OCCASIONAL PAPERS

EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN ANGLOPHONE AFRICA

A.J.M. van de Laar

Working Paper. Not for quotation. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not imply the endorsement of the Institute of Social Studies (No. 10, March 1971)

Institute of Social Studies
THE HAGUE - THE NETHERLANDS
I. Introduction

Human resource development began to be emphasised in literature on development problems at the beginning of the 1960s. In developed countries, education was given greater attention. In the United States in particular, the first Russian Sputnik blast-off in 1957 gave a strong impetus to education. American economists began to calculate the very substantial contribution which technical progress could make to economic growth, ascribing this progress to education and training. Investment yields in education appeared to be quite high, at least in developed countries. On the other hand, it began to be realised in the second half of the fifties that capital injections in developing countries had a far smaller impact than that of Marshall Aid in Western Europe. The explanation was thought to be the distribution of skills among the European peoples as against the situation in developing countries.

The relationship between levels of educational attainment and income differentials has been repeatedly observed. Although education is not the only explanatory variable (inherited wealth also plays a major role), the differences due to education received are significant. Virtually everywhere, therefore, strong political pressures for democratisation of the educational system have developed. This requires a broadening of the educational base and continued education, particularly for pupils from the lower classes of society.

The attainment of political independence by a great many African states around 1960 quickened the exodus of foreign colonial personnel, necessitating their replacement by local high-level manpower. It also gave rise to the wish to force accelerated development now that the yoke of colonialism had been thrown off.

Agreement was widespread that an expanded educational system would provide the key to the desired progress. It was also implicitly

* An earlier version of this article was published as "Onderwijs en werkgelegenheid in Engelssprekend Afrika", De Gids, June 1970.
assumed that increased education would lead to more rapid growth, and that education would independently stimulate growth; high-level manpower would then automatically be used in the realisation of this growth. More education was seen as the cause of growth and not as its result.

The question is whether these high expectations have been realised or whether the experiences of the sixties have not raised doubts regarding the correctness of the presupposed relationship between education and employment and the policy based thereon.

During the sixties educational policy was given shape at two African conferences: the Addis Ababa Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa (Unesco/ECA, 1961) and the Tananarive Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa (Unesco, 1962).

The Addis Ababa long-term plan 1961-60 included the following main targets:

(a) primary education (six years) to be universal, compulsory and free;
(b) secondary education to be provided to 30 per cent of primary school graduates;
(c) higher education to be provided, predominantly within Africa itself, to 20 per cent of those who complete secondary education;
(d) the percentage of national income earmarked for the financing of education to be increased to 4 per cent in 1965 and to 6 per cent in 1980.

The Tananarive Conference augmented the targets for higher education. These resulted in substantial price increases and measures to reduce unit costs were therefore strongly recommended. A staff/student ratio of 1:15 was advised; salaries form a major part of total educational costs, and are therefore a key element in unit costs.

Figures on the achievement of the Addis Ababa Plan during 1960-65 were presented to the Nairobi Conference on Education and Scientific and Technical Training in Relation to Development in Africa (1968). It appeared that in 1965 the total population of Middle Africa (the area South of the Sahara but North of Southern Africa) amounted to 207 million instead of the 182 million estimated during the formulation of the Addis Ababa Plan, a difference of 12 per cent. The participation ratios at the various educational levels were therefore substantially lower than had been planned.
The targets for primary education have not been met. The number of first entrants increased from 3,335,500 in 1960 to 4,009,300 in 1965 instead of the planned 5,239,700: an increase of 20.2 per cent instead of the planned 57.1 per cent. Total enrolments in primary education increased by only 673,800 instead of the planned 1,904,200.

The targets for secondary education have also not been fulfilled. Total enrolments in Middle Africa rose from 620,010 to 1,283,550 instead of the planned 1,555,100, an increase of 104 per cent against the 147 per cent foreseen. The distribution of pupils over the various types of secondary education deviated strongly from the targets. The percentage in technical and vocational training as well as the percentage in teacher training showed a substantial lag in favour of general education (see Table 1).

