

THE DYNAMICS OF FANTI DOMESTIC ORGANISATION

A comparison with Fortes' Ashanti Survey

by

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(Occasional Paper No 20, September 1972)

The text of this article will appear in an issue of
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY to be
devoted to Kinship, under the editorship of Meyer
Fortes, Cambridge.

The Problem

In this paper we shall focus on Fanti domestic organisation in its changing features as a component of the process of market penetration occurring in the rural areas of Ghana's Central Region.

The data concern six villages selected from a sample of 17 villages in which a survey of occupational differentiation was conducted in 1969.¹ While preparing this survey it was found necessary to undertake a census of each village as this appeared to be the only way of constructing proper sampling frames. To this aim student-interviewers made an effort at complete enumeration of each dwelling group, for each individual member, inter alia establishing "relationship to head of household." For the six villages these data were analysed² and compared to Fortes' 1945/46 data on two Ashanti townships.³

With respect to their domestic organisation the Fanti are inherently Akan. Accordingly, their rules of residence conform in nearly every detail to what Fortes has described for the Ashanti.⁴

It is the norm that members of a dwelling group be related by kinship or by marriage, that is, it should be a single kin group, which the man should bring into being by acquiring his own house at marriage, so that he can live there with his wife and with his children who he is supposed to rear. At the same time, however, and in contradiction to this rule, the man is supposed to offer houseroom to his maternal kin, notably his sisters' children, while the wife is expected to live with her mother (and sisters) or in later life, as an independent household head, with her daughters and sisters, as well as their daughters. This amounts to saying that a man has to solve contradictory requirements for loyalty toward his own children and his sisters' children. For a woman the problem is different but equally awkward: she is drawn between her husband and her mother.

The rules for occupancy of the position of "head of the house" (*fie panyin*) are also ambiguous. Both men and women are said to have an equal right to be "head of the house," while among the members of any dwelling group the *fie panyin* should be the person most senior by age, generation or status.

As with any requirement for equality in social relations, this one remains unrealised as the opportunities for becoming "head of the house" are unequal. Much more than is suggested by the seniority rule, incumbence of the position is dependent upon acquiring the ownership of a house

and apart from inheritance, building or buying a house is more a matter of economic achievement than of seniority. Even if women could undertake all economic activities to the extent that men can, they would still be hampered by having to bear and rear children. In addition, the competitive chances of women are lowered because they do not have the same legal status as men: they cannot hold political office (except the office of queen mother) and they can never fulfil the function of lineage head (*abusua panyin*).

What we can conclude straight away from this overview of Akan residence rules is that they do not form a logical, non-contradictory system which allows for an unambiguous definition of every single case. They are, on the contrary, inherently contradictory with the effect that time and again other (i.e. non-kinship) considerations decide what balance will be struck and accordingly what people will go to make up a dwelling unit.

Much the same holds true for the rules governing the recruitment of "heads of houses." There is a potential contradiction between the rule that the most senior person will act as "head of the house" and the rule that this role is unquestionably to be fulfilled by the house-owner! This, of course, is not a necessary, unavoidable contradiction. As long as economic opportunity continues to be distributed in favour of the most senior persons--that is, if both economic and political power are in the hands of the most senior people (especially males)--they are most likely to become house-owners and accordingly "heads of houses." However, as soon as persons not senior by age or generation receive a greater stake in the economic resources and find a way to gain more political influence, application of the seniority rule with regard to the role of "house-head" will be jeopardised.

The observation that domestic arrangements--such as the recruitment of the head of the house and the composition of the dwelling unit--are not unambiguously determined by kinship rules and that the probable application of kinship rules is dependent on economic and political arrangements that are not necessarily in line with kinship rules, points to the fact that domestic arrangements are very much an expression of a configuration of socio-economic forces. If we then realise to what extent domestic arrangements, once established, impinge in turn on other aspects of social life, in short that domestic arrangements are not just a resultant of a changing configuration of forces--of which kinship rules are only a component and obviously not the

most effective at that--but have considerable functional importance, we have every reason to focus our attention on what is happening to them.

The functional importance of domestic arrangements centers on the one hand around the fact that they decide on how people acquire house-room--one of the necessities of life--and on the other hand around the status accorded both in the family and the community to house-owners.

For the Fanti, house ownership is private ownership, with the exception of the family house which is lineage property. Those then who have no chance to acquire an existing house through inheritance or purchase, or a new one through building it, are dependent on the house-owners among them who because of kinship relations of one sort or another, feel obliged to offer house-room. In exchange for enjoying shelter (as well as leisure time companionship and emotional support) the house-owner is recognised as *fié panyin* (=head of the house) to whom some allegiance and obedience⁵ is owed.

Owning a house and being able to offer house-room to (some of) your relatives confers a considerable amount of prestige on the owner, both in his lineage (*abusua*) and in the community-at-large. Within the *abusua* it may become the stepping stone for attaining office well in advance of other candidates who might be more senior (by age). Within the community it is likely to enhance his/her political influence.

It is no wonder then that every Fanti like "every Ashanti, man or woman aspires to have his or her own house."⁶ The ideal is to build a new house--a many-roomed, two-storied house built from cement blocks, iron roofed, with a courtyard and with shutters and gutters and plastered walls--a house in which you can offer house-room to many members of your family. We found that more than 75% of our respondents adhered to this ideal⁷ and that within the context of their value orientations only the education of their children was given priority over housing.⁸ Building your own house is one of the main ways for expressing economic achievement and to make clear to others that one should get both prestige and influence and, of course, some amount of preference in acquiring positions of authority.

We can see now that the changes which are constantly occurring in the structure of economic opportunity, to the extent that, in terms of age and sex and of education and type of economic activity, they favour other groups,

will be accompanied by changes in the recruitment of house-owners and accordingly of "heads of houses." If those who benefit from the changed production and exchange relationships that come about with the growth of market participation, the spread of money transactions, the increase--through formal education of marketable skills--and the expansion of wage employment, are different as a group from those who used to have control over the economic resources, the composition of the house-owning group will alter. This may in turn have consequences for the type and the number of relatives to whom house-room is offered so that a concomitant change in the composition of dwelling groups is likely to take place. Indirectly within the sphere of the family this may affect the system of kinship obligations, while in the community at large the appearance of new groups of house-owners may have political repercussions.

Methodological Considerations

These introductory considerations present us with a problem of method, viz. that domestic arrangements as they exist are and have to be compromises between conflicting rules, while we must expect the character of these compromises to change over time as they depend on changes in the configuration of socio-economic forces. However, if we decide to study domestic arrangements in this way we will really need time series data while all we have available are cross-sectional data. Fortunately, they cover six Fanti villages which show quite different degrees of market penetration and can therefore be taken to represent different moments of socio-economic change.

