The Ujamaa Village Programme in Tanzania:
New Forms of Rural Development

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The role of *ujamaa* villages and other rural organisations and institutions in Tanzania should be seen in the light of historical developments, particularly of the anti-colonial struggle. The leading role in this struggle was taken by a party which represented a crystallisation of several movements resulting from the people's reaction to exploitation by foreign and native forces. One aspect of African socialism towards which this party, headed by Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, is leading the country is the rural development programme whose objective is to set up *ujamaa* villages. Peasants are stimulated to pool their labour and resources in a common effort towards a higher standard of living and the development of the country, rather than to achieve these aims through individual emulation. In the following pages we shall describe the background of the *ujamaa* programme, particularly the role of the TANU political party, the way in which *ujamaa* functions in rural areas, its ideals, and the implementation of the programme. Some of the difficulties encountered by the programme will be dealt with and also its achievements, on the basis of preliminary field observations and a few case studies.

*Ujamaa villages:* villages in which peasants live in their own houses but own and cultivate the land jointly. For further explanation see pp. 8-9.
Before Independence: The Growth of TANU

During colonial rule in Tanzania, native authorities, often traditional chiefs, were utilised to administer certain limited aspects of government. As these authorities became less representative of the people's interests, new and non-traditional leadership gradually emerged. This happened particularly through cooperative organisations such as the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU), a union of primary cooperative societies of coffee growers, created in 1932. By 1960, this Union had 43,000 members and its own training school. Primary societies functioned with considerable success, attendance of village representatives at their monthly meetings being estimated at 75 per cent.

The need for new organisations was partly reaction to the rather authoritarian way in which many government programmes were brought in and at times forced upon the people. Peasants have often reacted to this approach with the attitude of ndiyo bwana, showing considerable

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enthusiasm when a proposal was made but doing nothing when it had to be implemented. In several cases, however, when measures were forced upon the peasants which were not understood or which were against their interests, protest movements of different types have occurred. A well-known case is the terracing and land consolidation which the Luguru peasants in the Morogoro area were forced to undertake to protect their soil. These measures were of doubtful value and their manner of imposition upon the peasants caused considerable resistance, resulting in more or less violent action. The lack of communication between colonial authorities and peasants meant that their only way to express disagreement was by dramatic protest. Two scholars who studied the case noted:

"The political institutions were deficient in that they provided no acceptable method for expressing hostility and discontent; emotions developed with no opportunity for expressing them openly. The various councils and the hierarchy of officialdom, including headmen, sub-chiefs and chiefs, did not provide an effective conduit for bringing complaints to the surface. The district officials were isolated from direct contact with the peasants. When in the field, they were accompanied by sub-chiefs, headmen or agricultural instructors, and the Luguru were reluctant to present their complaints, especially if reprisals might follow. It was prudent to remain silent."4

The Tanzanian peasants continued to have good reasons to distrust outside interference in their traditional agricultural practices. Several large-scale settlement projects had been initiated from 1953 onwards by the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation Schemes (TAC).

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3 One case was the Hoza rebellion in Usambara, described in J.J. Hozza, The Hoza Rebellion and After: A Study in Innovation (Political Science Paper 6, Dissertation, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1969).

TAC took over from the Overseas Food Corporation, initiator of the ill-fated groundnuts schemes with African settler tenant farmers. It was characteristic of TAC schemes that, to transform the traditional African cultivator into a modern peasant smallholder, he had to be separated from his traditional environment and brought under a system of so-called "production under close supervision". New rules were more or less paternalistically imposed upon the peasants and their resentment at this approach was aggravated by the enforcement of extra work, the profitability of which was not always clear to them. This resentment was channelled into political opposition to colonial rule as a whole. Closely-supervised settlements were then created by the colonial régime to segregate the peasant from such "disturbing influences". 5

Grievances against specific programmes or institutions were increasingly interpreted as protests or grievances against the colonial régime as such. The cooperative movement thus became part of a nationalist front and the "politics of protest and agitation". 6 It is well-known to sociologists that it is easier to organise people against a common "enemy" than in favour of a positive cause. Group cohesiveness and solidarity is stronger under threat, when there is an opposing force or a so-called "negative reference group". 7 For this reason, recent United Nations community development policy statements evaluate "conflict", if properly channelled, as a positive factor in rallying people to a common effort. 8

The cooperative movement in Tanzania is typical of the validity of this approach. Cooperatives were first formed with considerable success in the early 1950s as an action against Asian dealers and


merchants. Once colonial rule and the influence of foreign interests had been eliminated or diminished, the cooperatives and similar common enterprises had to rely on the willingness of their members to build something for their own benefit, without the special motivation of defence or resistance against an external threat. This approach proved to be more difficult. In order to gain independence, however, an impressive political organisation was built up with relative ease.

This organisation, through which all forms of discontent and distrust were channelled constructively and with considerable success, was the Tanganyika African National Union, TANU. Created in 1954, this party, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, built a massive base among the population, particularly the peasantry, and moved the country rapidly towards independence. This was gained in 1961 after TANU had had a few years of partial administrative government experience.

TANU enabled a network of village organisations to be created throughout the country. A number of tribal associations were the response to various frustrations encountered by African growers when they produced cash crops in competition with vested interests. On plantations and in urban areas, the rapidly growing labour movement gave strength to TANU and to its struggle for independence.

Between 1955 and 1960, TANU membership grew from 100,000 to 1,000,000. In addition to cooperatives, tribal associations and labour unions, several other types of mass organisation were created and integrated into TANU. Village elders were organised into groups and became a channel of communication between TANU and the villagers. A youth league and a women's organisation were also created. Parents were organised to bring pressure to bear on schools to be in line with the plans of the Ministry of Education.

