BEYOND THE PUBLIC REALM
Local Governance Network and Service Development in the Amhara and Tigray Regions, Ethiopia

A thesis submitted by

Fenta Mandefro Abate
(Ethiopia)

in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
of the Institute of Social Studies,
The Hague, The Netherlands
April, 2007

Thesis Committee

Promotor:

Professor A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

Co-Promotor:

Professor Meine Pieter van Dijk
UNESCO-IHE, Delft
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

Examiners:

Professor Jan Abbink
African Studies Centre, Leiden
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam

Dr Tegegne Gebre Egziabher
Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa

Professor Mohamed Salih
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

This dissertation is part of the research programme of CERES,
Research School for Resource Studies for Development.
Funded by SAIL/ISS/RLDS/AAU/Ethiopia project.

Cover design by Yafet John (www.jafexpro.com)

© Copyright Shaker Publishing 2007
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.

Printed in The Netherlands.

ISBN 978-90-423-0313-3

Shaker Publishing BV
St. Maartenslaan 26
6221 AX Maastricht

Tel.: 043-3500424
Fax: 043-3255090
http:// www.shaker.nl

In loving memory of

the late **Askal Mandefro**, my oldest sister,

and

the late **Damtachew Alemu**, who supported and inspired me

Acknowledgements

Glory to Almighty God for giving me the endurance and tenacity to complete this study. In the long journey towards a PhD, I have been indebted to many people who contributed in one way or another to its successful completion.

First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my supervisors Professor A.H.J. (Bert) Helmsing, Professor Meine Pieter van Dijk and Dr Dele Olowu. Prof. Helmsing, the promoter with first responsibility, played a key role and contributed the most, not only after I joined the ISS PhD programme, but also before that. In 2000, when he was on a teaching mission to the Regional and Local Development Studies (RLDS) of the Addis Ababa University (AAU), he inspired me to write a PhD research proposal on the area of local governance. He subsequently encouraged and advised me to apply for a research grant. Prof. Helmsing carried much of the supervision burden, particularly during the write-up phase when he continually challenged me and demanded the best that I could give. I am very grateful to him.

I am also very grateful to Professor Meine Pieter van Dijk who accepted the co-promoter responsibility in December 2005, at critical phase of the thesis. I appreciate his meticulous reading of the draft chapters and his constructive criticism that contributed to the final manuscript. The encouragement and moral support he provided were an incentive to carry on.

I also thank Dr Olowu who was my co-promoter in the first and second years, but could not continue during the write-up phase as he left the ISS.

I also would like to thank my field supervisor Dr Meheret Ayenew of Addis Ababa University for his guidance during my fieldwork and his unwavering support and encouragement during all the phases of the PhD programme. His support and encouragement were also extended to my family whom I had to leave behind. I also wish to thank Professor Mohamed Salih for his comments during my thesis seminar and the encouragement he provided during the entire struggle of writing this thesis.

I appreciate and acknowledge the cooperation and support that I received during my fieldwork from officials and experts at regional and local levels as well as from NGOs, donor agencies and CBOs' representatives and experts.

I am indebted to Ilse Lelong Evertse and Joy Misa, my editor and formatter respectively, who made the thesis more readable.

I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support that I received from the SAIL/ISS/RLDS/AAU/Ethiopia project. I would like to extend my

deep gratitude to AAU, for granting me leave of absence to continue my studies in The Netherlands. During my stay at ISS, I enjoyed the support of many people. My special thanks go to Ank v.d. Berg and Els Mulder who were more than supportive. Ank, I will always remember you. My gratitude also goes to Maureen Koster and Dita Dirks of the PhD secretariat, Martin Blok, Els van de Weele, Cynthia Recto-Carreon, and Lubana Sharwani of the Student Office; John Sinjorgo and Rosa van der Zwan of the Finance Office, Sylvia Cattermole of the Facilities Office, and to all members of the Library and IT Services.

I acknowledge the encouragement and intellectual support of my fellow ISS colleagues Admasu Shiferaw, Getnet Alemu, Paulos Chanie, and Nicholas Awortwi. I will also remember my friendship with Merra Tegegne, Albert Musisi, Daniel Oshi, Tewodros Bekafa, Flimon Hadro, Akinyinka Akinyoade, Malika Basu, Awortwe Jerome, Girma Hailu, Jalele Erega, Belihu, Sleshi Temesgen, Getachew Ali, and Ahmed Abtew. I very much enjoyed the companionship of my officemates Nicky Pouw, M.V.S. Cantillo, Rakhi Gupta and Aamer Abdulah Seyd. I also enjoyed the encouragement and support of many fellow Ethiopians at different universities and institutes in The Netherlands of whom the following are most important: Mehari Mekonnen, Yemisrach Bekalu, Getnet Tadele, Woldeab Teshome, Aklilu Amsalu, *Qesis* Mulugeta Seyoum, Ayalew Tadele, Taye Husien, Wondimagegne Gihday, Alemayehu Wassie, Asnake Kefale, and Zenebe Gebre Egziabher. During his frequent visits to The Netherlands, Reta Alemu inspired me with a special spiritual value that gave me stamina to finish this PhD.

The congregations of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in The Hague, Amsterdam and Rotterdam are places that offered me rest and peace. Every Sunday, I was able to get rid of the week's worries and confusion. I am deeply indebted to all the congregation members. Special thanks should, however, go to Mulugeta and Fetlework, and Alemu and Woinshet whose homes were havens for me at times of intense stress. I cannot fail to acknowledge Fikrte, Abiy, Engda and Abeba, *Gash* Tadesse and Tadesu, Kiflemariam and Dirb, *Gash* Menbere and *Etye* Tsahai, and Captain Nigussie whose spiritual, material and moral support were invaluable.

Thanks are also due to many friends back home. Special thanks to Worku Yaze who played a decisive role in filling many emotional and material gaps for my family. The following are others who also provided my family with immense emotional and moral support when I was in the field and in The Netherlands: Meseret Melese, *Gash* Baye, Dereje Baye, Kassa Awoke, Molla Berhanu, the late Worku Milikte, Sesen Teferra, Yigremew Adal, and all my neighbours, especially Diakon Baye.

I have an immense debt of gratitude in respect of my parents: *Qesis* Mandefro Abate and Aseres Sharew whose prayer and encouragement were a great source of energy throughout my studies. My brother-in-law Mengiste Abate, my

brother Getachew, my sister Gedam, and my sister-in-law Mitikie Bizualem also provided me with great emotional and spiritual support.

Finally, this study would have not been possible without the unquantifiable love, encouragement and support offered by my wife, Fetlework Bizualem. Besides enduring the pain of separation for an extended period, Fetlework shouldered an unimaginable burden of responsibilities single-handedly. She not only assumed the difficult task of raising our children, Hilena and Ananiya, but also accepted the burden of the ever-increasing and never-satisfied demands of our extended families. Although she was overwhelmed by all these responsibilities, she was always energetic and patient, which gave me more energy to work hard. Last but not least, I am deeply indebted to my children Hilena and Ananiya who paid no less a price in terms of deferring the need for paternal love when I was in The Netherlands. Ananiya, whom I left him behind when he was only two – at the time he needed my presence most – paid an immense price. Anan, I can assure you that I have completed my studies and will be back with you soon.

Fenta Mandefro Abate

Contents

Acknowledgements *iv*
List of Tables, Boxes and Figures *xi*
List of Abbreviations *xiii*
Abstract *xvi*

1 Introduction to the Study 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Research Statement 3
1.3 Research Objectives 4
1.4 Specific Research Questions 5
1.5 Data and Analytical Approaches 5
1.6 Challenges and Limitations 9
1.7 Organization of the Thesis 10
Notes 12

2 Local Government, Governance and Decentralization: A Review 13
2.1 Introduction 13
2.2 Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa: an Overview 14
2.3 Decentralization and Local Government: Understanding the Paradigm Shift 16
2.4 Local Governance: Meaning and Emergence in the Development Debate 23
2.5 Local Governance and the Changing Role of Government 27
2.6 Local Governance Network (LGN): a New Approach to Local Development 33
2.6.1 Understanding the essence of an LGN 33
2.6.2 The emergence of the LGN approach to local development 37
2.6.3 LGN actors 39

2.6.4 Formation and typology of a network 43
2.6.5 LGN management and coordination 45
2.6.6 LGN learning 48
2.6.7 Synthesizing the features and challenges of an LGN 50
2.7 Conclusion: Towards a Framework of Analysis 52

3 Local Government and Governance in Ethiopia: Looking Back into the Present 60

3.1 Introduction 60
3.2 Local Government and Governance in Pre-1991 Constitutional Ethiopia: an Overview 61
3.2.1 The Haile Selassie I period (1931-1974) 61
3.2.2 The Derg period (1974–1991) 65
3.3 Political Change and Governance Reform in Post-1991 Ethiopia 68
3.3.1 Panorama of the political change and governance reform 68
3.3.2 Ethnic federalism, political pluralism and local governance 72
3.4 Tigray and Amhara Regions in Context 76
3.4.1 Socio-economic background 76
3.4.2 Political history and post-1991 dynamics in the Tigray and Amhara regions 78
3.4.3 Structure and functions of local governments in Tigray and Amhara National Regional States 86
3.5 Brief Description of the Case Study *Woredas* 92
3.6 Conclusion 95
Notes 96

4 Establishment, Structures and Functions of LGNs in Four Case Study *Woredas* 100

4.1 Introduction 100
4.2 Intergovernmental Relations and LGN Formation 100
4.3 Structure and Functions of LGNs 107
4.3.1 Multi-sector or multi-purpose LGNs 110
4.3.2 Sector-based LGNs 125
4.4 Some Important Features of LGNs 132
4.5 Conclusion 140
Notes 141

5 LGN and Service Development in the Case Study *Woredas* 143

5.1 Introduction 143

5.2 LGN for Safe Drinking Water (SDW) Development and Delivery 144
5.2.1 Principal LGN facilitators of SDW development and delivery 144
5.2.2 Actors' principal roles in and contributions to SDW development and delivery 145
5.2.3 LGN communication and decision-making structures for SDW development and delivery 148
5.2.4 Safe drinking water development and delivery outcome 149

5.3 LGN for Primary Health Care Development and Delivery 150
5.3.1 Principal LGN facilitators of primary health care development and delivery 151
5.3.2 Actors' principal roles in and contributions to primary health care development and delivery 151
5.3.3 LGN communication and decision-making structures for primary health care development and delivery 156
5.3.4 Primary health care development and delivery outcome 157

5.4 LGN for Environmental Rehabilitation through Land Conservation 175
5.4.1 Principal LGN facilitators of environmental rehabilitation 176
5.4.2 Actors' principal roles in and contributions to environmental rehabilitation 176
5.4.3 LGN decision-making and communication structures for environmental rehabilitation 182
5.4.4 Environmental rehabilitation activities' outcome 183

5.5 Conclusion 189

Notes 191

6 The Added Value of Local Governance Networking: A Synthesis from Case Study *Woredas* 193

6.1 Introduction 193

6.2 Value Added of LGNs 194
6.2.1 Resource mobilization 194
6.2.2 Communication and learning 196
6.2.3 Reduce duplication and conflicts 203
6.2.4 Community participation 204
6.2.5 Transparency, accountability and equity 209
6.2.6 Promote synergy 213

6.3 Factors Affecting the Emergence, Functioning and Added Value of LGNs 214
6.3.1 Contextual factors 214

6.3.2 Number, diversity and quality of actors 225
6.4 Conclusion 231
Notes 233

7 Theories of Local Governance: A Reflection 234
7.1 Introduction 234
7.2 Emergence and Functioning of LGN 235
7.2.1 Context matters 236
7.2.2 Actors and their roles: the pillars of LGN 246
7.2.3 Number, diversity and quality of actors matter 260
7.3 Varieties of LGN 262
7.4 LGN and Service Development: Looking at the Promises 265
7.5 'Demand' and 'Supply' Sides of LGN: Examining the Balance Sheet 266
7.6 Managing and Coordinating LGN: A Search Beyond the Weberian Approach 272
7.7 LGN: A New Opportunity or a Challenge for LGs? 275
7.8 Final Observations 278
Notes 280

Appendices *282*
References *336*

List of Tables, Boxes and Figures

Tables

1.1 Number of respondents by category and *woreda* 8

3.1 *Woreda* total revenue (Rev.) and recurrent expenditure (Exp.) and per capita in '00 ETB (1998-2001) 90

4.1 Profile of LGNs by *woreda* 108

4.2 Members of the WDC by *woreda* 111

4.3 *Woreda* leadership capacity assessment for the emergence and functioning of LGNs 118

4.4 Total actual relations/interconnections and density of LGN by *woreda* 135

4.5 Absolute local centrality (ALC) and relative local centrality (RLC) by *woreda* 139

5.1 Drinking water service development and coverage by *woreda* (1996-2001) 150

5.2 Ratio of primary health care facility to population by *woreda* (1996-2001) 158

5.3 Average aggregate primary health care facility index by *woreda* (1996-2001) 159

5.4 Primary health care service coverage (%) by *woreda* (1996-2001) 161

5.5 Health professional to population ratio by *woreda* (1996-2001) 162

5.6 Average aggregate health professionals' index by *woreda* (1996-2001) 164

5.7 CHA to population ratio by *woreda* (1996-2001) 167

5.8 Child (<1 year age) immunization service delivery achievements (%) by *woreda* (1996-2001) 168

5.9 Average aggregate child immunization service delivery index by *woreda* (1996-2001) 169

5.10 Maternal health service delivery achievements (%) by *woreda* (1996-2001) 171

5.11 Average aggregate maternal health service delivery index by *woreda* (1996-2001) 171
5.12 Extent of SWC performance by *woreda* (1996-2001) 184
5.13 Extent of afforestation activities by *woreda* (1996-2001) 188
6.1 Actors and intervention areas in Wukro *Woreda* 226
6.2 Actors and intervention areas in Degua Temben *Woreda* 228
6.3 Actors and intervention areas in Bugna *Woreda* 229
6.4 Actors and intervention areas in Baso Liben *Woreda* 231

Boxes

3.1 General and specific powers and duties of the *woreda* government 87
6.1 *Woreda*-wide communication and learning between state and non-state actors 197
6.2 Communication and learning through workshops 200
6.3 Community participation processes in projects financed by actors directly involved in planning and implementing service development projects 205
6.4 Community participation processes in SWC activities (Tigray *woredas*) 208
6.5 CBO (*Seleste Mahberat*) initiatives in promoting transparency and accountability (Degua Temben *Woreda*) 211
6.6 Roles of the *Seleste Mahberat* in beneficiary selection for FFW/CFW opportunities 212

Figures

2.1 Analytical framework 54
4.1 Intergovernmental relations between different levels of government 102
4.2 Processes and procedures for the establishment and functioning of LGNs 104
5.1 Average aggregate health facility index by *woreda* (1996-2001) 160
5.2 Average aggregate health professionals' index by *woreda* (1996-2001) 165
5.3 Average aggregate child immunization service delivery index by *woreda* (1996-2001) 170
5.4 Average aggregate maternal health service delivery index by *woreda* (1996-2001) 172

List of Abbreviations

AAGR	Average Annual Growth Rate
AAPO	All Amhara People's Organization
ADA	Amhara Development Association
ADCS	Adigrat Diocesan Catholic Secretariat
ALC	Actual local centrality
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
ANRS	Amhara National Regional State
AO	Agriculture Office
BCBRDP	Bugna Community-Based Rural Development Programme
BCG	Bacille Calmette Guerin
BIRDP	Bugna Integrated Rural Development Programme
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
BoPED	Bureau of Planning and Economic Development
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CBRHA	Community-Based Reproductive Health Agent
CFW	Cash for Work
CHA	Community Health Agent
CHC	Community Health Committee
CPC	Community Project Committee
CSA	Central Statistical Agency
DA	Development Agent
DPPB	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
DPPD	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Department
DPT	Diphtheia, Pertusis and Tetanus
EGS	Employment Generation Scheme
EHRCO	Ethiopian Human Rights Council
EOC/DICAC	Ethiopian Orthodox Church/Development and Inter Church Aid Commission
EPDM	Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary democratic Front
ERCS	Ethiopian Red Cross Society
ESRDF	Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund
ETDP	Eastern Tigray Development Program
EU	European Union
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FFW	Food for Work

GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
HO	Health Office
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOG	Institute on Governance
KCC	*Kushet* Conservation Committee
KCHC	*Kebele* Community Health Committee
KDC	*Kebele* Development Committee
LCF	Local Community Facilitator
LG	Local Government
LGN	Local Governance Network
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MEDaC	Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation
MoCB	Ministry of Capacity Building
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
ND	Not Dated
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OPHCC	Office of Population and Housing Census Commission
PA	Peasant Association
PDRE	People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
RAB	Regional Agriculture Bureau
RCSC	Regional Civil Service Commission
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
RHB	Regional Health Bureau
RLC	Relative local centrality
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
RWRMEDB	Regional Water Resource, Mining and Energy Development Bureau
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SARDP	Swedish-Amhara Rural Development Programme
SCF-UK	Save the Children Fund-United Kingdom
SDW	Safe Drinking Water
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SNNPRS	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
SWC	Soil and Water Conservation
T/KCC	*Tabia/Kushet* Conservation Committee
T/KCHC	*Tabia/Keble* Community Health Committee
T/KDC	*Tabia/Kebele* Development Committee
TCC	*Tabia* Conservation Committee

TCHC	*Tabia* Community Health Committee
TDA	Tigray Development Association
TDC	*Tabia* Development Committee
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TNRS	Tigray National Regional State
TT	Tetanus Toxoid
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UDA	Urban Dwellers Association
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WA	*Woreda* Administration
WCHC	*Woreda* Community Health Committee
WD	Water Desk
WDC	*Woreda* Development Committee
WDSC	*Woreda* Development Steering Committee
WFP	World Food Programme
WIBS	*Woreda* Integrated Basic Service
WPAC	*Woreda* Project Advisory Committee
WPE	Workers Party of Ethiopia
WVE	World Vision Ethiopia
ZA	Zonal Adminsitration
ZAD	Zonal Agriculture Department
ZHA	Zonal Health Department
ZWRMEDD	Zonal Water Resource, Mining and Energy Development Department

Abstract

Public service production and delivery are no longer the responsibility of just the public sector. Non-state actors such as NGOs, donor agencies, CBOs, and communities are important actors that create LGNs to improve service development and delivery through a collective effort. However, the development of an effective LGN between such actors depends on the government's enabling environment, LG leadership capacity, and these actors' response.

The objective of the research is to assess LGN's contribution to service development and delivery improvement. Cases studies were conducted in four *woredas/districts* and in respect of three types of services (safe drinking water, primary health care and environmental rehabilitation). An analysis of these services' development and delivery shows that different types of LGNs were created at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels, each performing particular but interrelated functions. The processes of creating and running LGNs involve intergovernmental relationships, with supra-LG agencies engaged in either a facilitatory and/or supervisory role. The analysis of the findings concludes that supra-LG agencies focus strongly on control, causing cumbersome bureaucratic processes that non-state actors have to navigate when undertaking local development activities.

The results show that LGNs play an important role in improving local service development and delivery. Besides these improvements, LGNs' value lies in enhancing the local socio-economic processes that no individual actors can achieve. They contribute to resource mobilization, communication and learning, community participation, conflict minimization, transparency, accountability, equity, and synergetic relations. However, the study also reveals that LGNs' role in improving service development and delivery and the value added vary between *woredas,* depending on the factors that affect their emergence and functioning. Contextual factors as well as the number, variety and quality of the actors are important. The regional political context (the legitimacy of and trust in the political system) and local contextual factors, which include the quality and continuity of the local leadership, the people-party relationship (past and present), the pre-existence of organized CBOs and (embryonic) participatory structures all, play a role. The local leadership's quality and continuity are key to LGNs, making a difference even in those localities operating in the same regional enabling environment. The number and variety of actors involved in

different LGNs are key regarding resource mobilization and learning. Most important, however, is the quality of the actors in terms of their capacity, interest in and commitment to networking.

The LGN approach does not only have a technical/supply (production and delivery of services) side, but also another side, namely in terms of representational/demand (participation in planning, policy formulation and other political empowerment arena). In this regard, both the existing literature and empirical evidence reveal that developing countries' governments are opening up local service production and delivery functions to LGs, CBOs, NGOs, donor agencies, and communities. Unlike on the supply side, governments have not yet provided all stakeholders on the demand side with sufficient space to take part in and influence policies. This study finds that non-state actors' involvement in policy formulation activities is, in fact, affected by deficient political pluralism, non-state actors' lack of interest and capacity and civil society actors' failure to network.

The study concludes that the LGN approach to local development presents LG authorities with opportunities, but also with new challenges. Indeed, it offers new mechanisms for addressing increasing and complex local development problems through multiple actors' joint efforts. It provides alternative structures and ways of working parallel with government structures. It also presents LG leaders with a complex task. Coordinating multiple actors' efforts and resources when each of them have their own organizational autonomy demands a new calibre of leadership and management systems that differ from traditional public sector management. LGs have to invest time and energy to acquire negotiation and dialogue skills, and focus on a collaborative approach to decision-making that will promote trust, interdependence and shared objectives among actors.

1 Introduction to the Study

1.1 Introduction

Since the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, governance has occupied a central place in the development debate in general and in Third World countries in particular. It focuses on creating an economic and political space for all societal actors, which denotes a paradigm shift (Chang, 2003; Helmsing, 2000; Moharir, 2002). This shift was mainly dictated by the crises that the centralized states had created (Dwivedi, 2002). Among other things, the production and provision of local public services through central/state government agencies have proven to be a failure. Consequently, in many parts of the world, local authorities are increasingly regarded as having a central role to play in the production and delivery of services (Gilbert et al., 1996; Helmsing, 2003; Karanja, 2005).

In spite of the great emphasis on local governments (LGs), they do not have sufficient capacity to improve deteriorating public services and are faced with an ever-increasing scarcity of resources to meet the growing public demand for basic services. This has led to a search for alternative approaches to local service development and delivery. State and non-state actors are interacting and orchestrating their activities at the local level through networks of relationships through which they share information, pool resources and design joint solutions to socio-economic problems (Jackson, 2002; McCarney, 1996; Stoker, 2004). The local governance network (LGN) has thus emerged as a practical approach with which to address multi-dimensional and complex local development problems (Enemuo, 2000; Goss, 2001). LGNs include, among others, NGO-government, NGO-community, donor-government, donor-community, and public-community partnerships (Fowler, 2002b; Wils and Helmsing, 2001). Local governance networking is an attractive approach to local development not only because of its potential regarding resource mobilization and synergy, but because it significantly stimulates a greater 'bottom-up' development (Bennett and Krebs, 1994).

The LGN approach differs fundamentally from local government and development's mainstream histories that concentrated almost exclusively on multi-purpose local authorities and the services that they provided. Stoker (2004) stated that in its understanding of the contexts of governing and the

core processes of governance, the LGN approach marks a breakthrough from traditional public administration. It focuses on the logic of collective action in managing and coordinating local development efforts through pluralist approaches (Cohen and Peterson, 1997; Kickert et al., 1997). Decisions are therefore mainly made and executed on the basis of negotiated and mutually agreed upon principles and guidelines rather than on hierarchical and command-driven rules and procedures. However, managing and coordinating LGN activities is complex, because this involves relationships across multiple actors from multiple sectors of society, and processes that go beyond the natural inter-organizational day-to-day communication (Engel, 1993). An LGN is concerned with processes that create conditions for structured rule and decision-making to define and establish common objectives to be jointly implemented (Stoker, 2004). Cross-sector and multi-actor interactions and working relationships are at the centre of an LGN (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

Government is a key actor in the LGN processes, but not a primary one in respect of its traditional functions of producing and providing public goods and services. It has to provide enabling policies and conditions for the emergence and functioning of LGNs between multiple local development actors. Providing enabling policies and conditions for the production and delivery of services through multiple actors' joint efforts differs significantly from traditional public sector management with the government formulating policies, identifying needs and priorities and, via administrative laws and budget appropriations, instructing bureaux and public enterprises what to produce and deliver (Lane, 1995). Government has to be pro-active and undertake many activities to facilitate cooperation between multi-actors such as NGOs, CBOs, and communities so that they can act jointly and address development problems. However, it is imperative to state that an LGN's emergence and effective functioning are not only influenced by enabling policies and conditions, but also by the various state and non-state actors' responses in general, and LGs and communities' responses in particular.

Although the LGN approach to local development has received increasing attention from researchers and policy makers, it has as yet not been confronted with arguments that counter its use. As stated above, enabling policies and conditions do not guarantee the emergence and effective functioning of LGNs. In this regard, there are several related questions that have not been sufficiently addressed, among others, the following are important: Do non-state actors respond favourably to and make use of governments' enabling policies? Are they interested in and committed to networking with state actors and among themselves to promote the public interest through joint efforts? Are all LGs and communities ready to make use of the opportunities created? How do differences in the local leadership's capacity and communities' responses affect the emergence and functioning of LGNs? Is an LGN's success dependent on spe-

cific regional and local contextual factors? What are the new challenges that an LGN presents to LGs?

In order to answer the above and other related questions, this research examines processes, interactions and relationships between multiple actors that are engaged in the establishment and functioning of LGNs. More importantly, the research wants to assess whether an LGN lives up to its promise and does indeed improve service development and delivery. The research investigates, examines and analyses the relationship between LGNs and local service development and delivery in four selected case study *woredas* (districts) in the Tigray and Amhara regions in Ethiopia.

1.2 Research Statement

Historically as well as in Ethiopia's new Federal State structure, Tigray and Amhara are neighbouring regions that constitute most of the northern parts of the country. They are virtually indistinguishable in terms of cultural and religious values and practices (Joiremand and Szayan, ND; Young, 1997). Linguistically, they belong to the same language group, i.e. the *Semitic* group. Their economies are highly dependent on traditional agriculture in which about 90 percent of the population are engaged. Topographically, they are characterized by steep mountain ranges. Long years of traditional agriculture in this rugged terrain have caused serious environmental degradation. The two regions are the most drought-stricken of all regions and their populations frequently suffer a shortage of food and other provisions necessary for survival (Aspen, 2002; Kefyalew, 2000; Mengistu, 1996; Mengesha, 2000). They were, more than any other regions of the country, affected by the 1975-1991 civil war. Amhara was, however, less affected than Tigray, where the war was fought for 17 years. Tedros et al. (2000) stated that Tigray was the first victim of the civil war and had faced huge socio-economic devastation. According to REST (1995), more than 75 percent of schools and health institutions were destroyed by the war.

Although the two regions have a great deal in common in terms of history, culture and economy, Tigray's service development and delivery showed a vast improvement during the post-1991 reforms, while Amhara made only modest progress.

In many respects, Tigray Region's service development and delivery are improving far more than that of Amhara Region. For example, when the education and health services are examined, there are clear differences between the two regions. As shown in Appendix 4, Tigray has achieved more than Amhara, both in terms of improving the number of schools as well as in primary and secondary education's gross enrolment ratios. On average, Tigray has increased its number of primary and secondary schools with 7.3 and 9.9 percent per annum respectively. Amhara, on the other hand, shows an improvement of only 2.6 and 1.3 percent per annum respectively. In 2001, Tigray furthermore

achieved gross enrolment ratios of 73.9 and 33.8 percent in terms of primary and secondary education respectively, while Amhara achieved only 53.3 and 11.0 percent in this category (ANRS/Education Bureau, 2002; Ministry of Education (MoE), 2002; TNRS/Education Bureau, 2003).

Health facility development and service deliveries also show a similar trend, i.e., Tigray performs better than Amhara. As shown in Appendix 5, the number of population per facility in Amhara is larger than in Tigray for all types of facilities (of those included in the Appendix). For example, in the period 1995-2001, the average number of people that a hospital in Amhara had to serve was almost three times more than that in Tigray, which also applies to the number of population per hospital bed. The average number of people a health centre served in Amhara was about twice that of Tigray (CSA, 1998; MoH, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001).

Appendix 6 shows a clear difference between the Tigray and Amhara regions in actual health service delivery achievements. Tigray achieved much more than Amhara in all services indicated in the Appendix. For example, in the year 2001, the actual percentage of assisted deliveries achieved in Tigray was more than four times that of Amhara. Except for family planning, the average annual growth rate (AAGR) of service deliveries in Amhara was almost half that of Tigray.

The differences between the Tigray and Amhara regions' achievements regarding service development and delivery, pose various questions, of which the following are important: What is the role of different political histories in hampering or promoting state-society synergy in the local development endeavours in the two regions? What is the role of regional and local political processes in the post-1991 period? Are there differences in the local leaderships' capacity, motivation for, commitment to and confidence in the political processes that could stimulate or hinder utilising the opportunities created by the post-1991 changes? Are there differences in local communities' organization, interest in and commitment to actively taking part in the local socio-economic activities in collaboration with LGs and other development partners? What are the major factors that hamper or promote LGNs' emergence and functioning between actors in general and LGs and communities in particular?

This research will examine the socio-political histories and the post-1991 LGN processes in the two regions so as to answer the above and other related questions and identify their effects on local service development and delivery.

1.3 Research Objectives

The paradigm shift from local government to local governance has given rise to a new approach to local development: a local governance network (LGN). The body of literature on this approach is growing fast; however, most of the discussions and arguments are based on its normative and potential values. In-

deed, there is no counter argument regarding its perceived significance for local development although little empirical research has been conducted to support its claimed benefits.

This study seeks to examine and analyse the relationship between local service development and LGNs. It also seeks to identify and analyse the factors that promote or hinder an LGN's emergence and functioning between state and non-state actors at the local level. In doing so, the study will identify and examine an LGN's processes, structures and functioning as well as its contributions to local service development and delivery. Finally, the author reflects on the literature to provide new insights based on the empirical evidence found in this study.

1.4 Specific Research Questions

There are two central questions in this study. First, what are the relationships between local governance networking and local service development and delivery? Second, what factors promote or hinder the emergence and functioning of LGNs?

Sub-questions:

- Have multi-actor LGNs for local development emerged in the case study *woredas*?
- How do multi-actor LGNs emerge and function at the local level to improve local service development and delivery?
- What major roles do various actors play in the establishment and functioning of LGNs?
- What important values do LGNs add to improve local governance?
- What lessons can be learned from the analysis of the LGN approach to local development?

1.5 Data and Analytical Approaches

The research is aimed at exploring the relationship between local service development and an LGN, and the factors that shape the latter's emergence and functioning. According to Yin (2003) and Soy (1997), a study that involves a detailed investigation of complex interactions and relationships between wide varieties of factors and phenomena should preferably make use of the case study approach. This research therefore employed the case study method in order to examine the interactions and relationships between local, regional, national, and international local development actors. As revealed in the research statement, Tigray and Amhara regions share many similarities. Despite these similarities, Tigray has, in the post-1991 period, improved service development

and delivery to a far greater extent than Amhara, with preliminary evidence indicating that this achievement has been realised through the communities, their organizations and other development actors' active participation. The case study *woredas* were therefore selected from the Tigray and Amhara regions as a means to understand the relationship between local service development and an LGN, and the complex factors that shaped an LGN's emergence and functioning in the period 1991-2001. In order to provide an in-depth analysis of the relationships, three local services viz. safe drinking water, primary health care and environmental rehabilitation through land conservation (soil and water conservation and afforestation) were selected. These three local services represent the utility,[1] social[2] and economic[3] sectors respectively.

An in-depth investigation and analysis were carried out of the different LGNs' processes, structures, and function(s) and of the various actors' role in each LGN and sector in order to identify the major factors that promote or hinder their development and performance in each case study *woreda*. The investigation and analysis focused on the factors shown in Figure 2.1, with each individual *woreda* being examined independently in terms of these factors. However, a comparative case analysis was carried out that divided the data into different types and sectors across all cases in order to further generate and consolidate evidence regarding the relationships and factors.

A comparative analysis was carried out in order to examine and analyse the differences between Tigray and Amhara regions in creating an enabling environment and the *woreda* governments, non-state actors and the people's corollary responses. The comparative analysis also aimed at examining and analysing the differences regarding how *woredas* operating in the same region responded to the regional enabling environment. This would help reveal the difference in the *woreda* leadership capacity to absorb and utilize opportunities when creating an enabling environment for LGNs to emerge and effectively function between various actors at the local level in order to ultimately promote service development and delivery.

Case selection

The empirical study was conducted in four *woredas,* two from Tigray and two from Amhara regions. Selecting *woredas* for case studies involved two major steps. The first step was reviewing *woredas'* service development and delivery achievements in each region based on indicators that included the new establishment, expansion or upgrading of existing services. Access to and coverage of primary health care, drinking water, and primary education services were used as important indicators. For this purpose, a detailed review was carried out of 140 *woredas'* (105 in Amhara and 35 in Tigray) socio-economic profiles, using data from various regional bureaus and offices in the respective regions. Based on their service development and delivery achievements, *woredas* were ranked in

order to identify high and low achieving *woredas* in each region. Supplementary qualitative information about the *woredas'* response in taking advantage of the new governance reforms was sought from regional officials and experts who had knowledge of *woredas'* activities. The study assumed that there is a relationship between local service development and delivery achievement, and LGNs' emergence and functioning. Hence, *woredas* with a high service development and delivery achievement were presumed to be *woredas* where stronger LGNs exist and operate, while *woredas* with a low service development and delivery achievement would indicate a low degree of LGN emergence and functioning.

Two high and two low achieving *woredas* were selected from each region. The second step started when a rapid assessment was conducted in eight selected *woredas* to select four of them for the final in-depth case studies. The rapid assessment focused on assessing the local governance processes such as the number and composition of the actors that were engaged in service development and delivery and the nature of their interactions. Service development and delivery achievements were also important focus areas for the assessment. The heads of relevant *woreda* sector offices, *woreda* officials, representatives of non-state actors, and key informants were approached in order to seek for and analyse the nature of LGN structures and activities in service development and delivery. On the basis of the rapid assessment, a *woreda* with more LGN activities was selected from two high achieving *woredas* in each region. The same procedure was followed to choose a *woreda* that had less LGN activities from two low achieving *woredas* in each region.

Data collection and analysis

The case study method involves a multi-perspective analysis, which requires the use of multiple data collection techniques and sources in order to reveal details that help with the understanding of complex relationships beyond that which seems obvious (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 1993). In this study, empirical data was collected from various sources, including: government organizations, NGOs, CBOs, bilateral and multilateral development agencies, network organization members, and community groups and individual members. Collecting data from multiple sources was crucial in order to investigate and analyse an LGN's complex processes, its vertical and horizontal relationships as well as its contribution to local service development and delivery. Multiple sources were, moreover, used to triangulate information and evidence about the same subject in order to enhance validity.

Empirical data from various sources were collected through structured and unstructured interviews, key informants, focus group discussions, checklists of facts and figures, and archival and document surveys. The respondents interviewed include regional and local political officials, regional bureau and *woreda* office heads and experts, non-state actor representatives and experts, commit-

tee members at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels, and individual key informants. As per his commitment, the author has undertaken to protect his informants from risks that may emanate from the information they provided. They therefore remain largely unidentified and when names are used, these are pseudonyms. At regional level, a total of 8 regional political officials, 24 regional bureau heads and experts, and 6 key informants were interviewed both in Tigray and Amhara regions. Table 1.1 summarises the respondents in each of the case study *woredas*.

Table 1.1
Number of respondents by category and woreda

No.	Respondent category	Wukro	Degua Temben	Bugna	Baso Liben	Total
1	*Woreda* councillors	4	4	4	4	16
2	*Woreda* executive members	5	5	5	5	20
3	*Woreda* sector heads and experts	11	11	11	11	44
4	Non-state actor representatives & experts[4]	18	11	14	3	46
5	*Tabiya/kebele* and *Kushet/Gote* leaders	10	10	10	10	40
6	Community-based committee members[5]	25	25	20	15	85
7	Key informants	3	3	3	3	12
8	Grand total	76	69	67	51	263

Three focus groups were organized in each case study *woreda* to further explore key issues such as the local people's confidence and trust in political processes and reforms, the nature of the interactions between politicians and people and the factors that hinder or promote good relationships. Each focus group was comprised of 8-10 persons drawn from the youth, men and women members of the community. The interactions between the focus group members in answering open-ended questions created an opportunity to enhance the depth of the data gathering and screen out the most popular views.

Quantitative data on service development and delivery as well as on other issues such as the number of health professionals and *woreda* revenue and expenditure were collected by reviewing administrative and performance reports, archival records, and documents at the regional and *woreda* levels. Facts and figures were also collected from wall charts and graphs.

The research largely deals with institutional interactions and these are more qualitative than quantitative in nature. Hence, much of the analysis of the data

focused on describing, understanding, and explaining complex social, economic and political phenomena that influence an LGN's emergence and effective functioning with regard to local service development and delivery. The analysis emphasises the understanding of an LGN's multi-dimensional nature and therefore comprised the identification and configuration of processes, actors, interactions and relationships, structures, and their impact on local decision-making and service development and delivery. Historical and contextual analyses were used to examine and understand the existing interactions, relations and structures established between the various actors in each case study *woreda*. The data collected from different sources in each case study were categorized into different types, using techniques such as classifying information into groups, creating matrices of categories, and tabulating events. Quantitative data were tabulated into different categories and analysed, using simple statistical methods such as the percentage of achievements, period average, average annual percentage growth rate, ratios, and indexing. The indexing method was used to aggregate information on service development and delivery into one picture for an enhanced comparative case analysis.

1.6 Challenges and Limitations

The fieldwork for this study took 18 months, which was longer than expected and was due to different challenges that emerged. The first challenge was encountered at the very beginning when the author started to review the socio-economic profile of 105 *woredas* in Amhara and 35 in Tigray. The data for a given socio-economic indicator were not available in full in the relevant bureau for all *woredas*, were thus usually incomplete, either in terms of the number of *woredas,* or in terms of the time period within which to track trends. Hence, the author was forced to visit many other regional bureaus that organize and keep related data. The fact that the zonal administration, which was repeatedly reported by regional experts as having the relevant information for all *woredas* under its jurisdiction, was dissolved early in 2002 was a serious constraint.

Challenges continued to emerge in the course of the rapid assessment and in-depth case studies. *Woreda* governments' poor record-keeping systems, the reshuffling of local employees and unwillingness of most non-state actors to provide financial data were among some of the serious challenges faced. In terms of record keeping, the *woreda* offices had no structured and organized system. Most of the available data were in the hands of individual experts instead of organized in a way that would make them available for users. This made it difficult to access data in the absence of the responsible expert, becoming almost impossible when the relevant employee had already been transferred to another office. For example, at the time of the rapid assessment in Bugna *woreda*, the author failed to find any primary education statistics from the Education Office, but fortunately traced this to one of the Health Office employees

who had recently been transferred from the Education Office. To the question why he had all the data that belonged to Education Office, the employee replied: 'I have them with me since no employee was assigned to take over my position and other staff members refused to take responsibility for keeping the data'. He further stated: 'in fact, I will not benefit at all, but I have the data just to prevent their loss for future use.'

Documenting state and non-state actors' financial and material contributions was one of the most important methods of measuring an LGN's contributions to local service development and delivery. However, it was very difficult to find actors' financial and material contributions to local development. Such data were neither properly recorded by the *woreda* governments/agencies nor were most non-state actors willing to provide them. Hence, the author's option in this regard was to identify and examine what each actor had contributed to service development and delivery outcomes by means of the number of health facilities constructed, the number of people for whom access had been created to safe drinking water, the size of soil and water conservation structures constructed, and the number of seedlings produced, distributed and planted.

The other limitation of this study is that the study covered the social, political and economic processes in the case study *woredas* during the period 1991-2001. However, the statistical data covered only the 1996-2001 period because, based on the 1995 Constitutions of the Tigray and Amhara regions, the *woredas'* boundaries were changed in 1996. Nonetheless, policy remained the same throughout the period and no major difference was expected in service development and delivery trends between 1991 and 1995.

1.7 Organization of the Thesis

Chapter two reviews the literature regarding decentralization, local government and governance. This chapter shows that even though decentralization has been a subject of much experimentation and debate, it has just been discussed within the limits of the public domain. Researchers therefore mainly concentrated on LGs' roles and authorities. Since the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, however, the issue of decentralization has broadened in scope, as authority has to be devolved to LGs as well as to other development actors. This denotes a paradigm shift from local government to local governance. Local public service production and delivery are no longer considered the responsibility of the state; both state and non-state actors are engaged in these activities through a network of relationships. The chapter clearly shows that the roles of government have changed from 'rowing' to 'steering'. Governments' new roles are contained in a broad concept called 'enabling' roles, in which governments at all levels have to facilitate and regulate a framework in which other actors can make their most effective contributions. The chapter also provides an extensive discussion on the emergence of the LGN approach in local development as

well as other related important issues. It concludes with a framework for the analysis of the study.

Chapter three provides a brief socio-political analysis of Ethiopia and its effect on the local government and governance system. It looks at the burdens of the past and the challenges of the present for the development of democratic local government and governance in the country. This chapter also provides a brief socio-political history of post-1991 Tigray and Amhara regions. It shows the basic historical differences between the two regions, forming the background of a better understanding of the differences in the post-1991 socio-political changes.

The empirical analysis and discussions per se begin in chapter four, which basically deals with the identification and analysis of the various LGNs' processes of formation, structures and functions in the case study *woredas* with regard to the three selected services. It synthesises and systematically analyses LGNs' important features as revealed by the empirical investigation. It identifies the different LGN structures established, although in varying degrees, at the local level in the *woredas*. However, neither processes are confined to the local level nor is membership limited to actors of local origin. The chapter shows that creating and running LGNs involves supra-local agencies that play either a facilitatory and/or regulatory role. The other important issues identified in this chapter are that not all LGNs are similar with respect to their type and function, nor do different actors have the same interest in the different types.

The relationships between LGNs and local services are dealt with in chapter five, which examines the various actors' specific intervention modalities, roles in and contributions to the development and delivery of each of the selected services in the case study *woredas*. The chapter shows that there is indeed a relationship between an LGN and service development. *Woredas* that have established different LGNs between a large number of diversified state and non-state actors and communities have achieved better results by improving the selected services' accessibility, coverage and deliveries.

Chapter six further analyses LGNs' processes, interactions and activities as well as the information obtained from the representatives of the various actors regarding whether LGNs added value other than service development and delivery. The analysis shows that LGNs have indeed added important value to the local socio-economic processes compared to what individuals could have done. However, LGNs' added value varies between the *woredas*, depending on the regional and local contextual factors as well as the number, diversity and quality of the actors involved in the various LGN structures.

Chapter seven reflects on local governance's major theoretical issues as based on the empirical findings from the case studies. It shows that the LGN literature is growing fast, but to some extent suffers from generalization due to the limited empirical studies in different socio-political contexts. An important

contribution of this research is that it clearly shows that LGNs' success is largely subject to macro and micro (central/region and local) contextual factors. Hence, there is a need for more rigorous empirical research in different countries to identify a wide variety of contextual factors that could be relevant to LGNs' creation and running. The research also shows that LGNs present LG authorities with both opportunities and challenges in meeting the growing public demand for basic services. Local leaders need to develop new skills with regard to coordination and management that should be based on the principle of negotiation and mutual understanding. Command-driven bureaucratic orders have little relevance for steering interactions and cooperation between autonomous actors.

Notes

1. Safe drinking water is the only utility in rural Ethiopia that is part of the local government's responsibility. Electricity and telephone are entirely in the hands of federal agencies. Drinking water is one of the local people' serious problems in the drought-prone regions of Tigray and Amhara.
2. Primary health care service is one of those poorly provided social services that is, among other things, characterized by low access and inequitable distribution. It is a service that directly involves local people in production and delivery activities through community structures and other mechanisms such as the training of community health agents (CHAs). This has attracted the involvement of pro-community development actors in supporting training, the construction of health facilities and providing primary health care equipment and tools.
3. Environmental rehabilitation through land conservation was selected as an important economic activity because the two regions are the most environmentally degraded and draught-prone regions in the country, with about 90 percent of their population depending on traditional and subsistence agriculture. The survival and economic improvement of the people are strongly dependent on the rehabilitation and conservation of the land to improve its productive capacity. It requires mobilizing and coordinating efforts and resources from various actors to ensure sustainable development for the local population.
4. All non-state actors interviewed were directly engaged in supporting and/or implementing development activities at the local level in one or more of the selected services. Hence, the numbers of respondents vary from case to case, depending on the number of non-state actors involved. The active involvement of the *Seleste Mahberat* at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels in Tigray *woredas* increased the number of respondents from non-state actors.
5. The number of respondents who were community-based committee members in Tigray *woredas* is higher than those in Amhara *woredas*, since the latter has no *kebele* and *gote* conservation committees. Baso Liben is even lower than that of Bugna, as it has no Kebele Community Health Committee.

2 Local Government, Governance and Decentralization: A Review

2.1 Introduction

Local government (LG) constitutes the lowest tier of government and is therefore citizens' closest form of governance, although their level of participation in and influence on their own affairs depends on its nature. Decentralization, on the other hand, refers to the degree of autonomy that LGs enjoy in making decisions that affect their own affairs (Boko, 2002). Consequently, a policy of decentralization has for quite sometime been advocated as a means of transferring public responsibilities and power to LGs and other public sector agencies. When the centralized state proved unsuccessful in the late 1970s and early 1980s, decentralization was specifically regarded as a means of reducing the centralized bureaucracy's size and intervention. Public sector reform, which would support citizen empowerment, popular participation, institutional effectiveness and responsiveness as well as the equitable distribution of resources to all groups of the society, was recommended to all Third World governments as a remedy for their failure to promote the development and delivering of services to their citizens. However, this reform was still confined to the public sector domain. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the issue of decentralization became more complex and the traditional way of limiting it to the issue to the public sector was challenged. As a result, a shift began to emerge in the conceptualisation of decentralization (Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Helmsing, 2001; Ngethe, 1998).

This chapter is devoted to a review of the literature on LG and decentralization in general and local governance and networking in particular. The chapter is dived into six sections, with section one providing a brief overview of decentralization and local governance in Africa. Section two deals with the paradigm shift in the LG and decentralization debate as well with the implications of political and other policy reforms in Third World countries with regard to addressing ever-increasing local development problems. Section three is devoted to an understanding of governance and its place in the contemporary local development debate in general and in Third World countries in particular. Section four examines government's changing roles in the context of new governance systems and processes. Section five deals with the essence and emergence of a local governance network (LGN) as a new approach to local development. It

covers broad issues such as LGN actors, typologies, management and coordination, learning and other important features. Section six concludes with a framework for an analysis of this research.

2.2 Decentralization and Local Governance in Africa: an Overview

Having been forged from colonial conquest, African states are characterized by highly centralized system of administration (Olowu, 2001). The colonizers main emphasis was on extracting resources to meet their own needs, rather than building democratic LGs by involving the local people. During most of the colonial period, no provisions were made to limit the colonial governor's discretionary power regarding the local population's affairs (Dia, 1996). Makumbe (1998) stated that in Africa, colonial rule was authoritarian in nature and in practice with LGs being used as instruments to control the 'natives' as well as the effective extraction of resources.

The end of World War II, which marked the beginning of decolonisation, brought about important changes in LG structures and functions due to the nationalist forces in the colonies' sustained agitation. The new direction was towards a 'democratic form of local government' based on elections (Enemuo, 2000; Olowu, 2001). In the 1950s, as part of the independence countdown, the colonial powers allowed a widespread devolution of functional responsibility to local representative bodies. Unfortunately, these changes were not yet fully implemented before political independence's 'winds of change' blew over Africa. The leaders of the newly independent countries didn't build on the embryonic changes either (Enemuo, 2000; Olowu, 1995).

From the early 1960s to the late 1970s, most African leaders dismantled LGs and provinces to shift power to the capital instead of increasing their citizens' participation opportunities. Consequently, Sub-Saharan African (SSA) governments strongly emphasised political control, thus impeding the advantages to be gained from decentralization (Ngethe, 1998; Olowu, 2001; Wunsch and Olowu, 1995). The reasons for this are many, including: the military leaders' dubious leadership legitimacy, the multi-ethnic nature of African states and their fragile national unity, and a system of public administration superimposed on traditional institutions and indigenous management systems (Dia, 1996; Enemuo, 2000; Kasfir; 1983). Another reason was the political leaders' belief that they could demonstrate their capacity for and the meaning of independent leadership through rapid development. The latter was built into a central planning programme that was mostly influenced by socialist ideology. As a result, democratic LGs were regarded as 'irritants' in the way of the leaders' ambition to build powerful economic states (Ngethe, 1998; Olowu, 2001; Wunsch and Olowu, 1995).

The above factors led to African states' predominant feature: the over-concentration of state power in a one-man system (military officer), or single-party system of government. Leaders of the newly independent states were therefore determined to appropriate absolute power and its many prerequisites, rather than effecting a gradual transformation to democratic governance that would promote autonomous LGs (Enemuo, 2000). Consequently, the central government's most important task became the eroding of local autonomy and increasing its central power and authority over virtually all areas of governance and social endeavour (Gboyega, 1998). The decentralization 'reforms' that many African states attempted within their socialist one-party or military state framework remained nominal. These 'reforms' took the shape of deconcentration designed to 'vertically' reinforce the state by extending its reach to the local arena. LGs were not allowed to deal with local communities' political, economic and social realities and problems (Dia, 1996; Ngethe, 1998; Olowu, 2001; Ribot, 2002).

Generally, the 1960s were the age of centralization rather than decentralization. The emasculation of local government systems through the erosion of functions and resources, the undermining of local political autonomy by means of central control and parallel party institutions, and even the abolition of LGs altogether were frequently experienced (Davey and Glentworth, 1978). The 1970s witnessed a return to decentralization**.** However, the political preference for centralization was still prevalent on a wide scale. The decentralization 'reforms' were administrative and procedural rather than introducing structural changes with regard to LGs. Local authorities could very seldom take significant actions without a lengthy review period and a central government ministry's approval. Often, there were strict constitutional or legal limits to the raising of revenue and to the local authorities' service provision powers (Smoke, 1994). By the end of 1970s, it was clear that there was no decentralized state system for decentralized development through popular participation (Ribot, 2002).

The central government's monopoly and control were not limited to the public sector, but extended to non-governmental and private organizations such as unions, churches, cooperatives, universities, benevolent associations and the like. These organizations were not only under close control, but were, in some cases, eradicated. The voluntary and private bases of collective action were destroyed. In the political arena, with the exception of a 'few countries like Gambia, Botswana, Mauritania, and Nigeria, competing political parties have been legislated out of existence' (Wunsch and Olowu, 1995:5).

Many African scholars underscore the harmful effect of the centralization of formal government institutions, non-government and private organizations. For example, Wunsch and Olowu (1995:5) explained: 'It has been futile in a sense that it has never achieved what it intended to do and it has been destructive

because it has preempted negotiation with and real cooperation by elements of the society whose willing commitment and efforts were needed for development. In general, what might be called "civic capacity" has been reduced, and "constitutional concentration" has been increased.'

The over-centralized African states produced enormous failures. By the late 1970s, they faced an economic crisis as a result of which most of them were forced to adopt structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to secure financial assistance and loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). These financial institutions and other donor agencies encouraged and, at times, forced central governments to decentralize service production and provision tasks to LGs and private enterprise. However, the mere decentralization of service production did not promote the establishment of sound LGs. While central governments did devolve their responsibilities to local units, they did not provide the financial and human resources necessary to carry out responsibilities. On the other hand, in many African countries the decentralization of economic decision-making through privatisation and deregulation did not make a significant difference, as there was little response to the call for private investment. This was due to the lack of the right institutional environment (Helmsing, 2003; Olowu, 1995; Ribot, 2002; van den Dool, 2003).

At the end of the 1980s, Africa – after a decade of structural adjustment experience – was in a worse economic shape than ever (Howell and Pearce, 2001). By the late 1980s and early 1990s – the onset of democratisation – decentralization was still an important element of African state reforms. It focused on a search for both state and non-state institutions that could provide local communities with opportunities to democratically participate in their affairs. However, devolutionary decentralization is currently still confronted with financial, managerial and human resource constraints. Supra-local governments are willing to devolve production and delivery of basic services to LGs and non-state actors, but have not yet demonstrated their commitment to share significant fiscal, administrative and political decision-making powers with LGs. While governments have accepted non-state actors and communities as partners in service production and delivery, they have not provided sufficient space for them in policy formulation. Although many African countries claim to have established a multi-party system, a de facto single party controls political processes and does not allow opposition and non-state actors to influence policy formulation (Hyden and Court, 2002; Olowu, 2001, 2002b).

2.3 Decentralization and Local Government: Understanding the Paradigm Shift

Although there are many ways of defining decentralization, it generally refers to the purposeful transfer of the decision-making authority from the centre to

sub-national governments and other agencies (Olowu, 2001; Wolman, 1990). LG is a political or administrative subdivision of a nation/state that is stipulated by law and has certain responsibilities in a defined territory (Mathur, 1999). This means that an LG is part of the government machinery that exercises authority in the socio-political decision-making processes within its jurisdiction (Stanyer, 1976). If given authority and resources, an LG is an important actor in stimulating, coordinating, organizing, and managing socio-political conditions that are necessary for economic development activities at community level (Bennett, 1990b). LGs are key recipients of decentralized authority and, hence, LG research is implicitly constructed within the framework of decentralization (Ribot, 2002).

Since World War II, and particularly in Third World countries, reforms of a political, economic and administrative nature have revolved around decentralization. Indeed, decentralization has captured donors and policy makers' attention and occupies a central place in the development debate (Helmsing, 2000). Although decentralization involves the transfer of decision-making authority to lower-level institutions, not all governments transfer authority to the same degree. Nor do researchers and policy makers understand and interpret decentralization in the same way, which is due to its cross-cutting nature. As a result, there are different types of decentralization among which devolution or political decentralization, deconcentration or administrative decentralization, and privatisation or economic decentralization are the most important. The transfer of political power to locally constituted units of government that decide on socio-political affairs and perform public functions in their own areas is called political decentralization. It involves the creation of autonomous LGs to be governed by legitimately elected bodies. The delegation of administrative decision-making power to provincial or local-level central government agencies is called administrative decentralization. In this type of decentralization, local level units are extensions of the central government with administrative leaders still dependent on it for their appointment, assignment, and salaries. The transfer of economic decision-making to producers and consumers through market mechanisms is called economic decentralization. It occurs within the framework of an economic liberalization programme through privatisation and deregulation (Boko, 2002; Olowu, 2001; Wolman, 1990).

As stated above, although decentralization is a common theme of the policy debate in development, it is understood and interpreted in different ways and used for different purposes (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Not only has the interpretation changed, but the decentralization policy's emphasis and objectives have also changed. In the 1960s and 1970s, the emphasis was purely on governmental reform, i.e. reform within the structure of government together with a shift of responsibilities and decision-making power from the central/federal level to the state and LGs. Between the late 1970s and 1980s, the

emphasis was on shifting the decision-making power and responsibilities for the production and provision of goods and services from government to the private sector, i.e. to increasingly open up and leave economic decision-making to market forces. Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, the emphasis was on transferring responsibilities and decision-making power from the higher tiers of government or the public sector to multiple actors from multiple sectors (public, private, civil society, and donors) of the society involved in the local social, economic and political development efforts (Bennett, 1990a).

In the 1960s, most developing countries introduced central planning as a means of providing rational and coherent policies for using scarce resources effectively in order to promote and achieve rapid economic growth. Central planning and administration were considered necessary to guide and control the economy as well as to integrate and unify nations that were emerging from long periods of colonial rule. As a result, most of the newly independent countries pursued administrative decentralization within the framework of a unitary structure and central planning. A new emphasis on and interest in decentralization began in the 1970s when it was realized that the central control and management of developing nations' economies did not ensure rapid economic growth. The concept of development was extended beyond the primary objective of economic growth to include growth-with-equity, which emphasized the basic needs of the poor. Planners and policy makers widely recognized that development requires a basic transformation of social, economic, and political structures (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983; Frederiksen and Westergaard, 1993). Aid agencies put pressure on governments of both long-independent and newly emerging countries to introduce decentralization reforms and programmes. Among the most important objectives were: improved management of development programmes and projects, popular participation in decision-making, responsible and accountable local leadership and improved and equitable service delivery to the local population. It was assumed that these objectives would be achieved through the devolution of political, administrative and fiscal decision-making powers to locally elected authorities. Aid agency professionals made a strong argument regarding the benefits that would accrue from the promotion of popular participation and the strengthening of local-level institutions through devolution. Conceptually, this moved decentralization from being a more technical aspect of managing LGs to being a more political aspect of governing localities. However, the public sector was still perceived as having to play a dominant role through decentralized monopolistic public institutions (Burns et al., 1994). Strong emphasis was placed on government as the principal political, economic and social actor (Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Fowler, 2002b; McCarney, 1996).

By the late 1970s, it was realized that, in most Third World countries, the state was over-centralized, producing enormous crises characterized by eco-

nomic decline, fiscal austerity, low wages, basic services of poor quality and quantity that reduced living standards and conditions, the personalization of power, violation of human rights and corruption. These are generally described as 'crises of governance' (Helmsing, 2001; Hyden and Court, 2002; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Wanyande, 2000). The state thus not only failed to provide poor citizens with basic services, but also to pay its large number of public sector employees since major donors refused to extend financial assistance or loans (Olowu, 1995; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). In many Third World countries, the state came to be regarded as part of the development process problem rather than a solution. This marked the beginning of the challenge to the basic tenets of the state's developmental role and its social-political legitimacy and connection with society (Helmsing, 2001; Howell and Pearce, 2001; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

The 1980s was a watershed in development thinking, shifting attention from government to the market as the engine of development (Howell and Pearce, 2001). The reform was embodied in a concrete framework and policy instrument known as 'Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)'. It was promoted by the developed countries and international financial institutions, the WB and IMF, with the latter two playing key roles by imposing a reform agenda on many crisis-ridden countries through stringent loan conditions (Fowler, 2002b; Lathrop, 1997; Ouedraogo, 2003; Willis, 2005). SAPs had a vested interest in the private sector that highly recommended deregulation and privatisation as mechanisms to decentralize economic management and production, thus ensuring a new economic path to development. The reform thus focused more on macro economic variables and the effective management of the economy on the basis of the market principle of producing and delivering public services (Olowu, 2001; Ribot, 2002). Consequently, as long as governments appeared to be willing to implement economic reforms, donors and aid agencies gave little thought to pressurizing recipient governments to undertake political reforms that would provide LGs and the people with opportunities to actively participate and influence local affairs. In effect, SAPs did little to address the political crisis, which was an important element of the general crisis (Burgess et al., 1997; Olowu, 2001; Wanyande, 2000).

Indeed, structural adjustment and economic liberalization introduced fundamental changes to development policy with the state no longer being considered the only actor in public affairs. In terms of socio-economic development and changes in the lives of the poor, however, the changes failed to live up to their advocates' optimism. In fact, SAPs not only failed to bring the expected changes, but brought about serious economic decline as neither the government nor the private sector was a strong actor in low income countries' economy (Bratton, 1994; Helmsing, 2005; Hyden, 2000; Wanyande, 2000).

The failure of the deregulation and liberalization approach to solve the economic and political crisis, together with the end of the Cold War resulted in a new context for governance reforms in the international arena and specifically in Third World countries. The collapse of the central economic system and the resultant political changes worldwide turned attention to local demands and the need to bring economic and political systems closer to local communities where they could participate in and influence decision-making (Litvack et al., 1998; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Turner and Hulme, 1997). Since the end of the 1980s in general and the beginning of the 1990s in particular, the policy community started searching for development practice tools that would go beyond the state and actively foster the non-state arena. In the early 1990s, donors introduced new forms of political conditionality to loans and technical assistance aimed at improving the democratic governance of the developing countries by requiring them to create space for all societal actors to improve the well-being of ultra-poor citizens (Howell and Pearce, 2001; Jackson, 2002).

Decentralization has continued to be an important issue on the reform agenda, but it has assumed a new meaning that has turned away from the public sector domain (McCarney, 1996; Ribot, 2002). Helmsing (2001:4) explained that 'decentralization has ceased to be a local government affair and has turned into a local governance issue.' It is being promoted in the context of the pluralist discourse, representing a system of policies and multiple actors through which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interaction and participation (Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Dwivedi, 2002; Ribot, 2002). Such changes are referred to as 'a change in paradigm' (Bennett, 1990a). According to Litvack et al. (1998:1), in the Third World countries, the change and the emphasis on decentralization in the current context is derived from different factors that include:

> the advent of multi-party political systems in Africa; the deepening of democratization in Latin America; the transition from a command to a market economy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; the need to improve delivery of local services to large populations in the centralized countries of East Asia; the challenge of ethnic and geographic diversity in South Asia, as well as ethnic tensions in other countries[…] and the attempt to keep centrifugal forces at bay by forging asymmetrical federations; and the plain and simple reality that central governments have often failed to provide effective public services.

The pressing need for LGs and development, the need to share central government's burden with other actors, and donor conditions regarding democratisation are other important factors that have urged Third World governments to engage in new governance reforms (Ribot, 2002).

On reviewing the decentralization discourse, it is apparent that in spite of the shifting nature of decentralization's emphasis and objectives, the debates on and implications for LG and governance can be categorized into two groups.

The first is an intergovernmental process, i.e. the decentralization of the decision-making authority between levels of government: from central to state and from central/state to local. This reflects the earlier or 'traditional' view of decentralization. The second is more focused on the broader and fundamental issues of state-society relations that require government to devolve power to the market and all other non-state actors. This represents and reflects the recent or 'new' thinking in decentralization (Bennett, 1994; Helmsing, 2001).

Helmsing (2000:1) stated that 'in earlier waves of decentralization the "problematique" was restricted to the organization of the public sector.' Hence, research efforts and debates were embedded in how the state should be structured to ensure efficient, effective and equitable supply of public goods and services. The focus was on what responsibilities and powers should be transferred to local structures and what should be part of central/state-local relationships regarding decision-making and resource allocation in order to carry out assigned tasks (Cohen and Peterson, 1999). Generally, discussions were preoccupied with intergovernmental relations, or the amount of autonomy local authorities should exercise (Burns et al., 1994). Much of the empirical work therefore focused on measuring the division of labour between central/state and local governments, i.e. who did what, and the level of decision-making power. The proportion of central/state-local revenues and the proportion of state-local expenditures and functional areas under local government were used as important parameters for measuring local decision-making power or autonomy (Wolman and McCormick, 1994).

In the context of the 'new' thinking, the comparative static question of 'which level of government is more appropriate?' has become secondary to a more fundamental question regarding state-society relations (Helmsing, 2000:1). The 'new' framework examines decentralized local governance structures in terms of organizational and institutional roles, state and non-state actors and whether they are engaged in implementing public sector tasks to promote local development and improve the life of the local people. It focuses on local governance network and institutional pluralism with roles being shared between different local actors to provide efficient public services and with government mostly playing a facilitator role. The central principle that distinguishes the 'new' framework from the 'traditional' is that it provides allocative tasks through a pluralist rather than a monopolist approach (Cohen and Peterson, 1997).

Viewed from the perspective of roles, the 'traditional' decentralization policies focused on a 'distributed institutional monopoly' strategy according to which central/state governments distribute roles spatially to LGs through different types of decentralization policies, rather than involving non-state actors. A major weakness of the 'traditional' approach was its overemphasis on LGs' functions and decision-making authority rather than on how public activities

can be shared between the various actors at the local level. In the 'new' framework, the 'de' of decentralization is about limiting the structural monopoly of roles. It is about breaking the administrative monopolies of the public sector and distributing a range of roles between the various actors required to carry out a specific public sector task (Cohen and Peterson, 1997, 1999). Kingsbury (2004) concluded that in the 'new' context, decentralization means 'recognizing multiple centres of power' that would ultimately promote and ensure accountability, transparency, participation, equity, and predictability in decision-making.

Role differentiation is the core concept of the 'new' framework because it disaggregates the actions needed to implement a task and allows the allocation of responsibility for implementing tasks from a single organization/institution to many. It is possible to assess whether a local governance structure is either monopolist or pluralist by examining the roles of the various actors' within it (Cohen and Peterson, 1997). An important issue is the re-appreciation and shifting roles of government in general and LGs in particular; their roles are recognized as 'enablers' that facilitate and regulate the framework in which other actors (producers and service providers) can make the most effective contribution (Helmsing, 2001).

A governance network is an important element of the 'new' framework of decentralization. It emphasizes partnership and role relationships between the various actors at the local level. A governance network considers both vertical and horizontal relationships. A vertical network allows a mix of central/subnational and local relationships. A horizontal network, on the other hand, helps to reveal the relationships between LGs, the private sector, NGOs, CBOs and people at the local level regarding policy formulation, planning and implementation of public sector tasks. State and non-state actors within the governance network share roles and tasks with regard to the production and provision of public goods and services (Cohen and Peterson, 1997, McCarney, 1996).

Cohen and Peterson (1997:5) argue that the 'new' framework is important to address the major failures of past decentralization efforts and to meet the new economic and political challenges of the 1990s and beyond. It does this by:

- Identifying and focusing on the roles required to effectively and efficiently carry out a particular public sector task;
- Allocating those roles among an appropriate and changing mix of central, non-central, private sector, NGOs, and community organization/institutions so as to maximize the complementary among these levels, in most cases strengthening them toward devolution; and
- Raising the level of accountability through increasing the number of actors operating at similar and different levels and carrying out roles relative to the task.

2.4 Local Governance: Meaning and Emergence in the Development Debate

Defining and understanding governance

The word governance, which literally means government and its exercise of power and control, is not new. Dethier (2000), for example, mentioned that Sir John Fortescue had published a book called 'The Governance of England' in 1470, an indication of how long the word has been used in the public sector. However, its use in discussions about social organizations other than government is a comparatively recent development (Dwivedi, 2002). From the late 1980s and early 1990s onward, governance has progressed from obscurity to widespread usage, constituting an important element of the 'new' decentralization and LG reforms. Not surprisingly, there are still differences in understanding with regard to its meaning (Plumtre and Graham, 1999). One of the reasons for this is its broad character that encompasses many related concepts, including among others: democracy and development, popular participation and development, accountability and transparency as well as equity (Devas, 2004; Wolman, 1990).

Traditionally, political scientists have used governance to express the nature of the relationships between the 'RULES, RULERS, and the RULED' (Olowu, 1999, 2002a). Soremekun (2000) shares the above understandings and provides further elaboration. According to him, governance refers directly to the ruler-ruled relationship, which has three dimensions: the functional, the structural and the normative. *Functionally*, governance deals with how rules are made, legitimised, and enforced. *Structurally*, it comprises three distinct institutions, the ruler or the state, the ruled or the society, and the rules or law. In essence then, governance embodies the quality of the relationship between the state and social institutions. Finally, its *normative* dimension highlights the values associated with governance, which include transparency, effectiveness, accountability, predictability, legitimacy, popular participation and plurality of choices. The above definitions incorporate important elements such as rule of law, accountability, participation, and transparency. However, it is clear that governance is perceived as a phenomenon that takes place within the public domain. It moreover emphasises the exercise of authority by leaders in government positions to promote social and economic development (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Tegegne and Kassahun, 2004).

Until relatively recent times, the standard view of government was that it had the authority and the necessary capacity to govern effectively and to implement policies and plans. At the end of 1980s and especially since the 1990s, this view has been challenged (Devas, 2004). Governance is not synonymous with government; it recognizes the limitations of government and has thus transcended the public sector (Ivanova, 2005). It represents broad, inclusive

and pluralist views when undertaking societal affairs. In this regard, governance includes a full range of activities involving all (state and non-state) actors in society (Dwivedi, 2002).

Even within the new understanding, different authors define governance differently but fundamentally similarly, except that the emphasis varies between the authors. Some emphasize activity and process, others process and structure or one of them, while others try to cover all the complex issues contained in it. The common denominator of all the definitions is that governance involves multiple actors from multiple sectors sharing the decision-making authority when undertaking public affairs. For example, Hyden and Court (2002:19) described governance as both an activity and a process that '[…] refers to the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions.' According to the UNDP (1997a:4), governance encompasses the functioning of central/federal, state/regional, and local governments' organizational structures, systems and activities as well as the institutions, organizations, and individuals that comprise civil society and commercial entities that actively participate in influencing public policy formulation and implementation. IOG and York University (1999:ii) defined governance as: 'the art of steering societies and organizations explained through interactions among structures, processes and traditions that in turn determine how power is exercised, how decisions are taken, and citizens or other stakeholders have their say.'

From the above definitions, it is clear that according to the current understanding of governance, government is one among many societal 'players' or actors that are concerned with public issues. Other actors such as NGOs, CBOs, the private sector, and religious organizations are actively involved in the policy formulation and management of societal development (IOG and York University, 1999). This transcendence beyond the public sector does not only refer to other societal actors' involvement in public affairs, but also to changes in the functions of government. It has to perform functions that were not in the past considered as belonging to government. Such functions include strengthening institutions for collective decision-making, facilitating and forming partnerships to achieve common goals, ensuring fair participation and representation of interests between a range of groups, as well as adequate arbitration between them (Gilbert et al., 1996). In general, governance refers to the 'hollowing out' of the state and a style of governing in which the boundaries between public, private and voluntary actors are shifting and becoming opaque (Helmsing, 2000; Rhodes, 1999). Governance makes boundaries between mainstream societal actors opaque as well as those between the governors and the governed, as the latter are involved in the formulation of the policies and rules that govern them (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

An important issue that should be noted to understand governance is that the concept can be usefully applied in different contexts and levels, such as in global, national, local, and corporate governance. Global governance, for example, deals with issues outside individual governments' direct scope. Governance in 'national space' refers to the system of governance within a country, which includes national, provincial/state and urban/local levels. Business economists mostly regard corporate governance as basically meaning private firms' accountability to their stakeholders (Marcussen and Torfing, 2003; Plumtre and Graham, 1999). This indicates the need for the specific use of the word 'governance' when addressing different interests and levels.

For Olowu and Wunsch (2004:1), local governance refers to the existence of working local systems established for the purpose of collective action and that promote and manage a locality's public affairs in the interest of the local residents. Helmsing (2001:4) explained that '(Local) governance is a different way of governing. The latter may be described as structures and processes of societal decision-making at the local level.' Local governance is thus a process that involves multiple actors from multiple levels and sectors working in partnership at the local level on the basis of interest and inclusive decision-making. It involves broad interactions between state and non-state actors regarding the policy formulation, planning, and implementations of public programmes towards improving the production and delivery of public services. It also creates opportunities for direct participation aimed at empowering the local population in general and the weaker sections in particular (Dwivedi 2002; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001; UNDP, 1997b).

The emergence of governance in the development debate

Since the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, governance has occupied a central place in the development debate in general and in Third World countries in particular, therefore denoting a paradigm shift (Chang, 2003; Moharir, 2002; Plumtre and Graham, 1999). Authors in the field identified different factors related to this paradigm shift; Bennett (1990a), for example, identified six major factors in this regard in OECED countries, while Litvack et al. (1998) identified more related factors in the context of developing countries (see 2.3). The paradigm shift was mainly dictated by the realities of governments' limitations in undertaking public affairs (Dwivedi, 2002). The failure of the economic-oriented reform (SAPs) to address the multitude of political, social and economic crises produced by many developing countries' centralized states and the increasing economic burdens on the poor were among the principal reasons for the growing emphasis on governance (Helmsing, 2001; Moharir, 2002). Cohen and Peterson (1999) argued that the primary factor driving the redefinition of the public sector in most developing countries was the state's limited financial and administrative capacity to produce and provide pub-

lic goods and services. Soetan (2000) and Olowu (2002a) argued that the development crisis in Third World countries in general and in Africa in particular, went beyond financial and capacity constraints. They argued that the crisis was linked to a crisis of governance that included broad economic, social and political problems caused by autocracy. As a result, the development debate and reforms shifted from LG to local governance, focusing on creating economic and political space for all societal actors (Helmsing, 2000; Olowu, 2002a).

In the 1990s, neither demand and preferences, nor delivery of public services were limited to the public sector. According to the governance thinking, the public service approach was only one of a number of ways to meet the public's demand (Helmsing, 2000). Helmsing (2001:3) identified several reasons for the growing shift towards the governance approach in the production and delivery of public goods:

> One refers to the already signalled inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the public service approach (government failure). Another refers to […] demands on the part of organized groups in society and of citizens in general to participate in the public decision-making that affect their lives. A […] related factor is a certain (re-) appreciation of indigenous institutions through which communities organise basic services. Lastly, the NGO/CBO non-profit sector has grown in strength in the delivery of basic services. Thus, the problem does not lie only with the public sector and its problems but also arises from other factors and from the fact that other modalities of delivery of services have become more viable and attractive alternatives. In other words, the 'hollowing out' of the state is not only caused by public failure.

IOG and York University (1999) also argued that the idea of governance broadens the opportunity for local development. When governments do not or cannot act, other actors may do so. A 'public interest partnership' may bring citizens, government officials and business leaders together at the initiation of any of these players to address questions of general and common concern.

Moreover, governance is more attractive because it opens new intellectual space that allows us to discuss public issues beyond government where other actors are recognized as important partners. It facilitates reflection on strategies about what should be done by a society in instances of government incapacity (Plumtre and Graham, 1999). For example, it has facilitated discussions of how communities can take action independently and/or jointly with established government structures to address issues of concern to citizens (IOG and York University, 1999). The concept of governance opens our mind to the possibility that different groups in society can join together to play a stronger role in addressing problems. It invites us to consider to what extent the attainment of desired social and economic outcomes may depend upon its arrangements and interactions between actors. Hence, it is neither accidental nor an exaggeration that much of the discourse about governance is directed towards partner-

ships/networks between different sectors of society, and towards public participation in decision-making (Plumtre and Graham, 1999).

Generally, the governance approach to local development opens a new era and offers hope and opportunities for Third World governments that are characterized by limited financial resources for investment, a weak administrative capacity and a fast-growing population and deteriorating urban and rural services. It focuses on using the energies and resources of various actors on the local scene, including devolved local governments, private firms, NGOs, CBOs and communities, to produce and provide sustainable services (Cohen and Peterson, 1997, 1999; Devas and Grant, 2003).

However, on the one hand, the realization of opportunities and hopes depends on central/state governments' abilities, willingness and commitment to enabling local governments, markets, civil societies and communities at large. On the other hand, it depends on local governments and other actors' ability to absorb and utilize the enabling environment created by the central/state government. In many transitional and developing countries, donors, international aid agencies and policy makers are increasingly promoting decentralization as a strategy to establish effective local governance and partnership for development (UNDP, 1997b).

2.5 Local Governance and the Changing Role of Government

The centralized states of developing countries have been known for being involved in and monopolizing every aspect of societal affairs, which has inhibited communities and other non-state actors' involvement. Under this system, public organizations and officials have focused on ensuring uncompromising bureaucratic procedures with regard to controlling and scrutinizing every aspect of public affairs (Karanja, 2005).

As stated earlier, the concept of governance involves multiple societal actors (state and non-state) to break the government's monopoly on public affairs. This changes the context, which requires a new method of governing and a different role for government. It stresses the emergence of governing networks between public, private and voluntary sector actors. This new style of governance calls for a redefinition of government's role. Hence, what and how much governments should do and what and how much should be left to other actors, has been one of the major governance issues since the 1990s (Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Gilbert et al., 1996; Rhodes, 1999).

According to Gilbert et al. (1996:31), the key question is whether governments should 'row' or 'steer'; rowing refers to common and long-standing practices whereby governments at different levels produce and deliver public services directly through their agencies. Steering focuses on setting broad objectives and ensuring that essential tasks are carried out. In the context of steering, the question of who actually produces and provides the services is of

less significance. Steering implies that local authorities are less involved in direct service production and provision, but instead coordinate, facilitate and regulate the activities of other service providers. These new roles are contained in a broad concept called an 'enabling' role, which is a primary responsibility of government at all levels. As an enabler, government has to facilitate and regulate the framework in which other actors (producers and service providers) can make their most effective contribution (Awortwi, 2004; Helmsing, 2001; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

According to Helmsing (1997b), the concept of government's 'enabling' role was enunciated in 1988 by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlement (UNCHS) in respect of the *Global strategy for shelter in the year 2000*. The strategy stated that government should do less with regard to direct implementation and rather create an enabling environment for households, community organizations, NGOs, and the private sector to mobilize resources and energies for service production and delivery. Helmsing (2001:9-10) stated that: 'government enablement concerns a fundamentally different way in which government conducts its affairs. Instead of self-contained, hierarchical bureaucratic processes, mediated by more or less democratically elected politicians, enabling governments seek to involve other actors in the formation and/or implementation of government policies and programs.' He further elaborated that these government responsibilities involve creating legal, regulatory, and institutional systems in which CBOs, NGOs, donors, and community groups can play increasing and multiple roles with regard to local service development and delivery. Rigid bureaucratic procedures and control can no longer serve as mechanisms to steer the various actors' activities; instead, negotiation and participation should be widely used mechanisms to govern the mode of operations (Aworwi, 2004).

However, the enabling role of government does not imply shrinking government's role. The role of government in general and that of LG in particular are appreciated, implying a new and greater role in creating the environment for multi-actor local governance (Batley, 1999; Helmsing, 1997b; Hubbard and Smith, 1999; Stoker, 2004). In fact, it entails a stronger and more coherent government. Although LGs are no longer in the driving seat, they are the most important local governance actors (Helmsing, 2005). It is most unlikely that effective cooperation and integration will develop spontaneously between various actors in a locality. To involve and establish networks with multiple and diversified actors, local authorities and agencies have to play a leading role and often need to invest considerable time and energy in negotiating with and building ties between different actors and in regulating all processes. Hence, LGs are uniquely placed and remain at the centre of these processes due to their legitimacy as elected bodies and their broader socio-political responsibilities (Cohen and Peterson, 1999; Helmsing, 2005; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Edwards and Hulme (2002a) also argued that even though multiple actors from multiple

sectors are involved in local governance processes, LGs remain the ultimate and most important actors in setting the local social, political and economic frameworks on which sustainable development depends. They further argued that regardless of non-state actors' strength and their contribution to local development, they cannot, by any standard, take the state's role, as they have no sovereignty.

In spite of the socio-political significance of the enablement concept, it cannot be regarded as being free of barriers, or be regarded as having just one meaning. According to Helmsing (1997b:109, 2000:4, 2001:7), there is little consensus about its precise meaning, let alone about how it is to be achieved. He stated that the identification of three different kinds of enablement (political, market and community) by Burgess et al. (1994, 1997) was an important step in its conceptual development. And yet, there are important differences between an enabling environment and policies. The World Bank advocates an enabling environment created by government. It feels that the state has to provide the private sector with an enabling environment for free economic exchanges through the promotion of macroeconomic stability, de-regulation, well-developed human capital, and openness to the world economy (Awortwi, 2003; Burgess et al., 1997; Helmsing, 2000; World Bank, 1997, 1994). According to Awortwi, the World Bank finds it important that the state's policies should stimulate the market to work effectively, but does not find the nature of a political regime equally important. Moreover, it regards an enabling environment as one free of barriers created by government, whereas in reality it involves conflicts of interests between social, economic and political groups that are all affected differently by this policy (Burgess et al., 1997). Helmsing (2000, 2001) and Wils and Helmsing (2001) advocated enabling policies that have profound political, administrative and economic implications, as a result of which a pro-active government has to do many things to ensure that multi-actors such as NGOs, private enterprises, CBOs, and communities at large are engaged in addressing societal problems. Enabling policies have to promote both political, market and community enablement since they are interrelated with one another. Political enablement, for example, provides the framework for all the others.

Political enablement

Political enablement is very broad, involving a major transformation of government's role and structure, which has a far-reaching impact on market and community enablement. It is defined as 'a transformation in the structure and functions of central/[state] and local government, the relations between them and their relations with the market and the community' (Burgess et al., 1997:144). Government needs to adopt different strategies to implement and achieve political enablement, including: political/administrative decentralization, democratisation, managerial and institutional reforms as well as encourag-

ing and involving NGOs, CBOs, private enterprises, and communities at large in public policy making and local development processes. Political enablement requires fundamental changes in the nature of local development planning and implementation. It has to allow various actors to influence preference setting, planning and resource allocation decisions as well as implementation strategies to improve the production and delivery of public goods and services. It has to also promote and facilitate the networking of relationships between different actors at the local level (Burgess et al., 1994, 1997; Helmsing, 2001).

To implement political enablement, central/state governments should constitutionally recognize LGs' fundamental roles and powers and thus decentralize decision-making authority, which provides scope for LGs and other local governance actors. In this context, decentralization involves the devolution of constitutionally defined authorities to democratically elected and legitimate local authorities to ensure autonomy in the control and use of resources, power and responsibility. The political representation and legitimacy of local authorities are vital components of political enablement, which creates a cohesive and cooperative environment for LGs to voluntarily involve various actors in general, and communities in particular. The effectiveness of local rules and institutions in securing recognition of and establishing confidence in them among the citizens depend on how the political leadership is structured and relates to the local people. The devolution of authority has to ultimately ensure that local development needs and priorities, planning and implementations are basically governed by local views and interests. Such powers and processes empower LGs to not only enjoy autonomous decision-making, but also to develop enabling strategies through a set of social and political practices that increases their legitimacy and role in coordinating and facilitating communities and their organizations (CBOs), self-help groups, NGOs and various private enterprises to form a network of relationships regarding the production and delivery of goods and services (Burgess et al., 1997; Gilbert et al., 1996; Helmsing, 1997b; Karanja, 2005).

The devolution of constitutionally recognized and defined authority to LGs has to be accompanied by the transfer of sufficient financial and human resources. Capacity problems undermine the role of LGs in exercising their powers and undertaking local development. Concern has been expressed that though in practice central/state governments have transferred responsibilities to LGs, they have not transferred sufficient human and financial resources to exercise authority and take on responsibilities. In most instances, central/state governments retain control of fiscal transfers to local authorities and use these as instruments to regulate the planning and execution of projects at the local level. In such a situation, LGs cannot plan, implement and achieve local development that reflects their communities' realities and interests. Hence, LGs should be provided with a reasonably stable and appropriate tax base and

should also have authority regarding the allocating and utilizing of central/state transfers in keeping with local interests. The management and administration of local administrative and technical staff should also form an integral part of local authority so that LGs can recruit and maintain employees who best fit the services to be provided and the policies to be implemented (Burgess et al., 1997; Gilbert et al., 1996).

Market enablement

Market enablement refers to facilitating and promoting formal and informal business sectors and individual entrepreneurs in order to provide market solutions for the production, distribution and exchange of goods and services. These solutions entail governments not placing regulatory obstacles in the path of market development and functioning and, where possible, withdrawing their direct production and provision activities. It is argued that removing obstacles to markets and entrepreneurs encourages and facilitates the mobilization of resources, skills and innovations that leads to increased production and a supply of public goods and services, thus meeting demands with more diversified options and competitive prices (Awortwi, 2003; Burgess et al., 1997; Karanja, 2005; Wils and Helmsing, 2001).

Burgess et al. (1997:141) suggested a number of instruments for implementing the market enablement strategy. Macroeconomic and sectoral policy reforms aimed at facilitating market forces and creating the legal, institutional and financial framework for enablement is one of the most important sets of strategies. Another set focuses on the elimination of price distortion in factor, product and financial markets through the liberalization of government controls of prices and through the removal of protective tariffs and import quotas.

Community enablement

In the new era of local governance, community enablement constitutes one of the most important components of government enablement. It can be defined as 'a strategy adopted by central/[state] and local governments to coordinate and facilitate the efforts of community and neighbourhood-based organizations to initiate, plan, and implement their own projects according to the principles of self-determination, self-organization and self-management' (Burgess, et al., 1997:151). Helmsing (1999), in Wils and Helmsing (2001:8), emphasised the role of LGs and defined community enablement as '(local) government(s) creating appropriate legal, administrative (including financial) and planning frameworks to facilitate community organization, management and action.' Even if actual community enablement takes place at the local level, the central/state government has to provide the general conditions that allow enablement to occur there through legal, organizational, regulatory and political reforms. In fact, in some countries central governments directly facilitate community en-

ablement through credit and funding schemes for community projects (Burgess, et al., 1997).

Community enablement primarily refers to governments' (central/state and local) role in promoting, encouraging and supporting community structures and initiatives to manage their own *collective goals*. In the context of local governance and development, however, community enablement suggests a wider scope. Central/state and local governments need to legislate policies and create an environment for an institutionalised collaborative arrangement or network through which communities and their organizations, together with state and non-state actors, actively take part in local development planning and implementation (Karanja, 2005; Wils and Helmsing, 2001). This involves establishing an institutional base for community initiatives and suitable legal, administrative, financial and planning frameworks that incorporate community efforts and resources into government systems and procedures for local development planning and implementation (Karanja, 2005). It also, of course, includes providing space for NGOs to play significant roles as mediators between the state and local community. If they are provided with an opportunity to participate in local decision-making and development processes, they can provide CBOs with technical, administrative, legal or economic advice and backup facilities (Burgess et al, 1997). Although community enablement is made up of several elements, the most important element is the growing significance attached to the principle of community participation (Helmsing, 2001). In this context, however, community participation differs fundamentally from participation in local development through contributions of labour, finance and material. Such contributions are still vital, but participation in the context of the recent local governance reforms refers to communities' involvement in vital decision-making processes that include need identification and prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. It also refers to communities and their organizations' involvement in policy dialogue and discussions that affect their affairs (Burgess, et al., 1997).

Hence, community enablement clearly calls for the decentralization of the decision-making authority from the central/state authority to LGs as well as communities and their organizations. Communities should be empowered to initiate, plan, implement, and administer projects independently and/or jointly with government and other actors to produce and deliver public goods and services that reflect the needs and priorities of the local people. This facilitates the processes of reversing development programmes' traditional concentration on the central/regional level to the local level, which will ultimately empower LGs and the local people (Burgess, et al., 1997; Karanja, 2005; UNDP, 1996).

2.6 Local Governance Network (LGN): a New Approach to Local Development

Previous research on LG and development concentrated mainly on local authorities, since other actors were rarely considered or allowed to be involved in public affairs. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, actors that local government researchers had not taken into consideration, such as private and voluntary agencies, have emerged in the governance process to constitute a *local governance network*. Stoker (1999) explained that until recently, academics have studied LGs as a single organization on which the production and delivery of public goods depend. Today, however, the vast map of local agencies makes it impossible to treat LG as a single organization and the only actor. Because of the externalisation of many services and the emergence of new agencies at the local level, an LG is only one actor among a network of agencies engaged in the production and provision of public goods and services. Ribot (2002), for example, stated that in the recent wave of decentralization in many African countries, various actors, including elected bodies, customary authorities, local representatives of technical services and ministries, community groups, 'development' committees, and NGOs, have been enabled to engage in local service production and delivery. However, these political, economic and social institutions have not as yet fully developed the necessary capacity to address Africa's complex and multi-dimensional development problems, nor have governments invested sufficient effort in building these actors' capacities (Olowu, 2002a). Community-based organizations are still weak. For example, in most SSA countries, the formalization of community associational activities is still relatively low (Helmsing, 2005).

2.6.1 Understanding the essence of an LGN

Networking, as an activity, has existed since the beginning of human life and refers to any relationship established for a collective purpose. At its most basic, it is a normal activity of people engaged in daily communication (Karl, 1999a). Different networks can be established between organizations, groups or individuals for different collective purposes. For example, business organizations form corporate networks, other organizations form information networks, parties select political alliances, and some groups form a self-help network. All of them have their own defined objective(s). For example, business networks are usually driven by market and profit motivations, and a political alliance is based on advancing political interests or enhancing influence vis-à-vis other parties (Anthony, 1999).

An LGN, however, is more complex, because it involves relationships across multiple actors from multiple sectors of society. The mere communication or exchange of information between organizations that emanates from

organizational boundaries' natural openness does not constitute an LGN's real essence. It involves processes that go beyond the natural inter-organizational day-to-day communication (Engel, 1993). An LGN is concerned with processes that create conditions for structured rule and decision-making to define and establish common objectives to be implemented jointly (Stoker, 2004). Cross-sector and multi-actor interactions and working relationships are the essence of an LGN (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

Different authors have defined an LGN in specific or general terms, but voluntary interactions and interdependencies between the actors and the resulting patterns of relations are important elements of each definition. Starkey (1998:14) defined an LGN in more general terms: '[…] any group of individuals or organizations who, on a voluntary basis, exchange information or undertake joint activities and who organize themselves in such a way that their individual autonomy remains intact'. Goss (2001:11-12) used an LGN to describe new forms of collective decision-making at the local level that lead to the development of different relationships, not simply between public agencies but between citizens, their organizations and other voluntary and private agencies. Prior, in Leach and Percy-Smith (2001:88-89), defined an LGN in the following terms: 'the local governance network consists of a set of relationships of interdependency between the constituent organizations, these relationships may exist where organizations depend on each other for access to specific resources [for example, finance, skills and land], where there are functional interdependencies or where there is a mutual interest in tackling an issue which one organization cannot deal with alone.'

Leach and Percy-Smith (2001:39) also defined an LGN in a manner that indicates its multi-organizational nature. According to them, an LGN describes the ways and processes through which state agencies (central/state and local), non-state agencies (CBOs, NGOs, donor/aid agencies, private organizations, self-help groups etc.) and the local people at large join together, interact and cooperate voluntarily at the local level to share political, social, and economic spaces in decision-making. They further elaborated that such processes are characterized by interdependence and continual interactions in order to negotiate and establish shared objectives and pool resources towards achieving common objectives.

In addition to continuous interactions and interdependencies, the most important issue emphasized by authors in defining an LGN, is the voluntary relationship that prevents an individual actors' freedom from being undermined. Bogason (2000), however, disagreed with the idea that autonomy could remain intact in a network. He argued that in a network in which different actors join together for one or more purposes, giving up some of their freedom of action in favour of the joint decisions and common objectives that brought them together is unavoidable. Indeed, it is true that individual autonomy and freedom

of action hardly remains intact in these processes. Nevertheless, an LGN does not require each actor's internal structure to transform. Consequently, individual actors do not lose their legal right to exist as an independent entity (Edwards and Sen, 2002).

According to Bennett and Krebs (1994:121), the LGN issue is entrenched in:

> (1) the organization of the state at the local level (centrally appointed or locally elected decision-making body);
>
> (2) the organization of business interests and civil societies (particularly the existence of business organizations and civil societies at the local level to carry out socio-economic activities);
>
> (3) […] the role of business organizations and civil societies in design, formulation, administration and evaluation of policy; the role of business and civil society as an agent of the state and vice versa; the relation between business, civil society and the state.

Governance as a new networking style of governing localities through the decentralization of decision-making authority to different actors has two important dimensions: the demand/representative and the supply/technical sides (Helmsing, 2000, 2005). These two sides are very important to unpack LGN issues very clearly. Participation is vital to an LGN; however, the blanket use of the term LGN does not address the real essence of participation by the different non-state actors in local development. The use of the demand- and supply-side concepts will help to classify the essence of participation into two but related categories: participation in policy formulation and the collective decision-making arena, and participation in the production and delivery of public goods and services. Helmsing (2000), a pioneer of the demand and supply concepts in the governance debate, stated that state and non-state actors' co-existence in the process of local development needs to have systemic dimensions that will help to 'unbundle' the different actors' role and participation in different functions regarding local development activities.

The LGN concept opens up ways for non-state actors and communities to be involved in key local decision-making. Hence, LGs are required to introduce a 'new style' of decision-making that involves non-state actors and communities in local policy making, need identification, preference and priority setting, resource allocation and utilization. Non-state actors' increased interest in together with the need for the continuous hollowing out of the state to provide space for the former in local policy formulation and collective preference setting leads to the development of an LGN's demand side (Helmsing, 2000, 2001; Stoker, 2004).

