# Elective Identities
## (Culture, Identization and Integration)

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# ERASMUS RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT

# REPORT SERIES
## *RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT*

| BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA AND CLASSIFICATIONS | | |
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| Abstract | Most of contemporary individual and social identities (constructed with societal, cultural and technological resources) are radically autonomous, nomadic and virtual – i.e. they are de-traditionalized, open to negotiation and not based on a single interpretation of a tradition. Identizations can be recycled - elements of former identities are being re-used in constructing later ones or identities emerging in one context can be implanted in another or hybridised – a nation state as a model for socio-political identity is a case in point (and so is its recent crisis). Values, political, cultural and social identities - elective identities of "nomads of the present", often emerging out of new social movements or informal networks - play an important role in determining choices of information codes, images and identities. Theories of clashes of civilizations and of fundamentalists versus modernists should be seen against the background of increasingly complex and successful attempts at global governance and increasing criticism of the ideologies of status quo. They may testify to the success of globalization instead of demonstrating its failure. The rise of religious fundamentalism and the emergence of network types of organization contribute to further acceleration of identization processes. "Girotondi della liberta" in Berlusconi's Italy and radical re-evaluation of cosmopolitanism as a family of images of representation are cases of emergent identizations with unclear but potentially critical political implications. | |
| Library of Congress Classification (LCC) | 5001-6182 | Business |
| | 5546-5548.6 | Office Organization and Management |
| | 5548.7-5548.85 | Industrial Psychology |
| | HM 136 | Individualism and sociology |
| Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) | M | Business Administration and Business Economics |
| | M 10 | Business Administration: general |
| | L 2 | Firm Objectives, Organization and Behaviour |
| | B 29 | Others |
| European Business Schools Library Group (EBSLG) | 85 A | Business General |
| | 100B | Organization Theory (general) |
| | 240 B | Information Systems Management |
| | 80 C | Social change |
| Gemeenschappelijke Onderwerpsontsluiting (GOO) | | |
| Classification GOO | 85.00 | Bedrijfskunde, Organisatiekunde: algemeen |
| | 85.05 | Management organisatie: algemeen |
| | 85.08 | Organisatiesociologie, organisatiepsychologie |
| | 71.41 | Sociale verandering |
| Keywords GOO | Bedrijfskunde / Bedrijfseconomie | |
| | Organisatieleer, informatietechnologie, prestatiebeoordeling | |
| | Identiteit, traditus, autonoom gedrag, veranderbaarheid, fundamentalisme, golbalisering, beschaving | |
| Free keywords | Identization, detraditionalization, processual, recycled and virtual identities, fundamentalism, globalism, cosmopolitanism, clash of civilizations | |

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Motto

> "Identification processes have been gradually transferred from the outside of society to its interior. From entities that are transcendent and metaphysical, from metasocial foundations such as myths, gods, ancestors, but also from the more recent avatars of God such as History or the Invisible Hand of the market, identification processes shift to associative human action, to culture, communication and social relations. As identity is progressively recognized as socially produced, it becomes obvious that notions like coherence, limit maintenance, and recognition only describe it in static terms; in its dynamic connotation, however, collective identity increasingly becomes a process of construction and autonomization. (…) The collective actor tends to construct its coherence and recognize itself within the limits set by the environment and social relations. Collective identity tends to coincide with conscious processes of 'organization' and it is experienced not so much as a situation as it is an action. To express increasingly self-reflexive and constructed manner in which contemporary collective actors tend to define themselves, I suggest using the term 'identization'." (Melucci, 1996, 76-77)

Abstract

Most of contemporary individual and social identities (constructed with societal, cultural and technological resources) are radically autonomous, nomadic and virtual – i.e. they are de-traditionalized, open to negotiation and not based on a single interpretation of a tradition. Identizations can be recycled - elements of former identities are being re-used in constructing later ones or identities emerging in one context can be implanted in another or hybridised – a nation state as a model for socio-political identity is a case in point (and so is its recent crisis). Values, political, cultural and social identities - elective identities of "nomads of the present", often emerging out of new social movements or informal networks - play an important role in determining choices of information codes, images and identities. Theories of clashes of civilizations and of fundamentalists versus modernists should be seen against the background of increasingly complex and successful attempts at global governance and increasing criticism of the ideologies of status quo. They may testify to the success of globalization instead of demonstrating its failure. The rise of religious fundamentalism and the emergence of network types of organization contribute to further acceleration of identization processes. "Girotondi della liberta" in Berlusconi's Italy and radical re-evaluation of cosmopolitanism as a family of images of representation are cases of emergent identizations with unclear but potentially critical political implications.

Key terms
Identization, detraditionalization, processual, recycled and virtual identities, fundamentalism, globalism, cosmopolitanism, clash of civilizations

1. Identizing in network societies

Who are we when we are who we are? Who will we be when we are who we want to be? Do we want to be what we grew wanting to become? Are we certain of rules we have to follow to play our social roles? The roles of students, teachers, experts, legislators, administrators, managers, citizens, politicians, parents, employers, employees, producers, consumers, fans, viewers, listeners or believers, chat-room visitors or participants in a scientific conference? With whom, against whom do we negotiate borders of our identities? Individual and collective identities, which had once appeared as solid embeddings of decisions, intentions and beliefs, have been undermined in the course of the 20th century. Nationhood became ambiguous. Calling myself a patriot I have to embrace not only a proud tradition of ages-long struggle against foreign yoke and domestic oppression, but to relate to a dubious legacy of chauvinism, xenophobia and national socialism. Parenthood is being challenged. Patronizing benevolence towards children can be interpreted not only as an expression of a family partnership, but also as an authoritarian coercion of dependents, an example of a deadly dictatorship of the cousins (as Malinowski used to call it). Citizenship requires re-engineering in an era of mass migrations and "Verfassungspatriotismus". Democracy does not stop at the factory door. Employment contracts get individualized. Collective agreements become undermined by benefits cafeterias, where employees shop for unique combination of psychological contract and quality of working life. Bureaucracies become undermined by higher education and mobility of employees, and by leaner, more flexible organizational forms against which they have to compete and which they have to emulate. Civil societies becomes diversified, solid trenches of class warfare, political parties and trade unions are being abandoned for inventive campaigns geared to market ideas, new problems with immigrants cut across class lines. Last not least, exercising their freedom to forge elective affinities at the expense of the traditional ones - individuals float in multiple blind dates in virtual chat-rooms, online communities, communication networks and increasing uncertainty.

Social scientists spoke of multiple and fluid identities, of an identity crisis, of generation gaps, of gender wars, of nomads of the present (Melucci). Human individuals and social groups were supposed to switch, flow, drift, change, reject permanent identification, re-model and re-engineer revivals and rejuvenations ("born again Christians" or "re-engineered Muslims" are a case in point, and so is a growing number of divorces). Sociologists, psychologists and philosophers spoke of the new individualists, of lonely crowds, of experience economy and of society of a spectacle. They accounted for a loss of stable identities by saying that "all that was solid melted into thin air", by complaining of "the corrosion of character", by mourning the phenomenon of "bowling alone" and "the collapse of the American community". Moreover, they often found out that identifying and self-identifying of an individual or of a group has been intertwined with power struggles, economic conflicts and ideological disputes.