If we proceed along these lines we shall be time and again confronted by the question whether the differences in domestic organisation which we detect, can be relevantly related to differences in the structure of production and exchange relations or whether they represent local differences in residence rules which have been in existence for a longer period. Although we have to concede that this may often be undecidable, there are a few ways in which wrong imputations may be avoided.

One is: to compare our findings systematically with those of Fortes; the other: to make systematic use of data we have collected on a 15-year old pioneer cocoa village⁹ which, because its set of social relationships is not yet full-grown and crystallised, can in many respects be conceived of

as the "non-village", exemplifying what Fanti social organisation is not.

By looking at aggregate means and ranges, the comparison with Fortes' findings will allow us to search for similarities between Ashanti and Fanti domestic arrangements, the more so because the differences between Agogo and Asokore--the Ashanti townships Fortes studied--can also be viewed as representing different moments of socio-economic change, Asokore being clearly more urbanised than Agogo.¹⁰ Moreover, the nearly 25 years that have elapsed between Fortes' Ashanti Survey (1945/46) and our Fanti survey (1969) will allow us to treat the Agogo-Asokore data as a momentary situation preceding the present social situation of the Fanti.

The Fanti Villages

Of the six villages of which the census data have been analysed for this study, 2 are fishing communities, 2 are farming communities, 1 is a rural town and 1 a residential community within the Cape Coast municipal area.

Of the fishing communities, one--Kromantse (Bentsir)--is located some 18 miles east of Cape Coast along the Cape Coast-Accra motor road. The other, Ampenyi (or Ampanye) is located some 12 miles west of Cape Coast off the Cape Coast-Takoradi motor road. At the time of the survey the 2-mile track linking Ampenyi to the motor road was only passable for Landrovers outside the rainy season. No lorry was stationed in the village at that time. In terms of ownership of boats (their number as well as their sizes), of outboard motors, and of nets, as well as in terms of the difference of transport facilities and access to markets--from Kromantse to the important week market of Mankesim is only 6 miles--Ampenyi has much smaller economic opportunities. There is another difference, namely, that the economically active in Ampenyi are only dependent on fishing for 58%, while for Kromantse this is 92%.¹¹ Many complaints can be heard about diminishing catches and while many older men have stopped fishing, many of the younger have moved to the West to Axim and Half Assini.

Of the farming villages, one--Kuradu--can be reached along the Abura Dunkwa-Mankesim road and a 2-mile track that in July/August 1969 was even less passable than that leading to Ampenyi. The other farming village, Old Ebu, is located in the Asebu area, some 3 miles from the Cape Coast-Kumasi road and is accessible along two, quite passable laterite roads. While the farmers of Kuradu have mainly gone in for cocoa--they are well within the

forest area, some 30 miles from the coast--the Old Ebu farmers have linked their lives to the lime trees that they have planted since the early thirties and the fruit of which they sell to Rose's Lime Company with its factory in Asebu.

The rural town, A beadzi Dominase (further referred to by us as Dominase) is located along the Dunkwa-Mankasim road. It is the seat of a paramount stool--to whose resort Kurado belongs--and as such an exception among the six villages, the others being headed by divisional chiefs. Farming, although less important here than in Kuradu and Old Ebu (where 80-90% of the labour force is engaged in farming) still keeps two-thirds of the population occupied. But many more than the average 15% are engaged in crafts, trade and service work, viz. 28%, while 31% of the economically active are wage-earners. Here in Dominase, there is a post office and a health clinic, amenities that are missing elsewhere.

In Essuekyir, located along the Cape Coast-Jukwa (Dunkwa-on-Offin) road a few miles north of the city, more than 50% of the labour force is engaged outside the primary sector and 47% is wage-earning. More than in any other township, people in Essuekyir are dependent on money and the market.

Inter-Village Comparisons

As we have suggested, we shall attempt to catch the dynamics of domestic organisation by comparing the six villages to the extent that they represent different moments of socio-economic change. In terms of our hypothesis this amounts to saying that we will compare them to the extent that they represent different degrees of market penetration.

In our view, market penetration is a process that comes about on at least three levels, viz.:

- 1) product marketing, that is, the extent to which producers sell their products on a market;
- 2) wage employment, that is, the extent to which people offer their labour on the market;
- 3) monetisation, that is, the extent to which people, through buying consumption goods, are dependent on money.

On the basis of the available survey data we are able to attribute a score to each township on each of the three dimensions of market penetration. 12

For the sake of convenience we shall indicate the relative position which a township occupies on each dimension as "High", "Medium", or "Low".

As can be seen from the list of scores, a fourth characteristic was added, namely, "level of formal education", because the significance of wage employment is greatly dependent on the wages people can negotiate and this in turn is dependent on the skills for which they have been trained.

	Product marketing	Monetisation	Formal education	Wage employment	Type
Kuradu	Low	Low	High	Medium	I
Old Ebu	Low	Low	High	Medium	
Kromantse	High	High	Low	Low	II
Ampenyi	High	High	Low	Low	
Essuekyir	Medium	High	Medium	High	IIIa
Dominase	Medium	Medium	High	High	IIIb

To the extent that we would like to rank the six villages with respect to "degree of market penetration" on the basis of the scores on the four dimensions, our aim has only been partially attained. What we can say is that the more urbanised villages in the third group do really represent a higher degree of market penetration than the other two groups. But it is impossible on the basis of the information in the above list to differentiate between farming and fishing villages. However, as can be gleaned from the list, if these do not represent different degrees of market penetration, they do form outspoken types, with the population of the farming villages having been drawn more strongly onto the labour market (supported by a reasonable level of skills), but a relatively low dependence on money and on product marketing. The pattern which the fishing villages exhibit is exactly the reverse: through their specialised means of subsistence they have been already dependent on the marketing of their product and accordingly on money for buying the necessary consumption goods for a relatively long period.

Although the difference in type between farming and fishing villages on the one hand and the more urbanised townships on the other is more outspoken than the differences within the latter group, we wish to draw attention to the finer differences, which are that Essuekyir and Dominase are equally "high" on wage employment but that the people of Dominase are somewhat better educated and at the same time less dependent on money for their livelihood.

The Ashanti-Fanti Comparison

In analysing his data, Fortes has emphasised the Agogo-Asokore comparison as a matter of course. From our point of view such inter-village comparisons are certainly of importance, specifically for answering questions about the way in which domestic organisation figures in the configuration of socio-economic forces, but--as we have pointed out earlier--we shall be better able to interpret cross-sectional differences as changes over time if we can consider them against the background of Ashanti-Fanti disparities and similarities. Let us see therefore what can be discovered from comparing aggregate Ashanti and Fanti measures. Aggregate Ashanti scores have been calculated from Fortes' data where necessary.