Table 1.
Percentage distribution of enrolments by type of secondary education in Middle Africa 1960-65.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of secondary education</th>
<th>1960 actual</th>
<th>1965 actual</th>
<th>target</th>
<th>deviation (in per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>general education</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>+ 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technical and vocational</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>- 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teacher training</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enrolments (1000)</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>- 17.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Targets for higher education have been considerably exceeded. Total students increased from 27,200 in 1960 to 68,000 in 1965 as against a target of 52,000, a realised increase of 150 per cent instead of 91 per cent. The staff-student ratio remained virtually the same 1:5.2 against 1:6.7 in 1960.

It appears that a number of African states reached or even exceeded the percentage of 5.78 of gross national product to be spent on financing education. If monetary income only is considered (excluding the subsistence sector), it appears that some countries spent more than 10 per cent on education, implying that a number of African
countries spend proportionally more on education than most developed countries.

II Economic Growth and Employment during the Sixties.

In the foregoing figures were presented for the whole of Middle Africa; our further discussion, however, will mainly concern certain anglophone countries. Congo (Kinshasa) is also included as this country has experienced several very pronounced developments. Although francophone Africa is not explicitly analysed, there is little reason to suppose that developments there have been fundamentally different.

Table 2 shows the growth of income and employment for the countries chosen.

Table 2.

Average annual growth of real GNP and wage employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>period</th>
<th>average annual rate of growth of</th>
<th>wage employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>real GNP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1964-68</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1960-68</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1961-68</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1960-68</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1960-66</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1960-68</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (K.)</td>
<td>1959-67</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although national accounting practices in some countries have been improved and made internationally comparable, the same cannot be said of employment statistics. Frequently, only establishments with more than 5 or 10 employees are counted, so that all sorts of independent workers are excluded. However, as the present discussion is on growth-rates on a weak but fairly uniform statistical basis, the figures presented do give some idea of the growth of wage employment.

1. The figures used in this article are taken from official national data, collected when the author was a consultant to the Economic Commission for Africa of the United Nations in 1969.
If present population growth is estimated at a minimum of 2.5 per cent per annum, it appears that it has outstripped the growth of wage employment in virtually all countries under consideration despite a real economic growth which, in historical perspective, is not without merit. The wage employment sectors of the economies under discussion comprise only 5 to 10 per cent of the total population; the overwhelming majority of new entrants to the labour market will therefore have to carve out an existence in the rural economy or in the periphery of the urban economy.

Important developments have occurred within the small wage employment labour market. Wage employment in agriculture has decreased due to rather unfavourable developments on the world markets for products of plantation agriculture, both in price and volume. High wage increases were demanded from the predominately foreign plantation owners and often supported by the respective governments. Under the circumstances, these higher wage costs could only be compensated by mechanisation of production, causing widespread dismissal of workers. In some countries dismissals in plantation agriculture have now probably come to an end (see Table 3).

Table 3.
Analysis of wage employment (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>period</th>
<th>initial year employment</th>
<th>changes agricultural</th>
<th>non-agricultural</th>
<th>terminal year employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1964-68</td>
<td>589.6</td>
<td>- 35.2</td>
<td>+ 54.4</td>
<td>608.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1960-68</td>
<td>244.5</td>
<td>+ 5.3</td>
<td>+ 32.0</td>
<td>281.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1964-68</td>
<td>417.0</td>
<td>- 79.8</td>
<td>+ 14.5</td>
<td>351.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1960-68</td>
<td>277.0</td>
<td>- 1.4</td>
<td>+ 74.9</td>
<td>350.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1960-66</td>
<td>499.9</td>
<td>+ 19.2</td>
<td>+ 50.2</td>
<td>569.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1960-68</td>
<td>333.0</td>
<td>- 11.8</td>
<td>+ 40.2</td>
<td>361.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (K.)</td>
<td>1958-67</td>
<td>1717.7</td>
<td>- 646.1</td>
<td>- 34.8</td>
<td>1034.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second characteristic of the labour market, partly a corollary of the first, is that the share of government employment in total wage employment tends to increase. At present this stands at between one-third and one-half of total wage employment.
As a result of the slow growth of employment opportunities and the rapid expansion of enrolment and educational output, wage employment prospects for those who receive this education are rapidly dwindling. Children who have completed primary education nowadays stand virtually no chance of finding a job, while the prospects for those with a four-year secondary education are becoming increasingly dimmer. In Kenya, for instance, educated labour supply for the period 1965-68 consisted of 346 thousand who had completed primary education and 33 thousand with basic secondary education, as against a labour demand of 110 thousand. A chance of one in three of finding work! In Uganda less than half the secondary school leavers have found jobs. In Ghana, where the educational system is historically more developed, the situation has become disastrous. Chances of finding a job there have already been reduced to one in ten! It must be remembered that three-quarters of Ghana's educated labour supply has completed ten years of schooling.

