

# Political influence on public appointments in the Netherlands: the X-factor?

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Respondents report  
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## **Preface**

This report contains the primary findings from a study that took place from mid 2008 until mid 2009. This study investigates whether political parties and/or actors associated with political parties can and do exert influence on the appointment of public officials, both within the national administration and in semi-public organizations. The study is part of an international, comparative study into 'party patronage' that was conducted in the same time period in fourteen European countries.

In the Netherlands, 47 interviews were held with experts on nine policy sectors. I am indebted to the participation and frankness of the (anonymous) respondents, for without their willingness to talk this study would not have been possible.

Next to this report, a number of other (scientific) publications are scheduled to appear. If you are interested to learn more about the project and/or the publications, please contact the researcher.

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## Research design

This study investigates whether political parties try to influence appointments in the (semi)-public sector. To this end, a qualitative survey was carried out following an international research protocol. First, a map of the state was made, sampling similar organizations in nine policy sectors in fourteen European countries. In the Dutch case this amounted to 71 organizations, see Appendix 1. Second, all appointment procedures for these selected organizations were analyzed to ascertain which formal arrangements are in place. Third, interviews were held following a topic list (see Appendix 2). For each policy sector five experts were interviewed leading to a total of 45 or more interviews, depending on the size of the sector. Appendix 3 shows which Dutch experts were interviewed and what their expertise entailed. Respondents will remain anonymous in this report, so there will be no interview quotes and conclusions are always based on the responses of multiple respondents. Finally, the data from the interviews was coded and stored in a database (SPSS) to be able to perform some statistical analyses. The database will be merged with the data from fourteen other countries, where the same study was carried out using the same methodology.<sup>1</sup>

In this report the primary findings from the interviews are described. Data is presented about the respondents and their answers. Topics that will be dealt with include the scope and reach of party patronage, motives for political parties to try to influence appointments, appointment practices and sector differences. Findings will only be described, not explained or tested. The report is in English because of the comparative nature of the international project.

## Respondents

From mid 2008 until spring 2009, a total of 47 interviews were held with 49 respondents; two interviews took place with two respondents at the same time. Two respondents were interviewed about more than one policy sector, leading to 51 observations in the database (see Table 1).

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<sup>1</sup> The project is co-ordinated by prof.dr. Peter Mair (EU Institute Florence) and dr. Petr Kopecky (University of Leiden). Participating researchers come from Austria, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary and The Netherlands.

**Table 1. Number of respondents per sector**

Sector	Respondents	Sector	Respondents
Economy	5	Health care	4
Finance	3	Culture and education	6
Judiciary	5	Foreign Affairs & development aid	5
Media	6	Regional and local government	6
Military and Police	9	Civil service in general	2

Appendix 3 lists the names of the respondents, and provides an indication of their expertise. A snowball sample was used to select the respondents. In most cases, a first respondent was selected through personal and professional networks of the researcher. Each respondent was asked to name persons who could be interviewed. Non-response was low; only two persons refused to participate in the study, and one interview was cancelled because of a job change.

Respondents were selected because of their expert knowledge of certain policy sectors. The selection of respondents also aimed to obtain a diverse sample, to obtain viewpoints from appointees, appointers, and independent observers. Table 2 provides an overview of the variation in background of respondents.

**Table 2. Background of respondents**

	Number
(Former) public official or (top) civil servant	18
Member of non-executive board	8
(Former) politician	8
Academic	8
Appointed official (in semi-public organization)	5
Independent	2

### **Selection of organizations**

For this study, nine policy sectors were selected (see Table 1). For each sector a number of organizations were selected, divided into three groups: ministries or ministerial units, non-departmental agencies/bodies, and executive organizations. Note that this selection is tailored to the needs of the international project; an international comparable set of organizations is selected, which does not fit entirely with the administrative, legal and sectoral peculiarities of individual countries.

Appendix 1 shows which organizations have been selected for the Dutch case. This ranges from pure state organizations – such as ministries, tax service, inspectorates, prosecution office, and intelligence agencies – to (privatized) state owned companies (SOC) like the Dutch railways, telecommunications and Gas Company. In

between these extremes, four types of organizations can be distinguished according to their legal status in Dutch law:

1. Contract Agencies (in Dutch: agentschappen) have no legal personality and all their decisions are subject to full ministerial accountability. Their autonomy is restricted to managerial decisions, within legal and financial boundaries. All employees are civil servants.
2. Independent Administrative Bodies (in Dutch: ZBOs); almost all ZBOs have legal personality, which can be based on public (about 60% of cases) or private law (about 40%). Their performance is only in part subject to ministerial accountability.
3. Legal Entities with a Statutory Task (in Dutch: RWT) are statutory bodies with legal personality, either based on public or private law. In practice, most of these bodies are school boards. Other examples are museums and university hospitals.
4. Water Boards and other public bodies as determined by article 134 of the Dutch Constitution are entirely independent bodies. As of 2004, the Water Boards are elected bodies.

Most of these organizations are included in the categories 'non-departmental agencies' and 'executive agencies' of the international project. Finally, a number of advisory bodies is included; officially recognized by the state, with their own statutes and a high degree of independence. The most exceptional organization in the selection is the national court of audit (in Dutch: Algemene Rekenkamer), which has its own constitutional basis and independence.

In total, 71 organizations have been selected. See Table 3 for the different categorizations.

**Table 3. Selected organizations per category**

International project		Dutch legal types	
Type	Number	Type	Number
Ministries or ministerial units	11	Ministries or ministerial units	18
Non-departmental agencies	39	Contract agency	9
Executive bodies	21	ZBO	23
		RWT	3
		State Owned Company	4
		Other	14

## Scope and reach of patronage

The analysis of the formal appointment procedures in the selected organizations shows that appointments are generally the prerogative of the parent minister i.e. the minister who is in charge of the policy sector in which organizations are active (in at least 85% of the organizations, see Figure 1 below). For example, all civil servants are appointed by the minister. This includes employees of contract agencies as well. In practice, ministers are actively involved in the appointment of top civil servants like directors, directors-general (DG) and secretaries-general (SG). Lower level appointments are mandated to the SG.

For the appointment to top positions (salary scale >15, usually DG and SG) a special procedure applies because of the involvement of the so-called ABD (in Dutch: Algemene Bestuursdienst). This service was established in 1995 to improve the management capabilities and mobility of top civil servants. The ABD manages a pool of top civil servants; in fact, these civil servants are employees of the Home Office (BZK). Therefore, the minister of the Home Office has to co-sign the appointment decision of top civil servants.

All appointments of ABD members are temporary; top civil servants are expected to take up a new position every five years (or shorter in case of interim management). About 35% of the directors of the 71 organizations for the study reported here are member of the ABD.

The ABD is not an entirely closed circuit; about 10% of job openings are expected to be fulfilled by outside candidates. There are three evident exceptions to the application of the ABD-procedures, namely the armed forces, the diplomat service and the judiciary. In each of these sectors, directors are civil servants but because additional requirements are made about the training background and/or previous career, outsiders are hardly ever appointed (or considered).

