REPORT ON THE EVALUATION
OF THE
IMD PROGRAMME IN
GUATEMALA
2002 - 2003

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Executive Summary

An external evaluation was carried out in July-August 2003 to assess the results and the implementation process of the first 15 months of IMD’s programme in Guatemala. The central objective of this programme is to strengthen political parties and the party system in a sustainable way. Several unfavourable conditions limit the realisation of this ambition: (i) the political party system in Guatemala has been unstable, fragmented, polarised and discredited, (ii) political parties were often not more than electoral machines, lacking a programmatic and ideological base, and generally figured among the weakest actors in society, (iii) political participation by citizens has been very low, especially among the indigenous majority of the population.

Against this background, since March 2002 IMD developed in a joint venture with UNDP an ambitious project for a multiparty dialogue process, trying to generate consensus on a shared National Agenda that reflects the basic principles of the Peace Agreements. The basic idea was that collaboration and dialogue among the parties is a prerequisite for future democratic stability, as none of the individual parties is able to sustain such a national project. Moreover, the national Congress does not function as a forum for dialogue given the polarized political climate in the country.

The initial result of the Dialogue programme was that a group of 40 politicians from all political parties was engaged in a year-long process of building mutual confidence and constructing an agenda for the future of the country. Indirectly, this Dialogue group stimulated the establishment of a Forum on Political Parties (previously not existing) in which all party leaders committed themselves to implement the agreements laid down in the Peace Agreements. The Dialogue was affected in the last phase by the polarisation around Rios Montt’s candidacy and by the start of the election campaign, thereby frustrating the smooth incorporation of the National Agenda into the programmes of the parties.

The importance of the Dialogue process and the positive support role of IMD for the UNDP as well as for the OAS programmes is widely acknowledged. Given the unfavourable conditions, this was probably the most that could have been achieved. A possible follow-up will depend on the new political situation generated by the November 2003 elections. The multiparty approach of IMD is definitely an interesting “niche”, although the donor community is currently inflated by similar approaches; a future strategy therefore requires careful rethinking.

IMD has also taken risks by supporting this project as the only donor with large funding, complemented by a relatively weak bilateral
programme that is in need of coherence and a strategic vision. The current challenge is to refocus the strategy and to closely coordinate with other (particularly Nordic) donors on complementary projects and to build on the confidence generated by a small group of politicians who potentially represent the seed for a new political culture in the country.

A dilemma to be resolved is that a multiparty approach seems to contradict support to individual parties, whereas newly created and less institutionalised parties require direct support to prevent that their ideological position will fade away in broader coalitions. These new parties prefer to be part of a colourful fruit salad, rather than being diluted into a fruit punch. The challenge for IMD is to accompany this search for constructing a colourful political spectrum without being caught in partisan rivalries. IMD is therefore advised to continue its programme in Guatemala, but to rethink and sharpen its focus.
1. Introduction

This document reports on the findings of an external evaluation mission to assess the Guatemala country programme of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). The evaluation was initiated by the board of IMD and is part of a first round of external evaluations of IMD’s programme. In 2003 these will be implemented in Guatemala and Mozambique, countries in which IMD operates relatively large programmes with a local representative.

The evaluation was realised by an international team of four experts in the field of democracy promotion and political participation: Tom Carothers (Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC), Mónica Jimenez (Director of Participa, Santiago de Chile), Raquel Zelaya (Director of ASIES and former member of the Peace Secretariate, Guatemala) and Kees Biekart (Fellow, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam). Mónica Jimenez acted as the team leader and Kees Biekart was responsible for drafting the report, which was discussed and approved by the entire team.

The objectives of the evaluation, according to the Terms of Reference, were the following:

- To assess the achieved results of the programme in relation with the objectives as specified in the logical framework;
- To provide an analysis of the current political situation and make concrete recommendations, if necessary, to adjust the IMD programme or specific projects in Guatemala in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme and ensure the best possible use of the available resources;
- To provide a better understanding of the relationship between the used methodology and the effectiveness of the programme. This includes the use of the dialogue methodology to enhance ownership, administrative procedures, the role of the representation and partnerships with other national and international organisations;
- To analyse the IMD/UNDP Project to establish a National Agenda and analyse the feasibility of the initiation and implementation of a similar Agenda setting exercise in other countries;
- To assess the appropriateness of the monitoring system as developed by ASIES.

Apart from these central objectives, the evaluation team was also requested to address a number of specific questions related to implementation modalities, programme coherence and sustainability:
a. Bilateral and cross-party projects:

- What are the achieved results, both qualitative as quantitative, in relation to the general and specific objectives of each project?
- Is the assumption correct that the three specific objectives lead to the overall objective namely developing and strengthening the multi party system?
- What is the impact of the programme at the institutional strengthening of political parties?
- What is the impact of the programme on the development and strengthening of a multiparty system in Guatemala?

b. Implementation modalities:

- Does the methodology as applied guarantee ownership of the process by political parties?
- How does the overall programme management function in Guatemala and in the Netherlands?
- Is the organisational set-up of the permanent representation appropriate for the execution of its various functions?
- Has the cooperation between IMD and other organisations been executed successfully and effectively?
- Has the registration and documentation of the projects been adequately organised?
- What is the added value of the IMD programme in Guatemala, compared to other local and international organizations like OAS, UNDP, FES working in the same field?
- Is the programme implemented in a coherent and comprehensive way?
- Are the results of the projects sustainable?

c. Lessons learned:

The evaluation will generate recommendations regarding the following issues:

- The need for a continuation of the programme and its possible future direction;
- The effectiveness of the allocation of the budget between the different projects;
- The role of the IMD representation and the main functions it should undertake;
- The impact of the programme as stated in the objectives;
- The relation between the political party ownership and the methodology applied.
The evaluation team visited Guatemala between 27 July and 6 August 2003. Personal interviews and group discussions were organised with a few dozen representatives of political parties, IMD-partners, other donors and resource persons (see Annex I). Although a large part of the interviews took place in the capital, two members of the mission (Jimenez and Biekart) also visited the countryside during a four-day trip. Documentation was gathered and reviewed, both in the Netherlands and in Guatemala (see Annex II). Additional interviews were held by Kees Biekart with IMD staff in the Netherlands, before and after the field mission.

We would like to thank Doris Cruz, IMD representative in Guatemala, for her excellent and supportive role in making the evaluation mission a success. We would also like to thank the IMD staff in The Hague and all those people in Guatemala that were taking the time to speak to us in this crucial period of the country’s democratisation process.
2. Guatemala: political context and political parties

The Guatemala programme of IMD started five years after the signing of the Peace Agreements that had formally ended three decades of political instability and violence. This chapter provides a brief political context analysis for the current evaluation, followed by an analysis of the political party system and the challenges facing this system, especially after the November 2003 elections.

2.1 The political context after the Peace Agreements

Ending Guatemala’s armed conflict took more than ten years of negotiations between the URNG and four consecutive governments, with a mediating role of the United Nations and a number of paises de amigos. The Peace Agreements, signed in December 1996 between the URNG and the PAN-led government, were a highlight in Guatemala’s history. The Agreements included a detailed list of complex themes and measures that were meant to tackle the causes of the civil war: political and socio-economic exclusion of the poor and of ethnic groups, and political institutions that had been dominated by a small and powerful elite. The implementation of the Agreements was therefore a major challenge, requiring genuine political will from state institutions as well as from civil society groups.

Almost seven years later and a few months before the November 2003 elections the implementation process has at least achieved the elimination of institutionalised political repression, which has led to an improvement of the human rights situation. There are now guarantees for political participation of all ideological tendencies and better conditions for social organisation of new groups in civil society. Moreover, all political parties have accepted the need for increased political participation by indigenous people, women and youth. Finally, a joint commitment by all social, political and economic forces has been made to reform the tax system by way of a Fiscal Pact.

However, it is also clear that the Peace Agreements have not (yet) contributed to a structural transformation of a divided Guatemalan society and of (inefficient and corrupt) state institutions. This transformation is still incomplete on many fronts, especially when it concerns a reform of the security services. As a result, Guatemalan citizens still feel the agreements have not considerably led to a noticeable improvement of their situation. Social and political exclusion of large parts of the (indigenous) population – one of the main causes of the civil war – is still persisting and perceptions of insecurity and fear are still present, particularly in rural areas. The
future government and the new Congress are expected to come up with concrete measures to deal with these problems after the election year, a year in which the United Nations mission MINUGUA – which verified the implementation of the Agreements – gradually withdrew from the country.

2.2 The political party system

Guatemala’s political party system is weak and unstable. Political parties function as electoral machines for individual candidates, rather than as programmatic political organisations that develop over a longer period of time. Remarkably, only one political party – the Christian Democratic PDC – has a substantial history (40 years) and more or less an explicit ideology. The two main parties (FRG and PAN) only exist for about twelve years, whereas the majority of parties often have a short life after they have been defeated in the elections.

Guatemalan political life is currently dominated by these two political forces, neither of which is best thought of in terms of a political party. One is the Republican Guatemalan Front (FRG), which is a populist movement centered around retired General Rios Montt, a former coup leader and currently the President of the National Congress. Since 1991 Rios Montt has tried to run for president, but until recently this was prevented by the Constitution. The FRG has a core of disciplined Montt followers but it appears to have assembled according to some observers a collection of persons that seek power for opportunistic reasons during its last four years in government. The FRG is ideologically mixed, fusing elements of right-wing nationalism with leftist social populism.

The other major political force is the Party for National Progress (PAN), representing the oligarchic economic class that dominated Guatemalan life for most of the 20th century, often equated with the members of the employers’ association CACIF. The oligarchic interests acted through the PAN for most of the 1990s but the PAN is more of a political vehicle for this class than a true party. This year an internal battle within the PAN led to the splitting off of its expected presidential candidate, Oscar Berger, who will now be running as the candidate of GANA, an alliance of three small parties. The PAN is greatly weakened by this split, as it is expected that the oligarchy’s money and influence will largely be put behind GANA.

The other approximately twenty political parties are an assortment of small political groups, most of them basically narrow leadership vehicles operating out of the capital with little institutional structure and social base. Only a couple of these parties (including the URNG) seem to be based on a broader political movement. The majority of these parties will likely not gain representation in the Congress during
the next elections and will either close down or fade into dormancy until the next election.

Most parties have a vertical and undemocratic structure in which the (male) presidential candidate and the party leader are the central figures. Their opinion constitutes the programme of the party, rather than a programme based on a jointly developed ideology. Parties receive a minor financial contribution from the state (about 25 eurocent for every vote), which is insufficient to finance the electoral campaigns and the organisational structure. Therefore, private (business) funding dominates to finance expensive media-based campaigns to promote personalities, rather than proposals based on ideologies. This ‘privatised’ political system generates populist candidates, promising spectacular political changes in any direction that aim to trigger the imagination and the hope of the population.

