Local land management in Benin with special reference to pastoral groups

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ABSTRACT

A review of local land management experiences in West Africa reveals that the resolution of conflicts over the uses of resources between herders and farmers depends on factors like land and water rights, promotion of the interests of pastoral groups and the intervention of traditional and modern institutions in conflict resolution. This paper on local land management in Benin with special reference to pastoral groups presents some findings in Kemon and Kokey villages. In both villages, land is still under common law to varying degrees despite modern law No 65-25 of 14th August entitled 'Régime de la propriété foncière'. Crop damage by cattle in areas where agriculture has become more widespread and the blocking of cattle routes are identified as the major causes of conflict between herders and farmers. Resolution of this tension calls for the intervention of local organisations. Conflicts are settled either through amicable settlement or compensation but unfortunately it is the herder in many cases who is still blamed for crop damage.

RESUME

Gestion des terroirs au Bénin: Le cas des groupes d'éleveurs

La revue des expériences au niveau de la gestion des terroirs en Afrique de l'Ouest révèle que la résolution des conflits liés à l'utilisation des ressources entre agriculteurs et éleveurs dépend de facteurs tels que les droits à la terre et à l'eau, la promotion des intérêts des éleveurs et l'intervention des institutions traditionnelles et modernes dans la résolution des conflits. Cet article sur la gestion des terroirs au Bénin traitant plus particulièrement des groupes d'éleveurs indique quelques résultats dans les villages de Kémon et de Kokey. Dans ces villages, la terre demeure encore à divers degrés sous le droit coutumier malgré la loi moderne No 65-25 du 14 Août 1965 portant sur le régime de la propriété foncière au Bénin. La destruction des cultures par les animaux due à l'agriculture extensive et au blocage du passage d'aniemailx est identifiée dans les deux milieux comme la cause majeure des conflits entre agriculteurs et éleveurs. La résolution des tensions nécessite alors l'intervention d'organisations locales. Le conflit est souvent réglé à l'amiable ou avec dédommagement mais dans la plupart des cas l'éleveur est malheureusement rendu responsable des dégâts occasionnés aux cultures.
INTRODUCTION
Due to technological changes in northern Benin, farmers and herders are involved to varying degrees in other, more lucrative farming activities (cotton) as well as in herding so that agricultural land, grazing area, fallow land/stubble-field, and watering places become resources which are the object of competition between the two groups. Van Raay and Delgado, (1975; 1979), quoted in Scoones (1995) state that ‘Changes in cropping patterns, such as the introduction of cash crops like cotton can restrict access of herds to stubble grazing and increase the conflict over crop damage’. On the other hand, an increasing number of national herders and transhumants, (herders who seasonally move with animals to search for water and pasture, or to avoid cultivated areas and potential crop damage during the growing season) mostly from Nigeria, come to Central Benin because of the good grazing in this region and this leads to conflict with farmers over crop damage and the disappearance of access to grazing areas and watering points. Because of the degradation of natural resources due to increasing pressure on resources by both farmers and herders and also the magnitude of some of the conflicts over resource use, the government of Benin promulgated Law 87.013 in 1987 in order to solve conflicts arising from transhumance. Thus, a transhumance committee was created in 1992 and organised by inter-departmental order No 010/MISAT/MDR/D-CAB. Added to these governmental initiatives, various International Institutions associated with governmental agencies namely ‘Projet de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles (PGRN/World Bank)’ and ‘Institut National des Recherches Agricoles du Bénin’/Royal Tropical Institute (INRAB/KIT) are implementing local land management schemes aimed at averting resource use conflict in Kemon (in Central Benin) and in Kokey (in northern Benin). This paper will highlight some features of various examples of local land management in West Africa. We will then analyse some aspects of local land management schemes in Benin namely land and water rights, promotion of pastoral interests, and conflict resolution.