Helmsing (2005:14) defined the demand side as: '[…] the interaction between local government and local civil society and economic actors in the proc-

ess of establishing annual and medium/long term public preferences/priorities and plans (public investment, long term territorial and development plans) and downward external accountability.' Government needs to open its boundaries for non-state actors and communities not only regarding service production and delivery functions, but also regarding political and policy-making processes so that they can participate. To realize these invaluable objectives, government should establish transparent, accountable and participative governance structure at the local level (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001; Olowu, 2002a). Of course, how the political system is organized to facilitate and control policy making has a significant impact on non-state actors and communities' opportunities and level of participation in policy making. In this regard, there is a distinction between pluralist (competitive) and corporatist (directive) political systems. In a competitive, multi-party system, political parties play crucial roles in presenting citizens and other actors with alternative policy options. In a non-competitive political system, policy making is mostly confined to the ruling party's political executive cabinet, providing other actors with little opportunity to influence public policy making. An important element of the demand side in which non-state actors could play a crucial role, is creating awareness among citizens on how to voice opinions and create forums where the public can vent their problems and demand their rights (Hyden and Court, 2002; Olowu, 2002b).

Helmsing (2005:14) defined the supply side of an LGN as '[…] the delivery of public services by non-public means (thru collective action or privately) and the role of non-public actors in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery (public and non-public).' Hence, the supply side of an LGN calls upon non-state actors such as NGOs, commercial enterprises, CBOs, associations and other development agencies, and the local people to take over the greatest part of service production as well as provision functions, while the state focuses on the role of facilitating and regulating the process. Even if LGs are required to largely focus on enabling roles, they also participate in the co-production and co-management of services (Helmsing, 2000).

Taking both sides into consideration, it could be said that an LGN is the constitution at a local level where both state and non-state actors play important roles in policy formulation, development planning, implementation and evaluation to the common end of improving production and the provision of infrastructure, goods and services. In other words, it establishes a bridge between public and private actors, between associations and businesses, between those who possess the means and those who have the skills as well as creating the conditions to integrate the poorest populations into the development process (Thirion, 1997).

It is with this in mind that governments are currently experimenting with many network structures within which politicians or public servants share power with other sectors of society (IOG and York University 1999). There has

been a significant shift in donor organizations' policies towards supporting the development of local governance capabilities and decentralization, thus recognizing that networking between different actors at the local level is an essential process that has to take place for local development (UNDP, 1996).

2.6.2 The emergence of the LGN approach to local development

The failure of the central state and its local counterpart, the local government, to produce and provide services through a hierarchy of command and control led to the search for alternative approaches. The network or partnership has thus emerged and increasingly become an attractive approach to address multi-dimensional and complex local development problems through multiple actors' joint efforts. An LGN is essentially a new approach to local development because it differs from the mainstream histories of local government and development that almost exclusively concentrated on multi-purpose local authorities and their services (Helmsing, 2005; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001; Stoker, 2004). Stoker stated that in its understanding of the contexts of governing and the core processes of governance, the LGN approach marks a breakthrough from traditional public administration

According to Goss (2001) and Enemuo (2000), the change from a traditional LG to a more complex LGN cannot be reduced to mere theoretical discussions; it is dictated by its practical significance. The proliferation of different actors operating at the local level coupled with an increasing awareness of local development issues' 'cross-cutting' nature and the need for a holistic approach to solving local problems, gave rise to the development of the network approach. In the context of decentralized governance, in which local authorities no longer monopolize power and multiple actors are involved in local development efforts, plans and policies can only be implemented through a degree of consensus and partnership. This ensures complementarity and the reduction of unnecessary competition and duplication of activities (Devas, 2004; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Almost similarly, Cohen and Peterson (1999) argue that the involvement of a great number of public and non-public actors in local development processes has raised a serious practical concern about the mechanisms of how to coordinate institutional pluralism. Hence, multi-organizational service networks are at the frontier of the current reform agenda in local governance. The growing scarcity of resources and the need to bring them into a common pool to serve local development's common objectives are other practical factors that contribute to the rise of the LGN approach. Moreover, actors in any sector, operating independently, will typically not have all the needed resources, or public faith and confidence to address issues of public concern effectively. The LGN approach offers insights into ways to nurture circumstances in which each sector's resources and management experience are com-

bined to solve local development problems (Gonzalez III et al., 2000; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

Bennett and Krebs (1994:120) elaborated the importance of networking as: 'Economic development partnerships have become an increasing field for attention, particularly focusing on how partnerships can be encouraged by policy initiatives. This has been argued to be part of stimulating greater "bottom-up" development, or developing indigenous potentials.' From both a theoretical and practical point of view, it can be maintained that the LGN approach to local development did not emerge spontaneously. Hence, an LGN, which includes among others private-government, private-community, NGO-government, NGO-community, donor-community, and public-community partnerships, can help move developing countries towards improving declining services and meeting increasing demands (Fowler, 2002b; Wils and Helmsing, 2001).

On examining a governance network's importance for its members in the process of improving local development performance, the following are among its most important benefits (Karl, 1999a:19; Starkey, 1998:20):

- Networks facilitate the sharing and exchanging of information, skills, knowledge, experiences, views, ideas and strategies through different forums and communication methods. Among their important methods of doing so are: publishing newsletters and information packets, conducting joint research activities as well as organizing joint meetings, workshops, conferences and seminars. Sharing skills and experiences can increase network members' overall competence regarding their understanding of development problems. Moreover, information exchange and coordination lead to less duplication of work and efforts.
- Networks can effectively link people and organizations from different levels and backgrounds that would not otherwise have an opportunity to interact. For example, they can bring together international NGOs and CBOs, central government development agencies and communities/CBOs, donors and local authorities, NGOs and LG agencies etc.
- Networks can provide the critical mass needed for local, national or international advocacy, action and policy change.
- Networks can bring together funding and technical cooperation agencies and those in need of resources and support, which would create the energy and motivation to address complex development problems that seem overwhelming to those working at grassroots level.
- Networks can help build and strengthen members and other participants' capacity through training, information generation and dissemination, lobbying, the mobilizing of resources, public awareness creation etc.

- Networks create alternative structures and ways of working that could reduce bureaucratic and hierarchical ways of working and promote more democratic and participatory decision-making and working methods.

The benefits of governance networks are not limited to those identified above; more benefits may occur in several interrelated ways. Longer-term benefits become apparent as development and research programmes become more effective, know-how is transferred and systems evolve. It enables members to accomplish more together than can be done as individuals or a single organization. The power of network and networking should be understood beyond the simple aggregation of groups and individuals. Their inclusiveness, capacity to facilitate exchange of information and ability to create a pool of resources and energy generate social synergy (Karl, 1999a).

Although networking has emerged as an attractive approach to local development, it faces different challenges and problems (see 2.6.7). An LGN is more complex than the traditional system of LGs. It involves a complex set of relationships with 'higher' tier government agencies and other state and non-state actors operating at the local level. This entails more demanding tasks for LGs. The activities of multiple actors from multiple sectors need effective coordination to unite different strategies and plans towards their common objectives with regard to local development. Local authorities need to scrutinize the activities of multiple actors effectively to protect public interest and also prevent potential conflicts between the actors. Coordinating and scrutinizing complex relationships are by no means easy tasks (see 2.6.5).

2.6.3 LGN actors

Actors form the foundation of an LGN because it ultimately entails interaction processes and cooperation between multiple actors throughout the overall governing processes. The number and diversity of actors (NGOs, CBOs, private, government, and donor) involved in the structure (non-hierarchical) and processes of (participative) decision-making, and the nature of the relationships (interactive and collaborative) with one another and the community at large are important factors for the emergence and functioning of an LGN (Cohen and Peterson, 1997, 1999; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

Actors can be grouped into two broad categories viz. public/state and non-public/state actors. The non-state category consists of civil society, donor and private sector actors. The public sector includes the central/state government and LG and their agencies, which are directly and/or indirectly engaged in facilitating and supervising local development activities. The private sector includes private firms and entrepreneurs, commercial chambers, producer and distribution co-operatives, and capital lenders. The civil society sector, on the other hand, includes NGOs, communities and their organizations (CBOs), reli-

gious organizations, women's and youth groups, and professional associations. The donor sector includes bilateral and multilateral agencies engaged in supporting local governments and communities in their efforts to produce and deliver basic services to the poor (Bennett and Krebs, 1994; Gonzalez III et al., 2000; Wils and Helmsing, 2001). It is important to note that an LGN does not limit itself to local organizations; regional, national and international actors that operate at the local level to leverage local governments and communities to improve local development are also important actors (Helmsing, 2003).

The LGN framework requires all actors from multi-sectors and multi-levels to join together to solve local problems. Different actors play different but interrelated and integrated roles (Malombe, 2000). Role refers to behaviour and activities that others expect an actor to play. In this context, role refers to a set of activities and/or contributions that actors can make to local development (van den Dool, 2003). Consequently, role is a core concept that helps to disaggregate the activities and actions required for local development and which allows the mapping of responsibility for implementing tasks from a single organization/institution to many. This approach helps to establish a new view of leveraging the public sector by promoting role pluralism between task-related actors. LGs, for example, are expected to create an enabling environment, while donor agencies, NGOs, CBOs and private sector actors play important roles in mobilizing resources and also in introducing different methods of service production and delivery, based on their specific experience and knowledge, to the public sector (Cohen and Peterson, 1997).

Development is therefore achieved through an integrated approach that strengthens state and non-state actors' roles and capabilities in the economy. In an integrated approach, government has to play several critical roles to enable the entire local governance system to function well (IOG and York University, 1999). Most important here is again local government's new role as a facilitator, a catalyst force in negotiations of interest to and between groups capable of self-organizing, accordingly enabling others to organize themselves, negotiate with regard to their interests and pursue their legitimate objectives. In these processes a 'negotiation state' emerges that 'arranges stages and conversations and directs the show' to the satisfactions of all actors in local development processes (Goss, 2001; UNDP, 1997b). As discussed earlier, government enablement has three dimensions, however, Goss (2001:24) generally and descriptively describes government's role in the LGN process as: regulating decision-making to prevent abuse of power, facilitating market management and functioning, leading negotiations about desired local outcomes as well as creating space and forums for civic dialogue. It has to set the framework for democratic participation, provide organizational and other resources necessary to make things happen, and initiate and support self-organization and management to produce and deliver services. The capacity of local leaderships to realize these

significant roles and the manner in which they discharge their enabling roles are crucial to an LGN's emergence and successful functioning (Helmsing, 2003).

Wils and Helmsing (2001:19) argue that private firms play important roles, such as the provision of a basic infrastructure and services, creating a competitive environment for community-based enterprises, and investing and contributing to community development as a (company) social goal, that leverage local development efforts. According to Helmsing (2003), private actors' multiple roles are increasingly recognized, however, joint action and cooperation do not occur easily, as combining competition (the essence of the business sector) with cooperation is not easy. In fact, in many developing countries like Africa, there is a low investment response from the private sector because the required institutional environment is not yet sufficiently developed to undertake ventures (Helmsing, 2005).

Communities and their organizations (CBOs) have also been recognized as important actors in the LGN. They have moved from the receiving end to producing and providing services. Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) stated that networking with the community sector is increasingly regarded as an instrument with which to foster and support citizen participation in local decision-making to develop more responsive policies and mobilize community support for particular initiatives. Strengthening CBOs could increase communities' abilities to influence government decisions as well as to undertake their own development with their own interests at heart and according to their own priorities, which could reduce their subordination to state-led development (Fowler et al., 1992).

According to Helmsing (2005:28), CBOs could undertake a range of development activities, such as the production and provision of services and an infrastructure, as well as finance and credit. However, he (2005:29) also argues that CBOs are not all the same; they are heterogeneous, meaning they can be large or small, formal or informal, horizontal or vertical. He stresses the need to make a distinction between grassroots, territorial CBOs and 'self-selected' grassroots groups. For him, territorial CBOs are all encompassing, broadly representative and multi-purpose, and established according to local tradition and custom, or by means of government (local or national) legislation. Their multipurpose nature allows these types of CBOs to establish networks with multiple organizations that are engaged in similar or related activities in local development processes, whereas 'self-selected' grassroots groups are mostly single purpose, more homogenous and less hierarchical. CBOs can serve as a training ground, thus providing an opportunity for sharing information and experience that will ultimately contribute to learning and a move from micro to meso and macro levels of influence. While this phenomenon has been noted in many Latin-American countries, it is less evident in Africa (Helmsing, 2005:36).

NGOs are other important LGN actors. In broad terms, 'NGOs can be defined as autonomous, privately set up, non-profit-making institutions that sup-

port, manage or facilitate development action' (Libenberg, 2001). However, NGOs are diversified, therefore could be classified as international, national and local (based on their geographical or scope of operation) and, based on their primary purpose, they could be classified as providing charity, service development and delivery, and empowerment and advocacy (Caroll, 1992; DeMars, 2005; Riddell et al., 1995). Wherever they belong and whatever their purposes, NGOs occupy an intermediary position between state and society, between local economy and polity as well as between national and international levels. For example, international NGOs are typically located between international development organizations and local recipients in the sense that they channel funds, broker information; and plan and implement programmes aimed at developing local people (Anheier, 1994; Brautigam, 1994).

Since 1980s onwards, NGOs have emerged as major actors on the international development scene. A mix of forces fuelled the rapid rise and prominence of NGOs. Some of the key factors for the rapid growth of NGOs have been: the ideological ascendancy of neo-liberalism; the perceived poor performance of the public sector in developing countries that lead to the search for alternative ways of providing services to the poor, especially by bilateral and multilateral aid agencies; the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the 'civil society' concept; the growth of social movements, such as the peace and environmental movements in the West and the human rights and democratisation movements in the former Communist East Block; and, finally, the growth and popularity of local initiatives (Edwards and Hulme, 2002b; Fowler, 2002b; Halliday, 2001; Turner and Hulme, 1997).

A situation has evolved in which NGOs are expected to take on a substantial role on behalf of the state, which encourages their involvement. NGOs therefore provide local services such as credit, information, technology transfer, heath care, education, water supplies, and improved natural resources management and protection. Hence, NGOs have started to gain experience and credibility in promoting sustainable local development (Fowler et al., 1992; Jordan and Tuijl, 2002). In many Third World countries where government assistance is not forthcoming, or the services provided by the market are too expensive, NGOs demonstrate their significance and ability as an alternative provider of basic services to the poor. They not only connect the marginalized poor with the system of benefits but also with decision-making processes. Consequently, they are considered important actors that facilitate the global trend of shifting power from the public sector to communities by creating opportunities for self-development and creating awareness that people and communities have rights that they should demand (Anang, 1994; Carroll, 1992; Edwards and Hulme, 2002b; Sandberg, 1994; Willis, 2005).

NGOs' capacity and effectiveness in promoting local development and people's empowerment are still debatable. For example, Edwards and Hulme

(2002b) and Willis (2005) argue that NGOs play important roles in improving local development in general and in providing basic services to poor communities in particular – roles that neither the government nor market is able to provide. On the other hand, Anang (1994:102) stated that 'in general, the past performance of NGOs was usually judged as poor, or having produced very little to solve development problems in the Third World.' Likewise, their success rate in respect of advocacy and empowerment is not impressive. There is little evidence that they have been engaged in strong advocacy or in mobilizing and supporting people to actively participate in formal political processes and policy debates. In Africa, most NGOs and civil society actors in general do not have sufficient capacities to do so, nor do governments tolerate such activities (Anheier, 1994; Fowler et al., 1992; Olowu, 2002a; Turner and Hulme, 1997).

The inability of Third World governments to address development challenges in general and multilateral and bilateral development aid programmes' countless failures regarding the reduction of poverty have caused a change in donors' policy. In the post Cold War era, bilateral and multilateral donors have preferred to channel development assistance either directly to LGs and the people through their own specialized development agencies, or through NGOs instead of central governments. They directly leverage LGs and communities through budget and technical assistance (training community members, local councillors and experts) to allow them to plan and implement their own development, which promotes assertiveness in the medium term (Anang, 1994; Nielsen, 2002). Of course, international financial institutions that fall within the IMF and WB Group's systems still provide loans and assistance to central governments to support financial stabilization and economic reforms. However, progress towards democratisation and improved local governance are now preconditions for assistance. Moreover, these donors have extended civic channels, such as NGOs, to act as intermediaries for direct support to local people (Enemuo, 2000; Fowler, 2000).

2.6.4 Formation and typology of a network

Network formation

Network formation is often not a deliberate process, but happens when different actors develop a mutual interest in acting jointly and need a mechanism for coordination and complementarity. The development from such initiatives to a fully-fledged LGN greatly depends on the LG's proactive nature. LGN formation between different actors suggests greater complementarity because no actor possesses all the necessary legal, financial, material and organizational resources for local development. Complementarity supports and promotes day-to-day interactions between different actors in the course of mobilizing, organizing and coordinating each actor's specific resources for synergetic actions in local development. Effective LGs complement the efforts of communities and

other actors by creating an enabling environment that strengthen and motivate them to collaborate and engage in local service production and delivery (Evans, 1997).

Theoretically, network formation seems simple and fast. In reality, however, networks usually evolve slowly and follow a development path dictated by their internal logic. The analysis of different experiences enables some stages to be identified as being relevant for most networks. Haverkort et al. (1993:13-14) have identified the following as typical stages of network formation:

(1) Preparation: in this stage, initiators identify an issue of common concern, formulate the idea of a network, and assess potential members' interest. For a new network to grow into a full-fledged network, it is important that this stage is based on the perceived needs and interests of the founding members.

(2) Establishment: if the basic assessment of the founding and potential members is positive, a decision is taken to form a network. At this stage, it is also important to decide on the shape the network will take. This will be influenced by the mechanisms and structure used for information exchange and collaboration, the rules and regulation that will govern the members' behaviour.

(3) Operations: after establishment, the network gradually becomes fully operational in the sense that it starts addressing the problems for which it was established. Some redesign of the network's structure and management may be necessary to allow members to become more fully active.

In addition to the above stages that are mainly dictated by internal logic, LGN formation is also influenced by governments at different levels. Their influence could entail: determining operational parameters and controlling financial and other resources through legislative powers and political legitimacy (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

Network typology

Not all networks are similar. Networks can be classified into different types according to, among others, their geographical and/or scope of coverage, objectives, and structure (horizontal vs. vertical). However, the diversity of networks suggests that no system of classification is entirely satisfactory. Starkey (1998:15-16) and Haverkort et al. (1993:9-11) discussed different types of networks, as based on the criteria above, as follows:

(1) Geographical coverage and/or scope: Based on these, networks may be classified as local, regional, national, and even international. The scope criterion is not limited to the geographical dimension, but also applies to the scope of the subject matters with which a network deals, i.e. whether it is multipurpose or single purpose. Network could therefore be for general community development, or for specific issues and specific activities, such as environmental rehabilitation, integrated pest management etc.

(2) Objectives: all networks have objectives and those that they pursue may be used as a basis for differentiating them. Some have been established to allow collaboration with regard to research, education or training. Others aim to exchange materials (e.g. seeds for planting or prototype implementing). Others are pressure groups, raising public awareness with regard to certain issues and influence national, sub-national and/or local policies in their area of interest.

According to Wolday (2000:144), based on their objectives, networks could be classified into two major groups: lateral learning networks and an operational alliance. Lateral learning networks refer to the association of institutions that primarily collaborate to improve their members' capacity. They collaborate because they are interested in improving practices and in sharing and improving the exchange of information between members. An operational alliance, on the other hand, is a stronger and more formal type of network in which members mobilize resources and share common operational objectives that the group has to realise.

Another type of network based on objectives could be a multiple or single objective network. In reality, many networks combine multiple objectives such as information exchange between members with practical collaboration in training and research and some public relations attributes.

(3) Structure: horizontal versus vertical network. Some networks bring people or organizations together that work at same level (horizontal orientation, e.g. farmer-based networks or different organizations working at district level). A horizontal network could be formed between organizations from different sectors (civil society, public and private) but with no hierarchical differences and relationships. Others link people and organization working on different levels (vertical orientation, e.g. those bringing together farmers, researchers, policy makers and international agencies) (Goss, 2001; Rhodes, 1991).

From the above brief review of network typology, it is possible to understand that in the study of LGN, it is imperative to identify the types of networks in a given locality. This will help with the analysis of which networks are actually involved and what they cover. It will also help to answer other questions that include: What is the primary focus of the network? How is it managed and what role does each member play? What is the network's impact regarding its contribution to the improvement of local development?

2.6.5 LGN management and coordination

The shift from a system of local government to an LGN system requires the local authorities to adopt a 'new style' of management and coordination. Interventions of multiple actors from multiple sectors and levels' require systemic coordination, both horizontally and vertically, to steer networks' development and activities. Horizontally, the resources and efforts of various actors engaged

in a wide array of local service production and delivery programmes should be integrated and coordinated in order to promote equitable distribution of services and avoid conflicts of interest as well as the duplication of efforts. An LGN requires effective vertical coordination between different government hierarchies. There should be meaningful consultations between central/regional, sub-regional and local level authorities to coherently integrate local development activities undertaken by various actors into the central/regional development efforts (Helmsing, 2000; Stoker, 2004; Walzer and Jacobs, 1998).

LGN management and coordination are complex, since they deal with complex processes and interactions. They involve bringing together diversified members and handling the differences between them, identifying problems and establishing common objectives. Independent multiple actors' involvement in LGN processes limits traditional management methods, i.e. enforcement mechanisms become less useful. Hence, local authorities and agencies need to focus on fostering mutual interactions and master the art of encouraging others to bargain, negotiate and articulate their interests. Creating an atmosphere of mutual trust, confidence and enthusiasm is the most important mechanism for LGN management and coordination (Haus and Heinelt, 2005; Kickert et al., 1997).

Trust is an important mechanism that holds different actors together. Goal congruence is, of course, a basic precondition for members to unite and act together. The issue of trust has to do with the degree of confidence that members have in each other with regard to achieving common goals. In the LGN context, the role of trust as a coordinating mechanism is illustrated by Fukuyama's (1999:16) explanation that 'if members of the group come to expect that others will behave reliably and honestly, then they will come to trust one another. Trust is like a lubricant that makes the running of any group or organization more efficient.' Rhodes (1999) shares Fukuyama's view and states that trust is a central LGN coordinating mechanism that holds a complex set of relationships together and produces cooperative behaviour with regard to achieving common objectives. Haus et al. (2005) also argue that trust is an important factor that can reduce transaction costs of networking by making use of the locally generated institutional potential for joint action. Haus and Heinelt (2005), for example, state that it is not difficult to coordinate and actively involve communities and their organizations in local socio-political activities if they trust the political system.

Actors are both 'autonomous' i.e. able to withdraw and withhold resources at their disposal, or free to argue publicly, and dependent on each other to realize the jointly established objectives or preferences. This presupposes that in the course of interaction and cooperation, LGN actors need to compromise some aspects of their private interests and also develop the capacity to relinquish opportunistic behaviour. However, actors do not naturally compromise

easily and simply, which sometimes causes conflict. Hence, interest articulation, negotiation and bargaining are important coordinating mechanisms on which LGs need to focus. Differences in interest and approaches between members should be resolved by dialogue and discussion instead of forcing one or all to reach a uniform solution. In this process, individual actors can express concerns and negotiate actions necessary to change an undesired state of affairs, or to achieve desired collective benefits. This promotes reciprocity between actors and participatory governance, which keeps parties in touch with one another, reinforces learning and the mobilization of resources for better results (Kickert et al., 1997; Morgan et al., 1999; Rhodes, 1999; Stoker, 2004).

Of course, coordinating LGN activities through regulation is one of the mechanisms that remains within the public sector domain. Government determines rules that private firms, NGOs, individuals and other agencies need to observe while interacting in the LGN processes. This is because government has an official mandate and responsibility to shape other actors' activities and scrutinize their behaviour. The behaviour of individual or groups of non-state actors is monitored by inspections with failure to meet regulatory standards resulting in measures that range from advice to termination of operation. However, supervision is at arm's length, in that there is no direct hierarchical and command relationship governing day-to-day activities (Stoker, 2004).

An LGN implies the existence of collaborative and cooperative behaviour and interest between actors in working together to address local development problems. Practically, these conditions may not exist, or may exist only partially. Resources and efforts need to be mobilized from all actors and their relationships need to be regulated. Such processes mostly run neither smoothly nor simply, because each actor has its own views, interests and resources, and can, to a degree, trade resources for influence in decision-making to reflect its interests and views. In this process, the role of local leadership becomes very crucial and leaders thus need to develop capacity and commitment to establish more effective integration, cooperation, and collaboration between various actors (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001; Rao, 1994; Rhodes, 1999).

Communities and their organizations are the most important actors and local leaders should focus on them and exert energy to effectively mobilize, coordinate and integrate their efforts and resources into the LGN processes. Leaders can motivate and encourage community involvement by organizing dialogue forums to discuss and identify problems and develop strategies. Leaders should also make demands and seek support on behalf of their communities, which further motivates people to support their ideas and activities. In the course of an LGN's management and coordination, local leaders have to exert extensive efforts to generate and secure support from the local people and organizations as well as from supra-local state (central/regional or sub-regional) and non-state (donors, NGOs, associations etc.) actors (Haus and Heinelt, 2005).

In a nutshell, in the context of increasing non-state actors' intervention and the complex relations and interactions between diversified actors, effective coordination and management are the nucleus of an LGN. According to Leach and Percy-Smith (2001:91), these diversified and complex relationships have three major implications. First, they point out the need for a more flexible structure that differs from the traditional government organization and that involves all development partners. Such efforts should not, however, only focus on incorporating all actors into the LGN structure but should also focus on effectively managing and coordinating different actors to exert efforts and deploy resources in respect of local development. Secondly, they point out that some activities, especially sector-specific projects, need formal agreements between the relevant local agencies and other actors in which each actor's role is defined and contained. And thirdly, they point out that local authorities need to develop and apply more effective and transparent supervision methods in order to ensure that local development activities carried out by LGN actors are as per the agreements and standards set. Local leadership plays key roles in implementing each agreement. Hence, strong and legitimate local leadership is crucial for an LGN's effective management and coordination (Haus and Heinelt, 2005).

2.6.6 LGN learning

'Learning can be described as a process in which an actor feels the need to gather and interpret information in order to improve his activities and to improve the knowledge on which these activities are based' (van den Dool, 2003:38). Network learning is not a formal way of learning. It is a social learning with members learning what to do and how to do it through a shared experience of what is good, what works, what is possible, and what the limits of action are. Members generally learn whether a network implements development activities more effectively than when this is done individually, how best to deal with constraints and external forces while working in a network and the like. In addition, more concrete learning effects are observed, such as the better utilization of resources, better lobbying methods, better and participatory decision-making procedures, civic mindedness and democratic thinking (Karl, 1999b). Network members learn these important lessons through voluntary interactions that provide them with a way to adapt to the characteristics of the complex network in which they operate (van den Dool, 2003).

Networks can be regarded as laboratories or sites of exploration, since they are made up of different management styles and social experiences. Effective networks depend largely on dialogue and open negotiations rather than on formal reports and are a place where learning can be tested, digested and exchanged between participants. An effective network is based on the fact that the different participants' knowledge is valued so that instead of power strug-

gles occurring with regard to the superiority of one participant's knowledge and experience, the network focuses on hearing and learning from different participants. The range of expertise that different actors possess should therefore be put to constructive use. Instead of rushing to find solutions, time should be taken to understand and analyse problems, to combine interventions and to understand how and why things happen. Networks could then build up a shared body of knowledge through analysis and discussion, instead of replaying old territorial arguments. In such a process, a network can emerge as a place where multi-organizational interactive learning takes place (Goss, 2001).

LGN learning happens when managers of different organizations, politicians, and citizens meet to decide on how to carry out the collective activities necessary for local development. A network can benefit much from various actors' experiences and management traditions. But, it can be painful to unite different experiences, organizational cultures and pools of knowledge into one common objective, as it actually requires a new way of management. Hence, in building an LGN, the participating agencies and individuals should be capable of learning across boundaries (Goss, 2001).

There are different ways in which network members learn from each other. According to Engel (1993) and Wolday (2000), working and experimenting together, developing work methods and manuals; attending a course, seminar, conference, or workshop as well as experience sharing and exchange visits are among the most important ways of learning.

Network learning is so effective because different institutional actors contribute different skills, experiences and management systems. This helps each actor to gain a broader understanding of network activities as well as of its private affairs and how a society's entire socio-economic system operates, rather than being confined to its own area of operation. Since network members try to carry out jointly established objective(s), they do not only learn from other members' experiences, but also from the network's experiences. They learn through learning by doing, which, in essence, helps them to learn from the success and failure stories of network activities.

The whole process of network learning underscores the complementarity and mutually supportive relations between public, private, and civil society actors, which is the primary focus of the new local governance system. Different actors' knowledge and information inputs complement each other and drive a more effective development and delivery of local services. The principle of complementarity suggests that no one actor possesses all the knowledge and information required to provide better services to the local people. At best, different actors possess one or more resources that complement those of others and result in greater output of public services than individual actors could hope to achieve. For example, an effective state could complement the efforts of civil societies, private actors and communities by creating a rule-governed environ-

ment where legal norms such as freedom of assembly and association are ensured and allow various actors to unite (Evans, 1997).

2.6.7 Synthesizing the features and challenges of an LGN

The growing need for collaborative and joint actions to address complex and deep-rooted local development problems has made the LGN approach attractive. However, the benefits of an LGN approach do not simply mature because different actors unite. Its success depends on certain important features that it has to possess as well as on its capacity to overcome challenges.

Features of effective networks

Experience suggests that effective networks have important features that enable them to smoothly interact, collaborate and cooperate. The following are among most important ones (Devas, 2004; Goss, 2001; Haverkort et al., 1993:16-17; Starkey, 1998:31-46):

- Clear and shared objectives that determine the network's direction and core activities.
- A committed core group who will take the initiative and be responsible for coordination, management and logistics. Core groups need to be, and remain, representative of network members when carrying out their activities. They must regularly interact with the members to keep up with their ideas and changing needs.
- A sense of belonging and openness between members. Decision-making processes, the choice of network activities and their means of implementation need to be democratic, and allow the members to feel that they can influence events.
- Network leaders and core groups' trustworthiness and legitimacy. Members support a network and its leadership's further activities when they accept the leaders and core groups as legitimate and trust them. They must be regarded as legitimate within the social and political environment in which a network operates.
- Complementarity and linkages. Successful networks do not limit their activities to their own boundary; they seek complementarity and linkages with other networks that may be tackling similar problems in different ways. Creating a culture of cross-boundary efforts promotes sharing of experiences and learning that contribute to the understanding of various societal problems.
- Beneficiary involvement. A network that was established to promote sustainable local development and to improve local people's lives needs to make an effort to encourage beneficiary participation in network decision-making processes.

- Effective networks meet regularly and organize other forums to discuss and evaluate past performances and to identify opportunities and challenges for future activities. Regular meetings and other dialogue forms improve the quality of the interactions and reciprocated communications between members. They also establish and promote a system of learning and experience sharing between members.

Challenges and problems of networks

Networking is powerful, but not easy. Networks and networking organizations face many challenges in their endeavour to use this potentially empowering means of working together to achieve common goals more effectively. Not all succeed in achieving what they want to achieve. Knowing these problems is as valid as knowing the features of an effective network. Some of the major challenges and pitfalls facing networks have been identified as follows (Haverkort et al., 1993; Karl, 1999a:25, 51-54; Starkey, 1998: 21-30):

- Finding the most appropriate structure. Networks must find a structure that is most appropriate for their specific activities. It is often a challenge to find the right balance between a structure that is too loose and one that is too formal and bureaucratic. All members would like to consciously avoid the hierarchical and formal bureaucratic structures found in traditional organizations. However, many networks tend to move towards centralization because a coordinator, secretariat, steering committee, and/or a board may try to control and run the network for its own sake, rather than to coordinate and facilitate its members' activities.
- Ensuring participation and accountability. Participation is the essence of a network. In networking, no one is forced to participate, but its structure encourages members to participate freely and in such a way that those who are most active usually have most influence on the decision-making regarding the networking direction and activities. But this freedom and flexibility present challenges in terms of accountability with regard to the results achieved by the network.
- Preventing or resolving conflicts of interest between participants. Although networks stimulate dialogue between different actors that are possibly from different sectors of the society, it is equally challenging to network coordinators to prevent or resolve conflicts that emanate in the course of dialogue.
- Competition. Networks face challenges from other institutions working on similar or closely related issues as they are considered competitors with regard to recognition and opportunities.
- Membership disparity. Although a small membership is not recommended, networks with a wide range of members may experience difficulties with balancing their involvement. If a network is made up of different organizations

with different capacities – large versus small, resource-rich versus poor etc. – hierarchical differences may hamper its performance. Large and resource-rich agencies tend to dominate smaller and poor organizations.

- Political constraints. LGNs have to operate in a given local government's political reality. Unstable or repressive leaderships are not uncommon in many developing countries, which hamper emergence and functioning of LGNs. Moreover, networks are formed to provide services as well as to influence service delivery policies, but local and supra-local authorities do not tolerate criticism and make it difficult for networks to advocate alternative policies in respect of improving service delivery.

2.7 Conclusion: Towards a Framework of Analysis

This chapter has shown that discussions on decentralization are no longer confined to the public sector. It has become a local governance issue rather than an LG issue with local socio-economic and political processes being influenced by various societal actors. Local public service production and delivery are no longer perceived as only the public sector's responsibilities. Non-state actors such as NGOs, CBOs, donor agencies, private enterprises, and communities, with which decentralization and local government researchers were not concerned, have emerged to play important roles. They participate directly in local socio-economic decision-making and the production and delivery of public services to the local people. Hence, local development depends on multiple actors from multiple sectors of society's involvement and contributions (Goss, 2001; Helmsing, 2001; McCarney, 1996; UNDP, 1996). The involvement of these multiple actors and the complex nature of local development problems require efforts and resources to be mobilized and coordinated rather than to address them individually. This gave rise to the emergence and development of the LGN approach, which this study adopted as an analysis framework to examine local service development and delivery in the case study *woredas*.

The LGN approach examines decentralized local governance structures in terms of organizational and institutional roles, whether state or non-state, i.e. those engaged in public sector tasks by promoting local development and improving the life of local people. In carrying out public responsibilities, institutional pluralism and allocative decision-making authority are at the centre of the LGN approach. Tasks and roles are shared between different actors in the production and delivery of public services (Cohen and Peterson, 1997). However, the LGN framework examines the roles and participation of various actors from two important sides of governance: the demand and supply sides. On the demand side, issues focus on how LGs and their agencies, civil society actors, donor agencies, private enterprises and communities are empowered by and participate in local policy formulation, need identification, preference and prior-

ity setting. On the supply side, the management of programmes and policies concerned with resource mobilization and development, programme implementation and production and the provision of public services at the local level are important issues of concern. Sound local governance reform should support both sides so as to maximize the development potentials of the various actors engaged in addressing local development challenges.

An LGN's emergence and effective functioning, on which improvement in local service development and delivery depends, is dependent on three factors: a regional enabling environment, LG leadership capacity and response, and non-state actors and local people's response (see Figure 2.1). Of course, the general socio-economic and political setting in which regional and local governments, private enterprises, civil society actors, donor agencies, and communities operate, is determined by the central government. Fundamental changes towards democratic governance have to be entrenched in constitutional and other national policy frameworks. For example, legal norms such as freedom of association and collective action need a constitutional basis, which is crucial for individuals and organizations to unite in order to address societal problems (Evans, 1997). Moreover, the nature of the relationships between the central political system and regional/local political situations will affect an LGN. For example, the degree to which the local population affiliates with and relates to the central political processes may vary considerably between regions and this may promote or hinder interaction and cooperation between the people and the local leadership (van Ufford, 1987).

In this study, the regional government's enabling role deals with creating socio-political conditions in which state and non-state agencies and communities can freely and voluntarily unite, interact and collaborate to produce and deliver public services. The regional government has to devolve decision-making authority to LGs and other development actors for them to decide on local development needs and priorities, to plan, allocate resources and implement programmes. This involves the establishment of a local governance structure run by a democratically elected and legitimate local leadership in which citizens have confidence and trust. Without legitimacy, the regional government cannot voluntarily secure trust and support, or policy objectives' political justifiability and enforceability (Haus and Heinelt, 2005). An important question in the legitimacy and trust arena concerns a regional political authority's representativeness in carrying out social, economic and political objectives. Who does

Figure 2.1
Analytical Framework



Source: Author's own construct

the regional authority represent? Do people accept the regional authority's claim and associate themselves with it? These and other questions are important (Boisier, 1983). The regional government needs to create a political environment in which the local people have a sense of belongings and trust in all socio-economic and political processes. It has to encourage and support communities to organize themselves, demand their rights and negotiate their interests with state and non-state actors. The regional government needs to facilitate and support the formation of network structures – differing from the bureaucratic hierarchies – between various autonomous actors through which they can unite and decide on local development's common objectives. This promotes interactions and collaborations between multiple actors and also helps to leverage and ameliorate local government capacity problems to identify needs and priorities, plan, implement, and evaluate development activities.

Although LGs are no longer in the driving seat, they are the principal LGN actors. They have a number of roles to play. Hence, local governments' response, which refers to their capacity and commitment to absorb and utilize enabling conditions created by the regional government, is so crucial for a successful LGN's emergence and functioning. As decentralized and lower level state systems, they represent as well as play the state's role (Helmsing, 2000, 2001; Mathur, 1999). They link state actors with non-state ones at the local level so that a multi-actor LGN can be established. LGs have to invest time and energy to enable state and non-state actors and local people to join together and participate in public service production and delivery. Their enabling roles include, among others (Goss, 2001; Helmsing, 2000; IOG and York University, 1999; UNDP, 1997b):

- Initiating communication with and seeking support from potential development actors;
- Enabling and supporting self-initiatives, self-management and a sense of self-reliance among community members;
- Setting frameworks and mechanisms for participatory decision-making to involve local development partners in need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, and evaluation processes;
- Leading negotiations between various actors about desired local outcomes through dialogue rather than through bureaucratic mechanisms; and
- Stimulating and promoting experience sharing and learning processes between local actors through meetings, workshops, and discussion fora.

Generally, LGs need to play the role of facilitator and catalyst force in the processes of coordinating and regulating efforts and resources both horizontally and vertically. They have to build relationships, promote and facilitate in-

teractions, collaborations and cooperation between multiple actors so that they can contribute most effectively to local development.

It should, however, be noted that the devolution of decision-making authority and other enabling conditions may not guarantee an LGN's emergence and effective functioning unless LGs make use of them. Local leaders need to effectively absorb these opportunities and create conditions for other actors to operate at the local level. LG's effectiveness and success in carrying out enabling roles depend on its leadership capacity. Leaders need to have vision and think strategically, require skill, commitment, and motivation. Local leaders' capacity to encourage and convince actors to work together as well as their skills in guiding interest articulation, negotiations and dialogue fora are crucial factors for an LGN's emergence and functioning (Rao, 1994; Rhodes, 1999). However, not all leaders undertake these functions equally well; some leaders are extremely adept at and efficient in executing their functions and exploiting opportunities, while others aren't, because local leadership is a function of a socio-political setting and leaders' personal characteristics. The socio-political processes and the resultant local leadership are greatly influenced by several contextual factors such as the political background (history), the nature of the state-society relations, the legitimacy of the local and supra-local political system, and the power that local leaders have within a political system and their connection with a political party. Personal capabilities and commitment to enact roles are other important factors. Leaders differ in these with regard to looking for alternative sources and mechanisms to mobilize resources for local development. They also differ in their personal charisma and other virtues like persuasiveness, decisiveness and strategic thinking, which are all vital for an LGN to emerge and function (Haus et al., 2005; Haus and Heinelt, 2005; van Ufford, 1987).

Non-state organizations such as NGOs, CBOs, donor agencies, associations and private organizations and the local people are important actors in a multi-actor and multi-sector LGN's emergence and functioning. They have to unite and act together to participate in service production and delivery identified by government as well as to be involved in preference and priority setting, planning and resource allocation, implementation, and evaluation processes that help to reflect the people's interests.

NGOs (international, national and regional/local), CBOs, associations, and donor agencies have constructive impacts on localities' socio-political and economic life. They are instruments that can motivate and empower local people to participate actively and voluntarily in local decisions and activities. Politically, they help to foster fairer, transparent, democratic and accountable local governance that is more tolerant of diversity and pluralism. On an LGN's demand side, they play significant roles in lobbying, advocating, and representing issues to promote poor and marginalized groups' interests. On the supply side, they play significant roles in improving local service development and delivery by

introducing new work methods, training local authorities and technical staff, and mobilizing financial and material resources. Non-state actors are double-edged cutting tools in the local governance process. They represent and reflect the public interest in their negations with government bodies and try to influence decisions towards fulfilling the public interest. In doing so, they help to strengthen state legitimacy by improving the relations and trust between public officials and ordinary citizens (Azfar et al, 1999). They also promote state legitimacy and trust by helping local governments to produce and provide better services.

However, non-state actors' roles and impacts on an LGN's emergence and effective functioning depend, among others, on:

- The number and diversity of these actors present and engaged in local socio-economic activities;
- Their capacities and commitment to complementing LG efforts in the production and delivery of public services through the financial support and training of local officials and civil servants;
- The actors' objectives, capacities and commitment to participating in local policy formulation, preference and priority setting as well as the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public programmes;
- The actors' capacity, interest in and commitment to joining and working together towards common ends as well as to establishing alternative venues for participation that complement formal local governance structures and channels of communication; and
- The efforts and strategies adopted to promote the flow of information and learning between multiple actors.

While civil society actors (CBOs, NGOs and associations) play crucial roles in LGNs' emergence and development for the purpose of better service production and delivery, they need to be autonomous from state influence with regard to policy formulation, planning, resource allocation and implementation processes (Rohdes, 1997). However, their relationships with the state are not without tensions. While governments in developing countries are developing a greater interest in civil societies with regard to undertaking service production and delivery activities (the supply side of governance), on the demand side, such as policy-making and political empowerment issues, they provide little room for this. Countries, particularly those under a dominant party rule, have very little room for civil society actors to influence policy-making and political issues. In fact, in these countries, civil society actors that challenge governments face strict measures, including closure and deregistration (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). This reaction stifles civil society actors' interest in and commitment to engaging in advocacy and empowerment arenas, which in turn affects the development of democratic local governance.

The local people's response to governance reforms and processes is crucial as sustainable change depends on it. Nevertheless, not all people in all localities respond in a similar way to changes in the local governance system or make use of it. The benefits of a decentralized local governance system can be materialized if the local people are equally ready to participate and set their own objectives with the help of organized state and non-state actors. The local people's willingness to participate, their enthusiasm for more space in decision-making and their understanding of the general changes in the local governance system are important factors with regard to an LGN's emergence and functioning. Local people should therefore voluntarily participate and work together with various state and non-state actors and contribute labour, material and financial resources to improve services.

Such collaborative and cooperative responses in respect of effective collective action through an LGN are, however, affected by different factors, including among others:

- The legitimacy of and trust in the political leadership. The introduction of a new governance policy should reflect popular interest, which will ensure the political leadership's legitimacy and trust in it. A leadership that lacks this encounters difficulty in mobilizing people for local development. People are interested in and committed to participation if they have trust in the leadership that it promotes their interests through envisaged plans. This forms the basis for cooperation and collective action between communities and the local leadership.
- Effective participatory structures. Democratic principles without well-established structures cannot achieve participation. LGs need to establish structures that directly involve local people and allow them to freely express their preferences and the perceived problems with regard to public service production and delivery. If the groups to be mobilized consider the structures at their disposal to be non-representative, this hardly generates interest-based and voluntary participation. Dialogue not coercion is required in pursuit of common objectives. In this respect, organized and strong participatory structures play significant roles in promoting the local people's participation, while the lack thereof often impedes it. Strong CBOs serve as checking mechanisms of government actions and enforce leaders' compliance with the wishes of citizens.
- Access to structures and the effects of previous participation. Who has access to existing mechanisms? Whose voice eventually influences decisions? Whose interests are eventually served? These are all important questions with regard to interest-based and active community participation. Sometimes, existing mechanisms are limited to prominent supporters of an LG and political system rather than to their critics. Moreover, a given community may not have opportunities for and experiences of direct participation, which impedes efforts

to utilize current opportunities. Communities with some history of participation through CBOs exert more effort in getting their voice heard in government decisions in respect of their interests.

- Acceptable local public works. Obstacles to popular participation are not limited to access to participatory structures and past experiences, but to future expectations as well. The extent to which people are willing to contribute their time, labour and other resources to local development projects does not only depend on favourable participatory working arrangements and mechanisms, but also on their trust in and perception of the LG's commitment to development activities that will benefit them.

In a nutshell, different actors play different but interrelated roles in an LGN's emergence and functioning. Local leaders need to invest in creating conditions for interaction by building ties with communities and other actors that are interested in supporting local development. However, it is equally imperative to ensure complementarity and synergetic actions in local development that are not only dependent on an LG investing and working towards networking, but also all on pro-growth forces forming coalitions with similar forces in general and with communities in particular. Communities need to actively take part in their own development and demonstrate to other actors that they are strong partners. The combination of strong LGs and organized communities motivates other actors to support development endeavours. If dedicated, NGOs, CBOs and donor agencies also need to look for and establish inter-organizational networks with all pro-development forces that can help to fuel the political and administrative engines of development at the local level (Evans, 1997).

3 Local Government and Governance in Ethiopia: Looking Back into the Present

3.1 Introduction

Ethiopia has a long history as a sovereign state apart from a brief occupation by Fascist Italy (1936-1941). Despite its long history, it never evolved into a strong, unified modern state until the 1890s (Asmelash, 2000; Fenta 1998; Meheret, 1997). Throughout its long history, centrifugal forces nurtured, among others, by ethnicity, geography and religion posed a serious challenge to the emergence of a unified, modern state (Clapham, 1969; Cohen, 1974).

The notion of establishing a unified modern state dates back to the attempts of Emperor Tewodros II, who came to power in 1855. His successor, Emperor Yohannes IV who assumed power in 1872, continued the unification process, but this was not yet completed when he died in 1889. Emperor Menelik II came to power in 1889 and completed the unification project that lead to the country's current geographical outline. He was also the first to introduce and lay the foundation of modern state administration (Meheret, 1997).

The unification process was carried out through a series of campaigns that involved conquering and expanding territory to the present eastern, southern and southwestern parts of the country. Most of the nationalities and peoples were conquered after offering strong resistance during which they suffered greatly from the central and northern highlanders' expansionist forces (Adhana, 1994; Merera, 2002; Schwab, 1972).

After Menelik, Emperor Haile Selassie I consolidated his centralization and absolute monarchical power through constitutional mechanisms. The emperor encouraged homogeneity by imposing the language (Amharic), values, culture, and religion of the *Semites*[1] rather than allowing the various nationalities self-administration. As a result, the conquered and incorporated nationalities have always understood the art of 'nation-building' as an exercise in centralized, autocratic rule by the Amharic- and *Tigrigna*-speaking peoples, who are conveniently lumped together as '*Abyssinians*'[2]. In spite of the Amharas and Tigrayans' rivalry for hegemony, they have generally formed the core of the modern political power and state administration (Clapham, 1994; Meheret, 1997; Pausewang,

1997;). The current political events in Ethiopia are strongly related to these historical political events (Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995).

This chapter is divided into four major sections. Section one deals with local government and governance systems in pre-1991 constitutional Ethiopia. This section facilitates an understanding of the politico-administrative background on which the post-1991 reforms are based and the extent to which it influenced the reform processes. Section two covers the political and governance reforms in post-1991 Ethiopia in general and their implications for local governance in particular. Section three deals with the Tigray and Amhara regions' socio-economic backgrounds, political history and processes as well as the post-1991 local governments' structure and functions. Section four presents a brief description of the four case study *woredas*.

3.2 Local Government and Governance in Pre-1991 Constitutional Ethiopia: an Overview

Compared to Ethiopia's long history, modern statehood and administration are recent phenomena (Meheret, 1997). Emperor Haile Selassie provided the first constitution in 1931 and revised it in 1955. Both the original and the Revised Constitutions were monarchical constitutions and were said to be 'gifts' to the people. In his speech on presenting the constitutions, the emperor, using the royal 'we', said that the constitutions had been granted 'unasked and of Our Own will'. They were indeed 'gifts' as they had not been drafted by a constitutional assembly, nor had a constitutional referendum been conducted (Brietzke, 1995; Markakis and Asmelash, 1974; Seyoum, 1974). The *Derg* drafted the third constitution in 1987 and this was said to have been approved by 81 percent of registered voters during a 'constitutional referendum' (Marcus, 2002).

3.2.1 The Haile Selassie I period (1931-1974)

Haile Selassie's long regime is known for modernizing the state administration and expanding the infrastructure. However, these efforts were mainly aimed at controlling the regional and ethnic forces instead of promoting and building a democratic culture and LGs (Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995). Haile Selassie traced his ancestry and related himself to a traditional Solomonic dynasty that promoted personal, non-transferable, and total authority and was believed to have been divinely founded (Cohen, 1974; Daniel, 1994).

The 1931 and Revised Constitutions were basically designed to play a key role in establishing a legal framework that virtually excluded regional nobles and local chiefs from any political position not directly derived from the throne (Cohen, 1974; Cohen and Kohen, 1980; Markakis and Asmelash, 1974). In both constitutions, sovereignty and supreme authority were vested in the emperor. He had absolute power regarding the creation of administrative organs and

structures, promulgation of administrative ordinances and regulations, and the appointment and dismissal of ministers, as well as provincial and local governors (Seyoum, 1974). This resulted in the creation of extremely deconcentrated provincial and local government administrations characterized by long chains of command and hierarchical power that were aimed at enforcing law, order and taxation without a commensurate concern for local public interests and service deliveries (Cohen, 1974; Cohen and Kohen, 1980).

Before World War II, the unitary Imperial government divided the Empire into three-tier administrative divisions, i.e. the *ghizat* or administrative regions, *awraja,* and *woreda*. The upper tier consisted of 32 *ghizats* or administrative regions; but there is no clarity regarding the number of *awrajas* and *woredas*. After World War II, the emperor introduced four-tier administrative divisions, which included the *teklay ghizat* or a province, *awraja*, *woreda*, and *mikitil woreda* (Daniel, 1994). After Eritrea united with Ethiopia in 1962, there were 14 *teklay ghizats*. However, reports are not consistent with regard to the number of *awraja*, *woreda* and *mikitil woreda* subdivisions. Daniel (1994), for example, stated that in the mid-1960s, there were 99 *awrajas,* 444 *woredas* and 1,328 *mikitil woredas*. Based on a credible source, Cohen and Kohen (1980), on the other hand, stated that in 1968 there were 103 *awrajas*, 505 *woredas* and 449 *mikitil woredas* under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Interior (MoI).

A *teklay ghizat* or provincial administration was usually governed by what was called a 'governor-general'. Appointed by the emperor, the governor-general was an agent of the monarch and, as such, did not challenge his sovereignty. He could be counted on to control the ethnic and regional forces that opposed central domination. Because the emperor picked his key appointees from among the central and northern highlanders (mainly Amhara), most of them, particularly in the southern provinces, did not come from their assigned areas. The governor-general was granted broad powers of administrative control over all affairs in the province. His priority included: maintaining law, order and security; running a proper judicial administration, and ensuring proper tax collection in the province through sub-province administrations. The governor also had to supervise the deconcentrated ministerial agencies that operated within the province (Cohen, 1974; Cohen and Kohen, 1980).

An *Awraja* was the second administrative hierarchy governed by the appointed governor. In many cases, the emperor appointed governors for the *awraja* through the MoI. Sometimes, however, the provincial governor could nominate or appoint someone, contingent on the emperor's approval. Unlike with the provincial governor, local nobles could request the appointment of native sons from among families with an established traditional power base. However, strong politicians at the centre frequently opposed these local nobles' requests, particularly in the southern provinces, so as to appoint their followers. In conducting his duties, the *awraja* governor was responsible and accountable

to the provincial governor. In his jurisdiction, the *awraja* governor's duties and responsibilities were similar to those of the provincial governor (Cohen, 1974; Cohen and Kohen, 1980).

The *woreda* office was an extension of higher-level administrative hierarchies. It was administered by the *woreda* governor who, in principle, had to be appointed by the emperor but was nominated by the provincial governor who, in turn, would learn of the candidate from the *awraja* governor. He might or might not be from among local men. The *woreda* governor, assisted by a principal secretary and no more than five employees, was, among others, responsible for enforcing law and order, ensuring tax collection and other dues and supervising the ministries' field offices. The *woreda* governor was always accountable to the *awraja* governor (Cohen, 1974; Cohen and Kohen, 1980).

Mikitil woreda, introduced in 1942, represented the lowest formal government structure to which local people had immediate access regarding complaints and other administrative issues. Unfortunately, however, the Imperial government gradually abolished this structure without any legal or political justification. By the late 1960s, this structure no longer existed in the then provinces of Tigre, Keffa, Arusi, and Bale (Cohen, 1974; Cohen and Kohen, 1980; Daniel, 1994).

In addition to formal structures, the Imperial government established a system of informal grassroots local administration at village level. The local official at this level had the title[3] of *Chika Shum* or village chief. He was responsible for a village or group of villages. The *Chika Shum* was appointed by the provincial governor and was based on this person's continuous contact with the regional hereditary element, i.e. he had to be from the local hereditary nobles. While appointments in the south could be for life, in the north, they rotated yearly amongst the leading men of the few families whose prestige was derived from being descendants of the group's founding family. The *Chika Shum* was indispensable to the government in extending its writ into the rural community. He established the link between formal local government officials and the local community. Generally, he served as an area spokesman in passing information from and to the local and provincial governors. Under the control of a *woreda* governor, he ensured that people paid their tithe and taxes as well as their dues in kind and labour to the appropriate authorities. He was the village judge to whom litigants would first apply. With the assistance of a police force assigned by a *woreda* governor at his request, he also maintained law and order (Cohen, 1974; Edward and Howard, 1955; Perham, 1969). Adhana (1994) argued that this level of administration was an instrument designed by the Imperial regime to ensure highly centralized political and administrative control over the local people's day-to-day affairs.

This systematic control, the ever-centralizing measures, and increasing economic exploitation through taxes and other dues resulted in popular resistance

in different parts of the country. In 1943, the Tigray people, who already felt marginalized by their rival Amhara group, revolted against a tax increment and the appointment of non-Tigrayans at different levels in the provincial administration and courts. The Imperial government harshly suppressed the resistance. Since the 1940s, Gojam, Bale and Gonder provinces had also been the scene of resistance that the Imperial government had suppressed (Keller, 1988; Meheret, 1997).

Not only the peasants, but also the army started to challenge the monolithic and absolute power of the emperor. The unsuccessful army coup of 1960 was the result of resentment that did not achieve much but at least helped to politicise the army. In response to this, the Haile Selassie regime promised land reform, community development programmes and the expansion of modern services such as health and education. The emperor kept some of his promises with regard to service expansion; but these measures were too little to satisfy the progressive, western-educated elites and other sections of the population exhausted by economic exploitation and political centralization. The demand for land reform grew louder in every corner of the country. Demands for radical local government and governance reforms that would provide self-governance to the various nationalities were forwarded to the absolute monarchical system (Asmelash, 2000; Fenta, 1998; Meheret, 1997).

In response, the government took the first initiative towards decentralization by introducing the *Awraja* Local Self-Administration Order No. 43 of 1966, which was supposed to be implemented in 50 *awrajas* drawn from the 14 provinces of the country (Cohen, 1974; Kohen, 1974; Meheret, 2002). The Parliament, however, resisted this change, reflecting the emperor's unwillingness, as he had a veto right over the Parliament. The MoI urged and obtained the Parliament's approval to implement a pilot programme in 17 *awrajas*. Pilot *awrajas* had 'development and administrative councils' consisting of representatives elected from districts/*woredas* under each *awraja* (Keller, 1988). However, the council was nominal in the sense that Order No. 43 of 1966 restricted its function to a mere advisory service, and it was primarily accountable to the MoI and the provincial governor rather than to the electorate. The *awraja* administrators, the most influential decision-makers at this level, were appointed by the central government. Moreover, the *awraja* administration had limited authority to raise revenue as the *Awraja* revenue bill had been rejected by the Parliament. The policy was thus a typical administrative measure rather than a serious decentralization experiment aimed at promoting local self-administration and democracy. In fact, the Imperial government's lack of commitment to real change was evident when it once again made the pilot *awrajas* a deconcentrated administrative system (Cohen, 1974; Meheret, 1997, 2002).

The Imperial government's reluctance to introduce local-self administration, and its repressive measures against popular demands for land reform, resulted

in civil unrest that ultimately gave rise to the 1974 popular revolution that overthrew the absolute monarch's 43-year rule.

3.2.2 The *Dreg* period (1974–1991)

Although the 1974 revolution involved all sectors of the society, it was hijacked by the military that immediately established what it called a 'Provisional Military Administrative Committee' or '*Derg*' (Daniel, 1994; Meheret, 1997).

The *Derg* government did not introduce new structures and system of governance except at the grassroots level. It quickly changed the name of the first order administrative structure from *teklay ghizat* to *kifle hager* ('*administrative region')*. In an attempt to show its move away from a regional ruler, it changed the title of this level of administration's heads from 'governor-general' to 'chief administrator' – in practice, military men under the *Derg's* direct supervision. The *Derg* simultaneously changed the composition of the *awraja* and *woreda* administrative leaders. It removed *awraja* and *woreda* governors appointed by the emperor and replaced them with military men and high school graduates who supported its socialist objectives (Cohen and Kohen, 1980; Daniel, 1994; Meheret, 1997).

After it had established full control over all levels of the country's administrative structures, the *Derg* maintained that it aimed at self-administration that would address the long-standing questions of nationalities. This was reflected in its 'National Democratic Revolution Programme' issued in 1976 (Asmelash, 2000; Pausewang, 1997). The Programme, as quoted by Daniel (1994:102), stated that: 'The right to self-administration of all nationalities will be recognized and fully respected. No nationality will dominate another one […] Given Ethiopia's existing situation, the problem of nationalities can be resolved if each nationality is accorded full right to self-government. This means that each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs.'

These promises never materialized, as the *Derg* opted for heavy centralization in its attempt to control and eliminate all political opponents. A number of urban-based opposition parties[4] emerged and challenged the *Derg,* but it responded harshly and crushed all resistance in a campaign called the 'Red Terror'.[5] As a result, an ethnic-based armed struggle commenced in many parts of the country, besides Eritrea, notably in Tigray, Oromia, Somali, and Afar. The *Derg* therefore reacted with military force rather than introducing the promised regional self-administration (Cohen and Kohen, 1980; Meheret, 1997).

The *Derg* introduced grassroots-elected local government structures in both rural and urban areas although these had only a short-lived success. The *Derg* realized that it had to win the support of the peasants and urban dwellers in order to make its lack of political legitimacy more acceptable (Meheret, 2002; Pausewang, 1994).

On 4 March 1975 the *Derg* issued Proclamation No. 31/1975 'A Proclamation to provide for the Public Ownership of Rural Land[6]'. This Proclamation provided for the establishment of 'Peasant Associations (PAs)' with a broad decision-making authority and responsibilities that included, among others: implementing land redistribution, adjudicating land and other disputes; and the construction of schools, rural roads and clinics. The rural population's response to these opportunities to participate in political power at the local level proved to be enthusiastic and 'revolutionary' compared to this group's historical social and political marginalisation by the Imperial government's local administrations (Cohen and Kohen, 1980; Marcus, 2002; Pausewang, 1994,1997).

The *Derg* government also established the 'Urban Dweller's Association (UDAs)' through Proclamation No. 47/1975. UDAs were given responsibility for the administration of municipalities and other urban centres. They had to provide the residents in their jurisdictions with all social and economic services through the residents' direct participation. Both PAs and UDAs were responsible for ensuring internal security through local militiamen (Fenta, 1993, Yigremew, 2001).

Indeed, before the *Derg* changed the PAs and UDAs into instruments of central control, they genuinely represented their members' interests (Pausewang et al., 2002a). Notwithstanding the PAs and UDAs' initial objectives, from 1977 onward, the government progressively centralized and changed them into simple lowest administrative units. Because of the growing resistance to the military government, these structures were infiltrated by political cadres and became functional tools of government while their original functions of nurturing local discussions and participation became rare phenomena. Between 1975-1977, PA and UDA officials were nominated and elected by each locality's general assembly. Later, however, the nomination and election of candidates were decided by higher officials with the public being assembled to hear the announcement rather than to elect. These local units did not only cease to be centres of local self-administration through popular participation, but turned into the government's most important tools to recruit military trainees and terrorize the broad mass of citizens (Pausewang, 1994; Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995).

The *Derg* consequently established an authoritarian state that hardly left any space for participatory governance and development. In 1984, the 'Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE)' was established, which effectively transformed the *Derg's* collective leadership into a one-man dictatorship under Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. This monopoly of power and repressive measures further intensified resistance across the country instead of promoting peace and stability. Although the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) were the main and best-organized challengers, numerous ethnic-based liberation movements showed their determination to fight the *Derg* (Meheret, 1997). The Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement

(EPDM) was another important multi-national political organization that, together with the TPLF, ensured that the *Derg* was continuously under pressure.

When the armed liberation movements stretched the government's force and its military and economic capacity was unable to bear the burden of a prolonged civil war, it introduced a transition from military rule to a one-party, WPE-led civil government. The *Derg* drafted a constitution 'approved through public referendum' that allowed Ethiopians in each constituency of the *Shengo* or 'parliament' to choose from among three carefully selected WPE candidates. In September 1987, the old military government was dissolved and the National *Shengo* declared the founding of the 'People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE)' (Asmelash, 2000; Marcus, 2002; Meheret, 1997). The PDRE picked up the nationality and self-administration issues that the *Derg* had abandoned ten years earlier. Through Proclamation No. 14/1987, the PDRE established 5 'Autonomous Regions7' and 24 'Administrative Regions' as first-order administrative subdivisions within a unitary structure. Autonomous and administrative regions were subdivided into 354 *awrajas*, while the *woreda* structure was abandoned in the administrative system. Without financial and human resources, PAs were supposed to take on the role of the former *woredas*. Moreover, the reform did not address the question of self-administration and local democracy, but wished to systematically undermine the struggle for self-determination. This was clear, as the provinces given autonomous status included the most unstable regions viz. Eritrea, Tigray, Asseb, Dire Dawa and Ogaden (Daniel, 1994; Fenta, 1993; Meheret, 2002).

Besides the new structure's nominal nature, the abolishment of the *woreda* structure was the new administrative reform's major weakness. Mulatu (1990) stated that the abolishment of the *woreda* structure in the absence of a viable administrative structure at the community level meant that the government was out of touch with local matters. He further argued that the government was not only structurally but also physically too far from the people as evidenced by the fact that people in some *awrajas* were required to travel three days to the *awraja* centre to obtain administrative services.

Generally, in terms of local governance, the new administrative system exacerbated the situation instead of improving it. It neither in principle nor in practice addressed local self-administration but merely reflected the reality that the government had no idea of how to respond to the civil war and the demand for local self-administration. In fact, the regime degenerated into a military Stalinist state in which command, which originated from only one person, was executed along the party structure's long chain that extended to the PAs and UDAs and hardly dented the popular resistance and liberation movements (Meheret, 1997).

3.3 Political Change and Governance Reform in Post-1991 Ethiopia

Although the *Derg* government tried to mobilize retired soldiers, civil servants, and university and college students to prevent the fast moving Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) force, it became clear to Mengistu that the problem was not mainly a lack of military force, but a total rejection of the regime because of its 17-year long misdeeds against individuals, groups and nationalities. Mengistu consequently fled the country on 21 May 1991, and the regime collapsed.

3.3.1 Panorama of the political change and governance reform

On 28 May 1991, the EPRDF[8] captured Addis Ababa and took over power from the defunct regime. The EPRDF declared that its principal political agenda was to create broad and pluralistic democratic conditions that would bring about an all-inclusive state-nation in which unity would be achieved through diversity rather than through homogeneity (Adhana, 1994). Since that day, changes in the political and economic arenas have taken place in a way that differs greatly from those during the Imperial and *Derg* regimes. The EPRDF initiated and organized the national 'Peace and Democratic Conference' held in Addis Ababa from 1-5 July 1991, which deliberated and adopted a National Charter for the transitional period. The Charter declared a new era of hope for peaceful and democratic cooperation among the different groups in Ethiopia. It included the most important elements of democracy, among which: encouraging and supporting the emergence of a free press, freedom of expression and association, political pluralism, equal rights, legal security, protection of human rights, and the rights of nations and nationalities and peoples to self-determination[9] (Cohen, 1995; Fasil, 1997; Pausewang, 1997).

Based on this Charter, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was established on 22 July 1991 for a two-year period, which was actually extended until 21 August 1995. The TGE was made up of a multinational council (the Council of Representatives) in which the EPRDF coalition and affiliates constituted the majority (Fasil, 1997; Marcus, 2002; Young, 1998). The movement towards the introduction of new governance structures and systems started when the TGE issued Proclamation No. 7/1992 that provided for the establishment of 13 ethnically defined self-governing regions and one urban centre: Addis Ababa. Different groups criticized the TGE (see 3.3.2) for using an ethno-linguistic factor as the only criterion for establishing self-governing regions. In spite of this, the TGE continued to implement the new policy because the EPRDF, ideologically guided by the TPLF, was clearly unwilling to compromise. It was convinced that ethnic federalism was the answer to the century-old problem of state centralization and Amhara domination (Young, 1996).

Many authors, like Aalen (2002a), Aspen (2002), Cohen (1995), Marcus (2002), Pausewang (1997), Pausewang et al. (2002a and 2002b), and Tronvoll and Aadland (1995) agree that the post-1991 politics has been highly influenced by the TPLF, which played a leading role in the 17-year struggle to overthrow the *Derg* regime. According to Young (1998:194), the present ethnic federalism policy's core background can be traced back to one of the TPLF´s objectives, which he explained as:'[…] the commitment of the TPLF – and later the EPRDF – to the right of national self-determination, and the implication that this involved the establishment of ethnically based regional administrations, was long-standing and cannot be considered primarily a result of the conference [July 1991], nor of the subsequent 1994 Constitution.'

The establishment of self-governing regional and local governments with all the necessary government machineries, including an elected council, judiciary and executive committee, marked the end of the century-old, highly centralized, unitary governance structure and system in Ethiopia (Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995). The *woreda* structure, abandoned by the *Derg* in 1987, was re-instituted by Proclamation No. 7/1992 as a basic government unit in each region (Daniel, 1994). Unlike in the pre-1991 period, the *woreda* structure was established as a local self-governing unit with its own elected council (TGE, 1992). Proclamation No. 7/1992 only provided for the establishment of regional and *woreda* governments. Article 5 (1) of the Proclamation, however, gave regional governments the power to establish and define the powers and duties of the grass-roots local government structure below the *woreda*. As a result, regional governments replaced the Peasant Associations of the *Derg* time with *tabia/kebele* administrations that would promote the local people's direct participation in local political, social and economic affairs. Moreover, Article 15 (1/d) provided regional governments with the power to establish an intermediary structure between the *woreda* and regional levels if this was deemed necessary. In fact, all regions established a structure called a zone administration.

The TGE drafted a new constitution adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in December 1994, which, on 24 August 1995, inaugurated the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). The Constitution adopted ethnic federalism and reaffirmed the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination, including secession (FDRE, 1995). The Federal Constitution identifies nine ethnically based States or Regional Governments[10] and one city administration. The Federal Constitution introduced parliamentary democracy through two chambers at the federal level known as the Federal Houses viz. the House of Peoples' Representatives[11] and the House of Federation[12] (FDRE, 1995). In terms of the local governance structure and systems, the constitution does not mention structures below the regional government level, but it does provide regional governments with a constitutional mandate to establish their own governance structures and systems (Cohen, 1995). Regional governments

therefore endorsed the transitional period's structures. For example, Amhara and Tigray State Constitutions provided regional, zonal, *woreda* and *tabia/kebele* structures with defined powers and duties.

The zonal administration[13] constitutes an important intermediary and deconcentrated unit between the regional and *woreda* governments. It is led by politicians[14] appointed by the regional council from among its members. Similar to the TGE, the *woreda* government constitutes the basic unit of government with an elected council, executive committee, and sector offices. All regional governments have fully recognized *woreda* and sub-*woreda* local governments' power and their important role in the development of their localities as well as that of their people. However, studies indicate that regional and zonal structures dominate the resource allocation as well as the planning and implementation of development projects financed by the government (Brosio, 2000; Meheret, 2002; Tegegne and Asfaw, 2002).

Economic policy reforms are important items on the post-1991 reform agenda. Both international and domestic forces have exerted strong pressure for economic liberalization (Abebe, 1994; Pausewang, 1994). In August 1991, the TGE adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP) that was welcomed by and impressed many westerners, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which initiated the introduction of the stabilization and structural adjustment programme in 1992 (Addis Alem, 2003; Brietzke, 1995). The NEP outlined that the state would not focus on, or be much involved in the direct production of goods and services. Its primary function would rather be the building of an infrastructure to provide sufficient services, skilled manpower, and to facilitate bureaucratic processes to attract investment. Despite this commitment, in practice, this enabling environment has not truly materialised. Marcus (2002) explained that neither the TGE nor the FDRE have been able to sufficiently fulfill these needs. As a result, many potential foreign investors have learned that they cannot secure sufficient electricity for their machinery, a guaranteed supply of raw or imported materials, experienced and disciplined workers, adequate banking and credit facilities, and modern communication services. On the other hand, the domestic private sector is still too underdeveloped and fragmented to take on major production and the delivery of services, or play a leading role in the economic sphere. The sector is highly constrained by a lack of capital and markets to invest in large-scale operations and, hence, is mainly confined to small and medium-scale operations in urban premises. Moreover, the government has not yet set economic operations free. It has only changed the form of intervention from 'public enterprises' to 'party-owned enterprises'. The latter have established a wide array of economic networks among themselves to control all major economic activities. This hampers free economic competition and the growth of private investment for sustainable development. Moreover, state bureaucracy is not only ineffi-

cient, but weighs heavily on the business community as a whole (Dessalegn, 2002).

As mentioned earlier, the TGE Charter incorporated a number of democratic principles that are necessary for the emergence of democratic governance, among which freedom of association is an important component. After half a century of repressive measures by the Imperial and Derg regimes, the transitional Charter created an opportunity for the emergence and re-emergence of different civil societies such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community based organizations (CBOs), professional associations, and advocacy groups (Dessalegn, 2002; Kassahun, 2002).

Professional associations were seriously affected by the previous government's repressive measures. The *Derg* government closed almost all professional associations; the Ethiopian Medical Association was among the few that survived. After 1991, professional associations started to flourish. According to Dessalegn (2002), a study conducted in 1998 showed that the number of professional associations had reached 75. In spite of the growth, they have not yet started to provide inputs and/or challenge government policies in their areas of specialization. The exception is the Ethiopian Economic Association[15] (Dessalegn, 2002). Similar to the professional associations, advocacy organizations, unthinkable during the *Derg* regime, have started to emerge. Most are, however, small and are not yet effective in advocating specific groups' interests or issues. Two advocacy organizations, viz. the Ethiopian Human Rights Council[16] (EHRCO), and the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association[17] (EWLA) have emerged, successfully attracting considerable public support as well as advocating those objectives for which they were established (Dessalegn, 2002; Kassahun, 2002).

Although Ethiopia has many indigenous CBOs, most of them are crisis driven and are socially oriented. They have not yet started mobilizing members and resources for sustainable local development (Kassahun, 2002; Qualman, 2000; Zenebe, 2001). Development-oriented NGOs (local and international) are, however, growing fast. By 1995, NGOs were widespread and involved in local development efforts in different sectors, such as health, environmental rehabilitation, education, and credit, in many parts of the country (Marcus, 2002). The number of NGOs grew from 70 in 1994 to 368 in 2000 (Dessalegn, 2002). The government encourages NGOs to work closely with local governments, sector agencies and people. NGOs mobilize resources to invest in rural areas where there is a lack of basic social and economic services. According to Dessalegn (2002), about 49 percent of NGOs' resources are invested in rural development programmes. Kassahun (2002) maintains that the Ethiopian government has been facilitating such NGO activities by providing administrative support, land for building, physical infrastructure, and extending duty-free

privileges for imported materials and equipment used in the development and delivery of local service.

Not only NGOs, but also bilateral and multi-lateral donors have been involved in supporting the democratisation and governance reform processes (Dessalegn and Meheret, 2004). They provide aid to the central government and also to local governments and people to improve and expand basic social and economic services to those who have no access to such services. Most multi-lateral donors channel their support to local service development through regional sector bureaus. Bilateral donors support local governments through their own agencies such as SIDA and SNV in Amhara and Irish Aid in Tigray. Generally, governance reforms are broad, transcending the public sector to directly involve non-state actors in the production and delivery of service to local people. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the involvement of national and international non-state agencies has created opportunities to improve basic services as well as providing communities with an opportunity to participate in local development efforts (Wubshet et al., 1997).

The involvement and participation of NGOs and other non-state actors in the production and delivery of local services show a positive picture. However, a similar trend and record have not yet been achieved in terms of their advocacy role and participation in policy making at various levels. Such roles have not yet been well integrated into the governance system. The problems are not attributed to government or non-state actors specifically, but to both as discussed in section 7.5.

3.3.2 Ethnic federalism, political pluralism and local governance

Ethiopia consists of more than seventy-five nationalities (Asmelash, 2000). Many of these nationalities had traditional systems of local governance, but their development and contribution to modern local governance were hampered by an over-centralized and superimposed system of governance that ruled the country for a century. The Amharas and Tigrayans formed the core and monopolized the modern Ethiopian administration, which other nationalities increasingly resented and against which they justifiably protested (Clapham, 1994; Meheret, 1997; Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995). The Tigrayans, however, believe that they constituted part of the marginalized nationalities rather than being a partner of the Amhara ruling class. They argue that their marginalisation was their reason for engaging in the liberation movement. The point is that the question of nationalities' self-administration is as old as the country's modern history. The strong resistance to and armed struggle against the *Derg* were also mainly organized along ethnic lines[18].

In the light of this, authors like Abbink (1997), Aspen (2002), Pausewang (1994 and 1997), Pausewang et al. (2002b), and Tronvoll and Aadland (1995) argue that it would have been difficult for the EPRDF to gain legitimacy with-

out addressing the issue of nationalities, and that neglecting the century-old question might have meant a continuation of the civil war. Baharu (1994:43) argues that 'to deny the principle of national self-determination is both unprincipled and impolitic.' Such views mainly coincide with the EPRDF's stand and argument for the adoption of ethnic federalism. The EPRDF is convinced of and promotes the ideology that 'nation building' through homogeneity is a tired ideology that has proved itself unsuccessful. As discussed earlier, the principle of 'self-determination', including secession, forms the main political ideology of the TPLF, which managed to inculcate this in the mind of the coalition EPRDF's members as well. The EPRDF has shown its allegiance to the principle of the right to self-determination as far as secession by embedding it in the 1994 Constitution under Article 39 (Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995).

The redefinition of the Ethiopian state on an ethno-linguistic basis has, however, not been accepted as either correct or as a satisfactory solution to the ethnicity problem. There are two main categories that negate EPRDF's ethnic federalism. First, the urban majority[19] and most Amharas hold the view that the TPLF/EPRDF introduced this policy as a divide-and-rule strategy and that by splitting the citizen's socio-political psychology along ethnic lines, it seeks to undermine joint efforts against its hegemony (Pausewang et al., 2002b). Pausewang (1997:186) stated the views of this group as: '[…] a massive majority of the vocal and politically knowledgeable elite is vehemently opposed to the government. They suspect the government of all kinds of sinister plots to dismantle the unity of the country, to control the other ethnic groups to the benefit of the Tigre, or to take revenge against their historical rivals, the Amhara.'

The second category opposes the policy on the grounds that it was only designed in a 'nominal' way to stifle real questions regarding freedom and self-determination. This group further argues that the change has only shifted the power balance from the Amharas to their compatriots- the Tigrayans, which thus perpetuates the *Abyssinians'* dominance over the occupied peoples of the south. Such a claim is strongly promoted particularly by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which demands more space and influence in politics and more self-determination in the Oromo area, even to the extent of secession (Merera, 2002; Pausewang et al., 2002b).

Adhana (1994:28) argues that the governance reforms introduced by the EPRDF are characterized by the 'politics of to be'[20] in contemporary Ethiopia. According to Adhana, while the first and second groups that negate the reform are characterized by the 'politics of not to be'[21] that promotes 'chauvinism and a nationalism of withdrawal' and, hence, are not reconciled with the 'politics of to be.' No matter whose argument is right or wrong, the politics of resentment and opposition can undermine pluralistic political processes for the emergence and development of democratic local governance.

A brief review of the post-1991 political processes should help to demonstrate how far the principles of regional and local self-administration have succeeded in establishing and promoting political pluralism and democratic local governance for sustainable development. The real test of the reforms does not only depend on the introduction of such a system, but also on its implementation and capacity to transform the Ethiopian nations, nationalities and peoples into a tolerant and civic society that respects one another and works together towards a common end.

By the time the EPRDF assumed power in May 1991, there was considerable pressure from both international and internal forces for it to commit itself to political pluralism and a democratic process. Hence, the EPRDF was confronted with the external challenges of preparing the ground for democratic governance (Aspen, 2002). Because cooperation was mainly defined on the basis of the ethnic resistance movements, the EPRDF invited all organizations established on such a basis to participate and also encouraged other ethnic groups to organize themselves and participate (but to be ready to join the common front) in the Peace and Democracy Conference in July 1991 (Addis Alem, 2003; Pausewang et al., 2002b).

After the establishment of the TGE, international and domestic public pressure continued for the TGE to embrace internationally accepted standards of democratic governance. The TGE's reaction was encouraging: it enacted a series of laws to facilitate democratic self-governance at the regional and local levels. The TGE Charter and, later, the FDRE Constitution provided the legal bases for the establishment of political parties that would promote pluralist politics. In the post-1991 period, a number of parties emerged accordingly. For example, in 2000, the number of registered parties operating in the country reached 79 (Oertel, 2004). The TGE established a National Election Board that conducted the first election for regional and local councils on the basis of Western democratic principles in 1992 (Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995). From 1992-2001, three rounds of regional and local council elections and two rounds of federal parliament elections were conducted, all aimed at promoting democratic governance at local and supra-local levels (Aspen, 2002).

Different international observers approved these elections on a technical basis. Aspen (2002:67) stated that: 'If democracy were fulfilled with technical implementation of elections, Ethiopia could have been a model for the rest of the world.' Pragmatically, however, from day one onward, the move towards a pluralist, competitive political and governance system became a serious problem because the EPRDF did not want to go beyond its rhetoric (Marcus, 2002). Pausewang et al. (2002b:30) stated that: 'As early as the summer of 1991 it became clear that TPLF and its EPRDF coalition did not intend to share power with all the other movements in the government coalition.' According to these authors, the EPRDF's unwillingness to share power became public in the 1992

regional and local elections when it refused[22] to accept the results of the vote in many constituencies.

According to Oertel (2004) and Pausewang et al. (2002a), the political parties can be grouped into three groups: 1) ethnic parties under the EPRDF coalition, 2) regional ethnic parties affiliated to the EPRDF and 3) the opposition parties. In the eyes of the law, all groups are equal and important for the democratisation process. In practice, however, they are not; the EPRDF only allows the establishment of opposition parties to demonstrate a multi-party political configuration, but does not allow them to compete freely for political power (Oertel, 2004). Pausewang et al. (2002a:15) stated that any ethnic or nation-wide party outside the EPRDF's domain (coalition or affiliation), faces harsh local discrimination. For example,

> The members of the All Amhara People's Organization (AAPO) […] face the same discrimination as members of the Coalition of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia (CAFPDE), the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) […] or the Oromo National Congress (ONC). Their members are treated almost like state enemies by the authorities, and they are accused of being criminals and constantly risk harassment and arrest.

The EPRDF established a chain of control at regional and local levels through member and affiliated parties, which created difficulties[23] for the opposition parties and supporters and prevented them from freely participating in the democratic processes. Pausewang et al. (2002a:12) stated that: 'We know from experience and research findings that the […] EPRDF and its affiliated parties have established a system of close control over peasants. […] Nor have they hesitated to use their power in creating obstacles to opposition organization and mobilization.' As a result, elections have been marred by the withdrawal of major opposition parties and have, thus, been characterized by the absence of democratic alternatives (Pausewang et al., 2002b). EPRDF leaders, however, disagree. For example, Pausewang and Aalen (2002:226-227) identified these claims as:

> Sebhat Nega, one of the most influential politicians, claims that his party's repeated electoral victories are a result of its political programme. […] Prime Minster Meles Zenawi explains EPRDF's monopolistic position by the fact that the party has based its support on the peasantry, which constitutes 85 per cent of the Ethiopian population. He claims that as long as the population of Ethiopia is as undiversified as this, the support for the party will remain strong.

EPRDF officials further argue that opposition parties have always registered for elections but decided to withdraw for two major reasons: the first and most important is that they knew that they did not have enough support to win the election. Secondly, they thought that their withdrawal would undermine the legitimacy and democratic credentials of the government in power (Addis

Alem, 2003; Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995). In spite of these claims by officials, studies reflect the EPRDF's heavy-handed interference to ensure its dominant position in all political processes. Meheret (2002) argues that the current political arrangement has made it difficult for multi-ethnic political parties other than the EPRDF and its affiliates.

It is unfortunate that in spite of its claim and hope for multi-ethic political pluralism through ethnic federalism, the current political system is marred by resentment and opposition, which has affected the development of democratic local governance that requires cooperation and dialogue among multi-actors and the people. Evidence from the Amhara case study *woredas* revealed that resentment and opposition to the current political processes have resulted in the ruling party's strong control over the local population, rather than cooperation and dialogue.

3.4 Tigray and Amhara Regions in Context

Tigray and Amhara are neighbouring regions that constitute the majority of the country's northern highlands (see Appendix 1). As discussed earlier, the two regions are at the centre of modern Ethiopian history. They share historical, cultural, and religious values. Culturally and religiously, they are virtually indistinguishable (Joiremand and Szayan, ND; Young, 1997).

3.4.1 Socio-economic background

Tigray National Regional State (TNRS)

The TNRS is one of the nine Regional States of the FDRE, ranked fourth and sixth in terms of population and area respectively. It is situated at the northern tip of the country bordered by Eritrea in the north, Sudan in the west, Amhara Region in the south, and Afar Region in the east (Kefyalew, 2000). The Region covers an area of 50,078.64 sq. km (CSA, 1998). Topographically, it is characterized by high plateaus and rugged mountains. The region's major economic activity is subsistence agriculture, which engages about 90 percent of the population. The subsistence agriculture's main activities include livestock and crop productions, which are carried out on the basis of traditional and backward systems of production. The rugged topography, together with the centuries-old cultivation system and growing population has resulted in severe environmental degradation that has exacerbated the frequency of drought in the region. Environmental degradation, the backward farming system and frequent drought are the major constraints that have undermined the region's capacity to produce sufficient food (Kefyalew, 2000; TRNS/BoFED, ND).

The TNRS is divided into 5 Zonal Administrations[24], 35 *Woreda* Governments and 540 *Tabia* Administrations (Kefyalew, 2000; TNRS, 1995b). In 2001, the estimated population of the region was 3,797,455 (49.2 percent male and

50.8 percent female) (CSA, 2002). According to the 1994 census, most of the population are Tigrayans (94.8 percent) who speak *Tigirgna* and the majority are Orthodox Christians (95.5 percent), followed by Muslim (4.1 percent) (OPHCC, 1995a). The Regional Government has adopted *Tigrigna* as the official working language (TNRS, 1995a).

Tigray Region experienced 17 years (1975-1991) of the liberation movement against the *Derg*. In this period, the war had been fought throughout almost all of Tigray. When the government began to suffer defeat at the hands of the TPLF, it not only suspended development and provision of social and economic services, but also destroyed these through air attacks and its ground forces. Tedros et al. (2000) stated that Tigray Region was the first and worst victim of the civil war. In order to mitigate the socio-economic challenges caused by the war, the Regional Government in collaboration with the local people and other actors has made a number of efforts to rehabilitate and reconstruct war-ravaged schools, health facilities and other infrastructures since 1991. These efforts have not been limited to rehabilitation and reconstruction, but also include a series of service expansions to remote rural areas that have not had access to them (REST, 1993b). In 2001, the gross school enrolment was 73.9 percent (75.9 male and 71.8 female) and 33.8 percent (40.8 male and 26.7 female) for primary and secondary education respectively. The health service coverage showed that 66.24 percent of the total population had access to health services within a 10 km radius (MoE, 2002, MoH, 2001).

Amhara National Regional State (ANRS)

ANRS is the country's third largest and second most populated Regional State. It borders several regions, including Tigray in the north, Afar in the east, Benishangul Gumuez in the west and Oromia in the south. It covers an area of 170,752 sq. km and topographically, two-thirds of the area consists of rugged, steep mountains. Most of the northern and eastern parts of the Region are typical highlands that have for centuries been under constant cultivation by means of traditional plough agriculture. As a result, the highlands have been seriously degraded and the region has become subject to frequent droughts and starvation. Subsistence, mixed agriculture that mainly includes livestock and crop productions is the principal economic activity of about 90 percent of the total population. However, agricultural activities are constrained by the erratic rainfall and frequent drought. As a result, ensuring food self-sufficiency has remained a serious challenge (ANRS/BoFED, 2004; Mengesha, 2000).

ANRS is divided into 11 Zonal Administrations[25], 105 *Woreda* Governments, and 3,064 *Kebele* Administrations. Of the 11 Zone Administrations, three are Nationality Zones that include the Himra, Awi, and Oromo peoples. As of 2001, the Region had an estimated population of 16,792,335 (50.1 percent male and 49.9 percent female) (ANRS/BoFED, 2002). According to the 1994 cen-

sus, ethnically and linguistically, the Amharas, who speak the Amharic language, is the largest nationality and accounts for 91.2 percent of the Region's population. Amharic is also the official working language of the Region. In terms of religion, the census shows that the majority (81.5 percent) of the population are Orthodox Christians, followed by Muslim (18.1 percent) (ANRS, 1995a; OPHCC, 1995b).

Although the Amharas are said to have monopolized state authority for a long time, the profile of their health and education facilities and service coverage is no better than that of others regions. In fact, sources show that it is one of the regions with the least developed social services. For example, in 2001, it was ranked second last in terms of health service coverage, while in terms of gross primary and secondary education enrolment, it was respectively ranked ninth and eighth of the nine regional states and two city administrations. In this year, the gross school enrolment ratios were 53.3 percent (56.9 male and 49.7 female) and 11.0 percent (11.5 male and 10.5 female) for primary and secondary education respectively. Of the Region's total population, 41.9 percent had access to health facilities within a 10 km radius (ANRS/Health Bureau, 2002; MoE, 2002).

3.4.2 Political history and post-1991 dynamics in the Tigray and Amhara regions

Although the Tigrayans and the Amharas are lumped together and viewed as one in the eyes of other nationalities, their relationship has been characterized by rivalry rather than effective partnership due to their struggle for hegemony (Clapham, 1994; Merera, 2002; Pausewang, 1997). The competition for dominance between the Amharas and the Tigrayans dates back to 1270 when power passed from the Zagwe dynasty[26] to a succession of Amhara kings who claimed to be descendents of the Solomonic dynasty[27] (Young, 1997). This continued in modern history and in the course of 'nation building', during which the Amharas succeeded in emerging in the dominant position. Nevertheless, the Tigrayans continued to hold privileged positions as members of the *Abyssinian* core, although they didn't accept their junior position (Marcus, 2002; Merera, 2002; Young, 1997). The 1991 political change shifted the balance of power from the Amharas to the Tigrayans. The Amhara people in general and the elites in particular considered the change as a landslide loss of power and didn't accept the Tigrayans' domination. They started to mobilize urban and rural Amhara people to contest this domination and promote their interests. As a result, the rift between the two groups has widened (Joireman and Szayna, ND). According to informants from the Amhara Region, the political reforms were designed and implemented by the TPLF/EPRDF in such a way that the Amhara elites were not only systematically purged from the national political arena but also from Amhara Region itself. The TPLF/EPRDF, on the other hand, justifies the new

reform as a remedy for the socio-political problems created by successive dominant Amhara rulers, which in turn further aggravates the Amharas' resistance to the emerging status quo (Merera, 2002)

Tigray Region

Gebre Ab (1997:21) notes that '[…] Tigray boasts [that it is] …one of the origins of Ethiopian civilization.' This dates back to King Ezana (c.AD 25-350) of the Aksumite Empire that lasted up to the tenth century (Adhana, 1994; Young, 1997). The Tigrayans argue that in spite of their significant position in Ethiopian history and civilization, their role and place in modern Ethiopian politics had been undermined by Amhara rule. In Adhana (1994:16-17), Gebru, a Tigrayan historian, argues that the influence and role of the Tigrayans were discontinued in modern Ethiopia due to the 'Amhara-dominated state.' Ever since the transfer of power from the Tigrayan King Emperor Yohannes IV to Emperor Menelik II in 1889, the Tigrayans had felt subordinate to the Amhara, a position that they refused to accept. As a result, in contemporary Ethiopia, Tigrayan political movements against the centre were conceived as and carried out along 'ethno-regionalism' and 'ethno-nationalism' rather than as a class struggle (Adhana, 1994; Merera, 2002).

In Tigray, there had been resistance since the 1930s when Haile Selassie launched a centralized administration. However, the first organized revolt against the centre, known as the '*Woyane* rebellion', erupted in 1943 and was harshly suppressed by the Haile Selassie government with British air support before it posed a serious challenge. The rebellion is said to have been initiated by peasants, however, the issues that they mentioned, include opposition to: corruption, excessive tax, and appointment of non-Tigrayans as provincial administrators and court judges. This clearly indicates that the *Woyane* rebellion was to a certain extent a manifestation of the growing regional nationalism among the Tigrayans (Marcus, 2002; Meheret, 1997).

The *Woyane* rebellion was not in vain, because when the 1974 revolution was hijacked by the military junta, strong and dedicated young Tigrayan nationalists, referring to this populist movement, decided to revert to a national liberation movement. On 18 February 1975, they established the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) at Dedebit in Western Tigray. The TPLF declared that Tigray nationalism was its major political goal. Young and educated leaders politicised the people of Tigray towards this goal by emphasising Tigrayan particularism and the need for an ethnic-centred struggle. Given the long years of discontent among the Tigrayans and the TPLF's emphasis on the liberation of Tigray, the people consider the TPLF founders heroes (Marcus, 2002; Pausewang, 1994; Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995; Young, 1997).

In the struggle against the military dictatorship, the TPLF first focused on establishing trust among all Tigrayans (urban and rural) by infiltrating deep into

the people, even in areas under the *Derg*'s intense military security. Moreover, in the liberated areas, TPLF fighters initiated and established youth, women and farmer associations devoted to raising political awareness among their members and mobilizing people for war and the delivery of basic services. In its liberated areas, the TPLF promoted democratic local governance according to which the people administered themselves through *baitos* (local councils) elected from among the local population. All these steps made the TPLF very popular, which enabled it to mobilize the people of Tigray for insurrection against the *Derg* (Marcus, 2002; Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995; Young, 1997).

In the course of the struggle, the TPLF anchored itself within the people of Tigray, with every individual and group committed to providing everything, including their lives, to the success of TPLF's objective. According to Tronvoll and Aadland (1995: 34), 'Over 55,000 *tegadelti* (resistance fighters) were killed in combat, and tens of thousands civilians died as direct cause of the war – victims of air raids and terror. Almost everyone in Tigray has family members or relatives who died in the war, and memories of the suffering are ubiquitous.'

When the TPLF liberated Tigray in 1989, it broadened its horizon to intra-Ethiopian politics and a complete overthrow of the *Derg*. This required a broad base and the TPLF initiated and established a coalition force – the EPRDF – in the same year. The TPLF's fighters constituted the major part of the EPRDF's force in the fight against the *Derg*. Because the EPRDF was TPLF's brainchild, and mainly made up of its forces, it was under the leadership of TPLF leaders during the struggle and has continued to be so after the fall of the *Derg* (Marcus, 2002; Merera, 2002; Pausewang, 1994; Young, 1998).