Obviously, this generates disillusion after it becomes clear that promises about fundamental changes – such as socio-economic improvements and guarantees for physical security – are not realised. Charges of corruption by elected politicians are therefore a returning issue, leading to a wide-spread perception of betrayal among the population after the elections. This in turn reinforces low voter turnout, which is already among the lowest in the entire continent. The mass media play a problematic role in this process, as these are dominated by corporate interests and generally lack any editorial independence.

The disillusion among the population about the virtues of the political system has led to a crisis of legitimacy of the parties. Surveys have indicated that the majority of citizens have a very negative opinion about political parties, despite the fact that most people recognise that these constitute key instruments in a representative democracy. The parties will therefore have to be democratised, in which leaders and candidates are elected by their membership, instead of being appointed by a small elite. It is also required that parties engage in a more permanent presence in society instead of only being activated during electoral campaigns.

These fundamental changes in the political system are only possible if political parties are jointly agreeing on structural changes, such as a reform of the Law on Political Parties that will be discussed in the next Congress. This reform basically aims to strengthen internal democracy of parties, regulate their funding, and improve the system of voter registration. Signs for a future consensus on these issues are present in newly established discussion platforms, such as the Forum on Political Parties, the Interparty Dialogue that works on a ‘Shared National Agenda’ and the Democratic Front for Democracy, an alliance of parties, social movements, academic institutions, NGOs and human rights groups. Actually, there seems to be no lack of national agendas,
but the question is whether these will be translated into legislation that will alter political practice.

An encouraging element is the role of the international donor community in relation to political parties. Previously, their focus was mainly on supporting non-governmental organisations and strengthening government institutions. In recent years a range of new programmes is targeting the weak political system by facilitating dialogue between political party representatives, offering a range of training courses for politicians and by supporting campaigns that stimulate political participation of marginalised sectors of the population.

2.3 Challenges faced by the political parties

In August 2003 a total of 22 parties were registered with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). Of these parties only nine presidential candidates are still in the race, after the withdrawal of Bueso (Christian Democrats), Paiz (Democratic Union) and the only indigena candidate Quemé (representing a coalition of CASA, Transparency and ANN). The latest opinion poll indicated that Oscar Berger (GANA) is leading, followed by Alvaro Colom (UNE), Efrain Rios Montt (FRG) and Leonel López (PAN).¹ If none of the presidential candidates gets a majority vote, which is very likely, a second election round between the top two candidates in late December will decide about the new president. A new Congress, which will be expanded from 113 to 158 candidates, will also be elected. It is expected that about six parties will manage to get one or more representatives in Congress.

As it is unlikely that any party will get a majority, a minimal consensus will have to be negotiated between the parties to guarantee the implementation of new legislation responding to joint agreements that were reached between the parties in previous months, such as the Shared National Agenda and the Agreement to fully implement the remaining elements of the Peace Agreements. Major political debate is expected to be generated on the issue of constitutional reform which aims to democratise key institutions such as the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Constitutional Court and the National Accounts Office. The legitimacy of these institutions has been questioned at times during the present government, especially in relation to the presidential candidacy of ex-general Ríos Montt.

Another key piece of legislation is the Fiscal Pact, requiring an agreement on a number of sensitive issues related to existing privileges and tax exemptions. The implementation of a new fiscal policy is important to finance the budget for health, education, public security,

¹ The poll was published on 9 September 2003 by the largest daily paper ‘Prensa Libre’. However, these polls are often manipulated and unreliable; therefore no percentages are given.
justice and poverty alleviation, which are issues that have raised high expectations among the population. In addition, the implementation of the adopted laws on the system of Local Development Councils, the Municipal Code and the law on Decentralisation are going to be important steps in expanding relationships between local governments and civil society. Essentially, these laws will generate new opportunities for citizens to influence public policies and to define the social budget, which have been important promises in the electoral campaigns.

In order to realise all these measures, political parties (and in particular their representatives in Congress) will greatly benefit from the necessary funding and high-quality technical assistance, preferably for a large part from national sources, as they lack the fundamental legislative experience. Exchanges with legislators from other countries and the use of ‘best practices’ from abroad can be helpful to increase the quality of the Guatemalan legislative process. The parties will also have to improve their capacity to reflect on their own weaknesses, given the fact that their membership is rather small (5% of the electorate) and their legitimacy is questioned.

In January 2003 the United States criticised the Guatemalan government for being too soft on combating drugs trafficking and that this was tolerated by high-ranking government officials. The US is threatening to exclude Guatemala from becoming part of the new Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, which is currently being negotiated; this could have serious implications for the national economy. This US sanction threat is a substantial proof of earlier allegations that networks of drugs trade and organised crime, which are part of a ‘parallel power’, have penetrated high-level political sectors in Guatemala. The creation of a commission to deal with this problem of organised crime impunity (CICIACS) has been agreed upon by all political parties, but will still have to be appointed in early 2004. Moreover, it will have to be monitored by the parties to guarantee a successful implementation, also to prevent Guatemala’s exclusion from the free trade agreement.

The challenges facing the political parties, and the political system in general, are therefore considerable. The parties in Congress will have to show the capacity to negotiate and to find a consensus which can create conditions for democratic governance in the years to come. Whoever will win the November 2003 elections, it is clear that the new government is going to have a very difficult task in dealing with all the issues mentioned above if it is not receiving the full support from opposition parties in the realisation of the minimal agenda that has been agreed upon in recent months. On the other hand, the future government, whatever political colour it may have, also will have to commit itself to this minimal national agenda to prevent the current process of democratic consolidation from breaking down, with all the dramatic consequences attached.
3. IMD’s programme in Guatemala

The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD), founded in 2000 by the Dutch political parties, aims to support the process of democratisation in ‘young democracies’. Its particular mission is to strengthen political parties and to contribute to the creation of well-functioning, sustainable and pluralistic political party systems. IMD has gradually developed over a dozen country programmes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In Latin America, IMD runs programmes in Suriname, Bolivia and Guatemala. The Guatemala programme officially started in March 2002. Before outlining the content of the programme, an overview will be given of its origin.

3.1 History of the Guatemala programme

From the very start of IMD’s activities, Guatemala was listed as a possible programme country for several reasons:

- The signing of the peace accords in 1996, bringing an end to three decades of civil war, provided new opportunities for a process of democratisation;
- Socio-economic inequality and marginalisation of the majority of the (Indian) population provided new challenges for an inclusive approach to politics;
- The weak system of political parties was in need of external support, other than the traditional funding from the oligarchy;
- The emergence of new opposition parties and their insertion into a multiparty system based on ideological (rather than personalistic) characteristics;
- The upcoming elections in November 2003 provided opportunities for a two-year pre-electoral programme of political party strengthening.

IMD completed two preparatory missions before starting up the programme in March 2002. The first identification mission was realised by Alvaro Pinto, IMD Board member and International Secretary of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), in July 2001. His main conclusion was that support to political parties in Guatemala was of key importance for the political future of the country, especially with the upcoming elections of 2003. The main challenge was to implement the agreements laid down in the Peace Accords, in particular the national agenda. The weak political party system was undermining this agenda as parties were acting merely as autocratic electoral machines for one candidate, rather than democratic organisations with their proper

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programmes. Therefore, the challenge was to strengthen party structures in the longer run, including their electoral programmes, with the elections of 2003 serving as a first target. Another conclusion was that civilian committees (comités civicos) and other social groups played an important role as alternative channels for political participation, and that support to these groups indirectly also would strengthen the political party system.

Pinto suggested several recommendations to IMD. The first one was to avoid direct financial support to political parties (as was done in Mozambique) given their current weakness. Instead it was proposed to initiate a programme consisting of three complementary elements: (i) a multiparty support programme aimed at strengthening dialogue and the elaboration of a joint national agenda; (ii) technical support programmes at the local level for political-civilian groups (such as ‘comités civicos’ or ‘mesas de concertación’); (iii) technical assistance to political parties through training programmes and seminars by party experts from the Netherlands.

Initial contacts were made with the Dutch Embassy, UNDP, OAS, IDEA and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, who were all in some way involved in these programmes. From these contacts the idea emerged to develop a dialogue programme on the National Agenda together with UNDP, possibly as a joint IMD-UNDP project. Another option was to participate in the OAS-supported programme for strengthening political parties, a programme also financed by the Dutch Embassy. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, UNDP proposed to take care of the entire IMD programme, with the exception of a possible IMD-OAS component. An estimated 1,2 million Dutch guilders (EUR 545,000) a year was mentioned to be necessary to finance the new programme (although a detailed budget could not be found in the archives).

A second and broader IMD mission to detail the agreements with the organisations involved visited Guatemala in February 2002. A second mission visited Guatemala between 3 and 10 February 2002, after a planned visit in November 2001 was postponed. Members included: Jos van Gennip (Christian Democratic party), Sam Pormes (Green Left party), Alvaro Pinto (Labour party and delegation leader) and Ellen van Koppen (Labour party). See ‘Report IMD-mission Guatemala 3-10 February 2002’ (in Dutch).
effective outcome. A tripartite council would be established by IMD to coordinate the implementation of the various initiatives and to facilitate collaboration between IMD, UNDP and OAS. The content of these programmes will be further detailed below.

The second preparatory mission also identified the need for additional so-called ‘bilateral projects’ between IMD and political parties and/or organisations representing civil society. This bilateral programme would focus particularly on exchanges between Dutch and Guatemalan political parties and on technical assistance for particular needs identified by the Guatemalan parties. Given the focus on the national level of the UNDP-IMD programme, a preference was given to support at the local level. One option was to train members of comités civicos, although a disadvantage is that these local committees have to be dissolved after the elections. Another suggestion was to work out projects for supporting individual political parties directly. A concrete proposal was not offered by the delegation, other then urging a close coordination with the UNDP-administered ‘cross-party’ programme.

The mission also proposed to appoint a former UNDP-employee, the Programme officer of the Peace Process programme Doris Cruz, as a country representative of IMD in Guatemala, starting in March 2002. She was closely involved in IMD’s preparations for the new country programme and her task would be to represent IMD locally and develop and implement the IMD programme in Guatemala.

3.2 The Dialogue programme: a joint venture between UNDP and IMD

The UNDP project ‘Multiparty Party Dialogue’ is currently the core of IMD’s programme in Guatemala. The full title is “Political Strengthening through Electoral Program Development”, but will be further referred to as the “Dialogue Programme”. It is a two-year programme (April 2002 - April 2004) with the central objective to support Guatemalan political parties in creating a Shared National Agenda which articulates the National Peace Agreements of 1996. The immediate aim is to enhance the capacity of these parties to build electoral programmes in the light of the November 2003 elections, based on constructing a National Agenda by means of a multiparty dialogue and accompanied by UNDP and IMD.