EXAMPLES OF LOCAL LAND MANAGEMENT SCHEMES IN WEST AFRICA

The project ODEM in its second phase (1985-1991) aimed at integrating crop and livestock production. In 1985, the formation of Pastoral Organisations (POs) started in Mali. The objective of this process was to rationalise resource use by establishing POs and granting them the necessary rights and assistance to manage land and water resources. For this purpose, ODEM was expected to be given sufficient authority by the government to adjudicate conflicts over land tenure and resource use and the project has subsequently carried out an important task in demarcating animal trekking routes into the Niger Delta. However, the government failed to delegate authority to ODEM to grant land rights to pastoral groups and to adjudicate resource use conflicts. Also the ministry concerned would only allow ODEM to undertake veterinary activities which explains, in part, the failure of the ODEM project. Thus, disputes over water rights (PO
wells) and land rights are unresolved. In addition, the fact that each PO covers thousands of hectares of land is not helpful in solving the problem of pastoral land rights. Clearly, pastoral groups lack support from the Malian government with the results that the promotion of pastoral interest is weak and the number of conflicts resolved is low.

**Mauritania: Livestock development project (1987-1992)**
(Source: Shanmugaratnam et al. 1991)

The objectives of the project were to slow down the deterioration of the grazing area and to boost productivity by making pastoral groups (Pastoral Associations -PAs) responsible for allocated grazing area, and to provide better services and production inputs. The possibility of the government’s leasing land to pastoral co-operatives is explicitly recognised. Such land leases can specify all necessary conditions for proper management and development of the land so that promotion of pastoral interests is strong and the level of conflict resolution reasonable. The successful outcome of this project is due to factors such as:

- A competent and relatively well educated leadership of the existing pastoral institutions who see the PAs as potential tools for strengthening their own positions and the positions of the herders in general vis-à-vis the government;
- A mutual understanding between the government, the herders and their leaders about what services the government can realistically provide.

**Niger: ‘Projet de développement de l’élevage au Niger centre-est’**
(Source: Shanmugaratnam et al. 1991)

The aim of the project was to increase livestock production and productivity by herd regeneration, to develop the livestock sector and to manage range and water resources better. Land legislation in Niger has been introduced largely to protect the interests of farmers which has often worked to the disadvantage of herders. For example, Law 61-5 (1961) which sets a northern limit to farming has not been satisfactorily enforced, and as a result herders are often required to compensate farmers for crop damage by their herds even beyond the legally set northern limit for farming. Even though the law permits herders only to graze their animals north of the line, traditional farmers do intrude. The evidence is that for pastoral group, land rights are unresolved even though the project has succeeded in resolving partial water rights by mobilising local cohesive groups into ‘Groupement Mutualiste Pastoraux (GMPs)’ around water points. Thus the levels of promotion of pastoral interests and the resolution of conflicts remain low to medium.

**Nigeria: Information from Ingawa et al. (1989) and Salih (1992)**

Ingawa et al. (1989) and Salih (1992) (quoted in Djeidi Sylla 1995) reveals that grazing reserves were introduced in Nigeria in 1964 to sedentarise Fulani transhumants, to protect grazing lands against encroachment by agriculture and to encourage herders to invest by providing some security of tenure. The grazing reserve policy has brought a number of benefits. For instance, the installation of infrastructure, such as water supplies and roads, has stimulated local development. Equally, the recognition of the
need to allow some private exploitation rights has encouraged herders themselves to make investments to improve the quality of rangeland. Also moving from diffuse usufruct to more specific rights through the issuing of Certificates of Occupancy to Fulani herders has increased the level of tenure security for this pastoral population. The major problem arising from the establishment of the reserves has been the failure to integrate the agricultural and pastoral production systems. Reserves have all too often been planned as exclusion zones to separate communities, partly in the belief that the primary need was to preserve land from arable encroachment. The consequence has often been to exacerbate, rather than alleviate, inter-community tensions.