Informants in Tigray (both at local and regional levels) argue that indeed, the TPLF had played a key role in providing leadership to overthrow the *Derg* due to its experiences accumulated in the long years of struggle, and for which the people of Tigray paid an immense cost in terms of life. Tronvoll and Aadland (1995) also argue that from a military viewpoint, the people of Tigray may be regarded as the rightful victors of the war against the *Derg* regime. According to the informants, it is therefore not surprising that the TPLF together with EPRDF coalition forces has had an important position in the post-*Derg* political reforms and processes.

Hence, the fact that no political party other than TPLF has succeeded in Tigray Region should be understood within the historical context (Aalen, 2002b). For example, in the Region, the only organized opposition force to the TPLF is the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party (EDUP), formerly know as Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU). It has not achieved any substantial support. The EDUP accuses the TPLF of not allowing opposition parties to compete freely and compelling people not to support any other party. This point of view is, however, not accepted by either the TPLF or the people (Aalen, 2002b; Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995). Aalen (2002b:98) concluded that '[…] the fact that no

other parties participated [in elections] is probably the reflection of the Tigrayan people's choice. […] It is therefore fair to say that there is currently no viable alternative to TPLF in the region.'

A peasant in Aksum, in northern Tigray, quoted by Tronvoll and Aadland (1995: 34-35), describes his relationship and feelings towards the TPLF as: 'We all stand behind the TPLF, and almost all of us have close relatives that are *tegadelti* [TPLF fighters]. The TPLF got rid of the *Derg* and brought peace to our country. That is all we want, and we consider the TPLF to be like our own flesh and blood.'

Interviews and discussions with the local people, local and regional leaders and the *Seleste Mahberat* (the three associations: youth, women and farmers) leaders revealed that the above views are widely shared among all groups of informants. They argue that it is not possible to understand the relationships between the people of Tigray and TPLF without looking back at the history of the liberation movement. Gebre Ab (1997) concluded that indeed, the struggle had demanded immense efforts and painful patience, but had achieved much, not only in overthrowing the *Derg* but also in revitalizing and maturing Tigray nationalism, which served as a springboard for the post-1991 development efforts.

Amhara Region

According to all accounts, Amhara rulers occupied a central position in modern Ethiopian history by initiating and completing 'nation building' (Adhana, 1994; Meheret, 1997; Merera, 2002). Emperor Haile Selassie[28] claimed to be an Amhara,but ethnically he was more Oromo than Amhara. Clapham (1994:29) identified his ethnic background as: '[…] his father's father was Oromo; his father's mother was Amhara; his mother's father was Oromo; and his mother's mother was Gurage.' His claim to be Amhara was an effort to establish his throne as part of the Solomonic dynasty. Not only did he claim to be Amhara, but he also promoted and imposed their values, culture and language on other nationalities and people, which lead to serious criticisms of the Amhara people (Adhana, 1994; Merera, 2002).

Informants from Amhara Region admit that the above is true. They argue, however, that they had no control over their affairs, let alone any influence on Imperial decisions; they had been dominated, exploited and oppressed by the ruling class. According to the informants, their lifestyle and the level of infrastructure development are testimonies to the fact that the Amhara people are one of the poorest nationalities in the country. There is some written evidence that supports these arguments. Adhana (1994), for example, stated that the empire-state under Menelik had not only dominated the non-Amhara but also the Amhara constituencies of the state-nation. He further asserted that the Haile Selassie regime's ruling class neglected the Amhara peasantry. Meheret (1997)

also argues that the Amhara people had been equally oppressed by the Haile Selassie regime, evidenced by the fact that the people of Gojam (one of Amhara's constituencies) revolted against the Imperial regime as early as the 1940s and continued their resistance until it was overthrown in 1974. Clapham (1994) stated that the historic northern regions such as Gondar, Gojam, Wollo and, of course, Tigray, were economically neglected and marginalized while Haile Selassie's Imperial regime facilitated the development of infrastructure in the south in order to incorporate the southern regions' resources firmly into Ethiopia. Because the northern regions depend on subsistence agriculture; the Imperial regime had little interest in developing their social and economic infrastructure. The informants further stated that, because they were neglected and repressed by the Imperial regime, the Amhara people were one of the prominent actors of the 1974 revolution.

Despite authors like Adhana (1994), Merera (2002) and Tronvoll and Aadland (1995) characterizing the Mengistu regime as a continuation of the Amhara dominance, the Amhara people do not associate themselves with it. Informants stated that the Amhara Region is known for harbouring strong resistance against the *Derg*, which cost the lives of tens of thousands of its young and educated people through the 'Red Terror.' The informants further explained that the *Derg* regime had accused and oppressed the people of Amhara of being sympathizers of the feudal regime. They feel that it is unfortunate that, in the post-*Derg* period, the Amhara people are still associated with their oppressors and are accused of every social, economic and political evil that occurred during the Imperial and *Derg* regimes, while they too had been victims. Such grievances are important elements of the Amharas' disappointment with and alienation from political processes.

Since the establishment of the TGE in 1991, the EPDM, which transformed itself into the Amhara Democratic Movement (ANDM) in 1994, has been the ruling party in the region (Addis Alem, 2003). The EPDM was established on 16 November 1980 in Embera *Woreda*, Temben *Awraja* of the then Tigray Province. It was founded by 37 members who were alienated from the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) due to political differences. The TPLF had played an important role in the EPDM's establishment and organization, and allowed it to operate in its liberated Tigray areas (ANDM, 2001).

The EPDM was established as a multi-national political party consisting of members from different ethnic groups who united to fight for all the oppressed nations, nationalities and peoples' interests on the basis of a 'Revolutionary Democracy.' It declared its armed struggle in 1981 and employed rural-based, popular, guerrilla combat as its major strategy to overthrow the *Derg*. In 1989, the EPDM accepted the TPLF's initiative to form a coalition force – the EPRDF (ANDM, 2001).

As mentioned above, the EPDM has ruled the Amhara Region since 1991. According to informants, the Amhara people in general and the elite in particular do not, however, understand the EPDM as differing from the TPLF, nor did the EPDM at the beginning declare that it specifically represents and promotes the Amhara people's interest. Not only the public, but also EPDM members have complained about the TPLF's domination of its leadership. The Ethiopian Review (1993:3) mentioned that '[…] EPDM is fast losing its credibility among its Amhara members. […] Many of the resigned EPDM members complained that the top leadership is controlled by Tigrayans.' The Tigrayans' strong presence in Amhara Region and the key role that they play in national and regional politics have created serious concern among the Amhara who feel that their political position and relative share of the power is fast disappearing (Joireman and Szayna, ND.). Moreover, the post-1991 political processes have fermented an 'anti-Amhara'[29] political atmosphere. Pausewang et al. (2002b:42) provide a description of this: 'Descendents of the Amhara settlers and administrators of the imperial period were indiscriminately victimized: their property looted, their houses burned, and many of them killed.' These authors further state that '[…] the government failed to act decisively to stop such outrageous pogroms.'

The Amhara reacted with resentment and opposition to these political processes. They establshed the All Amhara People's Organization (AAPO) in February 1992 (Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995). The AAPO emerged as one of the major opposition parties that, within a short period, mobilized urban and rural Amharas with the objective of protecting their rights and interests (Joireman and Szayna, ND; Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995). Unfortunately, however, the emergence of the AAPO as a strong opposition party increased the political tension in the Region, as the EPDM/EPRDF would not allow the former to compete freely and provide the Amhara people with political options. The AAPO and its supporters encountered serious difficulties in attempting to work within the political system (Aspen, 2002; Tronvoll and Aadland, 1995). Vestal (1997:179), for example, describes the problems that it faced in preparing to take part in the 1995 regional and federal legislature elections:

> […] the AAPO had spunk, leadership, organizational skills, and a considerable number of followers that might pose a serious challenge to EPRDF dominance in a fair election. To prevent such an event from happening, forces of the TPLF/EPRDF closed down some forty regional offices of the AAPO, seized party documents that were taken away in truck loads, and arrested Dr. Asrat Woldeyes and other officers. The AAPO headquarters in Addis Ababa were occupied for several days by government forces […] Members or sympathizers of the AAPO were subjected to nocturnal, unexplained, and thus deliberately terrifying arrest.

As mentioned earlier, the EPDM had been transformed into the ANDM in 1994. The ANDM programme, as quoted by Addis Alem (2003:133-134), expands on the rationale for change: '[…], the need for a multi-national organization has already been answered by the formation of the EPRDF. The continuation of the EPDM as a multinational organization would be an unnecessary and overlapping endeavour. Thus the EPDM decided to become a national organization and leave the job of co-ordination to the EPRDF.' However, informants described the change from the EPDM to the ANDM as an attempt to 'systematically divert the attention and support of the people from AAPO.' They explained that had it been for the reason indicated in the ANDM programme, it would have had been done in 1989 when the EPRDF was established, or in 1991, when it took over the responsibility of ruling the Region. They added that there has, moreover, been no change in the political processes and representation of public interests; 'control and intimidation are still quite abundant.'

Addis Alem (2003) reflects the government's opinion when stating that the AAPO supporters are mainly Amhara elites who lost their privileged status due to the new democratic and governance reforms. The government claims that the AAPO has failed to achieve its objectives peacefully and has from time to time engaged in 'illegal activities'. According to Addis Alem (2003:147), the AAPO, for example: 'was accused of involvement in illegal activities such as being an accomplice in some armed subversive actions' as a result of which its chairman, Professor Asrat Woldeyes, was 'convicted' and sentenced to serve a lengthy prison term. The informants, however, disagreed with these views and stated that in addition to local intimidation and harassment, the government adopted a finger-pointing approach to have the AAPO leadership dismantled so that it will vanish from the political scene. They concluded that the continuous marginalisation of the AAPO and its supporters from the political arena and the death of Professor Asrat Woldeyes while serving a prison sentence exacerbated the Amhara people's disappointment with the current political processes.

The other factor that added fuel to the political fire was the land re-allotment of 1997. The Regional Government claims that the policy was adopted in response to popular demand (ANRS, 1996). Community members, however, stated that the land re-allotment was a political decision that aimed at generating political support, while taking revenge on people who participated in the local administration during the Imperial and *Derg* periods. Studies conducted on post-land re-allotment support these claims rather than those of the Regional Government. Yigremew (1997) stated that his study, conducted in East Gojam Zone, could not identify any popular demand for land re-allotment. Ege shared Yigremew's findings and confirmed the community members' views, describing the policy as 'discrimination based on political criteria.' According to Ege (2002:73), the policy:

> […] stigmatized the officials of the preceding regimes as oppressors, but ironically enough lumped the current officials together with the oppressed peasants, without further criteria needed. The term birokrasi was used to refer to the quite numerous peasants who had served in various local offices under the Därg, while persons who had been officials or significant landowners before the revolution were referred to as "feudal remnants". Both groups were treated together under the birokrasi label.

Pausewang et al. (2002b) stated that the land redistribution was a central intervention in local conditions, characterized by the victimization of the former regimes' officials at the local level. They further argued that the real objective of land redistribution was neither equity nor justice; it was a political tactic used by the EPRDF to create a sense of dependency on it, while signalling a warning to all potential opponents in the Region. According to Vestal (1997:183), the land redistribution was used by the EPRDF as an instrument to keep the peasants as allies in places where 'rural people are EPRDF tenants who risk losing their lands if they criticize or anger the ruling party.'

According to the local people, participation in political processes other than that of the ANDM/EPRDF has become very difficult. Consequently they now seem to have decided not to take part, even if the government allows participation, because they doubt the government's sincerity and commitment. A statement made by participants of a focus group discussion in *Medage Kebele*, Bugna *Woreda*, clearly reflects the people's apathy and fear:

> Regional and *woreda* political leaders have told us to support any party we like, even those opposing the EPRDF as long as they are not engaged in armed activities. However, we have made our position clear to the *woreda* officials: they have to prevent opposition parties from coming here, because we have had paid a high enough price for merely being suspected of supporting the opposition party (AAPO), let alone openly supporting it. We are afraid that the government wants to establish whether we really support other parties or the EPRDF[30].

Previous discussions have shown that the post-1991 change and processes with regard to governance are perceived and absorbed differently by the Tigray and Amhara regions. In Tigray, they are understood among all groups as a great success achieved through strong Tigrayan nationalism. This has provided politicians at all levels and citizens with a vigorous motivation and commitment to work together to a common end, which is very essential for the emergence and functioning of an LGN. In Amhara, the people neither perceive the change and processes as favourably nor do politicians exert the necessary efforts to establish a smooth and cohesive environment and governance processes. The relationship between the ruling party and the people is characterized by resentment and alienation. The local people have no interest in participating in local decisions nor do political leaders exert efforts to facilitate the people's involvement

in these processes. This could have a detrimental effect on LGNs' emergence and functioning between the people and LGs in particular, and other actors in general.

3.4.3 Structure and functions of local governments in Tigray and Amhara National Regional States[31]

Article 52 (2/a&b) of the FDRE provides regional states with the power to draft their own constitutions and establish a State administration that best advances democratic self-government. On the basis of this constitutional provision, the Tigray and Amhara Regional State Councils ratified their State Constitution on 19 and 22 June 1995 respectively. The two regions' governance structures and the functions of the various administration levels are very similar. With the exception of differences in the political processes that have already been discussed in this and other chapters, the administrative and fiscal practices are also very similar.

Article 45 (1) of the Tigray and Amhara Regional State Constitutions defines the administrative hierarchies of the respective regions in a similar fashion, with each Regional State being organized into regional, zone, *woreda* and *tabia/kebele* administrative hierarchies. However, the regional council may define other administrative hierarchies if this is deemed necessary (TNRS, 1995a; ANRS; 1995a). The *woreda* and *tabia/kebele* hierarchies constitute the local governance structure with which this sub-section is concerned.

Woreda government

As discussed earlier, the *woreda* structure was reinstated by Proclamation No. 7/1992 of the TGE. In fact, in the post-1991 period, the *woreda* is not a simple field administration run by appointed officials, but is now a self-governing unit run by elected officials. It forms the regional government's basic unit to which budgets are allocated and disbursed. It is the leading actor in local social, economic, and political developments, which has to facilitate and coordinate various state and non-state actors and communities' efforts.

Tigray and Amhara Regions have provided the *woreda* government with detailed structures, powers and duties though their Regional Constitutions. The *woreda* governments' structures, powers and duties are similar in the two Regions, as evidenced by Articles 73, 74,76, and 78 of the Tigray Regional Constitution and Articles 76, 77, 79, and 81of the Amhara Regional Constitution. According to Articles 73 and 76 of the Tigray and Amhara Regional Constitutions respectively, a *woreda* government consists of the following organs: a council made up of elected representatives from each *tabia/kebele*, an executive committee elected by the council from among its members, a judicial organ, the office of the *woreda* government attorney, the office of the security and police force,

Box 3.1
General and specific powers and duties of the woreda government

1. **General powers and duties:**
   - *Woredas* have the power to implement laws, regulations, policies and directives issued by the regional state; as well as having to prepare and decide on social services and economic development plans within their jurisdictions.
   - Without prejudice to the *powers* and rights of the *woredas* to self-administration, to manage their internal affairs, and to develop their localities, *woredas* are established as lower administrative organs of the regional state and zonal administration.

2. **Specific powers and duties:**
   - Approving the *woreda's* social services, economic development, and administrative plans and programmes.
   - Directing basic agricultural development activities, managing and protecting the *woreda's* natural resources.
   - Mobilizing resources from various sources and the people for developmental activities such as environmental rehabilitation and protection, drinking water development, primary health and education facility development, and the construction of low-grade rural roads.
   - Electing the chairperson, vice chairperson, and secretary of the council; as well as member of the executive committee; and issuing internal regulations and directives.
   - Levying and collecting land use and other service taxes, and agricultural income revenues, as well as utilizing the *woreda's* sources of revenues, with the exception of revenues allocated and managed by the region.
   - Preparing and approving the *woreda's* budget.
   - Managing lower grade rural roads, primary schools and health institutions.

Source: ANRS, 1995a; TNRS, 1995a.

and offices for economic and social development (ANRS, 1995a; TNRS, 1995a).

The *woreda* council meets every three months to discuss the social, economic and political plans and performances presented by the executive committee. The *woreda* council is accountable to the local electorate and to the executive committee of the zonal administration and, through it, to the region's executive committee for all its affairs and results. According to *woreda* officials, this entrenched chain of accountability to zonal and regional authorities has promoted

upward accountability rather than accountability to the electorate, because financial and human resource decision-making powers are concentrated in the hands of the hierarchies on which *woreda* governments depend. As stipulated by the Tigray and Amhara Regional Constitutions, the *woreda* governments' general and specific powers and duties are described in Box 3.1.

The *woreda* executive committee, which is usually referred to as the *woreda* administration (WA), consists of the chief administrator, vice-administrator, secretary and other members. As the name implies, the executive committee is an executive organ of the *woreda* government, responsible for identifying needs, preparing social, economic and administrative plans, and submitting them to the council for approval. It is also responsible for facilitating and dealing with the mobilization of resources from various potential sources and the local people. It coordinates and facilitates such activities through different committees and sector offices within its jurisdiction.

Woreda governments have been granted these powers and duties by the Regional Constitutions to promote local development. Of course, in spite of the differences in responding to such opportunities, *woreda* governments have been engaged in need assessment, prioritising, planning, and implementing local service development and delivery through the LGN with various actors such as the community development-oriented federal agency, NGOs, CBOs, donor agencies and the local people. However, until 2001, *woreda* governments had limited power and access to government financial and human resources to plan and implement local development activities within their jurisdictions. *Woreda* governments and sector offices' role in the local development, financed by means of a government budget, was limited. Sector offices would assess needs, priorities and identify projects without financial costing (because they had no information about the capital budget) and these would be submitted to the *Woreda* Development Committee (WDC). The WDC would discuss, review and consolidate these projects and submit them to the *woreda* council for approval. The *woreda* council would send them to the zonal administration, while each sector office would send a copy of the approved projects to the respective zonal departments. According to *woreda* officials and sector heads, they had no control over capital budgeting and such projects were no more than a wish list, because the resource amount was not known nor did the *woreda* government and sector offices have real power to implement all the projects they had identified and approved. According to informants, such projects had been reduced and even cancelled by zonal and regional sector departments and bureaus before finally being approved by the regional government.

As indicated in Box 3.1, *woreda* governments have the power to prepare, approve and implement budgets. However, in the research period this was limited to a recurrent budget with the WA and other sector agencies preparing budgets for salary and administrative costs. In fact, the *woreda* council's approval of the

recurrent budget was not final, as its approval had to pass through the zonal and regional hierarchies for review, adjustment and approval. The utilization of the recurrent budget was also very rigid, leaving little room for *woreda* agencies to reallocate the available budget. Finance office informants from Amhara and Tigray case study *woredas* explained that until 2001, they had had no access to the totally approved recurrent budget. The recurrent budget for various *woreda* agencies was released for each month of a fiscal year through the *woreda* finance offices by the zonal finance department to which the finance offices had to account on a monthly basis. Consequently, there was no chance for the *woreda* to extend the unused budget to the next month. Not only was reallocation restricted to a specific time, but also to cost items and sectors. According to informants, *woreda* agencies could not reallocate a budget from salaries to administrative and maintenance costs, nor could the *woreda* government reallocate a budget from one sector to another, for example, from education to health. In all cases, the relevant *woreda* agencies had to apply to the zonal finance department and the relevant zonal department had to obtain final approval from the regional finance bureau.

Box 3.1 also reveals that *woredas* could levy and raise revenue from land use, agricultural income and other services, which they could use for financing their activities. According to *woreda* finance office informants, this was possible, but they had no power to determine the tax rates, as the regional governments determine land use and agricultural income tax, while service tax rates are mostly determined by the federal government. These sources of revenue were therefore not sufficient lucrative for *woredas* to become self-sufficient in financing their development activities. Informants explained that agricultural land use and income taxes are the major sources of revenue and cover more than 60 percent of the total revenue. However, agricultural income is strongly affected by drought and erratic weather, which in turn affects the revenue from this source. As a result, despite *woredas* being allowed to utilize the revenue they raised, they could finance only a limited part of their recurrent budget. Table 3.1 below shows the total revenue and total recurrent budget of the four case study *woredas* for the years 1998-2001.

As shown in Table 3.1, no *woreda* even covered 50 percent of its total recurrent expenditure in any of the years. The average percentage of own total revenue in relation to total recurrent expenditure shows that all *woredas* covered less than 45 percent of their total recurrent expenditure. Nonetheless, the percentage of *woreda* expenditures financed from their own revenue appears quite high compared to those of other African countries, i.e., they are relatively autonomous in financing their recurrent expenditures. But, it should be noted that the per capita expenditures are extremely small. Moreover, the high percentage of own revenue generated to finance recurrent expenditure should not conceal

woredas' lack of decision-making power regarding their capital budget, which is very important to address locally identified development needs.

Table 3.1
Woreda total revenue (Rev.), recurrent expenditure (Exp.) and per capita in'00 ETB [32] (1998-2001)

	Rev.	*PCR*	*Exp.*	*PCE.*	*% own Rev. to Exp.*
Wukro					
1998	10016	0.10	31759	0.33	31.54
1999	14649	0.15	33299	0.34	43.99
2000	15111	0.15	35993	0.35	41.98
2001	16904	0.16	36520	0.35	46.29
Average	14170	0.15	34393	0.35	41.20
Bugna					
1998	12368	0.07	27532	0.15	44.92
1999	12431	0.07	30747	0.16	40.43
2000	13131	0.07	27623	0.14	47.54
2001	13606	0.07	40554	0.20	33.55
Average	12884	0.07	31614	0.17	40.75
Degua Temben					
1998	5090	0.05	13223	0.13	38.50
1999	5543	0.06	15378	0.15	36.05
2000	5725	0.06	17836	0.17	32.10
2001	6526	0.06	20314	0.19	32.12
Average	5609	0.06	16688	0.16	33.61
Baso Liben					
1998	6015	0.05	15849	0.13	37.95
1999	7861	0.06	20081	0.15	39.15
2000	8574	0.06	21664	0.16	39.58
2001	9256	0.07	23251	0.17	39.81
Average	7927	0.06	20211	0.17	39.12

Sources: Revenue (Rev.) and Expenditure (Exp.), Finance Office archives of the respective *woredas* (2003). Author's own computation: per capita revenue and expenditure, and percentage of own revenue to expenditure.
Note: PCR = per capita revenue, PCE = per capita expenditure.

The authority of *woreda* governments regarding the recruitment, placement, promotion, discipline, and transfer of personnel was also limited. In fact, until 2001, such activities were the mandate of the Regional Civil Service Commission (RCSC). However, RCSC informants explained that because of the diffi-

culties encountered by the RCSC in carrying out these duties in respect of each *woreda*, it had delegated its authority to undertake certain activities in this regard to *woreda* governments. Delegation circulars that were sent to the *woredas* from the two Regions' RCSC, showed that the same level of authority had been delegated. Following the rules and regulations set by the RCSC, *woreda* agencies could recruit and employ non-professional employees at a monthly salary level of up to ETB 230. According to the sector heads, however, the sector offices had to submit the recruitment and selection forms to the respective zonal department for review and approval before employment could occur. If, approved, the same document, accompanied by additional comments from the zonal department, had to be submitted to the RCSC for final approval. No matter how long it took, employment and payment could not be effected until an approval letter had come from the RCSC. Based on the civil service rules and procedures, *woreda* agencies could only promote their employees to the same salary level, i.e. ETB 230, and promotion had to endure the same processes as that of recruitment and selection.

With regard to discipline, each sector office was delegated to undertake disciplinary measures if any employee failed to observe rules and regulations, was found inefficient and/or behaved unethically as defined by the civil service law. A sector office could decide and implement disciplinary measures regarding failures or acts classified as 'simple offences' by the civil service law when approved by the *woreda* administration, but it had to notify its respective zonal department and RCSC. According to informants, the disciplinary measures in this category ranged from oral and written reprimands to a fine of two months' salary. In the case of failures or acts classified as 'critical offences', the *woreda* office could recommend disciplinary measures such as demotion or dismissal, but the measures could only be implemented if they were accepted by the RCSC.

The transfer of employees from one sector office to another was not delegated to *woredas*, but they could apply for this to the RCSC, provided that the office for which the employee was working was willing to transfer the budget to the office where the employee would be transferred.

Tabia/Kebele and Kushet/Gote administrations[33]

Tabia/kebele administration is a formal grassroots local government structure that the Regional Constitutions of Tigray and Amhara provided under Articles 83 and 86 respectively. The *Tabia/kebele* administration has its own council directly elected by the residents, executive committee elected by the council from among its members, a social court nominated by the *tabia/kebele* executive committee and approved by the council, and socio-economic and security bodies such as development committees and the local militia (ANRS, 1995a; TNRS, 1995a). Despite its political and administrative importance, the *tabia/kebele* is

not part of the government's fiscal and personnel structures, i.e. it has no government budget and technical staff. In undertaking local development, it therefore largely depends on its capacity to mobilize the local people, strong CBOs that supplement its efforts and access to external resources from organizations such as NGOs, donor agencies and community development-oriented government agencies.

The *Tabia/kebele* council is the highest decision-making body in its jurisdiction and conducts monthly meeting to discuss and follow up development activities and political processes. It is accountable to the local electorate and to the *woreda* executive committee. It implements directives and orders related to peace and security, enforcement of tax collection, public mobilization, and other related issues authorised by the *woreda* government. The executive committee, in collaboration with other committees such as *Tabia/kebele* Development Committees, is responsible for identifying the needs, priorities and planning of local service development and delivery in collaboration with *woreda* sector agencies, non-state actors and the community. The executive committee's primary responsibility is the mobilisation of the local people to actively and voluntarily participate in local service production and delivery decisions and activities

The *Kushet/gote* administration[34] forms part of the formal grassroots local government structure established below the *tabia/kebele* level. Unlike the *tabia/kebele*, its structure and functions are not defined in the Tigray and Amhara Regions' Constitutions, but have been established by constitutional provisions provided under Article 45 (1) of the respective Regions. According to regional and *woreda* officials, *kushet/gote* structures were established to move government structures closer to the people and also assist *tabia/kebele* structures in undertaking socio-economic activities. The *Kushet/gote* administration has an executive committee directly elected by the village community. The executive members are accountable to the village community and to *tabia/kebele* council and executive committee. This structure facilitates the link and information flow between government structures and communities. Since many villages in a *tabia/kebele* have no means of communication and transport, the establishment of this structure has contributed to reducing these barriers and made government accessible to local communities. Moreover, this structure facilitates and coordinates community participation in its own villages and in *tabia/kebele*-wide development efforts.

3.5 Brief Description of the Case Study *Woredas*

In Chapter one it was already clarified that four *woredas*, two from Tigray and two from Amhara Regions, were selected to investigate and understand the relationships between local service development and LGNs and the factors that affect their emergence and functioning. Wukro, Degua Temben, Bugna and

Baso Liben are the four case studies *wordedas*, the first two of which are situated in Tigray and the last two in Amhara (see Appendix 2 and 3). Most of the information used for the brief description of the *woredas* was collected through structured interviews with each *woreda's* relevant officials and experts.

Wukro Woreda

Wukro is one of the 35 *woredas* in the TNRS. It is situated in the Eastern Zone of Tigray Region (TNRS/Health Bureau, 2003). The *Woreda* covers an estimated area of 987.83 sq. km (CSA, 1998). The town of Wukro, the seat of the *Woreda* Government, is located 50 km north of Mekele, the regional capital (WA, 2003).

In 2001, the *Woreda* had an estimated population of 105,076 (48.8 percent male and 51.2 percent female) (CSA, 2002). The population is very homogenous with about 99 percent being Tigray and 97 percent Orthodox Christians (WA, 2003). The vast majority of the population (about 93 percent) are engaged in subsistence agriculture. It is a severely degraded and drought-prone *Woreda,* which affects crop production and livestock husbandry (Agriculture Office, 2003).

In terms of basic service provision to the local people, profiles show that in 2001, 90.2 percent of the total projected primary school age population were enrolled (91.0 percent of males and 89.3 percent of the females) (Education Office, 2003). 92.4 percent of the population have access to health services within a radius of 10 km (Health Office, 2003), while 74 percent had access to safe drinking water (Water Desk, 2003). The town of Wukro has automatic telephone lines, banking services, a postal agent, and a 24-hour hydroelectric power supply. However, these services have not been expanded to the rural hinterlands where the majority of the population lives.

The *Woreda* Government has its own council consisting of 165 members (75 percent men and 25 percent women) directly elected by the people from each *tabia.* The executive committee or WA consists of 11 members (10 men and 1 woman) elected by the *Woreda* Council from among its members. There are 17 *tabia* and 66 *kushet* administrations that are responsible for the social, economic and political activities in their jurisdictions (WA, 2003).

Degua Temben Woreda

Degua Temben is one of 10 *woredas* found in Tigray's Central Zone (TNRS/ Health Bureau, 2003). It covers an estimated area of 1,109.72 sq km (CSA, 1998). Hagere Selam, the seat of the *Woreda* Government, is located 51 km northwest of Mekele (WA, 2003).

According to the CSA 2002, as of 2001, the *Woreda* had an estimated population of 105,770 (49.4 percent male and 50.6 percent female). Almost 100 percent of the *Woreda* population is Tigray and 99.9 percent are Orthodox Chris-

tians (WA, 2003). Subsistence agriculture, the principal economic activity, engages more than 97 percent of the population. Like many other *woredas* in the region, drought is a serious problem that threatens the local people's survival (Agriculture Office, 2003).

In 2001, 54.8 percent of the total projected primary school age population (51.4 percent male and 58.2 percent female) were enrolled (Education Office, 2003). The primary health care service coverage was 48.1 percent (Health Office, 2003), with 36.6 percent of the total population having access to safe drinking water (Water Desk, 2003). A postal agent and manual telephone services are available in Hagere Selam town. There are no banking services or electric power available anywhere in the *Woreda*.

The *Woreda* Council is made up of 180 members (67 percent men and 33 percent women) directly elected from each *tabia*, while the executive committee consists of 11 members (10 men and 1 woman) elected by the council. 18 *tabia* and 63 *kushet* administrations are responsible for grassroots administration and socio-economic activities (WA, 2003).

Bugna Woreda

Bugna is one of the 105 *woredas* in Amhara National Regional State (ANRS/BoFED, 2003). Bugna *Woreda* covers an area of 2,290 sq km (CSA, 1998). The seat of the *Woreda* Government is in the town of Lalibela. It is a small, historic town surrounded by 13 rock-hewn churches that were constructed in the 12th century by King Lalibela. The town is located 310 km northeast of Bahir Dar, the regional capital (WA, 2003).

In 2001, the estimated population of the *Woreda* was 198,029 (50.2 percent male and 49.8 percent female) (Education Office, 2003). About 98 percent of the population are Amharas. Orthodox Christianity is the predominant religion that roughly accounts for 98.5 percent of the population (WA, 2003). Agriculture is the main economic activity with more than 95 percent of the population engaged in subsistence farming. Bugna is one of the most drought-prone *woredas* in the Amhara Region. It has been the victim of all droughts that have plagued the country in general and the region in particular. The natural environment upon which the inhabitants' survival depends has been severely depleted, and can scarcely provide a sufficient agricultural yield (Agriculture Office, 2003).

In 2001, 48.4 percent (49.1 percent male and 47.7 percent female) of the total projected primary school age population in the *Woreda* were enrolled (Education Office, 2003). 60.7 percent of the total population had access to primary health care service facilities within a 10 km radius (Health Office, 2003), while 27.5 percent had access to safe drinking water (Water Desk, 2003). The town of Lalibela has access to semi-automatic telephone lines, a regular postal agent, and a 24-hour supply of hydroelectric power. It has no banking services.

The *Woreda* consists of 117 members (81 percent men and 19 percent women) directly elected by residents from each *kebele*. The executive committee, made up of 9 members (8 men and 1 woman), is elected by the council from among its members. The *Woreda* Government has 35 *kebele* and 127 *gote* administrations (WA, 2003).

Baso Liben Woreda

Baso Liben is found in East Gojam Zone of the Amhara Region (ANRS/ BoFED, 2003b). The *Woreda* covers an area of 1,339.99 sq km (CSA, 1998). Yejube town, where the *Woreda G*overnment is seated, is located 292 km south of the regional capital (WA, 2003).

In 2001, the total estimated population of the *Woreda* was 138,038 (49.5 percent male and 50.5 percent female) (Education Office, 2004). The population is predominantly Amhara (99.9 percent) of whom about 98 percent are Orthodox Christians (WA, 2004). As in other *woredas* in the region, the vast majority (about 97 percent) of the population are engaged in subsistence agriculture. The *Woreda* is relatively fertile and productive. However, 43 percent of the *Woreda* is located on the Blue Nile gorge escarpment, which is characterized by heavy erosion that is damaging the land and its productive capacity (Agriculture Office, 2004). According to agricultural experts, pressure from the fast-growing population as well as the ever-increasing erosion and deforestation will undermine the productive capacity of the *Woreda* unless extensive and intensive conservation is carried out.

In 2001, 41.7 percent (49.4 percent male and 34 percent female) of the total projected primary school age population were enrolled (Education Office, 2004). Primary health care service coverage was 37.2 percent (Health Office, 2004), while 17.2 percent of the total population had access to safe drinking water (Water Desk, 2004).

Baso Liben has its own council consisting of 75 members (83 percent men and 17 percent women) directly elected by the local people from each *kebele*. The executive committee consists of 9 members (8 men and 1 woman). The *Woreda* has 25 *kebele* and 80 *gote* administrations that undertake socio-political activities at grassroots level (WA, 2004).

3.6 Conclusion

During more than a century of empire building and the establishment of a modern state administration, Ethiopia experienced a power monopoly by the centre and, even worse, by individuals who assumed the leadership at different times. Formal and informal LG structures were established at grassroots level to ensure state control and mobilization of resources for the centre rather than to promote local self-administration and development. Furthermore, the politi-

cal power was characterized by rivalry for hegemony that undermined opportunities for the development of a tolerant and civic culture – political power and leadership were aspired to and achieved at gun-point instead of through democratic means.

Hence, the lack of a pluralistic and democratic culture together with ethnic diversity, which was stimulated and entrenched as a major political programme, has presented major challenges for the post-1991 democratisation and governance reforms at national, regional and local levels. The post-1991 reforms have indeed put democratic institutions and structures in place at all levels, but they do not yet function effectively as formulated by laws and expected by the larger society. The power monopoly of the ruling party, the EPRDF, and the hostile relationship between the opposition parties and the EPRDF has undermined transformation towards a democratic local governance and society.

The Tigrayans and Amharas, who have been competing for supremacy since 1270, played important roles in Ethiopian history. However, the Tigray people's struggle for liberation, led by the TPLF (1975-1991), created an important difference between the two regions. The struggle for liberation created a strong bond between the Tigray people and their political leaders, which prepared the way for the socio-political changes in the region. These differences in background are very important to grasp the differences in the post-1991 socio-political development in the two regions.

The discussions of the Tigray and Amhara Regions' LG structures and functions have shown that *woreda* governments depended on zonal and regional governments for fiscal and human resources, which undermined their autonomy and promoted upward accountability. Nevertheless, it could be said that in a country where local governments had never been allowed to exercise self-governance, this start should be encouraged and cultivated. Local governments cannot simply be declared autonomous and self-sufficient by means of legislation, they have to pass through a learning process. However, the learning process should start at both ends: the higher authorities should learn and develop confidence in LGs and the LGs should simultaneously demand their constitutional rights.

Notes

1. Semites are people who belong to the Semitic language group and are mainly *Tigrigna* and Amharic speakers (Meheret, 1997).
2. *Abyssinians* are found in the provinces of Tigray, Agew and Amhara (Adhana, 1994).
3. The titles varied from place to place but *Chika Shum* was widely used in many provinces.

4. Among others, the 'Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the Ethiopian Oppressed People's Revolutionary Struggle (EOPRS), the Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organization (EMLRO), Ethiopian Workers League (EWL), and the Revolutionary Flame (RF)' (Meheret, 1997:131-132).
5. It was a ruthless, nation-wide measure that arbitrarily violated basic human rights and democratic freedoms in a manner unprecedented in Ethiopia's modern history (Kassahun, 2002).
6. 'The law made all land the property of the state, which became responsible for equitably distributing land to all farmers who would cultivate it. It was the *Derg's* single most important and radical undertaking that substantially transformed the social, economic and political landscape of the country' (Meheret, 1997:182).
7. These regions had their own *shengos* (councils) as the highest organs of state power within their jurisdictions that were supposed to be responsible for the implementation of laws, decisions, and directives issued by the central government, were to determine social and economic plans and budgets, as well as elect judges and executive committee members from their members (Asmelash, 2000).
8. The EPRDF was founded by the TPLF in 1989 as a mechanism for expanding resistance against the *Derg* beyond Tigray. Initially, it included the TPLF and EPDM and, in 1990, the TPLF organized those Oromo war prisoners captured while fighting for the *Derg*, and established the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO). This was an important step in which the TPLF brought the Oromo people into the struggle in its final effort to overthrow the *Derg*. The Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Front (SEPDF) is the final EPRDF member and was established in 1994 (Pausewang et al., 2002a).
9. The issue of nationality and nations and people's was the TGE's priority, guaranteed by Article 2(b) of the Charter: 'each nation nationality and people [has] the right to administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation' (Fasil, 1997:39).
10. Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul Gumuz; the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), Gambella Peoples, and Harari Peoples as well as Addis Ababa City administration.
11. The House of Peoples Representatives is the highest law-making organ of the Federal Government whose members are directly elected by the people.
12. The House of Federation is composed of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples whereby each Nation, Nationality and People is represented by at least one member and by one additional representative for each one million of its population.

13. In the Amhara and Tigray regions, it was suspended at the end of 2001 except in the Nationality Zones of Amhara (Awi, Himra, and Oromo peoples).
14. Nationality Zones are led by elected councils.
15. 'Established in 1992 by a group of distinguished Ethiopian economists, the Ethiopian Economic Association is arguably the most active and visible professional association in the county. […] Its monthly round table debates bring together policy makers, academics, businessmen and interested professionals to discuss topical economic issues and government policies related to them.' (Dessalegn, 2002: 113).
16. 'It was established in 1991, shortly after the fall of the *Derg*. EHRCO stresses that it is a non-partisan organization committed to promoting the rule of law and the democratic process. […] it has succeeded in putting the democratic credentials of the government under close scrutiny.'(Dessalegn, 2002:110).
17. 'EWLA was established in the mid-1990s by a group of women lawyers to defend women's rights through the legal system, to raise public awareness about the plight of women, and to agitate for reforms promoting gender equality' (Dessalegn, 2002:111).
18. There were 12 opposition political organizations that declared an armed struggle against the *Derg* of which 8 were ethnically based, demanding secession or ethnic autonomy. They include, among others, the Eritrea People's Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Afar Liberation Front (ALF), and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), (Meheret, 1997).
19. The urban majority feels more Ethiopian than a particular ethnic group such as Oromo, Sidama, Amhara, Wolayita, Goffa, or otherwise (Pausewang et al., 2002b).
20. The 'politics of to be' is embedded in 'revolutionary democracy' and its agenda is to create the broadest possible democratic conditions and practice for the emergence of an all-inclusive nation state that would ensure unity in diversity (Adhana, 1994:28).
21. The 'politics of not to be' consists of two variants: 'chauvinistic nationalism and a nationalism of withdrawal' who cannot reconcile to 'revolutionary democracy.' 'Nationalism of withdrawal' poses itself as a negative force promoting sprit of separation whereas 'chauvinistic nationalism' promotes the 100-year-old politics of domination. Both reinforce each other and promote disintegration than building new unity in diversity (Adhana, 1994:28).
22. In the May 1992 elections, 'where the public did not comply with the wishes of EPRDF, election results were declared invalid on formal grounds and the elections were repeated, in some places up to three times, until the EPRDF candidates were installed' (Pausewang et al., 2002b:31).

23. 'The EPRDF member parties were given the local and regional administrative positions, and based their authority on the presence of TPLF troops. They established their control at the local level and discouraged, inhibited or even penalized all other political activities (Pausewang et al., 2002b:30). Election observers have reported that closure of party offices, imprisonment and harassment of supporters prohibited opposition parties from equal participation (Pausewang et al., 2002b).
24. Including Mekele Special Zone, the Regional capital.
25. Including Bahir Dar Special Zone, the Regional capital.
26. A dynasty of non-Semitic Agew people that came to power in the 10th century, ending the Aksumit's empire. The Zagwe dynasty was overthrown by a joint struggle by the Amharas and Tigrayans (Young, 1997:42).
27. Descending from Menelik I, heir to King Solomon and Queen Sheba. The Solomonic myth was used to sanctify the rulers and also to deify the Ethiopian peoples (Young, 1997).
28. Born on 23 July 1892 in the then province of Harer (http://www.infoplease.com/biography/var/haileselassie.html).
29. For detailed views of the local people on this subject, see 6.3.1 for Amhara *woredas*.
30. Focuse Group discussion, Medage *Kebele*, Bugna *Woreda*, 19-12-03.
31. 'Regional state' or 'regional government' is used as an alternative to 'National Regional State'.
32. *Tabia* and *Kushet* administrations in Tigray are respectively equivalent to *Kebele* and *Gote* administrations in Amhara
33. On average, *Kushet* and *Gote* administrations consist of an estimated population of 500 to 1000 and 1000-1500 respectively

4 Establishment, Structures and Functions of Local Governance Networks in Four Case Study *Woredas*

4.1 Introduction

A review of the existing literature on local governance networks (LGNs), as presented in chapter two, shows that an LGN is a complex phenomenon that involves interdependent interactions and relationships between multiple actors from multiple sectors of society, each of which has its own defined organizational autonomy. They unite to promote commonly shared objectives within a defined territory. The purpose of this chapter is to empirically identify, describe and analyse different LGNs' processes, structures and functions in relation to the three selected services (drinking water, primary health care and environmental rehabilitation) in the case study *woredas*.

The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one discusses intergovernmental relations in the light of LGN formation and functioning processes. It briefly identifies and discusses the major processes and procedures that donor agencies and NGOs have to undergo at the different (from federal to *woreda*) levels of government when establishing LGNs between LGs and communities. Section two deals with the structures and functions of the different types of networks established at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. This section identifies the various actors that participate in each LGN and the latter's specific objective(s) that brought and kept the former together to act collectively. Section three presents a synthesis of some specific features of LGNs as revealed in the case study *woredas*.

4.2 Intergovernmental Relations and LGN Formation

Examination and analysis of LGN formation in the case study *woredas* showed that the processes are not confined to the local level, but they involve both supra-local and LG agencies. Hence, it is imperative to briefly examine the structure of government and of intergovernmental relations in order to identify and understand the processes and procedures at different levels. Chapter three revealed that the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia

(TGE) in 1991 brought an end to the hitherto unitary and centralized system of government. The TGE introduced new socio-political settings and adopted a decentralized system of government through the establishment of regional and *woreda* self-governments. The 1994 Constitution officially inaugurated a federal structure that endorsed the structures established by the TGE. Based on the federal and regional constitutions, the Ethiopian state has five tiers viz. the federal, regional, zonal,[1] *woreda* and *tabia/kebele* levels (see Figure 4.1) (Asmelash, 2000; Fenta, 1998; Meheret, 2002).

These tiers of government are interconnected to one another through political, administrative and functional chains of relationships (see Figure 4.1). The Federal Government is responsible for enacting all the laws necessary for governing the country's political processes and parties (FDRE, 1995). Hence, regional governments are politically related to the Federal Government and are governed by the policies and rules that it provides. Regional governments, on the other hand, are the supreme political authorities in their jurisdictions, with the lower-level structures under their direct supervision through a political, administrative and functional chain of relationships. A *woreda* government has its own council directly elected by the local people. However, the council is not only accountable and responsible to the electorate, but also to zonal executive committee and, through the latter, to the regional government for all political decisions and outcomes (ANRS, 1995a; TNRS 1995a).

It is through this chain that regional and zonal authorities control the local socio-political processes. In a less friendly political environment, as in the Amhara *woredas*, political control tends to rest heavily on local affairs, which has a negative effect on the emergence of LGNs between different actors in general and between LGs and the people in particular. Administrative relationships establish a direct chain of command through which each level of government supervises its agencies that are engaged in executing day-to-day functions. The functional chain of relationships, on the other hand, involves vertical interactions between the federal ministries and regional bureaus, zonal departments and regional bureaus, and *woreda* offices and zonal departments in relation to sector specific matters. It is through this chain of relationships that sectoral policies and standards are provided to lower-level agencies and supervised by the higher levels to ensure proper implementation. Moreover, it is through this channel that *woreda* government agencies receive support from regional and zonal agencies.

Figure 4.1
Intergovernmental relations between the different levels of government



Source: Author's own construct.

On examining supra-local governments' specific role in the emergence and functioning of LGNs, it becomes clear that the Federal Government has established general socio-political frameworks that have created an opportunity for non-state actors to be involved in local development activities. In its National Policy for Disaster Prevention and Management, the Federal Government has

clearly stated and encouraged NGOs and other organized groups to actively participate in supporting community-based development efforts (Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 1995). It has also been involved in regulating and supervising the processes of LGN formation. International and national non-state agencies can only form LGNs by navigating the federal agencies' legal and administrative processes. They are required to be legally registered and certified, and to also enter into a general agreement with a relevant federal agency to which they have to periodically report (see Appendix 7).

Regional governments and agencies also play a facilitator and regulator role between state and non-state actors in the processes of LGN formation and functioning. By establishing constitutionally defined self-governing LGs, regional governments laid the foundation for LGNs. Regional and *woreda* governments deal with intergovernmental relations that are necessary for local development. As noted above, the functional chain of relationships constitutes an important set of intergovernmental relationships between the regional and *woreda* governments. It is an important channel through which financial, material and human resources provided by the regional government are allocated and distributed to *woreda* agencies for local service development and delivery. Regional and zonal agencies prepare government-financed local development projects to be implemented by zonal agencies in partnership with *woreda* sector offices. In terms of planning government-financed projects, *woreda* agencies have a limited role (see 3.4.3).

Regional bureaus and zonal departments are also involved in local development projects financed by donors who do not provide resources directly to LGs. Donors such as the UNDP provide funds earmarked for local service development, these funds are allocated and disbursed to *woreda* governments through regional bureaus and are implemented by zonal departments in collaboration with *woreda* sector offices.

Non-state actors that want to establish an LGN with LGs and communities not only have to undergo federal but also the regional processes. They have to negotiate and sign basic agreements with the relevant regional bureau(s), which provides the legal background for operating in the region and establishing an LGN with the LGs and the people. In fact, regional or local non-state actors have to first be registered and certified by the regional Bureau of Justice. Regional bureaus that sign basic agreements are responsible for supervising the interventions of non-state actors who operate at the local level. They control and follow up implementation by means of the respective zonal departments and direct field visits to ensure that all projects are planned and implemented as per the agreements and that they produce the desired results. Bureaus also facilitate and support LGN formation and functioning through their respective zonal sector departments. They provide technical and managerial assistance to

Figure 4.2
Processes and procedures for the establishment and functioning of LGNs





Note: Figure 4.2 should read as a continuous flow chart
Source: Author's own construct

woreda sector offices in identifying, planning, implementing and monitoring NGO- or donor-supported projects.

Generally, LGN formation involves long processes; it is neither simple nor fast, since it involves multi-level government decisions. Figure 4.2 illustrates the structure, while Appendix 7 provides a description of the processes that international, national and regional/local non-state actors have to undergo in the various levels of government in order to establish an LGN with LGs and communities. International and national actors start at the federal level, while regional or local non-state actors start at the regional level. The required processes and procedures reflect the fact that the decentralization policy has not made it possible for non-state actors to directly contact and negotiate with local authorities to establish an LGN. Regional constitutions have given *woreda* governments the authority to decide on all matters within their jurisdictions. Practically, however, power is concentrated at higher levels. Even if *woreda* governments do have the right to accept or reject intervention, they cannot authorize donors and NGOs' intervention without higher authorities' approval. Hence, the decentralized structure has created a long path and several checkpoints for non-state actors in the processes of establishing an LGN at the local level.

More practical processes and interactions between LGN actors take place at the local level, as indicated by the bold lines and boxes in Table 4.2. Local authorities and agencies, NGOs, donor agencies, CBOs, and communities engage in a broad local development dialogue so as to identify, plan and implement local development activities. In this regard, NGO respondents reported that while such processes take place at the local level, the processes at the federal and regional levels cause delays. The respondents explained that most government officials do not have confidence in or trust NGOs' developmental roles. As a result, bureaucratic delays and a lack of responsiveness to demands and decisions are common features that hamper local development activities' implementation in a specific fiscal period. According to these respondents, this has created a serous challenge for them with regard to convincing funding agencies to extend the implementation period. The respondents elaborated that supra-local government agencies in general, and federal agencies in particular, emphasise control and supervision rather than facilitating and promoting LGN formation.

Federal Government agencies, however, claim that NGOs' complaints regarding excessive government control and regulation are farfetched and unreasonable. They argue that these claims are made because NGOs wish to avoid government control and to act in their own interest, which the government will not accept (EU and MoCB, 2004). Research results, however, confirm the NGOs' claims rather than those of the government. Although there has been considerable improvement in the state-NGO relationship over the last few years, government agencies involved in the registering, regulating, and monitor-

ing of NGOs and their activities still focus on control (Dessalegn, 2002; Kassahun, 2002). Adey (1999) argues that this uneasy relationship has to be addressed, as it will undermine the development of an effective partnership between the two sectors. Graham (N.D.a) suggests that supra-local government agencies have to avoid the mentality that they can and should control non-state actors' every step and operational activity at the local level. However, it is still imperative that supra-local governments exercise optimal control and provide a legal framework within which non-state actors have to work, which includes obeying the laws of the country.

4.3 Structure and Functions of LGNs

LGNs do not have one and the same structure and function. They vary depending on the objectives established for and the nature of the relationship between the actors involved. Multiple and autonomous institutional actors' involvement in establishing and achieving common objectives makes the network structure and its management more complex than traditional public sector management. Managing an LGN not only involves bringing multiple actors together and accommodating them at some relevant level, but also facilitating, motivating and coordinating these actors' efforts. LGN management involves influencing different actors with different characteristics. It mainly involves negotiating and initiating the interactions between actors to achieve the specific objectives that necessitated the establishment of a network. Coordination to promote local development through collective efforts is key to an LGN.

Empirical assessments and examination were carried out in the case study *woredas* to identify LGNs' structures and functions. The results revealed that different LGNs have been established at the *woreda*, *tabia/kebele* and *kushet* levels. These LGNs have horizontal or non-hierarchical relationships between international, national, regional and local actors that have joined LGNs by means of negotiations and interactions. In this type of LGN, the nature of the established relationships matters rather than the actors' organizational location or origin.

Horizontal LGNs consist of both state and non-state actors that are directly involved in supporting local development efforts. Such LGNs create opportunities for the sharing of information, ideas, views, experiences, and strategies between diversified actors through interactions and inter-linkages. They are directly engaged in facilitating and/or implementing local development projects. Table 4.1 below presents a profile of horizontal LGNs in relation to the three selected services in the respective case study *woredas*.

Table 4.1
Profile of LGNs by woreda

No.	LGN	Wukro	Degua Temben	Bugna	Baso Liben	Sector/ purpose	Principal functions
1*	*Woreda* Development Committee (WDC)	X	X	X	X	Multi-sector or purpose	Facilitates, coordinates, and supervises all socio-economic development activities carried out in the *woreda*
2*	*Woreda* Development Steering Committee (WDSC)	-	-	X	-	Multi-sector or purpose	Facilitates, coordinates, and supervises all development activities carried out through non-state actors' support.
3*	*Woreda* Project Advisory Committee (WPAC)	X	-	-	-	Multi-sector or purpose	Facilitates, coordinates, and supervises all project activities financed by ETDP/Irish Aid.
4*	Community Project Committee (CPC)	X	X	-	X	Multi-sector	Facilitates, coordinates, and supervises all project activities financed by ESRDF
5*	*Woreda* Community Health Committee (WCHC)	X	X	X	-	Health	Facilitates primary health care awareness creation and service delivery at *woreda* level
6*	Network for SDW service development	X	X	X	X	Water	Facilitates, coordinates, plans, implements, and monitors SDW projects.

Continued

Table 4.1 *(Continuation)*

No.	LGN	Wukro	Degua Temben	Bugna	Baso Liben	Sector/ purpose	Principal functions
7*	Network for primary health care service development and delivery	X	X	X	X	Health	Facilitates, coordinates, plans, implements, and monitors primary health care service development and delivery activities supported by different state[2] and non-state actors
8*	Network for environmental rehabilitation	X	X	X	X	Agriculture/ Environment	Facilitates, coordinates, plans, implements and evaluates environmental rehabilitation works carried out by different state and non-state actors
9**	*Tabia/kebele* Development Committee (T/KDC)	X	X	X	X	Multi-sector	Facilitates & coordinates overall socio-economic development activities carried out in the *tabia/kebele*
10**	*Tabia/Kebele* Community Health Committee (T/KCHC)	X	X	X	-	Health	Promotion of primary health care awareness creation and service delivery at the *tabia level*
11**	*Tabia* and *Kushet* Conservation Committees	X	X	-	-	Agriculture/ Environment	Plan, implement and evaluate the SWC and afforestation works in the respective jurisdiction

Source: Field data, 2003.
Notes: 'X' represents presence while '-' represents absence of a particular LGN in the corresponding *woreda*
Scope: * *woreda*-wide
** *tabia/kebele*-wide

As shown in Table 4.1 above, there are horizontal LGNs in each of the case study *woredas*, but some of the horizontal LGNs mentioned are found only in one or two of the mentioned *wordedas*. For example, WDC and T/KDC are found in all *woredas*, whereas WPAC is found only in Wukro. The table also shows that some of the LGNs are multi-sector or multi-purpose networks while others' major activities focus on a single sector in the local socio-economic development processes. Those LGNs dealing with broader socio-economic activities, or more than one sector are classified as multi-sector or multi-purpose networks, while those dealing with development and delivery of specific sectoral services are single-sector networks. However, it has to be noted that single-sector networks could involve multi-sector actors while dealing with a specific service. For example, CHCs consist of members from different sectors but deal with health and health-related issues.

4.3.1 Multi-sector or multi-purpose LGNs

As shown in Table 4.1, WDC/WDSC, WPAC, CPC, and T/KDC are multi-sector or multi-purpose LGNs. However, WDC/WDSC and T/KDC are broader than WPAC and CPC. The principal functions of the former two are not sector bound, while the latter two only deal with sectoral development activities in more than one sector. WDC/WDSC and T/KDC are responsible for all the socio-economic development activities within their jurisdictions. WDC/WDSC and T/KDC mainly play a catalyst role, i.e. facilitating and coordinating local development planning and implementation through various actors. WPAC and CPC have a hybrid role, i.e. facilitating, coordinating and implementing projects for which they were established.

(i) Woreda Development Committee (WDC)

According to *woreda* officials, the WDC is established by the *woreda* council on the basis of regional government directives. The WDC is accountable to the *woreda* council. It was initially perceived to include only the public domain consisting of the *woreda* administration (WA) and sector agencies. Its objectives were broad: facilitating, coordinating and supervising all socio-economic development activities. However, different non-state actors' involvement in the local development processes indicated that there was a need to expand the WDC's membership beyond the public domain. Bugna, in fact, established an independent *Woreda* Development Steering Committee (WDSC), which is responsible for facilitating and coordinating the efforts and resources of non-state actors engaged in local development. The WDC has a similar structure in that the chief *woreda* administrator chairs it and the head of the *woreda* administration's economic affairs is the secretary of the committee. The number and diversification of WDC's members vary between *woredas*, depending on the diversification and number of state and non-state actors that have joined the committee. All

non-state actors are free to join the WDC, in practice, however, only those that have a project office or representative at the *woreda* level, and therefore have regular contact and interactions with LG agencies and communities, join the committee. Table 4.2 below illustrates the profile of the case study *woredas'* WDC members.

Table 4.2
Members of the WDC by woreda

No.	Members	Wukro	Degua T'ben	Bugna	Baso Liben
1	Chief *Woreda* Administrator	X	X	X	X
2	Head of Economic Affairs for the WA	X	X	X	X
3	Head of Social Affairs for the WA	X	X	X	X
4	Head of Finance Office	X	X	X	X
5	Head of Education Office	X	X	X	X
6	Head of Health Office	X	X	X	X
7	Head of Agriculture Office	X	X	X	X
8	Head of Justice Office	X	X	-	-
9	Head of Police Office	X	X	-	-
10	Chairpersons of the *Woreda Seleste Mahberat*[3]	X	X	-	-
11	REST Project Coordinator	X	X	-	-
12	ETDP/Irish Aid representative	X	-	-	-
13	WVE Project Coordinator	X	-	-	-
14	SARDP representative	-	-	-	X

Source: Field data, 2003
Note: 'X' represents membership while '-' represents non-membership

WDCs do not only vary regarding the number and diversification of their members, but also regarding their success in facilitating and coordinating intervention and interactions between actors. Differences in the *woredas'* leadership capacity and stability have caused differences in the WDCs' success in steering and promoting local development through the involvement of various actors. The following discussions deal with the specific features and activities of the WDCs in the case study *woredas*

Wukro

As mentioned earlier, the WDC was initially perceived as only being within the public domain. According to *woreda* officials, the WA was convinced that the WDC had broad duties and responsibilities that were impossible to achieve without non-state actors' direct participation in resource mobilization as well as in facilitating and coordinating efforts. As a result, the WA initiated and called on non-state actors operating at the *woreda* level to join the WDC so that a multi-actor LGN could be established. *Woreda* officials further stated that ini-

tially the non-state actors did not show much interest, since they focused on sector-based networks through which their projects were planned and implemented. They were, moreover, not enthusiastic to network among themselves through a larger non-sector LGN. They have a tendency to do everything their way and to demonstrate superior performance instead of sharing their methods and experiences.

WA officials explained that in order to show the significance of the WDC as a centre of development dialogue, the WA had to organize discussion fora involving different local development actors operating within the *woreda*. This gradually stimulated the non-state actors to actively participate and support the WDC's activities. *Woreda* officials maintained that unlike other non-state actors, the *Seleste Mahberat* demonstrated their interest and commitment from the very beginning, since they are closely associated with the *woreda* administrative and political systems that were established during the time of the liberation movement. The *Seleste Mahberat* leaders furthermore explained that their keen interest in and commitment to WDC participation are not only due to their close association with the WDC, but also because WDC membership has created an important opportunity for them to be involved in *woreda*-wide development dialogue and decision-making processes.

Non-state actor informants agreed that there is a lack of interest in networking among themselves due to their sense of mistrust and competition. A further, practical, reason why they focus more on sector-specific networks than on the WDC is because funding agencies mainly evaluate their performance on the basis of the successful implementation of projects that they finance, rather than on their role in the overall local development processes. The informants explained that despite this, the WA's efforts to organize continuous discussion fora motivated them and demonstrated the WDC's importance. Discussion processes facilitated the development of shared perceptions of interdependence rather than competition and conflict. The informants added that discussions, moreover, promote the communication and exchange of ideas and information that complement and facilitate their projects' implementation. In the end, non-state actors considered their membership in the WDC as an asset rather than a liability.

The WDC adopted different methods to bring members and other actors together in order to carry out its duties and responsibilities regarding the facilitating and coordinating of socio-economic development. Monthly and need-based or issue-driven meetings and conferences are among these methods. According to the members, the WDC conducts monthly meetings to discuss new projects, progress reports, challenges encountered, and opportunities identified during project implementation. It organizes semi-annual *woreda*-wide conferences that involve *woreda* councillors and executive members, sector heads and experts, *Seleste Mahberat* leaders, *tabia* and *kushet* leaders, NGO and donor

agency representatives, and community representatives. The participants discuss issues such as major development challenges and opportunities, needs and priorities, distribution of services, and ways of improving coordination and resource mobilization.

The WDC does not only deal with projects supported by non-state actors, but also by government budgets. Project ideas and needs, identified by sector offices, are discussed by the members before they are submitted to the *woreda* council for approval. The WDC oversees development activities carried out by the regional and zonal agencies in collaboration with sector offices and zonal departments. Non-state actor informants explained that they have little interest in discussing government-financed projects and activities, as they have no influence on the decisions made by regional and zonal agencies. *Woreda* officials shared these views and added that not only non-state actors, but also the *woreda* government and its agencies have little real influence.

The members explained that in general the WDC is an important LGN in facilitating and coordinating the various actors' efforts and resources for local development. Among others, the members recognized the following as the WDC's most important benefits:

- Promotes a common vision and objective for local development.
- Promotes cohesion and understanding through frequent interactions and close relations.
- Creates opportunity for sharing experiences and learning.

These benefits have in turn improved the 'knowledge and relational resources, and mobilization capacity'[4] for better local development. According to the members, discussions in the WDC have helped to promote a common vision and understanding regarding improving the local development. They further explained that *woreda*-wide dialogue fora have brought multi-actors together to discuss common local development agendas. This has created opportunities for interactions and interconnections, thus improving relationships between the actors. Some actors are thereafter able to discuss issues regarding local development's common agendas that they would otherwise not have had a chance to communicate. This is true for most NGOs that have few or no independent relationships among themselves. WDC members explained that such relations and discussions have created opportunities for actors to learn. The various actors share their various experiences with and information on the local development opportunities and challenges in general and those of their intervention area(s) in particular.

The WDC has created an opportunity for a more structured and coherent mobilization of resources for local development. For example, the *woreda's* most important local resource is the local people and the maximum use of this resource strongly depends on a smooth and positive relationship with the local

people. Through its structures that extend up to the grassroots level, *Seleste Mahberat's* presence and active participation in the WDC is a powerful instrument for mobilizing resources from community members.

Degua Temben

The WDC in Degua Temben is dominated by state actors since there are only a few non-state actors that are directly involved in the *woreda* development processes (see Table 4.2). It consists of the WA, sector agencies, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), and the *Seleste Mahberat.* According to *woreda* officials, the WA did try to facilitate its activities so that it could fulfil its objectives; nevertheless, the Committee barely received the necessary leadership to function effectively and successfully. The *woreda* leaders' weak capacity (see Table 4.3) affected the WDC's success, leading to the *woreda* leadership being changed, which in turn affected the opportunity for learning and building experiences regarding how to facilitate and coordinate local development.

Informants from sector offices, the RSET project office and *woreda Seleste Mahberat* stated that the WDC could not drive local development. They explained that the *woreda* leaders lack important leadership capacity such as skill, vision, strategic thinking, as well as the motivation and effort required to mobilize and coordinate resources from various actors. They have limited negotiation and dialogue skills with which to steer interactions and relationships between state and non-state actors. According to them, the WDC monthly meetings are not held regularly either. When conducted, discussions are mostly dominated by the WA and sector offices' issue-driven agendas and day-to-day routine administrative reports rather than a discussion of strategic issues. As a result, meetings are poorly attended. The informants reported that, for example, police and justice offices very rarely participate because their day-to-day activities are neither directly related to the WDC per se, nor does the WA makes the forum attractive for them to participate and contribute ideas. Strategic issues such as how to identify needs and priorities, opportunities and challenges, develop project ideas, and mobilize resources have consequently remained of secondary interest. According to sector informants, the *woreda* leaders have not exerted the necessary effort required to solicit and demand support from potential development actors. As a result, the sector offices have had limited opportunities to establish sector-based networks that could have provided an opportunity for learning from diversified experiences and access to more resources to expand and deliver services.

The informants also explained that the WA has not invested time and effort in organizing a development dialogue forum by using its own initiative. It has largely tended to organize such fora as a result of directives from higher-level governments (zonal and/or regional) to discuss specific or broad socio-political issues in the region that have a direct and indirect impact on the local people.

The *Seleste Mahberat* leaders stated that in spite of the WA's weakness, they have a vested interest in the WDC and have, for two reasons, also made efforts to improve its performance. First, they have a stake in the *woreda* political and administrative systems. Hence, the leaders explained, they would not like to see things go wrong and eventually blame the WA from a distance. Secondly, they believe that the WDC is an important forum though which to be involved in the larger *woreda* development decision-making processes. According to the leaders, they had asked and urged the WA to organize discussion fora on broad local development issues. Although the responses were not always positive, their demands have helped to pressurize the WA and organize discussion fora at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. These fora play an important role in keeping the local people focussed on local development.

Sector and REST project office informants appreciated the interest and the vital role that the *Seleste Mahberat* have played. The sector informants stated that the *Seleste Mahberat* are important members of the WDC, integrating LGs' development activities into the local people's efforts through their chains of relationships.

Bugna

Unlike other case study *woredas*, the WDC in Bugna consists of members from the WA and sector agencies (see Table 4.2). According to the *woreda* officials, the WA was convinced of the importance of involving non-state actors in the WDC and tried to encourage and involve those operating at the *woreda* level. Non-state actors were, however, not enthusiastic and when they participated in meetings, they did not show interest in discussing government plans and activities for the same reasons mentioned by non-state actors in Wukro. The WA therefore did not really push the idea of bringing non-state actors into the WDC. The SNV-Bugna Integrated Rural Development Programme (SNV-BIRDP) then took the initiative and came up with the idea of establishing an independent body that would coordinate the efforts and resources of the various non-state actors engaged in the local development. Other non-state actors, such as the Plan-Bugna Community-Based Rural Development Programme (Plan-BCBRDP) and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church Development and Inter Church Aid Commission (EOC/DICAC), reacted positively to the initiative. This gave rise to the establishment of the *Woreda* Development Steering Committee (WDSC). This did not, however, abolish the WDC, which was established by a regional government directive, and continues to oversee all the development activities and coordinate those projects carried out by means of government budget and community mobilization.

The WDSC has emerged as a multi-sector and multi-actor LGN consisting of the WA[5], agriculture, education and health offices, water desk, SNV, Plan, UNICEF-*Woreda* Integrated Basic Service (UNICEF/WIBS) programme coor-

dinator, and EOC/DICAC. The WDSC is chaired by the chief *woreda* administrator, and the secretary is elected on a rotating basis from among the members. According to *woreda* officials, the rotation of the secretary position was deliberately decided on by the members to actively involve all members in the WDSC's leadership and management. The members appreciated this practice and explained that it had helped them to develop a real sense of belonging. The WDSC is responsible for facilitating and coordinating the interventions and activities of non-state actors who are engaged in improving local service development and delivery. The principal functions of the WDSC include:

- Reviewing and discussing the needs, priorities and development plans as set by each sector and its partners and to be implemented by the same;
- Monitoring and evaluating fund allocation and implementation processes through periodical field visits and reports submitted by implementing agencies;
- Facilitating communication and the exchange of information between actors so that each member has a clear idea of what others are doing, which in turn prevents duplication of efforts and conflict between actors; and
- Organizing workshops at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels to discuss different actors' development challenges and opportunities and to exchange experiences.

Members reported that in order to carry out these and other functions, the WDSC conducts monthly meetings. Whenever urgent matters loom that require the members' attention and intervention, the chairperson can convene the Committee at any time before the monthly meeting.

Members explained that the WA plays an active and important role that makes the WDSC the centre of development dialogue and discussions. Informants from Plan and SNV appreciated the chair and other members of the WA's efforts, willingness and commitment to making the WDSC a successful LGN structure. According to them, the WA has exerted immense efforts in encouraging and convincing each of the sector offices to invest the maximum time and effort in identifying major problems and service gaps in the relevant sectors. These efforts are important incentives for them to expand and renew phased-out interventions.

Woreda officials also confirmed that the WA is really interested in and committed to the WDSC, as it has created an opportunity to facilitate and coordinate efforts and resources from various non-state actors through their active participation. All the members are interested in and committed to active participation. These officials explained that the SNV's interest in and commitment to the WDSC's emergence and functioning deserves special emphasis. Plan is also appreciated for its interest in and commitment to actively participating and supporting the Committee's activities.

According to the members, the fact that the WDSC was established as a result of state and non-state actors' mutual interests, created opportunities for all

the participating actors' wholehearted efforts. It is the most important LGN for learning and communication for not only actors within the *woreda* but also outside the *woreda*. This has been made possible through workshops organized at the *woreda* level and involving actors from zonal agencies and non-state actors operating in neighbouring *woredas*. An example of this is the 'sustainable land use (SLU) and natural resources management (NRM) workshop' that took place in October 1998. The WDSC not only conducts workshops at the *woreda* level, but also at the community level, for example, the 'community leadership workshops' (see Box 6.2).

Baso Liben

Like other *woredas*, the WDC was primarily established with the aim of promoting local development. However, *woreda* officials stated that the WDC could not emerge and function as an important LGN. They explained that the unstable political and administrative environment, characterized by a frequent change in leadership[6], provided *woreda* leaders with little time and chance to exercise effective leadership. Sector informants also confirmed that the WA has little time to conduct WDC meetings to discuss and coordinate the sectoral service development and delivery financed by government, let alone to identify specific development challenges and opportunities that can serve as a basis for requesting and demanding state and non-state actors' support.

According to *woreda* officials and sector informants, the fact that the *woreda* was selected by the Swedish-Amhara Rural Development Program (SARDP) as one of the eight intervention *woredas* in the East Gojam Zone created an opportunity to reactivate the WDC's activities. An SARDP informant stated that it was crucial to reactivate the WDC and KDC, as they are responsible for coordinating, planning and implementing all projects financed by the SARDP. When intervention started in late 1998, the WDC and KDC were not functioning. Hence, the SARDP began its intervention by providing participatory development planning and implementation training to WDC members so that they could take over these activities. In spite of this capacity-building support, the informant explained that the *woreda* leadership was unable to make the WDC effective. According to an SARDP informant[7], 'the political and administrative environment in Baso Liben has not been favourable for collective efforts to promote local development. Frequent turnover of *woreda* and *kebele* leaderships and alienation between local community and political leaders are critical problems'.

Besides the absence of diversified non-state actors that can facilitate interactions and exchange of experiences, another factor affecting the WDC's activities is the lack of smooth and cooperative relationships between the *woreda* leaders and sector agencies. The *woreda* leaders tend to dominate and impose their ideas instead of promoting dialogue and discussions in decision-making. These

Table 4.3
Woreda leadership capacity assessment for the emergence and functioning of LGNs

Assessment criteria	Wukro (n=24)			Degua Temben (n=24)			Bugna (n=24)			Baso Liben (n=21)		
	% relative frequency			% relative frequency			% relative frequency			% relative frequency		
	H	M	H	M	L	H	M	L	L	H	M	L
1. Vision and strategic thinking for local development	71	21	71	21	8	12.5	62.5	25	12.5	0	24	76
2. Facilitating and coordinating identification of needs and intervention areas for others to take part	67	21	67	21	12	17	62.5	25	12.5	0	38	62
3. Negotiating with and requesting different actors for resources and other supports	75	17	75	17	8	8	71	21	8	0	14	86
4. Determination and motivation to defend local interests	62.5	25	62.5	25	12.5	21	75	21	4	0	24	76
5. Motivation and efforts in promoting LGN between different actors	71	12.5	71	12.5	12.5	12.5	75	12.5	12.5	0	38	62
6. Organizing and conducting *woreda*-wide discussions and dialogue fora that involve multi-actors	75	21	75	21	4	12.5	58	21	21	0	33	67
7. Political will	83	17	83	17	0	75	37.5	25	37.5	0	14	86
Average relative frequency	72	19	72	19	9	23	63	22	15	0	26	74

views were confirmed by sector office informants. According to them, *woreda* officials mostly appear to have made their decisions before the meeting and leave little room for discussions with the other members. The net effect of these meetings has been that the informants basically listen to what has been decided rather than discussing what to decide. Despite the WDC having showed very little improvement with regard to activities, all members appreciated the SARDP's efforts and interests in making it an important local development forum.

The preceding discussions show that the WDC/WDSC is an important LGN for steering local development through sectoral and other networks. However, the various *woredas* have differing capacities to make it the real centre of development dialogue and to promote the emergence and functioning of other LGNs. An assessment of each of the case study *woreda's* leadership capacity was carried out on the basis of certain criteria that are considered important for the emergence and functioning of LGNs between various actors. With the exception of Baso Liben[8], a total of 24 respondents were drawn per *woreda* from the various actors that are responsible and/or have a direct relationship with the WA's activities. The composition and number of respondents are as follow: regional officials (4), *woreda* councillors (4), *woreda* cabinet members (4), sector heads (4), *tabia/kebele* leaders (4), and non-state WDC/WDSC members (4). For each assessment criteria, the respondents were given three levels of assessment, i.e. high (H), medium (M) and low (L). They selected one as based on their evaluation of the *woreda* leadership's capacity. The relative frequency of the assessment results for each criterion is shown in Table 4.3.

The capacity assessment clearly reveals that there are differences in the way *woredas* promote and facilitate LGNs for local development. The average relative frequency in Table 4.3 shows that the Wukro *Woreda* leadership is rated as high by more than 72 percent of the respondents. Bugna is ranked second, with 63 percent of the respondents giving a high rating. The average relative frequency for Degua Temben shows that 56 percent of the respondents assess the *woreda* leadership capacity as low. The assessment shows that Baso Liben is the weakest of all the case study *woreda*s, with 74 percent of the respondents giving a low rating. In fact, none of the respondents give it a high rating in respect of any of the criteria.

Interestingly, the relative frequencies for the Tigray *woreda* leaders' political will do not only show high, but also the highest of all the assessment criteria. In spite of differences in the average relative frequency, there is little difference in terms of political will between Wukro and Degua Temben *Woredas*. Only 37.5 of the respondents rate the Bugna *Woreda* leadership high in respect of this criterion, which is its lowest relative frequency. As discussed earlier, Baso Liben has the lowest rating with regard to the average relative frequency, with political will being rated as the lowest (86 percent) of all the other assessment criteria.

This shows the sharp difference in the political interest and commitment between the Tigray and the Amhara *woreda* leaderships.

(ii) Tabia/Kebele Development Committee (T/KDC)

According to *woreda* officials, the regional directive that provided for the establishment of the WDC also included directives for the establishment of a similar structure at the *tabia/kebele* level. As a result, a T/KDC was established in each *tabia/kebele* to steer local development at grassroots level. It is accountable to the *tabia/kebele* council. There is no major difference in the T/KDC's structures between the case study *woredas*, with the exception of the Tigray *woredas* where the *Seleste Mahberat* are among the most important members. Chaired by the *tabia/kebele* chief administrator, the T/KDC consists of the head of economic affairs for the *tabia/kebele* administration, the head of social affairs, the school director, the head of the local health institution, the agricultural Development Agent (DA), community representatives, and the chairpersons of *Tabia Seleste Mahberat*. *Tabia/kebele* administration members are not professional employees; they are elected local politicians. The school director, head of the health institution, and the DA are *woreda* sector employees who participate in T/KDC on a voluntary basis.

The T/KDC is responsible for facilitating and coordinating development activities at grassroots level that are carried out by state, non-state actors and the local people. It has to identify local development needs and priorities within its jurisdiction in collaboration with sector offices and other non-state actors that are engaged in supporting local development activities. The T/KDC's principal responsibility is facilitating and coordinating community participation.

In principle, the T/KDC's major duties and responsibilities are similar. Practically, however, activities and roles vary in Tigray and Amhara *woredas*. Both in Wukro and Degua Temben *Woredas*, *Tabia* Development Committees (TDCs) are important grassroots LGN structures. They link the efforts of the local community with state and non-state actors operating in the *woreda*. According to *woreda* and *tabia* officials, TDCs have actively participated in identifying development needs and priorities and selecting and suggesting specific *kushets* and sites for the establishment of different services. TDCs facilitate and coordinate community involvement and resource mobilization to leverage local development activities that are carried out by different state and non-state actors in a *tabia*.

According to *woreda* officials, the strong affiliation and trust in the political system that *tabia* leaders and the people have, the experiences they gained in undertaking local development during the liberation movement and the presence of the *Seleste Mahberat* are the most important factors that enabled TDCs to emerge and carry out crucial roles in the local development efforts. For example, *tabia* leaders in Degua Temben stated that in spite of the *woreda* leader-

ship's weakness in attracting diversified actors that could support and motivate the local people, community members actively participate and mobilize the resources at their disposal for local development. *Tabia* leaders and community members explained that the TPLF has convinced the local leaders and people that they can overcome poverty through a joint effort, as they had done when they defeated the *Derg* Government. All community members share this very strong conviction that has brought them together in pursuit of the common objectives of socio-economic development.

Indeed, the *Seleste Mahberat* are the most important and influential members of community-based LGN structures, including the TDC. *Tabia* leaders stated that the presence of the *Seleste Mahberat* in the committee is an important asset, since the local people know them through their good reputation. Community members also explained that they have trust and confidence in what the *Seleste Mahberat* suggest and do. Hence, they serve as important instruments for mobilizing resources and voluntary efforts from the members.

In Amhara *woredas*, the *Kebele* Development Committees (KDCs) have not developed strongly enough to facilitate and promote voluntary community participation in the local development processes. Officials in Bugna *Woreda* explained that the lack of affiliation and trust between the local people and the political system is a big problem that hampers the emergence and development of community-based LGN structures. Officials stated that because of public alienation from and resentment of the existing political system – from the regional to *gote* levels – emphasis is placed on political channels and structures. Community informants revealed that the local people are rarely consulted about their affairs, except with regard to development activities supported and carried out by non-state actors such as SNV and Plan that have directly involved them in need identification, prioritisation, planning, and implementation processes in which the people have developed an interest. In the absence of such actors, officials usually tell the local people what to do instead of asking them; people are also told the consequences of not participating rather than the benefits. Hence, there is hardly any interest in voluntary participation.

The following statement made by the SNV confirmed the problem related to the local people and politicians' trust and confidence in each other with regard to working together towards common objectives. SNV-BIRDP (1997:1) stated that the two important partners, the LG and the people, lack of confidence in each other is one of the major challenges of local development in Bugna. The SNV further elaborated that:

> '[…] the government has sometimes still an attitude of "we know best"; the government should tell the people how to develop themselves – the top-down attitude. This strengthens the people's apathy, which in turn confirms the government's approach of having to tell the people what to do. The result is a severe

lack of confidence between the two parties, a gap that has become an important obstacle for development.'

In order to improve the KDC's role in the local socio-economic development processes, SNV and Plan provide members with capacity building through training and workshops. SNV's capacity-building efforts in respect of participatory local development processes have not been limited to KDC members, but also include wider groups. Participatory community workshops have been organized for *woreda* officials, experts, *kebele* and *gote l*eaders, and community members to narrow the gap between the local people and political leadership. According to the *woreda* officials, these have started to work. Nevertheless, public alienation from and resentment of the political system are still important factors that continue to affect the state-society relations. In fact, *woreda* and *kebele* leaders still focus on coercing rather than on convincing the people to take the initiative and participate voluntarily in local development.

As mentioned in the discussion of the WDC with regard to Baso Liben, until the late 1998, KDCs did not function at all. *Kebele* leaders stated that at the *woreda* or *kebele* level the KDC is not discussed at all. The political leadership is preoccupied with political affairs rather than with development. An official[9] from Yelmeleme *Kebele* stated that 'the name KDC implies development; however, development is not the main agenda in this *woreda*. So, the KDC cannot emerge as an active, community-based development structure.' According to community informants, *kebele* and *gote* administrations are the most favoured structures to supervise and control community activities. They mobilize the local people to carry out conservation work, but the people are not consulted about what to do or how to do it..

Similar to the WDC, the SARDP provides training to *kebele* leaders so that they can reactivate the KDC to facilitate and coordinate community development activities. Moreover, the SARDP initiates and supports the organization of community workshops on practical participatory development planning with *kebele* leaders and community representatives being jointly engaged in the activities. In spite of these efforts and support, an SARDP informant explained that KDCs have remained too weak to effectively facilitate and coordinate community participation in local development. The informant identified two major problems. First, community participation does not constitute the major political process in the *woreda*, hence, little attention and political support are given to *kebeles* to run KDCs. Second, efforts to sensitise and train *kebele* leaders for participatory development planning and implementation do not result in the desired change because of the high turnover of leaders. In other words, those who have received training are suddenly replaced, taking efforts back to square one.

(iii) Community Project Committee (CPC)

The other horizontal LGN that involves multi-actors to promote multi-sector local development is the Community Project Committee (CPC). Assessment of the LGNs in the case study *woredas* revealed that the LGs and the people established the CPC in order to plan and implement development activities supported by the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Development Fund (ESRDF). The Fund focuses on developing a basic infrastructure to improve services to poor communities through the direct participation of the beneficiaries and their representatives. The ESRDF is not involved in project planning and implementation, nor does it give funds directly to LG agencies. The CPC, on behalf of communities, enters into a financing agreement with the ESRDF. The CPC is the principal party responsible for planning, implementing, and monitoring development projects. The ESRDF supports CPC members with training in order to build their capacity to undertake such responsibilities. It also trains and assigns a Local Community Facilitator (LCF)[10] to assist the CPC. At times, if the CPC believes that it lacks capacity, it negotiates with non-state or state actor(s) to act as its implementing agency. However, the CPC is still responsible for ensuring active community participation in all the project implementation processes. The ESRDF requires beneficiary communities to contribute at least 10 percent of the total project costs. This can be in the form of cash, labour and/or locally available materials. In order to ensure the release of funds, the CPC has to facilitate and coordinate contributions.

In relation to the three selected services in this study, Wukro, Degua Temben and Baso Liben have benefited from the ESRDF's support. Degua Temben and Baso Liben have received support for primary health care and safe drinking water development and delivery, while Wukro has received support for environmental rehabilitation. Structurally, the CPC is chaired by the chief *woreda* administrator, but the composition of members vary in the *woredas*, depending on the number of sectors supported by the Fund as well as the existence of CBOs, which the ESRDF is keen to involve.

In Wukro, the CPC consists of the WA, Agriculture Office (AO), *woreda Seleste Mahberat*, three community representatives, and the administration of the *tabia* where the project is implemented. The WA provides overall supervision and control, while the AO facilitates and coordinates the planning, implementation and evaluation of conservation activities. The *Tabia* administration, community representatives and the *Seleste Mahberat* facilitate and coordinate community participation and contributions.

The CPC in Degua Temben consists of the WA, Health Office (HO), *woreda Seleste Mahberat*, the *tabia* administration and three community representatives. Under the supervision and guidance of the CPC, the HO is responsible for facilitating and coordinating the health facilities' development. As in Wukro *Woreda*, the *tabia* administration, community representatives and the *Seleste Ma-*

hberat are responsible for facilitating and coordinating community participation and contributions. Besides the overall supervision, the WA is directly responsible for coordinating drinking water development projects. The CPC informants reported that all committee members and also the local people have a high interest in and commitment to the ESRDF's support, since it addressed two key problems in the *woreda*. First, the construction and furnishing of the first health centre created a first opportunity for the locals to have access to laboratory-based health services in the *woreda*. Secondly, the drilling of a deep well and installation of a pump that pipes water from a distance of 7 km over rugged mountains has supplied Hagere Selam town (the *woreda's* seat) with its first safe drinking water.

The CPC in Baso Liben consists of the WA, the Education Office[11] *kebele* administrations and three community representatives. Baso Liben only obtained its own Health Office in July 1998. Until that time, in addition to being responsible for the overall supervision, the WA had been responsible for coordinating health and water projects, which is a difficult job where there is unstable leadership. The *woreda* officials explained that as a result of this, the CPC had negotiated with zonal sector departments to be its implementing agency. The Zonal Health Department (ZHD) and Water Resources Mining and Energy Development Department (ZWRMEDD) had accordingly taken over its implementation responsibilities. However, need identifications, prioritisation and project site selection have been left to the CPC. The CPC is, moreover, fully responsible for community participation and resource contributions, which are mainly carried out through *kebele* administrations and community representatives. Community informants explained that the very fact that the ESRDF has assigned an LCF has created opportunities for them to be consulted about local development issues. However, the WA perpetuates the top-down approach, with officials and experts focussing on telling the people what to do rather than listening to them. *Kebele* leaders shared the community informants' views. They explained that much emphasis has been placed on resource mobilization from the people to meet the 10 percent requirement instead of consulting and discussing this with them. They further mentioned that they have resorted to 'coercing' people to contribute labour and materials as they have been told by the WA that they would be responsible for any deficit in the 10 percent requirement. This has hampered the development of voluntary and interest-based participation.

(iv) Woreda Project Advisory Committee (WPAC)

Eastern Tigray Development Programme (ETDP)/Irish Aid is an important bilateral development programme in Wukro *Woreda*. It supports multi-sector rural development activities with this study's three selected services being among the important intervention areas or sectors. ETDP/Irish Aid provides

demand-driven development assistance. The need for development assistance has to come from the *woreda* government, sector agencies and communities. The programme is not directly involved in project planning and implementation processes. However, it initiates and supports the establishment of a *Woreda* Project Advisory Committee that brings all the sectors and other important actors into one forum. The WPAC, chaired by the *woreda* administrator, consists of the Education Office, Health Office, Agriculture Office, and ETDP/Irish Aid representative. The WPAC was established to facilitate, coordinate, plan and implement all development interventions that are carried out through ETDP/Irish Aid support. The latter provides capacity-building support to WPAC members and partner sector offices' experts through training, workshops and exchange visits.

According to members, the WPAC is an important forum in promoting learning and communication through project planning, implementation and monitoring processes. Each sector office, in collaboration with the *tabia* and *kushet* administrations and community, has to identify projects and prepare a plan to be presented to and discussed by the WPAC members. According to sector informants, such practical processes are important for improving their capacities, not only for ETDP/Irish Aid development projects but also for others.

4.3.2 Sector-based LGNs

A sector-based LGN is an LGN that concentrates various actors' efforts and resources to improve local service development and delivery in a particular sector. Different state and non-state actors are engaged in supporting development and delivery of the three selected services through different intervention modalities. Some, in collaboration with LGs, sector agencies and communities at large, are directly involved in implementing projects. Others provide financial, material, technical, and capacity-building support, but are not directly involved in project planning and implementation. In terms of functions, sector-based networks are basically planning and implementing networks. They are directly responsible for identifying the needs, priorities, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of service development and delivery projects.

Intervention modalities as well as each actor's principal roles and contributions, major decision-making and communication structures, and the role of the LGN in improving the three selected services in the respective *woredas* are discussed in detail in chapter five. The following discussions are devoted to the identification of the various actors that are involved in each sector, which serves as a basis for the detailed discussions that will follow in the next chapter. A brief profile of each of the actors engaged in leveraging local development activities in one or more of the three selected services is presented in Appendix 8.

(i) LGN for safe drinking water (SDW) development and delivery

The LGN for drinking water development involves state actors from different levels (federal, regional, zonal, *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels). Donors, NGOs (international, national and local), CBOs, and local people are the other important actors. The WA, in collaboration with state and non-state actors, is fully responsible for identifying needs and priorities, and selecting specific *tabia/kebele and kushet/gote* (see 5.2.1).

The most important activities for drinking water development include the construction of shallow and deep wells, bore holes, as well as spring development and protection. Fitting wells and bore holes with hand or motorized pumps are also important activities. Different actors play different but interrelated roles in promoting this service (see 5.2.2). From among state actors, the WA and the ZWRMEDD are important actors that are directly engaged in drinking water development networks in all the case study *woredas*. *Tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations are also important state actors through which *woreda* governments communicate and mobilize local people to join hands with other actors. In addition to these state actors, the ESRDF is another important one in Degua Temben and Baso Liben *Woredas*.

Bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, NGOs and CBOs leverage efforts to improve drinking water development and provision in different ways (see 5.2.2). However, the diversity and number of the actors are not similar in all the case study *woredas*. Wukro is the first to involve a large and diversified set of actors that include ETDP/Irish Aid, UNDP, REST, Adigrat Diocesan Catholic Secretariat (ADCS), World Vision Ethiopia (WVE), EOC/DICAC, and the *Seleste Mahberat*. The first and second actors are a bilateral and multilateral agency respectively, while all but the last one are NGOs. The *Seleste Mahberat* are CBOs that work closely with state and non-state actors in all local development efforts. Bugna ranks second in the number and diversity of non-state actors, which include EOC/DICAC, Plan, SNV, and UNICEF/WIBS. The first two are NGOs while the third and fourth are a bilateral and multilateral development agency respectively. REST and *Seleste Mahberat* are the only non-state actors in Degua Temben, whereas in Baso Liben, SARDP and ERCS are the only ones. SARDP is a bilateral development programme while ERCS is a national NGO.

(ii) LGN for primary health care development and delivery

Health offices are at the centre of primary health care development and delivery LGNs. State and non-state actors have established networks with health offices in order to expand and improve primary health care provision to the local people. The most important activities of this LGN include: construction of primary health care units/facilities such as health centres, clinic/health stations, and health posts. The training of Community Health Agents (CHAs), mobilization

of medical equipment and supplies and logistical support are also important activities. Different actors support one or more these activities through different intervention modalities (see 5.3.2). The regional health bureau (RHB)is an important actor in providing general policies and guidelines for primary health service development and delivery. The WA and the zonal health department (ZHD) are health offices' principal partners and are directly involved in primary health care development and provision. *Tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations are also important state structures. The ESRDF is another important state actor in Degua Temben and Baso Liben *Woredas*.

The number and diversity of non-state actors that support primary health care service development and delivery still vary in the case study *woredas*. In Wukro *Woreda*, it includes: ETDP/Irish Aid, REST, Tigray Development Association (TDA), ADCS, and the *Seleste Mahberat*. Bugna also involves a number of actors, including: EOC/DICAC, Amhara Development Association (ADA), Plan, SNV, and UNICEF/WIBS. In Degua Temben, REST and the *Seleste Mahberat* are engaged in leveraging the Health Office. SARDP is the only one in Baso Liben *Woreda*.

Community health committees (CHCs)

In addition to the LGN between health offices and other state and non-state actors that are mainly engaged in the expansion of primary health care facilities and the infrastructure, there is another multi-actor network called the Community Health Committee (CHC). With the exception of Baso Liben, *woredas* have established CHCs at *woreda* and *tabia/kebele* levels. *Woreda* and *tabia/kebele* CHCs mainly play an advocacy and promotional role through the exchange of information between and awareness creation among local people to improve primary health care seeking and utilization behaviour. The main functions of CHCs in their respective jurisdictions include:

- Advocate and provide preventive primary health care educations on topics such as maternal and child health (MCH) care, preventing and controlling HIV/AIDS and epidemics such as malaria and typhoid; and the importance and method of environmental sanitation;
- Facilitate inter-sectoral communication and information exchange to follow up and control the outbreak of epidemics;
- Seek for and disseminate health information;
- Facilitate and mobilize the target population to make use of periodical immunization and other MCH services; and
- Facilitate and coordinate activities of the CHAs and the community in respect of the development of community-based primary health care service delivery system.

In Tigray *woredas*, the *Woreda* Community Health Committee (WCHC), chaired by the head of social affairs for the WA, consists of the Health Office (secretary), Education and Agriculture Offices, REST, and the *Seleste Mahberat*. The Wukro *Woreda* Health Office informant explained that the WCHC meets at least monthly to discuss how to carry out its major functions. At times when there was a high prevalence of a disease such as malaria, it has to meet frequently and organize community-wide discussions at *tabia* and *kushet* levels in collaboration with the *tabia* administration and *Tabia* Community Health Committee (TCHC). Such discussions play important roles in facilitating the exchange of information and experience between communities on how to control and prevent epidemics.

A Degua Temben Health Office informant reported that the WA has not been effective in promoting the activities of the WCHC due to its weak capacity. Nevertheless, REST and the *Seleste Mahberat*'s active participation and support have helped the Health Office to keep the WCHC active and perform its activities well.

Wukro and Degua Temben Health Office informants explained that Education and Agriculture Offices are important members that play a significant role in facilitating communication and information exchange at grassroots level by means of school teachers and development agents (DAs) respectively.

