s fundamental revivalist ideas—political
reading of Islam, establishment of an Islamic state, waging jihad and establishing global Islamic order. One can label this discursive community Post-Mawdudism instead of post-Islamism. However, this will reduce a complex discourse, as I will unfold it in this research, to only a body of critique on Mawdudi’s ideology and his Jama’at. This discourse produces ideas, ideals and worldviews that spring from a unique interpretative approach. It is informed by, but not reducible to, history, experience and socio-economic conditions. These activist-intellectuals were once ardent supporters of Mawdudi’s Islamist ideology or his Jama’at.

The case of post-Islamism in this research is a small subset of the broader post-Islamist project in other Muslim societies like Iran, Sudan and Turkey. It implies that conceptualisation of the current intellectual project as a strand of post-Islamism is applicable to a specific discursive community prevalent in a specific geographical location—Pakistan. Hence, its crude generalisation would be misleading. However, a rough parallel can be drawn between this discursive circle and the one called post-Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia (Lacroix 2005). In his article *Post-Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia?*, Stephane Lacroix argues that a “heterogeneous group of prominent liberal and Islamist intellectuals” in Saudi Arabia has “gained unprecedented momentum.” These “Islamo-liberal” intellectuals, according to Lacroix, criticise some rigid doctrines of Wahhabism. However, given the limited scope of these intellectuals and approval by a part of the reformist ruling elite, Lacroix quickly adds a question asking, “[b]ut is Saudi Arabia yet ready to enter the era of Post-Wahhabism?” (ibid: 1-3). Bayat counts this “Islamo-liberal” trend in Saudi Arabia as one of the many growing post-Islamist trends in the Muslim world (2007: 11). By this analogy, the discursive circle of Pakistani intellectuals qualifies for examination as an empirical category of post-Islamism. Although, currently a small discursive community with an evolving social discourse, it is a growing strand of master post-Islamist project. I agree with Bayat that post-Islamism, at least in Pakistan, is not anti-Islamic, anti-religious nor its is secular; and it emphasises human rights and individual liberties. At the same time, I differ with his conceptualisation of post-Islamism more oriented in the future than the past and historicity than fixed scriptures (ibid: 9).
1.5 Thesis Argument

A number of scholarly accounts have shown that the Jama’at has changed or is changing (Ahmad 1991; Ahmad 2005; Azmi 2002; Moten 2002; Nasr 1996, 2001). Some accounts identified the “end of ideology” and the beginning of pragmatic politics at a very early stage in the history of the Jama’at (Ahmad 1991; Azmi 2002). I agree with Ahmad (2005b), and Moten (2002) and further extend their discussion by examining an unexplored case of a trajectory of break-away intellectuals that has mutated, I argue, into a developed post-Islamist argument and limited religio-social discourse. These studies only show the existence of the element of change, rupture, crisis, ambiguity and mutation within the mainstream Islamist movement in India and Pakistan. However, the post-Islamist trajectory in Pakistan, as conceptualised above, has emerged and proliferated outside the mainstream Islamist movement, the Jama’at, and not within it. Here I also agree with Tibi’s understanding of post-Islamism saying that “post-Islamism can make sense only if an Islamist movement has abandoned the desire to set up an Islamic order” (2008: 45). Although, the focus is not to show whether the Jama’at in Pakistan has celebrated a stage of post-Islamism or not, rather, I dwell on a discourse community that has inaugurated an epochal shift from Islamism and mutated into post-Islamism.

The contribution offered by this thesis is, to take this debate further by examination of a new empirical case: post-Islamist intellectual discourse and trajectory in Pakistan. In content, post-Islamists seem to fill the theoretical gap left by the contradictions in Islamists’ theory and practices. This scenario complicates the job: I have to rely more on the content (what post-Islamists write and speak about) and less on the sociological analysis of these intellectuals. There appears to be a negligible number of studies dealing with Ghamidi and his intellectual movement in Pakistan. In his pioneering work on Ghamidi, the only published article, Khalid Masud (2006) discussed Ghamidi’s views on Shar’ia law. Rifat Hassan (2009) has discussed him in the context of Islam and modernity. Asef Iftikhar wrote his Master’s dissertation on Ghamidi and Mawdudi’s view on jihad and global order. In his recent publication (2010), Professor Mumtaz Ahmad discussed Ghamidi in a comparative fashion as a media-based preacher. Yet all these studies are far from what this thesis intends to present.
Against the views of Mawdudi, the Jama’at in Pakistan has accommodated a number of opportunities offered in modern sectors and institutions: in the realm of Western democracy (participation in electoral politics, forming alliances with secular groups, coming into power), educational sector (provision of education through private schooling), women’s participation in social and political activities, and business opportunities of global capitalism. Yet this shift to a new pragmatic response does not accompany a proper conceptual and ideological transformation leaving a theoretical or conceptual lag. This lag or, grey zone has constantly been produced, reproduced, widened and enlarged since formation of the Jama’at. The Islamists’ response, I argue, is half-baked: in practice, the Jama’at has positively responded to “un-Islamic” system, while at the ideological level, the Jama’at is still shouldering Mawdudi’s original thought. The grey zone is composed of issues like secular democracy, freedoms, hudood laws, gender equality, non-Muslims and jihad.

This thesis identifies and deals with the emerging fresh thinking of post-Islamist intellectuals outside the confines of Islamism in Pakistan. The research puzzle is methodologically suggestive to reflect more on the content and ideas of the post-Islamists in resolving the tensions.

The central thesis statement can be broken down into the following eight interrelated parts.

1. An alternative interpretation to Islamist worldview of the relationship between Islam, politics, state and society has emerged. It suggests that reformation of the individual is the vehicle for re-Islamisation of society and it retreats from the project of creating an Islamic state.

Post-Islamists’ alternative worldview to Mawdudi’s political interpretation and its critique on the Jama’at politics in Pakistan, can contribute to enriching our understanding of Islamism locally as well as globally (chapters 5 and 6).

2. This alternative Islamic worldview to Islamism has experienced an unprecedented expansionary phase through the introduction of new media and favourable support of state institutions in the recent past.

I argue that a number of factors have contributed to the transformation of an intellectual response including internal tensions and dissent within Islamism, generational factors, development of new interpretative tools for Islamic texts, Islamisation drive of the state, and the emergence of new popular media. While this thesis discusses all of these factors, it
specifically focuses on the intellectual development, transformation and the role of new media in its public outreach (chapters 5 & 6).

3. The study explores that the post-Islamist intellectual discourse was observable prior to the 9/11 tragedy, the associated debates and introduction of new media in Pakistan. Hence, it is not reducible to these external conditions.

Using biographical information, historical data and post-Islamists’ original writings, the study concludes that at least three phases can be discerned where only the last phase can be explained under the current external conditions.

4. Like Islamism, post-Islamism is also not a traditional response to modernity and change. Post-Islamism is modern not only in its social discourse and constitution, but also in its societal practice.

Analysis shows that the biography, social basis, constituency and interpretative approaches of Islamists and post-Islamists demonstrate that they are modern, not traditional responses. However, despite sticking to ijtihad, Mawdudi and the Jama’at followed a traditional epistemological approach (chapters 4, 5 and 6).

5. Through enunciation of a deliberate and conscious categorisation, the School of Shibli (Dabistan-e-Shibli), Ghamidi and his fellows syncretised divergent sub-continental Islamic voices and made a case for their identity and authority. Through this process, I show that this discourse is embedded in multiple modernities.

I have shown that Dabistan-e-Shibli is an important deliberate construct by Ghamidi that helps to define post-Islamism in its own terms and categories. It is useful in answering such questions as: who are post-Islamists? how are they related to Islamists? how do they relate themselves to earlier ulama, intellectuals and other thought movements? (chapter 5).

6. Because of their unique interpretative approach, post-Islamists have inaugurated conceptual developments that constitute transformation of old concepts, abundance of some concepts, and introduction of some new concepts. In relation to individual liberties, waging jihad, rights of women and non-Muslims, and Islam and democracy under their framework different explanations are possible for a number of instances.
I describe and then relate post-Islamists’ unique interpretative approach and epistemology to a number of empirical examples such as jihad as armed struggle, rights of the non-Muslims, Islam’s compatibility with democracy and gender relations with respect to hudood laws. The articulation of this methodology, I demonstrate, is the outcome of more than a century long deliberation of three intellectuals (Farahi-Islahi-Ghamidi). It became a serious academic task which they followed in a systematic and methodical way.

7. Supporting Bayat’s general argument (2007), post-Islamism in Pakistan is not secular or anti-religious. Post-Islamism is not a secular response to replace Islamism.

8. In many social issues, post-Islamist and Islamic Modernist discourses often converge. However, arguably, they differ in their interpretative approaches.

Using comparative approach, I show that despite many similar implications for a number of issues, Pakistani post-Islamists’ epistemological and interpretative approach is entirely different from Islamic modernists. The latter’s reliance on historicising defines the context outside the Qur’anic text. On the contrary, a unique interpretative approach enables post-Islamists to determine the context within the Qur’anic text itself. This fundamental difference distinguishes Pakistani post-Islamists from Islamic Modernists.

1.6 Definition of Key Terms

I have already defined Islamism and post-Islamism. Definition of other key terms like discourse, ideology, intellectual, modernity and opportunity spaces appears below.

1.6.1 Discourse, ideology, intellectual

The concept of “discourse” seems apt in this study to capture post-Islamists’ ideas and worldviews. The conceptualisation of “discourse” is based on Mehran Kamrava’s recent seminal study on Iran’s Intellectual Revolution. For Kamrava, discourse is a “general body of thought, based on a series of assumptions, about the nature of things as they are and as they ought to be” (2008: 3-9). Therefore, a specific discourse not only articulates the order of things in the ‘present’ but also is concerned about the ‘future’ re-ordering. Despite serving the same function as ideology—
“a blueprint for political thought and action”—discourse offers a ‘broader framework of ideas that informs’ ideology (ibid).

Ideology insists on ceaseless contact with “sacred symbols and with a fuller manifestation of the sacred in the existent.” Hence, ideology has to be concerned with authority, “transcendent and earthly” (Shils 1972: 25-27). The ideology of the Islamic “way of life” or Islam as “comprehensive system of life” was mainly Mawdudi’s intellectual construction derived through a re-reading of the foundational sources—Qur’an and Sunnah. Mawdudi announced the prevailing political, economic, social and cultural system as *Jahiliyya*, a pre-Islamic ignorance; recommended complete alienation from the existing order; and called for complete transformation of it.

As a framework for ideas, discourse forms a ‘discursive field’ in which competing articulations of ideologies interact. A “discursive field” determines the ‘limits of discussion’ and range of issues that can be tackled. Robert Wuthnow offers a more elaborate definition of discourse:

> Discourse subsumes the written as well the verbal, the formal as well the informal, and the gestural and the ritual as well as the conceptual. It occurs, however, within communities in the broader sense of the word: communities of competing producers, of interpreters and critics, of audiences and consumers, and of patrons and other significant actors who become the subject of discourse itself. It is only in these concrete living and breathing communities that discourse becomes meaningful (1989: 16).

This study argues that articulation of post-Islamist discourse in Pakistan manifests through the written and verbal word, including books, journals, articles, columns, websites, audio-video lectures, TV talk shows and question-answer sessions. The immediate constituency of this discourse is middle and upper-middle classes, mostly but not entirely, in the urban environment. The articulators of this discourse are overwhelmingly “grand” as well as “intermediary” intellectuals—anchors, columnists, writers, and scholars. It further entails proper definition of an “intellectual” as conceptualised in this study.

This conceptualisation distinguishes between an “intellectual” and the more general category of “intelligentsia.” In this study, the present reference is to the former rather than the latter. It forms a very specific, limited community of individuals that interacts with authorities and society, formally and informally, mainly using modern forms of communication, base their arguments in religious values and symbols; re-define and
re-interpret them and are thus disseminating a counter-discourse to the ideology of Islamism. I name them post-Islamist intellectuals, and their worldview post-Islamism. Post-Islamist intellectuals often criticise existing social arrangements, and the critical role of religious ideas and organisations in it. For an authentic and forceful articulation of their discontent, the intellectuals may invoke values and institutions of an exemplary past, an imaginative future or some idealized foreign cultures. To McDonough, “[t]he legitimation of change can be accomplished by appeals to reason, to scripture, and to exemplars” (1984: 9).

The other social category, “intelligentsia,” is made up of “learned elites who are distinguished from the general population by virtue of their higher levels of learning and their philosophical expositions on the nature of the surrounding world” (Kamrava 2008: 7). In response to the surrounding considerations, the “learned elite” may either be contented or discontented (see also Feuer 1976: 47-48).

The iconic figure, grand intellectual, in post-Islamism is Ghamidi who essentially belongs to the genre of religious intellectuals. Those termed “intermediary intellectuals” in this thesis, disseminate Ghamidi’s ideas. For this category, Khosrokhavar’s concept of “intermediary intellectuals” who “borrow some intellectual ideas from the ‘grand intellectuals’ but with considerable independence …” is more useful (2004: 198).

1.6.2 Modernity and modernisation

The term modern is “a correlative term: it implies what is new as opposed to what is ancient, what is innovative as opposed to what is traditional or handed-down” (Wilson 1987: 17-22). This definition treats the term as relatively historical where the current or present dimension of time is salient.

On the other hand, “modernisation” conveys the sense of future-orientation. Modernisation is the “programmatic remaking of the political and economic aspects of society in support of the new” (Berry 2003: 7). By implication, modernisation refers to the re-ordering of economic and political institutions (e.g. police, judiciary, post-office, electoral system etc) in light of innovative ideas and practices. “Modernism,” for Wilson, is used in reference to religion while modernisation to political and economic institutions. Modernism refers to a ‘conscious effort’ by participants to accommodate social and cultural changes into the realm of religious tradition. Chapter three of the thesis will show that Islamic
Modernism was a conscious response to create compatibility between Islam and the new experiences of human life. For modernity, Wilson “explicitly identifies openness and a commitment to the new as opposed to the old.” In Peter Berger’s opinion, although modernity is not a rival to religious tradition, yet it is “… intrinsically superior to whatever preceded it—the opposite of being modern is being backward…” (1977: 70). Jane Bennett articulated well, “premodern cosmos gave way to forces of scientific and instrumental rationality, secularism, individualism, and the bureaucratic nation state” (2008: 212).

In this backdrop, I define modernity as the ability and capacity of a society to transform itself in the face of changing conditions, both internally and externally, according to one’s own requirements, critical of its tradition in a self-reflexive manner but not necessarily discarding and overthrowing it. Conceptualising modernity in this sense also does not imply discarding the West and its valuable contributions for the betterment of humanity (Saeed 1994; Yavuz 2003). From an institutional perspective, the West and its innovations to primitive and tribal structures can be a good reference point; for instance, the development of electoral systems and institutions of parliament are a move forward on tribal forms of consultation. Yet democratisation in Muslim societies can take various trajectories according to one’s own historical and socio-cultural specificities. It also reveals that any conceptualisation of modernity is very much dependent on the question: to ‘what’ notion of the past, do we compare modernity? If, the comparison is with the “dark and confused pre-modernity,” then “modernity appears as a place of reason, freedom, and control.” On the other hand, if the comparison is with the “pre-modern age of community and cosmological coherence,” then it “becomes a place of dearth and alienation” (Bennett 2006: 211-24).

Thus, the modernisers, states or individuals, ulama, intellectuals or religious parties, have difficult fusions to make; between aspects of religion and exigencies of temporal realities; between the past and present; between borrowings from the West and retaining of the home-grown values; in short, between “self” and the “other.” My conceptualisation of modernity, thus, not only rejects the notion of classical modernisation theorists but also more clearly dissociates from all rejectionist/exclusivist approaches within Islam to discard all Western ideas and contributions to humankind in the name of purity (see e.g. Ali 1997).
Western modernity assumes, in view of its critics, linearity in time, “convergence of industrial societies,” and passing of traditional way of life in the non-Western world (see Eisenstadt 2000); an assumption asserted as fact and pre-condition for development. I, therefore, clearly accept and corroborate my conceptualisation of modernity with the project of “multiple modernities” as conceptualised by Eisenstadt (2000), Charles Taylor, David Martin, and Peter Wagner, and applied by Masud (2009), Yavuz (2003), Gole (2000) and Robinson (2008). This falls in line with the most prominent revisionist modernisation theorist, S. N. Eisenstadt who criticised modernisation theory because: it validates tradition/modernity dichotomy; it is ahistorical, and is based on Euro-American centrism (see in Tibi 2009: 48). From the project of multiple modernities that emerged in the works of Eisenstadt, as a critique on the notion of Western modernity, the concept of “Islamic modernity” has gained increasing currency recently (Göle 2000). Likewise, notions such as “alternative modernity” and “Asian modernity” developed (Smith 2006). The central theme of the multiple modernities is that “modernity and its features and forces can actually be received, developed, and expressed in significantly different ways in different parts of the world, and … by different communities living in single societies” (Smith 2006: 2). Thus, modernisation without Westernisation and secularisation is a vivid possibility, and there is no singular, homogeneous and universal form of modernity, which can be set as universal standard for the rest of the world (Ahmad 2004).

In the modern/traditional dichotomy, Islam is often equated with “tradition”—a religion that is essentially “other-worldly” and anti-progress. “Conservatism and traditionalism tended to be identified with Islam”, whereas, “adaptationism and modernizing reform tended to be identified with secularism and modern Western perspectives” (Esposito and Voll 1996: 5). Concerning tradition and modernity dichotomy, I follow Talal Asad who thinks that these two are not always in binary opposition and are not two distinct and mutually exclusive categories rather interdependent, mutually constitutive and ongoing processes. Talal Asad suggests, tradition is not a “stage” in the social development of a nation rather it is a “dimension of social life.” Hence, in a socialising process in the secular modernity context, tradition is not something that phases out in the advance stages of social evolution. Instead, tradition being an integral aspect of social life remains tied at each stage of life. “Tradition
and modernity are not really two mutually exclusive states of a culture or society but different aspects of historicity” (Asad 1995: 1). Even if a tradition is changing and evolving, it remains a tradition. In such a reformulation of the concept of “tradition,” in Asad’s account, aspects of Western/secular modernity—liberal values—can be described as a ‘tradition central to modernity.’ Therefore, ‘… liberalism … is a tradition in which there are possibilities of argument, reformulation, and encounter with other traditions’” (ibid). There are some aspects of the tradition that become redundant and need to be discarded; others may be preserved and upheld; yet others may be negotiable and can be transformed.

1.6.3 Opportunity spaces

This thesis contains references to “external conditions” that shape and are shaped by the Islamic forces in Pakistan. The point is that the Jama’at and post-Islamists do not operate in a vacuum and are bound to work within shrinking and expanding opportunity spaces; that is, a concept coined by Yavuz (2003) that is relevant here. Opportunity spaces refer to “fora of social interactions that create new possibilities for augmenting networks of shared meaning and associational life” (Yavuz 2003: 24). Such fora, according to Yavuz, include ‘civic and political forums, electronic and print media, and cyberspace and the market’ (ibid 2004: 223; 2003: 24). The expansion of opportunity spaces (democratisation, market and the new private media) in Pakistan that created new opportunities for the Islamists and post-Islamist intellectuals are treated in chapters 4 and 5. However, Islamists and post-Islamists’ ideas, internal resources, values and commitments are not reducible to external conditions only. The interpretive approach applied in this thesis provides us freedom to escape this methodological reductionism—to reduce the entire phenomenon of Islamism and post-Islamism to mere external conditions, thus making it a sponge soaking up all energies and strengths inherent in revivalist ideas and worldviews.

1.7 Methodological Perspectives

This thesis can be located at the intercept of Islamism studies—“the study of political and social organizations advocating the creation of an Islamic state and society” (Gunning 2007: 4)—and Islamic studies. Primarily, it has selected the narratives of two grand intellectuals (Mawdudi and Ghamidi) and their respective societal praxis. Although, I have gone
through a vast body of text and narratives, I preferred to use Gole’s “snapshot” approach. In this way, the meaning of the whole radiates from fragments of thoughts and examples (also see Frisby 1986, 1992). This approach enabled me to look for scattered verbal and written texts, capturing them as isolated observations, and social practices and fit them into a meaningful whole. It is also in line with the dialogic model of interpretation applied in this thesis.

1.7.1 Dialogic model of interpretation

Methodologically, this research is more in line with an interpretive style of social sciences inquiry. The study is based on an ontological and epistemological position. It asserts, “there is a social world independent of our knowledge of it and … that it is knowable” (Davies 2008: 17). The hermeneutic method further assumes that despite independent existence of social reality “out there” that “reality cannot be known objectively, but is understood intersubjectively” (Richards 1996: 16-17; Davies 2008: 17-24). It also implies that multiple understandings of the same phenomenon examined in this study are possible. Despite the researcher’s own identity as an ex-activist in the Pakistani Islamist students’ movement, and recognising that multiple interpretations of Islamists and post-Islamists’ thought and practice are possible, I follow Euben’s advice that a “better” interpretation is possible if the researcher is aware of his/her own identity; open to newness; and attentive to participants’ self-understandings. That is, “ones in which the subject might recognize herself, her meanings, her actions” (1999: 90; see also Gunning 2007: 4-8). In this study, researcher’s identity led to challenges that motivated understanding and re-understanding of the text through communication and dialogue (Richards 1996: 17).

The main concern is to explore, understand and interpret, not to explain/determine the causes of the genesis of post-Islamist intellectual discourse in Pakistan. The genesis and development of post-Islamism is treated as a symptom of the growing change in the political, economic, social and religious spheres (Wuthnow 1989: 531-32). The interpretive method is used as an alternative to the scientific method, however, following Richard’s advice, dialogic method used here is not assumed to “displace or transform scientific method” (1996: IX).

This study uses a “dialogic model of interpretation,” by Euben (1999: 25-26; 155-58), and (also Zaidi 2007: 413; Richards 1996; Afaki...
to the questions at hand. The strengths of this model, as also argued by Euben in her own context, are three-fold: 1) it permits laying central emphasis on post-Islamists’ ideas and worldviews explicated in their own (or nearly) terms and categories; 2) it animates a perspective to recognise that Islamism/post-Islamism are “intimately connected with material conditions” yet does not imply that only “such conditions explain the appeal” of Islamists and post-Islamists ideas (ibid: 89), and 3) their perspective of the world/worldviews can be criticised and evaluated but begins with taking their discourse seriously (Gunning 2007: 6). According to Zaidi, despite moving closer to apply “Gadamer’s dialogical hermeneutics … that takes seriously the truth-claims of the Other”, Euben’s “critical theory of Islam too strongly committed to the goal of ideology-critique and is unable to remain true to the aims of dialogical understanding” (2007: 413-414). In Zaidi’s view, Gadamer’s recommendation for “understanding” was “dialogical”. In his analysis, Euben’s first criticised rationalist discourse for its lack of understanding of Islamic fundamentalism, then made a case for understanding it through their own terms but unfortunately was “led back to a foundationalist, rationalist discourse.” In return, he suggests that in “Gadamerian hermeneutic dialogue … critique, albeit of a different kind, is already possible within hermeneutic dialogue” (2007: 419-420).

Analysis of post-Islamists discourse here means the study of their written and spoken texts on and beyond its textual surface. That is, to study the text in its proper historical, social and political context, yet, not to reduce their ideas to external context only. Following Akhtar, I will use a macrolinguistic approach; that is, to “correlate the linguistic phenomena with non-linguistic facts, facts which may not have been stated in the text but are very much relevant in the context” (2000: XI). Although, discourse as social process and linguistic structure are inextricably interlinked, it does not imply undermining post-Islamists ideas expounded in their own terms and categories. Hence, I depart from approaches undermining revivalist ideas by arguing that “actual content of Islamic fundamentalist thought is less important than the social conditions that give rise to it” (Hashemi 2009). This theoretical position is more in line with Weberian than Marxian thinking.
1.7.2 Data and sources of data

I have relied mostly on primary sources (original text, face-to-face and telephonic interviews, audio-video lectures and TV Talk Shows). For Ghamidi’s and Mawdudi’s ideas, I have mostly benefited from their original text in Urdu. A great many of Ghamidi’s ideas come from his audio and video lectures, TV Talk Shows and question and answers sessions.

Many studies on Islamism rely too much on secondary sources and data. Some of these have conducted fieldwork, but few had the opportunity to meet and interact with Islamist workers and leaders; even fewer can prove direct participation in their public meetings and protests. This writer was lucky to have the opportunity of first hand interaction with Islamist leaders and post-Islamist intellectuals in real time; when they were speaking to workers, public meetings, journalists, or arguing on talk shows. Personal, real-time access to observe internal debates and tensions among the activists/leaders enhances this experience. Thus, fine theoretical expositions and forceful ideological commitments communicated by the Islamist ideologues in their literature and speeches can always be contrasted with the actual practice and insights obtained from the internal tensions. As Esposito (1999: 263) argued, “what they write or say must be placed within the context of what they actually do.” The practice is not only something to be read in books but to be seen and observed.

1.8 Organisation of the Thesis

This dissertation consists of an integrated seven-chapter plan including the introductory and concluding ones. The introductory chapter has dealt with the background, research questions, thesis argument, methodological and definitional issues of the key terms employed in this thesis. A brief summary of the remainder of the thesis plan is as follows.

Chapter 2 is a review of the main theoretical approaches to the study of Islamic movements. It also offers a broader theoretical context in which the thesis can be located. Broadly, six theoretical strands are discussed which are deployed to make sense of the Islamic resurgence. These include essentialist, contextualist, Marxist, Historical-Institutional and social movement theory. Yavuz’s (2003) typology is modified for Pakistan, which broadly divides Islamic social movements along state-centred and society-centred approaches. However, I have noted that
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such typologies offer ideal types on the basis of main features and in reality such dichotomies are reductionist. Chapter 3 traces the historical and broader socio-political conditions in which various Islamic responses emerged and proliferated in the colonial and post-colonial Pakistan. The chapter adumbrates that in the British colonial India, the failure of Tehreek-e-Mujahedeen, the First War of Independence 1857-58, loss of political empire and socio-economic deprivations invoked three types of intellectual responses. The first was driven by a sense of conservation of the classical fiqh and protection of Islamic beliefs and practices which was manifested in establishment of three streams of Madrassas—Deoband, Ahl-e-Hadith and Barelwi. The second response was the outcome of Sir Sayyid’s Islamic Modernism which invoked establishment of Aligarh. The third response was driven by a sense of synchronising both responses. That is preservation of Islamic heritage and acquiring of modern education. Historian-theologian Shibli Naumani who is of paramount importance in this study spearheaded this latter response.

The chapter that follows specifically underscores the genesis and internal crisis of the Jama’at. Using biographical information, Mawdudi’s original text, issues and trend of the Jama’at and an ethnography in a village, I have shown that Islamism in Pakistan is a modern response and not a traditional trajectory. Chapter 5 begins with mention of an internal crisis in the 1950s and the resultant epochal shift in the Jama’at policy from a reformist organisation to a political party. The crisis resulted into the secession of more than 50 ulama, scholars and activists from the Jama’at including Amin Ahsan Islahi—an important figure in the Jama’at and latter Ghamidi’s teacher. In the late 1970s, Ghamidi was expelled from the Jama’at and he went into the fold of Islahi. By the late 90s, post-Islamists had developed an intellectual argument, which critiqued Mawdudi’s ideology and the Jama’at political strategy. Towards the end of the chapter, a number of external conditions—mainly the new media and post-9/11 debates and the enlightened moderation project—are discussed which inaugurated the expansionary phase of post-Islamism. The central argument of the chapter is that the post-Islamist discourse has reached their conclusions on a number of key issues such as gender relations, democracy, jihad etc, prior to opening of the external conditions.

In chapter 6, specific attention is paid to describe and examine post-Islamists’ epistemological principles in relation to democracy and jihad. The main argument running in this chapter is the appropriation of new
space for social reform using post-Islamists’ text-based approach. The last chapter summarises main findings and conclusions of the theses expounded upon in the previous chapters.
2 Theoretical Perspectives

There does seem to be something about Islam or at least the fundamentalist versions of Islam that have been dominant in recent years, that makes Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity (Francis Fukuyama).

The encounter between the militant strains of Islamic fundamentalism and Western culture, politics, and values touches on issues that extend deep into the historical consciousness of the west itself. Indeed, it should be seen that the struggle between Enlightenment notions of reason, secularism, universalism, civil society, and the like have always been in conflict with the volkish tendencies of cultural particularism, nativism, provincialism, and spiritualism both within the west and elsewhere (Michael J Thompson 2003).

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews some of the main theoretical approaches, applied to Islamic revival in the Muslim world to make sense of its growth and resurgence. It also provides a broader theoretical context where the researcher’s own theoretical and methodological approach resides.

As a prelude, section two is a brief account of the recent academic interest in the study of religious phenomena and groups. The next section organises the vast body of the theoretical approaches and categorises them mainly under five major currents; essentialist, contextualist, Marxist, Historical-Institutional and social movement theory. These categories are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive, with multifarious interaction among them. The succeeding section takes up a critical analysis of the existing approaches followed by a synoptic view of the theoretical perspectives guiding this research. Specific attention is paid to post-
Islamism as analytical framework to capture change/transformation within Islamic movements and Muslim societies. By using Yavuz’s (2003) typology, the last section contains a profile of Islamic movements in Pakistan along the lines—state-centred and society-centred. Adumbration of this ideal-typical classification is premised on the fact that the two discourses under inquiry, Islamism and post-Islamism, also articulate their competing visions of social change along “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches respectively.

2.2 Modernisation, Secularisation and Religion

Academic literature on the development of newly independent post-World War-II states coincided with the end of European colonial era and “the emergence of the United States as a superpower.” Based on theories of Max Weber and Talocott Parsons, academics like Gabriel Almond, Lucien Pye, David Apter, Samuel Huntington, James Coleman, Cyril Black, Sidney Verba, Daniel Lerner and David McClelland gave impetus to “modernization theory” or modernisation theories. The main thrust of these theories was the presence of cultural essentials as traditions in the third world inhibiting its progress and development. Religion as part of tradition was considered an impediment to progress (Hashemi 2009: 28-29).

The seminal classicists of the 19th century like August Comte, Karl Marx, Emile Durkhiem and Max Weber believed that the advent of industrial society will gradually reduce the importance of religion. These eminent social thinkers and theorists viewed religion as a pre-modern relic. It was assumed to fade with the progress of industrialization, urbanization and bureaucratization. This intellectual debate boiled down to the famous “secularisation hypothesis”—as societies modernise they secularise. Secularisation thesis transcended social science inquiries in the 20th century (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 3-4). Scholar C Wright Mills beautifully summarised the theory as,

Once, the world was filled with the sacred – in thought, practice, and institutional form. After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm (quoted by Norris and Inglehart 2004: 3).
However, religiopolitical activism and Islamic fundamentalism has not only grown but also transcended geographical boundaries in the recent past (Euben 1999: 3-4; Sayyid 1997: 7). Islamic revolution in Iran and subsequent religiously motivated social and political movements in other countries served as a major blow to the secularisation thesis. This religious resurgence was not limited to Islamic fundamentalist movements in the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world. Liberation theology in Latin America, evangelical Christianity in the US, Church-based initiatives in African regions and Hindutva in India, belied essential assumptions of this theory.

The trend in social sciences of relegating religion to the category of a periphery subject has undergone a sea change, and its influence is now plain to see (Ter Haar and Ellis 2006: 351). The renewed interest is mainly attributable to methodological sophistication which has enabled experts to deal with questions relating religion to social sciences, and the advent of a series of “real-world events” which have brought religion to the central stage (Bellin 2008: 315-16). Several cultural, social, political and violent backlash activities of the religious activists in various parts of the world generated data facilitating comparative research. Application of secularisation thesis seems even clumsier, in a Muslim social setting, where an organised religion, Islam, is reflected in social relations, individual choices and political mobilisation. Within the Islamic World, Turkey dubbed the ideal secular state for Muslims, seems the most interesting test case for the secularisation thesis (Tugal 2006). The rise of Islamist parties such as AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) and the Gulen movement bear witness to the rising influence of religion in politics and society. If secular Turkey is the best role model for Muslim countries, then by the same yardstick, Pakistan should be the worst case. The latter was created based on religion, Islam, and is the centre of political and social activism.

Secularisation thesis assumes the most obstinate barriers to achieving modernity are religion and religious institutions. It further assumes religious leaders and organisations are ossified in the past, hardened upholders of tradition. Latent or manifest, the advent of secularisation thesis, guided and shaped most research studies conducted on Islamic movements in the context of democratisation, pluralism, economic development, human rights and freedom of expression. Smith Christian has enumerated a number of factors responsible for replacing the hitherto
prevailing notion of modernity with the emergent multiple modernities. (2006: 2-3) The internal flaws and weaknesses of the modernity model as unravelled by real world events (Iranian Revolution of 1979; rise of Islamist forces in Turkey; 9/11) has invited a revision over the original model. A “critical theory of modernisation” has appeared.

2.3 Theoretical Approaches to Islamic Movements

An array of mutually inclusive themes, have been deployed to explain the resurgence of Islamism. To make sense of the growing influence of Islamic social forces, two main theoretical approaches have been in vogue—materialist and culturalist. The former, dominated by Marxists/neo-Marxists, gives primacy to economic and material factors and explain Islamic movements in the context of class struggle; the latter emphasises the precedence of meaning, ideas and cultural traits over materialist variables (Thompson 2003: 3-4; Tugal 2002: 86-90). Significantly, researchers differ on stitching theoretical strands to explain this phenomenon. As explained earlier, this section discusses a synoptic view of the main theoretical approaches.

2.3.1 Essentialists: Islamic text and response to modernity

The idea of “essentialism” reduces complex social processes to certain immutable, fixed and unchanging essential traits. The ‘essentialists’ reading of Islam presupposes an inherent immutability in its nature, which necessarily renders it incompatible with modernity. Consequently, they have reduced Islam to certain traditional traits of the past essentially distinct from Europe (Tugal 2002: 89). According to this notion, Islam is an anachronistic religion lost in the time and age of its revelation. Resultantly, something has gone “wrong with Islam” which defines its inability to be congruent with requirements of modern age—democratic norms, liberal values, industriousness, fine arts and modern cultural codes (Lewis 2002a). For them, there exists a clear disconnect between modern Muslim societies and Islam, a captive of the time and age of revelation. The former finds it inextricably difficult to reconcile societal trends with the pristine revealed text of the latter. The Orientalists, the conventional authorities on Islam, are blamed for the essentialist reading of Islam. They “have been accused of being essentialist and insensitive to the change, negotiation, development, and diversity that characterizes lived Islam.” (Anjum 2007) Orientalism, according to Said, “is a body of theory about
the ‘Orient’ and about Islam based on power differentials between the European scholars and their subjects” (see in Lukens-Bull 1999: 2). This notion of Islam helped ‘to legitimize colonial policy’ (ibid). Thus, Islam has a proclivity of incongruence with modern ways of life shaped by Western liberal values in the realm of politics, economy and culture. Consequently, it is necessary for Muslim societies to forget about traditional ways of life to be modern. This approach to understanding Islam and Muslim societies is woven in the modernisation theory of scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Bassam Tibi, Sivan and Daniel Pipes.

Taking the lead from modernisation theories, another salient feature of the essentialist scholars is their attempt to reduce complex social, historical and cultural processes into oppositional dichotomies: that is, traditional versus modern, religious versus secular, old versus new. Suggesting modernisation rather than romanticism/nostalgia sentimentalism with the majestic past as the key to “genuine area unity” in the Middle East, Daniel P. Lerner in his popular work *The Passing of Traditional Society*, commented on the leaders approach to choose between “Mecca and Mechanization” (1958: 405). Based on his large data set, Lerner predicted, “traditional society is passing from the Middle East because relatively few middle easterners still want to live by its rules” (ibid: 399). The many real world events in the recent past in the region could hardly support this prediction.

Bernard Lewis in *The Political Language of Islam* (2004: :117-18) wrote that “[a]mong Muslim theologians there is as yet no such liberal or modernist approach to the Qur’an, and all Muslims, in their attitude to the text of the Qur’an are, in principle at least fundamentalists.” In addition, “[t]heir aim is nothing less than to abrogate all the imported and modernized legal codes and social norms, and in their place to install and enforce the full panoply of the Shar’ia—its rules and penalties, its jurisdiction, and its prescribed form of government.” In Esposito’s account, few Islamic movements and activists in the Muslim world specifically the Middle East will fit in this stereotypical account. “Many of the leaders of Islamic organisations are graduates of major universities from faculties of medicine, science, and engineering” (1999:8; Kramer 2003). Lewis’s accusation of Islamic fundamentalists’ abrogation to all “imported norms” is also not supported by the realities. On the contrary, “[t]he widespread use of radio, television, audio and videocassettes, computers and fax machines, has made for a more effective communication of Islam nationally
CHAPTER 2

and transnationally” (Esposito 1999: 8). Muslim societies absorbed almost all modern technological products from mechanised farming to computers and articles of telecommunication. Even the Salafi-theo-monarchy of Saudi Arabia, Shi’ a theocracy in Iran and the Islamic Democratic Republic of Pakistan all welcomed modern tools and technological products (Asad 1995). The darlings of Western media (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Libya) for their fundamentalist regimes and policies (e.g. Zia’s Islamisation in the 1980s) present an incomplete picture of a more complex socio-political reality prevalent there (Esposito 1999: 6). As a tool to legitimise their undemocratic rules and policies, these regimes have been misusing cosmetic Islamic Laws and campaigns. Recently, the government of the Muttaheedda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA or United Action Front), an alliance of all major Islamic political parties including the Jama’at, did not feel constrained by their previous religious edicts to avoid a deal with the World Bank for restructuring of loans and credits (Nadvi and Robinson 2004; Singh 2007: 38). Needless to add that in the 2002 elections, the MMA capitalized on an anti-American sentiment and vote in the pos-9/11 scenario (Brohi 2006: 1-2). The two oldest Islamic movements—Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (founded in 1928) and the Jama’at in Pakistan (founded in 1941)—exemplify “new styles of Islamic organization”, and they never called for “return to pre-modern conditions” (Esposito and Voll 1996: 5). As regards these parties, the last decade of the 20th century and beginning of the new millennium witnessed new intellectual trends and civil society based organisation. Post-Islamism refers to one such intellectual and social trend in Muslim societies. For instance, the new wave to “bring together the two great trends of the late twentieth century: religious resurgence and democratization” (ibid).

Edward Said’s Orientalism was pioneering work against the Orientalists’ essentialist and textual approaches to Islam and Middle East. It provided a framework to the non-Western scholars to understand, critically analyse and produce alternative explanations of their cultures and societies. In Bobby Sayyid’s account, “Said’s critique concentrates on castigating Orientalism for its monolithic caricature of Islamic phenomena…” This critique has “produced a theorisation of Islam which seemingly rejects essentialism” (Sayyid 1997: 36-37). However, scholars like Bassam Tibi have observed a reactionary intellectual trend named by al-Azm as Orientalism in Reverse (Tibi 2008: 37-38).
Hamid El-Zein has further stretched the anti-Orientalists’ assertion that understanding Islam is not reducible to certain fixed substantive properties to the limits (see in Sayyid 1997:37). According to El-Zein, there is no one Islam, but many Islams. However, this extremely radical anti-essentialist theoretical exposition (which names practical variations in Islam as many Islams) is problematic in the sense that it writes off the reality of a universal category and pattern of Islam that exists as a historical fact. In his recent seminal anthropological study *Journey into Islam: the Crisis of Globalisation*, Akbar S. Ahmad toured nine Muslim-majority countries. Out of the three major models in the nine Muslim-majority countries—Mystic-Sufi, Literalist and Modernist—as conceptualized by Ahmad and his team of researchers, they concluded that the pendulum was swinging towards literalism and away from Sufi and Modernist Islam (Ahmad 2009). These models/categories are also problematic that overlook diverse cases within Islam.

The other problem of essentialists scholars like Lewis, Tibi, Pipes and Sivan is that they have assumed a monolithic and immutable/inflexible unchanging Islam articulated in the writings of a few renowned scholars such as Mawdudi, al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. In other words, there is a shared Islamist *weltanschauung* (worldview) narrated and discussed. This thesis demonstrates that how new meanings are instilled and competing vision derived from the same immutable text by new emerging intellectuals—post-Islamists for instance in Pakistan.

Some scholars tend to foreground a “cluster of absences” as the basis of their analysis on why capitalism and democracy could not take root in Muslim societies. In their view, the cluster of absences consists of “a missing middle class, the missing city, [and] the absence of political rights” (Yavuz 2003: 17). According to Lapidus, Islamic movements are a “response” as well as a “cultural expression of modernity” (Lapidus 1997: 1). These movements are not an emotional and irrational collective action by a mob without any historical rootedness, alternative vision and renewed commitment. Rather, the contemporary Islamic movements themselves are rooted in the advent of a number of 18th and 19th century reform movements that responded to the challenges posed by the colonial Europe (ibid; also see chapter 3).
2.3.2 Contexualists

Contexualists came forward to fill in the vacuum left by the essentialists' omissions. It was an improvement on the textual/essentialist reading of Islam (Yavuz 2003). The essentialists had detached Islam from the socio-cultural specificities of Muslim societies that put the revealed text to practice. For his ethnological account, anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s pioneering study *Islam Observed* is revered for breaking from the Orientalist’s long-held other-ising trend. Geertz studied Islam “as it was actually lived” and not as a “single Islam in scriptures and texts” (Anjum 2007: 656-57).

Kepel’s *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* is an elaborate account of his theory that since 1989, political Islam is facing a decline and has failed to fill the political gap in Muslim societies (Kepel 2006; Turner 2003: 140-41). The main weakness of Kepel’s analysis lies in its inability to explain the situation in Muslim societies after application of neo-liberal policies and the ensuing crisis, sprouting of new religious forces and state policies for curtailment of growing Islamism. For instance, the new response of post-Islamism observed in different Muslim societies including Pakistan.

According to Bryan S. Turner, social and cultural crisis in Muslim societies have generated four waves of political action (2003: 139) of political action: First, the 19th century reformist movements that opposed the Western threat as well as traditionalism. Second, the 1940s wave of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, (one can also count here the development of the Jama’at in pre-divided India in 1941). The third wave began with the Arab defeat in 1967, reached a ‘crescendo’ with the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and culminated in the resistance against USSR in Afghanistan; and the fourth wave arrived with the 1990 Gulf War, its aftermath in the form of 9/11 and the post-9/11 episodes. I will add here a fifth wave, which was (implicitly) identified by Bayat—the post-Islamist turn, which is not only a response to the Western challenges, but also the internal tensions and declining energies of Islamic movements. I will return to it shortly. The problem with these explanatory models is the explanation of Islamist phenomenon subject to external conditions. This approach undermines the inherent explanatory power of Islamist ideas and worldviews.
2.3.3 Marxist approaches: Islam as instrument

The Marxist-Materialist approaches believed that like all other religious phenomena, Islamic movements sustain and perpetuate the class interests of those who are in power and authority. In his study *Islamism in Turkey: Beyond Instrument and Meaning*, Cihan Tugal has reviewed that in explaining religious phenomenon, how Marxist sociological tradition has changed from classical-orthodox to neo-Marxist revisionist one. Whereas, the former emphasised the role of religion as instrumental for the dominant classes, the latter, recognises religion (here Islamism) “the potential mobilizing and politicizing forces.” The major flaw in these approaches is designating Islam “as a mere mobilizational too … for the excluded, exploited, alienated masses,” and thus its role as a “meaning system” is ignored (2002: 87-88). In Tugal’s own explanation, Islamism in Turkey is a “counter-hegemonic response to crisis” (2003: 50). For some the Islamists’ “success is rooted in their appropriation of religious symbols, discourse, and language to express socioeconomic grievances, utilizing them as instruments to enact radical internal political change” (Butko 2004: 33).

To Turner, Islamism or political Islam is the result of the “social frustrations, articulated around the social division of class, and generation that followed from the economic crisis of the global neo-liberal experiments of the 1970s and 1980s” (2003: 139). For Nikki Keddi, in the post-colonial states, “Islamism tends to be strong in certain specific circumstances and weak in others” (see in Alavi and Halliday 1988:16). To begin with, Islamism was not stronger, according to him, in traditional states where Western influence has not made inroads; while in the latter sense, states with strong Islamic movements have always been ruled once or more by a nationalist rather than Islamic ideology and the country experienced rapid economic development, urbanisation and dislocation (ibid: 17). To Keddi, “Islamism is the ideology of petty bourgeoisie” (see in Sayyid 1997:20). In the post-colonial state, the petty bourgeoisie class occupied administrative positions but lacked power. Islamism is a response to the crisis of this class. Whereas, Keddi appears to associate the growing influence of Islamism with the penetration of Western impact on economy and culture, he fails to answer the question of why Islamism attracted more adherents than socialists and other ideologies did? In other words, why the populace disenchanted with Western project of mod-
ernity consider Islam as a medium for voicing their grievances, and why not any other ideology?

For Eqbal Ahmad, the limited but rising appeal of the fundamentalist forces in Muslim societies is due to the “traumas of Muslim political life” and “absence of viable alternatives.” He regarded this steady resurgence of religious forces as an ‘aberration’ uncommon in the history of Muslim societies (see in Khan 1985: 4).

2.3.4 Historical-institutional approach

Challenging essentialist paradigm to Islamic politics, this approach is based on Sami Zubaida’s (1993, 2003) explanation of those specific ‘historical conjunctures’ in which the rise of Islamic movements is embedded in the Middle East. For Zubaida, “…the Islamic phenomenon in politics is the product of particular political and socio-economic conjunctures…” (2009: IX). Factors such as joblessness, fraud, youth bulge in population, a bankrupt educational system and other such issues “created a resentment in the masses of the Middle East, which is channeled to Islamic politics for historical reasons” (Tugal 2002). Conversely, the secular elite failed to fulfil the aspirations of the local population (Fischer 1982; Keddi in Halliday and Alawi 1988). The reason that nationalists, socialists and other contending ideologies failed to channel this support is enshrined in the fact that they “became identified with tyranny, corruption, and mismanagement” (Zubaida 2009: XVIII; Tugal 2002). Importantly, the religious institutions enjoyed an autonomous status as compared to other oppositional forces, which suffered from state repression. These factors contributed to the rise of political Islam as the ‘dominant idiom of antagonism.’ (p.xix) In Zubaida’s view, the Islamic political idiom, in which people and social groups express “their identities, aspirations and frustrations”, is modern and not a political act in the present age of the essential past.

The post-war demographic explosion, petro-dollars in the Gulf and the remittances that labourers sent back to countries like Pakistan, Egypt and Bangladesh, migration of rural folk to urban centres, rapid urbanisation and uneven economic development produced a sizeable marginal population filled with unrest and discontent (Fischer 1982; Sayyid 1997). The ‘rural folk’ migrating from the countryside also brought their values and ‘vocabularies’. For Bobby Sayyid, the migrants’ final vocabulary such as corruption and evil was “heavily permeated with Islam.” It could not
adapt to the modernised and urbanised environment. Their grievances and discontents in the slums were voiced by their final vocabulary, and thus Islamism was the result (1997: 21).

Historical-institutional framework in a sense can partly explain the proliferation of Islamic movements in Pakistan. The religious institutions (ulama, mosques, madrassas, tombs and shrines, religious politics) have enjoyed greater degree of freedom and autonomy than the liberal and secular forces did, who have suffered from repression under the military regimes, except General Ayub Khan. In Pakistan, the Islamic idiom has mostly identified itself with the state, which is viewed as both an opportunity and a threat. In the former sense, the religious forces have consolidated their position in the society through associational networks, mosques and madrassas. In the latter sense, Islam could not become the dominant and popular oppositional idiom in which individuals and groups could express their aspirations and frustrations. Opportunities and state repression have been identified as two important conditions/variables explaining Islamic resurgence and the specific attitude of Islamic movements towards democratisation by Islamic movements (Bayat 2007: 8-10; Esposito and Voll 1996).

2.3.5 Social movement theory approach

The social movement theory approach and its recent application to a number of Islamic social movements in the Middle East, in particular, has opened a new avenue of understanding these movements (Clark 2004; Wiktorowicz 2004). This enables one to analyse Islamic social movements in its entirety taking external opportunities and constraints and framing issues in consideration. Instead of dichotomising between modern/anti-modern, religious/secular, us/them and religious/secular, social movement theory enables us to study Islamic movements on a locus where the boundaries are not sharply drawn but remain fluid and fuzzy.

Divinely revealed text is subject to competing interpretations and varied understandings, and “Divine texts may be unalterable, but the ingenuities of human interpretation are endless” (Asad 1993: 236). The compatibility of its injunctions and guidelines with the changing experiences of human life is mediated through individual scholars/interpreters, and societal forces—social movements. The mediation occurs twice: once, when the meaning of the text is determined going back to time of its re-
provided; and second, when the relationship is established between the text and the current situation (Rahman 1984).

The engagement of the social movement is not simply to understand and relate the meaning of the text to a certain situation but it involves issues of power. Movements not only contend against a prevailing rule and institutional arrangement based on injustice but engage also in prognosis and mobilisation. So when the Islamists claim that “Islam is the solution” of all human predicaments in the modern world or Modernists assert that Islam and modern ways of lifestyle are mutually compatible, these are not mere “ideas” and “utterances”. Because, “it is not enough to utter ‘right’ ideas; those ideas must be given material force by mobilizing consensus around them.” Moreover, this is the point ‘leading us into social movement theory and practice’ (Bayat 2007: 6). In this way, Islamic societal forces form a ‘critical bridge’ between the immutable text and its relation with the changing political, economic, social and cultural values and institutions. So the question of who, when and under what conditions is interpreting, relating and voicing for a certain meaning of the text, always deserve central attention.

2.4 Analysis of Theoretical Approaches

Scholars have problematised underlying theories, assumptions and methodological issues guiding explanatory models, which overlook complexity and diversity prevalent across Islamic movements (Sayyid 1997). Sayyid problematises scholar’s treatment of diverse fundamentalist movements as a homogeneous analytical category. In their indiscriminate treatment of fundamentalism, says Sayyid, they outline three features: “it is a project to control women’s bodies; it is a political practice which rejects pluralism; and it is a movement that purposefully conflates religion and politics as a means of furthering its aims” (1997: 7-18). Such conceptualisations would naturally lead to questioning the recent headscarf controversy in France and, to decry the unveiling order as controlling women’s bodies of French secularism. Sayyid has asked similar questions in Turkey, “preventing women from veiling.” Is it then fundamentalism that’s prevalent in France and Turkey to subjugate women’s bodies?

In her seminal study, Roxanne L. Euben referred to the agreement among social scientific explanations on considering fundamentalism a “reactive, defensive, and nativistic,” and its growing appeal a “function of its efficacy as a conduit for the fury, fear, insecurity, and alienation
that are the concomitants of trying socioeconomic conditions and political circumstance in the modern world” (1999: 20; see also Lapidus 1997). More precisely, from a survey of representative literature, Irfan Ahmad enumerated five non-verifiable basic assumptions ubiquitous in studies on Islamism. According to him, this literature problematically assumes that Islamism is: 1) a revolt against modernity, secularism and democracy, where both are inherently mutually exclusive and parallel categories with no possible point of intersection; 2) represents a pure and indigenous culture vis-à-vis an impure (Western) modernity; 3) ossified, still, and immutable; 4) in antagonism and in conflict with modernity, and 5) consists of disturbed/agitated/angry and irrational actors (Ahmad 2005: 14; Euben 1999: 20-21). For Ira Lapidus, Islamic revival movements are a “reaction against” but also “expression” of modernity (1997: 444).

In a refreshing and cogent analysis in her book *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism*, political scientist Roxanne L. Euben attacked the constructs of treating “Islamism” and “European” as sovereign islands. In this seminal work, she argues that the critique of Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb, on imperialism, corrupt Middle Eastern regimes and modernity is not unique but is shared by Christian fundamentalists and neo-liberal philosophers (Euben 1999). “By situating Qutb in a crosscultural comparative context, Euben undermines the perceived opposition between “us” and “them” or “Islam” and “the West.” (see review article in AJISS Bernhardsson: 140) In the same vein, following Rahman (1969), Masud (2009) and Asad (1995), I reject compartmentalisation of human life into secular/religious and modern/traditional opposites. Therefore, this thesis rejects the belief of early modernisation theorists that traditions will disappear at the advanced stage of societal evolution towards modernisation and development. Like Asad, I tend to believe that “…when one talks about tradition, one should be talking about, in a sense, a dimension of social life and not a stage of social development” (Asad 1995). This understanding concludes that tradition and modernity are not two ‘mutually exclusive states of a culture or society but different aspects of historicity.’ (ibid)

In their analysis of various theoretical approaches to Islamic revival movements, independent studies by Sayyid and Euben have indicated that explanatory models based on modern rationalist discourse; not only “describe” fundamentalism but also “express Western conceptions of truth, political fears and cultural unease” (1999: 22; 1997: 7-26). For this,
Euben quickly adds to have dwelt on Edward Said’s and Michel Foucault’s understandings of knowledge-power relationship. One main methodological implication (of the modern rationalist discourse, the explanatory models based on it and its underlying assumptions) is that “rationalist analyses implicitly bracket the substance of fundamentalist political thought as irrelevant to properly scientific explanations” (ibid: 23).

Practically, many Islamists and traditional ulama in Muslim societies have been receptive to modern technologies and equipments in their respective movements and societies. For instance, the Saudi ulama accepted with ‘little or no objection’, the “new forms of transport including paved roads, new modes of building and printing, electricity, new medicines, and types of medical treatment, and so forth” (Asad 1993: 210). In a recent policy move in Saudi Arabia, the women were granted permission to argue on family related cases in courts. Likewise, contemporary Islamist movements appear bureaucratised with increasing use of latest technologies such as computers, multi-media, projectors and other modern conveniences. The acclaimed position of Islamic societal forces as “anti-West” or “anti-Colonial” does not mean they are anti-modern or anti-progress. In reality, Islamism poses a post-traditional response, modern and not mere theological (Ahmad 2005: 16). More specifically, these Islamic movements are “Janus-faced”; they are both modern and yearning for socio-economic development and conservatives seeking ethical and moral codes in society (Yavuz 2003).

2.5 Post-Islamism: A Review

The term, post-Islamism needs a debate as it is a relatively new term in the Islamism studies (Ahmad 2005; Kepel 2006: 386). In the academic discipline, Farhad Khosrokhavar (1994) had initially coined this term in his publications in French, where he used it for the reformist intellectuals in Iran (Khosrokhavar 2004). In an independent usage in 1996, Asef Bayat stretched its scope to encompass social and political issues. In the same year, his application of term for analysis of the emerging new trends in the Islamist discourse in Iran gave the term currency in the academic circles (Bayat 1996). To his credit, Bayat not only extended the

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7 Reported by BBC, accessed on 22/2/2010:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8526862.stm>
horizon of the term, but also developed it into an operational framework for the study of Islamism and Muslim societies. The Post-Islamist turn can certainly be observed within Islamic social movements and the formation of new emerging trends at both the civil society and state levels. However, “a more pervasive form would be when post-Islamism becomes an acceptable path in all of these domains at the same time.”

Following this initial induction, many French scholars like Olivier Roy (1999), Schulze (1998) and Kepel (2002) employed the term both directly and descriptively. According to Bayat, the word post-Islamism was used “primarily as an historical rather than an analytical category” (2007: 17). The critics considered post-Islamism as a variant of Islamism. In their long-held belief, the former is an outburst of revolutionary zeal as the latter was never amenable to change (Burgat 2003 cited in Bayat 2007; Lauzaire 2005; Ismail 2001). In his often-quoted work *Failure of Political Islam*, Olivier Roy has argued that the Islamism project as a revolutionary ideology of bringing about a change from above (through the establishment of an Islamic state) has reached a dead end and impasse. In Roy’s perception, the Islamists’ regrouping and reversion to religion pure and their ever increasing distance from real world politics reinforces belief in the failure of political Islam. Bayat has critically underscored the poor conceptualization by merely considering it an empirical and historical category rather than analytical and conceptual one (2007: 10). For Bayat, the advent of post-Islamism is not the dead end of Islamism.

In this thesis, the formulation of the term is primarily inspired by Bayat (2007). It is appreciated here that like its counterparts in India and the Middle East, the social, political and economic conditions and the gap between idealism and pragmatism has given rise to internal tensions and accommodations within the Islamist Jama’at in Pakistan. This research will selectively refer to those issues; however, a complete grasp of change within the Jama’at is beyond the scope of this project. I will underscore change, difference and reflect on Islamism from a new intellectual movement perspective—post-Islamist intellectuals in Pakistan. The conceptualization of post-Islamism as a (intellectual) project is more pervasive here,

[. . .] post-Islamism is also a project, a conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in so-

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8 Bayat’s response to my question on email dated 23/7/2009.
cial, political, and intellectual domains. Yet, post-Islamism is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular. Rather it represents an endeavour to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty. It is an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its head by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past. It wants to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with democracy and modernity, to achieve what some have called an “alternative modernity”… In short, whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, post-Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights (2007: 11).

The post-Islamist intellectual shift in Pakistan, as the argument is developed in this thesis, has distinguished itself mainly based on its unique epistemology and line of ijtihad. Unlike Bayat’s mention of “historicity rather than fixed scriptures,” the post-Islamist intellectuals in Pakistan emphasise on their articulated theory of thematic and structural coherence that makes the context internal to the doctrinal text. They consider history and external context an important factor in understanding of the Qur’anic text; however, they do not historicize (see chapter 6).

2.6 Profile of Islamic Movements in Pakistan

At least five trajectories are discernable in the religious organising in Pakistani society: political organisations, preaching societies and dawah organizations, madrassas and religious centres of learning, Sufi orders and pir-murid circles/lodges, and jihadi organisations. Author of Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, Hakan Yavuz has developed a typology of Islamic social movements dividing them along the lines society-centred and state-centred (Yavuz 2003: 28). Such clear demarcations between state and society can be proven to criticism as shown by Joel S. Migdal. Migdal offers a “state-in-society model,” which focuses on paradoxical features of the state. As a contradictory entity, the state must be simultaneously conceptualised as a “powerful image of a clearly bounded, unified organization,” as well as, a pile of “loosely connected parts or fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries between them and other groupings inside and outside the official state borders” (2001: 22-23).

In the following lines, Yavuz’s typology is adopted for Pakistan. It is an ideal type. In order not to be mistaken, here, I must add that I am not assuming a dichotomy between society-centred and state-centred ap-
proaches. This typology highlights main features of their change strategy and facilitates understanding of these movements within their prevalent diversity. However, in practice, interactions among them are multifarious.

