Livelihood, Locality and Globalisation

Rector Magnificus,
Highly esteemed audience,
here in this hall or following this event on the screen of a personal computer

Introduction

Bake Machou is a woman of about 35 years of age in North Benin¹. She belongs to the Fulani, a people of cattle keepers whom you can meet everywhere in West Africa. Bake is married, but has no children. Her husband, I’ll call him Amadou, has a second, younger wife, who does have children. Amadou has some cattle and grows sorghum, maize and cotton. They live, together with Amadou’s brother and his family, in a wuro, a compound in a cattle keepers’ camp near Alifiarou, 20 km from Kandi. Bake makes and sells cheese. She earns about $ 0.75 per preparation cycle, i.e. on average two or three times a week, in the rainy season only. But sometimes she earns next to nothing. The grain to prepare meals she obtains from her husband. With the money that she earns from cheese selling she covers her personal expenditure for clothing, kerosene, jewellery and buys the ingredients for the sauce she prepares for every meal. Because she does not have to spend money on children, she has managed in the course of time to buy some cattle, goats and sheep of her own. In the dry season, when there is no milk, Bake has no income. She then depends on her husband. (IJsendijk 1999).

Boureima is a rich cattle trader from Malanville in North Benin²). He buys cattle at the local markets. His apprentice takes care of the animals once they are bought. When he has bought 20 to 30 head after two or three weeks, Boureima rents a truck and takes the cattle to Cotonou, a large city 700 km to the south. On the way he has to bribe officials at least 7 road blocks. At the cattle market in Cotonou Boureima sells his cattle to butchers through a middleman. It may take a few weeks before all the cattle is
sold and Boureima gets his money, but then he has earned some $400. If prices on the market of Lomé, in neighbouring Togo, are better, he unloads his cattle some 200 km north of Cotonou and hires herdsmen who trek the cattle on the hoof secretly across the border. Boureima himself takes a taxi to Lomé. If the market of Ibadan in Nigeria looks more profitable, he sends the cattle across the border in North Benin, again on the hoof to stay clear of customs. Then he hires a truck in Nigeria to continue the journey. Boureima also owns many cattle. These are herded by his family or friendly cattle keepers. He donates much money to the mosque and he has made a pilgrimage to Mecca, hence his honorary title El Hadji (Quarles van Ufford 1999a; 1999b).

Bake and Boureima live in what we have for a long time called the Third World. Their life histories are examples of the diversity of livelihood and prosperity we may find there.

In this paper I will argue in section 1 that the label “Third World” is not appropriate any more. On the one hand, quite a number of countries have reached an acceptable standard of living. On the other hand, the diversity in prosperity and welfare between and within countries has increased. Still inherent in the development process is that some groups are included and others are excluded. Therefore, processes of social inclusion and exclusion remain in the focus of development studies.

In section 2, I will discuss how these processes of social inclusion and exclusion should be studied. People’s livelihood strategies will be taken as a point of departure and then I will focus on actor-structure interactions. In section 3, the effects of today’s globalisation on livelihood are discussed. In section 4, I will determine the consequences for development studies, by indicating the main research questions, the geographical area of research and the need for comparison.

Chapter 1 - Does the Third World still exist?

What constituted the Third World was obvious to many of us some 40 years ago. It was the countries outside North America, Western Europe, Australia and Japan and outside Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In this section I will show that the notion “Third World” is not appropriate any more, but that social exclusion is still apparent on a large scale and therefore remain the focus of development studies.

The name “Third World” originated in the 1950s by analogy with the “Tiers Etat” in France before the Revolution. The “Tiers Etat” were the poor, weakly developed population groups, exploited and oppressed by the other classes: nobility and clergy (Kleinpenning 1978, p.4). “Third World” was synonymous in the 1960s with “poor, hardly developed” and actually also with “exploited and oppressed”. The name gained popularity because it also suggested a third road of development between the Western capitalist world, shown in blue in fig.2 (3), and the Soviet Communist world, of course, shown in red.

People were, of course, aware of the differentiation in the Third World, but the idea that the countries had more in common was widespread. Western writers pointed in particular at the prevailing poverty and, therefore, the need to improve the standards of living. This unifying aspect was even strengthened at the end of the 1960s by the rise of the “dependencia” theory originating from Latin America. The “dependencia” theory pointed more than previous theories at the unequal (the word is in fact asymmetrical) incorporation of these countries into the world market as the underlying cause of poverty. This asymmetry had already started in colonial times, when Third World countries’ economies became restructured to cater not for their own needs, but for those of the colonial motherland. This dependency continued after political independence. In this view, a line could be drawn through the world, dividing the domi-
nant, capitalist countries of the centre from the dominated countries in the periphery. The line was clear cut and ran along the Rio Grande between the United States and Mexico, through the Mediterranean between Western Europe and Africa, and then farther east across the Central Asian mountain ranges.

Of course some questioned this supposed homogeneity of the Third World. They pointed at differences in prosperity, dissimilar forms of colonisation and of socio-economic systems, and at the enormous cultural heterogeneity. Others were convinced that countries like China and North Korea and, later, Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma and, still later, Angola and Mozambique no longer belonged to the Third World, because they had broken away from the asymmetrical relationship with the countries in the centre. These countries did not gained from immediately from the break in terms of wealth, but it was claimed that the qualitative breakthrough of dependency was a gain in itself (fig. 3).

Moreover, a considerable improvement in the standard of living was achieved in a number of countries. In the dominant view of exploitation of the periphery by the centre this was not considered to be possible. At first, people spoke rather scathingly about the success of mini-states like Hong Kong and Singapore, but soon other Asian Tigers or “Newly Industrialising Countries” like Taiwan and South-Korea could no longer be considered to belong to the Third World.

The interesting issue was that, contrary to the “dependencia” discussion, the rise of standards of living in these countries did not originate from loosening the ties with the capitalist world market, but, was based on the growth of a world market-oriented export industry. Thanks to a sharp rise in prices of oil, a number of other countries experienced a rapid growth in prosperity in the 1970s, too. Although, in some countries, the newly acquired wealth disappeared like snow before the sun, in others, especially in the Middle East, it proved to be sustainable (fig. 4).

Thus, in the course of time, the Third World shrunk. In addition, attention was drawn to poles of development in Third World countries. Whether they were the export production zones of Mexico and Malta, the metropoles of Brazil or the touristic areas of Turkey; they were said to be little different from developed countries. Thus the image of the Third World became even more fuzzy and more fragmented (fig. 5).

And then in 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and the Second World vanished (fig. 6). If I were to follow at this point of my presentation the American author Fukuyama (1992) and his proposition about “The End of History”, then the whole world would soon have to be coloured blue on the map. Fukuyama thinks that the fall of the Berlin Wall marks the end of the history of ideas and that there is no longer any alternative to western neoliberalism. In his view, the “Third World” as a road of development between capitalism and communism no longer exists. Neither does he consider Islamic fundamentalism, Asian authoritarianism or nationalism to be serious alternatives. He thinks that economy and politics are inevitably developing in the direction of a globalising free market and a liberal democracy. Others have greater difficulties in abandoning thinking about the world in terms of power blocks. This perhaps explains the popularity of an author who has pointed to potential new global dividing walls. I am referring to Huntington (1993), who in his “Clash of Civilisations” considers the interactions between cultures to be a new source of conflicts. Contrary to
Fukuyama, he does not discern one world, but no fewer than eight large civilisations between which conflicts may emerge. The most virulent frontier is the one between the western Christian civilisation in Europe, North America and Oceania and the Islamic civilisation that runs from Africa through the Middle East to Indonesia. Then there are the Orthodox Christian, encompassing the Greek and Slavic world, the African, the Hindu-Indian, the Japanese and the Confucian civilisations.

Fukuyama and Huntington point at contradictory trends: the former draws our attention to a trend towards ideological uniformity; the latter confronts us again with the wide cultural diversity in the world. However, both pass over the large differences in prosperity which still exist in the world, and even increase.

Is a new demarcation of the Third World still meaningful? And which? If member states of the European Union like Greece and Portugal are considered to be developed countries and we know that Mexico and South Korea are now members of the OECD, which is generally considered to be the organisation of developed countries, then we should consider all the countries classified by the World Bank as “upper-middle-income” and “high-income countries” to be developed (World Bank 1999 - http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/class.htm). In that case, the rest must then be considered as the Third World. This is fascinating, because it means that, besides Mexico, Botswana, Malaysia, Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela and Brazil and a few others are no longer relevant to development studies. However, we do receive a few pungent cases in return like Cuba, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and all the Central Asian republics and China, because these are “lower-middle-income countries”.

Moreover, this theoretical exercise in classifying countries is based on only one criterion, i.e. GNP per capita, which I think is biased. Since 1990, UNDP (United Nations Development Program) has been trying with the Human Development Index (HDI) to do justice to the view that development is not only a matter of income or a decent standard of living but also of welfare. In addition to income, UNDP includes longevity and knowledge in its HDI. According to the latest HDI ranking, Costa Rica and Argentina may reckon themselves among the developed countries, but Hungary, Mexico and Saudi Arabia may not (UNDP 1999 - http://www.undp.org/hdro/hdi.html). Thus, there is no automatic relationship between economic prosperity and human welfare.

