Abstract
There are few institutions linked to the exercise of public power in the economic sphere that have stood the test of time for as long as central banks.
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- 1.
Generally with regard to the development of central banking, see Siklos, The Changing Face of Central Banking, 2002.
- 2.
The Bank was founded under the title ‘The governor and Company of the Bank of England’ and granted royal charter on 27 July 1694.
- 3.
The Banque de France was set up in 1800, whereas in the German Reich the Reichsbank, the forerunner of the Bundesbank, was only established in 1875.
- 4.
Namely in Sweden, England and the Netherlands.
- 5.
Such as the Bank of England and De Nederlandse Bank.
- 6.
Such as the Reichsbank, the forerunner of the German Bundesbank.
- 7.
The South African Reserve Bank may serve as an example of a shareholder-owned central bank whose status has recently come under pressure. See Press release on the nationalization of the South African Reserve Bank of 25 January 2010, available at http://www.reservebank.co.za (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 8.
Amtenbrink/Lastra, Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regulatory Agencies – A Theoretical Framework, in: De Mulder (ed.), Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security. How Relevant Is a Rational Approach?, 2008, p. 5 (5).
- 9.
Trichet, The Role of Central Banks in a Globalized Economy, Speech held on the occasion of the 13th Conference de Montréal, 18 June 2007, p. 1.
- 10.
Ohler, International Regulation and Supervision of Financial Markets After the Crisis, Working Papers on Global Financial Markets No. 4, March 2009, p. 9.
- 11.
Amtenbrink, The Three Pillars of Central Bank Governance – Towards a Model Central Bank Law or a Code of Good Governance?, in: International Monetary Fund, Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 4, 2005, pp. 101 et seq. (102 et seq.).
- 12.
Currency board arrangements can for example be observed in a number of countries both inside and outside the EU, including Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kosovo and Montenegro are examples of countries which use the euro as a parallel currency without any formal monetary agreements with the EU.
- 13.
In context of the Euro, see Amtenbrink, Bits of Economic and Monetary Union Everywhere, in: Kochenov (ed.), On Bits of Europe Everywhere. Overseas Possessions of the EU Member States in the Legal-Political Context of European Law, forthcoming.
- 14.
A selected group of central bank governors that exchange views on the design and operation of central banks.
- 15.
Forum bringing together central bank governors to exchange views on issues of central bank governance with the Bank for International Settlements.
- 16.
IMF, Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration of Principles, 1999, available at http://www.imf.org (last accessed 7 May 2010). On the feasibility of a model central bank law (blueprint) see Amtenbrink, The Three Pillars of Central Bank Governance – Towards a Model Central Bank Law or a Code of Good Governance?, in: International Monetary Fund, Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 4, 2005, pp. 101 et seq. (119 et seq.).
- 17.
Law of 6 March 2004, available at http://www.cbi.iq/ (last accessed 7 May 2010). The IMF was heavily involved in the drawing-up of the new statute.
- 18.
A broad concept of money is referred to here which does not only include banknotes and coins but also other means of payment, see Mitlid/Vesterlund, Steering interest rates in monetary policy – how does it work, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review (2001) 1, p. 19.
- 19.
As this contribution focuses on the monetary policy objective itself, policy instruments are not discussed here.
- 20.
See e.g. European Central Bank, The Monetary Policy of the ECB, 2004, pp. 41–42.
- 21.
See e.g. Issing, Why Price Stability?, Paper presented at the First ECB Central Banking Conference on 2 and 3 November 2000, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010), with further references to relevant economic literature.
- 22.
Another example for a major central bank with a single monetary policy objective of price stability is the Bank of Japan. See Art. 2 of the Bank of Japan Act (Act No. 89 of 18 June 1997). The English language version is available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/ (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 23.
See paragraph 1 of the Regulation on Monetary Policy established by Royal Decree of 29 March 2001 pursuant to section 2, third paragraph, and section 4, second paragraph, of the Act of 24 May 1985 no. 28 on Norges Bank and the Monetary System.
- 24.
See section 2A(1) of the Federal Reserve Act: “The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” Also see the goals of the FED as defined in the Board of Governor’s Planning Document 2008–2011, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov (last accessed 7 May 2010). With regard to the approach to monetary policy in practice see Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco, A Primer on Monetary Policy Part I: Goals and Instruments, FRBSF Weekly Letter, Number 94-27, 5 August 1994.
- 25.