### 2.6.1 Society-oriented Islamic movements

Society-oriented Islamic movements pursue their desired change from below—with a bottom-up approach. They believe that the predicaments of Muslims societies are precipitated by evils of moral degradation and social and individual corruptions. As a gravity of change, society has mostly been overlooked. Society-oriented Islamic movements can be sub-divided into: 1) **everyday life based** movements, which are “concerned with influencing society and individuals and use both modern and traditional communications networks to develop new arguments for the construction of new imagined identities and worldviews” (Yavuz 2003: 276) **Inward contemplative movements** persuade its activists to disengage and withdraw from socio-political system and “focus on individuals as the object of change through cultivating the inner self as the inner space in order to construct a reinvigorated Islamic consciousness along very traditional lines” (ibid: 276). The most glaring example in this category is the Tablighi Jama’at. The Tablighi Jama’at (the preaching or inviting society) is an archetype of this category. It is a “movement in encapsulation,” which “stands apart from explicit concerns about public life and competition to secure communal interests in the larger society” (Metcalf 2003: 3). In sharp contrast to religious groups seeking change through state institutions, Tablighi Jama’at “depends on invitation and persuasion directed towards individuals” (ibid: 4). Through this approach, the solution of the contemporary problems is sought in ‘inner-looking’ and personal piety of individuals. Metcalf narrates an autobiography of a Tablighi activist saying that,

> … [others emphasise] education … industrial development, … economic prosperity. These are really offshoots; the root lies in our spiritual and moral development. Without faith and submission to the will of Allah we cannot succeed… (2003: 5).

It implies that redemption of individuals can lead to societal transformation at a larger scale.
2.6.2 State-oriented Islamic movements

State-centred Islamic movements/approaches consider corrupt systems, governmental structures and state officials the root causes of all ills of contemporary Muslim societies. In their view, unless the pious and righteous people (saliheen) run the state machinery and governmental infrastructure, Muslim societies cannot hope for permanent solutions to economic, social and political problems. At the core of such Islamists’ struggle lie the efforts for control of state power and governmental resources.

Jama’at-e-Islami has a more systematic vision and strategy of an ideal Islamic state. Mawdudi, founder of the Jama’at, had presented the idea of an Islamic state vis-à-vis the concept of nation and secular state. Mawdudi’s concept of Islamic state has received widespread academic attention in the last few decades (Adams 1983; Ahmed 1985; Zaman 2002).

In Mawdudi’s view, the “consolidation/construction” (banawo) and “disruption” (bigar) of human affairs ultimately rests on the question: who controls the strings of human affairs/power? As the vehicle is bound to move in the direction its driver is heading towards and the passengers are compelled to move into that direction…” (1997: 34). Following Goodwin, I call this notion as state-constructionist perspective. This approach emphasises “how states shape the very identities, social ties, ideas and even emotions of actors in civil society” (1997: 13).

This approach can be further divided into reformist-revolutionary movements, which employ legal and democratic processes in the hope of effecting change from above. The movements seek to persuade people for active support through their educational, political and social networks. And militant-revolutionary movements, that reject the existing system and use violence, confrontation and militancy at the first stage (e.g., Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan), at the later stage (e.g., Tanzeem-e-Islami) or employs agitation, blockage and protest. These movements consider democracy and democratic means un-Islamic. A typology (an ideal type) of the Islamic movements is given in table 2.1. The following table is adopted from (Yavuz 2003).
Table 2.1
Islamic Social Forces in Pakistan: A Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repertoire of Action</th>
<th>Repertoire of Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>VERTICAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>VERTICAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-Oriented</strong></td>
<td><strong>State-Oriented</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformist-revolutionary Movements</td>
<td>Revolutionary Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considers state as the object of change; participate in elections; use legal and democratic means; form alliances; hold public offices</td>
<td>Consider state as the object of change; belief in global caliphate; avoids elections and holding public offices; recommend/employ violence at early stage or at later stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: State</td>
<td>Target: State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome: Accommodation</td>
<td>Outcome: Confrontation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HORIZONTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>HORIZONTAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Society-Oriented</strong></td>
<td><strong>Society-Oriented</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal (everyday life-based movements)</td>
<td>Inward-oriented and piety-based movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considers society/individual as object of change; reconstruction of society as the solution; asserts transformative potential of ulama, intellectuals, media and religious groups in changing society;</td>
<td>Withdrawal from social and political life; individual as the inner space for social change; emphasises more on personal piety, worshipping and spiritual exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: Individual &amp; Society; media; education</td>
<td>Target: Individual religious consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome: Integration</td>
<td>Outcome: Withdrawal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2.7 Concluding Remarks

An overview of the major theoretical strands reveals an improvement in approaches to make sense of Islamic movements. By bringing the perspectives of Muslims as they lived with Islam, Contextualists offered an improvement over the Essentialist readings of Islam, who searched the Muslim reality in the text only. The recent but growing application of social movement theory to Islamic social movements has further enriched our understanding of these social forces. Despite inherent strengths of each approach, a strict categorisation is difficult because the interaction among them is multifarious. Our theoretical perspective in this research is guided by a number of issues. In my own perspective,
religion is an active and effective force that can stimulate individuals and social forces towards progress and development. Despite anti-colonialism and anti-West rhetoric in Islamists’ discourses, empirical data from different Muslim societies show that modern tools were permitted and absorbed. I depart from “us/them” divide and emphasise on a dialogic model where participants [Muslims and the West] are in a consistent debate and not residents of sovereign islands. Finally, the introduction of post-Islamism, as category of analysis, refers to the internal voices of dissent and reform that are responding to the failure of Islamists’ experimentation of creating an Islamic state.

The typology of Islamic movements modified from Yavuz (2003) offers an abstraction from reality. It is based on key features only relevant to the Islamic trajectories in Pakistan. It shows the prevailing diversity of Islamic social forces in Pakistan. These diverse forces employ various institutional arrangements, symbols and ideas to emphasise reconfiguration of state, society and community. In this thesis, two of these abstractions—state-centric and society-centric—approaches are important. The Jama’at model of social change is primarily driven by an ideology that relates transformation of individual and society to the institutions of state (chapter 4). On the contrary, post-Islamists criticise this approach and suggest an individual-focused and society-centric model of change (chapters 5 and 6).
Towards Revival and Reform: Historical Background

3.1 Introduction

This chapter defines the historical context within which the research is situated. The advent of various events in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the emergence of numerous intellectual trends in response to colonial conditions, and the multi-layered deprivations of the Muslims in India are of paramount significance. These events and trends shaped the proliferation of other numerous intellectual and social trajectories including the emergence of the Jama‘at. Discussion on these events will set the background of historical context that will help to explain and locate the proliferation of Islamism and post-Islamism.

The description does conclude that Islamist and post-Islamist responses in Pakistan are not instantaneous reactions/outbursts to the failure of modernity or secular ruling elite failings. However, these are historically rooted in the events and intellectual developments in the undivided colonial India (Lapidus 1997). Instead, I argue that the historicity of Islamist and post-Islamist trends do not show linearity as assumed by modernisation theorists but a non-homogeneous continuity. Thus, the emergence and proliferation of Islamism (see Chapter 4) and post-Islamist intellectual trajectory (see Chapters 5 & 6) can be placed on non-linear continuum of historical and intellectual developments in 18th and 19th century Muslim society in the Indo-Pak sub-continent.

In order to understand the evolution of Islamism and post-Islamism in the broader context of Pakistani state and society, section two provides a brief overview of the ideology of Pakistan, political struggle for the creation of Pakistan, and the emergence of various issues in the post-colonial setting. From this description, I intend to outline the external context/political environment that inevitably set the stage for the interplay of such societal forces, as Islamism and post-Islamism. In section 3,
the context is further enlarged by a description and analysis of the enduring legacy of 18th and 19th century intellectual and political developments in colonial India. Section 4 is the identification of intellectual responses of the Muslim society by dwelling on three of them: the traditionalist trajectories, Sir Sayyid’s modernism/rationalism and Shibli’s moderation.

3.2 Pakistan: Some Basic Facts

On 14 August 1947, the end of British rule over India saw the creation of two independent states—Pakistan and India. Pakistan was created based on an Islamic ideology, (Mujahid 2001; Sayeed 2000) and thus it was the “creation of an idea” too. A country of more than 170 million inhabitants, Pakistan is the second largest Muslims majority (97 per cent) nation after Indonesia. Administratively divided into four provinces, Pakistan shares its boundaries with China, India, Iran and Afghanistan. The ideology of this new nation and its geostrategic location in the region made it a very important player in the global affairs. Further, the post 9/11 developments, US war on terror in Afghanistan, and the Taliban’s militancy in the tribal areas of Pakistan contributed to its significance. Furthermore, the dispute over the territory of Kashmir between India and Pakistan forms another key area of concern for the global community.

Since independence, Pakistan has had a turbulent political history. Under various generals, it has seen 40 years of direct military rule. In the wake of the extended periods of military rule, the country has had to deal with the ill effects of abrogated constitutions, undermined popular sovereignty and eroded fundamental human rights (Haqqani 2005a, 2005b). Historically, while Pakistan has performed relatively better on economic front, its social indicators are dismal at best: low literacy rate, poor healthcare facilities, weak infrastructure, poor social services provision, mounting pressure of unemployment, swelling youth population with little or no hope for a better future and mounting radicalisation of society on ethnic and religious grounds (Zaidi 1999). After 9/11, the recent tide of militant activism has further aggravated the severity of the problems of Pakistani state and society. The multiplicity of the issues and lack of capacity of the state to deal effectively with the problems has brought the state close to a failed state (Rashid 2008). Pakistan’s political instability has been a function of widespread poverty, consistent cycles of civilian-military tension giving rise to erosion of institutional stability, preda-
tory nature of highly corrupt elitist state structure and “entrenched patron-client relationships protecting the interests of those in power” (Nadvi and Robinson 2004). The power elite consisting of military and civil establishments and political class is argued to have “close relationships with a traditional feudal elite unwilling to implement radical reforms that will benefit poor people” (ibid). Moreover, religious forces exercise an overwhelming influence on beliefs, ideas, worldviews and courses of action of individuals, societal trends and social processes in Pakistan. Some scholars regard religious forces and their worldviews as a cause of the failure of modernity in Pakistan (Pal 2004; Saeed 1994).

Pakistan’s economic record is both impressive and dismal at the same time. In the former sense, in the last six decades of its existence, Pakistan was able to achieve high economic growth rates thus doubling its per capita income despite the quadruple increase in population. In addition to this, the predominantly agrarian structure of the economy has moved into a more “diversified production structure.” Pakistan was also able to introduce neo-liberal reforms by deregulating, liberalising and opening up its economy to a greater degree than some other developing countries like India (Zaidi 1999). However, despite these achievements it has a record of underperformance on most of the social and political indicators. It has been a laboratory for experimenting with different development models and approaches: from state capitalism to socialist-oriented approaches to neo-liberal policies. Delivering social services, reducing income disparities and eradicating poverty are the most daunting challenges that Pakistan has still to overcome (Easterly 2001; Zaidi 1999).

3.2.1 The Pakistan movement

The formation of the All India Muslim League (AIML: formed in 1906) contributed to the emergence of a political forum that latter graduated into a demand for an independent homeland. The main objectives adopted in the inaugural meeting of AIML held in Dacca, clustered around protection and promotion of the political rights of the Indian Muslims in the given context of British rule, Hindu majority and multifaceted backwardness/deprivations of the Muslim community9 (Qureshi

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9 Some writers argue that the creation of the Muslim League was done on the instigation of Lord Minto to minimise the strength of the Congress party. Other analysts, however, refute this claim and seek causes emanated from is-
1965: 31-32). In the main objectives of AIML, there was no indication of a desire to establish an Islamic state.

When Mawdudi was developing the basic principles and tenets of his alternative ideology—Islam as comprehensive system of life—the pre-partition Indian political scene was dominated by two main ideologies: (1) the All India National Congress (AINC: formed in 1885) that claimed to represent all Indian religious communities, and (2) the All India Muslim League’s claim to be the political forum representative of the aspirations of Indian Muslims (Saeed 2000). In 1919, the ulama of Deoband seminary formed their own political party called Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind (JUH). Like AINC but unlike AIML, prominent religious leaders like Mawlana Azad and Mawlana Madani adopted the slogan of composite or united nationalism. They were proponents of the view that national identity is based on territory rather than religious affiliation. On the other hand, poet-thinker Iqbal refuted this notion in the strongest terms. His ideas were received in the AIML circles. Mawdudi also responded to this notion in his book “The Question of Nationalism” (masal-e qawmiyyat). He rejected all the three approaches of AINC, AIML and JUH (Al-Afaq 1971).

The deep-rooted cultural, political and religious tensions between Hindus and the Muslims, and a number of constitutional developments over time pushed AIML leadership to seek a radical shift in its basic objectives. That is, a departure from the idea of a united India to one of Muslim independence. The idea graduated into the historic Lahore/Pakistan resolution of 1940. AIML’s political struggle now took a concrete form by pursuing the establishment of a Muslim independent state in the north-west and north-east of the subcontinent where historically Muslims have been in majority. The excerpt from Iqbal’s idea of Pakistan says, “[s]elf-government within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India”10 (Qureshi 1965: 116-121).

10 Iqbal did not propose any name to his desired state. The name Pakistan was created by a Cambridge University student, Chauhdry Rahmat Ali. His proposition was the creation of three Muslim states rather than one: (a) Pakistan in north-west India; (b) Bang-i-Islam for Bengal and Assam; and (c) Usmanistan...
The chasm between Hindus and Muslims in India remains an historical fact, which the British colonial powers widened rather than reduced it (Sayeed 2000). Conscious of the strong historical schism, the Indian Muslims realised that the end of colonial rule was bound to give way to ethnic Hindu dominance of the state and society. The Muslim intelligentsia had identified that the two communities—Muslims and Hindus—cannot live on equal basis in a united India as the former lagged far behind the latter in education, commerce and political consciousness. It meant that if the equality of the two communities were accepted in principle, it would remain unfruitful unless solidified by proper institutional arrangements. However, the majority community, the Hindus, continuously opposed such institutional arrangements by the Colonial administration. The British had been more yielding to the political pressures of AINC with regard to the issues of direct relevance to Muslims and the inability of the administration to protect Muslim interests. This mix of British appeasement of the larger community at the cost of long-term Muslim interests and increasingly assertive AINC made Muslims’ demand for a separate political arrangement to protect their political interests and cultural ideals stronger. The issue of joint/separate electorates, and latter the annulment of partition of Bengal (1905) by the British administration yielding to the Hindu agitation made the Muslims’ belief stronger and firmer in a political arrangement where they can live according to their own political and cultural ideals.\footnote{These local and global events also had profound impact on Mawdudi’s thought. For instance, Mawdudi himself reminds us of the impact of the moral/cultural condition of Muslims in 1937, see: al-Afq’s \textit{Sayyd Abul A’ala Mawdudi}, pp.124-25.}

Moreover, some critical developments in the Middle East, the British attitude towards the Ottoman Caliphate in particular, added salt to Muslims’ injuries and provided basis for the inauguration of pan-Islamist Caliphate Movement.

\subsection*{3.2.2 Pan-Islamism: the Caliphate movement}

A number of 18\textsuperscript{th} century events associated with European expansion in the Muslim world spread feelings of frustration, indignation and humilia-
tion among Indian Muslims. The European encounter with the Muslim world at various levels also exposed the latter to new ideas, technologies and most importantly the new cultural codes, which the Muslims considered alien and based on infidelity. In 1757, at the Battle of Plassey, Bengal came under British rule. In 1774, the Ottomans signed the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja with the Russians on humiliating terms; in 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte grabbed Egypt; in 1831, the Holy Warriors Movement (tehreek-e-mujahideen) struck a deadly end at Balakot, and the Mutiny of 1857 ended in the consolidation of British rule over India striking a final blow to Mughal rule. The emergence of various Hindu revivalist movements with a predominant anti-Muslim zeal, at different times and geographical locations added to their injuries.

The historian of Pakistan movement, Khalid B. Sayeed, has enumerated a number of issues that took place between 1857-1914 that caused communal tensions between Muslims and Hindus on the one hand, and Muslims and the British on the other (Ahmad 1967: 123; Sayeed 2000: 42). As a result, the Indian Muslims gradually drifted towards a state of deprivation and indignation. In this backdrop, the Muslims' aspirations shifted into strong support for the last symbol of caliphate precipitating the pan-Islamic caliphate movement (Khilafat Movement) (Qureshi 1965: 37).

The call for the Khilafat movement came on the eve of World War I when it was felt that the British would dismantle the caliphate in Turkey leaving Muslims in total disarray. The Khilafat Committee consisting of Mawlana Muhammad Ali Jawhar, Mawlana Shawkat Ali and others from the Muslim' side and Gandhi from the Congress side decided to run a non-cooperation movement. Muhammad Ali Jinnah differed on the way the movement was planned and thus he resigned from the AINC (Sayeed 2000). The movement generated a populist appeal than an elitist. The Muslims wholeheartedly participated in the movement. They sold their properties, boycotted foreign goods, stopped sending their kids to English schools, migrated (mainly from the North West Frontier Province and the Sindh Province) to Afghanistan declaring India an Abode of War (dar-ul-barb), and agitated at a mass level. In 1920, when the movement was at its peak, the AINC withdrew its support and the Turkish government declared Turkey a modern secular state abolishing the caliphate (Yavuz 2003). Indian scholar and writer Altaf Azmi has critically analysed the sensational nature of the movement, which brought the
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Muslims close to disaster (2002: 356-64). The romanticism attached to the Ottoman Caliphat and a series of sensational and uncalculated moves by the masses espoused by the Khilafat leaders consequently left the Muslims educationally and economically at a deadly end (ibid). For historian I. H. Qureshi, the Khilafat movement was instrumental in creating political consciousness among the Muslim public (1965: 42).

The Khilafat movement was the first and last instance of Hindu-Muslim unity in pre-divided India (Sayeed 2000). The emotional bonding between Muslims and Hindus reached its zenith when a leader of the movement from Arya Samaj, Shuddhi Swami Shradhanand, was invited to deliver a speech against the British at Jaami’ Mosque of Delhi. When the short-lived romance between Hindus and Muslims was over, riots between Hindus and Muslims erupted claiming even the life of Swami Shradhanand in 1925. The ensuing communal violence spawned campaigns portraying Islam as a religion of violence and intolerance. In such turbulent circumstances, Mawlana Muhammad Ali, the main leader of the Khilafat movement, openly expressed his desire for a book that could explain the true nature of jihad in Islam. As a result, Mawdudi started to work on his first serious academic work, “The Jihad in Islam” (al-jihad fil-Islam) (1996: 16).

3.2.3 Islam, modernisation and the post-colonial state

Pakistan exemplifies a classic case of state-sponsored Islamisation and it reveals a paradoxical situation. Most of the time it was governed by Western educated secular elites yet it could never withstand the social-political pressure of traditional ulama and Islamists demanding Islamisation of the constitution and observance of Islamic moral codes in social transactions. With the exception of a few notable failures, the state has opted traditionalist and Islamists’ interpretation of religion in legislation as compared to the modernist one (Saeed 1994). Traditionalists view the modernist school as unauthentic and based on rationalist and heretical approaches, whereas, the later vies with ulama and Islamists citing them as the major barrier to development (Pal 2004).

The creation of Pakistan in 1947 was the result, as Hamza Alavi has argued, of a long political and constitutional struggle of a modern educated middle class (salaried class) and powerful landowning elite (Alavi and Halliday 1988: 68-70). The traditional ulama of Deoband and the Islamist Mawdudi were opposed to the idea of Muslim nationalism cham-
pioned by the Jinnah’s Muslim League. The JUH favoured a united India while Mawdudi advocated for an Islamic global order. After separation, the religious groups recognized Pakistan not only as a legitimate sovereign state but also initiated their struggle to Islamize it according to their own religious understandings (ibid; Khan 1985).

The idea of the emergence of an Islamic state is premised essentially on Mawdudi’s Islamist ideology, rather than the traditional ulama. During the early years of Pakistani independence, a heated controversy over power and the nature of the state kept all state and non-state actors engaged and the country could not set its proper direction to move forward (Binder 1961). The main achievement for the Islamists and ulama was the passing of the Objective Resolution in 1949, a supra-constitutional resolution that barred the enactment of any law repugnant to Qur’an and Sunnah. In a sense, at least for Islamists, the nature of the state was set to be an “Islamic state” (Nadeem 1995). In sharp contrast to the passing of the objective resolution, the Pakistani ruling elite failed to frame the first unanimously approved constitution of the country. The elite also failed to set the rules of the power game and to implement gross reforms needed in land, education and other sectors. Likewise, it showed its inability to deal with the roaring language controversy in the eastern wing (then Bengal and now Bangladesh) of the United Pakistan in the early stages. The net result was gross mismanagement of important issues of the nascent state of Pakistan leading to chaotic decades of lost opportunities. The important task of building political, social, economic and state institutions did not appear on the agenda of the ruling elites, intelligentsia and Islamic forces.

In this background, the state drifted away from the egalitarian and modernizing ideals of its founding Father, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

The first attack on the weak state came from its own military forces when General Ayub Khan took over in 1958. The dictator was modernist in his religious approach and capitalist in his economic outlook. His era is known for achieving remarkable growth rates and modernization of industrial and agricultural sectors. Under the guidance of the Chicago school, he was the architect of the Green Revolution in Pakistani agriculture sector (Zaidi 1999). The policy of tractorisation, canalization and mechanization supplemented by the high yield variety seeds transformed the agriculture sector from traditional to modern. In terms of major de-
dimension, this era is the decade of development (ibid). However, the distribution remained highly skewed and only the central districts of Punjab recorded high growth at the cost of smaller provinces and underdeveloped regions. This lopsided development made this era the controversial decade of development due to growing regional and provincial imbalances. The income inequality increased not only across regions but also across individuals (ibid).

On the political front, the dictator remained engaged in framing the second constitution of 1962 (as he abrogated the first constitution of 1956). In 1960, a constitutional commission was formed to give its recommendations by collecting opinions through questionnaires (Ahmad 1967: 246-47). Instead of consultation across the social, political and intellectual spectrum, the questionnaire mode of consultation effectively kept the genuine views of the public representatives out in favour of the Islamic parties such as the Jama’at (ibid: 247). However, now the important issue was how the authentic Hadith would be determined in ‘legal terms.’ The solution was sought in forming another commission to “…study the Islamization of general law, in consultation with similar commissions in other Muslim lands” (ibid: 247). In this way, scholars argue that the commission tried to postpone the Islamisation of laws and ‘transfer the pressure’ of religious groups to a global context (ibid: 248). The reported vision the commission held of a welfare state shows in the following excerpt

We have … an ideology which enables us to establish a model welfare state, and history shows that such a state had been established in the early days of Islam … Those who talk glibly of secularism in Pakistan, overlook the fact that, by a mere change of expression, one’s conduct does not change … Liberal secularism of the West which seems to attract the modern generation, is itself based on the traditional discipline which was developed when religion was force in those countries (quoted by Ahmad 1967: 248).

In 1960, the Central Institute of Islamic Research was established and renamed after the promulgation of the 1962 constitution as Islamic Research Institute (IRI). The 1962 Constitution retained the earlier formula of describing Qur’an and Sunnah as the supreme law but dropped the adjective ‘Islamic’ from the ‘Republic of Pakistan. However, in 1963, the name of the republic changed again to Islamic Republic of Pakistan through modification of the First Amendment in the Pakistani Constitu-
tion. Other Islamic articles of the 1956 Constitution remained. The 1962 Constitution also provided for the creation of the Council of Islamic Ideology, a constitutional body with a mandate to explain the Shar’ia position on all legislation by the central and provincial governments. The President was empowered to appoint learned Islamic scholars as members of the Council for a period of three years. The formation of constitutional bodies to assist the Islamization of laws in Pakistan resulted in increased access to opportunity spaces for the Islamic forces and pushing back the modernist school. This was the second milestone after the Objective Resolution which frustrated the dream of liberal-secular forces to turn Pakistan into a secular state. In the 1964-65 Presidential elections, Field Marshal Ayub Khan contested against the sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Miss Fatimah Jinnah. The allied opposition supported Jinnah against Ayub Khan. Mawdudi, the amir of the Jama’at also supported Jinnah against his strong ideological conviction of prohibiting women from leading an Islamic state (Nasr 1996: 44).

Notwithstanding these brief interludes with Islamist forces, the Ayub era can be regarded as the regime that modernised the most in the political history of Pakistan. His support for the modernist school shows a number of steps taken by him. He appointed Professor Fazlur Rahman, a renowned controversial modernist, as the head of the Central Institute of Islamic Research. In March 1961, the promulgation of Muslim Family Law Ordinance reflected his thinking, which pleased the modernist groups and invoked dissent by religious forces (Iftikhar 2005: 66).

The illiberal socialist policies of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ruled as Prime Minister from 20 December 1971 to 5 July 1977) followed Ayub’s liberal-capitalist regime. Bhutto popularised the idea of “Islamic socialism” in the political discourse, which also outraged Islamists and ulama who considered it an incursion into their privileged province. Bhutto legitimated his land reforms, nationalization of banks, industries and insurance companies in the name of Islam. A body of 113 ulama including the Jama’at leaders “issued a fatwa that condemned socialism and anyone who advocated, supported, or voted for it” (Esposito and Voll 1996: 108).

Bhutto’s overwhelming populism was to some degree a reaction to Ayub’s capitalist model, which set the path for future development and modernization, but also invoked resentment over increasing income inequalities. During anti-Ayub campaigns in 1967-69, and then in the ele-
tion campaign in 1968-70, Z.A. Bhutto emerged as the first populist leader after Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. Bhutto's nationalisation drive received stinging criticism from all corners, which may have been a response to the overall crisis left behind by the predecessor Ayub regime. However, the results of Bhuttoism could not be analyzed independently as external forces had greatly added to the failures of this era. On the international front, the shocks of the secession of Bangladesh as independent state in 1971, the issue of war prisoners with India, and status of Kashmir occupied the era. Economically, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil shock pushed up the country’s import bill while it was still reeling under the heavy losses of 1971 war. The floods of 1973 (some of the worst in the nation’s history) and the failure of cotton crop (the backbone of the country's exports) left the country worsened the crisis. To satisfy the growing Islamist uproar, Bhutto incorporated their views on Islam at various levels. He also articulated the look-east foreign policy and turned to Iran, Libya and the Gulf countries. This policy greatly increased export of Pakistani labour to these countries creating the “Middle East Boom” (Esposito and Voll 1996: 107; Zaidi 1999: 6). He also organized conferences of Islamic countries to extend the boundaries of Islamic identity of Pakistan from its Indian background to the heartland of Islam—the Middle East.

The secession of Bangladesh in 1971 as an independent state also called into question the role of Islamic ideology as a corner stone of the state, as the strongest force of national identity and the basis of Pakistan movement and Muslim nationalism (Esposito and Voll 1996: 107). However, if Islam had failed to hold together the diverse ethnic groups of the eastern and Western parts of Pakistan; again, Islam was still the only available option before the elites to keep the rest of the country together. The Islamists have been dwelling on this point. In this era, the Islamic political forces moved from the periphery to centre stage (Esposito and Voll 1996: 107; Nasr 2004: 195). In particular, the mainstream Islamist party, the Jama’at, managed to come forward and publicly propagate its ideology of an Islamic State and its alternative vision on Islamization of society (ibid). Expert on the Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan, Vali Nasr, argued in his book *Islamic Leviathan* that the Jama’at successfully framed its “Islamist assumptions in popular political culture” in an Islamic ‘frame of reference’, and weakened the hold of secular forces first in the 1960s and then in the 1970s (2001). The consensus-based Islamic
Constitution of 1973 by an elected parliament during the secular-socialist Bhutto regime marks the epic of Islamists’ growing influence in Pakistan. The constitution declared the country the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and set the framework for Islamizing state institutions and social order. In 1974, the Ahmadiyya were declared a non-Muslim minority due to their disbelief in the finality of the Prophet Muhammad. Further, a public affirmation of belief became part of the oaths required for the highest public offices—the Prime Minister and the President.

By the second half of the 1970s, Islam had become the dominant political and social idiom in the polity. Pakistan National Alliance (PNA: a coalition of secular and religious parties) formed to fight for restoration of parliamentary democracy and de-nationalization. The PNA movement was labelled as the movement for the system of the Prophet (Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa) (Nadeem 1995). The movement succeeded in mobilizing modern educated professionals and urbanites from the middle classes. The organizational skills and mobilization potential of the Jama’at played a pivotal role in the PNA movement. General elections in March 1977 resulted in controversial victory for Bhutto’s Peoples Party. A mass agitation spread across the country eliciting support from diverse social and political forces victimized by Bhutto’s regime through various state’s physical apparatuses. The military used the situation as an excuse by the military to step in and “save the nation”. As a result, the first “pious” military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, ‘pious’ only in relation to his “profane” predecessors (Ayub, Yahya and Bhutto). He declared martial law on 5 July 1977. On the eve of the second martial law, Islam had already made inroads as the dominant ideology not only across the political divide but also in the corridors of power and policies. General Zia-ul-Haq, gained the political support of the ever-ready conservative Muslim League and skilfully managed to obtain the backing from Islamist forces, mainly the Jama’at (Ashar 2004; Kaushik 1993: 19-20). Zia made a “sanctimonious appeal” to legitimate his rule. Unlike Bhutto’s elitist feudal background, Žia came from lower-middle class peasantry (and ‘Arain’ Punjabi clan). His family is said to have identified itself with the Jama’at-e-Islami (Kaushik 1993: 21).

The advent of various events (the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) had created the stage for long course of mutual cooperation and collaboration between the Pakistani state under the clutches of dictator and the Islamic forces. The eventful year of 1979,
left lasting impact on the Islamic world where Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran were “epicenters as well as tributaries, and confluences of the history-making events of that year” (Husain 2009: 9). General Zia-ul-Haq’s coup d’état in July 1977 overthrew the Bhutto regime in a largely peaceful manner in the wake of a nationwide mass protest against the alleged rigging of general election held the same year. The Jama’at was then led by Mian Tufail Muhammad who also happened to be a relative of the dictator. In contrast to Mawdudi’s opposition to the previous dictator (Ayub Khan), this time the Jama’at joined the federal cabinet thus securing important ministries and key positions in the state institutions.\footnote{Professor Ghafoor Ahmad became Minister of Commerce; Professor Khurshid Ahmad, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission; and M. Azam Farouqi took the oath as Minister of Information.} Zia-ul-Haq replaced the notion of Western democracy with “shuracracy” (Majlis-e-Shura), a name for consultative forum borrowed from the dictionary of Islamists. He legitimated his military rule by using Islam as an instrument. (see e.g. Esposito and Piscatori 1991: 439) To bolster his legitimacy and rally public support, Zia-ul-Haq launched an Islamization campaign through promulgating a series of ordinances regarding family laws, syllabus, hudood laws, zakat and ushr and interest-free banking. These steps opened new opportunity spaces for the Jama’at activists in terms of job openings and consolidation of its position in society. For the new regime, Islam did not remain a tool of legitimacy alone; the Islamists used it as marker of identity between Muslims/non-Muslims, religious/secular, men/women, pro-Jihad/anti-Jihad, and Sunni/Shia’ (Nasr 1993). Thus, the ruptures and ensuing polarization took deep roots in the society. Bad luck for the Pakistani state and society, this regime coincided with the Pakistani establishment of the Afghan Jihad project, a CIA joint venture in the 1980s. This project pushed the state to driver seat of jihadi bandwagon against the mighty former-USSR. Though the USA and the capitalist world, along with the oil-rich Arabian Gulf states readily helped Pakistan diplomatically, materially, manually, and financially, the state and society underwent a transformation towards a dangerous mix of religion and violence. The Jama’at fully participated in the jihad at not only the ideological front (preparing jihad literature, invoking jihadi spirit etc) but also members and supporters swelled the ranks of holy warriors as active combatants and trainers.
This project had laid the basis for trans-national jihadi network across the world. The Jama’at could not resist the temptation of open and tacit relations with Islamist organizations in the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds who participated in this project.

In Aug 1988, the sudden death of president Zia-ul-Haq in a plane crash opened the gate for civilian rule in the country. Another Bhutto and main rival of the dreaded Zia, Benazir Bhutto, swept the general elections the same year. As a Western educated woman, she led the secular Pakistan’s Peoples Party of her father. After a long exile, in 1985, she had returned to Pakistan to an unprecedented warm welcome at Lahore airport. In politics, she inherited her father’s charisma, which led her party to win the 1988 general elections, and to become the first elected women prime minister in the Muslim world (Waseem 2006). From 1988 to 1999, Bhutto’s PPP and Muslim League lead by Mian Nawaz Sharif each alternately, came to power. The resumption of civilian rule in the 1990s, initiated a new tension between the secular and nationalist political forces on the one hand, and the military and Islamists on the other. Commenting on this tension, Vali Nasr observed that the democratic forces were now trying to move Pakistan away from “Islamization to development and modernisation” (Nasr 2004: 197). However, the military establishment blunted every such attempt. Being in longstanding relationship with Islamist and conservative forces during Zia era, the military had decided to support actively these civilian forces against the secular Pakistan People’s Party. It had helped to form an alliance called IJI (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad/Islamic Democratic Alliance) of Muslim League and the religious right led by Jama’at-e-Islami, to block the way to victory for the PPP in the general elections. The military had fully calculated that such a policy would pitch the political forces against each other thus saving the day to delay the needed reforms. Such a policy of resistance can be ascertained from the fact that when Nawaz Sharif, a long time ally and supporter, tried to carry out his agenda of reforms in relations to neighbouring India for resolution of longstanding dispute over Kashmir, the same military establishment forced him out of the political scene and grabbed the power in October 1999 for General Pervez Musharraf (Nasr 2004).

The 1990s was a decade of multiple opportunity spaces for the Jama’at and other Islamist forces in Pakistan. During this era, the Jama’at new leader Qazi Husain Ahmad presented his party as an alternative to
the politics of PPP and the Muslim League. He had, though tacitly assisted the military in sacking the first Nawaz Sharif government in 1993. In due course of time, the Jama’at remained close associate of the military on key strategic issues like Kashmir and Afghanistan whereas Nawaz Sharif emerged as the most popular political leader with a proclaimed developmental agenda. His new approach, agenda and team earned him the opportunity to be compared with Mahatir, the Malaysian prime minister for his well-repute in Pakistan. The 1993 elections attested to the fact that Nawaz Sharif had claimed major share in the Islamic vote bank than the Islamists. (Nasr 2004: 199) The Jama’at amir Qazi Husain’s “adventurism” to conduct a solo flight, and the resultant frustration within party had publicly surfaced. Resultantly, the second Machchi Goth affair (see Chapter 5) took place in the Jama’at history. That is, a group of ardent Jama’at activists and leaders splintered forming Islamic Movement (Tehreek-e-Islami). The aim was to reclaim and reconfigure the ideology and strategy of the Islamic movement as outlined by Mawdudi in 1941, from the over-politicized Jama’at of the time.

The Afghan war faction Hizb-e-Islami was ideologically closer to the Jama’at and thus a major source of its muscular power in Pakistan. In 1994, the Jama’at encountered another major setback when its close ideological counterpart in Afghanistan, Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, was replaced by the ultra-conservative Taliban. The emergence of Taliban, as the story has now unfolded, was the outcome of a deliberate state policy pursued by the then PPP led government. This new force, Taliban, was ideologically close to the Deobandi Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam. Its rank and file had been educated in the network of Deobandi Madrassas. Since the Taliban had been trained and armed by the military establishment during the second reign of Benazir Bhutto, the military went closer to JUI at the cost of the Jama’at. Mainstream Islamism, the Jama’at, was now confronted with a major competing traditional religious force claiming its share in the same political space (Rashid 2008). The fall of Hikmatyar in Afghanistan was definitely a major setback for the Jama’at politics in Pakistan and it contracted its opportunity spaces.

The decade of 90s was era of structural adjustment programs. Throughout this era, new opportunities came by in every sector of the economy including education through private schools, colleges and universities. Islamic investment of the Jama’at workers, entrepreneurs and
their networks created a new public space—private schools, colleges—where private business, profit, self-employment and ideology interacted in many complex ways. The recent addition is the investment in real estate and private residential schemes/housing societies. During fieldwork in 2007, I have observed that the ‘Islamist/Jama’at investors’ have shown their considerable presence in this sector too. However, close interaction with the Jama’at workers also revealed that the growing elite class within the Islamist movement is also a major source of tension and discontent for the less privileged ones. At the same time, this ‘new Islamist entrepreneurial class’ seems to be the future social base of the Jama’at in Pakistan.13 Whereas, though the Jama’at activists pragmatically absorbed all of the ensued opportunities mostly opened in the 90s, there was no conceptual-ideological shift within its ideology to provide a framework for wholehearted accommodation of these avenues.

In 1997 general elections, Nawaz Sharif emerged victorious with a clear majority (63 per cent, forming government in the centre and all four provinces. Nawaz Sharif thus had golden opportunity to carry forward his agenda of shaping a state wherein the balance between the civil-military, Islamisation-development and Islam and the state can be redefined (Nasr 2004). This new vision was pregnant with an inevitable clash between the emboldened civilian government and the well-entrenched military and Islamist forces. Expectedly, both the latter forces responded with resentment. Internally, there was phenomenal surge in sectarian violence. On the external front, the military jacked up mercenary activity in the Kashmir leading to the Kargil war between India and Pakistan. The latter episode pitched the military against the civilian government. The walls of distrust reached a point where one of two had to blink. Ultimately the military sent Nawaz Sharif government packing and grabbed power for the third time on flimsy grounds. The Jama’at leadership and other religious forces welcomed the military coup d’état and demanded quick accountability and fresh elections.

On the night of assuming power, General Pervez Musharraf announced his seven-point agenda. Popular leadership including Nawaz Sharif was sent to jails, exiled or debarred from taking part in general election through sheer arms twisting on single-handed legal instruments. These steps created a political vacuum to be filled by an alliance of reli-

13 This analysis is based on my direct observations in the field.
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The MMA was able to capitalize on the opportunity spaces left by the absence of popular leadership as well as the anti-American sentiments provoked by the US attacks in Afghanistan and the fall of Taliban. The MMA formed government in NWFP, and joined a coalition government in the Baluchistan province. To pay for the favour of giving them a ruling opportunity in two provinces bordering Afghanistan, the MMA helped legitimize illegal action of Musharraf from October 12, 1999 and stay in power till end 2007, through an active support for the seventeenth amendment in the constitution (Baxter 2004: 101-30).

In the Musharraf era (1999-2007), the number of private TV channels jumped from only one state run television station to around 40. This was further augmented by the extension and availability of cyber-space to the remotest users in the far-flung regions. Access to internet, live chat, blogs, CDs/DVDs and mobile networks were welcomed by all. Nearly all of the major madrassas are hosting their web pages. The religious scholars and Islamists appear on private TV channels and participate in talk shows and live discussions. Even the Taliban leaders and spokespersons respond to live phone calls and reply to questions asked from the news-caster and anchors in live talk shows. In short, private media, private business sector and modern technology forms just another opportunity space where the ulama and Islamists have entered to participate not only in the debate but also in business to accrue profit and employment.

3.4 The Enduring Legacy of 18th and 19th Century

Pakistan’s prevailing religio-political milieu is shaped by a number of towering personalities, intellectual strands and events of 18th, 19th and first half of 20th century. I will restrict the discussion to the most relevant to this study.

3.4.1 Shah Waliullah

The life and religious thought of Shah Waliullah (1703-1768) has an enduring impact on the contemporary religio-social and political milieu of Muslims in the sub-continent. Some scholars consider him the founder of “Islamic Modernism”. (Ahmad 1967; also see Ansari 2003: 254, Masud 2009a) Shah Waliullah visited the holy cities of Mecca and Medina (1731-32 and attended the lectures of Hadith scholars. He wrote ex-
tensively covering many branches of Islamic learning including his magnum opus “Conclusive Argument from God” (Hujjat Allah al-baligha), Persian translation of the Qur’an, hadith, fiqh, beliefs, Sufism, and religious polemics (Rizvi 2004: 220-21). The number of his known works is around 70. His remarkable work was his Persian translation of the Holy Qur’an that invoked sharp criticism from traditional ulama opposed to the translation of Qur’an in a foreign language thus accusing him of hereesy/innovation. (ibid: 230) Shah’s contributions rendered him as religious scholar, great Sufi, social reformer and an ideologue who commented on social and political issues of his time.

In his view, the basis for worship of God does not arise from Divine scriptures alone but in his view “… because of the benefits they conferred on the individual and the society” (Saeed 1994: 83). Shah Waliullah stood for independent reasoning and rejected the long-held belief that the gates of ijtihad were closed in the 10th century. Shah’s second remarkable contribution was his quest for the true religion in the Qur’an and Hadith literature. In his major work the Conclusive Proof of God, he refers to rational arguments in support of his claims (Masud 2009a).

Shah Waliullah’s eldest son, Shah Abdul Aziz (1745-1823), rose to the status of Hadith scholar (muhadith) like his father. Leader of the Mujahideen movement, Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed, also remained under Shah’s tutelage.

Detailed account of Shah Waliullah’s contributions is beyond the scope of this study. Traditionalists, Islamic Socialists and Modernists have equal claim of allegiance to his ideas on religion. His legacy endured through his sons and disciples who proliferated in the colonial India in various forms of activism: intellectual, socio-political as well as militant.

3.4.2 The First War of Independence (1857-58)

The Indian revolt of 1857-58, which ended in dissolution of Mughal dynasty and consolidation of British rule, marks the beginning of modern India. (Metcalf 2006: 90) The event is significant also because it evoked multiple intellectual responses for the revival of the Indian Muslims.

The British East India Company, which entered the sub-continent in 1600 as trading company during the region of Elizabeth-I had effectively become an agent of Queen Victoria by 1837. Along with a political role, the company also acquired the authority to collect revenues/land taxes. (Sanyal 2005: 1-2; Zaman 2002) With acquiring the authority to collect
and administer revenues, the judicial system also went under their control gradually reducing qazis’ role to assistants of the British judicial staff. (Zaman 2002: 20-21) The colonial administration moves to bring new sectors under its control also had far-reaching implications for ulama, “who had once received land grants and jobs in government, now turned to society at large to sustain them in their role” (Robinson 2008: 262). In return, now ulama would be required to provide services to society too.

East India Company’s role as trading organization gradually ceased and it started working as the representative of the British Government in the sub-continent (Harris 2001: 9). The Indian Muslims and Hindus realized this fact very late. The Mughal emperor Bahader Shah Zafar-II had assumed the role of the Company’s puppet in Delhi. In 1835, the Company decision to strike the coins without the last Mughal king’s name on it sent further shock waves among the Indian Muslims. (ibid)

The Company’s continuous efforts to bring more territories under control, impose new taxes, bad treatment of locals by its employees, spurt in missionary activities, and non-popular initiatives on the part of British functionaries precipitated popular outrage against the colonialists (Harris 2001). After the failed Indian revolt in 1857, the sub-continent had slipped into the direct control of the British Crown in 1858 thus ending the 300-year-old Mughal empire (Metcalf 2006; Sanyal 2005). The shock, stress and frustration of the defeat left Indian Muslims with a profound sense of loss. The consolidation of British Crown’s rule in India was the long-awaited outcome of the weakening grip of Mughal rulers, which began in late 1600s. The internal fissures and power vacuum created by the weakening hold of the later Mughal emperors provided an opportunity first to Nadir Shah (1739) to invade Lahore; and then to Afghan king Ahmad Shah Abdali (1761) who attacked India in response to Shah Waliullah’s letter (see e.g. Jalal 2008; Sanyal 2005).

Addressing the causes of the Indian revolt, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) authored an essay ‘The Causes of Indian Revolt’ (Asbab-e-Baghawat-e-Hind) just after the disturbances had been put down. Although Sir Sayyid remained loyal to British officials during the mutiny, he never hesitated to point out the root causes of the Indian uprising, which shook the very foundations of the British colonial administration in North India. Sir Sayyid termed the revolt a response to “multiple grievances” including “British cultural policies”, “insolence and contempt for Indians by the British”, exclusion of the locals from the “consultative
process” and “severity of the revenue assessments” (Metcalf 2006: 100-01). His role in removing British misconceptions of Muslims' part in the failed Revolt-1857 is discussed in next section.

It is worth a mention here that Mawlana Muhammad Qasim Nanutvi (1833-1879) along with Mawlana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1828-1905)—founders of the Deoband Madrassa—had taken an active part in the 1857 uprising and had survived (Jalal 2008). Nanutvi's mentor Haji Imdadullah was associated with Shah Waliullah’s madrassa and the Mujahideen movement of Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed (Sayyid Ahmad the Martyr).

3.4.3 Western modernity and socioeconomic deprivations of Muslims in colonial India

Of all the challenges, the 19th century Indian Muslims were confronted with, in the British colonial regime, the challenge of Western modernity was the most daunting one. As Filali-Ansary has rightly observed the Muslims' encounter with the modernising West in the 19th century is more relevant than its own past is (Diamond et al. 2003: 193). The multifaceted threats colonial ‘other’ for Muslims’ culture and Muslimness in India, modernization of physical and social life became the imminent one. Striking an appropriate balance between the traditional way of life and assimilation of colonial innovations in realms of education, governance, communication, judiciary, and other aspects of official and social life presented a huge challenge to Muslim leaders of the time. They were speaking with the same voice to guide the Muslims about a proper response. Thus these challenges evoked three popular responses: rationalism, conservatism, and moderation. These are to be discussed shortly.

The British intervention resulted in removal of “the financial and institutional support for Islamic society.” A general resentment in Muslim society that was left without power was obvious. As Robinson has rightly stated that the “ulama, who had once received land grants and jobs in government, now turned to society at large to sustain them in their role. They would survive only if they provided services society wanted” (2008: 262).

The British colonial rule in India negatively affected the socioeconomic conditions of Muslims in many ways. The dwindling economic conditions of the Indian Muslims were coupled with social frustration that emanated from the sense of a loss of political empire—the Mughal dynasty. As the British agrarian policy varied across provinces, so it dras-
tically changed the “relationship of the landed classes … in some prov-
inces … in others less so or not at all” (Hardy 1972: 39). Writing about
the miserable condition and deprivation of the Muslim aristocracy in
lower Bengal, W. W. Hunter remarks were the following:

A hundred and seventy years ago it was almost impossible for a well-born
Musulman in Bengal to become poor; at present it is almost impossible for
him to continue rich… three distinct streams of wealth ran perennially
into the coffers of a noble Musalman House—Military command, the col-
clection of the Revenue, and Judicial or Political employ (1871: 155).

Under the British rule, the Army and collection of the land revenue,
as main sources of wealth and fortune, went out of Muslims’ hands.
Some fiscal measures “deprived many Muslim landholders of their es-
tates” coupled with abandoning Persian as official language with the re-
sult that “the Muslims had lost their forte in administration” (Sayeed
2000: 13-14). The Hindus had already learnt English and so the abolition
of Persian as court language (1837) meant that the Muslims would re-
main less competitive (Hardy 1972: 36). Such growing measures by the
British rule were accepted by the Hindus with thanks, which resulted in-
to weakening of the Muslims—who conquered and ruled India for a
long time.

The British named to their credit a number of modernisation initia-
tives in the colonial India. These include unification of the empire, social
reforms, legal codification and proliferation of public works. Metcalf re-
fers to critics of European modernity who also underscored the dark side
of it: “among them racism, militarism, and the economic exploitation
that was part of the colonial relationship.” The British mood towards its
colonial subject had undergone a sea change: in the 1930-40s, it was
more or less in line with the Enlightenment notions of progress and
‘universal humanism’; while in the 1870s, it reflected the mood of an ‘es-
sential difference’ between the colonizer and the colonized (2006: 92-93).

3.5 Muslim Intellectual Responses

3.5.1 Sir Sayyid and Islamic modernism

The mounting frustration invoked by the preceding tragic events and its
devastating implications caused proliferation of a number of societal res-
ponses in the last half of the 19th century (Ahmad 2005). Sir Sayyid Ah-
mad Khan (1817-1898) and his modernist approach was foremost
among them. He is the chief proponent of the Islamic modernist school in the Indo-Pak Muslim tradition. A number of other contributors to this school are Chiragh Ali, Sayed Amir Ali, Muhammad Iqbal, Khalifa Abdul Hakim and Professor Fazlur Rahman in the sub-continent, and Jamal al-Din Afghani (Iran), Khayr al-Din Bassa (Tunisia) and Muhammad Abduh (Egypt) elsewhere (Masud 2007: 3). This section will discuss the main theoretical threads of this school focusing on Sir Sayyid and Professor Fazlur Rahman.

Generally, there are four main tenets of Islamic modernism in the Indo-Pak sub-continent and elsewhere (Haddad 1991: 4; Ikram 2007: 73-145; Siddiqi 1982: 6-37). First, modernists think that man can produce desirable results in this world by following the law of causation, and so the law of compulsion (jabr) does not bind him. Second, modernists revolted against the Sufi recommendation of individual’s internal retreat from society, and denial of worldly pursuits. They considered Islam as both din-wa-dunya (religion and the world). Third, blind submission (taqleed) is substituted with free thinking and independent reasoning (ijtihad). The modernists called for “a movement of islah (reform), posited in opposition to those who advocated taqleed (imitation) of the times and thinking of the past” (Haddad 1991: 4). Finally, as the revealed text is subject to multiple interpretations, then what are the limits of reason? In response to this question, the modernists try to draw the boundaries between sphere of reason and realm of revelation (ibid: 6-7). Islamic Modernist, Fazlur Rahman, differentiates between classical and contemporary modernism. In his view, whereas, the former was concerned with internal reform as well as “controversialist reform with the West,” the latter “concerned basically and directly with internal reform and reconstruction” (1984: 85).

Sir Sayyid had targeted the prevalent sloppiness among Muslims as based on deprivation while he consistently tried to convince the British administration that their misguided policies towards Muslims had evoked a feeling of animosity among the latter. In addition, he tried to infuse a sense of loyalty in Muslims with their British administrators (see e.g. Metcalf 2006: 100-01).

Sir Sayyid’s target was the improvement of personal morality and transformation of the moral structure. He sought “transformation of the moral structure based upon conventional old customs (rasm wa riwaj) into a rationalistic personal morality, as the social basis for the improvement
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of his Indian Muslim community” (Kagaya: 85-86). For inculcation of new social values in Muslims, Sir Sayyid initiated publishing *Tahzeeb al-Akhlaq*. In the realm of politics, Sir Sayyid inculcated three main ideas: 1) “that political awakening was imperative; 2) that the British must be cultivated as friends, and 3) that it was not in the interests of the Muslims to join Congress” (Qureshi 1965: 21).

Of the four conventional sources of Islamic law (Qur’an, Hadith, Ijmaa and Qiya) to which the traditional ulama strictly adhere in their religious discourse, Sir Sayyid had upheld only the Qur’an as an infallible source. In his view, the Hadith collection was not reliable as because it contained material relevant to the time of Muhammad only. He rejected the principle of consensus (*Ijmaa*) and stood firmly in favour of Ijthad and independent reasoning. “He emphasized that the increase in human knowledge and modern life demanded that people solved their problems in the light of their own experiences instead of relying on what the ancient thinkers had said” (Saeed 1994: 85). Sir Sayyid “introduced a critical approach to biography writing in India.” He was critical of William Muir’s biographies of the Prophet and first four caliphs. Therefore, “he wrote *Khutbat-e-Ahmadiyya* to expose the biased and subjective approaches adopted by Muir and other Christian missionaries to studying the Prophet and Islam” (Masud 2009b: 6).

Sir Sayyid’s main contributions were as a religious scholar and a social reformer. In the former sense, he wrote extensively on theological issues including his commentary on the Qur’an and the Bible. He had tried to use rational methods in interpretation of the Qur’an on issues like polygamy, jihad, slavery, demonology, angelology, miracles, Gog and Magog (Ahmad 1967). His religious ideas while extremely controversial and often equated with rationalism by the ulama and Islamists alike provide energy and light to succeeding generations of modernists in the Indo-Pakistani territory. As a modernist, he put his ideas and thoughts to work and established educational institutions and societies. He suggested that modern education was the panacea for the Muslim revival.

As a rationalist scholar, he tried to reconcile Islam with the demands of rationality. His religious thought and approach can be placed in this category. He was apprehensive of the proclaimed role of the All Indian National Congress in safeguarding the rights of Muslims. In Sir Sayyid’s view the political alliance of Hindus and Muslims would mean the subjugation of the latter to the numerically strong and economically prosper-
ous partners. In his view, the Muslims were “… numerically much smaller than the Hindu population, educationally backward, politically immature, and in economic resources and enterprise far behind the others” (Ahmad 1967: 34). His prognosis of ‘political separatism’ for the Muslims in India would later motivate the formation of the All India Muslim League in 1906.

Sir Sayyid underwent a profound change in his thinking after his journey to England and Paris in 1869-70. This journey is considered a landmark in his Occidentalism. He compared “the equality of opportunity for both sexes…” in England with the illiterate woman in India (ibid: 34). During his stay in London, he also visited University of Cambridge and admired its syllabus, which inspired his own model educational institution in India. In the same visit, he chalked out his imagined higher education model. Sir Sayyid’s close social ties with the British colonial bureaucracy, his Western dress and modern lifestyle made him the subject of satire and criticism by Indian poets and writers (ibid: 36). He founded the Scientific Society in 1864 with the aim of introducing Western sciences and rendering from English into Urdu the scientific work. In 1875, he established the Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental school, which later became Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College in 1878. “It aimed at the liberalization of ideas, broad humanism, a scientific worldview, and a pragmatic approach to politics. It strove for a steady increase of educated Muslims in the government services” (ibid: 37; Metcalf 2006]). Another milestone in the same direction was the establishment of Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Educational Conference in 1886. It aimed at enriching Urdu language through translation from other contemporary languages to make it the secondary language in the Indian public and private schools. According to his theological thought, there could be no contradiction between the word of God (wahi) and the work of God (nature).

For the human individual and society revelational law is necessarily in consonance with human rationality. In human society, wahi and reason are therefore identical. Reason as a natural revelational instinct operates in man’s scientific investigations as much as in his concept of the deity, his distinction between good and evil, his views on Divine judgment and retribution, and his belief in life after death (Ahmad 1967: 43).

In the remainder of this section, I turn now to a brief account of eminent Modernist scholar, Professor Fazlur Rahman.
Professor Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988) remained by far the most outstanding Islamic Modernist scholar whose academic work is also well known to the Western academia. In Rahman’s brilliant scholarship, the Modernist intellectual trend of Sir Sayyid fully blossomed at its full zenith. Unlike Sir Sayyid, whose person became the basis of a social reform movement in the pre-partition India, Fazlur Rahman remained confined to intellectual contributions. His students continued and extended his work in Indonesia, Turkey and other parts of the world but less in his country of origin—Pakistan—where he became the subject of heated criticism by the religious conservatism. “The campaign against him included threats to his life and ended with his resignation and flight to Chicago, where he taught until his death” (Masud 2009a: 252). Before his flight to Chicago, Rahman held the position of the Director Central Institute of Islamic Research14 (August 1962) and member of the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan (1964) in the Ayub Khan era. As a head of the institute, Rahman’s aim was to interpret “Islam in rational and scientific terms to meet the requirements of a modern progressive society” (quoted in Berry 2003: 44).

To Rahman, bank interest is not riba (usury) because riba is “based on individual consumptive-motive” and the underlying philosophy behind establishing modern banking is to play a role as an agent of change in the national development.15 He was also of the belief that ‘zakat could be gradually perceived as tax with certain mechanism’ (ibid). Professor Rahman historicized Islamic law in his Islamic Methodology in History (1965). His approach was that by historical contextualization, Qur’anic injunctions could be understood. He analysed “Qur’anic verses about the status of women’s legal evidence, age of marriage, polygamy, and divorce” under this approach (Masud 2005). Rahman believed that “… a contextual Qur’anic theology would enable the Islamic community to see modernity as an opportunity to create the egalitarian society called for in the Qur’an” (Berry 2003: 39). He believed in the underlying unity of the Qur’an and considered it as a “functional guide” which could be unfolded by: 1) moving from the specifics of the Qur’an to the “eliciting and systematizing of its general principles, values and long-ranged objec-

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14 The institute is now called Islamic Research Institute (IRI), which is an organ of the International Islamic University Islamabad.

15 http://www.banglapedia.org/httpdocs/HT/K_0187.HTM
tives, and 2) then these general principles should be used to formulate specific visions dealing with the contemporary situations (Berry 2003: 40; Rahman 1984: 7). Rahman did not agree with the classical modernization theorists’ theory that secularism will phase out religion in its advance stages of evolution.

Rahman’s modernist ideas were greeted with unsparing criticism by the Islamists and conservative ulama. In particular, his views that the Hadith literature was historically unreliable stirred troubles for him (Berry 2003: 45). The other issue, which further ignited the fire of opposition of ulama and Islamic revivalists, was Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 of the Ayub regime. The Ordinance dealt with inheritance, polygamy and divorce issues. Rahman also favoured use of contraceptives on the plea that it was a responsibility to the society, which could not shoulder the burden of high growth in population (ibid: 46). The Jama’at became furious over this stance of Fazlur Rahman. A number of other controversial ideas (permissibility of mechanical slaughtering, the verbal revelation of the Qur’an etc) fanned the flames of Islamists and ulama’s antagonism and he ultimately had to resign and move to Chicago in 1968. Under the increasing pressure from religious circles, the Ayub regime withdrew support from Fazlur Rahman, and submitted to the demands of the religious conservatism. After the departure of Rahman from Pakistan to the United States, the school of Islamic Modernism has failed to produce fresh thought.

Muslim socialists formulated another response by fusing “socialist ideals with Islamic values”. The main idea was to respond to the “challenge of decolonization and under-development” (Haddad 1991: 5). According to Aziz Ahmad (1967), three theories of Islamic socialism can be discerned in the Indo-Pak sub-continent: 1) Ubaid Ullah Sindhi who subscribed to Shah Waliullah in his revolutionary thought, emphasised distribution according to needs and advocated Islamic socialism in line with the Western welfare state; 2) Mawlana Sewharwi tried to develop a theory of socialism within the “traditional structure of the Shar’ia.” He recommended a “maximum ceiling on private ownership, interfere in affecting redistribution of wealth, enforce taxation according to the

16 It is also worth mentioning that the Jama’at expelled another intellectual in the early 90s from its organization in the north-west Pakistan on almost the same charges that he advocated for family planning and recommended use of contraception.
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3.5.2 Ulama and preservation of classical Islamic heritage

In 19th century Muslim India, three major Madrassas were imparting Islamic learning each with different emphasis: the madrassa of Shah Waliullah on Qur’an and Hadith, the Farangi Mahall at Lucknow on rationalism and jurisprudence, and the seminary of Khayarabad on logic and medieval philosophy (Ahmad 1967: 103).

In the eve of growing British colonial influence and shrinking Mughal Empire in 18th century India, ulama of Farangi Mahall had enormous influence on Muslims’ religious thought (Ahmad 1967: 113). These ulama were instrumental in raising Muslims’ consciousness in realising the gravity of the challenge and how to deal with it. According to writer of The Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia, Francis Robinson, these ulama were “the consolidators in South Asia of the rationalist traditions of Islamic scholarship derived from Iran.” These rationalist traditions were “encapsulated in a renowned and widely used syllabus, the Dars-i-Nizamiyya,” which they created and which became the dominant system of Islamic education throughout the subcontinent.” These traditions, argues Robinson, were flexible and “had the capacity to preserve Islam while selectively adopting, social and cultural changes from the West.” Therefore, “between 1780 and 1820 these traditions were poised to bring some form of Islamic enlightenment” (2002: 2). In the Nizami Syllabus (Dars-e-Nizami), the focus shifted towards rational sciences which offered “superior training” to “prospective lawyers, judges and administrators” (ibid: 53).