Metaphors, words and concepts we still live by make it difficult to distinguish a fluid process underneath a temporary freeze-frame of an identity, to detect a verb and a gerund under a noun and a name. However, we have slowly and gradually become aware that our personalities are in fact parliaments of selves, where numerous parties

negotiate their desires, argue about their beliefs and compromise about actions. Likewise, even the strongest collective emotional experiences of national or religious fervour have repeatedly been deconstructed as "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991), as artificial as those with lesser emotional appeal, and as man-made as arbitrary conventions about playing rugby (Varnedoe, 1989) or settling a dispute in court (Cohen, 2002).

Let us take an example of a political identity of a modern nation-state and derived identities of its citizens. This product of European historical development became a globally accepted political identity for internationally active and politically emergent "collectives" and has been recognized by the United Nations Organization (which is, in fact, an Organization of United Nation-States, since nations deprived of a state are not represented). However, even more important was a tacit recognition of a nation-state as a dominant form of political organization by the newly emerging postcolonial states in the 1960ies. The acceptance of the European model of a nation-state as a dominant form of political organization of a local decolonised society was determined by emergent elites in African, South American or Asian countries. Why had they chosen this political form in spite of its European (i.e. linked to a former colonial power) origins? Had they studied in Johannesburg, San Paulo, Kanton Istambul or Cairo instead of at the Oxford, Sorbonne, Harvard, Madrid, Coimbra, Leiden or Berlin, their choice or rejection of nation-state could have been an issue for a broad social consultation and not a tacitly accepted fait accompli. The only respectable identity representatives of native counter-elites could imagine at the successful end of their liberation from colonial domination was that of a government of a sovereign nation-state with a flag, a national anthem, a currency, a football team and a place in the United Nations General Assembly. It was the only political identity, which had very clear, internationally compatible, easily recognizable, forms of organizing, managing, governance.

It took half a century for the African political and intellectual elites to come to terms with the critique of a mixed legacy of their struggle for independence and with tacit acceptance of the European model of a nation-state imposed on a collection of tribal and religious communities emerging from under the colonial rule. Only now, after a collapse of state socialism as an alternative to a capitalist market linked to a parliamentary democracy, do African political thinkers ask the questions about cultural and political ideologies determining identities in postcolonial societies:

"We are now in a position to answer the question: what would democratisation have entailed in the African context? It would have entailed the deracialization of civil power and the detribalisation of customary power, as starting points of an overall democratisation that would transcend the legacy of bifurcated power. A consistent democratisation would have required dismantling and reorganizing the local state, the array of Native Authorities organized around the principle of fusion of power, fortified by an administratively driven customary justice and nourished through extra-economic coercion."(Mamdani,1996,24-25)

This is the path not taken. Mugabe's recent removal of white farmers is a token gesture of political reform, but it certainly does not reinforce democratic process in Zimbabwe. New black owners of the farms will find themselves as much at the mercy of uncontrolled state bureaucracy in a lawless state as their white predecessors. The

need for a gradual build-up of local democracies within the framework of a nation-state has not been immediately clear to the black power elites. This should come as no surprise. It is only natural considering that for a century and a half it was not very clear to the leaders of working class movements in Europe either. The latter also focussed on getting hold of a nation-state either by parliamentary (social democrats) or revolutionary (communists) means. Less attention was devoted to the maintenance of trade union or party democracy and their translation into a state policy reinforcing civil society. Emergent political elites in the third world countries followed the same route. National liberation movements focussed on overthrowing colonial rule and taking a colonial state over. An exchange of a ruling elite from a foreign to a native one was tacitly expected to be beneficial to the masses of colonially exploited populations. No further development of civil society was stimulated. The mistake of counter-elites was easy to make: European trade-union and communist-party activists (whose class struggle was often compared to the anti-colonial resistance) also believed that at the end of their class struggles they will replace the capitalist middle class professionals (serving the interests of capitalists) with socialist state functionaries (serving interests of the working class). More anarchistic or democratic alternatives have never been seriously considered as sustainable forms of social organization.(1)

Using Melucci's term, we may say that collective identizing in newly liberated former colonies was a self-conscious application of a dominant political form. It displayed a certain organized blindness and amnesia vis a vis local cultural resources as a source of possible alternatives to a simple exchange of power between a former ("white") power elite and a new one ("black"). The new elites failed to identify political, cultural or social alternatives to dominant forms of political and economic organizing. By doing so, they narrowed down the scope of potential choices and excluded some paths identization could take. We understand why they did so (because they took a dominant form of political identity), but in order to answer the "how" question, one would have to reconstruct political history of all postcolonial nation-states in order to explain competitive advantage of some identizations over the others. There are some isolated attempts, including the one by Michael Burawoy, who watched how:

"Zambian "successors" were denied the resources and authority of their expatriate predecessors and how these were in turn promoted into newly created positions to "oversee" Zambianization. It turned into a study of the reproduction of the colour bar, the principle that no black should have white subordinate. Given that the first goal of the postcolonial Zambian government was to eliminate racial injustice, how was it, I asked, that the colour bar persisted? I extended out from the racial dynamics of the workplace to the economic and political interests of Zambian workers, multinational capital, the new governing class, and expatriate management. I showed how the configuration of class forces, inherited from colonialism, held the racial order in place."(Burawoy, 2000, 21-22)

Some alternative forms have been half-heartedly tried – for instance a short-lived Arab federation of Syria and Egypt (1958-1971) can be seen as an attempt to forge a political and economic organization based on a religious identity of predominantly Muslim Syrians and Egyptians in Northern Africa and in the Middle East. In 1972 Libya entered the federation, but backed off in 1974 and the whole federation collapsed splitting into original nation-states. United Arab Emirates – a union of

seven emirates formed in 1971 – still exists, but it is very small and only close, relatively homogeneous entities are involved. Yugoslavia existed from 1919 to 1990, but it dissolved in a bloody civil war. French, Spanish and Polish anarcho-syndicalism (of which only the Spanish one was partially implemented during the short-lived Republic and Spanish civil war in the mid-1930ies) are cases in point of imagined alternatives to a socialist nation state between two world wars. None of them offered a sustainable alternative to a political form of a parliamentary democracy within a nation state and to a globally integrated capitalist market economy. All of them, however, were conceived as attempts to remedy the "iron laws of oligarchy" and loss of democracy in working class organizations – primarily political parties and trade unions. All of them have been suppressed due to the political context in which identization took place.