Senegal: The eastern Senegal rural development project (1983-1990)
(Source: Shanmugaratnam et al. 1991)

The objective of the project was to assist livestock owners to increase their income. The target population (70 000) are agro-pastoralists (herders who cultivate crops as well as keeping animals), settled in permanent villages in which the Peulh ethnic group predominates (about 60% of target population). Central to the project approach were the grazing management schemes. The grazing management plans were thoroughly discussed with the Pastoral Units (PU) management committee. The implementation of the plans have led to more rational use of pasture, protection of previously overgrazed areas, better organisation of bush fire control, and better resolution of conflicts over local resource use both within and between pastoral communities. The fact that the population is largely agro-pastoralist means that they are more sedentary than pure pastoralists and thus livestock and human movements take place within a more limited area which makes the work of the project more easy to carry out. The result is that land rights are resolved and the promotion of pastoral interests and conflict resolution are at a medium level in Senegal.

For comparative analysis, it appears that in many cases land legislation does not take pastoral groups’ needs into account (Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). The resolution of conflicts over resource use between pastoral groups and agricultural groups is rather like a multiple-variable equation in which it is difficult to find a single, determinant variable which gives a successful solution.

Table 1. Summing up of the main features.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mali</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
<th>Niger</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land rights</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
<td>Resolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water rights</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
<td>Partly resolved</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Unresolved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of pastoral interest</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak/ medium</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low/ medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Shanmugaratnam et al. 1991; Ingawa et al. 1989; Salih 1992
There is no magic recipe which can be universally applied. It is therefore necessary to consider the nature of each area which may be dictated by intra/inter-community socio-economic alliance (Niger, Nigeria, Senegal), political priority (Mali, Mauritania, Senegal), or the type of pastoral groups i.e. agro-pastoralists or transhumants (Senegal, Niger). However, except in the Nigerian case, conflicts have a greater probability of being resolved when pastoral groups' interests and/or land rights are taken into consideration (Mauritania, Senegal). This supposes, of course, political willingness on the part of the government to assist pastoral groups (by passing a resolution on land legislation for instance) without neglecting their socio-economic and environmental links with other groups.

These examples in West Africa give an insight, which reveals the diversity of features related to local land management schemes involving pastoral groups. Equally, they underline some prerequisites for conflict resolution. Hence, certain lessons can be learnt:

- Satisfaction of pastoral groups' demands requires government support.
- The recognition of legal land rights for pastoral groups can lead to the resolution of conflicts over local resource use and stimulate herders to make investment to improve the pasture once they have a defensible right to the land.
- Local land management issues cannot be treated in isolation. There is a necessity to consider the broader social and economic environment.
- Local land management implementation is easier with sedentarised agro-pastoralists than with transhumants.

LOCAL LAND MANAGEMENT SCHEMES IN BENIN

Local land management schemes for the resolution of conflicts over resource use are implemented in Kemon and Kokey by the PGRN/World Bank and INRAB/KIT projects respectively. In both villages, the relationship between farmers and herders depends on the production system. This relationship is determined most of the time by the social organisation in which both groups of natural resource users operate and which therefore dictates their local land management practices. Arrangements between farmers and herders can develop into long-term alliances which serve to secure access to resources and which can compensate for variability in the quality of livelihood in non-equilibrium environments (McCown et al. 1979, quoted in Bayer and Waters-Bayer 1995). Thus, our analysis will consider the dimensions of land and water rights, promotion of pastoral interests, and the organisation necessary for conflict resolution.

Land and water rights

**Kemon village**

In Kemon, access and use of land is still controlled by 'Balley' (traditional village chief of the land and one of the three main decision centres of village). Indeed, in addition to 'Balley', there are 'Balode' (traditional chief of the hunters group and also deputy 'Balley') and l'Imam (responsible for integrating religion into the social organisation in Kemon). L'Imam is also a close collaborator of 'Balley' (Hounkpodote and Bediye...
1995). According to farmers/herders and PGRN/World Bank members interviewed, land in Kemon area is under a communal property regime and belongs to the village.

Although land is perceived in Kemon as communal property with social control to regulate land use and ensure that the environment is sustainably managed, only Balley can grant land to foreigners who in return are obliged to exploit the land resource sustainably. The newcomer who obtains the land is watched by his village neighbours as if he exploits the resource in an unsustainable manner, he can be expelled. This case is at variance with that of the proponents of privatisation like Hardin (1968) who argue that we will not observe sustainable management of common-property resource and the exclusion of some uses and users unless they are under private or state ownership. There is no land market in Kemon. Land is accessed by free settlement (only by autochthonous peoples), inheritance, and borrowing. Due to the centralised land management in Kemon, local people have, over time, maintained the fertility of their fields. As a consequence, land is not yet a scarce resource so that there is still land available for grazing in Kemon. As regards water resources, the type of property regime varies according to the kind of watering point in question.