Some of the teachers in the Shah Waliullah School also taught elsewhere and taught Sir Sayyid, Muhammad Qasim Nanotvi (1833-1877) and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829-1905). The latter two founded the madrassa of Deoband in 1867 in a small town near Delhi (Rahman 2004: 80-81). Sir Sayyid’s Muslim Oriental Aligarh (MAO) College was opened in 1875. Both centres of learning (the traditional Deoband and the mod-

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17 The Dars-e-Nizami or Nizami Syllabus was standardised by Mullah Nizamuddin. It emphasised rational sciences (m'aqulat) such as logic, grammar and philosophy more than the books taught by teachers before it. See Rahman’s Denizens of Alien Worlds… pp.83-84.
ern-Western MAO) were inspired by Shah Waliullahi thought. The former set the tradition of taqleed and conservation of medieval Islamic heritage disseminated through an extended chain of schools established not only in the Indian sub-continent but also across the globe. The latter emerged as a rival institution and cultural expression of a modern lifestyle debated and contested by not only the ulama but also the Islamists (Ikram 2007). The chasm continues to date. Graduates of Deobandi madrassas went into society assuming various functions. They “… went out to take up positions as teachers themselves, writers, debaters with rival Muslims and non-Muslims, publishing in the expanding vernacular market-place, prayer leaders and guardians at Mosques and shrines” (Metcalf 2002: 5). In this way, the ulama emerged as a new class in their own right asserting itself in three major trajectories: 1) teaching and disseminating Islamic knowledge through an ever-expanding chain of Madrassas in various parts of the sub-continent and Afghanistan; 2) organizing a preaching society (Tablighi Jama’at). The aim was to intervene in individuals’ personal space and shape their personal character on the lines determined by Prophet following his approved strategy—Dawah. Thus, the emphasis in Deobandi Tablighi Jama’at shifted from deep intellectual activity “to inviting lay Muslims, high and low ranking, learned and illiterate, to share the obligation of enjoining others to faithful practice” (ibid: 8); 3) some Deobandi ulama organised themselves under a political organisation of their own called Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind (JUH). The JUH opposed the British colonial rule and supported Gandhi’s All India National Congress over the All India Muslim League. Most of the Deobandi ulama of the pre-partition era opposed the idea of an independent Muslim homeland and stood for the idea of composite nationalism. At the time, the debate on the nature of nationhood in Islam engaged scholars like Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani (Deobandi scholar and rector of the Deoband Madrassa who argued nations are due to territories), Iqbal and Mawdudi (who argued the idea of Islam as the basis of the Muslimhood) and the Muslim nationalist struggle by the Jinnah’s Muslim League (who stressed the two nation theory which later became the popular basis of present Pakistan). Of all the Sunni traditional schools in the sub-continent, Deobandis exercise enormous religious, social and political influence. Lately, with the rise of Taliban in the 1990s in Afghanistan, the Deoband intellectual and social trajectories have received widespread media and scholarly attention (Noor et al 2009). The growth in Deoban-
Two other responses of Sunni ulama that emerged in the late 19th century were Barelwis and the Ahl-e-Hadith. The Ahl-e-Hadith credo was more puritanical and pristine in its exposition. It called for strict adherence to monotheism in letter and spirit. It denounced local customs, specifically, calling Sufi’s beliefs and practices as heresy. Their opposition to the “institutional forms of Sufism” appeared in the strongest terms. The extreme exclusivist version of Islam also meant undermining local and popular Islam and subjugating it to their acclaimed pure Islam, which the local practices have polluted. The derivation of Ahl-e-Hadith pristine Islam was premised not on the jurisprudential knowledge codified in the medieval fiqh but the Foundational sources (Metcalf 2002: 264-347). For their authoritative attitude and exclusivist interpretation denouncing not only the four major jurisprudential schools but also the local saints and mystics, their opponents labelled Ahl-e-Hadith as zabir parast (worshippers of externals). This puritanical elitist discourse of Ahl-e-Hadith, as against the Deobandis and Barelwis, pushed them away from the general masses. They accepted the entire corpus of Hadith literature. Their strict adherence to Hadith as source of Islamic law is reflected in one of these statements explaining the relationship between the Hadith and Qur’an. According to Amritsari, this relationship can be of any three kinds: 1) either harmonious, in which case Hadith is binding; 2) or Hadith is explaining an injunction not found in the Qur’an, in which case it is complementary, or; 3) the Hadith may be contradictory to Qur’an in which case through careful interpretation, the contradiction should be either removed or resolved (Ahmad 1967: 121). Majority of the leadership of Ahl-e-Hadith ulama belonged to well-born families of sayyid—descendants of the Prophet and other socially prominent families. By the end of 19th century, like that of the Deobandis, the ulama of Ahl-e-Hadith gradually organised themselves and initiated their own Madrassas. In 1912, the organisation of All India Ahl-e-Hadith Conference was another landmark in its history of gradual moves from creating mere “religiously responsible individuals” towards addressing social and political concerns (Metcalf 2002: 292-94). Before partition of India, Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith Hind (JAH) represented their political aspirations (Ashar 2004: 452). The Ahl-e-Hadith community is actively engaged in diverse modes of religious activism—madrassas, social activism, jihadi networks and
electoral politics. Most of Ahl-e-Hadith educational and social projects in Pakistan are funded by various sources from within the Saudi Arabia. According to Rahman, the Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas increased from 161 (1988) to 376 (2002). Similarly, between 1988 and 2000, a growth of 93 per cent was recorded in Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas in Pakistan (Rahman 2004: 79-80). The exclusivist attitude of Ahl-e-Hadith ulama towards local customs, saints, shrines and Hanafi School of law was instrumental in the emergence of the Barelwi movement.

The other trajectory within Sunni traditional Islam was the emergence of Barelwi movement that was inspired and cohered by Ahmad Reza Khan Bareilly (1856-1921)—of Bareilly in India hence Barelwi (Rahman 2004: 81-82). According to Metcalf, as against the emergence of Deoband and Ahl-e-Hadith schools that stood for preservation and purification of Islamic beliefs and practices, the Barelwi ulama emerged out of “opposition to the other two groups.” The three Sunni groups—Deoband, Barelwi and Ahl-e-Hadith—“debated a wide range of issues with each other, from theories of jurisprudence to mere polemic” (2002: 264-65). The prominent ulama of this group were “Pathans from the major cities of Bareilly and Baudaun in Rohilkand” (ibid: 297). Their major support essentially came from rural areas. Towards the end of 19th and beginning of 20th centuries, the Barelwi ulama succeeded in founding their own madrassas. The Barelwi School, also equated with Sufi/mystic thought and practice, in more general terms, exercises enormous influence and presence in diverse forms in Pakistani society. It ranges from their own madrassas to shrines to preaching and political activism. Rahman noted that the number of Barelwi madrassas increased from 717 (1988) to 1585 (2002), and there was 90 per cent growth between 1988 and 2000 (Rahman 2004: 79-80).

The intellectual responses, Sir Sayyid’s rationalism and Deoband’s conservatism failed to strike a right balance between oppositions: ‘between local and intruder, between Muslim and European’, and between “present” and the “past”. In Shibli Naumani’s synthetic approach, we find an attempt in this direction.

### 3.5.3 The Shibli Naumani: the quest for middle path

Scholar-theologian, Shibli Naumani (1857-1914) was an erudite writer, thinker and expert in Arabic and Persian. In his approach, he symbolises a syncretism in the sub-continental Islamic tradition. Due to his own in-
tellectual journey, Shibli became an embodiment and producer of moderation between the two extremes (Deoband’s conservatism and Sir Sayyid’s modernism). The term *multiple modernities* can be deployed for Shibli’s vision and efforts—to synchronize the classical Islamic heritage with the modern sciences.

Nadwat-ul-Ulama was established in 1894 with the aim to reform the syllabus, resolve inter-ulama disputes, to reform individuals without entering into politics and to establish an Islamic institution focusing on theoretical as well as applied sciences. Shibli joined Nadwat-ul-Ulama in 1904, which inaugurated a new phase in its life. However, he had to resign from Nadwa in 1913 as a result of ulama’s tough resistance inhibiting his reform efforts (Ikram 2007: 187-188).

Shibli is known for authoring his major work *Seerat-ul-Nabi*. He could complete only two volumes of this book and the project was then completed by his disciple Nadwi (1884-1953). Shibli also taught Arabic and Persian at Sir Sayyed’s Aligarh Muslim University for 16 years. Shibli’s simultaneous appreciation for both Islamic knowledge and modern sciences was greatly shaped by his stay at AMU, his ties with Thomas Arnold and his travel to the Middle East where he also met modernist Mohammad Abduh (Ikram 2007: 221-248).

In his *Biography of the Prophet*, Shibli “critiqued the Western as well as Muslim approaches to the biography writing.” According to Shibli, explains Masud, “the Western scholarship accepted the Muslim sources uncritically as they suited to their perceptions of the Prophet and Islam.” On the other end, “the Muslim biographies of the Prophet did not also apply the standards of historical criticism developed by the scholars of Hadith.” So Shibli’s contribution was that he “explained that early biographies of the Prophet were chronological narratives of his life; they were not concerned with matters of theology” (Masud 2009b: 6; Moaddel 2000: 53-70).

Shibli’s principal contribution was his vision of a mix of the two disciplines together, that is Islamic learning and modern education. “To reorientate the basic concepts of medieval Islamic education and to interpret Islamic history and philosophy in modern terms could introduce an element of dynamism in the entire field of learning.” In order to arrive at this point, Shibli made a “two-pronged attack” on the declining state of Islamic intellectualism. He helped reform and strengthen Nadwat-ul-Ulama, at Lucknow, a model institution for teaching of Arabic and Is-
Islamic studies’, and in the realm of research, he came up with the plan of ‘House of Writers’ (dar-ul-musannefeen). These intellectual, educational and theological currents continued to influence and shape the prevailing religio-political and socio-economic thought and practice in Pakistan in the post-partition era. More relevant for this study is the Shibli’s intellectual tradition in the sub-continent.

Instead of outright rejection of classical Islamic knowledge and modern education, Shibli opted for both. In his vision, revival of the Muslim’s glorious past is dependent on modern as well as medieval Islamic heritage. The two are not mutually exclusive but interdependent. Islamic medieval heritage is not something to omit or discard in the advanced stages of social evolution, as the original modernization theories suggest, but to be retained and upheld, taught and transferred to the next generation along with additions made by modern times. Furthermore, the Shibli school opted for ijtihad rather than upholding the principle of taqleed.

Shibli’s intellectual currents influenced men of scholarly repute like Farahi and Islahi. The school of Farahi called “The School of Reform” (Madrassa-ul-Islah) carried on the hermeneutic principles of Shibli. The Madrassa graduated a number of towering ulama, exegetes and social reformers. Mawlana Hamiduddin Farahi (1863-1930) made an enormous contribution to Islamic exegetical thought by exploring the inherent thematic and structural coherence (nazm) in the Qur’an. Farahi’s disciple Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904-1997) in his great work (Tadabbur-e-Qur’an) and Islahi’s student Javed Ahmad Ghamidi in his al-Bayan, have made substantial additions to the theory of nazm-e-Qur’an propounded by Farahi. According to this theory, the Qur’an is not a collection of disjointed and unconnected verses but a thematically and structurally coherent book called nizam: “… the whole Qur’an is a single discourse with perfect correspondence between and proper arrangement of its parts, from the beginning to the end” (Farahi 2008: 14). The original message of the Qur’an can be delineated by unfolding its inherent thematic coherence.

18 Mawdudi’s first major work al-Jihad fil Islam was also published by this institution in 1930; see at: <http://shibliacademy.blogspot.com/2006/12/dar-ul-musannefeen-shibli-academy.html>

19 Amin Ahsan Islahi’s preface to Collection of Exegetes of Farahi.

20 Tadabbur-e-Qur’an is a nine-volume commentary by Amin Ahsan Islahi.
The hermeneutic approach before exposition of this *nazm* theory dominated, since the medieval times, by interpreting the text of the Qur’an based on tradition. In their exegetical work on the Qur’an, “they show a pronounced preference for authority over rationality and tradition over originality.” Moreover, the earlier exegetical work also lacked ‘textual coherence’ and thus fell prey to a ‘fragmentarian approach’ (ibid: 2-3). Fa-rahi argues that the Qur’anic text reveals ‘univocal meaning’, the delineation of which depends on the degree of expertise in the classical Arabic which is key to understanding the latent meaning of the Qur’an. Once the exegete sets aside his personal biases and attains mastery in the linguistic skills of the Qur’an, it becomes possible to get to the theme of the Qur’an in a holistic manner, and to the central idea of each chapter (*surah*). Based on this approach, Farahi explored nine groups of chapters. Islahi, although upheld the theoretical *nazm* view of his teacher, differed on the number of groups which are seven instead of nine in his view. “Islahi believes that each of the seven surah groups treats all the phases of the Islamic movement as led by Muhammad in Arabia, though emphasis in each groups is on different themes of the movement” (Farahi 2008: 8). Ghamidi takes this discussion further to a post-Islamist turn extending the space to reflect, re-define and re-shape the contemporary Islamist discourse on Islamic penalties, fine arts, democracy, jihad and relations with non-Muslims, and women’s visibility in the public sphere. This discussion appears in the forthcoming chapters.

I conclude this brief note on Shibli with a phrase *Nadviyyat ki Tawsee*’ (the extension of Nadwism) as briefly discussed by Sheikh Muhammad Ikram (2007: 248). Shibli and Nadwa represent an idea and that idea is relevant here because post-Islamists define themselves under their own conscious construct—Dabistan-e-Shibli or the School of Shibli (chapter 5).

### 3.6 Concluding Remarks

The contemporary revivalist movements in Pakistan are embedded in the historical experiences of intellectual and socio-political developments in the pre-partition India. The historical experience of Muslim revivalism in the Indo-Pak sub-continent is unique in having greater diversity from the rest of the Muslim world. The long in time context infuses, says Voll, “dual character” into the intellectual content of Islamic movements: as
new experience, and as “part of a broader historical tradition” (also see Lapidus 1997, 1991: 23).

This chapter shows that diversity and non-linearity explains better Islamic discourse(s) in the Pakistani context. The Islamic societal trajectories and its various interpretations are not monolithic whole but embody in its self a degree of variety and diversity. Secondly, debates and discussions in the contemporary context are not new to Islam but have a long history. Based on secondary sources and through a description of them, I have shown how a variety of intellectual currents and counter-currents existed in pre-divided Indian society in the 18th and 19th centuries. Through a little deliberation, we can identify at least three major trajectories: the Modernist, the Traditionalist and the Shibli. In reality, these trajectories are not exhaustive and the list can be extended. Even in the contemporary Pakistani context, Islamic manifestations also encompass greater diversity. Employing Yavuz’s typology, I have shown that at least two main divisions are possible: society-centred and state-centred Islamic movements. These can be divided further into four categories. I have provided only one Weberian ideal type and further classifications can be obtained. The chapter served another main objective: identification of the broader context. I have explained the external environment set by the ideological spectrum, state policies and opportunity spaces in which the Islamists and post-Islamists are bound to operate. In the discussion that follows, I will describe the genesis of Islamism and post-Islamism in Pakistan.
4 The Genesis and Crisis of Islamism

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is a descriptive analysis of the biography, genesis, proliferation and internal crisis of the Jama’at in Pakistan. The central theme developed in this chapter shows that the Islamist Jama’at in Pakistan is a modern phenomenon and not a traditional response to modernity. Since its inception in 1941, the Jama’at has experienced internal crises, schisms and fissures throughout its history, yet, for various historical and current reasons, it could not develop a post-Islamist trend within its ranks in Pakistan.

Support for the arguments in this chapter come from glimpses of the intellectual biography of Mawdudi, his interpretive approach, his critical reading of the prophetic career, and internalization of opportunity spaces by the Jama’at. I also discuss the perpetual ebb and flow within the Jama’at resulting in secessions and defections of activists, mainly ulama and intellectuals. Seceding intellectuals a growing ideological gap that pushed the Jama’at closer to traditional Islam—mainly Deobandi-Sunni Islam. In his study on the Jama’at politics and its organizational transformation, Moten (2002) has analysed transformation of the Jama’at. In this thesis, the point of departure from Ahmad (2005) and Moten (2002) is that the conceptual transformation as an intellectual discourse has occurred outside the Jama’at by ex-Islamists, and not within it. Along with Moten, this thesis contends that the Jama’at transformation is mainly organizational and not ideological/conceptual.

The present chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the life of Mawdudi, the ideology of the Jama’at and the emergence of an Islamist movement in pre-divided British India. Here I argue that Islamism has been a creative and critical response to the challenges of Western modernity. Section 3 briefly sketches the way Mawdudi’s re-definition of
four key religious concepts, and a political interpretation of the prophetic shaped his political reading of Islam. Through outlining Mawdudi’s interpretative approach, the social basis of his Islamist Jama’at, his openness to accommodate modern ideas and technological developments, and main contours of the Jama’at election manifesto and political practice, I argue that Islamism is a modern response not meant to take Pakistan back into the middle ages. Two sources, the quantitative description of issues and trends in the Jama’at politics and ethnographic outline of a village in north-west Pakistan enhance the content pertaining to Jama’at.

It is important to note, this thesis does not assume Islamism is reducible to Mawdudi. As a concept, Islamism includes but exceeds the bounds of the contributions of Mawdudi.

4.2 Intellectual Biography of Mawdudi and Emergence of the Jama’at

This section provides a synoptic view of Mawdudi’s intellectual biography and his turn to formation of the Jama’at in pre-partition India.

4.2.1 Mawdudi’s biography and intellectual development

Mawlana Sayyid Abul Aala Mawdudi was born on 25 September 1903 to an elitist Sayyid/Sadaat family—descendants of the Prophet’s family—in Awrangabad (Deccan) India. (Shahpuri 1989a: 183) His father Sayyid Ahmad Hassan (b.1855) was a lawyer by profession, and his mother Ruqiyah Begum was the daughter of Mirza Qurban Ali Salik—a student of renowned Indian poet Mirza Ghalib. Mawdudi’s maternal family also belonged to a noble tradition of Turkish origin who served in prestigious positions in Delhi and Hyderabad. Mawdudi was the youngest of three ones. He proudly traced his lineage to the Sufi order of Khwaja Qutbuddin Chishti. His ancestors migrated from Hirat Afghanistan in the late 15th or early 16th century and settled in Delhi (Azmi 2002). Mawdudi got his name after one of the pious ancestors and Sufi in his lineage, Hazrat Abul A’ala Mawdud Chishti (Ahmad 2005; Nasr 1996).

Modernist Indian reformer, Sir Sayyid was (Ahmad Hassan’s) maternal uncle. Because of the family ties, Hassan enrolled at Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh (Shahpuri 1989a: 184; Nasr 1996: 10), but had to abandon school before completing his studies. The charge made against him stated that he was seen playing cricket wearing “infidel’s” dress at Sir
Sayyid’s school (Shahpuri 1989a: 185). Later, Ahmad Hassan graduated with a degree in law from Allahabad University and began his practice in Awrangabad. Initially, he was inspired by “alien ideas” and the British lifestyle and showed little tendency towards religion (ibid). Soon worldly pursuits overwhelmed him and in 1904, he moved to live by the tomb of Hazrat Nizamuddin in Delhi. Upon his brother’s intervention, Ahmad Hassan moved again and resumed his legal profession but his income from the profession dropped due to taking up genuine cases not based on deceit. In 1915 he moved to Hyderabad and then to Bhopal. He died in Bhopal in 1920. Mawdudi’s autobiography acknowledges his father’s enormous influence on his character and personality “especially in his idealism, piety, and humility” (Nasr 1996: 11).

Until the age of nine, Mawdudi received early education in a traditional manner under private tutors at his own home. He learned three languages, Persian, Urdu and Arabic as well as read some basic books on fiqh (jurisprudence) and logic. According to Mawdudi, his father’s stories of great personalities in Islamic history inculcated in him the seeds of love for religion (1989: 30). Mawdudi’s family paid special attention to him and his brothers in learning and preserving pure Urdu by monitoring their interaction with other children in Deccan. Consequently, Mawdudi claims to have not acquired even a single local pronunciation. Indian scholar Altaf Azmi (2002: 26-27) commented on Mawdudi that “extremism” was a hereditary problem for him, presenting his father’s switching between legal profession and ascetic retirement as evidence. Others examined aspects of the life and thought of the latter in light of his psychological analysis of his childhood (ibid: 23).

Mawdudi then enrolled at a high school at Awrangabad where he studied natural sciences. Here for the first time Mawdudi was exposed to modern sciences. At the age of 11, Mawdudi finished his matriculation (maulvi) and went to college (dar ul uloom) run by Mawlana Hamiduddin Farahi.21 His fathers’ sudden death prevented Mawdudi from completing his formal education beyond grade 10 but he relied on self-reading. At the age of 14, he translated Egyptian modernist, Qasim Amin’s book

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21 Mawlana Farahi was the teacher-mentor of Mawlana Islahi who was the teacher of Ghamidi. Mawlana Islahi was also close friend of Mawdudi and resigned from the Jama’at in 1958.
Modern Women (al-imra al-jadidah) into Urdu, which shows his great literary skills.\(^\text{22}\) (Nasr 1996: 13).

Mawdudi began his literary career as a journalist in 1918. In Mawdudi’s public career, this phase was the “era of journalism” (Shahpuri 1989a: 190). In this period, he worked for a number of newspapers and magazines such as weekly Taj, weekly Muslim (1921-23), and al-Jamia’ (1925-28). The latter two belonged to the Deoband ulama’s political arm (JUH). He also contributed to magazines like Ma’arif, Nigaar, Makhzan, Hamayoon and Maulvi (Sayyid Abul Aala Mawdudi 1989: 32-35). During his stint as editor al-Jamia’, most of the ulama were unhappy with his clean-shaven face (Shahpuri 1989a: 194). Journalism also compelled him to acquire skills in English. First under a private tutor and then through self-reading, Mawdudi gained enough competence in English to read books in history, philosophy, politics, economics, religion and sociology (ibid: 33). During 1921, he took time to read books in Arabic literature, Qur’anic exegesis, Hadith, fiqh, logic and philosophy under private tutors (ibid: 35).\(^\text{23}\) It was a period of great political turmoil for Muslims in India. Political and social excitement against the British colonial rule was growing. Mawdudi participated in the Caliphate/Khilafat movement to safeguard the last institution representing the global Ummah. According to Mawdudi, natural inclinations, family traditions and the impact of the “prevailing conditions” filled him with hate against the alien (Farangi), British domination. He was thus ready to join any such movement launched for independence of India (Mawdudi 1989: 32). During this period, Mawdudi grew in self-confidence and realized his untapped potential for undertaking great assignments and responsibilities (ibid: 34).

In 1925, communal violence followed the Khilafat movement. In a violent response to the Hindu Shuddhi movement, a Muslim killed the founder of the movement, Swami Shardhanand. Thus, the violent behaviour of Muslims was blamed on Islamic teachings and Qur’anic verses (Mawdudi 1996: 15-18). According to Mawdudi, during this period he was inspired by one of Mawlana Muhammad Ali’s sermons (renowned

\(^\text{22}\) Mawdudi says that initially he was inspired by the style and lucidity of this book but later his ideas changed and as atonement he wrote Purdah (Veiling), see in Shahpuri’s tareekh., p.189.

\(^\text{23}\) Names of traditional ulama who taught Mawdudi various Islamic books, from time to time, can be seen in Shahpuri’s tareekh., pp.198-99.
leader in the Khilafat movement), wherein the Mawlana expressed the desire for writing a book on jihad to allay doubts about the nature of jihad in Islam. Mawdudi responded to this call by writing his first major work *The Jihad in Islam (al-jihad fil-Islam)*. In the preface to this important book, he addresses European allegations that Islam spread through the power of the sword (ibid). He refuted the accusation by elucidating the fact that Islam spread through preaching only. Even if the sword dominated Islam, it re-conquered souls by preaching (Shahpuri 1989a: 196). In this book, Mawdudi rationalised the concept of jihad in Islam, its juridical principles and rules. He divided armed jihad into two main categories: defensive and reformist. Mawdudi also compared the concept of war in Islam with those of other civilizations such as Hinduism, Christianity and Judaism. He explained and embedded the notion of jihad in the “context of the laws of war and peace to which the British adhered” (Nasr 1996: 23).

Mawdudi reportedly said that he transformed from “nationalistic feelings” to religious revivalism during writing of *al-Jihad-fil-Islam* (Buhtah 1989: 252-253). This internal transformation caused him to quit his career in journalism in favour of working towards the Islamic revival. The book received commendations from the Indian poet, Muhammad Iqbal, Mawlana Ali of the Khilafat movement, Suleiman Nadwi of Nadwat-ul-Ulama and Mawlana Said of the JUH. The book is also having an enduring impact on Islamic political activists and militant Islamists worldwide.

The period 1919-1928 influenced Mawdudi’s thought and future course of action considerably. The advent of a number of episodes (breakdown of the Ottoman Caliphate, Shuddhi movement, communal violence and Indian politics) and Muslim’s helplessness pushed him to take appropriate actions. According to C. J. Adams, “by 1925, however, his thinking had begun to take a new turn” (Adams 1966: 373). Gradually, the end of the 1920s saw him lose interest in journalism and take up political pursuits (Shahpuri 1989a: 205). The transformative phase beginning with internal consciousness during the writing of *al-jihad fil-Islam* led him into deeper contemplation on other changing issues. For example, the rulers of Afghanistan, Turkey and Iran were seeking to impose a particular foreign dress to appear compatible with progress and development. The modernist classes in pre-divided India also appreciated these state-led cultural innovations. Mawdudi responded to this issue by writing an essay “Question of Dress” (*libaas ka masala*) published in 1929. He
developed a rational argument through his analysis of the social, economic, geographical, moral and cultural factors that determine a particular style and form of dress and clothing. The Shar’ia argument is introduced only later in the essay when cultural borrowing (dress in this case) through artificial means and state policies is discarded (see for details Mawdudi 2000d: 281-97). Mawdudi’s second well-read booklet Towards Understanding Islam (Deeniyat) appeared in 1930. Translated into many languages and taught in schools in different countries, this and other such writings secured his role as a persuasive writer. In March 1932, Mawdudi started his popular journal, Tarjuman-ul-Qur’an, form Hyderabad, which received rapid widespread attention (Shahpuri 1989a: 212).

Well-researched studies have established that Mawdudi was exposed to Marxist ideas, intellectuals and forums (Ahmad 2005; Nasr 1996). He began his career when the revolutionary ideas of Marx and Lenin were in discussion in the literary and poetic circles in colonial India (Ahmad 2005). According to Nasr and Ahmad, at least three sources confirm the impact of Marxism on Mawdudi. A forum of progressive writers named All India Progressive Writers Association formed with the aim of achieving an equal society free of exploitation (ibid: 55). In addition, the more direct impact on Mawdudi came from his in-laws of whom one member was an active communist (ibid: 56). Finally, two other famous personalities, Sayyid Abdul Latif (a professor of English literature and graduate of University of London) and Josh Malihabadi (a renowned Marxist poet) had close connections with Mawdudi. Mawdudi, his elder brother and Josh, lived together for six to seven years in one apartment (see about Josh’s autobiography in Ahmad 2005: 56). The fact that Mawdudi was exposed to Western ideas and intellectual trends becomes more evident when one notes that he employs Western theories and arguments in all of his major works including his six-volume commentary on the Qur’an (Tafheem-ul-Qur’an). For instance, in support of his claim that leadership shifts in the hands of nations that provided intellectual leadership, Mawdudi referred to a number of 17th, 18th and 19th century Western intellectuals.

Mawdudi himself identifies four stages in his intellectual development that is the subject of the next section.
4.2.2 Four stages in evolution of Mawdudi’s thoughts and turn to Islamism

In his famous speech at Machchi Goth, Mawdudi himself categorized four stages in the evolution of his revivalist thought and movement.

In the first phase (1928-1937), Mawdudi continued his struggle under tough financial constraints and limited resources. He referred to three of his popular works[^24] that employ three main components of his message: 1) Muslim is primarily the name of a global community whose duty is to overthrow the “un-Godly” system with a divine order; 2) Islamic way of life is a comprehensive system encompassing all aspects of human life, and 3) Only on the basis of beliefs and rituals, Islamic system cannot flourish under an infidel system of life. In this way, he diagnoses the real causes of the disruption (bigaar) in Muslim societies (Mawdudi 1997: 58-59). The literature produced during this phase relates primarily to issues such as the basics of Islamic civilization, Islamic beliefs, Islamic nationalism, riba and veiling. Mawdudi dubbed his works of that era “medication/treatment/prescription” (dava). He diagnosed that certain “patients” (mareez) should be properly medicated:

If, the “patient” is suffering from “atheism” then treat him with “The Basis of Islamic Civilization” (Islami tehzeeb aur us kay usool wa mabadee); if he/she suffers from “nationalism” (watan parastee), give him doses of “Islamic nationalism” (qawmiyyat-e-Islam); if “communism” has affected someone then treat him with “interest” (sood); during the ailment of “feminism”, use “veiling (pardah), and in the diseases of Farangiyyat, apply various doses of Ishaarat (quoted in Shahpuri 1989a: 244).

In the second phase (1937-38), Mawdudi identified the growing Indian nationalism as the most daunting challenge threatening the very identity of Muslims in colonial India. To him the identity of Muslims was rooted in Islamic civilization and not a specific race or creed. In this regard, he devoted three works to impel/belie the idea of nationalism. These were two volumes of “Muslims and the Contemporary Political Struggle” (Musalman awr Manjooda Siyasi Kasbkehes) and “The Question of Nationalism” (Masala-e-Qawmiyat) (1997: 59-61). He declared Indian nationalism an infidelity (kaaferana). He claimed that replacement of the British colonial infidel system with infidelity of Indian nationalism was

[^24]: These were: al-Jihad fil-Islam; Islami tehzeeb aur us kay usool wa mabadee; and Tanqeebat.
not a pious/noble deed. Furthermore, Mawdudi likened the “secular democratic national state” to an “a-religious democratic national state” and warned Muslims against its effects. He aggressively tried to communicate the message that religion obliges Muslims to establish political dominance and true ones should not shy away from even laying their lives down for the cause (ibid: 63). Mawdudi and the Islamists equated secularism with a “god-less” and “a-religious” system and popularised this meaning of secularism in the masses (Masud 2005: 367, 370).

The third phase (1939-41) culminated in the formation of the Jama’at-e-Islami in pre-partition India in 1941. According to Mawdudi, during this phase the alternative way in the form of a new revivalist movement, the Jama’at, was clearly shown to the public. Mawdudi situated his alternative vision within the dominant political discourses prevalent in pre-divided Indian politics prior to the formation of the Jama’at in 1941. In Mawdudi’s narration, he shunned the ideologies of composite Indian nationalism (All India National Congress and JUH) and the Muslim nationalism of Pakistan Muslim League with clarification of: 1) The fundamental features of an Islamic government (Islami Hakoomat); 2) What is meant by an Islamic civilization; how is it different from other civilizations; what is the importance of an Islamic system in the revival of Islamic civilization, and 3) What type of movement is required for the revival of this civilization; or why the existing movements may not become the source of this revival (ibid: 64-66).

In the analysis of the fourth phase (1941-1947), Mawdudi not only describes the what and how, but also explains the background conditions necessitating the why of changing his strategy from social reform to active politics (ibid). In his analysis of what happened between the formation of the Jama’at in 1941 and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Mawdudi shows his readiness to accommodate “Pakistan”. That is a state, which came into being based on two-nation theory/Muslim nationalism, and as a result of the political struggle of the Muslim League that Mawdudi had earlier despised as infidelity and ignorance (Jahiliyya). In Mawdudi’s view, partition had now created new opportunities for the Jama’at and now it should take full advantage of these.

With the partition of colonial India between two independent states, Pakistan and India, in 1947, the Jama’at-e-Islami also split along national lines. In practical terms, this was “nationalization of Islamism.” Olivier Roy commented on the triumph of pragmatism over “ideological com-
mitments” (2004: 62-67). Roy brackets Pakistan with Saudi Arabia where “Islamo-nationalism seems to have been superseded by radical Islamic transnationalism.” The main reason for this is the weak notion of “nation” in Pakistan, which is a constructed identity. The creation of Pakistan was more the birth of a concept than a nation. Mawdudi and the Jama’at pragmatically put up with a “concept” they had once opposed. Although, the Jama’at leaders and activists still read and disseminate Mawdudi’s ideas on an imaginary Islamic transnationalism enshrined in his works like Question of Nationalism (masala-e-qawmiyyat); in reality, the Jama’at has made itself amenable to the body politic of Pakistani state, and the demands of electoral politics.

The thesis has summarized Mawdudi’s intellectual development and his gradual move towards forming a revivalist Islamic party. After explaining the background conditions in which Islamism emerged, comes a brief description of the emergence and evolution of the Jama’at in Pakistan.

### 4.2.3 Emergence of the Jama’at

Poet, thinker and Islamic Modernist Muhammad Iqbal was concerned about reconstruction of the religious thought along the lines that respond and negotiate modern challenges. His famous lecture Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam was a “quest for a framework to understand modernity from Islamic perspective” (Masud 2007: 1). Iqbal envisioned establishment of a model Dar-ul-Uloom in Punjab to “lay the foundation for a new Islamic worldview, which would in turn facilitate the creation of a Muslim national homeland.” Iqbal asked Niyaz Ali, a retired civil servant, to look for a suitable person for overseeing this project (Nasr 1996: 34). Niyaz Ali contacted Mawdudi and after some correspondence on the nature of the project, they reached a mutual agreement. (see for details, Mawdudi’s correspondence with Niyaz Ali in Hashmi 1995) Unlike Iqbal’s original motive, which to establish an educational institute, Mawdudi was longing for a revivalist movement. According to Vali Nasr, “the situation in Hyderabad was fragile, and Mawdudi had come to the conclusion that it was not the best possible place for launching an Islamic revival” (1996: 35). Therefore, Niyaz Ali’s proposition was more an attractive alternative for Mawdudi. In March 1938, the latter moved to Pathan Kot, a village in the Punjab province. In their agreement, Niyaz Ali kept all possible precautions to preclude Mawdudi from turning Iq-
bal’s envisioned educational project into a political one. However, soon after Iqbal’s death in April 1938, Mawdudi renamed the project as Dar-ul-Islam aiming at Muslims’ revival in India. As a result, instead of establishing Dar-ul-Uloom, Mawdudi established Dar-al-Islam/House of Islam, which served as launching pad for establishing Jama’at-e-Islami in 1941. Prior to its launch, Mawdudi issued a public appeal through his journal—Tarjuman-al-Qur’an—for membership of the Jama’at. Some 75 persons responded to Mawdudi’s revivalist call. (Shahpuri 1989b: 33-38)

Of all the Islamic political parties in Pakistan, the Jama’at has received disproportionately high academic attention for a number of reasons. The Jama’at founder and ideologue, Mawdudi, became the propopent figure for all the Islamist movements across the globe. His consummate writings on Islamic state, Islamic economy, Islamic social fabrics, gender, jihad and exegesis of the Qur’an became popular all over the world. These writings have been translated into more than 28 languages. Mawdudi became the trendsetter for the transnational Islamist movements. He introduced a number of new terms and concepts, which influenced Islamic political discourse and practice, not only in Pakistan but also across the globe. Mawdudi’s outreach through his well-organized network of activists made it possible to make 20th century an era in terms of Islamist revivialist thought in which “we lived in the age of Mawdudi.” The Jama’at became the first Islamic political party in Pakistan to accept membership from all sectarian denominations—Deobandi, Bareli, Ahl-e-Hadith and Shi’a. The Jama’at organized and mobilized urban, modern educated middle classes, educated professionals into the realm of politics, education and welfare services. The Jama’at was on the forefront of opposition to the dictatorial regime of General Ayub Khan in the 1960s, suffered Z.A. Bhutto’s repression in the 1970s and, wholeheartedly supported and legitimated the military dictatorships of General Zia-ul-Haq (80s) and General Musharraf at the first decade of 21st century.

The Jama’at also supported the Islamisation drive in the 1980s and actively participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet Russia. After restoration of civilian in 1988 to 1999, the Jama’at moved to restore its lost credibility due to the marriage of convenience with the dictatorial regime of General Zia, and strike an abiding equilibrium among competing demands of its workers, the military fraternity and the public. The Jama’at is regarded as the most well-disciplined and organized of all po-
itical parties in Pakistan. It has been patronizing an active students’ wing Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba Pakistan (IJT) on the college campuses, labor unions in the railways and numerous other professional associations. The Jama’at adopted internal democracy by electing its central amir and other key position holders at district levels, a feature rare even in the self-proclaimed progressive parties such as the Bhutto’s PPP. Although, the Jama’at recommends and stresses democratic ways as the only permissible means for change, it supported and operated its own militant wings in Kashmir and Afghanistan. However, in domestic politics, the Jama’at has resorted mostly to elections and mass protests. It enjoys vibrant street power and mobilization potential in Pakistan.

4.3 Master Ideological Framework

4.3.1 Revivalist epistemology and the question of authority

Mawdudi’s treatment of the sources of Islamic law was also different from the traditionalist approach, although he never left the traditional framework (2000b: 268-307; Ahmad 1967: 39-54). He recognised four sources of Islamic law: Qur’an, Sunnah, the practice of the guided Caliphs (ta’amul) and decisions/opinions of the jurist-consults (2000b: 282). To Mawdudi, this order characterizes Islamic Ummah. The ulama, argues Mawdudi, reversed this order and thus rendered Islam immutable and immobile (1939: 182). The process of reform entails reactivation of this stated order again (ibid: 187), which gives primacy to Qur’an and Sunnah over other sources.

In Mawdudi’s view, the primary source of Islamic law is the Qur’an. It is a Divine message, which revealed to guide the people and explained by the Prophet who actually is an embodiment of all abiding guidelines of the Qur’an. According to Kirmani and Muhsin, the Qur’an for Mawdudi was the “book of God”, “book of modern knowledge”, “book of truth (haq)” and the “book of action (amal)” (1988: 29-40). The conceptualisation of the Qur’an as a book of modern knowledge meant for Mawdudi: 1) it is a catalyst in raising man’s rational understanding; 2) for articulation of its point, it employs the rational sources of knowledge, and 3) all rationally verifiable Qur’anic claims have come true over time (ibid: 33). Mawdudi’s classification of the sources of knowledge is mainly twofold—revealed (wahi) and rational (’aqli). The former includes revelation and theosophical experience (ilham); the latter consists of: 1) lives of the
prophets; 2) direct observations; 3) sense perception, reasoning and inferences; 4) the Divine signs in the universe, and 5) the historical evidence (ibid: 18-30).

According to Mawdudi, the Prophet not only reveals the message but also implements it (1939: 187). The Qur’an is the “latest edition” of all the revealed books. It is a guide for individuals as well as societies. The messenger had no authority to influence the text or meaning of the revelation. He only explained the revealed message to the public and enforced a system of life in light of these revealed principles. The Qur’an in our times is the same scripture that was revealed to Muhammad. Extraordinary arrangements were made for its preservation and generational transmission. The language of the Qur’an, Arabic, which is a living language and all sources to determine the meaning of its vocabulary are available (1997a: 227-36).

Qur’an to Mawdudi is also the fundamental source of the concept of Islamic state. The belief in the authenticity and authority of the Qur’an and the Prophetic gift and message of Muhammad is not a theological question alone but also one of identity and difference. To him, no colour, race or territory but this belief in Qur’an defines Islamic nationalism (ibid: 235).

It appears from Mawdudi’s writings that the Qur’an is not only a book of guidance to him but also a source of confidence and academic excellence. Under the title, My Benefactor Book (Meri Muhsen Kitab), Mawdudi expresses his superiority over Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx and other Western philosophers after he undertook deep contemplation of the Qur’an. In the form of the Qur’an, he found a ‘Master Key’ (shah kaleed) that resolved all complicated issues that came before him (Mawdudi 1997b: 15).

In Mawdudi’s view, Sunnah is the second authentic source of Islamic law. The duty of the Messenger was not only to deliver the information but the Messenger had to lead a movement; establish a Muslim society and perform a number of Divinely assigned functions such as dissemination and explanation of the Qur’an and Shar’ia. He demonstrated himself as the role model for moral excellence, arbitration, law giving and as ruler. None of these functions can be detached from his prophetic function (Mawdudi 200d: 15, 1970). In Mawdudi’s view, Sunnah can be derived from the historical continuity of Muslim Ummah, which is their
perpetual practice (amali tawatur) and the authentic collection of the prophetic sayings (ahadith) (ibid).

A number of scholars have argued that the Islamists’ interpretation “is not a retreat into traditional interpretations but an innovative and original reworking of canonical texts” (e.g. see in Sayyid 1997: 11). To address this issue, one should distinguish between Mawdudi’s hermeneutical approach and his epistemology. In the former, as art and science of interpretation, Mawdudi stood more for independent reasoning and ijtihad than taqlid; in the latter, he fell back on traditionalism.

Despite his liberal gesture and enthusiasm for renewing ijtihad, Mawdudi could not decisively break away from the traditional framework. This return to the traditional framework restricted and reduced the Islamists’ overall ability, capacity and potential for reform and thus limited their scope as agents of radical change in Pakistan (Nasr 1996: 107). In my own analysis, apart from outlining broader features of an Islamic state and the legislative process in it, Mawdudi failed to concretize his vision on the status of Hadith after modernist scholars specifically the G.A. Perwez School, raised numerous issues (Mawdudi 1970). Despite his yearning for critical reasoning and his stiff criticism of traditional ulama for their adherence to blind imitation, Mawdudi recounted the same conditions for legislators to do ijtihad: faith in Divine Shar’ia and knowledge of its revealed sources; acquaintance with the works of earlier scholars and issues of modern day times; and good moral conduct (Mawdudi 2000e: 11-13, 30). Commenting on these requirements for doing ijtihad, Nasr argues, “… these requirements have limited the extent of the Jama’at’s break with the traditional perspective” (1996: 107). However, Mawdudi rationalised these requirements by arguing that if the right to interpret the law text written in English may not be given to a person ignorant of English, then how can the same (right to interpretation) be granted to a person not skilled in Arabic (the language of the canonical text) (ibid: 30-31).

Mawdudi’s challenge to the traditional religious authority (ulama and pirs) took many forms. In his writings, he aggressively criticised the static approach and role of ulama and pirs in society. However, he struck a

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25 GA Perwez and his school rejected the authenticity of Hadith as a valid source of Islamic law. A scholar Dr Abdul Wadood subscribing to this school had correspondence with Mawdudi. See for all correspondence Mawdudi’s Sunnat ke Aay-imi Haithiyat.
fierce blow to the traditional authority through his lucid style/method and “simple language avoiding scholastic terminology and style” (Nasr 1996: 133). Modern educated public could now understand religious text and theological debates, once the prerogative of traditional ulama. Thus, the intellectual monopoly and hegemony of one class was severely threatened. According to Nasr,

Mawdudi’s significance does not lie in his scholarly contributions per se, but in creating an intellectual medium—in the form of a large number of texts—wherein modern socio-political themes could be discussed and addressed in an Islamic context (ibid).

Mawdudi’s exegetic approach is different from traditionalists, literalist-legalist and modernists. In interpreting Qur’anic text, he makes use of all traditional sources (Arabic language and grammar, Hadith literature, life of the Prophet, historical evidences and biblical scriptures) yet he extracts the final meaning in the light of his own rational understanding. He has been thoroughly critical of the Modernist/rationalist approach and of those who denied the authenticity of the Hadith as a reliable source of Islamic law (Mawdudi 1970: 16). Equally, he criticised scholarship with theosophical insights and uncritical approach of the traditional ulama. One could argue that Mawdudi stands within the traditional framework unless it is not in clash with his political ideology and revivalist worldview (Iftikhar 2005: 13). By selective undertakings from both (traditionalists and modernists) Mawdudi created an “apparently liberal-traditionalist gesture” (Ahmad 1967: 216-17). Such an impression created space for him to soothe traditional ulama on the one hand, and attract the attention of the modern educated classes on the other. In his correspondence with a modernist scholar, Mawdudi has clearly assumed the position of a traditionalist and seems to be constantly defending the traditionalist framework (Mawdudi 1970). Sociologically, such an approach has definitely expanded the opportunity for Islamists to be categorised with the traditionalist school against the modernist one.

Although in interpreting doctrinal text, Mawdudi permits disagreement (ikhtilaf) but draws a sharp contrast between two different types: 1) disagreement in interpretations based on solid and sincere research. However, the condition is that the researcher should remain intact within the religion, and 2) and disagreement that begins with prejudice and ends with sectarianism and conflict. Whereas, Qur’an condemns the latter, it encourages the former (Mawdudi 1998: 38).
Qur’an for Mawdudi is not merely static scripture indifferent to its surroundings. It is a book of movement and dawah, which mobilised a pious and reserved person (Muhammad) immediately after its revelation, and organised him and his fellows against the unjust system (ibid: 33-4). Mawdudi accommodates his political worldview while interpreting the Qur’an although it may not be visible all the time. His political reading of the prophetic career and formulation of political ideology is discussed shortly.

4.3.2 Response to positivists and modernists

By showing commitment to exercise his own legal deduction in understanding scriptural injunctions, Mawdudi deviated from ulama who insist on strict adherence to the established juridical schools. This approach of Mawdudi pushes him closer to Islamic modernists. One of the earliest writers on Mawdudi’s ideology, Adams noted at least three points of intersection between Mawdudi and the modernists: 1) in viewing that Islam not only encourages but also commands use of reason in unfolding the meaning of God’s revelations; 2) in the belief that nothing in the content of Islam is contrary to reason, and 3) the adherence to the belief in rational terms that the system outlined in the revealed sources is superior to other systems (Adams 1966: 386-87; also see Nasr 1996). Despite these convergences between Mawdudi and the modernists, Adams asks what it means for both. While in the latter’s conviction it means, “Islam is truly reasonable”; the former considers that “true reason is Islamic.” This boils down Mawdudi’s reliance on reason to an “instrumental function: it can decide which is the better of two things being compared, but it cannot independently establish the truth” (ibid: 387).

The main characteristic of positivism is the idea that science forms the only convincing basis of knowledge. Logically, the only way to progress and develop is the scientific path “to guide human conduct and society” (Yavuz 2003: 158). In the aftermath of the 1857 failed uprisings, Sir Sayyid attempted to explain Islamic beliefs and practices in light of scientific discoveries and rationalist discourses. His social reform strategy took practical form in Aligarh University. In his analysis, 18th century Europe witnessed the prevalence and triumph of science over religion. Old theories in the realm of economics, politics and morality were replaced by new approaches with manifest theophobic leanings (Mawdudi 1939: 27). These intellectual transformations within Europe inaugurated
the genesis of a new civilisation expelling religion from its purview. They created new equations: God-worshipping equated with superstition and naturalism with enlightenment (roshan khyali or roshan fikri). Mawdudi specifically identified the role played by Darwin’s *The Origins of Species* (1859) in stirring up naturalism and atheism to its highest peak. Mawdudi observed that, in recognition to his contributions, “Darwin was buried in the Westminster Abbey despite the fact that he was the proponent of digging the grave for religion in Europe.” Socially, says Mawdudi, discussions on science-related issues in Europe turned into a social trend even if the discussant never experienced academic science study (1939: 28).

For Mawdudi it is an issue of vital concern that the new generation, reared in the worldview of science and rationalism, has reduced Islam to a marker of identity and ancestral heritage only (2002: 207-21). They enrolled in modern schools and colleges that indoctrinated their minds with Western civilisation. The acquired rationalism was not their own, but borrowed from the West. Equipped with critical tools also acquired from them, the West in itself became a normative standard for criticising their own culture (ibid). Their discourse on religion reflects “loose-thinking” shaped by their incorrect premises, illogical thought ordering and inability to draw the right conclusions. For Mawdudi, this attitude towards religion is academically biased and methodologically incorrect because they will talk on other subjects with extreme caution. Their discussion on religion reflects “shallowness of mind” and “paucity of proper knowledge”. Religion as a subject is approached with an “irrational rationalism”. When Muslims pose such criticism, it blurs the boundaries between their Muslim-ness and non-Muslim-ness implying that a person can be a Muslim and non-Muslim simultaneously (ibid). Thus, Mawdudi calls into question not only the rationality of their arguments but also their identity. If they are believers in Qur’an as final authority, then they (should) automatically stop criticising their religion (ibid).

Mawdudi also addressed the concern prevalent among some classes, who questioned the modern relevance of Islam by arguing that Islam is a religion of the past and that it may not be revivable as an ideological and socio-political movement. Mawdudi put forward the power of ijtihad as befitting reply to their misgivings (1996b: 27). Dynamism in Islam and its mutability, argues Mawdudi, is injected through the unabated principle and practice of ijtihad. The universe and its laws are immutable and variation in time and space is immaterial in that connection. The disagree-
ment and variation might crop up in the application of these principles (ibid).

4.3.3 Mawdudi, modernisation and encounter with the western civilisation

The 19th century, said Mawdudi, witnessed the onslaught of Western civilisation subjugating Muslim’s brain and brawn across the globe. Mawdudi argued that although Muslims by appearance, the new generations have been flooded by Western ideas and ideals. Only an Islamic renaissance that entails a body of new scholarship can overcome this indoctrination. The intellectual resource of the old and traditional scholarship is unable to keep pace. For him, “in the realm of knowledge and action, only that scholarship can lead which takes us along in the forward direction and not in the backward” (Mawdudi 1939: 20).

In connection to borrowings from the West, Mawdudi criticised ulama, mourned their inability to foresee the needs of a fast changing society and to learn from the modern experiences of the West. In his view, it was the responsibility of the ulama, who had woken up, have visited Western countries, have got awareness of the values and principles of an emerging civilisation, activated their power of Ijtihad, derived the intellectual and practical basis of European development, and have inserted Western tools (in the light of Islamic principles) in the educational system and cultural life of Muslims, in a way that might had re-activated Islam’s muffled vehicle in motion at a temporal pace (1939: 41).

Clearly, Mawdudi reflected on the process of modernisation in light of Islam. In Mawdudi’s thought and Islamists discourse, we see disillusionment with the “Western forms of modern ideas” and a consistent zest to create an Islamic worldview of modernity (see e.g. Voll 1991: 23-24). Concisely, whereas modernists attempt to modernise Islam, Mawdudi stands for Islamisation of modernity (Nasr 1996).

Scholars have commented on Islamists’ selective accommodation of Western modernity. According to one critic of the Islamist project, “they [Islamists] are modern in that they approve the adoption of alien instruments of science and technology in order to fight the West with its own weapons, but they rebuke the cultural value system, defined here as cultural modernity” (Tibi 2009: 75). One may infer from a number of writings by Mawdudi that his advice to borrow from the West was not re-
stricted to technological tools and instruments only but also involved values and ideas (ibid: 50-51). However, his accommodation is creative and critical, and in my view is best explained by notions of “Islamic modernity” and “multiple modernities” (see e.g. Göle 2000, Jamal 2005). In his recent works, Bassam Tibi refuted this notion of Islamic modernity in the strongest possible terms by saying that this is an “Islamic illusion of semi-modernity” (2009: 74).

After discarding both responses (Sir Sayyid’s modernism and Deoband’s conservatism), Mawdudi yearns for a new approach exemplifying it with the metaphor of a ship,

This is time that Muslims should get off from the old ship (conservatism) and the chartered one (modernism). They should manufacture a ship of their “own” equipped with latest instruments, and make it competitive with other high speed ships. However, the design of the ship should strictly resemble an “Islamic ship”, and its “engineers”, “captains” and “sailors” must know the traditions (rasam) of and road (raah) to Kaaba (1939: 172).

In Mawdudi’s view, Sir Sayyid’s was a temporary solution to the predicament of Muslims in the aftermath of 1857. It created “anglo-Muhammadan” and “anglo-Indians” where the proportion of “Indian” and “Muhammadan” was negligible. To Mawdudi, “new Muslims” were required who can accommodate old and new with obvious and unquestionable authority of Islam as the only way of life (ibid).

In comparison to Western civilisation, Mawdudi reverted to the idea of two Islams: the one that is “complete”, “true”, “self-contained”, and superior to the West but practically non-existent in the lives of contemporary Muslims, and, the other Islam that is polluted in belief and practice as lived by Muslims. In the current context, Mawdudi thinks; the nature of competition is not that “Islam” and the West are in comparison, but in reality, “an upset, mournful, static and backward Muslim civilisation is in encounter with a civilisation [West] fuelled by quest, movement, activity, and knowledge” (Mawdudi 1939: 40). In his view, Islamic civilisation is on the course of continuous recession and retreat. He considered contemporary Muslims empty of “Islamic character”, “Islamic morality”, “Islamic ideas” and “Islamic spirit” (ibid: 40). The true Islamic spirit is missing from the mosques, madrassas and Sufi-lodges (khanqah). In his conviction, he tried to re-fill this spiritual space by reinvigorating his “true envisioned Islam”. In his earlier writings published in *Tarjuman,
Mawdudi seeks to bring “true Islam” back into the lives of Muslims. Here, it seems appropriate to recast Tibi’s notion of “real Islam”. For Tibi, “real Islam has always been a product of history and humans are involved in creating it.” Muslims always create their own Islam and by implication, what they create is not Divinely ordained (2009: 40).

Mawdudi has also expounded the science of domination and subjugation of nations. According to him, there appears to be two kinds of domination and hegemony: 1) moral and intellectual, and 2) political and material. Intellectual and political subjugation of a nation is a mirror image of the intellectual-political domination of the other nation (1939: 6). These two categories seem distinct yet there is a causal link between them: “This is natural law that a nation that thrives on reason and investigation, and advances in the realm of research and exploration also credits to its name both intellectual progress and material prosperity” (ibid: 6-7). To Mawdudi, contemporary Muslims suffer from dual slavery, intellectual and physical. They think and act according to Western ideas and ideals. Western civilisation is a measuring tool for gauging the truth, measuring the right and wrong and judging morality and civility.

Mawdudi identifies four types of nations that came in close contact with the West: 1) those who did not have a permanent civilisation of their own; 2) those having their own distinct civilisation but could not withstand the cultural invasion of the West; 3) those nations with similar characteristics of civilisation like the West, and 4) the distinct Islamic civilisation. The first three, says Mawdudi, adopted Western civilisation without any conflict or backlash. However, Islamic civilisation has a distinct character that seems in constant clash and conflict with the Western patterns of life, and this tension has detrimental consequences for Muslims’ belief and conduct (ibid: 10). He traces the roots of Western civilisation and its ideology of materialism to the 17th, 18th and 19th century intellectual developments that arose in an environment of conflict between science and reason on the one hand and religion and clergy on the other. Naturalism, positivism and rationalism emerged from the tension created by challenges to fundamental premises of religion and religious outlook (Mawdudi 1939).

In the West, tension developed between the Church and the Enlightenment worldview with clergy the main opposition to scientific thinking. Consequently, Christianity and then all of “religion” itself came in direct conflict with the liberals and naturalists. Mawdudi refers to a
number of Western philosophers and scientists Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Kepler, Galileo, Copernicus and Newton, who tried to explain the workings of the universe in light of the interplay of natural forces as opposed to a theistic explanation (Mawdudi 1939: 14). He also mentions Hume’s “empiricism and skepticism”, Hegel’s “idealism”, and Kant’s “practical wisdom” in this connection. Islam and its civilisation to Mawdudi is the anti-thesis of Western materialism and atheism. These are two boats sailing in the opposite directions. The values, moral ideals and ultimate goals are in consistent clash with each other.

4.4 **Mawdudi’s Political Reading of Islam**

4.4.1 Conceptual basis

For Mawdudi, Islam exceeds the bounds of mere faith and seeks to change social, political and economic order. Invoking “change” of social order as an aim necessitated a hold on power positions and infrastructure of the state. This new conceptualisation entailed: 1) introducing new meanings for key Islamic notions that distinguishes them from traditional understanding; 2) instituting new relationships between concepts underpinning his political programme, and 3) injecting new energy into the organisation of these concepts to equip them for mobilisation of the masses. To understand his state-centric vision and political reading of Islam, the four conceptual bases of Mawdudi’s ideology/worldview *Ilah, Rabb, Ibadah* and *Din* are discussed (Ifitäkhār 2005: 23-4; Nasr 1996: 64).

An understanding of these concepts, says Mawdudi, is important because the central theme of the Qur’an is constructed around them. Over time, the true meaning of these terms narrowed and obscured much of the intent of the Qur’an (2000a: 6-13).

The true essence of *ilah*, argues Mawdudi, is that the attribute of *ilah* (*ilahiyyat*) and authority are inextricably interconnected (ibid: 34). God enjoins an indivisible and all encompassing authority over the universe. If someone registers his claim to power and authority in the political meaning of the term, then it is like a claim to godhood in the metaphysical sense (ibid: 36-7). The second key term is *rabb*, which according to Mawdudi means, to bring up. Citing a number of Qur’anic verses and examples of a number of Prophets, Mawdudi builds his case for sovereignty as the essence of the term. This comprehensive and all-
encompassing notion was divided by earlier nations and the Arab pagans into a variety of connotations that fall into two categories: 1) inclusion of other beings as angels and jinn into the definition of a transcendental authority; and, 2) exclusion of Allah from political authority or including Him but nominally (ibid: 97).

*Ibadah* means humility and readiness to complete surrender in favour of a supreme authority. The word carries meanings of submission, servitude, worship and obedience. *Din* carries four themes in Qur’an according to Mawdudi: dominance on the part of the ultimate authority; servitude and obedience on the part of the one who is submitting; law, rules and regulations; and, reward and retribution meted out on the Day of Judgment (ibid: 44). Qur’an fixed its meaning and used it for a comprehensive “system” constituting: 1) sovereignty and supreme authority; 2) obedience and submission to such authority; 3) the system of thought and practice designed under the influence of this supreme authority, and 4) the reward and punishment meted out by the authority because of loyalty or rebellion against this system. When Qur’an uses the *din* (*al-din*), then it encompasses all of the four ingredients (ibid: 125). This implies that various forms of submissions and servitudes must bow down before the one supreme authority.

Mawdudi proffers a new meaning to these terms. He argues that the comprehensive nature of *din* is unparalleled in meaning by any other term but the contemporary notion of “state”. To summarise, by *din* he refers to a comprehensive system of life in which an individual surrenders his will to an ultimate authority, obeys His rules and regulations, expects reward for his obedience of the system and fears punishment for transgression and disobedience (ibid: 132). Islam is thus the “true *din* (*din-e-haq*) and comprehensive way of life, and the central aim of the Prophetic career was to triumph/establish/enforce it over all other orders/systems (ibid: 132). A more systematic organisation and politicisation of these terms can be seen in Mawdudi’s speech *Process of Islamic Revolution* (1996b: 161-200).

### 4.4.2 Political interpretation of the prophetic career

Mawdudi inaugurated a new understanding of Islam. The cause of seeking new understanding of Islam was his dissatisfaction with the prevalent “lifeless Islam” (*be-rooh Islam*) around him. Islam was primarily a “movement”, Muhammad was a “leader” and the Muslims formed the “party”
to achieve certain goals and principles. With persistent deterioration and loss of this identity, Islam has become synonymous with an ethnic and social category (1996b: 33-4). However, Mawdudi’s vision of Islam was not inherited from earlier generations, but an outcome of deep immersion, critical thinking and profound contemplation,

The Islam I found in my surrounding had least attraction. After developing research and criticism skills, the first thing I did was to unyoke myself from the inherited Islam … I converted to Islam anew … I invite non-Muslims and Muslims to this [newly found] Islam. My effort in this direction is aimed at seeking expansion of the so-called Muslim society. It is an invitation to eradicate injustice and transgression spread all around, to eliminate man’s godhood on earth; and to construct a new world on the lines of the Qur’an wherein, dignity, freedom, equality and justice is secured for all as human beings (1996b: 24-5).