Although the programme was designed to provide support to the Guatemalan political parties to more effectively participate in the November 2003 elections and to generate more coherent electoral programmes based on ideological principles and a national agenda, in the long run it also aims to strengthen the political party system. That is, beyond these elections.
Four phases were identified in the programme proposal:

- In the first phase, the political parties work together to identify their needs in relation to the priorities of a national agenda and to develop a shared work plan;
- The second phase will then work out this national agenda by using a multiparty dialogue in which the peace agreements and the socio-economic situation are used as key references;
- The third phase focuses on providing support to individual parties, helping them to generate dialogue and analysis within their party structures leading to the development of their own electoral programmes;
- Finally, in the fourth phase the programme assists the parties to translate their electoral programmes (based on the shared national agenda) into either a government or an opposition agenda.

During the programme implementation direct exchanges between Guatemalan and Dutch (and other foreign) political parties are organised to provide input to this process of electoral programme development. IMD considers this as a unique opportunity for Guatemalan political actors to acquire first-hand experience from other (consolidated and democratic) multiparty political systems. This bilateral element of the programme includes exchanges of experiences and technical information as well as training courses for specific issues related to the Shared National Agenda.

The programme is open to all political parties that are legally registered (16 parties at the start of the programme, gradually extended to 22 parties). Each party appoints two representatives that will participate in the identification of the main themes and in the subsequent dialogue process. An intensive scheme of about 40 workshops is planned in which the dialogue methodology developed by UNDP is implemented. This methodology originated in the MIT Organisational Learning Center and was previously used in other countries for democratic dialogue between civil actors, but in Guatemala for the first time also applied to political parties. It is foreseen that UNDP will start a regional project on the basis of the Guatemalan experience.

The entire programme has a budget of USD 446,436 for two years, of which 95% per cent will be provided by IMD and 5% by UNDP. The programme is run and administered by UNDP, with close collaboration with and consultation of IMD via a management committee composed of representatives from both organisations. This committee appoints the programme manager. Another committee composed of representatives from the OAS, IMD and UNPD will be established to coordinate activities of both programmes and to avoid duplication of efforts. Finally, an Advisory Board of local experts will be set up to provide advice to the UNDP-IMD programme.
throughout the implementation phase, especially on the bilateral projects.

At the end of the first year an external evaluation is foreseen to assess the achievements of the programme and judge whether possible adjustments are necessary. In addition, the local research institute ASIES was requested in the Spring of 2003 to develop an evaluation model (based on a logical framework analysis) in order to monitor and evaluate the UNDP-IMD project.

3.3 Democratic values: the OAS programme

The other large multilateral programme aimed at strengthening political parties in which IMD participates is the ‘Democratic values and political management programme’ run by the Democracy Promotion Unit of the OAS. Other than the UNDP programme, the OAS programme in Guatemala is part of a regional project which is also supported by a number of other donors, among them the governments of Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands. The programme is a follow-up to a project that started in 1998, in with a range of workshops and courses were convened to train local political leaders, and later also to stimulate the incorporation of women and youth into the constituencies of the parties.

Based on these experiences the ‘Democratic Values’ programme was developed in 2002. The central objective is to promote and develop democratic values and practices in Guatemala by way of strengthening the political party system.

The four specific goals are:

- Contribute to improving political practice and management in the public sphere by training political leaders and elected representatives in democratic values and political management;
- Contribute to developing a political culture of dialogue among political organisations and between these organisations and the government by creating spaces for discussion and analysis;
- Create conditions for increasing political participation (both in terms of quality as well as quantity) of representatives from the Indigenous peoples, women and youth;
- Promote the creation of capacities at the local level within the parties in order to contribute to their institutional strength.

Five clusters of activities are designed to put these objectives into practice. The first is to discuss and analyse ‘best practices’ of institutional strengthening of parties which can contribute to improve a range of current weaknesses. At the level of the internal party structures this refers to internal elections, party finances, political
organisation, conflict resolution, administration and the development of party programmes and proper ideologies. At the level of the entire party system the activities are geared towards improving the electoral system, developing systems to finance campaigns and promoting a democratic culture. Exchanges with party members from other countries forms part of this cluster.

A second set of activities is oriented at political education and training of leaders on democratic values and management of the parties. This part of the programme is basically meant for intermediate political leaders from all departments, prioritising women, youth and representatives from indigenous peoples. Linked to the training courses is a certificate for ‘new political leadership’ awarded by the University of San Carlos and the Central American Institute for Political Studies (INCEP).

The third area of activities aims to develop and strengthen interparty networks of women, youth and indigenous. These networks are formed on the basis of the previously mentioned training courses, so that capacities acquired can be put into practice immediately. The networks are considered to be a key space for dialogue and discussion and as a breeding space for a new political culture.

The fourth activity of the programme wants to strengthen the interaction between parties and organisations of civil society, as the link between political and civil society is underdeveloped and undermining the legitimacy of the parties. For that purpose ‘round tables’ (mesas de diálogo) are set up in which political parties in a structural way enter into a dialogue on their agendas and concerns about the construction of democracy. Four of these round tables will be established: between parties and (i) indigene organisations, (ii) women’s organisations, (iii) organisations of civil society, and (iv) the mass media.

Finally, the fifth cluster of activities aims to establish forums and networks to transfer all the capacities and experiences that are developed during the programme into the daily practice of the Guatemalan political parties. This is done within the parties themselves by strengthening internal training capacity (intraparty networks), but also between the various parties (the creation of a political party forum) and between parties and civil society.

IMD finances two elements of this large OAS programme: it gave partial support to the first cluster on ‘best practices’ (June 2002 – July 2003) and to the second cluster on political education and training, in particular to train leaders of civil committees (July 2002 – December 2003). The total IMD contribution amounts to USD 43,200. Although the OAS programme continues after 2003, IMD has (not yet) made any commitments for supporting this programme after the upcoming elections.
Apart from the Democratic Values programme, IMD also supports and actively participates in the Interamerican Forum on Political Parties, which was set up by the OAS and the IDB in 2001. In this annual forum of Latin American political parties, international political foundations and party internationals IMD is represented by its board member Alvaro Pinto.

3.4 The bilateral projects

Next to the larger support to the multilateral programmes described above, IMD also initiated a number of so-called 'bilateral projects'. The central objective of this bilateral programme is to support political parties in developing their technical, programmatical and ideological capacities needed to use the opportunities offered in the national, regional and/or international sphere. In practice this can relate to strengthening the organisation, training and education, both for individual parties as well as for alliances.

The parties have to apply for support based on project proposals. The bilateral projects do not directly provide funding for parties, but only offer financial or technical support for particular activities to a maximum of USD 30,000. IMD decides whether proposals are eligible for support, depending upon their complementarity with the core of the IMD programme (the Multiparty Dialogue) and the exchanges with Dutch (or European) political parties.

Between September 2002 and Augustus 2003 the following bilateral projects have been supported: 4

- Training of political party cadre organised by MINUGUA on a range of newly adopted laws, such as the municipal code, decentralisation law and the role of urban and rural development councils (First phase in 2002, second phase still ongoing; USD 40,000);
- Direct support for the URNG to facilitate the participation of 140 of their local members in the Foro Sao Paulo, an international political forum convened in the capital (December 2002; USD 22,841);
- Direct support for the Partido Unionista to train and prepare local leaders for the upcoming elections (January/February 2002; USD 28,531);
- Participation of Guatemala in the global network of parliamentarians in Greece, especially in relation to the World Bank (March 2003; Technical assistance);

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4 IMD Guatemala also counts support to the OAS programme as 'bilateral projects'; this is a matter of classification and based on the conviction that the multilateral programme with UNDP is the core of IMD’s programme. However, this overview does not include the projects supported as part of the OAS programme.
• Seminar on Ideologies and Programmes in the 21st Century, with participation of parties from the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and El Salvador (April 2003; USD 32,478);

• Forum on indigenous political participation, organised in Quetzaltenango (May 2003; USD 16,706);

• Elaboration of a guide on political organisations in Guatemalan, implemented by a researcher of the Francisco Marroquin University (Since October 2002; USD 1,558);

• Co-financing of a Friedrich Ebert-led campaign on “Conscientious Voting” (Vote Consciente) at local levels (Until August 2003; USD 20,000);

Apart from these eight (nearly) finalised projects, at the moment of evaluation about five new projects were still in the stage of approval. Among them a follow-up project to the national encounter of indígenas, a forum with the Social Pastorate in Alta Verapaz, support to a women’s organisation in Alta Verapaz and a pilot project on assessing the socio-economic viability of programmes for government.
4. Assessment of the results

The current evaluation was not meant to do an impact assessment of IMD’s Guatemala programme, given the fact that it had only run for about 15 months. However, the evaluators were asked to assess initial results and to make a mid-term review of the process of the ongoing programme. This chapter gives an overview of the results achieved with the Dialogue programme with UNDP (the core of the IMD programme), the OAS programme and the bilateral projects, followed by assessments of these results and an analysis of their sustainability. The next chapter analyses issues related to the implementation modalities of the programme in more detail.

4.1 Results of the Multiparty Dialogue programme

The evaluators were unanimously impressed by the results that have been achieved after one year with the multiparty dialogue process, although it was also clear that the process had some limitations that will be outlined later. But as a starter, it is important to stress that UNDP together with IMD has made a correct choice to develop this programme as a way to strengthen the Guatemalan political party system in the longer run. At two moments self-evaluations were produced by UNDP-IMD (April 2003) and by the Dialogue group (July 2003) of which the outcomes have been useful for the current assessment.5

Overall, UNDP has done excellent work with the multiparty dialogue process. The project was well-conceived and well-implemented. The UNDP team is dedicated and genuinely enthusiastic about the project and has worked hard at all aspect of the process. For UNDP the dialogue project was of special importance because it is an extension of UNDP’s work on national dialogue processes with other (civil) actors. The multiparty dialogue is its first effort in Latin America to stimulate and create a meeting and discussion space for political parties, and is therefore considered to be a pilot project that will generate important lessons for similar projects in other countries.

A project coordinator was contracted in May 2002 (in close cooperation with IMD) to prepare the dialogue process. Between June and August 2002 the programme was started up with the election of two representatives from each political party: one representative from the national leadership and one representative from the technical

5 See ‘Internal Report of the Management Committee UNDP-IMD’ (Guatemala, 7 April 2003); ‘Auto-evaluación representantes políticos, Diálogo Multipartidario’ (Guatemala, 31 July 2003).
department of each party. In August 2002 a total of 14 parties had presented their representatives; by July 2003 the number of parties had grown to 20. Although the group not always had the same composition, most of the (on average 40) party representatives participated in the entire dialogue programme. Only parties that managed to get at least one representative in Congress (4% of the total vote) would be allowed to participate in the follow-up of the dialogue programme after the elections, a condition that was meant to stimulate coalition-building and reduce the large number of political parties.