I admit that this presentation of the shrinking Third World is only a rough sketch and that there may be good arguments to skip some or add a few more countries. However, a preliminary conclusion impose itself, one which was already drawn by Harris (1986) in his "The End of the Third World". If the “Third World” ever existed, then it certainly does not exist any more and all the other labels like “the developing countries” or “the South” miss the point too, which is (1) that quite a number of countries have reached an acceptable standard of living and (2) that the diversity in prosperity and welfare between and within countries has increased. Firstly, according to the Human Development Report of 1998 (UNDP 1998 - see for summary and main statistics http://www.undp.org/hdro/98.htm) income in “low” and “middle-income countries” increased by 250% between 1960 and 1995, against only 80% in “high-income countries”. Life expectancy increased from 46 to 62 years and infant mortality decreased from 149 per thousand to 65. Between 1970 and 1995 illiteracy decreased from 52 to 30% and food consumption rose by 20%.

Secondly, and these are figures becoming increasingly significant for the globalising world, in 1960, the richest 20% of the world had 30 times the income of the poorest 20%, but by 1995 the gap had increased to 82 times; illiteracy in rural areas is twice that in urban areas; the literacy of women is 17% lower than that of men; women earn only 1/3 of the total income, which means that men earn 2/3. Moreover, 1.3 billion people live on an income of less than 1$ a day, 841 million are malnourished, 880 million have no access to health care, 885 million adults are illiterate (UNDP 1998).

Therefore, if we put the poverty line, for the sake of convenience and not without cynicism, at a monetary income equal to $1 purchasing power per day, then 20% of the 6 billion people in the world live in poverty. If we put the line at $2, then we are talking about as much as half of the world population. Thus we have to conclude that, despite the progress made, between 20% and 50% of the world population is excluded from this
progress. This exclusion no longer relates to countries as a whole, but rather to social groups and areas within countries. Moreover, it concerns not only people in remote, exotic places, but also people not far from here: in Albania or in Slovakia, and even in the metropolises closer to home.

Finally, we should be aware that, as a society’s value system attaches less importance to what a person can do or does and more to what he or she possesses or consumes, then consumption becomes a means of feeling or becoming accepted by society. Social exclusion is a dynamic phenomenon. Just as in the Netherlands, a schoolboy without a mobile phone hardly counts and many municipal social services departments consider a television set and a subscription to a newspaper to be primary needs, in India a woman is excluded from marriage where the level of a dowry is beyond the means of her family. It is important to note that social standards of consumption tend to rise faster than incomes. What was considered a luxury 30 years ago is now a necessity. For example, in the 1960s, 16 out of every 1000 Japanese owned a car, but in the 1980s, when the same level of income was reached in Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Malaysia, car ownership was between 50 to 64 per 1000 inhabitants, that is 3 or 4 times as much (UNDP 1998, pp.59-60).

Chapter 2 - Social Exclusion and Sustainable Livelihood

What is still inherent in the development process, therefore, is that some groups are included and others are excluded. Processes of social inclusion and exclusion are part of the development process and, because development studies, have, or at least should have, a normative preoccupation with the poor and the marginalised, these processes should be in the focus of our work. I will demonstrate in this section, elaborating on the concept of sustainable livelihood as a point of departure and paying attention to actor-structure interactions, how these processes of social inclusion and exclusion can be studied.

The notion of “social exclusion” became popular in the political debate in Western Europe and in the discussion of the underclass in the United States. It refers to the lack of access to social security, to employment, to safety, to human rights etc., in brief, to a decent living (ILO, 1996). In development studies, this notion finds its parallel in the concept of sustainable livelihood as the way in which people make themselves a living using their capabilities and their tangible and intangible assets (Chambers 1995). Livelihood is sustainable if it is adequate for the satisfaction of self-defined basic needs and proof against shocks and stresses. If livelihood is sustainable, it is synonymous with social inclusion; if not, it equates with social exclusion. I therefore find it important to elaborate on the concept of sustainable livelihood. 6)

2.1 Livelihood

Livelihood is not necessarily the same as having a job and does not necessarily even have anything to do with working. Moreover, although obtaining a monetary income is an important part of livelihood, it is not the only aspect that matters. It is quite conceivable for somebody with a low monetary income to be better off than someone with a higher monetary income. The poverty lines of $1 or $2 I referred to above have therefore to be
treated with circumspection. Generally, poor people undertake manifold activities which yield them food, housing, money etc. The most common of these are the production of crops, livestock, clothing and housing for home consumption; the production of crops and livestock for sale; trade; handicrafts such as basket weaving, pottery, carpentry; seasonal or permanent wage labour, which includes children; remittances by kin who have emigrated; loans, alms, gifts and sometimes corruption.

In Bake's compound all the crops and vegetables produced are consumed at home. Bake's husband seldom sells cattle, although occasionally a sheep. In fact, he earns his money by growing cotton for the market. His second wife is allowed to sell part of the milk production, the rest of the milk is also consumed at home. Bake buys milk to produce cheese, which is her main source of income. She also keeps some sheep and goats near the compound and has a tiny vegetable garden. She obviously has a lot of housekeeping to do, such as fetching water, washing clothes and cooking. The family constructed their huts themselves and these are maintained by the men. Last year her husband was asked by a peasant to look after his cow, so this cow is included in the herd. The milk and every second calf from this cow may be kept in return.

Boureima's livelihood is much more specialised, but also more complex. He buys and sells cattle and lives on the profit. He buys cattle for cash at the market place or in the cattle keepers compound. Sometimes he borrows money on them so that he can later buy cattle at a cheaper price. He also lends money to local authorities in order not to be troubled by them with permits and regulations. Boureima supplies food and lodging to his apprentice. He also needs money to pay truck drivers and herders for the transport to the south and to bribe customs officials on the road. Part of his own herd is looked after by a paid herder. The other part is taken care of by family and friendly herders under the same conditions as described above with reference to Bake's husband. Boureima had his house in Malanville build by a mason. He is a well respected and wealthy man and is expected to give alms to the poor.

Following Blaikie et al. (1994), Chambers and Conway (1992), Chambers (1995) and Carney (1999a), we may state that people need five vital resources in order to achieve a sustainable livelihood. We can call those resources (1) "human", (2) "natural", (3) "physical", (4) "financial" and (5) "social" capital:

1. human capital can be labour, but also skills, experience, knowledge, creativity and inventiveness;
2. natural capital is resources like land, water, forests and pastures, but also minerals;
3. physical capital can be food stocks, livestock, jewellery, equipment, tools and machinery;
4. financial capital is money in a savings account at the bank or in an old sock, a loan or credit;
5. social capital concerns the quality of relations among people, for example, whether one can count on support by family or mutual assistance among neighbours. I will return to this topic later.

"Capital" does not necessarily have to be held in private property. Land, water and forests can be communally owned. What matters is if one has access to the resource when it is needed and wanted. Chambers and Conway (1992) therefore distinguish, next to "resources" and "stores" (cattle, equipment, stocks), which together constitute "tangible assets", "non-tangible assets". "Non-tangible assets" consist of "claims" and "access". By "claims" they mean that people can call upon moral and practical assistance. "Access" means having or getting the opportunity to use the resource in practice. Thus it refers to the real opportunity for women to gather firewood in the forest or for men to use water for irrigation from the village well. According to Chambers (1995), it also refers to the possibility for women to obtain food from the compound's granary, or the access by men to information about prices for cattle or the possibilities for temporary wage labour elsewhere in the region.

Among the Fulani, men do the milking. They determine how much milk to leave for the calves; the rest is distributed amongst the women of the family. The quantity of milk a women receives depends, among other things, on how many children she has. Bake has no children, but she
received enough milk to be able to sell some of it. Then, when the children of her husband's second wife were old enough to milk the cattle of their father's herd, they gave preference to their mother over Bake in distributing the milk. Bake therefore did not have any milk left to sell, so that she was deprived of her traditional source of income.

Blaikie et al. (1994) has elaborated the access aspect further in an “access model to maintain livelihood”. According to him, every household and every member of it has a certain access profile to resources and tangible assets which depend on one’s rights, for example, property rights, by tradition or by law. They differ per individual and per household and they may also change over time. Each actor (household, individual) decides on a choice of livelihood strategies on the basis of his access. The “access model” resembles Sen’s “entitlement” (Sen 1981; Drèze and Sen 1989). The “endowment” and “entitlement” of actors are central in Sen’s view. “Endowment” refers to owned assets and personal capacities through which an “entitlement” to food can be exercised. “Entitlement” is the way in which access to food is obtained, for example, by producing it with endowments like land, skill and plough; by selling labour or cash crops to buy food; by transfer of food or money through gifts and loans. Many authors have applied Sen’s “entitlement” approach to fields of social interaction other than food security, such as to the exploitation of natural resources (cf. Dietz 1996). Blaikie et al. (1994, p. 88) value the concept as well, despite their criticism that Sen’s initial notion to perceive endowments and entitlements was static and given, and their observation that it caused a constriction in the debate on famine by neglecting its multi-causality.