Mawdudi based his revivalist strategy on a political reading of the prophetic career (Mawdudi 1947). According to Mawdudi, God sent all apostles with an obvious mission—to establish Divine order on earth. The leaders of this Islamic movement were the Messengers and Islam was thus a party. For an Islamic revolution in the contemporary world, one should follow their strategy. He thinks that it is unfortunate that we cannot obtain a complete history of these Messengers for lack of data on much of their entire struggle. The prophetic career of Muhammad offers a detailed account of all the stages through which the Islamic movement passed—from initial stages to the establishment of an Islamic order in the city state of Medina (Mawdudi 1996b). It seems that Mawdudi fails to substantiate his point by providing empirical examples from other prophets (see this point in conclusion).

According to Mawdudi, Muhammad encountered Roman and Iranian imperialism in the first stage of his career. The society was laden with exploitation, injustices and moral corruption. The first stage consists of the inauguration of this movement when the prophetic leadership overlooked these partial issues in favour of a “total” and “comprehensive” change. His message touched on the very foundational issue of the system (the refutation of all system/ La and the affirmation of Divine rule on earth/ Illa Allah). In this period, the leader, Muhammad, demonstrated Islamic ideals through his moral excellence and personal character. Slowly and gradually, kind-hearted individuals gravitated towards him and joined the nascent movement, and thus inaugurated the second stage
of the Islamic movement. This phase was full of suffering/agony in terms of pain, hardship, imprisonment, hunger and exile. It proved to be the “training camp of bearing with agonies” (masayeb ki tarbiyyat gaah) (ibid: 183). Muhammad elevated the holy community from their tribal and racial identities to an Islamic identity. The movement proliferated in Mecca until the next stage—migration to Medina arrived. After 13 years of struggle at Mecca, a holy community of 250-300 individuals was available to establish and run an Islamic state. In the fourth stage, the Islamic state formed. The concretisation of abstracted Islamic ideals was made possible in the fifth stage at Medina when an Islamic system evolved. An Islamic political, economic, educational and judicial system appeared as a complete system of life (ibid: 186, 189). Finally, in eight years, the boundaries of this nascent Islamic state extended beyond Medina to all Arab territories. Historically, the contribution made by war in the prophetic struggle is overestimated. In reality, the expansion was the outcome of a bloodless revolution, which claimed 1000-1200 lives only, a relatively small death toll in bringing about such a comprehensive revolution (ibid: 186-90).

Mawdudi’s conceptualisation of the aforementioned terms and the systemic approach accentuated criticism from traditional Islamic scholars as well as from Islamists and post-Islamists (Amjad 2000; Azmi 2002: 118-33; Khan 1973; Nadwi 1978: 112). The more technical and methodical critique came from Khan, in late 1950s and early 1960s (Khan 1995). According to Khan,

In my view, the interpretation of religion in Mawdudi’s books has deviated from the true religion. Although, the ingredients of Mawdudi’s composite explanation of religion are the same, but the new relationship invoked in them has deformed religion and it [Islam] seems an alien thing now (1995: 21).

Khan was student of Islahi, belonged to Farahi School and was an elite figure in the Jama’at-e-Islami India.

4.4.3 The Relevance of the prophetic method of change

For Mawdudi, the above is the natural way of bringing about a revolution following cause and effect relationship. It was not a supernatural phenomenon (muajieṣa). This method, if properly replicated today, can produce the same results.
In his lecture at Muslim University Aligarh (1996a: 161-200), Mawdudi rationalised the process of bringing about an Islamic government. Irrespective of the nature of the government, it is the outcome of the interplay (dialectics) of historical and psychological forces. The mutual coordination of a number of initial prerequisites, societal forces and natural premises contribute to the formation of a specific government. To Mawdudi this process closely resembles the chemical or physical process. The logical result or outcome depends on the premises. Mawdudi considers the desired government an ideological entity (\textit{usuli hakoomat}) one different from other forms of governments. The world had not experienced Mawdudi’s envisioned state, which was realised by Islam [in the city state of Medina]. The nationalist/secular state forms “the other” of Mawdudi’s ideological state, which is rooted in the idea of God’s Kingdom (\textit{khilafat-e-Ilahiyya}). The kingdom of God thus formed would be unique for being governed by a corpus of pious individuals (\textit{salibeen}) down from clerical positions to the top brass. The emergence of such an ideal ideological state entails a specific process consisting of “Islam as movement and Muslims as party” (Ahmad 2005: 79). Only those workers and leaders would qualify for running the movement who are ready to be transformed into specifically tailored individuals. They will propagate this message and a new system of education and training will evolve producing an alternative Islamic intellectual leadership consisting of “Muslim scientists”, “Muslim Philosophers”, “Muslim Historians”, “Muslim Economists”, “Muslim Jurists”, and “Muslim Political Scientists”. This new leadership then challenges the prevailing system based on ignorance/\textit{Jabiliyya}. The ideal moral conduct of this genre would naturally attract pious elements from all around. In this transformed society, the “other” system would find it harder and harder to sustain/continue. Logically, the system with best preparation, for Mawdudi, will emerge triumphant. It seems that Mawdudi’s envisioned Islamisation project had a double-focus: 1) Islamisation as a political project, and 2) Islamisation of knowledge as intellectual project. The latter for Tibi is a “civilisational project.” In Tibi’s critical reflection, “[t]he Islamist strategy combines the ‘Islamisation of knowledge’ with the Shar’iatisation of law in its fundamentalist project of a de-Westernisation of the Islamic world and the world at large” (2009: 72). For Mawdudi, the very nature of Islamic Shar’ia needs power, “by which he meant, capturing the machinery of the modern state” (Robinson 2008: 276).
Mawdudi juxtaposes his process of Islamic revolution with that of the French revolution inspired by Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu, the Russian revolution motivated by the ideas of Karl Marx, leadership of Lenin and Trotsky, and the German Social Nationalism inspired by Hegel, Hitler and others. Likewise, Islamic revolution can become a logical outcome of the pursuance of workers, who exemplify Qur’anic ideals (1996b).

The world is like a train powered by an engine which is fuelled by knowledge, ideas and research. Its drivers are intellectuals and researchers. The train and the passengers boarding it are bound to move in the direction in which the drivers want them to. If a passenger is not willing to continue his journey into that direction, he can only turn around inside the train but is unable to change the direction of the journey. The only one way to change the direction of the journey is to control/occupy the engine’s driving seat, and drive it towards the desired course. The people occupying the engine/driving seat currently have gone astray from the path of God and bereft of Islamic ideology. Consequently, the train is intentionally leading the passengers into the direction of materialism and atheism. It is the time to change the course of the train. Some people from among the God-worshippers should stand up and strive to seize the engine from the atheists. Unless the driving seat is not captured, we are bound to move in the direction taken by the God-unaware (na-Khuda shanas) drivers (1939: 21-22).

The above text reveals the following points: 1) knowledge, ideas, thoughts and intellectuals, as the realm of ideas are inextricably linked to political power/structure. In a Gramscian sense, there is an “organic link” between the two (Butko 2004: 46); 2) individuals’ agency/change potential is infinitely constrained by the structure; 3) a new realm of ideas through knowledge and research is required to emerge as a counter-hegemony to the existing hegemony to the existing hegemonies; 4) ultimate change will be the outcome of grabbing both positions (the state structure and the realm of ideas), and 5) Islam will lead state and society in an entirely different direction than Western materialism.

In the above discussion, Mawdudi’s overwhelming emphasis on the state and structural constraints on individual’s capacity to bring about change does not imply that he denied free will and change potential of an individual. On the contrary, Mawdudi belongs to that category of reformers in the sub-continent who, to quote Robinson, “heightened ideas of
human instrumentality” and emphasised that “knowing means doing” (2008: 270). In the same quote above, Mawdudi clarified his position.

One of Mawdudi’s important re-conceptualisations of old religious terms is his re-activation of *Jahiliyya*—literally “ignorance”. In traditional usage, “the *Jahiliyya* referred to the age of ignorance before the revelation of the Qur’an to Muhammad” (Haddad et al. 1991: 27). Mawdudi employed the term to “refer to forces, which corrupted historic Muslim societies, seeing *Jahiliyya* as a type of counter-revolution which came to dominate Muslim societies” (ibid). Egyptian revivalist ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, further developed this notion of *Jahiliyya* and extended its boundaries to include “opponents” of “true” Muslims; thus brought Egyptian Nasser’s nationalist-socialist regime under attack. Qutb considers modern society *Jahili* because it is not ruled by revealed laws, and is thus subject to overthrow. Islamists identify such deviations in state structure from “true Islamic ideal” and refer to a symbiotic relationship between the two. In a Gramscian framework, it is only after such “deviations” have been identified and analysed that “the counter-hegemon can begin a gradual infiltration of civil society through a dissemination of a new and dynamic worldview” (Butko 2004: 47-8).

In the following sections, I turn to understanding of Mawdudi’s ideas and the Jama’at politics through two sources: 1) the Jama’at manifesto and news statements issues by the Jama’at leaders from 1988-2006 as reported by two Urdu dailies in Pakistan; 2) a thin ethnography of a Jama’at network in a village in the north-west of Pakistan.

### 4.5 The Jama’at in Politics: Issues and Trends

This section employs Comparative Manifesto Project’s (CMP) coding scheme (Budge 2001: 50-65; Laver 2001: 3-9; Volkens 2005) to measure the Jama’at position on various political, social and economic issues. The aim is to obtain an overview of the Jama’at imagined Islamic state and the contours of its socio-political activism in Pakistan. For the content analysis, this section employs two main sources: the Jama’at election manifesto of 1997 (Ashar 2004: 677-696) and the news content of two Urdu dailies published in Pakistan—Daily Jang (Rawalpindi) and Daily Nawa-e-Waqt (Islamabad). As a family-owned newspaper, the Daily Jang was first published in 1941 in New Delhi and was then moved to Karachi after partition of India in 1947. The newspaper has persistently retained its wider circulation throughout the geographical locations of Pakistan.
Akhtar mentions lack of political/ideological commitment of Jang “except supporting the party in power and then drifting away to the other group” (2000: XXV). Apart from publishing an English Daily (*The News*), a family magazine, currently, the most popular private TV channel Geo is also owned by the Jang Group. In contrast, the *Daily Nawa-e-Waqt* “speaks for the nation’s conservative Muslim constituency” (ibid: XXVI). Both *Jang* and *Nawa-e-Waqt* have consistently accommodated new technological tools and professional ingenuities. Both have respectively an “estimated circulation of 500,000 and 400,000 copies per day” (ibid: XXVI-XXVII).

The news content spans from 1988 to 2006, the period of utmost significance in Pakistan’s political and economic history.\(^\text{26}\)

The information generated from the news content and manifesto data will answer a set of specific descriptive questions. What are the current trends and issues in Jama’at politics in Pakistan; what issues are more significant and what are less significant; what are the major contours of Islamist politics understood through these issues; what is the Jama’at position on major national issues in particular developmental issues, and how can a description of these trends and concerns enrich our understanding of the Jama’at politics in Pakistan?

Manifestoes of Islamic political parties reflect their ideology, philosophy and programme for change in Pakistan. To what extent does the Jama’at manifesto reflect its actual intentions, how far does the political practice of the Jama’at correspond to the ambitious goals identified in it and how many people actually read them? Asking these and other questions does not prohibit us from exploring and understanding the content of the manifestoes and measuring policy position. Although, manifestoes express wishful intentions of the political actors to change the destiny of the nation, they are “authoritative statements” ratified and owned by par-

\(^\text{26}\) For instance, democracy returned to Pakistan after the sudden death of Zia-ul-Haq in an air crash in 1988. The struggle for Kashmir independence underwent a major shift from ballot to bullet; with the disintegration of communist Russia and rise and fall of Taliban (1995-2001) in Afghanistan. In addition, the era of neo-liberal policies and structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s, and an alliance of all major religious parties called MMA marked an historic victory in the 2002 general elections. This later enabled MMA to form its own government in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and join a coalition government in Baluchistan province.
ty elites and activists alike. Reading the content of manifestos can serve numerous purposes: identifying change in party ideology over time; comparison across party ideology and policy positions; determining how much weight parties attached to different policy issues, and if the party in question grabs power, to what extent, it sticks to or deviates from its own promises made in the election platforms.

4.5.1 Quantification and classification

Following CMP, the coding unit in the Jama’at manifesto and news statement is the *quasi-sentence* defined as “an argument.” An argument is the “verbal expression of one political idea or issue.” The basic unit is the ‘sentence’ but it can be decomposed into different arguments, if the structure of the sentence allows. For example, if the Jama’at manifesto claims that “we will eradicate poverty and curb inflation”, it is one sentence with two arguments—to alleviate poverty, and curb inflation. Here we can draw a rule of thumb: complex statements and texts are decomposed into *quasi-sentences* for arguments as and when the sense changes, where a quasi-sentence is a “set of words, containing one and only one, political idea” (Volkens 2005).

The following is the classification scheme (see table 4.1), developed by CMP. I have modified it for the Jama’at in Pakistan and grouped the statements into eight major policy areas called policy domains, from D1 to D8. In the original CMP scheme, there are seven policy domains (i.e. D1-D7). However, to capture the Jama’at discourse on Islamic Shar’ta and Islamisation of economy and society, I have added a domain for Islamic ideology (D8). Each domain is further divided into sub-domains or issues/themes. The positive (+) sign means that some positive statement or reference is made about the issue in question and negative sign (-) means a negative reference.

As mentioned above, I have two sources of data—manifesto and the news content. The manifesto content is coded under 8 domains: External Relations, Freedom and Democracy, Political System, Economy, Welfare and Quality of Life, Fabric of Society, Social Groups and Islamic Ideology. However, in light of news content, I further modified my own scheme used for manifesto content. For example, D4 (Economy) is treated as an aggregate category, where sub-domains merge (see table 4.6). Likewise, in D3, political activism represents news content, in D2, freedom and democracy for new content absorbs all sub-domains, in D5,
social activism is an additional sub-domain that captures the Jama’at welfare activities specifically at the time of relief and emergencies, and finally, in D6, ethno-politics is an additional sub-domain to capture the Jama’at mostly negative mention of the regional and ethnic politics in Pakistan.

The coding of news and manifesto content was done following a careful and systematic procedure. Using a modified CMP scheme, three research assistants were hired, trained and engaged in collecting/writing down all news statements issued by the Jama’at local, provincial and national leadership, which appeared in these newspapers—Jang or Nawa-e-Waqt. Only the news pages were consulted and the editorial content/columns/op-ed. were left out. The research assistants would pick a file of the Daily Jang, leaf through all the news pages, locate news statements issued by the Jama’at leaders and will note them down into a note book along with name, date and place. In selection of newspapers, a rule of thumb was defined by the author: that is, first, the Daily Jang Rawalpindi was searched in the shelves; if not available, then Daily Jang Lahore or Karachi, and that if not available, then the Daily Nawa-e-Waqt was consulted. In about a month time, all newspaper files spanning 1988-2006 were thoroughly searched for the Jama’at leaders’ statements. To check for the reliability of the research assistants’ work, the author hired two more research assistants who randomly verified the news statements recorded and looked for the missing files. In a total duration of 45 days, the author had a compilation of huge text in the form of news statements issued by the Jama’at leaders. Using modified CMP, I developed a coding scheme and assigned similar numerical codes to similar statements. Following this procedure, I had a database for the news content comprising of 2726 observations, for the Jama’at. These observations were further categorised along the 8 main domains (see table 4.2).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Sub-Domains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D1 External Relations</td>
<td>Anti-Imperialism +; Military Defence +; Peace +; Internationalism +; Pan-Islamism +; Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2 Freedom and Democracy</td>
<td>Freedom and Human Rights +; Freedom and Human Rights -; Democracy +; Constitutionalism +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3 Political System/Political Activism</td>
<td>Governmental and Administrative Efficiency +; Governmental and Administrative Efficiency -; Corruption and Accountability; Decentralisation and Provincial Autonomy +; Centralisation +;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4 Economy</td>
<td>Free Enterprise +; Incentives +; Market Regulation +; Protection +; Economic Planning +; General Economic Goals +; Technology and Infrastructure +; Nationalisation +; Privatisation +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D5 Welfare and Quality of Life/Social Activism</td>
<td>Social Justice +; Culture +; Welfare State Expansion +; Education Expansion +; Environmental Protection +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6 Fabric of Society/Ethno-politics -</td>
<td>Social Harmony +; Law and Order +; Anti-Feudalism and Land Reform +; Anti-Capitalism +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D7 Social Groups</td>
<td>Labour Groups +; Farmers +; Under-privileged and Minority Groups +; Professional Groups +; Gender +; Youth +; Other Social Groups +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D8 Islamic Ideology/Jihad Activism</td>
<td>Islamic Shar’ia +; Islamic Economy +; Islamic Morality +; Islamisation (general)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Modified from Volkens (2005)
Table 4.2
All Domains: Manifesto and News Content Data (1988-2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Manifesto</th>
<th></th>
<th>News Content</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>In %</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>In %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1: External Relations</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2: Freedom and Democracy</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3: Political System/Political Activism*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4: Economy</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D5: Welfare and Quality of Life/Social Activism*</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6: Fabric of Society/Ethno-politics*</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D7: Social Groups</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D8: Islamic Ideology</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2726</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own database
* Only news content

A similar coding method was applied to the quantification of the Jama’at manifesto (issued at 1997 elections). The author carefully read and interpreted the manifesto content and assigned relevant codes. At the end, a total number of 625 observations were obtained that were further grouped into 8 categories, shown in table 4.2.

Unfortunately, Islamist parties do not update their manifestoes regularly and normally reprint older versions before elections, which make the comparison across time difficult. The Jama’at has updated its manifesto but with no substantial departure from the previous versions. The news data enables us to compare and contrast the issues across time as well. The limitation is that we deal only with a time span from 1988 to 2006. The eight main policy domains and sub-domains are in table 4.1.
4.5.2 Data analysis

Table 4.2, presents an aggregated picture of the main domains. In the Jama’at manifesto, social groups received more attention (18.08 per cent) than the rest. Four domains (D3, D4, D5 and D7) capture around 70 per cent of the total. The share of Islamic ideology is lower than expected for an Islamist organisation like the Jama’at. The news content in the same table, show political activism (39.91 per cent) followed by external relations (21.90 per cent) and Islamic ideology (10.71 per cent) claim the majority share. However, economy and welfare and quality of life receive 4.07 per cent and 8.88 per cent respectively. The table portrays diversity and not homogeneity in the Islamist political and public discourse.

Tables A-1 to A-8 (see appendix A) show a breakdown of the data presented in table 4.2. It is clear from table 4.2 that the Jama’at has paid disproportionately more attention, in the news content data, to issues around global politics, Kashmir and Afghanistan. Whereas, pan-Islamism dominates the manifesto content, Kashmir and Afghanistan outshines in the news content. Military and defence are salient, global peace and internationalism appears less visible in the data.

As manifest from table 4.2, and further elaborated in table A-2, freedoms, human rights and democracy do not fill the central content of Islamist political discourse. Apart from the figure, if we look at the content of the human rights issues, more focus goes to the violation of human rights in Kashmir and other conflict zones than abuses of human rights within the country.

In table A-3, governmental and administrative efficiency received more attention (57 per cent) followed by corruption and accountability (32 per cent), which are potentially more populist in nature; however, decentralisation and provincial autonomy, which are more pressing in the Pakistani context are not central to the Islamists debates.

As evident from table 4.2 and A-4, economy slips as a main component in the activism of the Jama’at. In the news content, a relative share of 4.1 per cent is far less than in the manifesto content, which is 17.4 per cent. Mawdudi’s text, the Jama’at manifesto and the news data nearly confirm that their proposed Islamic economy would be a mixed capitalist economy with a vibrant free enterprise and less state control.
Table A-5 gives an idea of the overwhelming space given to the more abstract notion of social justice (37.27 per cent in manifesto and 59.09 per cent in the news content), welfare state expansion is the minimum in the news content.

The Jama’at political discourse also has less emphasis on the pertinent issues of feudalism and land reforms in Pakistan (see Table A-6). Mawdudi opposed the then Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan’s land reform in Punjab in the 1950s on the basis of protecting individual’s private property rights in Islam (Nasr 1996: 74-75); for Binder (1961: 211), such move by Mawdudi was an attempt to win the support of zamindars in the Punjab that might had positive influence on the Jama’at electoral outcomes. Similar is its stand on the issue of ethnicity. The overwhelming discourse on Islam as the basis of ethnicity and negation of race and territory as the basis of nationalism has a negative impact on the rights and conflicts among diverse ethnic groups. The relationship between religion and the ethnic question has two dimensions in a country like Pakistan, where the idea of nationalism is more a “concept” than an actual nationalism; the religious groups play a cementing/positive role in holding ethnicities together based on religious identity. However, this very role of religion subsides and undermines the issues of rights and identities of the various ethnicities. The Jama’at political history also reveals that over time, it has softened its position on the question of nationalism. It began with Mawdudi’s “Islamo-transnationalism” before the partition of India, accepted national boundaries of Pakistan and India in 1947 (split the Jama’at along national lines) and showed a pragmatic concern by emphasising on “Islamo-nationalism” (Roy 2004: 62-67). Some recent developments reveal that if opportunities arise, the Jama’at elite’s response will be more in line with the political realities of Pakistan than Mawdudi’s ideology. During MMA government in NWFP (2002-2007), the Jama’at central leader and key minister is reported to have issued statements in favour of the rights and share in resource distribution of his province.27

The Jama’at political discourse also reveals an abstract conceptualisation of issues based on moral ideals and worldviews that enables it to escape concrete solutions of specific issues. For an ideologi-

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27 Various statements by the then Senior Provincial Minister and Ex-Provincial amir of the Jama’at NWFP; my own database.
cal/revolutionary movement, in Gramscian analysis, “the discourse of political Islam seeks to unify individuals on the level of ideas and a common world perception, not necessarily by economic status or on the basis of material deprivation” (Butko 2004: 45). Islamists mention the “totality of human predicament” and the “totality of systemic failure” as the gross basis of miseries and problems. Whereas, such gross generalisations could be helpful in understanding the overall gravity of human miseries in Pakistan, they are less helpful in determining specific social and economic needs of society and the strategy to overcome them. Political conceptualisation of needs must not only diagnose but also prognosticate the issues of the deprived class coupled with identifying symptoms and remedies in the given social context (Sen 1999). Whereas, distribution of all idle public lands among the landless and seizing vast land illegally owned by the feudal class, as the Jama’at manifesto declares, would seem revolutionary and populist, in practice, it is the social and political context that would determine the pros and cons of such public actions.

Interaction with activists, shows a strong feeling of loss among ardent Jama’at members over active participation in practical politics (elections, protests, power struggle) and the negative impact it had on its ability to contribute to social and community development.²⁸ Put simply, Jama’at active pursuance of state power, in the eyes of its activists, has diverted attention from issues of social welfare and development to issues of power and agitation politics (ihtijaji siyasat). Christopher Candland suggests in a comparative study of four religious associations including Jama’at that the “socially transformative power of religious institutions” is not only undermined by the “governments that attempt to use religious rhetoric to legitimate their policies” but also “religious political parties that rely upon the government to promote their strategies for social and political reform” (2000: 371).

Apart from these views and discussions prevalent among the Jama’at formal and informal meetings, which are abstract and general in nature, the time trend in figures 1-8 (see Appendix B) reveal that the media has captured a growing emphasis in the Jama’at politics on issues related to social groups, economy and social welfare. In the recent past, interaction with a number of provincial leaders in the provinces of Punjab and

²⁸ Informal discussions with Jama’at activists and leaders in July-Aug 2006 and 2007.
NWFP also revealed that the awareness is growing within the Jama’at about re-organisation of its welfare organ (al-Khidmat Foundation) on professional lines.\textsuperscript{29} However, deeper analysis of figures (Appendix B: 1-8) reveals abrupt spikes in the post-2002 period, when the Jama’at as part of the MMA came in power in the province of NWFP, and thus most of the statements coded in this period were of the Jama’at provincial ministers.

Recent scholarship discusses the role of religion (values, beliefs, practices, institutions, spiritual leaders, faith communities) in socio-political and economic development (Candland 2000; Mayotte 1998; Singh 2007; Ter Haar and Ellis 2006). Likewise, a number of researchers have studied Islamic welfare institutions run by the Islamic movements in the Middle East, mostly by Muslim Brotherhood and its sister organisations (Clark 2004, Gunning 2007). The Jama’at’s welfare-activation in the social sector has rarely received any academic attention. In his study conducted in 1957, renowned historian of the Pakistan movement, Khalid B. Sayeed cites Binder on the discipline and welfare activism of the Jama’at movement in the Pakistani province of Sindh at the time:

[i]t[i]their offices seem to be well organised and their accounts well kept … Their budgets are also fairly substantial, that of the Sindh provincial Jama’at being in the range of 100,000 Pakistan rupees in 1954. Most of this sum went for the supply of free medical care to refugees in Karachi area, for printing and paper, and for rent and salaries (quoted in 1957: 65).

Another aspect of Islamism (in this case of the Jama’at), against the essentialist approaches, Western media stereotyped images and Islamists’ own popularised themes of radical transformation of state and society appears in this data set. This caricature of Islamism is best exemplified by one of Tibi’s bold assertions: “[i]n the course of de-Westernisation of the Islamic world, contemporary Islamists are leading Muslim people back into the Stone Age in the name of an Islamic epistemology” (2009: 79).

However, from our data set, the Jama’at position can be interpreted a couple different ways. The diversity across issues and themes in the manifesto and news content, even without considering pragmatic political

\textsuperscript{29} Personal interviews with Inayat Ullah (member of the Jama’at provincial shura and position holder in Al-Khidmat Foundation), June 2009; Telephone interview with S. Amir J’afri, Director Ghazzali Foundation, October 2009.
compromises reveals that the Jama’at does not desire a stone age and that the “demonic spirit” will not take over Pakistan if they accede to power. Largely, a capitalist model of development with an “Islamic trickle down” (see Bayat 2007) spawns from the data. At the same time, the data falls short of persuading us that the Jama’at seeks radical transformation of existing power relations, and prevailing class-based social and economic arrangements. Scholars have employed Antonio Gramsci’s framework of hegemony—“a process of domination by consent and engineered conformism”—to explain and understand Islamists’ tide everywhere (Brohi 2006; also see Tugal 2009). Brohi takes the example of MMA (of which Jama’at was a part in 2002 elections) that according to her is not “counter-hegemonic”, rather it “sides with the exploitative classes and strengthen capitalism … not challenging class divisioning in society” (Brohi 2006: 12-13).

4.6 The Jama’at Network in a North-West Frontier Village

This section consists of a self-related and self-referenced biographical account (Davies 2008: 15) of the ideology, social practices and interactions of a small network of Islamists in a village in North-West Pakistan, that yielded Mawdudi’s revivalist message in the early 1970s. Two reasons make this account of Islamism self-referential: 1) my late father was an accomplished activist of the Jama’at network under enquiry, based in my village, and 2) I joined the student wing of the Jama’at in the late 1980s, which offers me a unique opportunity to observe its activities through active participation.30

This section is the product of memories, personal diaries and interactions with a number of Islamist activists in the village Sawaldher between 2006 and 2009. The narration spanning the chapter is subjective and thus does not claim objectivity. Following Gunning (2007), I take a critical self-conscious position in this brief ethnography. The selection of the site is purposive and premised on factors such as familiarity with and accessibility to the respondents, and hybrid nature of the village. The site of ethnography is Sawaldher, a semi-urban environment in North-West Pakistan with an estimated population of 40,000.

30 I joined the Jama’at student wing, Islami Jami’at-e-Talaba Pakistan in 1989 when I was in grade 9.
Through ethnographic account of a number of Islamic activists in this village, I argue that the ideology of Islamism was mainly responsible for the breakdown of traditional ties based on vertical lines giving way to horizontal bonds based on Islamist notion of brotherhood. I also argue that the introduction of Mawdudi’s revivalist thought in the early 1970s in this village initiated/invoked multiple processes of disruption not only of the primordial bonds of family and clan but also their links with the dominant view of traditional Islam—Deoband (also see Hashemi 2009). The trajectory of traditional Sunni-Deobandi Islam dominated in this village in the form of non-intrusive Mosque, pesh-e-Imam, and preaching society/Tablighi Jama’at was threatened by the introduction of this new activist Islamism. This Islamist ideology caused ruptures in the traditional belief system and understanding of religion of these activists in the early 1970s. The absorption of Islamist ideology was realised through a critical and creative process (Jamal 2009) and was not the outcome of uncritical submission. However, over the course of expanding opportunities in the realm of market and politics (opportunity spaces), Mawdudi’s original ideology became conflicted with ever-expanding temporal gains. I observed that political pragmatism and ‘cost-benefit analysis’ and not Mawdudi’s original thoughts were instrumental in shaping the Jama’at’s response of acting ‘rationally’ in favour of the former over the latter. Thus in the wake of opening opportunities in the realm of market and politics, the Islamists in this village played a critical role in temporalisation of Islam. Yet the transition/transformation from ‘hard-line’ theoretical position to ‘moderate’ stance did not go smoothly. Accommodation of changing experiences and absorption of opportunities was instrumental in creating perpetual waves of ‘intra-movement’ tensions with varied Islamists’ responses: accommodation, negotiation and rejection. Furthermore, it is argued that the social network and friendship ties created based on ‘shared solidarity’ derived from Islamist notions of equality. Social and economic background and biographies of these activists reveal that it was a middle class network and it primarily remained in dialogue with the middle classes, and not with the poor.

4.6.1 From primordial ties to active citizenship

In the training phase of ‘active citizenship’, the group of Jama’at members gradually broke away from primordial ties. They were obliged to take keen interest in politics and government/public policies of incum-
bent rulers. Being few, they had to be very active to make their voices heard on public and political issues. Such public activism and confrontational politics of Jama’at hierarchy of the day taxed their energies too much to attend to social and family needs. They were also dubbed ‘resistance politicos’, devoid of any meaningful following in the general masses (Hashemi 2009). They would now participate in public meetings and take part in electoral campaigns. Mawdudi’s politico-religious ideology thus became an intellectual platform and the Jama’at a political vehicle through which the activists could carry forward their reform agenda.

This “shared solidarity” was also responsible for their group identity construction of the activists. They felt intellectually superior to their counterparts in the village as the ever-increasing dependence on modern printing and pamphleteering ushered in a new culture of reading books, magazines and newspapers. Mawdudi’s easy-to-understand religious literature paved the way to emancipation from the dominant religious teachings of traditional ulama and challenged their interpretation of religious scriptures. These writings had also given the people confidence to think differently in matters of politics and religion. The new ideology vied for imposition of universal Islamic cultural ethos after massive displacement of centuries old local traditions. However, intensely appealing, modern in looks and democratic in nature, this message could not change the traditional cultural patterns with even utmost struggle of the “sincere” Jama’aties like my father and his friends. This situation, in time, caused severe social and psychological problems for the group manifesting itself in the form of double-personality syndromes. Pakistani’s politics was then a battlefield of contesting political ideologies: Bhutto’s Islamic socialism, Bacha Khan’s Pushtoon nationalism and Mawdudi’s Islamism. The 1970s was the phase of state’s suppression but also a period of Jama’at expansion (Nasr 1994). At least empirical evidence from this village, confirms Bayat’s argument that the Islamists’ influence is a function of opportunities and state repression (Bayat 2007).

Mawdudi’s ‘top-down’ message of systemic change replaced the traditional uncritical passive belief system and social conduct of the group members. Their newly explored Islam was no longer confined faith. The diagnosis of social problems and its remedies through collective wisdom and activism as elaborated by Mawdudi in his works, required organisational ingenuity not in vogue at the time. The central theme of the gras-
The roots level organisational set up had been mass production of young, loyal, and sincere activists through individual meetings with target person and investment of time and resources on his/her conversion to Mawdudi’s ideology. Meanwhile, the group regularly held collective literature study circles, Qur’anic study circles, attended reading rooms and carried out welfare activities. Every activity of the group had to be directed towards “system demolition” that sustained life in the country. As confided by an activist:

There was a system outside us. The “system” was the “other” of “us” . . . It was corrupt, devilish and alien run by a club of corrupt, secular, and western-minded individuals. That corrupt system was responsible for all of the ‘ills’ inside our household—kids always playing not doing homework, watching movies and TV dramas, listening to music, misbehaving with elders etc—as well as the ‘public culture’ in the village. We all were just passive recipients of this systemic manoeuvring.31

However, in retrospect, this grievance by my father and his ‘revolutionary friends’ about the existing system was not only a ‘moral outrage’, a ‘reaction’ or an ‘irrational response’. This grievance accompanied an alternative vision of transforming state institutions and societal order in their mould. They defined the real purpose of Islam as enforcement of the “revolutionary” message of Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet. The zeal for the destruction of system did not even forgive the traditional Islamic vocabulary and terminologies. A new theological vocabulary and terms developed to present the abstract message in a figurative/concrete Islamic idiom (Haddad et al. 1991, Metcalf 2004, Nasr 1996). To the group, these Islamist concepts worked as markers of identity, spread of culture of Islamist ideology and triumph over village political discourse. However, despite accomplishment in the discourse of ideas, the Jama’at ideology remained far from becoming the ‘popular political’ idiom in the village socio-political landscape.32

Throughout their career as these Islamic activists would discuss intellectual ideas in an extremely difficult language laden with elitist Urdu, Arabic and Persian vocabulary. Their conversations reminds one the intellectual debates among the North-Indian Islamic scholarship or high academic circles in Lahore and other major urban centres of Pakistan.

31 Field notes and direct observations.
32 My own analysis based on direct observations.
None of the Jama’at activists can be categorised as “poor”. Mostly they were from middle class and some formed the local elite. They all had access to the available media, could read, write and understand the national language of Urdu, and international language, English. Their job profile shows that most of them were in the modern sectors of the economy—government jobs, self-employed in their own businesses, or were engaged in modern professions as medical and teaching. None of them was a madrassa graduate but still they could converse on Islam, its basic beliefs, and could understand and discuss contemporary ideologies. Moreover, their meetings would be attended by a number of urbanite (shehri) Islamists—lawyers, medical practitioners, engineers and professors. These social ties of the village Islamists with urbanite Islamists also contributed towards an upward social mobility.

The Jama’at weekly and monthly meetings (ijtema’at) became fora of rural-urban ties. Membership in this educated group expanded the social networks of the members well beyond the immediate and extended family. The Urdu narratives, stories and debates of North-Indian scholars and poets (like Azad, Iqbal, Madani, Islahi and Mawdudi) would echo in the traditional houses, Hujras and streets of this north-Western Pakistani village with loud pronouncements of Islam as a better alternative system of collective and political life. Their journey towards Islamism would reflect a graduation from Mawdudi’s notion of Jahiliyya to “true Islam”. The new family of friends based on Islamist brotherhood would offer a joyful experience.

When we joined the Jama’at in the 1970s, we were just like one family … just like brothers. We used to join together, sit on wooden beds (charpays), bring our own simple meals from our houses and eat together. We were tied by a shared ideology, tenderness and purpose. After having dinner, we would plan extension of the Jama’at revolutionary message through distribution of dawah literature and relief work. At that time, we did not have ample resources but passion, zeal and zest for an Islamic revolution.

Another Jama’at member recounted his psychological state of mind after joining:

I feel a gratifying effect upon myself after meeting these sincere and loving movement brothers (tehreeki bhai). I have been a member of many friend-

33 Personal interviews, Jama’at’ members, July-August 2006, June-August 2009.
ship networks but such a degree of gratification I gain from the Jama’at brothers, I never experienced before.34

4.6.3 The social network and in-group tensions

However, ‘group-feeling’ and the ‘sincere friendship ties’ prevalent in the Jama’at network were a function of material prosperity and resources as much as shared ideology. The new opening economic opportunities, the affluence and material gains accrued by the Jama’at members in the subsequent years, negatively affected the ‘degree of Islamic brotherhood’.

Gradually some of the Jama’at activists became rich and resourceful. Money and wealth made inroads into the rank and file of the Jama’at. They started arranging sumptuous dinners inviting “rich” people as guests. Backbiting, only (serf) gossiping and abusing the opponents overshadowed the Islamicity of the Jama’at in these meetings… the social status coupled with economic affluence overshadowed the spirit of collectivity (rooh-e-ijtema).35

This change precipitated resentment and tension within the group leading to internal dislocation, mutations, secessions and transformations. The trajectories of dissent based on status/class change emerged out of tensions travelled on non-homogenous irregular paths: some left the Jama’at; some switched between different forms of activism; and others went silent but remained attached to the movement.

I left the Jama’at because it had become a club of elites. They [the Jama’at activists] spent most of their time in back-biting and downgrading their opponents. This was not the aim of the Jama’at when it was founded by Mawdudi….the Jama’at has indeed deviated from its original path.36

This Islamic network and established social bond is not only based on the satisfaction from joint struggle for supremacy of Islam, but also material and non-material personal benefits. The benefits include fund raising for the Jama’at, extended personal friendships, increased social status and employment opportunities for close relatives of Jama’at workers. The extended network of social ties with urban lawyers, doctors, civil servants and elected representatives also ensured social returns for civic

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
service—role in dispute resolutions, providing legal aid to one seeking legal assistance, assisting poor patients by recommending them to Islamist medical practitioners, assisting with admissions to colleges and universities, and facilitating other such services in governmental departments such as police, and passport office. These extended social ties would pay off enhanced business opportunities for some rather than all.37

4.6.4 Developmental projects as a discursive field of dialogue

Through an interactive process, the Jama’at activists produced a development space in the village. It reflected a discursive field in which competing political and religious actors debated their contribution to the material/infrastructural development of the village. It strengthened their commitment to the cause and represented a secular face of Islamist activism. The development space constitutes the villagers’ socio-economic aspirations and the Jama’at envisioned worldview on social change. This development space defined the purpose of village politics; it had not only changed the villagers’ perception of traditional politics, but also provided them with the standards to judge performance of other political parties and leaders against it. This was not an effort in isolation but such activities also attracted attention of other political workers and leaders in support of their thinking.

The elected representatives of the Jama’at initiated a number of development projects such as a clean water supply scheme (1980-82); telephone exchange (1980s); Basic Health Unit (1985-88); and intra-village roads’ construction (1985-88). There are three points of value in this study relating to these projects. Most of these state-funded infrastructure projects came to this village in the 1980s during Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law regime. A member of the Jama’at was elected as a member of the Union Council in 1980 and then in the 1985 non-partisan elections, another Jama’at member became Member of the National Assembly and initiated a number of developmental projects. The Jama’at activists’ alliance of friendship and the extended network of social contacts played a central role in the realisation and implementation of these projects—in negotiating the approval of the Basic Health Unit for the village with a Member of the Provincial Assembly of, and the Jama’at activists’ wholehearted

37 Field notes and interviews, op.cit.
participation in the completion of these projects. For instance, a Jama’at activist donated a large parcel of land for the water supply scheme, while others allocated time to monitor the projects. These developmental projects stirred up a wave of competition among the opposing political actors at a social level where developmental politics affected the political preferences of villagers and entered their cultural perspective. That is, people started questioning the performance of political leaders based on their contribution to development rather than ideologies, tribal identities, social status and other factors. Such an approach in politics was novel in the history of this village: now the leaders of other political parties would compete in the “development space” to satisfy the expectation of the voters.

The above discussion is well placed in development literature. Political parties, social groups and civil society organisations are important in “enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political attention” (Sen 1999: 149). Political parties can play a constructive role in shaping peoples’ choices and ideas about their rights, responsibilities, public policies, and monitoring state institutions.

As discussed in the previous section, the activism of political Islamists has been very effective in constitutional issues such as Shar’ia law and international policies and their ideas on anti-imperialism to an extent that the primacy of Shar’ia is well entrenched in the national political discourse. Ironically, the same zeal is largely non-existent vis-à-vis widespread poverty, inequality, illiteracy, and other social provisions. The same is true with much-needed land reforms, taxes the agriculture sector and issues highly questionable expenses on defence. Quoting Sen, “this docility of opposition has permitted successive governments to get away with unconscionable neglect of these vital matters of public policy.” If these social programmes could have become a public demand, the authorities, democratic or military, have to respond to them because “people tend to get what they demand, and more crucially, do not typically get what they do not demand” (1999: 156).

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38 Field observations and interviews conducted in July-Aug 2006.
39 Ibid.
4.6.5 Celebrating the elections

The local and general election campaign aroused feelings of optimism. The conduct of election campaigns and its meticulous management precipitated a real sense of change.\(^{40}\) Conduct of the local and general elections by the Islamists in this village offers crucial insight into the interaction of Mawdudi’s political philosophy and pragmatic decision-making. Depending on the central Jama’at decision to participate or boycott the elections, the Jama’at network in this village would activate a *campaign-mode* Shar’īa (in case of participation in the elections), or a *boycott-mode* Shar’īa (if not participating in the elections).\(^{41}\) Such tactical adjustments are often legitimated based on a general principle—strategy (*bikmat-e-amali*). In a critical evaluation of the status of strategy in religion and its deployment by Islamic movements, Islahi’s remarks were very critical:

To arouse and mobilise general public, they [the religious leaders] would resemble election campaign to the holy battles of Badr and Hunain [two wars fought by Muhammad]. Those not participating in the elections would be termed as heretics and apostates. However, if the political environment were not conducive, then these holy warriors would retreat into their caves in a cowardly fashion (1991: 90-91).

For the activists, every election in Pakistan would play a key role in shaping public discourse in the state and the status of Islam in statecraft. In politically conscious Sawaldher, elections were contested with enthusiasm comparable to a traditional “marriage ceremony” in this village: all differences between the activists are put aside; consultation meetings are regularly held; activists reduce personal complaints against each other; and they try to persuade, motivate and encourage each other; influential families are contacted and street level networking is strengthened; developmental contributions to the village infrastructure are surfaced/reminded in political debates:

The forthcoming elections are crucial in the given context of Pakistan and Islamic ummah. Your vote is a witnessing/attestation to the character of the candidate … casting and right-casting of vote is a Shar’īa obligation for which a voter will be answerable on the Day of Judgment. If you will send good people (*saliheen*) to the assemblies, a good assembly will be formed

\(^{40}\) Direct observations.

\(^{41}\) Based on my own observations at various election campaigns.
which will form a good system. We [the Jama’at’s candidates] may or may not “essentially” be elected to the parliament for developmental works but for the “change of the system”, although we will not put on the back-burner your social services too.  

The activists in this village take part in each election as an act of worship, a jihadi spirit with high expectations of sweeping victory for a “positive” change in the system. However, in contrast, the results have rarely been good news for the Jama’at workers. The result of every election brings sense of dejection, pessimism and self-criticism. The critique hardly reaches the level of posing a threat to the overall strategy of the Jama’at but its only local remedial measures silence the criticism. These cycles of discontent normally produce desertion, silencing, dismissing and transforming within the movement.

Consistent Jama’at participation in elections has pushed its activists to internalise all tactics prevalent in Pakistani constituency-based politics. From electoral alliances at the street, clan and party level to use of propaganda, banners, posters, hand-bills, stickers, corner meetings and general public meetings—all modern means of access to the masses are applied in the service. Street and clan-level political alliances are secure optimal number of votes in the elections. The alliances are primarily driven by rational calculations and cost-benefit analysis rather than ideology and piety.

However, it is difficult to deduce from the above that the Jama’at activists behave persistently because of cost-benefit calculus. A cost-benefit calculus, according to Euben, is that “which takes the goal-directed individual as the unit of analysis and assumes the formulation of self-interested goals, preference orderings, and the availability of knowledge about means and consequences” (1995: 169). The activists’ behaviour embodies certain key features from Mawdudi’s ideology, which may not be explainable under rational actor theory. These include “the role of the Divine in all aspects of human life, the importance of community as opposed to the individual, the moral imperative of acting within God's plan” (ibid: 171).

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42 This text is derived from speeches of the Jama’at members at various electoral campaigns.
4.6.6 Islamism and gender relations

For the Jama’at network in this village, Islamic activism was practically nearly exclusively male. However, they had proponents of female education at every level. These activists were instrumental in negotiating with the provincial government the establishment of a higher secondary school for girls. Yet, active participation of women in other socio-religious and political spheres have remained outside the scope of its activism. The Jama’at on many occasions conceded to demands of other political actors to bar women from voting. To assert such gender bias during elections, traditional Pushtoon modesty, cultural codes and religious injunctions become argument. By doing so, the Jama’at contributed to the status-quo of gender inequality and never raised the issue in their debate. However, this gender specific attitude doesn’t reveal the whole truth. The Jama’at broke this tradition when a new political opportunity in the Musharraf era appeared. The change was warmly welcomed, as the Jama’at became the custodian of this change: the Jama’at nominated women candidates for local elections while women voters remained at home on election day. Hence, the Jama’at position on women’s role in politics and social activities is determined by political opportunities, local environment and cultural realities and not by commitment to certain religious injunctions or principled politics.

4.6.7 Islamism as transformative force

In the 1970s, family elders and the local ulama did not welcome Mawdudi’s ideas, which worked as a transformative force for conversion from traditional Islam to Islamism. The Jama’at workers were accused of heresy and departure from the ‘old’ religion to “Mawdudiyyat” (roughly means Mawdudism). The latter symbolised “deviation” and distance from the traditional religion (Deobandi Islam) in the village. However, being mindful of resistance from traditional religious circles and local customs, Mawdudi had always exhorted activists that they are harbingers of the true message of the Prophet and must be prepared for physical hardships and material losses.

43 Field notes.
44 Ibid.
The Deobandi ulama and imams were apprehensive of not only their ‘heretic ideas’ but also their ‘fashionable/modern Islam’ manifested through their lifestyle. Almost all of these activists were subject to religious stress and social pressures from families and friends. As expected, the ulama spearheaded the attack with active support of the political elites of the village. The social discord with families and religious rejection from ulama would at times result into expulsion or forced migration of male activists from home. My father too faced this situation from my middle-class farmer grandfather and his close relatives who supported anti-Jama’at leanings. The religious and political elites of the village had sensed an emerging threat to their dominance. These classes were conscious enough to understand that the Jama’at literature, long-meetings, network of well-placed friends, fusion of Islam with politics and social and political activism had set in motion a strong force for change in areas of interests. However, their fears did not materialise as with the passage of time, the Jama’at revolutionary spirit lost the stream. Despite numerous internal contradictions and inconsistent policy pursued by the Jama’at on issues of women, jihad and democracy, its activists can be categorised more as latent forces of change than forces of status quo (see for details e.g. Akhtar 2000: 14-51).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Elite Composition</th>
<th>Regime Type</th>
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<td>1941-47</td>
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<td>Ulama’ dominant</td>
<td>Colonialism</td>
<td>Ideological Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-54</td>
<td>Mawdudi</td>
<td>Ulama’ dominant</td>
<td>Parliamentary Democracy</td>
<td>Pressure Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954-58</td>
<td>Mawdudi</td>
<td>Ulama/Western Educated</td>
<td>Parliamentary Democracy</td>
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<td>1958-72</td>
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<td>Balanced</td>
<td>Military Rule</td>
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<td>1972-77</td>
<td>Mian Tufail</td>
<td>Western dominant</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977-87</td>
<td>Mian Tufail</td>
<td>Western dominant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-92</td>
<td>Qazi Husain</td>
<td>Westernised</td>
<td>Parliamentary democracy</td>
<td>Cadre party/Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-97</td>
<td>Qazi Husain</td>
<td>Westernised</td>
<td>Parliamentary democracy</td>
<td>Mass-based political party</td>
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4.7 The Nature of the Jamaʿat Transformation

In his study of Jamaʿat politics in Pakistan, Abdul Rashid Moten (2002) analysed the Jamaʿat organisational history that began as an ideological revolutionary movement, turned into a pressure group, changed into a cadre party, evolved as a mass-based political party and finally transformed into an Islamic revolutionary movement. The transformation of the Jamaʿat, according to Moten, ‘has been piecemeal and evolutionary.’ While in discussion on the reasons for transformation of the Jamaʿat, Moten has included power struggle and tactical moves. He failed to differentiate between conceptual-ideological and political transformation. This question seemingly should/could be at the heart of Moten’s analysis which never received his central focus. In my analysis, I tend to infer from the Jamaʿat political history that it has celebrated a political-strategic adjustment and thus as a modern social movement has fulfilled a condition of modernity. It seems relevant to refer to one of Irfan Ahmad’s concluding points about the Jamaʿat’s transformation in north-India. The “Jamaʿat’s acceptance, defense, and celebration of secularism and democracy” concluded Ahmad, “echoes the line of the communists who initially denounced them as ‘bourgeois’ institutions but later on accepted them” (Ahmad 2005: 310).

What it reveals at most is the change in the Jamaʿat elite and organisational type over time, and not a conceptual shift. In my analysis, despite organisational changes and strategic adjustments in the real politic like any other political party, the Jamaʿat remained subjected to Mawdudi’s ideological burden. In fieldwork, face-to-face meetings with a number of Jamaʿat activists from Lahore, Islamabad, Peshawar, Mardan and Dir, I
observed that every strategic adjustment by the Jama’at elite sent shock waves of unrest and fostered ambiguities.\footnote{Field notes, June-Aug 2006, Jan-Dec 2007.}

Whereas the Islamic movement’s elite and their views have received considerable attention in academic literature, I am not aware of a study that incorporates an activists’ view of the Jama’at. The Jama’at confronts crisis and tensions emanating from multiple sources. In its political history, the Jama’at leadership had to trade between its principles and power (Moten 2002: 140-41). This long process of accommodation of opportunity spaces in the market and politics creates multi-layered and multi-pronged grievances, tensions and ambiguities among the activists. These factors fall into the following groups: (1) Jama’at’s political decisions (participation/boycott from elections, joining alliances with religious and secular parties, electoral strategies, electoral bargaining, power struggle, etc); (2) in-group tensions mostly emanating from economic and social inequalities between activists, its leaders and intra-activists; (3) breakdown of the Jama’at interpretive framework to explain and satisfy emerging questions about multiple issues like gender relations, family planning, lifestyle, consumerism and others; and, (4) activists internal crisis and quest for exploring the truth.\footnote{Field notes; interviews and close interaction with Jama’at workers.} These factors are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive.

Here I agree with Moten (2002: 140-41) in crediting the Jama’at elite in having chosen all democratic and modern means (press conferences, elections, protests, public meetings) instead of violence and terrorism. The Jama’at (as well as other religious political parties) consistent participation in political process is instrumental in mobilising a large body of modern educated, urban and middle class professionals. It can also be credited with diverting a multitude of religiously motivated youth from violence and militancy into democratic politics and the realm of economic opportunities.\footnote{In my own analysis, the degree of threat can be only imagined if thousands of madrassa graduates (specifically from Deobandi madrassas) and the Jama’at activists did not have available the political opportunity in the form of JUI and the Jama’at.}
4.8 Concluding Remarks

In the third quarter of the 20th century, the idea of renewal transformed into a new form called political Islam or Islamism. It asserted, that “the revelation had the right to control all human experiences and that state power must be sought to achieve this end” (Robinson 2008: 260). This strand of renewal, Islamism, in the sub-continent developed in the specific material conditions where the role of the Western political and cultural hegemony was defining. This chapter showed that Mawdudi as main ideologue of Islamism transformed in response to his socio-political conditions and critically re-visited Islam to respond to these conditions. Mawdudi’s ideas, emergence of the Jama’at and various transformations of the Jama’at over time can be seen in light of these opening and closing opportunity spaces.

Using multiple sources of data (biography, Mawdudi’s own text, schisms in the Jama’at, news and manifesto content and ethnography of Islamism in a village), I have shown that Islamism, its proponents and its constituency is a modern project and cannot be encamped along with traditionalism. For brevity’s sake, the Islamist discourse divides into its hermeneutical approach and use of modern tools in its socio-political struggle for power. Whereas, the Jama’at can be safely labelled as a modern project in relation to the latter, the same is not completely true in the former case.

As I have shown in his writings, Mawdudi made a strong case for his departure from traditional fiqhi and theosophical approaches. He broke away from tradition, posed a critique even on the Prophet’s fellowmen, stood for ijtihad, criticised Sufism and traditional ulama for their stagnation, rationalised Islam, invoked new and revivalist meanings in the traditional vocabulary, ‘felt free to move from one school to the other’, synergised and formulated his own method. Yet, in issues of interpretation, he could not break the traditional clichés. This failure to take a decisive position over the corpus of Hadith and falling back to traditional Islam reduced the scope of reform in Pakistan. The ambiguity, tension and inconsistency springing from Mawdudi’s theoretical burden and the actual practice of the Jama’at places doubts on Moten’s claim of “transformation” of the Jama’at. Mainly two issues prevent the Islamist Jama’at from entering into a post-Islamist era: Islamists unceasing struggle to enforce religion through the state institutions and to Islamise society from above;
and the breakdown of the epistemological framework in which a broader social reform can be envisaged.

Ample theoretical and empirical evidence supports the claim that the Jama’at transformation has strategic and political connotations. Within the Jama’at, however, an ideological-conceptual transformation remained a distant dream. One reason might be the perpetual secession, disdain for and expulsion of scholars and intellectuals from the Jama’at at various times.

In 1956-57, the Jama’at and its founder, Mawdudi was confronted with an extraordinary situation of its history when scholars of repute including Islahi and Israr Ahmad resigned from the Jama’at on the basis of differences developed with Mawdudi’s views on certain issues. Of all those who left the Jama’at at the time, Islahi, the co-founder of the Jama’at, represents a substantial blow the aftershocks of which are felt even today. The next chapter is devoted to expending a new trend flowing from Islahi.

The following chapter will discuss the historic rupture in the Jama’at resulting in a number of influential members (including Islahi) resignations. Then, dwelling on this developing phase, the chapter will build on to the emergence and development of post-Islamism in Pakistan. Here I must say that the overall post-Islamist trend in Pakistan includes but exceeds the bounds of the intellectuals covered in the following pages.
5 The Genesis of Post-Islamism

Like any other major world cultures, Islam contains within itself an astonishing variety of currents and counter-currents (Said 2009)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter traces the genesis and proliferation of post-Islamism in relation to Mawdudi’s political ideology and builds the story of the Jama’at on these foundations. It begins with an overview of the history of fractures in Mawdudi’s Jama’at in the 1950’s, the vantage point of Islahi’s resignation and finally Ghamidi’s gradual transformation from Islamism to post-Islamism in the 1970’s. To understand the gradual transformation of Ghamidi’s ideas and his recommended strategy for social change, one must recognise the distinction between “old Ghamidi” and “new Ghamidi”. The former is an embodiment of an Islamist-activist in the mould of Mawdudi’s ideology, while the latter seems to be a changed post-Islamist intellectual seeking transformation of society with a bottom-up approach. The post-Islamist Ghamidi and his intellectual discourse are comprehended through his biography, writings and audio-video discussions. Ghamidi, his disciples and followers subscribe to the lineage of School of Shibli—a self-described category.

The central argument in this chapter is that through a re-reading of the prophetic epoch, Ghamidi—the post-Islamist ideologue—arrived at quite different conclusions. These conclusions provided the post-Islamists with the necessary weapons for not only attacking/discarding the Islamist thesis on political Islam, but also adopting a different approach for social change in the Muslim polities.
In the same way, this chapter vies for location of post-Islamism in modernity. I argue that despite being imbedded in tradition and the past, the post-Islamist discourse is modern. By offering discussion on four aspects of post-Islamism and modernity: The biography of Ghamidi—shows that he is modern (not modernist) in his lifestyle, attire, consumption, acquiring knowledge and receptive attitude towards modern scholarship. Unlike Mawdudi and traditionalists, Ghamidi’s unique interpretative approach and line of ijtihad is a radical departure from the traditional and Islamists’ frameworks. Post-Islamist reading and re-reading of history (i.e. prophetic career) is original, critical and might have far-reaching consequences for individuals, states and societies, and Ghamidi’s intellectual-cum-social trajectory/discourse community has made extensive use of modern technologies and products.

The period of 1956-58 was a turning point in the history of the Jama’at as this is when a number of leading figures and intellectuals left the organisation. Among such leading scholars, I focus on one grand scholar, Amin Ahsan Islahi, whose resignation from the Jama’at is treated here as the embryonic stage of post-Islamism in Pakistan. The shock waves set in motion by Islahi’s resignation on the issue of defining contours of the authority of the amir, left an everlasting effect. A discussion of this episode in this section is a gateway to the succeeding section that dwells in length on the biography, context, discourse, emergence and flow of post-Islamist intellectual trajectory in Pakistan. I will illuminate how Ghamidi’s interpretation of the prophetic career is different from Mawdudi. The significance of this difference is twofold: The life and strategy of the Prophet guide and inspire all trajectories of Islamic activism in education, preaching, jihad and politics and, a specific understanding of the prophetic career shapes the strategies of Islamic social forces for change as well as defining their attitudes towards issues like gender equality, art, jihad and relations with non-Muslims.

5.2 Islamism between Ideology and Pragmatic Politics

In 1947, the end of the colonial era in the sub-continent gave birth to two independent states (Pakistan and India), which resulted in the Jama’at splitting into Jama’at-e-Islami Hind and Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan. Mawdudi opted for migration to Pakistan in the hope that this country [Pakistan] created in the name of Islam would readily embrace his revivalist vision of an Islamic state (Nasr 1996: 41). This shows that the Ja-
ma’at accepted the new national boundaries as a legitimate reality and adjusted its politics accordingly. Not only national borders were accommodated in the framework of his revolutionary ideology, but in 1948, Mawdudi rejected to declare the validity of jihad by voluntary fighters in Kashmir in the presence of peace treaties between Pakistan and India.\(^{48}\) (Hashmi et al. 1995: 317-329). In the nascent state of Pakistan, the Jama’at initiated activism through well-knit workers, propagating political ideas of Mawdudi in society and the organisation of its workers, which assumed an “anti-state” gesture in politics. Inevitably, the Jama’at and the Pakistani state soon came into conflict over the question of the relationship between religion and the state/politics (Shahpuri 1989b; Binder 1961; Nasr 1994: 141-46).

In the first decade of its existence, the Jama’at pursued its Islamic agenda through moral persuasion and societal reform more than political means. The issue of participation in the general elections in the province of Punjab (1951) was decided by the shura and the application of a unique method for the nomination of candidates. This unique method involved formation of voters’ councils (panchayat), which determined the most pious (salih) candidates for the elections (Nasr 1994: 30). The goal was to avoid candidates canvassing for self-projection. Despite a crushing defeat in these elections, the Jama’at leadership considered participation a vehicle for broadening the party’s social base. However, participation also brought out the pent up grievances and accusations of misconduct by Jama’at candidates. A number of grievances surfaced against some ardent members allegedly violating the ethical standards set by Mawdudi for Jama’at workers (Nasr 1994: 33). Confusion, ambiguity, frustration and crisis followed. Disenchanted with transformation of the Jama’at from an educational-religious movement to a political tone, a number of Jama’at leaders left the movement. According to Nasr, Mawdudi assumed a style of politician than a scholar (1996: 43).