After the major themes had been jointly identified by the participants, the dialogue programme took off in August 2002 with a series of workshops and discussion meetings in order to define a shared national agenda. The workshop topics were in fact a combination of the main themes of the Peace Agreements and of elements taken from the UNDP-sponsored Human Development Report. Between August 2002 and July 2003 the Dialogue group would convene almost thirty times in one or two-day sessions. Local experts were invited to provide input to the discussions, followed by internal debates and working groups in which the ‘civic dialogue’ method was used draw up common positions. By analysing key issues from different viewpoints and developing a minimal consensus, step by step a culture of dialogue was created.

The participants needed some time to get used to the methodology and to build some mutual trust in the regular workshops, but gradually a framework emerged of a common national agenda. The objective of the programme was to use this shared national agenda as a basis for developing electoral party programmes. From March 2003 onwards, the outcomes of the Dialogue group were therefore also transferred to the lower ranks of the political parties, for which UNDP facilitated workshops for individual parties mostly outside the capital. A total of 14 of these workshops were convened in which over 500 party cadre participated (of which 16% were women).

Two main obstacles were encountered in the Dialogue process. The first was the delayed start of the programme, due to delayed funding transfers by the Dutch ministry to IMD in March 2002. As a result the project coordinator had to be contracted later than was planned, which

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6 Although UNDP and IMD requested to propose a man and a woman, this equal gender balance was not realised.
7 This civil dialogue method has been developed by Generon, Society for Organisational Learning and the MIT Organisational Learning Centre and has been applied by UNDP in previous years for civil scenario dialogues. It was the first time that UNDP methodology coordinator Elena Diez Pinto applied the method also for a dialogue between political parties.
8 The whole dialogue process, including presentations by external experts, the internal debates and the concluding sessions, are very well documented by UNDP and all written material was submitted to the evaluation team. See ‘Programa de dialogo multipartidario’, UNDP-IMD, 2002/2003.
in turn delayed the implementation of the dialogue schedule. Readjustments of this schedule also implied that the last phase of the Dialogue process coincided with the start of the election campaign, in which increased competition between the political parties started to clash with a proper interparty dialogue.

The second obstacle was a combination of growing political tension in the period May to July 2003 (as a product of the disputed Rios Montt presidential candidacy) and pressure by the Consultative Group (formed by the international donor community) in May 2003 on all political parties to commit themselves unconditionally to the Peace Agreements. The combination of these external circumstances affected a proper finalisation of the Dialogue process, as the agreement and presentation of the Shared National Agenda had become a political condition by the donor community rather than a tool for future stability of the political party system.

As a result of these developments the parties and UNDP-IMD agreed to finalise the Dialogue process with a public presentation of the Shared National Agenda in mid-September 2003, barely 8 weeks before the general elections of 8 November 2003. The originally planned third and fourth phases of the Multiparty dialogue – aimed at translating the National Agenda into the individual electoral party programmes and to transform these programmes into government or opposition agendas – had to be either cancelled or seriously reduced. As a result, the last phase of the Dialogue process turned out to be rather frustrating for the parties as well as for the funders. A proper assessment of the impact of this last phase amidst the electoral campaign certainly has to be done after the elections.

After one year, the following results have been achieved with the dialogue process:

First, one of the most explicit outcomes of the UNDP-IMD Dialogue process is that a group of about 40 people representing political parties from the entire political spectrum was formed, creating a unique space for dialogue, discussion and analysis. Despite political differences the members of this group developed a climate of mutual respect, a firm commitment to pursue a national agenda based on the Peace Agreements and jointly showed that this micro environment can become the seed for a new political culture in Guatemala. The fact that such a forum did not previously exist in the country and that it showed cohesiveness despite a variety of political tensions is a remarkable result.

The second achievement is that, although the idea of a multiparty dialogue came from outside the country, it met with a strong positive response among the participants and seems to have been appropriated as their own space. That is, the establishment of a positive, neutral space where party representatives can meet to get to know one
another, work together, and learn from each other. Given the extremely divisive state of Guatemalan politics, this process of bridge-building is very useful. Representatives of some of the parties have used this space to explore possible political alliances among themselves (such as GANA) and to resolve political tensions.

A third important result of the dialogue process has been the increased political expertise on the part of the participants. The many seminars and workshops that they attended were well-organised and rich with content. The participants had exposure to many of the best political analysts and thinkers in Guatemala and the resultant discussion and debates were far-reaching and deep. The impact of this process of stimulating a new type of political culture can only be genuinely judged over time. However, the likelihood that an estimated one-third of the participants of the Dialogue group will be either elected into the new Congress or appointed into a future government post illustrates the potential of this impact.

Four, elaborating on a shared national agenda which is reflecting an unconditional commitment to the implementation of the Peace Agreements is a further important result of the dialogue process. It has allowed the participants (and indirectly the parties) to work together in a process of identifying the policy issues of greatest importance for the country and to find common ground between them on these priorities. The parties have held a number of meetings at the regional level to discuss the agenda and this has contributed to the political education of approximately 500 persons within the various parties. It is too early to judge whether the items on the agenda will indeed have been incorporated into the party programmes.

Five, the establishment of a Political Party Forum in November 2002, in which all parties are represented by their secretary generals, can be attributed for a large part to the existence of the Dialogue group. As such, the dialogue process has also usefully complemented the Political Party Forum that is supported by the OAS. A nucleus of about ten people within the dialogue also participate in the Forum and they have helped ensure that the Dialogue process helps to “feed” the forum. At times there have been uncertainties or even tensions within some of the parties about the two exercises (and confusion about which international organisation is responsible for which exercise) but over time the Dialogue and the Forum have become positive complements to each other. The key importance of the Forum was its commitment in July 2003 to unanimously respect and commit itself to the implementation of the Peace Agreements and to agree on a transparent and clean election process.

Although the parties themselves established the Political Party Forum, all party representatives interviewed admit that the existing Dialogue group gave the main incentive to create this Forum of party leaders.
Finally, an indirect result of the dialogue process has been that the previously unknown IMD, in Guatemala popularly called the ‘Instituto Holandés’, has positioned itself as a reliable donor and actor with a strong commitment to supporting multiparty initiatives. Visits by Dutch politicians to Guatemala, but also the visit of Guatemalan politicians to observe the Dutch elections in January 2003, have contributed to create a solid a basis of confidence, which will be necessary for the development of future IMD activities.

4.2 Results of the OAS programme

The results of the two IMD-financed elements of the OAS programme (Best Practices seminar and support to the Comités Cívicos) cannot easily be assessed as they are relatively small parts of a larger programme, and the mission was not asked to provide an assessment of the overall OAS Democratic Values programme. Besides that, the element on the civil committees was still ongoing. However, we do perceive that the overall design and strategic vision of this programme is in a way more coherent and in the longer run more explicitly worked out compared to the UNDP-IMD Dialogue process.

Of course, it has to be taken into account that the two programmes have different backgrounds and visions. Although both are clearly oriented at creating space for dialogue between the parties, UNDP focuses more on reconciliation in a broader sense (with other complementary programmes dealing with reconciliation in civil society) whereas OAS rather focuses on political stability by targeting more explicitly the party leaderships. A mid-term review of the OAS programme suggested that its implementation was still weakest in developing the relationships between parties and civil society organisations, especially with indigena organisations.10 In that sense the efforts of the two multilateral organisations can become more complementary if these comparative advantages are further articulated in a mutually reinforcing fashion.

Given its size and its position, IMD can only play a modest role in strengthening coordination between these (and other) programmes. However, as the only external funder that supports both projects it can indeed play a mediating role, as it has done at several moments. It is therefore important that IMD continues its support to both programmes in the future, although preferably together with the larger bilateral donors.

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10 See ‘Repaso del Programa Valores Democráticos y Gerencia Política de la UPD/OAS a petición de la Real Embajada de Noruega, Versión Final, 13 de mayo de 2003, p. 22.
4.3 Results of the bilateral projects

Of the eight bilateral projects that had been approved in the period of evaluation, six had been completed by late July 2003. Of these six projects, one was a visit to Greece and Holland by three Guatemalan Congress members (not reviewed) and two were directly aimed at supporting activities of one political party (at the request of URNG and the Partido Unionista). The results of these two projects will be discussed first.

Participation URNG cadre in Foro Sao Paulo (Guatemala, December 2002)

The objective of the project, submitted in September 2002 to IMD, was to strengthen the political formation of about 140 active members of the URNG by participating in discussions with other leftist parties at the occasion of the 11th Foro Sao Paulo, held in Guatemala. The project consisted of four regional seminars to prepare the participants for the Forum and to discuss proposals by the URNG leadership, in which a total of approximately 500 members participated. The delegation to the Forum was deliberately balanced, with a high proportion of indigenas, women and youth. The outcome of the project was that (i) URNG was able to present a large delegation to the international forum of left-wing parties, (ii) a large number of URNG members had been able to participate in the preparatory Forum discussions, where the delegates were elected in a democratic way, and (iii) the participants in the Forum had been able to participate in international discussions with like-minded parties, contributing to improve their political formation. After completion of the Forum, the URNG seriously delayed the financial report of the project.

Election training for leaders of the Partido Unionista (Guatemala, February 2003)

In order to prepare for the elections of November 2003 a group of over 800 active members of the Partido Unionista was trained in a two-day course, followed (on the third day) by the National Assembly of the party. The formation consisted of a training in political ideology, content of party programme, the emerging Shared National Agenda, election strategy and a training of election candidates. Of the participants 42% were women, 39% indigena and 60% was under the age of 35. The training course was evaluated by making a survey of 15% of the participants. The outcome of the activity was that 803 active party members had been formed and informed on the topics mentioned above and that a considerable share of the party membership had used the occasion to strengthen mutual ties and to discuss election strategies. It has to be mentioned that the project had been presented and planned by Secretary General Gustavo Porras, who a few months later withdrew from the party after he lost internal elections.
Training on new legislation for political parties by MINUGUA

In 2002 three new laws were approved by Congress as part of the commitments to the Peace Agreements: Law on Decentralisation, the Municipal Code and the Law on Urban and Rural Development Committees. These laws are fundamental for consolidating democratic participation at the local level and therefore the programme PROLEY of MINUGUA organised training seminars for all political parties, a project financed by ASDI (Sweden) and IMD. Virtually all political parties were very interested to receive this training. The results of the first phase of the programme (July-October 2002) are that over a dozen training courses were realised for six different parties throughout the country with a total of 441 participants (of which 13% were women). These active members are now able to explain the content of the three laws and their importance for democratic participation to their constituencies. The evaluation team visited one of these sessions in Jacaltenango (Partido Union Nacional) and was impressed by the capacity of the facilitators but also noted that the teaching method was rather traditional and that it could have more interactive.