We may conclude that “access and claims” come close to “social capital”, because if social capital in the broadest sense “includes the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and values that govern interactions among people and contributes to economic and social development” (World Bank 1998, p.1), then the access to a resource could also be considered as part of social capital. Having acknowledged this, I nevertheless include “access” as a separate, because fundamental, element in my conceptual model, that determines the real use of “vital capitals”.

Carney (1999a) explains that there are various views on social capital, but that the following core elements can be distinguished: (1) relations of trust, reciprocity and exchange between individuals, (2) connectedness, networks and groups, including access to wider institutions and, (3) common rules, norms and sanctions mutually agreed or handed down within societies. In my view, social capital concerns mutual help from neighbours, religious organisations, resource user groups, political parties etc. These are all manifestations of mutual engagements of people and, therefore, of importance to livelihood.

For Boureima trust is the key element in his management of relations. “Mutual trust is of utmost importance given the nature of his activities. Boureima must be able to count on the herders who drive his cattle across the border to do their job carefully. After all, they are being entrusted with a considerable and not insurable (physical) capital. He also has to trust that his middleman in Cotonou will do his best to judge the creditworthiness of the butchers and does everything to collect the outstanding credits. In their turn, the apprentice, herders and middleman have to trust Boureima to work with them again the next time. In the cattle trade there are no contracts, because of the absence of sanctions, trust is crucial” (Quarles van Ufford 1999a, p. 28).

I propose to use the notion “capital” for the five vital fields that livelihood rests upon, firstly because it puts on a par various terms like “resource”, “asset (tangible or non-tangible)” and “capital” and brings them together under a common denominator. Secondly, it draws a parallel with the discussion on social capital. The notion “capital” is an economic metaphor according to Carney (1999a), which does not do justice to the nature of social relationships which are not entirely oriented towards material gain. However, material gains are a very important aim in the notion of livelihood. Thirdly, even with respect to non-material motives and aims, it is possible and useful to apply terms like opportunities, investments and gains in order to arrive at a better understanding of livelihood strategies. I shall therefore continue to use the notion of “capital”.

(Fig. 7 - Actors’ livelihood strategies and five vital “capitals”)
In the long run, the livelihood of actors such as individuals, households and other social groups constitutes a “livelihood system”. In classic French geography a livelihood system was called “genre de vie” (Claval 1974), i.e. a system of livelihood strategies of a human group in a specific region in which the interaction of society with the natural environment was emphasised. However, a livelihood system was not seen as inevitably determined by the natural environment. Social reality and force of habit were considered to be more important. Nevertheless a “genre de vie” was considered as a unity of interaction of livelihood strategies with the natural environment and because of that it had a clear, spatial identity, called the region. The present view of a livelihood system is broader and more dynamic. In the 19th Century one could write about the French regions as more or less independent units, nowadays livelihood, even in the remotest corners of the world, experiences a multitude of influences from a broader national and international economic, social and political context. Moreover, the man-natural resources perspective has broadened into an interaction with various types of resources as indicated above, so that a livelihood system can no longer be regarded as a more or less closed regional system, but much more as a “complex ensemble of generically heterogeneous factors on various spatial levels of scale: natural and social, internal and external, historical and actual” (Kleinpenning 1997). What has remained is the view that livelihood systems are a social reality which, by force of habit, experience a certain inertia, so that it is sometimes hardly possible to reconstruct how they came into being (CASL 1998). Livelihood strategies are rooted in this social reality.

In figure 8 the five vital “capitals” are thus influenced by a social, economic, political and natural context. Note that, in this preliminary presentation, the context is undifferentiated and that the five vital “capitals” are basically described in a local context.

(Fig. 8 - Preliminary presentation of livelihood and context)

2.2 Coping and adaptive strategies

As indicated above, livelihood is sustainable if it is capable of adequately satisfying basic needs and securing people against shocks and stresses. Shocks are violent and come unexpectedly; stress is less violent, but can last longer. Both have their impact on one or more of the vital “capitals”. An environmental shock like a flood or an earthquake has its impact on natural, human and physical capital. Drought is an example of a high-level environmental stress; seasonality is a well-known example of low-level environmental stress. A second source of shocks and stresses is the economy. Devaluation can raise prices of imported goods drastically, but may, at the same time, increase the attractiveness of growing certain export crops. Price policies aiming at low food prices in the cities may chronically frustrate the income generation of food producers in rural areas. A third source of shocks and stresses is politics, with violent conflict as an unfortunately not uncommon extreme.

An important contribution to the understanding of how these shocks have their differential impact on livelihood strategies was made in the 1980s by Sen (1981; Drèze and Sen 1989). He noticed that a crop failure caused by drought or some other reason resulted in famine only under certain conditions. A drought results in a famine only when people run out of stock, do not have good relations with others to borrow food, do not find employment to earn money to buy food, or when their savings are gone. Despite increasing food prices caused by scarcity, malfunctioning markets are not able to attract enough food from elsewhere. Sometimes food is being exported from famine areas, because there is a lack of purchasing power. Sometimes it is not drought or flooding that triggers famine, but forced food deliveries to the government. Thus, according to Sen, it is not only the limited access of actors to “vital capitals” that causes famines, but also impacts stemming from a broader social, economic, political and natural context.

Because of contextual shocks and stresses, livelihood strategies temporarily take the shape of safety mechanisms called “coping strategies”. These are short-term responses to secure livelihood in periods of shocks and stress. They do not appear out of the blue, but are specific manifestations of the livelihood. In periods of hunger, food stocks are opened up and, if these are used up, assets like jewellery or cattle are sold and livestock keepers migrate to wetter areas. In periods of economic crisis people are inclined
to save and to develop alternative sources of income, for example, by migrating to the city. The collection of wild food and hunting are very old coping strategies; while relying on international disaster relief is a modern one.

Coping strategies are thus short-term or temporary responses to external shocks and stresses. Depending on the severity and length of the latter, coping strategies fade away and normal livelihood strategies return. However, this type of equilibrium thinking is often no longer adequate for a proper understanding of livelihood strategies. The contextual impact of climatic change, world market and politics is growing stronger and shocks and stresses appear more frequently, so that it is becoming important to shape the coping strategies more permanently. Thus temporary coping mechanisms develop into more permanent “adaptive strategies”. In the view of CASL (Community Adaptation and Sustainable Livelihoods - 1998, p.2), adaptive strategies result in an adapted livelihood, then the idea of adaptation vanishes and the adaptive strategy is considered to be a normal livelihood strategy. I am inclined to think that, at present, new coping and adaptive strategies will have to be developed as responses to new shocks and stresses, even before stability in livelihood as a result of a previous adaptation has come within reach.

It becomes clear from the above discussion that “sustainable livelihood thinking” is rather locally biased. The way shocks and stresses are perceived is almost exclusively extra-local. Their impact runs through the five vital “capitals” to livelihood and adaptive strategies. I think this notion should be amended in order to help our conceptualisation. A drought, for example, is a phenomenon on a macro-regional scale which is locally manifested in lack of rainfall. Drought as a climatic phenomenon should therefore be thought of as an extra-local level in natural capital, while soil fertility is local. The same goes for social capital. We included above “networks and groups, including access to wider institutions” and “political parties” in social capital. These typically represent the higher levels of scale in social capital. For these reasons, vital “capitals” in figure 9 are no longer perceived monolithically as in figure 11, but levels of scale are distinguished.

Bake’s people, the Fulani, the same people from whom Boureima buys most of his cattle, have been living in northern Benin since the 19th century. They originate from the Sahel. Up to the present time, groups of Fulani flee to Benin from Burkina Faso, Niger or Nigeria because of drought or political unrest. In the Sahel they were semi-nomadic pastoralists; their livelihood was built on cattle and milk. They also grew grain in the Sahel, but with variable success, because of the drier climate. From the day when they arrived in North Benin with their thinned-out herds, or even without cattle, crop cultivation became an important livelihood strategy. Despite the small fields they were able to get, crop growing remained more important for many of them than cattle keeping. Because of the importance of food crops, their way of life and, therefore, their cattle keeping, has become more sedentary. Practically spoken, they are more agro-pastoralists than they have ever been before (De Haan 1997a). Nevertheless they look upon themselves as pastoralists and their primary objective is the reconstitution of a large herd.

Migration to other areas because of environmental shocks or stresses is a well-known livelihood strategy of semi-nomadic pastoralists. Paying more attention to crop cultivation because of the loss of cattle is seen as a temporary solution, that is, as a coping strategy. For the Fulani in North Benin agriculture eventually became an adaptive strategy. For those groups who settled in the region a long time ago agro-pastoralism became a new livelihood. However, population growth, the increasing importance of cash crops, lack of pastures, conflicts with peasants, the demand for meat and the rise of cattle markets will make new coping strategies necessary and will eventually result in new adaptive strategies.