With regard to the ECB see Art. 127(1) TFEU. With regard to the FED see memorandum submitted by the United States Federal Reserve System, in Treasury and Civil Service Committee, The Role of the Bank of England, House of Commons Paper. Session 1993–94; 98-I vol. 2), Report, together with the proceedings of the Committee, HC Session 1993–94 (HMSO, London 1993), app. 20.
- 26.
See section 12(1) of the Bank of England Act 1998. In practice the Chancellor of the Exchequer sets an inflation target to be pursued by the Bank.
- 27.
See section 9 Reserve Bank Act 1989 based on which government and the governor of the Bank have to establish a so-called Policy Target Agreement (PTA).
- 28.
On this issue see Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks, 1999, chapter 5 I.1.1.
- 29.
In defends of the ECB’s approach in this regard this was already noted by Duisenberg, The ECB’s quantitative definition of price stability and its comparison with such definitions or inflation targets applied in other large economic areas, Letter to the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Mrs. Christa Randzio-Plath, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 30.
Greenspan, Opening Remarks to the symposium “Achieving Price Stability”, sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 29–31 August 1996, pp. 1–5, available at http://www.kc.frb.org (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 31.
For a recent study with further references to economic literature see Crowe/Meade, Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness, IMF Working Paper WP/08/119.
- 32.
De Haan/Amtenbrink/Eijffinger, Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantifications, BNL Quarterly Review, no. 209 – June 1999, pp. 169 et seq. (169–170), with reference to Cuckierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence, 1992. For a more recent study, see Alpanda and Honing, Political Monetary Cycles and a de facto Ranking of Central Bank Independence, SSRN Working Paper June 2009, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1032084 (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 33.
See Eijffinger/De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence, Princeton University Special Papers in International Economics, No. 19, May 1996, with further references.
- 34.
See e.g. Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors, Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, September 1997, List of core principles for effective banking supervision, para. 1.
- 35.
Different elements refer to the institutional, functional, organizational and financial independence of a central bank.
- 36.
See e.g. Cottarelli, Limiting Central Bank Credit to the Government. Theory and Practice, IMF Occasional Paper No. 110, December 1993, pp. 3 et seq. In the context of the ESCB see Art. 123–124 TFEU.
- 37.
Art. 130–131 TFEU and the Protocol on the ESCB and of the ECB annexed to EU Treaty and TFEU; see also Art. 88 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) which makes the transfer of monetary policy competences subject to the existence of a ECB that is independent and moreover geared towards maintaining price stability.
- 38.
See e.g. Gormley/De Haan, The Democratic deficit of the European Central Bank, ELRev. 21 (1996), p. 95; Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks, 1999, with further references.
- 39.
De Haan/Amtenbrink/Eijffinger, Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantifications, BNL Quarterly Review, no. 209, June 1999, pp. 169 et seq. (171).
- 40.
Dincer/Eichengreen, Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why and With What Effects?, NBER Paper No. 13003, March 2007; De Haan/Amtenbrink/Waller, The Transparency and Credibility of the European Central Bank, JCMS 42 (2004) 4, p. 775, with further references.
- 41.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 introduces both an override mechanism and performance-based dismissal of the governor of the Bank. The possibility to override monetary policy decisions can also be found at the Bank of England under the Treasury’s reserve powers, see section 19 of the Bank of England Act 1998.
- 42.
See e.g. Hochreiter/Schmidt-Hebbel/Winckler, Monetary Union: European Lessons, Latin American Prospects, The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 13 (2002) 3, p. 297.
- 43.
Treaty establishing the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) signed on 12 May 1962 (as amended), namely Title V.
- 44.
Traité du 16 mars 1994 instituant la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale.
- 45.
On the efforts of the UEMOA and CEMAC to promote the convergence of economic policies see Strauss-Kahn, Regional Currency Areas: A Few Lessons from the Experiences of the Eurosystem and the CFA Franc Zone, BIS Papers No. 17, supra n. 51, pp. 43–58 (p. 51).
- 46.
To be sure, free movement of capital was only fully liberalized in primary European law with the coming into effect of the new provisions on capital in the Treaty on the European Union. Prior to that restrictions on movements of capital had already been abolished by secondary Community law, see Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, OJ 1988 L 178/5, and namely the nomenclature in its Annex 1.
- 47.
Inter alia in the shape of exchange rate risks and a lack of price transparency in the internal market.
- 48.
Report to the Council and Commission on the Realisation by Stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community of 8 October 1970, OJ 1970 C 136/1. This document has become better known as the Werner Report.