Tabia Community Health Committee (TCHC), chaired by head of social affairs for a *tabia* administration, consists of representative of CHAs, the head of the local health institution, chairpersons of *tabia Seleste Mahberat*, the DA, school director, and representatives of local religious leaders.

The TCHC's role is appreciated in both Wukro and Degua Temben *Woredas*. In fact, the TCHC has been in operation since the 1980s. This has helped them to accumulate experience in promoting community-based primary health care delivery systems. According to Wukro and Degua Temben Health Office informants, awareness creation through primary health care education is widely provided by the TCHC at different socio-cultural events such as burial ceremonies and mass prayers at churches and mosques, and other social gatherings. In general, the WCHC and TCHC, in collaboration with health institutions, serve as instruments to promote primary health care education and information exchange between the local people. The involvement of school heads, DAs, *Seleste Mahberat* leaders, and local religious leaders at *tabia* level has created an opportunity to reach different groups.

Bugna established the WCHC through the SNV's initiative and support. Chaired by the head of the social affairs for the WA, it consists of the Health Office (secretary), Education Office and Agriculture Offices, SNV and Plan. The Community Health Nurse, employed by means of the SNV's support, is an advisory member to the Committee on how to facilitate and carry out its activities. A Health Office informant stated that the WCHC plays an important role

in promoting communication and exchange of health and health-related information between its members and communities. The SNV too plays a key role, not only in the establishment of the WCHC but also in its function. The informant added that Plan is also an important member. Both SNV and Plan have provided different logistical and material support such as lending vehicles to travel to rural localities and printing and duplicating promotional and educational flyers. The Health Office informant appreciated the roles of the Education and Agriculture Offices in communicating and exchanging health information to and from communities via school teachers and DAs. These offices could not, however, attend meetings regularly because of their busy schedule, which affects timely communication and the exchange of information.

The SNV also initiated and supported the establishment of *Kebele* Community Health Committee (KCHC). The Health Office informant explained that the KCHC could not, however, emerge and function as an important community-based structure. The problem is similar to that of the KDC where the *kebele* leadership has neither the experience nor political support to promote community-based structures. SNV and Plan informants underscored the fact that the political and community enabling environment has not been favourable for the emergence and functioning of community-based structures.

Baso Liben has no CHC at either *woreda* or *kebele* levels. There is no established experience in community-based health delivery, nor an actor that can initiate and support such a structure's establishment and functioning. In fact, according to the Health Office informant, the *woreda* government undermined some preliminary initiatives that were started during the last years of the *Derg* regime instead of encouraging and supporting their development. A few CHAs, trained during the *Derg* period, were prohibited from participating in primary health care delivery, as the WA suspected them of being collaborators of '*Derg-Isepa*'[12]. Sadly enough, the WA did not make any effort to train new CHAs until the SARDP initiated and supported such training in 2000.

(iii) LGN for environmental rehabilitation through land conservation

State and non-state actors have established networks with *woreda* agriculture offices and the local people to leverage their efforts in undertaking land conservation activities. They mobilize financial, material, and other resources in kind, such us food supplies (grain and oil). Agriculture offices are at the centre of environmental rehabilitation. They facilitate and coordinate resource mobilization as well as rehabilitation activities' planning and implementation. The *Woreda*, *tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations are important partners of agriculture offices, facilitating and coordinating community participation. The WA is an important partner in the processes of negotiation and agreement with state and non-state actors operating at the *woreda* level. The regional agriculture

bureau and zonal department support through capacity building, such as training experts and providing tools, selected tree seeds and motorbikes.

Wukro has involved large and diversified non-state actors drawn from different levels (international, national and local) and organizational origins (donors, NGOs, and CBOs). ETDP/Irish Aid and Germen Technical Cooperation (GTZ) are bilateral donor agencies that are engaged in supporting environmental rehabilitation. The WFP is a multi-lateral donor agency that promotes environmental rehabilitation activities through food for work (FFW) programmes. REST, the *Seleste Mahberat*, EOC/DICAC, and WVE are also among the important non-state actors that support environmental rehabilitation through different intervention modalities (see 5.4.2).

Assessments of non-state actors in Degua Temben *Woreda* revealed that REST and the *Seleste Mahberat* are the only actors that have established networks with the Agriculture Office and the local people. REST provides multi-dimensional support for the Agriculture Office and local people. As in Wukro *Woreda*, the *Seleste Mahberat* play a crucial role in the SWC and afforestation activities.

Bugna is second to Wukro in involving large and diversified non-state actors. Actors such as the SNV, Plan and EOC/DICAC are important in environmental rehabilitation. In addition, the Agriculture Office has established a network with the SCF-UK and WFP, as they support the SWC and afforestation activities through an employment generation scheme (EGS) and FFW programmes respectively.

With the exception of the SARDP's limited financial support in 2001, there is no other non-state actor involved in supporting the environmental rehabilitation efforts in Baso Liben *Woreda*.

Tabia and *kushet* conservation committees (T/KCCs)

In Tigray *woredas*, there are, in addition to the LGN between the agriculture office and other actors, community-based environmental rehabilitation structures at the *tabia* and *kushet* levels called Conservation Committees. These structures are not new phenomena, as they were established by the TPLF and REST during the time of the liberation movement. *Woreda* officials explained that during the struggle, land conservation was one of the most important activities carried out by means of community efforts to ensure survival and development. Hence, Conservation Committees were established to directly involve the local people in need identification, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. These processes have provided opportunities for acquiring experience and have served as a springboard for the post-liberation activities. According to community informants, as a result of their long years of experience, the people of Tigray have internalised conservation as part of their agricultural activities. Local officials and agriculture office informants confirmed that the local

people already consider the SWC and afforestation activities as very important agricultural activities. What the people mostly need and demand from the local administration and agriculture office are tools and technical support.

Tabia Conservation Committee (TCC), chaired by the *tabia* chairperson, consists of the agricultural development agent (DA), the chairpersons of *tabia Seleste Mahberat*, and a production cadre (elected by the people). *Kushet* Conservation Committee, chaired by the chairperson of *kushet administration,* consists of the chairpersons of *kushet Seleste Mahberat*, a production cadre and two trained community members (one in SWC and another in afforestation). *Woreda* officials explained that although different state and non-state actors' contributions are crucial for leveraging the local administrations and people's efforts, sustainable rehabilitation depends on the people's direct and active participation. Hence, officials added, *tabia* and *kushet* Conservation Committees (T/KCCs) have been serving as important community-based structures that promote voluntary and organized efforts towards environmental rehabilitation.

LG officials and community members reported that consensus has been established among the local people, the *Seleste Mahberat* and political leaders that every able bodied person has to contribute labour equivalent to 25[13] person days per annum to SWC activities. People consider their contribution as an investment, since SWC activities are carried out both on private farms and on communal lands. T/KCCs have the following major functions at the respective level:

- Identify needs, priorities and select SWC sites;
- Plan, implement, monitor and evaluate SWC and forestry development works in collaboration with agriculture experts and technicians;
- Mobilize the local community for conservation works;
- Organise discussion fora in collaboration with agriculture experts, technicians and DAs on how to improve conservation methods and efforts; and
- Make an inventory of and assess previously carried out SWC and forestry development works to improve future plans and performances.

Tabia and *kushet* administrations and the *Seleste Mahberat* are the most important and legitimate actors as far as mobilizing and coordinating the local people's efforts and resources are concerned. DAs are very important, particularly in assisting the local people technically, whereas agricultural cadres with basic training are important technical facilitators between the people and DAs.

In Amhara *woredas*, the local people are considered the principal actors of land conservation through SWC and afforestation. However, no community-based structure has been established to promote and coordinate voluntary participation. Both in Bugna and Baso Liben, local people are mobilized through *kebele* and *gote* administrations, known to them as political instruments rather

than as local development agents. Community informants reported that need identification, prioritisation and planning are carried out by agriculture experts and DAs with little or no input from the local people. Hence, there is little chance for the people to actively and voluntarily participate in conservation activities.

4.4 Some Important Features of LGNs

In spite of differences between the case study *woredas*, the assessment and analysis of LGNs in relation to the selected three services revealed several features such as (1) the diversification of actors and intervention modalities, (2) functional differences between the networks,(3) the interconnections/relationships and density of the LGN, and (4) the centrality/prominence of LGN actors.

Diversification of LGN actors and intervention modalities

Assessment of the establishment and functioning of different LGNs at the *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels revealed that an LGN involves multi-level processes and multi-actors. Previous discussions have showed that federal, regional, zonal, and LG agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors as well as international, national, and regional/local NGOs, and CBOs have been directly and/or indirectly involved in these processes. Of course, the number and diversity of actors that have established an LGN at the local level vary between *woredas* (see 6.3.2).

Not only are the actors diversified, so are their intervention modalities and areas/sectors. Through intergovernmental relations, supra-local government agencies are engaged in establishing political, legal and administrative regimes for various non-state actors' interventions. Supra-local government agencies are also engaged in supporting LGs' service development and delivery efforts. The ESRDF is an important federal agency that supports community-based development projects in three of the four case study *woredas*. Regional and zonal agencies provide sector offices with technical and managerial support in planning and implementing service development activities supported by non-state actors. The level of support varies between *woredas*, depending on the capacity of *woredas'* leadership to undertake such activities. In Baso Liben *Woreda* for example, zonal agencies have not only provided technical and managerial assistance but have also, as CPC agents, directly engaged in planning and implementing projects supported by the ESRDF.

Non-state actors have basically adopted different intervention modalities in supporting local development efforts. Some of the actors have directly participated in need identification, and the prioritisation, planning, implementation, and monitoring of development activities. Others have provided the LGs with

financial, material and capacity building but do not directly participate in project planning and implementation[14].

Generally, the LGN is not bound to local actors and processes. However, the activities and responses of local actors, including LG agencies, CBOs and the people at large, are very crucial to the emergence and functioning of various LGNs.

Functional difference between horizontal LGNs

An examination and analysis of horizontal networks in the case study *woredas* showed that different networks have been established between different actors at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. However, LGNs differ regarding the primary functions that they undertake. They could be classified as 'catalyst', 'planning and implementing', and 'hybrid' networks. Catalyst LGNs are those mainly engaged in facilitating and coordinating all socio-economic processes at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. In other words, catalyst networks are responsible for creating an enabling environment for development actors by facilitating and coordinating their activities so that duplications and conflict between them and development programmes are reduced. Such networks organize dialogue and discussion fora within their jurisdictions to promote learning and communication between the actors involved. From among the LGNs listed in table 4.1, WDC/WDSC and T/KDC can be classified as catalyst networks.

LGNs those are directly responsible for the planning and implementation of specific development projects and programmes could be classified as planning and implementing networks. In this regard, networks established between sector offices and different funding agencies at the *woreda* level are good examples. There are also hybrid networks that carry out planning and implementation, as well as catalyst functions. Such networks are involved in facilitating, coordinating, planning, and implementing multi-sector or single sector development activities at the *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. The WPAC for ETDP/Irish Aid, CPC for ESRDF projects, *Woreda* and *Tabia/Kebele* Community Health Committees, and *Tabia* and *Kushet* Conservation Committees fall into this category.

Interconnections and density of LGN

An LGN involves a number of actors, connected or related to one another in order to promote their shared objectives. Concepts such as interconnections/relations and density are important to measure the overall intensity of an LGN. Overall interconnections describe the total actual number of reciprocated relationships between actors engaged in one or more horizontal networks in a *woreda*. If all actors involved in a locality are connected directly to one another, the overall LGN is said to be a 'complete network'. In reality however, this is rare. Some may be more connected than others because of the multiple interactions that they create in the LGN to coordinate and facilitate local devel-

opment, while others may be engaged in creating relations with only limited actors (Scott, 1991). Networks involve transaction costs (Haus et al., 2005); hence, a complete network is not only rare, but it would also imply high transaction costs.

An LGN matrix was developed for each *woreda* in order to examine the level of interactions/relationships between the actors. Relationships may range from the exchange of information/experience to defined relations that may involve the transfer of skills, materials, and financial resources for the purpose of local service development and delivery. Different actors contribute one or more of these as well as making other contributions (each actor's comparative assessment scores based on its relations' qualities and its contributions to safe drinking water, primary health care and environmental rehabilitation development and deliveries are presented in Appendix 11, 13, and 22 respectively). The matrix for each case study *woreda* (see Appendix 9) includes only those actors that participate in one or more horizontal relationships at the *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels.

The formula developed by Scott (1991:73) to find the total actual number of lines[15] that connect points in a graph has been adopted to calculate the overall relations/interconnections among actors in a locality. The total number of actual relations/interconnections (r) present in a network is calculated by

$$\mathrm{r} = \frac{1}{2}\sum_{i}\sum_{j} z_{ij}$$

where, 'i' = a row and 'j' = a column of the network matrix (Scott, 1991:73).

Density describes the degree of linkages between actors in the overall network. The more actors are linked/connected to one another, the denser the network is. According to Scott (1991:73), in a 'complete network' of 'N' actors, each actors is connected to all except itself and *n(n-1)* = $n^2 - n$ gives the maximum total number of symmetric relations/interconnections that could exist. However, relation/connection z_{ij} is the same as z_{ji}. Thus, the maximum total distinct symmetric overall relations/interconnections is calculated by

$$\frac{n^2 - n}{2}$$

where *n* = the number of actors in a network. As mentioned above, a situation in which every actor is connected to every other actor is rare in every day reality. Hence, the concept of density helps to measure how far the network is from a state of completion (Scott, 1991:72-73). According to Scott, the formula involves comparing the actual number of connections present in a network (r)

with the total maximum number of connections that would be present if the network were complete.

$$\text{Then, density (D)} = \frac{r}{\frac{n^2 - n}{2}} = \frac{2r}{n^2 - n}$$

$$\text{or } \frac{\frac{1}{2}\sum_i \sum_j z_{ij}}{\frac{n^2 - n}{2}} = \frac{\sum_i \sum_j z_{ij}}{n^2 - n}$$

Different state and non-state actors are connected to one another either through multi-sector/purpose and/or sector-based horizontal networks or though independent informal and formal communication networks. In order to assess these interactions or networking, each actor is entered in both the row and column of the LGN matrix. The presence or absence of relation/interaction is represented by a binary digit '1' or '0' respectively in a cell jointly shared by a pair of actors (Scott, 1991). The row or column total for each actor indicates the number of pairs of interconnections/relationships that it has. The grand total of the row or column indicates the total actual number of interconnections/relations in a *woreda* between all the actors participating in horizontal LGNs in relation to the three selected services.

On the basis of the above formula and the LGN matrix for each *woreda* (see Appendix 9), the total actual number of relationships/interconnections and the density of the LGN in each *woreda* are presented below.

Table 4.4
Total actual relations/interconnections and density of LGN by woreda

No.	*Woreda*	Total actual relations/ interconnections $r = \frac{1}{2}\sum_i \sum_j z_{ij}$	Density $D = \frac{2r}{n^2 - n}$
1	Wukro	122	0.80
2	Degua Temben	48	0.72
3	Bugna	83	0.79
4	Baso Liben	32	0.71

The total number of interconnections/relations in a *woreda*/locality depends on: (1) the number of actors involved in horizontal relations, (2) the active involvement of each actor in multiple relations with other actors operating in that

jurisdiction, and (3) the existence of an active multi-actor LGN that could create opportunities for relations/interconnections by organizing discussion and dialogue fora. Wukro has the highest total actual number of relationships/interconnections followed by Bugna. The two *Woredas* involve relatively large numbers of actors, moreover, the WDC/WDSC in the respective *Woredas* actively create opportunities for wider communications and interactions between the different actors. Degua Temben ranks third, but is far below Wukro and Bugna. The *Woreda* leadership has hardly made the WDC the centre of a development dialogue forum to create opportunities for active participation by and communication between local development actors. For example, as already discussed, the WDC members such as the Police and Justice Offices have not per se considered their relationships with sector offices and other members active in terms of local service development and delivery. Baso Liben has the lowest interconnections/relationships. There are only a few actors in the *Woreda*, since the *Woreda* leadership has not created conditions for the WDC to actively function and promote a dialogue forum that would attract and involve potential actors.

The *Seleste Mahberat,* which have established relationships with diversified state and non-state actors operating in Wukro and Degua Temben, have added important value to the total actual number of interconnections/relationships. If it were not for them, Degua Temben would have a much lower number of interconnections/relations.

Woredas' LGN densities show the same trend as that of actual connections/relationships. However, density does not exhibit the volume of interconnections/relations. For density, the number of actors and the size of interactions are not important factors. Whether they are small or large, it is the proportion of the total actual number of relations with regard to the possible maximum number of relations that is important. For example, if there are three actors in a locality, each of which is connected to one another, the network is complete and hence, density is 1.0. Likewise, in a network that involves twenty actors connected to one another, density is still 1.0. The number of relations, which involves interactions among actors, is, however, different. The first and second hypothetical examples would have 3 and 190 reciprocated relations/connections respectively, which the density hardly reflects. Hence, density is poor when measuring the degree of interactions/relations, but it shows how far a network is from a state of 'completeness'. As shown in Table 4.4, Wukro has a total of 122 actual interconnections while Bugna has 83, but their density is almost the same, which conceals diversifications and volumes of interactions/relations between diversified and larger groups of actors.

Centrality/prominence of LGN actors

Scott (1991:85-95) provided the concept of 'local centrality'[16], which describes how well an actor is connected within the local network environment. It helps to measure the position of an actor in relation to other actors involved in the overall LGN. An actor connected with many other members of the network will emerge as a central/prominent actor. Knoke and Burt (1983:195) also stated that an actor is central/prominent within the social system to the extent that its relations make it particularly visible to other actors in the network system.

Local centrality/prominence measures are expressed in terms of the total actual interconnections/relations an actor has, or as a ratio of its total actual relations to the number of actors in the network. An actor is prominent/central if it has a high volume of relations or number of interconnections in a network. It has a high choice status to the extent that many other actors are directly connected to it (Knoke and Burt, 1983; Scott, 1991). According to Scott, the actual number of interconnections/relations measures the 'absolute local centrality' (ALC), while the ratio measures an actor's 'relative local centrality' (RLC). ALC is computed by the summation of an actor's interconnections/relations over the row or column of a network matrix consisting of 'N' actors.

Then, ALC = $(z_{1j} + z_{2j} + \ldots + z_{nj})$ or $\sum z_{ij}$

where 'z' represents the relationship of a particular actor with others in a network; 'i' is the row and is fixed at a particular value, and 'j' is the column of the matrix (Knoke and Burt, 1983: 198-200). On the other hand, the RLC of a particular actor is calculated by

$(z_{1j} + z_{2j} + \ldots + z_{nj})$/N-1 or $\sum z_{ij}$ /N-1

where the actor's relation to itself is ignored (Knoke and Burt, 1983:200). This measure of centrality indicates the actor's communication activity compared to that of others.

An actor may interact or be connected with all network members except itself. Hence, the maximum absolute local centrality of an actor is *n-1* while its maximum relative local centrality is 1; if it is connected to all actors then,

$\sum z_{ij}$ /N-1 gives 1.

If the absolute local centrality of an actor = 0, then the relative local centrality is also = 0. This type of actor doesn't qualify as a network member. On the bases of the LGN matrix for each *woreda*, the ALC and RLC of each actor in the respective *woreda* are presented in Table 4.5. Not all actors are equally con-

nected; each actor has a different number of connections and, hence, has a different relative and absolute local centrality.

In reality, an actor's relative and absolute centrality depends on: (1) its active participation in the WDC/WDSC and in *woreda*-wide discussion and dialogue fora, (2) the number of sectors in which it intervenes to provide support, (3) its legal power when supervising and monitoring others' activities, and (4) its interest in and commitment to networking in promoting local service development and delivery. As shown in Table 4.5, the WA is the most central/prominent actor in each *woreda*. It is connected to all actors and hence, has the highest ALC and RLC (1.00). The fact that the legal power of approving and supervising other actors' interventions is vested in the WA has created an opportunity for interconnections/relations with all other actors. For example, in spite of the low assessment results of their capacity with regard to the emergence and functioning of LGNs, the *Woreda* Administrations of Degua Temben and Baso Liben have emerged as central as Wukro and Bugna *Woreda* Administrations. This is because the legal authorities require every actor to pass the *woredas'* scrutiny before engaging in the local development processes. In the case of Wukro and Bugna *Woredas*, however, in addition to the legal authorities, other actors involved in the networking of relationships have recognized their prominence. Such recognition has been reflected in the capacity assessment, with both Wukro and Bugna being rated high by the majority of the respondents. Besides the WA, sector offices have emerged as central/prominent actors, as they participate in the WDC/WDSC and have simultaneously established their own networks with various actors. *Tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations also have a high ALC and RLC since they constitute the basic linkage between state and non-state actors and the local community.

As shown in Table 4.5, the *Seleste Mahberat* in the Tigray *woredas* are the most central non-state actors since there is no LGN in which they are not involved. For example, in Wukro, they are as central as the WA, because they are connected to each and every actor operating in the *woreda*. REST is another very central/prominent non-state actor in both Wukro and Degua Temben. In Wukro, other non-state actors that have an RLC of more than 0.80 include ETDP/Irish Aid, ADCS and WVE, all of which are engaged in supporting more than one sector. In Bugna, the SNV is the most central/prominent (RLC=0.93) non-state actor, and has a keen interest in and commitment to networking. Plan is another central/prominent non-state actor. In Baso Liben, SARDP and ERCS are the only non-state actors, with the former being the most prominent and the latter the most peripheral, not only compared to the SARDP but also to all the other actors. An important difference between LGs (such as *woredas* and *tabia/kebele*) and non-state actors that achieved a high RLC is that LGs' high rating does not necessarily indicate a high rate of activities because they create relations with other actors not only through their efforts,

Table 4.5
Absolute local centrality (ALC) and relative local centrality (RLC) by woreda

No.	Wukro			Degua Temben			Bugna			Baso Liben		
	Actors	ALC	RLC	Actors	ALC	RLC	Actors	ALC	RLC	Actors	ALC	RLC
1	ADCS	14	0.82	AO	9	0.82	ADA	6	0.43	AO	7	0.78
2	Agricult. Off. (AO)	16	0.94	EO	9	0.82	AO	13	0.93	EO	8	0.89
3	Educ. Off. (EO)	16	0.94	ESRDF	6	0.55	EO	13	0.93	ERCS	1	0.11
4	EOC/DICAC	6	0.35	FO	9	0.82	EOC/DICAC	11	0.79	ESRDF	5	0.56
5	ESRDF	10	0.59	HO	9	0.82	FO	10	0.71	FO	5	0.56
6	ETDP/Irish Aid	15	0.88	JO	3	0.27	HO	13	0.93	HO	8	0.89
7	Finance Off. (FO)	13	0.76	KA	8	0.73	*Gote* Admin. (GA)	13	0.93	GA	7	0.78
8	Health Of. (HO)	16	0.94	PO	5	0.45	*Kebele* Admin. (KA)	14	1.00	KA	7	0.78
9	Justice Off. (JO)	11	0.65	SM	9	0.82	Plan-BCBRDP	12	0.86	SARDP	7	0.78
10	*Kushet* Admin. (KA)	14	0.82	REST	9	0.82	SCF-UK	6	0.43	WA	9	1.00
11	Police Off. (PO)	11	0.65	TA	9	0.82	SNV-BIRDP	13	0.93			
12	REST	16	0.94	WA	11	1.00	UNICEF/WIBS	11	0.79			
13	*Seleste Mahberat* (SM)	17	1.00				WA	14	1.00			
14	TDA	13	0.76				Water Desk (WD)	11	0.79			
15	*Tabia* Admin. (TA)	15	0.88				WFP	6	0.43			
16	WA	17	1.00									
17	WFP	8	0.47									
18	WVE	14	0.82									

but also because this is legally required. In the case of non-state actors, however, high achievement clearly indicates the actors' interest in and efforts in respect of networking.

4.5 Conclusion

An LGN is an important way of bringing together different societal actors that have a vested interest in improving localities' socio-economic conditions. Indeed, an LGN is a phenomenon that takes place at the local level. However, processes are not confined to the local level nor is membership limited to actors of local origin. In fact, processes important for the establishment and functioning of an LGN at the local level, start at supra-local levels. Empirical assessments reveal that national, regional and sub-regional government agencies play important facilitatory and regulatory functions in the emergence and functioning of LGNs. Since the introduction of the National Transitional Charter in 1991, the central government has provided frameworks that encourage civil societies' establishment of and involvement in development. It encourages NGOs and other non-state development actors to work closely with the LGs and the people. It facilitates their development activities by providing duty-free privileges for imported materials and equipment to be used for local development purposes (Dessalegn, 2002; Kassahun, 2002). Regional and zonal governments also facilitate non-state interventions by providing land, offices and other infrastructure. Based on the request of LGs and non-state actors, they also provide technical and managerial assistance to facilitate the processes of project identification, planning, implementation and monitoring. In spite of such encouragement and support, federal and regional agencies keep tight control of and regulate the activities of non-state actors through registration, certification, the signing of a general/basic agreement, and mandatory periodical reports. Such processes tend to be so rigid that non-state actors are not comfortable with them, but cannot avoid them either.

In terms of membership, the LGN approach to local development does not promote territorialism, i.e. the origin of actors, be it international, national, regional and/or local, does not matter. Most important is the desire and motivation of actors to promote and join local efforts to address the local people's multi-dimensional socio-economic problems. Nevertheless, LGs and agencies remain key LGN actors on which its success in involving multiple actors in the local development processes depends. The centrality/prominence measure also shows that in spite of differences in effectiveness, local state actors are the most prominent and without their involvement, international, national, regional, and local non-state actors would not intervene and operate as legal socio-economic agents in a particular jurisdiction. Hence, the success of an LGN in improving local service development and delivery does not merely depend on the presence of potential state and non-state actors, but also on the local leadership's capac-

ity to facilitate and coordinate efforts that attract and encourage potential actors.

Different LGNs have been established at local and village levels between different actors from different origins with no hierarchical relations. In spite of the basic similarities in their mode of operation, horizontal networks are functionally diversified and can be classified into three categories: catalyst, planning and implementing, and hybrid. The first type is mostly engaged in the overall facilitation and coordination of socio-economic activities carried out within its jurisdiction, while the second is engaged in planning and implementing service development and delivery activities within a given sector. Hybrid networks play both roles and mostly involve inter-sectoral relations. Evidence shows that weaknesses in the catalyst network, such as the WDCs, have affected the success of planning and implementing networks as well as that of hybrid networks. Active catalyst networks seek to extend existing actors' development intervention and interact with potential actors to generate more support. This is clearly revealed in the case studies where *woredas* with strong WDC/WDSCs have involved different state and non-state actors that have supported one or more sectors. However, few non-state actors seem to have noticed this. Most of them give priority to sector-based/implementing and hybrid networks rather than to catalyst networks. This is mainly due to their specific projects being located in specific sectors and their success being evaluated by funding agencies. *Woreda* officials have also indicated that many non-state actors' lack of interest in forming a network of relationships among themselves through non-sectoral, larger networks is another reason for the low interest in catalyst networks. With the exception of a few actors, like the SNV in Bugna, ETDP/Irish aid in Wukro and SARDP in Baso Liben, many actors have not exerted efforts and resources on catalyst networks such as the WDCs and T/KDCs. Even if such networks' emergence and sustainable functioning depend on the local leadership capacity, other actors should complement the LGs' efforts by looking for and engaging in inter-organizational networks with all pro-development forces rather than limiting their relations and interactions to their interventions' specific sector(s)

Notes

1. In the Nationality Zones of the Amhara Region (Awi, Himra, and Oromo peoples), the zonal administration has an elected council. In other Amhara zones and in all zones of the Tigray Region, however, the zonal administration has no elected council, but is led by an executive committee made up of politicians (members of the regional council) and appointed by the regional government. It is not only administratively but also politically linked to the regional and *woreda* governments in the sense that the *woreda* councillors are accountable to the

zonal executive committee and through it to the regional government (ANRS, 1995a; TNRS, 1995a.

2. In the case of service development, i.e. construction of health facilities through government budget, planning is mainly done at regional and zonal levels.
3. Includes Farmers, Youth and Women Associations.
4. Knowledge resources refer to a range of knowledge, whether explicit and tacit, systematized and experiential, to which participants have accesses. Relational resources refer to the range of stakeholders involved in relation to the stakeholders' potential universe regarding what goes on in an area. Mobilization capacity has to do with, among others, the structure and institutional arenas developed and used to take advantage of opportunities (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003:65).
5. Including the chief administrator, and the heads of economic and social affairs.
6. In the years 1992-2001, the *Woreda* had six administrators (Baso Liben WA, 2004).
7. *Ato* Bahiru Tesfaye, SARDP *Woreda* Development Advisor, 13-01-04.
8. There is a total number of 21 respondents for Baso Liben, since there is only one non-state actor who has worked closely with the WDC.
9. *Ato* Aschalew Bayou, cabinet member, Yelemlem *Kebele*, Baso Liben *Woreda*, 14-01-04.
10. Trained and paid by the ESRDF.
11. The Education Office is a member since the ESRDF's support to the *Woreda* includes primary school construction.
12. Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) – the only party during the *Derg* regime.
13. Twenty-person days to new SWC activities and five-person days to the maintenance of previous works. The five-person days are contributed in remembrance of TPLF's fighters who sacrificed their lives fighting against the *Derg*.
14. The specific role and modality of intervention adopted by each actor in each of the selected services are discussed in chapter five.
15. Scott (1991) used the concept of line in the context of a graph connecting points; here it is replaced by relations/interconnections between actors in a network.
16. Local centrality does not refer to the physical centre of a network; it refers purely to a 'local phenomenon' within a social network environment.

5 LGN and Service Development in the Case Study *Woredas*

5.1 Introduction

Chapter four identified different horizontal LGNs – general purpose/catalyst, sector based/planning and implementing, and hybrid types of networks – established between state and non-state actors to perform different but interrelated functions in promoting local development. One of the principal objectives of this study is to explore the relationship between LGNs and local service development and delivery. To this end, this chapter is devoted to empirically investigating and discussing the various LGNs and actors' roles in and contributions to improving service development and delivery in each of the three selected services.

The chapter is divided into three major sections. Section one discusses the LGN for drinking water development. Section two deals with primary health care development and delivery, while section three is devoted to environmental rehabilitation networks. Each section examines and discusses the principal facilitators, each actor's principal role and contribution, decision-making and communication structure, and service development and delivery outcomes in each case study *woreda*.

Different actors unite to promote the local development's common objectives through an LGN, but not all actors have similar roles and contributions. A discussion of the principal facilitators will help to identify the actors that took primary responsibility for facilitating, coordinating and supervising different actors' interventions. Discussions of the principal roles and contributions, on the other hand, will focus on identifying and discussing each LGN actor's intervention modality, key roles and major contributions. Decision-making and communication structures are examined in order to identify and discuss alternative LGN structures through which various actors interact and communicate in respect of their common objectives. Finally, each selected service's development and delivery outcomes will be presented and compared between *woredas* to help analyse to what extent differences in the emergence and functioning of LGNs affect service development and delivery outcomes.

5.2 LGN for Safe Drinking Water (SDW) Development and Delivery

Safe drinking water is one of the most critical problems in Tigray and Amhara Regions since they are the most drought-prone regions of the country. The frequency and intensity of droughts have increased over time. 'A century ago the country suffered a drought every 10-15 years. Today they come with alarming regularity every five years or less. Although the drought caused famine of 1984-85 remains well known, […] significant droughts were suffered here in 1987, 1988, 1991-92, 1993-94, and 1999' (Jeffry, 2000:1). This is creating increasing difficulty with finding water from any type of source because surface water sources such as springs and ponds are drying up (REST, 1993a). Hence, drinking water constitutes one of the most basic services that call upon different actors to join hands to develop and provide this service.

5.2.1 Principal LGN facilitators of SDW development and delivery

Regional officials stated that drinking water is one of the basic services that require the local people's direct and active participation. Hence, officials explained, *woreda* administrations (WAs) have been given the primary responsibility for identifying the needs, planning and implementing of drinking water development activities. They have to coordinate and mobilize resources from the local population and other development actors. In undertaking such activities, they receive technical, managerial and other supports from the zonal water resource, mining and energy development departments (ZWRMEDDs). Hence, WAs are the principal facilitators. State and non-state actors are directly and indirectly involved in supporting spring development and protection and the construction of shallow and deep wells to improve drinking water development and delivery. Bugna *Woreda* is different from the other case study *woredas;* it has established a Water Desk (WD) through the SNV's initiative and support. The WA has employed a water engineer, whose salary is fully covered by the SNV, and who is responsible for facilitating and coordinating drinking water development activities carried out by different actors in the *Woreda*. In the case of Baso Liben, the ZWRMEDD is not only involved in providing technical assistance and supervision, but also in implementation activities. It implemented all drinking water development projects supported by the ESRDF as an implementing agent of the principal actor – the Community Project Committee (CPC.). It also carried out drinking water development by means of a government budget.

5.2.2 Actors' principal roles in and contributions to SDW development and delivery

Different actors make different contributions and play different roles. This is at the centre of the LGN approach to local development: tasks are allocated to and shared between multiple actors representing different sectors of society. Each actor's role in and contribution to each *woreda* are presented in detail in Appendix 10. The main roles and contributions are highlighted in the following discussions.

State actors are basically engaged in supervising, facilitating and coordinating the efforts of various actors involved directly and/or indirectly in drinking water development activities. In spite of differences in the case study *woredas'* effectiveness, WAs are important actors, responsible for facilitating, coordinating and supervising state and non-state actors' interventions. They are also responsible for facilitating community involvement through *tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations.

Regional water resource, mining, and energy development bureaus (RWRMEDBs) provide general policy guidelines and directives on drinking water development and utilization. They furthermore provide technical assistance in conducting hydrological survey. In the case of donors that do not directly engage in planning and implementation activities such as the UNDP in Wukro, the RWRMEDBs allocate fund to the *woreda* governments through the ZWRMEDDs. The ZWRMEDDs are important state actors that provide request- based assistance to *woredas* in planning, implementing and following up drinking water development projects supported by different actors. As noted above, in Baso Liben, the ZWRMEDD not only provides technical and managerial support but also has carried out drinking water development projects by means of a government budget. It contributed to 57 percent of the total population provided with access to drinking water service in the period 1996-2001. The ESRDF is an important federal agency engaged in supporting drinking water development projects in Degua Temben and Baso Liben *Woredas*. It contributed to 19 and 14 percent of the total population receiving drinking water service in the respective *woredas*.

Different non-state actors have joined LGs and the people in improving drinking water development through different intervention modalities. Some of them provide financial and material support, whereas others participate directly in the planning and implementation processes.

In Wukro, REST, ADCS, WVE, and the *Seleste Mahberat* are directly involved in all project processes, i.e. need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. In addition, these actors support water user committees and pump operators with training to ensure sustainable use of the service. The EOC/DICAC provides the WA with financial support but is not directly involved in planning and implementation activities Likewise,

ETDP/Irish Aid is not directly engaged in these activities, but it does not, however, limit itself to financial and material support. It also facilitates project activities through its *woreda* representative and the *Woreda* Project Advisory Committee (WPAC). Moreover, it conducts independent, periodical supervision and monitoring of projects supported by the programme. From a total of 67,195 people provided with access to SDW in the period 1996-2001, REST was the leading contributor (44 percent), followed by ETDP/Irish Aid and UNDP (18 percent each), ADCS (17 percent), WVE (1.4 percent), and EOC/DICAC (1 percent). According to *Woreda* officials, the *Seleste Mahberat* generate information that is valuable for need identification, prioritisation and site selections, which, in turn, promote equitable distributions of the service. Moreover, officials explained, they play key roles in mobilizing the local people to contribute labour and locally available materials to drinking water development projects. They constitute a significant proportion of project costs although these contributions have not always been independently recorded and reported.

REST and *Seleste Mahberat* are the only and most important non-actors in Degua Temben *Woreda*. They are directly involved in all processes of drinking water projects in partnership with *woreda* and sub-*woreda* administrations[1]. REST is the most important actor and it contributed to 81 percent of a total of 31,171 people receiving drinking water service in the period 1996-2001. As in Wukro, the contribution of the *Seleste Mahberat* has not been independently recorded. According to *woreda* officials, *the Seleste Mahberat* are engines of community mobilization and participation that ensure the local people's voluntary and active involvement in decision-making processes and contributions of labour and local materials.

In Bugna, Plan, SNV, UNICEF/WIBS, and EOC/DICAC are the actors that support drinking water service development. UNICEF/WIBS provides funds directly to the WA but is not directly involved. Other actors are directly engaged in all project processes. They undertake project activities in partnership with the WA/WD and sub-*woreda* administrations. In terms of contributions, Plan ranks first, as it contributed to 36 percent, followed by SNV (30 percent), UINICEF/WIBS (23 percent), and EOC/DICAC (12 percent) of a total of 47,858 people receiving access to drinking water in the period 1996-2001. According to *Woreda* officials, however, the contributions of the SNV should be understood beyond the number of people having gained access to water service. The SNV plays an important role in improving the WA's institutional capacity to steer the entire drinking water development activities by assisting with the establishment of a WD and the employment of a water engineer.

SARDP and ERCS are the only non-state actors who support Baso Liben *Woreda* in improving drinking water services. ERCS plans and implements projects in collaboration with the WA, whereas SARDP provides the WA with

funds to do so through the WDC and KDC. However, SARDP follows up and facilitates project activities though its *woreda* programme representative. SARDP also provides *woreda* and sub-*woreda* leaders and community members with capacity building support through workshops and trainings. Of the total of 19,403 people who have received drinking water service, SARDP and ERCS contributed 22 percent and 7 percent respectively.

A summary of the comparative assessment of the roles and contributions of non-state actors that have established horizontal LGNs with the WA in the respective case study *woredas* is presented in Appendix 11. The criteria for the comparative assessment of the actors' roles and contributions include: participation in need identification, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation; resource contributions (finance, material and labour), capacity building (training, equipment and tools), and information and experience sharing. The comparative assessment criteria show each actor's comprehensive role and contribution in promoting drinking water service development. An important feature of this assessment is that it vividly reveals the significance of each actor compared to others. For example, the contributions of the *Seleste Mahberat* have not been reported in terms of number of people for whom they have created access to drinking water. However, the average score of the comparative assessment shows that, besides REST, they are the most important actors in both Wukro and Degua Temben. Likewise, in Bugna *Woreda,* SNV ranks second in terms of the number of people for whom it has created access, whereas the comparative assessment shows that SNV is not only ranked first, but also achieved the highest and maximum score. This confirms the crucial roles it plays, which *woreda* officials also emphasised.

The average score of each actor's comparative assessment shows its position in relation to the overall assessment criteria rather than only to the number of people for whom it created access to drinking water service. Actors that actively participate in multiple activities and that have created access to drinking water for the largest number of the population, have a high average score in the overall assessment. For example, REST, the leading actor in creating access for a large number of people in Wukro and Degua Temben, has the highest and maximum score in both *woredas*. Actors that have created access for only a marginal number of people have a low average score. EOC/DICAC and WVE in Wukro and ERCS in Baso Liben are good examples. An actor operating in different *woredas* doesn't have the same score in every *woreda*. This can be attributed to one or both of the following factors. First, differences in the evaluators' value judgement. Second, differences in that particular actor's contributions to the different assessment criteria in different *woredas*.

5.2.3 LGN communication and decision-making structures for SDW development and delivery

In spite of differences between the case study *woredas* with regard to their effectiveness in facilitating and coordinating development activities, WDC/WDSC and T/KDC are common local governance network structures engaged in supervising, facilitating and coordinating development projects.

The WDC and TDC in Wukro are active in facilitating and coordinating drinking water development projects supported and carried out by different actors. TDC, in collaboration with the *Seleste Mahberat*, facilitates and coordinates the participation of communities in need identification, prioritisation, planning, and implementation activities. The WPAC, under the supervision and guidance of the WDC, also undertakes such activities for projects supported by ETDP/Irish Aid. According to *woreda* and *tabia* development committee informants, regular and need-based or issue-driven meetings are the most important fora for communication and decision-making processes. As discussed in chapter four, the WDC conducts monthly meetings in order to discuss the progress, challenges of and opportunities for ongoing projects, and other related matters that arise from discussions between different actors. TDCs also conduct monthly and need-based meetings. They discuss issues such as assessing community participation's strengths and weaknesses, and the effective utilization of already established services.

In Degua Temben, the WDC and TDC are important decision-making and communication structures. Nevertheless, discussions in chapter four revealed that the WDC has too little effective leadership in order to emerge as the centre of decision-making and communication. It is dominated by need-based and issue-driven meetings and discussions rather than conducting regular discussions. Like those in Wukro, the TDCs conduct monthly and need-based meetings in order to carry out the facilitation and coordination of communities' activities. The CPC[2] is another important LGN decision-making and communication structure that facilitates and coordinates drinking water development projects supported by the ESRDF.

In Bugna, the *Woreda* Development Steering Committee (WDSC) is an important LGN structure that is responsible for facilitating and coordinating the interventions of non-state actors. As a mater of fact, all drinking water projects carried out in the period 1996-2001 were supported by non-state actors. Hence, the WDSC is the principal decision-making and communication structure for facilitating and coordinating activities. Drinking water projects have to be presented and discussed by the WDSC members in regular monthly and need-based meetings. KDCs are, however, not active LGN decision-making and communication structures. SNV and Plan have supported KDCs through training and workshops to improve their activities, they have, nevertheless, not de-

veloped and emerged as active LGN structures since politicians at all levels emphasize the political structures, *kebele* and *gote* administrations.

WDC and KDC structures in Baso Liben did not function until the SARDP revitalized them late in 1998 to facilitate and coordinate its development support. Despite the SARDP's effort, they have not become effective in facilitating and coordinating communities' efforts and resources due to weak leadership. Communities appreciated the CPC far more for facilitating participatory decision-making and communication in the processes of planning and implementing ESRDF-supported projects.

From the above it is clear that the mere existence of LGN structures does not promote development unless these structures receive effective local leadership. The revitalization of the WDC and KDC by the SARDP reflects the important roles that non-state actors could play in leveraging LGs to facilitate and promote community-based structures for local development. However, the weakness of the WDC and KDC in spite of the SARDP's effort, further suggests that a local leadership's capacity to effectively absorb opportunities is still a crucial factor in the success of local development support.

5.2.4 Safe drinking water development and delivery outcome

Previous discussions revealed the various actors' roles in and contributions to improving drinking water service development in each of the case study *woreda*. The level of service improvement differs between *woredas*, depending on the actors' number and contributions (see Appendix 10). Wukro has the highest number of actors and contributions, followed by Bugna, which enabled them to achieve better drinking water service development (see Table 5.1). Degua Temben and Baso Liben have the same number of actors, but different contributions from each actor, which causes a difference in their achievements. For example, in the period 1996-2001, REST alone created access for a total of 25,102 people, which is greater than the access for the grand total number of people (19,403) in Baso Liben that was created by all the actors. As a result, drinking water service development for Baso Liben is the lowest of the case study *woredas*. There is no actor that supported drinking water service development during the entire period (1996-2001) and each actor's contribution in the year(s) it intervened is very limited. For example, ERCS intervened in 2001, which created access for 1,332 people. SARDP, the most prominent non-state actor in the *woreda*, started its support of drinking water in 1999.

In terms of the total number of people for whom access to drinking water service was created in the period 1996-2001, Wukro, Bugna, Degua Temben, and Baso Liben rank first, second, third and fourth respectively. As shown in Table 5.1 below, the average numbers of people provided with new, safe drinking water service annually are 11,199; 7,976; 5,195, and 3,234 for the respective *woredas*.

Table 5.1
Drinking water service development and coverage by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro			Degua Temben		
	People annually provided with new drinking water		Cumulative % of service coverage	People annually provided with new drinking water		Cumulative % of service coverage
	No.	%		No.	%	
1996[3]	9,145	10.1	14.3	9,241	9.9	14.7
1997	13,650	14.9	29.2	8,135	8.6	23.3
1998	15,425	16.1	45.3	2,136	2.2	25.5
1999	16,425	16.6	61.9	1,705	1.7	27.2
2000	6, 300	6.2	68.1	3,344	3.2	30.4
2001	6, 250	5.9	74.0	6,610	6.2	36.6
Average	**11,199**	**11.6**		**5,195**	**5.3**	
	Bugna			**Baso Liben**		
	People annually provided with new drinking water		Cumulative % of service coverage	People annually provided with new drinking water		Cumulative % of service coverage
	No.	%		No.	No.	
1996	5,485	3.1	5.3	4,197	3.6	5.6
1997	5,520	3.0	8.3	407	0.3	5.9
1998	8,980	4.8	13.1	5,655	4.5	10.4
1999	15,133	7.9	21.0	3,922	3.0	13.4
2000	9,520	4.9	25.9	2,721	2.0	15.4
2001	3,220	1.6	27.5	2,501	1.8	17.2
Average	**7,976**	**4.2**		**3.234**	**2.5**	

Source: Field data, 2003.

Table 5.1 above shows that Bugna performed better than Degua Temben in terms of the total number of people for whom access to drinking water service was created. However, Bugna has lower service coverage than Degua Temben because of its large population. By the end of the study period (2001), Bugna and Degua Temben had created access to 27.5 and 36.6 percent of their total populations respectively. This shows that in terms of the proportion of the population who should be provided with drinking water service, Degua Temben has not only performed better than Baso Liben, but also Bugna. Nevertheless, Degua Temben is still far behind Wukro.

5.3 LGN for Primary Health Care Development and Delivery

Primary health care service development and provision constitutes another important component of local service development considered in this study. The

development and provision of primary health care services is very essential in terms of building healthy and productive community members on whom sustainable local development depends. In view of this, both state and non-state actors have joined LGs and communities to support primary health care facility development and service provision. Primary health care development and delivery's principal facilitators, decision-making and communication structures, and outcomes as well as each actor's role and contribution are discussed in the subsections that follow.

5.3.1 Principal LGN facilitators of primary health care development and delivery

Woredas have health offices responsible for facilitating and coordinating primary health care service development and provision. Baso Liben, however, has had this office only since July 1998. The health offices are principal facilitators of LGNs established for the purpose of primary health care development and provision. They facilitate and coordinate direct and indirect interventions of state and non-state actors engaged in health care facility development and provision. The WAs are important partners of health offices, playing principal facilitatory roles, which involve negotiation with all actors that intervene in the respective *woreda*. Moreover, they coordinate the involvement of *tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations in all efforts to improve primary health care. In Baso Liben, before the establishment of the Health Office, the Zonal Health Department (ZHD), in partnership with the WA, was the principal facilitator of primary health care development and provision.

5.3.2 Actors' principal roles in and contributions to primary health care development and delivery

Each actor's specific and detailed roles and contributions regarding primary health care development and provision are presented in Appendix 12. Different actors play one or more roles in the development and delivery of primary health care.

WAs, health offices, ZHDs, and regional health bureaus (RHBs) are among the state actors that play different roles. As mentioned above, WAs, in collaboration with health offices, play the role of negotiator, coordinator and supervisor. The health offices are not only responsible for facilitating and coordinating other actors' interventions, but also for planning, implementing and monitoring actual primary health care service provisions. They coordinate and organize refresher and new training for CHAs. They support and facilitate CHAs' activities through the provision of primary health care kits, pills and other medicines. The also supervise and follow up their activities through health institutions and monthly meeting and discussion fora. In Baso Liben, such activities only started in 2000 when SARDP began to support CHA training.

The RHBs play an important role in providing overall policy guidelines and directives on primary health care service development and provision standards. They also play vital roles in the allocation of human, material and financial resources necessary for health institutions' day-to-day activities at the local level. Moreover, they supervise and follow up primary health care development and delivery projects carried out by different actors at the local level. At times of epidemics outbreak, the RHBs deploy a group of experts to assist health offices in controlling the epidemic. The ZHDs are intermediary structures between the *woreda* health offices and the RHBs. Policy guidelines and rules from the RHBs are communicated to health offices through the ZHDs, which have to ensure that they are properly implemented. Health offices' requests for budgets, employees, equipment, and medical supplies and responses to such requests have to pass through the ZHDs. Moreover, the ZHDs usually provide health offices with technical assistance in planning and following up health facilities' construction. Wukro and Bugna *Woredas* have managed to secure not only technical, human and recurrent budget support but also capital budgets to construct health facilities.

The ESRDF is an important state actor supporting primary health care facilities' construction in Degua Temben and Baso Liben *Woredas*. In the former, it supported construction of a health centre and a clinic/health station, while in the latter it supported the construction of four health posts. It facilitates and promotes community participation in service development through the CPC.

Non-state actors, including CBOs, NGOs and donor agencies, are also important actors in primary health care service development and delivery. However, their numbers as well as their diversity and contribution to various *woredas* differ.

The TDA, ETDP/Irish Aid, *Seleste Mahberat,* REST, and ADCS are important non-state actors that play different roles in improving primary health care service development and provision in Wukro *Woreda*. ETDP/Irish Aid is the most important actor in supporting primary health care facility construction and capacity building through training and the provision of furniture and equipment. It supported the construction and furnishing of a health centre, four health posts, and two clinics/health stations. Its intervention modality is similar to that of the drinking water development and provision. It does not directly take part in projects' planning and implementation but facilitates these activities through its *woreda* representative and the WPAC. TDA participates directly in planning and implementing the construction and furnishing of a health station/clinic. It also supports primary health care awareness creation by providing posters and flyers.

The *Seleste Mahberat* play crucial roles in promoting community participation in all processes of projects carried out by various actors. They mobilize members to contribute labour and materials to complement other actors' efforts to

construct primary health care facilities. They also initiated and carried out the construction of a health post and the replacement of an old clinic by mobilizing all the necessary resources from their members. In addition, they organize and provide primary health care education for their members to improve their seeking and utilizing of preventive health care.

REST is another important non-state actor engaged in facilitating and promoting capacity building and awareness creation within communities. In collaboration with the Health Office and Community Health Committees (CHCs), REST organizes community workshops and discussions at *woreda* and *tabia* levels. It deals with important primary health care issues such as family planning, immunization, environmental sanitation, HIV/AIDS, and malaria prevention and control. According to its *woreda* project coordinator, during the civil war, REST acquired experience on how to involve communities in primary health care deliveries. As a result, REST not only plays a key role in awareness creation, but also in facilitating and promoting community members' direct participation in primary health care service delivery. It trains CHAs and provides them with primary health care kits to help them undertake delivery activities. It advocates and promotes campaigns against the HIV/AIDS pandemic by organizing and supporting (providing teaching aids such as flyers, posters and signboards) ant-HIV/AIDS clubs. It organizes and provides training not only for CHAs, but also for religious and *Seleste Mahberat* leaders so that they can expand primary health care education even further within their communities.

The ADCS is involved in promoting primary health care service by training CHAs and providing primary health care kits. In addition, it supports rehabilitation of malnourished children. In collaboration with the Health Office and Wukro Health Centre, it identified 80-100 children below five years of age whose body weight was below 70 percent of the expected minimum weight. It provided the parents with 100 ETB per month to purchase food for these children until they had gained the minimum body weight. CHAs are assigned to follow up and ensure that these children are properly nourished. ADCS facilitates the recipient children's monthly check-ups.

Actors differ in terms of their intervention modalities and also in their contributions. A comparative assessment of actors' roles and contributions was carried out on the basis of selected activities and contributions that include: participation in need identification, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation; role in primary health care awareness creation; resource contributions (finance, material and labour); capacity building; and information and/or experience sharing (see Appendix 13). Some actors score high in participation, while others do so in resource contribution and capacity building. Hence, the average comparative assessment score helps to reveal the differences in the overall contributions. Although ETDP/Irish Aid scores high in resource contribution and capacity building, it is second to REST and the *Seleste Mahberat.*

This is because ETDP/Irish Aid does not participate directly in need identification, planning and implementation for which it has low score. The fact that REST and the *Seleste Mahberat* are directly involved in multiple primary health care activities gives them a high average score. TDA ranks third, while ADCS ranks last.

REST and the *Seleste Mahberat* are the only, yet significant, actors that support and facilitate primary health care development and provision in Degua Temben *Woreda*. An acting project coordinator for REST reported that REST is involved in both primary health care promotion and facility development. The promotional activities are similar to that of Wukro. In terms of primary health care facility development, it supported the construction and furnishing of three health posts and renovation of two clinics. The informant explained that, in partnership with *woreda* and sub-*woreda* administrations and the *Seleste Mahberat,* REST facilitates and promotes communities' participation in all processes of projects activities.

The role of the *Seleste Mahberat* in Degua Temben is similar to that in Wukro. They mobilize members to contribute labour and materials to support primary health care facility development activities carried out by the ESRDF and REST. They provide primary health care education for their members and encourage them to actively participate in service delivery. Educating members in primary health care is very important to improve people's seeking and utilizing of preventive primary health care.

The comparative assessment (see Appendix 13) shows that REST is the most important actor, achieving a high score in all assessment criteria. The *Seleste Mahberat* have a high score except in terms of the capacity-building criterion. Their average score is close to that of REST, which clearly reveals the significance of the *Seleste Mahberat* in the overall primary health care activities as contributions are usually reported qualitatively.

Non-state actors that support primary health care service development and provision in Bugna *Woreda,* include EOC/DICAC, ADA, Plan, SNV, and UNICEF/WIBS. EOC/DICAC supports facility development, which contributed to the construction of two clinics/health stations. In partnership with the Health Office, it is directly involved in planning and implementing facility development project activities. It also promotes the local people's participation in these processes. In addition to facility development, EOC/DICAC advocates HIV/AIDS prevention by training those EOC religious leaders who have access to and influence on many of the local people. ADA's intervention was limited to the construction of one clinic/health station, and was, in fact, blamed by the Health Office for not completing its construction.

According to a Health Office informant, SNV is the LGs and people's most important partner. It undertakes the construction of primary health care facilities as well as the promotion of primary health care provision. The SNV sup-

ported the construction and furnishing of three health posts. The informant stated that the SNV's role in promoting primary health care provision is very significant. It emphasises the building of structures and providing means through which the sustainability of primary health case can be ensured. It supports the Health Office's capacity building by subsidizing the running costs (fuel costs), training and employment support, the provision of equipment, reference books, motorbikes, drug supplies and contraceptives. It facilitates the local people's participation in primary health care delivery through CHA training and by providing primary health care kits. It moreover initiates and supports the establishment of community health committees.

Plan is the other most important partner in primary health care development and delivery efforts. It is engaged in facility development, capacity building and advocacy activities. It supported the construction and furnishing of three health posts. The capacity-building component includes provision of furniture, equipment, contraceptives, drug supplies and motorbikes for the Health Office. It also facilitates the Health Office's operational activities through different support mechanisms such as subsidizing the running costs (fuel costs) and lending field vehicles. All of these are mainly aimed at facilitating deliveries of services such as immunization and epidemic control in remote areas. CHA training and the provision of primary health care kits are important components of capacity building. Plan organizes and conducts community workshops to provide education on and advocate the importance of primary health care for the public in general and mothers and children in particular. It also initiates and supports the establishment of ant-HIV/AIDS clubs and peer groups at schools by providing them with teaching aids such as flyers, posters and signboards.

UNICEF/WIBS is another actor engaged in supporting the provision of primary health care for local communities in Bugna *Woreda*. It leverages the Health Office's capacity by providing drug supplies, equipment and furniture. It also supports the training of health experts and CHAs.

The comparative assessment scores of each actor's contribution to primary health care development and delivery's different activities in Bugna are presented in Appendix 13. Actors vary in their comparative assessment score in respect of each criterion, which is reflected in the average score. SNV is not only ranked first, but also has a high score for all the assessment criteria. Plan, EOC/DICAC and UNICEF/WIBS rank second, third and fourth respectively, while ADA ranks last and the lowest in its overall contributions.

SARDP is the only non-state actor engaged in supporting primary health care development and provision in Baso Liben *Woreda*. It supported renovation of a clinic. Moreover, in the post-1991 period, SARDP has been the only actor to initiate and support the training of CHAs. The comparative assessments (see Appendix 13) show that the SARDP has high scores in terms of capacity build-

ing, information and experience sharing, and participation in monitoring and evolution. Its active intervention in these activities enables it to achieve the same average score as that of the ESRDF, which has a high score for resource contributions.

5.3.3 LGN communication and decision-making structures for primary health care development and delivery

The WDC/WDSC and T/KDC are not sector-specific communication and decision-making structures; they consist of different, united actors that discuss, facilitate and coordinate multi-sector service development and provision, including primary health care services.

There are sector-specific communication and decision-making structures that facilitate primary health care service development and delivery. As a principal facilitator, the health offices of the respective *woredas* have established communication and decision-making networks with actors that participate in primary health care development and provision. Health offices, in collaboration with the WA, negotiate each actor's contribution and role in leveraging this service. The network between the health offices and other actors is in charge of the day-to-day service development and delivery activities. *Woreda* and *tabia/kebele* Community Health Committees (CHCs) are also important LGN communication structures, particularly for advocacy and promotional activities.

As discussed in chapter four, in Tigray *woredas*, CHCs were established by TPLF and REST during the liberation movement and have been functioning since then, which has enabled them to acquire experience. Tedros et al. (2000) stated that CHCs acquired valuable lessons during the civil war upon which post-civil-war community participation in primary health care development and delivery are built. They further stated that strengthening community-based structures has been adopted as a principal mechanism of promoting awareness of preventive primary health care among local communities. Wukro and Degua Temben *Woreda* health office informants explained that CHCs provide opportunities for communication and decision-making between different sectors and groups of a community. Community health workshops are organized at *woreda* and *tabia* levels to discuss primary health care issues. Such activities do not only facilitate and promote the provision of these services to community members, but also raises awareness among them.

According to Bugna and Baso Liben Health Office informants, the promotion of primary health care development and provision through community health committees has not developed well in the region, since it has little experience in this regard. As a result, these services are perceived as government health agencies' responsibility. Nevertheless, the SNV has created some opportunities by initiating and supporting the establishment of *woreda* and *kebele* CHCs. The *woreda (*WCHC), supported by the SNV and Plan, organizes and

conducts community health workshops and discussions. They promote the development of experience and the art of facilitating primary health care service provision through community participation. As discussed in chapter four, *kebele* community health committees (KCHCs) are, however, not active. *Woreda* CHC members explained that their weakness has affected the WCHC's success since the latter depends heavily on the former to reach the local people. A Health Office informant stated that despite their limited impact, these processes have helped to raise awareness within communities and also improve their seeking and utilizing of preventive health care. More importantly, the informant added, they help the Health Office draw lessons for future primary health care promotion and delivery activities.

In Baso Liben, there is no CHC at either *woreda* or *kebele* level. Communities have no experience regarding participation in primary health care service provision. Nor are there actors such as the *Seleste Mahberat* and REST in Tigray *woredas*, and SNV and Plan in Bugna *woreda* that could take the initiative and support the establishment and function of a community health committee.

5.3.4 Primary health care development and delivery outcome

LGNs, involving different actors with different contributions and roles, have contributed to primary health care services' development and provision. LGNs between health offices and other actors (state and non-state) pool their efforts and resources for the purpose of health facility expansion and the promotion of primary health care provision. Where they function actively, CHCs create opportunities for discussions on how to improve and promote this service to local communities. Such fora play important roles, not only on how to provide better local services but also on how to directly involve the people in the production and delivery processes. Primary health care development and delivery outcomes in the four case study *woredas*, measured in terms of primary health facility development, health care service coverage and delivery achievements, are discussed next. Health professionals are also important elements of this service delivery and will likewise be discussed in the following section.

Health facility development

Primary health care units/facilities under the direct supervision of the *woreda* government include health centres, health stations/clinics and health posts. Previous discussions showed that different state and non-state actors have intervened in different ways to promote primary health care development and provision. Important components of interventions are: facilitating and supporting the new construction, replacement, and rehabilitation/renovation of existing facilities. The construction of new facilities expands service provision, while rehabilitation or renovation is important to ensure continuity in service delivery from existing facilities. The level of facility development varies between case

study *woredas*, depending on the number of actors involved and their contributions (see Appendix 12).

In the period 1996-2001, through the involvement of different actors as discussed previously, Wukro constructed one health centre, five health stations/clinics (two new and three replacement), and five health posts. Degua Temben constructed one health centre, three clinics (one new and two renovation), and four health posts. Bugna constructed six clinics and six health posts, whereas Baso Liben constructed four health posts and renovated one clinic. Table 5.2 below shows the ratio of each type of health facility to the population in each *woreda* for the period 1996-2001.

Table 5.2
Ratio of primary health care facility to population by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro			Degua Temben		
	HC	HS/CL	HP	HC	HS/CL	HP
1996	1:90179	1:22545	none	none	1:31068	1:46602
1997	1:91605	1:15268	none	none	1:31693	1:47540
1998	1:48043	1:19217	1:24022	none	1:32714	1:32714
1999	1:49511	1:19804	1:24755	none	1:33545	1:33545
2000	1:51015	1:20406	1:25507	1:103204	1:51602	1:34401
2001	1:52538	1:21015	1:21015	1:105770	1:52885	1:26443
Average	**1:63815**	**1:19709**	**1:23825**	**1:104484**	**1:38918**	**1:36874**
	Bugna			**Baso Liben**		
	HC	HS/CL	HP	HC	HS/CL	HP
1996	1:178315	1:35663	none	none	1:39069	1:58603
1997	1:182108	1:22764	none	none	1:40436	1:60654
1998	1:186814	1:20757	1:93407	none	1:41851	1:41851
1999	1:191220	1:21247	1:63740	none	1:43316	1:32487
2000	1:195733	1:21748	1:48933	none	1:44827	1:33621
2001	1:198029	1:22003	1:33005	none	1:46013	1:34510
Average	**1:188703**	**1:24030**	**1:59771**	**none**	**1:42585**	**1:43621**

Note: HC= Health Centre, HS/CL= Health Station/Clinic, and HP=Health Post
Source: Author's own computation using field data, 2003.

As shown in the Table 5.2, Wukro ranked first in primary health care facility per population ratio for all types of facilities. The total number of population per facility was the lowest among the case study *woredas,* which means it had the highest ratio. Despite being lower than Wukro, Degua Temben improved the ratios per health centre and health post. The ratio per health station/clinic declined since one of the clinics had been replaced by a health centre. Bugna had also improved the ratios per clinic and health post, but not per health centre

since no additional health centre was constructed, while the total population had increased. Baso Liben was ranked last both in terms of profile and facility per population ratio. It had no health centre during the entire study period.

The facility per population ratio shows a difference between *woredas* regarding each facility, but not the total facility development difference. In order to bring the different primary health care facilities into one comparable indicator, a facility index was developed (see Appendix 14) that would show the overall health facility development in each *woreda*. In developing the facility index:

(1) 1996 was selected as a base year to examine *woredas'* overall facility development achievement during the period 1996-2001. In the case of health posts (HP), the base year was 1997 since HP data for the regions were not available for 1996.

(2) The per thousand population value of each type of facility in each year is divided by the regions' (Tigray and Amhara) average per thousand population value of the base year to arrive at its index value.

(3) Different facilities' index values in each year are aggregated and divided by the number of facility types to arrive at an annual arithmetic mean facility index.

Table 5.3 below shows that Wukro, had the highest average aggregate facility index throughout the period followed by Bugna. The fact that Degua Temben established its health centre in 2000, boosted its facility index. In fact, according to a Health Office informant from Degua Temben, the construction of the health centre was very significant in the sense that it gave the local people the opportunity to access a laboratory-supported health services within the *woreda*. Baso Liben was ranked last, having the lowest facility index throughout the period. The differences in the average aggregate index are more vividly shown in Figure 5.1.

Table 5.3
Average aggregate primary health care facility index by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro	Degua Temben	Bugna	Baso Liben
1996	1.23	0.76	0.81	0.61
1997	1.29	0.75	0.94	0.59
1998	3.41	0.94	1.20	0.74
1999	3.31	0.92	1.28	0.88
2000	3.21	1.40	1.37	0.83
2001	3.31	1.42	1.57	0.83
AAGR (%)	**22**	**13**	**14**	**6**

Source: Appendix 14

Figure 5.1
Average aggregate primary health care facility index by woreda (1996-2001)



As mentioned earlier, the facility index was computed on the basis of each facility's value per thousand of the population. Hence, differences in the average aggregate facility index reveal differences in the development of facilities between *woredas* in relation to their population. For example, Baso Liben had the lowest index values throughout the whole period, which reveals the lowest service development both in terms of type and number of health care facilities compared to other *woredas*. There are also differences in the average annual growth rates (AAGR %) of the index values between the *woredas*, which were computed by a formula adapted from Thiessen (1997: xiv):

$$\text{AAGR\%} = \left(\sqrt[n]{\frac{x_i t_n}{x_i t_0}} \times 100 \right) - 100$$

where: $X_i t_0$ = index value of a *woreda* for first year under consideration.
$X_i t_n$ = index value of a *woreda* for the last year under consideration
n = number of growth years under consideration

On the basis of the above formula, the facility index's average annual growth rate for each *woreda* is indicated in Table 5.3. Wukro achieved the highest rate (22 percent) followed by Bugna (14 percent). Degua Temben achieved 13 percent, which is close to Bugna's rate. Baso Liben achieved the lowest rate (6 percent), which is approximately one-fourth of what Wukro achieved and half of what Bugna and Degua Temben achieved. These differences in AAGR

show differences in the rate of primary health care facilities' development and expansion in relation to the population in the respective *woredas*. As mentioned earlier, differences in health care facility development and expansion are caused by differences in the number of actors involved and in the contributions (as measured by the facilities that they constructed).

Primary health care service coverage

Primary health care service coverage in Ethiopia is defined as the number of population with access to a primary health facility within a 10 km radius divided by the total population (ANRS/BoFED, 2003; TNRS/Health Bureau, 2002). Meeting this standard is a serious challenge since most of the people live in scattered rural areas. As discussed earlier, different state and non-state actors have engaged in LGNs and supported the construction, renovation and replacement of health facilities. Such activities contribute to improving primary health care service coverage in each *woreda*.

Table 5.4
Primary health care service coverage (%) by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro	Degua Temben	Bugna	Baso Liben
1996	57.0	34.2	40.6	28.8
1997	67.0	42.8	50.4	27.9
1998	91.9	44.7	54.7	35.8
1999	93.1	44.2	54.9	38.5
2000	90.4	46.7	56.7	37.9
2001	92.4	48.1	60.7	37.2
Average	82.0	43.5	53.0	34.4
AAGR (%)	**10**	**7**	**8**	**5**

Sources: Appendix 15

Table 5.4 shows that the percentage of people with access to primary health care facilities within a 10 km radius is very high in Wukro, not only in relation to other *woredas*, but also in absolute terms. Since 1998, more than 90 percent of the local people have had access to primary health care facilities within a 10 km radius.

Bugna is ranked second, but its coverage was far behind that of Wukro. Degua Temben is ranked third, while Baso Liben is ranked last. In terms of the AAGR, Wukro still had the highest rate (10 percent); however, the difference in the rate was not as high as the coverage since from 1998 onwards coverage was approaching the standard. Bugna and Degua Temben achieved 8 and 7 percent respectively, whereas Baso Liben achieved 5 percent AAGR.

Health professionals

Health professionals constitute an important component of primary health care provision. The improvement and expansions of primary health care facilities ca-

Table 5.5
Health professional to population ratio by woreda (1996-2001)

	GP	Nurse	HA.	San.	LT	PT.
Wukro						
1996	1:90179	1:15030	1:6441	none	1:90179	none
1997	1:91605	1:7047	1:4362	1:91605	1:91605	1:91605
1998	1:48043	1:7391	1:3003	1:96086	1:48043	1:96086
1999	1:49510	1:7617	1:2358	1:99021	1:49511	1:49511
2000	1:51014	1:5370	1:2373	1:51015	1:51015	1:51015
2001	1:52538	1:3090	1:2284	1:35025	1:52538	1:26269
Average[4]	1:63815	1:7591	1:3470	1:74550	1:63815	1:62897
Degua Temben						
1996	none	1:23301	1:7170	none	none	none
1997	none	1:19016	1:7923	none	none	none
1998	none	1:19629	1:6134	1:98143	none	none
1999	none	1:14376	1:5920	1:100634	none	none
2000	none	1:9382	1:4914	1:103204	1:103204	none
2001	none	1:6611	1:3917	1:105770	1:105770	none
Ave.	none	1:15386	1:5996	1:101938	1:104487	none
Bugna						
1996	1:178315	1:35663	1:8916	none	1:178315	none
1997	1:91054	1:30351	1:7588	none	1:182108	1:182108
1998	1:93407	1:26688	1:7784	1:186814	1:186814	1:186814
1999	1:95610	1;27317	1:7968	1:191220	1:191220	1:191220
2000	1:97867	1:13981	1:11514	1:97867	1:97867	1:97867
2001	1:66010	1:12377	1:7072	1:49507	1:39606	1:66010
Average	1:103710	1:24396	1:8474	1:131352	1:145988	1:144,804
Baso Liben						
1996	none	1:39069	1:19534	none	none	none
1997	none	1:60654	1:20218	none	none	none
1998	none	1:31388	1:20926	none	none	none
1999	none	1:32487	1:18564	1:129947	none	none
2000	none	1:26896	1:26896	1:134482	none	none
2001	none	1:23006	1:34510	1:138038	none	none
Average	none	1:35583	1:23441	1:134156	none	none

Note: GP = general practitioner, HA. = health assistant, San. = sanitarian, LT. = laboratory technician, and PT = pharmacy technician
Source: Field data, 2003.

n achieve the objective of improving primary health care provision if they are staffed with trained health professionals. In both Amhara and Tigray Regions, employment of health professionals falls under the regional civil service commission's authority and responsibility. *Woredas'* role in this regard is limited to requesting the assignment of professionals by means of intergovernmental relations. According to the regional civil service commission and health bureau informants, expansion of the primary health care facilities is one of the strongest reasons for requesting more health professionals. However, a WA and health office's strength and efforts are important factors in securing more employees. Hence, differences in the number of health professionals between the two regions' *woredas* is strongly related to the regional enabling environment, whereas differences between *woredas* of the same region is concerned with the strength and effort of the WA and health offices' request. The profile and ratio of health professionals to population in the four case study *woredas* are presented in Table 5.5.

Health office informants from all the case study *woredas* reported that the shortage of health professionals is a critical problem for primary health care provision. However, there are differences between *woredas* in general and between Tigray and Amhara *woredas* in particular. When asked how Tigray Region managed to have better ratios of health professionals to population, regional and *woreda* authorities and health experts replied that the deployment of TPLF war-time health professionals to the Regional Health Bureau system was an important factor in improving the problem in the post-war period.

As is evident from Table 5.5, Wukro had the lowest number of population per health professional for all categories/types. For example, the number of population a nurse had to serve in Wukro was one-third of that of Bugna and one-fifth of that of Baso Liben. Although Degua Temben did not have a general practitioner (GP) and pharmacy technician, the average annual ratios for nurses, health assistants, sanitarians, and laboratory technicians were higher than those in Bugna and Baso Liben.

Baso Liben had no GP, laboratory and pharmacy technicians. Moreover, the ratios of the available categories were the lowest of all the *Woredas*. For example, the average annual number of people a health assistant in Baso Liben had to serve was almost three-fold that of Bugna. As discussed earlier, until July 1998, the *woreda* did not have its own health office. According to a Health Office informant, this greatly affected the *Woreda's* capacity to facilitate and coordinate primary health service provision. The shortage of health professionals was a critical problem evidenced by the fact that a health post constructed in 1997 did not start service provision until health professionals were assigned in 1999. According to the informant, the lack of a strong WA and the lack of a health office to request more health professionals were the major factors that affected assignment of health professionals to health facilities. In fact, this not

only shows the weakness of the WA, but also the weak support provided by the regional government, whose agencies are responsible for employing and assigning health professionals.

The health professionals to population ratios show the difference between the *woredas* in relation to each category of health professional. However, they do not show the overall difference. Hence, the health professionals' index was developed (see Appendix 16) in order to aggregate all types/categories of health professionals into a single comparable indicator on the basis of which the overall difference is easily observable between *woredas*. In the method used for indexing health facilities:

(1) 1996 was selected as the base year to track the improvement in the number of health professionals during 1996-2001.

(2) The per thousand population value of each type of profession in each year is divided by the regions' (Tigray and Amhara) average per thousand population value of the base year to arrive at its index value.

(3) The index value of each type of profession is aggregated and divided by the number of health profession types in each year to arrive at the respective *woreda's* average index for that particular year.

Table 5.6
Average aggregate health professionals' index by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro	Degua Temben	Bugna	Baso Liben
1996	0.59	0.26	0.30	0.13
1997	1.48	0.28	0.60	0.10
1998	1.76	0.47	0.53	0.15
1999	2.14	0.54	0.66	0.27
2000	2.44	0.88	0.97	0.30
2001	3.56	1.07	1.33	0.29
AAGR (%)	**43**	**32**	**34**	**17**

Source: Appendix 16

Table 5.6 and, more clearly, Figure 5.2 reflect that Wukro and Baso Liben each occupied an extreme position, with the former having the highest average aggregate index values throughout the study period, which means the total number of health professionals serving the local population was the highest of the case study *woredas*. On the other hand, Baso Liben had the lowest aggregate health professionals' index values emanating from its lowest number of all possible health professionals. Degua Temben and Bugna are between the two extremes, with little difference between them. The fact that Degua Temben had

no GP and pharmacy technician undermined its average aggregate index values. However, it had higher annual average ratios of nurses, health assistants and sanitarians than Bugna. As a result, its annual average aggregate health professionals' index is only slightly lower than that of Bugna.

Figure 5.2
Average aggregate health professionals' index by woreda (1996-2001)



The AAGR shows a similar pattern to that of the average aggregate index values. Wukro has the highest rate (43 percent), which shows that its annual increment in the number of health professionals was the largest of all *woredas* and that Baso Liben is in the bottom position (17 percent). Bugna and Degua Temben have 32 and 34 percent respectively of the AAGR.

Community health agents (CHAs) are important elements of the primary health care service delivery over which *woredas* have full control. CHAs include community health workers (CHWs), traditional birth attendants (TBAs), and community-based reproductive health agents (CBRHAs) (TNRS/Health Bureau, 2002). Health office respondents reported that CHAs are volunteers nominated and selected for training by the local people from those among themselves whom they consider to be mature, responsible, and conscientious. According to the informants, CHAs, even if they do not fall into the professional category, play significant roles in primary health care promotion. CHAs are not only involved in promotional activities but also in delivery. For example, TBAs provide services for pregnant women during labour that include management of normal delivery, detection of problems and referral to the next level of service providers. CBRHAs promote integrated reproductive health (RH) services through information and education (IE) and advocacy. They also

provide integrated and community-based selected reproductive health care services including counselling. CBRHAs carry out IE and advocacy activities through home visits, group talks and individual discussions.

According to health office informants, CHAs play significant roles in promoting maternal and child health (MCH) care services. They provide mothers with information and basic education in order to create awareness about such services' benefits in improving health. Informants explained that such information and education encourage and motivate mothers to use the available MCH services. CHAs mobilize communities and undertake environmental sanitation and malaria prevention education in order to prevent epidemics. They also establish important links between communities and primary health care institutions through the detection of critical cases of illness and referral to the next level of health care institutions.

Even if the employment and assignment of health professionals is the prime responsibility of the public sector through intergovernmental relations, non-state actors and local communities also play important roles in leveraging the shortage of health professionals through CHAs. Communities participate in the nomination, selection and appointment. Non-state actors support the activities of CHAs through training, and by providing primary health kits and education materials such as flyers and demonstration materials.

In Tigray, community participation in primary health care service development and provision started during the civil war. Government services were gradually suspended in Tigray because of the civil war. As a result, the TPLF established community-based primary health care systems in place of formal government services. Communities were assisted and trained to help themselves through health committees and CHAs. Community Health Committees (HCs) and CHAs were responsible for identifying and tackling primary health care problems (TNRS/Health Bureau, 2002). According Tedros et al. (2000), over 3,000 CHAs from different *tabias* were trained during the civil war, which laid the groundwork for the post-1991, community-based LGN for primary health care service provisions in the Region.

Wukro and Degua Temben *Woredas* benefited from the enabling environment in which CHAs play significant roles in primary health care provision. As mentioned earlier, non-state actors are engaged in training and supporting CHAs in order to facilitate and support primary health care service development and delivery through the communities themselves. Health offices, in collaboration with network members, arrange and provide CHAs with refreshment training to ensure continuity in service provision. New CHAs are also trained to increase their numbers and replace those who die or are incapacitated. Wukro and Degua Temben Health Office informants stated that REST played a significant role in organizing the local people during the civil war and continued to do so in the post-1991 period by promoting and supporting pri-

mary health care service provision through the training of and logistical support to CHAs.

The Amhara Region had very limited experience of community-based primary health care service development and provision. Informants from Bugna and Baso Liben Health Offices explained that the training of CHAs was started in the last years of the *Derg* Government. However, this had been very fragmented since there was no community-based structure to integrate these activities into the community to provide a base from which to grow.

In spite of this, non-state actors' intervention in Bugna *Woreda* contributed to community participation in primary health care. As mentioned earlier, the SNV plays a great role in facilitating this process by initiating and supporting the establishment of CHCs at *woreda* and *kebele* levels. The Health Office, in partnership with non-state actors operating in the *woreda* such as SNV, Plan and UNICEF/WIBS, organizes and provide training for CHAs. They also provide the trainees with primary health kits and other logistics necessary for primary health education and service delivery.

Baso Liben's enabling environment for community-based primary health care service delivery is least favourable. A Health Office informant reported that a small number of CHAs had been trained during the *Derg* regime. However, as noted in chapter four, they were prohibited from participation, being accused of collaborating with the *Derg* Government. There was no CHA training until it was initiated and started by SARDP in 2000. According to the informant, the fact that the CHAs who had been trained during the *Derg* regime were marginalized and associated with the defunct political system, affected people's interest in participating in similar activities when these were initiated and started in 2000.

Table 5.7
CHA to population ratio by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro	Degua Temben	Bugna	Baso Liben
1996	1:444	1:496	1:1636	none
1997	1:424	1:506	1:1626	none
1998	1:433	1:470	1:1245	none
1999	1:388	1:468	1:1099	none
2000	1:371	1:473	1:1019	1:1245
2001	1:374	1:485	1:892	1:1278
Average	**1:406**	**1:483**	**1:1253**	**1:1262**

Source: Author's own computation using field data, 2003.

As shown in Table 5.7, there are differences between Tigray and Amhara *woredas* in the ratio of the number of CHAs to the population. Wukro and Degua Temben had a large number of CHAs. On average there was one CHA annually for 406 and 483 people in the respective *woredas*. Even if Bugna did show an improvement over the years, the number of CHAs in relation to its population was still very low. The average number of people each CHA had to serve annually was three-fold that of Wukro and Degua Temben. As mentioned above, Baso Liben only started training CHAs in 2000 and the average annual number of people a CHA had to serve in the two subsequent years was 1,262.

Primary health care service delivery

Previous discussions in terms of primary health care facility development, service coverage and health professionals showed differences in primary health care service development between the case study *woredas*. This part will examine and discuss the extent to which the actual service deliveries differ. Maternal and child health (MCH) care service deliveries, which are regular services offered to a specific group of the eligible population, have been selected to illustrate the case study *woredas'* achievements regarding actual primary health care delivery.

Table 5.8
Child (<1 year age) immunization service delivery achievements (%) by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro			Degua Temben		
	BCG	Measles	DPT3	BCG	Measles	DPT3
1996	98	84	96	74	77	83
1997	99	98	99	78	79	87
1998	99	93	97	91	87	91
1999	97	92	94	93	90	90
2000	98	92	97	92	91	89
2001	98	92	97	90	85	92
Average	**98**	**92**	**97**	**86**	**85**	**89**
	Bugna			**Baso Liben**		
	BCG	Measles	DPT3	BCG	Measles	DPT3
1996	59	43	48	57	47	39
1997	73	61	60	68	31	38
1998	76	72	70	52	39	58
1999	77	72	71	66	51	63
2000	79	74	73	75	59	66
2001	81	76	74	71	59	69
Average	**74**	**67**	**66**	**65**	**48**	**56**

Source: Appendix 17

Child (<1 year of age) immunizations, including Bacille Calmette Guerin (BCG), Measles, and Diphtheia, Pertusis and Tetanus (DPT3), are important primary child health care services. Maternal services include assisted delivery, antenatal care, postnatal care, family planning, and Tetanus Toxoid (TT2+) vaccinations for pregnant and non-pregnant mothers.

The annual percentage achievement of each *woreda* is computed in such a way that the actual number of population provided with a particular service in a given year is divided by the target population's eligible number in the same year (see Appendix 17 and 19). Table 5.8 presents the annual achievements for the above-mentioned child health care services. There are differences between *woredas*. Wukro, Degua Temben, Bugna and Baso Liben respectively rank in decreasing order in all types of child immunizations. Wukro had a high level of achievement, with the average annual achievement for each type of immunization being more than 90 percent. In fact, the average annual achievement for BCG and DPT3 is close to the maximum service level, i.e., 98 and 97 percent respectively. Degua Temben also had a high level of achievement, but lower than that of Wukro with the average annual percentage achievement for each type of immunization being above 84 percent. Bugna achieved better than Baso Liben, but considerably lower than Wukro and Degua Temben.

In order to bring the three types of child immunizations into one indicator and reveal the *woredas'* overall achievements, the child immunization service delivery index was developed (see Appendix 18) using the following method.

(1) 1996 was selected as the base year.

(2) The annual percentage achievement value of each service was divided by the base year regions' (Tigray and Amhara) average percentage achievement value of the same service to arrive at the annual index value of each service.

(3) The index value of each type of child immunization in each year was aggregated and the arithmetic mean of the child immunization service was calculated.

Table 5.9
Average aggregate child immunization service delivery index by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro	Degua Temben	Bugna	Baso Liben
1996	1.69	1.44	0.90	0.86
1997	1.81	1.50	1.18	0.79
1998	1.76	1.64	1.33	0.89
1999	1.86	1.80	1.46	1.09
2000	1.75	1.67	1.37	1.20
2001	1.75	1.64	1.40	1.20
AAGR%	**1**	**3**	**9**	**6**

Source: Appendix 18

As shown in Table 5.9 and more vividly in Figure 5.3, there are differences between the *woredas* in the average aggregate index values, which indicate differences in the child immunization service delivery's overall achievement.

Differences are not limited to inter-regional but also intra-regional i.e. between *woredas* of the same region. In Tigray, Wukro achieved better than Degua Temben, while in Amhara Bugna achieved better than Baso Liben. However, the differences between Tigray and Amhara *woredas* are remarkable.

Figure 5.3
Average aggregate child immunization service delivery index by woreda (1996-2001)



The AAGR is the lowest for Tigray *woredas* in general and Wukro in particular. This is because Tigray *woredas* had provided a high level of service throughout the period and hence, the change in service provision was very low. For example, more than 90 percent of the target population in Wukro received all types of child immunization considered in this study. Degua Temben has a better AAGR than Wukro, since the level of service was farther from the desired level when compared to that of Wukro. Bugna had the highest rate followed by Baso Liben; however, both of them were far from reaching the level of service Wukro and Degua Temben had already achieved.

The achievements of *woredas* in maternal health care service deliveries show trends similar to that of child immunizations. Wukro had the highest annual achievements followed by Degua Temben, Bugna and Baso Liben.

Adopting the method used for indexing child immunization, a maternal health care service delivery index was developed (see Appendix 20) to aggregate

all types of services into one indicator that would easily show the differences in overall achievements between *woredas*.

Table 5.10
Maternal health service delivery achievements (%) by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro						Degua Temben					
	TT2+ (P)	AC	AD	PC	TT2+ NP	FP	TT2+ (P)	AC	AD	PC	TT2+ (NP)	FP
1996	14	24	16	5	31	7	13	18	13	5	22	8
1997	22	42	34	9	49	12	17	24	14	8	43	12
1998	25	52	38	19	66	20	16	27	17	12	35	16
1999	26	65	33	28	64	29	19	30	19	17	55	19
2000	38	69	31	34	62	27	19	30	22	20	45	22
2001	39	77	42	42	66	34	28	31	25	26	61	23
Ave	**28**	**56**	**33**	**23**	**56**	**22**	**19**	**27**	**19**	**15**	**44**	**17**
	Bugna						**Baso Liben**					
	TT2+ (P)	AC	AD	PC	TT2+ NP	FP	TT2+ (P)	AC	AD	PC	TT2+ (NP)	FP
1996	13	5	11	2	21	6	15	10	3	2	20	2
1997	15	8	13	3	30	8	15	7	4	2	27	2
1998	15	12	14	6	33	8	12	13	4	3	22	3
1999	16	12	19	9	34	11	15	15	3	3	36	5
2000	20	13	19	9	42	10	17	17	4	2	39	8
2001	26	19	20	11	48	23	18	19	4	4	45	9
Ave	**18**	**12**	**16**	**7**	**35**	**11**	**15**	**14**	**3**	**3**	**32**	**5**

Note: P= pregnant, AC= antenatal care, AD= assisted delivery, PC= postnatal care, NP= non-pregnant, and FP = family planning
Source: Appendix 19

Table 5.11
Average aggregate maternal health service delivery index by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro	Degua Temben	Bugna	Baso Liben
1996	1.51	1.30	0.92	0.66
1997	2.65	1.94	1.19	0.71
1998	3.85	2.28	1.47	0.81
1999	4.63	2.94	1.84	0.98
2000	5.02	3.21	1.92	1.13
2001	5.76	3.84	2.47	1.23
AAGR%	**31**	**24**	**22**	**13**

Source: Appendix 20

Table 5.11 above shows that Wukro had the highest index values throughout the period, indicating that its overall achievement in maternal health service delivery was the highest of all *woredas*. Degua Temben is ranked second, followed by Bugna and Baso Liben respectively.

Figure 5.4
Average aggregate maternal health service delivery index by woreda (1996-2001)



Figure 5.4 clearly shows the increasing difference between *woredas* in the overall achievements of maternal health service delivery. Unlike for child immunizations, Wukro not only achieved the highest index values, but also the highest AAGR (31 percent), since its maternal health care service deliveries were far from the desired level. The average annual growth rates for Degua Temben and Bugna do not show significant differences, 24 and 22 percent respectively. However, Bugna was far behind the level of service deliveries that Degua Temben had already achieved. Baso Liben was the lowest and last in both average aggregate index values and the AAGR (13 percent).

According to health office informants, improvement in health service coverage through the expansion of health care facilities and also an improvement in the number of health professionals are important steps towards improving primary health care delivery. However, the utilization of available services such as the MCH care depends on the level of awareness and behavioural changes towards seeking these services. In turn, these factors depend on the existence, strength and efforts of the community-based primary health care facilitator networks and community members' involvement in the processes. The informants further explained that health committees and CHAs' active and voluntary participation have been instrumental in improving MCH services.

As discussed earlier, Tigray *woredas* have a better enabling environment for primary health care facilitator networks that not only encourage people to seek these services, but also participate in their delivery. Government officials and experts at regional-local levels and non-state actor respondents appreciate the roles CHAs and communities play in improving primary health care service expansion and provision. This is due to the experiences gained during the civil war in the region as already discussed. Wukro and Degua Temben Health Office informants explained that the civil war experience laid the foundation of the enabling environment for the local community's active and voluntary participation in primary health care service expansion and provision. This was stated by the Regional Health Bureau as:

> The role of the community in Tigray in expanding and strengthening health services was very encouraging. The community participated in almost all health activities including identification of health problems, implementation of health interventions, and participation in the construction of health facilities by either contributing money or their labour. The community health agents (CHAs) remained key partners in health development (TNRS/Health Bureau, 2002:6)

Community informants also appreciate the value of their collective effort experience gained during the civil war. Informants stated that:

> Despite the hardship that we [people] experienced, the civil war period was a period of learning that helped us to realize our potential and value regarding producing and providing services. When the *Derg* literally ignored us, not providing basic health services, the TPLF and REST organized and trained us to be engaged in primary health care development and delivery. This was an important opportunity for learning and experience. Now, we know what roles we can play in improving our own health. For example, we do not need to be told or instructed to prevent a malaria epidemic; we only need medicine and technical support[5].

Wukro and Degua Temben Health Office informants elaborated by remarking that *woreda* and *tabia* CHCs are important LGN structures in facilitating and coordinating primary health care service promotion and delivery. They provide primary health education at different social, cultural and religious gatherings such as meetings, public prayers at churches and mosques, and funeral ceremonies. CHAs facilitate and coordinate environmental sanitation, malaria prevention, and MCH service provision. The *Seleste Mahberat* also provide primary health care education to their members. All of the above raise awareness of and contribute to service-seeking behaviour among the local people.

As previously discussed, in the pre-1991 period, there was no well-established experience in the Amhara Region that could serve as a basis for the emergence and development of community-based primary health care promotion and delivery structures. As noted earlier, Bugna *Woreda* nevertheless benefits from the SNV's effort to promote primary health care through the CHC.

According to a Health Office informant, a *woreda*-level CHC facilitates information exchange regarding primary health care between members. Moreover, the Committee organizes and conducts workshops for CHAs, community representatives, *kebele* and *gote* leaders, and religious leaders on important primary health care issues such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, MCH, and environmental sanitation. Nonetheless, *Woreda* CHC members explained that because of weak *kebele* CHCs, the efforts of the *Woreda* CHC could not be effectively linked to the local community to bring about the desired results regarding awareness creation and behavioural changes towards seeking preventive primary health cares.

According to a Bugna Health Office informant, CHAs play important roles in improving awareness as well as the people's behaviour towards seeking preventive primary health care. However, there are too few CHAs in relation to the *woreda* population to provide primary health care education and services to community members residing in dispersed villages. Moreover, the weakness of *kebele* CHCs affects CHAs' activities, as organizing meetings for primary health care education and provision is not easy for individual CHAs.

Neither in the pre- nor in post-1991 periods were conditions favourable for the emergence and functioning of community-based local governance structures in Baso Liben *Woreda*. As a result, primary health care education and promotion aimed at raising awareness and improving the people's health care and service-seeking behaviour are mostly provided at health institutions when individuals visit these for treatment. Community informants acknowledged the provision and importance of primary health education at health institutions. However, they also stated that such practices have a limited impact on promoting awareness creation within the larger community: 'first, only those individuals who visit health institutions once in a while have such a chance and, second, there is no organized community structure for people to exchange and share what they have learned at health institutions.' [6]

Looking back at the differences in MCH service delivery achievements, Wukro achieved the highest regarding all services considered in this study. This achievement is attributed to its relative high performance in all other related factors important for primary health care service development and delivery. In relation to its population, it has the highest number of health facilities, health professionals and CHAs. Its health coverage is also the highest of the case study *woredas*. It also has well functioning community-based primary health care networks that promote service delivery to the local population. Previous discussions have also revealed that Baso Liben lies on the lowest margin. It has the lowest primary health care facilities, health professionals, CHAs, and health care service coverage. Moreover, it has no community-based primary health care service promotion and delivery network. Hence, its low achievement regarding MCH care service deliveries is attributed to all these factors.

In terms of facility development and number of health professionals in relation to the population, evidence has shown that there are no major differences between Bugna and Degua Temben *Woredas*. In fact, in terms of health service coverage, Bugna is much better than Degua Temben with the average annual coverage being 53 and 43.5 percent respectively. However, there are major differences in community-based primary health care promotion LGNs and CHAs participation. In the period 1996-2001, Degua Temben had an average of one CHA for each 483 individuals while the corresponding value for Bugna was 1,253, which is almost three-fold more. As previously discussed, health office informants have clearly indicated that primary health care service delivery to the local people does not only depend on the availability of and access to services, but also on the level of awareness and improvement in communities' health care and service-seeking behaviour. This in turn depends on promotional activities through community-based LGN structures and active and sufficient numbers of CHAs to keep close and day-to-day contact with beneficiaries. Hence, Degua Temben's better performance compared to that of Bugna can be attributed to its well-established experiences in primary health care service promotion and deliveries through community-based network structures and CHAs.