2.3 Actors and structure

So far I have explained how actors use available and accessible “capitals” for their livelihood strategies and the increased impact increased impact of shocks and stresses. Many changes in livelihood strategies result from the influence of external factors. However, livelihood strategies may also
change as a consequence of internal influences, such as a drive for increased prosperity and welfare. “Human agency” is the capacity of people to integrate experiences into their livelihood strategies and to look for outlets for ambitions and solutions to problems. Human agency enables them to reshape social conditions. Initially, we think of individual decision making and the way individuals use vital “capitals”, including the creation of access and claims that they can really use these “capitals”. However, social behaviour cannot be understood only in terms of individual motives, intentions and interests (Long 1992). We have learned from Bourdieu (1977; 1990), Giddens (1984) and Long (1989, 1992) that individual behaviour is socially constructed. “Agency” is embodied in the individual, but embedded in social relations through which it can become effective. Individual choices and decision making are embedded in values and norms and institutional structures. Through “human agency” structures may change. “Agency” causes livelihood changes in the long run, “agency” enables individuals and social groups, i.e. actors, to influence structure; “agency” is the hinge between actor and structure.

Initially, the “sustainable livelihood” approach (Chambers and Conway 1992; Chambers 1995) was strongly actor-oriented and had all the characteristics of the neo-populist view (Blaikie 1998) on development. Neopopulism is characterised by an unconditional belief in the adaptive capabilities of man, i.e. the human capacity to adapt repeatedly to changing circumstances and still to guarantee a sustainable exploitation of scarce resources. The strong actor and micro-orientation results in much attention being paid to local or indigenous knowledge and local agendas with which policy can adopt (De Haan 1999). This orientation is important, but not sufficient. The “sustainable livelihood” approach has since become more realistic (Hoon et al. 1997), notably in its recognition of structural bottlenecks or even barriers and the necessary quest for a hinge between structure and actor. Large donors like UNDP and DFID, the British Department for International Development, and even the poverty reduction programme of the World Bank, have now embraced the approach. They have recognised the structural bottlenecks, however they speak with a so far unjustified optimism about their ability to enhance the sustainability of livelihoods (Ashley and Carney 1999; Carney 1999b; see also Amalric 1998).

The reciprocity between structure and actor is most clearly identified in Hoon’s et al. view of sustainable livelihood (Hoon et al. 1997, p.4). According to the authors, livelihood strategies change because livelihood is a dynamic domain that combines (1) opportunities and assets available to a group of people to attain their goals and aspirations with (2) the interaction with and exposure to a series of favourable or harmful ecological, social, economic and political perturbations that may help or hinder a group’s capacity to make a living. Individuals and social groups are considered by Hoon et al. to be in interaction with their environment. They are neither powerless objects nor free agents who can become whatever they choose. There are feedback loops between actors themselves and between actor and the context in which they live. The following story of Bake’s carrier in cheese production illustrates at the micro-level the capacity of people to change structures as a feedback mechanism to stress.

When Bake received too little milk to sell she was very discouraged. In those days she often went to her uncle who lives in Parakou for money and help. Then she started to spin cotton for traditional garments, but this was not profitable. Next she started to buy small quantities of milk from other women in her camp and sold it at a very small margin. Her secret was that she first skimmed off the milk in order to keep the cream for herself. In this way she did not have to buy oil for cooking. If the next day the milk had become thick and sour, she mixed it with warm water to create more milk and then sold in the neighbouring peasant village. She used a slightly smaller measuring bowl than the other women did.

Then came the breakthrough: with some other women whose families had lost all their cattle because of rinderpest, they asked a women from another village to teach them how to make cheese. Fulani women are entitled to sell part of the milk they receive from men. Cheese was already produced in other parts of the region, but never by Fulani women. Hearing milk, which is necessary in cheese making, is a strong taboo among Fulani. It may cause bad luck to the herd. A real Fulani woman should not get involved with cheese making, it is rather a craft for peasant women, who were sometimes former slaves of the Fulani.

Despite the dishonour, Bake and her neighbours now make cheese,
because it pays better than selling milk. There are always Fulani women who do not have time to sell milk in the peasant village or who are not allowed to leave the compound. These are the ones, Bake and her friends buy their milk from. In the rainy season there is plenty of milk, but that is also when a lot of cheese is produced, so there is a possibility that very little money will be earned.

At the start Bake earned more from cheese production than she does now, simply because more milk was available. Now more milk sellers have started to produce cheese themselves. Others became jealous of the higher incomes of the cheese makers and refused to sell milk to them any longer. They spoke shame about the cheese makers because they did not respect the taboo and started to ask more money for their milk. Fortunately, some other women had pity on them and continued to sell their milk.

Finally, the quarrel was settled. It was agreed that fresh milk would no longer be sold outside the women's own camp. A rotation system was drawn up of which women could buy milk on which days to prepare cheese. In the dry season, when the herds are pastured far away from the village, they go in turns to the herds for milk. As a consequence, milk has become a commodity, which always has its price and is no longer given as a present or gift.

Sometimes Bake prefers to sell milk instead of making cheese. She says: “It feels better for me, as a Fulani women, to walk the streets of Kandi with a calabash of milk than with an enamel bowl of cheese. Cheese makers are still considered poor” (IJsendijk 1999, p.56).

A question that remains is how to conceptualise impact and feedback loops between actor and structure. Structure should be perceived as the shell in which the five “capitals” are embedded. The social part of “structure” consists of the shell of common rules, norms and sanctions mutually agreed or handed down, around social capital. The economic part includes market structure, supply and demand; and the political structure contains power relations. As I have already distinguished between different levels of scale in vital “capitals”, this can also be done with respect to structure (see fig. 10). For example, there are local and extra-local power relations structuring livelihood strategies. The precise division between structure and “capitals” is not easy to determine. “Capitals” are used by actors to “produce” livelihood; structure determines the direction of the outcome, although the direction may eventually change through the agency actor’s livelihood strategies.

Despite the success of Bake and her neighbours in cheese making, it is still too early to call this livelihood sustainable. Nevertheless, her life history clearly demonstrates that she has overcome her exclusion from milk distribution in her extended family, although her livelihood remains vulnerable like those of the other 1.3 to 3 billion people in the world I referred to above. Why do some people manage to have a sustainable livelihood and others not? Is it a matter of available capital and access to it, of fewer or more shocks and stresses, of sufficient or insufficient agency?

Gore’s review of the literature (1994, pp.6-8) on social exclusion in Africa is interesting in this respect. He concludes that there is an important split between two types of studies on social exclusion. (1) The first approach interprets social exclusion as a mechanism by which elites exclude others from access to resources with the objective of maximising their own returns. Social exclusion in that view is a process in which social groups try to monopolise specific, mostly economic, opportunities to their own advantage. They often use certain social or physical characteristics such as race, gender, language ethnicity, origin or religion to legitimise this insula-

(Fig. 10 - Agency in livelihood strategies)
with Gore (1994, p. 8) that a hinge between these two points of view
should be developed. Access to vital capital can always be denied, but this
does not block any possibility of agency on the part of the excluded. It
rather structures their field of action. For example, African governments
have tried for a long time to use price policies to reduce food prices in
order to privilege their urban rank and file at the cost of the farmers. This
had adversely affected farmers' incomes. However, because they started
selling food crops on illicit markets and smuggled produce across the bor-
der, it was eventually not the farmers, but the government that was stung.
Livelihood strategies engender processes of inclusion and exclusion: it is
important to note that the sustainable livelihood of one actor may result
in the social exclusion of another, or at least structure his or her field of
action.

Livelihood strategies are developed in an arena of conflicting or co-operat-
ing actors or, in the words of Olivier de Sardan (1993), in a "local politi-
cal arena". As Long (1992) notes, development workers and their projects
play an important role in the arena. Both Olivier de Sardan and Long are
interested in the articulation of development interventions with the local
population. Implicit assumptions about the rural and urban society, repre-
sentations and the more hidden agendas of the development workers
themselves and livelihood strategies of the local population make it diffi-
cult to plan or even foresee the outcome of development interventions. I
find the attention to differences among local actors, called strategic groups
by Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk (1994), more attractive than Long's
approach. According to the authors strategic groups are not permanent
social groups who present themselves irrespective of the problem posed.
They are rather groups of differing composition who present themselves
depending on the problem. Sometimes it is an occupational group, some-
times it is a status group like women or youths, sometimes it is a kinship
group, sometimes a network of mutual assistance or clients of a patron,
and sometimes a group of individuals with a common historical trajectory
of livelihood strategies. Conflicting interests exist between these groups
which are fought out in the local political arena.

In view of the specific content which the concept of "strategic groups" has
been given in the past (Evers and Schiel 1988) and the looser portrayal by
Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk, I prefer to use the term "interest
groups" 11).