TANU occupied itself not only with over-all national grievances and issues, but also with concrete problems at the base level, trying to bring people together to solve them. Friedland noted: "The major vehicle of mobilisation in the rural areas became the community self-help programmes. Initiated largely by TANU leaders at the local levels but controlled from the centre through a requirement that all materials provided by government had to be approved by a centralised agency, community self-help programmes involved building community centres, roads, wells, etc. The entire population of villages would be mobilised through the TANU branch."

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The party's top leadership kept in touch with village realities by visiting trips, so-called "safaris", to all local party headquarters. Tribal chieftains and councils, particularly those who collaborated with the colonial government, lost their influence and were replaced by elected councils of TANU adherents. TANU leaders at the local level often fulfilled the most important roles in local government.

The Rural Basis of TANU: Ten-House Cells

In building up TANU in the rural areas, so-called "ten-house cells" were established all over the country to bring people together at the base level. These were united in TANU branches; the latter sent delegates to regional conferences which elected representatives to the national executive where all trade unions, cooperatives, women, youth, elders and other groups were represented. The 20-member Central Committee of TANU was appointed by its President.

The purpose of the cell system was to mobilise members and socialise non-members in an attempt to take the TANU Party from the towns into the rural areas, involving local people in the decision-making process. One cell covered about ten houses. Which houses, generally widely scattered in rural areas, were to be included in each cell was decided upon by a "cell boundary commission" consisting of village elders, TANU branch officials and government-employed village executive officers. Houses close to each other were usually joined into one cell, but in some cases the elders tried to exclude certain houses, even though in close proximity, if inhabited by people whom they considered to be "stubborn". In some cases, the elders who were influential in the boundary committee were traditional leaders, "old people who have wisdom"; in other cases, there were new leaders, so-called "cultural elders". Once the boundaries were fixed, a cell leader was elected. One Tanzanian study indicates that the cell leaders were often former church leaders, aids to missionaries, successful farmers and large family owners: "In a typical village, the cell leader is invariably a rich mzee, the most influential and respected man of the village. These are the people who are known beyond the

borders of their villages. They have a degree of modernisation which could attract important people like village executive officers, who during their tours habitually visited them even before they were elected cell leaders.\textsuperscript{11}

The cell leader's functions are to explain TANU and government policies to the people; to articulate people's views and needs and to communicate them to TANU and government authorities; to win members for TANU; to collect party dues; to foster cooperation among members; to mobilise people for campaigns such as digging latrines, spreading literacy, and other common undertakings. The cell leader is the cell's delegate to the TANU Branch Annual Conference. Most cell leaders participate in short seminars in which they are briefed on their functions by higher TANU officials.\textsuperscript{12}

The relations between people in the same ten-house cell are not always harmonious and friendly. This can be concluded from a case study indicating that of 74 judicial cases brought for arbitration to the meeting of the ten-house cell or to the primary court magistrate in 1967, 46 involved people of the same cell. Out of 32 cases of land disputes, 19 involved people of the same cell.\textsuperscript{13}

The Rural Development Programme of TANU:

\textit{Ujamaa Vijijini}

At a meeting of TANU executives held on 5 February 1967, a strong impetus to rural development was given as part of the Arusha Declaration which outlined TANU's policy on socialism and self-reliance. In widely-circulated public documents explaining the need for and background of the Arusha Declaration, President Nyerere diagnosed the country's problems, such as the growing socio-economic inequality and the need for austerity in party and government circles. The President gave an example by his own dedication and his ascetic way of life, thus inspiring

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 17-18; one case is described in J.J. Hosza, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 34; I.H. Mnkondo, \textit{Politics in Usambara} (Political Science Paper No. 6, Dissertation, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1969), also noted that local TANU leaders are often better off and even used the term "petty bourgeoisie" to indicate the group from which they were recruited.

\textsuperscript{12} Shaila, \textit{The Cell System}, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.12-14.

many other Tanzanians.

Among the most important aspects of the Arusha Declaration were its emphasis on rural and agricultural development and the indication that the principal means of production would be brought under the control of organised workers and peasants. Great emphasis was placed on the self-reliance of the country. The main resources for development were regarded as the people, the land and agriculture, policies of socialism and self-reliance, and good leadership, all brought together by hard work. 14

The plans elaborating the Arusha Declaration gave an important place to rural development through the creation of ujamaa villages. Peasant families were to live together in villages, in their own houses but owning and cultivating the land jointly. This is held to be a modern version of traditional forms of agriculture, permitting rationalisation and an increase of production. These new forms are expected to evolve gradually through stages where common and private agriculture exist side by side. TANU leaders are expected to promote this programme throughout the country. 15

In a policy booklet regarding ujamaa, President Nyerere explained more precisely the kind of rural development that Tanzania would promote. Tendencies existed for farms to extend to a point at which the farmer had to hire labourers to plant and harvest the full acreage. This was considered in disagreement with the ujamaa system:

"The money obtained from all the crops goes to the owner; from that money he pays 'his' workers. And the result is that the spirit of equality between all people working on the farm has gone - for the employees are the servants of the man who employs them. Thus we have the beginnings of a class system in the rural areas." 16

"If this kind of capitalist development takes place widely over the country, we may get a good statistical increase in the national wealth of Tanzania, but the masses of the people will not necessarily be better off. On the contrary, as land becomes more scarce, we shall find ourselves with a farmers'..."


class and a labourers' class, with the latter being unable either to work for themselves or to receive a full return for the contribution they are making to the total output.) 17

This tendency of "capitalist development" and the emergence of class divisions was thought likely to become a problem, particularly in densely populated, well-watered, fertile areas where a land shortage existed. At present, about 35 per cent of the rural population live in areas where all available cultivable land is claimed and where compact settlement patterns prevail. 18

The Second Five-Year Plan of Tanzania, covering 1969-1974, gives top priority to rural development as announced in the Arusha Declaration. Rural development policy is oriented in such a way that it will lead towards a Socialist society with strong roots in Tanzanian rural cooperative traditions. It will therefore follow the principles of ujamaa vijijini, behind which the full range of governmental and political institutions will be mobilised. The Plan points out about ujamaa vijijini:

"By building on the principles of the traditional extended family system, with its emphasis on cooperation and mutual respect and responsibility, a society will be built in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities, when there is no exploitation of man by man, and where all have a gradually increasing level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury.