The ABD has expanded its scope over time to include appointments to international positions and lower level governments. In 2008 a pilot was started regarding appointments to ZBOs. For more information see [www.algemenebestuursdienst.nl](http://www.algemenebestuursdienst.nl).

There are two noteworthy exceptions to the ministerial prerogative of appointments: appointments to the High Council (the highest court) and the Netherlands Court of Audit have to be approved by parliament.

Next to the strong influence of the minister on appointments within the ministry, they are also quite often responsible for appointments to organizations at arms' length (see Table 4). This can involve the appointment of the CEO and members of executive and non-executive boards (in Dutch: raad van toezicht). And in those cases where the appointment constitutes a Royal Decision (in Dutch: Koninklijk Besluit), the

minister will nominate a candidate. This nomination is discussed in the council of ministers that usually agrees with the nomination, after which the Queen will sign the appointment decision. Although the minister does not formally appoint in such cases, his influence is still extensive.


**Table 4. Formal appointment procedures (ministries excluded)**

Appointment of CEO (N=60)		Appointment of members of non-executive board (N=30)	
Minister of parent ministry	45%	Minister of parent ministry	37%
Board of the organization	31%	Board of the organization	23%
Royal Decision	14%	Royal Decision	40%


In the case of the appointment of members of non-executive boards, nominations play an important role. Boards nominate a candidate to the minister (7 out of 10) or themselves (co-optation was found in 7 organizations), and ministers nominate to the council of ministers in case of a Royal Decision (9 out of 11).

Interestingly, respondents tend to underestimate the (formal) influence of the minister. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of respondents that states that politicians and/or political parties can influence appointments is lower than is formally the case. Sometimes this can be attributed to a lack of knowledge about specific organizations and their statutes, but more generally these respondents stated that the formal role of the minister is no more than a rubberstamp on the nomination or selection of the best candidate – prepared by the administration and/or professional headhunting agencies. The minister’s signature on the appointment decision is only a formality according to these respondents and can therefore not be interpreted as ‘influence’.

In sum, while the formal influence of the minister is quite large (85% of executive bodies, 89% of non-departmental agencies, and all appointments in ministries), respondents rate the *political* influence of ministers and political parties somewhat lower. In particular, all respondents agree that if political parties can exert influence at all, it is only through ministers who belong to their party. This raises the question how appointments are influenced in practice; do parties try to influence appointments through their ministers? Or, in other words, do ministers appoint candidates for party political reasons?




**Figure 1. Can appointments be influenced formally by politicians and/or political parties? (% of agreement)**



**Figure 2. In how many institutions do political actors/parties influence appointments? (% respondents agreement)**

Partisan appointments do occur, according to the respondents (66%), but there are large differences between organizations and sectors. Political actors are interested in the appointment of some organizations but not all (see Figure 2). Some positions and organizations are rated as more politically salient for example because of the size of the organization (budget), their visibility (in the media and political debate), their accident prone nature, or because of their prestige. Important regulatory authorities like AFM (financial markets) and NZA (health authority) and longstanding institutionalized advisory bodies like SER are highest on the wish list of political actors/parties.

Figure 3 and Table 5 offer more detail of the interest of political parties. Figure 3 shows that political influence is exerted more frequently in appointments within ministries and non-departmental agencies (in about 70% of the organizations) than in executive agencies. In fact, there is no room for political influence in the majority of executive agencies (53%), according to the respondents. Therefore, it would seem that the closer a position is to the core of the government, the more interested political actors are in trying to influence appointments.



**Figure 3. Do political parties/actors influence appointments in practice, per category of organizations? (% respondents agreement)**

The sector where respondents report the highest degrees of influence by political parties and actors concerns the media, in particular broadcasting (see Table 5). This is a relatively small sector compared to the other sectors in this study, but due to the

Dutch history of pillarization it is still a highly politicized one. Respondents report that political parties are very interested in vacancies and will actively seek opportunities to push candidates from their own network. The reader should note that the Dutch broadcasting sector is very complex; there are several broadcasting associations, most of which are based on ideological and religious convictions. These are private organizations, but funded by the government based on the number of members. In the boards of these private organizations one can find many (former) politicians, because their political networks offers access to the political arena and/or other resources. This is known as patronage from the demand side.<sup>2</sup>

The Dutch broadcasting sector was recently reorganized, and one new public broadcasting company (NPO) was established. Appointments to the non-executive board of NPO are now the minister's prerogative; before all broadcasting associations formed the board. The appointment of the CEO has become the prerogative of the non-executive board. All respondents agree that the appointment of the most recent CEO of NPO is a typical (and the first) example of de-politicization; the selection of the appointed candidate was based solely on merit.

In sum, the reduction of the influence of private broadcasting associations and political parties has been formalized with the implementation of the new system structure, but in practice political parties remain very interested in all vacancies.

**Table 5. Do political parties/actors influence appointments, per sector? (% yes)**

	Formal	Expert opinion	Party influence	Large role of party	Most institutions	Top level only
Economy	80%	100%	100%	40%	60%	100%
Finance	100%	67%	33%	33%	0%	67%
Judiciary	100%	60%	20%	0%	20%	60%
Media	100%	33%	100%	100%	67%	100%
Military Police	78%	63%	25%	22%	0%	33%
Health care	100%	83%	83%	0%	0%	50%
Culture Educ.	100%	100%	100%	25%	0%	25%
Foreign & dev.	100%	100%	80%	40%	20%	80%
Regional Local	100%	100%	50%	40%	20%	40%

Appointments in two other sectors are also considered politicized: economy and foreign affairs and development aid. In the case of economy, respondents often refer to the appointment of SER members and the appointment of a number of market regulators like NMA as examples of appointments in which political parties/actors are most interested. In fact, the composition of the SER reflects the power distribution in

<sup>2</sup> Piattoni, S. (ed.). (2001). *Clientelism, interests and democratic representations: the European experience in historical and comparative perspective*. Cambridge University Press.

parliament as far as the Crown Members are concerned; each party has its share of Crown Members. In the case of foreign affairs the appointment of ambassadors or international representatives (with UN or EU) is frequently mentioned as a reward for loyal party members. Although the diplomat service is a typical career service where officials have to rise through the ranks – moving from less interesting posts to more prestigious ones – on occasion outsiders will be appointed. Career diplomats will not openly express discontent with such appointments (because of their loyalty to the minister) but they are frowned upon.

Two other interesting conclusions can be made based on Table 5. First, appointments in the ministries of health care, and education and culture are considered much politicized but appointments in organizations at arms’ length in those sectors are not. This explains the somewhat contradictory findings for these sectors. And second, appointments in the military, judiciary and financial sector are the least politicized. Positions in these sectors require a certain background (training, prior experience), which precludes appointments of outsiders and for non-merit reasons.