### 2. Political context of identizing

Political context of identizing processes plays a very important role in determining choices of individuals, movements and societies. Some outcomes are dependent on the institutional context; the abovementioned anarcho-syndicalist alternative lost to a less democratic alternative (a bureaucratic communist party or a trade union) because of a failure to survive as an organizational alternative to bureaucracy (dictatorship of the proletariat had no future but was originally robust enough to withstand external pressure by total mobilization and large-scale terror). Likewise, new forms of a democratic state based on local democratic process (which might have emerged in the decolonising world, but failed to do so) lost to an European bureaucratic nation-state because of a lack of international support for alternative organizational forms (recognition of a Palestinian Authority by the United Nations is an exception to the rule, though it is clearly no match for Israel as a nation-state, which has more discretion in selecting allies, ignoring United Nations and implementing military policies). Some outcomes are dependent on a cultural climate. On a spur of the moment communities may disregard potentially more promising alternatives, because they run against political emotions. Mugabe's policy of abolishing colour bar in land ownership might be more successful if linked to a long-term plan of a gradual transfer of know-how and management to black shadow farmers – but this would require a compromising attitude towards white land owners (which would be less popular than a straightforward eviction). This collective failure of political imagination cannot be remedied by a desperate cri du coeur of the French student rebels of 1968 – "imagination au pouvoir". In order to help imagination become a powerful force, political identization has to be managed. In 1968 the Old Left (the communist parties) kept the institutions (party machines) – in spite of the death of their ideology (revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist world order). Everybody saw the communist future (imperialist policies of totalitarian Soviet state) and everybody knew that it did not work. The New Left (protest movements) kept "imagination" – i.e. designed new identity for the left, but failed to sustain imagination's long march through the institutions (in spite of the fact that individual representatives of 1968 did make careers in bureaucracies – Joshka Fischer, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Tom Hayden, Regis Debray are cases in point).

The events of 1968 had little immediate effect on global institutional order of nation-states. However, they marked a decisive break with an ideological Iron Curtain.

Identizing in the Cold War context was put in a reverse gear. Young French students read Che Guevara, Mao Dze Dong or Trotsky instead of Montesquieu, Weber or Rawls. Young Polish, Hungarian or Czech students did the reverse. They read Adorno, Rawls and Marcuse instead of Marx, Mao or Che. An American student occupying offices of the Columbia University in New York City called his parents to ask what Lenin was doing in Smolny palace during the October revolution… Identization is not an orderly, totally rational process and revolutionaries may either envision the future or fall back on the past traditions. It has happened before. French revolutionaries of 1789 often saw themselves as true descendants of republican Rome. They felt they were resuscitating Roman virtues and not serving as simple gravediggers of the monarchy and pioneers of uncertain future. Future was bright – as statues to Reason erected at the time (and Roman themes in female fashions) clearly indicate.

Identization is also considerably influenced by "the industrialization of representation in the modern era"(Ray, 2001,180), which means that any potential young radical had been already submerged in the constant flow of televised images before constructing a revolutionary identity of his or her own. Thus new generations of "rebels" could model themselves on the most distant and exotic revolutionaries. Fanon had only Marx and printed word when designing a political identity for the "wretched" of the earth, i.e. for the third world. Zapatistas had the resources of the Internet, mobile phones and political show in mass media. They could appeal to virtual communities. In their case imitation of revolutionary models was a case of counterculture. A counterculture is a generator of truly imagined communities (idealized, often venerated with political pilgrimages to Havana or Beijing). Sharing a subculture of social protest and political struggle against "establishments" one facilitates identization processes:

"Culture… engenders new classes and recruits members for them, creating a world in which community consists less in topographical proximity than in shared interests, expertise and values."(ibid., 181)

Social processes of identizing became accelerated already in the classical changes of European modernity. They were linked by historically earlier mass media – books, periodicals, written letters ("cahiers des doleances") and manifestos. Protestant rebellions, industrial revolution, colonial expansion – all had contributed to this acceleration of identizing among broadly distributed groups. Protestants had to forge a separate Christian identity – that of believers inspired by the Bible but regulating their religious life without the Roman Catholic hierarchy of priests and bishops. They have tied the Bible to a native vernacular thus reinforcing nation-state as a framework of religious organization. The industrialists had to strip peasants of agricultural resources and make them flock to urban centers – where they acquired class identities of their own (for instance – a proletarian or a middle class one). Both lower class proletarians and middle class professionals have been strengthening the nation-state, which regulated their class struggle at a national, usually political level (British labour legislation, Bismarck's "welfare state" laws, French class warfare of the Commune). Colonial conquests made Europeans assume "white man's burden" - i.e. an ideology of a natural superiority of Western European culture, social organization and technology to any other culture, social organization and technology – any place, any

time. Identization processes in Europe (and in the USA, which pursued a semi-colonial policy of their own) acquired a new twist.

When costs of maintaining the colonies (in the wake of WWII) became too high, colonial domination had been replaced with politically correct acknowledgement of national liberation movements (sometimes very late as was the case with Dutch dirty war in Indonesia in 1947 and Franco-British attempt to occupy Suez canal in 1956). New windows of opportunity for maintaining the inequalities of a global world system have developed, making it virtually impossible for former colonies to improve their economic, political and cultural status (cf. Wallerstein, 1995, Hopkins, Wallerstein, 1996, Said, 1993). Et plus ça change…? No. History does not repeat itself. **Identization processes acquired new dynamics, and maintenance of global domination in the interests of a relatively limited number of power elites in the strongest nation states becomes increasingly difficult, because of the growing transparence of all processes, including the identization ones, in the media-saturated, networked society.**

The above difficulty in maintaining ideological control in order to justify persistent inequalities was demonstrated not only in the streets of Seattle or Genoa, where hundreds of grass-roots organizations had converged in order to stage a spectacular protest action reported in most of the world's media. It could also be traced in a relentless criticism of those intellectuals, who are being perceived as representing the point of view of the privileged elites. There is hardly any world top conference involving representatives of international organizations and national governments without a counter-conference, a wave of protests or at least an attempt at an alternative approach towards global governance. On August 31 – September 4, 2002, the 2$^{nd}$ European conference of People's Global Action (PGA) network has met in Leiden, the Netherlands, to discuss joint actions of various groups, movements and NGO's, which came together in Seattle, Washington, Genoa and Prague, protesting against globalization and designing a strategy of opposing "the destruction of humanity and of the planet by a global market". This is clearly one of early attempts to create an alternative to the present world order and to oppose curbing of citizens' liberties under the pretext of war against terrorism. Needless to say, the conference is ignored by mass media – television, newspapers, radio and periodicals. It is thus also an attempt to give voice to those, who have been invisible in the media. A critique of V.S. Naipaul, an accomplished British writer (born in an Indian family in Jamaica and honoured with a Nobel prize in literature) by a Palestinian intellectual living in New York, Edward Said, is a case in point:

> "Naipaul is the perfect witness for The New York Review of Books, where he can be counted on to survey the Third World (with scarcely any other third World testimony to challenge him), its follies, its corruption, its hideous problems. To say that Naipaul resembles scavenger, then, is to say that he now prefers to render the ruins and derelictions of postcolonial history without tenderness, (…) He prefers to indict guerrillas for their pretensions rather than indict the imperialism and social injustice that drove them to insurrection, he attacks Muslims for the wealth of some of their number and for a vague history of African slave trading, thus putting aside many centuries of majority struggle and complex civilization; he sees in today's Third World only counterfeits of the First World, never such things as apartheid or the wholesale American devastation of Indochina.(…) He

can produce such effusions as this from Elisabeth Hardwick; (…) "Naipaul's work is a creative reflection upon a devastating lack of historical preparation, upon the anguish of whole countries and people unable to cope"."(Said, 2000, 100-101)

Political context of identizing is changing and dominant position of the present establishments cannot be taken for granted, since multicultural global interactions breed attempts at the articulation and presentation of too many emergent identities to contain and control them. More specifically, multicultural global interactions contribute to the detraditionalization of identization processes, making hybrid and improvised identities acceptable for growing segments of the population. Increasingly frequent attempts to rejuvenate "norms and values" debates in European societies are symptomatic response to the abovementioned detraditionalization. What does it consist of?