In response, Mawdudi constituted an eight member review committee (later reduced to four) to consult all Jama’at members in Pakistan and investigate the causes of their discontent with the Jama’at programme and strategy. The review committee submitted its report in November 1956 (Ahmad 2005: 12-13). The findings of the committee stunned the

\(^{48}\) A Secretary-level agreement was signed between the government of India and Pakistan on 19 April 1948 called the “Calcutta Agreement.”
highest ranks of the Jama’at including Mawdudi. They confronted accusations of transgressions, financial mismanagement by its own ardent members, and deviation from original goals. The committee’s report, submitted to shura in November 1956, unequivocally stated that the Jama’at had deviated from its own goals set by its founding members and Mawdudi himself (Nasr 1996: 34). The report suggested that the Jama’at should stay away from future general elections and instead concentrate on educational and dawah/preaching activities (Ahmad 1991: 7-11). For discussion on the review committee’s findings, the shura convened on 25 November 1956. After 15 days of consultation, the shura meeting ended with the adoption of a four-point resolution. According to Israr Ahmad, from the shura meeting (November 1956) to the Machchi Goth members’ session (February 1957), the Jama’at suffered severe crises (shadeed buhran) which finally “caused a death blow to the Jama’at of 1941” and gave birth to a “new” Jama’at-e-Islami” (Ahmad 1991: 9). Significantly, this crisis precipitated the desertion of 50 to 60 ardent Jama’at members, including Amin Ahsan Islahi, and all members of the review committee49 (Ahmad 2005: 13).

5.3 Choosing an Appropriate Strategy: Top-Down or Bottom-Up

The Jama’at’s central shura meeting on the review committee’s findings, which continued for 15 days, saw a heated debate splitting the shura in half with contrasting approaches to the goals of societal and state transformation. One half insisted on the Jama’at early return to its original bottom-up approach of 1951, while the other was adamant to continue with the recently adopted top-down strategy (Ahmad 1991: 24-26). In Israr Ahmad’s opinion, Amin Ahsan Islahi belonged to the former group and not the latter (1991: 26; Islahi 1991: 53-78). The four-point resolution was to bridge this gap between the two camps offering a temporary solace.

To oversee and monitor the progress of the four-point resolution, another committee, with Islahi as a member convened (Ahmad 1991: 27-28). The substance of the resolution, if adopted in letter and spirit, could

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49 The names of the committee members are: (1) Hakeem Abdul Rahim Ashraf (2) Mawlana Abdul Jabbar Ghazi (3) Mawlana Abdul Ghaffar Hasan (4) Shaikh Sultan Ahmad
have brought the Jamaʿat back to its four-point agenda\footnote{These points were: (1) reformation of individual Muslims, (2) training and organization of pious individuals, (3) societal reform, and (4) reforming the government and political structure. See in Nasr’s \textit{Vanguard}, p.31.} set in 1951, thus stifling every effort at dragging it into the realm of active politics. The mere anticipation of this end pitched the young and zealous leaders, desirous of an active political role even at the cost of compromising the Jamaʿat’s ethical standards, against the ulama. Mawdudi, overwhelmed by the former’s force of conviction, chose their company and parted ways with the opposing ulama group (Nasr 1994: 34). Israr Ahmad proclaimed that the Jamaʿat had deviated from its earlier chosen path (Ahmad 2004: 121). Dissatisfied with the review committee’s findings and its fall out, Mawdudi issued a charge against members of the committee calling into question its composition, terms of reference, jurisdiction and intentions (Ahmad 1991: 31-5). He accused members of the committee of a conspiracy against the Jamaʿat and demanded their resignations. The four members approached Islahi for justice.

Islahi came to the defence of the committee’s rights and findings and instead accused Mawdudi of being under the spell of some insiders’ propaganda (Islahi 1991). He termed this campaign, “undemocratic” and against the Jamaʿat’s constitution. Islahi vociferously “defended the constitutional powers of the shura against what he regarded as encroachments upon them by the amir” (Nasr 1994: 36). Islahi’s resentment over Mawdudi’s autocratic attitude as amir appeared in the strongest terms: “[…] if this is democracy and shuracracy, then Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin were its better teachers … In this regard, the nation does not require our services” (Islahi 1991: 77). This debate, between Mawdudi and Islahi, on violation or otherwise of democratic principle within the Jamaʿat, was held through correspondence in the late 1950s.

At the Machchi Goth session, Islahi agreed that the content of Mawdudi’s new resolution be presented before the Jamaʿat members. Islahi had consented on the condition that some changes would be made to the new resolution in light of the consensus resolution passed in shura session of December 1956. Islahi insisted on upholding balance and moderation (\textit{tawazun}) between the four-points outlined in 1951. As corollary, it implied that the Jamaʿat should pay more attention to the first three-points [reform, training and organising individuals and society]
over the last one [reforming the government and state structures]. Reform of the state and political structure, as understood from Islahi's view, would accompany the quantum of efforts gone into the first three tasks [reformation of individual and society and its training and organisation] (Ahmad 1991: 119, Islahi 1991, Nasr 1994: 38). Islahi also warned against the disruptive implications of following a “reverse order” of the same process. That is, a reverse order was sure to fail (Ahmad 1991:119).

Here I want to add that Islahi’s mutation from Islamism to post-Islamism remained incomplete; that is, he withdrew from a top-down to bottom-up approach but remained committed to the very idea and building blocks of an Islamic state. However, his hermeneutic approach shaped Ghamidi and the latter post-Islamist discourse in Pakistan.

The Machchi Goth session ended with Mawdudi’s celebration of a new strategy outlined in his long speech (Mawdudi 1997). At the cost of a split with the founding members and ardent supporters from the ulama, he consolidated his position within the Jama’at as sole “spokesman” and leader of his own brainchild—the Jama’at-e-Islami. With other choices dwindling, a number of ardent intellectuals, ulama, and activists including Islahi quit the Jama’at in the following years. To Nasr, the Machchi Goth affair marked the “end of ideology” and beginning of pragmatic politics and decision making in the party’ (Nasr 1994: 41). Although, Islahi’s and other’s resignations did not result in “mass exodus” from the Jama’at, it pushed the Jama’at into an ever-growing intellectual deficit. In my own analysis, Islahi and his intellectual input in the Jama’at was unparalleled by any other person except Mawdudi. He contributed to the development of vocabulary and jargon of Islamism through his works, which remain popular among Jama’at activists. His presence in the Jama’at also served as a “critical bridge” between an Islamist Mawdudi and his own intellectual lineage of Farahi and Shibli. The loss of “intellectual momentum” in the Jama’at is also reflected by the fact that “most of Mawdudi’s own seminal works, outlining his views on Islam, society and politics had been written between 1932 and 1948” (Nasr 1994: 40).

The turbulent history of the Jama’at’s has witnessed expulsions/resignations of a multitude of activists including intellectual-scholars. Mawlana Naumani’s resignation in 1941 was followed by more than 50 scholars-writers-ulama from the Jama’at in the 1950s. Likewise, Mawlana Abdul Rahim left the Jama’at in Bangladesh and developed his
own intellectual trajectory. In the 1990s, a number of activists and ulama opposed the reforms inaugurated by Qazi Husain Ahmad—the then amir of the Jama’at—and formed their own “Islamic movement” (Te-

hreek-e-Islami). Dr Israr Ahmad seceded from the Jama’at in late 1950s and Javed Ahmad Ghamidi in the 1970s. Ghamidi and Israr Ahmad are closely linked to Islahi, as both remained under the tutelage of Islahi. A number of writers/scholars/activists belong to a category that expected a Marxist revolution (of creating a society where people enjoy equal status) in Mawdudi’s envisioned Islamic state. This scholarship was misled by modern terms (such as revolution) liberally employed by Mawdudi to communicate his message. An empirical example of this category is Kau-
kab Siddiq, “a onetime Jama’at stalwart and translator of Mawdudi into English.” According to Nasr, Mawdudi did not approve “Siddiq’s openly Marxist rendition of his views.” This resulted into Siddiq’s secession from the Jama’at (1996: 75).

Another scholar of the Farahi School, Wahiduddin Khan, developed a critique of Mawdudi’s Islamist ideology in his classic “Error in Interpre-
tation” (t’abeer ki ghalati) in the early 1960s. He left the Jama’at in 1962. Khan, who was an activist in Indian Jama’at and a member of central executive, attacked the very basis of Mawdudi’s revivalist thought. The statement “political reading of religion” (din ki siyasi tashreeh) was first used by Khan in his methodical critique of Mawdudi (Khan 1995).

Whereas the Jama’at, its ideology and organisation and its political struggle has received considerable academic attention, the seceding voic-
es and their respective intellectual-social trajectories are often neglected. In what follows, I trace the historical roots of one intellectual trajecto-
ry—Ghamidi and his post-Islamist thought. Beginning with two prominent scholars whose influence on Ghamidi is substantial and defining.

Before, I discuss the genesis of post-Islamism, a brief introductory note is necessary regarding Ghamidi’s teacher—Amin Ahsan Islahi and Islahi’s mentor, Hamid-ud-Din Farahi. The latter was a great theologian-
scholar and explorer of the theory of thematic coherence/Nazm-e-
Qur’an in the Qur’an. Intellectually, post-Islamist scholarship subscribes to academic works of Farahi and Islahi (Ghamidi 2008; Nadeem 2008).
5.4 Intellectual Biography of Farahi and Islahi

Farahi (1862-1930) was a cousin and a student of the eminent theologian-historian Shibli Naumani. After acquiring skills in Arabic and Persian from tutors in a traditional manner, Farahi gained admission in Sir Sayyid’s MAO College. Commenting on Farahi’s skills in Arabic and Persian, Sir Sayyid lauded them as far better than the college’s professors. After graduation from Allahabad University, Farahi taught at various places. During his teaching stint at Aligarh, Farahi learned Hebrew from German Orientalist Joseph Horovitz (1874-1931) and taught the latter Arabic. Farahi conceived of an institution that taught traditional and modern sciences in Urdu language which led to the idea of Uthmania University in Hyderabad (1919).\(^{51}\) Farahi returned to his village in 1925 and resumed charge of his Madrassa al-Islah (The Reform School). Farahi’s extraordinary finding in intellectual terms was the thesis of internal coherence in the Qur’an.

Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahi was born in 1904 to a small land-owning family of Bhamhur, a village in Azamgarh, U.P, India (Islahi 2004). After his early education from local schools, Islahi joined Farahi’s Madrasat-al-Islah at grade three in 1915. During study in this Madrassa, he came under the intellectual influence of Mawlana Nigrami and Farahi.

In 1922, Islahi graduated from Farahi’s Madrassa-al-Islah and began his career as a journalist; first editing a newspaper Medina at Bijnawr, and then worked as Sach, a newspaper edited by Mawlana Daryabadi. Like his contemporary Mawdudi, Islahi too joined this modern profession instead of becoming a traditional theological functionary. The Indian freedom movement also influenced Islahi and he worked as the president of a local chapter of the Congress Party.\(^{52}\)

In 1925, Farahi invited his former student, Islahi, to study Qur’an. Farahi called on Islahi to help him complete his deliberation on the Qur’an based on his thematic coherence approach (Ghamidi 2008: 99-131). Islahi abandoned his career as a journalist and joined his teacher for thorough deliberations and understanding of the Qur’an from 1925 to 1930. After Farahi passed away in 1930, Islahi continued dissemina-

\(^{51}\) Farahi’s vision of a university can be compared with that of Sir Sayyid. It was during Sir Sayyid’s visit to England, specifically Cambridge University, when he dreamt of a like university in the India. It seems to have Shibli’s influence.

tion of his approach and ideas. He founded The Hamidiyya Circle (*Daiyatab-e-Hamidiyyah*) in 1936, and started publishing a periodical called The Reform (*al-Islah*) which continued until 1939. Islahi and Mawdudi co-founded the Jama’at-e-Islami in 1941. He remained with the Jama’at for 17 years.

In 1958, Islahi parted ways with the Jama’at after differences between him and Mawdudi emerged over the authority of the amir, and “the nature of the constitution of the Jama’at.”

According to Islahi, electioneering was a useless way of bringing about social change in society (Islahi 1991). For Islahi, the foremost objective of politicians is consolidation of power, not establishing Islam. Therefore, Dawah and not “political propaganda” was the right methodology. Islahi shifted his emphasis to the inner dimensions of individual and society perpetually under attack from the most dreadful malaise—hypocrisy. In connection to Pakistan’s leadership and their tactics to transform it into an Islamic state, Islahi wrote:

Hypocrisy is a deadly disease, and there have been in every age and society some people who were afflicted with it, but we do not find in history a single nation whose leaders have chosen it as a “national policy”, taking it to be the “key” to the “resolution of all their problems”. In history there seems to be only one such nation and that is unfortunately our nation (Pakistani).53

The above description not only reflects Islahi’s shifting emphasis in his post-Islamist intellectual and societal career but also the embryonic phase of a counter-discourse to the state-centred approach of the Islamists. Islahi’s counter-discourse was based on his new vision to flood society with a new reflective consciousness. This was not the job of politicians, and the realm was not the domain of political activism. Islahi’s social analysis of bringing about a genuine change in society premised on the belief that an intellectual transformation in light of Qur’an is required. These initial premises transformed into a developed argument by Ghamidi and his circle in favour of the need for a society-centred social movement.

In derivation of his revivalist thought, Mawdudi aptly extended application of duress (situations of compulsion where a person is left with no other options, but to choose a lesser sin/evil). That is, who may be in

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53 Ibid.
duress—iztirar (Islahi 1991: 97; Iftikhar 2005: 77). Mawdudi depicted Islam under siege, in duress, by internal and external hegemonic forces. According to Islahi, Islam is not in such duress. Making duress a similarity between individual and Islam will lead to a condition where Islam will “require its followers to violate its principles for its political growth” (Iftikhar 2005: 77). Islahi accused Mawdudi of employing “strategy” and “practical wisdom” as the basis of determining permissible and impermissible. Whereas, argues Islahi, this principle in religion was associated with duress and not strategy (1991: 99).

During the period, the Machchi Goth affair, Jama’at future in electoral politics and the authority of the amir all attracted the interest of scholars. Most scholarship on the Jama’at has deliberated on this episode (Bahadur 1977; Moten 2002; Nasr 1994). However, for the present researcher, Islahi’s resignation from the Jama’at in 1958 transcends all bounds of mere internal dissent and schism in Mawdudi’s community. After his resignation (in 1958), Islahi lived a long life (d.1997) with uncompromising attention toward completion of his monumental exegetical project—Tadabbur-e-Qur’an (Reflecting on Qur’an: his nine-volume commentary on the Qur’an). This project started in 1958 and completed in 1980, took 23 years to complete. According to Islahi, the masterpiece—Tadabbur-e-Qur’an—is the outcome of almost a century long deliberations on the Qur’an; his teacher Farahi spent 30-35 years while he devoted 55 years of his life to the task. The post-Islamists emphatically assert that Islahi’s Tafseer has had no parallel in all of Islamic history (Nadeem 2008).

As opposed to the traditional methodology of exegesis (tafseer bil riwayat), Islahi followed a direct approach to interpretation of Qur’an. This approach seeks to comprehend meanings in the Qur’an in light of its language, and context, while taking cues from dominant Arabic literature at the time of revelation. In addition, this approach strives toward understanding the context of every chapter, following the principle of internal coherence/nazm. The nazm principle states that each chapter is a complete/self-contained and well-knit unit of analysis having common features of introduction, a central theme and suitable epilogue summatting the entire content of the chapter (Masud 2007). In addition to intra-surah coherence, the Qur’an exhibits inter-surah coherence as well. Following this principle of internal order in the Qur’an, Islahi divided the
book into seven well-defined groups of chapters, with each group having eloquence and a central theme.\textsuperscript{54}

Islahi considers his interpretative method “scientific, rational, and based on common sense, without which the true message and beauty of the Qur’an cannot be understood or appreciated.”\textsuperscript{55} About academic freedom and critical deliberation, Islahi expounds confidently that; people should not expect blind submission from him; and that critical deliberation/reflection (\textit{ghawar wa taddabur}) is the most exalted virtues of all human possessions (Nadeem 2008: 170-71).

Thus, the troika of Farahi-Islahi-Ghamidi founded a new school in the field of exegesis (\textit{tafseer}), where the latter two added on to the exegetical principles laid down by Farahi. One of the main claims stemming from Farahi-Islahi-Ghamidi nazm approach is the possibility of only one interpretation of the Qur’an, that is, monovocality of the text. This, if achieved, argues Ghamidi, can bridge the gap between sectarian divide that feeds on the competing interpretations of the Qur’an without adhering to the principles of nazm. Further, this approach enhances the possibility of appropriating new space within the vocabulary and verses of the Qur’an compatible with social reform and modernisation efforts in Muslim societies. By using this approach, these scholars internalise the context to Qur’an and thus differ with Islamic Modernists who historicise. However, the claim to monovocality of the text may itself end up developing an exclusivist reading of the doctrinal sources. Some of his ex-fellows have examined empirical examples that reflect that post-Islamists reliance on this approach might create inconsistency and incoherence (Ansari 2009).

Islahi’s abandonment of Jama’at political activism and his determination to avoid practical politics did not mean that his ideas went unnoticed by the state and society. It also does not imply his detachment from issues and debates around him. He persistently printed his research findings in his own initiated journals: \textit{Mithaq} (started in 1960s), and then \textit{Taddabur} (started in 1981). As an intellectual, he used Qur’anic study circles and print activism, to remain engaged with society and state. In 1961, Islahi established “The Circle for Reflecting on the Qur’an” (\textit{Hal-

\textsuperscript{54} Islahi modified Farahi nine groups into seven. Similarly, Islahi viewed that each two chapters/surahs within a group forms a pair (\textit{tawwam}).

\textsuperscript{55} Accessed at: <http://www.amin-ahsan-islahi.com/?=5>
qa-e-Tadabbur-e-Qur’an) reinvented under the name of “The Circle for Reflecting on the Qur’an and Hadith” in 1981 (Ghamidi 2008), which continued until 1993. These circles were a kind of “solidarity network” where Qur’an became the central point of intellectual deliberations, and Islahi as the teacher-mentor in a teacher-disciple relationship. This was the complete opposite of Sheikh-Disciple relationship as envisaged in Sufism, where the disciple is obliged to follow the sheikh blindly without raising questions on his ideas and approach. Qur’an being the centre of his indhar-activism, Islahi posed a considerable challenge to the dominant approaches of traditional ulama, and even the Islamists in some instances. Once ardent member of the Jama’at, and now founder of his own Islamist organisation—Tanzeeem-e-Islami—Dr Israr Ahmad broke away from Islahi because of non-traditional views about the punishment of stoning to death (rajam). The same view also invoked harsh criticism and protests from the traditional ulama and Islamists after a court of law decided an adultery case in light of Islahi’s views (Ghamidi 2008). After this controversy, the Zia regime reconstituted the court. In the aftermath of the turmoil in the early 1980s, Ghamidi broke his silence and defended his teachers’ stance on the issue. In 1965 when Ayub Khan was running for the presidential elections against Fatima Jinnah, Islahi wrote an article in his journal. The article favoured Ayub Khan’s candidacy in the election, and so the government had it circulated widely. It is worth recalling that in the same elections, Mawdudi and his Jama’at were supporting Fatima Jinnah as against General Ayub Khan. Mawdudi’s stance was in contrast to his own position about women’s candidature for head of state. After winning the election, Ayub Khan contacted Islahi for a meeting that was conditionally accepted. According to Rauf, Islahi declined to accept Ayub’s offer of appointing him as Vice Chancellor of Islamia University, Bahawalpur (Rauf 2006: 151). As an Islamist and member of the Jama’at, Islahi also spent weeks behind bars in the anti-Qadiyani movement in 1951. Furthermore, the government formed an Islamic Law Commission in 1956 where Islahi worked as a member, but Ayub Khan abolished the commission in 1958.

56 Dr Rauf mentioned the conditions put forward by Islahi as (1) no guard will stop Islahi; and (2) the meeting will not be reported in the press, Rauf (2006) chapter 2, p.10.
Apart from his most important work, *Tadabbur-e-Qur’an*, Islahi authored around 18 books covering various religious, legal, social and political issues. Some of his books still form an important part of Jama’at training literature.

In 1973, Ghamidi and Islahi met and the former came under Islahi’s influence. Islahi influenced Ghamidi’s approach and method of understanding Qur’an and Hadith.

5.5 From Islamism to Post-Islamism: Arrival of Ghamidi

This biographical account of Ghamidi derives primarily from his own autobiographical essays published in *Maqamaat* (Signposts). This book, written in a Persianized and Arabicized Urdu idiom, is a collection of Ghamidi’s emotive and intellectual reflections on his own development in the historical and socio-political conditions (2008: 13-44). Ghamidi explained the reasons for writing these autobiographical essays, as researchers’ and writers’ interest in his life, ideas and works grow. “They wanted to know about us. In this quest, they made grave mistakes due to lack of authentic biographical information. So I decided to explain my intellectual development in these essays.”57 Ghamidi’s statement and the considerable Internet traffic on the subject is a good indicator showing increasing trends in the size of his audience and expanding constituency—mostly urban, middle and upper-middle classes, modern educated youth. Ghamidi’s narrative of his ceaseless struggle and for that matter of Mawdudi’s, Farahi’s and Islahi’s, “tell about a humble beginning, migration, and lonely struggle” (Masud 2009b). The drawback of autobiographies is that they are not critical.

Ghamidi was born on 18 April 1951 to a peasant family in the Sahiwal district of Punjab, Pakistan; exactly a decade after Mawdudi founded his Jama’at. His father wholeheartedly subscribed to a Sufi order of the subcontinent. Sufism was thus the first religio-intellectual school he was exposed to; a school he would latter criticise harshly, for its theology, method and Sheikh-Murid relationship (Ghamidi 2006: 159-88). After receiving his early education from local schools, Ghamidi did his matriculation in 1967 at Islamia High School in Pakpattan. In class seven, one of his teachers, a member of the Jama’at at Pakpattan he was introduced to Mawdudi’s literature. This was a first major shift in his intellectual life.

57 Ghamidi and Shehzad Saleem, telephone interviews, November 2009.
According to Ghamidi, he read all major works by Mawdudi and this “opened a new realm of knowledge and activism (‘ilm wa ‘amal)” (2008:19-20).

Under the tutelage of a local religious functionary, Ghamidi acquired initial skills in Arabic and Persian. Ghamidi had finished all books taught in the traditional religious course, Dars-e-Nizami, side by side his grade 10 studies (2008:19). Like Mawdudi, Ghamidi’s strength lies in his extraordinary self-reading skills. He relates that in class 10, he requested an exemption from class attendance from his head teacher, so that he could concentrate on self-reading (ibid:21). After doing his matriculation, Ghamidi moved to the city of Lahore, the main cultural and intellectual centre of Punjab, Pakistan. In the elitist Government College (GC) Lahore, he opted for English literature and philosophy as optional subjects. The GC and Lahore city presented, says Ghamidi, a galaxy of diverse scholars, poets and writers. He specifically mentions one private tutor who taught him Arabic, and whose lineage traces back to tutors of late 19th century intellectual tradition—Shibli and Farahi (ibid: 22). Ghamidi recalls his five-year long stay at GC and his scholarly appropriations,

[in these years] my routine was such that I would leave my residence early in the morning and after attending lectures [at GC] will sit in the library till evening. I would also visit scholars and attend their discussions … I would spend hours reading books for free at certain bookshops where certain publishers had provided this facility (2008: 23).

In 1973, one year after finishing his studies in English literature at GC Lahore, Ghamidi learned of Farahi and through his works about Islahi (ibid: 23). He approached Islahi in person and in this encounter realised,

Religion is not just uncritical submission, rather something intelligible and transferrable to others. The truth dawned on me [Ghamidi] that Qur’an is the ultimate arbiter (qawl-e-faisal); a scale for the entire religious content and a conclusive proof (hujjat) for the whole world. In the light of the Qur’an, we can judge the validity of Fiqh, Hadith, Philosophy, Mysticism, History and International Relations. For me, this was the starting point of exploring a “new Qur’an”… the Mawlana [Islahi] told me that if I was interested in reading Qur’an in this fashion then I should discard all desires of becoming a political leader in the Islamic mould. This entailed making a retreat for deliberation and intellectual contemplation. “Be determined that if, in the way of truth, you stand alone and your own shadow (saaya) deserts you, never sacrifice your true convictions” (ibid: 24).
Islahi’s message was a call to abandon political Islam in favour of intellectual contemplation. This message echoed the call to Islahi by his teacher Farahi in 1922. Whereas, Islahi abandoned journalism for deliberations on Qur’an and the Nazm-e-Qur’an principles; the call to Ghamidi inspired him the same way. In essence, both calls culminated in the inauguration of profound intellectualism more than populist genres of activism. In response, Ghamidi abandoned his graduation studies and joined Islahi as a disciple. This phase lasted for 10 years in which Ghamidi acquired skills in deliberation on Qur’an, Hadith and some current issues in modern philosophy. The long teacher-disciple relationship ended in 1983 with a profound impact on him:

In 1983, when this phase of education [as a private student with Islahi] ended, it had shaken up my entire belief system. Everything seemed to be leaving its place: fiqh, jurisprudence, mysticism and theology were now looking for its basis in the Qur’an. All existing explanations of the right interpretation of religion had come under criticism. My castle of ideas had been demolished and its new construction demanded fresh arrangements. So this [intellectual arrangements] claimed the next seven years of my life (2008: 26).

During this period, he confronted the reality of diminishing faith in the prevailing traditional approaches to understanding Islam. He had lost what he achieved ideologically as Islamist, and was ready to re-construct his ideas on the new lines of Farahi-Islahi thought. During this long period, Ghamidi concentrated on the entire contents of religion and specifically determined the principles for deliberations on the Qur’an, Hadith and extracting of Islamic injunction from these two sources (GML: 001). In the same period, he accessed the first critical work by Wahiduddin Khan (an ardent member of the Jama’at at the time) and was persuaded by Khan’s critical assessment of Mawdudi’s thought. In his work “Error in Interpretation”, Khan critically evaluates Mawdudi’s assertion of Islam as a system of life and a movement. He asserted that Mawdudi had inverted the fundamental notion of religion, which is self-purification (tazkia) and not the establishment of a political empire (Khan 1995).

Ghamidi recalls those moments when his fast-establishEd intellectual constructs crashed under the weight of serious academic questions (Ghamidi 2008).

On Sufism, his criticism surpassed that of Mawdudi and others. While he was a believer in the utility and revival of the Sufi-institution of
Khanqah (Sufi lodge), as regards purification of the soul and solutions to psychological problems based on modern consumer culture and uprooted individuals in the metropolitan environments, he was extremely critical of the theology of Sufism. He considered it a parallel religion vis-à-vis the doctrine of tazkiyya, which is the goal of religion. His criticism of Sufism appears in his book *Burhan*. It seems that for Ghamidi, criticism of Sufism is more an issue of theological concern than sociological as with Islamic modernists (see chapter 3).

Ghamidi had never been a student in the religious madrassa. On this very point, the traditional ulama question his position as a religious scholar. In response, he constructs an eclectic genealogy of scholars discussed later in this chapter.

After expulsion from the Jama’at, Ghamidi gradually felt the increasing distance from Mawdudi’s ideology and drifted under the influence of Islahi’s intellectual currents. This period represents the most important phase in his intellectual transformation from “Old Ghamidi” to “New Ghamidi” (from Islamist Ghamidi to post-Islamist Ghamidi). The post-Islamist Ghamidi, like his teacher Islahi after dissociating from Islamism, no longer believed in social transformation through power politics and state apparatuses. In his imagination, a corpus of ulama, intellectuals, writers and preachers should create a counter-discourse and then invade the habits and thoughts of entrenched social forces like feudalism, clergy, military dictatorships and socio-economic injustices. In my own analysis, as also evident from his various activisms in the 1980s and 1990s, it was a conceptual and not practical transformation.

The first change in his intellectual perspective came when, as a religious scholar he encountered unsatisfactory results from application of the Islamic law of inheritance. It was the first time Ghamidi faced the breakdown of a traditional interpretative framework. With a problem-based approach, Ghamidi tried to correct the results but it did not satisfy him (GML: 1-A). However, religion as a composite whole, its epistemological principles and interpretation had not yet become the focus of his attention. The second transformative event occurred in 1982 after which he devoted himself to academic understanding of various Islamic sciences. However, instead of contemplation on philosophical and moral content prior to issues of Islamic law (Shar’ia), Ghamidi’s intellectual journey took the reverse order due to unfolding events in Zia’s state-sponsored drive for Islamisation (GML: 1-A). One of the remarkable
events in the context of the same Islamisation move changed the course of Ghamidi’s intellectual career and social life. The judge of the Federal Shar’ia Court (FSC) decided a rajam case in light of Ghamidi’s teacher, Islahi’s opinion. There were demonstrations and protests by the religious forces to the effect that FSC was entirely dissolved and reconstituted with ulama as its judges. Ghamidi, as a student of Islahi, came forward to address this situation (ibid). After a critical review of Islahi’s opinion and arguments in that matter (the rajam punishment), he found it almost satisfactory. Ghamidi spent three years in reading and comprehending works on that issue. It was the first time that religious content as a whole appeared as an issue before abrogating his previous problem-based approach (ibid). He realised that the issue at hand was not confined to partial (jur'ee) Islamic penalties; rather it involved general principles (ku-liyyat). The latter involved a complex web of issues nested in debates that are more complicated (GML: 1-A). Beginning in 1985 and continuing for ten years, he immersed himself in the content of religion as a whole and in the quest for the “true religion” (din-e-haq) (GML: 1-A). It was during this process in 1990-91 that he felt the need of to write a comprehensive single textbook on religion explaining religious content from beginning to its ultimate end. In 1985, Ghamidi started publishing his own journal in Urdu Ishraq, which became the medium for Ghamidi’s ideas in Pakistan. The English-language journal Renaissance launched in 1991. The scope of both the journals, however, targeted limited readership as it catered mostly to well-read and learned community. Later, a dawah edition was published to reach a wider audience. The Ishraq-dawah edition is regularly published from Karachi now. Leafing through his intellectual biography, Ghamidi explains,

my own [intellectual] condition reflected a pantheon of ideas (butkada-e-tasawwafah) where I sculpted ideas and I worshiped them and then I smashed them down … in 1990, ultimately the ground was ready for laying the foundations of a new building/construct …. I was turning on 40, and had acquired clarity of thought to a greater extent … I am working on my authorial project for the last 17 years now (2008: 27).

In short, Ghamidi’s graduation to his current intellectual standing is rooted in constant ruptures and transformations. His dissatisfaction with the existing revivalist approaches and the breakdown of the traditional framework was instrumental in shaping his intellectual development.
Interaction with a number of post-Islamist scholars revealed their change from Islamist ideology and activism to the current worldview was a function of multiple internal and external crises. These issues caused their discontent, dissent and ultimate defection from Islamist thought and socio-political activism. For some, the ideological vacuum within the Jama’a became the ultimate cause; a popular post-Islamist scholar and ex-member of the Jama’a revealed the story of his defection,

I was an activist in the Jama’a and a member of its provincial shura. In 1991, I wrote a book raising a number of issues concerning music, family planning, and women visibility in public places. After the book was out, the Jama’a senior members contacted and accused me of “deviation” from the “consensus position” (ijma’i masayel). By God, I did not know what the Ijma‘i position was; and what was the opinion of Mawdudi and other Islamists like Qutb on Ijma’ … I had many questions but no answers in Mawdudi’s framework. I came to know about Ghamidi and his thoughts, which satisfactorily addressed my discontent.58

Other activists experienced a parallel-simultaneous process between Islamist activism and their turn to post-Islamist worldview:

My dissent, with the Jama’a ideology and activism, was a function of simultaneous processes: on the one hand, I listened to Ghamidi’s audio lectures and his deep analysis enhanced my critical ability, and on the other hand, the Jama’a internal tensions were reinforcing my discontent. I must say that essentially, my switching to Ghamidi’s ideas was the result of the logical appeal of it and not primarily my intellectual discontent within the Jama’a … but these new ideas made me critical about the ideology and practices of the Jama’a activists.59

Yet for others, the crisis was so deeply entrenched that it led them into a condition of near-disbelief and suspicion over the very existence of any Creator:

I subscribed to Barelvi [Sufi] ideology. In 1980s, the Afghan jihad and then Mawdudi’s ideology changed my views in favour of armed jihad. However, reading habit and critical thinking created some questions … at a certain stage, I was left with only two options: either to live like a “hypocrite,” having a Muslim name and following materialism, where the primary aim

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58 Dr Farooq Khan, telephone interview, February 2010.
59 Saleem Safi, follow up discussion, January 2010.
is seeking worldly pursuits but religion accompanies you as a cultural identity; or deliberate on the whole issue from its foundations. I opted for the second one … in this journey, I studied Arabic, comparative religions etc.,…as activist, closely observed Islamic movements … but two scholars, Wahiduddin Khan [Indian scholar and ex-member of the Jama’at] and Ghamidi, and their approach was appealing to me in the light of my own knowledge and reason.60

Brief Analysis

The above discussion is self-evident in manifesting the dwindling strength and energies of Islamist project to hold some of its internal critics together. For the post-Islamists in question, their diminishing belief in Islamism was a result of a numerous forces. Their dissent began with the ambiguity and fissures in mainstream Islamism (the Jama’at) and it further grew because of many Islamist experimentations—the state-led drive of Zia’s Islamisation in the 1980s, the Islamists’ consistent defeats in the elections in the 1990s and the drop-scene of the Afghan jihad project. Despite inaugurating a reconstructionist phase in the 1980s, Ghamidi was attracted to various modes of activism. In the 1980s and 90s, he tried to revive one or other forms of activism to reach a larger public (2008:18-44). However, they all seem to have failed. Inspired by the Islamic Salvation Front’s electoral success in Algeria, the then amir of the Jama’at established a political party named Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF established in 1993). Ghamidi and some of his fellows joined the PIF. However, they were soon disillusioned by the very idea of creating an Islamic state through elections. In response to the Jama’at defeat in the 1993 elections, Ghamidi wrote an essay Islami Inqilab where he seems to have totally discarded the possibility of an Islamic revolution through electoral politics of the current Islamist parties (2006: 274-87). Analysis of their various social activism in the 1980s and 90s show that realisation of their current worldview (strategy for social change) is greatly shaped by their increasing disillusionment of the Islamist project both at state and society levels.

What follows exposes the major theoretical postulates of the post-Islamist intellectual movement. First, Ghamidi’s re-reading of the Prophetic career will be delineated. The critical re-reading of the Prophetic

60 Rehan Yusufi, telephone interview, 3/2/2010; also see his article Ishraq: aik dawat aik mission: last accessed on 3/2/2010.
mission inaugurates new meaning and a post-Islamist discourse, which is not only in sharp contrast with the Islamist reading but also calls for defining key issues and debates anew.

5.6 Re-Reading of the Prophetic Career

Ghamidi’s revisit of the prophetic era suggests that the Islamists’ formulation of strategy by imitating the divinely guided life of the Prophet was a grave mistake and clear deviation from divine rules. This scheme is divinely monitored and regulated, allowing no deviation. Before discussing the implications of the post-Islamists’ revisit of the prophetic era, it is imperative to understand the concept of Messengerhood (Risalat) presented by Ghamidi and his school. The inauguration of this new framework (special status of the Messenger, his transcendental mission that ends in conclusive argument and administration of punishment and reward by him) enables them to engage critically with Islamists and traditionalists on a number of issues. This framework is called Itmam-e-Hujjat Framework (IHF) in the rest of the thesis.

The IHF stems from distinguishing the concept of Prophet (nabi) from the Messenger (rasul). A faulty notion of the prophetic career is said to be the cause of a number of modern misunderstandings in the Muslim world, which has set the wrong precedence/exemplary practices before us. The following will outline briefly Ghamidi’s approach to the prophetic mission—the IHF.

For Ghamidi, the central theme of the Qur’an is biographical account and the narrative of the prophetic admonition (2009a: 1). According to this approach, the nabi admonishes his people and those he admonishes may sometimes harm him. All Messengers enjoy the status of a nabi but not the other way around. The Messenger is sent with an additional responsibility to administer His scheme of reward and punishment (dainoo-nat), which is assumed to be held on the Day of Judgment (Iftikhar 2005). In this capacity, the status of Messenger is an elevated position with extraordinary responsibility. Out of many prophets, only about 313 were assigned this divine task to establish Divine scheme of reward and punishment on earth. This administration thus becomes an “historical testimony to the truth of the Final Day of Judgment” (Iftikhar 2005:83). The established divine practice in this connection is that the Messenger and his fellows will necessarily triumph over his nation in the Messenger’s lifetime. He propagates the divine message until it becomes conclu-
sive evidence with no excuse left with the addressees. In Qur’anic terms, this is a demonstration of “testifying to the truth of God and religion before people” (shahadah al-alnas). After coming forth of the IHF, if the primary addressees of the Messenger still deny the truth out of sheer arrogance, then the divine punishment to them is administered either by: the Messenger and his followers seek a safe abode for establishing a proper government and then punish the opponents of the Message with their own hand, or the punishment comes upon them in the shape of natural calamities and disasters (as with the people of Noah). In order to fulfill this heavy task, the Messenger’s career is strictly and thoroughly guided and monitored by divine authority, and he has no liberty to take key decisions at his own discretion. All the stages of his career (preaching, migration, waging war etc) are divinely ordained and he is only to administer this whole scheme. It implies that the Messenger and his fellows are divine instruments in this project. This divine scheme is not to be imitated in the contemporary world as is mistakenly done by the revivalists. The Islamists have failed to appreciate this divine Scheme (Ghamidi 2009, 2006).

Following this scheme, the prophetic career necessarily divides in a number of stages. These are admonition (inzaar), general and augmented admonition (inzaar-e-aam), culmination of the conclusive evidence (it-mam-e-hujjat), and finally, conclusion of the message and acquittal (bijrat wa bar’at).

In the final stage, the primary addressees are issued a last warning about arrival of that dreadful day of worldly punishment, which has always been a theme in the message, then the last ultimatum to choose between belief in the Messenger and his message and death.

Upon persistent denial, Muhammad was ordered to migrate to the town of Medina to establish a state, and so to administer the divine punishment on the deniers. The war at Badr represents the first phase of this punishment in which most of the summit leadership died. The promised assistance from the divine in this war came with the ratio of 1:10 (one Muslim fighter will triumph over 10 of the pagans). The prophetic career passing through various stages culminated into the fall of Mecca to Muhammad and his companions. The polytheists of Mecca were offered a categorical option (to embrace Islam or be killed) while, the Nazarites and Israelites had to choose among Islam and political subjugation (through jizya) or death (Iftikhar 2005:85). Upon consolidating
his position at Mecca and Medina, after award of punishment to the deniers, the Prophet sent messages to the rulers of a number of states. This episode ended with the life of Muhammad. The next question that arises is, whether this divine scheme (as post-Islamists believe) is replicable in the modern times (as Mawdudi described)?

**Brief Analysis**

If compared to Mawdudi’s understanding of the prophetic mission, which was to establish Divine kingdom on earth and which accordingly split the prophetic career along organisational stages, Ghamidi categorises them into thematic/conceptual stages. The common notion that encompasses these conceptual constructs is dawah and naseeha. Put simply, the revivalist vision derived from these interconnected points in the prophetic struggle is dawah. The dawah model integrates individuals, social groups, political parties, state structures and “others”. Dawah is an interactive model where multiple voices and actors interact in a dialogic way. Latter, I show that this dawah merges into An-Na’imi’s *civic reason* (see section 5.7 and chapter 6).

**The question of replication: an internal critique of Islamism**

The above re-reading falls in sharp contrast to Mawdudi’s political reading of the prophetic mission (see chapter 4). Using Ghamidi’s IHF, a young post-Islamist scholar invalidates Mawdudi’s Islamist interpretation of the prophetic career in the following words,

Muhammad at Mecca was reminded time and again that his responsibilities do not exceed admonition … in this whole period, Muhammad was not ordained to enforce religion nor enforcement of religion was declared the central aim of the Messengerhood …. As a result of “preaching” and only preaching, without any “revolutionary struggle”, the Islamic state of Medina came into existence … for this “revolution”, Muhammad never erected an “organisational structure”; he never established a system of pledging; and never handed over his followers a “strategy” for the enforcement of religion … The revolution that emerged fourteen hundred years ago cannot be an “exemplary strategy” for future revolutions (Amjad 2000: 36).

This assertion has far-reaching consequences for revivalist thought and strategy. It clearly challenges the validity of the Islamist claim that the Prophets’ mission was establishment of an Islamic system, enforce-
ment of justice and eradication of injustices. Ghamidi argues that ‘a desire to forcefully inject pure politics into religion’ dictated his explanation of the prophetic mission. If the latter’s explanation is followed, then by implication the prophetic efforts shall not be imitable for the Islamists’ political struggle (Mawdudi 1996a), which is devoid of appreciation for physical laws as Mawdudi’s assertion was,

The life of the Prophet Muhammad and his fellows is not to be used as an example in this case [struggle for Islamic revival] because he was obliged to fulfil the prophetic mission as a first order. For this purpose he never established a political organisation. And understandably so, as the Messenger is never meant to struggle for a political change, rather, he concentrates on purification of hearts and souls of individuals. His mission is not to become an actor in the “power struggle” but to preach and imbibe the moral principles in politics and economy. In the same vein, if one expects the Prophet to be a successful “banker” and “politician,” then he is mistaken. He is an inviter … He doesn’t come up with an “economic program.” He doesn’t bring any revolutionary program … the “Caliphs” were not essentially ulama but “political leaders” who were also well-acquainted with religion … if the ulama and religious groups would redirect their energies towards raising collective consciousness through preaching, education and exhortation then none of the current “structures” can stand up to them: neither these status-quo intuitions; nor the US hegemony in the current form.61

Another important issue arises here. In the discourse of ulama and Islamists, a state can only be Islamised through their active role in the political process, participation in the election process and presence in the legislatures. This shows an obvious distinction between the ideas of Islamists and post-Islamists (see chapter 6).

How do post-Islamists make sense of the failure of Jama’at to transform Pakistan into its envisioned Islamic state? Since post-Islamism links with Islamism through Dabistan-e-Shibli, and defines itself socially as a part of Mawdudi’s brotherhood (biradri); their criticism can be termed an internal criticism of the Jama’at. My analysis in this section is mainly based, but not restricted to, one of Ghamidi’s essays “Islamic Revolution” (Islami Inqilab) written in the context of the Jama’at defeat in the 1993 general elections (2006:274-87). The idea of this critique, I argue, is

directed at the very ideological core of the Jama’at as expounded by Mawdudi (see chapter 4).

In discussions on alternative strategies for political change, in the given context of Pakistan, Ghamidi eliminates the first two of the following options: 1) seizing power through armed struggle; 2) popular uprising forcing existing government to withdraw; 3) using elected representation to attain power, and 4) influencing the authors into accepting the ideology of Islamists (1995:6-7). The legitimating of the first two options called rebellion against the state (khurooj) is further subjected to numerous Shar’ia conditions. These include the government’s explicit denial of Shar’ia (kufr-e-bawwa), the despotic nature of the government and the leader having support of the majority (ibid: 7; Ghamidi 2006: 276-77).

For post-Islamists, the reasons for the Jama’at political failure relate to strategy (hikmat-e-amali) and not eternal Shar’ia per se. In his critical analysis of Jama’at electoral politics, Ghamidi mentions three prerequisites for its participation in active politics: 1) it should necessarily be led by a politician like Jinnah or Bhutto and not scholars, ulama and intellectuals like Mawdudi or Iqbal; 2) only political parties like Muslim League or People’s Party and not religious organisations like the Jama’at should carry on this project, and 3) electoral strategy should be based on existing realities with a clear focus to win elections and not to propagate the ideology (tawsee’ dawat) (1995: 11-13). Commenting on the Jama’at five decades long political struggle, Ghamidi points out that its failed strategy has,

almost totally deprived it of its ideological identity, its goal of reforming the Muslims and its zeal of disseminating the truth … transferred the leadership within the various levels of the party from scholars and intellectuals to people who are not only devoid of these abilities but they are also politically ineffective. Consequently, an atmosphere of gloom prevails at its various frontiers (1995: 13).

5.7 Post-Islamists’ Theory of Social Change

In relation to the theory of social change, “individual”, “state” and “society” are all widely used concepts in post-Islamist discourse. More generally, these terms are elusive and hard to narrow down. In contrast to individual, an immediate difficulty one comes across is to distinguish between state and society. To get to a working definition of the two, I tend to follow Hefner’s approach of “arenas” in which “boundaries, rights,
jurisdictions, and power distribution between state and societal agencies are debated, contested, and resolved (at least temporarily).” According to Hefner, these arenas can be *structures* in physical terms, belonging to the state (such as ministries); can be *institutions* (like universities and parliaments) and can be any other entity however ambiguous in the given state structure. Likewise, arenas can be *groups* and *organizations* enjoying greater degree of autonomy from the state rules and regulations such as “families, villages, and religious groups” (Hefner 2005: 113). In post-Islamist discourse, the basic unit in all these arenas is the individual. Individuals interact in various ways. They dictate and are dictated to shape and are shaped by these arenas. Only the individual possesses the ultimate capacity to change. Religion too, according to post-Islamists, addresses and inspires the individual, in the broader context of these arenas (Nadeem 2009: 17-24).

In the larger context of post-Islamists’ model of social change, the transformative values, forces, actors and institutions of religion operate essentially and fundamentally on the individual, and through the individual on family, society and the state. The perplexing problem is post-Islamists’ treatment of the individual as a homogenous category in the realm of dawah. This conceptualisation fuses various social categorisations among individuals based on status, class, authority, position, ethnicity, creed, faith and sex into a uniform category of invitees/addressees. This runs the danger of another social stratification inherent in it; that is, the division of society among “inviters” (*daag’ee*) and “invitees/addressees” (*madg’oyeen*) such that the former occupies more learned and pious position than the latter. However, this deduction is drawn out by post-Islamists’ further explanation of their dawah model. They explain that dawah is not univocal/monologue (a proselytisation of one class of individuals to other classes). Rather, it constitutes an interactive model of mutually influencing, mutually shaping process:

Cognizant societal transformation necessitates emergence of an inviter-invitee relationship in the society among individuals. The practice of dawah in Islam does not mean disconnecting from society under the shadow of [dawah] organisations. Rather it [dawah] constitutes a cultural/social value (*samajee qadr*) wherein a person simultaneously occupies the position of an inviter as well as an invitee. When we form organisations for dawah work, its logical outcome is dividing society along the lines of inviter and invitee … this stratification is against the Islamic conception
of dawah ... [our] model preclude nurture of those feelings, as self-righteousness and arrogance over one’s piety, after which the inviter considers himself different from the rest, and think of others as sinful beings (Nadeem 2009: 22).

Such a depiction of individual-society-state relationship and the assumed dynamic role of religion in it scale up post-Islamists focus on the individual to society. In the competing Islamic discourses of social change, post-Islamism inaugurates, at least in discourse if not a social movement, a society-centred model. This is an “inside-out” approach as compared to the Islamists’ “outside-in” approach.

Society-oriented movements refer to those forms of intellectual and social activism seeking to “transform society from within by utilising new opportunity spaces in the market and media to change individual habits and social relations” (Yavuz 2003: 30). Unlike Sufi-orders that invite individuals to an “inward retreat”, to withdraw from active life into the realm of private contemplation and personal piety, and contra political Islamists who believe in political activism and mobilisation for change of the “unjust/un-Godly” system; Islamic movements with society-centric approach recommend influencing social processes and individual behaviors as foci of intervention.

The agency and change potential of individuals, in post-Islamist discourse, overrides the transformative capacity of the structure and the state. This is more in line with the “phase one” of the prophetic career undertaken at Mecca. In this connection, post-Islamists insist on introducing a third condition between House of Islam and House of War. That is, dar-al-i’dad/House of Groundwork. This intellectual construct refers to a temporal-spatial space wherein Muslims should concentrate on its moral rehabilitation and economic strengthening. One can observe that even in articulation of this new phase (house of groundwork) by post-Islamists, pursuance of the lost Muslim’s political power reappears as mediating variable. According to Tibi, “power is a historical fact in conquests that were pursued in addition to trade and commerce as a means for the expansion of Islam” (2009: 71). For Tibi, prior to the Western project of globalisation, the Islamic venture of globalisation mapped the world into the House of War and the House of Islam, which lasted from seventh to seventeenth centuries (ibid).

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From the above description, it seems that post-Islamists consider an “Islamic system” an empty aggregation until filled with socio-politically aware individuals. The state is the aggregation of individual social piety and profanity. Society as a collective category contains not only individuals but also their mutual interactions, which the religion is purported to reform. These individuals (and various social groups) create their own social reality filled with the content of change or perpetuation of status quo. When political regimes change in a society, the ascension to power is the direct manifestation of the existing social realities. The political process (elections) does not create new social realities but only transfer power from one political elite to another. Hence, society must first contain numerous such creative processes capable of instilling new social reality and productive energy.

As against the intellectuals and religious leadership, the political leadership does not directly participate in the reconstruction of collective behaviour. Their job is to meet the demands of the masses based on the available opportunities . . . The real job of a politician is to mobilise the nation (Yusufi 2004: 49).

Such social transformation will precede the transformation of the state and governmental system. This is how post-Islamists have inaugurred a counter-discourse to Mawdudi’s state-centric model of social change.

To Ghamidi, the concept “reform” (islah) and not “revolution” fits well in the overall framework of Islam. The religious scholarship and intelligentsia graduate into the fold of a new relationship with the state and society. That relationship is premised on the principles of exhortation (naseeha, preaching (dawah) and admonition (indhar). The principles invalidate those historic forces of regressivity and backwardness: a community consisting of spiritually blind followers, politically subjugated and intellectually uncritical believers. Intellectually, a more enlightened one defined by a teacher-disciple relationship, and politically a more freedom-based emanating from brotherhood than blind following and pledging one is recommended (Ghamidi 2006; Khan 2008; Yusufi 2004).

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63 Ghamidi, panel interview with Saleem Safi, accessed at: http://www.tv-almawrid.org/

64 Ghamidi, personal interview, August 2007.
Religious ideas guide religious practices in society (YuSufi 2004). Therefore, any refocus of the prevailing religious practice in society, post-Islamists argue, is conditional upon serious academic revisit of the existing interpretations of religion (Nadeem 1995). Within competing worldviews and the multifaceted challenges of modern times, post-Islamist scholarship considers superiority of new ideas, fresh thinking and creative knowledge in a dialectical way,

Darwin’s *Survival of the Fittest Theory* is still valid in the empire of ideas. Theories and ideologies unable to stand up before the stumbling blow of the time and incapable to prove its superiority in the realm of reason; are deemed to fade away. Aligarh’s (modernism) and Deoband’s (traditionalism) days are counted now (Nadeem 2008: 171).

From a number of dispersed texts produced by the post-Islamists, I tend to conclude that in reforming religious thought and idealising free debate in society, their point of reference is Western liberalism and their admiration stands for Reformation movement in Europe. In their analysis, the problem arises when the religious leadership begins “worshipping the old/qadeem and demonizing the new/jadeed.” The victory of religious clergy over new ideas results into underdevelopment of society (Ghamidi 2008: 165; Nadeem 1995; Yusufi 2004: 45-46).

In post-Islamists’ model of social change ideas and not material conditions drive humanity. Intellectuals, ulama and institutions produce ideas. The hierarchy of transformative leadership goes in order of priority like, first intellectuals, then religious leaders, and then political leaders. These leaders have a cardinal role to play in raising awareness, changing people’s worldviews and shaping their behavioural and cultural norms (Yusufi 2004: 39-54). A young post-Islamist scholar, Yusufi, argues against the assumption that an ideologue is restricted to formulation of ideas only rather,

He fights against the old and deeply entrenched ideas in society and nurtures new ideas in it. He educates the society and introduces new avenues of thinking. He inculcates different perspective of looking at the issues. He reconstructs the national behaviour (2004: 42-43).

In post-Islamists’ discourse, the ulama and intellectuals should raise the discussion beyond modesty, adultery and vulgarity. Moral conduct is more about human conduct in society as global citizens. It also deals with honesty, dutifulness, patience, industriousness, rationality, material
progress, work ethic, saving and investment, rule of law and fulfilling responsibilities.\(^65\)

### 5.8 Reformist Genealogy and the Shibli Space

How do the current group of post-Islamist intellectuals identify themselves define their opponents and spell out their relation to predecessor ulama-intellectuals specifically in the Indo-Pak sub-continent? The significance of this question is also imbued in post-Islamists’ enthusiastic and liberal internalisation of various notions and products of modernity such as democracy, art, music, drama and film, gender equality, and freedom of expression. In defining and describing the post-Islamists definition of the ‘self’, I adhere to Kamrava’s method, to avoid looking at them from outside through the Western social science prism but rather, to describe and analyse them in their own concepts and categories (2008: 44).

After reviewing a large body of verbal and written text of the post-Islamists, I find Ghamidi’s own constructed category, Dabistan-e-Shibli (School of Shibli), more useful and meaningful for their self-definition. It reveals a break from post-1857 responses of traditionalism and rationalism. It represents an effort at syncretisation of the old and new, past and present, and spiritual and temporal. It exhibits a locus of non-linear continuity across time and approaches. According to Khalid Masud, “traditionalism” was also a deliberate and conscious construct.\(^66\)

The Dabistan-e-Shibli forms a discursive field and refers to a symbolic space within the post-Islamist discourse itself. The category, Dabistan-e-Shibli embodies historical as well as analytical dimensions. It offers a constitution of traditional ulama (like Azad and Nadwi), Islamic Modernists (like Shibli and Iqbal) and Islamists (like Mawdudi) and his own mentors, Farahi and Islahi. Ghamidi’s endorsement of Shibli’s approach and his adherents’ to it appears in his essays *Signposts*:

In contrast to these two schools [Deoband conservatism and Sir Sayyid’s Modernism], Shibli founded a third school premised on two principles that: (1) the meaning of progress in our view is that we continue “backward movement” until we reach into the period of Qur’anic revelation …

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\(^65\) Ghamidi’s interview with at Dunya TV, accessed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fu1aVaFiZ4A

\(^66\) Prof. Khalid Masud, brief discussion in Islamabad, 1/11/2009.
and that (2) the “old” itself entails that we are aware of the “modern” … Nadwi, Azad, Mawdudi, Farahi and Islahi, all are proponents of this group. I name it as The School of Shibli/Dabistan-e-Shibli (2008: 56).

Another post-Islamist scholar further elaborates the distinctive features of this category by saying that:

Their [scholars in Dabistan-e-Shibli] literary style and rhetoric is unique as well as elegant … they all are proponents (akaiser) of the movement for Islamic renewal and regeneration (tehreek-e-tajdeed wa ilhya-e-din) … Shibli marks the first personality in this caravan in our national history, so we name it Dabistan-e-Shibli … historian’s total disregard or in some cases their character assassination is no less than a tragedy (Nadeem 2008: 154).

The “literary style” of scholars in Dabistan-e-Shibli is relevant to a discussion on modernity in the sub-continent as well. Most of the scholars in this school synchronise the old Indo-Persian and new/modern style in their writings. In his recent work, Khalid Masud has concluded that how “the vision of modernity in India was reinforced by a particular literary style of the narrative that appealed to the cultural taste of the Indian Muslims.” In contrast, “ideas expressed” in the Modernist style of Sir Sayyid, “made the ideas also look alien” (Ikram 2007; Masud 2009b). About Shibli’s unique stature as litterateur (adeeb), Ikram writes:

We think that if two things—invasion of politics and sexual inclinations in literature—which are very popular in pseudo progressive circles but are not part of the true literature, are subtracted from it, then perhaps, Shibli would be the first Modernist/Progressive litterateur of the century (2007: 243).

Shibli, after whom the category takes its name, stood for simultaneous absorption of tradition and modernity (see chapter 3). Ghamidi seeks to synergize the divergent trajectories of the sub-continental Islamic intellectuals of the last 130 years, in national and geographic horizons. These intellectuals under the Dabistan, are different with respect to their academic contributions to Islam but they represent a continuation of one thought; “their enormous potential of critical deliberation [of the downfall of the East] and appreciation [for its renaissance] (Nadeem 2008).

Breaking the Dabistan-e-Shibli down into four interconnected periods will further clarify its evolutionary journey: 1) the Shiblian phase consists of shifting focus to moderation and synchronisation of traditional and
modern knowledge of the last quarter of 19th century represented by two schools—Deoband’s conservatism and Sir Sayyid’s modernism. In this phase, Shibli was personally involved in interpretation and articulation of ideas on reform and moderation; 2) in the second phase, four of Shibli’s direct students or inspired scholars—Sayyid Suleiman Nadwi, Muhammad Iqbal, Abul Kalam Azad and Hamiduddin Farahi—carried forward the renewal agenda in various forms, capacities and with various outcomes. Iqbal never sat under the tutelage of Shibli but presented the same ideas in his poetic verses,67 3) two 20th century activist-scholars, Mawdudi and Islahi mainly dominated the third phase of the Shibli tradition. Mawdudi pursued Kalam’s quest for Divine Kingdom, while Islahi followed on Farahi’s exegetical principles. Mawdudi and Islahi co-founded the Jama’at, and before resignation from the Jama’at in 1958, Islahi was the most trust-worthy friend of Mawdudi; (4) The fourth phase, in their self-perception, is lead by post-Islamists—Ghamidi and his public intellectuals (see for further details Ikram 2007, Nadeem 2008: 153-72).

In his short essay, Dabistan-e-Shibli, Ghamidi first outlines a broader spectrum of this category by including scholars like Nadwi, Daryabadi, Iqbal, Mawdudi, Kalam, Farahi and Islahi—thus synthesises all. Then he analyses critically each one of these scholars’ return to traditionalism or Sufism, eulogizes their return, and narrows the focus until only his teachers Farahi and Islahi, truly fits into this category. Thus Islahi, Ghamidi himself and his fellows are the true upholders of this school in the modern era (ibid). In the last leg of periodisation, Dabistan-e-Shibli boils down to The School of Farahi/Dabistan-e-Farahi.

On the basis of its interpretive approach, the School of Farahi (Dabistan-e-Farahi) is distinct from “traditionalism” and “modernism”… Qur’an is not central to traditionalist religious discourse, and it is subservient to Fiqh and Hadith literature … in contrast, the Farahi School believes in the authority of the Qur’an over all religious content … the issue of “context”

67 Suleiman Nadwi latter turned to Sufism and pledged himself with Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanwi. Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi was his student who also joined the Jama’at and then seceded. Hamiduddin Farahi, cousin-student of Shibli, is the proponent of thematic coherence (Nazm-e-Qur’an) in the Qur’an. Iqbal, the poet, philosopher and ideologue of Pakistan insisted on the revival of ijtihad in Muslim societies in his popular lectures (khutbat) The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.
and “historicity” distinguishes Farahi School from Modernists … the Modernists determine the context outside (kharij) the Qur’an, while the Farahi School determine it within the Qur’anic text … the current order of the Qur’an (tawqeefi), through its internal coherence (dakheli nazm), shows us which injunctions are “eternal” and which were “specific” to the Prophetic era (Nadeem 2008: 88).