The great majority of Ashanti and Fanti dwelling groups are, as the norm requires, single kin groups (see table 1).

Table 1: The dwelling group

	Ashanti	Fanti
% single kin groups	81	88
% wives residing with husbands	41	39

To the extent that they are not single kin groups, that is, to the extent that they have tenants, the Ashanti figure (19%) is higher than the Fanti percentage (12%). As the proportion of dwelling units with tenants can be expected to rise over time, this confronts us with a difficulty.

With regard to the contradictory requirement that wives should and yet should not reside with their husbands, Ashanti and Fanti show great similarity in the aggregate.

Generation depth, that is, the number of generations included in a dwelling group--used as an index of its duration--is greater for the Ashanti (see table 2).

Table 2: Generation depth

	Ashanti	Fanti
% 2nd and 3rd generation dwelling units	45	67
% dwelling units with more than 3 generations	a small minority	2.5

Dwelling units lasting longer than three generations seem to be a rare occurrence anyhow.

The head of the house¹³ should be the most senior by generation (or by age and status), but a person junior by generation may achieve the status of head through his economic performance. The incidence of this phenomenon, however, is low and does not show a significant difference between Ashanti and Fanti (see table 3).

Table 3: Heads of houses

	Ashanti	Fanti
% of house heads being junior by generation	9	8
% female heads of house	43	34
chance of becoming house heads, M/F	35/16% = 2.2	42/18% = 2.3
% male heads of all males over 40 years (resp. 45) ¹⁴	61	67
% female heads of all females over 40 years (resp. 45)	64	71
% heads of houses younger than 25 of that age group	3	4

The proportion of women among all house heads is lesser for the Fanti, the difference being small but significant. The relative chances to become head of house, however, are equal.

For both male and female heads the percentage of middle and old age is higher among the Fanti. If we take into account that the age groups compared extend over 5 more years in the Fanti case, the differences appear

to be quite considerable. People younger than 25 years become "house-head" only occasionally, whether among the Ashanti or the Fanti.

With regard to kinship in the domestic unit, we note that the ratio of non-lineage to lineage kin for dwelling groups under male heads is very similar, but strikingly different for units under female heads (see table 4). In fact, this ratio is almost inexpressible in the Fanti case; in female-head groups 724 members are lineage kin while only 1 is non-lineage kin.

Table 4: Kinship in the domestic unit

	Ashanti	Fanti
Ratio non-lineage/lineage kin		
(a) under male heads	2,0	1.5
(b) under female heads	0.2	0.0014
% Brothers and sisters under male heads	6	14
Filial members (<u>all</u> succeeding generations) of all members	83	79
Filial members (<u>next</u> succeeding generation)		
(a) of all members	54	52
(b) of all filial members	65	61
<u>Matricentrality</u> (%sister's children and uterine grandchildren, mothers)	41	24
Ratio sister's children/own children		
(a) under male heads	0,5	0.004
(b) under female heads	0.13	0.09

In many other respects kinship has a very different place in the Fanti domestic group of 1969 as compared to the Ashanti domestic unit of 1945/46.

(a) Fanti heads of house quite often reside with their (adult) brothers and sisters, who make up 12% of all dwelling groups (under male heads 14%; under female heads 10%). As Fortes' table 4 only gives details on dwelling units with male heads and a counterpart of this table for groups with female heads is lacking, we can only compare figures for male heads. These show that the incidence of brothers and sisters is much more marked for the Fanti.

(b) The same holds for "filial" members, whose proportion for the Fanti is higher on every count, no matter whether we look at "filial" as meaning: members of all succeeding generations, or as members of the next succeeding generation (that is, sons, daughters, nephews, nieces).

"Matricentrality" as measured by the % of sisters' children, sisters' uterine grandchildren and mothers is considerably higher for the Ashanti, while the incidence of sisters' children in dwelling units under male heads is so great in their case that the ratio to "own children" is as much as half (0.5) while that for the Fanti can be neglected. For groups under female heads the ratios are much smaller and nearly equal.

The size of dwelling units

Any effort to make sense of the Ashanti-Fanti disparities and similarities that were described in the last sections, has to take account of differences in the socio-economic process between Ashanti and Fanti townships and also between Ashanti and Fanti villages among themselves. The size of dwelling units figures as an important component in the analysis of the relationship between domestic arrangements and of socio-economic changes, as we shall now attempt to show.

In Fortes' analysis no specific attention has been given to this component; no wonder, as Agogo and Asokore are rather homogeneous as far as the size of dwelling units is concerned (see table 5).

Table 5: Size of dwelling units

	<u>Ashanti</u>		<u>Fanti</u>	
	<u>Total</u>	8.7	<u>Total</u>	5.1
	Agogo	9.0	Kuradu	6.3
	Asokore	8.3	Old Ebu	4.3
			Kromantse	6.8
			Ampenyi	4.1
			Essuekyir	4.1
			Dominase	5.3

However, as soon as we compare with and between Fanti villages, we note that:

- (a) dwelling units are significantly smaller in the Fanti case;¹⁵
- (b) there is quite a range of sizes (4.1-6.3) among Fanti villages.

With regard to the fact that the average number of inhabitants per dwelling house is considerably higher for the Ashanti, it is necessary to realise that this datum is greatly dependent upon the size of the dwelling house, notably on the number of rooms. In this respect it is quite significant that the common Ashanti house is a set of 4 or more rooms facing a courtyard around which it has been built, while many houses in the Fanti area are nothing more than a rectangular set of 2 or 3 rooms built in one line and facing the street.

Not all houses in the Fanti townships studied are of this type; in some cases the incidence of the courtyard-type house is quite high (table 6). Apparently this is the type of house to which people aspire, as is documented by considerable percentages of houses that are "on the way to becoming" a courtyard-house, and that are either L-shaped or composed of two lines of rooms confronting each other.

Table 6 House type

	Kurado	Old Ebu	Kromantse	Ampenyi	Essuekyir	Dominase
(1) % courtyard houses	59	7	28	14	3	65
(2) % potential courtyard houses	21	19	13	3	7	30
(3) Total of 1+2	80	26	41	17	10	95
(4) Average no. of rooms	5.2	3.9	4.9	3.8	3.0	5.7

$\sqrt{\rho} = 1.00$

In row (4) we have added survey data on "average number of rooms" to the table, allowing us to observe that there is a rankcorrelation equal to unity between the size of a house and its type.