Our conclusion must be that despite the fact that educational expansion has lagged behind the goals of the Addis Ababa Plan, the labour market has not expanded sufficiently to absorb the educated supply. Rapidly increasing numbers of schoolleavers at primary and secondary levels are therefore forced to carve out a meagre subsistence in the urban periphery as petty traders, errand boys or shoe polishers, or to be reabsorbed in the rural economy from which they have meanwhile been completely estranged, and where the education received is almost useless. There are virtually no studies which show that people who have completed primary education are more successful and progressive farmers than those who have not so benefited. Seen from this angle, an important part of educational expenditure has thus been a colossal waste.2

III The labour market for university graduates during the sixties.

In contrast with the depressing prospects for young people with primary or secondary education, the prospects for university graduates who were lucky enough to graduate in that period have been almost unique. In Africa they are predominantly employed by government.

The high-level manpower surveys carried out, *inter alia* to determine required educational programmes, found 70 - 85 percent of university-level posts in the public sector.\(^3\)

At the time of political independence, most of these posts were occupied by foreigners and the major demand for university graduates arose from the need to replace them. A second source of demand for university graduates stemmed from the wish of many governments to embark on ambitious development programmes, which led to a rapid relative growth of the government's role in the economy of most countries.

Toward the late sixties, the government bureaucracies had been Africanised to a considerable degree. In Tanzania, middle and higher-level officials increased from 4452 in 1961 to 7827 in 1968, while the percentage of Tanzanians increased from 26.1 to 79.3 per cent. In Kenya in 1969, citizens occupied 90 per cent of the administrative posts (613 out of 677). In the professional cadres Kenyans numbered 760 out of 2707, or 28 per cent. In Uganda, 80 per cent of administrative posts (560 out of 650) and 53 per cent at the professional level (550 out of 1040) had been Africanised in 1967. In Zambia in 1968 these figures were 19 per cent of professional posts and 71 per cent of administrative posts. The federal bureaucracy of Nigeria has been Africanised to about 90 per cent for some years now. In Ghana, separate statistics are no longer kept, indicating that Africanisation is virtually complete, at least for administrative posts.

The supply of university graduates during the first half of the sixties was rather meagre. Firstly, many universities were founded after 1960 (5 before 1960, 4 in 1961, 3 in 1962, 1 in 1964 and 1 in 1966) and only few students had graduated. Secondly, many students who went abroad to study in the early sixties - often with insufficient qualifications for admittance to national universities - returned only towards the end of the decade. Finally, universities had to wait until secondary schools had been built and began to supply suitable candidates in sufficient numbers. The delay due to difficulties in the extension of the school system and in the procurement of teachers was substantial.

The number of students only began to increase really rapidly during the second half of the sixties, as is shown by the figures of Table 4. Although only enrolments are given, outputs are equal to some 80 per cent of entrants, with a timelag of 3 to 4 years.

Table 4.