- Natural rivers or streams such as Beffa, Toumi, and Aouwo are considered under open access because every herder can have access without any particular exceptions.
- ‘Modern’ large diameter wells, mainly used for human needs are considered as communal property without any attempt to exclude any group of villagers. Autochthonous Peulh families use them sometimes to water their cattle since these herders live close to the village centre.
- Small wells dug in the field by farmers or artificial small wells dug by herders along rivers during the dry seasons are perceived as private property. Access to these watering points by neighbouring farmers or herders is not possible without preliminary permission. But this rule is often transgressed and leads to conflict between autochthonous herders and farmers.

**Kokey village**

In contrast to the situation in Kemon, there is no single person in Kokey who controls access to and use of land. Here, land management is decentralised. This means that a person who needs land has to negotiate directly with the landowner concerned. The village chief acts merely in an advisory capacity. Land becomes available through inheritance and borrowing. However, there is now no longer any free settlement since the land is becoming valuable because of the increasing incorporation of farmers into the market economy related to cotton production. Because of the shortage of fertile land in Kokey resulting from population growth, long periods of continuous cultivation and extensive agriculture, the tendency over the last decade is more or less towards private ownership. Communal property rights only apply to marginal i.e. uncultivated areas, which are sometimes considered by herders as openly accessible. In order to farm fertile land, some farmers are moving to the vicinity of the Alibory river originally a grazing area. Thus, herders are either being pushed towards largely uncultivated land or else they face difficulties in accessing the remaining grazing area because the grazing routes are blocked by agricultural expansion.
As is the case in Kemon, water resources used by herders are under various types of property regime.

- Alibory River, which is the major watering point in Kokey because it contains water throughout most of the year, is freely accessible. This means that it is perceived as being openly accessible.

- Pools, hollows, dams, and village wells (occasionally used) are considered as communal property by herders living in Kokey. According to these herders, the transhumants need preliminary permission before accessing these watering places.

- Occasional wells dug by herders along the Alibory during the driest season are considered as private property. The owners of such wells allow access by other herders after watering their own herds.

We may conclude that local land management practice is evolving in both villages with different types of land property rights. In Kemon, land is considered as communal property whereas in Kokey, land tenure is characterised by an overlap of communal and private property rights. With regard to water property rights, there is a combination of open access, communal property rights, and private property rights. This means that the implementation of local land management schemes is not based on a particular type of land/water property right (Feeny et al. 1990; Scoones 1995).

Promotion of the interests of pastoralists

**Kemon village**

According to local autochthonous Peuhl and transhumants interviewed, herders’ involvement in local land management committees ‘Comité de Gestion du Foncier (COGEF)’ is motivated by their expectation that a dam will be constructed. This expectation will be partly satisfied by the PGRN/World Bank project in Kemon. It is revealed by the environmental impact assessment survey of this project carried out in 1997 that the capacity of a dam big enough to supply the water needed for all the cattle (7231 animals) in Kemon is estimated as 17 115 cubic meter whereas the capacity of the actual dam is only 15 176 cubic meter.

**Kokey village**

This is an area of sedentary agro-pastoralists who settled there a long time ago. Their requirements are for grazing areas, veterinary services (animal health), and watering points. Grazing areas and animal health are the main needs of herders but as priorities they are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, if there is enough pasture of a sufficient quality the cattle will be in better health and may not need much veterinary care. On the other hand, if the animals receive good veterinary care they will be able to use their food more efficiently and will not require so much grazing area. The herders believe that the problem of watering points can be solved by transhumance whereas the problem of grazing area is becoming more and more intractable because of agricultural expansion and lack of formal legal recognition of land tenure rights. In any case, water is not a constraint in Kokey territory because there are many pools, two dams, and the village is close to the Alibory river. It can be said that herders in this village have to
content more with social uncertainty than agro-ecological uncertainty. A clearly different position over herders in the Sahel is taken by Kintz (1982) (quoted in Raynaut 1997) when he stresses that ‘In the herder’s mind, it is water that is the determining factor, that is foremost, in order for livestock to have access to a given area. Without water, it cannot survive. While fodder sometimes poses crucial problems, the herders feel that, in this domain, he can better cope with a difficult situation’.