We would, of course, expect the average size of houses to correlate closely with the average size of dwelling unit. But is this because we think that bigger houses are built by house-owners who feel obliged to offer house-room to a greater number of relatives than others-- or that more people will occupy a house if it is bigger? In both

cases a high and significant correlation is hypothesised and that is not what we find. How can this be accounted for?

What we observe on closer inspection of our data is that both Kuradu and Kromantse have average dwelling units that are "too big" for the average size of houses in these townships, while the reverse is true for Dominase. Old Ebu and Ampenyi occupy intermediate places, both in the rank order of house and of dwelling unit size.

A likely suggestion is that lineage ties are stronger at a lower level of market penetration, so that kinship obligations are experienced more heavily and dwelling units are accordingly bigger on the average. This holds for townships like Kuradu and Kromantse. The opposite case--as in Dominase--is of a township at a higher level of market penetration where kinship obligations have weakened and where dwelling units have become (relatively) smaller than existing houses allow.

As we have already mentioned, Old Ebu and Ampenyi occupy an intermediate position. In these villages, being at a lower level of market penetration, the size at which houses have been built and the strength of kinship ties seem to be "in balance". We are not too sure, however, of what this could mean and will have to search for a clearer interpretation. Essuekyir ranks low, both in size of house and of dwelling unit, and therefore reflects in a consequent way that it is at the highest level of market penetration in our sample.

If our assumption is correct that Fanti people, in view of their common aspiration, will build courtyard-type houses if they can, the incidence of such houses is a measure of their economic capacity to do so. Generally, therefore, the size of a person's house is an indication of his economic achievement and the "average number of rooms" for any township is an index of that township's prosperity (or: level of economic opportunity). Of course, one can easily think of better indicators of economic opportunity. More specifically, the sum total of new houses (by size and quality) built in the last 3-5 years as a proportion of the total stock of houses in a village, would be a much better index.

With this interpretation tagged to the factor "size of dwelling house" we may now improve on our view of the way in which domestic arrangements fit into the configuration of socio-economic forces. So far, we have assumed that at a lower level of market penetration, lineage ties will be stronger

and, accordingly, dwelling groups bigger. From this, however, would not only follow that bigger dwelling units should be expected to occur in Kuradu but also in Old Ebu; not only in Kromantse, but also in Ampenyi; in fact, as we have seen, these four townships all belong in the category of a "half way" level of market penetration.

Once we view house-size as a measure of economic opportunity we can make sense of the fact that lineage ties, as in Old Ebu and Ampenyi, can very well be strong, although dwelling groups are (relatively) small: people cannot afford to build bigger dwelling houses, and consequently, do not have so much house-room to offer.¹⁶ In our characterisation we have already commented on the differences in economic opportunities between the fishing villages Kromantse and Ampenyi. These remarks tie in completely with the interpretation suggested here. However, apart from the crude impression--mainly based on the outward appearances of these townships (general state of houses, outlay and amenities of the town)--that Kuradu is indeed more prosperous than Old Ebu, there are no convincing reasons why the inhabitants of the former should earn so much more from cocoa than the latter earn from lime.

The general hypothesis that the size of dwelling groups is the resultant of at least two factors, namely of the size of houses (being an expression of economic opportunity) and of the strength of lineage ties (being dependent on the degree of market penetration) should of course also apply to Dominase and Essuekyir. As far as the latter is concerned there is no problem: Essuekyir is at a high level of market penetration and lineage ties should therefore be weak, while--in view of the small houses--it is a poor township and people cannot offer house-room to many of their relatives.

Dominase, however, does not seem to fit: on the one hand it is prosperous (even: the most prosperous), on the other hand it is at a high level of market penetration and kinship ties should therefore be as weak as in Essuekyir. What this amounts to, after all, is that Dominase is exposed to cross-pressures so that, with regard to dwelling group size, we should expect it to remain halfway.. If we note again that dwelling unit size ranges from 4.1 to 6.8, we may indeed conclude that with 5.3 Dominase is at an intermediate level.

Market penetration, economic opportunity and the commodification of housing

A short digression is in order to examine how we can account for the disparate consequences of market penetration for prosperity.

In the case of Kromantse and Ampenyi, as we saw, there are such clear differences in economic opportunity (in terms of capital formation and of transport and market facilities) that we need not wonder why two fishing villages exhibiting the same type and degree of market participation are not equally prosperous.

In the case of Kuradu and Old Ebu we are rather at a loss. And then, what about Dominase and Essuekyir? Here we might be able to solve the problem in the fact that in these townships, although the degree of market penetration is equally high, the type of penetration is different.

Table 7: Types of market penetration

	Product marketing	Monetisation	Formal education	Wage employment
Essuekyir	M	H	M	H
Dominase	M	M	H	H

If we now look more specifically at this difference in pattern (see table 7), we note the following:

- (1) the inhabitants of both Dominase and Essuekyir have become greatly dependent for their livelihood upon finding wage employment.
- (2) as the educational level of Essuekyir inhabitants is lower, they cannot on the average negotiate wages at the same level as Dominase people.
- (3) moreover, monetisation has made more progress in Essuekyir, that is, people in that township are more dependent on money while they have less opportunity to earn it.
- (4) in addition--in view of the product market--it is likely that they cannot fall back on subsistence food production to a greater extent. Clearly, the import of the difference in market penetration pattern is that at an equal level of penetration Dominase will be more prosperous than Essuekyir.

The question of tenants can now be seen in better perspective. Renting and letting parts of houses and rooms represents a further stage in the commodification of housing and can generally be assumed to occur as a component

of market penetration. We have no problem therefore in understanding that Asokore, being the more urbanised township, shows a much higher percentage of dwelling units containing tenants than Agogo; nor in the fact that both Dominase and Essuekyir have a higher incidence of tenants with their higher degree of market participation (see table 8).

Table 8: % dwelling units with tenants

		Corrected
Agogo	10%	7
Asokore	31%	20
Kuradu	13) 7
Old Ebu	4	
Kromantse	11) 9
Ampenyi	8	
Essuekyir	22	} 22
Dominase	21	
Fanti, Total	12%	

However, we should also expect to find more dwelling units containing tenants wherever there are more rooms per dwelling house. Under such circumstances the opportunity for letting rooms is much greater. On this assumption we might argue that the incidence of tenants in the Ashanti townships, which we found to be unexpectedly high (see page 8) is at least partly due to the fact that Ashanti houses on the average contain more rooms. We might even go so far as to correct the Ashanti percentages for this difference by multiplying them by the ratio between the average size of houses in the Fanti and Ashanti samples. As data on "average number of rooms" for the Ashanti townships are lacking, we shall use the scores for "size of dwelling units" instead, arriving at a correction factor of 5.1/8.7. On these terms we find the aggregate percentage of Ashanti dwelling groups with tenants to be 11, resulting from 6% for Agogo and 20% for Asokore, that is, an average of the same order as the Fanti average (12%).