### 3. Identizing and detraditionalizing

Najpaul is important not only as an object of a critique for becoming a literary representative of colonial powers and benchmarking third world's postcolonial identities to the first world's colonial ones. He is also important as one of the early critics of a Muslim fundamentalism. He was one of the first observers to note that the fundamentalist revival, contrary to appearances, is not a traditionalist come-back, but a postmodern sociotechnical invention, a politicised and rejuvenated, reconstructed religious ideology employed by social movements of alternative modernization. He has noticed, in other words, that in spite of an appearance of re-traditionalization, Islamic fundamentalism is an instrument of de-traditionalization for broad segments of the population (both middle and lower class ones). As the author of two journeys around the Arab and non-Arab countries of Islam (cf. Naipaul,1982,1999) he is frequently quoted by journalists (cf. an interview with him conducted in August 2002 by Tobias Döring and Hubert Spiegel for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) when warning against global ambitions of Islamic fundamentalists, especially the Saudis. The question, which merits an answer, is why can fundamentalisms be winning so many followers in spite of their clearly unattractive side effects (terrorist attacks, primitive dictatorships, oppressive regimes)(2)? Before answering this question let us note that the same could be asked about roots of popularity of German nazism and Italian fascism or Soviet and Chinese communism. Why was German Nazism so psychologically attractive to a majority of German population, especially in the early thirties? Why was Soviet communism genuinely supported - even by the very victims of Stalinist terror? In both cases relative a stability of Hitler's or Stalin's regimes resulted from a mix of mass terror (preventive destruction of possible future counter-elites) and mass propaganda providing ubiquitous imagery of the only identity allowed by the ruling party. One could either become a devoted nazi or communist – or nobody at all (other identities were either absent from public spaces or vilified). But this simplistic propaganda could not be successful without appeal to the target populations. This appeal was linked, in all cases, to the promise of detraditionalization (becoming a nazi or a communist meant one was being modern). This propaganda onslaught went hand in hand with a destruction of privacy (privacy being a traditional escape from the call of historic duty). State monopoly on identization meant that no alternative identity of – let us say – a political opposition member, or a member of a non-communist detraditionalization policy – could emerge, be expressed and

acknowledged. Both nazis and communists banned jazz music – as decadent attempt to lure true nazis and communists to the alternative form of modernization – a liberal and democratic one with an US American flavour.

Causes of popularity of Islamic fundamentalist populism (which follows a communist and fascist ones as a non-capitalist alternative to modernization's threats to stability of rapidly modernized societies) can be thus found in a loss or a crisis of most institutions supporting social identization and compromised by their link to traditional centres of power and influence in the Islamic countries. What are these institutions, whose crisis new fundamentalists are exploiting?

The present crisis of these institutions has already been announced by their high-jacking by the nazi and soviet political elites. Political parties, trade unions, established churches and whole nation-states in totalitarian states of nazis or communists have been mere transmission belts of orders issued in a single controlling centre of the ruling party. In liberal democracies they have not been undermined so thoroughly, but they were subjected to the managerial controls and PR and marketing techniques imported from market companies. All of these institutions, which are still based on an assumption of a continuity of a social identity, exist in democratic societies of the early 21st century, but they undergo a systemic crisis, because their constituencies become flexible and temporary. They cannot cope with internal differentiation and flexible response to changing expectations of individualized citizens, members, generation cohorts, religious believers, followers of radical movements (ecological, feminist), etc. They cannot adapt new socialization procedures, while the old ones loose their significance. For an increasingly mobile population, identization becomes a difficult exercise of a duty of a citizen, often neglected, underestimated and beyond social control. Loss of social control is often perceived as a relative loss of civic virtues, but rarely remedied by direct educational, political and cultural action. Why is a response to this challenge so slow in coming about? One of the reasons can be found in individualized mobility of members of contemporary societies. Only fifty years ago, once a baby was baptized – he or she became a member of a church. Only twenty-five years ago, once a student graduated from a university, he or she became a member of a profession entering a company or an institution. Membership was life-long and local or professional community took care of observing obedience to the rules, of controlling individuals and groups. Clear-cut expectations went with this membership (for instance – regular church attendance, refraining from work and shopping on Sundays, patterning of social and family life) and socialization was life-long (upgrading professional knowledge, running peer control institutions, etc.). Likewise, once a citizen aligned his or her interests with a political program – he or she became a member of a political party. Parties were left (equality, socialism), right (liberty, liberalism) or centre (fraternity, conservatism). Finally, once one accepted legitimate means of increasing one's influence in a workplace, one became a member of a trade union, which had procedures for fighting for better working conditions of large segments of industrial employees.

None of these institutions flourishes in contemporary societies. Parties are too slow to articulate interests of quickly evolving society, where many subgroups and subcultures emerge and do not respond to traditional political programs. They become shell-parties, developing professional bureaucrats competing for state functions. Their program is very loosely connected with past programs of their predecessors (e.g.

traditional "leftist" parties - social democrats in the EU member states - supported privatisation and globalization of enterprises as eagerly as did representatives of traditional "right" – liberals, conservatives or Christian democrats). Trade unions cannot cope with a rapid differentiation of employment and with persistence of long-term structural unemployment, have no policies in view of new technologies and do not know how to respond to individualization of employee contracts (who thus fall out of collective ones). They feel compelled to collaborate with the employers, owners and managers, increasing competitiveness of native economy against global rivals instead of trying to increase their members' immediate material benefits. Churches find it difficult to retain necessary flexibility in view of new lifestyles and values and to relate them to the dogmatic traditions. It is, indeed, difficult to allow contraceptives and abortion for some members and forbid them for others, or to forbid them today and to recommend them tomorrow. If links to tradition lead to a dogmatic set of values and beliefs (as is the case with all religions of the book), detraditionalization itself is often highjacked as the safest return to the dogmas of the past in a re-invented institutional framework.

**Among the main causes of this difficulty for older and more authoritarian organizations to survive in a networked society one should thus list detraditionalization (before it becomes an instrument of re-dogmatization in service of a non-traditional bureaucracy – e.g. a communist, religious or nazi party). It is a dual process through which traditional institutional loci of identization loose attractiveness, and as a result identization takes place within social movements or virtual networks, some of which had been already subverted by the traditional and authoritarian institutions. Melucci, Castells and a number of other sociologists of new social movements have already mapped this territory for managers, educators, politicians and the media. Another factor responsible for the weakening of traditional authorities and institutions is an accelerated dissemination of new codes of information and images of representation, both of which facilitate identization. Weakening of traditional institutions of identization is a manifestation of a broader transition towards elective and re-engineered rather than inherited and unchanged affinities. In a sense, we elect our descent as much as we elect our ascent communities** (for a distinction between ascent and descent communities and the proliferation of both types in contemporary societies as a result of a freedom of choice, cf. Morris, 1996).