The objective is to farm the village land collectively with modern techniques of production, and to share the proceeds according to the work contributed. People who are farming together can obtain the economic advantages of large-scale farming, in the better utilisation of machinery, purchase of supplies, marketing of crops, etc. It becomes easier to supply technical advice through agricultural extension officers who can teach a group more easily in one place, rather than traveling from one small shamba to another. It is also easier to provide

17 Ibid., p. 115.

18 Lionel Cliffe and Griffiths Cunningham, op.cit., p. 3, note a trend toward concentration of land and the appearance of landless peasants in more densely populated areas such as Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Lushoto, but point out: "Yet still Tanzania is not in the position of many Latin American countries of needing to enact a comprehensive programme of land reform to share out land and get rid of glaring inequalities as a prerequisite to socialist development. Conversely, the peasants, although often extremely poor, do not harbour a deep bitterness as a result of oppression."
social facilities like water supplies, medical and educational services, to farmers who live in groups rather than in scattered holdings.

The equality of farmers in ujamaa communities, with no divisive class distinctions, creates a healthy and stable social system where corruption, exploitation and inequality of wealth unrelated to work done can be eliminated.

Until recently the trend has been in the opposite direction, away from extended family production and social unity, and towards the development of a class system in the rural areas. The immediate objective of the Second Five-Year Plan is to reverse this trend and to search out all possible avenues of advance towards ujamaa." 19

The Pilot Experience: Ruvuma

When the ujamaa policy was launched, several experiences in Tanzania could serve as examples. By 1967, about 30 villages in the country practised ujamaa principles more or less consciously. Fifteen of these were in the Ruvuma region in Songea in the south. These villages had a high degree of democratic control and participation; they were nucleated, and the land was commonly owned, worked and harvested.

The scheme in the Ruvuma region originated in the TANU Youth League Farmers' Scheme in Litowa. Ntimbanjayo Millinga was the local secretary of the TANU Youth League and founded the Scheme with 14 colleagues in November 1960. They wanted to create a sisal estate on which to work together so that they would no longer have to go to the coastal areas for work. Millinga had experience as a union agent of the Sisal and Plantation Workers' Union. Although the first experiment

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19 Tanzania, Second Five-Year Plan (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 26, paras. 2-5; Ujamaa - The Basis of African Socialism, TANU pamphlet, 1962, republished in Julius K. Nyerere, op. cit., pp. 1-12, noting about the concept: "'Ujamaa', then, or 'Familyhood', describes our Socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire Socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man. We, in Africa, have no more need of being 'converted' to Socialism that we have of being 'taught' democracy. Both are rooted in our own past - in the traditional society which produced us. Modern African Socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of 'society' as an extension of the basic family unit."
failed owing to the threat of wild animals and also the lack of adequate food, a new group — including Millinga — again tried to create a settlement in Litowa a year later. A land dispute with people from a nearby community was solved by the TANU district secretary. The project was supported by some foreign sources and by advice from Ralph Ibbott, a cooperative promoter who had had experience with farmers' cooperatives in Rhodesia. Some of the TANU branch committee people started to cultivate a communal plot in Njoomlole, close to Litowa, but continued to live in the old scattered way. During 1962, the Litowa members built a number of houses in their new villages and brought their families over.

The experiment developed steadily: elections were held each year in which all members chose a chairman, manager and secretary/treasurer and 9 management committee members. The committee served for three years, one-third resigning each year to be re-elected or not. Several other groups in the neighbourhood, including Njoomlole, asked for advice and came to visit. In 1962, in order to assist the new experiments adequately, an association was formed in consultation with the Area Commissioner, being officially named the Ruvuma Development Association a year later. As in the Israeli kibbutzim, some more educated people gave up their jobs and joined the new communal villages, attracted by the spirit prevailing there.

In some of the surrounding districts, the Area Commissioner stimulated the peasants to follow the Litowa example. However, when the initiator of a group was not involved in its development, as happened in such cases, leadership was not always adequate and up to the task. Some groups consequently disintegrated.

The Litowa experiment developed satisfactorily. President Nyerere came to visit in 1965 and declared that Litowa was an example of the ujamaa approach. In 1965, Millinga, the main leader of Litowa village, was elected to the National Assembly, after having served some time as elected District Councillor. Later, several of the Litowa members with more formal education decided to resign as members although continuing to live in the village. They would serve as part of a social and economic revolutionary army to spread the Litowa experience and to help to establish new villages along the same lines.
The school in Litowa tried to educate the children of the village and of neighbouring villages in such a way that they became immediately involved in ujamaa, in the hope that they would remain in the rural areas as they grew older. Children were taught to participate in construction activities and agricultural tasks, and in special projects such as poultry or rabbit raising, and to learn such skills as spinning and weaving. The pupils also learned to direct their own executive committee. 20 The Litowa experiment is presently being copied in many ujamaa villages.