Drawing on both the level of market penetration and the size of dwelling houses to account for the incidence of tenants, we can now try to explain the other inter-village differences in table 8 that have not yet been interpreted, namely:

- (1) the fact that Old Ebu and Ampenyi, which exhibit much the same degree of market penetration as Kurado and Kromantse, score lower with respect to the renting of rooms. This, it seems, can be explained by the smaller size of houses in these townships.
- (2) the fact that Essuekyir and Dominase appear to have an equal percentage of dwelling groups with tenants, while having respectively the smallest and the biggest average house-size. If we consider only the marked difference in house-size, Dominase should have more tenants (relatively, that is) or Essuekyir fewer. More likely the latter interpretation is the more fruitful in view of the fact that Essuekyir is the only village of the six where the inhabitants' basis of existence is not exclusively located in the village territory. In fact, Essuekyir is the residence of quite a score of Cape Coast and U. C.C.C.-commuters. Moreover, it is also an exception in that 14% of its inhabitants are migrants while the average for the six townships is only 3%. What this amounts to is that the occurrence of tenants is relatively high in Essuekyir because this is a settlement of which the population is only partly growing from natural causes. For another part, people find a home there who have moved from their home-town under the impact of the labour market. What this amounts to is that while in other centres--Dominase included--most of those renting rooms are local people, in Essuekyir many migrants have flocked together attracted by better employment opportunities. And this is a contingent of wage-earners who--coming from elsewhere yesterday and maybe moving out again tomorrow--are not likely to settle down and build their own houses. They therefore represent an extra demand for house-room that can not be accommodated within the communal context. Consequently, this extra demand generates a supply, thereby creating a "room market" such as one is not likely to find in any of the other townships.

Generation depth

As we have already seen, the generation depth of Fanti dwelling groups is smaller than that of Ashanti dwelling groups, the percentage of one or two generation groups being higher (67 vs. 45 per cent). In table 9 we can observe that no Fanti townships exhibit a generation depth equal to that of the Ashanti, and so the question arises whether this is an expression of an extra 25 years of socio-economic change or an inherent Fanti-Ashanti difference.

Table 9: Generation depth

	Dwelling units with	
	One or two generations	Three or more generations
ASHANTI, total	45	55
Kuradu	55	45
Old Ebu	73	27
Kromantse	53	47
Ampenyi	73	27
Essuekyir	82	18
Dominase	61	39
FANTI, total	67	33
Mpehin	88	12

The answer to this question is at once straightforward and ambiguous. It is straightforward in that we can point to the existence of a very close relationship between "generation depth" and "size of dwelling unit", a relationship that this time does include the Ashanti townships, as well as Mpehin. We find a rho-value of .95 which for N=9 is significant at $p < .01$. In view of the relationship, elaborated earlier, between "size of dwelling unit" on the one hand and "degree of market penetration", "type of market penetration" and "prosperity" on the other, the answer is also straightforward in that it points at a dependence of "generation depth" (and of the size of the dwelling unit) on the changing configuration of socio-economic forces.

The answer, however, is ambiguous in that we do not feel certain that market forces had not affected the Fanti-area more heavily than the Ashanti before 1945; in that case the observed differences might not be the effect of the 25-year period that separates the two field studies but would also have been discovered if the surveys had been conducted simultaneously.

It is doubtful whether this dilemma can be resolved on the basis of available evidence. The Fanti data on generation depth exhibit a characteristic that was not mentioned by Fortes for the Ashanti, viz. the presence of one generation dwelling units (see table 10). These run from only 6% in Kuradu to as much as 42.5% of all dwelling units in Essuekyir and their incidence, as might be expected, is inversely related to "size of dwelling unit."

Table 10: One vs. many-generation dwelling units

		One generation	More than 3 generations
Kuradu		6%	8
Old Ebu		24.5	3
Kromantse		13	4
Ampenyi		30	4
Essuekyir		42.5	0
Dominase		17	1
-----		-----	
Total FANTI		21.5	2+5

The rank correlation is quite high ($\rho = .94$) and significant ($p = 11.01$ for $N = 7$).

That is to say: in townships where dwelling units are on the average smaller, generation depth is lower in that a smaller proportion of "3 or more generations" dwelling groups occur, but also in the sense that a greater proportion of the dwelling units have a duration of not more than one generation. And in view of the relationship of this phenomenon with "size of dwelling unit", we may again assume that it is to a great extent due to the penetration of market forces and to the level of economic opportunities ("prosperity") that generation depth (that is, the duration of dwelling groups) is becoming significantly lowered over time.

In this respect we would draw special attention to the very high incidence of one-generation dwelling units in the less prosperous townships, viz.

- Essuekyir 42.5%
- Ampenyi 30 %
- Old Ebu 24.5%

What type of units are one-generation dwelling units? From table 11 we can see that not much less than half of these dwelling units are "one person" households (42%), one-third consists of two persons, while the remainder (24%) consists of 3 or more persons.

Table 11: One generation dwelling units by size

	1 person	2 persons	3 or more persons	Total one generation
Kuradu	0%	3%	3%	6
Old Ebu	13	10	1.5	24.5
Kromantse	3	4	6	13
Ampenyi	12.5	12	5.5	30
Essuekyir	20	15	7.5	42.5
Dominase	7	2	8	17
<hr/>				
Total Fanti	9	7.5	5	21.5
<hr/>				
Total FANTI as % of 1-generation dwelling units	42%	34%	24%	100%

The frequency with which one-person dwelling "groups" occur--it is superfluous to mention their relationship to "size of dwelling groups" ($\rho = .89$)-- is a clear indication of the breakdown of the kinship system as a system of social security: two-thirds of all these single-person households consist of middle or old-aged people (> 45), many of whom are widowed or divorced. As we discovered through an intensive post-survey observation and interview study in Ampenyi and Old Ebu, many of these people are at the mercy of more distant relatives (if there are any), who themselves often have little to save.

Most of the young and independent persons in the sample, are inhabitants of Essuekyir (42%), the majority being wage-employed males (90%) from elsewhere, attracted by the employment opportunities of the Cape Coast municipal area.

The "two-person"-one generation dwelling units consist of married couples (45%) and of brothers and sisters (31%), and for the remainder of a single person renting a room ¹⁷ to a tenant (this number should actually be added to the single person groups).

One-generation dwelling units bigger than 2 persons are composed of combinations of single persons or married couples with brothers or sisters and/or tenants.

