Peasant Participation in Latin America and its Obstacles:

an overview of conflict-resolution strategies

Gerrit Huizer

Director, Third World Centre,
University of Nijmegen

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Introduction

It is becoming almost impossible to deal as a social scientist with the subject of popular participation (which implies participation of the majority of the people in determining the direction of development, and also in the distribution of its benefits) without dealing with the interests opposing such participation and with ways to deal with this opposition. Particularly in Latin America the history of popular participation is one of growing contradiction, conflict and conflict resolution.

Although social conflict and tension appeared at one time to be taboo for the majority of social scientists and planners, developments during the 1960s have shown that this fear is disappearing.[1] Awareness is growing that conflict, rather than being something to be avoided at all costs, can even be a creative force in promoting needed change and effective participation. It is also increasingly recognized that change, and certain conflicts related to it, are almost inseparable. 'To plan for social change very often means to anticipate social conflict and to devise programmes for meeting the problems which arise out of such conflict.'[2]

A crucial precondition to applying a strategy which recognizes existing conflicts and tries to solve them, is to detect the conflicts of interest and injustices within the rural communities. To understand the local situation, it is necessary to identify strongly with the peasants' way of looking at things, the 'view from below'.[3] It is generally found that peasants view their present frustrations in an historical perspective. While development planners take the present status quo as the most logical point of departure for drafting plans and making future projects, peasants usually see it as unjust and retrogressive when compared with better days in the past. Their strongest felt need is not always for new inputs, but rather for a correction of the injustice done to them by the rich and powerful and a restoration of the former balance, e.g. regarding land ownership. Peasants know, much better than researchers and planners, that their situation has worsened and nowadays has less scope for improvement because economic forces, including the market economy and certain development programmes, are detrimental to them, causing indebtedness and loss of land.

The application of a conflict resolution strategy confirms and satisfies the people's feeling of justice, and thus has a strongly motivational effect. Moreover, as scholars of conflict sociology well know, effort and struggle against unjust institutions and their represent-

atives (a 'negative reference group'[4]) provide extra commitment and solidarity to those involved.

An important step towards channelling this potential with the aid of conflict resolution strategies, is to discuss the possible implications frankly and without bias. Some of the methods used by poor peasants in organizing to defend their legitimate interests and to achieve essential reforms, will be discussed below.

The way that acute frustration and rapid deterioration of living and land tenure conditions can bring apparently passive and traditionally-minded peasants to effective mobilization has been demonstrated many times in Latin America. Such mobilization has been mostly in areas where land has been alienated from traditional communities by the introduction of cash crops or other forms of capitalist agriculture, upsetting the often precarious situation of poor peasants. When habitual minimal survival conditions have collapsed, peasants have often reacted strongly, sometimes violently. In the past many such protest movements were spontaneous, localized and not systematically organized on a broad scale, and were often repressed. This led to a situation of apparent submission, slumbering resentment and potential resistance called 'culture of repression', which has prevailed in most of rural Latin America since the middle of the 19th century. This 'culture of repression' has been noted as the reason for the proverbial distrust of peasants towards participation in development schemes, however well-intentioned these may be. In the early 1960s the failure to arouse popular participation in programmes and projects led the United Nations development agencies to conclude that the restoration of more egalitarian land tenure conditions and the redistribution of large estates were preconditions of rural development. Moreover, 'It was observed that legal provisions pertaining to land reform would remain a dead letter if there were no organized peasantry to counterbalance strongly organized vested interests opposed to land redistribution'.[5] That such organizations are feasible and can achieve considerable changes in the agrarian structure to the benefit of the majority of the poor peasants, has been proven with more or less lasting impact, in several countries such as Mexico and Cuba. It is generally recognized, or has been carefully documented, that in these cases land reform came about largely as a result of militantly organized peasant pressure. In Mexico organized pressure reached its goal because a progressive or forward-looking government took up the challenge and was willing to *promulgate and implement* reform legislation against the vested interests. In Cuba oppression forced the organized peasantry underground and thus provoked them

to stage a violent revolution, after which effective reform could be carried out.

In Mexico land reform legislation had existed since Zapata led the peasant guerillas in the Mexican Revolution (1910-1919). A dynamic land reform implementation took place between 1934-1940, during the government of Lazaro Cardenas, who came to power under peasant pressure. Foreign interests in agriculture as well as the oil industry were mostly nationalized in that period and peasants were stimulated to organize in defence of their interests, as part of an overall conflict resolution strategy. Thus the acute conflict of interest between large landowners and landless agricultural workers became the starting point for overall regional development efforts. In the Laguna area of Mexico, for example, after a massive strike by agricultural workers in 1938 over extremely low wages, the government decided to implement the prevailing land reform laws in the area. Landowners were left with what the legal ceiling allowed them (150 hectares) and the remainder the immense estates were distributed among the 30,000 workers who formed collective enterprises in each village for the continued production of cotton (the main product of the area). Until the Mexican Government accepted a policy which favoured private rather than collective enterprise, this scheme was quite successful and gave a boost to the area in other respects, such as education, small industries and trading (as a result of the peasants' higher income) and also some effective women's programmes.[6]

In Cuba organizations were created by peasants from the early 1920s onward, to defend themselves against usurpation of their lands by, mainly foreign, plantation companies and other large estates. Although the efforts of the growing organizations were legalistic and defended existing rights, they were increasingly opposed by the companies and landlords and even by the authorities, and violently oppressed during the Batista regime. As oppression came to a climax and an alternative of armed resistance was offered by Fidel Castro and his guerilla group, the peasant organizations turned their non-violent struggle into an outright revolutionary effort. The peasants joined this movement and land reform was introduced in the liberated areas, finally leading to a victory over the conservative forces. The new revolutionary government could then carry out agrarian reform and dynamic rural development.[7]

In view of such historical lessons, it is surprising that development workers in the Third World as well as those from the metropolitan countries do not give more serious consideration to a constructive conflict resolution strategy which would give bargaining power to repressed groups and enable them effectively to demand needed concessions such

as land reform from the dominant elites. Consciously or not, most development workers are probably so much identified with the bias of the elites that they cannot objectively see the deteriorating situation of the masses, to say nothing of a 'view from below'. They recommended palliatives such as more resources for the 'poorest of the poor', but have no proposals for any fundamental change in the current development strategy which has caused sharp polarization between the few rich and the many poor in the Third World (and in the world as a whole). The increasing number of the latter and their worsening poverty are becoming a nightmare to national and international agencies, as dramatically expressed by the president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara in 1973: 'The data suggest that the decade of rapid growth has been accompanied by greater maldistribution of income in many developing countries and that the problem is most severe in the countryside', and 'an increasingly inequitable situation will pose a growing threat to political stability'.[8]

Rather than the continuation of the traditional overall development policy supplemented with more credits to the 'poorest', a development policy should be designed which will rapidly reverse the present polarization trend. This will need radical changes to the social and political structures but, as Raúl Prebisch, the then Director of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, stated 15 years ago, this could be done in a peaceful and orderly fashion. The conflict of interests between the few rich people and the masses of the poor should not be ignored or appeased with palliatives, but should be recognized, analysed and possibly solved by appropriate forms of conflict resolution strategy, with the active participation of the people concerned. Drawing on a variety of experiences from the last few decades in Latin America, various aspects of such participatory conflict resolution strategies will be discussed in the following pages.

1. *'Organizability' of Peasants*

In spite of various forms of repression the organizability of the peasants is not diminishing in most of Latin America. The more isolated areas are becoming increasingly integrated into the national life through roads and other means of communication. As a result there is a greater impact of the 'revolution of rising expectations' and of the feeling of 'relative deprivation', both of which were the motivators of the important peasant movements in the past. It is not surprising that strong peasant organizations arose in areas of relatively rapid development, where the peasantry either did not share in the benefits, or did so only slightly, or

even became its victims. Examples are the States of Morelos and Sonora and the Laguna region in Mexico, the Cochabamba Department in Bolivia, the State of Pernambuco in Brazil, the Convencion Valley in Peru, the States of Aragua and Carabobo in Venezuela and the sugar areas in Cuba. These areas were all undergoing significant economic developments, which benefited the peasantry very inadequately if at all. Similar situations are occurring presently on an increasingly large scale in most of Latin America. The modernization of agriculture as well as the increasing impact of capitalist enterprises, literacy programmes, vocational training, infrastructure-building and other similar activities have a direct influence on the 'organisability' of the peasants. It is evident that many development programmes have had little positive effect for the majority of poor peasants because of the adverse social climate in the rural areas, dominated at first by a small elite, and later by a rural middle-class or by large companies. In that context the small benefits for the majority brought about by development programmes, contrasting with the high expectations aroused in the communities where the programmes (and propaganda) are being carried out, may lead to acute frustration among the peasantry, a precondition for peasant organization.

Thus, the emphasizing of projects which lead to rapid increase in commercial agricultural production, and are therefore directed at the larger farmers (for example the irrigation schemes in the north-west of Mexico), had as a side effect, the awakening of land-hungry peasants who built effective rural organizations which were able to obtain important results. In North-west Mexico a commercial and rural enterpreneurial middle (and upper-middle) class was growing, while the great majority of the peasantry, whose expectations were rising considerably, benefited little. Thus a climate favourable for radical peasant organizations was created. It would seem that the hypothesis - increasingly accepted as a guideline for government policies - that social as well as economic development in rural areas is best promoted by the creation of a class of rich peasants which would subsequently lead to improvement of the lot of the peasants through demonstration effects, is not realistic.[9] There are indications that it is currently being recognized in Mexico that programmes to raise levels of living in the rural areas must be designed in such a way that all people benefit proportionally and that the creation of a new privileged minority must be avoided. The recent policy in Mexico favouring the collective exploitation of the expropriable haciendas, indicates possible solutions. These may, however, be neutralized again or destroyed if co-operative or collective farming become dependent on multinational coporations or 'agribusiness' for the sale of

produce, as is increasingly the case.[10]

There is considerable evidence that the forms of socio-economic planning which favour the masses cannot sufficiently cope with pressure from the vested interests (national as well as multinational) of those who feel that their privileged position is jeopardized and who have effective power at their disposal to maintain this position. As a result of this, the impact of most development projects including the well-intentioned ones, has been more favourable to those who were already better off, leading in the rural areas to a polarization between rich and poor.[11]

This fact of increasing polarization between rich and poor has, at times made the peasantry as a group more apt to organize for radical change than the urban workers. While the problems felt by many groups of urban workers can be solved by adaptations and improvements within the present social system (for example wage increases), the most strongly-felt needs of the peasantry, including those dependent on the large commercial haciendas as well as the small farmers who are subject to the rural power elite, can only be solved by a radical change of the power structure. The rigid opposition of the latter to change and the half-hearted development measures taken in many countries merely emphasize this basic issue. In the long run these factors seem to augment the 'organizability' of the peasants and their readiness for participation in the introduction of radical change in the social structure.