It is important to note that livelihood strategies not only at the individual
level, but even more at higher levels of decision making, such as the house-
hold or the extended family, are not singular activities. They comprise a
large number of production and labour activities using vital "capitals" in
various compositions. Livelihood strategies are thus multiple. Depending
on their role, individuals belong to different interest groups and therefore
the dividing lines between individuals and between groups are never rigid,
but variable and fuzzy. General categories as "the local population" or "the
poor" do not exist. In the local arena of livelihood strategies, inclusion and
exclusion may differ in each dimension. 12)

In Bake's camp it was agreed that milk would no longer be sold outside the
camp and that a rotation system would determine which women could buy
milk and when. The rotation system divided the camp into three parts, in
fact, three extended families living in various wuro's. Within each kinship
group, which now acted as an interest group, two women of the group
could buy up the daily supply of milk; the next day two others. They were
not allowed to buy milk outside the interest group (Ijsendijk 1999).

Finally, I have some notes on the "local nature" of the political arena. If
vital "capitals" are characterised by different scales and are being used in
livelihood strategies, then the political arena is, by definition, a local and
extra-local arena at the same time. Interest groups may include extra-locals,
and locals may use extra-locally situated capitals. Moreover, De Groot's
argument that the analysis of livelihood strategies should not be narrowed
to direct "actor-to-actor" contacts only should be considered (De Groot
1992, p. 323). An actor's opportunities and choices are influenced by other
(distant, sometimes even global) actors' strategies without face-to-face con-
tacts occurring.
Chapter 3 - The Importance of Locality and Globalisation

In this section I propose to discuss the main features of today's globalisation considering the consequences for studying sustainable livelihoods and processes of social inclusion and exclusion. In particular I will examine the significance of locality.

3.1 Locality

Inevitably, natural resources occupy an important place in the sustainable livelihood debate. Everywhere there is fear of environmental degradation, everywhere attention is drawn to the need for sustainable prosperity, in other words, it has become an article of faith to prevent depletion of natural resources while striving to increase prosperity. According to Hyden (1998, p. 8), ecosystems should even be the point of departure for sustainable livelihood. With the attention being paid to natural resources, locality is coming to occupy an important position in the debate about livelihood and social exclusion, because natural resources tend to be placespecific. Because of this and because many livelihood studies are actor-oriented, a local orientation dominates.

However, it has become clear from the previous section that the local arena should also be considered in a wider perspective. I have already indicated elsewhere (De Haan 1999, p. 15; 1995, p. 122) how to go beyond the local level, notably “by studying how the adaptive capabilities of actors are influenced, restricted or stimulated by integration in larger social-cultural, economic and political-cultural, economic and political entities...”.

“After all, the need for increase in prosperity coupled with sustainable exploitation of natural resources can only be understood (and this remark does not apply only to “low-income countries”) if increasing interdependence and globalisation are accounted for.”

It is interesting in this connection to consider Bookfield's (1992) “nested hierarchy” approach. Taking the example of sustainable agriculture, he explains that the agronomic sustainability of the field has to fit into a sus-
tainable exploitation of the farm as a whole. In the application of fallow and rotation a sustainable exploitation of the field's soil can be achieved that cannot be achieved at the individual level of the field. Sustainable exploitation at the farm level should fit into that of the agro-ecological zone or river basin. Take, for example, soil and water conservation measures such as terracing or irrigation, which can only yield sustainable effects if organised at an extra-farm level of scale. Staying with Brookfield, environmental policy should also be organised at the regional level.

This is also how the complex relationships between the local arena and the context can be perceived. However, I have reservations about Brookfield's plea for the regional level as the most suitable level for analysis of livelihood, as national and international levels are now becoming increasingly important. Nevertheless, I will show below that, because of globalisation, these higher levels of scale are more closely approaching the regional level than ever before. Moreover, it is questionable whether the notion of nested hierarchy is still valid. As I have already explained, livelihood strategies are not only multiple, but increasingly multi-local.

Bake's livelihood strategies are multiple in the sense that (1) cheese making is her main activity, (2) her husband provides her with food and housing, although she also produces some of these subsistence goods herself, (3) she was supported for some time by her uncle in the city. Her livelihood strategies have only a limited range and take place in the camp where she lives (and buys her milk and produces her cheese), the nearby peasant village of Alifiarou and the town of Kandi 20 km farther on, where she sells her cheese.

Boureima's livelihood strategies are more specialised, although he is a trader as well as a cattle owner, because he has invested in herds. However, his strategies are much more complex spatially and range from cattle markets in northern Benin to the butchers and abattoirs of Lomé, Cotonou and Ibadan.13)

3.2 Globalisation

I expect the multi-locality of livelihood strategies to become increasingly important in the present era of globalisation. I will therefore first examine the phenomenon of globalisation and then will return to its consequences for livelihood strategies.

Globalisation is said to be financial flash capital that shoots from one stock exchange to another, drives up share prices and drops them again like dominoes. Globalisation is increased worldwide competition between firms, firms which have plants all over the world and are hardly susceptible to influence by national governments any more. Globalisation is consumer goods from all over the world in the supermarket. Globalisation is people watching the news from all over the world on their television set, telephoning and e-mailing far-away friends, going on holiday all over the world. Globalisation is streetscapes in Europe, America and Asia which you cannot tell apart; asphalt everywhere, everywhere the same cars, the same neon signs of Coca Cola, McDonald's or Philips, people in a hurry and youngsters on Nikes.

De Ruijter (1997, pp. 381-382) defined globalisation as technological innovations in transport, automation and telecommunications resulting in massive exchanges of people, goods, services and ideas. Markets and social relations become worldwide. Standardisation of consumption and production and homogenisation of society are the result. Events in one place are quickly echoed in other parts on the globe. Globalisation is increasingly no longer considered as a process, but as a characteristic of the "global system": each particular entity has to be understood within the framework of the world as a whole. A www of interdependencies has been spun (DeRuijter 1997, p. 382).

There are, in fact, two views on globalisation (Schuurman 1997, p. 152). The first sees globalisation as increased homogenisation and interdependency all over the world in the cultural, social and economic dimensions. In this view, clearly identifiable centres give way to nodes which can differ depending on time and dimension. For some authors the driving forces are mostly socio-political, for others primarily economic, stemming from production and markets. This is the view I have formulated above. The second view, which I am inclined to support, sees a dialectical relationship between the global and the local, and is therefore sometimes called "glocalisation". This view also identifies the trend towards global
markets and politics, but notes an increased diversity and an increased importance of regionalism and community as well. Cultural fragmentation, for example, with its reinvention of local traditions and identities, is seen as an answer to the loss of identity through homogenisation. “Localisation” is often limited to the social and cultural domains, but Miyakawa (1998) has shown in his study of the Japanese automobile industry that localisation proved to be indispensable to enable the industry to outclass global competition.

Localisation, in his view, took the form of high-tech investments in already existing production areas of the Tokaido Megalopolis; through its connection with improvement (kaizen) movements; through the economies of agglomeration between automobile producers and subcontractors; and through the development of venture capital business in housing for workers. This did not result in just another example of agglomeration effects, but in a distinct production environment. Foreign industries like Volkswagen and Peugeot had no other choice but to settle there too (Miyakawa 1998).

And there are more examples: one need only think of the distinctive position the famous Silicon Valley occupies in the world of information technology.

In the political domain globalisation is often perceived as the end of the state. Some will point to the declining credibility of the welfare state, because it was incapable of securing society against unemployment and marginalisation. Others think that, with the completion of the welfare state, its historical calling has been achieved and its role has become superfluous. Others again argue that the state is now being presented with the account for years of nation building and the accompanying suppression of identities.

The fact is that the restructuring of the welfare state with its privatisation and deregulation has narrowed the activities of the state. It is also the fact that structural adjustment programmes in many “low-” and “middle-income countries” had the same effect. Nor has the state succeeded in controlling global markets. In the meantime, new regional and ethnic identities are being born or rising again: Belgium is federalising, Catalonia has gained a large degree of autonomy, Nigeria creates every now and then a new state in its federation and I do not need to elaborate about the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. Lastly, the democratisation that started in many “low-” and “middle-income countries” in the 1980s is accompanied by decentralisation in an attempt to bring political power closer to the people. Without exaggerating its effects, this also contributes to the decline of state influence.

3.3 Livelihood and globalisation

With respect to livelihood strategies, globalisation may have two important consequences: (1) because markets and social relations are becoming worldwide, livelihood will become multi-local (2) because of localisation, the importance of the international and the regional-local levels of scale will increase to the detriment of the national level. These expectations are illustrated by the following examples from Morocco and Kenya of successful migrant networks and sustainable agricultural intensification.

Extensive migrant networks exist between various areas in Morocco, including the oasis zone in the south, and Western Europe. Migration was initially oriented towards France, Belgium and the Netherlands. “The first reaction to the immigration policies in North-western Europe becoming more rigorous, was the shift of emigration into the direction of Italy and Spain” These countries too have now set limits on immigration. In order to get around the strict immigration rules, the migrants have put in position a whole range of inventive emigration methods. Regular family reunification and new marriages are the most legal and secure methods. “Besides, yearly many manage to enter Europe illegally. There are strong, region-bound networks between emigrants in Europe and their regions of origin, which stands surety for first care, housing and often work too...” Although most migrants eventually do not return permanently to Morocco, they send considerable sums of money to their family members who stayed behind in the oasis. Many oasis inhabitants “have been able to wrest themselves because of this from feudal relations, servitude and poverty that used to rule. Emigration has contributed positively to the level of living, housing and social status of most of the oasis inhabitants. This had
a strong emancipatory effect..." In some oases modern agriculture has expanded significantly. Migrants and remittances are at the basis of the purchase of motor pumps, mechanisation and colonisation of the desert. In the Sahara a new green frontier seems to be emerging (DeHaas 1999).