In view of the finding (see: Ashanti-Fanti comparison, table 4) that so many more dwelling groups under male heads contain brothers or sisters in the

Fanti than in the Ashanti sample (17 vs. 6%), it is of some relevance that of the one-generation dwelling units a total of 38 were composed of a person with a brother or sister, or nearly 6% of all dwelling units. This accounts for 43% of all dwelling units in the Fanti sample containing brothers and sisters.

We may therefore conclude that, dependent on the way in which they form patterns of "interference" with economic opportunity (prosperity), the market forces as they penetrate deeper into rural communities, lower the duration of dwelling groups and isolate people residentially from others. To the extent that this does not lead to the "single person" household, the onslaught is best endured by marital and sibling relationships.

As far as the last relationship is concerned, there is an apparent contradiction between the fact that brothers and sisters seem to prefer each other as residential partners over other family members once houses are so small that house-heads can only accommodate few of their kin, and the fact that--as we shall see later--with increased market penetration the percentage of siblings residing together decreased progressively. We will return to this issue on p. 28.

First order relationships

Fortes has concluded from his data on generation depth that "the domestic group tends to last only as long as its members are bound to one another by direct, first order kinship ties"¹⁷ (that is, relationships of the order of parent and child or sibling and sibling). Although this contention is not documented by statistical data from the Ashanti survey, so that a comparison cannot be made, it might be elucidating to see if we can document it for our Fanti study.

The way in which our data have been processed hinders us from saying what proportion of dwelling units in each township contains only first order relationships. However, we can say what percentage of the total population of each township (after deduction of household heads, tenants and spouses, who should not enter into the count) are first order kin (see table 12). We can observe from these figures that this percentage is quite low in some villages--in Kuradu (53%) and Kromantse (52%) it is very little over half--while in others it is strikingly high, with Mpehin again at the very extreme (89%) and Essuekyir also quite high on this score (74%). And, as we might expect, this aspect also correlates highly with both "generation depth" ($\rho = .99$; $p < .01$) and "size" ($\rho = .89$; $p = .01$).

Table 12: Percentage being first order kin

	1st order kin
Kuradu	53%
Old Ebu	65
Kromantse	52
Ampenyi	66
Essuekyir	74
Dominase	60
<hr/>	
Total FANTI	61
<hr/>	
Mpehin	89

The head of the house

In the section on "the Ashanti-Fanti comparison" attention was drawn to the fact that in terms of generation, the seniority rule for becoming "head of the house" was adhered to equally by the Fanti in 1969 as by the Ashanti in 1945/6 (92 and 91 per cent).

However, if we consider to what extent practice conforms to the rule that heads should also be the most senior by age, we find a much more outspoken disparity, viz. that 15% of the Fanti heads of houses are younger by age than some members of his or her dwelling unit (see table 13 for data on seniority of house-heads). For the Ashanti no statistical data are available on this score.

Table 13: Seniority of house-heads by age and generation compared

	(1) Junior by age	(2) Junior by generation	(3) 1 minus 2
Kuradu	18%	13%	5%
Old Ebu	13	5	8
Kromantse	19	14	5
Ampenyi	16	8	8
Essuekyir	15	1	14
Dominase	9	3	6
<hr/>			
Total FANTI	15	8	7
<hr/>			
Mpehin	6	0	6

If we look closely at the two columns of figures in table 13 (columns 1 and 2), we note that townships with a higher percentage of house-heads of a younger generation nearly always have a higher percentage of heads who are junior by age ($\rho = .86; .05 > p > .01$ at $N=7$). But we also note that in townships such as Kuradu and Kromantse, where market penetration has not yet interfered so much with kinship obligations and where there is sufficient prosperity to fulfil these obligations, the situation conforms less to the rule which requires the head of the house to be more senior than in townships representing higher levels of market penetration and lower levels of prosperity.

What we would have expected to be the case is that waiving the seniority rule would occur more often in those townships where the institutions of kinship have been more affected by market forces. How then are we to account for this seemingly adverse finding?

In trying to solve this problem, we should first realise that house-heads junior by generation will most likely be also junior by age. Consequently, the percentages in column (2) are contained in those of column (1).

What, then, about the heads who are younger than, but of the same generation as the other members of their dwelling group; that is, those of whom we find the incidence if we subtract (2) from (1)? This we have done in column (3), arriving at a set of percentages that does closely correlate with "size of dwelling unit" ($\rho = .80; .05 > p > .01$ at $N=7$), a correlation pointing to the fact that the occurrence of heads of houses, younger but of the same generation, is also part of the configuration determined by market penetration and economic opportunity.

Looked at from this angle, the data make perfect sense. We have already underlined the rule--also stated by Fortes¹⁸--that people junior by age and/or generation can achieve the status of house-head if, through their economic performance, they have acquired the means to build a house. Being able to

build a house then, not only means that one has the opportunity to offer house-room to others, but also that one is allowed (and possibly obliged) to offer house-room and accordingly form a dwelling group.

We should therefore expect to find more junior heads of houses where economic opportunities are more plentiful, and this tallies with the evidence. However, in those cases (like Kuradu and Kromantse) where prosperity goes together with stronger lineage ties, we may expect the younger house-owners to build bigger dwelling houses and to offer house-room to more relatives, including those of the parental generation.

In the opposite cases, where weaker lineage ties go together with a low level of economic opportunity, we should expect younger house-owners to build smaller houses in which they cannot offer house-room except to their spouses or brothers (sisters). This is the situation in Essuekyir.

In between, we have mixed cases with either stronger lineage ties and lower economic opportunity (as in Old Ebu and Ampenyi), or weaker lineage ties and greater prosperity (as in Dominase). These indeed show percentages at the intermediate level.

On the question of the age at which persons become household heads and of the chances for males and females (that is, whether these differ in general and for different age classes), there is not much to be added, except that for Fanti dwelling groups both male and female household heads are somewhat older on the average (see Table 14). We suggest that this is not the expression of a difference in conception of what the proper age for becoming head of house should be, but rather of a lower level of economic opportunity as between Ashanti in 1945/46 and the Fanti area in 1969.