Students in higher education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1964/5</th>
<th>1965/6</th>
<th>1966/7</th>
<th>1967/8</th>
<th>1968/9</th>
<th>% increase 1964-1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>1147</td>
<td>1520</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1126</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>2179</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>1410</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>6707</td>
<td>7709</td>
<td>9170</td>
<td>6594</td>
<td>8588</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>3414</td>
<td>4301</td>
<td>4478</td>
<td>4712</td>
<td>5035</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (K)</td>
<td>1886</td>
<td>2447</td>
<td>2973</td>
<td>3447</td>
<td>5225</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Students from the whole of East Africa are enrolled in each of these countries
b. Excluding the University of Nigeria at Nsukka, which enrolled 3350 in 1966/7
c. Excluding the "grandes écoles"

The number of students increased by 75 per cent in 5 years. If the war in Nigeria had not caused the University of Nigeria at Nsukka to close, students in the seven countries would have more than doubled. Now that the war has ended a rapid recovery at Nsukka may be expected.
Africanisation was far advanced by 1968-69 although the universities have been only recently able to supply substantial numbers of graduates; recruitment from different sources has therefore been necessary.

Three sources of recruitment can be identified. Firstly, the allocation of political spoils as the independence movement replaced the colonial administration. Further, many Africans left the business enterprises in which they had held mostly minor jobs, and the teaching profession, one of the few areas to which Africans were admitted in colonial days, for functions in government administration in which there was now a vacuum. Finally, some people with less qualifications and experience than were desirable had to be promoted to help fill the gap.

The African exodus from the teaching profession at a time when strong expansion of secondary education was planned, was particularly disruptive. The shortage of teachers has been more or less compensated by large numbers of volunteers (Peace Corps, Teachers for East Africa, Voluntary Service Overseas, CUSO) who, mostly appointed on short-term contracts, were unable to re-orient the educational programme from being predominantly academic to being of a more practical type. For the most part, the foreign volunteers could teach only what they had learned in an educational system which was of little relevance to Africa's needs. Even in countries where the secondary educational system was relatively small and undeveloped, the influx of foreign teachers contributed substantially to entrenching and consolidating the inherited colonial secondary educational system, and to forming powerful groups with a vested interest in the continuation of that system.

Faced with the example of numerous teachers who left the profession because career opportunities elsewhere looked more promising, it is hardly surprising that students showed little enthusiasm to become teachers. The option for general education opened up the road toward higher education and the prospect of better job opportunities. The discrepancies in the planned composition of secondary education, favouring general education and thwarting other types (see Table 1), thus become easier to understand.

The exodus of African academics from the business world led to the paradoxical situation that Africanisation of managerial and
professional business personnel probably decreased rather than increased during the sixties. Employers have rightly complained that it is difficult to retain management trainees who prefer government posts. Some entrepreneurs have reacted by less forceful recruitment and also by partial mechanisation of the production processes, requiring a different personnel structure. In many cases middle level functions have disappeared and the enterprise is kept running with a skeleton staff of experienced expatriates. At the same time, employment opportunities in the developed countries were favourable during the sixties, thus impeding additional recruitment from overseas.

This reaction fed fuel to the complaints that foreign firms were loath to Africanise. These complaints increased in intensity and became more widespread in the late sixties.

IV The present situation

Now that universities have begun to supply substantial numbers of graduates, and many students are returning from abroad, insofar as they have obtained no qualifications which will allow them to permanently stay abroad, governmental labour demand is decreasing rather abruptly. Full Africanisation, mostly in the non-professional ranks, will soon be realised; and rapid expansion of the government bureaucracy will lessen as it becomes increasingly difficult to raise the taxing capacity, i.e. to increase the relative share of government in the whole economy; thirdly, natural wastage due to death and retirement will be abnormally low in the coming 5 to 10 years due to the average youth of the present bureaucrats.