Successful agricultural intensification in Kenya is documented by Tiffin et al. (1994). "They use photographs from the 1930s that show severely eroded landscapes in the former native reserve of Machakos. 240,000 people lived there at that time. In 1990 the population had risen to 1.4 million. The area of land per capita diminished from 2.6 ha to less than 1 ha. However, pictures taken at the same spots now, show a prosperous countryside with terraces, trees, coffee shrubs and farms. Between 1930 and 1987 yields per ha increased 6 times. The value of production against constant prices rose ten times and value per capita three times. The success story began in the colonial period with the forced construction of terraces and the introduction of ploughs by Kenyan soldiers returning from the Second World War in India. But the boom in soil conservation started after independence: when compulsion disappeared; the terracing work was implemented by traditional working parties, and women, because of labour migration of men to Nairobi, started to play a leading role. Much organic manure is now used. The cattle that used to be collectively herded are now kept in private byres, fodder is grown and improved breeds of dairy cattle are used. The extended families of the past have become the nuclear families of the present and the status of women has improved considerably.

According to the authors, the initiative for this metamorphosis came from the local people, who reshaped their livelihoods on the basis of their own needs, insights and knowledge. In doing so, they used their revenues from coffee cultivation and remittances from migration, and chose from a range of skills, schooling, support for soil and water conservation and new crops (introduced by participatory technology development) offered by the government and a number of donors. Facilitating the functioning of markets and the privatisation of landownership were the main achievements of the Kenyan government.... It remains unclear if the whole population has equally participated in and profited from this intensification, or that there have been drop outs, marginalisation of certain groups have occurred etc." (De Haan 1999).

The example of migrant network shows that Brookfield's "nested hierarchy" of levels of scale is decreasingly in accord with reality. Locations of livelihood are increasingly no longer connected to each other by vertical, hierarchical lines that converge in an upper hierarchical level. Instead, they are increasingly connected by direct horizontal lines which are, moreover, becoming increasingly longer. Consequently, the structuring of fields of action, as discussed in section 2, becomes therefore increasingly multi-local.

Is this also the end of territoriality as one of the organising principles of society and, at the same time, the end of the territory, the bounded space inhabited and structured by a human group, that exerts a certain authority over it? According to Conti and Giaccaria (1998, p. 18) the concept of internationalisation still implies the overcoming of boundaries. They argue that internationalisation is a concept that considers the world as a differentiated set of areas, hierarchically structured as in Brookfield's "nested hierarchy". In their view, globalisation refers not only to the loss of power by nation states, but also to a changing perception of national and international levels of scale by actors. With respect to territoriality, therefore, globalisation is a qualitatively new step. Through globalisation, national boundaries become blurred, but local systems, i.e. regions, but without clear-cut physical or administrative boundaries, remain. Those local systems (or regions) will become fully-fledged parts of a global system instead of hierarchically subordinated sub-units. For example, some people have argued that the Machakos case is not representative of Africa. Because of its situation near Nairobi, its bimodal rainfall regime and the availability of uncultivated land, the region is considerably better off than other parts of Africa. However, from a localisation perspective, Machakas is indeed representative, or rather "exemplary". Its success in achieving a more sustainable livelihood emerged from a specific constellation of: population pressure; local knowledge enriched with experiences from outside even as far from India; profitable world market integration by coffee cultivation; multi-locality in livelihood strategies thanks to migration; social capital of self-help groups; and enabling government policies. The example of Machakos cannot therefore simply be duplicated elsewhere.14

Globalisation means that, in our perception of processes of inclusion and exclusion in multiple livelihood strategies, the different levels of scale both
in vital “capitals” and in structure come closer to each other and perhaps even fuse. Distant actors also come nearer. While the arena becomes increasingly global and livelihood strategies become more homogenous, certain local/regional characteristics of the arena remain or will even become more marked, and livelihood strategies will need to become more specific (see fig. 11).

(Fig. 11 - Sustainable livelihood in the era of globalisation)

Globalisation looks like a new round with new opportunities for livelihood, but it is doubtful whether social exclusion will then become a thing of the past. The question then arises of what can be the role of governance in this respect. Referring to its role in sustainable livelihood, Hyden (1998, p. 6.) defines governance as the “measures that involve setting rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules”. This also means that governance determines how and at what level of interest there is deliberation between the interests of, for example, a community of marginalised peasants and a few rare animals. According to Hyden (1998, pp. 13-14), governance should promote sustainable livelihood and prevent social exclusion by (1) nurturing local initiatives, (2) reinforcing civil rights, (3) improving the quality of relations between actors, notably in the field of trust and reciprocity, in other words, enlarging social capital and (4) reinforcing the incomes of poor households, including the reorganisation of taxation and public expenditure at the local level - if necessary, through non-governmental informal community-based organisations where local government is too weak. Hyden is in fact making a plea for a shift of the core of governance to the local level. This again demonstrates the increased importance of localisation.

denying the usefulness of governance at the national level or insisting that the state as a platform for emancipation (Schuurman 1999) has had its day, we can also find interesting developments in governance at the other extreme, i.e. at the global level. Lubbers and Koorevaar (1999) thinks that the stitches that the national state has dropped or has had to drop in globalisation, should be taken up by some sort of “global governance”. Global governance consists of global co-ordination by supra-regional and international governmental institutions of national governments balanced by an emerging international “civil society” consisting of global NGOs of environmental conservationists, voters, believers, consumers etc. Both have a task in the regulation of markets, notably the control of transnational firms operating on the global market. He makes a plea, in fact, for a new kind of (global) governance emerging from a symbiosis between governments, transnational firms and global civil society.

The future of development cooperation must also be viewed in this global perspective. Development cooperation has undoubtedly contributed to globalisation of markets and investments, but this does not mean, of course, that it can be dispensed with (Hoebink 1997). It is precisely the humanitarian side of development cooperation with its immunisation and literacy campaigns, housing programmes and valued elements such as the provision of micro-credit and debts rescheduling, that can be seen as a step of global social security.

At first sight, the era of globalisation seems to pass by Bake’s livelihood strategies. I made clear that her income did not exceed $1 a day, which placed her among the excluded of this world. However, it has become clear in the course of my presentation that she is not excluded. She has overcome her exclusion from milk distribution by producing cheese and to make cheese she had to overcome the traditions of her people. That was so successful that now all women in her camp produce cheese.

Bake’s livelihood strategies mainly took place in a local arena. Because she participated in different local interest groups (her extended family in the camp; her uncle’s household in the city; the group of cheese producers) she was able to become successful.

Whether her livelihood will be sustainable on the long run, it is too early to say. That depends on a number of factors that she cannot influence. An increase in the milk supply depends on rainfall, the size of the herds and the commercial orientation of herders. Only the latter may be influenced by demand from the cheese makers. The demand for cheese depends on the growth in incomes in the region. A rise in her own productivity depends on technological investments for which she needs credit. And that is only the part that concerns her cheese production. She has never attended classes, she has to walk far to obtain clean drinking water and medical care is expensive and of poor quality.
Nevertheless, the globalisation of her livelihood strategies has already started. The Maggi cubes she buys come from Senegal; the rice for a feast from Thailand or Pakistan; her matches and her husband's bicycle from Nigeria. As a result of booming cotton exports, the economy of Bake's region is expanding fast. Even her husband now cultivates cotton. The sustainability of that economic growth partly depends on the success of the privatisation of cotton marketing in Benin, on the negotiations in the WTO and on the opening up of a niche market in Europe for organic cotton from Benin. Representatives of an NGO of Fulani from the city are active in Bake's local political arena. They organise cultural festivals and literacy campaigns and hope to give a voice to the Fulani in the process of administrative decentralisation which is slowly getting under way. They are working hard on raising their people and en passant on moulding a Beninese Fulani identity to serve as a glue in the recruitment of their political rank and file. Their contacts extend to donors and scientific institutions in Europe.

In Boureima's livelihood strategies, the fusion between different levels of scale in vital "capitals" and structure is already apparent. Because of booming cotton exports, farmers are now investing in draught animals and new groups of suppliers and buyers, each with their specific impact, are appearing on the cattle market. Market organisation in Northern Benin is becoming more formal and transparent. For Boureima it is still a more or less open question as to what his cattle will be worth in Cotonou or Lomé upon his arrival. His colleagues in Burkina Faso are already much better informed about prices on the markets of Abidjan in Ivory Coast, because of better lines of communication on that side. They are able to react much more quickly than Boureima, partly because formalities at the Burkina-Ivory Coast border have become quicker and transparent after structural adjustment, so that the need for smuggling disappeared.