Recently, a growing interest exists in the 'revolutionary potential' of the peasantry. This potential is considerable and seems to be slumbering like a volcano. The most spectacular cases of organized peasant revolts which led to some form of agrarian revolution, were the Mexican peasant guerillas led by Zapata (1910-1919) and the syndicates in the Cochabamba Valley, under the leadership of José Rojas in Bolivia (1952); both occurred under conditions which are now found increasingly in Latin America in precisely the more developed regions, where rapid changes are taking place. The Mexican peasants were awakened by the expansionist activities of the sugar *hacendados* and their awareness was enhanced by the repression which followed their participation in the beginning of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. The Bolivian peasants were strongly aroused after their isolation was broken in the Chaco War and their awareness of the need for radical change was enhanced under the years of military repression between 1946-1952. Today, however, wars are not needed to break the isolation of the remotest areas, since this is being accomplished through the mass communication media and the building of roads. The integration of isolated areas

into the modern economy is sometimes related to ambitious national development and sometimes to the efforts of large landholders, including 'agribusiness' companies, to expand their holdings for speculative reasons. During the mid-sixties, civic-military action programmes have been introduced to open up isolated areas where guerilla forces have operated. Another factor breaking rural isolation is the increased migration to and return from urban areas in an (often vain) attempt to escape the deprivations of rural life. These trends are favourable for the growth of critical awareness among peasants, a *conditio sine qua non* for organization.

2. *Growth of awareness fostered by oppression*

Social-science literature often indicates as obstacles to the effective mobilization of peasants, the so-called 'resistance to change' and apathy that exists in rural communities, considered to be typical peasant characteristics. These attitudes however, are frequently a natural reaction to what peasants consider to be exploitation by the larger society, in the form of land grabbing, military conscription, attempts to levy taxes, diversion of water resources for the benefit of the landowners and so on. Non-participation in the social institutions imposed by the interests which dominate rural society could be seen not so much as an obstacle to participation in 'development', but rather as a form of self-protection against 'development' which only benefits a privileged minority. This resistance mentality can be and has at times been used as a starting point for a kind of participation, some forms of which are in the interest of the underprivileged groups themselves. To appeal to this potential resistance can be a way of stimulating enthusiastic popular participation among large groups of peasants.

Many factors affect the formation of peasant organizations and can help them to become a dynamic force. Prior to setting up of such organizations it is crucial to transform the potential or actual resentment and frustration of the peasants concerning their present situation, into an awareness of specific demands around which cohesive groups can be formed. It is important however, that these grievances, such as abuses committed by landlords or companies, and illegalities in land tenure, be seen not only as a specific problem to be solved, but as a symptom of the need to change the prevailing social structure as a whole. It is this social structure which has been basically responsible for the climate of violence, that has prevailed for ages in the rural areas of most of Latin America. The growth among the peasants of an awareness that their grievances and needs coincide with the requirements for structural

changes in the country as a whole, is an important step in the formation of effective, large-scale peasant organizations.

Some action programmes which tried to organize the peasants at the local or regional level have used the 'creation of awareness' as a first step. In the State of Rio Grande do Norte in Brazil the Servico de Asistenca Rural began a church-sponsored peasant organization programme in 1960 with a 'creation of awareness' campaign ('concientização'). The purpose of this and of a similar 'basic education' movement was to make the peasants aware of the situation in which they live, to promote creative nonconformity and to overcome resignation. Peasants were encouraged to organize representative pressure groups. One technique used was Paolo Freire's 'conscientisation' method, a method of teaching literacy which makes people aware of their situation in society as a whole, by promoting the ability to read and write through group discussion.[12] One aspect of this politization or 'conscientisation' of the peasants is to explain their situation in terms which give an easily-understandable, and therefore simplified (or even over-simplified) picture of a complicated and often confused agrarian situation. This seems to be the only practical way to create awareness which leads to active participation. This method was applied in Brazil before April 1964 and in Chile before September 1973, until oppressive military regimes made its application impossible. During the late 1960s progressive church groups increasingly adopted such awareness-creation methods in order to help people in rural areas, or slums, to stand up for their rights. When these attempts of working with the poor towards their emancipation were suppressed, at times with considerable violence, some priests and laymen, recognizing the 'class struggle' behind such oppression, created religiously inspired protest movements which were then increasingly denounced as 'revolutionary'. A first initiator was Camilo Torres, a Colombian priest who for many years was involved in non-violent efforts to work for popular emancipation and mobilization. In 1965, after his work was made impossible, he joined a guerilla movement and was killed in an ambush. Among the emancipatory movements of priests which emerged during the following years were, in Colombia the Golconda group and in Peru ONIS (National Office for Social Information). Oppressive measures against such initiatives resulted in the increasing radicalization of the Church, e.g. in Brazil, inspired by Dom Helder Camara, archbishop of Recife. This in turn had a considerable impact on the attitude of the Church as a whole towards the need for popular mobilization in favour of social justice. At the Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM) in Medellin, in 1968, this need was strongly emphasized and in the following years

more and more priests have been active in this field. As a theoretical reflection upon these activities, the 'theology of liberation' emerged as an answer to this oppression, which is serving economic development of benefit primarily to the rich and middle-class minorities of most Latin American countries.[13]

3. *Leadership and Outside Support*

While awareness is one precondition to the formation of a peasant organization, another is the availability of local leaders who are capable of mobilizing the peasants to protest when there is a specific grievance. Local peasant movements generally occur as a reaction to a particularly abusive act by a landlord or company. Able leadership is needed to transform this more or less spontaneous mobilization of people into an institutionalized and formal group, capable of taking up a continuous struggle for justice or for other demands. There have been examples of spontaneously and locally-formed groups gaining organizational strength and spreading by their own strength, as a result of the ability of local leaders. Well-known cases are: the peasant syndicate of Ucureña in Bolivia, the protest movement headed by Zapata in Mexico, the initial stage of the peasant movement in La Convencion, Peru, the peasant leagues in N.E.-Brazil, and those in the Eastern part of Cuba.

There is considerable evidence, however, that help for these movements from sympathetic outsiders such as schoolteachers, lawyers, priests, students, urban labour leaders and others is important from the very beginning. This is probably one reason why organizations generally started in areas which were relatively densely populated and close to urban centres. Such urban-oriented allies as those mentioned above have easy access to the places where peasants are being organized. In such areas there is also more chance of members of the peasantry itself being capable of taking up leadership roles in new organizations. An increasing contribution to peasant organization will probably be made by urban-oriented change agents who are already working in rural communities, such as schoolteachers and priests. In the past, Catholic priests have frequently had a moderating, if not oppositional effect on representative peasant organizations. As a result of military oppression in several countries as noted above, priests and elements of the higher clergy increasingly recognize the need for radical change in the rural social structure. On several occasions, over the last few years, local priests and sometimes higher members of the clergy have been active in support of peasant organization and at times have unhesitatingly participated or taken leading roles in actions undertaken by peasants to emphasize

their demands, for example peaceful land invasions. Rural priests and rural teachers however, need appropriate training and orientation in the intricacies of peasant organization if they are to be really effective. Once they have acted as promoters or catalysts, care should be taken to let truly local peasant leadership emerge to direct the organization. An important factor which contributed to the success of some independent peasant movements was the fact that they were regionally organized and adapted to the particular situation of one homogeneous area. In a few specific regions in some countries peasant organizations (federations of local groups) have been able to maintain independence and bargaining power and to defend their interests effectively. Regional organization seems to be most suitable, particularly for the purpose of political bargaining. Frequent contact between the rank and file and the top leadership is possible at the regional level. The fact that interests represented are more or less homogeneous, means that the membership can be rallied relatively easily for specific issues and occasions. At the national level this is more difficult to achieve. At that level the local interests can get lost in the over-all structure, which has to represent too wide a range of interests. The building up of local peasant organizations into a federation seems to be a feasible way of guaranteeing effective interest articulation for the peasants regionally.

Peasant organizations generally need sophisticated outside support particularly during their formation and when local movements spread to the regional (or national) level. At that level most of the allies and supporters of peasants have their own form of organization, independent of the peasant movements which they support, and some of these could be helpful as counterweights against the overwhelming influence of the landowners' organizations. In Mexico and Bolivia the teachers' unions have in some areas and at some times, encouraged their members, and guided them, to help in the formation of a regional peasant federation. Elsewhere student groups of one kind or another have done so. Most frequent has been the organized assistance of urban labour leaders, sometimes under the banner of a specific political party. To build up a movement rapidly and on a large scale, urban help, and the assumption of primary leadership by experienced urban labour or political leaders seems essential. The spread of the Bolivian peasant federation across the country in 1953 and the growth of the Federacion Campesina de Venezuela after 1958, indicate the effectiveness of able and sympathetic urban leadership supplied by political parties (such as the AD Party in Venezuela) or populist party-oriented government agencies

(such as the Ministry of Peasant Affairs in Bolivia in 1952-1960).

Once an important private or public agency is determined to promote effective peasant organization, this can be done relatively easily. The difficulty of institutionalizing local groups then becomes a minor problem, since they form part of a systematic over-all campaign. Formal institutionalization of the new groups can become, however, a mere paper structure without real strength if it is not based on active struggle and if no visible headway is made in this struggle.

4. *Urban Labour Support*

In a number of countries urban workers have, out of solidarity and well-conceived self-interest, seen the need to help organize the rural workers. A better-off peasantry would benefit urban workers in several ways: (a) in most urban areas of Latin America it would relieve the pressure on the labour market resulting from the great influx of unemployed rural workers; (b) an improvement of incomes in the rural areas would considerably enhance the possibilities for marketing industrial products of all kinds. This latter factor has in some countries even encouraged some industrial entrepreneurs to support rural workers' organizations. The industrialists of Sao Paolo have at certain stages given support to the Ligas Camponesas in the north-east of Brazil, which together with other rural unions, gained considerable benefits in 1963-64. Several cases are known where miners and urban labourers with organizing experience have helped the rural workers directly in the creation of viable organizations. One contribution of the urban labour movement could be to create a programme in which their help is systematically applied. This happened in 1952-53 in Bolivia, when miners assisted in the process of creating the Confederacion de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia. During Cardenas' regime in the Laguna area in Mexico, urban labour organizers in the regional towns helped to create a strong rural workers' organization which obtained important reforms and improvement measures.