In his poetic imagination, Ghamidi proclaims the triumph of his constructed school and discourse over the prevalent conservatism and modernism:

Currently, the first group [religious conservatism] has lived its life. It is like an old torn building which is falling down by itself as the new building is being erected. The second group [Modernism] is though in power, but the historical testimony is that like old heresies, this modern heresy (zalalat) will also phase out. The leadership of the coming age is destined to fall to Dabistan-e-Shibli. Its emergence is being underway behind the curtains (2008: 60).

Brief Analysis

It is worth noting here that Ghamidi is not the first thinker to show such an imagination. Mawdudi predicted the fall of socialism, capitalism and nationalism, and the rise of Islam as an alternative system; poet-thinker Iqbal had similar proclamations in his poetic verses about the downfall of the Western civilisation and the emergence of Islam. Likewise, all revivalist thinkers share this vision predicting an inevitable victory for their respective thought and social forces allied to them. We are reminded by the recurring theme in Luther’s discourse consisting of “the opposition between the received authority of the church on the one hand and the authority of the Word of God on the other hand.” According to Robert Wuthnow, in Wittenberg, Luther equated his opponents with “mere externalities” and admonished his followers for having “internal conviction” (Wuthnow 1989: 13).

In the media, post-Islamists tend to subscribe to this self-constructed reformist genealogy—the School of Shibli/Farahi. This school is the intellectual space where Ghamidi not only defines his ‘self’ and his main tenets, but also the ‘other’. This self-own-constructed space benefits Ghamidi and his activists to distance themselves from conservative traditional ulama, Islamists on the one hand, and Modernists on the other. To remain authentic and reformist, Ghamidi has to attack the traditional
clergy and its institutions and yet wants to maintain an impression of being within traditional framework. He defends religious tenets and beliefs; and yet sustains the identity of a modern intellectual. The Iqbal-Farahi-Islahi link provides him ample theoretical space to engage with diverse schools. Ghamidi’s approach to ijtihad refers extensively to Iqbal’s famous lectures *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. His media-based activism also symbolises the natural progression and graduation of his reformist genealogy outpouring from voluntary solitary intellectual confinements (Farahi) and dars-circles of solidarity networks (Islahi) into a public outreach using new private satellite channels, and website activism.

### 5.9 Scope and Constituency of Post-Islamism

The new media landscape has revolutionized communications. From newspapers, to traditional television operators all feel the impact of the shift of locus of control into domain of users. Pakistan is no exception to this proliferation of the new media landscape. Over 60 private television channels currently operate within the country. However, artificial barriers such as a failure to grant terrestrial beaming rights bar most rural Pakistanis from accessing them. In the urban areas, however, the affect is visible on the middle and upper classes normally those who can pay for cable with comfort. These two segments of the population have a different religious/spiritual need when it comes to watching religious programmes. They are primarily concerned with three facets: an identity facet, the rational man facet, and the leisure/lifestyle facet. This audience wishes to define its identity within the Islamic spectrum without having to adopt an ascetic lifestyle and one that will allow them to make rational decisions in contrast to decisions based on divine help.

With notable exceptions, the post-Islamist circle can hardly be said to have found any considerable support and defenders among the traditional ulama (Ahmad 2010). Their constituency is mainly located in the

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68 A Ghamidi’s ideas influenced a young scholar Ammar Khan Nasir who belongs to reputable Deobandi family running their own madrassa in Gujranwala. The scholar was appointed as the head of Ghamidi’s institute Al-Mawrid for some time. There is strong resentment within the Deobandi ulama about Khan’s leanings towards Ghamidi,(Field notes and content analysis of corres-
modern educated stratum with access to the new mass media. The new media (internet, private TV channels) has introduced his work and ideas among the middle, upper-middle and elite classes. Yet it is far from becoming a popular social movement. A number of factors are responsible for the appeal of Ghamidi and other post-Islamists’ ideas to these classes.

One reason is the lack of erudite modern scholars who can debate with the modern youth in their language. Ghamidi’s own background as graduate of the elite Government College Lahore, his command over English and the modern vocabulary and logical style is appreciated among the modern educated youth—male and female both. He develops his argument simultaneously from doctrinal and modern sources and synthesis divergent views in a way that everyone feels included in his discussion. Content analysis of various episodes of a popular talk show between Ghamidi and modern youth (both male and female as participants) aired on a private TV channel called Geo, reveals that he listens to their questions. Within the print media, an English daily, Daily Times, considered to represent liberal views, has been more sympathetic towards Ghamidi and his fellows in its news reporting, editorials and columns. The administrator of Ghamidi group, created by a civil servant, on Facebook, informed me that majority of its membership consists of both male and female youth. In addition, majority of the membership support Musharraf and his Enlightened Moderation project. I also analysed gestures and impressions of other participants towards Ghamidi (as opposed to traditional ulama and Islamists) in a number of debates on private channels where Ghamidi or one of his interlocutors were panellists. I found that in almost 95 per cent instances, the secular politicians, scholars, journalists, civil society and human rights activists supported Ghamidi and his views on various social issues. The most glaring example of this observation come from the famous 2006 debate aired on Geo.

69 Khurshid Ahmad Nadeem, telephone interview, December 2009; Dr Farooq Khan, telephone interview, December 2009.

70 Browsing Ghamidi’s name within the English press in Pakistan shows more coverage by Daily Times than any other newspaper.

on hudood laws (named *Zara Sochiay*). Despite insistent on moral and ethical dimensions through naseeha emanating from an elder, Ghamidi approves minimal religious intervention in spaces of leisure, festivals, sports, music, drama and dance. The modern youth that comes in debate with religious classes, on these issues, often cites Ghamidi’s views in their support. The case of women’s visibility in public spaces, their right to drive, love marriage and leisure is also not different from the youth. Particularly, that the more educated and affluent segments of society are attracted to a liberal brand of Islam. This could be viewed from many different paradigms. My interviews found that an identity crisis plagues these segments. Islamic liberalism allows them to reconcile their modern lifestyle in tandem with religious sanction. This also seems to be a factor, which provides solace to such segments. Alternatively, this limited access to liberal Islam is also furthering the ideological rift between those who have access to such content and those who do not. Hence, then the digital divide is evident in the attitudes towards religion between the upper, middle and lower segments of society.

In popular debate on the hudood laws in 2006, Ghamidi emerged as reformist scholar who can be a point of “overlapping consensus” between the ulama and the civil society and human rights activists. One columnist at a newspaper representing liberal views, expressed his view about Ghamidi in this context,

> The reformist approach appears to be making some headway but is limited by the short supply of liberal scholars of Islamic law compared to the literalist hordes produced by the seminaries. There is only one Ghamidi; there are a thousand Qazi Hussain Ahmeds [then amir of the Islamist Jama’at] (Naqvi 2006).

One might argue that this discursive circle has earned privileged access in private media channels. These channels are constantly looking for sellable talk shows and ideas on religion in the contemporary situation. This circle has become known among Islamists as well as the traditional ulama in Pakistan for their unique position on many issues. The reaction to their thoughts surfaces not only in the private discussions of ulama and Islamists, their Friday Sermons, but also the growing number of publications against them. In 2006, the editor of *Ishraq* survived a

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72 Field observations, also books and booklets attacking Ghamidi’s worldview, see chapter 6.
murder attempt. Ghamidi and his family have received death threat for years, and is now in exile in Malaysia. Still, the intellectuals who are the public face of the Ghamidi movement now produce even more publications, Internet sites, articles, pamphlets and other media for general consumption.

The terminologies used by Ghamidi in his books are extremely difficult, and addressed mainly to researchers and scholars. However, in talk shows and lectures, he articulates his ideas in a language intelligible by a wider public. The foundation of Ghamidi’s thought movement is three loosely related threads—the ulama-intellectuals, business elite and public intellectuals.

Ghamidi personally trained the ulama-intellectuals during his formative phase. Nearly all of the scholars in this circle come from modern education background such as engineering, law, business administration and political science (Ghamidi 2008). They remained disciples of Ghamidi for a number of years receiving knowledge in classical Arabic, the Qur’an, Hadith, history, literature and hermeneutics.  

The second tier consists of businesspersons and industrialists within urban centres like Lahore and Karachi. They support and finance various projects of this discursive circle. The third tier consists of public intellectuals (writers, public speakers, social activists, university teachers, independent researchers, TV anchors, columnists and preachers). Individuals with loose ties rather than formal organisation share through the bond of a common framework/ideology for social change. For this category, I will borrow Khosrokhavar’s term “intermediary intellectuals” who “borrow some intellectual ideas from the grand intellectuals but with considerable independence …” (2004: 8). Emerging events on the local, national and global scene are interpreted and analysed by these public intellectuals in light of that common framework and shared outlook. The shared outlook and the new religiously informed rational worldview becomes the basis of all analysis and critique.

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73 Field notes.
5.10 Educational Reform, Social Reform and Encounter with the Western Civilisation

Islamic discourses of all genres eulogise the ideological domination and physical subjugation of Muslim culture and territories by the West. In Islamists’ discourses (specifically Mawdudi), the sense of this dual subjugation (physical and intellectual) is profound. In the overall Islamist framework, the political-physical sense of subjugation overrides the intellectual and civilisational. In post-Islamists’ discourses in Pakistan, three domains of the social reality of Muslims appear to interact in complex ways. The following is a detailed account of this summary of post-Islamists discourse: the ideological and cultural dimensions of the Western civilisation pose considerable threat to the very basis of Islamic civilisation. The degree and scale of threat exceeds physical/political subjugation by the West. Muslims should retreat from its current course of reactionary strategy towards a profound educational-social reform. The reform in its religious thought is a necessary condition for redemption of Muslims from Western political and intellectual subjugation (Ghamidi 2008; Nadeem 2009; Khan 2009). Here it seems relevant to quote Turkish Professor of Sociology, Nilufer Gole, who in her article, Snapshots of Islamic Modernities, has termed the contemporary Islamist movements [here post-Islamist] as a critical reflection on both “traditional subjugation of Muslim identity and mono-civilizational impositions of Western modernity” (2000: 93). She captured some “snapshots” in Islamists’ social practices where Western modernity was not “simply rejected” but “critically and creatively re-appropriated” by new social movements in Turkey. Even for “Islamo-liberal” scholars like the ones in question seem reluctant to accommodate all genres of Western modernity uncritically. From post-Islamists’ discourse, one can discern at least three responses towards Western modernity: accommodation, negotiation and rejection (see e.g. Ghamidi 2009: 462, 2008: 69-72, 136-138). Like Mawdudi and the Islamists, post-Islamists see in modernity, to use Euben’s expression, “a crisis due to rupture with tradition, the dual rejection of theology and teleology inaugurated by Enlightenment rationalism and the subsequent diminishment of meaning in authority, morality and community…” (1999: 124).

In the realm of educational reform, on the premise of the larger post-Islamist framework is an inward looking moral reform, self-examination and advancement in physical sciences. This framework links to the polit-
ical and economic revival of Muslim societies. In this discourse, the inculcation of universal human values receives primacy over religious education. Universal human values, according to Ghamidi, reside in the Qur’anic concepts of Ma’roof (good) and Munkar (reprehensible). These are non-spatial and non-temporal universal values and do not refer to religious obligations. In this way, promotion of the ‘good’ and demotion of ‘reprehensible’ constitutes the post-Islamists’ notion of self. If the individual self is reformed, it may result in articulation of a larger societal change. Francis Robinson, following Charles Taylor, argued that transformation of the self is associated with modernity in the context of Islamic reform in South Asia (2008: 271; also see Taylor 1989: 111). In the oppositional binaries of ‘inside-outside’ of the self (Sufi’s recommendation to inward-retreat and Mawdudi’s advice to ‘outward-expression’), post-Islamists seek the middle ground. The transformation of state, society and global order is the outcome of the transformed individual ‘selves’ where the battle for piety and sacrilege depends on the free will of individuals. Thus the object of the educational system, according to post-Islamists, is the inner landscape of an individual.

Mawdudi and political Islamists seek a direct co-relationship between education and leadership (imamat) (Mawdudi 1999). They think the education system ought to produce future leaders in every field to lead the Ummah. For Mawdudi, his envisioned ideal Islamic state will not be realisable by the lot of existing intellectuals and graduates. Hence, the design of the educational system should meet the demands of an Islamic political project. For post-Islamists, power and leadership comes by implication and is not the cardinal aim of education. Educational system, Ghamidi thinks, should be mainly divided into two levels: 1) primary education (until age 18/grade 12) with the aim of achieving purification and civilising of the lower self (tehzeeb-e-nafs), and 2) specialised/higher education where research and critical reasoning skills are the primary focus. There is no need to set a-priori objectives for

74 Ghamidi in Aaj Islam, “Our educational system and reforms needed”, 2/5.
75 Khurshid Ahmad Nadeem, telephone interview, November 2009.
76 Ghamidi, TV Talk Show at Aaj TV program Aaj Islam: Our educational system and reforms needed, 2/5; accessed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yc1DSmD5xEY
the latter. Ghamidi argues, “Until students reach Class/Grade V, they should be taught ethics to instil in them a sense of humanism and civility.” The inculcation of universal ethical values in children is realised first in family, then through cultural tradition (tehzeebi riwayat) and last by the teacher and educational system. Even from the religious content, the humanitarian aspects should herald the religious one. By universal human values, post-Islamists refer to those acts and deeds commonly appreciated or abhorred by all human beings.

In relation to teaching Islamic studies to children in initial stages, Ghamidi recommends teaching ethics/universal human values (akhlaqiyyat) prior to formal Islamic studies. Producing good human beings, thus, to Ghamidi is a necessary condition for having good Muslims. He proposes that the aim of imparting ethics is a spiritual exercise rather than a political one. At a higher level, the aim of education must be restricted to producing specialisation and research skills in all fields of human activity, than producing an army of “Islamist Intellectuals” tailor-fit for a political agenda.

Post-Islamist scholarship has shown vehement criticism over the current enrolment practice in madrassas. In their view, the current practice in madrassas involves enrolment of students at a very early age for a specialised education, that is, doctrinal sources and fiqh. Whereas, specialisation is a stage that should logically appear later, after a broad-based primary education. In their policy recommendations, post-Islamists recommend abandonment of all prevailing class-based oppositional binaries (English/Urdu and Islamic/Secular) in educational system. Concisely, they argue for a uniform primary education (until age 18) and then a specialised/professional one. Universities of religious education should be established for those who are interested in becoming scholars of Islam after completion of their primary education under the broad-based system. This system if realised will enhance social harmony in society and will eradicate schism, violence and sectarianism the society faces today.

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77 Ibid., 1/5.
78 Editorial, Daily Times: Dr Ghamidi is right, Mr Aziz is wrong, 3/6/2006.
79 Ibid.
81 Ghamidi Aaj Islam, op. cit.
82 Ibid.
In Mawdudi’s discourse, knowledge and proliferation of knowledge is an instrument to reclaim the global power of Muslims (Mawdudi 1999). For Ghamidi, knowledge is value-neutral and an objective in its own right but by implications, it helps in the social revival and moral building of society. Unlike the Islamists’ discourse, the post-Islamists shy away from the notion of Islamisation of knowledge.83

This circle focuses on three interrelated levels regarding this issue. First, they offer criticism of the existing system of religious education in Pakistan and the associated socio-cultural tensions and conflicts. Second, they espouse an alternative model of religious education developed by Ghamidi and his fellows at a theoretical level. Finally, the establishment of an “ideal” institute of Islamic sciences (Al-Mawrid) as a role model of learning to produce Islamic scholars, who can teach and impart Islamic teachings as well as face up to the intellectual challenges of modernity.84


1) The madrassas system is based on the principle of taqleed (blind submission), and not critical thinking/ijtihad and argumentation (istidlal). During the course of learning, the students cultivate with a narrow vision turning them into “devout denouncer of every other sect and an ardent acclaimer of his own” (ibid.) This rote-learning behaviour and uncritical subscription to one’s own sect imprint far-reaching socio-cultural consequences, which appear when these madrassas graduates interact with society at social, political and cultural levels. Consequently, “the avenues of mosques have turned into national borders where the residents of one country do not find themselves in a position to establish relations with the other” (Ghamidi 1995).85 This social behaviour discourages free debate and freedom of expression resulting in frustration, tension, conflict and sectarian violence. The outcome

84 Due to persistent threats by the militant forces, the Al-Mawrid Institute appears deserted now.
85 Also see at: http://www.monthly-renaissance.com/issue/content.aspx?id=1121
is radicalised social behaviour hampering reform and modernisation efforts (ibid).

2) Despite being centres of Islamic learning, the Qur’an is not central to instruction in these places. In Ghamidi’s discourse, Qur’an is the final word of God, and forms the basis of educational, economic, political and social reform. In contrast, the madrassa system denigrates Qur’an to either rote memorization without understanding its meanings, or subjecting it to a quick deliberation exercise on some un-important material at the end of the education session. As a result, these centres of learning have become centres of darkness instead of enlightenment, and “… these institutions can have no access to the exalted wisdom of the Qur’an, just as a born blind person can have no idea about the sun’s splendor” (ibid).

3) Ghamidi criticised the entire syllabus taught at the madrassas as outdated and incapable of meeting the intellectual and religious requirements of our society. In the last two centuries, research conducted in the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, economics, astronomy, physics and political science could not make its way into the madrassas curriculum. A number of groundbreaking ideas appeared on the Western academic scene while others madrassas remained in complete ignorance of both developments.86

Questions of identity construction and its constituting elements rapidly emerge in developing societies like Pakistan, due in part to dual processes of socioeconomic development, urbanisation, modern lifestyle and urban consumerism, and Islamic “social ethos” derived and recommended by the Islamists and ulama for Muslims to keep strict observance in society. Language and dress code, for instance, constitutes two such elements of identity construction that cause perpetual tension. The tension mainly is the outcome of the “totalitarian view” of Islam that drags all aspects of life under the purview of Islamic teachings (Esposito and Voll 2001). Language and particularly dress code correspond, in

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86 Ibid.
post-Islamists view, to the realm of temporal category and is not a subject of Shar’ia per se,

The fundamental ingredients of “Muslim identity” should be preserved and upheld in all circumstances … [however in addition to this] every nation possesses certain peculiar markers of identity such as language etc … but these do not fall under the category of immutable religious obligations … they are subject to change and evolution if the need arises … but the change in it should be subject to certain principles … switching to another language deprives you of your entire “civilisation”, your “social ethos”, your “background”, and your “past” … I repeatedly say that when we abandoned Arabic, we cut-off from our 14 hundred years’ history; when we cut-off our link with Persian, we lost our 1000 years’ civilisational tradition and now we are breaking away with Urdu, and so we will lose our link to the 300 years cultural heritage.87

The modernisation of education is critically admitted. Their proposed educational system will re-establish the broken link with own past and personalities,

[In the broad-based general education,] teach all science subjects in English, social sciences in Urdu, and religion in Arabic language … the issue of languages shouldn’t be underestimated … it is a “civilisational concern”, an issue of “tradition”, an issue of your whole “background” … for instance, when you say for instance, that we are going to teach French from next day, it means a lot. It [French language] will be accompanied by its “personalities”, its “background”, its “civilisation” … students in Urdu-medium schools are somehow connected to their “tradition” but those in English medium are unaware of their civilisation and tradition to the extent that they barely know who is Iqbal, Rumi, Sanna’i, Attar, Ghalib and Mir [all are Urdu and Persian poets/Sufis]… they can’t read Shibli, Farahi and Sir Sayyid … this is a tragic situation … aforementioned personalities cannot be produced all of a sudden. They are situated in history… changes, variations and higher objectives adoring human history are effected by [such] big names…you cannot produce their alternative, so you should enable your students to benefit from their teachings.88

87 Ghamidi’s response to a question: language and dress in the eyes of religion, accessed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6CjuIZdevtQ
88 op. cit., 3/5.
Such conceptualisation creates space for multiple identities (national, ethnic, Islamic, and other), all of them legitimate. Mawdudi once strongly rejected the notion of identity as a legitimate religious topic in his discourse on the question of Muslim nationalism in pre-divided India. Whereas, Mawdudi and his Jama’at accommodated the idea of Pakistan—as a Muslim nation—under the guise of political pragmatism, Ghamidi and his fellows try to create such space within the idiom and vocabulary of Islam. However, their formulation fails to explain how and why, some identities become more visible and takes precedence over others?

Ghamidi informs us that as opposed to the basic values of Western civilisation which is liberty, Islamic civilisation is founded on the concept of “worship” (aboodiyat—submission to God) (2008: 136-138). The value of aboodiyat manifests in three cultural expressions that also distinguish Islamic civilisation. These are restraint in sexual relationships, respect for social and familial statuses (father, elder, teacher), and preservation and promotion of society’s good conventions and customs and eradication of social vices (ibid). Post-Islamists emphasise that the latter is the job of the courts, police and civil organisations in accordance with the law of the land. Ghamidi rejects Huntington’s clash of civilisation theory as the basis of conflict. For him, the basis of conflict lies in safeguarding economic interests, domination of the innate superiority over others and seeking adventurism (muhem jooyee).89

5.11 Conceptual Developments

One key feature common to all contemporary revivalist movements is the articulation of new terms, idioms and concepts in which their message is communicable to the modern educated audience. The concepts of Islamists are revivalist in nature and content filled with content such that these concepts bear diagnosis of societal predicaments along with appropriate messages and of prognosis. Even further, some concepts assume motivational dimensions.

Mawdudi introduced new terms and idioms for conveying his Islamist values. When General Zia-ul-Haq (ruled 1977-88) came into power in

Pakistan, terms such as “Islamic economy”, “Islamic education”, and “Islamic system” gained currency at the state level (Metcalf 2004: 240-41). Before that, Islam as a comprehensive system had become the dominant discourse in Pakistani politics. Mawdudi and the Jama’at scholarship introduced new terms into their ideology for the modern educated classes. In time, Islamist terms gained dialect vocabulary in Pakistani politics. According to Metcalf, the Islamic vocabulary in Pakistan has dominated all discussions to an extent that Marxism, Liberalism and others, have gradually ceased to exist as alternative ideologies (2004: 236). A recent poll of young persons in Karachi by the *Monthly Herald*, showed that a “substantial majority (64 per cent) wanted an Islamic state but the religious parties that espouse this cause received only three per cent of the vote.” The other dimension observed in the same poll was the higher approval ratings for the “Islamists” as compared to “secularists.” The former were “assertive and emotional” when they “spoke of the ‘moral decadence’ of the West and condemned the West’s aggression against Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya and Iraq” (Dawn 2010). Recent ethnographic fieldwork of Pakistani-American anthropologist Akbar S. Ahmad supports these observations. In his tour of Islamic countries, Ahmad observed that he was “taken aback by the almost-collapse of the modernist model in which I [Akbar S. Ahmad] grew up” (Knowlton 2/82007; also see Ahmad 2007).

To capture the post-Islamists’ additions to the list of new vocabulary, I employ Voll’s three-dimensional perspective. He used this classification for the revivalists’ conceptual development. According to Voll, at least three different types of conceptual developments can be discerned in the revivalist discourses. The first involves those concepts, which have been central to pre-modern revivalism but still endure in contemporary revivalism. The second reflects transformation of the older/traditional concepts into modern significance, and the third involves inauguration of new concepts in the context of relevant conditions (1991: 23-36).

For example, post-Islamists use *tehzeeb-e-nafs* (civilising of the self) instead of the religious term *tazkiyya nafs* (purification of the self). Although, conceptually, both convey the same meaning, “purification of the self”, in the former sense it assimilates both spiritual (*tazkiyya* - purification) and temporal/worldly dimensions. This term further carries the intended fundamental message of post-Islamists to society. That is, to dilute conceptual constructs instilled by Islamism with notions more in
line with universal human values, Weberian work ethic and Islamic injunctions related to personal interactions, dealings and practices. Placing more emphasis on the dimensions of the Prophet’s life as a good man, loving husband, honest trader, affectionate teacher; and an exemplary law-abiding citizen energises this process (also see for this aspect Robinson 2008). Primacy of these dimensions implicitly overshadows the other dimensions of his life as a ruler, politician, leader, commander and the others prominent in Islamists discourses. This is one major difference with the shift in post-Islamists’ written and verbal discourse from Islamism.

Post-Islamists have almost delinked themselves from the socially and politically dominant Islamist vocabulary. Mawdudi’s (as well as Qutb’s) popular notion of *Jahiliyya* gets no mention in that sense in their discourses. Against the use of *Jahiliyya* or La-deen for non-Muslim polities, post-Islamists use good or bad states. Likewise, post-Islamists reject the notion of Islam as a complete system of life. Their emphasis is on those values and moral ideals that shaped the Guided Caliphs. The next term that entirely faced substitution is the Islamic state with democratic state (see chapter 6). Likewise, instead of Islamists’ “theo-democracy” or “khalifat”, post-Islamists insist on the notion that democracy is linked to faith. Whereas, Islamists’ vocabulary predominantly embody a motivational aspect for radical transformation of the political order, post-Islamists’ terms invoke transformation of individual and society on realistic grounds.

The post-Islamists’ new vocabulary is mainly drawn from Arabicized and Persianized Urdu which is filled with meaning and message they intend to communicate to various societal forces. In its social analysis, at least three aspects reflect the significance of post-Islamists’ new vocabulary. These are distance, space and temporality. The new conceptual development distinguishes them from other competing religious discourses, and thus creates distance. Creation of enhanced/appropriated space within the vocabulary is linked with the state and non-state efforts to seek social reform. That is, in the areas of democratisation, hudood laws, gender equality and others. Temporality means, the creation of new space within these concepts such that they internalise temporal aspects and requisites along with spiritual ones.

Unlike Islamists who demand political activism from all Muslims and thus blur the categories of personal and collective obligation; content
analysis of their media productions reveal that post-Islamists preach a clear segregation between individuals in determining their activism in society. In their model of social change, one’s aesthetics, capabilities and social status determine one’s specific form of activism. That is why, ulama are not supposed to do practical politics; their duty is admonition and influencing politicians (political processes) indirectly. In a similar fashion, ordinary Muslims are not uniformly obliged to take active part in practical politics for the enforcement of Shar’ia.

5.12 The New Media, New Interpreters and Discourse Communities

Since 2002, Pakistani society has experienced a vibrant media landscape; mostly during the regime of General Musharraf (1999-2007). The new media landscape has opened new opportunity spaces for post-Islamists. They internalised these spaces and articulated their discourse within the competing articulations by Islamists and traditional ulama. The proliferation of private electronic channels, explosion of internet, cyber-communities and modern telecommunication technologies also created a new “media of mediation” between the religious authorities and lay individuals. There are more than 40 television channels airing “beam soaps, satire, music programmes, films, religious speech, political talk shows, and news of the hour” (see Report 2009: 14). Out of numerous talk shows and debates held in the last six years, the media has become a debate forum between post-Islamist scholars and “others” in debate. In this debate, at least, in five areas the dominant ideologies have been challenged, which may have far-reaching social consequences. These are: 1) waging armed struggle and its various Islamic injunctions (who, when and under what conditions can wage an armed struggle/jihad, the legitimacy of guerrilla wars, resistance movements, proxy wars); 2) the legitimacy (both Shar’ia and constitutional) of hudood laws promulgated in the 1980s by the military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq; 3) gender equality, mobility and the visibility of women in public places, and how the post-Islamist re-reading of Shar’ia tackles the gender issues differently; 4) the permissibility of music, drama, film, and other genres of fine arts in
Shar’ia, and 5) democracy (as principle of sovereignty, equality and freedom), as the only religiously permissible form of government in Shar’ia.90

According to a recent media report by International Media Support, the media demographics in Pakistan reflect a “multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and stratified class society with a clear divide between Urdu and English media” (2009: 14). The English media has some but little audience, mostly modern educated elite class. In contrast, Urdu print and electronic channels have a wider audience in the largest segment of society, both urban and rural. The most important aspect of the new media landscape is the ownership structure, dominated by three main competitors with highly disproportionate influence on shaping politics and societal trends (ibid).

The post-Islamists assume modern communication technologies with wider access to public fora of free dialogue and debate. However, this seems more a presentation of assumption as a fact. The new media may not reflect a freely available aggregation of telecommunication technologies, producers, anchors and talk shows only. It reflects, and is thus well entrenched in the existing class/power relations in Pakistani state and society, and thus might entail a power analysis too. To what extent and in what sense, the post-Islamist scholars, as the new interpreters of Islam, are serving the interests of the powerful groups in society, a young post-Islamist columnist-anchor responds:

Though, I acknowledge the common observation that “we” and “our ideas” promote a specific view of the religion-state and religion-society relationship that in some instances suit the interests of the powerful groups—media, ruling elite, military, and state policies at large. For instance, during General Musharraf era, “our views” on democracy did not suit the media and the state and so our discourse was mainly allowed on hudood laws, and promotion of an Enlightened Vision of Islam. Likewise, in this regime [Peoples’ Party’s government], our ideas on judicial freedom are not given proper attention by the media … but I must tell you that this is not the whole story … This is a give-and-take process. Take the example of reading a book. When I read a book, I do read it through my own prism, for my own purpose to fit it in my own frame (saancha). But in return, I am also influenced by the book. If the liberal ‘Asma Jahangir [a lawyer, human rights activist] instrumentalises Ghamidi sahib and his

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90 This is based on my own analysis of various post-Islamists’ media productions.
ideas, but in return she is also influenced through some of the instances of our ideas … Also take the example of reading Qur’an. Many people use Qur’an as instrument for their own interests but in return Qur’an also leaves impression on the readers.91

In Ghamidi’s analysis, the power of free debate and dialogue unfold the strengths and weaknesses of the competing arguments:

I do not deny the specific “conditions” and “timing” (the alleged U.S. backing of the debate and the drive for the Enlightened Moderation by General Musharraf) in which this debate [on hudood laws] was held. But once the gates of debate open accentuate discussion on a specific issue, my intellectual position will push me into that, no matter by whom the debate was initiated. Secondly, if specific temporal and spatial conditions have generated this debate then these should be considered as opportunities than costs.92

It seems that in (over)reliance on the positive function of open debate and power of free interplay of ideas in society, post-Islamists have undermined the relations of power. As if the subjects are capable and free to author and “make their own history” (Asad 1993: 3-4). Ghamidi’s proposition of free debate in society is based on a linear prescription, which assumes that the debate will enhance social awareness, which will be the new weapons of the oppressed in Pakistan,

Once the free debate raises the awareness level of individual, social groups and society at large, harder and harder for the landed gentry and military elite it will be to exploit them. A society with raised awareness can never be subjugated and controlled with traditional ways/forms of authority.93

However, what is missing in this analysis is that “the modern bureaucratic state seeks to bring all areas of life under its regulation. And the transformative forces of global capitalism grow ever more relentless in undermining culturally rooted identities and social relations” (Zaman

91 Saleem Safi, telephone interview, 2/2/2010.
92 Ghamidi’s discussion in TV Talk Show Live with Tal’at: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-709844197326138293&ei=WbCYwXv5D4DxVI-Aaawly2Qs&q=javed+ahmad+ghamidi&client=firefox-a#
93 Ghamidi, personal interview August 2007; Khurshid Ahmad Nadeem, personal interview, August 2007.
CHAPTER 5

Power entrepreneurs and relations of power reproduce themselves in new ways and forms. Power remains central even in the Ghamidi sense; power and the associated abuses change shape and form but never retire.

Ghamidi further elaborates his envisioned free society where the true and correct interpretation of religion can be imparted. Although, in his approach, he marginalises the idea of seizing state power for any envisioned change, yet the very notion of power re-appears. Post-Islamists’ imagination of opening and enlarging the envisioned discursive field is not without power considerations. If shrinking the discursive space sustains religious authority of the traditional ulama and Islamists, enlarging of it provides ensuing opportunity spaces to post-Islamists.

Ghamidi addressed initially only a scholarly audience to attract their attention on issues he deemed would create more havoc than harmony in society at that stage. In his approach, “public argument, then, is connected with obedience to the law and the rules…” (Asad 1993: 203). Public criticism and free use of reason is considered the gift of Western Enlightenment. In Genealogies of Religion (1993), Talal Asad reviews critically what the application of reason and public criticism meant at the time. In Asad’s view, Kant made a distinction between the public and private use of reason (p.204). In effect, certain “social limits” can be defined in which rational thought can exercise its freedom. The question is who will define these social limits and on what basis. Is it the sovereign ruler or the laws and the rules of the land legislated by the parliament? Asad derives two important limits on criticism from the history of the Enlightenment in the West where the liberal tradition is supposed to have taken roots. One is the sociological limit where only a minority of scholars and intellectuals are privileged to exercise the freedom of having access to open criticism; and the political limit, that is “the conditions in which one must refrain from open criticism” (p.204).

A second aspect of the stratified media in Pakistan is the privileged access of post-Islamists to capture more airtime than the Islamists and traditional ulama. In a sense, for post-Islamists, these channels turned into counter-public spheres vis-à-vis the traditional “institutions of mediation” (mosques, madrassas, shrines and Sufi lodge).

The new media has thus become a territory for new identity construction in Pakistan. The post-Islamists question the very constitution of the prevailing notions of identities shaped by the dominant religious ideolo-
gies, ethnic affinities and political propagandas. The “new Muslim” to be shaped in this habitat by these scholars is the owner of multiple identities: he is a good human being, a pious Muslim, a law abiding Pakistani citizen, a rational social and economic agent, and having legitimate claim to his ethnic origins (Punjabi and Pukhtun). These identities are mutually enforcing and not mutually conflicting.

The intersection point between post-Islamists and the media is a function of multiple social, political and ideological processes. Information and entertainment as the main output of the new media has to seek its viewership in a society wherein parasitic landlordism, religious conservatism and military establishment shape the pervading ethos. Post-Islamists’ unique re-reading and talk shows facilitate the broadening of such a public space in which the social ethos of a suppressed liberal minority class can be promoted and disseminated. Despite this fact, post-Islamists as activists and interpreters of religion can be safely categorised as professionals, academics and religious scholars seeking “change” against forces of status quo (see for analysis, 2000: 14-51).

5.13 Concluding Remarks

The internal crises of the Jama’at, that were the outcome of multiple causes, resulted in discontent of its own ardent activists. The incessant crises produced an ever-growing ideological vacuum, which kept the Jama’at intellectual class at odds with Mawdudi’s ideology. Over time, the Jama’at had to confront a critique from within by its own elite intellectual class and its regular members. Islahi’s disagreement with Mawdudi in the 1950s on the authority of the amir and the non-democratic way of running the Jama’at affairs, Khan’s attack on the very foundations of Mawdudi’s ideology and its conceptual basis in the early 1960s and finally, Ghamidi’s reconstruction of the entire argument and its synthesis groomed into a counter-worldview to Mawdudi—named here as post-Islamism. I refer to this discourse as post-Islamist because of some shared traits with other such discourses in Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It is a strand of the grand post-Islamist project and by no means has claims to generalisations.

This chapter showed that the emergence and development of post-Islamism in Pakistan followed a unique path. The building blocks of this project were constructed over a period of 130 years in which Farahi, Islahi, Khan and Ghamidi intellectually contributed. In case of Islahi and
Ghamidi, this counter-worldview to Mawdudi emerged as an intellectual issue in the religious sphere. They followed its entire content over a long period of time essentially and originally in the doctrinal sources. In this way, post-Islamism in Pakistan has a generational dimension. Farahi (d.1930), Islahi (d.1997), Khan and Ghamidi (b.1951) contributed to an entire body of theory. Farahi prevailed prior to Mawdudi but his mention is important because he outlined the theory of nazm which is the basis of contemporary post-Islamists’ hermeneutics and their engagement with competing Islamic discourses.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Ghamidi inaugurated the reconstructionist phase of post-Islamism. Although, as his biography reveals, this issue emerged because of his own discontent with the prevailing explanations and interpretative methods of Islamic discourses; however, it is evident from the contours of his own intellectual journey that a number of sociopolitical factors pushed him in the reconstructionist phase of post-Islamism. One main determining cause came from his dwindling trust on Mawdudi’s ideology and the state-led drive of Islamisation in Pakistan in the Zia-ul-Haq regime. Most of his current ideas, on democracy, jihad and gender relations appeared by mid-1990s. Ghamidi and his fellows were also known for their ideas to limited learned elite. However, their overall influence was limited to these circles. The eruption of new electronic media in Pakistan in the post-2000 era inaugurated the expansionary phase of post-Islamism in Pakistan. The emergence of this modern media of communication became a counter-public space for post-Islamists vis-à-vis the traditional institutions of mosque and madrassa occupied by ulama. Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation and the post-9/11 debates in Pakistan and across the globe further augmented this opportunity. Post-Islamist scholars emerged as “Islamo-liberal” intellectuals and expanded their influence in the middle, upper-middle classes mostly in the urban areas (Ahmad 2010; Lacroix 2004). Here I conclude that while the expansionary phase of post-Islamism depends on the opportunity spaces that appeared in the recent past and that gave these intellectuals unprecedented momentum; the historical data suggests that this discourse is not reducible to the opening of these opportunity spaces. The analysis suggests that for better understanding of the development of post-Islamist discourse over time can be broken down into various phases. Concentration on the last phase (the expansionary phase)
without knowing the historical trajectory of the discourse may be misleading.

Ghamidi’s own Persianized Urdu expression about his intellectual journey explains the condition and trajectory of constantly changing discourse and practice better. In his term Pantheon of Ideas, Ghamidi explains his own intellectual evolution of formulating ideas, following them and then smashing them down. The ideologues of both movements have responded to the challenge of modernity in a critical and creative way. Neither of them can be labelled an irrational or medieval response. Both have undergone life-long experience of engagement and passed through various phases: traditional-uncritical belief, engagement with Sufism, phases of skepticism and uncertainty, self-exploration and identity construction and mobilisation of middle class, modern educated individuals for reform and revival. The next chapter attempts to highlight some empirical examples in the post-Islamist discourse that were sculpted in their pantheon of ideas.
Any text, once written, escapes from its author and takes on a life of its own, whose richness or poverty, expansion or desiccation, oblivion or revival, will henceforth depend on its readers (Arkoun 2002: 157).

How do we reconcile the immutable principles of religion with the changing conditions of the world? The solution will be like this: We have to find something that is at the same time both changeable and immutable. And what is that? It is the revealed text itself (Soroush 2000).

6.1 Introduction

What is the relationship between Islam and liberal democracy in a Muslim majority state like Pakistan? I argue that the post-Islamists’ assertive shift from Mawdudi’s theo-democracy and Islamic state towards a democratic state based on Western-style notions of liberal democracy, is the outcome of a unique hermeneutic approach and line of ijtihad. The attribute “unique” by no means implies that other post-Islamists or reformers have ignored hermeneutics. On the contrary, most of them begin with introducing one or other form of hermeneutics to facilitate and justify their ideas and worldviews derived from the Divine text. The features that make Pakistani post-Islamists’ hermeneutics unique include: their articulation and application of nazm theory (chapter 5) and the overall treatment of foundational sources—distinguishing Hadith from Sunnah and re-defining key concepts such as Ijmaa’. Furthermore, their approach enables them to internalise the context to Qur’an instead of historicising it. I am specifically referring to Fazlur Rahman’s “double-movement theory” approach. Their approach locates these post-
Islamists in a unique position where they fall inside as well as deviate from the traditional framework. This approach is in contrast, at least in Pakistan, to all major schools: Traditionalists, Islamic Modernists and Islamists.

The journey from theological resources to liberal democracy is not a smooth one. In his recent seminal study, *Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies*, Nader Hashemi seeks to expose problems in the paradoxical relationship between liberal democracy, secularism and Muslim societies. According to Hashemi, “liberal democracy requires a form of secularism to sustain itself, yet simultaneously the main political, cultural, and intellectual resources at the disposal of Muslim democrats today are theological. A paradox thus confronts the democratic theorist” (Hashemi 2009: 1). In this chapter, I explore and analyse, how post-Islamist scholarship in Pakistan, as interpreted in their own terms and categories, address this paradox by application of their line of ijtihad.

Using their interpretative approach and re-reading of the Qur’anic text, I argue, Ghamidi and post-Islamist public intellectuals have created a broader conceptual secular space—not secularism—where liberal democracy is comfortably compatible with Islamic theological sources. However, two sub-arguments are in order: 1) post-Islamists have retreated from the controversy of Islamic versus secular state in favour of a democratic state, and 2) post-Islamists have also abandoned the Islamist notions of Islamisation of state and adopted the idea of re-Islamisation of individual and society.

Moreover, this thesis argues that researchers’ attempt to resolve the problem of liberal democracy in Muslim societies focus more on actual practice of Islamic movements, and neglect epistemological debates. This thesis attempts to bridge this gap by elucidating how a hermeneutic shift can create new theological resources that may address ambiguities and complications about Islam and modernity. In the same way, it argues that post-Islamists have created a secular space, but not secularism, which is suggested to be re-Islamised through reformation of the individual than Islamisation of the state.

The chapter explores how post-Islamist intellectuals, informed by socioeconomic and political conditions and through their own reinterpretation of religion, history and modernity have constituted a new interpretative approach. In the context of social reform, I argue that the unique-
ness of post-Islamist approach lies not in their openness to accommodate new experiences of the modern world but in the ways they handle the text, relate it to emerging situations, and appropriation of new space within the text.

Towards the end, the chapter argues that by implication of post-Islamist hermeneutics, the popular notion of jihad (as armed struggle) for the propagation and enforcement of Islam reduces to a historical category not applicable across time and space. In the same vein, it argues that striking jihad from the historical category ushers in space for nourishing pluralism. Jihad in the meaning of armed struggle becomes an instrument to safeguard human freedom and maintain law and order, and thus not a sacred end in itself. Both these aspects have far-reaching policy implications addressed in the concluding chapter. Before conclusion, some of the emergent critical assessments of post-Islamist thought are also discussed.

6.2 Quest for New Hermeneutics

As we learned from the biographies in chapter 4 and 5, for post-Islamists, the articulation of new hermeneutics had been a conscious project in their transitory phase from Islamism. External conditions, internal discontent and breakdown of the traditional framework propelled the initial quest for a new hermeneutics. Later it turned into a serious academic pursuit. To borrow Kamrava’s expression, which he used for reformist intellectuals in Iran, the exploration of new hermeneutics was “a task about which they go in a reasoned, methodical, and academic manner” (2008: 144). The initial questions in such hermeneutical debates included: is every aspect of human life ‘religious’? Do all dimensions of our temporal life need Divine intervention? Does everything belong to, as the Islamists normally make claims, the province of Islamic jurisdiction or do limits on the sacred exist? (Esposito and Voll 2001). If metaphysical intervention is limited and restricted to some key issue areas, then what are the limits of its intervention? How do we know that one thing belongs to the province of Islam and another not? Finally, how are these questions addressed by the post-Islamists’ unique epistemology and hermeneutics? These and other such questions have always been central to the reformist discourses. In response to these questions, I will demonstrate that a clearly different position from Islamism has evolved in post-Islamist intellectual discourse in Pakistan.
There is no comparative academic inquiry dealing with the analysis of post-Islamists’ hermeneutics in light of Western scholarship such as Schleiermacher (d.1834), Dilthey (d.1911), Gadamer, Husserl (d.1938), Habermas (1929-) and Ricoeur (1913-). Iftikhar while commenting on the need of such comparative examination also observes that such a comparison could not be a simple one because both “do not have sufficiently similar parallels” (2005: 74). In his essay *From Biblical to General Hermeneutics: A Historical Thematic Development*, Afaki made a strong case whereby post-Islamists’ exegetical approach can be compared to Schleiermacher (Afaki 2000). Schleiermacher’s general hermeneutics, according to Afaki, is based on two-dimensional interpretation: grammatical and psychological. “Grammatical because the text is an act of speaking which is always expressed through language, and psychological because it is a manifestation of the speaker’s [the author’s] thought” (ibid). Grammatically, fixing of meaning in a given text “must be decided on the basis of the use of language common to the author and his original public.” Secondly, “the meaning of each word of a passage must be determined by the context in which it occurs.” Any speech act involves two aspects of author’s personality in an amalgamated from: “the inner system of his thought, and the system of language as its outer expression” (ibid). Afaki’s analysis shows that Schleiermacher’s theory of general hermeneutics can be compared to Islahi’s-Ghamidi’s theory of nazm.

Based on his IHF (see chapter 5), Ghamidi specifies the exact addressees to which Qur’an was primarily revealed. These addressees were Ishmaelites, Israelites (Jews) and Nazarites’ Christians of Arabia (Ghamidi 2009). This specificity of addressees by Ghamidi also enables post-Islamists to depart from generalisation of Qur’anic injunctions without first knowing the exact location and context. A fellow of Ghamidi, cites two examples from the Qur’an, of universalising and specifying injunctions: the punishment plan announced in chapter Al-Tawbah against the polytheists, Jews and Nazarites Christians is specific to them only. On the contrary, “cetris paribus, the injunctions against fornication in the Qur’an have universal character in applicability” (Iftikhar 2005: 66). This brief mention of Ghamidi’s exegetical method brings Rahman’s “double movement” theory into perspective (Moosa 2003: 15-18). Despite seemingly apparent similarities between Ghamidi’s and Rahman’s exegetical approach, both are not the same (Iftikhar 2005: 66).
In Rahman’s double movement approach, in determination of understanding of the divine intentionality, the historical conditions attain central location. The first movement involves studying “both the micro and macro context in which the Qur’an was first revealed. This would establish the original meaning of revelation within the moral-social context of the prophetic society as well as the broader picture of the world at large at that time.” Then the second movement engages an “attempt to apply those general and systematic values and principles to the context of the contemporary reader of the Qur’an” (op. cit., pp.15-16). However, Rahman’s approach when compared to Ghamidi’s theory reveals that both are not the same. Ghamidi gives “primacy to the language and the text of the Qur’an … that permit extension or application of a directive to situations other than the historical instance of the directive’s origin and applicability” (Iftikhar 2005: 67). Moreover, the underlying assumptions in both cases are different; the central goal of Qur’an is not to establish a just socioeconomic order in Ghamidi’s view as opposed to Rahman.

The particular view on the limits of sacred intervention within a Muslim society can either hamper and/or facilitate reform efforts and processes in social practice. Specific interpretative approaches to Islamic sources determine the opening and closing of intellectual space in which social reform can appear. With regard to reform, two issues are important in epistemological debates: what are the authentic sources of Islamic law and what are the principles (usul) of deriving injunctions from these sources.

6.3 The Question of Sources: Re-visiting Multiplicity of Sources

Ghamidi’s most creative advancement in the epistemological discourse upon the authentic sources of religion is a radical shift. In this regard, his intellectual direction converges on the “fusion” of multiplicity of sources of religion on a “unitary source”—the person of Muhammad and the “human nature”:

God Almighty had imbued Islam in the very “human nature” as guidance. Afterwards, He sent down his prophets to reveal every “essential detail” of it to humankind through His last Prophet Muhammad. Consequently, it is now only him who is the sole source of this religion in the world. He has the authority to proclaim something as part of Islam until the Last Day of Judgment (Ghamidi 2009b).
Consequently, religious guidance is either imbued in “human nature” and/or in the “words,” “deeds” or “tacit approvals” of the Prophet. The Prophet transmitted religion to the ummah in two forms: Qur’an and Sunnah (not Hadith). Likewise, the two other sources, consensus (Ijmaa’)—total agreement without any difference—and analogical reasoning (Qiyas) are discarded as “sources” of religion. Ghamidi emphasizes on two other terms: (1) perpetual recitation (tawatur qawli) (2) and perpetual practice (tawatur amali). Both these terms refer to “the transmission of religion through reading, writing, speaking, and practically adhering to it, generation after generation” (2008: 9).

In Islamic jurisprudence, according to Masud, Ijmaa’ has a two way meaning: as a source and as a “ratifying authority.” In the former sense, it means that “the sum total of agreed opinions among the Companions of the Prophet … or among the later jurists should constitute a source of legal reasoning.” In the latter sense, Ijmaa’ refers to a process by which majority of the Muslim community adopt certain “opinion or practice” with continuity, and “it may also be taken as law” (Masud 2003: 135).

This shows a clear departure from the traditional approach to sources of religion. In a traditional approach, the sources are ordered: Qur’an, Hadith, Ijmaa’ (consensus) and finally Qiyas (analogical reasoning). Post-Islamists consider Qur’an and Sunnah as the only valid authentic sources of Islamic injunctions where Sunnah and Hadith is not the same thing (Ghamidi 2009b).

In post-Islamist framework, Qur’an is the primary source of religion. Following Farahi-Islahi’s thematic and structural coherence (nazm-e- kalam), Ghamidi rejects the traditional fragmentary/piecemeal approach to the Qur’an (see Chapter 5). In his view, the Qur’an is a coherent book of Divine revelations to His Last Messenger. The exact meaning of each verse can be determined only in its proper “context” where the context is internal to Qur’an and not external, as Modernists believe (Nadeem 2008). The Qur’an thus forms a thematically coherent discourse and is not an isolated unit of words, verses and chapters. This discourse, Ghamidi claims, is a dialogue (mukalaema) with its multiple addressees:

94 Words refer to sayings of the Prophet; deeds refer to practice of the Prophet; and tacit approval refers to those approvals by the Prophet when something related to religion was done before him, and he did not disapprove them.
The signification of its [Qur’an] words to its meaning is perfectly definite. Whatever the Qur’an intends to say, it says with consummate certitude, and does not remain deficient in expressing its intention on any matter at all. Its meaning is only the one that its words accept, the meaning is neither different from the words nor at variation with them. Its words are the only gateway to access its world of meanings. Its words express their meaning with perfect certitude, and there does not remain any room for any doubt at all.\textsuperscript{95}

Two types of resources can be employed to discover the exact meaning of the Qur’anic text: external and internal sources. The former includes the historical record of the Prophet (Hadith), history and Biblical sources while the latter consists of the language and clues of the Qur’an (Iftikhar 2005).

The structural and thematic coherence in the Qur’an implies that each verse is in order with its preceding and succeeding verse; each chapter/surah is an independent unit of analysis and in complete harmony with other chapters. Qur’an can be divided into seven chapters with each chapter having its own central theme (\textit{umood}). Each chapter begins with one or more than one Meccan surah and ends with one or more than one Medinan surah; modern paragraphing and punctuations (commas, full stops, colons, semi-colons, etc) can be applied to Qur’an.

According to Ghamidi, thematically, Qur’an is the narrative of the Prophetic admonition of his addressees (\textit{sargazesht-e-inzaar}). That is, Muhammad was a Prophet (\textit{nabi}) as well as a Messenger (\textit{rasul}) of God. In the latter capacity, he belonged to a special category of prophets, Messengerhood, which according to Divine rule will necessarily triumph over his direct addressees (1992: 1-5). All prophets who are also Messengers are assigned the responsibility to warn their respective people about God’s final judgment. After clarification of their message, the Messenger’s mission culminates in a formulation of conclusive evidence (\textit{itmam-e-hujjat}). He then administers Divine judgment of punishment and reward on earth (\textit{dainoonat}). The Qur’an works this entire prophetic career/mission into its thematically coherent seven chapters (ibid). Pre-understanding of this narrative of the prophetic admonition is a necessary condition, according to post-Islamists, for searching for the exact

\textsuperscript{95} The passage has been translated from the Urdu original by Nadir Aqeel Ansari from Ghamidi’s \textit{Meezan} 2008, p.25.
meaning of the Qur’an. The reason is, it helps in determining the proper context of the Qur’anic text. Unlike Modernists, who determine the context outside the Qur’anic text by historicising it, post-Islamists approach and determine it within the text (Nadeem 2008). Therefore, it is a “text-based” approach in contrast to modernists’ historical approach (Rahman 1984). A young post-Islamist scholar, Nadeem, equated modernism with “intellectual pleasure” (zibnee ayyashee) and condemned their approach of interpreting Islam in light of objectives of Shar’ia and historical context. The scholar argues that there is difference between historicising (and subjecting Islam to maqasid) Islam and taking support from these two in understanding Islam (tafeem-e-din) (Nadeem 2009: 18-19).

Ghamidi argues that interpretation of the revealed text in light of these principles, can lead to creation of enhanced space within the text itself—the space that sprouts from the text and is not imposed on it apologetically.

The more problematic issue is how to treat the Hadith literature. By distinguishing Hadith from Sunnah, the post-Islamists have made an important breakthrough. In their interpretation, Hadith and Sunnah are not the same concepts. The Sunnah refers to “those religious traditions of the Abrahamic faith, which Muhammad, after their revival and reform and after some additions to them, established as religion in the community of his followers” (Ifikhar 2005: 69, Japanwala 2008: 109-13). The Sunnah was transferred to us from generation to generation through perpetual adherence (amali tawatur) as opposed to Qur’an, which we found through oral perpetuation (qawli tawatur) (Ghamidi 2009b). The main principles applied by Ghamidi to derive Sunnah:

- The Sunnah relates only to religion and things other than religion are not Sunnah. Therefore, a particular dress code of the Prophet and his mode of transportation is not Sunnah. Likewise, explanation of the science of farming, prescriptions for medication, and designing war strategies are not the prophetic goal and thus not religion. There is no such thing as tib-i-Nabawi—prophetic medication (2009: 57-60, GML: 023-A).

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96 Ghamidi, telephone interview, 1/12/2009.
The sphere of Sunnah is concerned entirely with practical things, not beliefs and philosophical discussions. For instance, historical happenings of the prophetic era, the prophet’s wars discussed in the Hadith literature are not Sunnah (ibid).

Sunnah consists of only those practices that were informed and primarily initiated by the Prophet (prayers, hajj, zakat, etc.) although the directives can be found in the Qur’an. Directives initiated by the Qur’an (amputation of hands, waging of war against the “infidels”—a historical category in post-Islamist literature and not applied to non-Muslims of today, etc.) and practiced by the Prophet are not Sunnah but an explanation of the Qur’an (tafheem wa tablyeem) and moral excellence of the Prophet (uswa-i hasanah). An example of the latter would be the Qur’anic directive to treat well your wives and the Prophet acted upon this directive. Therefore, it is not Sunnah but moral excellence (ibid).

The optional acts of worship and the moral excellence followed by the Prophet over and above the obligatory requirements do not form independent Sunnah (optional prayers, and twice performing of hajj). (GML: 024-B).

The guidance instilled in human nature if explained by the Prophet does not form an independent Sunnah. For instance, instructions not to tell a lie; admonition against eating donkey, lions and snakes are exposed to human nature not to be eaten (ibid). According to Ghamidi, “telling a lie is not forbidden in our religion but in religion of nature (deen-i fitrat)” (ibid; Japanwala 2008).

The general guidelines issued by the Prophet but never intended as Sunnah, will not form Sunnah. For example, the various supplications taught by him during prostration are not Sunnah (Ghamidi 2009b).

Sunnah cannot derive from isolated narratives (khabar-e-wahid). Like Qur’an, the Sunnah necessarily derives from consensus of the Ummah. The Prophet administered this duty with greater care (Ghamidi 2009: 57-60).

Based on the above principles, Ghamidi enumerates only 27 Sunnan (pl. of Sunnah). This is a deviation from the traditional position, which refers to countless prophetic approvals and acts as Sunnah (Japanwala 2008: 130-33). The Sunnah-Hadith distinction has enormous social consequences. In distinguishing Hadith from Sunnah, Ghamidi situates his
argument in the thought of 18th century reformist Shah Waliullah, (see Nasir 2009; GML: 023-A; Japanwala 2008) who believed that every act/saying/isolated instruction or overt or tacit approval of the Prophet do not fulfil conditions laid down for Sunnah. For instance, war strategies and the personal likes and dislikes of the Prophet do not form Sunnah, and thus are not the content of religion (ibid). To distinguish the ‘constant and variable components’ of religion from one another, Shah Waliullah referred to the Prophet’s “governmental rulings” and the “eternal rules” (Soroush et al. 2000: 29). While the former category is restricted in scope to the prophetic era, the latter can be generalised and universalized (ibid). For example, a post-Islamist scholar objects to ulama’s claim that the Prophet’s rulings (that blood money (diyyat) is 100 camels) belonged to the category of eternal Shar‘ia:

… the Qur‘an has not determined any fixed amount of blood money, and is thus left to be decided according to the prevailing custom (ma’roof) … [since we know that] in matters related to Ma’roof, each society is free to follow its own customs and not that of the Arabs’ one in the Prophet’s era. Therefore, the religious status of the Prophet’s ruling on fixation of blood money is not eternal, rather pertains to application of a general Shar‘ia principle to a specific temporal and spatial situation98 (Nasir 2010).

In response to a number of critical questions posed by a traditional scholar on the post-Islamist position on blood money, the latter links his argument with Shah Waliullah and then furthers Shah’s argument in a creative and critical fashion:

Shah’s opinion was that fixation of blood money in terms of gold, silver, goats or cows [instead of 100 camels] for Arabs and non-Arabs, was based on wisdom (himat). The underlying wisdom [as Shah thought] ceases to exist because perhaps he believed that gold or silver-based exchange system will prevail forever … the advancement of human civilisation has belied Shah’s proposition. Because, the world has gradually entered into credit money passing through metallic and paper money … so in the light of Qur‘anic injunctions, we opine that fixation of blood money belongs to the category of “governmental rulings” (siyasah) and not “eternal Shar‘ia” (tashree‘) (ibid).

In Ghamidi’s view, the Hadith does not benefit us in certitude. Most of the Hadith literature comes from a single reporter (akhbar-e-ahaad), which is good for probable knowledge (zanni ilm) at most. Unlike the preservation and passing on of the Qur’an and Sunnah, argues Ghamidi, the Prophet had not made any special arrangements to record and pass on the Hadith literature as a fundamental source of religion. The Hadith does not add anything to the basic content of religion. However, Ghamidi recognises the Hadith literature as the most important source of knowing the exemplary practice of the Prophet and explanation of various religious issues. In the post-Islamist discourse, a Hadith of the Prophet qualifies for acceptance if it fulfills these criteria: the Hadith should not be against the Qur’an and the established Sunnah (Ghamidi 2009); and the Hadith should not be against the established facts and reason (intuitive realities, historical truths, knowledge derived from observations and experiences) (ibid). They have set conditions for analysts. They include: 1) who bases their argument on the Hadith literature; 2) who appreciates the intricacies of the original Arabic language of the Qur’an and Hadith, and 3) knowing the specific context of the Hadith including a thorough knowledge of all Hadith literature. Post-Islamists argue that five key issue areas need to be revisited in light of the above interpretative approach: 1) re-interpretation of the Qur’an, 2) critical revisit of the Hadith literature, 3) the new understanding of Islam in light of these principles, 4) fresh understanding of the biography of the Prophet, and 5) a revisit to the biographies of the companions of the Prophet (GML: 189/last lecture).

Between Mutable and the Immutable

The above interpretative approach has enabled post-Islamists to carry out another project: an intellectual attempt to differentiate between the Divine laws (Shar’ia) and the human understanding of it (fiqh). Contemporary literature shows post-Islamists in question are not unique in this effort. Efforts to ask the questions persist: what is sacred, religious and immutable and what is human understanding of the immutable (Cooper 1998: 43, Kamrava 2008)? The uniqueness of post-Islamism lay in the ways it accomplishes this Herculean task, through a re-categorisation of the revealed content into two main groups—Shar’ia laws, and beliefs and morality. In response to the “Islamisation campaign” in Pakistan and elsewhere, mainly spearheaded by the political Islamists, post-Islamists
have been insisting on investing intellectual energies on extracting a “common core of Shar’ia” than derivation of fiqh and an Islamic system of life. Once extracted and identified as separable from human understanding (fiqh), this core can help clarify a number of confusions about the nature and scope of Shar’iah. They consider the Qur’an as scale and distinguisher between the ‘truth and evil’ and the ‘religious and the secular’.