- 49.
See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund of 2 July 1944, as amended.
- 50.
It is a well-known fact that namely the Bundesbank-system has been a major source of inspiration for the drafters of the legal framework governing the ESCB and the ECB.
- 51.
Note that according to Art. 10(2) of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB a voting system on a rotation basis is introduced from the time that the number of national central bank governors present in the Governing Council exceeds 15. The introduction of this system has been postponed until the number of national central bank governors exceeds 18. See Decision of the ECB of 18 December 2008 to postpone the start of the rotation system in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, ECB/2008/29, OJ 2009 L 3/4.
- 52.
In the case of Germany it is fair to extent this previous position to Europe as a whole, see Marsh, The Bundesbank. The Bank that Rules Europe, 1993.
- 53.
See Sturm and Siegfried, Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 31, June 2005; see also Malliaris, The Global Monetary System: Its Weaknesses and the Role of the IMF, the EU and NAFTA, North American Journal of Economics and Finance 13 (2002), pp. 72 et seq.
- 54.
See e.g. the study by Belke/Rees, The Importance of Global Shocks for National Policy Makers. Rising Challenges for Central Banks, Ruhr Economic Papers No. 135, September 2009, who identify global liquidity as an important factor.
- 55.
Generally see International Monetary Fund, Globalization and Inflation, World Economic Outlook, April 2006.
- 56.
See e.g. Rogoff, Impact of Globalization on Monetary Policy, Paper prepared for the symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August 2006, available at http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2006/pdf/rogoff.paper.0829.pdf (last accessed 7 May 2010), pp. 6 et seq; but see Trichet, The Role of Central Banks in a Globalized Economy, Speech held on the occasion of the 13th Conference de Montréal, 18 June 2007, p. 4, who also refers to other contributing factors not directly linked to globalization, such as budgetary discipline and the anti-inflationary approach to monetary policy.
- 57.
Ball, Has Globalization Changed Inflation, NBER Working Paper No. 12687, November 2006, p. 1
- 58.
Trichet, The Role of Central Banks in a Globalized Economy, Speech held on the occasion of the 13th Conference de Montréal, 18 June 2007.
- 59.
A point made by Kohn, The Effects of Globalization on Inflation and Their Implications for Monetary Policy, Speech held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 51st Economic Conference, 16 June 2006, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov (accessed 7 May 2010).
- 60.
Brackets added. Rogoff, Impact of Globalization on Monetary Policy, Paper prepared for the symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August 2006, available at http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2006/pdf/rogoff.paper.0829.pdf (last accessed 7 May 2010), p. 8; Ball, Has Globalization Changed Inflation, NBER Working Paper No. 12687, November 2006, p. 3, argues that financial openness as defined by the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities have an impact on interest rates and asset prices.
- 61.
Kohn, The Effects of Globalization on Inflation and Their Implications for Monetary Policy, Speech held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 51st Economic Conference, 16 June 2006, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 62.
Kohn, The Effects of Globalization on Inflation and Their Implications for Monetary Policy, Speech held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 51st Economic Conference, 16 June 2006, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 63.
See e.g. the study by Belke/Rees, The Importance of Global Shocks for National Policy Makers. Rising Challenges for Central Banks, Ruhr Economic Papers No. 135, September 2009.
- 64.
See e.g. Garten, Global authority can fill financial vacuum, Financial Times Online edition, published on 25 September 2008, available at http://www.ft.com (last accessed 7 May 2010); Calvo, Lender of last resort: Put it on the agenda!, VoxEU.org Policy Note, 23 March 2009, available at http://www.voxeu.org (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 65.
Issing, One size fits all! A single monetary policy for the Euro Area, Speech held at the International Research Forum, 20 May 2005; Amtenbrink, Economic, Monetary and Social Policy, in: McDonnell/Kapteyn/Mortelmans/Timmermans (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities, (4th ed.) 2008, pp. 881 et seq. (966), on early signs of diverging economic situations in the euro area.
- 66.
With regard to the role of central banks in dealing with the crisis that is not explored in this contribution, see e.g. Bank for International Settlements Committee on the Global Financial System, Central bank operations in response to the financial turmoil, Report submitted by a Study Group established by the Committee, July 2008, available at http://www.bis.org (last accessed 7 May 2010); Papademos, How to deal with the global financial crisis and promote the economy’s recovery and sustained growth, Speech held at the 7th European Business Summit organised by the European Business Forum, 26 March 2009, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010); Roth, Challenges for Central Banks during the Current Global Crisis, address at the occasion of the Sixth Annual NBP-SNB Joint Seminar on “Challenges for Central Banks during the Current Global Crisis”, 15 June 2009, available at http://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/sem_2009_06_14_speech/source (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 67.