If political influence is exerted on appointments it usually concerns only the top level appointments (directors, CEO, DG, SG, boards), and not lower level appointments. Respondents report the least influence on appointments, even in the top positions, in the sectors of culture and education, and the military and police. For example, in the military the minister is involved in appointments until the rank of colonel, but all other officers are appointed by the central commander CDS (who is himself appointed by the minister).

Based on the respondents’ answers, we can now calculate the scope and reach of party patronage for the nine Dutch policy sectors (see Table 6).

**Table 6. Scope and reach of party patronage**

	<b>Ministry</b>	<b>NDA</b>	<b>Executive</b>	<b>Overall</b>
Formal influence (0-1)	1.00	1.00	0.85	0.96
Expert opinion (0-1)	0.86	0.76	0.49	0.67
Party can influence (0-1)	0.74	0.69	0.47	0.60
Role of party (0-1)	0.18	0.40	0.37	0.34
How many institutions (0-2)	1.18	1.20	0.85	1.05
Level (0-3)	0.79	0.80	0.59	0.70


*Conclusions*

Political parties can influence appointments in the nine Dutch policy sectors because ministers are in charge of these appointments in almost all the organizations in this study – although less in the executive organizations. Experts rate this influence lower because they make a distinction between the formal role of a minister in appoint-

ments and potential partisan influences. Certain sectors are more prone to political influence (media, economy, foreign affairs) than others (military and policy, judiciary, finance). And certain organizations attract more interest from political parties (SER, broadcasting, and regulatory authorities) than others. However, political influence never reaches beyond the top level positions.

**Motives for party patronage**

Why would political parties/actors be interested in appointments, and try to influence them? What would they hope to gain from this influence? Figure 4 shows the motives that respondents have mentioned for political parties and actors to influence appointments. It is difficult to generalize the motives; most respondents state that in one organization one motive can be important, and in another organization another motive. Hence, the answer ‘mixed’ is the largest category.



**Figure 4. Motives for political parties to influence appointments (% of respondents)**

Clientelism (rewarding loyal party activists) is more exception than rule. Although many respondents mention examples of appointments as rewards, these examples are said to be exceptions – most respondents also mention the same examples for example of former ministers or members of parliament (MPs) being appointed as the CEO of an important regulatory authority, or as the mayor of a municipality. More-

over, even in such cases it is rare that an appointee is considered incompetent for the function, which makes it difficult to pinpoint whether these appointments are indeed the result of favouritism of politicians/ministers.


The motive that is mentioned most often by the respondents refers to the control that political parties or ministers hope to gain by appointing a trustee to a certain position. Because of the inherent trust in an appointee from the same party, parties and ministers hope to have easy access to information - through the mutual network lines. Also, it is assumed that the appointee will carry out his task in a way that fits with the beliefs or plans of the appointer and/or the political party. However, many respondents also state that it is not uncommon for an appointee to do just the opposite, to demonstrate their independence and disprove that they are appointed because of their political affiliations – because appointees fear that they would not be considered competent. Members of non-executive boards and CEOs will act in the best interest of the organization they serve, rather than in line with the party programme.

Other motives that are mentioned (18%) refer to for example the appointment of personal friends or former colleagues/associates. Again, the implicit trust and familiarity between appointer and appointee is decisive to such decisions. On occasion, respondents have mentioned examples of an appointment as 'getting rid' of someone; for example, a minister who cannot get along with a top civil servant may appoint him/her to another position, outside the ministry.

Despite the existence of these motives for party patronage, almost all respondents (96%, see Figure 5) agree that the most important criterion for an appointment is merit; professional competencies, skills, and experience determine whether a certain candidate is selected and appointed. This fits with the growing trend of professionalization of selection procedures, by using head hunting agencies and assessments (tests) which will be discussed later on.

The dominance of merit as criterion for appointments is however interpreted in different ways. Most respondents have noted a change in the appreciation of certain skills and competencies in the public domain; rather than substantive knowledge of a certain sector, top level officials nowadays have to have managerial skills. About half of the respondents appreciate this change, but the other half considers it to be a change for the worse. The rise of managerialism in the public sector places more emphasis on knowledge of managerial and political processes rather than knowledge about the policy history of a sector, a network of contacts and the ability to determine the fit of a new policy in a specific sector/tradition. Respondents who consider the increased mobility of civil servants – partly due to the ABD – a good development, point to the benefits of the influx of new ideas (fresh eyes, innovations) and the improvement of the management of public organizations (application of new techniques like performance indicators). Respondents who consider the increased mobility a bad

development point to the memory loss of the government, the constant need for (structural) change and a short term focus, which leads to the destruction of knowledge, organizations, networks and traditions, inefficiency and poor policy.



**Figure 5. Criteria for appointment (% of respondents)**

Respondents also have different opinions about the role of political affiliations in the selection and appointment procedures. Political affiliations can refer both to someone's viewpoints and to his/her membership of a political party. While 64% of the respondents mention political affiliations as important to appointments, this can take on different forms. First, most top level officials in public and semi-public organizations have to have a degree of sensitivity for political matters as that is required for their function. Therefore, they usually have a certain degree of political awareness, regardless of being a member of a political party. Second, public officials are more oriented and interested in the public 'cause or interest'; that is often why they want to work in the public sector. This awareness can be translated into a party membership. But even without a party membership, it is often not difficult to find out what viewpoints a certain top level official holds from his/her past performance. Respondents therefore state that even if it is not public knowledge to which party a certain candidate belongs, 'one usually has a pretty good idea where (s)he stands'. Therefore it is not a question that is asked of candidates, according to all (!) respondents. Third, outright partisan appointments – where the appointer appoints a fellow party member – are rare. In fact, many respondents state that 'a strong minister will ap-

point candidates from other parties to create a system of checks and balances'. Or an appointer will appoint a candidate because his/her viewpoints fit with the requirements of a specific function or task. Particularly when changes have to be implemented, either in policy or in the organization, an appointer will select a candidate who has similar viewpoints about those changes and/or has prior experience with similar changes.

In sum, the political element does play an important role in appointments in the Dutch public domain, but seldom in a partisan way. In fact, when asked 91% of the respondents state that Dutch political parties have a strong tradition of distributing and sharing appointments. This fits with the Dutch tradition of consociationalism, in which coalition cabinets are seeking consensus and societal support. This distribution of appointments is most visible in the (representative) composition of advisory bodies and non-executive boards. To outsiders, the distribution of appointments may seem a very political process, but it is actually an attempt to depoliticize decision and policy making.

The third and final criterion for appointments (personal, see Figure 5) refers to two processes: (1) appointments of former associates/colleagues and (2) the appointment of a candidate who is 'known' for his/her performance and viewpoints. The personality and reputation of a candidate can contribute to his/her appointment.

### *Conclusion*

Political affiliations of candidates do play a role in their appointment, but in different and rather opaque ways. Respondents conclude that it is the 'mix' of professional competencies, political sensitivity and personal reputation that determine whether a candidate is appointed. Political elements are thus the X-factor in appointment procedures; you have to have it, but nobody knows exactly what it is.