The importance of the project is that MINUGUA does not exclude any party for its courses. However, based on earlier experiences, it was decided to implement the courses separately for each party. Another positive element is that party leaders (Congress members and/or Secretary Generals) played an active role in the preparation and realisations of the meetings. It is remarkable that in the first phase of the programme the majority of cadre trained (52%) was member of the Partido Unionista; in the second phase the participants are more evenly distributed over the various parties. The second phase will also have translations of the laws in Maya languages available, which were realised together with the Guatemalan Maya Language Academy.


The objective of this IMD-organised seminar was to provide input from foreign political parties in developing a proper ideological debate in Guatemala as part of a process of modernising the political system. The two-day seminar included the participation of parties from Europe and Latin America. After several presentations, the participants further discussed the topics in working groups. The final report did not offer details on the number of participants, nor on the outcome of the seminar. According to several resource persons the seminar was useful and interesting, but it was hard to predict its impact on the ideological debate in Guatemala. These persons also suggested that a stronger role of the party internationals in Guatemala would probably have a greater impact.
**Forums on indigenous political participation (May 2003)**

The project aims to increase participation of indigenous people in political parties by organising national and regional discussion meetings with national party leaders participating in the Multiparty Dialogue and leaders from Comités Civos and various indigena organisations. The main conclusions and demands of the first Regional meeting were presented at a National meeting in Tecpán in May 2003. The outcome of this process was that the topic of political participation of Indigenous peoples was put on the agenda of the political parties, although the response of the parties could have been a lot better. The project will require a number of follow-up activities (coherent analyses, training courses, involvement of more young participants, participation of Indigena mayors, etc.). A proposal for follow-up was presented to IMD for funding; three additional Regional meetings are still to be realised.

4.4 Assessment of the results of the cross-party programmes

The results achieved, and listed above, are definitely important but will have to be analysed in a broader framework. Below we will analyse some elements that will put the achievements of the dialogue process into a political perspective, given the central objective of IMD to strengthen the Guatemalan political party system in the longer run.

**Limited role of the Dialogue in strengthening the parties**

One of the purposes of the dialogue process is to strengthen the parties themselves. By helping educate some key persons in the parties, the dialogue has helped strengthen the potential leadership capacity within the parties. One should be cautious, however, about assuming that merely giving some training to two people in each party will itself have much effect on parties that suffer from a long list of profound structural deficiencies. Certainly some of the party representatives will try to bring back into their parties what they have learned in the dialogue process but it would be premature to declare that these persons will be effective “agents of change” within their parties given the powerful obstacles to change in almost all the parties.

A related element, also acknowledged by the Dialogue group in its self-evaluation, is that Guatemala currently has too many political parties (22 at the moment of evaluation), but only very few consolidated parties. Many parties collapse after the elections and many even totally disappear after four years. On the other hand, the need was felt to stimulate ideological diversity and to prevent that new parties would be quickly absorbed by traditional alliances. After all, often the smaller parties were providing innovative views. As it was stated by one of the
Dialogue participants: “we want to keep our ideological identity, like being part of a colorful fruit salad, rather than being diluted into a fruit punch”. This point also underscores the importance of reforming the Law on Political Parties, which will give better guarantees for smaller parties to survive financially.

The relative value of national agendas

The participants in the dialogue have valued their work on a shared national agenda. Elaborating the agenda helped the participants focus on the peace agreements (which have been almost abandoned since 1999) and on how these accords can be taken forward. It would be premature and overreaching, however, to say that the shared national agenda represents the relaunching of the Peace Agreements.

Given that the agenda has not yet been finished and not yet launched it is too early to judge its impact on the parties or on the national political scene. Although it will certainly be useful, some cautionary points are in order. First, it should be noted that Guatemala is rich with national agendas – agendas have been and continue to be produced by various groups (with the backing of a wide variety of international donors), which are all taking the Peace Agreements as the point of departure. As one participant in the dialogue comments to the evaluators, “this country has been hyper-diagnosed; we could have just started with the peace accords and gone from there rather than creating a new agenda.”

Second, the agenda is a list of national policy priorities – it is the “what” but not the “how.” Thus, for example, the different parties were able to agree that the reduction of poverty is a priority. But they did not seek to come to agreement on the much harder, more divisive question of what measures and policies should be taken to reduce poverty. In other words, the level of agreement or consensus achieved only goes to a certain depth. The agenda is thus not in itself the basis for a legislative agenda for a new government or a policy agenda for opposition parties, although this is acknowledged by UNDP and IMD and plans are made to elaborate on the agenda in the following months.

Third, Guatemalan politics are profoundly divided between the two main political forces (the ruling FRG and the economic elites represented by the PAN-related center-right forces in the opposition). This division is coming to a boiling point in the unfolding electoral process. Though the achievement of a shared national agenda by the multiparty dialogue process is a helpful exercise, it does not represent a bridge over this tremendously wide and deep divide in Guatemalan politics. This stark fact was underlined in July 2003 with the Forum on political parties: a week after the parties signed an ethics and non-violence agreement related to the elections, the FRG unleashed a
savage burst of violence in the capital to protest the initial court rejection of Rios Montt’s candidacy.\footnote{11}

Use of the Agenda in the near future

The next six months will be crucial in the finalisation, launching, and use of the national agenda. Ideally this stage would have been reached three to six months earlier in order not to coincide with the electoral campaign but the fact that it will occur during the campaign can also be treated as an opportunity. During the campaign, however, parties will be very focused on the much narrower process of putting forward their candidates and their core messages rather than trying to engage in a broader debate on a national agenda.

The arrival to power of a new government in January 2004 will also be an opportunity for the use of the agenda as a background to and possible stimulus for the development of a government programme. On the other hand it is very likely that the victorious party will come to power with its own program and intentions, which in turn might be undermining the whole exercise of have reached an agreement on the key issues of a National Agenda.

In short, considerable thought will have to be given to how the agenda can be used both during the campaign and during the first several months of a new government. UNDP’s plans for this appear not that well-defined. It has focused more on disseminating the agenda within the parties themselves, especially at the level of departments and the municipalities. Meanwhile, to the surprise of the evaluation mission, UNDP had decided to cancel the third phase of the programme that focused on strengthening individual party programmes, or at least to postpone the implementation of this element until after the electoral campaign.

4.5 Assessment of the results of the bilateral projects

The bilateral projects component of the programme appears weakly developed, especially in comparison to the multiparty dialogue component. IMD Guatemala is actually not receiving many proposals from the parties. There is little sense of thematic focus to what grants have been made, other than very general ideas about participation. Clear selection criteria for the bilateral projects will have to be developed as part of a strategic vision about the role of these projects in relation to the cross-party projects.

\footnote{However, it should be acknowledged that the Dialogue group showed its coherence and strength by not temporarily suspending the participation of the FRG representatives, as was the case with the Forum on Political Parties. It is another example of how the Dialogue group currently performs a reconciling role in Guatemalan politics.}
There have been problems with the administrative follow-up of some of the grants. There is also a lack of background knowledge of the relevant actors and issues with regard to some of the grants, such as the grant for indigenous participation. Moreover, there is already an abundance of training workshops, seminars, and conferences with the parties sponsored by other donors, often related to the same themes of participation of women, youth, and indigenous people. It is therefore required that IMD links up more closely with other funding agencies in order to see where its complementary ‘niche’ can lay. For example, some of the work on indigenous participation is also supported by many European (and particularly Dutch) NGOs and it is important not to duplicate efforts.

IMD also needs to be very cautious about giving individual grants to political parties, even when the grants are paid out on an expense reimbursed bases. The parties have very little internal capacity to generate proposals and to implement the activities. And there is a strong danger of creating within the political party sector the same unhealthy pattern of supply-driven activities that dominates the NGO world. Apart from this administrative side, IMD should reconsider at all, as a multiparty initiative, to provide grants to individual parties. The experience with the two grants to individual political parties has generated little tangible results. Moreover, IMD runs the risk of being identified with particular ideological positions, which should be avoided as it can undermine its ‘multiparty’ profile. Therefore, bilateral support should always be part of a ‘package’ to multiple parties (as was done, for example, with the MINUGUA project in which various parties were trained on new legislation).

Exchanges with Dutch political parties

It does not appear that the effort to develop ties between the Dutch political parties and the Guatemalan parties has yet had much result. It is also not immediately apparent how useful the Dutch parties can be to the Guatemalan parties given that the Guatemalan parties are only nominally parties in the usual sense of the term. Guatemala does not so much need “party strengthening” as “party building,” which is a much more basic task, one that occasional exchange visits and seminars by foreign experts does not contribute much to.

Despite this concern, representatives of the Guatemalan political parties positively valued the visits by Dutch politicians (as part of the ‘mirror function’) and also appreciated the two visits to the Netherlands (one of these on the occasion of the January 2003 elections). Through these visits they were, for example, informed about the procedures of the Social Planning Bureau, a semi-autonomous government body geared towards calculating the potential socio-economic impact of election programmes. A similar institution does
not exist in Guatemala and, therefore, Dutch technical assistance could be helpful to set up such a Planning Bureau.

When asked about the lessons from these visits, the representatives of the Dialogue group indicated, among other things, that they had seen how important the existence of strong and stable political parties are for a democratic political system. Also the total absence of election fraud, or even intentions in that direction, and the respectful relationships between government and opposition parties had impressed the visitors. It confirms how very different the political systems are in both countries and that more concrete lessons likely are to be learned from exchanges with other parties (and systems) in Latin America.

4.6 Sustainability of the results

In order to analyse the sustainability of the results described above, it is useful to review again some of the basic features of the current Guatemalan political party system. Several experts emphasized to the evaluators that political parties in Guatemala are fundamentally weaker than in other Central American countries. In their view, though there are almost two dozen political parties in Guatemala today, there are no “real” political parties. Instead, Guatemalan political life is dominated by two political forces, the FRG and PAN, neither of which is best thought of in terms of a political party.

Guatemalan citizens express no confidence in or respect for their political parties, nor in the electoral process, which is expressed by extremely low voter participation. Political parties are seen as dominated by corrupt, self-interested politicians. The parties have incoherent ideological bases and their relationship to society is superficial and usually opportunistic. Despite various political party aid initiatives during the 1990s, including many training seminars sponsored by Guatemalan and foreign organisations, there has been no discernable improvement in the system of political parties.

The sustainability of the results of the multiparty dialogue, and its related projects, have to be understood against this background. Results are probably not visible in the elaboration of party programmes (if they will drafted up at all), but rather in the existence of a committed small group of Dialogue participants that will be elected into the new Congress. This group, that has gone through the whole process of intense debates with other politicians and that reached a consensus on a national agenda, will have to guarantee that the

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12 This also holds true for the URNG, the former coalition of the four armed revolutionary organisations, which – though possessing a genuine political base and an internal organisation – is nonetheless quite weak and still in a process of transforming itself into a political party.
outcome of the Dialogue process is translated into new legislation and into the construction of a new political culture. It is estimated that about 15 Dialogue participants will be elected. They will serve as the main intermediaries for UNDP-IMD to their parties in following up on the multiparty dialogue.