Special training courses to help urban labour organizers understand the problems of rural workers would be helpful in this respect. For example, many of the cadres of the Federacion Campesina de Venezuela were originally urban labour organizers who became peasant organization leaders mainly through in-service training. The organization of seminars for urban labour leaders who have experience in, or who have become dedicated to, the formation of rural workers' unions, would be useful. Urban workers' organizations could regularly open their leadership training facil-

ities to the leaders of rural workers. This is already happening in several Latin American countries. International workers' and other organizations have supported such efforts in various ways.

Assistance in the creation of a solidarity fund which would help the rural organizations get through the difficult initial stages of growth and struggle would be another important contribution.

A particularly important contribution could be made by providing certain services to the growing rural organizations which they are not able to provide themselves but which are highly desired by the membership. It is a well-known rural development strategy that people unite more easily for the fulfilment of their most strongly felt needs. One such need, acutely felt by peasants of various kinds, is security of tenure and legal protection. Peasants in many areas suffer severely from current practices of land usurpation by the rich, which are a circumvention or even an outright violation of the existing laws. Therefore one of the most important services urban labour unions, or sympathetic church groups, could render is to make available legal advisers to assist the peasants in defending their civil and other rights, guaranteed by law but not always by local practice.

Legal defence is most effective when it does not deal only with isolated offences but when violations of the law are gathered into categories and presented in bulk to the corresponding courts, e.g. offenses dealing with minimum wages, protection of tenancy, rent regulations, freedom of association, and so on. In this way the need for representation at the local, regional and national level is immediately felt and local rural workers' organizations can from the outset be integrated into a national or regional organization. Since most existing urban labour organizations already work at those different levels and could lend facilities at each, it is relatively easy for them to help create viable peasant organizations. This happened to a large extent in La Convencion, Peru, where there emerged one of the most militant peasant movements of the sixties in Latin America.[14]

Not all urban workers' organizations are adapted to enter the field of rural organization. Organizations with strong branches in outlying provincial towns are better adapted than those concentrated in the capital. In Cuba, sugar plantation and factory workers unions have been helpful on occasions in support of the organization of peasants. In some countries mining areas, situated in rural problem areas, have proved to be excellent focal points for the initiation beginning of rural organizations. Not only is there contact between the mining centres and surrounding villages, but many mine workers, after spending a good

number of years in their job, retire to their village of origin. Some of the more effective peasant organizations in Bolivia, Peru and Chile have grown in areas surrounding important mining centres. In some cases, an additional advantage was that the miners had been recruited from the peasant population and thus practically all spoke the indigenous language.

One danger involved in the formation of a strong link between urban and rural workers' movements is that the urban workers may dominate the peasant organizations and utilize them for objectives which serve urban labour and its political impact rather than serving the peasantry. This has happened to some extent in Venezuela.

5. *Favourable factors and obstacles*

Past experiences demonstrate that growing peasant organizations are able to and will gain strength through the active defence of their rights against the repressive climate maintained by a foreign or national agricultural power elite, if the Government does not actively support this elite. Naturally if the Government's law enforcing agencies were to actively support the peasantry it would be much better.

In most countries it is, therefore, desirable to insist on the implementation of existing laws rather than immediately demanding new laws more favourably disposed towards the peasants particularly during the period of building up the strength and cohesiveness of peasant organizations. In this way there would be no opposition from the many groups in the country which have a relatively neutral regard for the need to bring about drastic structural changes in rural areas. Some of these groups may even be content to see that laws and values which they cherish are effectively implemented. The precise content of laws regarding peasant organization and rural labour conditions, seems to be of relatively less importance than how effectively they are implemented and the spirit in which this is done. Even when laws on peasant organizations are designed more as an obstacle to organization than as an encouragement, effective peasant organizations can arise. The peasant leagues in the late 1950s Brazil created a structure of civil associations for the defence of peasant interests, which did not fall under the labour law and did not encounter special difficulties over legel recognition. Many effective peasant organizations existed without any legal recognition at all, such as the Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico, an important factor in the acceleration of the Mexican agrarian reform programme after 1958 because of its real political bargaining power.

Official tolerance, not to mention active encouragement, of basic civil rights such as the freedom of association, is however, rare. This right is included in the constitutions of most countries and is confirmed, in many, by the ratification of the corresponding ILO Conventions. The right of freedom of association is however, frequently interfered with in Latin American countries. In most cases this is done by the landholding interests, often supported, openly or covertly, by national or local authorities. For example, on many estates peasants are not allowed to form associations to represent their interests. If this does happen, landowners dislodge or evict them. Although the international machinery regarding infractions of freedom of association has been able to deal with some cases, complaints from local organizations about the ineffectiveness of procedures dealing with their cases are frequently useless.

The obstacles faced by peasant organizations in most Latin American countries have become tremendous during the last few years. It is increasingly difficult to imagine orderly and effective organization, applying pressure peacefully, given the lawlessness and violence, maintained in the rural areas by the agricultural elites, often with the collaboration of the police or military forces. The methods used to oppose peasant organizations fall in most countries under criminal law, but are not effectively dealt with as such.[15] When, out of despair, the peasants, defend themselves with similar acts of violence however, penalties are heavy and the *status quo* is restored with methods that in some instances come close to civil war. Severe warnings by prestigeous international agencies regarding the fatal long term consequences of employing such repressive policies rather than solving the problems, have as yet found little repsonse.

It would not be justified to say that in the whole of Latin America the personal security of those engaging in representative organization is threatened. There is considerable variation from country to country and area to area, depending on the orientation of national or local authorities and the attitude of the agricultural elite. While in some areas, as at present in most of Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia and in some regions of Mexico, the number of peasants and peasant leaders threatened and assassinated is alarming, elsewhere such acts happen either sporadically or not at all.[16] The kind of self-defence which seems to be needed as part of the peasant organization and/or agrarian reform process, depends on local circumstances. In some cases, such as in the north-Western development region of Mexico, where a simple threat of reprisal in case of assassination of peasant leaders was sufficient and where other forms of direct action applied

were conspicuously non-violent and symbolic, the authorities reacted with considerable prudence. In more isolated areas, however, things are different and some measure of armed peasant self-defence may be the only way to counteract the permanent state of violence or threat of violence under which the rural population lives. In some areas where landowners, in circumvention of the law, have their own guards who terrorise the peasants, the most strongly felt need around which people have organized has been the formation of self-defence groups. In some countries, such as Mexico in the thirties and Bolivia in 1952, Governments have even helped peasant communities to form militias which were supplied with arms and became sufficiently effective to defend the peasants and their families against the aggressive activities of the landowning elites (including foreign companies), and their 'white guards' or 'pistoleros'. According to Government reports from that period, the formation of peasant unions and the implementation of agrarian reform in Mexico under President Cardenas (1934-1940) was accomplished only as a result of the fact that during those years, 60,000 rifles were distributed among peasants who were organized into rural defence units, supervised by 200 loyal army officers. The peasantry itself requested this during meetings of regional or state level peasant organizations. While not generally to be condoned, the possession of arms and the ability to use them as part of the bargaining process as a counterweight to violent threats from landowners, considerably encouraged the active participation of the peasantry in carrying out the agrarian reform process as stipulated by the law. Unlawful opposition by landowners was thus neutralized. In some countries the traditional elite, partly forced by pressures from below supported or encouraged by the more progressive elite groups, have discovered that it can be in their own interest and benefit to participate in new developments. They have come to a *modus vivendi* with the new and more dynamic elites and even with those who more or less represent peasant interests. In those cases, agrarian reform could to a large extent be carried out and peasant organizations become part of the normal political institutions.

However, this *modus vivendi* between old and new elites in Mexico later led to new problems and obstacles as representative peasant organizations became increasingly controlled by the new elite. The peasant organizations which had been helpful in the struggle between the new and the traditional rural elite, to the benefit of the former, could later be neutralized and kept in a state of tranquility by the strategic granting of a minimum of limited benefits.

While the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) created in the thirties and related to the official political party

(PRI) became increasingly conformist and even corrupt, alternative and more radical organizations emerged such as the Union of Peasants and Workers (UGOCM) in 1946, the Independent Peasant Federation (CCI) in the early sixties and several smaller local organizations and movements. Although the leaders of these organizations have been persecuted and jailed many times, the new impulses by the Mexican government to agrarian reform in the course of the last decades have always been given as a response to mobilizations organized by these militant organizations.[17]

In some instances elements of the landed elite have broken with their class and headed or supported movements to bring about radical change in the *status quo*. Francisco Madero, in the Mexican revolution, Francisco Juliao, in the Brazilian peasant leagues, and Fidel Castro in Cuba, are outstanding examples. It would be possible to try to direct efforts more systematically, towards increasing the number of dissidents among the traditional elites as part of the strategy of promoting peasant organization. Some of the younger elements are probably willing and eager to accept new constructive roles in which they can find self-esteem and status and which are more in step with dynamic development needs than the traditional roles of their fathers. One could imagine that many of them could be made to feel that the fulfilment of new roles is more satisfactory than status derived from inheritance and adherence to outdated patterns of seigneurial life. So far, few systematic efforts have been made to tap the potentialities of disconformity and adventure of such young elements.

Some military governments, after many years of oppressive activities against peasants have chosen to channel and guide, rather than continue to repress, representative peasant organizations in their struggle against a traditional rural elite. The Peruvian 'revolutionary' military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado which came to power in 1968, implemented a kind of land reform which some strong peasant organization had been demanding. Simultaneously the Government created local peasant leagues all over the country through SINAMOS (National System for Social Mobilization), which were then brought together in a National Peasant Confederation (CNA). Between 1969 and 1975 the existing contradictions and conflicts between rich and poor in the rural areas were utilized constructively to build a strong popular movement.[18]

It should be noted that these progressive policies were to a large extent a response to highly militant peasant organizations which had emerged in spite of severe oppression in some areas, for example in the Convencion Valley in Cusco department. A massive concentration of peasants had gathered in Huyro, in this valley, as part of a protest march on its way to Cusco. In order to halt this mobilization a repre-

sentative of the military came to announce, only a few weeks before the *coup d'état* of October 1968 which brought them to power, that the government would be changed and a new policy of reforms designed, in accordance with peasant demands.[19] Such a policy is only possible if the government is willing to take the risk and solve existing contradictions and conflicts and oppose the vested interests of the traditional elite, the agribusi and other corporations, such as W.R. Grace, Gildemeister and Cerro de Pasco. In Peru a relatively radical land reform programme was carried out, distributing most of the large landholding to peasant co-operative enterprises and communities.