### **Appointment practices**

One of the reasons why respondents conclude that political parties cannot exert direct influence on appointments is the increased professionalization of selection and appointment procedures. The use of head hunting agencies and assessments in the selection of candidates reduces the chances of candidates to be appointed because of their political affiliations. Political parties who push candidates for certain positions will have to make sure that their candidate is qualified and competent, and even then they cannot be certain that (s)he is the best candidate who will 'win' the selection.

The professionalization of the appointment procedures fits with the aforementioned rise of managerialism. Moreover, because of managerialism the managerial competencies of candidates are becoming more and more important. In the Dutch system, political functions are not always seen as executive or managerial, which

probably explains why a number of respondents have said that managerialism has reduced the appointment opportunities for former politicians. All in all, managerialism is one of the most important changes in appointment practices over the last decades (see Table 7), also because it is linked to a number of other changes: professionalization of procedures, more mobility, and shorter terms of appointment.

De-politicization is mentioned most often. This refers to two interrelated changes: (1) the decrease of the influence of national political parties and (2) the decentralization of appointment decisions. In many cases, the national government has hived off the responsibility to make appointments to for example the non-executive boards of semi-public organizations (like the board of commissioners of state owned companies). In the case of the appointment of mayors municipal councils have been granted more influence; they nominate a candidate and this nomination is usually accepted by the minister of the Home Office and affirmed by Royal Decision. The traditional influence of national political parties has consequently been reduced, in favour of local political parties (in the council). More information on mayoral appointments will be given below.

**Table 7. Changes in appointment practices**

	<b>Mentioned by # respondents</b>
De-politicization of sector	16
Managerialism	14
Gender debate	9
Professionalization of procedures	8
Parties have become more active	4
More mobility within the sector	4
Shorter terms of appointment	2
No changes	2
Other	1

A very recent change in appointment practices is the gender debate. The number of women in top positions in the Dutch public sector is very low. (See for example the number of female respondents in this study.) The current cabinet has therefore issued policies to appoint more women. One example is the announcement of the minister of the Home Office that the next police head commissioner has to be a woman, or else the minister will not appoint the nominated candidate. Respondents are generally sympathetic to the debate, although some question the effectiveness of such measures.

Finally, a number of respondents has mentioned that some political parties have become more active in their attempts to influence appointments in the public sector. Table 7 lists only four respondents who have mentioned this as a change, but during the interviews the increased interest of parties in appointments was mentioned

quite often. Parties do differ however strongly in how active they are in this respect, and also how organized they go about it. CDA was mentioned by about one third of the respondents as the most successful party when it comes to obtaining a share of appointments. There are different explanations for this success. The size and governing tradition of the party were mentioned most often; CDA has the highest number of seats in parliament, and has been in office for over 80 years – except in the 1990s when two consecutive cabinets were formed without CDA. According to the respondents, this absence of power has traumatized the party and has led to a severe loss of appointment opportunities. As a result, CDA members have been very active in pushing and appointing candidates from their party since their return to power after 2000, according to these respondents. But CDA is also applauded by respondents for being a ‘governors’ party which has a strong tradition of supplying good candidates for board and CEO positions. Moreover, CDA is well reputed for having a system to keep track of upcoming vacancies and potential candidates (see Table 8 and more below). Other political parties are reported to be less interested and less active, either because party patronage does not fit with their (liberal) viewpoints, because the party network is less coherent, or because they are small parties without the resources to supply candidates and/or keep track of interesting positions. Almost all respondents agree however that in the Dutch system no party is excluded from the opportunity to obtain a share of appointments; candidates of opposition parties are not excluded because of their affiliations. However, parties do have to be acknowledged by other parties as being a trustworthy party i.e. by being stable or durable and well-organized. New parties will therefore have to wait a while before they can enter into the distributive system of appointments.

As mentioned, some parties have a well-organized system to keep track of vacancies and select potential candidates from the party network. This system is known to almost half (43%) of the respondents as the ‘party lobbyist’, a member of parliament who is in charge of this task (see Table 8).<sup>3</sup> Originally, the party lobbyist was in charge of selecting and pushing candidates for mayoral appointments. During the times of pillarization, political parties had a strict distribution formula for mayoral positions, especially in the four largest cities of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague). However, because of depillarization this formula is no longer upheld – as the appointment of the mayor of Rotterdam during this study showed. Respondents expected Rotterdam to get a CDA mayor, but instead the municipal council selected a PVDA politician who was consequently appointed by Royal Decision.

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<sup>3</sup> The party lobbyist was mentioned by respondents from all sectors, except from the sector of foreign affairs and development aid.

**Table 8. Within political parties, who is in charge of appointments?**

	Mentioned by # respondents
'Party lobbyist'	21
Party network	7
Spokesmen in parliament	6
Minister	5
Party leader	3
Members of parliament	2
Do not know	5

The loss of influence of national parties on mayoral appointments has not meant a reduction of their interest in appointments. On the contrary, respondents mentioned several examples of activities by the party lobbyist and other party members, or even an expansion of lobbying to functions within the administration and in semi-public organizations. Also, respondents referred to party initiatives to make inventories of potential candidates for all kinds of functions, within the party and for certain public functions, and the existence of talent scouting committees that assess the capabilities of proposed candidates and interested party members. These examples were not limited to CDA, but also included parties like VVD and PVDA.

It is not always clear – including for respondents – who is involved in selecting, nominating and pushing candidates from the party network. The information about vacancies is spread throughout the network, at different occasions (meetings). In some cases candidates take the initiative themselves and approach the party to ensure that they will be supported when applying for a position. In that respect, it is important to note that party members, in particular the party lobbyist, do not only play a role in supporting nominations but also in discouraging candidates who are believed to be not competent enough for the position or when the distribution mechanism will favour candidates from other parties. In both cases the party will try to discourage candidates to avoid loss of face/reputation, either for the party or for the candidates.

### *Conclusion*

(All) Dutch political parties are certainly interested in appointments to positions in the public sector – although in different degrees in different sectors and for different positions. Most parties have organized a system or appointed someone to carry out this task (keeping track of vacancies and contacting or pushing potential candidates). A number of recent developments has however made this task more difficult, in particular the increased professionalization of selection and appointment procedures.

Parties in office can exert more influence than opposition parties because 'their minister is in charge of appointments, but respondents all agree that it is a Dutch tradition to share appointments between all parties. This fits with the need of parties to co-operate and form coalitions, but also with the consensual tradition of

Dutch politics.<sup>4</sup>

## Sector differences

There are many differences between the nine sectors under investigation in this study, some of which have already been discussed (cf. Table 5). Here we will take a brief look at the different sectors. Table 9 shows the scope and reach of party patronage per sector (based on the same calculations as in Table 6).