Table 14: Percentage of each age group being head of house

Male heads	< 25	25-40(45)	> 40(45)	Total
Ashanti	2	35	66	42
Fanti	8	30	75	42
Female heads				
Ashanti	3.5	15	39	20
Fanti	1	12	39	18

That no difference in conception divides Fanti and Ashanti is corroborated by the fact that younger persons (that is, below 25 years of age) do become head of house among the Fanti as infrequently as among the Ashanti (viz. 3

and 4 percent). It should be acknowledged, however, that as can be seen from table 14, Fanti males below 25 clearly have a greater chance than their Ashanti counterparts (8 vs. 2 percent). This is mainly due to the fact that there are two exceptions with regard to heads of houses younger than 25, namely Old Ebu (12%) and Essuekyir (15%). The latter case is quite in line with our other findings, notably that 12% of house-heads in this township are young male migrant wage earners. The former is quite unrelated to anything we know about Old Ebu. Possibly the presence of a considerable group of young house-owners points to growing economic opportunities for the younger generation, a fact that might help to explain the dubious position of Old Ebu with regard to our measure of "prosperity". It may actually mean that lime is only now beginning to pay in an area where the population has already been oriented toward this cash crop since the early thirties (the first Rose's Lime factory in the area at Abakrampa dates back to 1928¹⁹).

Kinship in the domestic unit

Finally, we arrive at the question of what is happening to the role that kinship used to play in bringing together the members of a dwelling group. More specifically, the question should be whether the dominant position of members of the matrilineage is being upheld or whether it is being corroded by market penetration.

We shall examine this problem from four different but related viewpoints, that is to say, we shall look at what is happening to:

- 1) the ratio of non-lineage to lineage kin;
- 2) the proportion of brothers and sisters;
- 3) the proportion of filial members;
- 4) the proportion of sister's children, uterine grandchildren and mothers.

The last item will be used as a measure of "matri-centrality", that is, as a measure of the strength of the matricentral unit.²⁰

We shall hypothesise that as a component of a configuration of socio-economic forces, with increased market penetration the role of matrilineal kinship relations will decrease. Specifically, this amounts to saying that with increasing market penetration we may expect:

- 1) the ratio non-lineage/lineage kin to increase;
- 2) the proportion of brothers and sisters to decrease;
- 3) the proportion of filial members (next succeeding generation) to increase, and,
- 4) the degree of "matricentrality" to decrease.

Let us now see how these hypotheses stand the test of the data.

According to Fortes, "a striking feature . . . is the very small proportion of non-lineage kin living under female heads."²¹ This is certainly supported by

the Fanti data: of all the 724 members of dwelling groups under female heads, only one is "non-lineage" kin, from which we may conclude that non-lineage kin in such dwelling groups is virtually non-existent. Assuming the Ashanti percentage also to hold for the Fanti, we should have found about 50 non-lineage members under female heads instead of 1. This is very different from what we had hypothesized. As the ratio non-lineage vs. lineage kin under male heads (see table 15) is also lower for the Fanti (1.5 over against 2.0) apparently these differences do not represent socio-economic change. This then raises the old question whether they should rather be interpreted as an initial difference in domestic organisation between the Fanti and the Ashanti.

Table 15: Ratio non-lineage/lineage kin for male and female members under male heads

	Male Members	Female members	Total
Kuradu	1.8	2.3	2.1 2.2
Old Ebu	3.0	1.7	2.4
Kromantse	.9	.7	.8 1.0
Ampenyi	1.5	1.1	1.3
Essuekyir	4.7	3.8	4.3 3.3
Dominase	3.3	1.8	2.3
Total Fanti	1.7	1.3	1.5
Mpehin	6.5	14.7	8.6
Total Ashanti	1.5	2.4	2.0
Agogo	.8	1.1	1.0
Asokore	2.2	3.7	3.0

Let us ignore the Ashanti-Fanti difference for the present and focus our attention on the within-sample differences (see table 15). These allow us to draw the following conclusions:

1. The extremely high ratio for Mpehin underlines that, basically, non-lineage and lineage kin tend to balance each other in Fanti as well as in Ashanti dwelling groups.
2. Such a perfect balance is found for Agogo, and (approximately) for the fishing villages, Kromantse and Ampenyi.
3. Although both Kuradu and Old Ebu exhibit somewhat higher ratios than the fishing villages, we can in the main say that at higher levels of market penetration--represented by Asokore (3.0) and Essuekyir (4.3)--the non-lineage/lineage kin ratio is higher.

Within this general picture, the disparities can be accommodated, if we consider not only "degree" but also "type" of market penetration as well as the role of economic opportunity.

We have seen that the farming villages have been more exposed to the labour market than the fishing villages, while the fishing villages are much more strongly dependent on the marketing of their product. This, however, brings to the forefront that these villages have been incorporated in a pattern of pre-capitalist regional specialisation, and accordingly, that their dependence on the product markets of the area is not a result of recent change and cannot be expected to bear on the strength of lineage ties.

We have then three types of market penetration and three levels of non-lineage/lineage kin ratios, with the fishing villages being lowest (1.0), and Essuekyir and Dominase highest (3.3). Within each type there are disparities, but these--as can be easily shown--are related to differences in economic opportunity. For those townships within a type with lower economic opportunities, viz. Old Ebu and Ampenyi, ratios are higher than for the other township of the same type. This is what one would expect in view of the interpretation, suggested earlier, that lower economic opportunity means that people cannot afford to fulfil the kinship obligations which they acknowledge. For the same reason, the ratio for Dominase is lower than that for Essuekyir, as within the same type economic opportunity is higher in Dominase.

In summary, lineage as a principle for bringing people together under one roof is pushed back to the extent that a township is exposed to the conditions of the market, more especially of the labour market. One may wonder why characteristics of domestic organisation, such as

- the extent to which dwelling units are single kin units (% of tenants);
- the size of the dwelling groups;
- generation depth, and
- the recruitment of house-heads;

which all change with the growing dominance of product marketing, did not show this special sensitivity for conditions of the labour market. (In terms of the data: why these characteristics did not show the same difference as the non-lineage/lineage kin ratio between the two farming and the two fishing villages.

At present we can only suggest that the preference for living with wife and children over living with lineage kin is the combined effect of formal education and of wage employment (more specifically of the regularity of the working hours and wage payments), factors that are not so likely to affect the other aspects of domestic organisation. We do not yet have sufficient data at our disposal to prove this contention, but the available data seem to point this way.

Returning now to other measures of the relative importance of lineage in recruiting members for the dwelling group, the subsequent tables document the differences observed between the Fanti villages. In table 16 we see that the presence of brothers and sisters in dwelling groups is a feature that generally declines with the onslaught of market forces.

Table 16: Percentage adult brother and sisters

	Adult brothers and sisters
Kuradu	9%
Old Ebu	7
Kromantse	15
Ampenyi	19
Essuekyir	5
Dominase	11
Total Fanti	12%
Mpehin	6%

Earlier, however, we have discovered (see page 21) that where, as in Essuekyir, the number of lineage kin has dwindled and patrilocality asserts itself strongly, there is a tendency for the lineage bond to exhibit itself most outspokenly as a bond between siblings.