In Colombia from 1968 onward a similar effort to organize peasants in a more or less controlled way through the Association of Colombian Peasants (ANUC) was undertaken by the Lleras Restrepo government. When promised land reform measures which the peasants had been demanding for years, were not effectively implemented however, the ANUC radicalized and organized land invasions on a large scale in disputed areas. The government then tried to counteract the movement, but ANUC had gained sufficient strength to continue its activities and continues to do so in spite of serious oppression.

One danger of official favour is the co-option of leaders into the ruling elite once their organization has gained some strength. The 'buying' of leaders and organizations is a frequent practice and has neutralized many representative groups which could have been instrumental in bringing about structural change. Sometimes the organizations are integrated into a political party which is in reality much less change-oriented than its declaration of principles and official statements indicates. Some parties moderated their agrarian policy considerably once they had obtained sufficient control over the organized peasantry. Elsewhere, national or international bodies gained control over growing peasant organizations by aiding them financially or by providing them with training programmes and then pressing them to moderate their policies.

This happened for example to CEDOC in Equador, a strong peasant and labour organization of social Christian origin, affiliated for many years to CLAT (Latin American Labour Confederation). CLAT, strongly supported by funds from Christian-democratic organizations in Europe, stopped chanelling this support to CEDOC when the latter accepted a more radical policy and began to undertake joint activities with the Communist oriented trade unions in that country. A split was provoked within CEDOC but the majority, particularly the peasant federation FENOC, accepted the independent line even while this meant the cutting off of financial support through CLAT.

One way to neutralize such influences is for peasant

organizations to achieve and maintain financial independence. The best example of this approach is the Union Central de Sociedades de Credito Colectivo Ejidal of the Laguna region in Mexico. This peasant organization which protested effectively against official corruption from its initiation in 1940 onward, has been under constant attack by public and private bodies, but manages to maintain a nucleus of cohesive groups because it has economic independence. This independence comes from the considerable contributions paid by the membership, additional benefit of which is that the membership has a sense of control over its leaders. Another source of contributions is a 1% levy on commercial dealings which the union imposes, in co-operation with its local member organizations on their produce. It appears that a proper combination of co-operative economic activities with syndical action can enhance the chances for survival of peasant organizations. Among the many forms of non-conventional co-operatives presently existing in the developing countries, this combination of trade union and co-operative provides a worth-while field for experimentation.

Credits and co-operative technical advice to small independent and precariously existing organizations could aid the survival of many worth-while groups, threatened by landlord opposition on one side and neutralizing economic, political or financial control on the other.

6. *Land Demands as the Catalyst to Participation*

In most cases organizations are originally formed around such issues as better tenancy conditions, higher agricultural wages, or the abolition of unpaid (and illegal) semi-feudal services which have to be rendered to the landlords. It has apparently been easier to organize around concrete grievances, felt daily and continuously, than around large-scale changes such as agrarian reform. When, through organized action, some specific benefits are obtained, the peasants may feel stronger and demand additional benefits. In general it was the intransigence of the landowners and their refusal to negotiate and give in to moderate demands which made the peasants more radical and demand the lands they worked.

One effect of meeting the demands for legal minimum wages and the abolition of unpaid services is that large land-holding becomes less attractive to the owners. In spite of the rudimentary agricultural techniques practiced many haciendas were economically profitable, because of the exploitation of the readily available human resources which were more or less tied to the land. Once free services disappear and the labour force has to be paid a normal wage, the traditional hacienda system can become a burden to the owner. This is probably one reason for strong landlord opposition

against changes in labour conditions. In 1938 the re-distribution of most of the cotton estates in the Laguna area of Mexico was provoked by the fact that the landowners claimed they could not cede to any of the demands regarding wage increases and better working conditions.

In some cases, radical demands and action on the part of peasants, was a direct reaction to landowners or companies attempting to expand their properties through evicting the peasants from lands which they had possessed or worked for years. In other cases it was the refusal of landowners to negotiate or even consider the legitimate demands of the peasants with regard to tenure conditions or wages, that caused the radicalization of the peasants. The agrarian reform issue did not originate as a well-defined policy or as an integral part of national economic planning, but rather as a reaction against various forms of abuse inherent in the latifundia or hacienda system. This was true, for example, in the Convencion Valley in Peru.

Elsewhere the reform issue arose because lands were legally registered as the property of large owners, who had taken over the lands of the indigenous communities, either recently or in the second half of the nineteenth century, by legal tricks or usurpation. These communities frequently have titles dating from the colonial period which they value more than laws introduced later, which are disadvantageous to communal property. In some countries large estates are owned by foreign companies or individuals in contravention of the law and are rightfully claimed by the local peasants for land distribution.

Nowadays peasant organizations generally have as a priority, demands for agrarian reform and land redistribution as these have become increasingly legitimate issues, recognized and guaranteed by legislation in most countries. These priorities are generally thoroughly explained and discussed in meetings or assemblies at the local level, and particularly in congresses, rallies and conventions held at a regional or national level. Such events, which are allowed in some countries such as Colombia, Mexico, Peru but not in others, can exert strong pressure. Sometimes these congresses, (some of which are attended by hundreds or even thousands of peasants from an entire area), file out into the streets of the town in which they are being held, thus impressing on public opinion their potential strength and bargaining power. A march of a great number of peasants demanding land reform is an important way of applying pressure. Meeting in large numbers also has a bolstering, psychological effect on the peasants themselves; it gives them a sense of solidarity, power and self-esteem which they generally have never previously experienced.

Such marches can become demonstrations when there is an acute issue at stake, and where slogans expressing that

demand are carried. A similar effect can be achieved by the organization of a 'caravan', as has been done on various occasions in Mexico. On several occasions, a few hundred peasant representatives of the Laguna area travelled in a large number of trucks to the capital and on their way drew so much public attention that, soon after arrival, a representative committee was given audience by the President to discuss and partly resolve their urgent demands. Such spectacular forms of bargaining are important since in most countries bargaining through negotiations by representative organizations is not very effective. One reason is that a great number of under- and unemployed people are willing to accept conditions lower than those in dispute. Under these circumstances demands can be expressed most effectively by various forms of 'political bargaining.'[20] Through massive demonstrations of such proportions that they threaten to upset the normal routine of life, protesting groups try to coerce the Government so that it will intervene in their favour on disputed issues or strongly-felt needs. This strategy has been applied by peasants in La Convencion, Peru, by the ANUC in Colombia, and in Mexico.

One of the most important and immediate effects of such organized action is the respect gained by allegedly inert and humble groups from those who consider themselves superior. This again has considerable psychological repercussions for the peasants themselves in the growth of feelings of self-respect and esteem.
Depending on the conflict to be dealt with, another tactic applied in many countries, is the sit-in. Officials find it difficult not to attend to demands presented to them when a few hundred peasants quietly occupy the office of a government agency, their leaders asserting that they are not going to leave until a solution has been found to the problems. Large groups of peasants have been known to sit for days in or in front of a particular office until they were duly heard. If the problems under consideration are very serious, such sit-ins can easily become demonstrations in which the peasants use placards to mobilize public opinion in their favour. This form of pressure has much in common with the bargaining tactics used by urban unions.

Sometimes a sit-in in front of a court where litigation cases are being dealt with can pressure judges, often landlords themselves, to decide in favour of the peasants in cases where colleague landlords are violating the law. Even neutral law enforcement agencies may need some demonstration of peasant bargaining power to counterbalance heavy pressure from the established rural elite to tolerate such illegal practices as exaggerated tenancy rates, feudal or 'bonded' labour relations, land alienation, etc. Peasant organizations

are generally well aware that their demonstration of power needs to be peaceful if it is not to meet ferocious repression.

Victory in the case of the expropriation of the Galileia estate in 1959 in Pernambuco, Brazil, after several years of organized struggle, meant a strengthening of the peasant leagues as a whole, as was the successful outcome of a large-scale strike in 1963, organized by the newly-created rural syndicates, both Catholic and government-sponsored, in conjunction with the leagues. After the initial success in most countries of systematic actions, new representative rural organizations were able to gain strength rapidly by bargaining for the implementation of existing legislation with regard to the formation of unions minimum wages and the abolition of service obligations. An important form of bargaining used by peasants in cases of land usurpation (at present or in the past) has been the peaceful invasion, occupation or 'recovery' of land. Most official agrarian reform projects have been started in areas where the peasants had already successfully applied this method of effective and/or symbolic occupation, as for example, the Algolan and Cerro de Pasco Corporation estates in Peru, the Cananea Cattle Company estate in the north of Mexico, several large plots of land along the Magdalena river in the Atlantico Department of Colombia, the many haciendas in the most densely-populated states of Venezuela, as well as the generalized agrarian upheavals which were incentives to reform programmes in Mexico and Bolivia.
Although the legislation of some countries explicitly states that lands which have been invaded by peasants will not be distributed under the land-reform programme, in the light of historical facts this does not always appear to be a realistic approach. So far almost all efforts towards agrarian reform have been a direct result of methods, used by organized peasants after more institutionalized forms of action had proved unsuccessful. Ways should be sought to use this tactic in a constructive manner to promote necessary social change.

The tactics applied in land invasion or occupation vary from one case to another. If peasants, continuing to occupy a plot land they have worked on for years, refuse to continue to give unpaid labour to the owner or to leave at his request without being paid proper compensation for improvement made, it can hardly be called an 'invasion'.However, this is often done by the owners and by the press which supports them. In many countries in such cases, the peasants officially have the support of the law but not always of those who enforce the law.

The occupation and cultivation of unused public land by land-hungry peasants, 'squatting', has been justified by law in several countries. This becomes a problem when

large land-holders claim to have obtained property titles to areas in which these plots are located and seek to profit from improvements made by the squatters. In such cases the squatters are dislodged and, at times, return to neighbouring areas or to the same region. This happened on a large scale in Cuba before 1959.
Indigenous communities have at times effectively occupied lands to which they have age-old titles after many years of unsuccessful litigation in the courts. Such occupations consisted generally of the building of symbolic living quarters on the 'recovered' lands by members of the community and of ploughing the land or grazing their cattle on it. To brand such acts as violent, as is often the case, and to try to restore the previous *status quo*, which is often in contravention of the law, by the use of police or armed force has cost the lives of many peasants and has not solved the basic problem.