The Ujamaa Programme and Its Implementation

The purposes of ujamaa can be summarised as follows:

1. increase in labour productivity through working together with a division of labour and specialisation of functions;

2. more profitable forms of marketing, purchasing, provision of services, forms of mechanisation;

3. spread of technical innovation through education and extension services;

4. creation of self-reliant rural communities who can determine their own future;

5. avoidance of exploitation of one peasant by the other and of excessive differentiation of wealth and power;

6. reduction of the gap between urban and rural life. 21

In a more concrete interpretation of the ujamaa agricultural programme, President Nyerere pointed out:

"This means that most of our farming would be done by groups of people who live as a community and work as a community. They would live together in a village; they would farm together; market together; and undertake the provision of local services and small local requirements as a community. Their community would be the traditional family group, or any other

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21 See several official policy declarations by TANU and the President; also: A.C. Ellman, Progress, Problems and Prospects in Ujamaa Development in Tanzania (Economic Research Bureau, University College, Dar es Salaam, 1970), E.R.B. Paper 70.18, p. 2.
group of people living according to ujamaa principles, large enough to take account of modern methods and the twentieth century needs of man. The land this community farmed would be called 'our land' by all the members; the crops they produced on that land would be 'our crops'; it would be 'our shop' which provided individual members with the day-to-day necessities from outside; 'our workshop' which made the bricks from which houses and other buildings were constructed, and so on." 22

The transformation of rural areas according to the ujamaa principles is accomplished step by step. A first step generally is the so-called villagisation, to persuade people to move from their houses scattered over a wide area into a single village where they can enjoy common facilities such as schools, water, etc. A next step is to persuade people to start a small communal plot that will be worked and harvested in common, and the proceeds of which will be shared. Once sufficient confidence in the community farm has been gained, all the land can be pooled that way, with the exception of individual gardens around the houses for vegetables.

The first step usually results from mass meetings at which government and TANU officials explain the ujamaa idea to the ten-house cell leaders or to the population in general. In some cases, President Nyerere has personally promoted ujamaa in those areas which he happened to visit. People often mentioned that they were prepared and influenced in favour of ujamaa by the President's broadcast speeches. This happened particularly in more isolated villages where government officials did not visit frequently. Some cases of outside pressure and even sanctions against local leaders who did not promote ujamaa in their villages occurred, but on the whole persuasion was used to stimulate the people to participate.

In the initiation of many ujamaa villages, the ten-house cells form the basis of common effort rather than the group of neighbours and kinsmen who are traditionally chosen to participate in mutual aid and joint action by a sponsor of a work party. The element of supplying beer or food, as happened in traditional work parties, is not practised under the ujamaa system.

Each step in the process towards ujamaa is such that it facilitates the next step. For example, when, communally-cleared land is divided into individual plots, this is done so as to facilitate cooperation between neighbours and the common mechanical operation of certain aspects of cultivation. It is rarely that plots are laid out around the houses of each family. Houses were generally built in clusters, each with a small garden plot of a half-to-one acre, while the arable land is around the village. The village is often supplied with a communally-built school, store and other facilities. The whole structure is such that eventual pooling of the arable or grazing land, or of that part cultivated with cash crops, is relatively easy.

The organisation of communal tasks depends on the level of ujamaa achieved in a village. At the highest level, all members work every day on specific tasks according to the commonly-accepted work division. In less highly developed ujamaa villages, only part of the day or some days of the week are spent on commonly-divided tasks, the rest of the time being dedicated to the private homestead plots. In newly developing villages, the tasks of clearing land or of cultivating a relatively small communal plot are done in common.

In the West Lake area, for example, attempts were made to educate people in ujamaa by encouraging them to help each other in small groups, the ten-house cells, to cultivate individual one-acre plots. The group shifts from one plot to the next, ploughing, planting or weeding, until all are finished. Once people see the benefits of working together on a small scale, it is easier to introduce ujamaa on a large scale.

Among the difficulties brought out in various case studies and observed during field visits are the peasants' complaints that work done by others on their plot as part of ujamaa was not as satisfactory as it would have been had they done it themselves.

The problem of division of work is particularly difficult in large villages. In order to make members do their proper share the work was divided into smaller work groups in which mutual control could be exercised more easily. Within these work groups tasks are assigned to individuals or sub-groups, often based on the ten-house cells.

The most important incentive is to link reward to the work contributed, carefully recording the tasks assigned to individuals and the sub-groups. At the end of the year the proceeds are distributed according to the work contributed. 24

Once communal work tasks have been initiated, the ujamaa impact may be increased by gradually increasing the number of days worked on common enterprises. For example, in one village two days a week were initially dedicated to communal farming and water furrow work. Accomplishment of these tasks was sometimes enforced by lightly fining those who did not do their share. At a later stage, the development officer tried to persuade the people to work four days a week on communal tasks, giving a very successful neighbouring village as an example.

In general, members who do not fulfil their assigned tasks are fined or punished by extra work. If they cannot attend, they are allowed to send a friend or relative as a replacement. In some cases an elaborate system exists based on piecework, and each member has a small book which the secretary signs when a job is completed. The system of fines for not showing up for work is particularly necessary in the initial stage before there is any collective income to be distributed according to the workdays given by each member.

The income of an ujamaa village derives mainly from the sale of agricultural produce and from profits from village machinery and shops. Part of the revenue is kept for construction projects and between 5 and 10 per cent for unforeseen events. After deduction of costs and special items, proceeds are distributed among members according to their workdays and effort. A leader gets the same amount as other members, although an outstanding leader may receive a bonus. In some cases, such as in Njoomlole and Litowa, the salary received by the main leader as a Member of Parliament goes into the village revenues to be shared.

Individual families may retain the income derived from proceeds of their homestead plot. They can also own some cattle. Houses can be owned individually, but belong to the village if they have been built by common effort.

An important factor is the physical planning of the village, in which the desires of the people have to be taken into consideration. In some villages people prefer large home plots, but this implies that the houses will be at rather large distances from each other and the village as a whole somewhat widespread. In other cases, the people may be persuaded to build their houses more closely together with small gardens, while the individual plots are all laid out in a special field on the village outskirts. It will then be easier to merge the individual plots into a collective farm with mechanical cultivation when the time is ripe for such a decision. Also the place of a school, dispensary, and stores, and a potable water system, have to be planned in accordance with the people's desires.