We would like to add, in contradiction to Fortes' statement "that there is not a single case, in either township, of a man and his wife's brother sharing a dwelling,"²² that we found a few cases of "brothers" who actually were "brothers-in-law" to a male head of the house, while his wife was living under the same roof. We hasten to say, however, that these cases support rather than weaken the statement, as they consisted of:

- a younger brother of the wife of school-going age who she was obliged to raise owing to the lack of other, older brothers;
- a crippled brother, not able to look after himself.

From table 17 we can similarly conclude that the filial generation increases relatively with market penetration, although we find a contradiction between the Ashanti and Fanti percentages. The relative increase of the filial generation is closely correlated with the decrease in generation depth.

Table 17: Filial (next succeeding generation) of all filial members

Agogo	62%
Asokore	69
Total ASHANTI	65
Kuradu	60
Old Ebu	62
Kromantse	57
Ampenyi	56
Essuekyir	65
Dominase	61
Total FANTI	61
Mpehin	81

Table 18, lastly, documents the strength of the matricentral unit as being clearly less for the Fanti than for the Ashanti and as also generally decreasing with market penetration.

Table 18: Percentage of sisters' children, sisters' uterine grandchildren and mothers of all members

Agogo	47%
Asokore	33
Total ASHANTI	41
Kuradu	26
Old Ebu	23
Kromantse	31
Ampenyi	30
Essuekyir	13
Dominase	23
Total FANTI	24
Mpehin	5

In all these tables Mpehin fulfils its function of the "non-village", exposing what could certainly not be considered as an expression of Fanti residence rules.

Closer inspection of the tables just mentioned shows that they all exhibit

the same pattern of differences as table 15. This is what we should expect as they refer to closely related features of the same configuration. Table 19 gives further proof of these relationships by means of the rank correlations between the four characteristics (rho-values).

Table 19: Rho-values *

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Non-lineage/ lineage kin	% brothers & sisters	% filial members	Matricen- trality
(1) Non-lineage/ lineage kin	--	-.90	+ .96	-.94
(2) % brothers & sisters		--	-.93	+ .87
(3) % filial members			--	-.94
(4) Matricen- trality				--

* All rho-values are significant, p .01 at N=7.

The occurrence of negative and positive rho-values points to the fact that some features--viz. non-lineage/lineage kin and the percentage of filial members--relate negatively to the strength of the lineage, others--viz. the percentage of brothers and sisters and the matricentrality measure--relate to it positively.

These very close relationships go far to show both the reliability of the measurements and that the explanation of the differences in the ratio non-lineage/lineage kin, developed in this section, can equally serve to explain the differences occurring for the other characteristics. That is to say, that the weakening of lineage ties is generated by the combined effect of market penetration and changing economic opportunities.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. Emile V. W. Verduyn and Tom A. Boyd, Occupational Differentiation in Rural Areas. A Research Design (Social Studies Project, Research Report Series No. 2, Cape Coast 1970).

2. The basic data for these villages are:

	Population	No. of dwelling units
Kuradu	241	38
Old Ebu	335	78
Kromantse	891	131
Ampenyi	700	170
Essuekyir	329	80
Dominase	582	110
T o t a l	3,078	607

3. Cf. Meyer Fortes, "Time and Social Structure: An Ashanti Case Study", in M. Fortes, ed. Social Structure, Studies presented to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, (Oxford 1949), pp. 54 - 84. We shall also base ourselves on: Meyer Fortes, et al, "Ashanti Survey, 1945-6: An Experiment in Social Research", in Geographical Journal, 110, 1947, pp. 149-79.

4. Fortes, "Time and Social Structure. . .", op. cit., mainly pp. 63-69.

5. Cf. Emile V. W. Verduyn et al, "Composition of Households in some Fanti Communities. A study of the framework of social integration." (Institute of Social Studies Occasional Paper, 1971). In this paper (cf. p. 17) we have attempted to show how limited the authority of the *fié panyin* really is.

6. Fortes, "Time and Social Structure", p. 68.

7. These data are taken from the actual sample survey. The survey report is in preparation.

8. Cf. T. A. Boyd, Value Orientations Influencing Decision Making in Rural Communities (Social Studies Project, Research Report Series No. 5, Cape Coast 1971).

9. This village, named Mpehin, has been founded near the Western border of the Central Region (north of Kissi) by migrants from Agona state. Its population, according to our 1969 census, was 147 divided over 35 dwelling units. Mpehin is much like the "farming village" mentioned by Fortes in "Ashanti Survey" (p. 168), where some 70 percent of the dwelling groups were nuclear families. In Mpehin the percentage was 59.

10. Fortes, "Time and Social Structure. . .", pp. 161-63.

- 11 These percentages include--apart from the fishermen--the fishsmokers and fishmongers.
- 12 The context of this paper does not allow an explanation of which data were used as indicators for the different dimensions.
- 13 We want to emphasise again that the import of the office of "house-head" within the house is of small significance.
- 14 The class boundaries of our age classification do not coincide with those used by Fortes.
- 15 In view of the population data of the 1960 and the 1970 Population Censuses, our 1969 census presents a clear case of under-enumeration. However, we have to take into account that both the preference of many people to be counted in their home areas and the tendency of chiefs to aim at inflating the population number (on which local authority appropriations are based) lead to over-enumeration in the rural areas at census time. The official Census data therefore cannot be used to validate our count. If populations were larger, the "average size of dwelling units" would not represent the real situation; however, in a relative way, it would still be a useful measure.
- 16 In our post-survey observation study of Ampenyi we have indeed noted that many other types of kinship obligations which are acknowledged can no longer be fulfilled for lack of financial means. Cf. also, Vercrijse, "Composition of Fanti households. . .", op. cit., pp. 18-20.
- 17 Tenants are often referred to as being either 'friends' or 'strangers'. In view of the fact that face-to-face relationships are still very much governed by the rules of reciprocity, the label 'friend' suggests that house-room is given to a locally-known person to whom only token rent is charged. But it is not felt to be wrong to enter into contractual relationships with 'strangers'. Accordingly, migrant inhabitants, if they want house-room, have to enter a housing market that is quickly coming into existence.
- 18 Fortes, "Time and Social Structure. . .", op. cit., p. 65.
- 19 Cf. H. T. M. Wagenbuur, Line Farmers. A Case Study of a Cash Crop in a Subsistence Economy (Social Studies Project, Research Report Series, No. 1, Cape Coast 1969).
- 20 Cf. Fortes, "Time and Social Structure. . .", op. cit., p. 73.
- 21 Ibid, p. 72.
- 22 Ibid. p. 76.