Indeed, active community participation in primary health facilities development is crucial for expanding and creating access to health services. However, it is equally imperative to emphasize and exert efforts to organize communities and involve them in awareness creation and actual primary health care delivery systems so that they can maximize their utilization of services from the existing facilities. In this regard, the experiences of Tigray *woredas* clearly reflect the value of such practices.

5.4 LGN for Environmental Rehabilitation through Land Conservation

In Ethiopia, where more than 80 percent of the population depend on subsistence agriculture, environmental degradation, which manifests itself in the form of land degradation, is one of local development's critical challenges (Eyasu, 2002; Sisay and Adugna, 2001). Soil erosion and deforestation are among the major causes of land degradation. Extensive deforestation aimed at land cultivation, for use as a source of energy and for use in construction reduced the country's 40 percent forest cover to 2.7 percent (Aregay, 1999). Inappropriate farming methods, high population growth and deforestation exacerbate soil erosion in a country where the average loss of soil from cropland is estimated to be 42 tons per hectare per annum (John et al., 2000; Kinfe, 2002; Tadesse, 2001).

The problem of land degradation, which includes soil erosion and deforestation, is particularly severe in the northern highland regions of Ethiopia, i.e.

Amhara and Tigray (Kinfe, 2002). The two regions have become the most drought-prone regions of the country with the frequency and extent of droughts increasing. Plough agriculture is said to have started more than three thousand years ago and is still a dominant economic activity that engages about 90 percent of the population (Mengistu, 1996; Mengesha, 2000). The declining fallowing system, felling of trees, removal of vegetation, and cultivation of steep slopes have exposed the land to heavy erosion. For example, the average annual soil loss in Tigray is more than 80 tons per hectare per annum (Kinfe, 2002). As a result, soil depth, fertility and productivity are declining. This threatens the survival of people who depend on subsistence agriculture. Tadesse (2001:1) stated that: 'land degradation is a great threat for the future and it requires great effort and resources to ameliorate.' Hence, environmental rehabilitation through land conservation constitutes an important local development activity that calls upon different actors to ensure the local people's survival on a sustainable basis. Land conservation activities considered in this study include soil and water conservation (SWC) and afforestation. SWC activities include the construction of terraces, check dams, cut-off drains and artificial water ways to prevent erosion and run-off water. Tree seedling production, distribution and planting are the most important activities of the afforestation programmes considered in this study.

5.4.1 Principal LGN facilitators of environmental rehabilitation

Environmental rehabilitation and natural resources conservation is one of LGs' most important responsibilities. Agriculture offices are the principal facilitators and coordinators of environmental rehabilitation LGNs. WAs assist agriculture offices in facilitating, coordinating and supervising the interventions of those state and non-state actors who directly and indirectly support rehabilitation efforts. They also play an important role in facilitating and coordinating participation of *tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations and local people in all the efforts. Agriculture offices assign development agents (DAs) at *tabia/kebele* level in order to provide technical assistance in planning and implementing environmental rehabilitation activities though community participation.

5.4.2 Actors' principal roles in and contributions to environmental rehabilitation

Different actors who are directly and indirectly involved in environmental rehabilitation in the various *woredas* play different roles and contribute different types of resources. The various actors' detailed and specific contributions and roles in the various *woredas* are presented in Appendix 21.

In addition to the provision of overall guidance and supervision through the WDC/WDSC, WAs, in collaboration with the agriculture offices, are involved in negotiations with state and non-state actors that support environmental re-

habilitation activities. Agriculture offices not only play a facilitatory role but are also involved in need identification, planning, implementation, and monitoring of SWC and afforestation activities. They carry out these activities in partnership with actors that directly engage in the planning and implementation in sub-*woreda* local administrations and communities. In the case of actors that are not involved in planning and implementation, such as ETDP/Irish Aid and GTZ in Wukro and SCF-UK in Bugna, agriculture offices and sub-*woreda* administrations are responsible for the planning and implementing activities. Facilitating, coordinating and organizing training for farmers on the SWC and afforestation activities are part of agriculture offices' principal role. They also facilitate and support *tabia*/*kebele* and *kushet*/*gote* administrations' SWC and afforestation activities through the provision of tools and technical support. According to Bugna and Baso Liben Agriculture Office informants, office experts and development agents are very much involved in the need identification, prioritisation, planning, monitoring and evaluation of conservation activities carried out through community participation since there is no conservation committee at *kebele* and *gote* levels. People are mobilized through *kebele* and *gote* administrations instead of independent community-based conservation structures being established.

The zonal agriculture departments (ZADs) and regional agriculture bureaus (RABs) play supervisory and facilitatory roles through sectoral lines of communication. They facilitate the regional government's allocation and disbursement of budgets, provision of vehicles and equipment to agriculture offices and employment of personnel at agricultural offices. They support agriculture offices' efforts by providing technical advice, studies such as searching for the best tree species to grow in a *woreda*, providing tree seeds, and training experts. As far as supervision is concerned, they periodically follow up and require agriculture offices' reports regarding the utilization of government budgets, vehicles and equipment. They also supervise rehabilitation activities supported by non-state actors. The ESRDF is among the state actors in Wukro *Woreda* that supported the terracing of 855 hectares of land.

Non-state actors' role in promoting environmental rehabilitation generally varies, depending on the modalities of interventions adopted by each actor. Some of the actors are involved in the planning and implementation of conservation activities, whereas others provide financial, material and technical support, but are not involved in these activities.

REST, *Seleste Mahberat*, WVE, ETDP/Irish Aid, EOC/DICAC, GTZ, and WFP are non-state actors that support environmental rehabilitation in Wukro *Woreda*. REST is directly involved in identifying the needs, priorities, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluations of SWC and afforestation activities that it supports through FFW programs. It supported the terracing of 1,098 hectares of land, construction of 23.1 km of check dam and produced and dis-

tributed 399,159 seedlings to community members to plant on communal and private lands. Community capacity building through the training of farmers in SWC and afforestation activities, inter-regional (Amhara, Oromia and SNNPRS) and intra-regional experience sharing and exchange visits, and provision of improved tree seeds and working tools are vital support that REST provides. Agriculture Office experts are also given training and exchange visit opportunities that include international exposure to countries such as India and Israel. Its efforts to educate the local people on the causes of environmental degradation, risks and conservation measures can be classified as capacity-building contributions.

The *Seleste Mahberat* are at the centre of environmental rehabilitation through SWC and afforestation activities. They participate in need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of SWC and afforestation projects supported by state and non-state actors. Moreover, in collaboration with *tabia* and *kushet* Conservation Committees, they carry out SWC and afforestation activities through community mobilizations. They organize discussion fora on environmental degradation problems and conservation measures to encourage and motivate members to actively participate and contribute labour and materials. They carried out the terracing of 19,487 hectares of land, construction of 297.5 km of check dam, the production of 9,650,989 seedlings and planting of 17, 755,139.

The WVE also participates directly in planning and implementing SWC activities. Through FFW programmes, it carried out the terracing of 2,773 hectares of land and construction of 36 km of check dam. In addition, it supports training of farmers in SWC and afforestation activities in order to strengthen communities' capacity to undertake conservation activities on a sustainable basis. It also supports plantation activities through the transportation of tree seedlings to communal plantation sites.

EDTP/Irish Aid adopts the same intervention modality in all sectors. It is not directly involved in planning and implementation but facilitates and coordinates the processes through the WPAC. It supported the terracing of 3,073 hectares of land and construction of 11.5 km of check dam through CFW programmes. The provision of motorbikes, office furniture, tools, and the training of agriculture experts and farmers are important components of ETDP/Irish Aid's capacity building role. It also supports inter-regional and intra-regional experience sharing and exchange visits for agriculture experts.

The EOC/DICAC and GTZ support seedling production. The EOC/DICAC directly provided the Agriculture Office with resources to produce 145,408 seedlings. GTZ's support is provided through BOA, which supported the production of 80,000 seedlings. According to a forestry unit team leader, GTZ in partnership with office experts conducted physical and ecological surveys on how to improve seedling production in the *Woreda*.

The WFP is another important actor that supports SWC and afforestation activities through FFW programmes in Wukro *Woreda*. It is not directly involved in planning and implementation, but does, however, support the Agriculture Office through field experts who carry out these activities. The WFP contributed to the terracing of 5,347 hectares of land, construction of 50.4 km of check dam, and the production and distribution of 9,164,988 seedlings. It also supports capacity building through the training of agriculture office experts and farmers, exchange visits, provision of motorbikes, improved tree seeds, and tools.

A comparative assessment was carried out in order to reveal each actor's overall contribution and role as evaluated by the Agriculture Office of Wukro (see Appendix 22). The assessment criteria include participation (need assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation); the role in environmental rehabilitation education; resource contribution (finance, material and labour); capacity building; and information and experience exchange. Each actor has a different score for each criterion. Actors that are directly involved in planning and implementation processes generally have a better score than those that do not participate directly. The *Seleste Mahberat* not only contribute much labour and many material resources, but are also involved and play important roles in all activities. As a result, they are ranked first regarding the average relative assessment score. REST is ranked second followed by ETDP/Irish Aid, WFP, WVE, and GTZ respectively. EOC/DICAC has the lowest average score since its resource contribution is not high nor does it participate in other activities.

REST and the *Seleste Mahberat* are the only non-state actors in Degua Temben that facilitate and support SWC and afforestation activates, but are nevertheless important. REST's intervention modality in SWC and afforestation programmes is basically the same in all *woredas*. Through the FFW programme, REST supported the terracing of 8,657 hectares of land, construction of 146.4 km of check dam, and the production of 8,198,085 and planting of 766,193 tree seedlings. Building the capacity of the Agriculture Office and communities through training and provision of improved tree seeds, tools for SWC and afforestation activities are important components of its contributions. Similar to what it does in Wukro, it facilitates and supports inter-regional and intra-regional experience sharing and exchange visits for farmers and agriculture experts. Agriculture Office experts are provided with opportunities for international experience and training in countries such as India and Israel. In partnership with the Agriculture Office and the *Seleste Mahberat*, REST organizes and provides education regarding the causes of environmental degradation, the consequences and conservation measures.

As in Wukro *Woreda*, the *Seleste Mahberat* are important actors and the roles they play are similar. According to the SWC team leader of an Agriculture Of-

fice, their presence is very important in order to mobilize their members to contribute labour and material resources. Moreover, their active participation in conservation committees at *tabia* and *kushet* levels leverages the efforts of the *tabia* and *kushet* administrations to make these committees important centres of communication and learning. The *Seleste Mahberat* contributed to the terracing of 17,170 hectares of land, the construction of 254.1 km of check dams, the production of 7,574,335 and planting of 13,208,231 tree seedlings. They also organize and conduct discussion fora on environmental degradation problems and conservation activities.

Although REST and the *Seleste Mahberat* are the only non-state actors, they play an important role that is obvious from the comparative assessment score. Both of them achieve a high score (see Appendix 22) for almost all the criteria.

Bugna has involved many non-state actors in undertaking environmental rehabilitation. An informant from Amhara Regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) stated that the *Woreda* leadership's success stories in facilitating and coordinating non-state actors' activities and the severe environmental degradation that threatens the survival of the local people attract many non-state actors to the *woreda*. Non-state actors that are directly and indirectly involved in promoting and supporting environmental rehabilitation activities include SNV, Plan, EOC/DICAC, SCF-UK, and WFP. A natural resource team leader explained that SNV is one of the most prominent actors and plays a crucial role. SNV supports rehabilitation activities by means of different mechanisms, but does not directly undertake these activities itself. Its first approach is to provide the Agriculture Office with multifaceted support in order to build its planning, implementation, and monitoring capacities. This support includes the training of experts and DAs in SWC and tree nursery management, providing equipment, reference books, motorbikes, improved tree seeds, and providing tools for SWC and afforestation activities. It also provides the Agriculture Office with technical and expert advice in the course of the practical planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of conservation works.

Secondly, the SNV introduced new and innovative methods to promote interest-based and sustainable conservation efforts. The first innovative method initiated by the SNV was the distribution of steep slope, uncultivable land to volunteers for private forest development activities. This is aimed at rehabilitating the natural environment while generating economic benefits for the local people. The second innovative method was organizing neighbourhood farmers into groups and, on a voluntary basis, educating them to undertake sustainable land use (SLU) and natural resources management (NRM) on their own farm lands. Through this method, the SNV organized and supported 22 SLU, 76 SWC and 25 forest development groups. In partnership with the Agriculture Office, it provides theoretical and practical training to support and improve farmers' understanding and experience. It supports groups through the provi-

sion of tools and the assignment of Community Development Workers (CDWs) to assist farmers in planning and implementing their own activities. In addition to these, the SNV advocates and promotes environmental rehabilitation activities through environmental clubs and community workshops. It also facilitates and supports inter-*kebele* experience-sharing and exchange visits in order to facilitate learning between different communities.

Plan is another important actor that supports environmental rehabilitation in Bugna *Woreda* in different ways. It is directly involved in need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of SWC and afforestation activities, which it carries out through cash for work (CFW) programmes. It contributed to the terracing of 575.2 hectares of land, the construction of 75.3 km of check dam and cut-off drain, and the production and distribution of 1,161,295 tree seedlings. In addition, Plan facilitates and supports community capacity building in environmental rehabilitation through the training of farmers, by establishing environmental clubs, and through discussion workshops on environmental degradation problems and conservation measures. According to an Agriculture Office informant, Plan introduced an important method of improving communities' voluntary contribution to SWC efforts. It negotiated and came to an agreement with communities that every person participating in a CFW programme would contribute two days' free labour for every 17 working days.

EOC/DICAC, in partnership with the Agriculture Office, carries out SWC and seedling production through FFW programmes. It contributed to the terracing of 40 hectares of land, the construction of 1 km of check dam, and the production and distribution of 1,500,000 tree seedlings.

Through financial and material support, WFP and SCF-UK augment the Agriculture Office's capacity to undertake environmental rehabilitation activities, but are not directly involved in the planning and implementation processes. Through FFW programmes, the WFP supported the terracing of 1,061 hectares of land, the construction of 54 km of check dam and cut-off drain, and the production and distribution of 31,863,492 tree seedlings. Through employment generation scheme (EGS), SCF-UK supported the terracing of 686 hectares of land as well as the construction of 19 km of check dam.

In terms of the actors' overall contribution to and role in promoting environmental rehabilitation, the Agriculture Office's comparative assessment (see Appendix 22) reveals that SNV has a high score for almost every criterion and thus leads the other actors. Plan follows SNV, and is followed by WFP. Although SCF-UK scores better than EOC/DICAC, both of them have an average score below the medium.

In Baso Liben *Woreda*, SARDP is the only non-state actor that support environmental rehabiliation. Despite SARDP being a significant actor in the *woreda*

development effort, its intervention in conservation and rehabilitation is limited; it supported the production of 480,000 seedlings.

5.4.3 LGN communication and decision-making structures for environmental rehabilitation

As already discussed, in spite of the differences in the *woredas'* effectiveness, WDC/WDSC and T/KDC are multi-sector and multi-actor LGN decision-making and communication structures. Hence, as in other local service development, environmental rehabilitation issues and information are discussed and exchanged between actors involved in these structures.

The agriculture offices establish a network of relationships with different state and non-state actors that are directly and indirectly involved in supporting and facilitating SWC and afforestation activities. This creates opportunities for joint decision-making and communication. The agriculture offices, in collaboration with the WA, negotiate and agree with each actor about its specific role and contribution. Agriculture offices and partner actors prepare a detailed plan of action that is presented to and discussed by the WDC/WDSC. In Wukro *Woreda*, for ETDP/Irish Aid and ESRDF-supported projects, WPAC and CPC respectively provide additional decision-making and communication channels between the different committees' members.

In Tigray *woredas*, environmental rehabilitation activities are not only facilitated and promoted through TDCs, but also through independent Conservation Committees established at *tabia* and *kushet* levels. These Committees were established by the TPLF and REST during the civil war to undertake environmental rehabilitation in partnership with *tabia* and *kushet* administrations. Gebre Ab (1997) stated that from the viewpoint of other liberation movements, the protection of the environment through SWC and afforestation in which LGs and other community-based structures set up by the TPLF were instrumental, was a unique contribution of the liberation movement in Tigray. The vice administrator[7] of Wukro *Woreda* stated that:

> The war was not only against the *Derg* but also against environmental degradation that threatens the survival of the Tigray people. While the fighters were fighting and pushing the *Derg* from the region, civilians were fighting against environmental degradation in the liberated areas so that survival would be ensured after the victory. The struggle against the *Derg* ended in May 1991, however, the struggle against environmental degradation has continued in a more organized and vigorous manner since the problem is still very big and has grown over a period of three thousand years

Esser et al. (2002) also stated that during the civil war, TPLF and REST organized the local community in areas controlled by the former to undertake SWC programmes during which community members were directly involved in

problem identification, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation activities. This experience created a fertile ground for community-based LGNs in the post-1991 period. As a result, *tabia* and *kushet* Conservation Committees serve as important decision-making and communication structures in which members openly and freely discuss conservation activities.

Unlike Tigray, Amhara Region has no well-established experience of conducting environmental rehabilitation though community-based structures. As mentioned earlier, conservation activities started during the *Derg* regime when need identification, and the prioritising and planning of activities were carried out by agriculture experts, who gave the people little or no chance to be involved in the process. Post-1991, in spite of policy changes regarding decentralization and community participation, the situation did not improve much with regard to communities' participation in local affairs because of the lack of a political and community-enabling environment. There is an unfavourable condition and no effort has been made to facilitate the emergence and functioning of community-based local governance decision-making and communication structures. Political structures, such as *kebele* and *gote* administrations, are instruments with which to mobilize labour and materials from the local people for conservation activities. Unfortunately, the people have little or no confidence and trust in these structures because of the unfriendly political environment. As a result, the local people have not developed interest-based and voluntary participation.

5.4.4 Environmental rehabilitation activities' outcome

As stated earlier, in this study, environmental rehabilitation through land conservation includes SWC and afforestation activities. Hence, this part will be devoted to discussing the outcomes in terms of SWC and afforestation works carried out in each case study *woreda* through the various actors' contribution.

Land conservation through SWC

SWC is carried out by means of two major approaches viz. through community participation and FFW/CFW/EGS programmes. Despite differences in interest and voluntarism, local communities participate and contribute labour and materials to rehabilitate the degraded land so that its productive capacity can be improved and sustained.

The extent of SWC works carried out through community participation differs between the various *woredas*. The *woredas'* total achievement is presented in Table 5.12. Wukro terraced 19,487 hectares of land, the best achievement of the four *woredas*. Degua Temben and Bugna terraced 17,170 and 17,011 hectares of land respectively, revealing that there is no major difference between them. Baso Liben did the least of all by terracing only 6,816 hectares of land. In terms of the construction of different SWC structures such as a check dam, cut-off

drain and artificial water way, Bugna did the best (377 km) followed by Wukro (297.53 km), Degua Temben (254.1 km) and Baso Liben (192.4 km). Achievements in relation to the population show that Tigray *woredas* achieved more than Amhara *woredas* in all SWC activities (see Appendix 23). Wukro leads in all cases with each thousand of the population having on average annually terraced 33.1 hectares of land and constructed 0.5 km of check dam; the corresponding values for Degua Temben are 28.8 hectares and 0.4 km. Bugna is next with each thousand of the population having terraced 14.8 hectares of land and constructed 0.3 km. Baso Liben's performance was very poor, not only compared to Tigray *woredas* but also to Bugna. It terraced only 8.8 hectares of land and constructed 0.2 km of check dam, cut-off drain and artificial water way per each thousand of the population per annum.

Table 5.12
Extent of SWC performance by woreda (1996-2001)

Woreda	**Through community participation**			
	Area of land terraced in hectares		SWC structures in km	
	Total	AA	Total	AA
Wukro	19,487	3,248	297.5	49.6
Degua Temben	17,170	2,862	254.1	42.4
Bugna	17,011	2,835	377	62.8
Baso Liben	6,816	1,136	192.4	32.1
Woreda	**Through FFW/CFW/EGS**			
	Area of land terraced in hectares		SWC structures in km	
	Total	AA	Total	AA
Wukro	13,146	2,191	120.9	20.2
Degua Temben	8,657	1,443	146.4	24.4
Bugna	2,362.2	394	149.3	24.9
Baso Liben	none	none	none	none
Woreda	**Grand Total**			
	Area of land terraced in hectares		SWC structures in km	
	Total	AA	Total	AA
Wukro	32,633	5,439	418.2	69.7
Degua Temben	25,827	4,305	400.5	66.7
Bugna	19,373.2	3,229	526.3	87.7
Baso Liben	6,816	1,136	192.4	32.1

Note: AA = Annual Average
Source: Appendix 23

The differences between the two regions are caused by differences in community-based conservation structures and experience in the pre-*Derg* period as well as differences in the post-1991 enabling environment for community participation. As discussed earlier, people in Tigray accumulated experiences in environmental rehabilitation during the civil war. They have continued to be the main actor in land conservation. Kinfe (2002) stated that even though many state and non-state agencies do support conservation efforts in Tigray through funding, coordination and/or information dissemination, the local people are the main actors, mobilizing their efforts through community-based structures. Natural resource experts in Wukro and Degua Temben *Woredas* stated that the rural people of Tigray understand land conservation as an integral part of agricultural activities. They understand that SWC and afforestation activities are as important as cultivating the land to grow crops. People in Wukro stated that:

> We are sure that we could survive if we only eat and drink; and what we can eat and drink is strongly linked to the land, as we are farmers. However, the land has been degraded because it has been cultivated for three thousand years. The experience we had during the struggle showed us that the land's capacity to yield better production depends on our capacity to rehabilitate it and prevent further degradation. Hence, we voluntarily and actively participate in land conservation to ensure our survival[8]

People in Degua Temben have similar views, stated as:

> To ensure our livelihood, we have to cultivate land and produce crops. We have learnt from our experiences that the capacity of the land to produce crops depends on what we invest; we will produce more if we rehabilitate it and prevent further degradation. So, land conservation is part of the agricultural activities that we have been busy with for a long time. We have been carrying out conservation activities voluntarily since we, ourselves, benefit, but we need support in terms of tools and training [9]

According to natural resource experts in Wukro and Degua Temben, the presence of the *Seleste Mahberat* and the experiences of *tabia* and *kushet* leaders in mobilizing communities through TDC and community-based conservation structures are very instrumental in maintaining the local people's keen interest and commitment as established during the civil war.

As repeatedly mentioned in every issue related to public participation, in the Amhara case study *woredas*, voluntary participation has not developed. According to community members, they are mainly mobilized through the kebele and gote administrations for labour and material contributions to implement SWC activities. Community members in Bilbela *Kebele* expressed their regret about the little attention paid to their ideas and views:

> It seems that government has reached a conclusion that we know nothing about our affairs and, hence, they [political leaders] always want us to listen rather than

> speak. Whenever anyone tries to speak against the views of *kebele* or higher officials, he/she is labelled as anti-development. Such practices do not motivate us to voluntarily and actively participate in land conservation and other activities.[10]

Community members in Baso Liben *Woreda* stated that they have never been consulted about what and how SWC should be done. They are instructed by the *kebele* and *gote* administrations to contribute labour and materials. In explaining the lack of participation, community members in Yelaminje *Kebele* stated 'besides not being asked to participate in need identification, prioritisation and planning, the people are not consulted as to which months, weeks, and days would be suitable for them to carry out SWC activities.'[11] A 44-year old man[12] stated that 'we [people] contribute labour and materials for SWC, not because we are convinced of its merits, but rather not to be classified as "*tserelimat* (anti-development) and *tekawami* (political resistant)", which would mean harassment and intimidation.' A member of Korke *Kebele* Administration explained that neither the people nor the *kebele* and *gote* leaders are convinced by what is being done. However, the leaders are engaged in mobilizing activities as directives come from the *Woreda*, and they cannot refuse to obey these.

In this gloomy environment for interest-based and voluntary community participation, the interventions of non-state actors such as SNV and Plan in Bugna have created opportunities for participatory environmental rehabilitation activities. The Agriculture Office and community informants appreciate these actors' efforts to promote participatory approaches. The two actors, in partnership with the Agriculture Office, organize training and workshops on participatory environmental rehabilitation, emphasizing communities' role in need identification, planning, implementation, and monitoring activities. An informant from Plan stated that convincing the local people that they have to voluntarily and actively participate and at the same time convincing local leaders that they have to involve and listen to people are not simple tasks as participation is strongly associated with the local people and politicians' political interests and the two sides have hardly any shared common political objectives. Hence, successive meetings, workshops and discussions have been organized to discuss participation issues with the people and local leaders in order to establish fertile ground for participatory local development. According to the informant, although the desired level has not been achieved, these efforts have contributed to the gradual improvement of community participation in land conservation activities. The informant added that a lot has to be done to improve the state-society relationship to encourage the emergence and development of sustainable participatory local development.

SNV and Plan do not limit themselves only to organizing participatory fora, but have also introduced methods that promote interest-based and voluntary community participation. For example, as previously discussed, the SNV has initiated and organized groups of voluntary neighbourhood farmers and sup-

ported SLU on their farmlands. The two-day voluntary free labour contribution for every 17 workdays of the CFW programme introduced by Plan is another way of winning voluntary participation in conservation activities. All these contribute to Bugna accomplishing more than Baso Liben.

The second approach to undertaking SWC activities is through FFW/CFW/EGS that are supported by state and non-state actors. This approach aims at creating opportunities for able-bodied people who chronically suffer food shortage by engaging them in environmental rehabilitation through SWC activities.

Wukro has involved larger numbers of actors to support its efforts to rehabilitate land through SWC activities. It achieved the highest total of SWC works through FFW/CFW programmes, which terraced a total of 13,146 hectares of land and constructed 120.9 km of check dam. In Degua Temben, REST is the only actor that supported SWC activities through the FFW programme throughout the study period. It carried out extensive SWC works that included the terracing of 8,657 hectares of land and the construction of 146.4 km of check dam. In terms of the number of actors, Bugna has involved more actors than Degua Temben. However, actors such as SCF-UK, WFP, and EOC/DICAC only began to support SWC in 2001. Moreover, each actor's annual contribution is very low compared to REST in Degua Temben. As a result, Bugna achieved less than Degua Temben, which constructed 2,362.2 hectares of terracing and 149.3 km of check dam, cut-off drain and artificial water way. In Baso Liben there is no actor engaged in supporting the Agriculture Office to undertake SWC.

The overall achievements in SWC works (through community participation and FFW/CFW/EGS) show that Wukro is in the front line, having terraced 32,633 hectares of land and constructed 418.2 km of check dam. Degua Temben is next, having terraced 25,827 hectares of land and constructed 400.5 km of check dam. In terms of areas of land terraced (19,373.2 hectares), Bugna is third, while its grand total achievement in the construction of a check dam, cut-off drain and artificial water way (526.3 km) is the highest of all the *woredas* because of more construction through the community's participation (377 km of 526.3 km). However, the previous discussions of SWC achievement through community participation showed that even if the absolute figure seems high, in relation to its population, Bugna still achieved less than Wukro and Degua Temben. Baso Liben is last and achieved the least of all the case study *woredas*, having only terraced 6,816 hectares of land and constructed 192.4 km of check dam and cut-off drain.

Land conservation through afforestation

Afforestation is another environmental rehabilitation method to prevent land degradation and water loss. In this study, tree seedling production, distribution

and planting were selected as important activities to assess the *woredas'* achievements regarding afforestation.

Table 5.13
Extent of afforestation activities by woreda (1996-2001)

Woreda	Seedlings (in number)					
	Produced		Planted		Survived	
	Total	AA	Total	AA	Total	AA
Wukro	19,440,544	3,240,091	17,755,139	2,959,190	10,784,941	1,797,490
Deg. Tem.	15,772,420	2,628,737	13,974,370	2,329,062	10,303,221	1,717,204
Bugna	34,524,787	5,754,131	28,630,019	4,771,670	14,864,121	2,477,354
Baso Liben	9,618,000	1,603,000	8,988,995	1,498,166	6,152,803	1,025,467

Source: Appendix 24.
Note: AA= Annual Average

Similar to SWC, afforestation is carried out through the local people and other non-state actors' involvement. Non-state actors are directly and indirectly involved in supporting agriculture offices and communities in producing seedlings. For example, in Wukro and Degua Temben, REST and the *Seleste Mahberat* are directly engaged in seedling production. The Agriculture Office of Wukro has received material and technical supports from GTZ, WFP and EOC/DICAC. In Bugna, Plan and EOC/DICAC are directly involved, while WFP supports the Agriculture Office through the provision of materials, working tools and grains (paying the labour costs of seedling production). The SNV supports afforestation activities through capacity building. It trains experts and DAs in tree nursery management. It also provides improved tree seeds and tools to produce and plant tree seedlings. In Baso Liben, tree seedling production is mainly carried out by Agriculture Office and individual farmers. In 2001, the Agriculture Office received limited financial support from the SARDP to produce seedlings.

Bugna produced the highest number of tree seedlings followed by Wukro. The WFP supported the production of more than 90 percent (31,863,492 of 34,524,787) of the tree seedlings produced in Bugna. The number of tree seedlings that Bugna produced through the WFP is greater than the grand total (19,440,544) of tree seedlings produced by Wukro. Degua Temben produced 15,772,420 tree seedlings, which is lower than that of Wukro but higher than that of Baso Liben (9,618,000).

The local people's role in and contribution to afforestation are very significant in all the case study *woredas*. With the exception of the meagre number of seedlings (766,193) that REST planted in Degua Temben, planting of tree seed-

lings is carried out by the local people. The absolute number of planted tree seedlings follows the trend of seedling production achievement. However, plantation achievement in relation to the population shows that there is a difference between the *woredas*. Appendix 25 shows that Wukro leads by having planted an average of 28,977 tree seedlings per thousand of the population per annum followed by Bugna that planted 26,538 seedlings. Degua Temben planted an average of 19,723 seedlings per thousand of the populations per annum, while Baso Liben achieved the least, and only planted an average of 11,727 seedlings.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter showed that different state and non-state actors join together through different LGN structures at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. They each contribute different resources and also play different but inter-related roles regarding local service development and delivery. The following are the major conclusions drawn from the empirical findings.

Firstly, state actors play multiple roles at different levels. The ESRDF, a federal community-development-oriented agency, plays an important role in encouraging and supporting LGs and communities to learn and undertake their own development. Regional and zonal agencies play important roles in providing policy guidelines and directives and ensuring the implementation of these to shape and control the activities of the different actors engaged in the production and provision of services. They also provide sector offices and partner actors with technical and administrative support. In fact, some zonal agencies such as ZWRMEDD are engaged in the co-production of services. Regional and zonal agencies' other crucial role is the allocation of material, financial and human resources to *woreda* agencies. These are necessary to run the service institutions' day-to-day activities such as in health centres, clinics, and health posts. The WA and sector offices are the principal network facilitators. The WA facilitates, coordinates and supervises the efforts of different actors engaged in different networks through the WDC/WDSC and other administrative and political channels that extend up to grassroots level. Sector offices play a leading role in facilitating and coordinating planning and implementing networks that are engaged in improving service development and delivery. *Tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations serve as important communication nodes at the local level where *woreda* decisions are communicated and implemented. They also coordinate and supervise community participation in local development processes.

Secondly, different non-state actors, such as NGOs, CBOs and donor agencies, have engaged in LGNs with the local administrations and sector agencies. Depending on the nature of the intervention modalities adopted, they play different roles that range from resource contributions for service development and delivery projects, to active involvement in need identification, prioritisation,

as well as the planning, implementation, and monitoring of project activities. Actors like the SNV do not limit their efforts only to these activities but also actively engage in searching for and creating different LGN structures that could create alternative venues for local development dialogues. The comparative assessments for each actor in each of the three services revealed that a high resource contribution alone does not ensure an actor's importance in the overall LGN processes. Active participation in various service development and delivery activities is highly appreciated by LG officials and sector experts.

Thirdly, there is indeed a relationship between an LGN's emergence and functioning and local service development and delivery. This chapter showed that the various LGNs established between different actors from different organizational origins (NGOs, CBOs, and donors, local and supra-local government agencies) have mobilized different resources that leveraged *woreda* governments in undertaking local service development and delivery. Examination and analysis of the three selected services (drinking water, primary health care and environmental rehabilitation) revealed that the different actors' interventions through LGNs have improved accessibility, coverage and deliveries. The role of an LGN in improving services can be deduced from the differences in the case study *woredas'* achievements. *Woredas* that established different LGNs and provided effective leadership for their proper functioning have achieved better. Wukro is a good example of a *woreda* that exploited the positive enabling environment well. It has not only benefited from the active community structures and participation, but also attracted and involved various supra-local and local actors in different LGN structures to produce and provide local services. Hence, it emerged first in the development and delivery of all three selected services. Bugna is ranked next in establishing networks with various actors that have diversified resources. However, the poor political and community enabling environment has affected community inputs to the LGN processes, which undermines its overall achievement. Nonetheless, it still achieved much better than Baso Liben, which exhibited the least LGN processes. It not only suffers from a low political and community enabling environment, but also from weak local leadership. It therefore has weak LGN structures that involve only a few actors. It has neither benefited from community participation nor from the intervention of greater numbers of external actors. Hence, its service development and delivery achievements are the poorest of all the case study *woredas*. Degua Temben has also been affected by weak leadership regarding attracting and involving different actors as well as managing existing LGNs for local development. It achieved far less than Wukro in all three selected services. However, the significant contributions made by REST throughout the period and the presence of the *Seleste Mahberat* and other experienced community-based LGN structures helped Degua Temben to achieve better than Baso Liben and even, in some cases, better than Bugna.

Indeed, various actors' interventions contribute to local development activities. However, it is not the number of actors alone that guarantees high achievement, but also the quality of the actors involved in all the LGN processes. Some actors are more important than others. For example, ETDP/Irish Aid and REST in Wukro, REST in Degua Temben, SNV and Plan in Bugna and SARDP in Baso Liben are significant actors that provide multi-faceted support for LGs and communities to improve service development and provision.

Fourthly, the analysis revealed that the existence of effective CBOs and other community-based structures is crucial for the emergence and functioning of LGNs for better service development and delivery. Differences in the level of community participation have caused differences in local service development and delivery outcomes. Tigray *woredas* have benefited from the presence of the *Seleste Mahberat* and other community-based LGN structures that have sustained active and interest-based community participation. Amhara *woredas*, unfortunately, have the least developed community-based LGN structures and, hence, the local community's roles in and contributions to their own development have remained marginal. The difference between the two regions could be attributed to the differences in the political and community enabling environment. In Tigray Region, the local people have a strong affiliation with and trust in the political system, which created synergetic relationships between the state and society in local development. Such assets are scarce in Amhara Region, hampering the people's voluntary and active participation (see 6.3). Community participation is not only low in Baso Liben where participatory opportunities are limited, but also in Bugna where different non-actors invested considerable efforts in creating different participatory opportunities and fora. This is evident from fact that although Bugna has involved a greater number of actors in terms of service delivery activities such as MCH, which is strongly dependent on active community LGN structures and participation, it not only achieved less than Wukro but also less than Degua Temben.

Notes

1. Sub-*woreda* administrations always refer to *tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations.
2. This applies not only to the SDW but also to other projects supported by the ESRDF.
3. Cumulative percentage of service coverage of 1996 includes percentage of people provided with the service in previous years.
4. Aggregate ratio of each type of health profession divided by the number of years in which a professional(s) existed in the study period.
5. Focus group discussion, Negash *Tabia*, Wukro *Woreda,* 08-11-03.

6. Focus group discussion, Yelemlem *Kebele*, Baso Liben *Woreda*, 12-01-04
7. *Ayte* Kiflay Abay, Vice Administrator, Wukro *Woreda*, 13-11-03.
8. Focus group discussion, Gemad *Tabia*, Wukro *Woreda* 11-11-03.
9. Focus group discussion, Seret *Tabia*, Degua Temben *Woreda*, 27-11-03.
10. Focus group discussion, Bete Anbessa *Kebele*, Bugna *Woreda*, 18-12-03
11. Focus group discussion, Yelaminje *Kebele*, Baso Liben *Woreda*, 11-01-04.
12. *Ato* Tiguhi Sebehat, Korke *Kebele*, Baso Liben *Woreda*, 14-01-04.

6 The Added Value of Local Governance Networking: A Synthesis from Case Study *Woredas*

6.1 Introduction

Chapter five empirically investigated and analyzed the case study *woredas'* service development and delivery achievements regarding drinking water, primary health care and environmental rehabilitation. Despite differences between the case studies, evidence reveals that LGNs established between different actors at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels have contributed to service development and delivery outcomes.

Empirical analyses also reveal that LGNs have not only contributed to improvements in service development and delivery outcomes, but also added important value to the local socio-economic processes compared to what individual actors could have done without LGNs. Based on an analysis of the processes, interactions, activities, respondents' replies and comparisons between *woredas*, LGNs' value added lies in the following: (1) resource mobilization, (2) communication and learning, (3) community participation, (4) decrease in duplication and conflict, (5) transparency, accountability and equity, and the (6) promotion of synergy. However, evidence equally reveals that the roles of LGNs in improving the local development outcome and the value added vary between *woredas*, depending on factors that affect their emergence and functioning. This study has identified two major sets of factors: contextual factors and the number, diversity and quality of the actors engaged in LGN processes. Contextual factors include the regional political context (legitimacy of and trust in a political system) and *woreda*/local contextual factors, which include, among others, the leadership's quality and continuity and the party-people relationship (past and present).

This chapter is divided into two broad sections. Section one deals with LGNs' added value as identified above. It discusses and synthesizes how each added value is attained through the interactions of the various actors in the LGN structures at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. Section two examines and discusses the major sets of factors that affect LGNs' emergence and functioning in the Tigray and Amhara case study *woredas*. It looks into the regional and local

contextual factors and analyses how these factors have affected LGN development. It also examines how the number, diversity and quality of actors engaged in supporting LGs and people influenced LGNs' emergence and functioning in each *woreda*.

6.2 Value Added of LGNs

In spite of differences in the value added between *woredas* due to differences in the contextual factors and the actors' number, diversity and quality, which will be discussed in section two, empirical evidence reveals that LGNs have added value to the important local development components discussed below.

6.2.1 Resource mobilization

LGNs established between different actors at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels have mobilized resources from different sources to which LGs would not have had access and/or that would have been very difficult to mobilize. Resources from bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, NGOs, CBOs, and the local people are mobilized through different sectoral and non-sectoral networks. Not all actors possess the same resources; hence, negotiations and agreements between *woreda* agencies and other state and non-state actors are important means of mobilizing different resources from different actors. An actor could, at best, possess one or a combination of the following resources: political and legal, organizational, financial, material, labour, human/expertise, and information/advisory resources.

In all the case studies, the WA contributes social legitimacy. The politico-legal legitimacy vested in the WA to legitimatise other actors' interventions in the local development processes is most important. This is a crucial contribution that other actors neither possess nor can overlook when making their own contributions within a *woreda* government's jurisdiction. In spite of differences between the case studies, the WA provides institutional and organizational mechanisms through which different actors' efforts and resources are coordinated. Both the establishment of general purpose network structures, such as WDC/WDSC and T/KDC, and sector offices' involvement in the network of relationships between different state and non-state actors are important institutional mechanisms that the WA provides. The WA also supervises and coordinates the mobilization of labour and material resources from the local people through *tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* structures. *Woreda* sector offices, on the other hand, contribute organizational resources such as a working structure/relationship, work methods, guidelines and standards. They link horizontal structures with the vertical (zonal and regional) structures through which standards and policy guidelines for local service development and provisions are communicated. The provision of baseline information and deployment of ex-

perts to identify needs and priorities, plan, implement, and monitor service development and delivery are sector offices' other vital contributions.

Non-state and state actors mobilize different forms of resources including those in kind (grain and oil), financial, material (equipment, furniture, tools), and vehicular (cars and motorbikes), all of which are vital to leverage local service development and delivery. They also mobilize human resources in the sense that they support employment of experts, provide technical and advisory services and assign experts who, together with sector experts, are directly involved in the planning, implementation and monitoring of projects. SNV for example, besides offering technical and advisory services, supported the employment of a planning officer, water engineer and community health nurse. Promoting and supporting experience sharing between local leaders and sector experts and the training with which they are provided constitute an important dimension of human resource mobilization. SNV, ETDP/Irish Aid, REST, Plan, and SARDP informants explained that building the capacity of LG leaders, sector experts and communities is very crucial in resource mobilization, as it improves their ability to search for and generate resources from alternative sources on which sustainable development depends.

Actors that are directly engaged in supporting local development play an important role in motivating people and creating conditions for resource contributions to local development. Such actors negotiate with the local people so that they will contribute resources that are at their disposal, such as labour and/or materials. This is an important role to improve community contribution to local development in all localities in general and in Amhara in particular, as the voluntary community involvement there is poor. For example, as discussed in chapters four and five, Plan negotiated and agreed with communities that each person participating in a cash-for-work (CFW) programme had to contribute two days' free labour for every 17 working days. The ESRDF's experience shows another method of resource mobilization from communities. ESRDF informants stated that communities not only have to learn how to plan, implement and monitor development activities, but also have to understand and develop experience regarding how to mobilize resources. To this end, the ESRDF has made it clear that it will only support community-based local development projects if LGs and communities agree and commit themselves to contributing 10% of the project costs. To meet such commitments, communities under the CPC and LGs' leadership contribute resources in terms of cash, labour and/or locally available materials.

In Tigray *woredas*, the *Seleste Mahberat* serve as important instruments of resource mobilization from communities. They facilitate and coordinate labour and materials to support projects financed by different actors. *Woreda* officials and leaders of the *Seleste Mahberat* stated that although there are no accurate records, their contribution to local service development and provision is signifi-

cant. This is clearly reflected by the comparative contribution assessment discussed in chapter five. They have established consensus that each able-bodied community member has to contribute 25 person days per annum towards SWC activities. According to community members, this is the least they can do to ensure their survival and build hope for the next generation. REST project office informants stated that the *Seleste Mahberat* do not only facilitate the mobilization of the agreed upon contributions, but also encourage members to make a further contribution. They negotiate with the actors to increase project outputs by increasing the communities' contribution. For example, they increased labour and material contributions to increase the number of drinking water projects from 2 to 3. Moreover, informants stated, the *Seleste Mahberat* fill the resource gaps that would have appeared in a project's implementation. These informants explained that, for example, in more than 25 percent of the cases, construction of a water point requires digging deeper as well as construction because no water is found at the estimated depth. In such cases, the *Seleste Mahberat* ask their members to increase their contributions of labour and locally available materials so that the price of these items can be saved and re-allocated to purchasing construction materials.

6.2.2 Communication and learning

LGNs established between different actors at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels facilitate communication and learning between different actors involved in promoting the common objective of improving local development. The various LGN structures that provide such opportunities include the WDC/WDSC, WPAC, CHCs, CPC, T/KDC, and T/KCC (see chapter four). For example, the WDC/WDSC has brought different actors together and created opportunities for the communication and exchange of ideas and experiences, which some actors might otherwise not have been able to experience. However, not all *woredas* have all these structures. Moreover, the effectiveness of each structure in facilitating communication and learning varies between the *woredas* because of differences in contextual factors and the number, diversification and quality of the actors engaged in LGN processes (see 6.3).

Wukro has almost all the structures mentioned above. The WDC is an important horizontal LGN composed of different actors. Members explained that the WA has a vested interest in and commitment to facilitating and coordinating the WDC's activities. According to members and *woreda* officials, the WDC facilitates and promotes communication and learning between members in two major ways: monthly meetings and semi-annually organized conferences. Members explained that regular meetings provide an opportunity for different actors to come together and discuss development issues. They reflect on local development challenges and opportunities identified by different actors in the course of planning and implementing development projects. Each actor is exposed to

Box 6.1
Woreda-wide communication and learning between state and non-state actors

The WDC organizes and conducts semi-annual *woreda*-wide conferences that involve different actors including: *woreda* councillors and executive members, sector heads and experts, *tabia* and *kushet l*eaders, *Seleste Mahberat* leaders, representatives of non-state actors operating in the *woreda* and community representatives. Such conferences create opportunities for discussion and learning between the participating members by raising important points which, among others, include:

- Identifying *woreda* development challenges and potentials. Participants discuss and update major *woreda* development challenges and potentials that could help to capture emerging realities.
- Assessing and reflecting on what has been done and what needs to be done, how best it could be done to maximize opportunities and minimize the *woreda* development challenges. Once the WA has provided an overview of previous development activities, the participants discuss and reflect on the report based on their understanding and observation of the reality.
- Identifying and prioritising the *woreda's* development needs, which could serve as the basis to request potential development actors to become involved.
- Assessing and identifying service distribution and delivery problems between *tabias* in the *woreda*.
- Identifying obstacles that hamper joint efforts and discussing how to improve interactions between all the local development actors.
- Experience sharing: participating actors are given time to share their experiences, from the perspective of the achievements as well as the challenges faced in implementing local development projects in the *woreda* and/or elsewhere. Different actors provide different information and experiences about similar situations, which encourages discussion and learning between members.

Source: Fieldwork, 2003.

different experiences, methods and approaches used by other actors in addressing a particular problem. This not only promotes communication but also learning and synergetic relationships between participating actors. Informants explained that the baseline socio-economic information that one or more actors have, is shared between the members, which reduces the time and resources they would have spent on generating and organizing such information. The organization of conferences is another important communication and learning opportunity that the WDC creates (see Box 6.1).

The WPAC is another important communication and learning forum for members that includes the WA, sector offices and the ETDP/Irish Aid repre-

sentative. According to the members, the WPAC conducts monthly and need-based meetings to discuss problems and opportunities in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of projects supported by the ETDP/Irish Aid. *Woreda* officials explained that the WAPC has also facilitated the exchange of information and experiences with the WDC through members that participate in both networks.

The CPC has created a learning opportunity for members as the ESRDF provides training and orientations on how to identify needs and priorities, as well as how to plan, implement, and monitor community-based projects. According to *woreda* officials, training provided to experts and other CPC members is not only valuable for ESRDF-supported projects, but also for others supported by different actors.

Community Health Committees at *woreda* and *tabia* levels have opened opportunities for communication and learning between different sectors and groups of communities on primary health care service development and provision. Community health workshops are organized at *woreda* and *tabia* levels to discuss primary health care issues aimed at promoting awareness creation within community members.

The TDC is another active LGN that facilitates and coordinates development activities in its jurisdiction. It frequently communicates and exchanges information with the WDC and other development actors. The TDC facilitates and coordinates direct communication between the local people and state and non-state actors that are directly involved in the local development efforts.

In addition to the above LGN structures, sector offices have established important networks with different actors engaged in supporting service development and provisions. According to sector informants, they have limited access to public funds to do the planning, implementation, and monitoring of service development projects. The networks that they have established with different actors have generated resources to be implemented at the local level. This has created opportunities for sector experts to learn from the experiences of non-state actors. Sector offices also have the opportunity to learn by doing in the processes of planning and implementing projects supported by actors that are not directly involved in such processes.

All the LGNs discussed under Wukro, with the exception of the WPAC, are also present in Degua Temben. Although the WDC is present, it has not been effective in facilitating communication and learning due to two major reasons. Firstly, the committee is dominated by state actors that use the same management style and operate within the same rules and regulations. *REST* and the *Seleste Mahberat* are the only non-state actors. Hence, the opportunity for learning from the experiences of diversified actors is limited. Secondly, the WA has a limited capacity to effectively steer the WDC's activities to make it the centre of development dialogue. According to informants, the leaders convene issue-

driven meetings rather than monthly meetings. This means that there is little opportunity for broad communication and learning processes since attention is focused on a particular issue.

Sector informants explained that the absence of diversified actors has not only undermined the WDC's opportunities for learning, but also those of the sector offices. For example, an Agriculture Office informant stated that learning opportunities regarding environmental rehabilitation are confined to REST's experience and practices. Moreover, Health and Agriculture Office informants explained that REST capitalizes on its long years of experience and technical expertise; it tends to impose its values rather than promoting open and free learning processes. This hampers the positive and learning effects of the experiences that REST shares with sector experts.

Leaders of the *Seleste Mahberat* agree that the lack of diversified actors has affected opportunities for learning. The leaders, however, explained that although there are few opportunities for learning between WDC members at the monthly meetings, *woreda*-wide conferences have been organized and held as a result of *Seleste Mahberat* and REST's pressure and support. According to informants, such conferences have created opportunities for dialogue and discussion on *woreda-wide* socio-economic issues. *Woreda* councillors and executive members, sector heads and experts, *Seleste Mahberat* leaders, representative of REST, *tabia* and *kushet* leaders, and community representatives are important participants in such processes.

Woreda and *tabia* CHCs, CPC for ESRDF support, TDC, and TCC are important LGNs that create opportunities for communication and learning. A Health Office informant, for example, explained that *woreda* and *tabia* CHCs serve as important communication and learning centres in the areas of primary health care. They promote primary health care education and awareness creation among the rural people through community workshops and at different socio-cultural events. Such discussions include important health care topics such as HIV/AIDS prevention, MCH care, environmental sanitation, and the control of malaria and other epidemics.

The WDSC, CHC and KDC are the LGN structures found in Bugna *Woreda*. However, not all structures are effective in facilitating communication and learning to achieve the objectives for which they were established.

The WDSC is an active LGN that facilitates communication and learning between multiple actors. Members explained that there is open and free communication that encourages interaction, sharing of experience and learning between members. Monthly and issue-based meetings are important fora during which members communicate and learn from one another. Conferences and workshops (see Box 6.2) have also been organized on a wider scale in order to create opportunities for dialogue and discussion between community members,

Box 6.2
Communication and Learning through workshops

1. Community Workshop
In order to identify the development potentials and problems on the ground, a team made up of the WA representative, sector experts from different offices and SNV experts conducted community workshops in different *kebeles* and at different times on the following issues:

- Assessment and discussion of development experiences, challenges faced and measures taken by communities.
- Identification of development needs, challenges and assessment of institutional mechanisms' support
- Setting priorities for interventions. Such processes have created opportunities for communities, officials and experts to discuss and learn from each other on how to promote common development objectives.

2. Community Leaders Workshops
The WDSC and SNV organized workshops for *kebele/gote* government leaders and traditional community leaders (key persons who play an important role in community life as in cases of arbitration) in different *kebeles* and at different times. Common workshop topics include:

- Sustainable agriculture and environmental rehabilitation.
- Community leadership styles and methods.
- Conflict prevention and resolution
- Formulating area/local development proposals

Such workshops facilitate communication and learning between the participants drawn from different *gotes* and who thus have different social positions in the community. Discussions on different issues facilitate the interface between conventional and traditional practices.

(Continued)

kebele and *gote* leaders, sector heads, *woreda* councillors and executive members, and non-state actors' representatives.

Bugna is fortunate in having the SNV to promote and facilitate LGN activities. It has exerted efforts in looking for alternative ways of promoting and facilitating communication and learning between different actors.

The *woreda* community health committee (WCHC) is the other important LGN that facilitates its members' communication and learning about primary health care services. According to a Health Office informant, a WCHC integrates primary health care education and information with other sectors such as education and agriculture. The Committee organizes and conducts workshops, which have created opportunities for communication and learning between

***Box 6.2** (Continuation)*

3. Sustainable land use (SLU) and natural resources management (NRM) workshop (October 1998)
In collaboration with the WDSC, the SNV organized this workshop with the aim of sharing its experiences and creating a common understanding of SLU and NRM. Participants were drawn from Bugna WA, Agriculture Office (AO), Zonal Agriculture Department, SOS-Sahel, EOC/DICAC, and Plan. They deliberated on the basic essence of SLU and NRM. They discussed and identified past efforts' major problems in delivering the desired result. Among others, the major bottlenecks identified by the participants were top-down planning and implementation approaches that paid less attention to community interests and knowledge.

A successful experience in undertaking SLU and NRM through the establishment of interest-based neighbourhood groups was presented by the SNV. The participants discussed and raised questions with regard to the method's effectiveness. Further explanation was provided by the SNV representatives. The WA and AO participants witnessed the effectiveness and sustainable nature of the approach compared to that of the traditional community mobilization approach. The participants acknowledged the importance of the approach and agreed to test it on a wider level. The AO has already introduced the method in selected *kebeles* to further examine the method's viability.

Source: SNV archives and interview (December, 2003)

different groups within communities, including community members, traditional and religious leaders, and *kebele* and *gote* leaders.

Although the KDC and KCHC are in place, they facilitate very little communication and learning. Sector office and non-state actor informants stated that there are not enough important factors for these LGNs to function effectively at the community level (see regional and *woreda* contextual factors for the Amhara Region). *Woreda* officials agreed that there are only limited opportunities for communication and learning through *kebele* level LGNs. However, although much remains to be done, community conferences and workshops on wider local development issues that have been organized and conducted by the WDSC in collaboration with SNV and Plan, have had important learning effect regarding the value of participation.

Bugna *Woreda* sector offices have benefited from sector-based networks that involve diversified actors. Similar to Wukro, learning opportunities are created by actors who are directly involved in planning and implementation processes and also by those who provide sector offices with resources to plan and imple-

ment development activities. In the former case, sector experts are exposed to different experiences while in the latter, they engage in learning by doing.

In Baso Liben, no LGN structures have effectively facilitated and promoted communication and learning whether at the *woreda* or *kebele* level. Structures such as the WDC and KDC have remained too weak to carry out the objectives for which they were established. As stated in many parts of this research, the frequent turnover of leadership gives leaders little time to make the WDC and KDC communication and learning centres.

The SARDP's intervention and its support for participatory community-based development has created opportunities for the communication and the exchange of ideas between local administrations, sector offices and the people. Community members participate in workshops organized at *kebele* level to identify local development needs and priorities. According to an SARDP informant, however, these interventions and support have not brought sustainable effects regarding learning and communication because the *woreda* and *kebele* leaders who participated in the workshops and trainings were replaced.

The CPC is the other LGN structure through which community involvement in local development issues is facilitated. It has created opportunities for an alternative forum for communication between the local people and their leaders who would otherwise have few chances to talk about local development agendas.

According to sector informants, the opportunities for communication and learning through sector-based networks are negligible. Sector offices don't have access to diversified actors' experiences nor to sufficient resource support to learn by doing.

The above discussions regarding the case study *woredas* showed that both direct interventions in planning and implementation and resource support by non-state actors have created opportunities for learning and communication. According to local leaders and experts, when sector offices' capacity is very poor, actors' direct involvement in planning and implementing local development projects is crucial for maximizing day-to-day learning from their diversified experiences. In addition to the learning opportunities through sector-based networks, such actors contribute much to the learning and communication processes in a multi-actor, general purpose LGN such as a WDC/WDSC. However, *woreda* leaders and experts are of the opinion that the opportunity for learning by doing is then reduced, since NGO experts mostly capitalize on their expertise and experience to gear and influence the processes instead of giving local leaders and experts equal opportunities.

Resource support for *woreda* agencies without being involved in the planning and implementation has, on the other hand, created opportunities for learning by doing. *Woreda* leaders and sector experts appreciate the decision-making autonomy and the learning by doing opportunities that they enjoy. However,

informants did not hide the fact that they have a limited capacity to carry out projects timely and effectively. They have difficulties in meeting standards and deadlines set by such actors for the planning and implementation process.

The above discussions show that *woreda* leaders and experts face a dilemma when having to decide which intervention modality is more enabling. They are confronted with decision-making autonomy versus lack of capacity to effectively undertake project planning and implementation for better service development and delivery. The best solution is to suggest that actors focus on building LGs' capacity. However, this might not be achieved easily or in the short term. Hence, there should be a balance between decision-making autonomy in the short term versus LG capacity. Non-state actors should avoid capitalizing on their expertise and experience in project preparation and implementation processes, simultaneously local leaders and experts should be open and ready to learn processes so that they can assume responsibility for them.

An important point that should be noted at this juncture is that although diversified actors with diversified experiences promote learning and communication for better results, managing and coordinating such processes are not easy. According to Wukro and Bugna *Woreda* officials, facilitating learning and communication between diversified actors is demanding. Some actors tend to overshadow learning and communication processes by presenting their ideas and experiences as being superior to others. REST, WVE and Plan have been criticised for such behaviour. Informants explained that, in some instances, communication between diversified actors tends to lead to conflict rather than learning, which requires careful handling. Moreover, an LGN involves transaction costs. According to *woreda* officials and sector experts, getting all the actors in one place at one time is really time consuming and tests the relevant organiser's patience. Some actors arrive late and then demand to be briefed regarding the previous discussions so that they can agree or disagree with the decisions reached. Even worse, some others call and ask to be excused, or ask for a postponement of the meeting after much time has been wasted waiting for them to arrive. If the requesting actor(s) is/are major stakeholder(s) of the agenda to be discussed and decided, a postponement is mandatory and the actors who have arrived suffer real costs that negatively affect their interest in the LGN. Hence, an LGN requires leaders to invest much time, not only in meetings, but also beforehand in communicating and negotiating so that all the actors will attend and arrive in time.

6.2.3 Reduce duplication and conflicts

As noted above, the involvement of large and diversified actors in the LGN not only creates opportunities but also challenges. It demands more effort and capacity to facilitate and coordinate activities so that duplication and conflict are reduced in favour of more synergetic relationships.

According to the WA and sector informants in Wukro and Bugna, most duplication tends to occur in an intervention *tabia/kebele* where more than one actor may have an interest in intervening due to the *tabia/kebel's* accessibility as in, for example, Negash in Wukro and Neakutelab in Bugna. In order to avoid such problems, the WDC/WDSC makes an annual assessment of each *kebele's* service profile and identifies most missing services that need intervention. When a new project is presented for a proposed intervention *tabia/kebele*, the Committee discusses this and decides in which *tabia/kebele* a project should be located. On the basis of this decision, the actors realign their intervention *tabia/kebele*. For example, an informant from Bugna Health Office stated that Plan suggested that Yimrehane-Degosach should be as one of its intervention *kebele,* the WDSC however, decided that it should rather intervene in Tadios Amba, as the SNV was already undertaking integrated development in the former. However, this process presents the WDSC with a serious challenge since it has to negotiate with and convince the realigning actor to accept an alternative so that this change will not cause dissatisfaction. The realignment of intervention *kebele* not only contributes to a reduction in duplication and the prevention of conflict, but also to equity. In the process of realignment, *tabias/kebeles* that have not been selected are given a chance for intervention.

According to Wukro *Woreda* officials, discussions and decisions in the WDC do not only reduce duplication in intervention *tabias* but also in intervention areas/activities. For example, the WDC found that more attention was given to primary health care facility development such as the construction of health posts and clinics. Indeed, even more facilities were needed; however, achievements in primary health service promotion do not only depend on the accessibility of services, but also on rural communities' level of awareness and use of the available services. Taking this into account, the WDC decided that some actors should focus on promoting primary health care activities. Accordingly, officials stated, REST agreed to focus fully on promotional as well as community capacity-building activities with regard to primary health care service.

Wukro and Bugna *Woreda* informants stated that actors such as REST, WVE and Plan do not only tend to dominate WDC/WDSC discussions, but also engage in comparing and contrasting their activities with that of others in the various communities, which is unpleasant. Such issues are brought to the attention of the WDC/WDSC and discussed by the members before this leads to hostile relations that would undermine the complementarity and synergetic relationships in local development.

6.2.4 Community participation

In the period 1996-2001, *woreda* governments had limited access to government financial and material resources to undertake local development. The role of *woreda* governments and sector offices in capital budgets was limited. *Woreda*

Box 6.3
Community participation processes in projects financed by actors directly involved in planning and implementing service development projects

1. Intervention *tabias/kebeles* are selected by the WDC/WDSC, which is communicated to the respective *tabia/kebele* leaders to facilitate communication and intervention.
2. Representative(s) of the actor and the relevant sector office approach the *tabia/kebele* administration and T/KDC members to discuss the programme generally and arrange a meeting with the people for further discussions and decisions.
3. The *tabia/kebele* administration organizes a meeting in collaboration with the T/KDC in which people from different *kushets/gotes* meet and have discussions with the actor and sector representatives. The chief administrator of the *tabia/kebele* facilitates the meeting. Representative of the actor in collaboration with sector representatives provide background information on the actor, how and in which area/sector it will support the local people, what kind of resources are available for what purposes, and what is expected from the local administration and people.
4. On the bases of this information, people discuss, identify and prioritise problems. In terms of planning, people discuss and identify in which *kushet/gote* the project should be located, what kind of resources and how much they can contribute, when it would be better to implement the project so that it will not compete with or hinder the peak of the local agricultural activities.
5. The relevant sector and partner actor are directly responsible for all technical and administrative supervision and coordination of the project's planning and implementation. The *Tabiya/kebele* and T/KDC facilitate and coordinate community contributions as per the agreement reached

Source: Fieldwork, 2003

officials claimed, although plans were basically planned at zonal and regional levels, project ideas were developed on the basis of community needs and priorities generated through *tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations. Sector experts, however, stated that this exercise was very 'nominal' in the sense that it did not reflect the community's needs and priorities. They further explained that not only communities' needs were 'nominal', but also those needs and priories screened and developed by sector offices were simple 'wish lists'. They did not serve a purpose beyond providing zonal and regional agencies with information for further planning. Hence, community participation in government-financed activities was very limited and mainly required for labour and material contributions in project implementations.

In these circumstances, state (ESRDF) and non-state actors' direct support of and intervention in the local development processes have created opportunities for communities to directly participate in need identification, prioritisation, planning, and implementation of local service development and provisions. Different actors play important roles in facilitating and promoting community participation through LGN structures established at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. According to the WA and sector informants, however, the level of involvement in facilitating community participation varies between actors, depending on the nature of the intervention modalities. The following two categories of actors clarify this point of view:

(i) Actors that are directly involved in planning and implementing development projects promote community participation directly at grassroots level, such as ADCS, REST, TDA, WVE, ADA, EOC/DICAC, Plan and SNV. Their method of participating in communities is indicated in Box 6.3.

According to informants from actors that are directly engaged in these processes, the local people's direct and active participation in such processes promotes interest-based contributions (local knowledge, experience, labour, and materials) and a sense of ownership of development projects. Moreover, the involvement of ordinary citizens and their organizations in the identification of their own problems and interest creates opportunities to reduce the elite's capture of local development processes. Box 6.5 provides a good example of not only how transparency and accountability are promoted, but also of how communities and CBOs' participation can reduce elite capture. This clearly reflects that a network of relationships between the people, CBOs and grassroots LGs gives them the power to defend and ensure popular interests.

According to informants, promoting community participation through the processes indicated in Box 6.3 is, however, not simple or swift. There are different barriers such as frequent political meetings, recurring drought and its corollary effect on food security, and experts' low interest in facilitating communities' participation. *Tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrators are preoccupied with political meetings that not only hamper scheduling but also prescheduled meetings with communities. According to informants, recurrent drought has also forced local administrations and the people to undertake sustainable local development. Drought not only affects the lives of the people in the period that it occurs, but also in the subsequent years when they have to exert more effort to rehabilitate and acquire assets, such as cattle, lost in the drought. As a result, community meetings are sometimes considered a liability that competes for individuals' time. Another obstacle for effective community participation identified by informants is the fact that sector experts and some LG officials tend to short-circuit the process rather than facilitating it; they feel that involving communities in need identification, prioritisation, and planning would complicate the matter and cause delays in decision-making. The in-

volvement of different non-state actors and communities in LGNs has, however, reduced experts and LG officials' premature judgment regarding communities' participation. This suggests that an LGN brings deliberation to a new public space, thus reducing the 'backdoor' capture of issues by politicians and the elite.

Plan and SNV informants in Bugna, and an SARDP informant in Baso Liben stated that a poor political and community enabling environment is another factor that affects effective community participation. Weak community-based participatory structures and a lack of trust and affiliation between the politicians and people are critical problems. They hamper open communication and the exchange of information to establish a common objective and exert efforts. Reducing such barriers demands extra efforts.

(ii) As previously discussed, some actors provide LGs with direct financial, material, and capacity building support without being directly involved in planning and implementation. Such actors include ETDP/Irish Aid in Wukro, UNICEF/WIBS in Bugna and SARDP in Baso Liben. According to informants from these actors, community participation in need identification, prioritisation, planning and implementation is a mandatory requirement for a project to qualify for funding.

However, mandatory requirements are not the only means of ensuring community participation. These actors have introduced two important checking mechanisms. The first is through project representatives who participate in the WDC/WDSC at the *woreda* level. Representatives of such actors are responsible for following up the day-to-day processes to ensure that projects are planned and implemented as per the terms negotiated and agreed upon. The second mechanism is through project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation processes. These actors are directly engaged in examining project processes and checking with communities whether people have been provided with opportunities to actively participate. According to an SARDP informant, SARDP is not limited to only setting conditions and following up processes, but also engages in initiating and supporting participatory structures and processes since the enabling environment for voluntary and interest-based participation is poor. Although, according to the informant, little has changed with regard to the local leaders and people's interest and commitment, the SARDP's intervention in the LGN is a light in the dark of the participatory environment. This has been acknowledged by *woreda* officials, sectors experts, *kebele* and *gote* leaders and community members.

ESRDF's intervention modality is similar to that of actors discussed above in the second category, and community participation is a precondition to secure funding. The ESRDF encourages and supports LGs and communities to establish a CPC that will stimulate and institutionalise community participation. Moreover, the ESRDF trains and assigns a Local Community Facilitator (LCF)

to assist the CPC and communities on how to formulate acceptable development proposals. The LCF also follows up processes and periodically reports to the ESRDF on the level of community participation. According to local people in Baso Liben, in spite of local leaders' dominance of the processes, the ESRDF has created an opportunity for them to be involved in identifying their needs and priorities.

As repeatedly stated, the Tigray *woredas*, *Tabia*/*Kushet* Conservation Committees and *Tabia* CHC are important community-based LGNs that provide an opportunity for direct participation by the local people. Through the CHC, local people participate directly in nominating and electing CHAs, in epidemic prevention and control, environmental sanitation, and in primary health care education.

Tabia and *kushet* Conservation Committees are well-known LGN structures with regard to facilitating and coordinating direct community participation in environmental rehabilitation. According to community informants, these structures promote interest-based and voluntary participation in planning and implementing conservation activities. Box 6.4 describes the processes of community participation in SWC activities.

Box 6.4
Community participation processes in SWC activities (Tigray woredas)

1. *Tabia* Conservation Committee (TCC) and TDC organize public meetings to discuss the strength and weakness of previous conservation activities and suggest mechanisms to improve future plans and performance. The *Kushet* Conservation Committee (KCC) takes the responsibility for preparing a detailed plan of action for each *kushet*.
2. The KCC calls communities residing within its jurisdiction to a meeting to discuss draft plans and seek inputs before it presents and discusses these with the TCC.
3. The TCC and TDC organize public meeting to discuss and approve the plan prepared by the KCC, and decide on the time table (period of implementation).
4. Formation of *guile* (work teams) in each *kushet*. The *Seleste Mahberat* take the leading role in forming *guile* that consist of 10 members from the same neighbourhood. Each *guile* elects a team leader who coordinates the implementation of specified SWC activities. In the course of implementation, each *gujile* meets every Friday to monitor progress and plan future actions. At the end of the SWC period, the team leader reports to the KCC and the latter makes a field visit to evaluate the activities.
5. On the basis of *gujile* reports and field visits, the KCC prepares a report and submits it to the TCC. The TCC prepares a consolidated *tabia*-wide report and presents it to TDC and communities for final evaluation in a public gathering.

Source: Fieldwork, 2003.

In Amhara *woredas*, such practices do not exist. However, an informant from Bugna Agriculture Office explained that the experiences gained and results achieved by the SNV regarding sustainable land use and resource management have created an opportunity to question the old methods of mobilizing communities through *kebele* and *gote* administrations. An assessment and evaluation carried out by the SNV and Agriculture Office revealed that this system has created interest in and ownership for the members to undertake conservation activities on a sustainable basis.

It would be an important omission not to mention the roles and place of the *Seleste Mahberat* in the community participation arena in Tigray Region. The *Seleste Mahberat* have gained legitimacy from both the people and politicians with regard to actively taking part in all affairs that affect the people (see regional contextual factors). As a result, through their interwoven relationships, they serve as links between communities and other actors. They actively participate in all LGN structures established at the *woreda* and *kushet* levels. According to the *Seleste Mahberat* leaders, their pervasiveness in the LGN structures has created an opportunity for them to not only promote community participation but to also prevent the elite's domination of communities' priorities and interests in local development processes.

6.2.5 Transparency, accountability and equity

Transparency and accountability are important elements of local decision-making in respect of local development. LGNs add value to transparency and accountability by facilitating interaction and exchanging information regarding decision-making between actors, while the actors as a group, or individually, remain accountable for the results. Moreover, an LGN promotes and achieves a more open decision-making and flow of information to members as well as all interested parties that have access to decision-making processes and/or information. This creates an opportunity to hold actors accountable for their decisions and outcomes. Transparency and accountability in local decision-making also help reduce elite capture as well as increasing equity, because they increase public influence on decisions and desired outcomes.

Although there is still a long way to go to establish effective transparency and accountability, evidence in the case study *woredas* has revealed that the LGN system has established the following mechanisms for promoting transparency and accountability in local development processes.

(i) Horizontal LGN structures

Informants from the WA, sector offices and non-state actors explained that the WDC/WDSC is an important structure that promotes transparency and accountability. In terms of transparency, WDC/WDSC members have access to information, such as the specific roles and responsibilities, modalities of inter-

vention, areas/sector of intervention, and the resources, that each actor has at its disposal. Issues are specifically and openly discussed between members to reach decisions. The WDC/WDSC requires its implementing sectors and partner(s) to periodically give an account of the resources utilized for as well as the status of the project. Reports are discussed and compared against the approved plans to check for deviations. These reports provide important information regarding financial and material resource utilization and an actor's position in relation to the agreed upon responsibilities. Moreover, the Committee carries out field visits to cross-check project status reports with the actual performance on the ground. *Tabia/kebele* structures and the local people are involved in need identification processes, prioritisation, planning, as well as implementation processes to promote transparency regarding resource allocation and utilization.

(ii) Vertical intergovernmental structures

Even if projects financed by donors and NGOs are planned and implemented by horizontal LGN structures at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels, the very fact that such projects have to be approved and supervised by the relevant regional and zonal agencies has created a system of vertical accountability. WA and sector informants explained that periodical reports (quarter, semi-annual and annual) are mandatory. Reports are required to clearly indicate the status of a project (in terms of time, financial and material utilization and actual accomplishments) as well as the challenges and opportunities expected in the course of finalizing it. Informants stated that these reports are submitted to regional and zonal agencies engaged in project supervision. Regional bureaus reported that during implementation, they occasionally assign technical supervisory teams to check the actual accomplishments against the reports and to also ensure that facilities such as clinics, schools, and water points are constructed as per the agreements and specified standards.

(iii) External auditing

All projects implemented at local level are subject to external auditing, at least at the end of the project life. This is facilitated and coordinated by the relevant regional sector bureau(s) in collaboration with funding agencies.

All these processes are important steps to develop the promotion of transparency and accountability in decision-making and resource utilization. However, sector office informants did not hide the fact that the system of accountability focuses on ensuring upward and hierarchical accountability rather than likewise promoting downward accountability to the local people. The author discovered a serious problem that hampers promotion of transparency and accountability: *woredas* have no proper record-keeping systems to provide all interested parties with the correct information. Although reports are periodically produced, they are rarely recorded and kept after the project life. As a result,

transparency and accountability are confined to a project life instead of being established as permanent elements of LGNs' processes.

According to leaders of the Se*leste Mahberat,* their presence and active participation in all LGN structures (*woreda-kushet* levels) are important to facilitate transparency and accountability, reduce elite capture and increase equity in local development efforts. They have access to decision-making processes and information that can affect public resource allocation and utilization. They have, for example, information about the resources allocated and distributed to the FFW/CFW and can therefore require an explanation whenever deviations are observed. Box 6.5 provides practical evidence of the vital roles that *Seleste Mahberat* play in promoting transparency and accountability.

LGNs have also promoted more equitable service development and provision in different ways. As shown in previous discussions, *tabias/kebeles* in which interventions are going to be made, are selected by the WDC/WDSC on the

Box 6.5
CBO (Seleste Mahberat) initiatives in promoting transparency and accountability (Degua Temben Woreda)

In 2001, distribution of grain and oil to people who participated in the FFW programmes supported by REST was unduly delayed. People complained about this to the *tabia* administrations and the latter to the WA and REST project office. However, neither the WA nor the project office gave a clear response that could justify the delay. At one time, people were told that the delay was caused by a transportation problem outside the country, at another time, some donors that had promised to donate food did not deliver etc.

When these matters were not settled, the *Seleste Mahberat* mobilized *tabia* leaders and local people and seriously challenged the WA regarding why the distribution had not been effected, but there was no satisfactory response. They took the issue to zonal and regional government officials on the basis of which investigation started.

The investigation showed that the then *Woreda* Project Coordinator of REST and the head of the Agriculture Office (AO) were suspected of corruption. They were taken into custody but released on bail. Unfortunately, however, neither of them faced a court trail as the head of the AO committed suicide while the project coordinator left the country.

Woreda leaders who had failed to respond to and act on this request were removed from position. Through this experience, the *tabia* and *Seleste Mahberat* leaders as well as the local people learned lessons on the need to take a case to a higher-level government when the responsible LG leaders fail to respond to and properly act on demands.

Source: Fieldwork, 2003

Box 6.6
Roles of the Seleste Mahberat in beneficiary selection for FFW/CFW opportunities

Once areas to be rehabilitated through the SWC have been identified by the TDC and TCC in collaboration with the Agriculture Office and supporting partners such as REST, the next step for implementation is identifying beneficiaries of such programmes.

Beneficiaries are not selected randomly. *Tabia* and *kushet SelesteMahberat* leaders, in partnership with *tabia* and *kushet* administrations, assess and identify eligible members on the basis of how critical the food shortage of individuals or families is, as identified and classified by neighbourhood community members. The *Seleste Mahberat* consult their members regarding whether they are interested.

To ensure transparency in these processes, the *tabia* administration in collaboration with the *Seleste Mahberat* leaders present those identified as eligible beneficiaries at public meeting and selection is only final after discussion and approval by the people. Such opportunities are not given permanently, only once to those identified as eligible; members are selected on a rotating basis so that opportunities are distributed between the wider community's members who actually deserve to be chosen.

Source: Fieldwork, 2003

basis of an assessment of the service profile. This contributes to equity in the sense that services are not concentrated in a few accessible *tabias/kebeles*. For example, Debere Tsion and Debre Birhan *Tabias* in Wukro are not easily accessible, but have been selected by the WDC to have their own health facilities so that people have access within their locality. Equity in service distribution is not only considered at *woreda* level but also at *tabia/kebele* level. As shown in Box 6.3, *tabia/kebele* leaders and community members are directly involved in service development and provision projects. A *kushet/gote* in which a service development project is going to be placed, is selected by participants in partnership with the implementing sector agency and partners, so that services are distributed fairly between communities within a locality. *Tabia/kebele* leaders, however, stated that such processes do not run smoothly or proceed swiftly. Each *kushet/gote* would like a new development activity to be located within its jurisdiction. Such decision-making processes are time consuming and sometimes even cause conflict between the participants.

Actors based in *woredas*, such as SNV, Plan, WVE and REST, play important roles in prompting equity by establishing facilities in different localities as well as leveraging actual service delivery activities. For example, in order to promote immunization and the control of epidemics in remote areas, these actors sup-

port the health offices by providing transport and means to preserve medicine, such as ice boxes. The training of CHAs, selected from different *tabias/kebeles*, and the provision of primary health care kits and medicines are other important mechanisms for promoting equity in primary health care service delivery. According to health office informants, people who do not have easy access to health institutions at least have access to CHAs in their neighbourhood who can offer education and provide services.

Similar to other LGN benefits discussed earlier, the *Seleste Mahberat* play important roles in facilitating equity in many ways. According to the leaders, they gather information about the distribution of facilities between *tabias* through their chain of networks that extend up to *kushet* level. The leaders explained that such information supplements the baseline information necessary for the WDC to select and decide on *tabias* for intervention. Box 6.6 shows above the vital roles that the *Seleste Mahberat* play in promoting the equitable distribution of FFW/CFW opportunities.

6.2.6 Promote synergy

As discussed earlier, all actors do not command all resources or carry out all activities necessary for local development. Hence, different state and non-state actors are engaged in complementary relationships through different LGN structures that have, at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels, created a basis for synergetic relationships. *Woreda* governments and their agencies provide the social legitimacy and organizational resources necessary for citizens and other actors to unite and contribute the resources that they possess (see 6.2.1). LGNs do not only promote synergy through resource contributions but also through common decision-making and dialogue fora that facilitate communication and the exchange of information between actors regarding coordinated intervention (see 6.2.2). Such processes play important roles in reducing the duplication of efforts and conflict between actors through the realigning of plans (see 6.2.3).

LGNs promote community-state synergy by creating different opportunities for local people to participate directly in local development processes (see 6.2.4). Communities complement state and non-state actors' efforts by providing information, local knowledge, experience, labour and materials that could cost outsiders much time and effort to acquire. However, community-state synergy differs greatly between Tigray and Amhara Regions due to the affiliation of and the trust that communities have in the political leadership. In Tigray, political leaders and the people share common objectives entrenched in trust and conviction, which generate energy for more state-society synergy in local development. In Amhara Region, the lack of affiliation and trust between the politicians and communities has eroded the basis for state-society synergy. The political leadership focuses on mobilizing communities through political pressure instead of through persuasion and by establishing shared objectives. According

to community informants, mobilization by means of pressure is understood as repression rather than participation.

In Tigray Region, pre-existing experiences and community-based structures such as the *Seleste Mahberat* have provided a useful foundation for synergetic relationships between various actors and communities. The absence of such experiences and structures in Amhara Region has affected the development of synergetic relationships for local development between the local leadership and people.

6.3 Factors Affecting the Emergence, Functioning and Added Value of LGNs

An LGN does not occur in a vacuum. It occurs in socio-political settings or contexts that may vary from region to region and from locality to locality. Moreover, an LGN emerges and adds value to local socio-economic development processes when multiple actors voluntarily unite and interact to establish common objectives and achieve better local development than that which could be achieved by means of individual efforts. Hence, it is imperative to look into and analyse how the regional and local contextual factors and the number, diversity and quality of actors affect the emergence and functioning of an LGN and its capacity to add value.

6.3.1 Contextual factors

Contextual factors refer to historical and ongoing political and social processes. An examination and analysis of such processes in the case study *woredas* reveal that the regional political context, the *woreda* level political context (party-people relationship or political legitimacy: past and present), and *woreda* leadership's quality and continuity are important contextual factors. Regional and/or local experiences in self-administration and in undertaking development activities through communities, and the existence of pre-established CBOs and (embryonic) participatory structures are also important factors for the emergence and functioning of an LGN.

Regional political context

The regional political context refers to the legitimacy of and trust in a political system and processes, and the nature of the resultant relationship with the people: affiliation or alienation, solidarity or dissension, social cohesion or repulsion. Such factors influence the socio-political processes at the local level.

The political context in Tigray Region is characterized by affiliation and solidarity between the people of Tigray and the ruling party, the TPLF. According to regional and local officials, the fertile ground for the current positive political relationship between the local people and the TPLF was established dur-

ing the 17-year struggle (1975-1991) for liberation and democracy. Officials elaborated that the Tigray people's struggle for liberation helped to overthrow the military government as well as creating an opportunity for the development of strong political, social and economic cohesion. As noted in chapter three, the TPLF was established by militant Tigrayan students in 1975 to fight for and defend the Tigray people's political, social and economic interests (Young, 1998). Regional officials stated that the TPLF brought together all groups within Tigray and established the common objective of achieving democratic self-administration. Gebre Ab (1997:23) explains the struggle's positive effects as 'The 17-year struggle to overthrow the military regime had far reaching consequences, including the revitalization of Tigrayan nationalism and political awareness. It was not just a war but a struggle for a more democratic and progressive social order for self-determination.'

Ever since the founding of the liberation movement, the TPLF has emphasised the local people and local administration's interests. In order to facilitate participation in local decision-making, the TPLF established *tabia* and *kushet baitos* (LG *councils)* in all areas under its control (Cheari, N.D.). Young (1997) shares Cheari's view and explains that the TPLF placed its primary emphasis on LG structures, i.e. *kushet, tabia* and *woreda* administrations to nurture participation and democratic decision-making. The civilian population and political leaders engaged in an open debate and discussion on the liberation movement and local affairs' objectives. Besides being willing to include the people's ideas in these processes, the political leaders also accepted criticism. Neither individual leaders nor their policies were immune to public criticism (Young, 1997). According to *woreda* and regional officials, the TPLF had, in a practical way, demonstrated its commitment to and capacity for promoting and achieving the people's objectives through the people themselves. This enabled the TPLF to emerge as a legitimate political party to which the people have strong affiliation and which they trust.

According to Gebre Ab (1997), the deconcentrated *woreda*/district administrations of the *Derg* were replaced by elected *baito*, consisting of 100-120 representatives from each *tabia*. The *woreda baito* elected an executive council of 14-15 members from among its councillors. This shows that the post-1991 LG structures adopted by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia are not new to Tigray *woreda* and *tabia* administrations. Gebre Ab (1997), Young (1996) and Mitiku et al. (2005) explain that the LG structures established by the TPLF during the civil war had served as a prototype for the newly-formed LG structures in post-1991 Ethiopia.

Gebre Ab (1997) explains that the TPLF engaged in intensive political education to promote a high degree of community participation through LG structures and their own community-based organizations: the *Seleste Mahberat*. *Woreda* and regional officials stated that the establishment of the *Seleste Mahberat* in the

early 1980s was a significant step towards ensuring sustainable public participation in the war, and local service development and delivery. According to officials, during the civil war, *tabia* and k*ushet* administrations in partnership with the *Seleste Mahberat* had taken the primary responsibility for local service development through community participation. The *Seleste Mahberat* had clearly demonstrated their capacity for and commitment to promoting community participation and the provision of basic services in the most chaotic and war-torn environment of the civil war period. Consequently, in the post-civil-war period, they emerged as the most legitimate community-based organization, whose voices matter in local development processes. An official[1] from Degua Temben *Woreda* stated that: 'the local people easily accepted anything endorsed by the *Seleste Mahberat* and would not accept what they opposed or what they abstained from.' Gebre Ab (1997:188) also states that: 'the three associations [are] the key to community involvement, empowerment and sector co-ordination in Tigray. It [is] considered impossible to take any action without the approval of the associations.'

Cheari (N.D) argues that the establishment of these local structures and the direct participation of the local people in political, social and economic affairs during the struggle enriched 'the people-community values'. A great many experiences had therefore been gained for the post-civil-war local development activities in the region. Gebre Ab (1997), maintains that the wartime *woreda* and sub-*woreda* LGs had gained experiences in self-administration and in supporting local development. These experiences formed the fertile ground on which LGN development and community participation have been founded in post-civil war Tigray. REST (1993b:7) argues that: 'there is a highly motivated, conscious, and articulate population organized within a grassroots democratic system, which allows for a genuine participatory approach towards development.' REST (1993b:14) concludes that 'the basis for community empowerment and carrying-out community-based, replicable and sustainable socio-economic development programs is already in place.'

According to the local people and officials, besides the experiences gained, the success of the struggle against the military government created its own motivation for further solidarity in local development. A statement made by a 58-year-old man[2] in Wukro *Woreda* confirms the claim. He stated:

> Under the leadership of the TPLF, we [the people] had overthrown *Derg-Isepa*, which had initially seemed difficult and even impossible for some. The struggle and its shining achievements are the living examples of the fruits of collective efforts. Hence, in the post-civil-war period, we are convinced that we can make a difference to our lives and even eradicate poverty through joint efforts under the leadership of our organization, the TPLF.

Generally, the TPLF has established strong socio-political solidarity with all groups in Tigray, including the elites and ordinary citizens. REST (1993b:2) elaborates that: 'since the end of the civil war, peace and stability has been maintained, and a process of decentralization and democratisation is underway. These developments have created a favourable condition for the people and the government to fight against the socio-economic underdevelopment that has persisted for so many years.'

The political context of Amhara Region is quite different from that in Tigray. As discussed in chapter three, since the establishment of the TGE in 1991, the regional ruling party has been the Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Movement (EPDM)[3] that was transformed into the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) in 1994. According to informants, however, with the exception of those individuals involved in politics, the majority of the Amharas in general and the elites in particular barely accept the EPDM/ANDM as a party established by the Amharas in the interest of the Amharas. The ANDM (2001) confirmed that the EPDM was established, with the assistance of TPLF, by people from multi-ethnic origins who joined together to struggle for the interests of multi-nationalities. According to key informants, before 1991 the EPDM had not claimed to specifically represent and promote the interest of the Amhara people nor did it do so for quite sometime in the post-1991 period. Informants further explained that the transformation of the EPDM into the ANDM had not brought significant change to the regional political processes, since it was not genuinely designed to respond to popular interests. According to informants, the ANDM continued with the same method of political control, rather than providing space for the elites and the people to play a role in the socio-political changes.

The party's lack of legitimacy is perceived by regional political officials, but for different reasons. Regional politicians argued that most of the region was under the military government's rule until its final collapse; hence, the EPDM did not have enough time to introduce itself and establish a firm political foothold. Officials argued that the problem is not only related to the pre-1991 period but also to the period thereafter. According to them, most of the Amhara elites who had enjoyed privileged positions during the previous regimes were unhappy with the post-1991 democratic processes in the country in general and in the region in particular. Hence, they resisted change and, whenever possible, tried to be obstructive instead of nurturing and facilitating the new changes for development purposes. Local political leaders' lack of experience, particularly those who joined the party in the post-war period, with regard to involving communities in local political affairs, is another major problem identified by regional officials. Whatever the explanation, the political context in Amhara Region has not been favourable for the development of cooperative/supportive behaviour and action between the politicians, elites, and the public at large.

These unfavourable regional political contexts are reflected at the local level, undermining the local political leadership's legitimacy with regard to establishing an effective partnership with the local people. The local people's attitudes towards and views of the regional political party and the nature of their relationships are discussed under Bugna and Baso Liben *Woredas*.

Woreda contextual factors

Woreda contextual factors include the political context (party-people relation or legitimacy: past and present) and the *woreda* leadership's quality and continuity with regard to facilitating and coordinating LGN formation and functioning. The existence of pre-established (embryonic) participatory structures and the local administrations and communities' previous experiences in undertaking their own development will influence the development of an LGN and its capacity to add value.

Previous discussions showed that Tigray *woredas* have no problems regarding their political legitimacy. However, the leadership's capacity and stability/continuity are also important factors that further strengthen the search for external support to leverage community efforts and capacity.

Information from various sources, such as *tabia* leaders, community members, *Seleste Mahberat* leaders, sector heads, and NGO representatives, shows that Wukro *Woreda* has benefited from stable and capable leadership. According to informants, in the period 1992-2001, the *woreda* did not experience leadership change. The leadership capacity assessment presented in Table 4.3 demonstrates the *Woreda* leadership's greater capacity. Informants explained that the *Woreda* leadership is determined and committed to making changes in the local service development and provision, which in turn ensures continuity in leadership. The existence of a capable, committed and stable leadership has created opportunities for continuity in strategies and major working relationships between different actors. Top regional officials have also recognized the leadership's commitment and capacity to facilitate and coordinate local development programmes. An official[4], for example, stated that: 'Wukro *Woreda* benefits from its highly committed and energetic leaders who actively seek every opportunity for local development. The WA is known for its success in promoting local development through the involvement of different actors.' This has developed different actors' interest in intervening in the *Woreda* development efforts. Informants from among non-state actors, such as REST, TDA, ADCS, ETDP/Irish Aid, and WVE, confirmed that the WA's interest in and capacity to work together has resulted in good will and motivation. The WA is active in organizing discussion and dialogue fora through the WDC to discuss common development agendas.

As discussed in chapter three, a *tabia* administration is a government substructure at the local level that has its own elected council and executive com-

mittee, whereas a *kushet* administration is a structure below the *tabia* level, having only an elected executive committee. *Woreda* officials explained that these structures play important roles in an LGN's processes and in local development activities. The experiences they accumulated during the civil war have served as a springboard for post-1991 development efforts. Informants from non-state actors, such as WVE, REST and ADCS, have also acknowledged the crucial roles that *tabia* and *kushet* administrations play in facilitating and coordinating local people's participation through the TDC and other structures. *Tabia* and *kushet* leaders explained that the WA's efforts to facilitate and coordinate the interventions of state and non-state actors that leverage local service development and delivery are important. Such efforts have created motivational factors for *Tabia* and *kushet* leaders and the people, sustaining and promoting their interest in and commitment to local development.

Although Degua Temben *Woreda* leadership enjoys the same political legitimacy, its capacity and stability differ from that of Wukro. *Tabia* leaders, community members and the *Seleste Mahberat* leaders explained that Degua Temben is one of those *woredas* in Tigray that has least benefited from the favourable socio-political changes introduced in the post-1991 period. Most *Woreda* leaders are TPLF members who participated in the struggle against the *Derg,* therefore they have no problem with regard to political commitment and interest. Nevertheless, the informants explained that the leaders lack the capacity to initiate, mobilize and coordinate efforts and resources from various actors for local development activities (see Table 4.3 for capacity assessment results). Most of the executive members did not even have a full high school education. For example, the chief administrator who administered the *Woreda* between 1992-1995, was a farmer *tegadalay* (TPLF fighter); his capacity regarding strategic thinking, vision and coordination was limited. According to the informants, he had been nominated by the TPLF because of his good record in the liberation movement.

The informants further stated that the WA's limitations are also recognized by the zonal and regional authorities. Hence, in the 1996 *woreda* election, new candidates were nominated and elected. Unfortunately, however, *Seleste Mahberat* leaders and sector experts stated that this change did not lead to change in the *Woreda* development processes. Most of the new leaders were not significantly better than the previous. For example, the *Woreda* chief administrator and vice administrator had only attained a Grade Nine education. Other executive members were no better than the chief and vice administrators. For example, the head of social affairs, responsible for health and other social services, had only attained a Grade Five education, while the head of economic affairs had completed Grade Nine. According to the informants, the *Woreda* leaders did not only have an insufficient level of education, but also lacked important leadership qualities such as vision and strategic thinking, skills regarding nego-

tiation and dialogue, and an enthusiasm to improve results. Consequently, the WA's capacity to play a role in identifying local development problems as well as to negotiate with different actors to secure development support was still very poor. An informant from the REST Project Office shared the above views and stated that the WA has not been active in facilitating and coordinating the activities of sector offices and other actors operating in the *Woreda*, let alone in dealing with potential actors.

According to *Seleste Mahberat* and *tabia* leaders, in addition to capacity problems, certain irregularities have affected the stability of the *Woreda* leadership. Informants explained that there was a case where resources (grain and oil) allocated by REST for a FFW programme were misused (see Box 6.5). The case was taken to the zonal and regional authorities, which led to another change in the *woreda* leadership. This caused further leadership instability that affected the WA's capacity to establish an attractive environment for potential actors to intervene. Instability provides little chance for learning and experience, hence, continuity is important for leaders to learn by doing the job.

The local political context in Amhara *woredas* is characterized by alienation and mistrust between the local people and political leaders. Regional political officials stated that Bugna *Woreda* is one of those few *woredas* in the region that was fully 'liberated' by the EPDM at the end of 1989. Hence, officials stated, the local people know the EPDM better, whereas local leaders have been given responsibilities to administer local affairs through the people's participation. Community informants agreed with officials that they have known the EPDM long and that the local people supported the struggle against the *Derg* dictatorship. The community informants stated that, in fact, until the final collapse of the *Derg*, the EPDM had demonstrated its commitment to freedom and democratic order in its local administration. It dissolved the Peasant Associations (PAs), grassroots local administrations established by the *Derg,* and replaced them with the *Gizieawi Yehizib Astedader* (provisional people's council) nominated by the people from among the local residents. The EPDM initiated and organized the people into Women, Youth and Farmers Associations to facilitate the local people's participation in the war, establishment of a peaceful local administration and democratic land redistribution.