**Table 9. Scope and reach of party patronage, per sector (N=49)**

	Formal (0-1)	Expert opinion (0-1)	Party can influence (0-1)	Role of parties (0-1)	How many institu- tions (0-2)	Which level (0-3)
Economy	0.93	0.93	1.0	0.4	2.0	1.0
Finance	1.0	0.67	0.33	0.22	0.78	0.56
Judiciary	1.0	0.67	0.33	0	0.87	0.53
Media	1.0	0.33	1.0	1.0	1.67	1.0
Military/Police	1.0	0.54	0.25	0.33	1.11	0.72
Health care	1.0	0.72	0.72	0	0.72	0.72
Culture/Educ.	0.67	0.75	0.75	0.17	0.92	0.75
Foreign/Devel.	1.0	1.0	0.80	0.53	1.07	0.80
Regional Loc.	1.0	0.83	0.50	0.40	0.60	0.40
<b>Overall</b>	<b>0.96</b>	<b>0.67</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.34</b>	<b>1.05</b>	<b>0.70</b>

### *Economy*

The influence of political actors is considered relatively high in this sector. Parties are perceived to play an active role, pushing candidates for vacancies in most institutions that were selected for this sector – although not below the top level. This high degree of party patronage can in large part be explained by the fact that a number of very important organizations have been included in the sample, like the advisory body SER, the national bank DNB, and some important regulators like AFM (financial markets) and NMA (competition).

As discussed before, political affiliations are very important in appointments to SER because of the representation of different ideological viewpoints, indicated by the membership of a political party in particular of the Crown Members of SER. Interestingly, it is not the minister of Economics who appoints these members, but the minister of Social Affairs (SZW). In fact, respondents also indicated that the minister of Finance plays an important role in this sector – perhaps more important than the

<sup>4</sup> Baakman, N. (2004). De nomenklatoera in Nederland. Over het verschijnsel van partijpolitieke benoemingen. In: G. Voerman (ed.). *Jaarboek DNPP 2003*. Groningen. [pp. 173-197]

minister of Economics – for example because of his formal role of shareholder in the state-owned companies that were also included in the sample. The role of the minister is more important anyway than the role of political parties; they can only exert influence through their minister.

### *Finance*

Although there is a strong formal influence of the minister when it comes to appointments in this sector, all respondents agree that there is little room for *political* influence, either by the minister or political parties. Appointments are based on merit i.e. the knowledge and prior experience of a candidate in the financial or economic sector. Outsiders are seldom appointed because they lack the necessary training background – which also explains why respondents state that the ABD plays only a minor role in this sector.

Three organizations would be considered more of interest to political parties and actors: AFM and DNB (see above) and the national court of audit. As explained before, appointments to the court of audit are done by parliament. This is one of the few instances where political parties can exercise direct influence on appointments. Fitting with the Dutch tradition it is however customary to distribute the top level functions between candidates from different parties; there has to be a balance between merit and different political affiliations (the ‘mix’). In the cases of AFM and DNB it has been emphasized that appointees have to have relevant experience and capacities, but because these organizations are considered very important and prestigious political parties/actors will be (actively) interested.

### *Judiciary*

Most respondents – even from other sectors – agree that the judiciary is an example par excellence of impartiality and neutrality. The separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judiciary) implies that people in this sector refrain from overt political activities. The number of members of parliament and/or the cabinet originating from this sector is indeed low. Party membership is considered a private matter.

Consequently, according to the respondents all appointments are based on merit. While the minister formally appoints CEOs and members of non-executive boards in a majority of the organizations selected for this sector, there is always the requirement of a legal degree for appointees (in Dutch: *rechterlijk ambtenaar*). The judiciary is a career based sector; people rise through the ranks. Many appointees – judges, prosecutors – will not openly express their political affiliations or belong to a certain political party. Ministerial influence is also limited to the top level functions; all other appointments are carried out by CEOs, executive and non-executive boards (cf. de-politicization in Table 7). Party patronage is thus very low or perhaps even absent in this sector, with one exception: the appointment of members of the High

Council by parliament.

### *Media*

The media, in particular the broadcasting companies and associations, can perhaps be considered as the sector with the highest degree of party patronage (see Table 5). Although the minister has delegated the authority to appoint the CEO of the public broadcasting company NPO to the board, political parties remain actively interested in vacancies and will push their own candidates. In the private broadcasting associations many former politicians are appointed, as a type of 'patronage from the demand side'.

As far as the other selected organizations in this sector are concerned, there is limited interest in them from political parties. As with NPO, recent system changes have delegated appointments to non-executive boards making appointments less open to political influences (cf. de-politicization in Table 7).

### *Military and Police*

The respondents disagreed strongly about the existence and degree of political influence on appointments in this 'sector'. Therefore, additional interviews were held to obtain more clarity, but without much success as the differences of opinion continued. Perhaps the level of patronage in the military can better be described in the words of respondents themselves: 'it is not your political colour that determine to what position you are appointed, but the colour of your uniform does'. This conclusion refers to the fact that top positions in the military rotate between officers from the navy, the air force, the ground forces and recently also the military police (in Dutch: *marechaussee*). The military is led by the Commander of Armed Forces (CDS), who is appointed by the minister. CDS is a military officer, coming from one of the four divisions within the military. While he has to have a certain degree of political sensitivity – as he is the link between the military and the minister/politicians – he is not selected for his political affiliation, even if that was known.

Within each division, military officers have a strong group spirit; they form year groups that 'adopt' officers from the next year group to further each others' career. These relations are expressed in familial terms, like father and son. Promotion opportunities are based on your performance in the past, but your 'father' can help you by recommending you to the senior officers who are in charge of appointments. This is a non-political system, although respondents do indicate that there are dominant ideological viewpoints within certain divisions of the military, for example many navy officers will vote for the liberal party VVD. An officer with different viewpoints will have a hard time to be accepted and promoted, but it is not impossible. It is however uncommon for military officers to have very divergent views due to the strong socialization processes in military training.

Respondents agree about the lack of political influence and interest in positions in both the civilian and military functions in the Ministry of Defence. In other organizations that were selected for this sector, like the intelligence agencies, merit and sometimes a military background are decisive to being appointed.

One of the biggest problems that both the military and the police are faced with at the moment is the lack of women, particularly in top positions. Gender has therefore become an important requirement in the selection and appointment procedures.

Appointments within the police force are quite complex. The police force is divided into 24 regional bodies (ZBOs) and one national contract agency (KLPD). Each police region is governed by a 'regional college' consisting of the mayors and district attorneys of that region; police head commissioners take part in the meetings of the regional college.<sup>5</sup> Per region one mayor is selected as 'manager' (in Dutch: korpsbeheerder) of the police force in that region; this mayor is thus appointed by Royal Decision, based on a nomination by the minister of BZK and after consultation of various actors (commissioner of the Queen, minister of justice, college of PG that governs the DA and the regional college). This mayor appoints all employees of the police force, after advice from the police head commissioner (in Dutch: hoofdcommissaris). The police head commissioner is appointed by Royal Decision, based on a nomination by the mayor/manager to the minister of BZK. Again various actors are consulted: commissioner of the Queen, minister of justice, the college of PG and the regional college.