Some scholars argue to the contrary and assume overcoming “Islamic essentialism” prerequisite for religious reform and thus cultural change: “a willingness to rethink the belief in immutability of Islamic thought” (Tibi 2009: 40).

Through a critical linguistic analysis of the Qur’anic text, Ghamidi inaugurates a new classification of the religious content, which is said to be his most salient contribution in Islamic studies. He classifies religion into (1) philosophical basis (al-Hikmah), and (2) Law/Shar’ia (al-Kitab) (GML: 01-B, 04-B; Ghamidi 2009b). In his view, this categorisation is not imposed upon the Qur’an but rather premised upon it. In a number of verses, the Qur’an draws a line between al-Hikmah and al-Kitab. In his understanding, the former refers to that part of the religious content that deals with the philosophical foundations of religion, while, the latter is the Divine law. Ghamidi further classifies the two categories as: (1) al-Hikmah: (a) beliefs (b) ethics; (2) al-Kitab: (a) Shar’ia of worship rituals (b) the social Shar’ia (c) the political Shar’ia (d) the economic Shar’ia (e) the Shar’ia of preaching (f) the Shar’ia of jihad (g) the penal Shar’ia (h) the dietary Shar’ia (i) Islamic customs and etiquette (j) oaths and atonements (Ghamidi 2009b).

The above classification relates to the post-Islamists’ dissatisfaction with the traditional fiqh. They insist on discarding the medieval fiqh due to (1) its inability to deal with complex questions of modern times, (2) its sheer weight of literature thus overwhelming the simple, logical and useful corpus of “Shar’ia”—as understood in post-Islamists’ discourse (Malik nd: 81-102). On this subject, Ghamidi expounded his views:

[my other difference with Mawdudi is] even in his religious views, he is embedded in a specific fiqh tradition. But as a result of my own independent research, I have concluded that fiqh is a heavy load laid down on back

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99 Shehzad Saleem: Introduction to Understanding the Qur’an lecture series, accessed at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dRmYKnbaTo>  
100 Dr Farooq Khan, personal interview, 11/10/2009.
of Shar’ia. It is like the pearls of Shar’ia are buried under the pebbles. Inspired by Iqbal’s reconstruction lectures, initially, I also thought about the regeneration of fiqh. But after in-depth deliberations, I came to the conclusion that fiqh-regeneration is not required. On the contrary, what is required is the “liberation” of Shar’ia from the “heavy weight” of fiqh (Malik nd: 83).

How does the frozen body of fiqh to constantly update and revise itself dynamically in the face of changing social conditions? The post-Islamists answer this question in a manner that cannot be expected from Islamists and Modernists; that is, ijtihad and juristic preference within fiqhi schools (ijtihad fil madhab) (Nadeem 2008: 196-207) or making reason “the guiding principle” (Kamrava 2008: 146). For post-Islamists:

Elucidation, explanation, and dissemination of the details of this brief and precise Shar’ia are required. Development of fiqh will follow on. Fiqh is a necessity of our daily life. Right now, the adjudication of our judges is also a contribution toward fiqh development. The legislation in our parliament is also fiqh … Today, we can formulate rules and regulations [fiqh] that might be alterable tomorrow. [However] the immutable thing is God’s Shar’ia. It should be religiously constructed (tadween) (Malik nd: 83).

Post-Islamists assume that humans are primarily rational and that is why they perform religious obligations. This condition determines the limits of Divine intervention too. The interference of Divine authority is initiated when necessary and in a limited way. They do not agree with the Islamists’ campaign for Islamisation of all spheres of life: the Islamisation of knowledge, banking, leisure and many other non-religious areas. This line of thinking, in post-Islamists view, raised the expectations of Muslims from revealed sources, and they are waiting for ready-made solutions. These “false” expectations from Islam have overburdened religion, and desiccated the creative energies of Muslim intelligentsia:

… the solution [of economic problems] will not spring from where it is sought [revealed sources]. The thinking that Islam is the Divine panacea bearing ready-made answers to every question of human life, has plagued Muslim’s physique for centuries now… think about our nuclear capability: did we consult Qur’an for it? … similar are economic problems … for improvement of living standards of our downtrodden classes in national development plan, we should first, look into the “human experiences”,

101 Ghamidi, telephone interviews, February 2010.
and should determine what are the causes of it … then, in religion, we will find only minimal guidance [about economic problems] (Malik nd: 84).

Ghamidi argues that in the sphere of science, revelation intervenes at the stage of moral importance. Qur’an is not a book of science and therefore cannot teach us about scientific discoveries. The nature of its intervention is moral. However, according to Ghamidi, all fundamental religious (here Islamic) premises can be analysed based on one or multiple sources of knowledge (intuition, historical evidences, senses, messenger’s testimony and the experimental proof). Post-Islamists criticise what they term the “exceptionalist” and “exclusivist” attitude adopted by positivists/empiricists towards religion because: (1) they insist on the empirical/sensual proof of the religious claims in terms of sense experience and empirical proof. Whereas, in the secular sphere, they accept claims as truisms based only on ‘other sources’ as well; for example, we admit on the basis of historical evidence that Karl Marx existed in human history; (2) Religion is treated exceptionally, something not analysable based on common sources of knowledge. For Ghamidi, empirical proof is only one authentic source of knowledge. The other valid sources for him are our intuitive faculty, historical perpetuity, the Messengers’ testimony, reason, senses and experiment.

6.4 Religion and Democracy: the Central Problem

Democracy is a contested term. To delimit its scope, I employ Hadenius’ three-way definition: “a general principle of popular sovereignty, a principle of freedom, and a principle of equality” (1992: 9, also see Gunning 2007: 16). The three principles respectively reveal that the explicit preferences of the people as the basis of legitimate ‘political decision making’; the free and unimpeded will of the people to be expressed in political decision making; and that all individuals’ opinions and preferences should be treated alike and considered as equal (ibid). Larry Diamond et

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102 Ghamidi’s response to a question on Cousin Marriage and Abnormal Children, accessed at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U5CaGmQ8QkI>


104 Ibid.
al, mentions seven features common to any democracy: individual freedoms and civil liberties; rule of the law; sovereignty resting upon the people; equality of all citizens before the law; vertical and horizontal accountability for government officials; transparency of the ruling systems to the demands of the citizens; and equality of opportunity for citizens (1988: 218-260). For Bukay, these features are important because they emphasise human rights, freedoms and liberties instead of elections and institutional arrangements (2007: 72). In contrast, Hashemi has emphasised on eight institutional guarantees for a successful liberal democracy:

1. freedom to form and join organizations;
2. freedom of expression;
3. inclusive suffrage;
4. the right to run for office;
5. the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes;
6. availability of alternative information;
7. free and fair elections;
8. the existence of institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

In the context of Islam and democracy, the problematic part pertains to “sovereignty.” To a Western mind, metaphysical basis of sovereignty, as outlined by Mawdudi, disturbs an entire network of relationships. In his seminal study, Nader Hashemi (2009) modelled this tension elegantly, see Figure 6.1.

**Figure 6.1**

_Demonstration of tension between religion and democracy_

![Diagram showing the tension between God, Human, and Human](Source: Hashemi (2009: 10))
Theoretical “tension” between democracy and religion, according to Hashemi, can be outlined along horizontal and vertical axes. The vertical axis shows the relationship between human and God. Democracy is “a system of political organisation that fundamentally implies a horizontal relationship among individuals in society” (ibid: 10). The tension emanates from a point where the vertical relationship interferes to regulate the social organisation of society by reference to Divine supremacy undermining popular sovereignty. This tension leads political theorists to the conclusion that a liberal democratic polity requires separation of state and religion. The danger in religious politics and social engineering in light of religious values and norms is human rights’ abuse, that is, rights and concerns of women and minorities. Hashemi challenges this understanding of “structural incompatibility between religious politics and liberal-democratic development” and its underlying assumptions (p.11) with three key arguments: They are, 1) given that secularism is needed for liberal democracy to take root, and that theological resources are inherently not pro-democratic and pro-secularism; these ideas must be “socially constructed”; 2) in the given historical and socio-political context of Muslim societies, the “road to liberal democracy … must pass through the gates of religious politics”, and (3) neither rejection nor privatisation of religion is a requirement for liberal democratic development. On the other hand, what is required is the “re-interpretation of religious ideas” specifically those related to “political authority” and individual rights (ibid: 12).

Depending on the context, the vertical equation may regulate or intervene in the horizontal one. This may occur through legislation of religious laws by the government; active political participation of the religious class, and/or; elected or unelected rule of religious groups.

As discussed in chapter 4, for Islamists, Divine authority is the ultimate fountain of legitimate law. However, can a “democratic conception of the people’s authority be reconciled with an Islamic understanding of God’s authority” (Fadl 2005)? My intention is to explore and examine how post-Islamist scholarship, with application of its hermeneutic approach and ijtihad addressed this problem in their re-interpretation of the sacred text, and counter-worldview to Mawdudi’s theo-democratic approach.
6.5 Post-Islamists on (Theo) Democracy: Reformulation?

For political Islamists, an Islamic state is supposed to accept the supremacy of Shar’ia/Islamic law over all aspects of social, political and religious life (Mawdudi 1960). This formulation, if accepted, can lead to the following issues: 1) since Islamic law (mostly based on fiqh) is thought to discriminate between Muslims and non-Muslims and deny gender equality, it does not provide equality, and 2) it denies the basic right of the governed to make their laws, and is thus against the basic principles of democracy. The very notion of an Islamic democracy thus becomes a “self-contradiction” (Bukay 2007).

The whole discussion on this religion-democracy tension hinges on one key issue: who is sovereign in political sense (God, parliament or head of the state). If we take it for granted that, the metaphysical basis of the political system is an integral part of Muslims’ social reality, then how post-Islamists in Pakistan deal with the issue of popular versus Divine sovereignty? The question central to my thesis: did post-Islamists deviate from Islamist notions of sovereignty and Islamic state?

6.5.1 Divine sovereignty and vicegerency: reformulation?

In his essay Political Theory of Islam, Mawdudi wrote that sovereignty in Islam belongs to God as opposed to Western democracy where it belongs to the people (1960: 145-146). This interpretation by Mawdudi led him to accuse modern democracy of falling into shirk. Mawdudi’s articulation of Divine sovereignty came from his intellectual endeavour to invoke new meanings and relationships in four Qur’anic terms (see chapter 4). He claimed that human beings must surrender to God all “rights of overlordship, legislation and exercising of authority over others” (ibid). Whereas, Mawdudi’s Jama’at after partition of India committed this shirk by recognising the sovereign states of Pakistan and India and then by its active participation in electoral process and legislation, his conceptualisation still occupies central stage in academic discussion on the issue of Divine sovereignty versus popular sovereignty. Modernist scholar Fazlur Rahman endorses Mutawalli’s critique on Mawdudi’s notion of sovereignty. For Rahman, the Qur’anic verses in which Mawdudi based his notion of Divine sovereignty, in reality, refer to the “rule of Allah in the heavens and the earth. Such verses convey the meaning of God’s general power over the entire creation as creator, sustainer, guide and judge, but have nothing to do with the specific concept of political sovereignty.
which is, indeed, a modern growth” (1981: 297). The evolution of political sovereignty, in Rahman’s view, refers to a “coercive power to ensure obedience to its laws.” Since God, either does not have such coercive power or does not exercise it so, He cannot be named as sovereign in the political sense of the term. Rahman then suggests that this confusion should be dispelled by clearly deciding which of the three “powers in the modern political structure” (namely parliament, community or head of the state), has the final political power (p.298).

On the basis of textual analysis of the relevant Qur’anic verses (which were quoted by Mawdudi in his support), post-Islamists share Rahman’s critique that the reported verses by Mawdudi pertain to sovereignty of God over the universe (takweeni) and have no relationship with political sovereignty. Mawdudi coined two terms: hakimiyyat/Divine sovereignty and khilafat/vicegerency of man (1960: 147). In Mawdudi’s view, a number of points flow from the term Khilafat. In the status of vicegerency, man is not successor to any other creature. This vicegerency is a sacred trust, and as vicegerent, man exercises delegated powers (Mawdudi 2000d: 101-102). These premises naturally imply, in the Islamists discourse, the articulation of “popular vicegerency” as opposed to “popular sovereignty” in the Western political thought. Ghamidi’s reformulation of these premises converges on the notion of popular sovereignty.

For Ghamidi, such political conceptualisation of the Qur’anic words Hakimiyyat and Khilafat is based on misunderstanding of the proper context of these terms within the Qur’an. If examined in its proper context, Ghamidi asserts, that various occurrences of the term, Hakimiyyat/Divine sovereignty in Qur’an refers to Takweeni sovereignty (God is supreme over the universe as creator and owner), and it in no way refers to political/legislative sovereignty of God.

In the realm of political sovereignty, the actual issue is who exercise coercive powers and not the sovereignty of God per se. The rights and responsibilities in a political structure come from a social contract that is made between the rulers and the governed, and not from the notion of Divine sovereignty (GML-81-A). Since “human beings need social order and political organization….they should develop a social contract that creates a fair and righteous government” (Hunter 2009: 178)

Likewise, Ghamidi argues that the term khalifa is used in the Qur’anic text (2:30): “I am going to make Khalifa in the earth.” The word Khalifa in Arabic has two meanings: 1) “a person who succeeds someone by as-
summing his position of power and authority”, 2) “a person vested with power and authority.” The second meaning of the word developed from the first, which is a common feature of language (that words develop new meanings), according to Ghamidi. He opted for the second meaning instead of the first (unlike the Islamists),

Linguistically, it is not possible to adopt the first meaning. Grammatical principles dictate that the word Khalifa which actually occurs as a common noun in the verse, should have either been defined by the article alif laam or by a determining noun (mudhaff ilaah) if the first meaning were to be attributed to it (Saleem 2005: 55).

Ghamidi then takes a number of examples from within the Qur’an which shows that the second meaning is internal to Qur’an, as in verses (7: 69); (38: 26) and (24: 55). According to Ghamidi, the first verse mentions the people of ‘Aad as Khulafa of Noah’s folks. If the first meaning of the term is accepted, then historically we know that “there exists a time lapse of many centuries between the people of ‘Aad and the people of Noah”, and likewise, their places of origin were different (Saleem 2005: 56-7).

**Brief Analysis**

The above discussion shows that through textual analysis of the two key terms in the political theory of Mawdudi (hakimiyyat and khalifa), post-Islamists have developed an alternative explanation. The entire discussion on the sovereignty of God in Islamist discourse loses its relevance in post-Islamism. The reason given by Ghamidi is that Divine sovereignty in its current political sense (used by Islamists) has no basis in the doctrinal sources. In their alternative explanation, the Divine authority has revealed certain injunctions, related to the political authority of Muslims if they are governing a territory. This reconceptualisation of Divine sovereignty by post-Islamists should be read in light of their explanation of the second term (vicegerency of man). In their analysis of the term, vicegerency of man means that he is vested with power and authority, and not delegated with power. In sum, man is endowed with free will and vested with power; he is instructed to run his political affairs based on shura, which is a compulsory obligation in political affairs and not merely a moral injunction. The institutional arrangements of political parties, elections, parliament and legislation contribute and work towards institu-
6.5.2 Islam and democracy: reformulation of shura

As stated earlier, Ghamidi’s method is a text-based approach rather than an historical or sociological one. In his view, Islam’s political vision is based purely on a democratic principle (shura) and not a theo-democratic one. To substantiate his claim, Ghamidi offers two pieces of evidence: one from the text and the other from the practice of the guided Caliphs. This reformulation is essentially textual and backed by empirical evidence of how the guided Caliphs were elected to their power position based on democratic majority principle of the then prevalent tribal method (GML: 083-B, Nadeem 1995). Ghamidi develops a linguistic analysis of the Qur’anic verse (42:38) on which he bases his entire argument. His textual analysis leads to a number of conclusions.

1) The political system envisioned by Islam is based essentially on “democratic” (shura) principle. In Ghamidi’s view, this verse categorically denies Mawdudi’s proposition of theo-democracy, Israr’s style Khilafat, Iran’s style theocracy, Taliban’s style emirate or Saudi style monarchy. On the contrary, this verse implies a pure democratic principle that closely corresponds to the institutional forms of modern democracy. While the entire emphasis lays on a democratic principle, the form belongs to the category of temporal and spatial dynamics and not eternal Shar’ia (ibid).

2) Using his interpretative method, when he expands the Qur’anic verse “their system is based on their consultation” (wa amruhum shoora bainhum), the following conclusions follow: (2.1) the word amr means system in this verse. Due to the general nature of the word, it encompasses all systemic aspects such as: union council’s affairs; national and provincial issues; social and political injunctions; legislative procedures; the right to exercise or abandon authority; nomination and abduction of rulers; interpretation of religion for collective affairs (Ghamidi 2009b: 494). (2.2) in Ghamidi’s view, the verse declines to accept the impression that it is an instruction in a situation where the society is already divided between the
ruler and the ruled (that is, the government pre-exists the institution of shura), no matter despotic or a monarchic, and they are advised to consult in state affairs. If that were the case, then only consultation for the rulers would be required irrespective of whether the ruler is a monarch or a theocrat. On the contrary, this principle encompasses all three phases of governance (the process of coming into power, running of state affairs and dissolution of government) Ghamidi endorses Mawdudi’s later interpretation of the verse, which recommends the ruler’s nomination be conditioned on consultation; the entire political system is itself based on consultation; all citizens enjoy equal rights in consultation; the government could be dissolved if the majority turns against it; everyone’s opinion should become part of the process for which consultation is sought, and in case of disagreement, the majority principle should play the decisive role (see Ghamidi 2009b; GML: 83-A; Khan 2009: 21-29).

For post-Islamists, adherence to shura in political system belongs to the category of Shar’ia (that is binding), and is thus not merely a moral persuasion (Iftikhar 2005: 92-93). Islam’s insistence on upholding democratic principle, argues Ghamidi, does not imply a specific form of government. The latter is a function of spatial and temporal variations. Ghamidi asserts his claim by showing that, from Islamic history the nomination of all four guided caliphs was based on this democratic principle, except the last one where the application of the consultative principle could not be properly applied (Saleem 2000). Likewise, the guided Caliphs adhered to this principle in their reign and sought consultation in all official matters (GML: 83-B). For intellectual, Khaled Abou El Fadl (2003), Qur’an identified three values without specifying a particular form of government. These values are “pursuing justice through social cooperation and mutual assistance”; “establishing a non-autocratic, consultative method of governance”; and “institutionalising mercy and compassion in social interactions.”

In sum, post-Islamists’ discourse on democracy contains a doctrinal dimension and a social analysis dimension. In the former, democracy in the Hadenius’ three-way sense can be directly derived from the textual sources. For the latter, I employ Sen’s three significant virtues (intrinsic, instrumental and constructive) of democracy (1999: 157-58). For post-

106 Also see Mawdudi’s Muqadema Tafheem al-Qur’an.
Islamists, intrinsically, demand for democracy is a virtue and a condition of faith (taqaza-e-Ieeman). To Ghamidi, democracy should be the principal means and primary end of all social and political struggles. Freedom of speech and expression, the manners to respect difference of opinion, rule of law, sanctity of the constitution as a social contract, as a “sacred document” and the mass awareness of this reality are locations of engagement for intellectuals, writers and scholars.

After Pakistan came into being, Islamists and ulama initiated a political struggle to insert this clause in the objective resolution stating that God is the supreme authority on earth and sovereignty belongs to Him only (Ashar 2004). In their view, the insertion of the supremacy/sovereignty of God in the objective resolution was a useless effort and tantamount to belittling the stature of God (ibid). Their constitutional struggle could have become more productive if directed at formulating a social contract based on the universal moral values and safeguarding the rights of various stakeholders/ethnicities/classes in Pakistan (ibid). At the state level, in constitutional affairs, there is limited number of eternal (abadi) religious injunctions to follow and not the temporal (waqti) one.

Post-Islamists vehemently legitimate the prevalent system in which political parties contest elections, form governments and legislate based on majority principle. A post-Islamist scholar, Shahzad Saleem argues,

In compliance with the Qur’anic injunction (their system is based on their consultation), the Sunnah decreed by the Prophet (sws) is based on two principles: First, Muslims shall be consulted in the affairs of state through their leaders in whom they profess confidence. Second, among the various parties or groups present in an Islamic State, only that party shall assume its political authority which enjoys the confidence of the majority (Saleem 2002c).

Public intellectuals of post-Islamist thought movement in Pakistan do not shy away in accepting and praising Western contributions in the development of democracy as institution, which offer useful instruments (e.g., political parties, parliament, elections) for building democracy are thought to have elevated the concept of basic principle of democracy from its tribal seedlings to its current modern form. Justifying cross-cultural borrowings, they assert,

if we can use their [Western] industrial products, medicines and other commodities in our daily life, then why not we can benefit from their ex-
periences in establishing democratic order. This is the common heritage of the entire humanity and one must benefit from this common heritage.\footnote{Ghamidi, telephone interview, December 2009.}

Before delineating the post-Islamists’ reformulation of the phenomenon of a democratic state instead of an Islamic or secular state, the following theoretical propositions can be provided. The notable point is that in these propositions, the question of democracy is being analysed by post-Islamists in the perspective of a modern nation state with an existing or potential role for elections, political parties, parliament, legislation and other functioning state institutions. These propositions derive from dispersed verbal and written texts using Gole’s snapshot approach (GML: 1-189; Nadeem 2009, 1995; Khan 2009; Saleem 2002b, 2002c).

In a broader perspective, the exact match with Islam’s political ideals is the notion of a pure democratic state rather than an Islamic or secular state. Democracy offers the best alternative to all other available options (autocracy, theocracy, dictatorship). It is the best instrument in protection, promotion and preservation of free will, the basis of God’s scheme in this life.

The human experience has also established that democracy is positively related with socioeconomic development and human progress. A universal consensus (\textit{aulami ijmaa}) has emerged in favour of democracy.

Islam associates itself with this envisioned democratic state through its moral teachings at a vibrant civil society level; and with the state through the free popular will of the people.

Islam does not offer any comprehensive system of life as expounded by Mawdudi and other Islamists.

The scope of religious rules pertaining to collective affairs is essentially in the nature of basic parameters. These are restricted to a very limited set of issues.

Multiple interpretations of these religious rules are possible in society. However, for an interpretation to be legislated as a state law, it must win the hearts and minds of the popular majority.

In case of differences on certain interpretation, the principle of majority should be applied. Numerical majority in this case is not the criterion for truth but a principle of arriving at conclusion.
In Pakistan, the majority sentiment should reveal itself through their political leaders and political parties. Ulama’s and Islamists’ direct participation in practical politics is harmful not only for Islam but also for the society.

The prevailing religious groups in Pakistan are founded on the basis of certain religious interpretations and are thus deepening dissensions and divisions in society. Political parties should be religious and not the other way round.

A secular space should be created for the political leadership to strengthen democratic process, and evolve a social contract in Pakistan.

Ulama and religiously motivated activists should direct their energies in the direction of social reform through dawah, naseeha and education. If they intend to influence political process, they should indirectly influence the political process.

In this entire process, Islam should be developed on the basis of cultural values instilled in individuals and social groups, and should not be imposed from above.

**Figure 6.2**

*Post-Islamists’ God-centric model of political and social organisation*

Source: Author’s construct based on post-Islamists’ views.
The above propositions do not suggest elimination of metaphysical intervention in political organisation or privatisation of religion leaving space for a state to be secular (understood in terms of secularism). On the contrary, this discourse departs from both notions—Islamic and secular state. The post-Islamist reformulation, offers a God-centric model of polity and social organisation. Figure 6.2 depicts a repositioning of God in Hashemi’s model given in figure 6.1. The repositioning of God in figure 6.2 offers a critical reflection on Mawdudi’s lego-theo-structural political model, which creates concepts like sovereignty of God and man’s vicegerency (khalifat). The vertical axis exhibits relationship between state institutions/ruling elite/authorities and the governed filtering through a civic reasoning (see next section).

For Ghamidi, individual, state and society’s integration into a singular composite whole using Islam as a thread is an issue of enormous fragility. He argues that Islam creates a connection, and a balance between the three (individual, state and society) in compliance with the natural evolution of society in the direction of modernisation and progress. This “natural equilibrium” (fitritawazun) is attained by the precise and limited intervention of revelation in individual and societal affairs. However, this natural equilibrium will be disturbed if: 1) a certain religious class asserts its authority by seeking political power to implement its understanding of doctrinal tenets, or coerces specific views on society through the instrument of force rather than through civic reason and popular will of the people; 2) too much expectations are attached with the revealed guidance, and/or 3) in the religious discourse, the primary focus shifts from transformation of individual to Islamisation of the state. Post-Islamists argue that these situations will undermine not only the essence of religion, but will also create a conflict and incompatibility between religion and modernising tendencies in Muslim societies. Some pertinent questions arise here, if post-Islamists do not advocate for secularism, then how will the state and government tie to the doctrinal tenets; and what are the avenues at the state level where post-Islamists recommend and advocate intervention of the sacred guidance? In his Political Shar’i'ah of Islam, Ghamidi argues that after coming into power, the Muslims are under religious obligation to do the following three things (2009b: 483-497).

Muslim citizens would be required to offer their prayers as affirmation to their faith. In congregation mosques (jaame’ masjid), Friday prayer and sermon would be led and delivered by various state authorities in their respective jurisdictions. Zakat is a state tax and not charity. For zakat-payer, zakat is worship but for the state, it is a tax, rather the only tax. The state cannot levy any other tax after taking zakat except with the consent of the citizens. Payment of zakat is obligatory in savings and wealth (2.5 per cent), output (5 and 10 per cent) and natural resources (20 per cent). Only three categories are exempted from zakat: necessities, amounts less than the prescribed text and factors of production. These are the maximum rates and can only be adjusted downward, according to economic conditions. The eight heads of zakat expenditures, as stipulated in the Qur’an, are not narrow but broader categories. Thus, zakat proceeds can be spent on poverty alleviation programmes, development projects, national defence, tourism and all administrative costs. The last religious obligation is enjoining the Good and forbidding the Evil. The state can follow these mechanisms. In some cases, it can be exhortation through the Friday sermons, which is specifically assigned to the rulers. In other cases, the use of force by police and the military may enforce it. Maroof and Munkar are not religious obligations but based on the religion of nature (din-e-fitrat). These refer to “well-known good things and bad things” (jaami pehchani achaaiyyan aur buraaiyyan) in society. These are determined by social customs, reason, human nature and conscience (see details of this summary in Khan 2009; Nadeem 1995; Ghamidi 2009b).

In the opinion of most post-Islamists, legitimating consultation of doctrinal resources in codification of state laws or policy formulations spawns from the principle of equality in a democratic society. This can be contested on the same basis as other conventions and resources are consulted for legislation, so in codification of laws, the legislature should also consider revealed guidance, if there is any. However, in case of multiple interpretations, only that interpretation of the revealed guidance should be legislated, which enjoys the support of the majority expressed through their political leaders (Saleem 2002c).

In their social analysis, society follows an unimpeded path and process of evolution and progress. Any conscious and unnatural religious barriers such as through coercive apparatuses to impede this process of societal evolution or strategies to direct it away from its natural course is
CHAPTER 6

counterproductive. The “natural” way, Ghamidi argues, is to supply human consciousness with the awareness of those changes, Islam intends to inject in society. As soon as, these teachings will become part of the individual belief and social discourse, it will influence the trends of a modern society. Here I tend to use Weber’s insights formulated by Jere Cohen (2002: 3). Cohen distinguished between behavioural and cultural mechanisms of influence. Behavioural mechanism, here, means the mechanism through which Islamic teachings influence social, political and economic conduct of an individual towards changing his own socio-economic conditions and those of society. Likewise, the cultural mechanism refers to a condition where Islamic ideas and practices ‘become part of the mainstream culture’; in turn, the culture influences other societal processes and outcomes. Once such a transformative process (through both behavioural and cultural mechanisms) is set in motion, a mutually conditioning societal course can be imagined where an individual’s conduct causes change in society and vice versa. In this complex web of social processes, Weber “saw religious groups as bearers of new ideas and stressed the impact of religious forces on the development of modern culture” (ibid). In Ghamidi’s view, society represents the total network of social relationships created by the mutual interactions of individuals. These interactions take place among social groups, communities, political parties and social networks. Islam intends to fill this multi-faceted and multi-layered hub of relationships with three things, which are also the basis of Islamic civilisation: 1) restraint/abstinence in sexual relations (hifz-e-furooj); 2) respect for familial and social status (hifz-e-marateb) and; 3) promoting good deed and prohibiting wrong ones. It shows that in the context of social reform, post-Islamists are primarily concerned with a religio-cultural change. In this capacity, they pose little direct threat to the government or forces of status quo in Pakistan (feudal and military elites).

6.5.3 An Islamic opposition to Islamic state

Post-Islamists’ social discourse has emerged as an “Islamic opposition” to the conventional method and process of Islamisation in Pakistan. For them, winning hearts and minds is a prerequisite before Islamising the

state and its various institutions. Bringing various sectors of society under the domination of Islamic injunctions without proper cultivation of ideas in society activates the process of ‘disenchantment’ in society. To use Kosmin’s expression, “the more hearts and minds become ‘disenchanted,’ the more institutions that have specialised in the promotion of the ‘enchantment’ process lose plausibility and authority” (2007: 5), it is consultation that should also be the basis for interpretation and application of any religious directive pertaining to the state affairs. Experts of Islamic sciences may proffer their opinions … legally binding on people only when the majority of the elected representatives of people accept them. In the present-day state, the institution of the parliament is constituted for this very purpose … If this status of the parliament is accepted, the discussion on an “Islamic state” vis-à-vis a “secular state” also becomes irrelevant … Once this state is truly formed, Islam will manifest itself in the system in proportion to the degree of people’s commitment to this faith. This is the natural way. Any deviation from it will lead only to hypocrisy, which we have been witnessing for the past half-century in Pakistan.110

Democratic society and a democratic state, argues Ghamidi, is the “central position” between the two extremist visions of Islamism and secularism. The notion of an Islamic state is thus not only harmful to Muslims but also to Islam,

Secularism like Islamism is an ideology, and so is an Islamic state vis-à-vis a secular state … but my recommendation is not of an ideological state but a democratic state … the labelling of the city state of Medina as Islamic state is an innovation of our age … about the religious identity of the state of Medina, at the most one can claim is that Islamic moral ideals appeared in the form of an organised community and that’s all, no more, no less.111

The Islamists, says Ghamidi, have admitted the “state” as an exclusive entity and sovereign island vis-à-vis an individual. Of the former, Islamisation will automatically initiate a moral “Islamic trickle down” and will

110 Ghamidi’s essay on Islam and Taliban (trans. Asif Iftikhar): last accessed 10/2/2010:
http://www.monthly-renaissance.com/issue/content.aspx?id=1158
111 Ghamidi, telephone interview, 30/11/2009.
reform the individual. Ghamidi argues, that the state should be left to its natural course in a democratic way and imposition of any religious ideology be avoided. In case an elected parliament of a Muslim state enacts a law that is explicitly contrary to Shar’ia, then it means for Ghamidi, that the society has turned against religious teachings. [in such a situation] in my view, the process of Islamic reform should begin from directing efforts towards individuals and not the state. If the majority has gone astray to Islam then Islamically, you cannot impose the will of the minority over the majority.

Based on Divine texts, Ghamidi derives the modern political science classification of ‘state’ and ‘government’. State, argues Ghamidi, is a sacred institution, which is God’s blessing on earth and statelessness is anarchy and a curse of God (GML: 81-A, 81-A). The Arabic terms al-Jamaa’ and al-sultan which were politically manipulated by Mawdudi and others for their envisioned “Islamic party” are used for, according to Ghamidi, the modern notion of “state”. If they disagree with the policies of the government, the Muslims can protest against it and can dissolve it through peaceful means. However, rebellion/insurgency against the state or the government in itself (nafs-e-hakoomat) is tantamount to apostasy and death without state as demise in ignorance (2009b: 484-485).

Post-Islamists’ idealised citizens are not only conformists with the very notion of modern state, but also law abiding individuals: dutiful teachers, law abiding drivers, soldiers, shop-keepers, businessmen, tax payers and loving spouses. Abiding by state laws is a Shar’ia requirement. Violation of its laws is tantamount to violation of Shar’ia. Stopping your car at a red signal is obedience of Shar’ia. One personal story narrated by Ghamidi during informal discussion with him will explain this point

112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 However, when the state manifests clear infidelity (kufr-e-bawwa), then only the right (haq) is granted. But Ghamidi puts tough conditions for armed rebellion against the state which are, the rebels should display clear majority among the public and all other conditions valid for waging armed jihad such as the authority of the state.
Once I was invited to a party where majority of the participants were ulama. Under the new state law enacted those days, serving food at ceremonies was banned. I just picked up a glass of plain water and left the table. Some ulama approached me and asked me to have some food. My response was: “the Messenger of God has stopped me from taking food.” They were astonished to hear this response.116

Religious political parties claim that politics are inextricably linked to Islam and there is no separation between the two. In Ghamidi’s view, the relationship between religion and politics is established through “another mechanism” and not active politics of the religious class. To Ghamidi, construction, and management of mosques and the appointment of prayer-leaders is the responsibility of the state. The institution of mosque is an important platform, which if left to individuals and groups will invoke sectarianism in society. The Friday sermon and prayer, Ghamidi argues, is the responsibility of state officials to deliver. This is how the institution of mosques mediates to bring both together: the politicians/state officials and the public (Ghamidi 1995).

For post-Islamists, the demand for Pakistan was neither a conscious effort to establish an Islamic state nor a secular state. On the contrary, it was a struggle for the rights of Indian Muslims, which gradually evolved into the demand for Pakistan.117 The emerging nation states in Europe, the diminishing trust (crisis of trust) between Hindus and Muslims, and consequently, the run for rights between them helped Islam to appear as the most dominant agent of identity construction against Hindus.118 Ghamidi makes a distinction between the movement elite’s perspective and the masses perspective pertaining to whether Pakistan should be an Islamic or secular state. Over the course of Pakistan movement, as the demand for a separate homeland and the Muslim identity appeared to emerge, the masses (awam) accepted it at face value. In his revisit to the history of Pakistan movement, Ghamidi asserts that the founder, Jinnah, envisioned a ‘democratic state’ instead of a ‘theocratic’ or ‘monarchic’ one. In that way, he imagined that in Muslim majority areas, if a democratic state is created, then majority of the members of parliament will be Muslims

116 Ghamidi, informal discussion, August 2007.
117 Ghamidi TV Talk Show: Identity: Religious or National; accessed at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1mjrvt0oays>
118 Ibid.
and thus it will not be possible to legislate against Shar‘ia. Scholars promoting Pakistan as secular state locate their argument in Jinnah’s famous 11 August 1947 speech (Fatah 2008: 27, Irfani 2009: 15, Nadeem 1995: 11-16, see Jinnah’s speech in Pirzada 2000: 248-51).\footnote{See Ghamidi’s Secularism and the Quaid: (last accessed on 13/2/2010) at: <http://www.monthly-renaissance.com/issue/content.aspx?id=899>}

The content of Jinnah’s speech offers an excellent view of where the post-Islamist scholars and writers engage in debate with both the Islamists and the secularists. In their reformulation, Jinnah’s speech is the true reflection of the Medinan Treaty (Mesaq-e-Medina), a treaty signed by the Prophet and the tribes of Medina after his migration to the city-state. This is how ‘historical’ Islam is deployed in social construction of their views in Pakistan (Nadeem 1995: 11-16),

Pakistan should be a Muslim’s state not an “Islamic or secular” one; a state where you should produce good Muslims. It never happens that “constitutions and governmental structures” create identities and then nations spring from those identities. Rather, the process of nation building is prior to the identity construction … We should look into the background history of the secularism in the West where the authority was in the hands of the Church. People agitated against the Church and not the religion. This discussion is irrelevant in the context of Pakistan. Here, where is the Church? From whom’s clutches you want to liberate yourselves? … But in our religious thought there is no Church … the nature of the state (Islamic or secular) depends upon the Muslims’ living in this country. Therefore, I move a step forward and say that Pakistan should be a “democratic state” with a vibrant democratic culture and democratic society.\footnote{Ghamidi’s panel interview with Saleem Safi on Religious and Political Problems of Pakistan, accessed at: <http://www.tv-almawrid.org>}

Post-Islamists discourse on democratic state is consistent with a number of Modernist voices in the Muslim world:

Ganji distinguishes between “the religious State” (dowlat-e-dini) and a “State-related religion” (dine-e-dowlati) in which Islam cannot answer all the social and political questions and the popular vote has to decide these issues. The religious government imposes Islamic precepts independently of the people, in the name of the Sacred. The State-related religion supposes the autonomy of the citizens in their sovereign decisions concerning the government of the country. In this way, according to Ganji, there are three
different types of discourses about the velayat faqih. Monarchist discourse stipulates the same rights for the Islamic leader as for the shah; fascist discourse assumes the unity of society under the leadership of a religious jurist; and democratic discourse subordinates the rule of the Islamic jurist to the sovereign will of the citizens. He defends the third alternative (Khosrokhavar 2004: 9).

Any attempt to impose Islamic laws from above, is thought, would be expelled by society as and when democracy is resumed. The same happened to Zia’s Islamisation drive after his death. Islam should penetrate into the civilising process of society through cultural symbols, and not be “imposed” upon it.

Religious parties and ulama, according to Ghamidi, should stay away from practical politics in favour of social reform:

[…] political parties should be religious because they represent Muslims, and not the religious groups need to be political. Religious groups coming into politics would divide the nation into sects because they subscribe to a specific religious sect… the role of the ulama and religious scholars are to reform and educate citizens. I do not deny their right to take part into politics but when I become a doctor then professional ethics require that I should become a good doctor and not a politician … the problem is that if ulama and religious groups come into power even through elections, they will transform Pakistan into a theocratic state.121

6.6 Hermeneutics, Secular Space and Human Rights

To gain a clear understanding of the term human rights, I refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which all Muslim countries are signatories. In this context, human rights refer to “certain core rights that include rights to life, liberty, and security of the person; and against arbitrary imprisonment, slavery, torture, and genocide” (Fortman 2009 et al: 3). These rights broadly encompass legal, political and economic rights, which cannot be denied on the basis of one’s relation to a specific race, colour, religion, territory and language or social and economic status (ibid). As Islam and state is central to discussion in the context of post-Islamists’ debate on human rights, I prefer to stay within An-Na’imi’s analytical framework (2008: 84-139), where he discusses human rights, constitutionalism and citizenship in “an integrated framework.” In

121 Ibid.
order not to be mistaken, I differ and concur with An-Na’imi’s recommendation to “separate Islam from the state while acknowledging the public role of Islam, including its influences on the formulation of public policy and legislation” (p.85). Two main issues in An-Na’imi’s analysis create an ambiguity about Islam-state relationship; empirical realities do not support the idea of “religious neutrality of the state” in the view of its critics (Mahmood 2006). The U.S. state-led initiative, specifically in a post September 11 scenario, to reform Islam from within is a good example. A secular state is also ideological as an Islamic state (Sayyid 1997). Louis Althusser’s ideological state apparatuses seem relevant here. For Althusser, ideological state apparatuses are institutions such as schools, churches, family, legal and cultural that function by ideology (Althusser 1971). A more revealing phenomenon in An-Na’imi’s analysis, which is also more relevant to the post-Islamist discourse in Pakistan, is his theme “civic reason” and its relation to the concept of a secular space than a secular state. A secular space is a physical and discursive space imaginable at formal state and civil society levels guided and shaped by An-Na’imi’s “civic reason”. By civic reason, An-Na’imi means, “reasons that can be publicly debated and contested by any citizen, individually or in community with others, in accordance with norms of civility and mutual respect” (p. 85). The goal of defining civic reason by An-Na’imi is “to diminish the impact of claims of religious exclusivity on the ability to debate issues of public policy.” To summarise, doctrinal sources become part of the reasoning processes through its interpreters, using all opportunity spaces (media, public forums, mosque etc.), and are able to influence public policy and legislation. The secular space is resistant to subjugation or monopolising by one specific interpretation or to the domination of a religious class. The space opens to the “overlapping consensus” achieved through civic reason and is legislated through popularly elected political parties. In a secular space, post-Islamists do not deny the right of ulama to enter into practical politics, but they reformulate their role in society and in a way that they may influence public policy and legislation through civic reason. These constructs are discussed under strong assumptions of room for multiple interpretations, and open debate and dialogue on these interpretations in a Muslim society. An example will clarify post-Islamists’ recommended role of religion in state affairs through the twin concepts—civic reason and secular space—I just deployed. For instance, if legislation on hudood punishment for fornication
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is underway in Pakistan, then multiple understandings of this specific Shar’ia law should become part of the civic reasoning. The one that wins the majority of public support should be legislated by the elected parliament. In a recent debate on a private TV channel in Pakistan, on hudood laws of the Zia-ul-Haq period, graduated into an “overlapping consensus” over a set of issues. In this debate, the new electronic media played a key role and it engaged competing Islamic discourses in a reasoning process.

In his conceptualisation, Bayat refers to a “conscious attempt” by post-Islamism to “marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, with democracy and modernity … emphasises religiosity and rights” (2007: 11). It implies that in interpreting Islam, a concern for expanding individual choices, liberties and freedom is a necessary condition for a discourse and trend to qualify for post-Islamism. In the context of Islam and human rights, An-Na’im observes that although most of the Shar’ia injunctions are in line with human rights, however, there are exceptions that include “some specific and very serious aspects of the rights of women and non-Muslims and the freedom of religion and belief…” In cases of such conflict between some Shar’ia principles and human rights norms, An-Na’im seeks an Islamic reform by proposing “that we as Muslims consider transforming our understanding of Shar’ia in the present context of Islamic societies” (2008: 111). He emphasises “that the real issue is always about human understanding and practice and not about Islam in the abstract” (ibid: 112). The renascent interest of scholars in studying hermeneutics and its relationship with various social and political issues has also grown, in the recent past, mainly due to tragic events of September 11, where the attackers were “individuals identifying themselves as Muslims with the intent to do God’s will” (Fortman et al. 2009: 5). It reveals that the abuse of human rights does not come directly from the “[s]criptures themselves” but “the manner in which they are interpreted” (ibid). It is also worth noting that the recent growth in academic interest in hermeneutics as well as the reform efforts within Islam are closely related with a specific historic moment—post-9/11—and the global hegemonic project of the U.S. (Mahmood 2006).

The abovementioned backdrop brings three issues to the fore that can enhance the perspective of post-Islamism in Pakistan: 1) to what extent, these scholars incorporate human rights concerns, or how would their imagined Islamic society look like if gazed through the lens of indi-
individual liberties and human rights; 2) what significant changes/transformations in this case are observable from Islamism, and 3) to what extent, their understanding of Shar‘ia in relation to human rights/individual liberties can be explained under the local and global socio-political conditions.

When the strand of post-Islamism in question is examined on the basis of these questions, the discussion can be summarised as follows. All quotes and ideas mentioned below refer to post-Islamist public intellectuals in Pakistan.

The Divine construct of all moral injunctions is premised on a restraint from inflicting harm to these four key domains: life, property, honour and freedom of thought and expression. The Divine authority has declared these four things as sacred (Yusufi 2006). All Qur‘anic injunctions relating to permission and prohibition (Halal and Haram) or mention of various punishments (such as punishments for spreading anarchy, murder and injury, fornication, accusing someone of fornication and theft) necessarily relate to securing those four key domains of human life. In addition, the human intellect is said to have no basis to determine the nature and extent of these punishments (Saleem 2002). There are only two instances in which capital punishment is permissible, and that only through the institution of judiciary and authority of the state: If someone has intentionally killed another person and if a person or group has challenged the authority of the state by indulging in rape, robbery, terrorism, rebellion, mischief (muharaba or fasad fil arz) (ibid; Khan 2009). However, apostasy, blasphemy and drinking are said to have no consequences as a capital crime in Shar‘ia. The instances of punishments for apostasy, in the prophetic era, relate to the Divine mission. Similarly, the punishments for drinkers were not hudood but t‘azeer, and hence belong to the governmental rulings (siyasa) where the state can legislate (Ghamidi 2006: 138-43).

In traditional understanding of religion, apostasy is “held to apply to any Muslim who is deemed to have reverted from Islam by an intentional or blasphemous act or utterance, even when said mockingly or out of stubbornness” (An-Na‘im 2008: 119; Saeed and Saeed 2004). For post-Islamists, apostasy is not punishable by death. The reason behind this claim comes from their hermeneutics. In their view, it was a punishment for those who denied the prophetic message after receiving conclusive evidence from the Messenger himself (Khan 2009: 3-35; also see various
sections of chapter 5 and 6). Second, claims to capital punishment for apostates will frustrate the very foundations of the Divine scheme—to examine people based on their belief and good conduct in this world. If individuals are forced to abrogate their right to choose between alternative beliefs and worldviews freely, their inalienable right to act upon and to express these beliefs in public, then it will challenge the very basis of the Divine scheme for which life on earth is created (Khan 2009: 30-48). However, for post-Islamists, an individual loses the right to exercise ownership of these otherwise sacred domains [life, property, dignity and freedom] if he transgresses, as an individual, as a group or as a nation, against the same four domains owned by others (Ghamidi 2009b: 589). Again, thanks to their unique hermeneutics, the only leftover category of jihad as armed struggle is also related and dependent on securing and promoting these four domains. That is, if plans by a nation or state are executed resulting in religious persecution or injustices, then an armed jihad can be waged. Even in this case, declaring jihad is subject to a set of other Shar‘ia conditions including authority of the state; military strength in the ratio of 2:1; moral basis for justification of waging war, and absence of any peace accords or international treaties between the warring nations (see the section on jihad in this chapter). It is important to note a conceptual development here. Post-Islamists have abandoned Mawdudi’s classification of (1) reformist, and (2) defensive jihad. All wars associated with the Prophet were in connection to the divine mission and they are now an historical category.

The marginalised position of women in Pakistani society is reflected in all spheres of life. Economically, she is the least empowered and often excluded from key decision making processes. The unequal status of women Pakistan in its multifaceted forms is aptly summarised by Weiss (2003) as,

the inverse sex ratio is one of the lowest in the world: 91 women for every 100 men, thereby bringing into question women’s right of access to nutrition, health care and related concerns. Pakistan’s female economic activity rate, compared to males, is only 42 percent. While just over half of all adult urban women are literate, less than a quarter are so in rural areas; access to an education is highly circumscribed for women in many parts of the country. This resulted, in 2000, in an overall female adult literacy rate of 27.9 percent, compared to a male adult literacy rate more than double that, at 57.5 percent. Formal political participation remains an essentially male domain despite increasing numbers of women joining political parties,
changes in social perception of politics and the recognition of the significance of women’s inclusion in it (2003: 588).

However, the more controversial debate concerning women’s unequal social status in Pakistan is the one related to Zia’s Islamisation programme of 1979 and his controversial hudood laws that were promulgated four years later (see footnote 3, chapter 1). One important aspect of these laws is law of evidence (Qanoon-e-Shahadat) that discriminates in testimony on the basis of sex. These laws prohibit women “from testifying at all in certain kinds of cases and would cause their testimony in other cases to be irrelevant unless corroborated by another woman.” Likewise, “the law clearly gives men and women different legal rights and, at least, underscores that the state does not regard women and men as equal economic actors” (Weiss 2003: 587; also see Cheema et al 2008). On religious-textual grounds, the post-Islamist scholars have been opposing these laws (specifically the law of evidence) since its promulgation.

The question of gender equality begins in post-Islamist discourse in a more traditional manner; initially the discourse seems filled with patriarchal notions (notions of modesty; a woman’s role as wife and mother; the centre of family; childcare). In familial affairs, husband is qawam for two reasons: firstly, he has the responsibility of earning livelihood not the woman; secondly, his physical, emotional and psychological capabilities suit this responsibility (Hunter 2009: 179). They further explain that in familial ties the designation of man as the head of family is not based on man/woman divide rather on husband/wife divide. In Ghamidi’s view, an Islamic social organisation is necessarily based on a family system and Islam is sensitive towards preserving the institution of family. For him, a smooth functioning family system depends on division of responsibilities where the husband assumes responsibility for earning the means for the family and headship while the wife in charge of raising and educating the children (Ghamidi 2008; Khan 2009). Apart from this, in this discourse, women have equal rights to education, property, inheritance (half of man), employment, sports, leisure and socialisation. She can attend and entertain male guests at home, can drive a car, become an artist, perform hajj without being accompanied by close relative, go to mosque for prayer, take part in politics, contest elections and become head of the state. Head covering is culturally preferred but is not a “directive of the Shar’ia” (Hunter 2009: 179). Her testimony is equal to a man except in financial transactions where Qur’an specifically mentions
two women and one man. They argue, this has nothing to do with gender equality but with the nature of transaction (debt deal) in which women are proven to forgetting (Khan 2009: 83-86). A woman’s testimony to all other cases in a court of law is equal to men (ibid). The belief common among religious circles that women are less sensible (naqes al-‘aql) is based on, post-Islamists argue, a misinterpretation of the Hadith. The Hadith in their view actually means, that women are given “relief and reduction in worldly and religious affairs” (Saleem 2005). Her blood money (diyyat) is also not half of man (Nasir 2010). The discursive circle mentions feminism in these words: “although Islam does not support the basic tenets of the feminist movement, it must be conceded that this movement has served to create awareness in the educated Muslim women regarding some of the viewpoints that are presented to them by the clergy under the label of Islam” (Saleem 2005). On the question of multiple marriages, they approach the issue from a historical perspective. In their view, the right way of stating the Qur’anic intent is not to state that the revealed text has granted permission of multiple marriages but to say that the act of multiple marriages is not prohibited in Islam. The reason they explain is that the practice of conducting multiple marriages was in vogue before Islam and Qur’an has made reference to a specific social condition when appeal was made to marry those widows who lost their husbands in a war.

6.7 Jihad as Armed Struggle: Reformulation?

This section underscores the post-Islamists’ reformulation of jihad as armed struggle. It implies that other conceptualisations of the term such as, intellectual evolution, development and growth of one’s own self, of other fellow human beings or struggle against one’s own malicious desires/tendencies are ignored. In her recent work Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia, historian Ayesha Jalal makes a clear distinction between jihad as ethics and jihad as war. In the former connotation, it is more in the

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122 Ghamidi’s TV Talk Show Why is Woman’s Testimony half to a man?, accessed at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zR55ehPqBGU&feature=related>

123 Ghamidi’s TV Talk Show Multiple Marriages in Islam (1-5), accessed at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1FT62hAAx8&feature=PlayList&p=093C5BD132CBA3E2&playnext_from=PL&playnext=2&index=28>
meaning of “striving”, in the later sense it is “armed struggle” (2008: XXX). The reference here is to latter than the former.

Brief examination of the post-Islamist body of written and spoken text produced and disseminated in the last 20 years, reveals that they have been replying to a number of pertinent questions concerning jihad (Shar’ia laws of jihad, its history, application in militant struggles within both Pakistan and other Muslim countries and others). Post-Islamists ideas on jihad took proper theoretical construction prior to the rise and fall of Talibain in Afghanistan and the tragic events of 9/11. Although, the mass media increase in Pakistan in the post-9/11 era pushed public dissemination and press coverage of this discourse; one can argue that the post-Islamists’ reformulation of the concept of jihad is not a social and cultural construction and is deeply entrenched in the intellectual pursuance and critical revisit of the theory and practice of jihad in Islamic history.

To delimit the scope of discussion in this section, I will show the relationship between post-Islamists unique line of ijtihad and reformulation of jihad. My main argument is that following a unique hermeneutic approach, post-Islamists have reduced the generally debated notion of jihad to a historical category—a form of jihad that was only associated with the prophetic mission and has been abolished forever. The only kind of jihad in post-Islamists’ discourse that survived as a theological category, is the one waged against injustices and religious persecution. Even the aim of this latter category, as explained by Ghamidi, is to safeguard individual freedoms and liberties, and not propagation/dissemination of religion (here Islam). More precisely, the latter category fuses into a secular just war, although still called jihad fi sabil Allah (jihad in the way of God) in post-Islamist discourse. There are some social, political and policy implications from this reformulation of jihad addressed briefly below.

**Theorising jihad: jihad for freedom and individual liberties**

For Mawdudi, Muslims as upholders of true religion are authorised to spread this message and subjugate other nations (Mawdudi 1996). Mawdudi derived two types of jihad from the Qur’anic verses: defensive jihad, and reformist jihad. In the latter sense, Muslims have religious authorisation to enforce Islamic order across the globe after coming into
power. Mawdudi agreed with Sunni jurists on other conditions of jihad\textsuperscript{124} (authority of the state, honouring all previous treaties with the enemy state) (Nasr 1996: 74). However, his position on jihad had many lives, it softened and hardened at various times (ibid; Azmi 2002; Hashmi et al 1995). For Ghamidi, Mawdudi’s formulation of reformist jihad resonates with an imperialist mind and design. Although in the distant past, the populace was open to such articulations, modern democratic society calls into question the validity of Mawdudi’s proposition. The contemporary world is witnessing a global surge in favour of democracy and against imperialism (GML: 65, 66). It implies that for Ghamidi, Mawdudi’s reformist jihad is an imperialist project, which he criticises on the basis and in favour of a freedom argument. Hence, post-Islamists share the Western argument as described by one scholar, “the Western mind is likely to see the whole notion of this kind of jihad as religiously sanctified colonialism” (Iftikhar 2005: 100). For a Western mind, it is also not easy to distinguish between jihad and terrorism (Bonney 2004; Lewis 2004; Pipes 2003). It is noted that Ghamidi’s treatment of jihad in this way is different from Watt’s articulation of jihad, which had primarily “secular economic origins, namely camel raids” (Turner 2003: 142).

For Ghamidi, Mawdudi’s views based on certain Qur’anic verses, on the legitimacy of reformist jihad have far-reaching implications for global peace. Osama bin laden has also quoted the same verses as Mawdudi in his \textit{al-jihad}. Lumping of these distinct and mutually exclusive categories of jihad, argues Ghamidi, has created confusion and inflamed incessant waves of militancy in the Muslim world in the name of jihad (GML: 65, 66). The question now arises: how and to what effect, do post-Islamists re-define this whole issue.

Ghamidi’s theoretical exposition of jihad is premised on his concept of \textit{Risalat}/Messengerhood (see chapter 5). In the initial phase of his prophetic career, the \textit{rasul} is restricted to proselytising through peaceful means with instructions to avoid use of force. After clarification of the message, the Prophet migrated as ruler to the city of Medina. Before migration, the Medinan tribal chiefs pledged at his hands. His career necessarily passed through a number of stages: admonition, extended admoni-

\textsuperscript{124} For instance, Mawdudi rejected declaring a jihad by voluntary fighters as valid jihad in Kashmir in 1948, see in Hashmi \textit{et al} \textit{Khutoot}, pp.317-329; Nasr’s \textit{Mawdudi…}, p.74.
tion, conclusive evidence, migration and the administration of punishment and reward. Muhammad’s own nation received a final ultimatum to choose between belief and death. Other tribes had other lenient options (to opt between faith or pay jizya with a political subjugation). After articulating his understanding of the Muhammad’s mission, Ghamidi came up with a number of empirical cases from Qur’anic and Biblical sources about the Messenger’s career, which went through the same stages. He shows how various Messengers in different nations have passed through almost the same stages and have practically administered reward and punishment (chapter 5). This alternative narrative to Mawdudi’s political reading has implications for reconceptualisation of jihad. In contrast to Mawdudi’s understanding of jihad, a post-Islamist scholar claims that their view offers

a unique perspective on jihad … all the killings and assassinations by the Prophet and his companions, their conquests of certain territories, their jihad and the choices they gave of ‘Islam or death or of Islam or death or subjugation and jizya’ were all under the rubric of a Divinely specified territory in a Divinely specified people in a Divinely specified territory in a Divinely specified time (Ifikhar 2005: 102).

The above view essentially emanates from scriptural reading and is potent to change the perception of Muslims of the “other”.

After reducing that specific category of armed struggle for subjugation of the “other” in the name of Islam to the apostolic era, post-Islamists enjoy the liberty to define and articulate another category of war in the modern vocabulary of freedoms and human rights in tandem with the modern notions of war and peace. Unlike the traditional way of defining jihad as armed struggle in juridical fashion, which stems from religious connotation, Ghamidi explains a theory in resonance with the liberal/Western notions of freedom, individual liberties and peace:

Sustenance of a civilised society requires guaranteed freedom and peace for its citizens. These two values are the cornerstones on which human civilisation dwells for its evolution and growth. In practice, an individual is brought to justice upon transgression of these values. Logically, if a collective militates against these values by doing injustices or persecuting its citizens; that nation, that country and that state must be stopped from doing so (2009: 579-80).
Ghamidi seeks a religious justification for the protection of freedom and peace: the Divine scheme is to test individuals based on their liberty and freedom to choose between good and evil. If that liberty co-opted, it is a declaration of war against the Divine scheme. The war is to be waged against the usurpers of these rights. This type of war is simple and enjoys relative consensus. If this was the only case where the revealed text was involved, I might have avoided it to bring under discussion in the Shar'ia of jihad. Unfortunately, this is not the only kind of war.125

The following points emanate from the above discussion. The Qur'an (22:40) mentions places of worship (Monasteries, Synagogues, Mosques and Temples). These all are symbols of religion and of religious freedom. It reveals that permission for waging war given by the Qur'an does not derive from religious motives but from individual freedom of belief and action. Jihad in this form is said an effort to curb mischief, anarchy and ensure freedom and peace in society.126 Armed struggle against injustice/persecution is still a religious obligation, if other necessary conditions are met (authority of the state, presence of actual moral basis, conditions of international treaties and availability of material force). The mention of these conditions coupled with their reformulation of jihad, post-Islamists discard all kinds of guerrilla warfare, private jihadist organisations and suicide bombings (Khan 2008).

Thus, freedom and peace remain the only bases for war in Islam under a post-Islamist paradigm. The punishment plan narrated in the chapter al-Tawba (widely quoted by all militants) was specific to the polytheists, Israelites and Nazarites of that time. It was in relation to the law of administering punishment and reward by Muhammad, which ended with the life of the Prophet. No such punishments/killings in the contemporary world can be administered based on these verses. The Islamic state is not under obligation to “subjugate people vanquished in a war as dhimis or levy jizya on them” (Iftikhar 2005: 87). The dichotomy House of War (dar al-harb) and House of Islam (dar al-Islam) vanishes except when a Muslim state is in state of war with a non-Muslim state. Waging war against a non-Islamic system to replace it with an Islamic order has no basis in the foundational sources and the career of the Prophet (ibid: 87).