One should note, however, that these new elective affinities can assume many forms – some of them resembling traditional communities, for instance religious ones, and some transcending territorial boundaries and appealing to a global network. From this last point of view the case of such cultural clashes as the one surrounding Salman Rushdie's "Satanic Verses" is indeed a case in point:

"As a media product circulating in a global domain, *The Satanic Verses* precipitated a violent clash of values that are rooted in different traditions; and while the spatial barriers between these traditions have been eroded by cultural migrations and communication flows, the gulf of understanding remains."(Thompson, 1996, 105)(3)

In other words; the clash was about traditional, religious values – but their triggering by a cultural product from a different civilization would have been impossible without modern processes of mass migrations and global reach of mass media. The clash itself

would be impossible if all parties respected the territorial rights of nation states and global divisions of a Cold War. The fact that Iranian religious leaders expressed their claims in world media ignoring territorial constraints of national systems of justice should not have come as a surprise. Their case ran parallel to the cases of human rights activists encouraging citizens to express their claims in front of the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. In both cases their claims were on behalf of collectives (Islamic communities offended by a legally permitted blasphemy) or individuals (citizens of European states wronged by national legal systems) showing no respect for nation state's sovereign jurisdiction, manifesting an adherence to a post-national and denationalised concept of citizenship (Sassen, 2002, 288). In both cases nation states were disregarded in appeals for justice and in both cases they were unable to control communication flows and information codes (either a language of religious fundamentalism or of human rights). In the case of Salman Rushdie, religious fundamentalists found that the British nation-state failed to accommodate universal moral norms (prohibition of blasphemy), which should take precedence at the expense of citizen liberties (freedom of expression). In the case of individual European citizens claiming to have been wronged by their national systems of justice, lawyers try to find if individuals or groups are systematically excluded from due protection guaranteed by the universal declaration of human rights. In both cases it would have been impossible to disregard nation-state if modern technologies did not allow for communications and virtual community forming beyond nation state's control. How are new communication flows, information codes and images of representation produced, disseminated and used in those and other identization processes in a network society?

### 4. Repertories of representation

How do we go about selecting images of ourselves, and communicating them to the others? How can we guarantee the others' attention to our message and our relevance in view of emergent values? What do we actually do when we construct our identities? Some of them we are socialized into very early in our lives, so that we get the impression of never have chosen at all. Yet we are choosing all the time. We make choices in words, images, codes of communication, linguistic repertoires. We learn to "identify" ourselves not only when displaying a passport in an airport, but more significantly, when recognizing our interests, celebrating our values, organizing our projects, maintaining our links, ties and communications with the others. Individuals going about their business in families, workplaces and urban centres are all involved in identization processes, but rarely perceive them as such. Some organizations and communities try to visualize those identizations by ceremonies (celebrations of a football club victory in city centers, ritual clashes with fans of another sport club), uniforms or special dress (face painting and wrapping in national flags by football fans during international games), etc. However, in ordinary life we usually tend to gloss over numerous identization points we pass (for instance filling in a consumer questionnaire or choosing a product because of its significance in differentiating ourselves from the other, but also, for instance, comparing average wage level in various countries to decide about the level of world capitalist system into which we have been socialized).

Participating in dramatic, non-routine events attracts more attention. Student revolt of 1968 was prompted by a refusal to stay within a repertory of representations of student roles at the university and within society at large. Zapatistas refused to accept a repertory of representations, which hid the poorest peasants from the rest of the Mexican society. The first anti-globalization protest movements are also based on a refusal to stay within a repertory of representations of marginal roles on a stage occupied by multinational corporations and institutions of international governance. Political parties and their cultures were found lacking in appeal to the young generation. Ritualized oppositional roles were found to be lacking in breadth around 1968 – accessible identities seemed "square", conformist and marginalized. Cult film of the period – "Graduate" or "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest" – demonstrated acceptance of students in adult life of a society (in this case through a romance between a student and a mother of his fellow-student or through a radical comparison of establishment with total dictatorship) and implied that the same acceptance should be demanded in university decision-making and in society at large. A popular protest movement against war in Vietnam was increasingly supported also by the working class, which had been bearing most of the burdens of war (as another cult film of the period – "Deer Hunter" – amply demonstrates).(4) Marginalization is also experienced by antiglobalists – Pax Americana excludes too many human societies from meaningful citizenship identities. Moreover, barring some extreme political developments (e.g. the present threat of a preventive war to be waged by the USA against Iraq), this exclusion is often masked by a concept of cultural relativism, which prevents a more thorough analysis of power relations and radical de-marginalization (including de-racialization):

"The notion of cultural relativism transformed coloniality of power into a semantic problem. If we accept that actions, objects, beliefs and so on are culture-relative, we hide the coloniality of power from which different cultures came into being in the first place. The problem, then, is not to accommodate cosmpolitanism to cultural relativism, but to dissolve cultural relativism and to focus on the coloniality of power and the colonial difference produced, reproduced and maintained by global design. Critical cosmopolitanism and new democratic projects imply negotiating the coloniality of power and the colonial difference in a world controlled by global capitalism. Rights of man or human rights, of course, would have to be negotiated across gender lines (…), but also across the coloniality of power that structured and still structures the modern/colonial world around the racially grounded colonial difference."(Mignolo, 2002, 179-180)

Another example of a conscious attempt to uncover tacit assumptions about identity and to modify identization processes was provided by feminist movements questioning gender roles and identities as biased and reflecting male dominated society. Women refused a second rate identity and noticed that both representatives of establishment and of rebellious students displayed the same taught ignorance about gender issues. It is worth noting that in spite of a widespread belief that Islamic countries are much more repressive with respect to women, there have been periods in the late twentieth century, when three Islamic countries have been headed by female prime ministers and presidents, while there has been no female president of the United States or Russia, no female chancellor of Germany or president of France and no female prime minister of Japan or chairperson of Chinese Communist Party yet. Nevertheless, a large-scale deprofessionalization and removal from public sphere of

women in Taliban dominated Afghanistan speaks more vividly to our imagination than statistics about political careers of women in Islamic vs Christian countries.

Why did women decide to identify with a struggle against male domination rather than with a gradual adjustment to a long march through male dominated institutions? Why students choose images of young revolutionaries and of protesters on barricades instead of images of the young managerial cadres of the world's elite marching through educational institutions towards power positions in the world's strongest superpower (as their younger colleagues did throughout the 1980ies and 1990ies, a period of unprecedented growth of MBA education)? Why did women fail to buy the imagery of a firm gender inequality based on ultimate biological differences? Why did students fail to buy the imagery of a rational society in pursuit of wealth and happiness? Why did they fail to buy the imagery of Cold War in 1966 and not in 1961? Why did they refuse to accept an argument about a domino effect of a potential communist conquest of South Vietnam? There was no protest movement when the president of the United States was considering a pre-emptive strike against Soviet missiles in Cuba (1961), although this might have been much more dangerous for world peace than a war in Vietnam (1965).

