Administrative Measures in Crime Control

24 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2009

See all articles by W. Huisman

W. Huisman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Monique Koemans

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

We want to discuss several new administrative measures that were introduced into the Anglo-Saxon world and that have been copied in part in the Netherlands. One is aimed at tackling nuisance in the public domain and the other at the prevention of organised crime. These new measures have been praised by Dutch politicians as effective methods to reduce crime levels without bringing criminal law into play. At first glance, these administrative measures indeed appear to tackle deviant behaviour without applying criminal law. However, the recent reforms can have unexpected and paradoxical consequences. This paper argues that potentially these new laws do more to criminalise everyday behaviour. This can lead to an increase in criminal cases and in the end adds an extra burden to the criminal justice system instead of lightening its load. By eroding the division between administrative law and criminal law through the introduction of certain administrative measures, one can actually increase the scope of the criminal justice system. However, these negative effects are generally ignored by Dutch policy-makers. This article explores the introduction of British and American initiatives in relation to recent developments in the Netherlands concerning anti-social behaviour and organised crime and their possible paradoxical net-widening results.

Keywords: administrative measures, nuisance in public domain, prevention organised crime, criminalisation

Suggested Citation

Huisman, W. and Koemans, Monique, Administrative Measures in Crime Control (2008). Erasmus Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 5, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1498423

W. Huisman (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Monique Koemans

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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