Unfortunately, however, key informants explained, the post-1991 period had witnessed an 'anti-Amhara political atmosphere', which the EPDM made no effort to challenge. During the TGE, when the country was divided into ethnic-based regions, the EPDM took over the responsibility for ruling Amhara Region, whereas other regions were given to parties that specifically and clearly declared they were representing the interests of the people whom they ruled. In spite of the EPDM ruling position, informants explained, it had participated in political finger pointing during which the Amhara nationality was associated with all sorts of evils generated by the previous regimes. According to infor-

mants, 'the Amhara nationality has become the subject of major criticisms and attacks[5] by EPRDF politicians, including EPDM top officials'[6].

As a result, informants explained, the pre-1991 positive relationship between the EPDM and the people of Bugna changed into one of alienation and tension. Association leaders and community informants stated that because of the local people's growing political resentment and alienation, community-based structures have little chance of obtaining political support. Consequently, Farmers, Women and Youth Associations remain inactive with regard to the local social, political and economic development processes.

Community informants further stated that the establishment of the All Amhara People Organization (AAPO) in 1992 exacerbated political alienation between the EPDM and the local people. They explained that when some people started to support the AAPO, EPDM local officials began to harass and control the locals, which further strengthened the process of alienation instead of healing it. Any complaint about the local administration is interpreted as political opposition and those people who criticise this harassment face political intimidation. Hence, the local people abstain from any kind of participation that might be explicitly or implicitly understood as a challenge to the political system.

According to community informants, the transformation of the EPDM into the ANDM has not changed the local people's political attitude. The people still do not consider the change genuine, as it was done after four years of EPDM rule and mainly to divert political attention from the people's support of the AAPO. Generally, this political atmosphere is too serious a challenge for LGs and the people to form an effective LGN in respect of local interests.

Although hostile political processes have affected state-society relationships at the local level, Bugna *Woreda* has been fortunate in having a relatively stable and capable leadership. In the 1992-2001 period, it experienced only one change of administrator. Leadership continuity has created an opportunity for learning and gaining experiences in facilitating and coordinating LGN formation and functioning between different state and non-state actors. According to regional officials, unlike those members who joined the party in the post-1991 period, Bugna *Woreda* leaders had participated in the struggle against the *Derg*. Hence, they know the party's democratic principles and practices well and work accordingly. *Woreda* officials, however, stated that unlike in the struggle period, the democratic process has been declining at the local level and they doubt whether top political officials have confidence in the local leadership. Regional and zonal political officials have more trust and confidence in political cadres than they do in elected local officials. Furthermore, the local people's resentment of and alienation from the party have resulted in heavy dependence being placed on political structures to control community activities, rather than community-based structures for local development being facilitated and supported.

This has affected the emergence and effective functioning of LGNs at sub-*woreda* levels. *Woreda* officials explained that *kebele* and *gote* administrations have neither the capacity nor public support to effectively facilitate and coordinate voluntary and interest-based community participation.

Informants of non-state actors explained that the local people lack affiliation with and trust in political officials and government structures. A Plan informant explained that the people find the government structure an instrument of control rather than a facilitator and coordinator of local development. Due to fear of 'revenge', people are reluctant to openly speak of and address problems in the presence of government representatives even if they do participate in local affairs organized and facilitated by NGOs and other non-state actors.

According to respondents from non-state actors, the gap between the local people and authorities is a real obstacle to the local people's genuine and interest-based participation in the LGN. Nevertheless, the *Woreda* leadership's continuity and ability to facilitate and coordinate local development activities have created better conditions for non-state actors to undertake local development. The WA does not only have an interest in coordinating existing interventions and programmes but also takes the initiative to oppose higher-level officials in order to protect *woreda* interests. For example, the Plan informant stated that zonal officials were in favour of diverting Plan's intervention from Bugna to other *Woreda*. However, the WA strongly opposed this decision and guaranteed the proposed intervention. The SNV informant also stated that in 1998 the Zonal Planning and Development Department prevented the WDSC from employing a planning officer and the purchase of a four-wheeled drive vehicle for the *Woreda*. The WA refused to accept these decisions and exerted efforts until it managed to get them implemented in the following fiscal year. Moreover, the SNV informant explained, the *Woreda* leadership is open and receptive to new ideas and initiatives for the emergence and functioning of an LGN. For example, ideas for the establishing of the WDSC and WCHC were initiated by the SNV, which the WA accepted gratefully and implemented together with other actors. SNV and Plan informants stated that the *woreda* leadership's relentless efforts in general and those of the chief and vice administrators in particular in facilitating and coordinating the activities of the various state and non-state actors engaged in local development cannot be exaggerated. This reveals that even if the regional and local political contexts are not favourable, local leaders' continuity and quality contribute to LGNs' success.

Baso Liben ranks lowest both in terms of local political contexts and leadership quality and continuity. Regional officials stated that Baso Liben *Woreda* is one of the many *woredas* in Amhara Region that the EPDM/EPRDF 'liberated' from *Derg* only a few weeks before the regime collapsed. Community informants also stated that the local people did not know the EPDM before the downfall of the *Derg*. They reported that when the EPRDF took over power

from the *Derg*, the people had been provided with orientations about the EPDM. However, in spite of this, the local people did not think that there was a difference between the EPDM and TPLF, since all processes were carried out in the presence of an overwhelming numbers of TPLF cadres. The local people were very dissatisfied with the political processes as a whole, rather than developing an affiliation with and trust in the EPDM. Consequently, the political environment grew tense with people being harassed and imprisoned as '*Derg-Isepa*' and/or 'ex-soldiers'.

Community informants further stated the people resented the EPDM not only because they had not known it before 1991, but also because of its 'unrepresentative' nature as manifested in the post-1991 years. According to the informants, the EPDM/ANDM demonstrated its 'unrepresentative' nature in many ways. They explained that top political leaders made gross allegation against the Amhara people, blaming them for the country's problems, which encouraged anti-Amhara political sentiment in many parts of the country where many people sacrificed their lives and resources. Informants[7] provided the following as an example to support their argument:

> In 2001, people living in areas bordering on Oromia Region were suddenly attacked and killed by armed people due to anti-Amhara politics. The local people reported this to *woreda,* zonal and regional authorities that were expected to defend them. Regional officials, however, responded by saying that no innocent citizens had been affected; the Regional Government could not protect or defend those *shiftas* (bandits) who were destabilizing the local peace in the border areas.

Community informants in Baso Liben share the views of those in Bugna regarding the EPDM's transformation into the ANDM, believing that it was done as a strategy to switch the people's attention away from the AAPO. Local ANDM officials have taken repressive measures against AAPO supporters and leaders instead of providing space for political participation and competition.

The other factor that exacerbated alienation between the people of Baso Liben and the political system was the land re-allotment policy that was issued by the Regional Government in 1996 and implemented in 1997. According to community informants land redistribution was necessary to give the young and the landless opportunities, but the policy was imposed on them and used as an instrument to gain political support by benefiting the political system's supporters, while taking revenge on people involved in the local administration during the Imperial and *Derg* regimes (see 3.4.2 for Amhara Region). These views have been confirmed by studies conducted by Yigremew (1997) and Ege (2002). All these factors have provided the local people with little opportunity to voluntarily and actively participate in local development processes.

Woreda officials stated that it is true that the local people resent the new political processes. They have no confidence in the party nor trust it to represent

and promote their interests. A regional ANDM official[8] stated that resentment of and alienation from the EPDM/ANDM is not unique to Baso Liben, but that this is the norm in most parts of the region, such as West and East Gojam, most parts of South and North Gander, South Wollo, as well as North Shewa. He explained that 'the local people's lack of exposure to the EPDM in the pre-1991 political struggle has created a lack of a feeling of belonging to and trust in the post-1991 political processes. Moreover, there has been little political effort to harmonize and convince the people.

According to *Woreda* officials, the local people's resentment and alienation resulted in control-oriented political processes, which further aggravated the problem. The ANDM, the informants explained, has no confidence and trust in officials elected from among the local people, let alone in the people themselves. Consequently, the *Woreda* political processes have been under the 'watchful eye' of political cadres who do not belong in the area, but are assigned by regional and zonal political authorities to supervise and control political processes. According to officials, anyone opposing these cadres' ideas and opinions is labelled as a '*wolaway* (hesitant)' who lacks political commitment and is subject to 'nominal evaluation or *gimgema'* to remove him/her from his/her position. This has resulted in a frequent turnover of leadership and in administrative instability. An elected *Woreda* official[9] explained that: 'our authority is just like sleeping in a tree, which means no one is sure when he/she will be removed from his/her position. Our authority is full of insecurity and uncertainty, which makes strategic thinking for local development impossible.' Accordingly, the WA, affected by the frequent turnover of leadership (six *woreda* administrators in ten years), has not been able to promote and facilitate the establishment and effective functioning of LGNs.

Regional officials agreed with the fact that there has been a high turnover of leadership in the *woreda* that has affected the enabling environment for local development. The local leaders have no experience of and commitment to the political processes and the ANDM's objectives. Local politicians joined the party after 1991, without having made any sacrifice during the struggle against the *Derg*. Most of them, the regional officials stated, lacked party discipline and focussed on promoting their personal interests through corruption instead of promoting popular interests. Consequently, some were fined and fired from the party while others received prison sentences. This forced regional and zonal authorities to replace corrupted local officials with new officials, which added to the destabilization of the local leadership, but malpractices could not be tolerated.

In the light of the above, community informants stated that both the *woreda* and regional officials' views of the political turmoil in the *Woreda* are correct. Local leaders are very uncertain of their authority since they are subject to sudden removal by zonal and regional political authorities. As a result, they have

little time to strategically think about and plan local development. In explaining the turmoil in the *Woreda* leadership, a 49-year-old man[10] stated that: 'political leaders are coming and going like a flood, leaving little experience for a settled administration.' He elaborated that *Woreda* officials have indeed engaged in corrupt practices, grabbing everything they can before being removed from their position. According to community informants, *Woreda* officials have been busy with political control and harassment to demonstrate their loyalty to the party rather than facilitating popular participation in development. In general, informants stated, the local people have been paying the costs of the unstable leadership, corruption, political control and harassment, and the lack of local development.

An SARDP informant stated that in Baso Liben the political and community-enabling environment is not favourable for the emergence and functioning of an LGN. The frequent turnover of the *Woreda* and *kebele* leadership and the political alienation of the local people are major setbacks. On one hand, the lack of a smooth relationship between politicians and the people has affected voluntary and interest-based community participation in local development. On the other hand, the turnover of leadership has affected established relations and strategies, as new leaders are reluctant to accept methods and strategies adopted by previous ones. The leaders removed from their position by the party are usually labelled as undemocratic, ineffective, and the like. Therefore, newly assigned leaders do not have any interest in and appreciation of what has already been achieved.

Generally, the ANDM has hardly established any local roots. In the eyes of the local people, the party is not accountable to them. Local politicians too feel marginalized and consider their roles more ceremonial and symbolic than strategic and practical. Unfortunately, as discussed above, local leaders do not receive support from either higher-level politicians or from the local people, which erodes motivation for and commitment to effective leadership.

6.3.2 Number, diversity and quality of actors

Evidence shows that the number, diversity, and quality of actors engaged in supporting LGs and the people constitute the second major set of factors that influence LGNs' emergence, functioning and value added. The number of actors refers to the total sum of actors involved in the LGN processes. Ideally, a large number of actors can create opportunities for financial and material resources. Although every additional resource benefits local development, the significance of contribution depends on the quality of the actor rather than merely on a large number of actors. The diversity of actors refers to the composition of the actors in terms of the organizational and social groups that they represent such as NGOs, CBOs, bilateral and multilateral agencies, religious organizations etc. Diversity in the actors' organizational origins adds value to

learning opportunities since they have different experiences and perspectives on local development that broaden their understanding of local development. Nevertheless, a large number and wide diversification of actors are not without costs, as their interaction may involve friction and even conflict with others trying to establish a greater sphere of influence. The quality of an actor is the most important factor for an LGN to emerge and undertake significant socio-economic activities. It refers to important features associated with actors, including the scale of their contribution to service development, the diversity of the intervention areas/sectors and the length of the intervention period as well as the experiences in undertaking development in a particular locality. The other important element of quality is an actor's interest in, commitment and capacity to interact with other actors to strengthen an existing LGN and/or promote the establishment of a new LGN to provide an alternative venue for participation.

Table 6.1
Actors and intervention areas in Wukro Woreda*

No.	Actors	Category of actors	Intervention areas			
			ER	*PHC*	*SDW*	*TIAs*
1	ADCS	Local NGO	0	1	1	2
2	EOC/DICAC	National NGO	1	0	1	2
3	ESRDF	Federal agency	1	0	0	1
4	ETDP/Irish Aid	Bilateral donor	1	1	1	3
5	GTZ	Bilateral donor	1	0	0	1
6	FA	CBO	1	1	1	3
7	WAs	CBO	1	1	1	3
8	YA	CBO	1	1	1	3
9	REST	Regional/local NGO	1	1	1	3
10	TDA	Regional/local NGO	0	1	0	1
11	UNDP	Multilateral donor	0	0	1	1
12	WVE	International NGO	1	0	1	2
13	WFP	Multilateral donor	1	0	0	1
Total number of actors in each sector			10	7	9	

Notes:
ER = environmental rehabilitation, PHC = primary health care, SDW, safe drinking water, TIAs = total intervention areas, FA = Farmers Association, WAs = Women Association, YA = Youth Association
* Sector agencies and LG structures are not included since they are found in every case study *woreda* despite differences in their activities as discussed in chapter five. This applies to all case study *woredas*
Source: Field data, 2003.

Reviews and an analysis of the three services' LGNs in Wukro *Woreda* reveal that a large and diversified number of actors have been involved in supporting one or more of these services (see Table 6.1). The binary digit '1' or '0' respectively represents an actor's intervention or non-intervention area.

As shown in Table 6.1, actors that have joined LG agencies and the people of Wukro are diversified regarding their organizational origin/category as this includes multi and bilateral donors, NGOs, and CBOs. According to *Woreda* officials and sector experts, it is crucial that there should be various actors that represent different groups and organizations in order to learn from different experiences and mobilize resources from different areas. Moreover, informants added, diversified actors create opportunities for local people to participate in local development processes directly. Not only are these actors diversified, but their interventions are as well. Eight of the thirteen actors have been involved in two or in all three selected services. The intervention of actors such as REST, ETDP/Irish Aid and ADCS in more than one sector has created an opportunity for inter-sectoral communication and experience sharing.

Although every actor that intervenes in the *woreda* contributes to local development in one or more ways, not all actors are equally important in terms of quality. Each actor's absolute and comparative contribution was discussed in chapter five. According to *Woreda* officials and sector informants, ETDP/Irish Aid, REST, the *Seleste Mahberat,* ADCS, and WFP are the most important actors, contributing in different ways throughout the period 1996-2001. In terms of scale of contribution, diversity of intervention sectors and capacity building, ETDP/Irish Aid is first followed by REST and ADCS respectively. According to these informants, besides resource and capacity-building support, ETDP/Irish Aid intervention created opportunities for the establishment of the WPAC that is an alternative LGN forum for discussion and dialogue. The *Seleste Mahberat* are at the centre of the LGN processes from *woreda* to *kushet* levels. They possess a vital resource, i.e. a unique social legitimacy among the local people, thus ensuring their active and voluntary participation in all processes and sectors of local development activities. They thus truly belong to the category of most important actors. In fact, there is no other actor that could effectively substitute their role. Agriculture Office informants stated that the WFP is one of the most important actors providing multi-faceted support for environmental rehabilitation efforts.

Woreda officials stated that although the WVE began intervention in the *Woreda* late in 2000, it is active in sharing its experiences in community-based development. According to *Woreda* officials, the ESRDF needs to be credited for its encouragement and support in establishing the CPC, which has brought different actors together to discuss common agendas regarding local development.

Degua Temben *Woreda* has not been able to involve many and diversified external actors in the local development efforts. As discussed earlier, the first problem is related to the *Woreda* leaders' weak capacity to identify local development problems and seek potential external actors. An informant from the Regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) stated that most NGOs would not like to go to *woredas* with a poor record of coordination capacity. For example, FARM-Africa, a UK-based international NGO, was encouraged by the DPPB to go to Degua Temben *Woreda*, but was not interested because of its poor leadership capacity record. As shown in Table 6.2, REST, the *Seleste Mahberat* (Farmers, Women, and Youth Associations) and ESRDF were the only actors directly involved in supporting the *Woreda* development in the period 1996-2001. These actors here were therefore few in number and low in diversity, which hampered the opportunity for more resource mobilization, experience sharing and learning.

Table 6.2
Actors and intervention areas in Degua Temben Woreda

No.	Actors	Category of actors	Intervention areas			
			ER	*PHC*	*SDW*	*TIAs*
1	ESRDF	Federal agency	0	1	1	2
2	FA	CBO	1	1	1	3
3	WAs	CBO	1	1	1	3
4	YA	CBO	1	1	1	3
5	REST	Regional/local NGO	1	1	1	3
Total number of actors in each sector			4	5	5	

Source: Field data, 2003.

According to the *Woreda* officials and sector informants, in terms of the quality of actors, REST had supported multi-sector service development and capacity-building efforts during the entire study period. They stated that REST had, among others things, undertaken significant development activities regarding safe drinking water, primary health care service development and provisions and environmental rehabilitation. Capacity building's important roles include training sector experts, *tabia* and *kushet* leaders, *Seleste Mahberat* leaders, and community members. The *Seleste Mahberat* are also a prominent and core group of LGN actors at the *Woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. They play pivotal roles in ensuring the local people's active participation in local service development and delivery.

The second problem identified by the *Woreda* officials and sector experts that affected external actors' intervention in the *Woreda*, is related to REST. Although all informants agree that REST is the most important development partner, they feel that it has, in a sense, promoted its monopoly in the *Woreda*, rather than facilitating other external actors' interaction and interventions. At every forum at regional and zonal levels, REST informs other external actors that it has established integrated multi-sector development assistance in the *Woreda*. According to the informants, REST promotes the idea that instead of intervening directly, other actors should rather provide the *woreda* with development support through it. REST, however, has different views on this matter. An informant from its *Woreda* Project Office stated that REST only provides other actors with information about its activities to avoid duplication of efforts. Moreover, the fact that REST negotiates with other actors to obtain more resources for the *Woreda* development should be appreciated and considered an extra effort to improve partnership in the local development processes, which the WA has failed to carry out effectively.

Woreda officials and sector informants stated that the ESRDF is another important actor that promotes partnership between local actors by encouraging and supporting the establishment of a CPC. It supports training of CPC members to improve their planning and implementation capacity. In terms of its contribution to local service development, the ESRDF is praised by community members, LG and *Seleste Mahberat* leaders and sector experts for supporting projects that addressed two major problems in the *Woreda* (see chapter five).

An assessment of LGNs' emergence and functioning in Bugna *Woreda* shows that a number of diversified actors are engaged in the LGN with LG agencies and actors that support and facilitate local service development and provisions in different areas/sectors.

Table 6.3
Actors and intervention areas in Bugna Woreda

No.	Actors	Category of actors	Intervention areas			
			ER	*PHC*	*SDW*	*TIAs*
1	ADA	Regional/local NGO	0	1	0	1
2	EOC/DICAC	National NGO	1	1	1	3
3	Plan	International NGO	1	1	1	3
4	SCF-UK	International NGO	1	0	0	1
5	SNV	Bilateral donor	1	1	1	3
6	UNICEF/WIBS	Multilateral donor	0	1	1	2
7	WFP	Multilateral donor	1	0	0	1
Total number of actors in each sector			5	5	4	

Source: Field data, 2003.

Actors' composition varies, including regional/local, national and international NGOs as well as multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, a situation that gives rise to institutional pluralism in local development decision-making and service provision. *Woreda* officials and sector informants stated that diversified actors' involvement is very crucial in mobilizing resources and creating opportunities for LGs and sector experts to learn from their experiences in local development. Community informants also explained that non-state actors' interventions do not only help to improve local services, but also create opportunities for the local people to directly participate in local development activities.

In terms of the quality of actors, *Woreda* officials and sector informants stated that, in many respects, the SNV takes the leading position. It has been involved in multi-faceted development support for about ten years. It is a very important partner, not only in terms of resource contributions, wider intervention areas, and a longer period of intervention, but also in terms of its interest in and efforts regarding networking. It promotes and supports the emergence and functioning of LGNs between the various actors operating in the *Woreda*. For example, the WDSC and WCHC are important LGNs that were established through its support. In addition, the SNV initiates and organizes discussion and dialogue fora between multiple actors to discuss different local development issues (see Box 6.2). According to an SNV informant, capacity-building and networking activities constitute important components of the SNV's intervention, which is aimed at promoting sustainable local development. It believes that the rural people's multi-faceted and deep-rooted problems can only be addressed through networks, by means of which actors can search for common solutions to common problems through mutual learning.

According to *Woreda* officials and sector informants, besides the SNV, Plan is another important actor. It provides local service development and provisions with multi-dimensional leverage. Plan not only supports different sectors and communities with service development, but also with capacity building. It is also one of the strongest members of the WDSC, actively participating in all endeavours to make it the centre of development dialogue. Moreover, it initiates and organizes participatory discussion fora and workshops on different local development issues, such as environmental rehabilitation, primary health care and the rights of children, for *kebele* and *gote* leaders as well as community members. One important limitation identified by sector informants is that Plan experts capitalize on their expertise to influence decisions and discussions, which sometimes undermines good communication.

EOC/DICAC, UNICEF/WIBS, SCF-UK, and WFP are other important actors in Bugna that support LGs and communities' efforts to improve service development and provision. According *Woreda* officials and sector informants,

however, their role in promoting and supporting LGNs is mainly limited to the sectors in which they are involved.

Table 6.4
Actors and their intervention areas in Baso Liben Woreda

No.	Actors	Category of actors	Intervention areas			
			ER	*PHC*	*SDW*	*TIAs*
1	ERCS	National NGO	0	0	1	1
2	ESRDF	Federal agency	0	1	1	2
3	SARDP/SIDA	Bilateral donor	1	1	1	3
Total number of actors in each sector			1	2	3	

Source: Field data, 2003.

As shown in Table 6.4, actors that are involved in supporting LG agencies and the people in Baso Liben are few in number and not diversified regarding their composition. Discussions of local contextual factors showed that both the regional and *Woreda* contextual factors are least favourable for the emergence and functioning of LGNs. The *Woreda* officials stated that the lack of higher officials and the local community's support of and sympathy for the WA, makes it powerless. This hardly motivates the leaders to search for alternative ways of promoting local development. According to an SARDP informant, the WA doesn't have enough time to communicate and negotiate with potential actors regarding support, nor is the socio-political environment attractive enough to intervene.

Woreda officials stated that of all the actors, the SARDP is the most important in terms of exerting efforts to promote LGNs between LGs, sector agencies and the local people. It invests time and other resources in revitalizing WDC and KDC structures to facilitate and coordinate local development through active community participation.

The ESRDF is another important actor that the emergence and functioning of an LGN between the local people and agencies by encouraging and supporting the establishment of a CPC. The ERCS started supporting safe drinking water development in 2001, but its relationship is limited to the WA. Hence, its contribution to the emergence and development of an LGN is not significant.

6.4 Conclusion

The network approach to local governance has gained popularity in recent years, not only for its capacity to improve local service development and delivery, but also for the great and crucial value that it adds to the entire complex of

socio-political issues, and that is vital for sustainable local development. The examination and synthesis of LGN structures and major activities in the case study *woredas* reveal that LGNs have added value to resource mobilization, communication and learning, community participation, reduction of duplication and conflict; transparency, accountability and equity as well as to synergetic relationships. However, the emergence and functioning of LGNs and the value that they add vary between *woredas*, depending on two major sets of factors, i.e. contextual factors and the number, diversity and quality of the actors involved in LGNs.

In Tigray *woredas*, an established set of collective effort experiences together with favourable current socio-political processes has provided fertile ground for LGNs to emerge and add important value to the local development processes. The nature of a political regime's relationships with a society influences its capacity to generate solidarity and synergy with regard to local development. Whether for historical or current reasons, communities need to trust that the political system in which they live represents their interests. Shared objectives, which are very crucial for state-society synergy, can only be established if there is trust between political leaders and communities. Tigray *woredas* have benefited from the high affiliation with and trust between the people of Tigray and the party, the TPLF. The strong bond between the people and the party, established during the 17 years of struggle for liberation, is the cornerstone of the voluntary and interest-based community participation. In Amhara *woredas*, the elite and the public's lack of affiliation with and trust in the political processes are major barriers to active community participation upon which LGNs' success depends when promoting sustainable development.

An important point to make is that supra-local government political and community enabling is crucial in setting the stage for LGNs to emerge and function, but does not guarantee their success in promoting local development. Local leadership capacity and continuity are more significant contextual factors. This can be clearly deduced from the fact that *woredas* operating in the same regional enabling environment have different success rates in promoting and facilitating the emergence and functioning of LGN structures. Evidence has showed that the mere existence of an LGN structure does not add much value, unless it involves interactions and synergetic relationships between actors. This is evident from the experiences of the WDC in Degua Temben and Baso Liben. Local leaders have to steer the interaction and communication to motivate participation and attract potential actors with diversified resources and experiences that can add important value to the socio-political processes. It is evident that Wukro *Woreda* has benefited much from the positive regional and local contextual factors that enabled it to involve diversified actors. This has not only contributed to service development and delivery, but also to other LGN value added such as participation, learning and communication, which

promote synergetic relationships between actors. With regard to Bugna, the regional and local political contexts are not positive. However, the quality and continuity of the *woreda* leadership have generated interest and attracted diversified actors to leverage the local development processes. This reflects that the local leadership's capacity can make a difference concerning the emergence and functioning of LGNs. Nevertheless, it is equally important to note that the regional and local political contexts still have a detrimental effect on communities' role and interest in actively taking part in and complementing the local leadership's efforts. Hence, to maximize the benefits of the LGN approach, local and supra-local governments need to establish trust between them and local community members to provide the foundation for shared objectives.

Another important lesson to be drawn is that not only the number and diversity of actors, but also their quality, which, among others, includes their capacity for, interest in and commitment to networking, is vital for the emergence and functioning of LGN structures in order to improve service development and add important value to the local political, social and economic processes as a whole.

Notes

1. *Ayte* Guesh Halefom, Cabinet member, Degua Temben *Woreda*, 28-11-03.
2. *Haleka* Hiluf Hailu, Gemad *Tabia*, Wukro *Woreda*, 15-11-03.
3. 'The EPDM transformed itself into the Amhara [National] Democratic Movement (ANDM) in January 1994 in order to concentrate its energy on the interests of the Amhara Nationality' (Addis Alem, 2003: 133).
4. *Ayte* Araya Nigusu, Head Rural Development Bureau, Tigray Region, 29-1-03
5. 'EPRDF politicians have criticized the Amhara people as a whole as oppressors and a dominant group that established political and cultural hegemony over other ethnic groups during all previous regimes. Such statements from the EPRDF motivated and encouraged newly established ethnic-based parties to marginalize and attack the Amhara people residing in different parts of the country' (Key informants, Bugna Woreda, 20-12-03).
6. For example, the then Head of EPDM and Prime Minster of the TGE, promoted anti-Amhara sentiment in pubic rather than protecting and defending the right of people to equally benefit from the political change' (Key informants, Bugna Woreda, 20-12-03).
7. Focus group discussion, Korke *Kebele,* Baso Liben *Woreda*, 14-01-04.
8. *Ato* Demel Tadesse, political officer, Amhara Region, 17-06-03
9. *Ato* Yisemaw Belay, Cabinet Member, Baso Liben *Woreda*, 10-01-04.
10. *Ato* Eskalehu Tefahunegn, Yelaminje *Kebele*, Baso Liben *Woreda*, 12-01-04.

7 Theories of Local Governance: A Reflection

7.1 Introduction

Governance is not a new concept; since the late 1980s and early 1990s it has, however, become a key concept in the international development debate in general and in Third World development in particular. By the end of the 1970s it was evident that, in general, developing countries' centralized governments and, particularly, those of African countries, were in crises and incapable of delivering socially relevant functions for their fast growing populations (Helmsing, 2001:2). The crises are basically related and therefore described as a 'crisis of governance' (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Wanyande, 2000).

Since that time, the state, as the engine of development, and its social-political legitimacy in society have been challenged (Helmsing, 2000). In the 1990s, it became especially evident that significant improvement could be made to the well-being of the majority of developing countries' ultra-poor citizens through a joint action by all the relevant actors, including the state, donors, NGOs, the private sector, and the people themselves (Jackson, 2002). As a result, emphasis was placed on the local level and different actors began to directly intervene and support efforts at this level, which caused a pervasive paradigm shift in the LG system (see 2.3). An increase in the number of different actors at the local level as well as an increasing awareness of local development problems' 'cross-cutting' nature that requires a holistic understanding, gave rise to the development of the LGN approach (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

Generally, where Third World governments have limited resources and a market-based approach faces different implementation hurdles, the LGN approach is emerging as an important escape from the trap of deteriorating local service production and delivery. It focuses on using all actors' energies and resources to solve societal problems.

The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the basic issues and concepts of local governance vis-à-vis the empirical findings. The chapter is divided into six sections. Section one reflects on important factors that influence an LGN's emergence and functioning. Section two presents the different types of LGN identified in the case study *woredas* and reflects on the relevant existing literature. Section three briefly reflects on the promises of an LGN for local service development in poor countries like Ethiopia. Section four deals with the two

sides of an LGN: demand and supply. It reflects on what demand and supply respectively represent in LGN activities regarding local development and then synthesizes the empirical evidence so as to deduce which of the two is more evident. This section examines national and regional socio-political settings in order to analyse the overall conditions for the emergence of supply and demand sides. Section five briefly reflects on the Weberian approach to public sector management in order to show an LGN's basic features in managing and coordinating public affairs. Section six reflects on the major challenges and opportunities that an LGN presents for LG authorities.

7.2 Emergence and Functioning of LGN

An LGN marks a breakthrough from local development's traditional public administration view and has transformed local development from a monocentric to a polycentric approach (Stoker, 2004). Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) argue that there is no alternative to the network approach if the interests, energies and resources of far more diverse and overlapping patterns of local communities are to be enlisted to solve various problems.

Even though an LGN appears an attractive approach to local development problems, its emergence and functioning are dependent on a multitude of factors. Government enablement, the existence of core groups with shared visions and relevant experiences, an atmosphere of openness and understanding, and the legitimacy of network leaders are crucial conditions for an LGN to emerge and function (Haverkort et al., 1993). In the course of the empirical examination and analysis of the emergence and functioning of LGNs in the case study *woredas*, certain very basic issues emerged that have not been sufficiently captured by the existing LGN literature. Some of these issues are strongly related to what is found in the existing literature, but require further discussion to provide new insights that complement the growing body of literature.

An LGN is a complex system of governance with different actors with defined organizational and/or jurisdictional boundaries coming together to act collectively towards common objectives. It has been thoroughly established that the emergence and functioning of such a system of governance depend on an enabling environment provided by the government and also on non-state actors' existence, capacity and commitment to undertake public activities (Leach and Pierre, 2001).

As an enabler, the government is a crucial actor in which the concept of enabling implies and calls on the government to radically change its role from direct production and provision to facilitation of others' efforts (Awortwi, 2003). As discussed in chapter two, there are three types of enablement that include political, market, and community enablement (Burgess et al., 1997). Market enablement refers to facilitating and promoting formal and informal business sectors and entrepreneurs to provide market solutions for local service

production and delivery. Political enablement refers to a transformation in central, regional and local governments' structure and functions that will improve relations between them and their relations with non-state actors such as NGOs, CBOs, and the community at large. It demands decentralization and institutional reform that primarily provides space for non-state actors in local decision-making. Community enablement, on the other hand, is referred to as a strategy adopted by central, regional and local governments to coordinate and facilitate the community and their organizations' efforts to initiate, plan, and implement service development and provision. Voluntary and interest-based community participation lies at the heart of community enablement (Helmsing, 2001:7-8).

Like many African countries, market enablement in Ethiopia is still poor, particularly in rural *woredas*/LGs. Evidence shows that political and community enablement are very important factors that influence the emergence and functioning of the LGNs in the case study *woredas*. Both federal and regional constitutions have made provision for such enablement, although the materialization of such an enabling environment is affected by a set of contextual factors at regional and local levels and the way that these factors relate to the central political system.

7.2.1 Context matters

A study that the OECD conducted on local partnerships and governance in seven countries indicated that context really matters for the effectiveness of local partnerships. The scope for partnership or networking is closely related to the governance context. The manner in which regions and localities are administered and policies are implemented provides the underlying conditions for the relationships between different actors (OECD, 2001). Almond and Verba as cited by Wanyande (2000:239) underscore the importance of context in local democracy and governance. They state that only the 'civic culture,' characterized by citizens' strong interest in participating in politics and a high level of trust and tolerance between the people and their political leaders, is conducive to the emergence and development of democracy. Olowu and Wunsch (2004:12-19) identify different local and regional/central contextual factors that affect local governance in African counties. According to them, a number of important, silent micro/local contextual factors affect local governance, which include: the inexperience of local political leadership, a severe scarcity of political legitimacy and a harsh political and institutional environment. According to Olowu and Wunsch (2004), the concentration of political power in only a few hands; regional/ethnic divisions aimed at keeping the public divided; heavy-handed, intimidating and repressive state responses to political opposition and challenges; and the manipulation of pre-existing regional and ethnic rivalry to isolate and discourage potentially challenging groups from governance proc-

esses are the most important regional and central contextual factors that affect local governance development. Evans (1997) recognizes the role of context for a synergetic relationship between state and society regarding local development. He states that a specific kind of political process, or a pre-existing regime could influence state-society relationships. Haus et al. (2005) also maintain that the characteristics of the socio-political contexts, which differ between localities, could influence the action arena for collective efforts. They further explain that political culture is an important contextual factor that shapes political leaders and communities' attitudes and behaviour during their interactions. According to NORAD (2005), socio-political contextual factors not only influence the nature of interactions between the local people and leaders, but also between other non-state actor partners.

Empirical investigations and analyses in Tigray and Amhara Regions have revealed that pre-established and on-going socio-political local and regional factors and the nature of the current relationships with the central political processes have influenced the emergence and functioning of an LGN. These are: (1) The affiliation and trust (past and present) between the regional ruling party/political leaders and the people; (2) the pre-existence of organized CBOs and participatory (embryonic network) structures; (3) the experience of local administrations and communities in undertaking the responsibility for local development; and (4) LG leadership legitimacy, capacity and continuity are important contextual factors that cause obvious differences between the two regions. Differences have also been observed between *woredas* in the same region, with these being mainly attributed to the local leadership's capacity and continuity factors.

Political affiliation and trust: past and present

Establishing an LGN is a process that incurs transaction costs in the course of negotiations with different actors. Trust and affiliations are important instruments to reduce the costs and make use of locally generated, individual and institutional potentials for joint action. A specific political culture and history shape socio-political actors' attitudes and behaviours, depending on the level of trust and affiliation (Haus et al., 2005). Not only the past, but also prevailing local and regional political conditions underpin or undermine the trust and affiliation between the local population and their leadership with regard to being engaged in an LGN to better coordinate socio-economic activities. Poor legitimacy and a lack of trust are hardly incentives for cooperation, while strong trust and solidarity complement network efforts and promote a synergetic relationship (Evans, 1997).

Political processes that establish broad consensus between the governors and the governed are also crucial. Dialogue and trust between them is the result of a political culture established over a certain period within a defined territory.

Organizational culture, historical distinctiveness with respect to cooperation, rigidities or flexibility in the attitudes of local leaders and the local people, and trust between them are some of the factors that determine the nature of interaction and cooperation (Jackson, 2002:136).

The shared objectives of and trust between the political leadership and local communities are the most important contextual factors that shape and reinforce state-society relations (Evans, 1997). Boisier (1983) states that a sense of regional identity, i.e. a collective sense of belonging felt by politicians and people in a region or locality is essential to establish political legitimacy. Empirical evidence shows that the political history and current processes in Tigray Region have produced affiliation and trust between the political leaders (regional-local) and the people (see 6.3). They have established joint political, economic and social objectives that generate interest in and commitment to better achievement. Such factors have created better political and community enablement for the emergence and development of LGNs.

The ways in which political regimes respond to popular interests influence the nature of state-society interactions for the development of synergetic relationships (Evans, 1997). Political processes and rules that are perceived as unjust, unfair and irrelevant by community members would never promote reciprocity and commitment to a common end (Fukuyama, 1999). If local people develop a feeling of being ignored or marginalized in local affairs, there is little trust in the LG and political process that, in turn, affects good relationships. LGs in such an environment struggle to establish an effective political and community enabling environment necessary for an LGN (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Empirical analysis reveals that Amhara Region is characterized by such environments. Unlike Tigray, the elites and local population hardly associate themselves with the political processes taking place at the local, regional and central levels. A sense of political marginalisation and repression is widely prevalent among the public in general and the elites in particular. Hence, affiliation with and trust in the regional ruling party are very scarce assets. Whether for one or more of the reasons discussed under Amhara's regional and local contextual factors (see 6.3), the lack of harmonious, ongoing political processes as well as the absence of a pre-established participatory political tradition and structures is a major disruptive force regarding the promotion of LGNs.

According to Hyden and Court (2002), the way a political system is structured will affect political processes and the state-society interactions at the local level. The basis of the central power's legitimacy and its structure affect the nature of the political processes at regional and sub-regional levels (Boisier, 1983). How individuals relate to a political system and how they familiarise themselves with and are interested in public issues depend on how the political system is constructed and how participation in public affairs is channelled. In most cases, the regional and local political systems in many Third World countries are

strongly influenced by central political systems' structure. Hence, the regional and local elites[1], local politicians, and people's affiliation with, trust in and attitudes towards the centre are important elements of political and community enablement processes. An established degree of trust among communities regarding a political system's nature and purpose is essential, and without this, individuals and interest groups have no reason to engage in an active socio-political life. Public trust and confidence in a political system helps to create an environment in which communities and their organizations will be actively involved in the processes to form alliances and seek mechanisms to improve development (Dwivedi, 2002).

The case studies reveal that politicians, elites and the people of Tigray have a strong affiliation with and trust in local and regional political processes as well as in the central government political system. Qualman (2000) states that the people of Tigray, who were all mobilized to win the war against the military government, have an exceptional affiliation with the current political system in Ethiopia. This attachment relates to what Boisier (1983) refers to as 'access to central decision-making', which determines the nature of regional and sub-regional elites and politicians' relationship with and commitment to the centre. In Amhara Region, the local people and elites' affiliation with and trust in the post-1991 political system differ considerably from that of Tigray.

EPRDF/ANDM officials, however, argue that the Amhara elites oppose the political processes and systems introduced by the EPRDF just because they lost their dominant position over other Ethiopians. Such conflicting views between the ruling party and people promote alienation and resentment instead of affiliation with and trust in the party, which affected voluntary and interest-based participation in socio-political processes.

The public and a political regime's conflicting interests can be fairly and sufficiently addressed by a pluralist and competitive political system. Competitions in politics can put pressure on the ruling party to be responsive to the local communities' interests rather than controlling by means of repressive measures (Evans, 1997). Smith (2003) argues that multiparty politics is very important to foster changes in socio-political processes by increasing popular participation and the distribution of power among different groups. Multiparty competition provides an opportunity for the rotation of power between contending parties, based on their capacity to reflect and respond to the public interests by means of their policies. However, according to Smith, the multiparty system's development and success in introducing and bringing real change to governance do not only depend on legal provisions, but also on the level of the political space and freedom for open competition. Doorenspleet (2003) also argues that it is not only the existence of political parties that defines a multiparty political system, but also the possibilities of open competition. A political regime that declares a multiparty system but impedes all opposition and competition to ensure

the continuity of the regime, hardly qualifies as an advocate of political pluralism. According to Dahl (1971), the most obvious change expected from a multiparty and competitive political system is the replacement of a one-party hegemonic regime with other competing parties. According to Doorenspleet (2003), if, regardless of opposition parties' existence and periodic elections in a country, one party is constantly in office and often governs alone (winning more than 50 percent of the seats) for two consecutive elections, that country has a 'dominant party'.

The EPRDF introduced a multiparty system in Ethiopia when it established the Transitional Government in 1991. However, according to Merera (2002), the EPRDF only introduced this system to pretend that it had assumed power through a democratic election rather than through the gun. He argues that there is a contradiction between the officially declared multiparty system and the opening up of political space for all contending forces. Merera's views are shared by informants from the Amhara *woredas*. They explained that there is no room for the development of opposition parties that could provide alternatives to promote the public interest. For example, the informants explained that the All Amhara People's Organization (APPO) has been excluded from the local political scene by the EPRDF, while, simultaneously, people who joined the party have suffered. Supporters are intimidated and treated harshly to teach others not to join or support any opposition party in future. The EPRDF has introduced an extended system of political control over the local citizens and opposition parties, so that its power cannot be challenged (Pausewang et al., 2002a). Based on his research in Mafud *woreda*, North Shewa, Amhara Region, Aspen, as described in Pausewang et al. (2002b:39), depicts the level of political control as a 'system of control that penetrates deep into the rural areas by the use of a web of cadres from the EPRDF and its branches.'

Fisher (1993) argues that power monopolies in only a few hands have made the emergence and development of broad-based national political parties, which are necessary for national consensus, difficult, or have inhibited the development of local political parties that genuinely represent local interests. Jacob (1971) also argues that if a single interest group dominates the political power, its interest - and its interest alone - will govern. In the Ethiopian context, Merera (2002), Pausewang et al. (2002a) and Clapham (2005) argue that the EPRDF controls all the political processes in different regions through ethnic-based parties, established with its support, and whose purpose is to serve its dominance. This monopoly of power is progressively promoting alienation and provoking opposition from systematically excluded groups such as the Oromo, Amhara and many other nations and nationalities in the country's southern and eastern parts (Merera, 2002). Suberu (2000) argues that the ever-increasing repression to control resistance and to converge virtually all aspects of national politics on one group will result in armed rebellion. As a matter of fact, Pause-

wang et al. (2002a:15) have identified armed resistance groups, the most significant of which are the OLF, Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the Patriotic Unity Front. All of the above explain the challenges regarding the development of a competitive political system in Ethiopia.

Generally, social cohesion and consensus cannot be established if there are political alienation and polarization between the governors and the governed. There must be trust between regional and local politicians as well as between politicians and the people if there is to be an open political process to justify activities that will give rise to the social and political cohesions necessary to establish a common objective regarding local development. As noted earlier, there is considerable difference between the people of Tigray and Amhara in terms of affiliation with and trust in the post-1991 political processes. This has in turn caused a difference in the regional and local political and community enabling conditions necessary for the development of synergetic relationships between the local people and the leadership. The author has observed that elites are at the centre of socio-political processes as their values are reflected and shared by the larger community and influence the entire socio-political process at the local level. Hence, the emergence and functioning of LGNs do not only depend on community participation, but also on the elites' active and genuine participation. On examining community participation's success, one has to investigate the elites' position and behaviour regarding this participatory scheme.

Pre-existence of organized CBOs and participatory structure

The pre-existence of organized community associations that have established cooperative patterns of interactions with local authorities and other actors provides a useful foundation for subsequent mobilization (Evans, 1997). Helmsing (2005:31) stated that 'community organization is a basic pre-condition for community initiative and management and for any enabling policy of other stakeholders to relate to.' Important elements of participation, such as interest, voluntarism, reciprocity and commitment, do not happen out of the blue. Networks between communities, established by their organizations (CBOs), enable them to provide themselves with vitally needed services as well as helping to maintain a strong sense of participatory consultation and democratic commitment. This in turn fosters a strong feeling of solidarity among citizens and places a high premium on integrity and trustworthiness in the local community's affairs (Mabogunje, 1999). CBOs can also mobilize members for participation in socio-political affairs that can facilitate the political regime's legitimacy (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). However, meaningful engagement between local authorities and local communities does not merely depend on CBOs' existence (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Such associations' efforts and commitment to generate social action on a scale that is politically and economically effective are very important in current mobilization (Evans, 1997).

CBOs do not germinate and grow from 'outside'; they come from within society as a result of specific historical, social and political contexts (Shah, 2005). Many CBOs evolved from embryonic indigenous structures that functioned in the absence of national authority. The rise of civic associations in South Africa is strongly linked to forms of resistance against the state and apartheid and in Lebanon, many CBOs emerged during the civil war (Fisher, 1993; Helmsing, 2005). Likewise, the rise of the *Seleste Mahberat* in Tigray is linked to the liberation movement. This created a great historical opportunity for them to gain experience in local development and occupy considerable space in the local social, political, and economic affairs. If previous collective action demonstrated good results, this can trigger further collective action and organization (Helmsing, 2005:31). This holds true for the *Seleste Mahberat* in the sense that their success in mobilizing the local people for community interest during the liberation movement created goodwill and confidence in them among the local leaders and people regarding their activities in the post-liberation period.

The roles of the *Seleste Mahberat* in local development provide ample empirical evidence of the significance of CBOs. They serve as important instruments to influence and orient individual behaviour and attitudes towards cooperative and collective actions. Communities in Tigray *woredas* do not hesitate to contribute anything the *Seleste Mahberat* ask for the purpose of local development processes. This verifies Turner and Hulme's (1997) statement that when CBO leaders present the idea of collective action, it generates 'social synergy' from which human, material and financial resources become available. According to Santos and Heeks (2003), a region/locality's social and political contexts are important factors in the existence and functioning of CBOs. Evans (1997) also states that the socio-political environment in which CBOs undertake developmentally relevant activities is a crucial factor. Indeed, it is true that the success of the *Seleste Mahberat* is not attributed only to their strength, but also to a political environment and culture that recognize their roles and provide sufficient support and decision-making space.

Embryonic or mature community development structures are important to extend a network of civic engagement between different members of a society. This is evident from Tigray *woredas* where conservation and community health committees, established at *tabia* and *kushet* levels during the period of the liberation movement, have grown into strong LGNs that facilitate and promote active and interest-based community participation in local development. These structures serve as a springboard for elaborate collective and cooperative actions by community members and external actors that have a keen interest in grassroots structures.

Generally, experienced and socio-politically esteemed CBOs, such as the *Seleste Mahberat* and embryonic network structures, such as conservation and

community health committees in Tigray, contribute much to the emergence and functioning of an LGN. The experience of Bugna *Woreda* shows that the absence of strong CBOs and grassroots network structures is one of the limiting factors for LGNs that compete for non-state actors' resources and time to develop communities' interest in participation. Unlike Amhara Region, non-state actors in Tigray do not spend time organizing community-based structures as they are already in place. The *Seleste Mahberat* and other community-based structures generate the local people's voluntary and interest-based participation in the entire LGN milieu, which complements state and non-state actors' efforts in the course of establishing people-centred networks for sustainable development.

Experiences in undertaking local development responsibility

It cannot be assumed that effective cooperation and integration between communities and other actors for the purpose of local development will develop spontaneously (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Genuine LG and community commitments to work and act together to solve community problems are achieved through long experience of civic engagement and successful collaboration between local leaders and community members (Fukuyama, 1999; Mabogunje, 1999).

LGs and the people can start self-initiated and self-financed local service development and delivery due to one or a combination of the following reasons: an encouraging and supportive government policy, a highly motivated and visionary leader and/or group of local people, the emergence and development of strong community-based organizations, and their isolation from national service development and delivery systems due to war and other problems. Whether for one or more of these reasons, LGs and people who have experience of undertaking local development responsibilities provide a fertile ground for the emergence and functioning of an LGN. They acquire skills for and interests in partnership that can play a significant role in promoting and facilitating a network of relationships between multiple actors. Community participation, which is the very essence of an LGN, will be simple, as the leaders and people have already gained experience and realized benefits.

This is evident from Tigray *woredas*. The seeds of community-based local service development and delivery in Tigray were planted during the liberation movement (REST, 1993b). Officials and the people reported that when the military government was confronted by strong resistance throughout Tigray, it was unwilling to deliver basic services to the local people. In this situation, mobilizing efforts from all of Tigray's people to ensure basic service delivery was the most reliable option for the TPLF leadership. *Tabia* and k*ushet* councils (*baitos)* and the *Seleste Mahberat* took over the primary responsibility for mobilizing people to carry out different socio-economic development activities such as

minor road construction, afforestation, SWC, the rehabilitation of schools and health facilities destroyed in the war etc. These activities were carried out with the local people's active participation in need identification, prioritisation, planning and implementation (Gebre Ab, 1997).

According to REST (1993b), this provided opportunities to develop a range of practical, first-hand experiences regarding the maximization of opportunities for development that could be expanded and disseminated to a wider partnership of multiple actors. Tigray's experience provides ample evidence of the value of LGs and people having established experience in promoting and facilitating the emergence and functioning of an LGN. On the other hand, the lack of such experience as well as other factors has remained a serious challenge for the emergence and functioning of an LGN in Amhara *woredas*. Hence, LGs and other pro-LGN actors should search for community structures and experiences with regard to undertaking their common affairs and cultivating them in order for them to grow into service development and delivery systems, rather than imposing externally designed structures in which communities are less interested.

Local Government leadership legitimacy, capacity and continuity

LGs are responsible for the development of their localities. They have to create a socio-political environment in which people enjoy peace and security that will motivate them to invest time and resources in their localities. In the context of current decentralization processes and the LGN paradigm for local development, LGs are more amenable to joining forces with other actors to promote and produce sustainable development results. Relationships between state and non-state actors need to be more direct and straightforward at local level than at supra-local levels (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Local leaders need to facilitate and coordinate horizontal LGNs that require interdependent relationships between multiple actors from multiple sectors. They should also provide a channel for vertical coordination and the exchange of information between supra-local government agencies and other actors at the local level. In order to effectively undertake these responsibilities, there is a need for legitimate and capable local leadership (Haus et al., 2005; OECD, 2001).

Local leadership is exercised within a given socio-political setting where its legitimacy is influenced by national, regional and local contextual factors (van Haus et al., 2005; Ufford, 1987). The relationship between the local population and the formal political leadership sets the realm of legitimacy, i.e. how local people perceive a political system and the way the rules and procedures that the government uses affect their freedom, peace and security, determine the level of legitimacy (Hyden and Court, 2002; van Ufford, 1987).

Effective and sustainable local development depends greatly on socio-political processes at the local level, which in turn depend on people working

together, pooling their resources and energies to accomplish common objectives (Jacob, 1971). Communities are interested in and committed to socio-political processes whenever they accept a political system as legitimate. Deficits in legitimacy, which could be caused by the political leadership's failure to represent and promote community interests, could lead to the local people's loss of trust in representative institutions and decision-making systems (Haus et al., 2005; Haus and Heinelt, 2005).

Tigray and Amhara Regions exhibit different levels of leadership legitimacy. In Tigray, despite the difference in the level of effectiveness in the *woredas'* leadership due to their different capacities, the political leadership does not suffer from a lack of legitimacy. People trust and have confidence that the political leaderships at national, regional and local levels represent their interests. As discussed throughout this study, the strong solidarity between the people of Tigray and the TPLF, established during the liberation movement period, laid the foundation for the current trust and confidence in the political regime. In Amhara *woredas*, legitimacy is a scarce political phenomenon with the local people, in general, and elites, in particular, not believing that the current political system promotes and represents their interests. In the local development processes, this has undermined cooperative relationships between the local leadership and the communities. The system of community involvement in local development is top-down (from the authorities to the people) and by means of pressure and coercion rather than through discussion. Such processes further erode the political leadership's legitimacy. Haus and Heinelt (2005) stated that participation contributes to legitimacy only when it provides opportunity for interest articulation and dialogue towards establishing shared objectives.

Leadership capacity is a key factor regarding a realistic assessment of problems and opportunities, the establishment of priorities and the marshalling of internal and external resources from different actors to address these priorities (Jackson, 2002; VanSant, 2003). The capacity of local leaders is crucial in effectively facilitating and coordinating LGNs between diversified autonomous actors. Evidence shows that although LGs may operate with the same political legitimacy, they perform differently because of differences in the local leadership. Weak leadership not only affects the capacity to search for opportunities, but also to absorb available opportunities.

Indeed, the importance of leadership capacity for the effective coordination of an LGN has been recognized by many authors such as Evans (1997), Haus et al. (2005), Haus and Heinelt (2005), OECD (2001), and Leach and Percy-Smith (2001). The literature on leadership continuity (stability) is, however, scanty. This study has found that leadership continuity is an important local contextual factor that affects an LGN's development and performance. Important attributes of leadership, such as being forward-looking, learning by doing, self-reliance and confidence, depend, among others, on a predictable tenure in

office. Unstable leadership affects the capacity of local leaders to negotiate and attract actors as well as actors' interest in and commitment to such localities. Regional DPPB informants maintained that most non-state actors identify and prefer to work with LGs that have good records regarding leadership stability and capacity. Hence, LGs that are directly responsible for facilitating, coordinating and supervising networks among multiple actors need to have stable leadership.

In general, local leadership is a principal LGN actor, with its success in facilitating and coordinating the emergence and functioning of an effective LGN depending, among other things, on its legitimacy, capacity and stable tenure in office. Evidence shows that a local leadership that lacks one or more of these factors has difficulty with effectively promoting and steering LGN processes.

Although the importance of contextual factors has been captured by different authors dealing with different socio-political issues, they have not been sufficiently covered in the LGN literature. Previously discussed contextual factors, which arise from different local and supra-local socio-political settings, are very crucial for the emergence and functioning of an LGN. Hence, studies should not only be aware of the importance of these factors when analysing an LGN, but further studies also need to be conducted in different countries and localities to identify a wider range of contextual factors that could be equally relevant. To underestimate contextual factors' importance in the analysis of LGN would certainly undermine the extent to which successful experiences could be replicated.

7.2.2 Actors and their roles: the pillars of LGN

Actors are at the centre of an LGN's emergence and functioning. The range of actors that are involved in an LGN is growing, which makes it a multifaceted phenomenon. It involves different institutions, structures, processes and procedures, and practices necessary to negotiate the social, economic and political affairs of localities.

The LGN concept has widened the public realm. It refers to the involvement and coordination of multi-level (vertical) and multi-organizational (horizontal) actors in the production of public services with different actors playing different but interrelated roles (Haus et al., 2005). Hence, the term LGN actors refers to all actors, including central, regional and local governments and their agencies; NGOs, CBOs, private enterprises, and donor agencies. Multiple vertical and horizontal inter-linkages and relationships between various actors are a typical feature of an LGN (Kauzya, 2003).

Empirical evidence reveals that both state and non-state actors of local, regional, national and international origins are involved in different sectors through different intervention modalities. Discussions in the literature emphasize LGN actors' state and non-state dichotomy. However, the assessment and

analyses of LGNs in the case study *woredas* indicated that the intervention modalities and roles of each category of actors deserve further discussion in order to maximize the opportunities that they offer for an LGN. It is imperative to consider the nature of actors and the strategic resources that each actor has at its disposal.

The roles of multi-level state actors

Although an LGN is essentially about processes at the local level, 'networks do not emerge fully formed' and governments at different levels influence their development by determining their operational parameters and objectives through legislative control and political legitimacy (Leach and Percy-Smith 2001:31). Of course, an LGN is premised on pluralistic decision-making structures and approaches to steering local development (Helmsing, 2003; Kickert et al., 1997). Hence, the interaction of supra-local and LG agencies performing interlinked functions through interwoven structures is very crucial (Helmsing, 1997). The concept of enablement has made it clear that governments at all levels continue to play crucial roles, based on the principle of interdependencies and mutual interactions so that multiple actors from multiple sectors contribute best to local development (Wils and Helming, 2001). Thus, the debate today is more about intergovernmental relations than central-local relations and how this affects local level interactions and networking among various actors (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001; Smoke, 2003).

The assessment and analyses of an LGN in the case study *woredas* show that different non-state actors pass through a chain of processes at different levels of government before an LGN is established and operationalized at the local level (see 4.2). This aspect of an LGN has not received sufficient attention in the literature. Most discussions are preoccupied with the roles of the LG and, hence, supra-local governments' specific roles have not been sufficiently captured. The empirical evidence suggests, however, that the assessment and analysis of an LGN should go beyond local processes to sufficiently capture the nature of supra-local governments' interactions and roles. In this regard, the following empirical reflections complement the LGN literature.

The Federal/Central Government plays enabling and supervisory roles in the formation of an LGN. The following are important enabling roles: Firstly, the provision and establishment of a socio-political and legal environment that creates opportunities for new socio-political and institutional systems. The restructuring of the centralized unitary system of governance and replacement by a decentralized federal system has made the establishment of self-governing LG structures possible. Secondly, the Federal Government also provides the general legal and policy framework that creates opportunities for international and national development agencies (NGOs and donors) to intervene in and support local socio-economic development processes. It facilitates their local develop-

ment activities by offering administrative support, providing land for buildings, physical infrastructure, and duty-free privileges regarding materials and equipment to be used for local service development and delivery (Dessalegn, 2002; Kassahun, 2002). Thirdly, in addition to the above vital legal and institutional support, evidence from the case study *woredas* shows that the central government directly supports the emergence and functioning of an LGN at the local level through an independent community-development-oriented agency, ESRDF. The agency promotes networks between communities and LGs to plan and implement service development projects through community-based development support programmes.

The Federal Government also establishes regulatory and supervisory rules and procedures to which donor agencies and international and national NGOs need to adhere in their interventions in local development activities (see 4.2 and Appendix 7). Government claims that such rules and procedures are vital to bring interventions in line with major policies.

Despite the important changes introduced in the general socio-political framework for intervention in local development, donors and NGOs are still critical of government legislation and implementing agencies regarding their creation of the necessary enabling conditions. According to NGOs, central government rules and procedures are old[2] and cannot cope with the changing nature of governance. Moreover, implementing agencies focus on controlling rather than on facilitating and supporting LGN processes. Mistrust of non-state actors in general and NGOs in particular characterizes government agencies and employees' behaviour and attitude. This relates to what Fowler et al. (1992) describe as an ongoing uneasy relationship between NGOs and government that is perpetuated because of their different perspectives and agendas regarding politics and other development issues.

Regional governments also play enabling and supervisory roles in LGNs' emergence and functioning. They have established constitutionally defined *woreda* and *tabia/kebele* LGs with elected council and an executive arm responsible for local socio-economic development decisions and implementations. *Woredas* have been authorized to negotiate and mobilize resources from different actors such as communities, CBOs, NGOs, and community-development-oriented donor agencies. This is the most important legal-enabling framework for an LGN to take place at the local level. Another important enabling role is the constitutional recognition of communities' rights and role in local development affairs. However, the mere recognition of rights and roles is no guarantee for effective community participation. As noted in earlier discussions, voluntary and interest-based community participation in local development is greatly influenced by the political and community enabling environment (see 6.3.1 and 7.2.1).

Material, human and financial support provided to *woreda* government agencies is another important component of the regional government's enabling role. Regional bureaus also provide technical and managerial assistances to *woreda* sector offices and training to sector experts in order to improve their capacity.

With regard to supervision, regional governments supervise all socio-political processes that occur at the local level by means of the political and administrative chains of command. They also regulate and supervise donor agencies and NGOs in the processes of LGN formation and programme implementation (see 4.2 and Appendix 7).

Non-state and LG informants in the two regions assert that bureaucratic processes and procedures and the corollary delay in reviewing and signing agreements are still basic problems. Regional agencies are slow to respond to complaints and requests coming from LGs and non-state actors. Moreover, the chains of command focus on ensuring upward accountability rather than on likewise promoting downward accountability to the people. Non-state actor informants stated that unlike federal agencies and officials, regional agencies and officials have a better sense of affiliation with and ownership of projects to be implemented in different localities of their jurisdictions.

Zonal agencies have been engaged in the co-production of services with the WA and sector offices with regard to projects financed by government budget and funds from donors that do not operate at the local level. They also provide technical and managerial support to *woreda* sector offices. This is important for improving sector offices' capacity in the processes of local development planning and implementation. However, *woreda* officials and sector experts are of the opinion that zonal agencies tend to dominate and over-ride *woreda* authorities. *Woreda* officials in Amhara Region stated that the zonal administration is an extended politico-administrative arm of the regional government, which is overly involved in local affairs.

The above discussions reveal that an LGN cannot be established and function independently and isolated from supra-local government authorities and agencies. Central, regional, and sub-regional authorities and agencies have roles to play in its emergence and functioning at the local level.

LGs remain key actors in the LGN processes. From the five roles that Helmsing (2005:19-20) identified as important LGs roles in local development, the following two are strongly related and relevant to the LGN context: '[1]) by virtue of their public interest role, LGs have a 'capacity to convene' other social actors to define the local public interest in and the broad direction of local economic development; and [2]) LGs can enable or facilitate other actors to make a more effective contribution towards solving LED problems.' However, this 'enabling' role requires new capacities and new skills regarding managing and coordinating activities on behalf of LGs. *Woreda* governments have been gener-

ally responsible for levelling the playing field for the emergence of different horizontal LGNs. They facilitate and coordinate the establishment of different LGNs between various actors in order to mobilize efforts and resources for local service development and delivery. Supervising and regulating various actors and networks' activities is the other dimension of *woredas'* roles throughout all LGN processes.

These are key roles that neither supra-local governments nor communities could carry out alone. However, not all *woredas* are effective in undertaking all these responsibilities. Despite differences among *woredas*, donor agencies and NGOs that operate at the *woreda* level generally agree that *woreda* governments and agencies have interests in facilitating and coordinating LGN activities and not only do this better than the national agencies, but also better than the regional ones. They have a better understanding of these actors' significance in mobilizing resources as they have limited access to government sources. Hence, supra-local governments should focus on building local agencies' capacities and decrease their regulatory and supervision activities of non-state actors.

The *Tabia/kebele* administration constitutes an important channel of communication between the *woreda* government and the local people and also between non-state actors and the people involved in an LGN's processes. Despite the differences between Tigray and Amhara Regions, *tabia/kebele* administration has been responsible for facilitating and coordinating community participation in local development processes. The vital activities of a *tabia* in Tigray Region provide ample evidence of their vital roles in local development and lessons can be drawn in the sense that if grassroots LG structures are given sufficient political space and support, they do play critical roles in the emergence and functioning of an LGN.

Roles of non-state actors

The term non-state actors is so broad that it includes all organizations that are independent of the central, regional and LG machineries in their organizational structures. In the LGN context, a rigid organizational boundary would affect its basic intent, thus making discretely disaggregating its organizational independence from the state authority difficult. When state and non-state actors work together, they forgo a certain level of autonomy in the process of inter-organizational networking (Josselin and Wallace, 2001). The changing political, economic and social landscapes at global, national and local levels have required non-state actors' increasing intervention at the local level. Weak economic capacity and the rethinking of government and its corollary on governance in the 1990s, which resulted in government being considered as one of the actors instead of the sole provider of services, promote non-state actors' direct participation in the production and delivery of basic public services at the local level (Brautigam, 1994; Helmsing, 2000).

The most important categories of non-state actors that are directly and indirectly involved in local service development and delivery in the case study *woreda*s include: NGOs, CBOs, and bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. Despite non-state actors trying to reach local people and locating development projects at the local level, this study has revealed that roles and modalities of interventions vary among the various actors.

NGOs

Until the 1980s, NGO activities in developing countries were associated with relief and emergency rather than part of mainstream development efforts (Fowler, 2002b; Riddell et al., 1995). By the early 1990s, all this had largely changed. From then onward, NGOs have been regarded as part of the orthodox development circle and their significance is growing fast in the broader effort to reduce poverty (Riddell et al., 1995). Different factors contributed to the increasing importance of NGOs in local development (see 2.6.3).

Broadly, NGOs can be described as agencies that differ from government bodies. Nevertheless, the growth of various types of NGOs has occasionally led to the blurring of this distinction as there is a growing tendency for government and state agencies or even politicians to establish their own 'non-governmental' organizations (Riddell et al., 1995). This has become common in Ethiopia where almost all regional states have established development associations such as the Tigray Development Association (TDA), Amhara Development Associations (ADA), Oromo Development Association (ODA) etc. (Graham, N.D.b). In fact, the TDA is the oldest and was established in 1989 by TPLF politicians and Tigrayan refugees in the U.S.A. Regional development associations have their own structures and management that differ from those of the government; however, they are strongly linked with and influenced by the regional governments as board chairs and members of these associations are key political figures in the central and regional governments.

Donors currently favour channelling resources for community-based development programmes through NGOs instead of government agencies (Anang, 1994; Fowler 2002a). Consequently, the growth of government-affiliated NGOs, such as those mentioned above, may indicate that governments are responding to donors' emphasis on NGOs by establishing their own 'NGOs' to ensure that they have access to development funds.

Generally, NGOs embrace a wide variety of agencies, in many different countries that address very many different issues. Different criteria are used to classify NGOs, which will re-group them to improve understanding. The first criterion is the geographic scope/level of operation, which classifies NGOs as international, national and local. International NGOs are those usually based in the North and principally engaged in funding development projects and providing food and other materials at times of disaster and emergency. They can be

operational, directly engaged in project implementation at the local level by using their own staff and resources; or non-operational, providing financial and material support from their headquarters or branch offices through partner organizations. The second criterion is operation area/activity/ orientation, or purpose. This includes charity, service development and delivery, environmentalists, and empowerment and advocacy. The third is organizational affiliation, i.e. secular versus religious affiliation NGOs (DeMars, 2005; Riddell et al., 1995).

Wherever they belong (international, national or local) and whatever they do with regard to the various activities listed above, NGOs are considered 'connective tissues', bridges, facilitators, and translators that link together donor communities' interventions and actions that are required to leverage the development, humanitarian and democratisation efforts taking place at the micro/local level (Edwards and Fowler, 2002b). They are increasingly involved in the provision of health, education, water and credit services to millions of poor people in thousands of communities in developing countries.

The perceived limitations of the state and, in many African countries, the failure of the market to provide basic services and promote development, as well as NGOs' ability to use local people's knowledge and local materials in the development and provision of services, their ability to react quickly to local demands, and the roles they play in the process of empowerment and democratisation at the local level are all sound reasons for NGOs being perceived as important actors of local development (Caroll, 1992; Sandberg, 1994; Willis, 2005).

Although the enthusiasm for NGOs' roles in local service development and delivery has continued, their performance and success is still debatable (see 2.6.3). However, Jordan and Tuijl (2002) argue that NGOs should not be judged by the narrow concept of service provision alone, because they are increasingly involved in articulating and representing people's interests or concerns at different levels of decision-making. Willis (2005) also argues that one of the most important aspects of donors' enthusiasm for NGOs is their capacity to 'empower' communities to take part in their own affairs. Evidence to prove such claims is, however, scanty. Instead, poor performance records regarding advocacy and democratisation are more plentiful (Edwards and Hulme, 2002b). In spite of heavy criticism regarding their capacity for and interest in formal policy and political reform advocacy, NGOs are praised for their participatory development interventions that facilitate local citizens' self-image and confidence to take part in political activities (Carroll, 1992; Edwards and Hulme, 2002b).

Because of the heavily centralized Imperial and *Derg* governments, the role of NGOs in pre-1991 Ethiopia was mainly understood to mean relief and emergency activities. The post-1991 changes that the TGE made to the national

and local governance systems and economic development policy created opportunities for the proliferation of indigenous and international NGOs in order for them to directly take part in local service development and provision (Sisay, 2004). NGOs are allowed and encouraged to participate in many areas, including, among others, the prevention of land degradation and the rehabilitation thereof, water harvesting and exploitation of ground water, health, education, as well as community and women's empowerment (RRC, 1995).

The assessments and analyses of LGN actors in the case study *woredas* reveal that NGOs are one of *woreda* governments and the people's most important partners regarding improving local service development and delivery. They play key roles in the establishment and functioning of sector-based/planning and implementing LGNs. When classified on the basis of their geographic scope/level of operation, NGOs in the case study *woredas* fall into international, national and regional/local levels. The SCF-UK, Plan and WVE are international NGOs while the EOC/DICAC and ERCS are national NGOs. Regional/local NGOs include REST, TDA, ADCS, and ADA.

In the case study *woredas,* NGOs' operation area/activity regarding the three services selected for this study shows that NGOs are involved in one or more sectors. REST, Plan, ADCS, EOC/DICAC, and the WVE are involved in more than one sector, while SCF-UK, ERCS, ADA, and TDA are involved in only one sector. NGO informants stated that intervention in multi-sectors provides them with an opportunity for establishing contacts and relationships with many state actors and also for a better understanding of local socio-economic situations. *Woreda* leaders and experts, on the other hand, explained that NGOs that are involved in more than one sector have created opportunities for inter-organizational linkages through sector-based networks.

The literature makes an important distinction between operational (directly engaged in project implementation) and non-operational (providing financial and material supports) NGOs (Riddell et al., 1995). However, this distinction cannot capture the specific intervention modality that each operational NGO adopts or the pros and cons of each modality. This study has identified at least three different modalities of intervention. The first is direct support through a locally based project office through which an NGO participates directly in different development project activities. Such NGOs include REST, Plan, WVE, and EOC/DICAC. In collaboration with *woreda* government agencies and communities, they plan and implement the projects that they support. This direct intervention modality and physical proximity have created opportunities for close and day-to-day communications between these actors and local leaders, experts and the people at large to jointly identify local problems and find solutions. The second intervention modality is the direct support of LG agencies without participation in planning and implementation. This is adopted by NGOs that have a limited intervention in a *woreda*. Resources are then provided

to an LG by means of a partner sector agency rather than by establishing a project office. For example, in its Bugna pilot environmental rehabilitation project, SCF-UK provides the *woreda* Agriculture Office with resources. A third intervention modality is transitory, direct intervention. This is mainly adopted by regional development associations, i.e. the TDA and ADA. In partnership with a relevant sector office, they directly plan and implement specific projects on a transitory basis.

As discussed in chapter six, local leaders and experts face a dilemma as to which modality of intervention is more enabling. They appreciate the autonomy they have regarding resources given to them for their own planning and implementation, as this creates an opportunity for learning by doing. However, they make no secret of their capacity problem regarding the planning, implementing and monitoring of projects. In the light of this, they recognize and believe in the importance of direct intervention. Indeed, where LGs have a limited capacity for planning and implementation, NGOs' direct intervention is quite important. On the other hand, it is equally imperative to note that NGOs need not capitalize on their expertise to dominate LG decisions. Their interventions should not only focus on current planning and implementation effectiveness, but also on teaching the local authorities and experts so that, in the long term, they could take over these activities.

In fact, NGO informants argue that locally based direct involvement is not only important to fill capacity gaps and provide opportunities for learning from their experiences, but also to promote LGN development and community empowerment, which is one of their objectives. They argue that although community participation in project planning and implementation could be included as a requirement for LG agencies to secure funding; it hardly ensures effective participation. According to NGO respondents, sector experts generally prefer to use their own knowledge and experiences instead of facilitating participation to generate ideas and information from the people themselves. Local people share the above views and stated that NGOs' involvement in planning and implementation has created more opportunities for participation in local development activities. An important point at this juncture is that even where NGOs are directly involved, the issue of empowerment is merely confined to communities' involvement in project activities. Advocating and enlightening communities about their rights and roles in politics are still scarce activities, because the NGOs do not have the courage to do so nor do governments tolerate such activities. Most NGOs undertake less politically sensitive advocacy activities such as awareness creation regarding gender, children's rights, and traditional harmful practices.

Although indigenous (national, regional/local) NGOs have a better understanding of the local political, social and economic realities, they have a capacity problem to effectively support LGs and communities' efforts. An exception is

REST, which has accumulated experiences and capacities through networks established over the years with international NGOs and bilateral and multilateral funding agencies. An informant from REST Head Office explained that since its establishment, REST has been working closely with the people as well as with international organizations. REST has strong networks, among others, with EU, UNICEF, USAID, Oxfam Canada, and Norwegian Church Aid. It has also expanded its funding sources to countries in Asia such as Japan, Hong Kong, and New Zealand (REST, 1995). Hence, indigenous NGOs can learn from REST and work hard at establishing networks with different funding agencies involved in building civil societies' capacities. However, local NGO informants stated that REST has access to international sources not only because of its capacities, but also because of the strong political support it receives through board members who are key TPLF political leaders. NGOs like REST that have an indigenous foundation and political and social legitimacy are important in mobilizing resources and using indigenous knowledge and experience for local development purposes. According to *woreda* officials and sector experts in Degua Tembien, although REST is a vital actor in this regard, its predominance in the *woreda* has caused a repulsion force with regard to other NGOs. This suggests that care needs to be taken that such NGOs do not grow into a monopoly that will affect the participation of similar or different non-state actors in a locality in which they operate.

According to local NGO respondents and government officials at regional and local levels, the other problem for local NGOs in establishing networks with international NGOs is the latter's lack of interest in using the former as an implementing partner. However, respondents of international NGOs argue that local NGOs have little experience and capacity to implement multifaceted development projects. Whatever the argument, the fact is that there is little networking between local and international NGOs. Generally, there is very little independent networking between local and international NGOs as well as between all levels, which hampers their capacity to establish common objectives and challenge government policies in the interest of the local people.

In terms of their roles in local service development and provision, empirical evidence (service development and delivery outcomes) and discussions with local authorities and community members show that NGOs are important LGN actors. The expansion of water points and health facilities, such as health posts, clinics, and health centres, are important contributions to improve access to and equitable distributions of these services to the majority of the remotely located rural poor. Interventions though the FFW/CFW/EGS programmes are also important in promoting environmental rehabilitation and preventing further degradation, while providing opportunity for able bodied poor people and those facing food scarcity to work and feed their families.

CBOs

CBOs are heterogeneous institutions involved in many different activities (Helmsing, 2005). They are created by people for their own benefit and are distinctive due to these people's gender, age or occupation. They can also be jointly established by all types of community members, i.e. men and women of all ages, to structure and regulate their common social life (Fowler et al., 1992). Whatever the members' composition, Helmsing (2005:29) emphasised the need to make a distinction between grassroots territorial CBOs and 'self-selected' grassroots groups (see 2.6.3).

Their indigenous character, shared values and common interests are important factors that hold CBOs together. The degree of social and political trust that CBOs enjoy depends on the historical conditions that gave rise to their establishment (Fowler, 2000).

In the context of the new local governance paradigm, CBOs are being transformed from being at the receiving end of services to producing and providing certain services and being partners in LGN efforts. They can mobilize their members to actively take part in local political, social and economic affairs. However, the opportunity to meaningfully engage community members in the local socio-economic and political affairs depends on CBOs' strength and the socio-political space they are given (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

Helmsing (2005:35) underlined the need to strengthen community groups' position, which concerns the formation of second- and third-level community organizations, i.e., associations of grassroots groups and federations of associations. He further elaborated that the formation of such apex organizations can provide several important advantages, among others: more influence being exercised, facilitating information and experience sharing and undertaking functions that are not feasible at grassroots level. Helmsing added that apex organizations could also strengthen CBOs' autonomy vis-à-vis the state.

Ethiopia has many indigenous CBOs that have existed for generations, such as funeral-saving societies (*Idirs*), self-help community groups (*mahibers*) and saving associations (*Iqubs*). However, their significance and organizational base to grow into development-oriented CBOs have not yet been exploited (Qualman, 2000; Zenebe, 2001). Most of these CBOs are merely active at times of stress and during social events rather than mobilizing their members and resources for sustainable development (Kassahun, 2002).

As noted in many parts of this study, Tigray Region has benefited from the establishment of the *Seleste Mahberat*. Organizationally, they have a very mixed character. They fall into Fowler et al.'s (1992) categorization in the sense that they are distinctive because of their gender focus, (e.g. the Women Association), age focus (e.g. the Youth Association), and occupational focus (e.g. the Farmers Association). In spite of their categorical character, among themselves they are firmly integrated/networked. They fall into the category that Helmsing

(2003 and 2005) describes as 'grassroots territorial CBOs' in that they are multipurpose, representing broad groups of people who are territorially dispersed. Initially established through political activists and interested members' initiative, they later grew from k*ushet* to regional levels as legally registered organizations with an established hierarchical structure.

Each association has full organizational autonomy regarding all matters that deal with members' specific interests. In local development efforts, however, they act jointly through the horizontal network that they have established at each level. Political leaders and community members know them best by their generic name *Seleste Mahberat* (the Three Associations). According to *Seleste Mahberat's* regional and *woreda* leaders, their progress from the village to the regional level has provided opportunities for autonomy that will not be easily affected by local political leaders' whims. If anything goes wrong with the associations and their members' interests, *tabia/kushet*-level leaders report to *woreda Seleste Mahberat* to discuss the matter with the WA. If the WA cannot address the problem, this is communicated to zonal and regional *Seleste Mahberat* leaders so that they can take the matter to top-level government officials. This confirms Helmsing's (2005) argument that the presence of second- and third-tier structures in CBOs/associations' organization can strengthen their autonomy vis-à-vis the state.

At the regional level, the *Seleste Mahberat's* apex structures undertake important activities for their local-level leaders and members. The regional Associations provide leadership training to zonal, *woreda* and *tabia* association leaders. This and other important services are not only provided for leaders but also for the members. In collaboration with other organizations such as REST and TDA, the *Seleste Mahberat* have been providing their members with skills training in the area of micro enterprise development. Women and Youth Associations jointly play an important advocacy role in how to improve female students' enrolment in primary and secondary schools. They also organize tutorial classes for secondary school female students so that they can perform better and meet the admission requirements for higher education. A regional Women's Association informant explained that the Association organizes different public fora at *woreda* and zonal levels to discuss different issues, such as the role of women in politics and how to prevent harmful traditional practices, such as genital mutilation and early marriage. In addition to face-to-face communication fora, the Women's Association distributes a newsletter every quarter and broadcasts information and education programmes for 20 minutes every week in collaboration with *Dimits Woyane*[3] ('the voice of the rebels') Radio. The activities undertaken by the regional *Seleste Mahberat*, reinforce Helmsing's (2005) argument that apex organizations enable CBOs/associations to undertake functions that are not feasible at grassroots level.

Leaders of the *Seleste Mahberat* at all levels explained that they are important partners, not only in local development, but also in political processes at all levels in the region. Political leaders at all levels accepted this claim and explained that anything that requires community participation has to involve the *Seleste Mahberat*; if a proposal fails to secure their endorsement, the people will not accept this either. They institutionalise social interactions and foster trust between communities and political leaders, which are important aspects for the emergence and functioning of a successful LGN. Their structures at k*ushet, tabia*, *woreda*, zonal, and regional levels have created opportunities for them to have access to government decision-making structures and political leaders to voice and emphasise community needs. According to the *Seleste Mahberat* leaders, these opportunities are crucial to reduce the elite's domination of local needs and priorities. In general, they serve as a:

- Platform for the exchange of information and deliberation among members; the use of local knowledge and experiences, and the mobilization of resources though voluntary contributions to local development.
- Platform for discussion and negotiation with other actors, such as LGs, NGOs, and donors, on behalf of their members.
- Platform for an intra-local and inter-local exchange of experiences through workshops and visits.

In spite of the *Seleste Mahberat's* key functions in all socio-political processes in Tigray Region, the author observed that their close link to government structures and their strong political affiliation have an impact on their capacity to emerge as independent, vibrant civil societies that are able to challenge government policies affecting their members and the community.

The practical importance of the *Seleste Mahberat* is vividly illustrated when examining the impact of such CBOs' absence/weakness in Amhara *woredas*. Governments in Africa adopt a variety of responses to community associations' activities and in some instances they are not interested if they consider these associations and their activities as threats to their power (Helmsing, 2005), which is true of many post-colonial governments. The situation in Amhara Region reflects this realty. According to informants, due to the mistrust and political alienation between the ruling party and the people, politicians do not encourage and support the development of CBOs. Such adverse political and community enablement does not facilitate establishing new nor developing existing CBOs, as is done in Bugna.

Donors

Donors have revisited their methods of providing development assistance. Central governments are no longer key channels of development assistance. They channel their assistance for local and community-based development through

Southern and Northern NGOs, as they want to reduce the state's role in the production and delivery of services (Enemuo, 2000; Riddell et al., 1995; Shah, 2005). According to Graham (N.D.b), however, Third World governments still insist on donors providing funds in different forms, such as project funding, capacity building and budget support, to the central and regional governments rather than providing NGOs with funds. Nielsen (2002) argues that encouraging and leveraging LGs through budget support and technical assistance is a decisive role that donors have to play to promote local governance and development. Graham (N.D.b) shared this view and stated that direct funding to LGs could create accountability for the delivery of services. He, however, maintained that putting funds in government hands at the expense of NGOs would be a mistake. Funding NGOs does not only facilitate service delivery to the local poor but also develops a vibrant civil society that can impact the larger socio-political arena.

This study makes it clear that bilateral and multilateral donor agencies have preferred to provide LGs and communities with financial, technical, and other capacity leverages rather than channelling them through NGOs. Donor agencies are of the opinion that most NGOs in Ethiopia have no established experience in undertaking integrated local development and that they are mostly characterized by competition instead of cooperation.

The ETDP/Irish Aid, GTZ, SNV, and SARDP/SIDA are bilateral development agencies, whereas UNICEF/WIBS, UNDP and WFP are multilateral agencies. They support one or more sectors of service development and capacity-building efforts through three different intervention modalities. The first is the provision of funds and other support through regional and zonal agencies. The second is the direct provision of financial, material and capacity-building support without being directly involved in planning and implementation. The third modality is direct support and intervention in planning and implementation. The UNDP, GTZ and WFP support LGs and communities through the first approach. Direct contact with LG officials and communities is limited to project evaluation processes carried out by a team of experts/consultants, which gives little opportunity for the development of a horizontal LGN at the local level. The WFP, however, promotes close relationships with *woreda* agriculture offices and communities through different capacity-building packages such as providing tools and training for experts and farmers. The ETDP/Irish Aid, SARDP and UNICEF/WIBS use the second intervention modality. They do, of course, appraise projects and closely follow up all processes at the *woreda* level through field representatives to ensure that community members and groups are encouraged and actively involved. They make community participation a mandatory requirement to secure funds, which is an important leverage and driver factor for local agencies to promote community-LG networks. However, a similar modality of intervention does not imply similar enabling roles for

these actors regarding the emergence and functioning of an LGN. This depends on the interest in and commitment to promoting and supporting network development. The ETDP/Irish Aid and SARDP have been credited for their efforts in promoting networks between sectors and communities. They provide multi-faceted capacity-building support for the development of participatory and cooperative development activities.

The SNV uses the third intervention modality, direct intervention in local development activities through a project office established at the *woreda* level. The SNV is known for its interest in and commitment to establishing networks at different levels to bring state and non-state actors together to fight deep-rooted poverty. The North Wollo Gender Forum, consisting of different state and non-state actors in the zone, is the result of an SNV initiative that shows its interest in and commitment to networking not only at the local level but also on a wider scale (SNV-BIRDP, 1999). It promotes networking not only among organized actors but also initiates and supports neighbourhood communities in forming interest-based groups to undertake development activities based on their own understanding and through their own means. *Woreda* and *kebele* leaders, sector experts, and communities have a special appreciation of the SNV's interest in, capacity for and efforts in establishing a better working environment through a network of relationships between different actors to promote local development.

In a nutshell, empirical evidence shows that donor agencies' support of LGs through any of the intervention modalities has contributed to service provision and development. Local leaders and experts take the view that direct relationships accompanied by close and frequent advisory, technical and other capacity-building support result in the creation of better enabling conditions. They feel that such an approach neither erodes their autonomy in decision-making nor leaves them alone to cope with capacity problems that can ultimately undermine development.

7.2.3 Number, diversity and quality of actors matter

While an LGN is ultimately a process of interactions and co-operations, it obviously involves and depends on organizational actors (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). It is quite obvious that an LGN is a new approach and discussions in the literature on this approach are mainly based on normative issues rather than on empirical evidence. As a result, discussions are characterized by generalizations rather than by specific features of each element of an LGN. Authors such as Malombe (2000), Cohen and Peterson (1997 and 1999), Leach and Percy-Smith (2001), Helmsing (2003), Gonzalez III et al. (2000) have argued that an LGN involves actors from multiple sectors (state, private, civil society and donors) that join together on the basis of their mutual interest in addressing local development problems. Indeed, such diversified actors' intervention is very crucial

for an LGN to emerge and function. This study has, however, found that not only diversity but also the number and quality of the actors involved matters if an LGN is to carry out socio-economically significant activities.

A large number of actors cannot guarantee more resources, but in principle they create better access to mobilize resources. Wukro *woreda* has the largest number of actors that have directly contributed to development efforts and it consequently emerged first from among all the case study *woredas* in its service development and delivery achievements. However, evidence also shows that merely a large number of actors would not ensure a better contribution, but that the quality of the actors matters. For example, in Degua Temben, REST alone supported far more hectares of SWC activities than five actors in Bugna.

As discussed in chapter six, quality refers to a number of identifiable variables related to an actor's roles in and contributions to an LGN's emergence and functioning. Intervention areas (sectors), the scale of contributions, the length of the intervention period, and interest in and capacity to promote joint action are among the important variables that have a significant impact on local service development and delivery outcomes. Actors vary not only in intervention areas, but also in the scale of their contributions to each sector. The length of the intervention period that an actor operates in a locality has an impact on the size of the contribution as well as on its role in all the socio-political processes. A relatively longer period of intervention in a given locality provides an actor with an opportunity to better understand the local social, political, and economic settings and to provide the development process with better inputs. The SNV's intervention in Bugna, which started in 1994, demonstrated the value of the intervention period. An SNV informant explained that the relatively long period of intervention provided the SNV with an opportunity to acquire the local knowledge necessary to better understand the multifaceted problems of local development. However, an important issue worth noting in this regard is that the longer a non-state actor remains in a locality, the more it may tend to grow into a monopoly and dominate LGs' ideas and decisions. This is more likely to happen if the actor is the most important source of support for local development. This is evident from Degua Temben *woreda* where REST has undertaken immense integrated rural development activities since 1991. While recognizing the tremendous contribution, *woreda* leaders and experts have a feeling that REST tends to dominate decision-making and impose its ideas rather than dialoguing and incorporating their ideas. Helmsing (2000) argues that not all network actors behave democratically and respond positively to collective preferences and priorities. Hence, LGs need to be cautious and prevent such undesirable manifestations.

It has been frequently stated that an LGN cuts across service boundaries and actors to generate synergetic relationships that will not, however, appear spontaneously. This requires the efforts and interest of all the actors involved.

However, not all actors have an equal interest in, commitment and capacity to facilitate and promote joint fora to discuss common objectives. In the previous chapters, analyses of different LGNs showed that not only is the capacity of the local leadership crucial, but that other actors at the *woreda* level are equally important. The analyses also revealed that most actors emphasize establishing sector-based networks in which they are involved, rather than equally supporting multi-purpose LGNs. Some actors, such as the SNV in Bugna, SARDP in Baso Liben and the *Seleste Mahberat* in Tigray *woredas*, have, however, demonstrated real interest in and exerted efforts by supporting the emergence and functioning of multi-purpose LGNs such as WDC/WDSC and T/KDC.

As noted above, the diversification of actors in terms of the organizational and social groups that they represent is also important to ensure multi-agency and cross-sector relationships, which lies at the heart of the LGN approach (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). *Woreda* officials and sector experts in Wukro and Bugna explained that the presence of multiple actors from multiple sectors (such as government, NGOs, CBOs, and donor agencies) is very important. These actors have created opportunities for better access to resources as well as for diversified organizational experience on how to facilitate and promote local development. However, informants have also remarked that while a large number of and diversified actors create opportunities, they also present challenges for the local leadership. Coordinating multiple actors with diversified organizational experience and interests is challenging because in some situations aversion and conflict prevail between actors instead of inclination and cooperation. Discussions and dialogues sometimes tend to be marred by actors asserting their organizational superiority regarding the subject matter, rather than by them sharing experiences with others and listening to their ideas. According to informants, it demands time, patience and tactful leadership to focus these discussions on generating complementary ideas and experiences.

7.3 Varieties of LGN

The flexibility that an LGN provides when organizing individuals, groups and organizations' efforts and resources to achieve common objectives could be one of the reasons why LGN increasingly attract attention in the development discourse. Assessments and analyses of LGN structures and functions in the case study *woredas* revealed that not all have the same structure and function. Broadly, they could be classified into vertical, horizontal, catalyst, planning and implementing, and hybrid types. The first two basically refer to the nature of relationships, while the last three refer to the principal functions that they carry out.

A vertical network basically represents intergovernmental relationships between the various levels of governments. This is not only crucial for classic organizational relations, but also for the emergence and functioning of horizontal

LGNs. It plays important roles in establishing the fundamental socio-economic and legal frameworks through which LGNs could be established between different actors. A vertical network also serves as a channel through which supra-local government agencies undertake regulatory and supervisory activities with different international, national, regional, and local actors engaged in LGNs. Moreover, a vertical network enables *woreda* governments and sector agencies to be formally and directly connected to the regional government and zonal administration. It is through this channel that *woreda* agencies receive financial, material, and human resource support that is necessary for the regular provision of services such as health, education and agriculture.

The horizontal LGNs, which include WDC/WDSC, T/KDC, CPC, WPAC, CHC, and different sector-based networks, are established between different actors without hierarchical relationships.

On the basis of their principal functions, horizontal networks could be classified into catalyst, planning and implementing, and hybrid types. A catalyst network consists of different state and non-state actors and is mainly involved in identifying local development priorities and problems, organizing dialogue and discussion fora, coordinating and supervising overall socio-economic and specific development activities carried out by different groups of networked actors within its jurisdiction. Networks that fall into this category include the WDC/WDSC and T/KDC at *woreda* and *tabia/kebele* levels respectively. As a network made up of diversified state and non-state actors, the WDC/WDSC plays the role of lynchpin, catalyser, arbitrator, and information disseminator between all the actors and networks that are engaged in undertaking local service development and deliveries. The WDC/WDSC's activities have created opportunities for cross-sectoral links, interactions, and discussions that could help to consolidate and integrate local development efforts.

Planning and implementing networks refer to those established between a particular sector office and other actors involved in supporting service development and delivery. Under the leadership of the relevant sector office, such a network is directly responsible for the planning and implementation of specific development programmes. Hybrid networks, on the other hand, refer to networks that are not limited to either a catalyst or planning and implementing function, but carry out both. Such networks are established between different actors to undertake facilitation, coordination and implementation functions. The CPC for ESRDF-supported projects, WPAC for ETDP/Irish, CHCs, and conservation committees are good examples of hybrid networks.

Although a network's complex nature suggests that it is hard to define a given network by means of a particular criterion, the objective (simple collaboration and information exchange vs. mobilization and management of resources), geographical coverage and/or scope (the geographical coverage and/or scope of the activity) and structure (vertical vs. horizontal) are among

the most important criteria used to classify networks (Haverkort et al., 1993; Starkey, 1998). From among the various types of networks previously discussed, vertical and horizontal networks meet the structure criterion. A vertical network refers to a network that links actors from different levels by means of hierarchical relationships. In this kind of network, the relationship between actors is governed by policies, rules and procedures rather than by trust.

A network that brings different sectors of actors (state, civil society, donors, and private) of different origins (international, national, regional, and local) together to join and interact at the local level with no hierarchical and command relationship is called a horizontal network (Goss, 2001; Marcussen and Torfing, 2003). In a horizontal network, the nature of the relationships establishes matters rather than the actors' organizational location. At one end, horizontal network actors are interdependent, but almost autonomous at the other end. The two extremes describe the nature of the relationships between actors in the governance network with the first indicating the need for mutual interaction and shared objectives. The second indicates that each actor's existence as an independent entity can never be diluted due to its membership.