The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Larosière Report), chaired by J. de Larosière, 25 February 2009, p. 7 et seq. To be sure, the policy recommendations made in this report are not all limited to the EU.
- 68.
The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Larosière Report), chaired by J. de Larosière, 25 February 2009, p. 7; for a brief assessment of the contribution of the U.S. subprime mortgages market to the financial crisis see Ohler, International Regulation and Supervision of Financial Markets after the Crisis, Working Papers on Global Financial Markets No. 4, March 2009, pp. 5 et seq; see also the remarks by the Governor of the Bank of Japan: Shirakawa, Revisiting the Philosophy behind Central Bank Policy, Speech at the Economic Club of New York, 22 April 2010, available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en (last accessed 24 April 2010), p. 5, who openly wonders: “For me, the key question, which applies to many central banks including both the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve, is that, why we, as central banks, maintained interest rates at such a low level, in spite of the uneasiness we felt at that time toward the bubble-like symptoms.”
- 69.
Roberts, The Failure of the Guardians: Central Banking Reform and the Financial Crisis, Suffolk University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 09-54, 21 December 2009, p. 17, who observes that “Central bank independence was not justified as a technique for protecting systemic stability”, but rather, “an anti-inflation regime”.
- 70.
See e.g. Frisell/Roszbach/Spagnolo, Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks, Sveriges Riksbank Research Paper Series No. 54, March 2008, p. 8; Shirakawa, Revisiting the Philosophy behind Central Bank Policy, Speech at the Economic Club of New York, 22 April 2010, available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en (last accessed 24 April 2010), pp. 7–8.
- 71.
On the terminology see Clement, The term “macro prudential”: origins and evolution, BIS Quarterly Review, March 2010, p. 59.
- 72.
Shirakawa, Revisiting the Philosophy behind Central Bank Policy, Speech at the Economic Club of New York, 22 April 2010, available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en (last accessed 7 May 2010), pp. 5–6.
- 73.
The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Larosière Report), chaired by J. de Larosière, 25 February 2009, p. 44.
- 74.
See e.g. Art. 127(5) TFEU and Art. 3.3. of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, OJ 2008 C 115/230, according to which the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.
- 75.
Brackets added and footnote omitted; Issing, Monetary and Financial Stability: Is there a Trade-off?, Speech presented at the conference on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle”, 28–29 March 2003, Bank for International Settlements, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010). Issing does acknowledge the possibility of short-term conflicts “in rare circumstances”.
- 76.
Bodo/Wheelock, Price Stability and Financial Stability: The Historical Record, Federal reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 1998, pp. 41 et seq. (60).
- 77.
See Trichet, Laudatio for Hans Tietmeyer, Speech held on 26 March 2010, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 78.
Issing, Monetary and Financial Stability: Is there a Trade-off?, Speech presented at the conference on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle”, 28–29 March 2003, Bank for International Settlements, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 79.
Exemplary in this regard are the five statutory objectives laid down for the UK Financial Services Authority in the Financial Service and Markets Act 2000.
- 80.
With regard to the usefulness of such broad objectives for accountability purposes, see e.g. Hüpkes/Quintyn/Taylor, The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice, IMF Working Paper WP/05/51, 2005.
- 81.
Amtenbrink, Economic, Monetary and Social Policy, in: McDonnell/Kapteyn/Mortelmans/Timmermans (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities, (4th ed.) 2008, pp. 881 et seq. (972), with further references.
- 82.
The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Larosière Report), chaired by J. de Larosière, 25 February 2009, pp. 7 et seq.
- 83.
Issing, Monetary and Financial Stability: Is there a Trade-off?, Speech presented at the conference on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle”, 28–29 March 2003, Bank for International Settlements, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 84.
Posen, Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper Series WP 06/1, January 2006, p. 11, who argues that “… the connection between monetary conditions and the rise of bubbles is rather tenuous, and by raising interest rates a central bank is unlikely to achieve what is needed — i.e., persuading investors that the bubble is ill-founded and/or that they will not find some greater fool to sell to in time.”; see also Issing, Monetary and Financial Stability: Is there a Trade-off?, Speech presented at the conference on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle”, 28–29 March 2003, Bank for International Settlements, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010), who raises doubts as to the ability of central banks to detect such bubbles in real time.