Another possible source of sustainability could be represented by a future multiparty training institute for party cadre, a proposal that was suggested on several occasions to the evaluators and for which several donors expressed some interest. However, other observers doubt that a new institution will solve the structural causes of a deficient political party system. But as part of the ‘mirror function’ of IMD, it is a positive sign that the Guatemalan partners have been inspired by the idea of setting up their own multiparty institute, leaving aside whoever would be willing to fund such an initiative.
5. Implementation modalities

Next to assessing and analysing results of IMD’s programme the evaluation mission was also requested to judge a number of issues related to the implementation of the programme in Guatemala (see the Introduction). The following chapter addresses these issues by combining them into four different clusters:

- Coherence of programme design and implementation; ownership of the programme by the parties;
- Programme management, organisation of the Guatemala office, registration and documentation of projects;
- Cooperation with other donors and value-added of IMD programme compared to these donors;
- Quality of evaluation and monitoring, including comments on the current evaluation process.

5.1 Coherence of programme design and implementation

As was stated in the previous chapters, the choice to work with UNDP and to support their multiparty dialogue programme has been a fortunate decision. UNDP was well-placed and well-equipped to start up this dialogue project, although the OAS in principle was more experienced in this field. The decision, after some pressure from the Dutch Embassy, to support both programmes, was therefore even more important and has given IMD a good and credible image in Guatemala. This positive profile provides a solid basis for further elaborating IMD’s presence in the country.

However, it cannot be denied that IMD has taken some huge risks. First of all the choice to start up its major pilot programme in a country with one of the most unstable political party systems of the continent can be questioned. A second risk was to support the UNDP pilot project with a grant that equalled more than 10 % of its entire international budget without sharing this potential risk with other donors. A third risk was to create frictions at the start of the programme by profiling itself as a multiparty institute, while simultaneously prioritising bilateral support to particular political parties. The fourth risk was to plan the programme rather tightly towards the general elections of 2003, while knowing that any major delay would mean that the final stretch of the dialogue process would coincide with the election campaign. The fifth risk was to have this programme monitored and developed by a (Dutch and Guatemalan) staff without major political experience in the country.

That all these potential risks, apart from the delay, were eventually neutralised is in fact a miracle. It is due to the professional capacity of the UNDP staff, the quality of the dialogue method, and the
supportive role of local experts, other donors and international organisations who recognised the enormous value of a multiparty dialogue in this stage of Guatemala’s political process. It is also due to the good relationships that were developed between IMD and the representatives of the political parties, especially after the Dialogue process proved to be of a high quality generating an atmosphere of mutual confidence among the parties.

The bilateral programme, that was meant to be complementary to the multiparty dialogue process, suffers from a lack of coherence and political vision. The decision to request the parties to submit their project proposals was in hindsight probably not a good idea. Not only did this generate very few requests, but the quality was generally not very high. More recently initiated bilateral projects focusing on political participation of civil society groups are certainly justified, but require better preparation and coordination with other donors supporting similar activities. Moreover, the rapid expansion of IMD’s Guatemala programme caused some administrative pressures, which will be further discussed below.

The ownership by the political parties of the multiparty dialogue programme is positively valued according to an internal evaluation of UNDP-IMD in April 2003. However, the evaluation team also received opposite views. Some participants of the Dialogue group voiced their concern that UNDP was too strictly defining the content and the agenda of the dialogue process. It was felt that the parties were ‘actors’ in the process of drafting a Shared National Agenda, rather than that it was their own programme. These voices will have to be taken more seriously in the early design of the follow-up to the UNDP programme, for example, by involving the (newly elected) political parties more closely in the preparations of this new phase.

5.2 Programme management

A local IMD office was set up in Guatemala City in March 2002 to administer the programme. Located at the premises of the research institute ASIES, the office has a staff of three people: the IMD country representative (Doris Cruz), an administrative assistant (Carmen Trejo), and a bookkeeper (Rene Cifuentes). IMD’s country representative is a former UNDP employee who has lived almost 20 years in the Netherlands. She was selected for her knowledge of both Guatemala and the Netherlands and for her qualities to deal with local politicians and with delegations from abroad.

The main tasks of the office are to maintain contacts with the political party members involved in the Dialogue programme, to maintain contacts with other donors and the Dutch Embassy, to provide information to the Headquarters in The Hague, to organise foreign visits and delegations and to administer requests and funds related to the bilateral projects. Currently, the IMD office is not registered in
Guatemala as a legal entity, which is apparently a deliberate choice. The country representative is directly accountable to the Director of IMD and has a certain degree of decision-making power for the smaller bilateral projects, after consulting the Director.

In the first phase of the programme, from early 2002 up to May 2003, the Guatemala programme was administered and supported on the Dutch side by an IMD Programme Officer located at the offices of one of the political parties (in this case Ellen van Koppen of the Labour Party PvdA). Political support and supervision was handled by one of the Board members (Alvaro Pinto, PvdA), who regularly travelled to Guatemala to coordinate with the country representative.

In June 2003 this model was readjusted: a new Policy Officer for Latin America (Heleen Schrooyen) was contracted to take over the administrative supervision, whereas the political supervision was extended to a council consisting of Programme Officers from several political parties. This gradual readjustment was a result of the establishment of a new IMD office in The Hague in 2002, following a decision by the Board to professionalize the institute and to acquire more government funding. These organisational changes also included the introduction of a new centralised ‘project management system’, in which all projects would be registered with standard procedures for approval and administration.

At the time of the evaluation this system was not yet operational and obviously still in a preparatory phase. The evaluation team was in fact struck by the absence of a systematic project administration containing detailed overviews of bilateral projects, disbursements, project proposals, etc. Apparently, ‘internal project approval requests’ (in Dutch: afwegingsmemo’s) of many projects, even for those that had been finalised already, had not been produced; only final reports from the partners had been submitted in a satisfactory way. The absence of clear project approval criteria, systematic project identification systems, and even project numbers or disbursement overviews gave the impression of a deficient project administration. Given the size of the Guatemala programme, IMD is advised to give a high priority in dealing with these matters.

The deficiencies are partly caused by the rapid growth of the programme, especially since late 2002. The country representative has therefore requested an extension of her staff with an additional assistant. Although the evaluators acknowledge this need, it would be good to take this decision after reassessing the overall function and management of the local office. The need for an IMD country representative is not in question: given the importance and size of the programme, and given the complex and unstable political situation, a strong local office is definitely providing an added value for IMD’s presence in Guatemala.
The role and composition of the Advisory Board to the programme also needs some rethinking and readjusting. The current group of ten outstanding advisors have played a key role in the launch of the multiparty dialogue programme, and have been very committed to support the country representative. However, since the majority of its members are in fact ‘stakeholders’ of IMD projects, it cannot be expected that they are at all times a source of independent advice. It is recommended to split up the ‘coordination role’ of the Advisory Board (which is indeed a key role) and the ‘advisory role’ by a group of independent experts. This new group can provide important input in the future strategy of the programme, which, according to many resource persons interviewed, will require more focus and coherence.

5.3 Cooperation with other donors

One of our discussion partners commented that Guatemala was currently saturated by donor projects prioritising support to political parties and strengthening the political system. With the elections approaching, the supply of these projects has reached such a level that the parties are almost unable to handle all these offers. This is not to say that IMD has no role to play anymore. To the contrary: we found an overall consensus among political parties, donor agencies and experts that IMD’s activities in Guatemala are in fact crucial and that it should continue its presence in the coming years.

The added value of IMD, compared to many other donor programmes, is two-fold. First, IMD is the only donor actively supporting the two key multilateral cross-party programmes in Guatemala (of the UNDP and the OAS) and has indirectly contributed to make these programmes more complementary by providing opportunities for coordination and dialogue. Although a constructive collaboration between the two large multilateral organisations appears to be quite difficult (and characterised by insiders as ‘respectful competition’), there seems to be at least some mutual reinforcement which has been facilitated by IMD.

The second element that adds value to IMD’s presence in Guatemala is its focus on “multipartyism” rather than preferential support to individual parties and on consensus rather than political confrontation. At the same time, IMD is not the only external actor taking a multiparty approach to party aid in Guatemala. Norway and Denmark are doing so through their support for the OAS programme, Konrad Adenauer is doing so through its support for the political party seminars organized by ASIES, and Sweden’s political party aid, which is just now being launched, will also take a multiparty approach and involve at least six different Swedish party foundations working together. Again, the multiparty approach does not exclude support to individual parties, as long as this is part of a package offered to multiple parties in which none of these parties will receive a preferential treatment.
The mutual coordination with other international donors is good, but can still be improved. IMD correctly consulted all the larger donors in the preparatory phase of the programme, but failed to follow up on particular key contacts. Especially several Nordic government agencies, all working in the same ‘saturated’ field, suggested that IMD would benefit from more regular consultations and exchanges of information. In addition, IMD is advised to open up regular contacts with other European NGOs (both party foundations and development agencies), so as to avoid any overlap in activities and to guarantee complementarity. Given its multiparty character, IMD is potentially well-placed to play a leading role in improving coordination between these agencies and to bridge the gap with the larger donors.

5.4 Monitoring and evaluation

Requested by the newly established IMD office in The Hague, the Guatemala office started developing its own monitoring and evaluation system in early 2003. Previously no monitoring or evaluation had been done in a systematic manner. The research institute ASIES, with a long tradition of analysing political parties, was asked to develop an evaluation model that would be used for all ongoing activities and projects. Based on a log-frame analysis, ASIES completed the design of such a model in June 2003. The idea was to implement this model and to submit a first evaluation report of all completed projects to the evaluation team, but practical obstacles had delayed this report. However, ASIES did assist in the realisation of a self-evaluation of the Dialogue group, which has proven to be useful for the current report.

The model developed by ASIES is very solid and detailed, but also rather traditional. It is not easy to apply for those who are not acquainted with the logical framework and it therefore requires permanent technical support from the ASIES monitoring team. Another concern is that the model will generate many (mostly quantitative) data, which can become too diverse to process. Also, the model is less geared towards generating qualitative data or information about for example project relevance or strategic vision. However, as a first start it will be quite helpful for IMD in collecting data and outcomes regarding all its projects, which are currently barely available. After one year it will be necessary to review how this new monitoring system is working in practice and which adjustments might be needed.