The Government makes an important contribution to ujamaa villages which are in the process of creation by giving technical assistance in their planning. The availability of land, water and other natural resources, soil conditions and other factors have to be taken into account in order to plan a viable village. Economic failure of a village is not only a setback for the participants, but for the ujamaa programme as a whole. In many districts, planning teams have been set up which spend brief periods in the areas where villages are being formed. These teams consist of an agricultural technician, livestock specialist, land planner, economist, irrigation specialist, surveyor, town planner and cooperative specialist. The team lives in the village and works in close collaboration with the village committee. The plans concern the crops to be grown, the size of plots for different cultivations, the methods to be used, the services required, and the forms of possible finance.

The administrative structures of ujamaa villages show considerable local variation. Generally, the main authority in the village is the general council of members, also called the central village committee, which meets about four times a year. The functions of this council are: to elect a management committee; to elect a chairman who represents the village (together with the TANU official appointed by TANU headquarters); to examine and approve the production plan and budget drawn up by the management committee; to examine and approve the plan for distribution of the annual income according to the work schedule; to examine and approve the reports of the management committee; to approve new members or the penalties and expulsion of members if neces-
sary; to discuss and decide on all important issues. The TANU official appointed in the village is advisor to the council, to give guidance according to the basic principles of ujamaa as laid down in the Arusha Declaration.

Village members can form several other committees according to local needs. While some villages have as many as six different committees, others have only one, although most have a TANU committee. Villages threatened by robbery, wild animals or, as in some bordering on Mozambique, by possible Portuguese attack, may form a defence committee. Many villages have a committee for education, concerning itself with the education of the children and of adults, culture, health and other aspects of social life. A financial committee controls financial affairs and guards against corruption.

The following brief report of a central village committee meeting with a regional development officer (RDO) gives an impression of the activities of a committee and of the role played by development officials.

"The RDO arranged on this day to talk to the committee members of the village. The following was discussed:

1. Aid: The people had asked the RDO to send them a lorry for transporting building poles from the forest to the village. So far nothing has happened. The RDO explained that there is only one car allocated for this purpose but he has tried his best to borrow from other departments and the car is on the way.

2. Drinking Water: RDO said plans are being fulfilled and soon the people will have clean water. A dip for the cattle will be built.

3. Person to be Trained as a Nurse: RDO told the committee men to choose one person and send him the name of their choice.

4. Radio of the Village: RDO answered that he has asked for one and will tell the people as soon as possible.

5. Leaders' Course: Will train leaders after the RDO and executive officers have been trained.

6. Maize Milling Machine: RDO suggested that if the women stay together and cooperate they may be able to buy their own machine or one can be borrowed for them. He told them to write to him to come for further explanation of the issue. A confusion was solved here because the RDO is supposed to
have stated earlier that the village will be given a free milling machine, which is not true. The RDO told the committee members to listen carefully to speeches and to distinguish between an idea, a promise and an action. They should not confuse an idea with a promise, otherwise they will regret unnecessarily.

7. **Cinema:** RDO promised to bring the village a film show as soon as the community development projector is ready.

8. **Ox-plough:** The people are now training six cattle for the job and would like to be helped with a plough. RDO asked the committee to prepare a list of those who are interested to use the ox-plough and he will send the list to the area commissioner.

Finally the RDO requested the committee to work hard and not to listen to the non-members who want to spoil the spirit of socialism.**25**

Considerable attention is given to leadership training. Most leaders and committee members of villages visited had gone through some kind of short training course, organised in the district capital or another centrally located place. An essential part of the training is the explanation of ujamaa principles and African socialism, as promoted by the TANU Party. Most village leaders are also TANU officials. In addition to the ideological orientation, great emphasis is given to practical technical matters such as improved agricultural techniques, bookkeeping, direction of meetings, etc.

Since many new organisations, political as well as economic, have been brought to the rural areas, many leadership positions have to be filled. In two villages in the Meru area where leadership patterns were studied, there were respectively 184 and 194 leadership positions, or 0.36 and 0.34 positions per farmer. However, it is not so that a third of the farmers have a leadership function. Most leaders hold several leadership positions simultaneously, in one village 2.24 positions per leader and in the other 1.75. The majority of leaders in both villages have several positions, generally in different spheres.

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25 From a report supplied by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning.
An idealised and "theoretical" example of how an ujamaa village can come into being is that of the cattle-cotton ujamaa village in Sukumaland, described by Roger Lewin. In this area cattle raising was the main source of income, and a man's prestige was defined by the number of cattle he owned. Cattle was particularly important as a security since crop failure was frequent in the area. The productivity of the cattle, either in milk or meat, was of secondary importance to the fact of having the cattle for security, as "saving herds". After some of the young men of the village had discussed the possibility of increasing the cattle's productivity, a TANU ujamaa village organiser and a local veterinary officer visited the village to help them. Twenty peasants decided that they would each contribute one head of cattle to a common herd. In order to avoid the possibility of varying quality, the choice of cattle from each man was made by the group as a whole. The herd needed eighty acres of grazing land, fifty of which were allotted to the group by the village elders. The rest was contributed by four members in exchange for the promise that other group members would keep some of their cattle. A disease prevention fund for vaccination was created by contributions (16 shillings each) from the members. A three-quarters-of-an-acre plot was later utilised as a vegetable garden and another small plot for cotton cultivation. The herd, which extended gradually with calves, almost doubled in three years; the better quality of the cattle enabled considerable profits to be made by selling a few head. After much discussion it was decided to invest half these profits in the purchase of a bull and of fencing materials, and to divide the other half among the members. In the fourth year of the experiment people had enough confidence in each other to start organising a ujamaa village, pooling most of their private land and cattle in addition to what they already had in common.


Only their own foodcrops were cultivated individually. In consultation with the elders and those who did not participate in the experiment, the adjustment of landholdings and house sites was arranged in such a way that the members could build their houses close together. The success of the experiment motivated other peasants to apply for entrance to the ujamaa village; this was agreed upon after a year's trial.

Generally, there seems to be more influence from above in the process of creating a ujamaa village than in the idealised case described above. The initiative often comes from TANU or from agricultural or rural development officials who try to persuade the people to initiate cooperative efforts of the ujamaa type.