Respondents agree that political viewpoints and/or party membership of police head commissioners used to be common knowledge, but that has changed under the influence of the rise of managerialism. A management development programme has been initiated and appointment procedures have been professionalized. Also, the complicated appointment process makes it difficult for (national) political parties to exert influence. In fact, one could say that the regionalization and autonomization of the police force has led to de-politicization of the police force as a whole. (On the other hand police head commissioners have become important actors at the local and regional level; their visibility in the media and the political arena has increased.)

### *Health Care*

The respondents from the health care sector were unanimous in their answers about appointments in this sector; there are one or two examples of 'political' appointments (like in the case of NZA where a former minister was appointed) but generally ap-

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<sup>5</sup> Because of the regional scale of the police force, information on appointments was obtained through the interviews with respondents from the sector 'local and regional government' rather than 'military and police'. See also Appendix 1.

pointments are based on merit and prior experience within this sector. Outsiders are seldom appointed; positions in this sector require too specialist knowledge. For example, the non-executive board of an (academic) hospital will not appoint a non-medical candidate as CEO – although lower ranking management functions will be carried out by professional managers. This lack of political interest and influence is an interesting finding because the minister is in charge of almost all appointments in this sector,<sup>6</sup> due to a recent change in the management structure of a number of non-departmental agencies (ZBOs). By removing the non-executive board, the minister has obtained the right to appoint all CEOs of this organization (in line with the charter law on ZBOs). However, in practice this has seldom led to partisan appointments.

Rather than political affiliation, another type of patronage seems to be at play in this sector; the representation of different sub-sectors. Several respondents referred to recent appointments of candidates who were selected because of their affiliation with for example patient federations, groups of medical professions, welfare or homecare organizations, and so on. The distribution of positions between such sub-sectors is an important instrument in this sector to obtain support for new policies and political decisions like the marketization of the health care sector.

A similar type of distribution is also found in the composition of the council for national health care (RVZ), the main advisory body in this sector. However, this is not unique to this sector, but part of the general pattern for appointments to advisory bodies in this study (see e.g. below on culture and education). Finally, as with other sectors, the respondents have all mentioned the importance of the gender debate and the need to appoint more women to top positions.

### *Culture and Education*

From all respondents, the respondents from this sector complained the most about the rise of managerialism; they claim that decentralization of legal competencies and finances, large scale mergers of educational institutions leading to bureaucratization, the high mobility among civil servants and constant re-organizations and budget cuts have undermined the quality and effectiveness of educational policies. There are but few people left who understand the legal and financial peculiarities of this sector. Appointments are more based on managerial competencies than substantive knowledge which will only reinforce the memory loss and inefficient policy making.

The Dutch system of education has a complex background due to pillarization and the pacification in the early 1900s when political parties reached a compromise on the financing of ‘special’ schools (in Dutch: *bijzonder onderwijs*). All schools in the

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<sup>6</sup> One of the selected organizations, the food regulation authority VWA is subordinated to the ministry of Agriculture. Respondents were therefore not familiar with this agency and could not provide information about appointments to this agency.

Netherlands, whether they are public or based on private initiative (religious or otherwise) are funded by the state if they meet certain legal criteria. Parents have a Constitutional right to send their children to a school of their ideological or religious beliefs. If there is no such school, they can establish one themselves – paid for by the state. (The budget for education is the largest budget in the State Budget.) At first, this led to a highly centralized system in which the national government would prescribe detailed regulations. Over time, the national government has delegated a lot of competencies to municipalities and school boards. Municipalities in turn have ‘autonomized’ the public schools, to avoid a conflict of interest with their responsibilities for the implementation of educational policies.

Consequently, the Dutch education system is nowadays characterized by a high degree of autonomy for all educational institutions. The influence of the minister and the ministry has diminished over time, including on appointments (in public institutions as there never was influence in non-public ones). A second characteristic resulting from this history is that there are still many remnants of pillarization. For example, several political parties still have strong linkages to schools and school boards. Earlier on (see above on broadcasting associations) this was referred to as patronage from the demand side.

The cultural sector has a very different background. Contrary to other countries, culture has always been a non-political matter. As a result, there has never been much interest in policies on art and/or cultural institutions, except for financial aspects. Appointments to important positions do not attract much attention for political parties/actors. As in the educational sector, the rise of managerialism has had a strong impact, both in terms of policy-making (emphasizing the business side of art and culture) and in terms of the management of cultural institutions. For example, museum directors are nowadays expected to be managers first and caretaker of the art that is on display second. Similar changes can be observed in the appointment of non-executive board members; boards are looking for candidates with managerial and financial knowledge. Appointment procedures will become more professionalized, as part of the professionalization of the sector as a whole – although not all respondents consider this a positive trend.

In sum, in this sector the minister has a high degree of influence on appointments within the ministry, but a low degree of influence on appointments outside the ministry. This explains the somewhat contradictory findings in Table 9. The rise of managerialism has been very strong and, according to the respondents, not for the better.

#### *Foreign Affairs and Development Aid*

This sector is a career service in all respects. For example, the ABD does not play a role of any significance, outsiders are seldom appointed, candidates have to rise

through the ranks going from less appealing to more prestigious posts, and candidates come from a homogeneous, closed network. Nevertheless, the respondents mention a high degree of political influence (or interest) on appointments. They point mostly to the role of the minister who has to decide about the nominations to high ranking and prestigious positions. Respondents also point to the large differences in the interest and involvement of individual ministers in the past cabinets. The degree of party patronage in this sector would therefore appear to be highly contingent upon who and which party are in charge. In the interviews respondents were asked to answer the questions focussing on the current and last two or three cabinets only. Apparently, the interest of the current minister in appointments is high. It is however not possible to conclude that this is typical for this sector. In fact, some respondents have mentioned a number of developments that would suggest that political influences are decreasing, such as the professionalization of appointment procedures, and the expansion of the training programmes allowing for more diversity in gender, family background and academic degrees. The diplomat service remains however a closed network, where outsiders are not heartily welcomed. The diplomat service is also a very traditional and conservative network where the gender debate has only just begun. Political affiliations are not considered decisive to appointments, but there is little variation in ideological viewpoints among the diplomat corps.

Another reason for the high score on party patronage for this sector can be found in the fact that appointments to international posts have the reputation for being a 'reward' position for former politicians. Respondents were able to mention several examples of such appointments – and newspapers reported on a couple of such appointments during this study.

A third and final reason for the high scores on party patronage relates to development aid rather than the diplomat service. According to the respondents, political parties are very interested in development aid because it is a 'spending' department and it spends money on a good cause. There are few political risks and much political gains in this field. Moreover, the position of the minister of development aid is a prestigious one because of its international character (the same applies to minister of foreign affairs who can even substitute for the prime minister in international negotiations).

All in all, the sector of foreign affairs and developmental aid attract a lot of attention from political parties and actors. Whether this is a systematic or temporary feature – dependent upon which party and minister are in charge – cannot be concluded on the basis of the five interviews alone. That would require more research.