Catalyst, planning and implementing as well as hybrid networks are defined purely on the basis of a network's principal functions rather than on its structural relationships. It is an important criterion that helps to classify diversified networks that are engaged in undertaking different activities in local development. However, this type of network is not well captured in the exiting literature. The functional criterion focuses on identifying the principal activities of a network and its members in local development processes. This classification helps to identify what the processes are and who does what in carrying out specific activities to achieve the desired results. This clearly suggests that empirical researchers have to closely scrutinize this classification to examine the division of labour between network members as well as between different networks while they work towards the joint objective of promoting local development.

Evidence shows that not all actors play similar roles or have similar interest in and commitment to different types of LGN. In spite of differences in their success, *woreda* and *tabia/kebele* leaderships remain central in all types of LGN in general and in catalyst networks in particular, as they are responsible for facilitating and coordinating all socio-economic processes at the respective levels. Sector offices place more emphasis on planning and implementing networks, since they receive resources for service development and delivery directly though these networks, while simultaneously being responsible for facilitating their activities. Likewise, most non-state actors focus on sectoral networks, since their funds and support go directly to specific sector(s). Most of these actors see their participation in catalyst networks such as WDC/WDSC as a secondary activity, while in practice it is the most important LGN on which sector-based/planning and implementing, and hybrid networks depend. It is

through this network that multiple actors representing diversified sectors of society interact and exchange ideas and information. Hence, little emphasis on this LGN would amount to undermining other networks under its direct supervision.

While the roles of non-state actors in catalyst, planning and implementing, as well as those of hybrid networks are admittedly crucial, evidence shows that the different types of networks' success largely depends on local leaderships' legitimacy, capacity, experiences (continuity) and commitment. For example, the capacity of the *woreda* administration to attract, facilitate and coordinate non-state actors by means of the WDC/WDSC to participate in different sectors, affect planning and implementing, as well as hybrid networks' success. In addition, community participation is found to be a crucial element of horizontal LGNs whose interest and commitment depend on the local and supra-local political leaderships' legitimacy as well as on the presence of core organized groups such as the *Seleste Mahberat* in Tigray.

7.4 LGN and Service Development: Looking at the Promises

Broader conceptualisation of decentralization beyond the public realm as well as funding and donor agencies' subsequent pressure on Third World governments are motivated by different objectives, which, among others, include: promoting the democratisation of the local level government, narrowing down the public-private divide in service production and delivery, promoting popular participation in public decision-making, and leveraging government's limited capacity through multiple actors' involvement (Helmsing, 2000; OECD, 2001; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004). It is argued that the government should be motivated to actively involve multiple actors in decision-making, since they not only share authority but also the economic and social burdens that hamper service development and delivery to the people. In fact, the very logic of an LGN lies in the idea of enabling others to make decisions that will generate alternative ways of addressing societies' social, economic and political problems (Helmsing, 2000). As a result, there has been a shift in attitude and practice towards local service development and delivery. Until recently, services such as safe drinking water, health, sanitation, and education were considered the responsibility of the government (HAP, 2001). In the context of an LGN, however, the government is considered one of the actors rather than the only actor engaged in local service development and delivery (Helmsing, 2001).

Despite the growing discussion about LGNs' value with regard to local development, this has not yet been sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. The assessment and analyses of selected local service development and deliveries in this study show that both state and non-state actors are directly and indirectly involved in producing and providing these services through a network of relationships established at *woreda* and sub-*woreda* levels. State actors, ranging

from federal agencies to LGs, have participated in LGN processes and activities in one or more ways. CBOs, NGOs, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, and the local people are among non-state actors that participate in LGNs. This network of relationships has created opportunities for LGs to have access to different experiences, management systems and human, financial, technical, information and material resources.

However, differences among case study *woredas* in attracting and involving multiple actors have caused a difference in opportunities and access to different resources. As a result, they have achieved a different level of achievement in improving and providing drinking water, primary health care, and environmental rehabilitation (see chapter five). This clearly demonstrates LGNs' role in improving local service development and deliveries. The LGN approach does not only reduce the government's burdens and responsibilities but also creates alternative avenues for delivering local services.

The empirical findings of this study suggest that an LGN's vital role in countries like Ethiopia where LG agencies are very resource constrained. Moreover, the market mechanism, particularly in rural areas, cannot emerge as an alternative provider of basic services because of the poor local economic base for investment in and producing of services, poverty that prevents the local people from buying services at market prices, and the government's inability to create effective market enablement in terms of investment in infrastructure and operational activities (decision-making and bureaucratic procedures).

Hence, to improve moribund local services to all citizens in general and to the fast-growing rural population in particular, Third World governments need to invest their time in and exert efforts to establish an enabling environment for the emergence and functioning of LGNs that will promote and facilitate the participation of every citizen and that of different organized actors with different capacities, resources and experiences.

7.5 'Demand' and 'Supply' Sides of LGN: Examining the Balance Sheet

Broadly speaking, LGNs' complex processes and activities relate to two dimensions: the demand and supply sides. The demand side of an LGN refers to interest representation and articulation of preferences in relation to policy and plan formulation processes to improve local development. It also refers to the mechanisms through which the different actors (LG, CBOs, NGOs, local interest groups and individuals, and donor agencies) relate to and participate therein. The supply side concerns state and non-state actors' involvement in producing and delivering public services through collective action (network) or private means. It opens the way for multiple actors' involvement in resource

mobilization for the production and delivery of public services (Cohen and Peterson, 1997; Helmsing, 2000, 2005; UNDP, 1996).

However, the effective manifestation of the two sides of an LGN requires effective market, political, and community enablement, while most Third World governments lack the necessary capacity and/or commitment. Nevertheless, because of the changing nature of governance, donors' pressure and growing resource constraints, central and regional governments are increasingly opening up their service production and delivery domain to LGs, people, CBOs, NGOs, and donor agencies. Governments are encouraging community-based initiatives and the interventions of different development agencies at the local level to leverage local service development and provision (OECD, 2001).

Empirical evidence from Amhara and Tigray Regions shows that LGs have been given responsibilities to produce and deliver services to the local people. They have to mobilize resources from the local people and other actors to meet growing service demands. Central and regional governments are pushing NGOs and other non-state state actors towards the local level to engage in basic service production and delivery (NORAD, 2005). The examination and analyses of the supply side of LGNs in the three selected services show that different actors (central and regional agencies, NGOs, CBOs, and donor agencies) are engaged in supporting LGs and communities. These actors are providing material, financial, technical as well as capacity-building support. However, the total contribution to the production and delivery of the above services varies among *woredas*, depending on the *woreda* leadership's capacity to attract and actively involve a number of state and non-state actors and communities.

Those *woredas* that have managed to attract and involve relatively large numbers of as well as diversified actors have achieved better in the development and delivery of services. This implies that the difference in ability to attract and involve non-state actors is becoming a new source of inter-*woreda* inequalities in service development and delivery. In Tigray Region, Wukro *woreda* is a good example, while Degua Temben represents the weak side in this regard. Although interest-based and active community participation remains the common challenge in Amhara; Bugna has attracted more actors than Baso Liben, which contributed to its better achievement. Generally, service development and delivery in the case study *woredas* have clearly revealed that different actors are involved in different ways in LGNs' supply side for local development (see chapter five).

Evidence on the demand side of local governance, which involves the participation and representation of all stakeholders in specific and broad decision-making processes, shows mixed results. Regardless of the differences in effectiveness among the case studies, LGs, people and non-state actors that operate directly at the *woreda* level have been participating in important decisions such as the allocation and utilization of resources generated through LGNs. Actors

that are engaged in LGNs to directly undertake local development activities participate in need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, and monitoring processes. These actors play important roles in motivating local people to actively and directly participate in the processes. However, non-state actors have no influence on public sector financed projects and medium- and long-term development plans. Regional officials stated that LGs and people participate in the formulation and development of a Five Year Plan. Local officials and people, however, stated that their participation is limited to information generation and has little influence on the final output. According to experts, not only is their involvement in broad development plans limited, but also their involvement in specific local-government-financed projects. They are limited to listing priorities and needs for budgeting to be prepared at zonal and regional levels.

Another important element of the demand side of LGNs is the involvement of all the concerned development actors in policy dialogue and advocacy. Improvement in governance can be achieved if public-policy-making institutions and structures work with other actors involved in implementing policies and programmes at the local level. However, in most African countries, policy-making institutions are mostly concentrated at the top (central) level and, hence, policies lack inputs from LGs, the people and other stakeholders (Olowu, 2002a). Bratton (1994) also explains that policy dialogue and formulation in most African countries lack the input of local service producers and consumers who have the most relevant information and the greatest stake.

NGOs and other non-state actors in the case study *woredas* reported that there are signs of improvement at central and regional levels regarding creating opportunities for policy dialogues. The participation of different stakeholders at local, regional and central levels in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is repeatedly stated as one of the most important steps in involving multiple actors in a broad policy dialogue that affects the strategies and activities of all actors involved in development. According to Negassa (2005), the PRSP dialogue forum contributed much to addressing important socio-economic and political issues that are closely related to good governance and poverty reduction efforts. Another important instance of policy dialogue is the participation of NGOs in draft legislation that will govern their legal status and operation. Moreover, regional bureaus in Amhara and Tigray have started organizing dialogue fora on sector-specific issues that involve different actors, which NGOs and other non-state actors consider a positive move. However, it has to be noted that all the above initiatives are very embryonic (EU and MoCB, 2004).

Most non-state actor respondents stated that although the above experiences are signs of hope, the government's interest in and commitment to opening up the doors for policy dialogue is still scanty. According to informants, the

above dialogue fora were organized due to the pressure and requirements of donor and lending agencies such as the EU, World Bank and IMF. The views of development associations in Amhara and Tigray Regions differ from those of other NGOs and donor agencies. Informants from TDA and ADA explained that they not only have sufficient space in service development and delivery but also in regional policy dialogue. REST shares development associations' views. However, other non-state actors claim that development associations and REST have this access and space because they were created by and are related to the political system. The EU and MoCB (2004) share these claims, and stated that regional development associations' excellent relationship is due to their close link to the political system. In fact, Graham (N.D.b) questions their independence and whether they should fall in the category of a vibrant civil society.

Based on an analysis of information from various sources, the major factors that affect non-state actors' policy and advocacy roles fall into the three following categories. The problems are attributed to both state and non-state actors rather than to the state alone.

Deficient political pluralism

According to Hyden and Court (2002), the political space given to sub-national levels of government and non-state actors to participate in policy dialogue and formulation depends on how a political system is organized regarding facilitating and controlling the making of public policy. The aggregation of different actors' ideas and interests into a specific policy proposal depends on the political system's pluralist and competitive nature. However, political pluralism and multiparty democracy require a certain political history (Smith, 2003). Until 1991, political pluralism and competition or opposition had never been on the agendas of any of Ethiopia's governments. Both the Imperial and *Derg* regimes established a total hegemony with any opposition being defined and treated as illegal. Such processes left little or no experience of a tolerant and pluralist political culture (Merera, 2002). The 1991 political change introduced a multiparty system for the first time in the country's history. However, the political processes since then have not reflected pluralism in any real sense. The EPRDF claims to have won all the elections conducted up to 2000. Smith (2003) argues that legal provisions for a multiparty system and regular elections hardly promote pluralist and democratic governance unless they provide real political space for the development of oppositions and free competition.

Merera (2002) and Pausewang et al. (2002a) argue that the elections have been used as instruments to legitimise the dominance of the EPRDF instead of creating opportunities for opposition parties to freely compete and share power. Pausewang et al. (2002b:31), for example, stated that '[…] election results [1992 *woreda* election] were declared invalid on formal grounds and the

elections were repeated, in some places up to three times, until the EPRDF candidates were installed.' As a result, the EPRDF emerged as the only policy formulator. According to Aalen (2002a), even in the context of a dominant party system, the central executive (Council of Ministers), led by the EPRDF, has been the most important policy actor. She further stated that the EPRDF adopted a centralized policy-making system in which regional states have little influence on federal policies. Abbink as cited by Aalen (2002:60) stated that '[…] the states do not have any role in debating the policies and in proposing legislation formulated at federal level.' Heads of regional sector bureaus have confirmed that they have little or no influence on policies issued by the federal government.

According to the EU and MoCB (2004), in principle, the central government recognizes the roles of civil society actors in policy making and advocacy as a means of promoting democratic governance. Practically, however, the roles of NGOs and other civil society actors are very limited with regard to these issues. They have not been granted the right to advocate and lobby on behalf of client groups or voiceless citizens. Non-state actors that attempt to engage in policy and political matters run the risk of incurring the government's fury. In fact, the chance to lobby is limited as parliamentary seats and cabinet positions are predominantly occupied by the one-party EPRDF.

Non-state actors' interest, commitment and capacity to take up policy and advocacy issues

The belief that non-state actors could play crucial roles in policy and advocacy not only depends on governments' whims, but also on these actors' interest, commitment and capacity. Donor agencies like the World Bank and IMF have shown vested interest in policy issues and have been working with the government since the establishment of the TGE in 1991 so as to influence the macro ideological context. Most bilateral and multilateral agencies at *woreda* level, however, focus on empowering LGs and communities through resource allocation and capacity building that will enable them to identify, plan, implement, and monitor their own development programmes. Advocacy and support for gender equality and participatory development are important components of community empowerment.

As mentioned earlier, regional development associations and REST claim that they participate in regional policy matters, but to what extent this is done independently and how their ideas differ from those of the government is still the subject of debate. Most NGOs focus on service development and delivery. In terms of advocacy, they are involved in activities such as children's rights, gender equality, combating traditional harmful practices, but show little interest in, commitment and capacity to engage in politically sensitive advocacy and policy issues. In fact, in the course of interviews, it became obvious that most

NGO respondents wish to emphasise that they are non-political development actors, which obviously contradicts their objective of empowerment that has social and political dimensions. The findings of this study reinforce the criticism that NGOs focus too much on service delivery and too little on policy advocacy and change (Helmsing, 2005:34). Development in Practice (1991) argues that if NGOs focus on the production and delivery of basic services to justify the relevance of their programmes regardless of the political context, they are, in fact, enabling governments to shift resources from service delivery and invest more in mechanisms to suppress civilian populations and abuse human rights.

Generally, NGOs' interest in and commitment to policy and advocacy is low, which Graham (N.D.a) explains as NGOs in Ethiopia not wishing to take up issues that are politically sensitive at local and national levels. Kassahun (2002:126) also states that 'if advocacy is to be understood as trying to change policies that negatively impinge on the well being of target groups, NGOs in Ethiopia have not made positive contributions.' Non-state actors in Ethiopia not only lack interest in and commitment to, but also the capacity and skill to lobby, to provide advocacy and policy analysis and dialogue. Only recently have some professional associations, such as the Ethiopian Economics Professional Association and an independent research organization called the Forum for Social Studies, started policy research and dialogues (Dessalegn, 2002; EU and MoCB, 2004).

It would be unfair not to mention the challenges that NGOs and other civil society actors could face from the government if they were to actively become involved in advocacy to challenge policy. Addressing politically sensitive issues is a risky business for civil society actors (Qulman, 2000). According to NGO informants, although they take a politically distanced position, the government is still very suspicious of their activities. Most NGO informants seem to share Turner and Hulme's (1997) argument that in most African countries, NGOs involved in government policy are treated as adversaries and face serious actions that range from harassment to liquidations. In fact, the EU and MoCB (2004) stated that two civil society organizations were recently suspended by the government. According to them, although the government claims that the suspensions were due to 'technical issues', i.e. failure to report to the Ministry of Justice as the law dictates, the facts show that the government questioned their right to take a public stance on key political and policy issues.

Lack of network among civil society actors

Effective policy advocacy and lobbying requires a co-coordinated voice, since government cannot be easily pressurized and challenged by disorganized efforts. Hence, civil society actors need to establish networks among themselves that will give them an opportunity to voice their opinion strongly and loudly. In

this study, however, it is revealed that NGOs have little interest in networking among themselves. There are no strong networks that are independent of government actors at either the local or regional level. All NGO informants recognized the importance of establishing a network among themselves; however, a sense of mistrust and competition instead of cooperation has affected their capacity to unite. Not only NGO representatives, but also central and regional government officials have recognized their inability to network and provide an effective and coherent voice for government to listen to and then make the changes deemed necessary (EU and MoCB, 2004).

An examination and analysis of an LGN's demand and supply side activities in the case study *woredas* generally revealed that in spite of differences among *woredas*, different actors with different resources and contributions have come together on the supply side to produce and provide local services. On the demand side, LGs and non-state agencies' participation in need identification, the prioritisation, planning, implementation and monitoring of local service development projects, supported by LG partners, is encouraging. Although improving, the political space government has provided and the roles different non-state actors have assumed in the policy and advocacy arena indicate that much needs to be done on both sides. The lack of pluralism in the policy arena forces all actors to operate within the government and the government alone generates policies rather than identifying and suggesting locally relevant policy options. The government should involve LGs, non-state actors and people both on the supply and demand sides, i.e. it should not only open up its service production and provision functions, but also its policy-making and public sector investment processes.

7.6 Managing and Coordinating LGN: A Search beyond the Weberian Approach

An LGN involves complex processes and organizational systems that require the systemic coordination and management of public affairs, both horizontally and vertically (Helmsing, 2000; Kickert and Koppenjan, 1997). The government plays key roles in managing and coordinating LGNs, but these differ from the mechanisms suggested by the Weberian model of bureaucracy.

Weber introduced what he calls the 'ideal model of bureaucracy', which is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency while exercising the most rational and legal authority. He developed propositions regarding the division of labour, subordination, hierarchical structure and control to ensure efficiency. He focused on rigid and formal institutional rules, laws, and procedures that everyone in an administrative set-up has to adhere to, thus guaranteeing consistency, legality and equality for all citizens. Weber finds the method of getting public business done more important than the end result, which could be af-

fected by a multitude of society's dynamic factors (Awortwi, 2003; Lane, 1995, 2000).

Obviously, resource allocation in the public's interest can hardly avoid bureaucratic structures that represent the sovereign state at various levels of government (Kettl, 2000). In fact, in LGNs, bureaucratic structures are not only unavoidable, but also constitute important elements through which governments at different levels steer and regulate their establishment and functioning. Nevertheless, the literature shows that the Weberian model as it stands has critical limitations regarding the coordination and management of dynamic processes (Awortwi, 2003; Lane, 1995, 2000). These problems have been recognized by academicians and donor agencies as well as by governments. Kettle (2000:5) remarks that: 'Government managers and elected officials alike have complained that standard bureaucratic procedures frequently handicap their government's ability to respond effectively to global challenges.' The following are the major limitations of the Weberian model when compared to the LGN approach of managing and coordinating public affairs.

Firstly, Weber assumed that only government could deliver public services with bureaucracy being technically capable of this as well as the most efficient instrument, albeit with limited resources (Awortwi, 2003). In the Weberian approach, public service production and delivery's demand and supply sides are determined by the public sector alone. Government formulates policies, identifies needs and priorities, and, via administrative laws and budget appropriation, instructs bureaux and public enterprises to produce and deliver public goods and services (Lane, 1995). Weber's assumptions do not match the LGN approach, because they hamper public managers and officials' strategic and innovative thinking regarding seeking alternative ways of achieving public goals (Awortwi, 2003). Societal problems are increasing both in magnitude and complexity, calling for interdependency and interactions between public agencies and other organizations in order to produce well-functioning public programmes (Lane, 1995). The major driving force within LGNs is public programmes that are initiated through interactions between state and non-state actors and aim at jointly implementing initiated programmes. Hence, LG officials and managers need to look beyond the public realm and establish different types of LGN structures to coordinate all of various actors' efforts and resources towards producing and delivering public services. Moreover, the LGN approach is not limited to the supply side, but also serves the demand side of governance that could be articulated by various actors as it includes the political, social and economic rights of citizens.

Second, Weber's model seems to assume a static situation with objectives and goals remaining unchanged so that adherence to routine as well as rigid rules and procedures is possible (Awortwi, 2003; Lane, 1995). An LGN, characterized by flexible interactions between interdependent but autonomous multi-

ple actors, could hardly be promoted by a model that insists on a slavish devotion to mechanistic and inflexible rules and procedures (Lane, 1995). An LGN focuses on the logic of collective action in managing and coordinating local development efforts through pluralist approaches (Bennett and Kerbs, 1994; Cohen and Peterson, 1997; Kickert et al., 1997). Decisions are mainly made and executed on the bases of negotiated and mutually agreed upon principles and guidelines rather than through hierarchical and command-driven rules and procedures. However, this study has identified that hierarchical, bureaucratic supervision does not lie outside LGNs' domain. Government, which is still the legitimate authority coordinating the public sector, provides basic rules that actors need to observe. It also monitors LGNs' processes and outcomes to ensure the proper utilization of resources and means in order to meet pubic objectives. Nevertheless, unlike in the Weberian model, this type of regulatory authority does not imply absolute control, because no LGN actor completely relinquishes its organizational autonomy that gives it the potential right to react differently. Hence, in the sense that the direct command relationship is not applied, oversight or inspection is at arm's length (Stoker, 2004).

The weakness of the Weberian bureaucratic, command-driven coordinating mechanism is clearly exemplified at the *kebele* level in the Amhara Region. Community participation is mostly carried out by *kebele* administrations on the basis of their formal authority rather than through negotiation and the articulation of interest. This approach has not led to the local people's active and voluntary participation, which has affected their contributions to the emergence and functioning of LGNs for sustainable local development.

Unlike the Weberian model of bureaucracy, negotiation, trust and reciprocity are important LGN coordinating mechanisms. Each LGN actor has its own resource(s) to contribute and, to a certain extent, it needs to trade resources for influence in order to promote its specific interests. Hence, managing and coordinating complex relationships require a focus on establishing more effective integration, cooperation, and collaboration between actors operating together, while maintaining their autonomy (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). This suggests that an LGN faces many risks, unless (a) network coordinator(s) provide(s) effective coordination and guidance. The absence of rigid bureaucratic control and self-centred competition do not imply that an LGN is free from conflict. Stoker (2004) argues that interaction between multiple actors from multiple sectors that all have their own interests and agenda clearly suggests that an LGN is susceptible to conflict. This study has also identified conflicts between LGN actors. Non-state actors tend to compete for intervention *tabias/kebeles,* which sometimes instigates conflict. For successful LGN coordination and management, leaders need to develop cooperative and conversant characteristics and skills in order to maintain their position as legitimate LGN leaders. They have to develop the ability to understand LGN processes and manage

them accordingly. However, also the organizational structures in the local governance system have to reflect LGNs' flexible nature, as an LGN cannot function in a traditional LG structure (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001).

In chapter five, the discussions and analyses of LGNs with regard to the three selected services showed that *woreda* governments have established different decision-making and coordinating mechanisms that differ from the LG system's traditional and constitutionally defined structures. In spite of differences in the effectiveness of coordination that are due to differences in the leadership capacity and political and community enablement, the WDC/WDSC and T/KDC are good examples of multi-actor LGN structures. Moreover, sector-based networks established between sector offices and other actors are governed by negotiation and trust rather than by bureaucratic rules and procedures.

7.7 LGN: A New Opportunity or a Challenge for LGs?

'Globalisation' and 'localization' are prominent features of the current economic development debate. While the two concepts seem to contradict each other in the sense that emphasis on one could undermine the other, they interact in a paradoxical way. As the economy has become increasingly globalized, the local dimension of economic development has attracted growing interest from both scholars and policy makers. This is due to localities and regions having emerged as the day-to-day playing grounds in which the pressures of economic change have to be negotiated, no matter how global these pressures may originally be (Morgan et al., 1999). The LGN approach to local development is part of this broader change (Helmsing, 2003). The LGN approach is not a magic bullet for local development problems. The involvement of multiple actors from multiple sectors of society in local development efforts creates opportunities as well as a new set of challenges with which local leaders may not be acquainted.

Challenges

Although LGs' burdens regarding developmental responsibilities are shared by LGNs' multiple actors, LGs are expected to play a more strategic role. *Woreda* officials and sector experts explained that in the face of limited capacity, managing and coordinating LGNs is very challenging. An informant from Wukro Agriculture Office explained that negotiating and dealing with different actors require capacity and patience, because each actor wants to incorporate what it thinks best rather than being equally considerate of others' interests and of institutional requirements. Justifying and explaining decisions to these actors demand much time and patience. Different actors' interventions are mainly based on interest and voluntarism, thus making LGN management and coordination more demanding and requiring more tact, as neither the WA nor sector offices

can apply a traditional bureaucratic approach. An official in Baso Liben stated that where *Woreda* authorities are struggling to coordinate routine government activities because of the frequent turnover of leadership and the uneasy relationship between political leaders and sector experts, coordinating and managing LGN activities are a true challenge for the WA.

The literature also recognizes that an LGN involves a complex set of relationships between actors at the local level whose relationships are interwoven (Leach and Pierre, 2001; Stoker, 2004). Morgan et al. (1999) also stated that the network approach seems deceptively simple in principle, but practically it is profoundly demanding. LGs have to 'steer' and 'enable' other actors to become actively involved in the LGN process. This increases the number and complexity of their tasks and responsibilities because steering is strategic, thus involving difficult activities that differ from traditional routines. 'Enabling' likewise refers to broader role. LGs need to use persuasion more than they did in the past as well as negotiation skills and diplomacy. They further have to accommodate more actors' interests from both inside and outside government, have to build coalitions of interests and lead rather than direct (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Since an LGN presupposes interdependence and mutual interests, LGs have to promote and engage in dialogue with various actors in order to facilitate information and experience sharing, the pooling of resources and the design of joint solutions to local development problems.

The success of LGs in undertaking complex tasks depends, among other things, on leadership. Leadership is in turn a function of different factors, which include supra-local and local political power relations, state-society relations/legitimacy; and leaders' capacity, motivation and values. These factors can be grouped into: contextual, institutional, and personal factors (Haus et al., 2005; Jacob, 1997; Singh et al., 1971; van Ufford, 1987). Contextual factors refer to the larger socio-political environment in which leadership is exercised. State-society relations are important elements of contextual factors, determining local leadership's legitimacy. The discussions under section 7.2.1 showed that local and supra-local political contexts either reinforce or undermine the legitimacy on which local leaders' capacity to mobilize and communities' interest in active and voluntary participation in local affairs depends.

Institutional factors deal with multiple factors such as decision-making power regarding organizational resources, access to supra-local political power and exercising representative functions (Haus and Heinelt, 2005). Although there is no difference among *woredas* regarding government financial and personnel decision-making power, there is a difference in access to supra-local political power and in exercising representative functions. *Woreda* leaders in Tigray confidently assert that they are the primary representatives of the local people and that their access to the political decision-making structure at any level in the region is not limited. Political leaders at different levels have therefore estab-

lished a collective identity. Amhara *woredas* lack this important asset. According to local officials, access to zonal and regional political structures is mainly channelled through appointed cadres rather than elected officials. In terms of their representativeness, the people as well as elected officials have their reservations. According to elected *woreda* officials in Baso Liben, their decision-making power and representative functions are nominal, because appointed cadres and higher level political officials have the most influence.

Leadership's personal factors refer to leaders' capacity, motivation and relationships with their followers (both within an organization and community wide) through their formal and institutional roles within the political processes (Haus and Heinelt, 2005; Jacob, 1997). Evidence from case studies shows that *woredas* operating in the same regional context (political and community enablement) differ in promoting LGN processes for local development activities due to differences in leadership capacity. For example, his colleagues as well as the local staff, *tabia* and *kushet* leaders, non-state actor representatives, and the community admire the *Woreda* administrator in Wukro for his capacity and motivation regarding the establishment of good relationships and the promotion of common objectives. In spite of ample political and community enablement, the *woreda* government in Degua Temben has not attracted many and/or diversified actors due to the *Woreda* leaders' limited capacity to actively seek partnerships. In the case of the Amhara *woredas*, Bugna has benefited from leaders who are committed to promoting and defending local interests through their joint efforts. However, the uneasy relations between the local and supra-local political structures have affected their motivation and commitment and have even sometime led to leaders being victimized. For example, in Bugna, the *Woreda* administrator was removed from his position after a few months because he challenged zonal officials' unfair attempts to divert Plan International's intervention from Bugna to another *woreda*.

A political system's legitimacy is another factor that influences local leaders' success. Supra-local and local political forces shape and influence the nature of the relationships that local leaders establish with communities. Leaders may have adequate capacity and motivation, but if they represent a political leadership that suffers from a lack of legitimacy, they cannot secure popular support, which is one of the most important sources of resources that an LG has at its disposal.

Opportunities

An LGN presents LGs with new and complex tasks, but it also reveals new mechanisms for addressing increasing and complex local development problems through the involvement of diversified actors (Morgan et al., 1999; Stoker, 2004). An LGN provides alternative structures and ways of working that differ from a hierarchical and bureaucratic structure. It links LGs and the people with

multi-level (international, national and regional) and multi-sector (state, NGOs, CBOs, and donors) organizations. These actors' interventions create opportunities for LGs to access and mobilize resources to improve services and meet the increasing demand. An LGN also creates opportunities for learning from the actors' ideas, experiences and practices (Karl, 1999c; Starkey, 1998).

Although there are differences between *woredas,* LGNs have, among others, improved: resource mobilization, service development and delivery, and learning and communication. Different actors' interventions for the purpose of supporting service development and delivery efforts have also improved access to and equity regarding service distribution. According to *woreda* officials and experts, some localities (*kebeles/tabias*) that had no access to or would not have had access to services such as primary health care facilities and safe drinking water within the foreseeable future, have these due to different actors' intervention through multi-purpose and sector-based LGNs.

According to *woreda* officials and experts, capacity-building packages that include training, workshops; provision of equipment, vehicles, tools and furniture have been provided by LGN actors. Non-state actors' involvement in local development processes has also created an opportunity for community participation in need identification, prioritisation, planning and implementation processes. This is very important for promoting state-society synergy, particularly in localities where the state-society relationship has been strained.

7.8 Final Observations

The LGN approach is a recent phenomenon in the local development debate that has, since the 1990s, become popular as part of the global public sector reform in general and of Third World governments in particular. However, the conceptualisation of the LGN approach is dominated by propositions and deductions that lack an empirical background. In this chapter, reflections on local governance theories vis-à-vis empirical findings from the case studies showed that LGN concepts and principles tend to be more generalized in describing important elements and processes. Based on the existing literature and the empirical findings, the following key observations were made:

Firstly, government enablement is crucial for an LGN. The LGN approach is primarily built on the principle of multiple actors from multiple sectors such as the state, communities and their organizations (CBOs), NGOs, and donor agencies. Evidence shows that the success and dividends that emanate from an LGN depend on various contextual factors that include: a trust-based political history and process, the existence of community-based core groups (CBOs) and embryonic participatory structures, established experience in undertaking local development responsibility; and a legitimate, stable and capable LG leadership.

Secondly, actors are crucial for LGNs to succeed. In this regard, discussions in the literature focus on a state and non-state dichotomy that aggregates and hides different levels of government and different types of non-state actors' roles. In fact, discussions about state actors in the establishment and functioning of LGNs usually focus on LGs and their agencies. Evidence shows that supra-local government agencies also play different but interdependent roles without which LGNs cannot be established. However, empirical evidence also reveals that not all levels of government are equally interested in and committed to LGNs. In spite of the differences between the case studies, LGs are revealed as having an interest in and commitment to LGNs. Similar to state actors, non-state actors also do not all play one and the same role. An important issue in discussing different non-state actors in LGNs is the modality of the intervention that they adopt in supporting local development. In localities where there are strong CBOs (like in Tigray), they are directly involved in local development processes and serve as links between the community and state and between the community and non-state actors. The evidence further shows that most NGOs are directly involved in the planning and implementing of local development projects, while most donor agencies provide financial, material and capacity-building support through sector-specific and related projects. NGOs are criticized for capitalizing on their expertise and thus influencing decision-making that ultimately undermines LGs' autonomy. However, these LGs complaints scarcely provide sufficient grounds for recommending these actors' withdrawal from project planning and implementation because LGs have neither sufficient capacity nor other learning mechanisms to ensure proper implementation of development projects. Donor agencies' maintained distance from planning and implementation should be complemented by practical technical support and advisory services to ensure proper resource utilization. Generally, the decision regarding which modality is more enabling is sandwiched between the need for autonomy and capacity problems that suggests LGs have to compromise and first focus on learning and building their capacity.

Thirdly, not all LGNs have a similar structure and functions, nor do the various actors have the same interest and role in the various types of LGNs. Supra-local governments mostly have an interest in and focus on intergovernmental relations when establishing the LGN framework and regulating its processes and activities. Because of limited LG capacity, however, regional and sub-regional agencies are also involved in providing horizontal networks at the local level with technical and managerial support. LGs serve as a meeting point where actors from different (international, national, regional and local) levels interact through horizontal networks to produce and deliver services. Most non-state actors have a strong role in horizontal networks at the local level and most emphasize sector-based/planning and implementing, and hybrid networks. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that sector-based networks' success and

the opportunity for the wider exchange of information, ideas, and learning between various actors depend on a broad-based or multi-purpose catalyst/facilitator network's strength.

Fourthly, an LGN is a new way of governing society and its development, which calls on all concerned actors to be involved in the demand and supply sides. Indeed, it could be concluded that governments are opening up local service production and delivery to LGs, communities, CBOs, NGOs, and donor agencies, with the latter responding in various ways. However, the literature, reinforced by the empirical evidence from this study, shows that Third World governments in general and African countries in particular are not yet convinced of and committed to actively involving these actors in the policy arena. This could affect LGNs' success regarding making broader changes in local governance and development.

Fifthly, LGNs' roles in promoting local service development and delivery have changed from normative enthusiasm to pragmatic importance. Empirical evidence from the case studies shows that the LGN approach is important in addressing deteriorating local services to most poor people when the government is incapable of providing basic services and the chances of a market-based delivery are limited. However, an LGN is not a magic bullet that solves all local development problems. Its success depends on various factors such as: regional and local political and community enablement; LG leadership legitimacy, continuity and capacity; the number, diversity and quality of the actors involved; and community interest in and commitment to voluntary participation in the establishment and functioning of an LGN.

Sixthly, theoretical insights and empirical evidence show that LGNs do not only imply a new set of opportunities for local authorities, but also challenges. LGNs promote learning and communication, participation, resource mobilization, and synergetic readerships for local development, among others. However, capacity problems prevent LGs from taking advantage of these opportunities. To tap and maximize the opportunities created, LGs need to establish structures that involve multiple actors from multiple sectors. They need to introduce coordination and management systems that differ from traditional bureaucratic systems. Primarily, LGs have to promote a collaborative approach in local decision making that is built on mutual trust, interdependency and shared objectives. These require a new insight and new calibre of LG leadership.

Notes

1. Includes the traditional, business and educated elites.
2. NGO respondents explained that although national guideline had been issued in 1995, the principal law that governs NGOs and other civil society actors' registration and activities dates back to 1966.

3. Established by the TPLF during the liberation movement and still an important channel of communication, broadcasting different political, social and economic programmes to the people of Tigray.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Map of Ethiopia showing study Regions



Source: ANRS, BoFED, December 2004.

Appendix 2 Map of Tigray Region showing case study *Woredas*



Source: TNRS, Health Bureau, November 2004.

Appendix 3 Map of Amhara Region showing case study *Woredas*



Source: ANRS, BoFED, December 2004.

Appendix 4

Changes in the number of primary and secondary schools and gross enrolment ratios for Tigray and Amhara Regions (1995-2001)

Year	Tigray				Amhara			
	Primary		Secondary		Primary		Secondary	
	No. of schools	Enrolment ratios	No. of schools	Enrolment ratios	No. of schools	Enrolment ratios	No. of schools	Enrolment ratios
1995*	582	40.7	21	5.2	2503	24.8	75	5.7
1996*	721	46.8	21	5.6	2580	25.0	76	6.5
1997*	753	47.0	23	5.8	2658	28.0	77	5.9
1998	790	56.1	23	8.8	2760	34.6	81	8.5
1999	811	58.4	26	11.8	2819	40.4	81	9.5
2000	852	63.5	31	18.7	2895	46.8	81	10.3
2001	888	73.9	37	33.8	2928	53.3	81	11.0
AAGR (%)	7.3	10.5	9.9	36.6	2.6	13.6	1.3	11.6

Sources: Tigray Education Bureau* (January, 2003), Amhara Education Bureau* (October, 2002; MoE, 2002).
AAGR = Annual Average Growth Rate

Appendix 5

Health facility to population ratio for Tigray and Amhara Regions (1995-2001)

Year	Ratio by facility type in Tigray			
	Hospital	Hospital bed	Health centre	Clinic
1995*	1:533833	1:5005	1:177944	1:22556
1996*	1:549833	1:3436	1:173632	1:21013
1997	1:559981	1:3240	1:159994	1:17319
1999	1:299417	1:2914	1:119767	1:22597
2000	1:307888	1:2996	1:127402	1:21606
2001	1:292112	1:3120	1:130947	1:21215
Average	1:423844	1:3452	1:148281	1:21051
Year	**Ratio by facility type in Amhara**			
	Hospital	**Hospital bed**	**Health centre**	**Clinic**
1995*	1:1284364	1:10960	1:336381	1:29010
1996*	1:1322909	1:11289	1:346476	1:29881
1997	1:1344788	1:10665	1:273938	1:22550
1999	1:990625	1:9700	1:283036	1:27470
2000	1:1018470	1:9973	1:243217	1:31158
2001	1:1049522	1:13924	1:218083	1:31329
Average	1:1168446	1:11085	1:283522	1:28566

Sources: Author's own computation on the basis of: CSA* (1998), MoH (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001).

Appendix 6
Delivery achievements (%) for selected maternal and child health care (MCH) services for Tigray and Amhara Regions (1995-2001)

Year	Achievements in Tigray				Achievements in Amhara			
	Maternal health care		Child immunization		Maternal health care		Child immunization	
	Assisted delivery	Family planning	BCG	DPT3	Assisted delivery	Family planning	BCG	DPT3
1995	15	7	46	36	4.5	3.1	55.1	36.7
1996	19	8	89	70	5.3	4.8	64.5	51.7
1997	18	13	95	82	5.5	7.2	92.9	73.3
1998	18	14	99	84	7.8	8.4	81.8	72.3
1999	26	25	98	90	5.5	13.0	82.2	72.4
2000	29	35	97	92	6.7	16.6	64.3	59.5
2001	34	39	99	92	7.7	18.4	87.2	61.5
AAGR (%)	15	33	14	17	9	35	8	9

Sources: Tigray Region Health Bureau (January, 2003) and Amhara Region Health Bureau (October, 2002).

Appendix 7
Major legal and administrative processes and procedure that non-state actors have to navigate in the formation of LGNs

1. Any international and national NGO interested in operating in any part of Ethiopia has to be first registered and acquire a certificate from the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) on the basis of the 'Associations Registration Regulation (legal notice No. 321 of 1966)' (Ministry of Health, 2003). Then, the NGO has to sign a general agreement with the Federal Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) (RRC, 1995). Bilateral and multilateral donors that need to directly support local development efforts in any region have to first negotiate and sign a general agreement with the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDaC).

2. Bilateral and multilateral donors contact and communicate with the Regional Bureau of Planning and Economic Development (BoPED) to negotiate and establish a general memorandum of understanding about the nature of the development assistance and possible ways of intervening in the region. On the basis of the memorandum of understanding, donors that provide development assistance directly to LGs make rapid field assessments in the region to identify intervention *woredas* and sector(s). During field assessments, brief discussions are held with *woreda* officials and sector experts on the major problems to identify the most urgent intervention areas. In the case of NGOs, they contact and communicate the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB), which is legally responsible for coordinating NGO activities. They carry out a similar rapid assessment. In fact, regional/local NGOs have to be registered and certified by the regional Bureau of Justice before they deal with the DPPB.

3. Project proposal preparation: once donors/NGOs have identified and decided on the specific *woreda* and sector for intervention, they have to prepare project proposals. A project proposal is a document that broadly shows the project's location (*woreda*), the intervention sector, total budget, duration as well as the direct beneficiaries. Donors have to submit the proposals to the BoPED, while NGOs submit to the DPPB. Proposals are reviewed by the respective bureaus and sent to relevant sector bureaus in the region for technical reviews and their compliance with national & regional sectoral policies. The BoPED and DPPB consolidate the comments from the relevant sector bureaus and provide these to the donors and NGOs respectively for their consideration in the preparation of the final project agreement document.

4. Basic operational agreement: the complete and final project proposal is then signed by theBoPED, relevant sector bureau(s) and the donor. An NGO's project proposal is, on the other hand, signed by the DPPB and relevant sector bureau(s) and the NGO. In order to facilitate and supervise intervention processes and also to ensure provision of technical assistances to *woreda* agencies, copies of the basic operational agreement are sent to the zonal administration, Department of Planning and Economic Development (DoPED), Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Department (DPPD) (in the case of an NGO's project), and relevant sector department(s). To make sure that detailed operational plans are prepared and implemented, some copies are sent to the *woreda* administration and sector offices.

5. Operational project preparation and agreement: at this stage, *woreda* government agencies and other local actors start to take full responsibility for facilitating and coordinating all the processes of establishing an LGN. The *woreda* government is fully authorized to accept or reject the proposed project. The WA negotiates the actor's roles and intervention modalities in respect of supporting development activities. To prevent duplication of efforts, intervention *tabias/kebeles* are identified and decided by the WDC/WDSC. Further discussions are held on how to promote communication and the exchange of information with other development actors already operating in a *woreda*. The relevant sector offices and actors supporting projects in collaboration with the *tabia/kebele* administration and local communities identify the needs and priories and prepare the detailed plan of action for implementation. In the case of actors that provide resources and other supports, but are not directly involved in project implementation processes, the relevant sector offices are responsible for preparing operational projects. Projects that are prepared by means of these processes are presented to the WDC/WDSC for review and discussion. They are reviewed in terms of their compliance with basic project agreements signed at the regional level in the light of the *woreda* development needs and priorities. The WDC/WDSC presents this agreement to the *woreda* council for approval and when approved, the final agreement is signed between the actor supporting the project, the WA and relevant sector office.

6. Project implementation: at this stage, different local actors are involved in playing different roles. *Woreda*, *tabia/kebele* and *kushet/gote* administrations are responsible for establishing the enabling environment for the active involvement of all concerned stakeholders in their jurisdictions. *Woreda* and sub-*woreda* administrations are responsible for coordinating and supervising the involvement of communities and their organi-

zations, while sector offices are the primary facilitators and coordinators of project implementations.

Appendix 8
Brief descriptions of actors' and their activities by woreda

Wukro *Woreda*

1. Adigrat Diocesan Catholic Secretariat (ADCS)

The ADCS is the social and development coordinating office of the Catholic Diocesan of Adigrat; based in Adigrat town, the capital of Eastern Zone Administration of Tigray. It is mandated by the Church to undertake development activities to improve the lives of the majority, the rural poor. The primary objective of ADCS is to respond to and promote basic human needs and services such as drinking water and primary health care services. It initiates and supports community-based development efforts. Its development approach is direct intervention in need assessment, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects. It promotes direct participation of the local administration and community in all phases of project implementation.

2. Ethiopian Orthodox Church Development and Inter Church Aid Commission (EOC/DICAC)

The EOC/DICAC is a national non-governmental religious affiliated organization. It is a development division of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. It is fully mandated by the Holy Synod to facilitate, support, and run relief, rehabilitation and integrated rural development programmes and projects in different parts of the country. Its primary developmental objectives include, among others, agricultural development and environmental rehabilitation, expanding primary school and health services, and improving access to drinking water. In Wukro, however, its support was limited to afforestation activities.

3. Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund (ESRDF)

See description 1 of Degua Temben *Woreda*. In terms of the intervention area in this *woreda*, ESRDF supported environmental rehabilitation efforts.

4. Eastern Tigray Development Programme/Irish Aid (ETDP/Irish Aid)

ETDP/Irish Aid is a bilateral development programme financed by the Irish Government that started intervention in 1994. It has a programme coordination office in Adigrat. The programme is aimed at promoting and supporting integrated rural development programmes with a primarily focus on the rehabilitation of the physical environment and establishment of a better socio-economic infrastructure for sustainable development through direct participation of LGs, agencies and communities.

The programme does not have a project office or unit at the *woreda* level, because all development activities supported by the programme are planned and implemented by sector offices in collaboration with the *woreda*, *tabia* and *kushet* administrations and the local people at large. However, it established a *Woreda* Project Advisory Committee to facilitate and coordinate development activities supported by the programme. The pro-

gramme covers multi-sector rural development, including the three sectors covered in this study. Capacity development that includes provision of equipment, office furniture, vehicles, and working tools as well as training of *woreda* leaders, sector experts, and local people are important components.

5. German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)

It is a bilateral development agency financed by the German Government. It has been supporting rural development programmes in Tigray Region since 1992. However, it only started supporting Wukro in 2001. Its main focus of support is capacity building through the transfer of knowledge and skills. It supports the Agriculture Office through the provision of tree seeds and finance to produce seedlings.

6. Relief Society of Tigray (REST)

REST is an indigenous non-governmental organization established in 1978 by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). REST's primary objective at the time of its establishment was to mitigate human suffering caused by the famine and civil war. It mobilized relief assistance from donors and humanitarian agencies and distributed these to Tigrayan refugees in Sudan and civilian victims residing in areas under TPLF control. REST expanded its sphere of mobilizing resources by establishing branch offices in Europe, North America and the Sudan, in fact, this activity continued and even expanded into Asian countries in the post -1991 period.

During the war, REST integrated relief assistance with environmental rehabilitation with local people being provided relief assistance and engaging in wide-scale SWC to rehabilitate the land and prevent further degradation. It introduced community-based conservation activities and organized communities at *tabia* and *kushet* levels to undertake need identifications, planning, implementations, monitoring and evaluations. It also introduced a community-based primary health care system.

The end of the war in May 1991, brought peace and stability to the region and since then REST has been transformed into an organized development agent in the region with a similar major shift of emphasis from relief provision to long-term development programmes. REST is aimed at promoting self-reliance among the people of Tigray through people-led development approaches. It encourages the direct involvement of the local people and their organizations, *the Seleste Mahberat*, in all phases of local development project activities. It provides LG leaders, experts as well as to the people with trainings to enable them to develop self-reliance and fully undertake the rehabilitation and development of their localities in particular and the region in general. It has a project office at the *woreda* level responsible for coordinating its multi-sector integrated rural development programmes among which SDW, primary health care services and environmental rehabilitation are important components.

7. The *Seleste Mahberat*

The *Seleste Mahberat* is a generic name given to the three important community-based organizations viz. Farmers, Youth and Women associations. These associations were established in the early 1980s by politicians of the respective groups with the prime objective of emphasising the social, economic and political interests of their members. These associations had served as important instruments to mobilize the people to actively take part and support the TPLF in the struggle against the *Derg*. They had also

served as important institutional mechanism to mobilize the local people to undertake local development activities in the TPLF-controlled areas. In collaboration with *tabia* and *kushet* administrations, they undertook the primary responsibility of engaging the local people in local socio-economic activities to produce and provide them with basic services. This had helped the *Seleste Mahberat* to emerge as crucial local development actors, which they have continued to be in a more organized and structured manner in the post war period.

Until the end of the civil war, the associations were organized and operating at *woreda*, *tabia* and *kushet* levels. In September 1991, each association organized a conference and established apex structures at zonal and regional levels. In 1994, they had been registered at the Ministry of Justice as CBOs with structures at regional, zonal, *woreda, tabia*, and *kushet* levels. Each level is run by an elected executive committee. *Kushet, tabia,* and woreda executive members are directly elected, whereas zonal and regional executive committees are elected by representatives from *tabias* and *woredas*.

Woreda-, *tabia*- and *kushet*-level structures participate directly in local social, political, and economic affairs. They are among the most prominent LGN actors and there is no single LGN structure that does not involve them. The apex structures at regional and zonal levels have created an opportunity for them to have access to higher political decision-makers. Moreover, apex structures provide training and other capacity-building support to lower level structures.

8. Tigray Development Association (TDA)

The TDA is a non-governmental development organization. It was established by TPLF politicians as well as Tigrayan refugees in the U.S.A. dedicated to the improvement of the war ravaged Tigray people in 1989. When the *Derg* collapsed in 1991, the TDA immediately moved its head quarter to Mekelle, the regional capital, and began a huge campaign to mobilize resources from all Tigrayans and non-Tigrayans outside and inside the country. The TDA has primarily focused on rehabilitating the region's social and economic infrastructure that was destroyed during the 17 years of civil war. It has aimed at making efforts in respect of and bringing resources to the people to address their problems through their own efforts.

The TDA has an independent management and organization structure responsible for mobilizing resources from its members and donors as well as planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating the development projects that it finances. However, it is strongly affiliated to the regional government and the ruling party, the TPLF. The board, chair and members are key TPLF figures . The TPLF works in partnership with government agencies at any level in the region. It participates directly in the planning and implementation of basic services and promotes and supports direct community participation in all development processes.

9. World Food Programme (WFP)

WFP is a multi-lateral food aid agency. It is one of the best-known partners of the Ethiopian Government in the fight against hunger caused by frequent droughts. It has been playing key roles in food aid coordination and provision in the country since the 1960s. In terms of development-related activities, the WFP is aimed at creating temporary employment through food-for-work (FFW) to reduce the local people's vulnerability. It provides food supplies (grain and oil) to LG agencies (AO) to pay the people who

participate in SWC and forest development activities through FFW programmes. It promotes land conservation through SWC and afforestation to improve productivity and reduce food-aid dependency. It also supports the capacity building of agriculture offices through the provision of motorbikes, tools for SWC and afforestation activities as well as training of farmers and agriculture experts in the areas of environmental rehabilitation and natural resource management.

10. World Vision Ethiopia (WVE)

WVE is a non-political international Christian organization that has been undertaking development activities in Tigray Region since mid 1992. The major objective of the organization is to improve the livelihood of the rural community through an integrated rural development approach that includes environmental rehabilitation, water resource development, and improving access to primary education and health care services.

In Wukro *woreda*, WVE started intervention in 2000. In collaboration with *woreda* and sub-*woreda* administrations, sector agencies and the local people, it undertakes SDW service development, environmental rehabilitation and capacity building. It has a project office at the *woreda* level responsible for coordinating, planning, implementing and evaluating projects that it supports. Development projects are planned and implemented in collaboration with local administrations, sector agencies and the local community at large.

Degua Temben *Woreda*

1. Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund (ESRDF)

ESRDF is a nationwide development programme of the Federal Government of Ethiopia. It was established in 1996 by Proclamation No. 19/1996 on the basis of the positive assessment of the performance of the earlier three-year pilot programme called the Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation Fund under the Emergency, Recovery and Reconstruction Programme of the TGE. The Federal Government of Ethiopia, World Bank and UNDP are the major sources of funds. The ESRDF's major objective is to improve the living conditions of poor communities by expanding and improving the basic socio-economic infrastructure in the course of which the people directly participate, not only as beneficiaries but also as partners of the development processes. To ensure such processes, the ESRDF promotes and supports LGs and communities to establishment a Community Project Committee (CPC). The CPC facilitates and coordinate community involvement in need identification, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development projects. The ESRDF requires communities to contribute at least 10 percent of project costs, which can either be in the form of labour, locally available materials, cash, or a combination. ESRDF believes that this helps develop a sense of ownership among communities and has an impact on the sustainable use of services.

The ESRDF prioritises demand-driven and community-based projects with a view to enhancing participatory development and grassroots empowerment. Nevertheless, not all communities have equal information, capacity and interest in taking initiatives. Hence, it disseminates information to encourage and support communities to take advantage of the Fund. It also trains and assigns a Local Community Facilitator (LCF) to assist LGs and communities to identify needs and priorities, plan, and implement local

development projects. The ESRDF encourages partnership between community groups and state and/or non-state agencies in undertaking local development activities. It allows the CPC to negotiate and assign implementing agencies such as sector bureaus, departments, offices, and NGOs to implement projects on its behalf. This helps weak LGs and communities to benefit from the Fund. However, even through this arrangement, the CPC is still responsible for ensuring active community participation. In Wukro *woreda,* the ESRDF supports SDW and primary health care services development and delivery as well as capacity building training for CPC members in participatory planning and implementation.

2. REST

See description No. 6 of Wukro *woreda* (above). REST has been directly engaged in promoting integrated rural development through its project office. SDW service development, primary health care services and environmental rehabilitation are among its important intervention areas.

3. The *Seleste Mahberat* (see description no. 7 of Wukro *Woreda* above)

Bugna *Woreda*

1. Amhara Development Association (ADA)

ADA is a non-governmental development organization. It was established in 1992 by interested individuals mainly drawn from members of the Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement (EPDM), the regional ruling party. ADA has broad objectives aimed at alleviating poverty and eradicating the backwardness of the people of Amhara by way of promoting health and education services as well as improving the infrastructure such as the rural roads. It collaborates with government and non-government organizations in order to facilitate the achievement of its broad objectives. In collaboration with the LGs and people, ADA is directly involved in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluations of development activities. Similar to the TDA, it has an independent organizational structure and management but is strongly affiliated to EPDM/ANDM whose board members and chair are key political leaders. In this *woreda*, ADA supported the construction of a health station.

2. EOC/DICAC (see description no. 2 of Wukro *Woreda* above)

EOC/DICAC started its intervention in 1992. In the early years, it mainly focused on emergency assistance to respond to urgent basic human needs, particularly those of children and women. From 1994 onwards, however, it has been involved in integrated rural development programmes to improve the lives of the rural people on a sustainable basis. SDW service development, primary health care service facility development and environmental rehabilitation are among its important intervention areas. It has a project office at *woreda* level that facilitates and coordinates the planning and implementation of its development activities in collaboration with the LGs and people.

3. Plan International Ethiopia-Bugna Community-based Rural Development Programme (Plan-BCBRDP)

Plan International Ethiopia is an international NGO that focuses on children and has no political or religious affiliation. It began its intervention in Bugna *woreda* in July 1997.

Its primary objectives include improving basic services and food supplies to children, families and communities so that the lives of children can be improved on a sustainable basis. It has introduced a community-based development programme as a means of achieving its objectives.

Plan has a project office that is responsible for facilitating, coordinating and implementing its development interventions in collaboration with the LGs and people. Plan is directly involved in need identification, prioritisation, and planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating local development projects. It places greater emphasis on communities' direct participation in development processes to achieve two things. Firstly, empower the people to influence decisions that affect their affairs. Secondly, develop communities' skills and experience to develop and implement their own development projects. Plan's intervention areas include different domains of local development, among which primary health care, SDW development, environmental rehabilitation, and capacity building constitute major components. The construction of health facilities and hand-dug wells as well as spring development are important activities. Development in the environmental domain includes SWC and forest development activities, which are carried out through Cash-for-Work (CFW) programmes. Plan supports sector offices' capacity building through the training and provision of office furniture, equipment and supplies such as books, medical supplies (contraceptives), and tree seeds. It also supports the training of community members in different areas such as SWC and forest development activities and primary health care education.

4. Save the Children Fund-UK (SCF-UK)

The SCF-UK is an independent international NGO. It is one of the leading children's charity organizations working in Ethiopia. SCF-UK provides emergency relief assistance to save the lives of children. It emphasises and is committed to developing long-term solutions rather than short-term crises-driven interventions. While earlier SCF-UK intervention in Bugna focused on emergency relief for vulnerable children and women, in 2001 it introduced the pilot project of an employment generation scheme (EGS). Environmental rehabilitation through SWC was selected as the pilot project since environmental degradation is the principal cause of food scarcity in the *woreda*. The Agriculture Office is the implementing partner of this scheme for which the SCF-UK provides the funds and has assigned an expert to coordinate its activities and supervise implementation activities.

5. SNV Ethiopia-Bugna Integrated Rural Development Programme (SNV-BIRDP)

The SNV is a development organization that forms part of the bilateral development co-operation of The Netherlands Government. It started an integrated rural development programme in the *woreda* in October 1994. The overall goal of SNV-BIRDP is to improve the living conditions of the rural people through the LGs and people's direct participation. SNV has introduced bottom up participatory local development approaches in which community members are directly involved in need identifications, priority setting, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes. LGs and sector agencies are also important partners of these processes.

The SNV has a programme coordinating office at *woreda* level that is responsible for facilitating, coordinating and implementing development activities. The SNV has played

multiple roles through different intervention modalities, which can be grouped into capacity building, financing and supporting infrastructure development, community support, and facilitator roles. It has primarily aimed at developing self-reliance among LGs and communities to ensure sustainable development. Capacity building, which is provided to community members, local leaders and sector experts, is considered as the most important means of developing self-reliance. The second component of capacity building includes the provision of vehicles, furniture, equipment, materials, and supplies. The SNV also provides financial support for the development of basic services such as a primary health care facility and SDW service development. Moreover, the SNV helps community members to develop and implement community-based projects such as sustainable land use, SWC, and forestry development. It provides material and technical support to community members who are engaged in their own development activities. SNV has employed Community Development Workers (CDWs) who organize, coordinate and facilitate the involvement of communities in different local development activities.

SNV facilitates and supports the development of dialogue fora between government organizations, community representatives and other non-state actors in order to promote interaction and cooperation between state and non-state actors. It is convinced that different socio-economic actors can bring a better result when they work together and it therefore invests time and resource to support networking among different actors.

6. UNICEF/*Woreda* Integrated Basic Services (UNICEF/WIBS)

UNICEF is one of the most important multilateral donor agencies and provides development assistance to nation-wide programmes in Ethiopia. It has adopted different development assistance programmes in different periods. The *Woreda* Integrated Basic Services (WIBS) programme is a major component of the Fourth Country Programme launched in 1994 and implemented in 55 *woredas* selected from 10 regions in the country. WIBS is mainly designed to be implemented directly by *woreda* governments as an instrument of facilitating decentralized decision-making processes and services provisions at the local level where the most disadvantaged groups such as children and women are found. The programme is aimed at creating best practices with regard to participatory decentralized development management that could be replicated in other *woredas*.

In Amhara National Regional States, the programme has been implemented in 10 *woredas* with Bugna being one. Local administrations and sector offices in collaboration with communities are responsible for identifying needs, and the prioritisation, planning, implementing of projects. Although, UNICEF is not directly involved in these processes, it influences these processes' approval in the sense that WIBS' development plans, once prepared and approved at the *woreda* level, are not final and binding until they have been accepted by UNICEF. UNICEF is also not directly involved in programme implementation processes, but in the purchase of supplies and equipment necessary for programme implementation.

The intervention areas of UNICEF/WIBS in Bugna *woreda* that fall within the domain of this study include primary health care and safe water development programmes. It provides health institutions with equipment, furniture and supplies. It supports the training of CHAs to improve community-based primary health care service

provisions. It also supports construction of hand-dug wells and spring development and protection to improve SDW services to the local poor.

7. WFP (see description no. 9 of Wukro *Woreda* above)

Baso Liben *Woreda*

1. Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS)

The ERCS is a national humanitarian organization established in 1935. It has a broad mission that includes preventing and alleviating human suffering and promoting the prevalence of peace in keeping with the Geneva Convention. The Society focuses on emergency relief/rehabilitation, disaster prevention and preparedness. In terms of developmental interventions, it supports primary health care services through the construction of health facilities and the training of CHAs. It also supports SDW service development. In spite of the Society's wider activities, its intervention in Baso Liben *woreda* is limited to spring development to improve local people's access to potable water service.

2. ESRDF (see description no. 1 of Degua Temben above)

In Baso Liben, primary health care and SDW services are among the basic services that benefit from the ESRDF's support. It has supported construction and furnishing of health facilities and water points in order to improve the local people's access to these vital services.

3. Swedish-Amhara Rural Development Programme (SARDP)

The SARDP is a bilateral development programme supported by the Swedish International Development Agency in Amhara Region since 1997. The *woreda* development support constitutes the major component of the programme. It is carried out in 16 *woredas* of South Wollo and East Gojam, eight *woredas* in each zone.

Baso Liben *woreda* is one of the eight programme beneficiary *woredas* in East Gojam. In Baso Liben, the programme started late in 1998. The *woreda* development support component of the programme is aimed at promoting local service expansion, sustainable use of natural resources, and empowerment and capacity building of LGs and communities as means of improving the life of the rural community on a sustainable basis.

SARDP does not itself undertake development activities. It provides funds for basic service development and capacity building efforts. It has introduced a bottom-up participatory local development strategy that facilitates LG and communities' empowerment. The WA has been fully authorized to identify and prioritise development needs, and to plan, implement, monitor, and evaluate local development projects together with the local community. The programme covers a wide range of intervention areas among which primary health care and SDW services, and agriculture important are important components.

Appendix 9
Local governance network matrix

Wukro Woreda

No.	Actors	ADCS	AO	EO	EOC	ESRDF	ETDP	FO	HO	JO	KUA	PO	REST	SM	TDA	TA	WA	WFP	WVE	Sum
1	**ADCS**	-	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	14
2	**AO**	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	16
3	**EO**	1	1	-	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	16
4	**EOC**	0	1	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	6
5	**ESRDF**	0	1	1	0	-	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	10
6	**ETDP**	1	1	1	0	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	15
7	**FO**	1	1	1	0	0	1	-	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	13
8	**HO**	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	16
9	**JO**	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	-	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	11
10	**KUA**	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	-	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	14
11	**PO**	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	-	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	11
12	**REST**	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	16
13	**SM**	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	17
14	**TDA**	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	-	1	1	0	1	13
15	**TA**	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	15
16	**WA**	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	17
17	**WFP**	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	-	0	8
18	**WVE**	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	-	14
	Sum	14	16	16	6	10	15	13	16	11	12	11	16	17	13	15	17	8	14	244

Note: AO = Agriculture Office, EO = Education Office, EOC = EOC/DICAC, ETDP = ETDP/Irish Aid, FO = Finance office, HO = Health Office, JO = Justice Office, KUA = *Kushet* Administration, PO = Police Office, SM = *Seleste Mahberat*, TÂ = *Tabia* Administration.

Appendix 9 *(continued)*

Bugna Woreda

No.	Actors	ADA	AO	EO	EOC	FO	HO	GA	KA	Plan	SCF-UK	SNV	UNICEF/ WIBS	WA	WD	WFP	Sum
1	ADA	-	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	6
2	AO	0	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
3	EO	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	13
4	EOC	0	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	11
5	FO	0	1	1	1	-	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	10
6	HO	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	13
7	GA	1	1	1	1	0	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
8	KA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	14
9	Plan	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	1	0	12
10	SCF-UK	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	-	1	0	1	0	0	6
11	SNV	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	0	13
12	UNICEF/WIBS	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	-	1	1	0	11
13	WA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	1	14
14	WD	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	-	0	11
15	WFP	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	-	6
	Sum	6	13	13	11	10	13	13	14	12	6	13	11	14	11	6	166

Note: GA= *Gote* Administration, KA = *Kebele* Administration
Source: Field data, 2003

Appendix 9 (continued)

Degua Temben Woreda

No.	Actors	AO	EO	ESRDF	FO	HO	JO	KUA	PO	REST	SM	TA	WA	Sum
1	**AO**	-	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	9
2	**EO**	1	-	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	9
3	**ESRDF**	0	0	-	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	6
4	**FO**	1	1	0	-	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	9
5	**HO**	1	1	1	1	-	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	9
6	**JO**	0	0	0	1	0	-	0	1	0	0	0	1	3
7	**KUA**	1	1	1	0	1	0	-	0	1	1	1	1	8
8	**PO**	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	-	0	0	0	1	5
9	**SM**	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	-	1	1	9
10	**REST**	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	-	1	1	1	9
11	**TA**	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	-	1	9
12	**WA**	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	11
	Sum	9	9	6	9	9	3	8	5	9	9	9	11	96

Baso Liben Woreda

No.	Actors	AO	EO	ERCS	ESRDF	FO	HO	GA	KA	SARDP	WA	Sum
1	**AO**	-	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
2	**EO**	1	-	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	8
3	**ERCS**	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
4	**ESRDF**	0	1	0	-	0	1	1	1	0	1	5
5	**FO**	1	1	0	0	-	1	0	0	1	1	5
6	**HO**	1	1	0	1	1	-	1	1	1	1	8
7	**GA**	1	1	0	1	0	1	-	1	1	1	7
8	**KA**	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	-	1	1	7
9	**SARDP**	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	-	1	7
10	**WA**	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	9
	Sum	7	8	1	5	5	8	7	7	7	9	64

Appendix 10
LGN for SDW Service Development by Woreda (1996-2001)

Wukro *Woreda*

1. **Actors**
   Woreda administration (WA), ZWRMEDD, RWRMEDB, ETDP/Irish Aid, REST, ADCS, *Seleste Mahberat*, UNDP, WVE, and EOC/DICAC.

2. **Principal facilitator(s)**
   WA, technically assisted by ZWRMEDD.

3. **Principal roles and contribution of actors**

a. WA

- Negotiates, coordinates and supervises the interventions of non-state actors that include ETDP/Irish Aid, REST, ADCS, WVE, EOC/DICAC and *Seleste Mahberat*.
- Facilitates and coordinates need identifications, prioritisation, site selection, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SDW development projects in partnership with other partners.
- Coordinates and supervises community participation for SDW through *tabia* and *kushet* administrations and TDC.

b. The ZWRMEDD/RWMEDB

- Provides general policy guidelines and directives on SDW development and utilization.
- Provides technical assistances such as hydrological surveys and supervision of SDW development projects that are carried out by other actors.

c. ETDP/Irish Aid

- Appraised, monitored, and evaluated SDW development projects in partnership with WPAC.
- Supported development of one spring, construction and fitting of 14 deep wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 11,775 people.
- Supports the training of water-user committees as well as the exchange of information and experience among communities.

d. REST

- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates SDW development projects in collaboration with *woreda* and sub-*woreda* structures.
- Developed 4 springs, constructed and fitted 43 (18 deep and 25 shallow) wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 29,470 people.
- Establishes water-user committees and provides members and pump operators with training and tools.
- Facilitates the exchange of information and experience among communities.

e. ADCS

- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates SDW development projects in partnership with WA and sub-*woreda* structures.
- Developed one spring, constructed and fitted 12 hand-dug wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 11,300 people.
- Provides water-user committees and pump operators with training.

f. The Seleste Mahberat

- Participate in need identification, prioritisation, site selection, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation with all actors that are involved in these processes.
- Mobilize their members to contribute labour and locally available materials.
- Advocate participation and encourage members to actively participate in all phases of SDW development projects.

g. UNDP

- Supported the construction and fitting of 10 hand-dug wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 12,050 people.

h. World Vision Ethiopia (WVE)

- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates SDW development projects in partnership with WA and sub-*woreda* administrations.
- Developed 2 springs that created access to water for 950 people.

i. EOC/DICAC

Financed the construction and fitting of 2 hand-dug wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 650 people.

4. **Network decision-making and communication structures**
   WDC, TDC, and WPAC.

5. **Total contribution:** Created access to water for 67,195 people.

Degua Tembien *Woreda*

1. **Actors**
   WA, ZWRMEDD, RWRMEDB, ESRDF, REST and *Seleste Mahberat*.

2. **Principal facilitator(s)**
   WA, technically assisted by ZWRMEDD.

3. **Principal roles and contribution of actors:**

a. WA

- Negotiates, coordinates and supervises the interventions of state and non-state actors that include REST, ESRDF and *Seleste Mahberat*.
- Facilitates and coordinates need identification prioritisation, site selection, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SDW development projects in collaboration with other partners.

- Coordinates and supervises community participation for SDW through *tabia* and *kushet* administrations and TDC.

b. The ZWRMEDD/RWRMEDB

- Provides general policy guidelines and directives on SDW development and utilization.
- Provides technical assistances such as hydrological survey and supervision of SDW development projects that are carried out by other actors.

c. ESRDF

- Promotes community participation by initiating and supporting the establishment of a CPC to involve people in all phases of a project that it supports.
- Appraises monitors and evaluates SWD projects.
- Supported drilling of one bore hole and development of one spring that created access to water for 6,069 people
- Financed the purchasing of a motorized water pump and installation of 7 km pipeline to supply water to the town of Hagere Selam.
- Financed the training of two motor operators.

d. REST

- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates SDW development projects in collaboration with WA and sub-*woreda* structures.
- Developed 22 springs, constructed and fitted 22 (8 deep and 8 shallow) wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 25,102 people.
- Provides pump operators and water-user committees with training.
- Facilitates the exchange of information and experience among communities.

e. Seleste Mahberat

- Participate in need identification, prioritisation, site selection, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation with all actors that are involved in these processes.
- Mobilize their members to contribute labour and materials.
- Advocate participation and encourage members to actively participate in all phases of SDW development projects.

4. **Network decision-making and communication structure:**
   WDC, TDC and CPC.
5. **Total contribution:** Created access to SDW service for 31,171 people.

Bugna *Woreda*

1. **Actors**
   WA, ZWRMEDD, RWRMEDB, EOC/DICAC, Plan, SNV, and UNICEF/ WIBS.
2. **Principal facilitator(s)**
   WA and Water Desk (WD), technically assisted by ZWRMEDD.
3. **Principal roles & contribution of actors**

a. WA/WD

- Negotiates, coordinates and supervises the interventions of non- state actors that include EOC/DICAC, Plan, SNV, and UNICEF/WIBS.
- Facilitates and coordinates need identification, prioritisation, site selection, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SDW development projects in partnership with other partners.
- Coordinates and supervises community participation in SDW through *kebele* and *gote* administrations.

b. The ZWRMEDD/RWRMEDB

- Provides general policy guidelines and directives on SDW development and utilization.
- Provides technical assistances such as hydrological surveys.

c. EOC/DICAC

- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates SDW development projects.
- Developed 5 springs, constructed and fitted 3 hand-dug wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 5,850 people.

d. Plan

- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates SDW development projects.
- Developed 24 springs, constructed and fitted 2 hand-dug wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 16,863 people.
- Establishes water-user committees and provides members with training.
- Facilitates the exchange of information and experience among communities.

e. SNV

- Developed 15 springs, constructed and fitted 5 hand-dug wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 14,225 people.
- Provides pump operators and water-user committees with training and tools.
- Initiated and supported the establishment and functioning of a Water Desk.
- Facilitates the exchange of experience and information among communities.

f. UNICEF/WIBS

- Supported development of 3 springs, construction and fitting of 6 hand-dug wells with hand pumps, which created access to water for 10,920 people.
- Supports pump operators tools and training.

4. **Network decision-making and communication structures**
   WDSC and TDC.
5. **Total contribution:** Created access to SDW service for 47,858 people.

Baso Liben *Woreda*

1. **Actors**
   WA, ZWRMEDD, RWRMEB, ESRDF, ERCS and SARDP.

2. **Principal facilitator(s)**
   WA and ZWRMEDD.

3. **Principal roles & contribution of actors**

a. WA

- Negotiates and coordinates the interventions of state and non-state actors that include the ERCS, SARDP and ESRDF.
- Coordinates planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SDW development projects in partnership with other partners.
- Coordinates and supervises community participation for SDW through *kebele* and *gote* administrations.

b. The ZWRMEDD/RWRMEDB

- Provides general policy guidelines and directives on SDW development and utilization.
- Provides technical assistances such as hydrological surveys.
- In collaboration with the WA, ZWRMEDD plans, implements, monitors and evaluates SDW development projects financed by the government.
- As an implementing agent of CPC, the ZWRMEDD has implemented SDW development projects supported by the ESRDF.
- It developed four springs, constructed and fitted 15 hand-dug wells with hand pumps by means of a government budget that created access to water for 11,105 people.

c. ERCS

- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates SDW development projects in collaboration with the WA.
- Developed 3 springs that created access to water for 1,332 people

d. ESRDF

- Promotes community participation through the establishment of a CPC.
- Appraises, monitors, and evaluates SWD projects.
- Supported development of 2 springs, construction and fitting of 5 hand-dug wells with hand pumps that created access to water for 2,653 people.

e. SARDP

- Monitors and evaluates SDW development projects that it supports.
- Facilitates participatory development and the exchange of information and experience among communities through community workshops and dialogue forms.

4. **Network decision-making and communication structures**
   WDC, KDC, and CPC .

5. **Total contribution:** Created access to SDW services to 19,403 people.

Appendix 11
Comparative assessment of actors' roles and contribution for SDW (assessed by WA)

No.	Actors by woreda	Assessment criteria and comparative score						
		Participation in planning & implementation	Participation in monitoring & evaluation	Resource contribution	Capacity building	Inform. & experience exchange	Total score	Ave. score
Wukro								
1	ADCS	3	3	3	1	2	12	2.4
2	EOC/DICAC	0	2	1	1	1	5	1.0
3	ETDP/Irish Aid	0	3	3	3	3	12	2.4
4	REST	3	3	3	3	3	15	3.0
5	Seleste Mahberat	3	3	3	2	3	14	2.8
6	WVE	3	2	1	1	2	9	1.8
Degua Temben								
1	ESRDF	1	3	3	3	2	12	2.4
2	REST	3	3	3	3	3	15	3.0
3	Seleste Mahberat	3	3	3	1	3	13	2.6
Bugna								
1	EOC/DICAC	2	2	3	2	1	10	2.0
2	Plan-BCBRDP	3	3	3	3	2	14	2.8
3	SNV-BIRDP	3	3	3	3	3	15	3.0
4	UNICEF/WIBS	1	2	3	3	2	11	2.2
Baso Liben								
1	ERCS	2	1	1	0	1	5	1.0
2	ESRDF	1	2	2	1	2	10	2.0
3	SARDP	1	3	3	2	3	12	2.4

Note: 3 = High, 2 = Medium, 1 = Low, and 0 = not involved at all, Inform. = Information.

Source: Field data, 2003.

Appendix 12
LGN for primary health care service development and delivery by woreda (1996-2001)

Wukro *Woreda*

1. **Actors:** WA, HO, ZHD, RHD, ETDP/Irish Aid, REST, TDA, ADCS, and *Seleste Mahberat*.
2. **Principal facilitator:** Health Office (HO).
3. **Principal roles and contribution of actors:**

a. WA

- Negotiates and coordinates the interventions of actors that include ETDP/Irish Aid, REST, TDA, and *Seleste Mahberat* in primary health care service development and provision.
- Provides overall guidance and supervision through WDC.
- Facilitates community participation in health facilities development and provisions through WCHC, *tabia* and *kushet* administrations, TDC, and TCHC.

b. HO (HO)

- Facilitates and coordinates need identification, prioritisation, and site selection for health facility development in collaboration with other partners.
- Facilitates and coordinates planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of health facilities development projects in collaboration with the ETDP/Irish Aid, TDA, ZHD and the *Seleste Mahberat*.
- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates primary health care provision.
- Coordinates and facilitates the activities of the WCHC to promote primary health care service development and provision through direct and active participation of the local people.
- In collaboration with other partners, it facilitates, coordinates, and organizes new and refresher trainings for CHAs.
- Supports, facilitates and coordinates the day-to-day activities of CHAs.

c. ZHD /RHB

- Provides policy guidelines and rules for primary health care facility development and service provision.
- Coordinates budget allocation and disbursement as well as the assignment of personnel and purchase of medical equipment and supplies.
- Constructed a clinic by means of a government budget in collaboration with HO.
- Provides HO with technical assistance in planning and supervision of facility construction.
- Provides HO with logistical and other support including a vehicle, icebox and the assignment of experts during immunization and control of epidemics.

d. ETDP/Irish Aid

- Appraises, monitors, and evaluates health facilities' construction projects in partnership with HO and WPAC.
- Supported construction and furnishing of a health centre, two clinics and four health posts.
- Provides capacity building to HO through provision of furniture, motorbikes and training of health experts as well as CHAs.

e. REST

- Promotes and supports awareness creation of primary health care issues that include HIV/AIDS, family planning, immunization, and environmental sanitation through posters, community workshops and discussion fora at *woreda*, and *tabia* levels.
- Organizes HIV/AIDS prevention clubs and supports them through transportation and demonstration materials such as posters.
- Provides religious and *Seleste Mahberat* leaders with training on HIV/AIDS and other primary health care issues.
- Trains CHAs and provides primary health care kits.
- Provides HO with logistical support (icebox, transport) during immunization and epidemic control.

f. TDA

- In partnership with HO, *tabia* and kushet administrations and local people, it plans, implements, monitors and evaluates facility construction projects.
- Supported construction and furnishing of a clinic.
- Promotes primary health care education through the provision of posters, flyers and signboards.

g. ADCS

- In partnership with HO and Wukro Health Centre, it supports 80-100 malnourished children by providing their parents with 100 Birr to purchase food.
- Supports CHAs through the provision of primary health kits.

h. Seleste Mahberat

- Participate in need assessment, prioritisation, site selection, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of health facilities' development that are carried out by different actors
- Mobilize their members to contribute labour and locally available materials
- Initiated, planned and mobilized resources to construct a health post and replacement of an old clinic.
- Facilitate and promote primary health care service provision by communities by encouraging members to actively participate in CHA positions.
- Organize discussion fora and also provide members with primary health care education with regard to HIV/AIDS, malaria, MCH, and environmental sanitation.

4. **Network decision-making and communication structures**
   WDC, TDC, WCHC, TCHC.
5. **Total contribution (facility development)**
   A health centre, two clinics, and five health stations were constructed and three clinics were replaced.

Degua Tembien *Woreda*

1. **Actors:** WA, HO, ZHD, RHD, ESRDF, REST and *Seleste Mahberat.*
2. **Principal facilitator:** Health Office (HO).
3. **Principal roles and contribution of actors**

a. WA

- Negotiates and coordinates the interventions of actors that include REST, ESRDF, and *Seleste Mahberat* in primary health care service development and provision.
- Provides overall guidance and supervision through the WDC.
- Facilitates community participation in health facilities development and provisions through WCHC, *tabia* and *kushet* administrations, TDC, and TCHC.

b. HO

- Facilitates and coordinates need identification, prioritisation, and site selection for primary health care facility development in collaboration with other partners.
- Facilitates and coordinates planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of facility development projects in collaboration with REST, ESRDF, ZHD, and *Seleste Mahberat.*
- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates primary health care provisions.
- Coordinates and facilitates the activities of the WCHC to promote primary health care service development and provision through the direct and active participation of the local people.
- Facilitates, coordinates, and organizes new and refresher trainings for CHAs in collaboration with other partners.
- Supports, facilitates and coordinates the day-tod-ay activities of CHAs.

c. ZHD/RHB

- Provides policy guidelines and rules for primary health facility development and service provision.
- Coordinates budget allocation and disbursement as well as the assignment of personnel and purchase of furniture and medical equipment and supplies.
- Provides HO with logistical and other support including vehicle, icebox and the assignment of experts during immunization and control of epidemics.

d. ESRDF

- Promotes community participation through the establishment of a CPC.
- Appraises, monitors and evaluates health facility construction projects.

- Supported construction and furnishing of a health centre, a clinic and a health post.
- Provides CPC members with participatory local development training.
- Supports primary health education through the provision of educational materials such as flyers and posters.

e. REST

- In partnership with HO, *tabia* & *kushet* administrations and the local people, it undertakes need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of health facility construction projects.
- Supported the construction and furnishing of 3 health posts and renovation of 2 clinics.
- Promotes and provides primary health care education on different issues including HIV/AIDS, family planning, immunization, and environmental sanitation.
- Trains CHAs and provides primary health care kits.

f. Seleste Mahberat

- Participate in need assessment, prioritisation, site selection, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of health facility development that are carried out by different actors
- Mobilize their members to contribute labour and locally available materials
- Facilitate and promote primary health care service provision through communities by encouraging members to actively participate in CHA positions.
- Organize discussions on and provides primary health care education to members with regard to HIV/AIDS, malaria, MCH, and environmental sanitation

4. **Network decision-making and communication structures**
   WDC, CPC, TDC, WCHC, and TCHC.
5. **Total contribution (facility development)**
   A health centre, a clinic, and four health posts were constructed and two clinics were renovated.

Bugna *Woreda*

1. **Actors:** WA, HO ZHD, RHB, EOC/DICAC, ADA, Plan, SNV, and UNICEF/WIBS.
2. **Principal facilitator:** Health Office (HO).
3. **Principal roles and contribution of actors**

a. WA

- Negotiates and coordinates the interventions of actors that include EOC/DICAC, Plan, SNV, and UNICEF/WIBS.
- Provides overall guidance and supervision through the WDSC.
- Facilitates community participation in health facility's development and provisions through the WCHC as well as through *kebele* and *gote* administrations.

b. HO

- Facilitates and coordinates need identification, prioritisation, and site selection for primary health facility development in collaboration with other partners.
- Facilitates and coordinates planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of facility development projects in collaboration with EOC/DICAC, Plan, SNV, and ZHD.
- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates primary health care provisions.
- Coordinates and facilitates the activities of the WCHC to promote the direct and active participation of the local people in primary health care service development and provision.
- Facilitates, coordinates and organizes new and refresher training for CHAs in collaboration with other partners.
- Facilitates and coordinates the day-to-day activities of CHAs.

c. ZHD/RHB

- Provides policy guidelines and rules for primary health development and service provision.
- Coordinates budget allocation and disbursement as well as the assignment of personnel and purchase of furniture, medical equipment and supplies.
- Constructed 3 clinics by means of a government budget in collaboration with HO.
- Provides HO with logistical and other support including a vehicle, icebox and the assignment of experts during immunization and control of epidemics.

d. EOC/DICAC

- In partnership with HO, *kebele* & *gote* administrations and the people, it undertakes need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of health facility construction projects.
- Supported construction of two clinics.
- Facilitates awareness creation about HIV/AIDS within communities through the training of EOC religious leaders.

e. ADA

In partnership with HO, *kebele* and *gote* administrations, it undertakes the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of facility development project.

f. UNICEF/WIBS

- Supports HO's capacity through training of health experts and provision of drugs and equipment.
- Supports CHAs' training and provision of primary health kits.

g. Plan

- Together with LGs and communities, it undertakes need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of facility development projects.
- Supported construction and furnishing of 3 health posts.

- Promotes and supports primary health care education and awareness creation within the community through workshops at *woreda* and *kebele* levels that covers important issues such as such as child and maternal health care and HIVAIDS.
- Establishes HIV/AIDS prevention clubs and peer groups and supports them with teaching aids such as flyers, posters and sign boards.
- Supports training of CHAs and provision of primary health care kits.
- Supports HO's capacity building through the provision of motorbikes, furniture and equipment as well as drug supplies and contraceptives.
- Promotes and supports immunization and epidemic control in remote rural areas through fuel budget subsidy and also lending of vehicles to alleviate the transportation problem.

h. SNV-BIRDP

- In partnership with HO, *kebele* and *gote* administrations and the local people, it undertakes need assessment, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of health facility development projects.
- Supported construction and furnishing of 3 health posts.
- Provides capacity building support to HO through the provision of furniture, equipment, reference books, drug supplies and contraceptives, motorbikes as well as through employment support and training of health experts.
- Facilitates and promoted community participation in primary health provision through the training of CHAs and provision of primary health care kits.
- Initiated and supported the establishment of Community Health Committees at *woreda* and *kebele* levels.
- Initiates and supports discussion forums between local leaders, health experts and communities to discuss community health care issues.

4. Network decision-making and communication structures
WDSC, WCHC, KDC, and KCHC.

5. Total contribution (facility developemnt0:
Six clinics and six health posts were constructed.

Baso Liben

1. Actors: WA, HO, ZHD, RHB, ESRDF, ERCS and SARDP.

2. Principal facilitator(s): Until 1999, WA and ZHD and after 1999 HO.

3. Principal roles and contribution of actors

a. WA

- Negotiates and coordinates the intervention of actors that include ESRDF and SARDP.
- Provides overall guidance and supervision through the WDC.
- Facilitates community participation in health facility development and provisions through *kebele* and *gote* administrations.

b. HO

- Facilitates and coordinates need identifications, prioritisation, and site selection for health facilities development in collaboration with other partners
- Facilitates and coordinates the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of health facilities development projects in collaboration with ESRDF, SARDP, and ZHD.
- Plans, implements, monitors, and evaluates primary health care provisions.
- Facilitates and coordinates CHAs' training in collaboration with SARDP.
- Facilitates and coordinates the day-to-day activities of CHAs.

c. ZHD/RHB

- Provides policy guidelines and rules for primary health development and service provision.
- Coordinates budget allocation and disbursement as well as the assignment of personnel, purchase of furniture, medical equipment and supplies.
- Until 1999, ZHD coordinated planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of health facility development projects in collaboration with the WA and ESRDF.
- Provides HO with logistical and other support including a vehicle, icebox and the assignment of experts during immunization and control of epidemics

e. ESRDF

- Promotes and supports community participation though the establishment of a CPC.
- Appraises, monitors and evaluates health facility development projects.
- Supported construction and furnishing of four health posts.
- Supports primary health education through the provision of materials such as flyers and posters.

f. SARDP

- Promotes community participation by means of participatory workshops that involve people in actual need assessment, prioritisation, planning, and implementation processes.
- Provides advisory service to the WA and sector HO in need assessment, planning, and implementation.
- Supported the renovating and furnishing of a clinic.

4. Network decision-making and communication structures
WDC, CPC, and KDC.

5. Total contribution
Four health posts were constructed and one clinic was renovated.

Appendix 13

Comparative assessment of actors' roles and contribution for primary health care service development and delivery (assessed by HO)

No.	Actor by woreda	Major activities/ contribution and comparative score for each activity/contribution							
		Participation in plan. & implementation	Participation in monitor. & evaluation	Primary health care education & awareness creation	Resource contribution	Capacity building	Inform & experience exchange	Total score	Ave. score
Wukro									
1	ADCS	1	1	1	2	2	2	9	1.5
1	ETDP/Irish Aid	1	3	3	3	3	3	16	2.7
2	REST	3	2	3	2	3	3	16	2.7
3	TDA	2	2	1	2	2	2	11	1.8
4	Sel. Mahb.	3	3	3	3	1	3	16	2.7
Degua Temben									
1	ESRDF	1	3	2	3	3	3	15	2.5
2	REST	3	3	3	3	3	3	18	3.0
3	Sel. Mahb	3	3	3	3	2	3	17	2.8
Bugna									
1	ADA	2	2	0	1	0	0	5	0.8
2	EOC/DICAC	3	3	2	3	2	2	15	2.5
3	Plan –BCBRDP	3	3	3	3	2	3	17	2.8
4	SNV-BRDIP	3	3	3	3	3	3	18	3.0
5	UNICEF/WIBS	1	2	2	3	3	2	13	2.2
Baso Liben									
1	ESRDF	1	2	1	3	3	2	13	2.2
2	SARDP	1	3	2	2	3	3	14	2.3

Note: 3 = High, 2 = Medium, 1 = Low, and 0 = not involved at all; Inform. = Information; Sel. Mahb. = Seleste Mahberat
Source: Field data, 2003.

Appendix 14
Health facilities index (1996-2001)

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben	Tig-ray	Am-hara	Regions' ave.
1996							
Pop. in '000	90.179	93.204	178.315	117.206	3299.00	14552.00	8925.50
HC/'000 pop.	0.0111	0.0000	0.0056	0.0000	0.0058	0.0029	0.0034
HC/'000 pop. index	2.4700	0.0000	1.6411	0.0000	1.6854	0.8446	1.0000
HS/'000 pop.	0.0444	0.0322	0.0280	0.0256	0.0476	0.0335	0.0361
HS/'000 pop. index	1.2295	0.8922	0.7772	0.7095	1.3191	0.9276	1.0000
HP/'000 pop.	0.0000	0.0215	0.0000	0.0171	0.0445	0.0088	0.0154
HP/'000 pop. index	0.0000	1.3935	0.0000	1.1080	2.8872	0.5722	1.0000
Aggregate index	3.6995	2.2856	2.4183	1.8175	5.8917	2.3444	3.0000

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
1997				
Pop. in '000	91.6050	95.0790	182.1080	121.3080
HC/'000 pop.	0.0109	0.0000	0.0055	0.0000
HC/'000 pop. index	2.0588	0.0000	1.6069	0.0000
HS/'000 pop.	0.0655	0.0316	0.0439	0.0247
HS/'000 pop. index	1.8155	0.8746	1.2177	0.6855
HP/'000 pop.	0.0000	0.0210	0.0000	0.0165
HP/'000 pop. index	0.0000	1.3659	0.0000	1.0705
Aggregate index	3.8743	2.2405	2.8246	1.7560

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
1998				
Pop. in '000	96.086	98.1430	186.814	125.553
HC/'000 pop.	0.0208	0.0000	0.0054	0.0000
HC/'000 pop. index	6.0909	0.0000	1.5665	0.0000
HS/'000 pop.	0.0520	0.0306	0.0482	0.0239
HS/'000 pop. index	1.4423	0.8473	1.3354	0.6623
HP/'000 pop.	0.0416	0.0306	0.0107	0.0239
HP/'000 pop. index	2.7030	1.9849	0.6952	1.5516
Aggregate index	10.2362	2.8322	3.5971	2.2138

Note: Pop. = Population, HC = Health Centre, HS = Health Station, and HP = Health Post
Source: Field data, 2003

Appendix 14 *(continued)*

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
1999				
Pop. in '000	99.021	100.643	191.220	129.947
HC/'000 pop.	0.0202	0.0000	0.0052	0.0000
HC/'000 pop. index	5.9107	0.0000	1.5304	0.0000
HS/'000 pop.	0.0505	0.0299	0.0471	0.0231
HS/'000 pop. index	1.3997	0.8288	1.3046	0.6399
HP/'000 pop.	0.0404	0.0299	0.0157	0.0308
HP/'000 pop. index	2.6231	1.9415	1.0187	1.9988
Aggregate index	9.9335	2.7702	3.8538	2.6387

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
2000				
Pop. in '000	102.029	103.2040	195.733	134.482
HC/'000 pop.	0.0196	0.0097	0.0051	0.0000
HC/'000 pop. index	5.7363	1.8357	1.4951	0.0000
HS/'000 pop.	0.0490	0.0194	0.0460	0.0223
HS/'000 pop. index	1.3584	0.5372	1.2746	0.6184
HP/'000 pop.	0.0392	0.0291	0.0204	0.0297
HP/'000 pop. index	2.5457	1.8876	1.3270	1.9314
Aggregate index	9.6404	4.2146	4.0967	2.5000

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
2001				
Pop. in '000	105.076	105.7700	198.029	138.038
HC/'000 pop.	0.0190	0.0095	0.0050	0.0000
HC/'000 pop. index	5.5477	1.7668	1.4778	0.0000
HS/'000 pop.	0.0474	0.0189	0.0454	0.0217
HS/'000 pop. index	1.3137	0.5241	1.2598	0.6024
HP/'000 pop.	0.0474	0.0284	0.0303	0.0290
HP/'000 pop. index	3.0775	1.8418	1.9674	1.8816
Aggregate index	9.9389	4.2737	4.7049	2.4840

Appendix 15

Health service coverage by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro			Degua Temben		
	Pop. in '000			Pop. in '000		
	Total	Having access to health service	HSC in %	Total	Having access to health service	HSC in %
1996	90.18	51.40	57.0	93.20	31.876	34.2
1997	91.61	61.38	67.0	95.08	40.694	42.8
1998	96.09	88.30	91.9	98.14	43.870	44.7
1999	99.02	92.19	93.1	100.34	44.480	44.2
2000	102.03	92.23	90.4	103.20	48.196	46.7
2001	105.50	97.09	92.4	105.77	50.875	48.1
Ave.	97.40	80.43	82.6	99.29	43.684	43.5
AAGR%			10			7

Year	Bugna			Baso Liben		
	Pop. in '000			Pop. in '000		
	Total	Having access to health service	HSC in %	Total	Having access to health service	HSC in %
1996	178.32	72.40	40.6	117.21	33.76	28.8
1997	182.11	91.78	50.4	121.31	33.85	27.9
1998	186.81	102.19	54.7	125.55	44.95	35.8
1999	191.22	104.98	54.9	129.95	50.03	38.5
2000	195.73	110.98	56.7	134.48	50.97	37.9
2001	198.03	120.20	60.7	138.04	51.35	37.2
Ave.	188.70	100.42	53.2	127.76	44.15	34. 6
AAGR%			8			5

Note: HSC = Health Service Coverage; Ave. = Average
HSC refers to % of population having access to health service within a 10 km radius
Source: Field data, 2003

Appendix 16
Health personnel index (1996-2001)

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben	Tig-ray	Am-hara	Regions' ave.
1996							
Tot. pop. in '000	90.179	93.204	178.315	117.206	3299.00	14552.00	8925.500
GP/'000 pop.	0.0111	0.0000	0.0056	0.0000	0.0249	0.0173	0.0187
GP/'000 pop. index	0.5927	0.0000	0.0095	0.0000	1.3285	0.9255	1.0000
N/'000 pop.	0.0665	0.0429	0.0280	0.0256	0.1173	0.0343	0.0496
N/'000 pop. index	1.0405	0.8647	0.5649	0.5157	2.3635	0.6909	1.0000
HA/'000 pop.	0.1552	0.1395	0.1122	0.0512	0.3974	0.1499	0.1956
HA/'000 pop. index	0.6936	0.7130	0.5733	0.2617	2.0315	0.7662	1.0000
S/'000 pop.	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0127	0.0098	0.0104
S/'000 pop. index	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	1.2285	0.9482	1.0000
LT/'000 pop.	0.0111	0.0000	0.0056	0.0000	0.0173	0.0063	0.0083
LT/'000 pop. index	1.2385	0.0000	0.6719	0.0000	2.0700	0.7574	1.0000
PT/'000 pop.	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0158	0.0034	0.0057
PT/'000 pop. index	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	2.7586	0.6013	1.0000
Aggregate index	3.5653	1.5778	1.8196	0.7774	11.7804	4.6895	6.0000

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
1997				
Tot. pop. in '000	91.605	95.079	182.108	121.308
GP/'000 pop.	0.0109	0.0000	0.0110	0.0000
GP/'000 pop. index	0.5834	0.0000	0.5870	0.0000
N/'000 pop.	0.1419	0.0421	0.0329	0.0165
N/'000 pop. index	2.8591	0.8476	0.6638	0.3322
HA/'000 pop.	0.2292	0.1262	0.1318	0.0495
HA/'000 pop. index	1.1718	0.6452	0.6737	0.2528
S/'000 pop.	0.0109	0.0105	0.0055	0.0000
S/'000 pop. index	1.0533	1.0148	0.5299	0.0000
LT/'000 pop.	0.0109	0.0000	0.0055	0.0000
LT/'000 pop. index	1.3078	0.0000	0.6579	0.0000
PT/'000 pop.	0.0109	0.0000	0.0055	0.0000
PT/'000 pop. index	1.9104	0.0000	0.5030	0.0000
Aggregate index	8.8858	2.5076	3.6153	0.5850

Note: GP = General practitioner; N-Nurse; HA = Health assistant, LT = Laboratory technician; PT = Pharmaceutical technician
Source: Field data, 2003.