By way of recommendation, it is important that IMD primarily selects data generated by monitoring and evaluation that are useful for improving its own programme design and implementation, rather than being concerned too much about its accountability to the donor and other (secondary) stakeholders. The organisation and preparation of the current exercise suggests that IMD is eager to develop such a learning approach to evaluation, although this will take some time.
Several useful lessons can be drawn from this external evaluation. For example, it was clear that many partners and stakeholders were unhappy with the timing of the evaluation: in the middle of the busy election campaign and halfway the implementation of the UNDP-IMD project. Better consultation of the stakeholders could have prevented unnecessary tension. The input promised to the evaluation team (self-evaluation by the Dialogue group, and monitoring outputs provided by ASIES) was either not ready or produced under considerable pressure. Some of the partners were even not sure whether their own programmes were evaluated or whether it was an evaluation of the IMD programme as such. IMD seems to be conscious of these shortcomings and has promised better preparations and consultations in future evaluations.

The evaluation team therefore proposes the following suggestions for future (external) evaluations of IMD’s programme:

- All organisations involved in an evaluation process will have to be informed in an early stage (and explicitly) about the objectives and methods of an evaluation, and preferably also contribute to the drafting of the Terms of Reference;
- The stakeholders are to benefit primarily from an evaluation and not the donors, which has consequences for the design of the exercise and for the eventual feedback process;
- The evaluation team should be smaller (two or three persons) but spend more time (at least two weeks) in the ‘field’ so that a superficial and rapid schedule can be avoided;
- A preparatory exercise, such as a self-evaluation, is very useful as an input to any evaluation process, as it is helpful to limit the evaluation focus and to better prepare the programme (in that sense, it was a pity that the self-evaluation of the Dialogue group was implemented so late);
- Large meetings with entire delegations should be kept to a minimum, as these are only useful for well-prepared focus group discussions. The smaller meetings, with just one person being interviewed, were much more useful to the team;
- The evaluation team should be independent and not include any persons who represent organisations that are direct beneficiaries of the programme;
- Attendance of IMD staff at the evaluation interview meetings should be avoided;
- The programme of the evaluation should include more meetings with direct beneficiaries, civil society groups and independent experts.
6. Conclusions

The following general conclusions can be drawn from this external evaluation process:

1. Political context
   - The 1996 Peace Agreements provided the context for an end to social and political polarisation and the start of a process of democratisation
   - The political party system in Guatemala has been unstable, fragmented, polarised and discredited. Political parties were often not more than electoral machines, lacking a programmatic and ideological base, and figure among the weakest actors in society
   - Political participation by citizens has been very low, especially among indigenous people that represent at least half of the population
   - At the November 2003 elections a new Congress will be elected that is of crucial importance to get new legislation approved, needed for democratic consolidation

2. Programme design
   - IMD initiated its Guatemala programme in March 2002 after two identification missions proposed to develop a joint venture with UNDP on political party strengthening, complemented by a range of bilateral projects
   - A local IMD office was started up in 2002 with a local representative
   - A two-year core project with UNDP was started to develop a National Agenda with all registered political parties in a multiparty dialogue process; IMD is the only donor
   - Parallel, an OAS project on Democratic Values with a similar approach was also supported by IMD, together with other donors
   - A number of bilateral projects complementing the cross-party programmes were funded, including two projects supporting (progressive) individual parties

3. Programme results
   - Despite two major obstacles during the implementation of the Dialogue process (delayed start leading to a coincidence with the electoral campaign, and donor pressure to present the Agenda), the programme was very well executed by UNDP
   - The main result of the Dialogue was the training and formation of a group of 40 party members who appropriated the development of a Shared National Agenda and who created a
space for debate and mutual respect between the parties that did not exist anywhere else in Guatemala

- The creation of the Forum on Political Parties was indirectly a result of the Dialogue process: the Dialogue group and the Forum interacted in a complementary sense
- Due to the success of the programmes, IMD gained a credible image as the ‘Instituto Holandés’, which played a mediating role between OAS and UNDP
- The bilateral projects generated mixed results, mainly due to a lack of strategic vision

4. Assessment of results

- Despite the successful Dialogue, it is premature to believe that the participants will act as ‘agents of change’ in their respective parties
- The potential impact of the National Agenda is limited by the inflation of other national agendas, as yet unclear strategies to implement these, and by political polarisation
- There is a risk that the victorious party in the next elections will ignore the agreements reached in the Dialogue process
- IMD, as a multiparty initiative, should avoid providing grants to individual parties when this is not part of a multiparty package
- Exchange programmes of (Dutch) parliamentarians contribute little to party building

5. Sustainability of results

- A follow-up project will have to work further with the elected party members of the Dialogue group, or at least use them as intermediaries to their parties
- The creation of a multiparty institute in Guatemala is an interesting idea, but should be sustained by local funding and not by IMD

6. Programme coherence and ownership

- Although the cross-party programmes, especially the OAS programme, reflected a coherent approach and a strategic vision, this was often lacking in the bilateral projects
- IMD has taken considerable risks with the UNDP project, in which it invested a relatively large grant as a single donor with problematic preconditions
- The ownership of the Dialogue programme by the political parties is positively valued by UNDP and IMD, but several parties have voiced their concerns about this ownership

7. Programme management

- IMD has no clear criteria for the identification and approval of (bilateral) projects
• The local office lacks a well-functioning project management system, although this is currently being introduced
• The current workload of the local IMD staff has to be dealt with
• The existence of a local IMD office is of great value for the implementation of the programme and the representation of the institute
• The Advisory Board has functioned well at the start of the programme but needs to be reorganised as it is currently not the proper source for independent advice

8. Value added of IMD
• The value-added of IMD lies in its complementary support to the two cross-party programmes and in its ‘multiparty’ focus, rather than in its support to individual political parties

9. Cooperation with other donors
• Coordination with other donors has been satisfactory, but can be improved, especially with the Nordic agencies supporting similar programmes
• IMD will have to expand its contacts with European NGOs, both political foundations as well as development agencies; IMD can possibly play a bridging role with other (bilateral) donors when it concerns ‘political aid’

10. Monitoring and evaluation
• The new monitoring system developed by ASIES is a welcome improvement, but is still rather traditional with the risk of generating too many (quantitative) data
• IMD is eager to develop a learning approach to evaluation
• The self-evaluations prepared for this evaluation were useful, but produced under pressure and rather donor-oriented
• Future (external) evaluations will have to involve programme beneficiaries more closely in the design and the implementation phase
7. Recommendations

The evaluation team was requested to make recommendations on five terrains: (i) future direction of the programme, (ii) more effective resource allocation, (iii) role of local IMD office, (iv) increasing programme impact, and (v) improving ownership.

7.1 Future direction of the programme

Several factors combine to make it imperative that IMD develop a new strategy for Guatemala: (i) the UNDP-IMD Dialogue project is coming to a natural endpoint, (ii) the political context is entering a period of possible instability and potentially explosive change, (iii) the political party scene in Guatemala has in the past two years become remarkably saturated with international assistance and many of these activities are offered on a multiparty basis.

IMD should therefore consider several different options for its future programme direction:

- Bring the current project to conclusion in 2004 and then pull out of the country, in recognition of the fact that Guatemala is already receiving more political party assistance than any other Latin American country;
- Carry the multiparty dialogue process forward. IMD could work with UNDP to develop a new phase of the multiparty dialogue process. Any continuation of this process will have to take account of the very different political context that will emerge after the elections: some of the parties will make it into Congress and will focus much of their political efforts there; many other parties will not make it into Congress and most of these will close down or go into dormancy. In this context there will be less interest in and demand for a multiparty dialogue of the type that has been carried out over the past 15 months. Such a dialogue will also be less relevant in that most attention will be focused on the development of a new government programme and the positioning of the opposition parties with respect to that programme;
- Focusing on one or two specific issues relating to the reform of the party system. IMD could for example decide to focus on what will be one of the main issues relating to party reform in the post-election context – the new Law on Political Parties and Elections. IMD could sponsor an inter-related series of activities (a national conference, training of experts, training of journalists, etc.) on the issue with the intention of helping
stimulate the process of developing, passing, and implementing a new law;

- Focusing on one or two specific issues regarding participation. Almost all the international actors working with the political parties are trying to increase participation of women, youth, and indigenous people. IMD could choose one of these areas, such as women or youth, as a main focus and concentrate on it fully, making it IMD’s areas of specialisation;

- Concentrate on working with those parties represented in the new Congress, with a focus on technical assistance directly related to helping those parties be effective in the Congress, such as in law drafting, legislative strategy, multiparty negotiations, constituent relations, and so forth. The parties in the new Congress will certainly be in need of such assistance but at the same time it is likely that there will be various donors eager to provide such help. IMD should move in this direction therefore only if it determines that it can provide something that other donors will not be providing;

- Focusing on internal party building with those parties not in Congress. It is certain that there will be a large amount of international donor attention on those parties represented in the new Congress, both training of deputies as well as internal party capacity building. IMD could take a different approach and develop a programme to work with all registered parties not in Congress to help them build and develop in the lean years until the next election.

The evaluation team would advise IMD not to withdraw at this moment from Guatemala, as it has to capitalise on the credibility that was build up over the past 15 months. Close coordination with other (especially Nordic) funders and continued support to the UNDP and OAS programmes seems to be a wise step forward.

### 7.2 More effective resource allocation

Up to January 2004, when the new Congress and Government will take office, it will be very difficult for IMD to make major decisions about future project allocations. It is recommended that a mission visits Guatemala after mid-January to speak to newly elected Congress members, especially those that have been participating in the Dialogue group, to identify their particular needs and to analyse the new political situation.

It is also recommended to explore possibilities to complement support activities of USAID and IDB to the new Congress, however from a multiparty perspective.

In the meantime, IMD can focus on the following issues:
• Reassess ongoing project requests in the light of a new future strategy;
• Review the new monitoring and evaluation systems set up by ASIES;
• Reassess and possibly reorganise the local IMD office.

7.3 Role of the local IMD office

It is recommended to maintain the current country representation as this presence is of crucial importance to further develop and monitor IMD’s programme in the future. The institute needs to maintain its regular contacts with representatives from the Dutch Embassy, UNDP, OAS and other funders, as well as its contacts with the political parties. A local presence can also be beneficial for developing a higher profile at the local level, where IMD is virtually unknown, and in circles of civil society actors.

Meanwhile, it will be important to address some of the weaknesses identified in the evaluation report, such as:

• Restructuring the Advisory Board;
• Improvement of project management systems;
• Developing explicit project allocation criteria;
• Strengthening and training the local staff.