An important asset for ujamaa villages is that they increasingly form the base for the activities of rural development and agricultural extension agents rather than district headquarters. About one-third of the rural development assistants are presently based in ujamaa villages and operate from there in the surrounding areas. The rural development and extension workers are especially trained in cooperative management and similar tasks in order to assist the ujamaa villages.

The various types of ujamaa villages include:

1. villages established by regional authorities;
2. villages established voluntarily by the people;
3. traditional villages beginning cooperative activities;
4. villages which were started as settlement schemes in the early 1960s and are now being transformed into ujamaa villages;
5. villages initiated by missions;
6. "blockfarms" which will be transformed into ujamaa villages at a later stage;
7. a few villages of young people where it is hoped that the parents will join later.

Over-all Results of the Ujamaa Programme

By the end of 1968 about 180 ujamaa villages were reported to exist all over the country, with a population of 58,500. At the end of 1969 this had increased to 650 villages covering about 300,000 people, or

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28 For some cases in these different categories see L.M. Mongi and Johanna Westman, Report on Safari to Kigoma Region, 1-21 February 1970, mimeographed.
2.5 per cent of the entire population. Over 400 of these villages were in the Mtwara region on the borders of Mozambique and were created as defence villages mainly against Portuguese attack. Probably 90 per cent of the ujamaa villages were not yet quite at the stage at which they practised communal farming as in the Ruvuma scheme; in order to be counted, they had to be at least on the way towards some form of communal farming.

By mid-1970 the number had again increased to 1,100 villages (covering half a million people), 600 of these villages being in the Mtwara region. The other villages were geographically distributed as follows: 29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shinyanga</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbeya</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Region</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabora</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanga</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iringa</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodoma</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruvuma</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mara</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arusha</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morogoro</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Lake</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singida</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigoma</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwanza</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilimanjaro</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that not only have more and more ujamaa villages been created since the Arusha Declaration, but they have also become bigger. While most of the original villages had fifty or less families, those formed at a later stage often contained 200 to 300 families and some, such as in the Rufiji Valley, more than 1,000.

At present almost all ujamaa villages are in the economically less developed areas of the country where there is no shortage of land, few permanent crops, and little social and economic differentiation to act as a barrier to cooperation, as happened in some villages in the more densely populated and developed areas. The rapid spread of the

Ujamaa programme comes out clearly in table I.

Table I. Number of Ujamaa Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of villages</th>
<th>Total population of villages</th>
<th>Total population as percentage of national total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 1967</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1968</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>58,500</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1969</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1970</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures used here include villages at all stages of ujamaa development and at all levels of commitment to the policy, although some may as yet have taken only a small step on the path to ujamaa.

Observations on Some Cases

In one of the areas visited, the Rufiji valley, several ujamaa villages had been created at the instigation of government and TANU officials as a result of a threatening emergency. At any time, the plots of a good many peasants in the valley could be flooded by the river, and people felt the need to move to higher and more secure areas. The best way to do this was through ujamaa, creating concentrated villages where people could commonly enjoy services which were hard to supply to scattered peasant families. Several hundreds of families were prepared to participate in the project. In Mloka and Chumbi, two villages which were the subject of a case study, 31 members were put to work on the newly-created ujamaa farm, the improvement and extension of the new village, and on the rice fields in the valley. Two days a week were dedicated to each of these three tasks. The ujamaa farm was being cleared and would be utilised for communal exploitation. The new village needed a great deal of cleaning, tree cutting, plots had to be prepared for a school, offices etc., and roads constructed.

30 From Antony Ellman, Development of Ujamaa Farming, op.cit., p. 9.

Rice fields were being cleared communally but would be divided into individual two-acre plots for all participants. The advantage was that the plots would be consolidated and not widely scattered as in earlier days.

The whole effort was directed by the Village Executive Committee headed by the TANU Branch Chairman and Secretary. The Committee further consisted of delegates elected at the Branch Annual Conference and representatives of the TANU Youth League and the Elders Section. The timetable and hours of work were determined by the TANU Chairman. Supervision of the work was in the hands of the Village Executive Officer, a government employee, who headed the Village Development Committee.

All ujamaa villages visited in the Rufiji area received from the Government a school and a sanitary drinking water system as an incentive for the people to participate. The hundreds of houses built in each village since 1968 along newly laid out streets, some carrying such names as Myerere Street or Ujamaa Street, show how successful this approach has been. Most of the chairmen of executive committees were older men, but apparently from among the more dynamic elders. In some cases the chairman was a young man. All villages had a community development worker or an agricultural extension agent or both stationed in the village to guide production and other development efforts. A five-year plan had been made up in each village for the period 1969-1974, showing the trend towards gradual extension of communal land and effort. Only a year after the initiation, it is difficult to assess if all the plans can be implemented. In several cases, the technicians complained that people tended to dedicate more time to their individual subsistence plots than to the communal cash crop land, but this may well improve as the first benefits from the communal land come in. One factor which considerably helped to give the villages in the Rufiji valley a good and enthusiastic start was the effort of the National (Youth) service to help villagers in constructing their new homes.

Some incentives were purely economic. In Bungu, a village of 300 peasant families, cashew nuts were still cultivated on an individual basis and plans for starting to work a collective plot were being discussed. The main stimulus toward this cooperative undertaking came from the creation of a cashew nut processing plant jointly owned by
the National Development Corporation (51 per cent) and the peasants through the Bungu Farmers' Cooperative Union (49 per cent). The plant can employ about 200 people. Although at present the workers receive wages, in due time they will receive a share of the profits according to the work they have put in. This is also the case in the cashew nut processing plant at Kerege close to Dar es Salaam, which has a long tradition of ujamaa.