The changed supply situation is illustrated by the following figures. In Ghana, 5,000 students are expected to graduate during the three years 1969-72 against 4,500 in the previous 8 years (1961-68). Similar proportions hold for most other countries. In Tanzania and Zambia the acceleration will be still greater. In Kenya the supply from overseas in the coming five years is expected to exceed the production of the national university (about 2500 against some 2000 from own territory) reflecting the Mboya Airlift operations of the early sixties. In Nigeria the situation is very complicated. The replacement of the four regions by the present twelve states has led to the creation of duplicate administrations and to the dismantling of
the former Northern regional administration. Ibos and Yorubas have fled or departed from the North, so that existing regional disparities have been further accentuated. This structure implies that surpluses are already emerging in the south whilst in the north shortages have become greater, leading to massive recruitment from overseas. The recruitment of foreigners rather than Nigerians from other parts of the country has the advantage that the former can be more readily dismissed when their contracts expire or when Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria starts producing sufficient graduates to take their various posts. (Enrolments at ABU increased from 558 in 1963/64 to 1745 in 1968/69, even though most students come from Kwara State, so that the other five northern states are still highly underrepresented).

The changed demand supply situation can be put as follows: In 1969 the Ghanaian government was faced with 500 applicants for 250 university-level posts. Since 1966 Kenya has granted fellowships under the condition that student recipients will serve in government after completing their studies. However, lack of funds and opportunity prevented the government from absorbing the first, rather small, group of graduates under this scheme in 1969.

An important factor which complicates personnel planning is that many governments have no precise idea of how many students are studying abroad or their fields of study, owing to the fact that administrative controls in the first years of independence were rather poor.

Rapid Africanisation has led to a strong rejuvenation of government personnel. With a normal age structure and an effective term of service of 30 years, an average 18 percent replacement demand in a five-year period may be expected. In Tanzania the replacement demand was only 2 per cent in the period 1964-69. With at most 8000 high-level manpower posts this means a replacement demand of 35 per year against a normal 240, and this while the university output has reached some 500 per year and is increasing rapidly! The situation is similar in the other countries.

As a result of these developments, employment prospects are changing rapidly. This holds true in particular for arts and social science graduates who will have to search for jobs other than in government administration, mostly in teaching and the business sector. The prospects for the scientific professions (engineers, agronomists,
doctors, etc.) do not change so rapidly because of the still prevailing supply limitations; Africanisation has progressed less in this area and more posts are available (the ratio between posts based on arts or science education is usually about two-to-three.

As a corollary of the developments sketched in Section III, the teaching force at secondary level is still predominantly foreign. In East Africa less than 20 per cent of the total posts were occupied by Africans in 1968, although substantial numbers of Asians (with British passports and born and raised in East Africa) are employed as teachers. In Congo (K), Nigeria and Ghana more than half the teachers in secondary education have been Africanised. This in itself is a sign that jobs in government administration are no longer plentiful. Further Africanisation of teachers under present conditions is rather simple; given the abrupt reduction of government demand and the expanded supply, many graduates simply have no other choice. In all countries with the exception of Zambia, secondary education could be almost entirely Africanised by 1975.

It is interesting to note that graduates in the social sciences (particularly law, sociology, political science and related fields) are likely to find things more difficult than the arts graduates (languages, literature, geography and history). This is because the social sciences have only recently been incorporated in the teaching programmes, and substitution of the perhaps more useful social sciences for the humanities would arouse opposition by teachers of the latter, particularly if no expansion of the total programme were allowed. Furthermore, the ratio arts-science will probably be further unbalanced as science students will more easily find alternative employment outside the unpopular teaching profession. The supply mix of teachers may thus be permanently unbalanced within a financially constrained expansion of the secondary system. Finally, the social science departments of universities are usually the most Africanised in a context in which large numbers of expatriates are still present. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that university faculties will be able to find the inner strength to redress any imbalance in faculty numbers caused by a changing composition of student numbers over subjects. Such faculties would undoubtedly prefer postgraduate programmes which would leave intact the liberal arts undergraduate basis, but which would make
education even more costly without guaranteeing a more meaningful syllabus.