The authorities could tolerate peaceful and symbolic occupation, and subsequent cultivation, of land not fulfilling its 'social function', as a means by which landless peasants are able to express their demands. The legal implications should be carefully studied and in order that certain rules should be established to institutionalise this method as a guarantee against misuse. Similar procedures have made the strike one of the accepted means of bargaining in urban labour conflict. It seems to be important for several reasons that the over-all agrarian conflict that has been slumbering for centuries should come into the open in an effectively channelled way. The suppression of protests of peasants against strongly felt injustice can lead to violent explosions, as has happened in the past, when spontaneous and unorganized revolts occurred in reactions to excessive abuses. The history of Latin American countries includes several cases where the peasants, out of vengeance, ransacked houses and even killed landowners and their families. The number of peasants killed in reprisal was however generally higher.

Most land invasions and similar acts however, were not spontaneous flare-ups of rural violence but rather organized efforts to achieve a significant change in the social structure. In these cases destructive violence was minimal. The simple fact of getting the land, through peaceful occupation, seems to have been sufficient 'vengeance' for the peasants. Landlords were sometimes warned in advance so as to give them an opportunity to go to their town house, thus minimizing the chances of destructive violence during the occupation, as happened in the Bolivian land reform in 1953. Peasant organizations which have had experience of peaceful and/or symbolic invasions of unused or underused land, might well contribute to a proper institutionalization of

these tactics by analyzing and explaining their experiences. This is particularly important since it is the lack of such institutionalized means of pressure for agrarian reform which appears to have led either to stagnation of reform programmes or to acute rural unrest.

Similarly, in the initial stages of the trade union movement in Europe, activities undertaken in support of the legitimate demands of workers were easily branded as 'illegal' or 'subversive', without a realistic appraisal of the viewpoints and interests of both partners in the conflict being made. There is a great need to institutionalize the various tactics used in conflicts in rural areas, as is the case with similar phenomena in urban and industrial environment about which extensive literature exists. The implications of peaceful and orderly occupations of idle land (which peasants can legally claim according to agrarian reform laws) should be given careful study, as was given to the strike and other tactics related to collective bargaining in industry. While the strike is now part of the constitutional rights of workers in many countries, the tactics used by peasants to emphasize their demands have been made illegal and punishable by several agrarian reform laws.

This does not seem to be very realistic, since in several cases the same governments that have made land occupations illegal, have *de facto* acceded to such tactics. It might be argued that making the symbolic and peaceful occupation of idle or extensively used latifundio land a legalized method by which peasants can display their bargaining power and the strength of their demands, is a more secure way to maintain ordered procedure in the rural areas than by the ruthless suppression of this approach, which often leads to violence.

It is often claimed that not suppressing conflict may also lead to disorder and violence. The forces in conflict can, however, be channelled and effectively directed towards a solution before they become destructive. The escalation of peasant demands within the framework of existing legislation, given the intransigence of the group likely to lose some of its privileges if the present laws were to be effectively implemented, could bring about effective restructuring of the prevailing system without destructive violence, as happened in Peru (1968-75). In the latter case, however, there was considerable resistance, particularly from foreign owned estates, such as the sugar plantations in the coastal region, an area where peasant struggle has been endemic since the beginning of this century.[21]

7. *Participation in Agrarian Reform*

Not only the case of Cuba, where one can speak of an outright

agrarian revolution but also the cases of (non-violent) agrarian reform, clearly show that agrarian change is not merely a technical, economic or social problem, but is also a political one. Agrarian reform has been part of an over-all political competition or struggle in which various groups have competed for power and control.

The Mexican reform process, which has been going on for over fifty years, illustrates the ups and downs of political tide. At times when the peasants had political power or 'power capability' (threat of power) through direct action, land distribution proceeded at considerable speed and significant gains were made. This was most clearly the case with the groups led by Zapata in the initial stage of the Mexican reform and also with the peasant movement, headed by Jacinto Lopez, in the north-Western development areas in 1958. At other times the peasants gained influence because the Government needed them for support, as was the case in the Cardenas period (1934-1940), when Mexico became politically a more or less stable nation.

The situation was similar in the other countries with large-scale reforms, Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru. In Bolivia, after years of repression, the peasant organizations in some areas were so radicalized that they almost forced the reformist government that had come to power to implement a radical agrarian reform programme. This consisted of *de facto* distribution of most of the available land in less than a year, radically changing the rural power structure, and giving the reformist government the stable base of popular support it needed. In Venezuela, after 1958, something similar happened but in a much less radical way. The government approved an initially effective land reform because it needed the electoral support of the peasants, who were organized as a political clientele. The participation of the peasants in the agrarian reform process was very institutionalized.

In countries which had a more or less vigorous agrarian reform programme, Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru (and also Guatemala in the early fifties and Chile before 1973), legal provisions existed which closely linked the agrarian reform process to the formation of peasant organizations. A petition for land generally could only be made by an organized group of peasants, an 'agrarian executive committee', a syndicate or a union. In most cases these groups represented a certain community or a group of peasants which were tied to, or lived near a particularly large land-holding, and the latter was the object of the request for land distribution. In some cases, after the land-holding had been assigned to the group as a whole, the group was charged with its distribution among the individual peasants. In other cases the distribution was planned in advance. In the main, however, the existence of an organized group and a few elect-

ed persons who, as representatives of the whole group, could deal with the authorities facilitated the actual distribution process considerably.

In such cases one of the functions of the peasant organizations is to apply various types of pressure on the government agency in charge of the land distribution, for a rapid execution of the agrarian reform process. When an agrarian reform programme is vigorously executed, there is little need for such pressures. Then the main function of the organization can be to neutralize, at a local level, the opposing forces of those landowners who try all of the legal and sometimes illegal, means to halt the process. Landlords can try to intimidate the peasant group sponsoring the petition, or threaten or corrupt government officials sent to initiate the land distribution procedure. As noted above, in Mexico and Bolivia it was necessary for this reason to distribute arms to the peasant groups during the most vigorous period of land distribution, so that they could protect themselves against the violent opposition of landowners, who threatened not only them, but also on occasion, the government officials.

One effective way to avoid violence and to bring about a rapid and drastic transformation of the rural social structure is the approach followed in Bolivia. In 1953, the peasants were organized into syndicates in a sweeping campaign which covered almost all the densely-populated areas of the country in a short period. The peasants were declared owners of the plots they had been occupying (in exchange for labour) on the haciendas. They also became provisional owners of most of the parts of the haciendas which they had been working collectively for the landlord. Under the reform legislation the part which the landowner could keep for himself would be legally determined at a later stage. The fact that most landlords, fearing the vengeance of the peasants whom they had abused for years, fled to the cities in expectation of future title arrangements, made the transfer of property rights easy. The local syndicates took over the management functions on the estate, relatively smoothly and without the violence which characterized this procedure at some stages in Mexico. In that country the landlords remained in power while the legal procedure to transfer land to the peasants was in process, whereas in Bolivia the peasants took possession of and had effective power over, the land which according to the law would legally be theirs in the future. An additional advantage of this drastic method is that a fervour of enthusiasm is created among the peasants which facilitates the acceptance of new production techniques and similar necessities which have to accompany agrarian reform.

In Mexico this was very difficult on the whole. During the long years that reform procedures were being carried out the landlords continued to use the land and found many means of opposing the peasants who claimed it. Many cases were reported in which peasant leaders were threatened, imprisoned and even assassinated while the procedures were being carried out. The landlords remained in effective possession of the land which, in most areas, implied that they kept effective political power. This explains in part the climate of lawlessness and violence which continued to prevail in some rural parts of Mexico in spite of the tremendous progress made in the land distribution programme.

In the initial stages of the reform in Mexico, and particularly in Venezuela, peasant groups accelerated the agrarian reform process in a haphazard way simply by occupying the lands which they claimed, in accordance with promised or actual legislation. The juridical aspects of the distribution were generally arranged later, but during the sometimes time-consuming process of legal expropriation and transfer of property, it was possible for the peasants to cultivate the land. When the government has decided to carry out land redistribution but where the rural elites create all kinds of obstacles, including illegal actions and violence, the orderly occupation of the lands to be distributed, supervised by the police if necessary (as happened in some cases in Venezuela), could help to ensure the effective and peaceful execution of the programme. Once members of the rural elite see that the reform will be carried out in spite of their opposition, they sometimes become willing to facilitate the process. In Venezuela in several cases, the landlords were able to obtain a quick transfer of their property and reimbursement by the agrarian institute, by arranging with the peasant unions an advance occupation of their estates. They saw more benefit in transferring their property rapidly than in fighting a battle which they knew would be lost in the long run.

An additional advantage of organizing some form of direct action in relation to the agrarian reform process is the fact that it helps to strengthen the cohesiveness of the peasant organization and its ability to face the many post-reform problems more effectively. It is not surprising that CORDIPLAN, the Venezuelan national community development programme, chose two pilot projects in precisely those places where strong peasant organizations existed and which had, at one stage, organized land invasions to accelerate the land reform process.

Whatever the exact procedure, particularly at the local level, the government officials concerned need to utilize an appropriate approach. Officials who come from urban middle-class backgrounds often need considerable training to be

able to deal with peasants in other than a paternalistic manner which causes resentment and makes dialogue impossible.[22]

On the other hand, peasant leaders would benefit considerably from training in the technicalities of the reform process. The agrarian reform process is generally considered to be essentially bureaucratic. The peasants' willingness to collaborate in post-reform efforts would be enhanced by promoting their participation from the very beginning in the reform itself. In Bolivia, in a number of cases, the peasants have helped competent officials with preliminary field surveys carried out as part of the expropriation process. Officials would benefit from the peasants' knowledge of the environment and thus more easily avoid mistakes.