First, a large increase in the numbers of students in mid-1960ies meant an increase in frequency of generational self-socialization (on a large campus rather than in a tight local community) and thus a radical change in a generational identization processes. As young generations started drifting through educational institutions, they began to use their newly won identities as a base for social actions. A powerful national protest movement against war in Vietnam was born out of a local and modest Free Speech Movement against turning a park into a multi-level parking at the Berkeley campus. It was a local trigger of a national protest movement, which, moreover, had huge echoes all over the world (including Paris, Mexico City, Warsaw, Amsterdam, Prague Frankfurt or Bolonia). Growth of universities, necessitated by modern economy and facilitated by relative affluence gave rise to a new social group looking for new identities. Students did not yet experience class struggle and did not have to serve in Vietnam en masse (young people from lower and less educated classes did), but they acted upon their identities acquired in the course of their student careers and reinforced during the protest movement projects and actions. They could find a common cause (unpopular war in Vietnam), a common denominator (young generation's refusal to accept war propaganda) and a common ground (academic networking and media coverage). The rest was a question of time spent together and experience of a generational participation in the making of world history:

"This is why identities are so important – because they build interests, values and projects, around experience, and refuse to dissolve by establishing specific connections between nature, history, geography and culture. Identities anchor power in some areas of the social structure, and build from there their resistance or their offensives in the informational struggle about the cultural codes constructing the behaviour and, thus, new institutions."(Castells, 1997, 360)

What repertories of representation do we find in contemporary societies, after the student protest movements (1960ies), after collapse of state socialism (1980ies) and after the crises of globalization and its inequalities (around 2000)? Why are populist and rightist politicians emerging in all European countries appealing to xenophobic

identities (Le Pen, Fortuyn, Berlusconi, Haider in the European Union, Metsiar in Slovakia, Lepper in Poland, Zirinovskij in Russia, Mugabe in Zambia)? Why can they tap the resources of popular "resentment" against modernization, against open society and world governance, in spite of clearly insufficient alternative programs?

They tap these resources, because they appeal to the suppressed religiously expressed traditions of universal humanity dating back to the period before the establishment of a nation state (after the peace of Westphalia). However, their populism consists of appealing to the emotions beyond the nation state's regulations, but at the same time channelling them into the political struggle for power precisely in the very same nation states populist politicians are criticizing. Attractiveness of their appeal results from a much more profound inspiration of a pre-nation state debate about "the inclusion of the other" in the European religious, moral and political universe on the eve of a colonial expansion. This is what present day African and South American scholars deconstruct when interpreting the debates of Valdollidad of the early XVIth century, between Juan Gines de Sepulveda and Bartolome de las Casas "about the degree of humanity of Amerindians and the right of Spaniards to declare war, enslave Amerindians and take possession of their land and bodies":

"These inquiries circulated in Europe first in a manuscript form and later in the book entitled Relectio de Indis (Vitoria,1539). In published form, these inquiries were organized into three major issues: (1) whether Amerindians were true "owners" of their lands and other properties and in control of their own social organization;(2) whether instead the emperor and the people were "owners" and had the right to control both Amerindians and other non-Christian people (infidels); and (3) whether the "legal entitlements" were that justified (from a Spanish point of view) Spanish domination of Amerindians.

In today's terminology, Vitoria's inquiry was principally concerned with the idea of "the inclusion of the other". The political aspects of society and international relations were examined with the assumption that every human and rational being (under Greek and Christian parameters) has."(Mignolo,2002, 164)

It is certainly one of the most mysterious ironies of fate that appealing to the universal inclusion of all humans in a civilised community today's populists in the western countries embrace racist prejudice against those representatives of former colonial nations who are currently living in their (mostly western European) urban centers of the former colonial powers. Algerians and Senegalese in France, Moroccans and Surinamese in the Netherlands, Pakistanis or Indians in Great Britain, Ethiopians in Italy, Angolans in Portugal or Kongolese in Belgium are cases in point. As one of the US Arab citizens put it; if September 11 happened in Europe, popular backlash against those perceived as "Arabs" would have been much more bloody and widespread.


5.  Clashes of cultural codes?

Neither the emergence of new socio-political identities in post-colonial Africa or post-WWII Europe, nor the emergence of a student protest movement in the late 1960ies lead to an establishment of sustainable identities. Post-colonial states in Africa and

socialist states of post WWII Europe had failed to secure mass participation, thus alienating significant groups among their populations (and prompting, among others, immigration wave towards the western world). Radical protest movements have deliberately cut off past traditions of identizing offered by the "old Left" (political parties, trade unions) but failed to construct institutions enabling newly won identities to survive in a neutral or hostile institutional environment. However, none of them has been lost without a trace in contemporary identizing processes (although it may not always be immediately visible due to the enormous fragmentation of research and policy areas). First, African countries are being viewed by social scientists and policy analysts as unfinished democratisation and liberation projects, and it is far from clear which course they will steer in the nearest future. After all, even Mugabe is being challenged in spite of a very authoritarian policy of suppressing all forms of opposition. In other words, identizing within these countries, after a particularly bloody period of multiple civil wars and at the beginning of a new millenium is not a foregone conclusion:

"The reform of indirect rule systems in post-independence Africa built on the practice of participation without representation. In the second phase of radical African governments – from Quaddafi and Sankara to early Rawlings and Museveni – this reform became the basis of dismantling authority in the local state without democratising power in the central state. (…) Participatory forms ("empowerment") that stress the autonomy of a bounded group – only to undermine the possibility of an alliance building majority-based representation – can justify and uphold the most undemocratic forms of central power. One only needs to look at the experience of self-initiated squatter settlements in South Africa; many began with an emphasis on participation and ended up with a warlord."(Mamdani, 1996,298-299)

Contemporary African politicians are acutely aware of this uneasy outcome of identization processes.The fact that the president of the Republic of South Africa heads a protest demonstration of thousands of poor South Africans against the international conference on environmental protection testifies to an attempt to break with this authoritarian tradition. The conference, attended by sixty thousand delegates from all over the world and held in one of the most expensive city districts in the whole of Africa in late august 2002, is broadly perceived as insufficient to tackle the problem of global pollution. It is de facto ignored by the governments of the most industrialized countries of the world: the United States and Japan. Members of the European Union are less negligent, but their actions also amount to paying a lip service to the international agreements. Moreover, government delegates sitting in air-conditioned conference rooms are only a stone throw away from one of the poorest slums of Johannesburg, where a provision of running water, sewage, electricity and decent housing is still a challenge defying national and international aid efforts. Therefore the fact that Mr Mbeki has chosen to march with the demonstrators on Saturday, August 31, 2002 rather than remain with the world's delegates inside the "conference city", is a very important symbolic gesture, an act within the identization process of modern South Africans and, more generally, with citizens of what used to be called "the third world". Mr Mbeki is an official host of the official delegates of world governments and global governance platforms. He is also, however, an official head of the alternative demonstration protesting against one-sidedness and post-colonial nature of relief efforts undertaken by official delegations. Cultural codes of international governance (based on nation-state grounded and postcolonially ranked

identities) clash with cultural codes of growing resistance identities - of NGO's, new social movements, citizens' initiatives, anti-globalization protests, regional associations, new political initiatives of African politicians. Cultural codes of the emergent African socio-political identities are also being forged in the same identization processes linked to anti-globalization movements, reflecting a mass protest against systematic inequalities generated by global development and social costs of maintaining it.