### *Regional and Local Government*

Regional and local government are not a sector in the same way as the other sectors. It includes all 12 provinces, almost 400 municipalities, and over 60 water boards

and PBOs (based on article 134 of the Constitution). Furthermore, municipalities have their own types of NDA and executive organizations, which we have included here as one category. However, the number of interviewees with knowledge about this category of organizations is too limited to be able to draw conclusions. As mentioned before, the police regions were included in the interviews of this sector as well, leading to a total of nine interviews (six on local and regional government and three on police regions). The findings on the police were already dealt with before. The complexities and size of this 'sector' require a lot more research to be able to draw solid conclusions. The findings in this study will therefore remain somewhat superficial and generalist.

In general we can conclude that the influence of national political parties - either direct or through their minister – has diminished in this sector. First of all, this influence never reached deeper than the top level anyway; the minister of BZK nominates for example the Commissioner of the Queen (province) and the mayor (municipality), but not the executives and top civil servants. CQs and mayors are appointed by Royal Decision. Second, the right to appoint in this 'sector' has been delegated to the authorities at the local level and/or the non-executive boards of organizations. For example, the local municipal council will nominate a candidate for a mayoral position (although in concurrence with the CQ of the province). There is no more distributive formula for mayoral appointments anymore. In the case of PBOs, the board will appoint candidates nominated by the industry that is represented by the PBO.<sup>7</sup> Third, although the introduction of general elections of the Water Boards in 2004 has increased the influence of political parties because they can partake in the elections, it has proven difficult to find interested and capable candidates. Empirically, the influence of national political parties has not been very strong. And fourth, the rise of managerialism has reduced political influences on the appointment of police head commissioners (see above). Therefore, formally the minister of BZK has a large role in appointments in this 'sector' but in practice he has little influence, let alone partisan influence. Furthermore, the number of appointment opportunities is limited to the top level, and always the topic of (extensive) negotiations between a large number of actors, interests and organizations.

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<sup>7</sup> PBOs represent different branches of industry, for example bakers or painters, or industries that produce certain products like eggs or fish. All PBOs are supervised by SER, on behalf of the minister of Social Affairs. Appointments to SER were discussed in the sections on the economic sector.

## Conclusions

The findings from this (qualitative) study show that Dutch political parties are actively interested in appointments to organizations in the public and semi-public sector. Their main motive is to gain control over a certain sector or organization; by appointing a trustworthy appointee, parties hope to have easy access to information and to ensure that policies are implemented in line with party programmes.

Parties can however seldom exert direct influence on appointments because almost all appointments are the prerogative of the minister in charge of a specific policy sector. Therefore parties use indirect ways to exert influence, for example by nominating and pushing their own candidates, or influencing the appointing minister (from the same party). Information about vacancies is spread throughout the party network by different party members. Most parties have a system or a person who is in charge of this task; keeping track of vacancies and potential candidates (the 'party lobbyist'). Furthermore, political parties have a tradition of sharing appointments; each party feels 'entitled' to a certain number of appointments. This fits with the Dutch tradition of consensualism. The party lobbyists make sure that parties can get their share.

There are big differences in the interest of parties for vacancies between sectors and (type of) organizations. The strongest interest is found in the media, foreign affairs and development aid, and the economic sector. Parties are much less interested in appointments in the military, the judiciary and the financial sector. Organizations that attract a lot of attention are usually important regulatory and advisory bodies. Reversely, non-executive boards and advisory bodies have a strong interest in obtaining members with access to political networks; this was labelled patronage from the demand side. In general one can conclude that political parties are more interested in organizations that are closer to the government rather than executive organizations at (long) arms' length. Furthermore, the interest never reaches deeper than appointments to the top level positions like CEO and board members.

Over time the degree of influence of national political parties has diminished. This is due to a number of trends, most notably the rise of managerialism. This has led to a strong appreciation of managerial skills in candidates for appointment, and to a professionalization of appointment procedures. Assessments and more transparency make it more difficult for parties to determine the outcome of a selection process. A second trend which has diminished the influence of national political parties refers to the delegation of the authority to appoint to for example local parties or non-executive boards. Some political parties have responded to this loss of influence by initiating new ways to increase the scope of appointments or the means to exert influence on appointers.

Pure partisan appointments – to reward loyal party members – do still occur but

they are considered exceptions and generally frowned upon. Political affiliations are considered important assets of a candidate but in many different ways. For example, candidates for top level positions need to be politically sensitive and interested in the public cause. This can be translated into the membership of a political party, but not necessarily. Political aspects are part of a 'mix' of competencies, skills, knowledge (managerial and/or substantive), viewpoints and prior experience that will determine whether a certain candidate is appointed or not. This was labelled the X-factor; you have to have it, but nobody knows exactly what it is.

## Appendix 1: Sample of Dutch countries

Sector	Ministry	Non-departmental agencies	Executive agencies
<b>Economy</b>	Economic Affairs	CBS: central bureau for statistics NMA: market competition authority OPTA: telecom competition authority TENNET: electricity infrastructure maintenance agency SenterNovem: subsidies to companies for R&D and sustainability initiatives Social & Economic council (advisory body)	Schiphol NV: national airport Gasunie NV: national gas production and export NS (NV): Dutch railways Holland Casino NV: casino
<b>Finance</b>	Finance (including Tax Service)	AFM: financial markets competition authority Dienst Roerende Zaken: agency for government assets Domeinen: agency for government grounds and terrains National Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer)	DNB: Dutch national bank BNG: Bank of Dutch municipalities (50% owned by state, 50% by municipalities)
<b>Judiciary</b>	Justice	CBP: privacy protection agency Cie. Gelijke Behandeling: tribunal for equal treatment Raad voor Rechtsbijstand: council for legal aid Raad voor Rechtspraak: agency for supervision of courts IND: immigration agency (?)	Prosecution office OM (part of ministry) Courts and judicial benches
<b>Media</b>	Ministry of Education, Science and Culture	Commissariaat voor Media: media commission Stimuleringsfonds voor Pers: fund for subsidies for press	(Dutch Broadcasting Company NOS?)
<b>Military and Police</b>	Home Office Defense	AIVD: intelligence agency MIVD: military intelligence agency CRI: criminal investigation agency NIBRA: training of firemen and catastrophe workers OVV: investigates accidents in traffic, waterways, air etc. KLPD: coordination of national police	Army, Navy, Air Force DJI: prison service

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Ministry</b>	<b>Non-departmental agencies</b>	<b>Executive agencies</b>
<b>Health care</b>	Health Welfare & Sport (including Health Inspectorate)	CVZ: advice on health insurance coverage, dissemination of health care premiums, coordination of insurance companies CTZ: to determine tariffs for medical treatments and drugs CBG: to decide which medical drugs are allowed on market NL Zorgautoriteit: regulator health sector VWA: food safety authority RVGZ: Council for Health Care (advisory body)	Academic hospitals
<b>Culture and Education</b>	Education Culture & Science (including Education Inspectorate)	NVAO: certification of higher education programs N.W.O.: funds scientific research KNAW: royal academy for sciences Div. fondsen voor kunst: funds to subsidize different art forms Onderwijsraad: Education council (advisory body) Cultuurraad: Council for Culture (advisory body)	Public universities National museums Nationaal Archief: national archive IB-Groep: student loan company CFI: subsidies for primary and secondary schools
<b>Foreign Services</b>	Foreign Affairs	NCDO: agency for developmental aid CBI: centre to promote import from developing countries	Embassies and consulates
<b>Regional and local administration</b>		Provinces Municipalities (G4; largest municipalities) Water Boards and other art. 134 Constitution organizations	Police authorities (regional) "Verbonden partijen" i.e. semi-independent organizations carrying out tasks for municipalities (G4 only)

## **Appendix 2: Topic list for interviews**

Q1. Based on content analyses: is an institution formally reachable by political parties, i.e. do parties have legal power to appoint individuals to jobs in this institution?)