A second alternative for university graduates is to find employment in the private sector, but this is not so simple as it may seem. The private sector can be usually divided into two segments. The small-family-enterprise sector which is predominantly in the hands of foreign minority groups (Asians in East Africa, Greeks and Belgians in Congo K., the French in former French West Africa, and the Lebanese in the remainder of West Africa), and the large enterprises which are most likely to offer opportunities for African graduates. These large enterprises, however, are predominantly owned by foreign-based multi-national firms which usually intend to remain permanently in Africa. This makes them reluctant to Africanise top management too rapidly. Even if Africanisation is contemplated, personnel policies will still be controlled by the corporate headquarters overseas.

In view of this reluctance to Africanise, government pressure will often be necessary to assure that maximum numbers of citizens are employed, and to ascertain that Africans are able to acquire industrial and commercial experience; such know-how can be better acquired through on-the-job training than behind school desks.

Most African governments have no clear policy by which to realise the Africanisation of the private sector. This is a delicate subject. If a government presses too hard, foreign investors become irritated, the investment climate deteriorates and foreign investors are discouraged. If the government does nothing, Africanisation is likely to proceed very slowly. Recently, it would seem that nationalisation of foreign firms is becoming increasingly popular as an instrument to ensure broader national participation in the business sector of the economy (vide the nationalisations in Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Sierra Leone). Expulsion of aliens also appears to be politically enticing: Kenya, Congo (K) and Ghana.

Three points are of some significance. Enterprises usually seem to prefer graduates with some experience. As fresh graduates by definition are inexperienced, the question arises where they may acquire this. A new trend is now making itself felt. Government officials whose promotion ladder are blocked by the youth of their superiors, become frustrated and look for work elsewhere, i.e. in the business sector. This is a reversal, albeit on a small scale, of the trend of the early sixties.

A second point is that some firms prefer college drop-outs. These people consider themselves partial failures, are therefore happy with the job and are willing to work harder, while the university graduate often behaves like a crown prince who expects red-carpet treatment. Moreover, from the point of view of company morale, promotion should be stimulated from within rather than that candidates be attracted from elsewhere. This, too, operates to the disadvantage of the new graduate.

A third point is that the business sector may be expected to prefer certain categories of graduates: technicians, lawyers, economists, accountants and the like, rather than indiscriminate social scientists whose use to the enterprise is problematical. This again may encourage a polarisation within the arts and social science faculties to favour certain subjects, and against general liberal arts graduates who have hitherto been recruited into government.

In view of all this, the private sector's demand may be expected to remain limited, while its Africanisation will be much slower than has been the case in government over the past few years. Moreover, in absolute terms, the relevant private sector is comparatively small.

V Increasing the absorptive capacity

The absorptive capacity for university graduates in Africa is considerably limited by the fact that they are far too expensive in relation to national incomes. Starting salaries in government are between £700-£200 per annum plus allowances and heavily subsidised government housing. These salaries are 25-30 times higher than the average per capita national income. Assuming that no drastic changes will occur in the existing salary structures or in fiscal policies, it is relatively simple to calculate how many new posts become available each year. The
supply and demand studies made so far in fact assume constant salary structures; the absorptive capacity is accordingly limited and the inherited colonial structure remains essentially unaffected. These excessive salaries were at the time strongly supported by British Fabian socialists on the grounds that Africans and Whites in the civil service ought to receive identical salaries, often including periodic overseas leave for the former! Now that the civil service has been Africanised a very unequal income distribution has become entrenched in the system.

In most developed countries the average salaries of academics are no more than double or thrice the average per capita national income, while the salary scale pyramid is far less steep than in Africa. These relatively high salaries in Africa limit the use of graduates because few firms are willing or able to pay the going rate. Moreover, it is difficult to obtain an equivalent income in self-employment, with the exception of some specialised professions for which there are limited opportunities in the larger cities catering to the demands of an expatriate colony.

Personnel turnover is therefore quite restricted and the rigidity of the existing salary structure is fiercely defended.

The absorptive capacity of the labour market could be increased by improved labour market information; this might help students to assess the remaining job opportunities more realistically, and perhaps to choose subject combinations which will later be in greater demand. In the past, a deliberate choice was unnecessary since the government employed all graduates regardless of their disciplines.