From those different opinions mentioned above, we can conclude that fodder and water are both vital for cattle and justify the herders’ strategy of mobility (Niamir 1990). One becomes a priority when the other is not a real constraint. In Kemon, the priority is given to water because pasture is available whereas in Kokey the fodder is important because of the scarcity of grazing area.

Conflict resolution

In both Kemon and Kokey, crop damage resulting either from the disappearance of cattle routes to grazing land and watering places or from cattle straying appears to be the major cause of tension between herders and farmers. Based upon COGEF, CPRC, or CARDER statements about the types and causes of conflicts, it is evident that the nature of disagreements between herders and farmers at present is related more to physical than to social factors despite the ethnic diversity which is higher in Kemon (around seven ethnic groups) than Kokey (about four ethnic groups). Such a situation is the consequence of overall pressure on the land caused mainly by agricultural expansion in the two areas. In order to overcome these conflicts over resource use, traditional organisations such as governmental and International agencies are involved in local land management schemes for the resolution of conflicts in both villages.

Government intervention

Considering the growing concern over environment management and the increasing tension between farmers and herders, conflicts between these two groups have become a national issue. The government of Benin has taken some initiatives with respect to the formation of transhumance committees. Thus, on 20th January 1992 transhumance committees were created and organised by inter-departmental order No 010/MISAT/MDR/D-CAB. They exist at village, communal, district, province, and national level and comprise farmers and herders as well as political and administrative authorities.

The activities of transhumance committees consist of preparing and monitoring transhumance under the control of the political and administrative authorities. In the past, these committees were deemed to be too rigidly structured and to be slow and inefficient. Furthermore, bribery and corruption occur and this affects the fairness of decision-making. Previously, the function of conflict settlement was assumed by traditional organisations in each locality. In Kemon for instance, a traditional organisation of hunters and farmers operated at village level with inter-village or regional networks. It was, in effect, a village army and played a remarkable role in looking for and disarming foreign transhumants responsible for bloody conflict. However, the organisation was sometimes violent in its strategy and lacked support from the government (Onibon and Okou
In addition, the Peulh hierarchy comprises only herders and is based on elders since the structure of traditional Peulh ethnic group organisations is determined by lineage or class relations. It operates at camp and village level for organising/monitoring transhumance and resolving conflicts over the use of resources. In the past, the reception of transhumants in the area and conflict settlement were the responsibility of the local autochthonous Peulh chief or ‘Kembou’. The Peulh hierarchy is respected and listened to and acts as an intermediary between the administration and herders. The weakness of such an organisation is that the elders often do not allow the younger people adequately to express their opinions.

With respect to Kokey village, the traditional manner of resolving conflicts over the use of resources is based on mutual consultation between Bariba (farmers) and Peulh (herders) since both groups settled in the village a long time ago and have a communal basis for the spatial planning of resource use. There are hierarchy Bariba and hierarchy Peulh whose chief at village level is called ‘Rouga’. When conflict over resource use emerges between farmer and herder, the farmer complains to the chief of the Bariba ethnic group who invites the ‘Rouga’. Together they constitute a committee comprising both Bariba and Peulh ethnic groups in order to discover and assess the damage and make a report on the magnitude of the damage to both chiefs who usually meet at the Bariba chief’s palace. Depending on the extent of the damage, the responsible herder and the plaintiff farmer are brought to agreement on a sum of money to be paid by the herder as compensation. If the damage is relatively small and if it happens to be the herder’s first infraction, he may get away with no more than a warning.