At the regional, and particularly at the national level, the participation of peasant representatives in the technical bodies responsible for the agrarian reform, exists formally. In Venezuela there are two peasant federation representatives in the five-man board of directors of the Instituto Agrario Nacional. In Mexico, however, where land distribution has been going on for about fifty years, there is practically no peasant representation at the policy level. Such representation would be most helpful in the deciding of priorities as to where and when to distribute lands most urgently and also where the need and pressure of the peasants for land is strongest. In the planning of the reform programme at the national level it is difficult to combine technical criteria with social needs, but this would be facilitated by effective participation of various peasant representatives in a more than formal way. It is also important to ensure that the peasant organization leaders who function at this level really represent the peasantry. In several cases the top-level posts in such organizations have fallen into the hands of politicans who use their key positions to neutralize or even control the peasants' demands rather than represent them effectively. Good communication between the local and the national level of peasant organization is of great importance and can facilitate co-ordinated action. Where symbolic occupations of estates take place the authorities at the national level may be warned in advance; the proper contacts made with the law-enforcement authorities, who could then inform their local representatives on the issue. It is well known that law enforcement at the local level is often partial and is to some extent controlled by the rural elite. By avoiding violence and other problems such co-ordination can contribute to effective action, as happened in various cases in Mexico, Venezuela, Peru and in Chile (before 1973). The case of Chile demands a special

study, but a few remarks can be made. In that country peasant participation has been minimal for a long period and has existed only in a few areas which were either typically indigenous (Mapuche Indians), or where mining was practised by workers who also practised agriculture (the Norte Chico region). In those areas the communist-socialist Federacion Campesina e Indigena de Chile (Peasant and Indian Federation of Chile) had its strongholds.[23] During the period of government by the Christian-Democrat president Frei (1964-1970) the INDAP (National Institute of Agricultural and Livestock Development) strongly contributed to a government sponsored peasant organization campaign, preparing the peasantry for the officially promised agrarian reform programme. The progress made by this programme was too slow, and benefitted only a quarter of the 100.000 landless peasants to whom land had been promised. As a result,in 1970, there was an increase in the votes for the more radical reform programme of Salvador Allende, who was elected president. This latter programme, implemented between 1970 and the overthrow of the Allende Government in 1973, was accompanied by considerable peasant participation and brought about a considerable transformation of the rural power structure.[24]

8. *The role of "anti-participation structures".*

It is outside the scope of this article to analyse the coup d'état in Chile in 1973 which radically reversed the trend of increasing popular participation in that country. The national and foreign powers behind this change could well be seen as an expression of 'structures of anti-participation', which should be taken into account when dealing with participation.[25] The years of the Chilean experiment under the regimes of Frei and Allende, and also the various experiences in peasant participation in Latin America touched upon in this article, demonstrate particularly that when peasants become restless because of the changes and frustrations resulting from 'modernization', their energies can be channelled constructively through organization, by the utilization of appropriate conflict resolution strategies. Bold national or local government agencies are needed to support or tolerate such an organiazation, and to neutralize the often violent attacks by the traditional and modern economic elites. In most cases, however, the peasants' efforts to defend their interests in an organized way are repressed, a result of 'structures of anti-participation' as is happening today in Chile and in an increasing number of other Latin American countries. This sometimes happens (as recently in Peru) as a result of pressure from broader economic forces interested in a good 'investment climate'.[26] In such cases the governments will gradually lose their credibility and legitimacy. The majority of the peasants may become increasingly aware

of the need for a revolutionary overthrow of the prevailing political system, if necessary by violence. The growth of this awareness may take years, as in Cuba, where in the end, national and foreign elites were eliminated altogether. It is hard to foresee whether, in the long run, other countries with strongly repressive governments will go the same way. There is evidence that the peasant struggle for land develops more vigorously when much land is owned or used by foreign companies, as was true of Cuba. In some of these cases in particular, the struggle of peasants has been quick to evolve from relatively weak efforts to gain certain concrete benefits, to more or less revolutionary action. This kind of evolution was not the result of a clear theoretical consciousness on the part of peasants and workers of the role of such corporations, but was a reaction to the rigid and rude forms of exploitation and domination being maintained by these corporations at all costs. Examples are: the struggle of the peasant workers in the Laguna area of Mexico in 1938 against the Anderson Clayton and other cotton producing and trading companies, leading to the almost complete expulsion of these companies from the region; the land invasions organized by the Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico (UGOCM) in 1958 against the Cananea Cattle Company in Sonora; the actions of the 'comunidades' of Pasco and Junin in Peru against the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. A particularly clear example is the gradually escalating struggle of the Cuban peasants against large national and foreign landowners and plantation companies, such as the United Fruit Company.[27]

In several Latin American countries, the disadvantage of foreign (transnational) corporations have often been felt more strongly in agriculture than in other fields of the economy. In the mining and particularly in the manufacturing and oil industries, transnational corporations can claim that certain, sometimes considerable benefits accrue to the countries in which they operate, in spite of the huge profits they make. In agriculture however, the exploitation of the host country and its population is more clearcut and obvious. Protest against inhuman working conditions in the mining, manufacturing or oil industries, can often be neutralized by giving way to certain material demands, such as wage increases or higher taxes or royalties. This is more difficult in agriculture. Although simple wage demands can be met, the demand for land by peasants whose forefathers, or who themselves, have been evicted by the introduction of plantations, cannot be fulfilled unless the agrarian structure is radically changed. There are numerous examples where the demand for land has aroused the population to strong resistance movements against transnational corporations.

The introduction of the plantation economy was often

felt as an intrusion and, in fact, often consisted simply of the usurpation of lands belonging to local peasants or communities, as happened in Cuba.

In Cuba as in several other Latin American countries, the struggle of peasants against large estates and corporations had a tradition which went back to the colonial period. In Cuba, it started in particular with the introduction of railways in about 1830 which made the cultivation of sugarcane profitable. The owners of sugar estates than began to extend their lands agressively by eviction and usurpation at the cost of the small tobacco producing farms.

From the beginning, many agribusiness corporations have been a source of frustration for the local population, and on the whole they have done very little to compensate for this. On the contrary, they have often agressively continued this trend. Formerly independent peasants forced to work on the plantations, were badly paid and housed. The profitability of plantation-agriculture often meant, that more land was needed. When this was the case, the same rude means of usurpation or similar doubtful methods were used to obtain more land from neighbouring peasant communities. When movements to correct these practices were initiated by the victims or by those who were interested in helping them, the counter reaction on the part of the corporations was out of proportion. Thus the moderate efforts of the Guatemalan government in 1953 to expropriate some of the unused lands of the United Fruit Company for distribution among landless peasants, led to international action to defend the U.F.C.'s interests, which went as far as overthrowing the Guatemalan government and installing a military dictatorship which has caused and today still causes the death of numerous peasant and labour leaders.[28] In several developing countries such companies are a strong, dominating force, virtually unchallenged.[29]

The influence of agribusiness corporations in some of the smaller Latin American countries comes out clearly in the following statistics.[30]

Some big companies and small countries: a comparison of company activity data and national aggregates for selected plantation economies 1967-68 (a)
(Million dollars, U.S.)

	Company				
	Annual Sales	Net Income	National Income	Exports	
				Total	Plantations (b)
Booker	198.6	11.5			
Guyana			162.5	108.2	31.8
Tate & Lyle	549.2	27.1			
Jamaica			787.2	219.5	44.9
Trinidad			569.0	466.2	24.2
United Fruit	488.9	53.1			
Panama			634.0	95.2	55.6
Honduras			649.0	181.4	85.2

(a) Source: All country data are from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, January 1970. Company data are from respective company annual reports.
(b) Plantation exports refer to exports of the commodity produced in the particular country by the relevant metropolitan enterprise.

The current prevailing trend of expansion in the activities of transnational argibusiness corporations noted by various observers,[31] seems to strengthen 'anti-participation structures'. This expansion frequently occurs today through contract farming with small farmers or with co-operatives, rather than directly through the plantation system. This process is part of the Green Revolution and appears to be one of the strategies currently fostered by the World Bank.[32] These policies tend to make the peasants more dependent on credit and on outside economic control of inputs as well as output, and can therefore be seen as one of the 'structures of anti-participation'.

This is particularly true when these development policies are carried out in countries where 'anti-participation structures' in the form of repressive institutions which block the articulation of peasant interest already prevail, as is the case in Brazil.

It is important to note that the effect of these structures, i.e. the blocking of people's participation in interest articulation, has in some cases however, led to new and unorthodox forms of organization. One example is the local level

base group movement related to the Churches in various Latin American countries, particularly Brazil. This grass-roots, emancipatory movement partly results from the practice of the 'theology of liberation' (see above p.8-9), and is developed with great care. It is not accidental that among groups of clergy which give guidance to such movements, there is severe criticism of development policies which make the peasantry more dependent and also of the doctrine of 'national security' which prevails in many Latin American countries as a justification of oppressive military governments.[33] Initial research into the effects of the 'anti-participation structures' created by governments adhering to the 'national security' doctrine is being undertaken, and indicates that transnational business interests in combination with certain governments are blocking the process of democratic participation.[34] Some of the results of this research will be summarized in the last section of this paper.

9. *Internationally sponsored counteraction ('anti-participation')*

Brazilian archbishop, Dom Helder Camara declared in Lausanne (27 December 1976) that all Latin American countries except three are being ruled by the military. He also said that it is useless to condemn their well known attitude of disregard for human rights, unless the real causes of the situation are discussed, namely the logic of 'National Security', imposed by North-America.[35] This logic has prevailed in Brazil since 1964. In that year the moderately reformist government of Joao Goulart was overthrown by the military with support from the CIA, as was admitted 13 years later by the US ambassador, Lincoln Gordon.[36] In the decade following 1964 the 'economic miracle' of Brazilian economic growth took place. The question arose, however, growth for whom?

In their Pastoral Letter of May 1973, a number of bishops and other high Church dignitaries of northeastern Brazil analyzed the socio-economic situation and expressed great concern over growing disparities in income resulting from the take-over of the Brazilian economy by foreign interests invited by the (military) government. The top 20% of the population saw its share of the national income increase from 54% to 64% while the lower half of the total population saw its share of 17% diminish to 13.7%. It was pointed out that ruthless oppression was being used to prevent any kind of organized protest against this trend. Economic polarization and oppression of human rights created an explosive situation. Ironically enough, one of the world's most important development managers, Robert McNamara, director of the World Bank (formerly chairman of Ford Company and US Secretary of Defense), expressed a similar fear about the Third World as a whole in his presidential address to

the Board of Governors of the World Bank in 1973 in Nairobi. However, he did not give much concrete evidence.[37]

This statement by McNamara echoed some of the things he had said when still US Secretary of Defence a few years earlier, in 1968. After mentioning his reflections of 1968 on national security, that the World Bank had divided the world's nations into four categories, rich, middle-income, poor and very poor, McNamara observed:

'Since 1958, 87% of the very poor nations, 69% of the poor nations and 48% of the middle income nations suffered serious violence. There can be no question but that there is a relationship between violence and economic backwardness, and the trend of such violence is up, not down'.[38]

Looking at the period between 1958 and 1966, McNamara was also aware of the fact that:

'... of the 149 serious internal insurgencies in those eight years under discussion, Communists were involved in only 58 of them, 38% of the total, and this includes 7 instances in which a Communist regime was itself the target of the uprising'.[39]

He pointed towards 'appropriate military capabilities' as one way of coping with such growing insecurity. But he also noted:

'The specific military problem, however, is only a narrow facet of the broader security problem. Military force can help provide law and order, but only to the degree that a basis for law and order already exists in the developing society, a basic willingness on the part of the people to cooperate'.[40]

In order to achieve the latter purpose, that of people's cooperation, McNamara offered no real suggestions:

'Only the developing nations themselves can take the fundamental measures that make outside assistance meaningful. These measures are often unpalatable and frequently call for political courage and decisiveness. But to fail to undertake painful but essential reform inevitably leads to far more painful revolutionary violence'.[41]

Several of these statements are similar to others made in his 1973 address as president of the World Bank.