A few years ago it looked as if traders like Boureima and, with him, cattle keepers in West Africa would face serious competition from imports of frozen, subsidised meat from the European Union. This meat was taken out of the European market at guaranteed prices to farmers. For Boureima it was false alarm, because Benin imported very little meat. Elsewhere in West Africa, too, traders and cattle keepers suffered few losses, because the frozen meat was of inferior quality and was therefore bought by consumers who never bought Sahelian meat. Nevertheless a short, one-sided, publicity campaign by European NGOs was sufficient to cause the European Union to change tack. One of the positive after-effects was the financing, inter alia, by the European Union, of a monitoring system of cattle and meat prices in West Africa that has contributed to more transparent markets.

Boureima's and even Bake's arenas of livelihood strategies have thus become increasingly global: distant actors are coming nearer and levels of scale in vital "capitals" and even in structure are fusing. However, if we consider Bake in particular: the opportunities for her to sustain her livelihood and thus guarantee her social inclusion do not seem more gloomy than "before" globalisation13).
Chapter 4 - Implications for the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen

If the Third World no longer exists, the Third World Centre is in need of a new name and a new mission. It is of the utmost importance that development studies, to improve the understanding of how a sustainable livelihood can be achieved in a globalising era, should continue. As I said above, development studies, should have a normative preoccupation with the poor and the marginalised. I think this goes in particular for development studies in this university. Our university's identity is based on solidarity, respect and sharing, which are par excellence our values too. From the conceptual model “sustainable livelihood in a global era”, which I have just outlined our research agenda can be easily derived:

- With respect to access: what vital “capitals”, human, natural, physical, financial and social, do actors, both individuals and social groups, have at their disposal to shape their livelihood; which structural factors shape access, how do actors acquire access to those vital “capitals; how important is social capital as compared to the other vital "capitals?"

- With respect to multipleness: which livelihood strategies are distinguished; which interest groups figure in the livelihood arena; how do actors manage to be part of different interest groups?

- With respect to vulnerability: how dynamic are livelihood strategies, that is, how do they adapt to temporary and more permanent shocks and stresses; what temporary coping strategies do different actors develop and how do these become more permanent adaptive strategies?

- With respect to multi-locality: how multi-local are livelihood strategies; do vital capitals fuse at different levels of scale; how does the structuring of fields of action develops?

- With respect to social inclusion and exclusion: how do they work out
with respect to different dimensions of multiple livelihood strategies; how are actors’ livelihood strategies influenced by structures through the vital “capitals” they use; what role does agency play as the hinge between actor and structure; do actors’ livelihood strategies change structures?

• Do structures fuse at different levels of scale? Is the national level losing ground to the benefit of both local/regional and global levels? Are processes of inclusion and exclusion becoming more homogeneous and more specific at the same time? Is global governance developing into a global social security or safety net system and is it capable of preventing social exclusion?

These questions will be at the focus of the research programme of what will now be called the “Centre for International Development Issues (CIDIN)”. As a consequence our future research will have to become increasingly:

• **Multi-dimensional** because livelihood strategies are multiple. In addition, we will have to make an effort to go beyond the type of research that concentrates only on facets and micro-levels (Kleinpenning 1997). Because of their interdisciplinary nature, development studies are capable of achieving this.

• Because livelihood strategies in a globalising era take place at different locations, our research has to be **multi-local** too, i.e. will increasingly have to take place simultaneously in different places. This makes high demands on both the organisation and techniques of the research and on the researchers.

• Moreover, our research will have to be **comparative** if it aims to draw conclusions about globalisation and globalisation-localisation trends (De Haan 1999; Blaikie and De Haan 1998). If markets and social relations are supposed to become worldwide, then our research has to be global, too. One thinks first, of course, of comparative studies analysing similarities and increased diversity in “middle” and “low” income countries. But the Third World no longer exists and an exclusive orientation on these “mid-

dle” and “low” income countries therefore misses the point of globalisation. To understand the processes of inclusion and exclusion in livelihood in the era of globalisation, similar and connected processes must be studied across the globe in “low-income”, “middle-income” and “high-income countries”, in Africa, in Asia and in Latin America, in Eastern and Western Europe, in the former Soviet Union etc. Scepticism about the possibilities of such comparative studies is inappropriate. I think that development researchers underestimate the potential of their experience and skills in a globalising world.

“For example, I managed a number of times to interest Dutch planners and policy makers in African experiences with local environmental management by village committee, which have powers Dutch neighbourhood safety projects can only dream of (De Haan 1997b). Recently, Dutch jurists have started, together with Beninese researchers, to become acquainted with informal, Beninese types of conflict resolution, often based on customary law, in order to contribute to the development in the Netherlands of forms of self-regulation and alternative conflict resolution (cf. De Haan 1998c).

Interesting comparisons could also be made ... between conflicts in the tropical rain forest of Cameroon involving local people, timber companies and the department of forestry (and possibly also the World Wildlife Fund) and those in the Gelderse Vallei between pig farmers, city dwellers seeking recreation, the ministry of agriculture and conservation foundations around the ROM (Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu) spatial and environmental project.” (De Haan 1999). Poverty studies in the Netherlands and studies of informal social security systems elsewhere in the world have the same comparative potential.

• This does not mean that development studies should throw themselves into the Netherlands and Western Europe, although Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union do seem to be interesting new study areas to me. But, it does mean that CIDIN has to look for **strategic co-operation alliances**. It will be important to couple research in order to arrive at comparative research projects which take contrasting livelihood strategies as a point of departure, to shed more light on certain aspects of multi-locality,

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multiplicity and fusing levels of scale. It would be interesting to undertake studies which concentrate on the sometimes striking resemblance of historical processes in Western Europe and present processes in Eastern Europe or Africa\textsuperscript{16}). However, it would be even more important to undertake comparative studies in order to highlight current coherence in the processes of social inclusion and exclusion in each area. It goes without saying that historical depth and a regional perspective will prove their usefulness in this respect (Kleinpenning 1997). It is important therefore to establish stronger linkages between our research and that of others in the faculty (NOM AND INSOCO), in the University of Nijmegen (NICCOS) and in the national research school (CERES).

- Our new name, Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen (CIDIN), expresses our new global orientation. However, what remains is a research and training community in development studies. That community is made up of staff and undergraduates, post-graduate students and alumni. We will try more than before to keep in touch with each other in order to work together and to learn from each other's experience. The university is a unity of research, education and training, as our former Rector Magnificus rightly pointed out in his valedictory address (Van Els 1999). As far as the study of globalisation is concerned, our research and training community has a tremendous potential in itself. Our students carry out fieldwork all over the world, our graduates work not only with numerous development organisations abroad, but also at development agencies in the Netherlands, in social security departments, in the immigration service etc. Modern information and communication technology will help us to cooperate more intensively than before and to become a solid research and training community. What has been said with respect to our research programme about multi-dimensionality, multi-locality, comparativeness and new research areas, goes for the training programme and for student fieldwork too.

- I want to state explicitly that it is our task to cooperate intensively with foreign students, lecturers and researchers. CIDIN must involve them in its research and training community: We will be a hospitable basis for foreign colleagues, just as we are always received with hospitality during our fieldwork abroad. Moreover, I think that internationalisation means also that our foreign guests should also have the opportunity to study for themselves globalisation in the Netherlands.

The Dutch government concluded some daring treaties, known as the Sustainable Development Treaties, a few years ago with Bhutan, Costa Rica and Benin. These treaties were designed to express joint responsibility for worldwide sustainable development as agreed upon at the Environment and Development Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. I describe them as daring because one of their underlying principles is "reciprocity". It was foreseeable that such a principle would immediately cause Dutch politicians to take fright. The ECOoperation foundation in Amsterdam, which has been implementing the treaties during the past few years, has therefore encountered a lot of scorn. I experienced this at first hand as coordinator of university cooperation with Benin. I found the criticism undeserved and short-sighted at that point, because reciprocity should be an important source of inspiration in development cooperation. I have just explained how trust and reciprocity constitute the basic elements of social capital and how social capital is one of the pillars of sustainable livelihood. In a globalising world, social capital and, therefore, reciprocity are indispensable. This is why you will find downstairs an exhibition that tries to capture that principle in photographs from the four partner countries of Bhutan, Costa Rica, Benin and the Netherlands.