125 GML: lectures no. 65 and 66, accessed at: <www.tv-almawrid.org>
126 Ibid.
Although not reducible to external conditions, contemporary religious debate on the theory and principles of jihad is not merely a matter of reading the relevant foundational ‘text’. The prevailing socio-political conditions motivate and shape the interpretative process. What motivated Mawdudi to author his seminal work (al-Jihad fil Islam) in 1926 was not only an intellectual response. Rather he responded to a “political situation” by exerting his energies into formulating a theory of jihad (see chapters 3 and 4). Likewise, the case of post-Islamists on jihad is also subject to prevailing socio-political conditions both locally and globally. Discussion on jihad in the context of Islam and Pakistan remains unsubstantiated until analysed in the backdrop of the Afghan war fought against former USSR in the 1980s, and then between the warring groups in the 1990s. The Pakistani military (with funding and support from the U.S. and the Islamic world, specifically the Arab world) planned and organised this incursion. In terms of the diverse influence it imprinted on global politics in general and Pakistani society in particular is enormous and beyond the scope of this chapter. The enduring consequences of this jihadist project appear in the advent of a series of local insurgencies, growing military tendencies, local uprisings and global acts of violence. With liberal, secular and nationalist scholars, and among poets and politicians in Pakistan, the validity and consequences of the Afghan war have always been questioned in critical terms. However, the response of the religious forces has been mixed: some religious groups like the Jama’at not only morally and intellectually supported it but its activists physically participated (Nasr 1994). Based on field observations, post-Islamists emerged as an Islamic opposition of discursive and physical phenomenon of Islamic militancy. Ghamidi’s introduction as an intellectual in the 1990s was mainly due to his critique on militancy in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Post-Islamists declare all forms of private jihad (local and global) un-Islamic. They consider loyalty to state and collectivity as religious obligation and all ideologies and struggles that weaken the organised order deviation from the true path (GML: 65, 66).

**Post-Islamists’ de-glorification of resistance as virtue**

The post-Islamists re-constructionist theory encapsulates the physical and cultural threat Muslims feel by the relentless advance of global capitalism. There appears to be a transnational dimension to this sense of defeat Muslims around the world now feel. A spirit of resistance in intel-
lectual articulations as well as “violent reactions of rage and anger” (Moosa 2003: 26) drives the response to this situation. The present view is a debate on Honor Lobby (ghairat lobby) in contemporary Pakistan.

The ex-president of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf admitted that “in the wake of 9/11 attacks, then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage threatened Pakistan’s military intelligence chief that the U.S. would bomb this country ‘back to the Stone Age’ if Musharraf did not cooperate in the War against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.” Heated controversy endured in Pakistani politics over this news. Support from the Musharraf regime was instrumental in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent fall of the Taliban. The religious political forces internalised Musharraf’s position on the US anti-Taliban/al-Qaeda War in Afghanistan in their political discourse, which paid dividends to religious parties in 2002 elections.

Apart from policy discourse, there is an important religious dimension in Pakistan’s compliance with the United States and the United Nations. Islamists politicise this dimension in their public discourse. Not only in politics but also in the media and intellectual circles, a notion of ghairat (national honor) lobby has inaugurated assimilating multi-layer and micro-macro levels of honor, dignity, self-esteem and resistance. According to one widely published Pakistani English newspaper columnist Sadiq Saleem, “the ‘Ghairat’ (national honour) lobby, led by Islamist political parties, retired generals and the newly empowered right wing conspiracy theorists serving as television anchors have worked up the nation once again in the ‘honour is more important than aid’ slogan mongering” (The News, 14 October 2009). At individual, family, clan and tribal level, the institution of ghairat has patriarchal connections between individuals and families. At a more macro-social level, the same value is simplistically aggregated and elevated to the position of a state policy to be pursued by the successive governments in global affairs.

The ghairat lobby serves as an analytical category and as a glimpse to underscore post-Islamists’ public discourse and intellectual argument on international relations. The post-Islamists’ difference and schism from Islamism in Pakistan elucidates that there is no “singular Islamist attitude towards international politics…” (Nasr 2000). The aim is to know

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127 News accessed on 1 December 2009 at:
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1538476,00.html>
whether and if it mutates into new social discourse. How does the religious text, according to post-Islamists’ interpretation, inform us about the policy adopted by Musharraf, and how do post-Islamists’ position address the issue in question?

In connection to Pakistan’s (and other Muslim countries) relations with global powers (specifically the US and the West), the central point integrating post-Islamists’ public discourse is the appeal to determine their exact position in the contemporary world. They argue that the Muslims’ Ummah has long ago lost its political glory and military might but it is still unable to locate its exact place in the global environment (Khan 2008).

In response to the discussion around national honour in the wake of U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Ghamidi developed a narrative from within the religious text and prophetic career:

General public, writers and intellectuals [these days: in the wake of 9/11] are arguing that we should cut down ourselves in protection of our dignity and honour [against the US] … but I argue that, there is a simple science explained by the prophets, the Qur’an and the Bible. That is, when the weaker nations are threatened by the powerful one, they have three options at their disposal: 1) either after analysis the weaker nations conclude that the opponent power has over-estimated her military strength and we can win the war if attacked; 2) or in the second situation, the weaker nation estimates equal probability of winning and defeat, and 3) and in the last case, it is estimated that the defeat is certain … In the light of the prophetic teachings, fighting in situation 3 is suicide. In such situations, dignified (ba-waqaar) reconciliation is recommended. Dignity in such cases is a relative term and is a function of multiple factors … the Muslims for the last 200 years fall in category 3 but they [think] and are acting according to 1 and 2 (GML: 81-A).

A uni-polar world, Ghamidi argues, is the root cause of many atrocities in the Muslim world. A bi-polar world enhances the chances of a relatively honourable position for the weaker nations. Unlike all other Islamic forces who credit in their name the defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan, post-Islamists lay blame on Muslims who turned the natural balance of a bi-polar world into a uni-polar one. Ghamidi’s reading of Islamic history is self-critical: “… my advice to the contemporary Muslims is to seek a “strategic retreat”—ask for a long leave for peace and concentrate on rebuilding its societies from within (Khan 2008: 213-27).
To paraphrase, post-Islamists seek to de-link Muslims’ current spirit and body of intellectual and physical resistance based on a “triumphalist ideology”. Instead, they emphasise in their discourses, the realisation of a sea change, which has occurred due to Muslim’s political decline. In their view, to use Moosa’s expression, “[…] this ideology of Empire permeates theology, jurisprudence, ethics, and espouses a worldview that advances hierarchy … this triumphalist creed and worldview is unable to deliver its adherents to its perceived goals of worldly success and leadership” (2003: 26).

The post-Islamist discourse in its opposition to the global powers (mainly US and Europe) has three features that distinguish them from Islamists. The first point consists of a self-reflection and an inward-looking framework of analysis. In their arguments, to state that global powers are imperialists is to state the obvious. In their argument, imperial behaviour of the present-day global powers is not primarily an anti-Islamic phenomenon, rather the very attribute is associated with power position and the Muslims were no exception to this when they were global powers. For example, a scholar of this circle, after a detailed analysis of the predicament of the Muslim Ummah describes four points as framework for its renaissance: science and technology, democratic culture, justice (equality of all citizens before law) and bargaining for a peace recess with astuteness (Khan 2008: 213). The second feature is the use of language that is laden with vocabulary of human rights, democracy and pluralism instead of religious expressions. The last feature relates more to the basis and distinguishing of an Islamic civilisation from the contemporary western one. For this discursive community, three features constitute the basis of an Islamic civilisation: 1) restraint on sexual relations and insistence on preserving the institution of family; 2) valuing familial and social statuses such as father and mother, teacher and elder, and 3) establishing an institution (by the state) for promotion of good (understood in social terms and not in religious obligations) and eradication of evil (things that are not considered good by society as good).

6.8 Critiques on Post-Islamist Interpretative Approach

With the proliferation of post-Islamist ideas in society, mainly through the new media, the number of critical articles, sermons, books and discussions is growing. In his research, Asif Iftikhar (2005: 78-9) divided these critiques into three main categories: 1) those who charge Ghamidi
with deviation from consensus position; 2) criticism on “Ghamidi’s interpretations vis-à-vis his arguments”, and 3) criticisms from within (that is, critiques posed by Ghamidi’s current interlocutors and ex-students).

Ghamidi’s reformulation of sources (the distinction between Hadith and Sunnah, refutation of recognising Qiyas and Ijma‘ as independent sources) has resented traditional ulama everywhere. Mawlana Rafiq (2009) considers Ghamidi an extension of the late 19th century Modernist trend pioneered by Sir Sayyid and continued by G.A. Pervez and others. According to Rafiq, Ghamidi is innovator as well as denier of Hadith because these two are concomitant attributes (2009: 10). In his criticism, Rafiq seems to define diverse intellectual trends in the sub-continent under one homogeneous category—modernity. According to Rafiq, this heresy (modernity) has numerous shades: Qadianiyyat, Perviziyyat, Maghrebiyyat, Tajadud, Moderation and Enlightened Moderation (ibid: 9). For him, the following key features constitute modernity (and thus Ghamidi’s thought),

- promotion of scepticism and wrong interpretation of the established religious injunctions; denial of the multiple Qur’anic readings; refutation of Hadith and Sunnah; conspiracy of changing the true meanings of the religious terms; refutation of Ijma‘; obedience to the government despite having intellectual pride; disrespect for the ulama; the unholy attempt to present Western civilisation in Islamic terms; denial of veiling for Muslim woman; denial of Shar‘a penalty for drinkers, and approval of sculptures, music and playing musical instruments (ibid: 9).

An ex-fellow of Ghamidi has addressed hermeneutics of post-Islamism in critical terms. Through empirical examples, Ansari (2009) has identified the inconsistencies that might erupt due to application of these hermeneutics. For Ansari, the emphasis on monovocality of the text and application of nazm theory will lead to another exclusivist interpretation of Islam. For him, post-Islamists seek to dilute the force of resistance within Islam. He labelled this discourse as “survivalist Islam” (Ansari 2009).

### 6.9 Concluding Remarks

The debate on Islam’s compatibility with democracy has long been central to Western academia. It has also been subject of internal debate and contestation within Islam. Masud has aptly reviewed three contrasting
scholars’ (Khalifa Abdul Hakim, modernist; Qari Tayyib, Deoband and Amin Ahsan Islahi, then Islamist), views on Islam and democracy (Masud 2004). Due to problematic relationships between Islam, secularism and liberal democracy in Muslim societies, scholars have been insistent on the issues of reform in religious ideas and the social construction of these ideas to accommodate democracy. The underlying tension behind Islam’s incompatibility with modern democracy emanates from the belief and practice of Divine intervention in social organisation; mainly from three avenues: enactment of religious laws by the state; government of the religious class, and active politics by religious groups. Whereas, scholars concentrate on the sociology of religion in practice; this chapter develops an empirical example of religious ideas and worldviews of an intellectual community in their own terms and categories. It reveals the strength and power of ideas and worldview that redefine relationships between theological resources and social categories, and thus qualify for sociological implications.

Islamism studies normally neglect the various hermeneutical approaches. I have shown through two examples, democracy and jihad, how post-Islamists new hermeneutical approach relate with two pressing social issues of the day (democracy and jihad). Given this line of ijtihad, even ‘text-based’ interpretation can bring about a new space in which Islam and modernity can be envisaged. The social significance of this approach lies in the fact that you do not need to create a theory and then conciliate it with Islamic text. Post-Islamists reading suggest that the text itself appropriates new space.

The issue of Islam’s compatibility with democracy has been central to academic enquiry (see e.g. Caha 2003; Esposito and Voll 1996; Tibi 1997, 2008). A study of representative literature reveals three possible scholarly positions: 1) those who believe in Islam’s compatibility with democracy provided that an Islamic theory of secularism evolves first; 2) those who think of Islam’s inherent incompatibility with democracy and liberal values; and 3) those who project Islam as an opposition to Western form of democracy and thus advocate varied forms of theo-democracy or shura-cracy.

I have shown that post-Islamists’ intellectual-social discourse has created a new space in which modern notion of democracy can be envisaged. Delinking of religious class/ulama/Islamists from state politics and power struggle, post-Islamists push for the enhancement of secular
space. However, it is not secularism but bringing state and religion closer through its spiritual force, values and norms inculcated in individuals’ consciousness.

With few notable exceptions, autocratic rulers, military dictators and theocratic regimes govern the majority of Muslim nations. The political history of Pakistan where this study is situated, also presents a grim history (though better than most of the Middle East) of the disruption of democratic process by the military generals. Apart from numerous historical, political and social factors responsible for the failure of democracy to take root in Muslim societies that is debated in the literature, this section contains two specific explanations for discussion: 1) The essentialist/Orientalist reading of the matter locating the problem in the textual sources and early Islamic history, and 2) The view that secularism in Muslim societies is a precondition for building democracy (Hashemi 2009). I have shown that post-Islamists’ reformulation of democracy is a rupture in and departure from Islamism and traditionalism. The argument in this section had a double focus. On the one hand, it admitted and furthered Nader Hashemi’s and Bassam Tibi’s (2008) claim that reform in religious thought in Muslim societies is a precondition to create harmony between Islam/Muslim society and democracy. On the other hand, it contested Hashemi’s proposition (as well as Tibi 2008: 45) that “the development of an indigenous theory of Islamic secularism will significantly increase the prospects for liberal democracy in Muslim societies” (Hashemi 2008: 133). I argue that post-Islamists’ reformulation creates a new space within the Islamic text (and history) for accommodation of democracy. The incorporation of democracy in Islam by post-Islamists, does not necessitate formulation of an ‘indigenous theory of Islamic secularism’.
7 Conclusions

7.1 Introduction

This research focused upon a very limited, geographic-specific discourse community of intellectuals that developed as a strand of the broader post-Islamist trend in the Muslim world. This concluding chapter summarises main arguments offered in the previous chapters. The following section summarises these issues.

Sections 2 and 3 respectively discuss the crisis of Islamism and the nature and scope of emergent post-Islamist trajectory in Pakistan. The rest of the chapter deals with a set of issues as follows.

7.2 Crisis of Islamism

Chapters 4 and 5, I conclude that the Islamist project in Pakistan, spearheaded by Mawdudi’s Jama’at, invoked multifaceted crises since inception in 1941. I based my analysis on Mawdudi’s intellectual biography, his interpretative approach and political reading of Islam, the organisation and social basis of the Jama’at and the emphasis on diverse issues in its political discourse and a thin ethnography of Islamists’ network in a village of the north-west province of Pakistan. The Jama’at through its disciplined activists and organised social networks and professional associations is still a giant societal movement. It failed to emerge as popular political party in the given context of Pakistani state and society, yet its idiom and vocabulary still dominate the religious and political discourse. The prevalence of the Jama’at Islamist idiom is so pervasive that it has captured central stage in the overall national discourse and has successfully marginalised all other alternative voices—for instance, liberal and socialist (Metcalf 2002). However, due to growing socio-political developments, at local and global levels, opening of new opportunity spaces
(market, media and elections) in the 1990s and the breakdown of Mawdudi’s original puritan ideology to withstand and satisfactorily explain these transitions, the Islamist Jama’at has entered into an ideological vacuum. I discussed the main reasons why this ideological vacuum is increasing in width and depth over time. On the political front, the Jama’at consistently compromised its ideological promises in favour of accommodating opportunity spaces. These ad hoc tactical adjustments transformed the Jama’at from a narrow-based ideological movement into a mass party (Moten 2002) however, at the cost of dwindling trust even among its own activists. The second major issue examined at length in chapter 5 is the continuous outflow of ulama, scholars and intellectuals. A number of autocratic steps taken by Mawdudi and his close aides in the 1950s and then later consistently by the Jama’at elite created an ever-growing, ever-expanding intellectual deficit. Coupled with this, the Jama’at elite has rarely given a serious thought to this issue—how to overcome this deficit? Briefly, the Jama’at has pragmatically absorbed all known “blessings” of Western modernity (for instance, democracy, alliances with secular parties, political bargaining, class-based educational system in the private sector, women participation in politics), however it is still struggling hard to survive under the burden of Mawdudi’s thought. This study suggests that within Mawdudi’s thought some adjustments and revisits were possible to welcome these changes. However, the intellectual deficit is the main reason, I suggest, for Jama’at’s inability to transform itself conceptually-ideologically. My last point in this connection is about the transformative potential of the Jama’at and its activists. Based on Akhtar (2000) and my own close interaction with the Jama’at activists (in the village as well as other parts of Pakistan). The Jama’at derived primarily from middle and upper middle classes from modern educated backgrounds and they could play a key role in transformation and modernisation of Pakistani state and society. The Jama’at’s overwhelming emphasis on power politics for which it was less suitable and Mawdudi’s return to traditional Islamic framework reduced its potential for social reform. organisationally and politically, its remained developed as a modern party; however, hermeneutically and conceptually it tells the story of retreat from Mawdudi’s initial posture as modern intellectual towards traditional Islam—more precisely towards Deoband.

The sources and symptoms of crises within the Jama’at (and in society regarding the Islamist project) are not specific to Islamism in Pakistan.
Conclusions

The crisis of Islamism in Pakistan can be better understood through its counterparts in other Muslim societies like Iran, Turkey, Sudan and Egypt. In chapters 1 and 2, I have discussed some of the instances of this global crisis of Islamism as discussed by reputable scholars like Roy (2004), Bayat (2007), Kepel (2006), Dagi (2004) and others.

I leafed through the Jama’at history, specifically those following a number of epochal shifts in the Jama’at strategy. My focus remained on the one that spread within the Jama’at in the mid-1950s and resulted in the secession of more than 50 influential ulama and scholars (chapter 5). I suggest that the issue (democratic principle and authority of the amir within the Jama’at) on which Islahi based his resignation and his latter influence on Ghamidi (who left the Jama’at in the 1970s) inclined me to call it the embryonic phase of post-Islamism. Islahi developed some of the pertinent building blocks of post-Islamist thought, which motivated the reconstructionist phase of post-Islamism in the 1980s and 1990s. However, Islahi himself subscribed to some of the Islamist thoughts (like adherence to Islamic state) despite substantial and far-reaching departure from Mawdudi’s worldview (like Mawdudi’s political interpretation of Islam and the aim of the prophetic mission).

7.3 Nature and Scope of Post-Islamism in Pakistan

This thesis shows that a new phenomenon has become popular in Pakistan through the new electronic media. The articulators of this phenomenon are ex-Islamists. In their discourses on Islam and modernity, they emphasise respect for freedom, human rights, women and youth concerns and liberal democracy instead of an Islamic state. Like other post-Islamists, this strand in Pakistan retreats from seizing state power or bringing about a revolution. They reject categorically any revolutionary means and ends. The closest term to their Islamic worldview is reform (islah) and not revolution (inqilab). Their recommended reform is gradual, long term, methodical and through education and reconstruction. This made their message and reform project less appealing for people seeking total change and transformation in society. It hampered this discourse from transforming into a popular social-political movement. Still the speedy proliferation of this discourse in the recent past specifically among the middle, upper-middle and elite classes suggest that it is symptomatic of possibilities that this discourse might attract the attention of institutions and social movements.
The retreat from revolutionary approach facilitated post-Islamists’ job to work with existing institutions and seek indirect ways of influencing public policy and legislation. As discussed in chapter 5, their interactive dawah model reduces, though simplistically, holders of various social, political and economic statuses to individuals. It implies that a civil servant, a driver, a soldier, a feudalist, an industrialist, a bureaucrat, an elected member of the parliament and the Prime Minister, all are individuals. Religion as method of two-way critique, admonition, exhortation and naseeha makes no difference between its addressees. I have shown that this approach seeks extra-ordinary change potential in individuals undermining structures, traditional forces of status-quo, and advancement of modern bureaucratic state that controls every dimension of human life.

Following Bayat, Lacroix, Dagi, Kepel and Irfan, I named this discourse and intellectual circle post-Islamism. As clarified in chapter 1 that this phenomenon is not unique to Pakistan rather other Muslim societies are experiencing the same or likely trends. In some countries (like Iran and Turkey), post-Islamism has emerged as a popular social movement; in other places (like Saudi Arabia and Egypt), its scope and social influence is limited. I conclude that Pakistani post-Islamist thought movement is similar to the one in Saudi Arabia that is, a limited strand of broader post-Islamism.

For its proponents (specifically Bayat) and those who applied it to empirical examples, post-Islamism is a project constituted of these features: 1) social and political conditions where the appeal of Islamism has dwindled due to multifaceted crisis from within and without (Bayat 2007; Roy 2004: 1); 2) exclusive, monopolist, puritan, statist and revolutionary account of political Islam is changing in favour of more inclusive, society-centric, vigilant towards individual liberties and concerns of women, youth and non-Muslims, and hermeneutically, a movement away from fixed scripture towards historicity (Bayat 2007; Dagi 2004); 3) a category of analysis that is not distinct but a “variant of Islamism” (Bayat 2007); 4) not anti-Islamic or secular but “secularisation of state and prevalence of religious ethic in society” (ibid); 5) it can become a pervasive argument only if an Islamist organisation retreats from establishing an Islamic state (Tibi 2008); 6) multiple discursive and physical spaces through which reformers/post-Islamists may influence Islamists thought and
strategy (Yilmaz nd), and 7) political reform is linked to religious reform (Lacroix 2004).

The main postulates of Bayat’s conceptualisation and its features guided understanding of the phenomenon in Pakistan. In that, I found that only some postulates relate to the post-Islamist project in Pakistan.

From discussion generated in the previous chapters, it is clear that the expansionary phase and rise of post-Islamism coincided with two epochal events: the Enlightened Moderation spearheaded by the military dictator, Pervez Musharraf (ruled 1999-2007) and the 9/11 tragedy and the associated global debates. For critics, mostly Islamists and ulama, Ghamidi and his fellows re-interpreted Islam to suit Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation. For instance, linking Ghamidi’s interpretative method to Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation, Mawlana Rafiq equates the former to heresy, and heresy to modernity. For him, modernity has numerous shades such as Qadiyaniyyat (after G.A. Qadiyan who claimed to be a Prophet); Perviziyyat (after scholar G.A. Pervez who denied Hadith as authentic source of law); Maghrebiyyat (Westernisation); Tajadud (modernism); Moderation and Enlightened Moderation (2009: 9).

In her recent article *Secularism, Hermeneutics and Empire: the Politics of Islamic Reformation*, Saba Mahmood explores the link between U.S. government projects to reform Islam from within promoting a body of scholarship within Islam that uses a specific hermeneutical approach. These scholars are moderate or liberal Muslims who are open to Western notions of “political order and society.” For Saba, “what unites this rather disparate group of Muslim reformers and intellectuals … is … a shared approach to scriptural hermeneutics” (2006: 329). This is an act, argues Saba, “to re-fashion Islam along the lines of the Protestant Reformation” and hence the “convergence of U.S. imperial interests and the secular liberal Muslim agenda needs to be understood …” (ibid).

As a backdrop to the above, recall the research questions from chapter 1: what are the historical roots of this intellectual discourse? Is it a response to the 9/11 conditions and General Musharraf’s enlightened moderation? This study explored the idea that looking at the overall development of the post-Islamist discourse over time, and not just in the current expansionary phase can answer these questions.

The study shows that one set of conditions (mostly internal and intellectual) pushed the grand articulators of this discourse towards finding new interpretative tools and epistemological approaches. The internal
crisis within Islamism was vital in compelling these intellectuals to redefine and rethink an entire set of issues. However, as this discourse has matured through a long historical process in which divergent voices have made their contribution, the study concludes that it is not reducible to the crisis of Islamism, Musharraf’s Enlightened Moderation and/or the U.S. patronage of a specific scriptural hermeneutic. On the contrary, the arguments are summarised as follows.

Farahi, who founded *nazm*, which forms the basis of post-Islamism’s unique interpretive approach, flourished in the early part of the 20th century. He left his academic career at Aligarh and devoted himself to articulate his theory of *nazm* and apply it to selected chapters of the Qur’an. The *nazm* (coherence) has three main constituents: 1) order, 2) proportion and 3) unity. Farahi insisted that with this *nazm* approach, “a single interpretation of the Qur’an was possible.” For his teacher, Shibli, Farahi had “achieved the impossible”’ and for post-Islamists, it [exploring *nazm* in Qur’an] was a “superhuman accomplishment.” In their view, Farahi, “demonstrated to all the Western critics that with a sound understanding of the Arabic language one can appreciate the coherence in the Qur’an which is certainly not a haphazard collection of injunctions.” Farahi coincided with poet, philosopher and thinker Muhammad Iqbal. It was about the same period when Iqbal was delivering his lectures on the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam. Farahi wrote most of his works in Arabic and remained mostly detached from the socio-political debates of his time. Further, he invited his ex-disciple, Islahi, to disengage with his current career as journalist and attend to serious academic understanding of the Qur’an. Islahi joined Farahi. Later, Islahi joined Mawdudi’s call for establishing an Islamic revivalist movement—the Jama’at-e-Islami. As elaborated in chapter 5, the Jama’at suffered a severe internal crisis in the 1950s. The central pillar of controversy developed between Mawdudi and Islahi over violation of democratic ethics and principles by the former in the opinion of the latter. After 17 years of activism in the Jama’at, Islahi had to abandon his struggle for political revival of Islam in favour of deliberation on the Qur’an in light of the theory of *nazm*. Islahi began this project in 1958 and pursued it until 1978. Together Islahi and Farahi, spent about 100 years combined completing the project. Ghamidi was next, when he abandoned Islamism and joined with Islahi. In 1974, when Ghamidi was only 23, his colleagues named him *allama* (the most learned one) and the appeal of Mawdudi’s
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revivalist ideology had already dwindled in his mind. Upon Islahi’s call, Ghamidi abandoned his career as a political Islamist and devoted himself to understanding Farahi’s hermeneutical approach. The analysis in chapter 5 shows that Islahi’s influence on Ghamidi’s approach to religion was defining and he increasingly felt distanced from Islamist ideology and practice. This generational dimension [Farahi (1862-30), Islahi (1904-97), Ghamidi (1951-)] is followed by another phase—the Reconstructionist phase launched by Ghamidi in the 1990s.

As understood from Ghamidi’s intellectual biography and face-to-face discussions, a deep sense of internal crisis over the state-led Islamisation drive of Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s and breakdown of interpretative approaches to doctrinal sources drove his reconstruction of Islamic thought. I have shown that this task not only required his intellectual preparations but also a strong backing of religious authority to which he can subscribe. His own intellectual leanings, training and approaches confirm that he would neither associate himself with Islamic Modernists like Sir Sayyid or Fazlur Rahman nor with the sub-continental traditional Islamic schools—Deoband, Ahl-e-Hadith and Barelwi. With great ingenuity, he constructed a new category called the School of Shibli (Dabistan-e-Shibli), which synchronised divergent Islamic voices—traditionalists, Islamic Modernists, Islamists and his own teachers. By 1993, Ghamidi had developed an internal critique of the prevailing approaches to Islamic revival and reform. He attacked the conceptual basis of Mawdudi’s political Islam and his political reading of the prophetic career. He developed a critique of Sufi Islam and its various practices, presented an alternative understanding of Islamic punishments and specifically, its alleged gendered dimensions. He also accomplished writing a single textbook, in a modern fashion, which explained the entire religious content in one manuscript (Ghamidi 2009). In this project, Ghamidi introduced a new categorisation of religious content—Shar’ia and Hikmah. In his attempt, he made a clear distinction between Shar’ia and understanding of Shar’ia (fiqh). As argued in chapter 6, the aim of his reconstructionist approach was not to reformulate fiqh for the 21st century. On the contrary, in his view, development of fiqh was based on the day-to-day decisions of the courts and legislations of parliament. In these writings, he sought to rationalise an expanded secular space for secular political leaders and their parties (2006: 274-87), but arguably not secularism. In his assessment, political parties should be religious because they
represent Muslims in Pakistan and religious parties should stay away from politics because they politicize Islam and thus will end up enforcing a specific understanding of Islam. One of the arguments in chapter 1 was that post-Islamism in Pakistan is not secular or anti-religious. In their discourse, they relate Divine guidance to both reformation of the individual and the state. However, the reformation struggle between the individual and the state is not dialectical. Rather a good or bad state (not Islamic or secular) is the aggregation of individual pieties and profanities (Nasr 1996). Post-Islamists identify four key areas (political system, economy, social fabrics and penalties) at state level, where revealed guidance has shown limited intervention. Besides, their emphasis on the spiritual and moral aspects of Divine guidance in reformation of individuals, they define maximum limits, on the positive side, for a Muslim state to demand from its citizens; these are, to observe routine prayers and pay zakat as a tax to the state (Ghamidi 2009: 492). If a person will meet these two demands, then his personal freedoms are secure and the state cannot force, on religious grounds anyone, to perform Hajj, wear a specific dress, sport a beard or fast in the month of Ramadan. For promotion of good practices and discouragement of bad ones, the state can use education and exhortation as instruments. This leads to the conclusion that, in post-Islamist discourse religion and the state connect but not in the same way that Islamists create this link.

To reiterate from chapter 5, Ghamidi’s religious discourse in this phase, in light of his personality and background as political Islamist where Mawdudi’s defining influence reflected itself publically in his attire, aesthetics, lifestyle and serving Islam beyond writing books. This latter attribute of Ghamidi, distinguished him from his teachers-mentors—Farahi and Islahi. Ghamidi presented his findings carefully, through the traditional medium of print, speeches and audio tapes, before a limited learned community of scholars and educated classes and avoided appearing at wider public forums. Nonetheless, Islamists and informed sections of the upper-middle classes in Pakistan knew of him and his ideas. I have shown that in this phase, he trained, formally and informally, as a number of modern educated individuals and established his Institute of Islamic Sciences—Al-Mawrid. His ideas on jihad, democracy and human rights had come under discussion, although at a limited scale, in society through his organs—Ishraq and Renaissance.
The emergence of Musharraf corresponded with the ascendance of an idea to state power. Unlike Zia-ul-Haq’s rise to power based on an Islamisation drive, Musharraf distanced himself from the dominant statist discourse of the 1980s. The secular and liberal forces—to use these terms in a more general way—supported Musharraf and his conceived Enlightened Moderation project. This coupled by another move, the eruption of private electronic media and Internet. Ghamidi and his fellows received disproportionate airtime on state and private TV channels. These opportunity spaces inaugurated the expansionary phase of post-Islamism in Pakistan. The tragedy of 9/11 followed by the U.S.-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan lead to the subjugation of these nations as well as madrassas reforms, the debate on hudood laws and the women protection bill, the rise of religious parties’ alliance in two provinces along with many other factors helped bring post-Islamist discourse to the forefront. These scholars delivered lectures on sensitive issues at seminars, workshops and conferences. All genres of modern media—CDs, YouTube, blogs, websites, TV channels—were liberally internalised by post-Islamists. In the Musharraf era, the discursive and physical distance between post-Islamists and society narrowed rapidly.

I will now summarise some of the main features of post-Islamist discourse in terms of its social constituency and impact on society.

The coming of a post-Islamist intellectual discourse, as shown in this thesis, seems closer in its implications to Islamic modernism. However, deeper, fuller deliberation on its various contours reveals that it has come about through long intellectual endeavours predominantly directed at outlining a new hermeneutic and epistemological approach. Farahi, Islahi and Ghamidi developed basic postulates of this discourse, mostly in academic isolation over more than a century long deliberation on the doctrinal sources. This contemplation followed a reasoned, methodical and predominantly academic path, sharing close resemblance with traditional centres of learning—Madrassas—that are often accused of indifference to the changes taking place in their respective socio-political environments. However, Ghamidi’s own training and background as political activist in the Jama’at and Mawdudi’s defining influence on his lifestyle introduced an epochal shift in articulation, conceptual developments and public outreach of this discourse. He employed modern terms and categories, such as democracy, tax and state, to attract wider public appeal for his message in society. This familiarity with modern terms facilitated
Ghamidi’s job to attract attention of the modern educated and upper classes.

This augmented by the new media gave his ideas unprecedented momentum. Another major external factor that also boosted his stature from that of a lay preacher to an intellectual and ideologue at national level was the local and global conditions pushing public debates on certain key issues in Pakistan. These conditions were the result of the 9/11 tragedy for Pakistani state and society, specifically, due to the US war in Afghanistan and the declared pro-U.S. policy by Pakistan; secondly, the Enlightened Moderation project of the military dictator General Musharraf. Post-Islamists’ neo-Islamic-liberal understanding of these issues, as Mumtaz Ahmad has named in his recent article, not only supported Pakistan’s state policy but also provided a conceptual basis for nullification of Islamists’ and ulama’ campaign against the state and the war on terror. However, mention of the influence of these external factors in the projection of post-Islamist ideas would be misleading if the historical trajectory of the development of this discourse and transformation itself over time were not taken into account. For example, I cite three issues—democracy, jihad and hudood laws—to suggest that the discourse itself was prior to these immediate local and global conditions.

Historically, if traced it back to Farahi, who founded the theory of thematic coherence and Islahi, who applied this theory to the entire Qur’anic content, then post-Islamism, which expanded in the recent past by the contributions of Ghamidi and his public intellectuals absorbs almost 130 years of consistent intellectual deliberation and meditation on doctrinal sources. If we accept Swales’ (1987) definition that discourse communities are “time-neutral”, then from Farahi to Islahi to Ghamidi, it constitutes an intellectual community of discourse sharing some core ideas and spanning more than a century long research and deliberation. It was only in the recent past that the introduction of new media inaugurated the expansionary phase of this discourse, illuminating its principles and implications to a wider public for debate, critique and discussion. Here, if we accept Swales’ second features of a discourse community—that is “medium-neutral” and “unconstrained by space”—then we can term the post-Islamist social trend that emerged and expanded in the recent past a discourse community sharing a common worldview. A multitude of individuals and social groups subscribe to and cluster around Ghamidi’s worldview, and relate to one another loosely in the current
post-Islamist discourse community. The participants of this community include writers, public speakers, researchers, bloggers, Qur’anic circles and web-activists. The new media, as discussed in chapter 5, has opened up broader engagement of these ideas in a debate with the competing Islamic worldviews and discourses in Pakistan.

The primary focus in this thesis on content and discourse narrowed the scope of this research to investigate the numerical strengths and impact of post-Islamism on society thoroughly. However, the study provides a glimpse through the role of new media in expanding ideas in the wider public, and some hints towards the post-Islamist community of scholars and their immediate constituency. I argued that mere intellectual discourse, offering an alternative worldview and moderate interpretation might not have the desired impact. Popular appeal and altering existing class arrangements in society necessitates transformation of mere worldviews into popular social movements. Post-Islamists are yet to realise this stage. The role of formal and informal institutional arrangements and interaction of ideas with these arrangements will play a key role in transforming post-Islamism into a social movement. As Bayat has rightly suggested, “engaging in social and intellectual mobilization, building networks of activism, and providing education must be accomplished on a massive scale. There is no escape from mobilizing consensus around a liberatory interpretation of religion whenever and wherever religion becomes a key element in popular ethos” (2007: 188).

Analysis of post-Islamist ideas and worldviews suggests that this trajectory should be delineated through its interpretative method and approach because, if implications are used as a yardstick, then the current trajectory might seem a stand-in category for Islamic Modernism, which I have shown is not the case. At a deeper, fuller and academic level, as shown in chapter 5, the post-Islamist trajectory reduces to Dabistan-e-Farahi. However, if examined from a broader intellectual-social and historical perspective, its scope expands to a self-constructed category, Dabistan-e-Shibli. This unique articulation of the self, not only blurs the boundaries between post-Islamists and Islamists but also post-Islamists and the Islamic Modernists. This further complicates the labelling of the current intellectual trajectory. However, in the hitherto available typologies of the Islamic phenomenon and in the specific context of these intellectuals, post-Islamism still offers the best framework for understanding this trajectory.
This research inaugurates consideration of hermeneutic shift as the element of change within and without Islamic movements. This might lead to similar conclusions as Modernists and Islamic liberals would reach. From discussion generated in chapters 5 and 6, the term post-Islamism is redefined as a hermeneutic-analytical category, both embodiment and producer, of ideas, ideals and worldviews. But these ideas and worldviews primarily spawn from a unique interpretative approach and not essentially from social construction of doctrinal themes to absorb modern themes such as democracy and promotion of Islamic notion of peace by reducing armed jihad to defensive jihad only (Ali 2002: 71-94). As such, post-Islamist discourse is informed by, but not reducible to, history, experience and socio-economic conditions. Although, I concur with Moosa that “rethinking Islam cannot occur in a fortress society or only in academic citadels: it needs living communities” (2003: 28), instead through following a dialogic model, I argue that before the canvas of living communities is determined, one should understand the content and discourse in its own terms and categories. This naturally shifted the primary focus from external socioeconomic conditions and causal analysis of the emergence of post-Islamism towards understanding of ideas and worldviews in their own terms and categories (Euben 1999: 18-19).

The focus within this community of discourse has shifted from its Islamist worldview of creating an Islamic state and Islamisation of society from above to idealising a democratic state and society. It further seeks to re-Islamise its envisioned democratic state through reformation of individual behaviour rather than enforcement of Shar’ia and Islamisation of the state. This community of scholars not only observes and defends the most critical religious boundaries, but also creatively expands the available space for accommodating change and changing experiences of modern life. Post-Islamism is neither secular nor anti-Islamic. Likewise, it is neither traditional nor Islamist but it is post-Islamist.

The intellectual biographies of Mawdudi and Ghamidi also question the general applicability, if not validity, of “class legitimization” explanations by Marxist approaches. These approaches suggest that “the specific content of a new ideology is shaped … by two conditions: first, by the fact that new ideas reflect the particular historical experience of the rising ruling class, and second, by the fact that the new ruling class controls the means of ideological production” (Wuthnow 1989: 523-25). As understood from biographical accounts and proliferation of both discourses
such explanations do not take all non-material/cultural dynamics and societal complexities into account. More specifically, they ignore the long tedious process that scholars like Mawdudi and Ghamidi experienced, and more importantly, the inherent power of ideas and worldviews (Euben 1999).

I have shown that post-Islamist scholarship confronted challenges on two fronts: from within, as seekers of ‘truth’ and discoverers of true religion, and from without, the ambiguity in Islamism. Thus post-Islamists’ ambiguity, scepticism and crisis was mainly a function of the quest for knowing the true religion, breakdown of the traditional religious framework and failure of Mawdudi’s thought to answer emerging questions about gender relations, democracy and jihad among others.

Through a deeper, fuller and critical analysis, the post-Islamist scholarship realised that epistemological shift was the only solution. Unlike, the Islamist Mawdudi, who first spearheaded an intellectually radical departure from traditional interpretive framework, and former fell for the same framework thus limiting the Jama’at’s capacity for social reform, post-Islamist scholars like Islahi and Ghamidi developed space for change. The shift enabled post-Islamists to overcome the entrenched Islamists’ crisis of a lag between ideology and practice. More specifically, because of the trade-off between ideology and practice, the Jama’at had to sacrifice its pure ideals at the altar of political and economic opportunities. In contrast, the post-Islamists preferred development of an alternative epistemological framework to strategic shifts and tactical adjustments for the desired goals.

Another point is the failure of post-Islamism to initiate a popular social movement in Pakistan. Despite three decades of intellectual deliberations, 20 years of limited public engagement and almost six years of media-based interactions, the post-Islamist scholarship has failed to transform their ideas into a popular social movement. This study suggests four main reasons responsible: 1) post-Islamists relations with the power elite (the elite do not consider it a threat thus it loses popular appeal); 2) the absence of repressive state policies (like in Iran or Egypt for reformist discourses); 3) the contours of Pakistani society (the social space for dialogue on religious issues is open but filled with persecutory syndromes for ideas enunciated by Ghamidi and his fellows); and 4) the nature of post-Islamist discourse itself (focuses on the educated middle classes and elite section of society). Moreover, the discourse is intellec-
tually re-constructionist addressing academic issues in a systematic and methodical way more than following a populist approach to thrive on religious symbols, customs and rites.

7.4 Are Islamism and Post-Islamism Modern?

The study of both Islamism and post-Islamism leads to the conclusion that there is no one modernity as modernisation theories claimed but multiple modernities. Different territories and societies can create different combinations of conditions that can lead towards progress and development. The historical account of Islamic renewal and reform in chapter 3 and then cases of Islamism and post-Islamism suggest that within Islam different strands of modernities can be imagined. The study suggests that both Islamism and post-Islamism in Pakistan offer a critical reflection on both traditional authority and “mono-civilizational impositions of Western modernity.” Even “Islamo-liberal” scholars like the ones in question, seem reluctant to accommodate all genres of Western modernity uncritically. One can discern at least three responses towards Western modernity: accommodation, negotiation and rejection. Both Islamists and post-Islamists, see in modernity, to use Euben’s expression, “a crisis due to rupture with tradition, the dual rejection of theology and teleology inaugurated by Enlightenment rationalism and the subsequent diminishment of meaning in authority, morality and community…” (1999: 124)

Both Islamism and post-Islamism are modern responses and neither appears to be dragging Muslim societies back into the archaic or distant past. Both trajectories yearn for moral codes as well as progress and are thus Janus-faced: that is, they are “modern and socially and politically progressive” on the one hand, and “conservative and authoritarian” seeking moral codes in society on the other (Yavuz 2003: 18).

As shown in chapter 5, post-Islamists do not pose a direct threat to regimes and ruling elites. However, traditional ulama, sectarian organisations and militants emphatically resent it. Intellectuals, writers and public speakers subscribing to post-Islamist worldview are threatened directly and in-directly. In 2006, the ex-editor of *Ishraq*, the main organ for Ghamidi, was shot. Recently multiple sources have threatened Ghamidi and he has gone into hiding in Malaysia. Even Al-Mawrid, the post-Islamist research group founded by Ghamidi in Lahore remains deserted because of threats against researchers there. Therefore, unlike Iranian
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reformist intellectuals who suffer from state repression, Pakistani post-Islamists suffer social persecution.

I have also shown that the Islamists pragmatic approach to accommodate new opportunity spaces is sometimes in conflict with its theoretical tenets. Thus, a “conceptual space”, “ideological vacuum” and “grey zone” developed that reverberates in multifarious ways. Over time, the elite authoritarian attitude of the Jama’at to cope with dissent and divergent views on its political posturing results in desertion by a large number of intellectuals. Ex-Islamists and now post-Islamists have arguably filled this vacuum; they have taken the discussion many steps deeper and farther. By separating human understanding of Shar’ia (fiqh) from the Divine content of Shar’ia; and an unambiguous recognition of reason and free will in interpreting Islamic text, post-Islamists have intelligently articulated Islam’s compatibility with democracy, freedom of expression, gender mobility and visibility and, consumption of modern art and art forms. Islamists in Pakistan and elsewhere can dwell on these fresh ideas expounded by post-Islamists in Pakistan.

Field observations and close interaction with the Islamists that revealed the Jama’at’s efforts to internalise new opportunities visibly reverberates in the spheres of internal tensions and identity crisis within ordinary Islamists. The crisis infuses dissent, which leads to forceful silence, transformations or secession of Islamic activists. Without proper conceptual and theoretical transformation, which in broader terms suggest a reform within religious thought, internal pressures only lead to tactical and ad-hoc adjustments. The post-Islamists overcame this by reverting to a rigorous and thorough, academic understanding of the Islamic text. This thesis only had room to focus on some of the consequences of this re-articulation by Ghamidi and his fellows.

The interaction of post-Islamism and modernity is both affirmative and critical: it critically and creatively discards and pragmatically negotiates the boundaries of its space with the secular modernity. The outcome is a ‘hybrid’ space—an Islamic modernity. The post-Islamist intellectuals and their media-based activism form a ‘critical’ bridge between immutable text and its meaning on the one hand, and the pragmatic realities on the other. In this formulation, post-Islamism is necessarily a step forward after the many setbacks to Islamists on various practical and ideological fronts. The post-Islamist ideas and practices may not be
manifest and observable everywhere but they do exist and are in constant tension and conflict with competing discourses.

Ghamidi’s text-based approach resolves a central problem in literature on Islam’s compatibility with modern democracy. Modernisation theorists suggest re-interpretation of the Islamic text in light of modern conditions in a manner that accommodates human rights’ concerns and democratic norms. Even if successful, such efforts at re-interpretation of the text often suffer from a crisis of legitimacy within Muslim society. Post-Islamists response to this situation is that even proper reading of the text under their approach can resolve some issues.

A close analysis may reveal that this approach seeks to enhance the ‘secular space’ but does not promote secularism. It ‘re-Islamises’ this space through reforming individual thoughts, habits and actions by promoting spiritual values, norms and a new social awareness. In the context of Islam’s relationship with the state, this research differs from scholars such as Hashemi (2009) and Tibi (2008). They argue for, an “Islamic theory of secularism” as a pre-condition for democratisation in Muslim societies. Chapter 6 concludes that this space for reform—democratisation—can be appropriated through post-Islamists’ newly promoted worldview.

As opposed to the traditional and modernist approaches, the experience of post-Islamists show that initiating a new epistemology for appropriation of new space for social reform within the text is a possibility. This unique interpretative approach not only frees reformist thinkers and activists from the tedious process of creating compatibility between the text and new situations but also enhances the capacity of the text. In this connection, the second point in this thesis is that post-Islamists’ reformist epistemology has a unique distinction of deliberating on the text directly without reverting to an apologetic approach of reconciling Islam with modernity. Seemingly, Ghamidi’s view on democracy, gender equality, hudood, capital punishment for apostasy and treatment of Hadith literature are similar to Modernists in Pakistan and elsewhere. However, it does not make them Modernists. The Islamic text may support “absolutism and hierarchy, as well as foundations for liberty and equality” (Esposito and Voll 1996: 7). It becomes imperative for researchers to take into account the “ideas and ideals” emanating from the religious text as important “conceptual resources within Islam for democratization”, for
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instance (ibid). The role of the revealed text, its interpreters and our understanding of the interpreter’s interpretation is vital.

7.5 Islamists-Post-Islamists inter-communication

I have shown that current post-Islamists were once ardent supporters of Islamism in Pakistan. The strand of post-Islamism in question could not develop within the Jama’at and these intellectuals had to quit the Islamist project. What about their mutual interactions and dialogue, one might ask? The study does not rule out the possibility of inter-communication and through it influencing each other’s ideas and strategies. This notion derives from one assumption and two bits of empirical evidence support it. The assumption is that post-Islamists occupy a refined/superior discourse, in terms of its intellectual content and media-based articulators, which suggest that the flow of ideas to occur from post-Islamism to Islamism. Two pieces of evidence support this assumption: one from direct fieldwork observations of Islamists-post-Islamists physical as well as discursive interactions in Pakistan and the other from Gulen’s movement on Turkish Islamists. Yilmaz identified numerous sources related to Gulen’s movement in Turkey (see chapter 1) towards transformation of Turkish Islamism. These sources include schools, media and physical interactions between Gulen’s inspired intellectuals and Islamists. According to Yilmaz, Gulen’s “competitive Islamic discourse which is not anti-Western, tolerant, pluralistic, politically and economically more liberal etc. has weakened the influence of Erbakan’s Islamism on the wider socially conservative masses … including the nascent Anatolian elite” (Yilmaz nd: 23).

Field evidence in this study comes from direct observations and close interactions with Jama’a’t activists and party elites. Ghamidi’s counter-worldview to Mawdudi and his discourse community is widely debated and discussed within the Jama’a’t, perhaps more critically than within the communities of ulama. However, among religious social forces, the Jama’a’t and its various forums offer the broader constituency where some hear and accommodate post-Islamists voices. This leads to the conclusion that the new wave of post-Islamism neither brings the death of political Islam nor implies that post-Islamism is more modern than Islamism. In both cases and on both sides, the intellectual and social boundaries remain open. Both interact and communicate with each other, which carry the potential of influencing each other’s worldviews. The new op-
portunity spaces (market, media and informal meetings) provide formal and informal social occasions for interaction and dialogue. Whereas, Islamism is well entrenched in society and far better institutionalised, post-Islamism has groomed into a refined intellectual discourse that is open and evolving.

Post-Islamists’ re-formulation of the entire argument does help in measuring distance from Islamism. In many instances, the boundaries between Islamism and post-Islamism remain opaque. In some areas, the debate has matured, while in others, cross-fertilisation is still a possibility. In practice, the possibility to re-define each other’s limits and reshape each other goals, ideals and strategies remains. In the end, one can safely conclude that the intellectual balance is changing in favour of post-Islamists but organisational power and societal influence is a dream they have yet to realise. The new media (e.g. private TV channels, cyberspace) has turned the textual discourse and loosely tied post-Islamist intellectuals into a post-Islamist project, which seeks to transform society using a society-centred approach—to transform the political and social macro-structures by inculcating new vision and consciousness into individuals and society. The post-Islamist thought movement represents the ‘going public’ of an intellectual discourse on Islam and modernity.

7.6 Non-Linear Historical Continuity

In chapter 3, I briefly cited from the Urdu classic *Mauj-e-Kawthar* (wave of paradise), where Muhammad Ikram writes about the continuity of *Nadwiyyat* (roughly translated as the continuity of *Nahda/Shibli* tradition). Then in chapter 5, I explored at length that the post-Islamists in question define and relate themselves with syncretism of Shibli through their own construct—Dabistan-e-Shibli. The intellectual construct is an important development that embodies continuity and rupture from tradition. Islamic reform in Muslim societies has the feature that they accommodate certain aspects of modern experiences, negotiate some others and reject still others to remain in the mainstream tradition. They become custodians of change within the tradition.

In her seminal study, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900*, Barbara D. Metcalf challenged the prevalent assumption that “Islam in nineteenth-century India stagnated and that significant cultural change took place only through adoption of Western values” (2002: 348). Although the cultural change was enthused and constricted, concluded
Metcalf, by events stimulated by Western expansion. The change was a feature internal to Islam. In her scholarly study of numerous Islamic revivalist trajectories, specifically Deoband, Metcalf aptly suggests that the “broad repertoire of religious styles’ and “process of change” in Muslim societies should be studied without “loss of continuity.” Chapter 3 showed that the debates in this thesis are not new to Islam, and a more enthusiastic proliferation of these can be found in the post-1857 era where multi-layered deprivations, political, cultural as well as socio-economic, were instrumental in the emergence of diverse responses. This suggests that the genesis of Islamism and then post-Islamism and its current relevance to widespread issues and debates in Pakistan may be better understood if considered on the plane of historical continuum. Chapter 3 also chronicles selected historical experiences of Islamic intellectuals and socio-political developments in pre-partition India that continue to influence the contemporary revivalist social forces in Pakistan. This does not mean the historical context can contain all the aspects of the current discourse and power of intellectual content in Islamism and post-Islamism. I suggest that the historical context of pre-partition colonial India and post-colonial Pakistan indicate four interrelated ideas. First, as opposed to other regions of the Islamic world, the Indo-Pak subcontinent is unique and diverse in terms of religious diversity and contribution to Islamic thought. Second, Islamic articulation in Pakistan is not a monolith rather a function of non-homogenous continuity and rival contestation. Third, debates on Islam and its relationship to modernity—in more general terms—have a long history in colonial India and are in no way new to Islam in the contemporary Pakistan. Fourth, Ghamidi’s articulation of Dabistan-e-Shibli offers useful synchronisation of divergent intellectual voices into a singular analytical category useful in attacking oppositional binaries and synthesis of multiple discourses.

The study also suggests that post-Islamists’ conscious attempt not to form a political or dawah organisation has enabled them to selectively undertake from divergent scholars and schools. This has broadened their intellectual capability and scope of research.

7.7 Policy Implications

The research findings have a number of policy implications. In the given socio-political conditions of Pakistani state and society, the emergent extremism and militancy, that challenges the sovereignty of Pakistani
state, madrassas reforms, hudood laws, blasphemy laws, and women and minority-related constitutional issues are key areas wherein traditional ulama, Islamists and secular social forces compete for their respective interpretations in policy space. Often, both the elected and non-elected ruling elites initiate reforms in these areas. However, either the rulers hamper the process for political expediency of legitimising their authority or, the governments surrender it before the traditional/Islamist viewpoint. As a corollary, despite the sizeable presence of pro-reform social forces in society, previously the debate could not take place at the public level. Things have changed in the last seven years. The spread of new print and electronic media in Pakistan has brought new interpreters of Islam to central stage. As a sign of eagerness of society for social and religious reforms, Ghamidi and his post-Islamist team of young intellectuals have gained disproportionate share of the new private TV channels. In the given context of government’s anti-militant position and pro-reform gestures, post-Islamist scholars have broadened the scope of the debate. Fresh ideas on most sensitive issues—women rights, family planning, status of non-Muslims, legitimacy of hudood laws, relations with neighbouring countries, guerrilla warfare in Kashmir, militancy and suicide bombings, sectarianism and others have claimed central stage in the debates on electronic media.

The extensive coverage of Ghamidi and his fellows’ on public and private TV channels, during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf promoted his agenda of Enlightened Moderation and vividly exhibits post-Islamists’ relations with power—Pakistani state and ruling elite. While, I acknowledge my interpretive methodology helps me escape this reductionism, the power of post-Islamist discourse in terms of its powerful content and ideas cannot be undermined by reducing it to discourse on power. Post-Islamist discourse is filled with innovative ideas and can enhance policy space for social reform.

More specifically, my findings from the Islamists network in the village discussed in chapter 4, and the role of public intellectuals generally, relates this study to developmental policy too. I suggest that the Islamist network and the post-Islamist intellectual currents have a two-way connection with social policy by refining policy formulation through a constructive criticism of its various aspects and voicing people’s aspirations. Political parties, social groups and civil society organisations are important in ‘enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and support-
ing their claims to political attention’ (Sen 1999: 149). Public intellectuals and Islamic political parties can play a constructive role in shaping peoples’ choices and ideas about their rights, responsibilities, public policies and monitoring state institutions.

I suggest by way of conclusion that in a developing country like Pakistan, the paradigms of naseeha, dawah and talqeen as further refined and emphasised by post-Islamists, can lead to informed citizenship about their rights and responsibilities and active critique on governing elite and public policy. This will spare a body of preachers, teachers and orators from their current mode of power struggle towards education, exhortation and civic reasoning.

7.8 Future Research

This research has opened some venues for future investigation. Specifically, three key areas arise.

First, serious studies on unexamined aspects of the mainstream Islamist movement in Pakistan, the Jama’at are necessary. Little academic attention has gone to ethnographic accounts of Islamist networks at village, community, town and city levels. From a very thin ethnographic study of an Islamist network in a frontier village, I have shown how thousands of such networks can possibly be investigated for the enrichment of our understanding of Islamism in society. Little is known about the ideology, practices and interactions of the Islamic activists: what the ideology and praxis of Islamism really mean for the activists; and, how the activists associate themselves with the Islamist leaders, society and the state; how and to what effect, the activists interpret Mawdudi’s ideology and design their strategies in their respective local environment. Likewise, there are numerous trends, transformations, trajectories and patterns within the Jama’at open for exploration and analysis. Negligible scholarly endeavours have been made to examine the Jama’at welfare networks, its sister organisations such as its labour movement (Tehreek-e-Mihnat), students’ movement (Islami Jamiat Talaba), teachers’ association (Tanzeem-e-Asateza) and its other professional organisations. Similarly, in its joint political activism with other religious and secular organisations, the Jama’at participated in political protests, was instrumental in mass mobilisation and played a key role in organising electoral campaigns. Other questions are about how the Jama’at’s close interactions with these forces might have a profound impact on its policy, discourse and strategy
as well as the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of this interactive process are yet to be examined.

Second, this research has raised only a few issues pertaining to the significance of interpretative approach and epistemology and its close association with our understanding of democracy, jihad and the Islamic state. Some areas outside the scope of this thesis may include gender relations, music, drama, film and other genres of fine arts, hudood laws and various domains of society and economy. Much has been written and said by independent religious scholars and intellectuals about these issues, which are yet to make their way into serious academic circles. The post-9/11 scenario and the response to textual-essentialist approaches have evoked researchers’ attention to the actual practices of Islamists across the globe. Yet the current trend should not result in undermining the new content produced by Islamists/post-Islamists re-defining the relationship between Islam and modernity. Similarly, the impact of post-Islamist ideas on society and its relevance for other Muslim societies are future venues of research.

Third, a critical review of Mawdudi’s intellectual content could include a non-linear trend on various issues. This evolution in Mawdudi’s thought over time has hardly remained a subject of academic discussion.
### Table A-1
Sub-Domain: External Relations

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<th>News Content In Percent</th>
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<td>8.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Military/Defence +</td>
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<td>14.3</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Peace +</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Internationalism +</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pan-Islamism +</td>
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<td>58</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>16.1</td>
<td>79</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Global Powers</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Kashmir &amp; Afghanistan</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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Source: Author’s own database

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### Table A-2
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<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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Source: Author’s own database
### Table A-3
Sub-Domains: Political System

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<td>5. Centralization +</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
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Source: Author’s own database

### Table A-4
Sub-Domains: Economy

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Incentives +</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>4. Protectionism +</td>
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<td>1.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Economic Planning +</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. General Economic Goals</td>
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<td>9.17</td>
</tr>
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<td>51.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Nationalization +</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>9. Privatization +</td>
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Source: Author’s own database
### Table A-5
Sub-Domains: Welfare and Quality of Life

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<th>Rel. Freq</th>
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<td>2. Culture +</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>4. Education Expansion +</td>
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<td>5. Environmental Protection +</td>
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Source: Author’s own database

### Table A-6
Sub-Domains: Fabric of Society

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<th>In Percent</th>
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<td>2. Law and Order +</td>
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<td>3. Anti-Feudalism &amp; Land Reform +</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>5. Ethno-politics</td>
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Source: Author’s own database
### Table A-7
**Sub-Domains: Social Groups**

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<td>In Percent</td>
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<td>Labour Groups +</td>
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<td>Farmers +</td>
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<td>Professional Groups +</td>
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<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender +</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth +</td>
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Source: Author’s own database

### Table A-8
**Sub-Domain: Islamic Ideology**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>In Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Shar'ia/Shar'ia Activism +</td>
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<td>Islamic Economy +</td>
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<td>18.42</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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Source: Author’s own database
Appendices

Appendix B
Time Trend

Figure A-2
Time Trend (1988-2006), News Content
Figure 7: Time Trend in Social Groups (D7) (Total Observations=125)

Figure 8: Time Trend in Islamic Ideology (D8) (Total Observations=292)

Source: These graphs are based on author’s own database
References


References


Hunter, W.W. (1871) *Our Indian Musalmans: are they bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen?* London: Trubner and Company.


the Conference on College Composition and Communication, 38th Atlanta, GA. Available online.


References


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Amin completed his BSc (Hons/1996) and MSc (1997) in Economics from International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI), Pakistan. In 1998, Amin was offered a position of Research Officer/Lecturer at the School of Economics, IIUI. He taught a number of undergraduate courses in development economics, public finance, Islamic economics and Islamic banking. During this period, he also translated a book on Islamic banking and finance from English into Urdu, which was published by the IIUI in the year 2000. While he was a student of economics, Amin showed great interest in studying political Islam and the working of Islamic institutions in Pakistan. In 2005, he coordinated a survey of madrassas in the north-west Pakistan, funded by the Asia Foundation/DFID. This survey was instrumental in changing his interest from studying pure economics and taking deep interest in interdisciplinary subjects. In the last 4 years, during his stay at the ISS and immersion in the PhD process, Amin intends to continue an academic career in studying political Islam, Islamic social movements and post-Islamist trends developing in Muslim societies, specifically in South Asia and the Middle East.

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This thesis has not been submitted to any university for a degree or any other award.