An interesting example of the "block farm" approach is Mkuini village in the Pare district, considered a successful example on the way to being a "socialist" village. The members had, in addition to their individual 3½ hectare plots, a "block farm" which was rapidly extended from a small plot of 5½ hectares to 50 hectares for growing cotton. The "block farm" is divided into individual plots among the 86 members but these plots are worked in common by groups of five. Only the harvesting is done individually. The cotton is marketed cooperatively. There are also plans to start a communal dairy farm.

Members are divided into three groups of about twenty each, one for house construction, one for the "block farm", and one tank and furrow group. The three groups work together in the clearance of 1,000 hectares for a future communal farm. There is a village committee which regulates the communal work for village improvement, an agricultural committee to manage the "block farm" and the future communal farm, and a water committee to manage irrigation.

Cases have been reported in which the "block farm" stage was seen as the final goal by the peasants, since they had not been sufficiently informed about possible further steps towards ujamaa.

Several Kinds of Problems and Difficulties

Some problems in relation to the creation of a ujamaa village or settlement are merely technical, such as the food supply during the transfer period.

In some cases, people who participated in the programme to create a new settlement lost too much time in getting to and from their place of origin for food and other necessities. Since it would take one or two years before the new plots could produce sufficient foodstuffs for subsistence, the problem of an appropriate food supply during those two
years had to be considered. Such measures were necessary to keep the settlers permanently in the new settlements.

In other cases, people move with their whole families to new sites, but have to rely on work as wage labourers to get food during the first year, until they become self-reliant. Elsewhere, much assistance in food supply is given during the first two years. In cases where the distance between the new and old sites was not too large, peasants left their families at their old homes so that they could be self-reliant for food. In some mission-initiated villages, members lived close to the new sites and developed economic self-sufficiency before building their new houses. 32

Other Difficulties Encountered by the Ujamaa Programme are Related to Human Factors

In ujamaa villages that were created in some of the earlier settlement schemes, the main difficulty was to overcome the traditional paternalistic approach of the management, about some of whom was observed:

"There was an attitude on the part of the management that the fewer operations entrusted to the members, the better the results were likely to be. The settlers were so peripheral to the running of the scheme that they became alienated from the management. We were told on a visit to one scheme that the management, both expatriates and their local (politically-appointed) assistants, were universally hated, and that the members were dissatisfied with the pay-out of proceeds. Without knowing the details they felt cheated. This mutual distrust on the part of the management and settlers hindered the over-all performance of these and many other supervised schemes." 33

The cleavage between newly-settled villagers (including the village committee) and the management of the settlements was emphasised by the difference in living conditions between the managing "elite"

32 See, for example, J. Rald, op.cit., p. 6.
33 Lionel Cliffe and Griffiths Cunningham, op.cit., p. 28.
(in some cases up to 18 people) who lived in separate government-built houses, and the peasants. In such cases, the latter felt that they were day-labourers or tenants of a landlord rather than members of a communal effort. Sometimes, there was then little feeling of commitment among the members of the settlement. 34

The decreased enthusiasm in earlier experiments is probably also related to over-all political change in the community. During the villagisation campaign announced by President Nyerere in an Address to the National Assembly on 10 December 1962, factors of political involvement played an important role. In the establishment of new settlement schemes, people were motivated by the rise in political prestige that they would gain by participating in the TANU-sponsored development drive. Many schemes were then started to consolidate or open-up lands. Initially, the people gave several days of communal labour per week. After the independence struggle, enthusiasm dropped gradually and so did the number of days contributed. The most difficult problem was that the credits supplied were seen as a gift and people did not feel responsible for the communal loans. 35

Some problems faced by the ujamaa programme are related to one of its basic purposes, namely, to avoid class polarisation in the rural areas between the rich and the poor. These problems occur particularly in areas where a certain class division already exists. Thus, in some areas, one of the obstacles the ujamaa programme has to face is the great number of small farmers who grow cash crops such as coffee, tea, cotton, tobacco, pyrethrum, bananas and cashews, on an individual basis. Some of these farmers, sometimes called "kulaks", are so successful that they have been able to extend their operation and start to employ hired labour. 36 The introduction of ujamaa has proven difficult in areas where many kulaks live. It is hard to convince

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35 See studies by S. Groeneveld and N. Newiger in Hans Ruthenberg (ed.), Ibid.,

36 John S. Saul, Class and Penetration in Tanzania (mimeographed paper, undated, University of Dar es Salaam), p. 8, quoted René Dumont who utilised this term for Tanzania. The emergence of a "kulak" class in Tanzania was confirmed by a field study of H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, Staff, Kulaks and Peasants (Leiden: Afrika Studiecentrum, 1970).
them to pool their land, particularly when it is occupied by more or less permanent crops requiring a great deal of investment. Although under some circumstances farmers can benefit from certain common undertakings or from living in concentrated villages with modern facilities, they are strongly individualistic in the agricultural process and often try to maximise individual profit. At times, common effort is just another means to serve this purpose of individual profit-making.

One of the main difficulties in introducing ujamaa into cash crop areas is therefore the breaking-down of this individualism. Sometimes it has been possible to initiate ujamaa projects in these areas where a differentiation had grown between wealthy and poor farmers and even between employers and workers, as long as the projects did not interfere with existent property and work relations. In the Rungwe area, ten-house cells were assigned a small plot of relatively poor quality for communal exploitation, but the existing individual cultivation structure was left essentially intact.

A difficult implication for the introduction of ujamaa in certain cases was that peasants with relatively little land felt that they worked proportionately more than the wealthier farmers on the land of others, particularly those with large plots. In such cases, as in Itumba, communal labour favoured those who were already better off.

The wealthier farmers were found to exercise considerable control within the ujamaa system, because they were in a position to transfer usufruct rights of land to poorer peasants who, in exchange, had to serve the "patron" in several ways. This included participating in communal work parties, but also in electing the "patron" to key positions in the TANU branch or ten-house cell. This patron-client relationship interfered with the egalitarian ideas behind the ujamaa programme. It was difficult, however, to introduce anything into the villages without the consent and support of the local elite. It seems

37 J. Rald, op.cit., gives cases in the West Lake area and notes (p. 21): "In areas where foodcrop farmers start to open up new lands together or pool their resources this problem of individualism hardly exists. In this sector, working together and sharing of proceeds continued to be important."