7.4 Increasing programme impact

The impact of IMD’s programme can be increased by paying attention to the following issues:

• Drawing clear lessons from project evaluations;
• Avoiding individual and isolated support to political parties and prioritising a multiparty approach;
• Introducing a more pro-active approach to project identification;
• Making more use of diplomatic channels for political pressure;
• Drawing media attention for delegation visits;
• Trying to avoid the allocation of large grants, and use a more strategic and diversified approach to resource allocation.
7.5 Improving ownership

Although the Dialogue method tries to lay the ownership with the political parties, there have been some concerns about the dominant role of UNDP. In order to improve ownership of the programme, one can think of:

- Active involvement of the parties in designing the next phase of the programme;
- Establishing an advisory board to UNDP-IMD composed of Dialogue participants.
## Annex I: List of persons interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Doris Cruz</td>
<td>IMD: Country Representative Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala, 28 July 03; Huehuetenango, 2 Aug 03*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mark Dijk*</td>
<td>IMD: Policy Officer Africa</td>
<td>The Hague, 23 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ellen van Koppen*</td>
<td>Labour party (PvdA) Programme Officer for IMD</td>
<td>Amsterdam, 28 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roel von Meijenfeldt*</td>
<td>IMD: Executive Director</td>
<td>The Hague, 23 July 03; 20 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alvaro Pinto Scholtbach*</td>
<td>IMD: Board member and International Secretary Dutch Labour Party (PvdA)</td>
<td>Amsterdam, 29 Aug 03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heleen Schrooyen*</td>
<td>IMD: Policy Officer Latin America</td>
<td>The Hague, 3 &amp; 23 July 03; 20 Aug 03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Tuit*</td>
<td>IMD: Senior Policy Officer</td>
<td>The Hague, 23 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IMD partners in Guatemala</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Miguel Angel Balcárcel</td>
<td>UNDP: Coordinator Multiarty Dialogue Programme</td>
<td>Guatemala, 28, 30 July 03; 5 Aug 03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elena Diez Pinto</td>
<td>UNDP: Technical Advisor Regional Democratic Dialogue Programme</td>
<td>Guatemala, 30 July 03; 5 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fernando Masaya</td>
<td>UNDP: Project Officer</td>
<td>Guatemala, 30 July 03; 5 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christina Ellich</td>
<td>UNDP: Project Officer</td>
<td>Guatemala, 30 July 03; 5 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rolando Robles Soñia González</td>
<td>UNDP: Assistents Multiarty Dialogue Programme</td>
<td>Guatemala, 30 July 03; 5 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juan Pablo Corlazzoli</td>
<td>United Nations: Resident Coordinator Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala, 31 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marco Antonio Barahona Muñoz Hans Quevedo, Raquel Zelaya Karin Erbsen de Maldonado Carlos Escobar Armas Edmundo Urutia</td>
<td>ASIES: Research coordinators and board representatives</td>
<td>Guatemala, 29 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juan Luis Castilla Virginia Barrios Fuentes Luis Felipe Linares López</td>
<td>ASIES: Monitoring Project</td>
<td>Guatemala, 29 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ana Isabel Garita</td>
<td>MINUGUA: Director PROLEY</td>
<td>Guatemala, 29 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manuela Alvarado</td>
<td>Former member of Congress; encuentro pueblos indígenas</td>
<td>Guatemala, 31 July 03; Quetzaltenango, 4 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramiro López Ramírez</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ricardo Gómez, Ana Isabel Garita, Raquel Zelaya, Christina Ellich</td>
<td>UNDP: Advisory Group Multiparty Dialogue Programme</td>
<td>Guatemala, 31 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eduardo Núñez</td>
<td>OAS: Coordinator ‘Programa Valores Democraticos y Gerencia Política’</td>
<td>Guatemala, 1 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ricardo Stein</td>
<td>SOROS Foundation: Guatemala: Executive Director</td>
<td>Guatemala, 1 Aug 03</td>
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### Political party representatives (Guatemala)

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<th>Name</th>
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<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>José Mauricio Rodríguez</td>
<td>Partido Unión Democrática: Secretario General Adjunta</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>29 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olga Cristina Camey de Noack</td>
<td>Alianza GANA: Member of Congress</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>29 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patricia Orantes</td>
<td>Alianza GANA: Assistant to Eduardo Stein; Member of Dialogue</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>29 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sulema Paz de Rodriguez</td>
<td>FRG: Member of Congress</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>30 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jorge Mario Ríos Muñoz</td>
<td>FRG: Chair of the Legislative Technical Support Committee</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>30 July 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP-IMD Dialogue Group (appr. 20 members)</td>
<td>Presentation self evaluation, facilitated by ASIES</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>31 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hugo Villatoro, Oscar Palacios</td>
<td>Alianza GANA: local campaigning group</td>
<td>Huehuetenango</td>
<td>2 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carlos Rivas</td>
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<tr>
<td>José Antonio, Carmen</td>
<td>Partido Unión Nacional</td>
<td>Jacaltenango</td>
<td>3 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jesus Cifuentes, Alfonso Tobar</td>
<td>Partido CASA</td>
<td>Quetzaltenango</td>
<td>4 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Felipe Santos, Guillermo Mendoza</td>
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<td>Bertha de Leon, Chulasca Geron</td>
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<td>Americo Geron, Julio Hernández</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roberto Casas, Manuela Alvarado</td>
<td>Comité Cívico Xeljú</td>
<td>Quetzaltenango</td>
<td>4 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ricardo Cajas, Abraham Velazquez</td>
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<td>Daniel Tucux, Martin Alvarado</td>
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<td>Miguel Ordóñez, Iris López</td>
<td>Comité’s Cívicos de Sololá, San Marcos la Laguna, Cantanel</td>
<td>Quetzaltenango</td>
<td>4 Aug 03</td>
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<td>Valeriano Pérez, Augusto de Leon</td>
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<td>Juan Antonio Zalanec, Israel Zacadeu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nineth Montenegro</td>
<td>ANN: Member of Congress</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>5 Aug 03</td>
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### International donors and diplomats

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization/Role</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hans Petter Buvollen*</td>
<td>UNDP: Coordinator Civil Society Programme</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>27 July 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anja Stuckert</td>
<td>Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Guatemala Representative</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>30 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jorge Molina Valdivieso</td>
<td>Ambassador of Chile</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>29 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marta Leissner</td>
<td>Ambassador of Sweden</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>31 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arend Pieper*</td>
<td>Dutch Embassy: Charge d’Affairs</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>5 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marijke Otten</td>
<td>Dutch Embassy: Deputy Charge d’Affairs</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>28 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position and Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hans Magnusson</td>
<td>Policy Officer ASDI; Swedish Embassy</td>
<td>Guatemala, 6 Aug 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbara Pesce-Monteiros</td>
<td>UNDP: Adjunct Resident Coordinator</td>
<td>Guatemala, 31 July 03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guri Rusten</td>
<td>Norwegian Embassy: Project Officer NORAD</td>
<td>Guatemala, 5 Aug 03</td>
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<td>Klaus Wulff</td>
<td>Danish Embassy: Coordinator PRODECA</td>
<td>Guatemala, 6 Aug 03</td>
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<td><strong>Other resource persons</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gustavo Porras</td>
<td>Ex Secretary General Partido Unionista;</td>
<td>Guatemala, 28 July 03</td>
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<td>Frank La Rue</td>
<td>CALDH: Executive Director</td>
<td>Guatemala, 5 Aug 03</td>
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<td>Mario Polanco</td>
<td>GAM: Executive Director</td>
<td>Guatemala, 5 Aug 03</td>
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<td>Gabriel Aguilera Peralta</td>
<td>Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Guatemala, 6 Aug 03</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*) Interviewed by Kees Biekart only
Annex II: List of documents reviewed

Published documents:


Internal documents IMD:

Project reports:

- Programa de divulgación con partidos políticos sobre legislación de participación social y gobiernos locales. Proley/Minugua. Guatemala, 7 de noviembre 2002.
• Informe final “Encuentro nacional sobre la participación política de los pueblos indígenas en los partidos políticos y comités cívicos”. Tecpán, Chimaltenago, 30-31 de mayo 2003.
• Programa de diálogo multipartidario, PNUD-IMD (Compilación de presentaciones y informes de los talleres). 2002/03.

Reports of visits:
• Verslag IMD-missie Guatemala 3-10 februari 2002 (Pinto, Van Gennip, Pormes, Van Koppen).
• Informe de la visita de observación de las elecciones generales en Holanda, auspiciado por el IMD. Enero de 2003.
• Informe de viaje a Grecia (8-10 de marzo 2003) y Holanda (12-13 de marzo 2003), Olga Camey (PU), Nineth Montenegro (ANN) y Sulema Paz de Rodriguez (FRG).
• Report IMD mission to Guatemala (Roel von Meijenfeldt, Executive Director, IMD). Guatemala, 13-17 April 2003.
• Conclusies missie naar Guatemala (Bert Koenders). 8 Augustus 2003.

Evaluation reports:
• Berntzen, Einar (ed.) ‘Repaso del programa Valores Democráticos y Gerencia Política de la UPD/OAS a petición de la Real Embajada de Noruega’. (13 de mayo 2003).
• Auto-evaluación representantes partidos políticos; diálogo multipartidaria (31 de julio 2003).

Other documents:
• Memos by IMD Board members on Guatemala.
• Internal reports by the Guatemala IMD representative.
• Correspondence at the IMD Headquarters in The Hague.
• IMD website: www.IMD.org.
Members of the evaluation team

Mónica Jiménez de Barros (Chile) is a founder and President of the Participa corporation, an organisation dedicated to strengthening democracy. She was a member of the Citizens’ Council, board member of Fundación Paz Ciudadana, and board member of International IDEA. She has been a leading figure on the social worker scene in Chile and abroad for many years. She was Director of the School of Social Work and Chair of the Academicians Association of the Catholic University and a member of the Higher Council. She was a member of the Pontifical Council on Peace and Justice based at the Vatican and of the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Kees Biekart (The Netherlands) is an independent researcher and an expert on democratisation, civil society building and the role of international aid donors in Latin America. He is a fellow and board member of the Amsterdam-based Transnational Institute (TNI) and Chair of the Netherlands’ Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies (NALACS). His recent publications include Compassion and Calculation: The Business of Private Foreign Aid (1996) and The Politics of Civil Society Building: European Private Aid Agencies and Democratic Transitions in Central America (1999).

Thomas Carothers (United States) is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC and Director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project, a research endeavour that analyses the state of democracy in the world and the efforts by the United States and other countries to promote democracy. He is a leading authority on democracy promotion and democratisation worldwide as well as an expert on US foreign policy. His recent publications include Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (1999) and Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (2000).

Raquel Zelaya Rosales (Guatemala) is Executive Secretary of the research institute ASIES and Member of the Executive Council of the Rafael Landívar University. She was Minister of Finance and member of the Government Peace Commission (COPAZ) and First Secretary of Peace. She has also given her professional services to the Economic Integration Secretariat of Central America (SIECA) and to the Chamber of Commerce of Guatemala and the Women’s Institute of Advanced Education (IFES). She was a member of the Council of State, representing women’s organisations, and President of ASIES.