Q2. In your opinion, are the institutions formally reachable by political parties, i.e. in general, do people linked to political parties have legal power to appoint individuals to jobs in these institutions?

Q3. In your opinion, DO such individuals (ministers, PM, President, party chairman) actually appoint individuals to jobs in the institutions?

Q4. If yes, what role do political parties play in these appointments? (large/small role)

Q5a. If yes, would you say that political parties appoint (in a few/most/all institutions)?

Q5b. If yes, would you say that political parties appoint at top/middle/bottom level?

Q6: In your opinion, why do political parties actually appoint people to these jobs? Are they interested in rewarding their loyal party activists and members with state jobs or do they want to control these sectors and institutions by having personnel linked to the party appointed in them?

Q7: Now, we want to ask you a question about the people appointed by political parties to these positions. Would you say that they have gotten their jobs because they are professionally qualified for them, or because of their political link, or because of their personal allegiance, or any other allegiance?

Q8: Do you think that the current practices of appointments differ substantially from previous periods, say in the last 15-20 years? If so, how and why?

Q9: In reality, who within the parties is responsible for making these appointments?

Q10: In general, when political parties make appointments, are these appointments done only by parties currently in government, or do opposition parties also get a share of appointments in state institutions?

Q11: Additional comments, questions and clarifications; e.g. potential explanations for the scope and extent of party patronage etc.

### Appendix 3: Dutch respondents

Name	Experience (list is indicative, not comprehensive)
Dr. N. Baakman	Assistant professor Politics, University of Maastricht, investigator of patronage in the Netherlands
Drs. D.J. van den Berg	Former SG, former ambassador, currently board of TU Delft
Prof.dr. P. van Bergeijk	Former civil servant of ministry of Economics, currently professor at ISS
Mr. P.J. Biesheuvel	Former MP (CDA), several board positions in public sector including PBOs
Dhr. J. Bik	Retired reporter for NRC
Drs. H. Bruins Slot	Former top civil servant, CEO of a non-departmental agency, mayor and chair of NPO. Currently several board positions in public sector
Drs. H. Brouwer	Executive board member Dutch national bank, former civil servant
Prof.dr. J. van Cuilenburg	Member of Commissariaat voor de Media, parttime professor in communication studies
Mr. A. van Delden	Former president of Raad voor Rechtspraak, several positions in judiciary sector
Prof.dr. H. Garretsen	Former professor of Economics at UU and RU, currently professor of Economics at RUG and member of SER
Mw. Drs. L. van Geest	DG Ministry of Finance
Mw. Prof.dr. L. Gunning-Schepers	Chair of executive board AMC academic hospital, chair of NFU (representing all academic hospitals)
Drs. F.J. van der Heijden	Former MP (CDA), former alderman and council member in Rotterdam, now retired
Dr. D. Hermans	Chair of executive board of CVZ, former board positions in social security sector
Prof.dr. J. Hoffenaar	NIMH, parttime professor Military History, military officer
Mr. M. van den Honert	Director of directorate in Ministry of Justice
Dhr. C. Keller	NPO (broadcasting)
Prof.dr. C. Klijn	Parttime professor EUR, specialist in international security and defense
Prof.dr. R. Koole	Professor in politics, former chair of political party (PvdA)
Prof.dr. P. van Koppen	Professor at institute Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, University Leiden
Dr. B. Kreemers	Former spokesman ministry of Defense, now director RVZ (health care) and member of ABD
Mw. Mr. M. van der Laan	Former state secretary Media, former MP (D66), at the time of the interview director in private firm
Mw. Ir. J. Leemhuis-Stout	Several board positions in public sector, former CvdK
Prof.dr. F. Leeuw	Director WODC, part-time professor Law, Public Administration and Social Sciences at University Maastricht
Prof.dr. F. Leijnse	Former chair HBO council, former/current MP, part-time professor Open University
Prof.dr. H. Leune	Retired professor Sociology EUR, former chair of Onderwijsraad
Mw. Dr. M. Lückerath-Rovers	Associate professor Fiscal Law, institute Regulation and Compliance EUR, investigates boards of commissioners in public and private sector
Dhr. W. Meijer	Former state secretary, currently several board positions in public sector including president of board of commissioners NS

<b>Name</b>	<b>Experience (list is indicative, not comprehensive)</b>
Prof.dr. E. Müller	COT, specialist in crisis management in public sector
Drs. J.W. Oosterwijk	Former SG, at the time of the interview member of executive board EUR
Mr. W. Otto	Several advisory positions in media sector, now independent consultant
Dhr. J. Riezenkamp	Former DG Ministry of Education, several board positions in cultural sector
Dr. R. Roborgh	DG Ministry of Education
Prof.dr. P. Hoebink	Professor in CIDIN at RU (specialist in development aid)
Mr. U. Koesoemo Joedo	Director/advisor at ABD
Mw. Prof.dr. P. Meurs	Professor IBMG at EUR, member of WRR, MP in Senate (PvdA), several board positions in public sector (health care)
Prof.dr. K. Putters	Professor IBMG at EUR, MP in Senate (PvdA), member of non-executive board OVV, former member RVZ
Dr. A. Rinnooy Kan	Chair of SER, former political positions (D66)
Prof.dr. L. de la Rive Box	Former director in ministry of Foreign Affairs, currently rector ISS
Dhr. P. Tieleman	Former chief of police, at the time of the interview advisor to School for Police Leadership
Prof.dr. P. Tops	Professor in public administration (local government), board member of Police Academy
Mr. R. Vecht	Official at NPO (broadcasting)
Drs. C. Van 't Veen	Former DG, former director of museum, currently director RACM
Prof.dr. R. In 't Veld	Retired professor of public administration, various (board) positions in the public sector, former dean of NSOB
Dhr. K. Vijlbrief	Director/advisor of ABD
Prof.dr. J. Voorhoeve	Former minister of Defense, part-time professor at Defense Academy NDA, member of Raad van State
Mr. R. van Zutphen	Chair of NVVR (representing legal sector), vice-president of court at Utrecht

- Note that two respondents have asked to remain entirely anonymous. In both cases this concerned high ranking civil servants.
- Two respondents were interviewed about more than one sector.