

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	vii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations	xiii
1 Introduction, Methodology and Definitional Considerations.....	1
1.1 Illustrating the Accountability Deficit: the Roma Lead-Poisoning Case	1
1.2 The Subject Matter.....	5
1.2.1 International Territorial Administrations: Legal Contours.....	6
1.2.2 The Research Question: Holding International Territorial Administrations to Account	8
1.2.3 Why a Public Law Approach?	10
1.3 The Methodology.....	11
1.3.1 Stage One	14
1.3.2 Stage Two.....	15
1.3.3 Stage Three.....	16
1.3.4 Stage Four	17
1.4 Definitional Considerations Placed in Context.....	17
1.4.1 Three Public Law Principles in Context.....	17
1.4.1.1 The Exercise of Public Power Confined by Law	19
1.4.1.2 Reviewability of the Exercise of Public Power	21
1.4.1.3 Independent Judiciary through the Diffusion of Public Power	26
1.4.2 Accountability in Context: Who, to Whom and for What?	29
1.4.3 Legitimacy in Context: Accountability as a Legitimizing Factor.....	32
1.4.4 International Dimensions: A Public Law Approach to International Law	36
1.5 Outline of the Book.....	38
2 International Territorial Administration: International Entities as Quasi- States	41
2.1 Precedents and Parallels.....	42
2.1.1 The Mandate System.....	43
2.1.2 The Trusteeship System.....	45
2.1.3 <i>Sui generis</i> Administrations	46
2.2 Outlining Contemporary International Territorial Administration	49

2.2.1	ITA Missions: Beyond the Peacekeeping Paradigm	50
2.2.2	ITA Missions: Introducing the OHR, UNMIK and UNTAET	52
2.3	International Territorial Administration: Two Selected Themes	58
2.3.1	ITA Missions: An Elusive Legal Basis.....	59
2.3.1.1	The UN Charter	59
2.3.1.2	State Consent.....	64
2.3.2	ITA Missions: Bypassing the Framework of Sovereignty	66
2.3.2.1	Sovereignty and the Period of Mandates and Trusteeships	69
2.3.2.2	Sovereignty and International Territorial Administrations.....	73
2.4	Concluding Remarks.....	78
3	Holding International Territorial Administrations to Account: Mandates and Trusteeships as Precedents	81
3.1	Accountability Mechanisms as a Function of a Statutory Framework	82
3.1.1	Reporting Obligation.....	83
3.1.2	Individual Right to Petition.....	85
3.1.3	Judicial Scrutiny: The Role of Courts.....	92
3.1.3.1	From the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions to the Phosphate Lands in Nauru.....	96
3.2	Accountability Mechanisms During <i>Sui generis</i> Administrations ...	100
3.2.1	The Territory of the Saar Basin.....	101
3.2.2	The Free City of Danzig.....	103
3.2.3	The City of Jerusalem and the Free Territory of Trieste	106
3.3	Concluding Remarks.....	108
4	Holding International Territorial Administrations to Account: Determinants of the Accountability Deficit	113
4.1	Lack of a Clearly Applicable Legal Framework	114
4.1.1	International Law: Unprepared.....	115
4.1.1.1	Applicability of Human Rights Norms Through Constituent Documents.....	118
4.1.1.2	Applicability of Human Rights Norms Based on the Legal Status of these Norms	119
4.1.1.3	Applicability of Human Rights Norms Through Treaties: Three Options	120
4.1.2	Domestic Law: Unequipped.....	128
4.1.2.1	Decrypting the ‘Domestic’ in Domestic Law	129
4.1.2.2	The Weakness of ‘Domestic’ Law as a Legal Framework.....	132

4.1.3	Summary	134
4.2	Extensive Immunity	135
4.2.1	Immunity and Human Rights: Friction	135
4.2.2	Immunity and Human Rights: Waiver and the <i>Solange</i> Approach	136
4.2.3	Immunity in the Context of International Territorial Administration.....	140
4.2.4	Summary	145
4.3	Inclusive and Concentrated Mandate.....	147
4.3.1	Mandate: Initial Attribution	147
4.3.2	Mandate: Self-Interpretation	150
4.3.3	Mandate: Gradual Devolution.....	153
4.3.3.1	Local Authorities under UNMIK.....	155
4.3.3.2	Local Authorities under UNTAET	160
4.3.3.3	Local Authorities under the OHR	163
4.3.4	Summary	164
4.4	Concluding Remarks and the Inadequacy of the ‘ <i>State-of- Emergency</i> ’ Defence	165
5	Holding International Territorial Administrations to Account: The Accountability Deficit in Practice	173
5.1	Initial Accountability Framework: the Prevalence of a Peacekeeping Mindset.....	174
5.1.1	The Reporting Obligation	175
5.1.2	Internal Oversight Procedures.....	176
5.1.3	Domestic Jurisdictions	179
5.1.4	Compensatory Claims Procedures	181
5.2	Addressing the Accountability Deficit: Ad Hoc Responses.....	185
5.2.1	Safeguards as Part of the Decision-Making Process	185
5.2.2	Ombudsperson Institutions	187
5.2.3	Human Rights Panels	193
5.2.3.1	Avoiding Accountability Through Executive Interference: The Demise of the HRAP	197
5.2.4	Review Procedures with Specialized Jurisdiction	201
5.2.4.1	The Case of Florim Ejupi and Kosovo’s Judicial System.....	206
5.3	Existing Institutions: Accountability through Improvisation.....	208
5.3.1	Local Courts and Institutions	209
5.3.1.1	The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the OHR	216
5.3.1.2	The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the OHR	218

5.3.2	Courts Beyond Internationally Administered Territories	227
5.3.2.1	The European Court of Human Rights and ITA Missions	229
5.3.3	Other International and Regional Human Rights Mechanisms	235
5.3.3.1	Indirect Scrutiny by International Compliance Mechanisms	236
5.3.3.2	Direct Scrutiny by International Compliance Mechanisms	239
5.3.3.3	Incidental Oversight by International Organizations	244
5.4	Concluding Remarks	245
6	Concluding Observations	249
6.1	The Legitimacy of a Call for Increased Accountability of International Territorial Administrations	250
6.1.1	Legal Interaction of the Global and the Local	250
6.1.2	The Direct Impact of Internationalized Public Powers on the Individual	251
6.1.3	The Lack of a Coherent Legal and Regulatory Framework	252
6.2	A Public Law Approach to the Accountability Deficit of International Territorial Administrations	253
6.2.1	The Issue: A Disregard of Public Law by International Territorial Administrations	254
6.2.2	The Consequence: Improvised Accountability	258
6.3	Further Research	261
6.4	Final Remarks	264
	Nederlandse samenvatting	267
	References	275
	Index	309
	About the Author	317