It is, however, revealing to see what happens to governments which try to make 'essential reforms' as McNamara apparently recommended. In Chile, a few days before McNamara's warning speech to his fellow-directors in September 1973, one of the most serious efforts undertaken by a legally elected Third World government to implement such essential reforms and to spread the benefits of national income and development more equally, was drastically halted. The government of president Allende was overthrown with the support of McNamara's own government and the multinational corporate circles to which he belongs. The contradictions between the official statements of Western development managers on reforms and popular participation and the

effects of the policies of their institutions are so obvious that they demand further consideration.[42]

The overwhelming power of the Western economic system had been challenged in a few cases by 'populist' governments, supported or pushed by the increased political participation or mobilization of large masses of the people of countries such as Brazil before 1964 and Chile before 1973. As soon as it became clear that these countries were looking for ways of development that were not completely in harmony with the interests of the overall Western capitalist world system, they were brought into line again, regardless of the cost, as had happened to Iran (1953) and to Guatemala (1954), with strong backing from the CIA. Whatever popular organizations existed in the countries concerned were ruthlessly crushed.

The interests of multinational corporations in Third World countries grew rapidly during the sixties. In the early seventies, continuing efforts in some of those countries to maintain or achieve some measures of independence, control or self reliance, became a growing problem to the global managers. This problem became more alarming when the Western theories of gradual development in similar stages of economic growth to the rich Western nations,[43] were disproved by the facts, as demonstrated by prestigeous institutions such as the Economic Commission for Latin America of United Nations and later UNCTAD. Critical Western and Third World scholars such as Frank, Samir Amin, Galtung, also disproved the current modernization and development theories underlying the dominant system, and brought in various versions of *dependencia* theories, denouncing the increasing exploitation of Third World economies by Western economic interests (often multinational corporations). When in an increasing number of Third World countries, alternative development models were seriously discussed and a few countries, such as Chile, started to act on them, Western political and corporate powerholders reacted strongly.

Such reaction had been noted and to some extent predicted by those utilizing *dependencia* theories to explain economic (under)development in the Third World. In the light of these theories, which are based on solid evidence, the events in Chile in 1973, and the statements made by McNamara, can be understood. It is indicated that the large scale manner in which the capitalist economic system operates, the multinational corporations need to control as far as possible, all aspects of the production process, the supply of raw materials and the marketing of the commodities. There is need for long range planning to provide maximum security and avoidance of risk. The investment climate has to be favourable to make profits, but even more important is that this climate should remain stable,

which implies maximum political stability.

"'Hemispheric security' comes to mean protection not against interference by non-hemispheric powers or even international Communism, but rather against the threat of truly independent regimes of any type in Latin America".[44]

As is pointed out, the multinational corporations therefore have an increasing interest in the active participation of the state (particularly the United States) in international economic relationships. One example of this state participation is foreign aid, including the aid channelled through US dominated agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF.[45] It is not accidental that these latter institutions gave little or no assistance to Chile during the period of the Allende government, although Chile had previously implemented precisely those reforms (land reform, distribution of income) which were advocated as crucial in the speeches of World Bank director McNamara.

This situation changes following the demise of a reformist government, when, as *Business Week*,[46] (9 Aug. 1976) indicated, a 'new economic realism' prevails in a situation of 'political stability', as is currently happening in Chile and Argentina, as a result of the role of the Armed Forces in alliance with the middle classes and leading technocrats. As a result of such a situation foreign aid and investment has increased considerably in the last few years.[47]

In addition to private foreign investment in 1976 Chile received 290 million US dollars of direct US aid in spite of US Congress resolutions suspending economic and military aid to that country. There is evidence that the policies of the military in Brazil and Chile which created a climate of safety and security for Western multinational investment, tried to find ideological justification in a 'national security doctrine', echoing the ideas of NcNamara (The Essence of Security) expressed while he was US Secretary of Defence, but utilizing the geopolitical jargon used in Germany during the thirties by fascist or national-socialist ideologists.[48] The Rockefeller Report on Latin America produced by Nelson Rockefeller in 1969, highlighted the importance of enlightening the Latin American military concerning the ideology of security functioning successfully in Brazil at that time. During the next few years, as a reaction to signs of dissidence in Third World countries a strong trust in 'security' strategies as a means of safeguarding orderly i.e. Western, development became increasingly predominant among the Western economic power elite.

Efforts to find solutions outside the Western capitalist models (such as Chile in 1970-73), and the growing discussion over the need for a New International Economic Order among the (originally 77) non-aligned nations, was seen by the Western power elite as a far more serious threat to the pre-

vailing economic system than the Soviet Union and its allies had ever been.[49] Therefore, the Trilateral Commission was initiated as a reaction to the growing tendency towards self-reliance (collective or individual) of Third World countries during the early seventies. After many years of preparatory efforts, the formal creation of the Trilateral Commission took place in 1973 at the initiative of David Rockefeller, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank and main figure in the Exxon Oil Company, the world's largest multinational corporation.[50] In this Trilateral Commission, corporate and political leaders of the rich Western countries, many of whom had met previously but informally at the so-called Bilderberg conferences in which Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands played an important role, were formally brought together. In addition to the US and Western Europe this time Japan was also brought in, hence the name Trilateral Commission. Although the Commission has worked without any publicity, and its origins and its existence are relatively unknown, its membership includes the most influential persons of the present US government (Carter, Mondale, Brzezinsky, Vance, Young, Blumenthal), long before they came to power in 1976. In fact the Trilateral Commission is seen as responsible for the campaign which brought these people to the prominent positions they currently occupy.

The Commission further contains representatives of a good number of the world's largest multinational corporations (Coca Cola, IBM, Unilever, Royal Dutch Shell, Deere, Sony, Mitsubishi, to mention only a few), the most important banks and some scholarly institutions which have served the present Western power elite. A few Western trade union leaders, including the AFL/CIO (USA) and Deutsche Gewerkschafts Bund (W-Germany), are also members of the Commission. The Commission as a whole comprising over 150 members, meets once a year, its 32 member Executive Committee twice a year.

The Trilateral Commission has, in the last few years, issued about twenty reports on world affairs, the so-called Triangle Papers, giving broad analyses and guidelines regarding policies which would strengthen the prevailing Western dominated economic system. The present policies of such international development agencies as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund seem to be largely in line with these broad outlines of the Trilateral Commission, as is sometimes specifically noted in the Triangle Papers.

While Third World economists explained the failure of the various development decades to bridge the gap between rich and poor countries, by denouncing the continuing or increasing dependency of the poor on the rich, and began to support strategies of self-reliance or even 'dissociation'

from the Western economic influences as the only solution for Third World countries, the Trilateral Commission in its 1974 report, strongly emphasized the (need for) interdependence of the Trilateral economies and those of the Third World. The way in which the Trilateral Commission envisages this interdependence is made clear in its third report, drafted in 1974 by Richard Gardner, Saburo Okita and B.J. Udink (a former Netherlands Christian Democrat Minister for development co-operation, presently director of OGEM, a Dutch construction multinational). This report noted:

'The interests of both developed and developing countries will be better served in this historical period by cooperation than by confrontation. We recognize that this statement has a hollow ring in the light of the failure of developed countries to live up to the aid and trade targets of the two U.N. Development Decades...'.

And also:

'From an economic point of view, the so-called Third World has become at least three worlds - the oil producing countries earning huge amounts of foreign exchange, the relatively well-off developing countries with other valuable resources or a growing industrial base, and the 'have-not' developing countries such as those in the Indian subcontinent and the Sahelian zone of Africa. Emphasis on these differences is not motivated by a desire to break up the unity of the developing world - the developing countries will continue to unite when they have common interests - it is motivated rather by a desire to adapt policies to new realities so that the legitimate interests of all will be served.'[51]

It is foreseen that the countries of the second category such as Mexico, Brazil, Turkey and Malaysia, 'which enjoy substantial foreign exchange reserves, high prices for their exports or ready access to capital markets' do not need much 'additional concessional aid'.[52] This aid will have to go mainly to the 'resources-poor, low-income developing countries that lack large foreign exchange reserves, buoyant export prospect, or the ability to service credit on commercial or near-commercial terms'. These countries, called the Fourth World in the report, are also the countries where the Western multinational corporations have not (yet) penetrated as deeply as elsewhere. They include India, Pakistan, and Bangla Desh, a total of nearly 1 billion people.[53] Some of the important questions regarding the economic world order raised by this report are as follows:

'How can the Trilateral countries open their markets to the agricultural and manufactured exports of the developing countries while assuring orderly internal adjustment?
How can the potential of foreign investment in general and the multinational corporation in particular be utilized consistently with the needs and aspirations of developing countries?'[54]

The destiny of countries which are considered to be more or less capable of functioning within the prevailing economic order, because they have essential raw materials or the beginnings of industrialization along multinational corporation lines, has recently been demonstrated in Peru.[55] As noted above, in that country the military had taken power in 1968 after having oppressed peasant rebellions for various years during the Belaunde government. That government had promised reforms but was unable to carry them out and was, in fact, selling out to international business. The military took a more patriotic line after 1968 and expropriated some of the most blatantly exploitative foreign companies and started to implement land reform and other popular measures. Partly in view of the exaggerated expectations of available oil resources, the country had accrued a considerable foreign debt from private Western banks (the World Bank had washed its hands of Peru when it tried to follow a more independent economic policy). In order to cope with its increasing debts, the country was practically forced by the International Monetary Fund (headed by a former Dutch minister and Unilever advisor Johannes Witteveen), to undo a good deal of the reforms carried out in previous years. The reaction of peasant and workers' organizations which had been growing during those years, was rather violently crushed during a general protest strike in 1978, (the first since 1919), at the cost of over a hundred persons killed. Various peasant and workers' organizations, including the National Agrarian Federation (CNA) the peasant organization created by the Velasco government, were outlawed. The only ones to benefit from the measures imposed by the IMF appear to be the mining companies. Standards of living among the common people have deteriorated rapidly, apparently the price of being creditworthy within the 'interdependence' of the Western economic system, a price which has to be enforced by increasing oppression. Such oppression may in the next decade however, easily lead to a situation similar to that prevailing in Cuba before 1959. The 'interdependence' promoted by the Trilateral Commission bears a contradiction within itself. As Teotonio dos Santos observed with regard to the integration of Third World countries into the international system:

'The process of internationalization has two faces: one dependent face (the present) and one liberating face (that of the future). The dependant face and the liberating face present themselves in one and the same process...'[56]

As the Peruvian theologist Gustavo Gutierrez recently stated:

'The popular sectors have suffered hard blows, but they have also learned important lessons. The popular movement is aware of its backward steps, of the ambiguity of certain programs and of the lack of precision of its social projects. This is part of every historical process. But it is also aware of steadfastness, hope, appropriate

silences and political realism. The exploited classes have demonstrated a potential for resistance that bewilders the dominators and surprises the now harshly repressed revolutionary groups who have recently taken the lead in some processes in Latin America'.[57]

Ironically enough the present anti-participatory policies of the Western world's development managers could lead to a situation, as vaguely foreseen by McNamara in his 1973 speech, in which the poor peasants in Latin America and elsewhere will come to active revolutionary political participation precisely because they are not allowed a peaceful and gradual participation in the developments in their country solving fundamental conflicts.[58]

NOTES

1. Erich Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in South-East Asia*, Bombay/London, Asia Publishing House, 1961; Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama, An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968, Vol. 1, Part Two: Political Problems.
2. Irving Louis Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development*, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 379.
3. The 'view from below' approach, as well as the illusion of 'objectivity' cherished by most social scientists and the considerable misunderstanding about peasant life which results from it, have been amply dealt with in Gerrit Huizer and Bruce Mannheim (eds), *The Politics of Anthropology* (The Hague/Paris, Mouton, 1979),
4. Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York. The Free Press, 1963).
5. United Nations, *Report of the World Land Reform Conference, 1966* Doc.E/4298/rev.1, New York, 1968, 15.
6. This case is amply evaluated in Clarence Senior, *Land Reform and Democracy*, University of Florida Press, 1958. See also Gerrit Huizer, Community Development, Land Reform and Peasant Organization, in: T. Shanin (ed.), *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, Penguin Books, 1971.
7. The author is indebted to the Associacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos, Havana, which supplied him with data on the Cuban peasant struggle through interviews and training material such as Antero Regalado, *Las Luchas Campesinas en Cuba*, Havana, 1973. For a more extended account of the peasant movements in Cuba see: Gerrit Huizer, 'The Role of Peasant Organizations in the Struggle against Multinational Corporations: The Cuban case', in Ahamed Idris-Soven, Elizabeth Idris-Soven and Mary K. Vaughan, *The World as a Company Town*, The Hague/Paris, Mouton (World Anthropology Series), 1978.

8. Robert McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank, Nairobi, Sept. 24, 1973.
9. See e.g. Charles Erasmus, *Man takes Control; Cultural Development and American Aid*, University of Minnesota Press, 1961.
10. See Ernest Feder, *Strawberry Imperialism*, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1976.
11. Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara, *Modernizing Mexican Agriculture*, UNRISD, Geneva, 1976.
12. See Paolo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, New York, Herder and Herder, 1972.
13. The whole problem of 'development' versus 'liberation' is explained in Gustavo Gutierrez, *Theology of Liberation*, New York, Orbis, 1972.
14. A good account of above mentioned happenings can be found in a collection of newspaper articles from that period, Hugo Neira, *Cuzco: Tierra y Muerte*, Lima, Popuplibros Peruanos, 1964.
15. In the last few years, serious cases of infractions of basic human rights, including assasinations, have been well reported by Amnesty International *Yearbook of Political Prisoners*, 1976, 1977; *The Republic of Nicaragua, An Amnesty International Report*, London, 1978; Roger Plant, *Guatemala, Unnatural Disaster*, Latin America Bureau, London, 1978.
16. See some of the Amnesty International reports mentioned before.
17. Judith Adler Hellman, *Mexico in Crisis*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1978, particularly chapter 4, p. 95 ff.
18. For information about the first years of the Peruvian land reform after 1969, see Howard Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes. Peasant Political Mobilization in Peru*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1975; for an evaluation of the whole reform see José Matos Mar & José Manuel Mejía, *Reforma Agraria: Logros y Contradicciones 1964-1979*. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, 1980.
19. See Gerrit Huizer, 'Poor and Rich Peasants in the Tea Cooperatives in La Convención, Peru' (forthcoming).
20. See, for example, James L. Payne, *Labour and Politics in Peru. The System of Political Bargaining*, Yale University Press, 1965.
21. See Mario A. Malpica, *Biografia de la Revolucion*, Lima, Ediciones Ensayos Sociales, 1967, p. 527-532. About the Peruvian peasant mobilization see also Howard Handelman, *Struggle in the Andes. Peasant Political Mobilization in Peru*, op. cit.
22. See Gerrit Huizer, *Rural Extension and Peasant Motivation in Latin America and the Caribbean*, F.A.O. Occasional Paper no. 2, Rome, July 1973.
23. Concerning the Chilean peasant movement see Almino Affonso, c.s., *Movimiento Campesino Chileno*, ICIRA, Santiago de Chile, 1970, vol. I and II.

24. Concerning the Chilean land reform and its impact, see Solon Barraclough, 'The Structure and problems of the Chilean agrarian sector', in: J. Ann Zammit, ed., *The Chilean Road to Socialism*, Sussex, Institute for Development Studies, 1973.
25. This term has come up at the Second UNRISD Dialogue on Participation, Geneva, 6-7 Febr. 1978, document UNRISD/78/C.11, p. 3 ff.
26. See Hugo Cabieses & Carlos Otero, *Economia Peruana: un ensayo de interpretacion*, DESCO, Centro de Estudios y Promocion del Desarrollo, Lima, 1978.
27. See Antero Regalado, op. cit., various places.
28. See Thomas and Marjorie Melville, *Guatemala - Another Vietnam?*, Harmondsworth, Pelican Latin American Library, Penguin Books, 1971.
29. Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller, *Global Reach. The power of multinational corporations*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974.
30. From George Beckford, 'The Dynamics of Growth and the Nature of Metropolitan Plantation Enterprise', in: *Social and Economic Studies*, vol. 19, no. 4, December 1970 (University of the West Indies, Jamaica), p. 448.
31. See e.g. Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins. *Food First, Beyond the Myth of Scarcity*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977; Susan George, *How the other half dies. The real reasons for world hunger*, Harmondsworth Penguin Books, 1976.
32. Ernest Feder, 'McNamara's Little Green Revolution' in: *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), XL, 44 (April, 3, 1976).
33. Jose Antonio Viera-Gallo, 'The Church and the Doctrine of National Security', in: IDOC International, *The Church at the Crossroads. Christians in Latin America from Medellin to Puebla (1968-1978)*, Rome, 1978.
34. See e.g. the ample documentation on the role of the Trilateral Commission for a conference of theologists and social scientists which took place in February 1978 in San José, Costa Rica, collected in Hugo Assman, ed., *Carter y la Logica del Imperialismo*, Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, San José, Costa Rica, 1978, two volumes.
35. Dom Helder Camara, quoted in *Pro Mundi Vita Bulletin*, 'De Confrontatie van de Kerken van Latijns Amerika met de Staat en de Ideologie van de 'Nationale Veiligheid' (The Confrontation of the Churches of Latin America with the State and the Ideology of National Security), Brussel, No. 71, Maart-April 1978, p.5.
36. Interview with *Veja*, Sao Paolo, 9 March 1977, quoted in Eduardo Galeano, 'Open Veins of Latin America: seven years after', *Monthly Review*, vol. 30, no. 7.
37. Robert McNamara, address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank, Nairobi, September 24, 1973, quoted on p.4 above.

38. Robert McNamara, *The Essence of Security. Reflections in Office*, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968, p. 146.
39. Ibid., p. 148.
40. Ibid., p. 150.
41. Ibid., p. 152.
42. See Aart van der Laar, *The World Bank and the World's Poor*, Institute of Social Studies Occasional Papers No. 58, The Hague, July 1976, about some of the contradictions between World Bank's rhetoric and its actual policies. Also Gerrit Huizer, 'Willen de banken der rijken de armsten der armen werkelijk helpen?', *Internationale Spectator*, December 1977.
43. The most important ideological expression of the Western development model was probably by W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1960 (later Rostow was advisor to the presidents Kennedy and Johnson on the Vietnam policy).
44. Susanne Bodenheimer, 'Dependency and imperialism: the roots of Latin American underdevelopment', *Politics and Society*, May, 1971, p. 350.
45. Ibid., p. 351.
46. Quoted in *Pro Mundi Vita Bulletin*, op. cit., p. 23.
47. Ibid., p. 23.
48. See *Pro Mundi Vita Bulletin*, op. cit.
49. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages*, Penguin Books, 1970, quoted several times in Hugo Assmann, ed., *Carter y la Logica del Imperialismo*, Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, San José, Costa Rica, 1978.
50. One interesting article which summarizes the work of the Trilateral Commission is Jeff Frieden, 'The Trilateral Commission: Economics and Politics in the 1970s', *Monthly Review*, 29, no. 7, Dec. 77, p. 1-18; also many articles in Hugo Assmann, op. cit.
51. Trilateral Commission, *A Turning Point in North South Economic Relations*, Triangle Paper no. 3, in *Task Force Reports 1-7*, New York University Press, New York, 1977, p. 69.
52. Ibid., p. 61.
53. Ibid., p. 71.
54. Ibid., p. 71.
55. For a summarizing account of the 1977 and 1978 developments in Peru see Barbara Stallings, 'Privatization and the public debt: US banks in Peru', *NACLA Report on the Americas*, XII, No. 4, July-Aug. 1978.
56. Teotonio dos Santos, 'El nuevo caracter de la dependencia', quoted in Susanne Bodenheimer, op. cit., p. 357.
57. Gustavo Gutierrez, *La Fuerza Historica de los Pobres*, CEP, Lima, Sept. 1978, p. 20-21 (translation: James and Margaret Goff and Carmen Danino).
58. For an elaboration of this dialectical process see also Gerrit Huizer, *Conflict Resolution Strategies: Alternative Approaches to Rural Development*, paper presented at the 25th Anniversary Conference of the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, December 1977.

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