Another method is by reducing non-salary items in the government's recurrent budget in favour of personal emoluments. This means curtailing transport, stationery, office equipment and the like, thus reducing the efficiency of the whole apparatus. Political pressure to keep the literate or semi-literate off the streets is strong, even if they cannot effectively function because there is nothing to do. This would bring a salaried class into existence similar to what the classical economists called unproductive labour.

A third way to get graduates to work is by directly or indirectly reducing their relative income. In Tanzania, salaries and further emoluments were severely reduced in 1966-67 following the new socialist political line initiated by the Arusha Declaration. However, it is not to be expected that other countries will show great eagerness
to follow this example; the vested interests of the bureaucratic elite most directly affected by such measures, will obviously resist them. In most countries the higher bureaucrats are very powerful people, capable of thwarting any attempts in an undesirable direction. Indirectly, a reduction of relative incomes can be achieved through inflation, a dramatic example being Congo (K) where between 1960 and 1968 prices increased tenfold and minimum wages sixfold, so that the real income of wageworkers was halved. Higher salaries were practically frozen and nominal minimum salaries were increased so that salary discrepancies within the civil service were strongly reduced. In 1968 a Permanent Secretary earned no more than 10 times as much as a lower clerk, as against 30 times as much in 1960. Galloping inflation, however, has totally disrupted government finances, which only have begun to be brought under control since the economic reform of 1967.

In the other countries under discussion, inflation has been far less pronounced, even though it nowadays exceeds the periodic scale increases. Most salary incomes are slowly being eroded; now that there is less scope for general salary reforms, promotions will tend to follow scale increments instead of the irregular pattern characteristic of the early post-independence years. Since 1966 the strongly conservative regime of Ghana has first dismissed considerable numbers of employees, partly on the advice of IMF and World Bank, and followed this by large wage and salary increases for the others, particularly at the top, under the cloak of boosting their morale by compensating them for past inflation. In the longer run, of course, such policies tend to accentuate social cleavages and provide a fertile breeding ground for oppositional politics, especially now that the literate unemployed are steadily increasing, particularly in Ghana, but also elsewhere.

A last method by which to reduce the scarcity premium of university graduates in Africa is through systematic overproduction, forcing them to compete for jobs at ever lower levels. Historically this has occurred in countries such as India, Pakistan, Egypt and the Philippines. Increased supply of all kinds of personnel with higher educational qualifications enables the entrance prerequisites for all job levels to be increased without necessitating payment of higher salaries. In Africa, this phenomenon has occurred for some time at the lower levels. Raising the admission requirements causes a de facto
devaluation of the lower level diploma; this increases the social pressure for higher education, which becomes essential if a man is to stay in the race. It is thereby unimportant that there are numerous candidates with higher diplomas who cannot find jobs: without the diploma, chances are virtually nil. With a higher diploma one has at least a (small) chance. If, through oversupply, graduates end up in jobs for which previously persons were recruited with lower qualifications, higher qualifications self-evidently become the new norm, so that the secondary school diploma devalues and the social demand for more higher education increases. This whole process presupposes that each phase in effect is "preparatory higher" education, i.e. general education and not vocational or technical education. In many countries vocational schools have become failures; where they succeeded initially they have often been upgraded as alternative roads towards higher education in medicine or engineering or business-administration, which again tends to lead to office-type jobs later on. The shift (see section I) towards general education will therefore be difficult to change if it is felt that inclusion of more practical subjects in some schools will diminish pupils' chances to be admitted to the next higher level of education. As people with a general education topped-off with a liberal arts degree are fed back into the secondary school system as teachers, the loop closes and the system feeds upon itself, thereby making it ever more difficult to bring about meaningful change. This has also proven very difficult in most universities in developed countries. As long as government, as the major national employer, is among the first to continuously increase its educational prerequisites for jobs, the so-called social demand for continued education will persist unabated.