- Reciprocity should also be the basic principle of our research and training community in development studies. Reciprocity is in a nutshell how we, at the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen, will put into practice our university's identity. We, as researchers and students will work together with our partners over there. We do not work for excluded people, but with them; not only over there, but here, too; we do not only teach them, but learn from them, too. Il faut maintenir la solidarité, réduire la dépendance et agrandir la réciprocité.
5 - Word of Thanks (summary)

At the end of this presentation I wish to express my gratitude to:

the Stichtingsbestuur and the College van Bestuur of the Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen and the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences for entrusting me with the chair of development studies;

the Rector Magnificus, I particularly welcome your plans as announced in your inaugural address last December;

the students (including the postgraduate students and alumni), you are our core business and I would like us to shape the training and research community of development studies together;

my colleagues of CIDIN, the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen: thank you for your welcome and for your support in developing new directions in research and training;

my colleagues of the Faculty of Social Sciences, especially those in anthropology, for their welcome;

Professors Hüsken, Borsboom, Jansen and Wolters and Dr. Hollander: I hope to develop close links with you in research and training;

Professor De Ruiter, this applies to the CERES national research school, too; my colleagues of NICCOS and in particular dr. Van Naerssen: I also hope to establish research links with you;

Professor van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, my promotor;

Professor Dietz and all my former colleagues at the University of Amsterdam inauguration, for the good times we had in Amsterdam: we will continue our cooperation;
Professor Boko and all colleagues at the National University of Benin, especially CIFRED, the Centre Interfacultaire de Formation et de Recherche en Environnement pour le Développement Durable: we will continue to explore the opportunities for reciprocity;

the "éminences grises" of Dutch geography of developing countries: Professor Hinderink, for teaching me geography; Professor DeBruijne, for being my mentor in Amsterdam and giving me room to develop my research and teaching experience; Professor Kleinpenning, for your trust and warm welcome in Nijmegen;

my sons Jubi and Guus, for your support and understanding;

my dearest Ineke, for your everlasting love.

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6 - Notes

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(1) The life histories of Bake Machou and other women are beautifully portrayed by Deborah IJsendijk in her Master's thesis on the Human Geography of Developing Countries at the University of Amsterdam, completed in 1999. We Dance in our Own Way ... Livelihood Strategies of Fulbe Women and Change in Northern Benin analyses the coping strategies of Fulani (or Fulbe) women selling milk and producing cheese in relation to milk availability and access to milk. I am grateful to Deborah for allowing me to use one of her case studies and illustrations.

(2) The case of Boureima is animatedly presented by Dr. Paul Quarles van Ufford in an article in Dutch in Geografie in 1999. He completed his research project on the structure of cattle trade and cattle markets in Benin and the strategies of cattle traders in 1999 with an excellent and compelling Ph.D. thesis in geography entitled Trade and Traders. The Making of the Cattle Market in Benin. The study examines how West African cattle traders, by using their economic, social and ideological capital, play a substantial role in the transformation of markets. It explored interactions between actors and structure using a variety of methodological tools, including analysis of supply, demand and prices, of trade flows and trader's accumulation paths and trade, business and labour networks. Various life histories of traders are portrayed. I am indebted to Paul Quarles van Ufford for allowing me to use this case study and illustrations.
I am obliged to Jaap van Dokkum for skilfully compiling and drawing the world maps and figures illustrating this text.

See both DeBruijne “the gap must be fundamental if it relativises so strongly these differences” (1977, p.13) and Kleinpenning (1978, pp.22-23) pointing at the diversity of the Third World.

Huizer referred to the same figures in his farewell speech (1999, p.11).

I am aware that in the debate on sustainability of livelihoods often an environmental extension is added. In those cases (cf. Scoones 1998, p.5) “sustainable” not only equates social inclusion but “not undermining the natural resource base” as well. However, I feel this extension puts much emphasis on the natural environment, whereas socio-economic aspects are of equal importance. Environmental sustainability is included in “satisfaction of self-defined basic needs” and does not have to be stressed separately.

Although this typology in five vital “capitals” is exclusive to me, I am aware that other authors discern other “capitals” depending on their specific interests and divergent definitions. I include Bourdieu’s “symbolic capital”, prestige and status, in social capital. Klaus Hoven brought to my attention Cees Hamelink’s (1999, p.109) characterisation of “information capital”, meaning the total of financial capacity to bear the costs of internet access and use, the technical capability to use the internet infrastructure, the intellectual capacity to filter and evaluate information, the motivation to search actively for information and, finally, the capacity to use information in social life. Following Grégoire and Labazée (1993, cited in Quarles van Ufford 1999b, p. 22), who pointed to the ideological conditions, notably religion, for trade in Africa, Quarles van Ufford (1999b, p. 264) uses “ideological capital” as a reinterpretation of symbolic capital, adding religion and ethnic identity.

In this respect the work of the IDS Environmental Entitlements Research Team is noteworthy. Laurens Nijzink brought to my attention a volume of the IDS Bulletin. Herein, Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1997, p.9) explain the concept of “environmental entitlements, ...... (which) refer to alternative sets of benefits derived from environmental goods and services (cf. natural capitals as one of the vital capitals - LdH) over which people have legitimate effective command and which are instrumental in achieving well-being”. “Entitlements in turn enhance people’s capabilities, which are what people can do or be with their entitlements”.

In Leach, Mearns and Scoones (1999, p.240) they analyse the role of institutions in community-based natural resource management. “In focussing attention on the mapping processes by which components of heterogeneous environments become endowments and entitlements of particular social actors” they provide a dynamic perspective on the role of institutions.

In Le poisson est devenu du mil Antje van Driel skilfully examines the changes in livelihood triggered by a period of relative drought in the Niger valley of Benin. The most important livelihood systems were those of Dendi agro-fishermen and Fulani agro-pastoralists, who both used alternately the floodplain for fishing and grazing. With decreasing rainfall and dramatically lowered water tables in the river, the fish yields of the Dendi dwindled. However, the same cause gave birth to excellent new farming lands in the floodplain. The Dendi successfully adapted their livelihood strategies to the stiffer environmental conditions by concentrating on agriculture. “Where the herds once grazed and the fisherman fished, the land is now used for farming ....” The Fulani have to look for pastures elsewhere and also come increasingly into conflict with farmers because their herds cause damage to the encroaching fields when they try to reach watering places and pastures in the floodplain (Van Driel 1998). We may say that the Fulani still represent the “coping with drought” case and not yet that of adaptation.
I think this is also the crux of Huizer's work on the long tradition of peasant movements in Latin America resisting exploitation by large landowners (cf. Huizer 1970 and Van der Velden and Hoebink 1999).

Both Detlev Haude and Frans Schuurman drew my attention to a long debate in the 1980s about the nature of strategic groups. The notion was introduced in the development debate (or should I say “discourse”) in Benin by Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk, who indeed derived the concept from Evers and Schiel. The latter presented it to analyse the process of class formation in Southeast Asia. According to Evers and Schiel (1988, pp. 10-25), strategic groups are made up of persons having a common identity, a certain degree of internal organisation and active implementation of political and economic goals, especially stimulated by situations of conflict. In daily development parlance the notion of strategic groups refers to all kinds of interest groups which people may be part of simultaneously.

In referring to Berry, Gore raises a point which needs to be looked into further (Berry 1998: in Gore 1994, p. 12). According to Berry, it is not social exclusion that is a current problem in Africa, but “rather the opposite - the fact that many Africans have become locked into multiple channels of access and strategies of resource management which perpetuate low productivity. But, partly as a result of low productivity and agrarian crisis, it may be that in the long run, increasing numbers of impoverished rural people simply divest themselves, intentionally or no, of membership of access-controlling institutions and thereby form a new category of the dispossessed”.

In an excellent book on Pastoralism in a Global Age, Fred Zaal has analysed the changing livelihoods of two well-known pastoral groups in Africa, the Maasai in Kenya and the Fulani in Burkina Faso, showing the relevance of market conditions for grain and livestock with which both groups are confronted. Thanks to favourable market conditions, poor Fulani manage to survive, although they are expected to become increasingly marginalised. For richer livestock keepers, especially in Kenya, the importance of commercial production will rise, but their vulnerability to terms of trade is expected to diminish (Zaal 1998).

De Bruijne, Dietz and Verrest (1999, p.42) put it this way: “globalisation and localisation result in a larger number of constantly shifting regions, each with its own specificity of nature, pace and direction of economic, social and cultural change, and in respect of spatial arrangements and land use”.

However, Schalkwijk and De Bruijne (1999) have observed a clear, positive effect of globalisation on livelihood. They describe the case of Mea, a women living with her man and children in a backstreet courtyard in Paramaribo, Surinam. He is a fisherman and often away from home. She does not have an income of her own, however she knows how to organise support. When, in 1996, she was asked if her situation was worse than 10 years before she answered without hesitating: “No, in 1986 I did not have family in the Netherlands, but now I have my mother, a sister and a brother over there. They send me gifts for the children, shoes and clothes”. Even her fridge comes from the Netherlands. Her poor household depends for extra’s on support from abroad.

Hüsken, for example, has made an exemplary comparison of the historical development of the modern bureaucratic state and its impact on peasants and villagers in two different parts of the globe, i.e. the Gondosari in Java and Groesbeek (known for its history of smuggling) near Nijmegen. Confrontations between foresters and villagers followed a similar pattern and had remarkably similar outcomes” (Hüsken 1997, p. 257). Strikingly, Internationale Samenwerking, the magazine of the information service of the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation also recently published an article under the headline that the Dutch province of
Drenthe in the year 1949, the year that Dutch development aid started, resembled the present “Third World” (Internationale Samenwerking Sept. 1999). Some respondents in that article did not agree with the comparison, a disagreement that mainly reflected their own perceptions of present-day low-income countries. According to Internationale Samenwerking, the crisis in the peat market, which resulted in low wages and poverty, poor housing, export of profits, and paternalistic (government) aid in those days, resembled the present situation in low-income countries.

7 - Bibliography


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