39 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
that as long as there is no blatant exploitation of the poor by the wealthier, and polarisation into opposing classes is not an acute problem, local patrons can help ujamaa to take roots. However, if insufficient benefits of the new system accrue to the poor peasants, the first signs of discontent are likely to appear. Government officials generally deal with better-off farmers on a kind of exchange basis: they help each other in various ways, not always to the benefit of the ujamaa village as a whole. 40

There is some evidence in Tanzania of cases in which better-off farmers, if actively involved in ujamaa efforts, relinquish or diminish their inclination to work merely for individual gain. Individualism as yet is not deeply-rooted in Tanzania's rural society, and a tendency to find satisfaction in leading functions for the common good can be a motivation which brings outstanding individuals into agreement with the ujamaa idea. The influence and esteem enjoyed by the leaders, in addition at times to minor individual gains, compensates for the loss of rapidly increasing profits due to joining the ujamaa effort. However, the more deeply entrenched are individualist tendencies, the more difficult it will be to appeal to this type of motivation.

In other cases, the tendency to work only for individual profits is so strong that farmers who have become rich in this way try to hinder the introduction of the ujamaa system. They do so by discouraging people from joining, pointing out the risks involved; occasionally even witchcraft is used, as in Kimunyu in the Pare region. A leader threatened to have "medicine" put on the lands to be used for a ujamaa project so that every person working those lands would face the fate of death. The leader in question claimed those lands for himself. 41 In Kigonigone in the same region it was impossible to clear more than 5 hectares of land for communal use because people from neighbouring villages and urban areas claimed property rights in the fertile woodlands. Unless such problems are settled, creation of a ujamaa village will be difficult.

The need to face natural or other kinds of difficulties or opposing

40 See, for example, H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, Staff, Kulaks and Peasants, op.cit.

41 Data from a field report by Claudita Mtemba, Ujamaa Villages in Pare, December 1969, mimeographed.
forces can sometimes be turned into an advantage for stimulating group cohesion. The fact that most ujamaa villages are in areas under threat from elsewhere, or in areas that are threatened by natural disasters, such as the Rufiji Valley, indicates that the "struggle" element has been successfully used. With some reservations, the dynamics of dissent or conflict might eventually be utilised in those areas where at present, the introduction of ujamaa is hindered because local leadership is in the hands of the relatively wealthy who are not really interested. Once control by the better-off becomes more rigid and is felt as a grievance by the small and landless peasants, new leadership could emerge among the latter category in opposition to the existing leaders.

The UN policy document on community development noted that, under certain circumstances, consensus built around traditional leadership can have a development-impeding consequence if those leaders are interested in the established order rather than in dynamic change to the benefit of all. In such cases, the UN document recommends a weakening of traditional solidarity as"... a necessary cost that has to be paid for development. A more effective strategy than that of community consensus might be to identify creatively deviant individuals, help them to cultivate leadership qualities, and create new groups and organisations around them. Such a strategy would initially weaken the community consensus, but when the process of development is sufficiently advanced, a new consensus may emerge around more development-oriented values and individuals." 42

An expert closely related to the ujamaa programme observed in relation to the problem under consideration:

"In areas of heavy population pressure and economic stratification like Kilimanjaro, Iringa or Tukuyu, the only way to form ujamaa farms would be by consolidation and redistribution of holdings. But this would be likely to necessitate expropriation of some farmers, which is not considered politically or economically desirable at the present stage, though it may become necessary later. A conflict which arose between large and small maize farmers in Iringa over such an issue was discussed in a series of articles in the Government news-

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42 United Nations, op.cit. para. 15; in this context the UN document also notes that "... conflict and disagreement on development issues rather than cohesiveness is a more true and realistic measure of development of communities and in that way, success of community development programmes."
paper in June and July of this year \[197\]. The only solution
which has so far been found to problems of this sort, is to
start cooperative or collective activities which do not require
large amounts of land, marketing, transporting, cooperative
shops, intensive agricultural projects, small industries, etc.
But these, of course, do not solve the problem of increasing
differentiation in land-holdings and other forms of wealth
and power." 43

**Concluding Remarks**

Since most of the present ujamaa villages are of recent creation, it
is too early to evaluate their success. The studies so far made of
ujamaa villages often concern cases in which certain difficulties
arose; for practical reasons, emphasis has been given in those studies
to the obstacles and difficulties encountered. This is part of the
learning process in which the whole ujamaa is at present involved.
It seems that, in preference to emphasising the number of houses
built or hectares communally cleared for individual or communal cultiva-
tion, evaluation studies and reports give attention to the more problem-
atic issues. This testifies to the realistic and auto-critical spirit
in which the ujamaa programme is undertaken.

A main potential of the ujamaa programme seems to be that in
Tanzania as a whole the problem of class polarisation in rural areas
may be sufficiently avoided to prevent serious social trouble. It is
also hoped that development may be spread more or less equally wherever
people are willing and stimulated to take up the challenge. In a few
areas where a certain class differentiation already exists, it may be
difficult or even painful to tackle this problem, but this differentia-

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43 A. Ellman, Development of Ujamaa Farming, op. cit., p. 15;
for a detailed description of a case where the creation of a ujamaa
village in the Kilimanjaro area was difficult for reasons of land
property see: G.R. Mboya, Feasibility of Ujamaa Villages in Kilimanjaro
(Political Science Paper No. 7, Dissertation, University College,
tion is not yet general or extreme in Tanzania. For an evaluation of the programme we should therefore examine the success of the efforts made by newly developing areas in the country, in which they avoid the "betting on the strong" approach and start gradually on the way towards ujamaa. As such, this programme can demonstrate a valuable alternative to rural development policies, worth following with care and sympathy.