Although from the individual's viewpoint it is important to continue within the formal educational system as long as possible, this backfires if everyone pursues the same goal in a slow growing economy, as occurs nowadays. The trend towards ever more and ever higher levels of education is largely re-enforced by the educational financing policies of government; these make it progressively easier to continue

one's education, the further one has progressed in the educational pyramid. In primary schools fees are still a handicap. Where school fees were abolished they often had to be reimposed because the financial burden for government became unbearable (primary education often absorbs one-half to two-thirds of the total educational budget). On the other hand, since independence many governments have taken measures aimed at reducing the direct cost of secondary education to pupils and their parents in order to promote further education. Virtually everywhere, university education is fully subsidised through student bursaries.

Under the pretext that the country benefits immeasurably from its high level manpower (if at least they do not join the brain drain), those people are subsidised who may be expected to have the highest earning power upon completion of their studies, even though they will likely have to compete at a rather lower level in the future than at present. This structure of educational financing thus contributes to a strongly anti-egalitarian income distribution.

VI Conclusion.

Wage employment prospects for pupils with primary and even secondary education have diminished strongly in the past decade, increasing feelings of frustration and social unrest. After the golden opportunities of the first decade after independence, employment prospects for university graduates will also change rather rapidly during the seventies; this will also fuel frustration and underemployed graduates may provide leadership for incipient oppositional political movements. On the other hand, the employed have used their disproportionately large political power to enforce large nominal wage increases. The increase in the wage bill in the sixties served to pay people more rather than to pay more people, thus resulting in increased income inequality (see table 5).

Nowadays these wage increases are mostly being eroded by rapidly increasing prices which are partly caused by increasing indirect taxes necessary to finance the higher governmental salaries.
Table 5.

Employment and Income Developments Changes in percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>period</th>
<th>employment</th>
<th>wage bill</th>
<th>average wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1962-68</td>
<td>+ 22.0</td>
<td>+ 74.4</td>
<td>+ 42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1964-68</td>
<td>+ 0.1</td>
<td>+ 34.9</td>
<td>+ 34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1964-67</td>
<td>+ 29.0</td>
<td>+ 75.0</td>
<td>+ 36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1965-68</td>
<td>+ 2.9</td>
<td>+ 28.8</td>
<td>+ 25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The potentially damaging influence of deteriorating employment prospects can be mitigated if:

1. graduates accept lower salaries and/or scale down their aspirations, undoubtedly a painful and slow process;
2. part of the overproduction of graduates goes overseas (brain drain) instead of organising political opposition against the privileges of vested interests;
3. an acceleration of employment-generating economic growth should suddenly occur. This is unlikely. Pressure to Africanise the private sector will increase and may lead to unrest within foreign minority groups which are important in the private sector. Also, medium-term growth and efficiency may be unfavourably affected by nationalisation of key sectors. On the other hand, large enterprises may find it cheaper to invest in order to eliminate some posts than to Africanise, using existing investment incentives which tend to subsidise capital expenditure at the cost of labour-using technologies. In the long run, such a policy would accentuate social unrest and tensions and stimulate unemployment, as a result of which the (re-)investment climate would deteriorate even further in the eyes of prospective foreign or local investors.6

In a number of African countries expenditure on law and order is amongst the fastest growing expenditure categories of the government budget. Such an expenditure pattern is perfectly rational when viewed from the rapidly increasing unemployed semi-literate who, one day, may wish to challenge the privileged positions of those in power.

---

6. The net capital outflow on private account from developing countries has already become negative. See OECD, Development Assistance in 1969.
It must be feared that the 1970s will be very difficult for Africa, with chances for increasing conflict between government and universities. Given the experiences of the past decade, it was premature to assume that more education would automatically lead to absorption in the labour market and a higher growth rate. That certainly has not been the case in India and Egypt, and these examples had long been available when the present policies were embarked upon.

Reconsideration of the role of education in development is long overdue. Most African universities have been preoccupied with their internal problems of getting established and getting programmes and staff built up, and have not been able to give much thought to these problems. It is to be hoped that too strong vested interests have not developed to jeopardize any adaptation which may prove necessary in the future.

The Hague,
January 1971.