In both Kemon or in Kokey, the traditional organisations for conflict resolution intervene in disagreements between herders and farmers especially in cases of crop damage. Their approach is based on amicable settlement or compensation. They are respected by villagers and are remarkably ubiquitous. However the ability of traditional organisations to intervention was weakened by the military regime in 1974, which broke the power of the feudal chieftainships. In their place, the military regime has set up and empowered a system of local government represented at village level by the ‘délégué’ i.e. a modern village chief. Local level jurisdiction is now assigned to these structures.

The intervention of international institutions

Kemon village

Since 1995, the ‘Operation foncière’ team of the ‘Volet Aménagement des Bassins Versants’ project of PGRN/World Bank in collaboration with political and administrative authorities and traditional institutions have succeeded in delimiting a grazing area of about 144 sq. km at about 10 miles from the village centre. This area is mainly used by transhumants and it is hoped that this will avoid conflicts over crop damage by cattle. In October 1995, the local land management committee ‘Comité de Gestion du Foncier (COGEF)’ was created. Herders represent 31% of the total members in COGEF. The key positions such as president, secretary, treasurer, and ‘leader’ are occupied by farmers. Transhumants in COGEF are spokespersons of their community. The objective of COGEF is to create a framework for natural resource management and to safeguard everybody’s interests.
COGEBF is therefore perceived as an instrument for promotion of social and economic development with a sustainable base in Kemon. It is also perceived as an institutional framework for pilot activities undertaken by PGRN/World Bank for better transhumance management in ‘Bassins Versants de la Beffa’. When there is crop damage or violence over cattle, the victim complains to the bureau of COGEBF, which sends committee members to discover and assess the damage and report on it in order to pave the way for a peaceful and amicable settlement of the dispute between herder and farmer. Moreover, COGEBF prescribes the rule of ‘the destroyer pays’, which obviously works to the disadvantage of herders. Herders exploiting natural resources should pay a tax of 75 FCFA/animal for transmigrant herders who stay in the village territory for few days, 50 FCFA/month/animal for herders who have recently settled, and 25 FCFA/month/animal for herders who settle during the dry season in the territory of Kemon. This money will be used for the regeneration of vegetation (planting trees, pastures, and shrubs) (Dangbegnon 1998). The effectiveness of COGEBF can be seen from:
- Its ability to obtain agreement by both sides on the resolution of conflicts.
- Its ability to identify the responsible herder particularly when s/he is transhumant.
This success is mainly due to the fact that COGEBF involves representative of the different participants in natural resource use.

Kokey village
As part of its programme for delimiting cattle routes and settling conflicts, the ‘Cellule Gestion de Terroir (GT)’ of INRAB/KIT has conducted the first forum on cattle raising in Kokey. This led in February 1996 to the creation of a village committee for the settlement and prevention of conflicts ‘Comité de prévention et de règlement de conflit (CPRC)’. The formation of such a committee is justified by the fact that existing local committees like the transhumance committee and the ‘fulfulde’ committee are less concerned with the resolution of conflicts over resource use. The task of the CPRC is to delimit and enforce the use of cattle routes because conflicts often occur over crop damage by cattle and the blocking of cattle routes by farmers. The CPRC includes farmers (five persons) and herders (five persons) i.e. in equal numbers. Farmers occupy positions such as president, secretary, treasurer, and organisation/information manager for the farmers. The herders, occupy the positions of vice-president, deputy secretary, deputy treasurer, and organisation/information manager for the herders. The managers for the reception of transhumants are both farmers and herders. The CPRC has worked for the last two years with the help of the traditional chief and the political authorities. The support from the political authorities at a higher level was greatly appreciated. The district commissioner has financed the demarcation of cattle routes and encouraged the mayor and the local radio to support the activities of the CPRC and the ‘Cellule-GT’. After a further two years, a second forum was held which aims at assessing and structuring the CPRC. It was apparent that the tasks of the CPRC had been successfully accomplished because the frequency of conflicts had declined to such an extent that the villagers decided to retain the present CPRC members.
News of the CPRC's success has spread and neighbouring villages seek to follow its lead. Table 2 sums up the various levels of conflict resolution, the approach used, and the degree of satisfaction felt by the antagonists.