- 85.
See generally on this issue Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies, FMG Special papers No. 52, Financial Markets Group Research Centre, 1992; Di Noia/Di Giorgio, Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Institutions?, International Finance 3 (1999) 2, pp. 361 et seq. (368 et seq.); ECB, The Role of Central Banks in Prudential Supervision, Position Paper, 2001, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010); in the European context see also Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, 1997, pp. 310–327; Andenas/Hadjiemmanuel, Banking Supervision, The Internal Market and European Monetary Union, in: Andenas et al. (eds.), European Economic and Monetary Union: the Institutional Framework, 1997, pp. 371 et seq. (386–394); an instructive overview of the arguments is provided in a position paper by the European Central Bank: The Role of Central Banks, 2001, in particular p. 3–7.
- 86.
Di Noia/Di Giorgio, Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Institutions?, International Finance 3 (1999) 2, pp. 361 et seq. (368), with reference to Goodhart/Schoenmaker, Should the functions of monetary policy and banking supervision be separated?, Oxf. Econ. Pap. 47 (1995) 4, p. 539.
- 87.
Tuya/Zamalloa, Issues on Placing Banking Supervision in the Central Bank, in: Balino/Cottarelli (eds.), Frameworks for Monetary Stability, 1994, pp. 663 et seq. (679).
- 88.
Di Noia/Di Giorgio, Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Institutions?, International Finance 3 (1999) 2, pp. 361 et seq. (376).
- 89.
On central banks as network institutions, see Marcusson, The transnational governance network of central bankers, in: Djelic/Sahlin-Anderson (eds.), Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of Regulation, 2006, pp. 180 et seq. (191 et seq.).
- 90.
Successor to the Financial Stability Forum. It brings together namely representatives from national governments, central banks and supervisory agencies.
- 91.
Selected group of central bank governors that exchange views on the design and operation of central banks.
- 92.
Forum bringing together central bank governors to exchange views on issues of central bank governance with the Bank for International Settlements.
- 93.
Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, 1997, pp. 339–343, 353. In this context Smits criticises the fact that the Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom and the Protocol on certain provisions relating to Denmark for excluding this role of the ECB. This may be particularly problematic in the case of the United Kingdom as the most important European financial capital.
- 94.
E.g. Lastra, Central Banking and Banking Regulation, 1996, with further references.
- 95.
See Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, 1997, pp. 334–338.
- 96.
Now Art. 127(6) TFEU.
- 97.
European Commission adopts legislative proposals to strengthen financial supervision in the EU, Press release of 23 September 2009, IP/09/1347.
- 98.
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Banking Authority, COM(2009) 501 final; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, COM(2009) 502 final; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority, COM(2009) 503 final; see also Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives 1998/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC, and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority, COM(2009) 576 final.
- 99.
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, COM(2009) 499 final; Proposal for a Council Decision entrusting the European Central Bank with specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board, COM(2009) 500 final.
- 100.
Ibid., Art. 4(1), (2) and Art. 6.
- 101.
Ibid., Art. 3(1).
- 102.
Ibid., Art. 15–18.
- 103.
Ibid., Art. 16(2).
- 104.
For an early overview of the role of central banks in dealing with the global financial crisis, see Bank for International Settlements Committee on the Global Financial System, Central bank operations in response to the financial turmoil, Report submitted by a Study Group established by the Committee, July 2008, available at http://www.bis.org (last accessed 7 May 2010); Papademos, How to deal with the global financial crisis and promote the economy’s recovery and sustained growth, Speech held at the 7th European Business Summit organised by the European Business Forum, 26 March 2009, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010); Roth, Challenges for Central Banks during the Current Global Crisis, address at the occasion of the Sixth Annual NBP-SNB Joint Seminar on “Challenges for Central Banks during the Current Global Crisis”, 15 June 2009, available at http://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/sem_2009_06_14_speech/source (last accessed 7 May 2010).
- 105.
Roberts, The Failure of the Guardians: Central Banking Reform and the Financial Crisis, Suffolk University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 09-54, 21 December 2009, p. 25.
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Amtenbrink, F. (2011). Central Bank Challenges in the Global Economy. In: Herrmann, C., Terhechte, J. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2011. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 2. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14432-5_2
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