For instance, the so called African renaissance movement and its mixed consequences, for instance in the international AIDS debate and in African countries' struggle against pharmaceutical companies producing disease's inhibitors – are a case in point. So are the identities forged in their student period by the present African leaders (e.g. president Mbeki of South African Republic, president Mugabe of Zambia and president Nujoma of Namibia)

The post-communist states in central and eastern Europe have also left their mark on the European Union. During the Cold War they had exercised an ideological pressure on their western counterparts, facilitating development of a welfare state (as a social-democratic or Christian-democratic alternative to the communist rule). Breakdown of the state socialist system signalled by the rise of the Polish "Solidarity" trade union movement in 1980 and completed with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 triggered a dismantling of the welfare state (within the framework of its "privatisation"). The post-communist countries emerged from communism with relatively strong trade union movements and their former communist parties re-emerged as social democratic ones. The very existence of the communist-controlled societies prior to 1980-1989, during the Cold War, made the western European capitalism ("Rheinland" or "polder" model) much more corporatist and welfare state oriented than in the United States. Social security and welfare aspects of collective agreements between employee and employer's organizations are a case in point. They still survive, but they are being undermined by both decreasing membership in large trade unions and by increasing numbers of individualized employment contracts with varied packages of employee benefits and insurances. At present, identizing processes within these countries result in a rough parity between political left and right, with a whole array of smaller political parties and movements trying to incorporate new identities in a political landscape (e.g. ecological or feminist initiatives, local citizens' movements)(5).

There is also another area, in which these post-communist countries are influencing the European Union even before their formal ascent to it. Forthcoming Polish, Czech or Hungarian ascension to the European Union has already triggered attempt at the latter's re-design and re-engineering (cf. German foreign minister, J.Fischer's idea of a federation of European states). Western European populists and liberals (brought together, for instance, in the present Dutch government) try to mobilize mass prejudice by designing a new, lower category of EU-membership (demanding, for instance, re-introduction of obligatory visum for citizens of new EU-member states). The whole European Union, which has proceeded much more swiftly along economic than political lines, is also being redefined vis a vis Russia and Turkey, two large states, which clearly aspire to membership, but whose integration would offer numerous difficulties. For instance, integrating Russia would have to mean integrating a large society with a very low average income per capita, a very weak civil society

virtually deprived of independent media and an overgrown political-military complex of an entrenched authoritarian state. In case of Turkey, Europe is facing a dilemma of a NATO loyalty to an ally and an European allegiance to democratic principles and human rights, both of which are regularly swept aside by the Turkish power elite (behaviour, which is tacitly, somewhat hypocritically, accepted by the EU, since leaving the outcome of domestic political struggles to democratic process might mean victory of anti-democratic Muslim fundamentalists and loss of Turkey both as a reliable NATO member and as a prospective member of the EU).

Some of these difficulties emerge from different cultural codes used by these two countries when modernizing (based on European ones, but adopted selectively). In both countries armed elites took power after the breakdown of the older empire and in both they had preserved the authoritarian model of a state in order to achieve modernization without democratisation (ideology of a revolutionary state in Lenin's Russia and ideology of a religiously neutral nation-state in Attatürk's Turkey) . Again, as in politically changing Africa, identization processes in integrating Europe are also hardly predictable, even if we disregard for the time being the extreme cases of Russia, Turkey and Israel (all of which had formally applied for EU membership). Tackling the problem of radical "otherness" would require a new doctrine of an euro-cosmopolitanism. (6)

New social movements, which had started in the late 1960ies, but which continue through the "green" ecological initiatives, feminist and other alternative movements (devoted to migration, racism, autonomy and self-organization, ecology and conservation, militarization and repression, participative economy, sexual minorities, etc.) of the 1980ies and 1990ies, have recently started developing governance procedures in order to build up a broad platform for antiglobalist and social consulting initiatives (cf. the abovementioned 2nd European Conference on People's Global Action, Aug.31-Sept.4,2002 in Leiden, The Netherlands). This is paralleled by growth of open platforms as a flexible form of organization and coordination, e.g. by the European Social Consulta project, which plans an international conference on February 22-24, and relies on online communities.(7)  However, these new social movements and the growth of information and communication technologies (primarily the spread of the Internet and mobile phone communications) have influenced the cultural codes in which new identization processes are taking place. They have, according to some scholars, influenced the very logic of culture, thanks to which a global training in cultural individualization serves as a cultural code for personal identization and social consumption (in societies, which have started replacing the concept of religion with the concept of culture):

"…in the modern era the logic of culture is gradually extended to encompass economic behaviour and the leisure practices of the social body, becoming a universal paradigm of identity formation and differentiation that is complicitous with, or parasitic upon (depending on one's point of view), the spread of capitalism. Inseparable from the practices of material production and consumption that accompany the globalization of the marketplace, a diluted form of self-cultivation seeks personal distinction in the consumption and acquisition of translinguistic, transnational symbols. The result is a generalized economy of self-conscious identity formation that penetrates every corner of the globe at the level of the material

practice, where it can operate the recruitment of individuals into social and economic norms under the guise of fostering their individuality."(Ray, 2001,11-12)

The view expressed above should be qualified: while it is indeed possible to try to decode cultural codes by way of detecting a "matrix code" of modernity and postmodernity, it can only be done ex post, by historians. We should not therefore avoid jumping to conclusions – for instance, that processes of contemporary identization are parallel to processes of economic and political globalization and resistance to it. Processes of identizing are linked to globalization issues, but these links are far from clear. On the one hand globalization broadens the repertory of symbolic images picked up in the local identization processes (e.g. French farmers burning McDonald's), on the other accelerated identization makes globalization's influence upon local situations much more visible. Globalization is a complex megaprocess composed of many processes in economics, politics and culture (some of which can be happening even if nobody is aware of them), while identization is a much more basic and local bunch of small and large processes, which occur continuously (simultaneously bottom-up and top-down), are much more intimately experienced by human individuals (i.e. a situation in which one identifies with some distant ideal but is unaware of this identification is extremely rare). Identization would have occurred even if globalization had never emerged, but globalization with its colonial and decolonising past would have been either very different or impossible without increasingly complex and conflicting identization processes.(8)

We should also avoid an assumption that an inquiry must reveal a causal bond between, let us say, a globally expanding market economy, a political domination of parliamentary democracies and an ideological hegemony of a culture of individualized consumption. This is not necessarily the case - as the conflicts with fundamentalist religious groups (Christian militias in the USA, Al Queyda network in Afganistan, extreme sects assaulting subway with poisonous gas in Tokyo) clearly indicate. Clashes between world governance structures (WTO, IMF, WG) and anti-globalists are also symptomatic for lack of consensus about optimising cultural, political and economic institutions. Moreover, individuals do not simply grow into patterns of socialization and do not "fall" blindly into the individualized consumption as a result of concentrated efforts and one-sided persuasion attempts. They are also quite capable of selectively detraditionalizing, that is, picking up fragments of traditions and leaving the others aside. They are quite capable of organizing themselves in flexible, often virtual networks and promoting lifestyles (and consumption patterns), which differ from those prevailing in a society at large.

Cultural and subcultural resources are continually re-invented, rejuvenated, recycled and re-engineered, and all of this happens amidst political, economic and cultural struggle. All societies, in spite of detraditionalization, preserve some institutional traces of former movements, former resistance to authority and networking for change. Almost all known societies try to preserve their social capital by cultivating social bonds, links and contacts, by encouraging informal networks of trust, solidarity and cooperation (Melucci's "hidden networks of belonging, of pre-existing solidarity networks") and by creating platforms for these informal networks to be heard (again, Melucci's term "civic listening spaces" captures the essence of this phenomenon).