Appendix 16 *(continued)*

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
1998				
Tot. pop. in '000	96.086	98.143	186.814	125.553
GP/'000 pop.	0.0208	0.0000	0.0107	0.0000
GP/'000 pop. index	1.1124	0.0000	0.5722	0.0000
N/'000 pop.	0.1353	0.0408	0.0375	0.0319
N/'000 pop. index	2.7258	0.8212	0.7550	0.6419
HA/'000 pop.	0.3330	0.1223	0.1285	0.0478
HA/'000 pop. index	1.7024	0.6251	0.6567	0.2443
S/'000 pop.	0.0104	0.0102	0.0054	0.0000
S/'000 pop. index	1.0042	0.9832	0.5165	0.0000
LT/'000 pop.	0.0208	0.0000	0.0054	0.0000
LT/'000 pop. index	2.4936	0.0000	0.6413	0.0000
PT/'000 pop.	0.0085	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000
PT/'000 pop. index	1.4931	0.0000	0.0120	0.0000
Aggregate index	10.5315	2.4295	3.1538	0.8862

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
1999				
Tot. pop. in '000	99.021	100.643	191.220	129.947
GP/'000 pop.	0.0202	0.0000	0.0105	0.0000
GP/'000 pop. index	1.0795	0.0000	0.5590	0.0000
N/'000 pop.	0.1313	0.0498	0.0366	0.0308
N/'000 pop. index	2.6451	1.0040	0.7376	0.6202
HA/'000 pop.	0.4242	0.1395	0.1255	0.0539
HA/'000 pop. index	2.1683	0.7133	0.6416	0.2754
S/'000 pop.	0.0101	0.0100	0.0052	0.0077
S/'000 pop. index	0.9745	0.9616	0.5046	0.7425
LT/'000 pop.	0.0202	0.0000	0.0052	0.0000
LT/'000 pop. index	2.4198	0.0000	0.6265	0.0000
PT/'000 pop.	0.0202	0.0000	0.0052	0.0000
PT/'000 pop. index	3.5348	0.0000	0.9152	0.0000
Aggregate index	12.8220	2.6789	3.9845	1.6380

Appendix 16 *(continued)*

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
2000				
Tot. pop. in '000	102.029	103.204	195.733	134.482
GP/'000 pop.	0.0196	0.0000	0.0102	0.0000
GP/'000 pop. index	1.0477	0.0000	0.5461	0.0000
N/'000 pop.	0.1862	0.0872	0.0715	0.0372
N/'000 pop. index	3.7519	1.7571	1.4411	0.7491
HA/'000 pop.	0.4214	0.1357	0.0869	0.0372
HA/'000 pop. index	2.1544	0.6935	0.4440	0.1901
S/'000 pop.	0.0196	0.0097	0.0102	0.0074
S/'000 pop. index	1.8914	0.9350	0.9860	0.7175
LT/'000 pop.	0.0196	0.0097	0.0051	0.0000
LT/'000 pop. index	2.3484	1.1609	0.6121	0.0000
PT/'000 pop.	0.0196	0.0000	0.0102	0.0000
PT/'000 pop. index	3.4306	0.0000	1.7883	0.0000
Aggregate index	14.6245	4.5465	5.8176	1.8065

	Wuk-ro	Degua Tembien	Bug-na	Baso Liben
2001				
Tot. pop. in '000	105.076	105.770	198.029	138.038
GP/'000 pop.	190.0000	0.0000	0.0151	0.0000
GP/'000 pop. index	1.0132	0.0000	0.8097	0.0000
N/'000 pop.	0.3223	0.1040	0.0808	0.0435
N/'000 pop. index	6.4931	2.0954	1.6279	0.8757
HA/'000 pop.	0.4360	0.1324	0.1414	0.0290
HA/'000 pop. index	2.2289	0.6766	0.7228	0.1481
S/'000 pop.	0.0284	0.0095	0.0101	0.0072
S/'000 pop. index	2.7438	0.9123	0.9745	0.6990
LT/'000 pop.	0.0190	0.0095	0.0101	0.0000
LT/'000 pop. index	2.2712	1.1327	1.2100	0.0000
PT/'000 pop.	0.0379	0.0000	0.0151	0.0000
PT/'000 pop. index	6.6354	0.0000	2.6513	0.0000
Aggregate index	21.3857	4.8170	7.9961	1.7228

Appendix 17

Child immunization service delivery achievement by woreda (< 1 year age)

Year	Achievements in Wukro							Achievements in Degua Temben						
	Target pop. in '000	BCG		Measles		DPT3		Target pop. in '000	BCG		Measles		DPT3	
		in '000	in %	in '000	in %	in '000	in %		in '000	in %	in '000	in %	in '000	in %
1996	3.156	3.100	98.23	2.660	84.28	3.037	96.23	3.262	2.416	74.06	2.502	76.70	2.732	83.36
1997	3.206	3.187	99.41	3.135	97.78	3.175	99.03	3.328	2.609	78.39	2.618	78.66	2.905	87.30
1998	3.363	3.337	99.23	3.124	92.89	3.267	97.14	3.435	3.127	91.03	2.986	86.93	3.111	90.57
1999	3.466	3.378	97.46	3..172	91.51	3.250	93.77	3.522	3.275	92.98	3.163	89.80	3.185	90.43
2000	3.571	3.509	98.26	3.292	92.19	3.468	97.11	3.612	3.335	92.33	3.278	90.75	3.219	89.12
2001	3.678	3.601	98.00	3.390	92.17	3.577	97.25	3.702	3.347	90.41	3.160	85.36	3.423	92.46
Ave.	3.407	3.352	98.00	3.120	92.00	3.296	97.00	3.477	3.018	87.00	2.577	84.70	3.096	89.00

Year	Achievements in Bugna							Achievements in Baso Liben						
	Target pop. in '000	BCG		Measles		DPT3		Target pop. in '000	BCG		Measles		DPT3	
		in '000	in %	in '000	in %	in '000	in %		in '000	in %	in '000	in %	in '000	in %
1996	6.241	3.669	58.79	2.714	43.49	2.996	48.01	4.102	2.335	56.92	1.936	47.20	1.597	38.93
1997	6.373	4.672	73.31	3.925	61.59	3.852	60.44	4.246	2.897	68.23	1.296	30.52	1.627	38.32
1998	6.538	4.951	75.73	4.689	71.72	4.591	70.22	4.394	2.289	52.21	1.714	39.00	2.557	58.19
1999	6.692	5.157	77.06	4.851	72.49	4.741	70.84	4.548	2.987	65.68	2.330	51.23	2.866	63.02
2000	6.850	5.392	78.71	5.071	74.03	4.993	72.89	4.707	3.534	75.08	2.758	58.59	3.084	65.52
2001	6.931	5.603	80.84	5.250	75.75	5.141	74.17	4.831	3.437	71.14	2.831	58.60	3.343	69.20
Ave.	6.604	4.907	74.00	4.417	67.00	4.386	66.00	4.471	2.913	65.00	2.144	48.00	2.512	56.00

Source: Field data, 2003.

Appendix 18
Child immunization service delivery index (1996-2001)

Woreda/ region	Achievements						Aggre-gate index
	BCG		Measles		DPT3		
	in %	index	in %	index	in %	index	
1996							
Wukro	98.23	1.4171	84.28	1.8999	96.23	1.7392	5.06
Deg. Temben	74.06	1.0684	76.70	1.7500	83.36	1.5066	4.32
Bugna	58.79	0.8481	43.49	0.9804	48.01	0.8677	2.70
Baso Liben	56.92	0.8211	47.20	1.0640	38.93	0.7036	2.59
Tigray	89.41	1.2898	64.34	1.4504	70.41	1.2725	4.01
Amhara	64.52	0.9308	39.59	0.8925	51.73	0.9349	2.76
Regions' ave.	69.32	1.0000	44.36	1.0000	55.33	1.0000	3.000
1997							
Wukro	99.41	1.43407	97.78	2.20424	99.03	1.7898	5.43
Deg. Temben	78.39	1.13084	78.66	1.7955	87.30	1.5778	4.50
Bugna	73.31	1.05756	61.59	1.38841	60.44	1.0924	3.54
Baso Liben	68.23	0.98428	30.52	0.68801	38.32	0.6926	2.36
1998							
Wukro	99.23	1.4315	92.89	2.0940	97.14	1.7556	5.28
Deg. Temben	91.03	1.3132	86.93	1.9773	90.57	1.6369	4.93
Bugna	75.73	1.0925	71.72	1.6168	70.22	1.2691	3.98
Baso Liben	52.21	0.7532	39.00	0.8792	58.19	1.0517	2.68
1999							
Wukro	97.46	1.4059	91.51	2.0629	93.77	2.1138	5.58
Deg. Temben	92.98	1.3413	89.80	2.0455	90.43	2.0243	5.41
Bugna	77.06	1.1117	72.49	1.6341	70.84	1.6341	4.38
Baso Liben	65.68	0.9475	51.23	1.1549	63.52	1.1549	3.26
2000							
Wukro	98.26	1.4175	92.19	2.0782	97.11	1.7551	5.25
Deg. Temben	92.33	1.3319	90.75	2.0682	89.12	1.6107	5.01
Bugna	78.71	1.1355	74.03	1.6688	72.89	1.3174	4.12
Baso Liben	75.08	1.0831	58.59	1.3208	65.52	1.1842	3.59
2001							
Wukro	98.00	1.4137	92.17	2.0778	97.25	1.7576	5.25
Deg. Temben	90.41	1.3042	85.36	1.9318	92.46	1.6711	4.91
Bugna	80.84	1.1662	75.75	1.7076	74.17	1.3405	4.21
Baso Liben	71.14	1.0263	58.60	1.3210	69.20	1.2507	3.60

Source: Field data, 2003

Appendix 19

Maternal health service delivery achievement by woreda (1996-2001)

Year & *woreda*	Target pop. in '000	Achievements								Target pop. in '000	Achievements			
		TT2 + (P)		Antenatal care		Assisted delivery		Postnatal care			TT2 + (NP)		Family planning	
		in '000	in %	in '000	in %	in '000	in %	in '000	in %		in '000	in %	in '000	in %
Wukro														
1996	3.607	0.508	14.08	0.850	23.59	0.577	16.00	0.193	5.36	17.134	5.385	31.43	1.215	7.09
1997	3.664	0.809	22.08	1.547	42.22	1.240	33.84	0.330	9.00	17.405	8.590	49.35	2.044	11.74
1998	3.843	0.963	25.06	1.998	52.02	1.474	38.35	0.729	18.97	18.256	12.028	65.88	3.655	20.02
1999	3.961	1.044	26.36	2.574	64.98	1.290	32.57	1.095	27.64	18.814	11.969	63.62	5.511	29.29
2000	4.081	1.565	38.35	2.806	68.75	1.273	31.19	1.377	33.74	19.385	11.989	61.85	5.272	27.20
2001	4.203	1.632	38.83	3.241	77.11	1.764	41.97	1.764	41.97	19.964	12.701	66.10	6.821	34.17
Ave.	3.893	1.087	28.00	2.169	56.00	1.270	33.00	0.915	23.49	18.493	10.444	56.00	4.086	22.00
Degua Tembien														
1996	3.728	0.476	12.77	0.674	18.07	0.486	13.03	0.183	4.90	17.709	3.871	21.86	1.454	8.21
1997	3.803	0.650	17.09	0.918	24.14	0.542	14.24	0.318	8.35	18.065	7.818	43.27	2.168	12.00
1998	3.925	0.639	16.28	1.060	27.01	0.684	17.41	0.472	12.01	18.647	6.484	34.77	2.963	15.89
1999	4.025	0.762	18.93	1.196	29.71	0.772	19.17	0.677	16.82	19.120	10.450	54.65	3.713	19.42
2000	4.128	0.782	18.94	1.239	30.02	0.911	22.06	0.844	20.44	19.609	8.863	45.20	4.298	21.92
2001	4.231	1.200	28.36	1.318	31.15	1.072	25.33	1.100	26.00	20.096	12.241	60.91	4.704	23.41
Ave.	3.973	0.727	19.00	1.0675	27.00	0.7445	19.00	0.599	15.00	18.874	8.288	44.00	3.217	17.00

Appendix 19 *(continued)*

Year & *woreda*	Target pop. in '000	Achievements								Target pop. in '000	Achievements			
		TT2 + (P)		Antenatal care		Assisted delivery		Postnatal care			TT2 + (NP)		Family planning	
		in '000	in %	in '000	in %	in '000	in %	in '000	in %		in '000	in %	in '000	in %
Bugna														
1996	7.132	0.917	12.86	0.390	5.47	0.772	10.82	0.152	2.13	33.879	7.189	21.22	2.127	6.28
1997	7.284	1.075	14.76	0.551	7.56	0.945	12.97	0.211	2.90	34.600	10.510	30.37	2.817	8.14
1998	7.472	1.084	14.50	0.872	11.67	1.068	14.29	0.466	6.24	35.494	11.635	32.78	2.916	8.22
1999	7.648	1.247	16.30	0.951	12.43	1.423	18.61	0.696	9.10	36.331	12.265	33.76	3.878	10.67
2000	7.829	1.594	20.36	1.055	13.47	1.473	18.81	0.668	8.53	37.189	15.533	41.77	3.838	10.32
2001	7.921	2.047	25.84	1.528	19.29	1.553	19.61	0.903	11.40	37.625	18.127	48.18	8.674	23.05
Ave.	7.548	1.327	18.00	0.891	12.00	1.206	16.00	0.516	7.00	35.853	12.543	35.00	4.042	11.00
Baso Liben														
1996	4.688	0.710	15.14	0.464	9.90	0.159	3.39	0.079	1.69	22.269	4.407	19.79	0.476	2.14
1997	4.852	0.727	14.98	0.341	7.03	0.196	4.04	0.098	2.02	23.049	6.193	26.87	0.400	1.73
1998	5.022	0.612	12.19	0.677	13.48	0.220	4.38	0.146	2.91	23.855	5.360	22.47	0.785	3.29
1999	5.198	0.782	15.04	0.764	14.70	0.160	3.08	0.139	2.67	24.690	8.791	35.61	1.195	4.84
2000	5.379	0.899	16.71	0.945	17.58	0.217	4.03	0.105	1.95	25.552	9.963	38.99	2.080	8.14
2001	5.521	1.009	18.27	1.069	19.37	0.242	4.38	0.206	3.73	26.227	11.924	45.47	2.294	8.75
Ave.	5.11	0.790	15.00	0.710	14.00	0.199	4.00	0.129	3.00	24.274	7.773	32.00	1.205	5.00

Source: Field data, 2003

Appendix 20

Maternal health service delivery index by woreda (1996-2001)

Woreda/ region	Achievements												Aggre-gate index
	TT2 +(P)		Antenatal care		Assisted delivery		Postnatal care		TT2 +(NP)		Family planning		
	in %	index	in %	index	in %	index	in %	index	in %	index	in %	index	
1996													
Wukro	14.08	0.8456	23.59	1.2370	16.00	2.0382	5.36	1.8807	31.43	1.72125	7.09	1.3130	9.04
Degua Temben	12.77	0.7670	18.07	0.9476	13.03	1.6599	4.90	1.7193	21.86	1.19715	8.21	1.5204	7.81
Bugna	12.86	0.7724	5.47	0.2868	10.82	1.3783	2.13	0.7474	21.22	1.16210	6.28	1.1630	5.51
Baso Liben	15.14	0.9093	9.90	0.5191	3.39	0.4318	1.69	0.5930	19.79	1.08379	2.14	0.3963	3.93
Tigray Region	15.49	0.9303	26.49	1.3891	18.58	2.3669	4.30	1.5088	43.85	2.40142	8.90	1.6481	10.24
Amhara Region	16.92	1.0162	17.29	0.9067	5.30	0.6752	2.50	0.8772	13.82	0.75685	4.80	0.8889	5.12
Regions' ave.	16.65	1.0000	19.07	1.0000	7.85	1.0000	2.85	1.0000	18.26	1.00000	5.40	1.0000	6.00
1997													
Wukro	22.08	1.3261	42.22	2.2139	33.84	4.3108	9.00	3.1579	49.35	2.7026	11.74	2.1741	15.89
Degua Temben	17.09	1.0264	24.14	1.2659	14.24	1.8140	8.35	2.9298	43.27	2.3697	12.00	2.2222	11.63
Bugna	14.76	0.8865	7.56	0.3964	12.97	1.6522	2.90	1.0175	30.37	1.6632	8.14	1.5074	7.12
Baso Liben	14.98	0.8997	7.03	0.3686	4.04	0.5146	2.02	0.7088	26.87	1.4715	1.73	0.3204	4.28
1998													
Wukro	25.06	1.5051	52.02	2.7278	38.35	4.8854	18.97	6.6561	65.88	3.6079	20.02	3.7074	23.09
Degua Temben	16.28	0.9778	27.01	1.4164	17.41	2.2178	12.01	4.2140	34.77	1.9042	15.89	2.9426	13.67
Bugna	14.50	0.8709	11.67	0.6120	14.29	1.8204	6.24	2.1895	32.78	1.7952	8.22	1.5222	8.81
Baso Liben	12.19	0.7321	13.48	0.7069	4.38	0.5580	2.91	1.0211	22.47	1.2306	3.29	0.6093	4.86

Continued

Appendix 20 *(continued)*

Woreda/ region	Achievements												Aggre-gate index
	TT2 +(P)		Antenatal care		Assisted delivery		Postnatal care		TT2 +(NP)		Family planning		
	in %	index	in %	index	in %	index	in %	index	in %	index	in %	index	
1999													
Wukro	26.36	1.5832	64.98	3.4074	32.57	4.1490	27.64	9.6982	63.62	3.4841	29.29	5.4241	27.75
Degua Temben	18.93	1.0024	29.71	1.5579	19.17	2.4420	16.82	5.9018	54.65	2.9929	19.42	3.5963	17.62
Bugna	16.30	0.9790	12.43	0.6518	18.61	2.3707	9.1	3.1930	33.76	1.8488	10.67	1.9759	11.02
Baso Liben	15.04	0.9033	14.7	0.7708	3.08	0.3924	2.67	0.9368	35.61	1.9502	4.84	0.8963	5.85
2000													
Wukro	38.35	2.3033	68.75	3.6051	31.19	3.9732	33.74	11.839	61.85	3.3872	27.2	5.0370	30.14
Degua Temben	17.49	1.1375	30.02	1.5742	22.06	2.8102	20.44	7.1719	45.20	2.4754	21.92	4.0593	19.23
Bugna	20.36	1.2228	13.47	0.7063	18.81	2.3962	8.53	2.9930	41.77	2.2875	10.32	1.9111	11.52
Baso Liben	16.71	1.0036	17.58	0.9219	4.03	0.5134	1.95	0.6842	38.99	2.1353	8.14	1.5074	6.77
2001													
Wukro	38.83	1.7576	77.11	4.0435	41.97	5.3465	41.97	14.726	66.10	3.6199	34.17	5.037	34.53
Degua Temben	28.36	1.6711	31.15	1.6335	25.33	3.2268	26	9.1228	60.91	3.3357	23.41	4.0593	23.05
Bugna	25.84	1.4305	19.19	1.0063	19.61	2.9481	11.4	4.7000	48.18	2.8386	23.05	1.9111	14.83
Baso Liben	18.27	1.0507	19.37	1.0157	4.38	0.5250	3.73	1.3008	45.47	2.3901	8.75	1.5604	7.24

Source: Field data, 2003

Appendix 21
LGN for Environmental Rehabilitation by woreda (1996-2001)

Wukro *Woreda*

1. **Actors:** WA, AO, ZAD/RAB, ETDP/Irish Aid, ESRDF, EOC/DICAC, REST, *Seleste Mahberat*, WFP, GTZ, and WVE.
2. **Principal facilitator:** Agriculture Office (AO).
3. **Principal roles and contribution of actors**

a. WA

- Negotiates and coordinates the intervention of actors that include ETDP/Irish Aid, EOC/DICAC, ESRDF, REST, *Seleste Mahberat*, WFP, and WVE in SWC and afforestation activities.
- Provides overall guidance and supervision through the WDC.
- Facilitates community participation in SWC and afforestation activities through *tabia* and *kushet* administrations, TDC, TCC and KCC.

b. AO

- Facilitates and coordinates need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of conservation activities supported and carried out by different actors.
- Provides technical and material support to *tabia* and *kushet* conservation committees.
- Facilitates, coordinates and organizes training for to conservation committee members and farmers.
- Organizes and provides environmental rehabilitation education to community members.

c. ZAD/RAB

- Provides general policy guidelines, rules and standards environmental protection and conservation measures as well as practices.
- Coordinates budget allocation and disbursement as well as the assignment of personnel, and purchase of furniture and vehicles such as motorbikes.
- Provides training for experts and also assists them in conducting studies on tree species that grow best in the *woreda* .
- Coordinates and supervises WFP and GTZ's support.

d. ETDP/Irish Aid

- Appraises, monitors, and evaluates SWC projects in partnership with the AO and WPAC.
- Supported terracing of 3,073 hectares of land and construction of 11.5 km of check dam.

- Provides the AO with capacity building support thorough the provision of motorbikes, tools and the training of experts as well as farmers in SWC techniques and forest development.
- Supports inter-regional and intra-regional experience sharing between experts and farmers.

e. EOC/DICAC

Supported the AO to produce 145,408 seedlings.

f. ESRDF

- Appraises, approves, monitors, and evaluates SWC projects.
- Promotes community participation through CPC.
- Supported terracing of 855 hectares of land.
- Provides CPC members with training and orientation with regard to participatory local development methods.

g. GTZ

- Supports the production and distribution of 80,000 seedlings.
- Has conducted an environmental (physical and ecological) survey in collaboration with the AO on how to improve seedling production in the *woreda*.

h. REST

- In partnership with the AO, *tabia* &*kushet* administrations and conservation committees, it undertakes need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of SWC and afforestation activities.
- Supported terracing of 1,098 hectares of land, construction of 23.1 km of check dam, and production of 399,159 seedlings.
- Facilitates the planting of seedlings through the provision of transport.
- Provides the AO with capacity-building support thorough the training of agriculture experts and technicians.
- Provides farmers with training in SWC and afforestation techniques as well as with tools and improved tree seeds so as to improve their capacity.
- Facilitates and supports inter-and intra-regional experience sharing between agricultural experts and farmers.

i. Seleste Mahberat

- Participates in need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SWC activities carried out by different actors.
- Plans, implements, monitors and evaluates SWC and afforestation activities by means of the mobilization of members.
- Conducts public discussions on environmental degradation problems and conservation measures.
- Terraced 19,487 hectares of land, constructed 397.53 km of check dam, and produced and planted 9,650,989 and 17,755,139 seedlings.

j. WFP

- Monitors and evaluates SWC and the afforestation activities that it supports.
- Supported terracing of 5,347 hectare of land, construction of 50.35 km check dam, production and distribution of 9,164,988 seedlings.
- Supports the AO's capacity building through training of experts and technicians as well as through the provision of motorbikes and improved tree seeds.
- Supports farmers in their SWC and afforestation activities through training and the provision of working tools.
- Supports inter-regional and intra-regional experience sharing between experts.

k. WVE

- In partnership with the AO, *tabia* &*kushet* administrations and conservation committees, it undertakes need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SWC and afforestation activities.
- Supported terracing of 2,773 hectare of land and construction of 36 km of check dam.
- Builds communities' capacity through training and the provision of improved tree seeds and working tools.
- Supports seedling planting by means of transport.

4. **Network decision-making & communication structures**
   WDC, WPAC, CPC, TDC, T/KCC.
5. **Total contribution**
   32,633 hectares of land were terraced, 418.48 km of check dam constructed, 19,440,544 and 17,755,139 seedlings were produced and planted respectively, of which 10,784,941 seedlings survived.

Degua Tembien

1. **Actors:** WA, AO, ZAD, RAD, REST and Seleste Mahberat.
2. **Principal facilitator:** Agriculture Office (AO).
3. **Principal roles and contribution of actors**

a. WA

- Negotiates and coordinates the intervention of actors, including REST and *Seleste Mahberat*, in SWC and afforestation activities
- Provides overall guidance and supervision through the WDC.
- Facilitates community participation in SWC and afforestation through *tabia* and *kushet* administrations, TDC, T/KCC.

b. AO

- Facilitates and coordinates need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of conservation activities supported and carried out by REST and the Seleste Mahberat.

- Provides technical and material supports to *tabia* and *kushet* conservation committees.
- Facilitates, coordinates, and organizes training of conservation committee members and farmers.
- Organizes and provides environmental rehabilitation education for community members.

c. ZAD/RAB

- Provides general policy guidelines, rules and standards, environmental protection and conservation measures as well as practices.
- Coordinates budget allocation and disbursement as well as the assignment of personnel, and purchase of furniture and vehicles such as motorbikes.
- Provides training for experts and also assists them in conducting studies on tree species that grow best in the *woreda*

d. REST

- In partnership with the AO, *tabia* &*kushet* administrations and conservation committees, it undertakes need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of SWC and afforestation activities.
- Supported terracing of 8,657 hectares of land, construction of 146.4 km of check dam, and the production of 8,198,085 seedlings and the planting of 766,193.
- Facilitates planting of seedlings by providing means of transport.
- Provides capacity building support to the AO through training of agriculture experts and technicians
- Provides training to farmers in SWC and afforestation techniques as well as working tools and improved tree seeds so as to improve their capacity.
- Facilitates and supports inter- and intra-regional experience sharing between agricultural experts and farmers.

e. Seleste Mahberat

- Participate in need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SWC activities carried out by different actors.
- Plan, implement, monitor and evaluate SWC works and afforestation activities carried out through the mobilization of members.
- Conduct public discussions on environmental degradation problems and conservation measures.
- Terraced 17,170 hectares of land, constructed 254.1 km of check dam, and also produced 7,574,335 seedlings and planted 13,208,177.

4. Network decision-making & communication structures

WDC, TDC, T/KCC.

5. **Total contribution**
   25,827 hectares of land were terraced, 400.5 km of check dam constructed, 15,772,420 and 13,974,370 seedlings were produced and planted respectively, of which 10,303,972 seedlings survived

Bugna *Woreda*

1. **Actors:** WA, AO, ZAD/RAD, EOC/DICAC, Plan, SNV, WFP and SCF-UK.
2. **Principal facilitator:** Agriculture Office (AO).
3. **Principal roles and contribution of actors**

a. WA

- Negotiates and coordinates the interventions of actors that include EOC/DICAC, Plan, SNV, WFP, and SCF-UK.
- Provides overall guidance and supervision through the WDC and WDSC.
- Facilitates community participation in SWC and afforestation through *kebele* and *gote* administration

b. AO

- Facilitates and coordinates need identification, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of conservation activities.
- Facilitates, coordinates and organizes training for conservation committees and farmers.
- Organizes and provides environmental rehabilitation education for community members.

c. ZAD/BOA

- Provides general policy guidelines, rules and standards for environmental protection and conservation measures as well as practices.
- Coordinates budget allocation and disbursement as well as the assignment of personnel, and purchase of furniture and vehicles such as motorbikes.
- Provides training for experts and also assists them in conducting studies on tree species that grow best in the *woreda*.
- Coordinates and supervises WFP's support.

d. WFP

- Monitors and evaluates SWC and afforestation activities that it supports.
- Supported terracing of 1,061hectare of land, construction of 54 km of check dam, and the production and distribution of 31,863,492 seedlings.
- Supports the AO's capacity through training of experts as well as the provision of working tools.
- Supports training of farmers in SWC and afforestation activities.

e. SCF-KU

- Supported terracing of 686 hectares of land and construction of 19 km of check dam and artificial waterways.
- Monitors and evaluates conservation projects that it supports.

f. SNV-BIRDP

- Facilitates and promotes community participation in need assessment and prioritisation of SWC and afforestation.
- Supports the AO's capacity thorough different methods that include: training of experts, construction of an office building and the DAs' residential house, provision of motorbikes, office furniture and equipment, reference books as well as improved tree seeds.
- Provides technical advice to the AO on planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation techniques.
- Organizes workshops on participatory planning and implementation in environmental rehabilitation
- Organizes communities into groups to undertake SLU and NRM and also provides these groups with training, working tools as well as technical advices.
- Establishes and supports environmental advocacy clubs.
- Organizes and supports inter-*kebele* experience sharing and exchange visits.

g. EOC/DICAC

- In partnership with the AO, kebele and *gote* administrations, it undertakes need identifications, prioritisation, planning, implementation, monitoring,, and evaluation of SWC and afforestation activities.
- Supported terracing of 40 hectares of land, construction of 1 km of check dam, and production of 1,500,000 seedlings.

4. **Network decision-making & communication structures**
   WDC/WDSC and KDC

5. **Total contribution**
   19,373.16 hectares of land were terraced; 526.34 km of check dam, the cutting of a drain and artificial water way constructed; 34,524,787 and 28,630,019 seedlings were produced and planted respectively, of which 14,864,121 seedlings survived.

Baso Liben

1. **Actors:** WA, AO, ZAD/RAB, and SARDP.
2. **Principal facilitator:** Agriculture Office (AO).
3. **Principal roles and contribution of actors**

a. WA

- Coordinates SARDP's support.

- Facilitates communities' participation through the WDC, kebele and *gote* administrations.

b. AO

- Identifies needs, priorities and planned SWC activities to be carried out through communities' participation.
- Provides technical assistance to communities in producing and planting seedlings.
- Plans and implements SARDP's support for seedling production.
- Organizes and provides training for farmers on SWC and afforestation activities.
- Provides environmental rehabilitation education to community members.

c. ZAD/BOA

- Provides general policy guidelines, rules and standards for environmental protection and conservation measures as well as practices.
- Coordinates budget allocation and disbursement as well as the assignment of personnel, and purchase of furniture and vehicles such as motorbikes.
- Provides training for experts and also assists them in conducting studies on tree species that grow best in the *woreda*

d. SARDP

Supported the production of 480,000 seedlings.

4. Network decision-making and communication structures

WD and KDC.

5. Total contribution

6,816 hectares of land were terraced; 192.49 km of check dam, the cutting of a drain and artificial waterway constructed, 9,618,000 and 8,988,995 of seedlings were produced and planted respectively, of which 6,152,803 seedlings survived.

Appendix 22

Comparative assessment of actors' roles and contributions for environmental rehabilitation (assessed by AO)

No.	Actors by *woreda*	Assessment criteria and comparative score							
		Participation in planning & implementation	Participation in monitoring & evaluation	Environmental rehabilitation education	Resource contributions	Capacity building	Information & experience exchange	Total score	Ave. score
Wukro									
1	ETDP/Irish Aid	1	3	0	3	3	3	15	2.5
2	ESRDF	1	2	0	2	1	2	8	1.3
3	EOC/DICAC	0	2	0	1	0	1	4	0.7
4	GTZ	0	2	0	1	2	2	7	1.2
5	REST	3	3	3	2	3	2	16	2.7
6	*Seleste Mahberat*	3	3	3	3	2	3	17	2.8
7	WVE	2	2	1	2	3	2	12	2.0
8	WFP	1	3	1	3	3	3	14	2.3
Degua Temben									
1	REST	3	3	2	3	3	3	17	2.8
2	*Seleste Mahberat*	3	3	3	3	2	3	17	2.8
Bugna									
1	EOC/DICAC	2	2	0	1	2	2	9	1.5
2	Plan -BCBRDP	3	3	2	2	3	2	15	2.5
3	SCF-UK	1	3	0	3	0	3	10	1.7
4	SNV-BRDIP	2	3	3	3	3	3	17	2.8
5	WFP	0	3	1	3	3	3	13	2.3
Baso Liben									
1	SARD	1	2	1	1	2	2	9	1.5

Note: 3= High, 2= Medium, 1= Low, and 0 = not involved at all

Source: Field data, 2003

Appendix 23
Extent of SWC performance by woreda (1996-2001)

	Pop. in '000	Through community participation				Through FW/CFW		Total SWC works	
		Terraced land in ha		SWC structures in km		Terraced land in ha.	SWC in km	Terraced land in ha.	SWC in km
		Total	Per '000 pop.	Total	Per '000 pop.				
Wukro									
1996	90.179	2914	32.3	79.3	0.9	0.0	0.0	2914	79.3
1997	91.605	3057	33.4	28.2	0.3	183.0	20.0	3240	48.2
1998	96.086	1847	19.2	32.0	0.3	1329.0	14.0	3176	46.0
1999	99.021	3261	32.9	51.0	0.5	4384.0	27.0	7645	78.0
2000	102.029	3430	33.6	10.0	0.1	4198.0	29.3	7628	39.3
2001	105.076	4978	47.4	97.0	0.9	3052.0	30.6	8030	127.6
Total		19487	198.8	297.5	3.0	13146	120.9	32633	418.4
Ave.	97.333	3247.8	33.1	49.6	0.5	2191.0	20.2	5438.8	69.7
Degua Tembien									
1996	93.204	2891	31.0	35.0	0.4	1498	10.4	4389	45.4
1997	95.079	2917	30.7	21.3	0.2	790	15.0	3707	36.3
1998	98.143	1674	17.1	8.8	0.1	1249	25.0	2923	33.8
1999	100.634	3066	30.5	50.0	0.5	647	15.0	3713	65.0
2000	103.204	3193	30.9	27.0	0.3	647	34.0	3840	61.0
2001	105.77	3429	32.4	112.0	1.1	3826	47.0	7255	159.0
Total	596.034	17170	172.6	254.1	2.6	8657	146.4	25827	400.5
Ave.	99.3	2861.7	28.8	42.4	0.4	1442.8	24.4	4304.5	66.8
Bugna									
1996	178.315	1056	5.9	23.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	1056	23.0
1997	182.108	1657	9.1	63.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	1657	63.0
1998	186.814	2786	14.9	115.0	0.6	56.3	3.9	2842	118.9
1999	191.22	3753	19.6	72.0	0.4	128.0	27.3	3881	99.3
2000	195.733	4092	20.9	57.0	0.3	94.3	31.1	4186	88.1
2001	198.029	3667	18.5	47.0	0.2	2083.5	87.0	5751	134.0
Total		17011	88.9	377.0	2.0	2362.1	149.3	19373	526.3
Ave.	188.703	2835.2	14.8	62.8	0.3	393.7	24.9	3228.8	87.7
Baso Liben									
1996	117.206	302	2.58	9.1	0.1	none	none	302	9.1
1997	121.308	1131	9.32	25.7	0.2	none	none	1131	25.7
1998	125.553	1859	14.81	26.0	0.2	none	none	1859	26.0
1999	129.947	1187	9.13	45.3	0.4	none	none	1187	45.3
2000	134.482	1351	10.05	55.0	0.4	none	none	1351	55.0
2001	138.038	986	7.14	31.3	0.2	none	none	986	31.3
Total	766.534	6816	53.03	192.4	1.5	none	none	6816	192.4
Ave.	127.8	1136.0	8.8	32.1	0.3	none	none	1136.0	32.1

Note: Pop. = population, ha. = hectare
Source: Field data, 2003

Appendix 24

Extent of afforestation performance (in absolute terms) by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro			Degua Temben		
	Seedlings in number			Seedlings in number		
	produced	planted	survived	produced	planted	survived
1996	1660691	1630189	815095	1613374	1315978	1022515
1997	2243188	1833305	981656	1685804	1359649	972149
1998	3032951	2914427	1368266	2800077	2502747	1890325
1999	4498521	4098522	2497128	3181790	3069150	2274240
2000	4991489	4275692	3269992	3401985	3111392	2423774
2001	3013704	3003004	1852804	3089390	2615454	1720969
Total	19440544	17755139	10784941	15772420	13974370	10303221
Ave.	3240091	2959190	1797490	2628737	2329062	1717209
Year	**Bugna**			**Baso Liben**		
	Seedlings in number			**Seedlings in number**		
	produced	planted	survived	produced	planted	survived
1996	4478000	3839831	2534289	1541300	1419000	962082
1997	5750000	5446162	2178465	1708700	1576760	1122653
1998	3000000	2963000	1737840	1355000	1234400	818407
1999	7192705	4236404	2245294	1412000	1287200	901040
2000	7215759	6254622	2752033	1324000	1303560	952381
2001	6888323	5890000	3416200	2277000	2168075	1396240
Total	34524787	28630019	14864121	9618000	8988995	6152803
Ave.	5754131	4771670	2477354	1603000	1498166	1025467

Source: Field data, 2003

Appendix 25
Extent of afforestation performance (in relation to population) by woreda (1996-2001)

Year	Wukro			Degua Temben		
	Number of seedlings per '000 pop.			Number of seedlings per '000 pop.		
	produced	planted	survived	produced	planted	survived
1996	18415	18077	9039	17311	14120	10983
1997	24486	20012	10716	17730	14300	10224
1998	31564	21797	14239	22214	20440	17441
1999	45430	41391	25218	25172	24508	20604
2000	48922	41906	32049	21948	24335	18978
2001	28566	28464	17562	20819	19830	13055
Total	197383	171647	108823	125194	117533	91285
Ave.	33264	28977	17374	20936	19723	15299
Year	**Bugna**			**Baso Liben**		
	Number of seedlings per '000 pop.			**Number of seedlings per '000 pop.**		
	produced	planted	survived	produced	planted	survived
1996	25112	21533	14212	13150	12106	8208
1997	31574	29906	11962	14085	12998	9254
1998	30457	23442	15238	10793	9832	6519
1999	36248	22155	11742	10866	9905	6934
2000	36866	31955	14060	9845	9693	7082
2001	34784	29743	17251	16495	15706	10115
Total	195041	158734	84465	75234	70240	48112
Ave.	32638	26538	14108	12547	11727	8027

Source: Field data, 2003

References

Aalen, L. (2002a) 'Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000.' Report R 2002: 2, the Chr. Michelsen Institute Development and Human Rights. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

Aalen, L. (2002b) 'Expression of Control, Fear and Devotion: The Elections in Mekele and Wukro, Tigray Region', in S. Pausewang et al. (eds.) *Ethiopia sine the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance*, pp. 83-99. London: Zed Books.

Abbink, J. (1997) 'Ethnicity and Constitutionalism in Contemporary Ethiopia', *Journal of African Law* 41(2): 159-174.

Abebe[1] Z. and S. Pausewang (1994) 'Introduction: Looking Back into the Future', in Abebe Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy*, pp. 1-11. London: British Academic Press.

Addis Alem B. (2003) 'Economic Development and Democracy in Ethiopia', Ph.D. Dissertation, Erasmus University, Rotterdam.

Adey A. (1999) 'NGO's Focus on Development and Their Research Needs', in Tegegne G.E and Addis T. (eds.) *Proceedings of the Twenty Fifth Anniversary Symposium on Issues of Development Research In Ethiopia* Nov. 26-28, 1998, pp. 33-38. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Printing Press.

Adhana H. (1994) 'Mutation of Statehood and Contemporary Politics', in Abebe Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy,* pp. 12-29. London: British Academic Press.

Amahara Development Association (ADA) (2002) 'Alma News Letter: Special Issue', August 2001.

Adshead, M. (2002) *Developing European Regions?: Comparative Governance, Policy Networks and European Integration.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

Anang, F.T. (1994) 'Evaluating the Role and Impact of Foreign NGOs in Ghana', in E. Sandberg (ed.) *The Changing Politics of Non-Governmental Organisations and the African State*, pp. 101-120. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Anheier, H.K. (1994) 'Non-Governmental Organisations and Institutional Development in Africa: A Comparative Analysis', in E. Sandberg (ed.) *The Changing Politics of Non-Governmental Organisations and the African State*, pp. 139-168.Westport, CT: Praeger.

Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) (2001) *Tsinat: Befashishitawi Chifchefa éna Afena Yaltenberekekew Ye Ethiopia Hizboch Democracywi Nikinakie YetegadiloTarik 1972-1982 (*title in Amharic). Bahir Dar.

[1] Author names without comma are Ethiopian authors whose names start with first given name.

Amahara National Regional State (ANRS)/Bureau of Finance Economic Development (BoFED) (2004) *Development Indicators of Amhara Region*, second edition. BoFED, Bahir Dar.

ANRS/BoFED (2003) Welfare *and Poverty Situation of UNICEF Assisted Woreda in Amhara Region*. BoFED, Bahir Dar.

ANRS/BoFED (2002) *The Amhara National Regional State, Bureau of Finance and Economic Development, 2000/2001 Annual Statistical Bulletin*. BoFED, Bahir Dar.

ANRS/Health Bureau (2002) *Amhara National Regional State Health Bureau. Health and Health Related Indicators*. Health Bureau, Bahir Dar.

ANRS (1996) 'Proclamation No. 16/1996 A Proclamation to Provide for the Reallotment of the Possession of Rural land in the Amhara National Region', *ZIKRE HIG* 1st Year No.16. Bahir Dar.

ANRS (1995a) 'Proclamation No. 2/1995 A Proclamation of the Constitution of the Amhara National Region', *ZIKRE HIG GAZETE* 1st Year No. 2. Bahir Dar.

ANRS (1995b) 'Proclamation No. 3/1995 A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of Woredas of the Amhara National Regional State', *ZIKRE HIG* 1st Year No.3. Bahir Dar.

Anthony, A. (1999) 'Enhancing NGOs-Local Government Partnerships for Development: A Study of Selected Interventions in Northern Ghana under the New Policy Agenda', M.A. thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Anttiroiko, A-V (2004) 'Towards Citizen-centred Local e-Governance?' http://mansetori.uta.fi/kanssalaisena/anttiroiko.htm.

Aregay W. (1999) *Exploratory Study of Two Regions in Ethiopia to Identify Target Areas and Patterns for Intervention*, Report No. 6. Mimeo.

Asmelash B. (2000) 'Decentralization as a Tool for Resolving the Nationality Problem: The Ethiopian Experience', *Regional Development Dialogue* 21(1): 122-152.

Asmelash B. (1997) 'Decentralization as a Strategy for Resolving the Nationality Problem: The Ethiopian Experiment', A Paper Presented at the 18th AAPAM Round Table Conference on the theme: '*Decentralization as a Principle of Democratic Governance in Africa: Issues and Options*.' Nairobi, Kenya.

Aspen, H. (2002) 'Models of Democracy – Perceptions of Power: Government and Peasantery in Ethiopia', in Bahru Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) Ethiopia: *the Challenge of Democracy from Below*, pp. 61-70. Stockholm: Enlanders Gotab.

Ayee, J. (2002) 'Governance, Institutional Reforms and Policy Outcomes in Ghana', in D. Olowu and S. Sako (eds.) *Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Builiding and Democratic Renewal in Africa*, pp. 173-193. Bloomsfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Awortwi, N. (2005) 'New Public Management Paradigm, Lesson from Africa from the Delivery of Basic Services in Ghanaian Cities', in Tegegne G. and M.P van Dijk (eds.) *Issues and Challenges in Local and Regional Development: Decentralization, Urban Service Delivery, Rural-Urban Linkages, and Inequality in Developing Counties*, pp. 79-104. Addis Ababa: United Printers.

Awortwi, N. (2003) 'Getting the Fundamentals Wrong: Governance of Multiple Modalities of Basic Services Delivery in Three Ghanaian Cities', Ph.D Dissertation, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Azfar, O. et al. (1999) *Decentralization, Governance and Public Services: the Impact of Institutional Arrangements: A Review of Literature*. IRIS Centre, University of Maryland, Collage Park.

Bahru Z. (1994) 'Hayla-Sellase: From Progressive to Reactionary', in Abebe Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy,* pp. 30-44. London: British Academic Press.

Batley, R. (1999) 'The New Public Management in Developing Countries', *Journal of International Development* 11(5): 755-760.

Bennett, R.J. and G. Krebs (1994) 'Local Economic Development Partnerships: An Analysis of Policy Networks in EC-LEDA Local Employment Development Strategies', *Regional Studies* 28: 119-140.

Bennett, R.J. (1993) 'Local government in Europe: common directions of change', in R. J. Bennett (ed.) *Local Government in the New Europe*, pp. 1-27. London: Belhaven Press.

Bennett, R.J. (1990a) 'Decentralization, Intergovernmental Relations and Markets: Towards Post-Welfare Agenda?', in R. J. Bennett (ed.) D*ecentralization*, Local *Governments and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda,* pp. 1-28. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bennett, R.J. (1990b) 'Decentralization and Local Economic Development', in R. J. Bennett (ed.) D*ecentralization*, *Local Governments and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda,* pp. 221-244. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bogason, P. (2000) *Public Policy and Local Governance: Institutions in Postmodern Society*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Boisier, S. (1983) *Economic policy, Social Organisation and Regional Development (materials to assemble a theory of regional development*), Cuadernos del ILPES, No. 29. Chile: ILPES.

Boko, S.H. (2002) *Decentralization and Reform in Africa*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Borton, J. (1995) 'Ethiopia: NGO Consortia and Coordination Arrangements, 1984-91', in J. Borton et al. (1995) *Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice*, pp. 25-42. London: Earthscan.

Bradach, J.L. and R.G. Eccles (1991) 'Price, authority and trust: from ideal types to plural forms', in G. Thompson et al. (eds.) *Markets, Hierarchies and networks. The coordination of social life*, pp. 277-292. London: Sage.

Bratton, M. (1994) 'Non-Governmental Organisations in Africa: Can they Influence Public Policy', in E. Sandberg (ed.) *The Changing Politics of Non-Governmental Organisations and the African State*, pp. 33-58. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Brautigam, D. (1994) 'State, NGOs, and International Aid in the Gambia', in E. Sandberg (ed.) *The Changing Politics of Non-Governmental Organisations and the African State*, pp. 59-82.: Westport, CT: Praeger.

Brietzke, P. (1995) 'Ethiopia's "Leap in the Dark": Federalism and Self-Determination in the new Constitution', *Journal of African Law* 39(1): 19-38.

Brosio, G. (2000) *Decentralization in Africa.*
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/fiscal/brosio.pdf.

Bogason, P. (2000) *Public Policy and Local Governance: Institutions in Postmodern Society*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Burgess, R. et al. (1997) 'Contemporary Policies for Enablement and Participation: A Critical Review', in R. Burgess et al. (eds.) *The Challenge of Sustainable Cities: Neoliberal-*

ism and Urban Strategies in Developing Countries, pp. 139-162. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Burns, D. et al. (1994) *The Politics of Decentralization: Revitalizing Local Democracy*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Carroll, T. (1992) *Intermediary NGOs: the Supporting Link in Grassroots Development*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Chang, H-J. (2003) *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*. London: Anthem Press.

Cheari, C.P (N.D) 'Land and Democracy in Tigray', Institute of Development Research, Addis Ababa University. Mimeo.

Cheema, G.S. and D. A. Rondinelli (1983) *Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Clapham, C. (2005) 'Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis.' http//: www.ethiomedia.com/fastpress/Clapham_on_ethiopian_crisis.html.

Clapham, C. (1994) 'Ethnicity and the National Question in Ethiopia', in P. Woodward and M. Forsyth (eds.) *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and its Alternatives,* pp. *27-40*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing.

Clapham, C. (1969) *Haile-Selassie's Government*. London: Longmans.

Central Statistical Agency (CSA) (1998) *Ethiopia Statistical Abstract 1997*. Addis Ababa: CSA.

CSA (2002) *Ethiopia Statistical Abstract 2001*. Addis Ababa: CSA.

Cohen, J.M. and S.B. Peterson (1999) *Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Cohen, J.M. and S.B Peterson (1997) 'Administrative Decentralization: A New Framework for Improved Governance, Accountability, and Performance', Development Discussion Paper No. 582, Harvard Institute for Development, Harvard University.

Cohen, J.M. (1995) 'Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia', *Northeast African Studies* 2(2): 157-188.

Cohen, J.M and P.H. Kohen (1980) *Ethiopian Provincial and Municipal Government: Imperial Patterns and Post Revolutionary Changes*. Michigan: African Studies Centre.

Cohen, J.M. (1974) *Local Government Reform in Ethiopia: an Analysis of the Problems and Prospects of the Awraja Self-Government Proposal, with Particular Emphasis on Rural Change, Local Participation and Potential areas of external Assistance*. Washington, D.C.: USIAD.

Crozier, M. and E. Friedberg (1980) *Actors and Systems: the Politics of Collective Action*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Dahl, R.A. (1971) *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Daniel G. (1994) 'A Nation in Perpetual Transition: the Politics of Changes in Administrative Divisions and Subdivisions in Ethiopia', in M. Harold G. (ed.) *New trends in Ethiopian Studies: Papers of the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies* 2: 83-113. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.

Davey, K. and G. Glentworth (1978) 'Local Administration: The Second Coming?', in Institute of Commonwealth Studies *A Revival of Local Government and Administration*?: A*n Assessment of Recent Developments in Several New States*. Collected Seminar Papers No. 23, pp. 74-79. London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London.

DeMars, W. E. (2005) *NGOs and Translational Networks: Wild Cards in World Politics*. London: Pluto Press.

Dessalegn R. and Meheret A. (2204) 'Democracy Assistance to Post-Conflict Ethiopia: Building Local Institutions', Working Paper 27. Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' in cooperation with Forum for Social Studies. http: //www.clingendael.nl/publications/2004/20040700_cru_working_paper_27_prf.

Dessalegn R. (2002) 'Civil Society Organisation in Ethiopia', in Bahru Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia: the Challenge of Democracy from Below*, pp. 103-119. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.

Dethier, J-J. (2000) 'Governance, Decentralization and Reform: An Introduction', in *J-J.* Dethier (ed.) *Governance, Decentralization and Reform in China, India and Russia*, pp. 1-46. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Devas, N. (2004) *Urban Governance, Voice and Poverty in the Developing World*. London: Earthscan.

Devas, N. and U. Grant (2003) 'Local Government Decision-making Citizen Participation and Local Accountability: Some Evidence from Kenya and Uganda', *Public Administration and Development* 23: 307-316.

Development in Practice (1991) 'Editorial', 1(3). http: //www.developmentinpractice.org./abstracts/vol01/edvln3.htm.

Dia, M. (1996) *Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Doorenspleet, R. (2003) 'Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa', in M.A.M. Salih (ed.) *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance*, pp. 169-187. London: Pluto Press.

Dwivedi, O.P. (2002) 'On Common Good and Good Governance: An Alternative Approach', in D. Olowu and S. Sako (eds.) *Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Building and Democratic Renewal in Africa*, pp. 35-52. Bloomsfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Edwards, M. and A. Fowler (2002) 'Introduction: Changing Challenges for NGDO Management', in M. Edwards and A. Fowler (eds.) *the Earthscan Reader on NGO Management,* pp. 1-10. London: Earthscan.

Edwards, M. (2002) 'International Development NGOs: Agents of Foreign Aid or Vehicles for International Cooperation?', in M. Edwards and A. Fowler (eds.) *the Earthscan Reader on NGO Management*, pp. 27-37. London: Earthscan.

Edwards, M. and G. Sen (2002) 'NGOs, Social Changes and the Transformation of Human Relationships: A 21st-century Civic Agenda', in M. Edwards and A. Fowler (eds.) *The Earthscan Reader on NGO Management*, pp. 38-49. London: Earthscan.

Edwards, M. and D. Hulme (2002a) 'Making a Difference: Scaling-up the Developmental Impact of NGOs-Concepts and Experiences', in M. Edwards and A. Fowler (eds.) *the Earthscan Reader on NGO Management*, pp. 53-73. London: Earthscan.

Edwards, M. and D. Hulme (2002b) 'NGOs Performance and Accountability: Introduction Overview' in, M. Edwards and A. Fowler (eds.) *the Earthscan Reader on NGO Management*, pp. 187-203. London: Earthscan.

Edwards, M. et al. (1999) 'NGOs in a global future: marrying local delivery to worldwide leverage', *Public Administration and Development* 19: 117-136.

Edward, W. and H. Howard (1955) *Public Administration in Ethiopia: A study in Retrospec-*

tive and Prospect. Athens: Geboren.

Ege, S. (2002) 'Peasant Participation in Land Reform: the Amhara Land Redistribution of 1997', in Bahru Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia: the Challenge of Democracy from Below*, pp. 71-86. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.

Endashaw B. (2003) *Factors Affecting the Privatisation Policy Implementation in Developing Countries: a Case Study of Privatisation Policy in Ethiopia*. Mphil Thesis, University of Bergen, Bergen.

Enemuo, F. (2000) 'Problems and Prospects of Local Governance', in G. Hyden et al. (eds.) *African Perspective on Governance*, pp. 181-204. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Engel, P.G.H. (1993) 'Daring to Share: Networking among non-governmental organisations', in C. Alders et al. (eds.) *Linking with Farmers: Networking for Low-External-Input and Sustainable Agriculture,* pp.131-150. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Esser, K. et al. (2002) *'Soil Conservation in Tigray, Ethiopia',* Noragric Report No. 5, Noragric Agricultural University of Norway. http: //www.umb.no/noragric/ publications/reports/rep5_firstpages.pdf.

Eyasu E. (2002) *Farmers' Perceptions of Soil Fertility Change and Management*. SOS-SAHEL, Institute for Sustainable Development, Addis Ababa.

Ethiopian Review (1993) 'News and Analysis August 1993.' http://ethiopianreview. homestead.com/News_EditorsNote_Aug1993.html.

European Union and Ministry of Capacity Building (EU and MoCB) (2004) 'Mapping Non-State Actors in Ethiopia', A Research Study Commissioned by the European Union and Ministry of Capacity Building, Ethiopia. Mimeo.

Evans, P. (1997) 'Government Action, Social Capital and Development: Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy', in P. Evans (ed.) *State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development*, pp. 178-209. University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, Research Series #94, 1997. http: //repositories.cdlib. org/uciaspubs/research/94.

Fasil N. (1997) *Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect*. Asmara: The Red Sea Press.

Farrington, J. and D. J. Lewis (1993) 'Chapter 1 Introduction', in J. Farrington and D.J. Lewis (eds.) *Non-governmental Organisations and the State in Asia: rethinking roles in sustainable agricultural development,* pp. 3-26. London: Routledge.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) (1995) 'Proclamation No.1/1995 A Proclamation to Pronounce the Coming into Effect of the Constitution of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.' *FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA* 1st Year No. 1, Addis Ababa.

Fenta M. (1998) 'Decentralization in Post Derg Ethiopia: Aspects of Federal Regional Relations', M.A. Thesis, Regional and Local Development Studies, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa.

Fenta M. (1993) 'Local Government within the New Regionalization Policy in Ethiopia', BA Senior Essay, Department of Management and Public Administration, Faculty of Business and Economics, Addis Ababa University.

Fisher, J. (1993) *The Road from Rio: Sustainable Development and the Nongovernmental Movement in the Third World*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Fowler, A. (2002a) 'NGO Futures-Beyond Aid: NGDO Values and Fourth Position',

in M. Edwards and A. Fowler (eds.) *the Earthscan Reader on NGO Management*, pp. 13-26. London: Earthscan.

Fowler, A. (2002b) 'Beyond Partnership: Getting Real about NGO Relationships in the Aid System', in M. Edwards and A. Fowler (eds.) *the Earthscan Reader on NGO Management*, pp. 241-255. London: Earthscan.

Fowler, A. (2000) *Civil Society, NGDOs and Social Development: Changing the Rules of the Game*. UNRISD Occasional Paper 1, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva.

Fowler, A. (1997) *Striking a Balance: a Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of Non-governmental Organisations in International Development*. London: Earthscan.

Fowler, A. et al. (1992) *Institutional Development and NGOs in Africa: Policy Perspectives for European Development Agencies*. Oxford: INTRAC.

Frederiksen, B.F and K. Westergaard (1993) 'Political Culture, Local Government and Local Institutions', Papers from the Researcher-Training Course Held at Roskilde University Centre 3 to 6 April 1991, Institute of Development Study, Roskilde University, Occasional Paper No. 7.

Fukuyama, F. (1999) *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order*. New York: The Free Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1995) *Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. London: Penguin Books.

Gboyega, A. (1998) 'Decentralization and Local Autonomy in Nigeria's Federal System: Crossing the Stream while Searching for the Febbles', in J.D. Barkan (ed.) *Decentralization and Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa,* Occasional Paper No. 49, University of Iowa International program. Iowa: Iowa University.

Gebre Ab B. (1997) 'Local Government, Equity and Primary Health Care in Ethiopia', Ph.D. Dissertation, Faculty of Science, University of London, London.

Gilbert, R. et al. (1996) *Making Cities Work: The Role of Local Authorities in the Urban Environment*. London: Earthscan.

Girma H. (2004) 'Scaling up NGOs' Good Practices: Making a Difference Action Aid Ethiopia's Initiative in Alternative Basic Education', M.A. Thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Gonzalez III, J.L. et al. (2000) *Opting for Partnership: Governance Innovations in Southeast Asia*. Ottwa: Institute on Governance.

Goss, S. (2001) *Making Local Governance Work: Networks, Relationships and the Management of Change*. New York: Palgrave.

Graham, J. (N.D.a) 'Wither NGOs in Ethiopia? NGOs and the Sate Part II.' http://www.addistribune.com/Archives/2003/04/18-04-03/Wither.htm.

Graham, J. (N.D.b) 'Wither NGOs in Ethiopia? Local NGOs and the Future of NGOs in Ethiopia, Part III.' http://www.addistribune.com/Archives/2003/04/18-04-03/Wither.htm.

Hajer, M. A. and H. Wagenaar (eds.) (2003) *Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Halliday, F. (2001) 'The Romance of Non-state Actors', in D. Josselin and W. Wallace (eds.) *Non-state Actors in World Politics*, pp. 1-20. New York: Palgrave.

Haus, M. et al. (2005a) 'Introduction', in M. Haus et al. (eds.) *Urban Governance and Democracy: Leadership and Community Involvement*, pp. 1-11. London: Routledge.

Haus, M. and H. Heinelt (2005) 'How to Achieve Governability at the Local Level? Theoretical and conceptual considerations on a complementarity of urban leadership and community involvement', in M. Haus et al. (eds.) *Urban Governance and Democracy: Leadership and Community Involvement*, pp. 12-39. London: Routledge.

Haverkort, B. et al. (1993) 'Networking for Low-external-input and Sustainable Agriculture', in C. Alders et al. (eds.) *Linking with Farmers: Networking for Low-External-Input and Sustainable Agriculture*, pp 3-23. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.

Helmsing, A.H.J. (2005) 'Governance of Local Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Who are the Dancers and Do They Act "in Concert"?', ISS Working Paper Series No. 408, The Hague.

Helmsing, A.H.J. (2003) 'Local Economic Development: New Generations of Actors, Policies and Instruments for Africa', *Public Administration and Development* 23(1): 67-76.

Helmsing, A.H.J. (2001) 'Decentralization, Enablement and Local Governance in Low Income Countries', ISS Working Paper No. 342, Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague.

Helmsing, A.H.J. (2000) *Decentralization and Ennoblement: Issues in the Local Governance Debate*. Utrecht: University of Utrecht

Helmsing, A.H.J. (1997a) *'Local Government and Finance: an Introduction'*, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. Mimeo.

Helmsing, A.H.J. (1997b) 'Government Enablement and Planning', in A.H.J Helmsing and J. Guimarães, (eds.) *Locality, State and Development: Essays in the Honour of Jos G.M Hilhorst*, pp. 107-130. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.

Howell, J. and J. Pearce (2001) Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Hubbard, M. and M. Smith (1999) 'Does New Public Management Work in Reforming the State's Role in Agricultural Marketing in Developing Countries?' *Journal of International Development* 11(5): 785-790.

Hulme, D. and M. Edwards (1997) 'NGOs, States and Donors: An Overview', in D. Hulme and M. Edwards (eds.) *NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort*, pp. 3-15. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) (2001) 'Why Humanitarian Accountability? Contextual and operational factors.' http: //www.hapinternational.org/pdfword/844.RevisedCGcleanII.pdf.

Hyden, G. and J. Court (2002) 'Comparing Governance Across Countries and Over Time: Conceptual Challenges', in D. Olowu and S. Sako (eds.) *Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Builiding and Democratic Renewal in Africa*, pp. 13-34. Bloomsfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Hyden, G. (2000) 'The Governance Challenge in Africa', in G. Hyden et al. (eds.) *African Perspective on Governance*, pp. 13-33. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Institute on Governance (IOG) and York University (1999) 'Understanding Governance in Strong Aboriginal Communities: Phase One: Principles and Best Practices from the Literature.' www.iog.ca/publications/strong_ab_gov.pdf.

Ivanova, M. (2005) 'Environment: The Path of Global Environmental Governance-Form and Function in Historical Perspective', in G. Ayre and R. Callway (eds.)*Governance for Sustainable Development,* pp. 45-72. London: Earthscan.

Jacob, P.E. (1971) 'Values and Public Vitality: The Political Dynamics of Community Activeness', in The International Studies of Values in Politics, *Values and the Active Community: a Cross-national Study of the Influence of Local Leadership*, pp. 3-39. New York: Free Press.

Jackson, E.T. and S. Gariba (2002) 'Complexity in Local Stakeholder Coordination: Decentralization and Community Water Management in Northern Ghana', *Public Administration and Development* 22: 135-140.

Jeffrey, P. (2000) 'Why another Drought in Ethiopia?' UMCOR News Archive. http: //gbgm-umc.org/umcor/00/eth4.stm.

John, P. et al. (2000) 'Strategies for Sustainable Agricultural Development in the Ethiopian Highlands.' http: //ideas.repec.org/p/fpr/edtddp/77.html.

Joireman, S.F. and T.S. Szayna (ND.) 'The Ethiopian Prospective Case.' http: //www.rand.org/pubs/monograph-reports/MR1188.ch5.pdf.

Jordan, L. and P.V. Tuijl (2002) 'Political Responsibility in Transitional NGO Advocacy', in M. Edwards and A. Fowler (eds.) *the Earthscan Reader on NGO Management*, pp. 100-120. London: Earthscan.

Josselin, D. and W. Wallace (2001) 'Non-state Actors in World Politics: a Framework', in D. Josselin and W. Wallace (eds.) *Non-state Actors in World Politics*, pp. 1-20. New York: Palgrave.

Kasfir, N. (1983) 'Designs and Dilemmas: an overview', in P. Mahood (ed.) *Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa*, pp. 25-47. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Karanja, A.M. (2005) 'Solid Waste Management in Nairobi: Actors, Institutional Arrangements and Contributions to Sustainable Development', Ph.D Dissertation, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Karl, M. (1999a) 'Introduction', in M. Karl et al. (eds.) *Measuring the Immeasurable: Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation of Networks*, pp. 17-26. New Delhi: Women's Feature Service.

Karl, M. (1999b) 'Using the Results of Monitoring and Evaluation-Introduction', in M. Karl et al. (eds.) *Measuring the Immeasurable: Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation of Networks,* pp. 165-174.New Delhi: Women's Feature Service.

Karl, M. (1999c) 'Measuring the Immeasurable! Conclusions, Guidelines and Recommendations', in M. Karl et al. (eds.) *Measuring the Immeasurable: Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation of Networks,* pp. 205-230. New Delhi: Women's Feature Service.

Kassahun B. (2002) 'The Role of NGOs in Protecting Democratic Values. The Ethiopian Experience', in Bahru Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia: the Challenge of Democracy from Below*, pp. 120-129. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.

Kauzya, J-M. (2003) *Local Governance Capacity-Building for Full-Range Participation: Concepts, Frameworks and Experiences in African Countries*. DESA Discussion Paper No.33, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York. http:// www.un.org/esa/esa03dep33.pdf.

Kefyalew K-M. (2000) 'The Efforts of Relief Society of Tigray (REST) and People's Participation in Environmental Rehabilitation in Tigray Region, Ethiopia', MA thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Keller, E.J. (1988) *Revolutionary Ethiopia: from Empire to People's Republic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Kettl, D.F. (2000) *The Global Public Management Revolution: A Report on the Transformation of Governance*. Washington, D.C: the Brookings Institution.

Kickert, W.J.M et al. (1997) 'Introduction: A Management Perspective on Policy Networks', in W.J.M Kickert et al. (eds.) *Managing Complex Network: Strategies for the Public Sector,* pp. 1-34. London: Sage.

Kickert, W.J.M. and J.F.M. Koppenjan (1997) 'Public Management and Network Management: an Overview', in W.J.M. Kickert et al. (eds.) *Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector,* pp. 35-61. London: Sage.

Kinfe A.W. (2002) 'Public and Private Labour Investment and Institutions for Soil and Water Conservation in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia,' PIMEA Working Paper 02, Wageningen University http: //www.north-south.nl/webfiles/pimeas2002-02.pdf.

Kingsbury, D. (2004) *Key Issues in Development*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kohen, P. (1974) 'Jurisdiction of Local Government with Particular Reference to Municipalities in Ethiopia', in Asmelash B. (comp.) *Studies in Ethiopian Government and Administration*, pp. 141-159. Addis Ababa: Faculty of Arts, Haile Selassie I University.

Knoke, D. and R. S. Burt (1983) 'Prominence', in R.S. Burt and M.J. Minor *Applied Network Analysis: A Methodological Introduction*, pp. 195-222. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Lane, J-E. (2000) *New Public Management*. London: Routledge.

Lane, J-E. (1995)*The Public Sector: Concepts, Models and Approache*s. London: Sage.

Lathrop, G. (1997) 'Local Development, Social Contract and Institutional Thickness', in A.H.J. Helmsing and J. Guimarães (eds.) *Locality, state and Development: Essays in the Honour of Jos G.M Hilhorst*, pp. 107-130. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies

Leach, R. and J. Percy-Smith (2001) *Local Governance in Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Libenberg, S. (2001) 'Non-Governmental Organisations as agents of development', in H. Swanepoel and F. de Beer (eds.) *Introduction to Development Studies*, pp. 85-78. London: Thomson Publishing.

Litvack, J. et al. (1998) '*Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries',* Sector Studies Series 21491. Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

Mabogunje, A. (1999) 'Literature in the Time of Tyranny: African Writers and the Crisis of Governance and Decentralization', in D. Olowu et al. (1999) *Governance and Democratisation in West Africa*, pp. 29-39. UK: Russell Press Ltd.

Mackintosh, M. and R. Roy (1999) 'Introduction: economic decentralization, issues of theory and policy', in M. Mackintosh and R. Roy (eds.) *Economic Decentralization and Public Management Reform*, pp. 1-23. Cheletenham: Edward Elgar.

Makumbe, J.M. (1998) 'Decentralization, Democracy, and Development in Zimbabwe', in J.D Barkan (ed.), *Decentralization and Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa,* Occasional Paper No. 48, University of Iowa International program. Iowa: Iowa University.

Malombe, J. (2000) *Community Development Foundations: Emerging Partnerships*. Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

Marcussen, M. and J. Torfing (2003) *Grasping Governance Networks*. Centre for Democratic Network Governance Working Paper 2003: 5, Centre for Democratic Network Governance Roskilde University, Roskilde.

Markakis, J. and Asmelash B. (1974) 'Representative Institutions in Ethiopia', in Asmelash B. (comp.) *Studies in Ethiopian Government and Administration*, pp. 44-70. Addis Ababa: Faculty of Arts, Haile Selassie I University.

Marcus, H.G. (2002) *A History of Ethiopia Updated Edition*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Martin, I.S. *(1998) Building a Learning Network on Governance: The Experience of the Governance Cooperative. Ottawa:* Institute on Governance.

Mathur, S.N.J. (1999) *Decentralization and Local Politics: Readings in Indian Government and Politics-2*. New Delhi: Sage.

McCarney, P.L. (1996) 'Revising Local Government: The Neglected Tier in Development', in P.L. McCarney (ed.)*The Changing Nature of Local Government in Developing Countries,* pp. 5-30. Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies.

McCann, J.C. (2002) 'Prospects for Democracy, Agro-ecology and Civil Society: The Elections in Amhara Region, Ethiopia's Rural/Urban Hinterland', in S. Pausewang et al. (eds.) *Ethiopia sine the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance*, pp. 63-82. London: Zed Books.

Meheret A. (2002) 'Decentralization in Ethiopia: Two Case Studies on Devolution of Power and Responsibilities to Local Government Authorities', in Bahru Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia: the Challenge of Democracy from Below*, pp 130-146. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.

Meheret A. (1997) 'Public Administration in Ethiopia- 1974-1991: Administrative and Policy Responses to Turbulence', Ph.D Dissertation, University of Albany, State University of New York, New York.

Mengesha M. (2000) 'NGO's and Participation in Self-Reliant Community Development: A Case of Agri-Service Ethiopia in Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia', MA thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Merera G. (2002) 'Ethiopia: Competing ethnic nationalisms and the quest for democracy, 1960-2000', Ph.D Dissertation, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Miller, W. et al. (2000) *Models of Local Governance. Public Opinion and Political Theory in Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDaC) (1999) *Survey of the Ethiopian Economy: Review of Post-Reform Development (1992/93-1997/98).* Addis Ababa: MEDaC.

Ministry of Education (MoE) (2002) *Education Statistics Annual Abstract: 1994 E.C./2001-02/*. Addis Ababa: Master Printing Press.

Ministry of Health (MoH) (2003) *NGOs Involvement in the Ethiopian Health Sector: facts, challenges, and suggestions for collaborative environment.* Addis Ababa: MoH.

MoH (2001) *Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Health: Health and Health Related Indicators*. Addis Ababa: Berhanena Selam Printing Enterprise.

MoH (2000) *Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Health: Health and Health Related Indicators*. Addis Ababa: Berhanena Selam Printing Enterprise.

MOH (1999) *Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Health: Health and Health Related Indicators*. Addis Ababa: Alpha Printers.

MoH (1998) *Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Health: Health and Health Related Indicators*. Addis Ababa: Smayata Press.

MoH (1996) *Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Health: Health Service Standard: Health Centre*. Addis Baba: MoH.

Moharir, V. (2002) 'Governance and Policy Analysis', in D. Olowu, S. Sako (eds.) *Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Builiding and Democratic Renewal in Africa*, pp. 107-123. Bloomsfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Mitiku H. et al. (2005) *Research Report 2 Land Registration in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia*. Nottingham: Russell Press.

Morgan, K. et al. (1999) 'Networking for Local Economic Development', in G. Stoker (ed.) *The New Management of British Local Governance,* pp. 181-196. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Mulatu W. (1990) 'Regional Planning in Ethiopia: Issues and Problems', A Report Submitted to the Regional Planning Department of the Office of the National Committee for Central Planning under UNDP TOKTEN Project ETH/82/007.

Negassa G. (2005) 'Addressing Governance Reforms in PRSP programmes,' M.A Thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Ngethe, N. (1998) 'The Politics of Democratisation through Decentralization in Kenya: Policy and Practice with Emphasis on the District Focus for Rural Development', in J.D. Barkan (ed.), *Decentralization and Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa,* Occasional Paper No. 45, University of Iowa International Programme. Iowa: Iowa University.

Nielsen, H.A. (2002) 'The Role of Donors: How to Combine Sector Program Support with Devolution? A Comment from a Practitioner to J. Wunsch: 'Decentralization, Local Governance and "Recentralization" in Africa', *Public Administration and Development* 22: 175-178.

NORAD (2005) 'Study of the Impact of the Work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society, Summary of Synthesis Report', Study/1/2005. http://www.norad.no1default.asp?FILE=items/3038/25/050034-01%20sammendrag.pdf.

Oates, W.E. (1990) 'Decentralization of the Public Sector: An Overview,' in R.J. Bennett (ed.) D*ecentralization*, *Local Governments and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda,* pp. 43-58. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

OECD (2001) *Local Partnerships for Better Governance*. Paris: OECD.

Oertel, S. (2004) 'Governance Profile of Ethiopia', Economic Commission for Africa, Development Policy Management Division http://www.uneca.org/dpmd/publications/countryprofiles/Ethiopia-Final.pdf.

Olowu, D. and J.S. Wunsch, (2004) *Local Governance in Africa: the Challenges of Democratic Decentralization*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Olowu, D. (2003) 'Local Institutional and Political Structures and Processes: Recent Experience in Africa', *Public Administration and Development* 23: 41-52.

Olowu, D. (2002a) 'Introduction: Governance and Policy Management Capacity in Africa', in D. Olowu and S. Sako (eds.) *Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Building and Democratic Renewal in Africa*, pp. 1-12. Bloomsfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Olowu, D. (2002b) 'Governance, Institutional Reforms, and Policy Processes in Africa: Research and Capacity Building Implications', in D. Olowu and S. Sako (eds.) *Better Governance and Public Policy: Capacity Building and Democratic Renewal in Africa*, pp. 53-71. Bloomsfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Olowu, D. (2001) 'Decentralization Policies and Practices under Structural Adjustment and Democratisation in Africa. Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Program Paper No. 4, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva.

Olowu, D. (2000) 'Bureaucracy and Democratic Reform', in G. Hyden et al. (eds.) *African Perspective on Governance*, pp. 153-180. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Olowu, D. (1999) 'Local Governance, Democracy, and Development', in R. Joseph (ed.) *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa,* pp. 285-296. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienne.

Olowu, D. (1995) 'The African Experience in Local Governance', in P.S. Reddy (ed.) *Perspectives on Local Government Management and Development in Africa*. Durban: Department of Public Administration, Durban University.

Office of Population and Housing Census Commission (OPHCC) (1995a) 'The 1994 Population and Hosing Census of Ethiopia Results for Tigray Region Summary Report.' Addis Ababa.

OPHCC (1995b) 'The 1994 Population and Hosing Census of Ethiopia Results for Amhara Region Summary Report.' Addis Ababa.

Ouedraogo, H.M.G. (2003) 'Decentralization and Local Governance: Experiences from West Africa', *Public Administration and Development* 23: 97-103.

Pausewang, S. (2002) 'No Environmental Protection without Local Democracy? Why Peasants Distrust Their Agricultural Advisers', in Bahru Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia: the Challenge of Democracy from Below*, pp. 87-100. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.

Pausewang, S. et al. (2002a) 'Democratisation in Ethiopia: Some Notes on Theory and Methodology', in S. Pausewang et al. (eds.) *Ethiopia sine the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance*, pp. 1-25. London: Zed Books.

Pausewang, S. et al. (2002b) 'A processes of Democratisation or Control? The Historical and Political Context', in S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia sine the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance*, pp. 26-44. London: Zed Books.

Pausewang, S. and L. Aalen (2002) 'Shattered Promises and Hopes: The 2001 Local Elections in Southern Region', in S. Pausewang et al. (eds.) *Ethiopia sine the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance*, pp. 201-229. London: Zed Books.

Pausewang, S. (1997) 'Democratic Dialogue and Local Tradition', in K. Fukui et al. (eds.) *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the 13th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, 12-17 December 1997,* II: 186-205. Kyoto: Shokado Book Seller.

Pausewang, S. (1994) 'Local Democracy and Central Control', in Abebe Z. and S. Pausewang (eds.) *Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy*, pp. 209-230. London: British Academic Press.

Perham, M. (1969) *The Government of Ethiopia.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Phiri, P. (2004) 'From Local Government to Local Governance: A Quest to Strengthen Capacities for Actors in Local Development. An Evaluation of a Capacity Building Program in Zambia', M.A Thesis, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.

Plumtre, T. J. Graham (1999) *Governance and Good Governance: International and Aboriginal Perspectives*. Ottawa: Institute on Governance.

Rouban, L. (1999) 'Introduction: Citizens and the New Governance', in L. Rouban (ed.) *Citizens and the New Governance: Beyond the New Public Management*, European Group of Public Administration Yearbook 3. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

Powell, W.W. (1991) 'Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organisation', in G. Thompson et al. (eds.) *Markets, Hierarchies and Networks. The Coordination of Social Life*, pp. 264-276. London: Sage.

Qualman, A. (2000) *Ethiopia: Building Civil Society. A Case Study in Capacity Development.* Prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency, Policy Branch, Political and Social Policies. www.iss.co.za/pubs/Other/ahsi/Mboge_Doe/chap3.pdf.

Randall, V. (1988) 'Introduction', in V. Randall (ed.) *Political Parties in the Third World,* pp. 1-6. London: Sage.

Rao, N. (1994) *The Making and Unmaking of Local Self-Government.* Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing.

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) (1995) *General Guidelines for the Implementation of the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management.* Addis Ababa: RRC.

Relief Society of Tigray (REST) (1995) 'Annual Plans and Programs of REST'. Mimeo.

REST (1993a) 'Central Tigray Integrated Agricultural Development Program (1993-1997). Program Proposal Central Document (Revised).' Mimeo.

REST (1993b) 'Social Development in Tigray: Problems and Solutions.' Mimeo.

Ribot, J.C. (2002) *African Decentralization: Local Actors, Powers and Accountability*. UNRISD Program on Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Paper No.8.

Riddell, R.C. et al. (1995) *Non-Governmental Organisations and Rural Poverty Alleviation.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rhodes, R.A.W. (1991) 'Policy Networks and Sub-central Government', in G. Thompson et al. (eds.) *Markets, Hierarchies and Networks. The Coordination of Social Life*, pp. 203-214. London: Sage.

Rhodes, R.A.W. (1999) 'Foreword: Governance and Networks', in G. Stoker (ed.) *the New Management of British Local Governance,* pp. xii-xxiv. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Salih, M.A.M. (2003) 'Introduction: The Evolution of African Political Parties', in M.A.M Salih (ed.) *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance,* pp. 1-33. London: Pluto Press.

Sandberg, E. (1994) 'Introduction: The Changing Politics of Non-Governmental Organisations and the African State', in E. Sandberg (ed.) *The Changing Politics of Non-Governmental Organisations and the African State*, pp. 1-31. London: Westport, CT.

Santos, R. and R. Heeks (2003) *ITCs and Intra-Governmental Structures at Local, Regional and Central Levels: Updating Conventional Ideas.* Manchester: IDPM, University of Manchester. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNDPAN015495.pdf.

Schwab, P. (1972) *Decision-Making in Ethiopia: a Study of the Political Process.* London: C. Hurst and Company.

Scott, J. (1991) *Social Network Analysis: a Handbook*. London: Sage.

Seyoum G.E. (1974) 'Structure of the Ethiopian Government: the Institutional Framework', in Asemelash B. (comp.) *Studies in Ethiopian Government and Administration*, pp. 25-43. Addis Ababa: Faculty of Arts, Haile Selassie I University.

Shah, A. (2005) 'Sustainable Development: Non-governmental Organisations on Development Issues.' http//www.globalissues.org/TradeRelated/Poverty/NGOs.asp.

Singh, B.K. et al. (1971) 'Patterns of Commitment', in The International Studies of Values in Politics *Values and the Active Community: a Cross-national Study of the Influence of Local Leadership,* pp. 67-106. New York: Free Press.

Sisay A. and Adugna L. (2001) 'Abstracts of International Conference on Contemporary Development Issues in Ethiopia', August 16-18, 2001, Western Michigan University. http: //www.wmich.edu/hcentre/cadpr/abstracts.demel.teketay.html.

Sisay G-E (2004) 'Challenges Faced by Local NGOs in Ethiopia with the Global Shift in Development Approach: from Need Based to Right Based Approach (abstract)', A Paper presented on ISTR Sixth International Conference, July 11-14, 2004, Toronto, Canada. http: //atlas.confrences.com/c/a/m/1/14.htm.

Smith, B.C (2003) *Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development,* second edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Smoke, P. (2003) 'Decentralization in Africa: Goals, Dimensions, Myths and Challenges', *Public Administration and Development* 23: 7-16.

Smoke, P. (1994) *Local Government Finance in Developing Countries: The Case of Kenya.* Nairobi: Oxford University Press.

SNV-Bugna Integrated Rural Development Programme (BIRDP) (1999) 'SNV-Ethiopia Netherlands Development Organisation BIRDP Annual Report 1998.' Mimeo.

SNV-BIRDP (1997) 'Second Consultation Workshop on Five Year Plan Bugna Integrated Rural Development Program 1998-2003, September 19-20, 1997.' Mimeo.

Soetan, F. (2000) 'Women, Development, and Governance', in G. Hyden et al. (eds.) *African Perspective on Governance*, pp. 205-235. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Soremekun, K. (2000) 'The International Dimensions of Governance', in G. Hyden et al. (eds.) *African Perspective on Governance*, pp. 267-293. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Soy, S.K. (1997) 'The Case Study as a Research Method', University of Texas at Austin. http: //www.gslis.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm.

Stanyer, J. (1976) *Understanding Local Government.* London: Martin Robertson.

Starkey, P. (1998) *Networking for Development.* London: International Forum for Rural Transport and Development.

Stoker, Gerry (2004) *Transforming Local Governance. From Thatcherism to New Labour.* Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stoker, Gerry 1999 (ed.) *The New Management of British Local Governance.* New York: Macmillan.

Suberu, R. (2000) 'Governance and Ethnic Factor', in G. Hyden et al. (eds.) *African Perspective on Governance*, pp. 123-152. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Tadesse G. (2001) 'Land Degradation: a Challenge to Ethiopia.' http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11393316&dop.

Tedros A. et al. (2000) 'The Community-based malaria control program in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia. A Review of Program Set-up, Activities, Outcomes and Impact', *Journal of Parassitologia* 42(3-4): 255-290.

TGE (1992) 'Proclamation No.7/1992 A Proclamation to provide for the Establshment of National/Regional Self-Governments.' NEGARIT GAZETA 51st Year No.2, Addis Ababa.

Tegegne G.E and Kassahun B. (2004) 'The Role of Decentralized Governance in Building Local Institutions, Diffusing Ethnic Conflicts, and Alleviating Poverty in Ethiopia', *Regional Development Dialogue* 25(1): 35-63.

Tegegne G.E and Asfaw K. (2002) 'Institutional Setting for Local-Level Development Planning in Ethiopia: An Assessment and a Way Forward', *Regional Development Studies* 8: 21-50.

Tegegne G.E (2001) 'Institutional Setting for Local Development Planning in Ethiopia: An Assessment and Evidences from the Amhara Region', V.R.F. Series No.357, International Exchange Division, Research and Administrative Department, IDE-JETRO, Japan. Chiba: IDE-JETRO.

Tegegne G.E (2000) 'Regional Development Planning in Ethiopia: Past Experience, Current Initiatives and Future Prospects', *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review* 16(1): 65-93.

Tellis. W, (1997) 'Application of a Case Study Methodology'. *The Qualitative Report,* [Online serial], *3*(3). http: //www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html.

Theunis, S. (1992) *Non-Governmental Development Organisations of Developing Countries: and the South Smiles.* Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited (2004) 'Country Profile 2004 Ethiopia' http: //bds-ethiopia.net/1-documents/ETU-Ethiopia-profile.pdf.

Thiessen, H. (1997) *Measuring the Real World: A Textbook of Applied Statistical Methods.* New York: John Will & Sons.

Thirion, S. (1997) 'Local Partnership as a Key Tool for Participation and Decentralization.' http: //www.fao.org/WAICENT/faoinfo/sustdev/Rodirect/Rofo0010.htm.

TNRS/Education Bureau (2002) *Education Statistical Abstract 1988-1993/1996-2001.* Mekele: Education Bureau.

TNRS/Education Bureau (2000a) *Education Statistical Abstract 1984-1991/1992-1999.* Mekele: Education Bureau.

TNRS/Education Bureau (2000b) *Education Statistical Abstract Annual Report.* Mekele: Education Bureau.

TNRS/Health Bureau (2003) ' Map of Tigray Woredas'. Mimeo.

TNRS/Health Bureau (2002) 'Tigray Region Health Sector Development Program 1995-1997 E.C'. Mimeo.

TNRS (1995a) '*Ye Tigray Biherawi Kililawi Mengist Hige Mengist*' (title in Amharic), Mekele.

TNRS (1995b) '*Ye Tigray Biherawi Kilil Woredawoch Lemaquaquam Yewota Awaji*' (title in Amharic), Mekele.

TNRS/BoFED (ND) 'An Overview into the Regional Socio-economic Condition'. Mimeo.

Tronvoll, K. (2002) 'Political Repression and Resistance: The Elections in Hadiya, Southern Region', in S. Pausewang et al. (eds.) *Ethiopia sine the Derg: A Decade of Democratic Pretension and Performance*, pp. 156-178. London: Zed Books.

Tronvoll, K. and O. Aadland (1995) *Human Rights Report No. 5. The Process of Democratisation in Ethiopia-An Expression of Popular Participation or Political Resistance*? Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights.

Turner, M. and D. Hulme (1997) *Governance, Administration and Development: Making the State Work.* West Hartford, CT: Kumarain Press.

UNDP (1997a) Participatory Local Governance: LIFE's Method and Experience (1992-1997) Technical Advisory Paper 1. New York: UNDP.

UNDP (1997b) 'Global Research Framework of the Decentralized Governance Program.' http: //magnet.undp.org/Docs/dec/DECEN923.Casestud.htm.

UNDP (1996) 'Participatory Evaluation in Programs Involving Governance Decentralization: A Methodological Note.' http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/dec/EVALUATE.HTM.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Development Management Division (1997) 'Documenting Successful NGOs Experience: A Case Study of Ethiopia.' http: //www.uneca.org.eca_resources/Publications/Publications_DMD.htm.

United Nations (2002) 'United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Investment and Innovation Policy Review Ethiopia.' http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteipcm4.en.pdf.

Van Sant, J. (2003) 'Challenges of Local NGO Sustainability. Keynote Remarks prepared for the USAID/PVC-ASHA Annual PVO Conference, 14 October, 2003.' http://www.pps.aas.duke.edu/center/cidr/downloads/vansant_200310.pdf.

van Ufford, P.Q. (1987) 'Introduction: Studying Local Leadership and Program Implementation in Indonesia', in van P.Q van Ufford (ed.) *Local Leadership and Program Implementation in Indonesia*, pp. 7-23. Amsterdam: Free University Press.

van den Dool, L. (2003) *Local Learning: the Role of African Local Public Organisations in Development Projects*. Eburon: Delft.

Vestal, T.M. (1997) 'Promises Unkept: Freedom of Association in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia', in K. Fukui et al. (eds.) *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the 13th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, 12-17 December 1997,* II: 171-185. Kyoto: Shokado Book Seller.

Walzer, N. B.D. Jacobs (1998) *Public Private Partnerships for Local Economic Development*. Westport, CT: Praeger).

Wanyande, P. (2000) 'Structural Adjustment and Governance', in G. Hyden et al. (eds.) *African Perspective on Governance*, pp. 237-266. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Wils, F. and A.H.J. Helmsing (2001) 'Enabling Communities and Markets: Meaning, Relationships and Options in Settlement Improvement', ISS Working Paper Series No. 335, Institute of Development Studies, The Hague.

Willis, K. (2005) *Theories and Practices of Development*. London: Routledge.

Wolday A. (2000) 'Networking Micro Finance Activities in Ethiopia: Challenges and prospects', in Mulat D. (ed.) *The Development of Micro Finance in Ethiopia*, *Proceeding of the Conference on Micro Finance Development in Ethiopia*, Bahir Dar.

Wolman, H. and S. McCormick (1994) 'The effect of decentralization on local governments', in R.J. Bennett (ed.) *Local Government and Market Decentralization: Experiences in Industrialized, Developing, and Former Eastern Bloc Countries,* pp. 249-266. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Wolman, H. (1990) 'Decentralization: What It Is and Why We Should Care', in R.J. Bennett (ed.) D*ecentralization*, *Local Governments and Markets: Towards a Post-Welfare Agenda,* pp. 29-58. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

World Bank (1997) *World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

World Bank (1994) *World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Wubshet M. et al. (1997) 'The Significant Contribution of Community Participation in Improving Community Health: An Experience from an Integrated and Holistic

Community Development Project in Ethiopia', in K. Fukui et al. (eds.) *Ethiopia in Broader Perspective: Papers of the 13th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, 12-17 December 1997,* II: 171-185. Kyoto: Shokado Book Seller.

Wunsch, J.S. and D. Olowu (1995) 'The Failure of the Centralized African State: introduction', in J.S. Wunsch and D. Olowu (eds.) The Failure of the Centralized Sate: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa. California: ICS Press.

Yigremew A. (1997) 'Rural Land Holding Adjustment in West Gojam, Amhara Region', *Ethiopian Journal of Development Research* 9 (2): 57-89).

Yigremw A. (2001) 'Decentralization and Local Governance in post-Dergue Ethiopia', in Berhanu M. and E.V. MHSA (eds.) *Governance and Sustainable Development: Promoting Collaborative Partnerships,* pp. 103-111. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Yin, R. K. (2003) *Applications of Case Study Research,* second edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Yin, R.K. (1993) *Applications of Case Study Research*. Newbury Park: Sage.

Young, J. (1998) 'Regionalism and Democracy in Ethiopia', *Third World Quarterly* 19(2): 191-204.

Young, J. (1997) *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, J. (1996) 'Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia', *Review of African Political Economy* 70: 531-542.

Zenebe N. (2001) 'NGO-Government Relations: Conflict and Co-operation in Development Management for Rehabilitation of Demobilized Soldiers: The Case of Eastern Tigray, Ethiopia.' *Africa Development* 26 (1/2): 252-293.

Fenta Mandefro Abate

Admitted to the PhD programme in September 2001 on the basis of:

> MA in Regional and Local Development Studies
> (with distinction), Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1998.

This thesis has not been submitted to any university for a degree or any other award.