Unfortunately, herders in many cases continue to be blamed for crop damage because they are in a minority (6.3% of the total population in Kemon and 12.4% in Kokey) or because they do not have clearly defensible rights of settlement (Shanmugaratnam et al. 1991).

Summarising this section we will mention firstly, that herders are more involved in decision-making in the CPRC than in the COGEF because they occupy all the deputy positions whereas in the COGEF they are only members. This means that herders may have a greater influence on decision making in the CPRC than in the COGEF. The second point is that experiences both in Kemon and Kokey, show that the local institutions' involvement in the resolution of conflicts over the use of resources is beneficial. This success is attributable to the facts that these institutions include representatives of all the resource users, take into account the interests of the different participants, react to situations quickly, and are respected by the local community. In the third place, we may also conclude that the support of international agencies as well as national government is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of conflict resolution</th>
<th>Magnitude of conflict</th>
<th>Settlement approach</th>
<th>Degree of satisfaction of antagonists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herder-farmer level</td>
<td>Minor crop damage</td>
<td>Amicable settlement</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional organisation</td>
<td>Crop damage</td>
<td>Amicable settlement</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>level</td>
<td>level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Délégué' or mayor level</td>
<td>Crop damage</td>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District level:</td>
<td>Conflict unresolved</td>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Gendarmerie'</td>
<td>by 'délégué' or mayor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District level:</td>
<td>Conflict and voluntary</td>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>Low/medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political and administrative</td>
<td>or murderous assaults and batteries unresolved by 'délégué', mayor or 'Gendarmerie'</td>
<td>with or without imprisonment</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COGEF</td>
<td>Crop damage</td>
<td>Amicable settlement</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRC</td>
<td>Crop damage</td>
<td>Prevention of conflict</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sinsin et al. 1997; Fieldwork.
necessary especially in areas where they share a common interest with local organisations. Finally the activities of the COGEF and CPRC are sometimes inhibited because of disagreements with the local political and administrative authorities involved in the legal transhumance committee. These disagreements occur mainly because there is now less scope for corruption. The sustainability of local initiatives built up in order to avert conflicts over the use of resources and implemented through local land management will depend on recognition of the legitimacy and autonomy of the COGEF and CPRC by the local political and administrative authorities.

CONCLUSIONS

What can be concluded from this paper is firstly, that the resolution of conflicts over the use of resources between farmers and herders through local land management schemes does not depend on a particular system of land and water property management.

The second conclusion is that the recognition of interventions by traditional institutions in local land management schemes is necessary for the resolution of conflicts over the use of resources. These traditional institutions will include representative of the various resource users concerned who will intervene in local land management decision making and implementation. Furthermore, traditional institutions must safeguard everybody’s interests and take into account the relationships between different patterns of production. Thus, the key features of successful local land management schemes for conflict resolution remain the identification through participatory approaches of the causes or solutions of conflicts and an emphasis on building on existing traditional initiatives involving representatives of all the resource users (Colchester 1994).

Thirdly, we may also conclude that the support of National governments and International agencies is necessary in order to empower and enhance the ability of traditional institutions to avert conflicts over the use of resources. The lack of transfer of legal powers of decision making to institutions implementing traditional initiatives based on territorial units may sometimes lessen the ability of such institutions to tackle conflicts over the use of resources. In this regard, the process of political democratisation which is currently under way in many African countries offers more opportunity for the intervention of traditional institutions in conflict settlement whereas authoritarian systems often undermine local initiatives. Thus, tangible support both from National governments and International Institutions is required in order to legitimise these traditional initiatives and to endorse their autonomy. In addition, such support is needed to provide legal land and water rights to pastoral groups where agriculture expands at the expense of grazing lands and watering places. It would be worthwhile to reinforce the traditional land rights legislation where local land management schemes are implemented in order to reassure herders.

Finally, in areas where there are already externally imposed institutions, it is worthwhile to evaluate their ability to implement local land management schemes for the resolution of conflicts. This will help to avoid their duplicating the efforts of local institutions, a situation which might result in a shift from resource use conflict to institution conflict because of the individual or group interests at stake.
REFERENCES