Are contemporary clashes of cultural codes birth pangs of new global governance structures, processes and agencies or platforms? Or are they expressions of contradictions signalling the limits of controllability and coordination in complex societies with virtual communicational backups? There is definitely an inflation of phrases indicating conflicting cultural codes: "cultural revolution, cultural evolution, culture shock, culture wars, cultural capital, corporate culture, counter culture, working-class culture, popular culture, high culture, the culture of personality, cultural literacy, the culture industry, multiculturalism, cultural diversity, cultural opportunity, cultural studies" (cf. Ray, 2001, 2) – but what does it mean? Does it mean that we are becoming increasingly aware of cross-cultural issues involved in designing, implementing and running global governance projects? Or does it mean that we are stumbling upon levels of complexity, emergence and risk, which surpass our managerial and cognitive skills and capabilities, our organizational know-how and our ideological resources? Growth pains of global governance procedures or dead end streets of global mismanagement? In spite of a biased and one-sided coverage of African developments in world media, even there cautious hopes are being expressed:

"What the analysis goes on to demand,(…) is the invention of a state appropriate to a postimperialist future. To those who prudently reply that it cannot be done, the answer will be that it can certainly be thought of. Cases spring to mind. It was already beginning to be thought of, even during the dreadful 1980s, in the projects of sixteen country Economic Community of West African States, and, potentially again, in those of the nine-country Southern African Development Coordination Conference launched a little later. Each set of projects supposed a gradual dismantlement of the nation-state legacy derived from imperialism, and the introduction of participatory structures within a wide regionalist framework."(Davidson, 1992, 321-322)

Let us hope for the increasing global governance and regional integration, but let us focus on the obstacles in order to understand our elective affinities and identities and to account for them in managing our integration – regional, continental and, presumably, hopefully, global.

<div align="right">Krimpen a/d Ijssel, September 22, 2002</div>

# Notes

(1) It is quite revealing to compare the paternalistic attitude of the first European politicians tackling the working class problems to the words spoken by general Jan Smuts, South African prime minister during his Rhodes Memorial lectures at oxford in 1929: "The African… has largely remained a child type, with a child psychology and outlook. A child-like human cannot be a bad human, for are we not in spiritual matters bidden to be like unto little children? Perhaps as a direct result of this temperament the African is the only happy human I have come across" (Mamdani,1996,4)

(2) Teaching in Cairo within the elitist MBA program run jointly by Regional Information Technology Institute of Egypt and Maastricht School of Management in the 1990ies I was surprised by a gradual re-appearance of the Muslim head covering by female students. All of them came from middle and upper classes of the Egyptian society, and in the beginning of the 1990ies all of them dressed in a fashionable, western way, drove western cars and spent their holidays in Europe or in the United States. The fact that some of them embraced Muslim fundamentalism in spite of belonging to the privileged class (and thus being able to enjoy the western consumption standards) testifies to the power of identization. Castells is probably right when he writes that: "the social roots of radical fundamentalism (of which female head gear among middle class women is but a faint reflection, but bloody terrorist attacks on tourists in Luxor is not  – S.M.) appear to derive from the combination of successful state-led modernization in the 1950ies and 1960ies and the failure of economic modernization in most Muslim countries during the 1970ies and 1980ies, as their economies could not adopt to the new conditions of global competition and technological revolution in the latter period. Thus, a young urban population, with a high level of education as a result of the first wave of modernization, was frustrated in its expectations, as the economy faltered and new forms of cultural dependency set in."(Castells, 1997, 18)

(3) Cross-cultural clash of values illustrated by the case of Salman Rushdie's allegedly blasphemous novel, "Satanic Verses", should not obscure the fact that on balance, relationships between Islamic and Christian communities cannot be reduced to a simplified image of a backward Islam trying to drag progressive Christianity back to Middle Ages. One should keep in mind that: "just about the time Canada was briefly experimenting for the first time with a woman prime minister in 1993, three different Muslim countries had women prime ministers, and one of them had a woman leader of an opposition. Here were cultural silences, sins of omission. Pakistan, Turkey, and Bangladesh (all Muslim countries) have had women as chief executives, whereas the united States has had no woman president, Germany no woman chancellor, and Russia no woman president."(Mazrui, 2001, 113)

(4) "Apocalypse Now" by Francis Ford Coppola is another cult film on Vietnam, but its message is slightly less domestic and more global. Coppola reconstructs the Vietnam war from the perspective of an ironically criticized "white man's burden", that is from the point of Conrad's long short story

"Heart of Darkness". He sees in this war another episode in colonial tradition of the West.

(5) Let us keep in mind that this accelerated identization (individuals have to define themselves within a dynamically changing political landscape with parties disappearing and emerging all the time) takes place in the context of a post-communist awareness of a peripheral position compared to Western Europe (a resentment close to the postcolonial resentments in Africa) – succinctly expressed the situation of these countries in the following way: "After a century of revolts against peripheral backwardness, after several, though different types of, revolutions and four decades of desperate experiment, in the end always ended up where they started. After its long detour, Central and Eastern Europe was still languishing on the periphery of Europe."(Berend,1998,xvi)

(6) Historical analogies are often misleading. Nevertheless, one wonders what would provide a present day equivalent of a correctional doctrine of papacy to match the 16th century situation in which "the religion-state (as opposed to a later nation-state ideologically introduced by Kant and the Enlightenment – S.M.) became instrumental as a replacement for the emperor and the pope in international relations, and in which a Christian cosmopolitanism was advanced as a correction of the Castillian crown's global designs"(Mignolo, 2002, 167). This argument, in turn, ties in with an argument often voiced in modern Christian debates about the self-secularization of the European Christianity: "Will the concept of the course of history as driven towards emancipation by diminishing strong structures (in thought, individual consciousness, political power, social relations, and religion) not be a transcription of the Christian message… of the dissolution of Western metaphysics?"(Vattimo, 2002, 91)

(7) In a manifesto of an European Social Consulta we read: "If other worlds are possible, we should take initiative at their construction. We need ambitious, strategic, and long-term projects that make collective mobilization possible. We need projects that focus on the local, and which allow to connect day-to-day issues with global struggles. We should move forward from an informed position and from active social debate, from collective participation and mobilization, from convergence and diversity of our groups and social movements. In opposition to the Europe of capital we should construct the Europe of the peoples. In opposition to a collective "dumbing down" we should spread popular culture and education.(…) The ESC is an experimental ship for social transformation. It is an utopian project that emerges from the margins of information society in order to produce cracks in "Fortress Europe"". (cf. http://www.consultaeuropea.org) The movement was born in Spain – in Barcelona and Madrid (Catalanian Polytechnic that runs the server carrying this network organization's website)

(8) Identization processes involve - by definition - self-scrutiny, which globalizing agencies can avoid or postpone. However, with the increasing transparency of global activities the identization processes cannot remain uninfluenced. The recent emergence of a right-wing identization of the USA

as the sole superpower entitled to wage multiple preventive wars without considering either allies, international governance bodies (blatant disregard of the United Nations) or third parties (Arab league countries) is an interesting example of a merger of globalizing and identizing processes in political choices of the US power elite.

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