Some Reflections on the Necessity and Feasibility of a Unified Approach

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1. **Introduction**

This paper represents an attempt to interpret some of the premises and implications of what recently has come to be called the 'unified approach' to development. It relies implicitly on an interpretation of the underlying tendencies in the discussions at the United Nations experts meeting on the Unified Approach, held in Stockholm in November 1972, and on the document which served as a basis for discussion at this meeting.¹

1.1 The experts participating in the meeting seemed to agree unanimously on the urgency for a unified approach to development in all societies, whether dependent or the dominant industrially advanced,² all also seemed to agree on the broad implications of the unified approach, as long as the discussions remained general and abstract.³ However, when the concept was discussed in more concrete terms, a great variety in views appeared, ranging from differences in emphasis in the use of the concept to divergencies and even to radically opposite interpretations, dependent on the ideological and political premises and viewpoints of the participants. These divergencies and interpretations were basically concerned with the relationship between prevailing development theories and the practice of the development process, the meaning given to each of them.

The meeting was characterised by two diverging tendencies. One group viewed the emergence of the claim for a unified approach as an appeal to clarify and make explicit the actual tendencies that characterise present societal processes, and saw the growing emphasis on the need for a unified approach as the outcome of increasing contradictions that mark the world of today. The other group stressed the need to find new ways to make planning more responsive and capable of dealing with the increasingly serious problems of present-day societies. The first group might, for simplicity's sake, be characterised as favouring a 'process approach' to the problems of development, perceiving the need and feasibility of a unified approach as the outcome of and response to the development of internal contradictions within and between societies and as the fruit of a process from within and below. The second group might be typified as representing a management approach to development, working with the premises that problems are basically manageable from outside and above by planning and by planners if their approach would help to achieve control over all the variables and lead to the introduction of all inputs needed for development, converting these into a coherent and consistent set of objectives subsequently to be translated into corresponding targets, so as to deal effectively with prevailing problems.

1.2 The first approach assumes that the societal and planning processes are the outcome of the interplay of the totality of social forces operative in a society, each representing specific classes and groups with interests which may or may not coincide; therefore, planning has to be understood as a basically political process and activity. The second group presupposes that planning, although it has political aspects, can be legitimately regarded as a technical professional activity, designed to bring all factors under control, so as to ensure the adequate management of society by those entrusted with this function. In the first group the view prevailed that development is historically an uneven, conflictive, dynamic process in which progressive and regressive dis-
equilibria combine and shape each other insofar as they result from the relationship between dominant and dependent societies which tend to confirm and consolidate each other's conditions as well as from internal societal tendencies, expressive of different modes of production and diverging interest groups. The second group tended to regard development more in terms of a linear process in which societies and people in a state of 'underdevelopment' will move towards development insofar as they acquire the properties, qualities and capacities of 'developed' societies and people.

While the first group tended to look at planning as a process in which all groups in society identify and articulate their interests, organise in the defence and promotion of those interests and press for acceptance of their claims by society and government, the second group considered it as the specialised activity of government which expresses general interest on behalf of the population, and attempts to ensure such a combination of inputs in planning that the interests and needs of all groups are fairly represented. While neither group wholly refused to recognise the other's position as at least partly valuable, legitimate and thus contributive to the theory and practice of development, profound cleavage between them was visible. In fact, each time a group proceeded to work out, clarify and represent its position more forcefully and explicitly, the other group did the same.

Pressure to achieve results and a sense of urgency to contribute stimulated a sense of compromise and some measure of agreement, which were worked on from the moment divergencies emerged and become explicit. The meeting was not only characterised by opposite tendencies between participants, but by another simultaneous tendency to, on the one hand, bring out clearly the divergent interpretations of what is and should be the unified approach and, on the other hand, to reduce and reconcile these interpretations so as to prevent an impasse and to come to terms. Yet a breakdown was visible to all participants as the discussion, after an initial stage of fruitful and intense dialogue, changed into an exercise in statement and counter-statement. Pressure to reconcile divergent and even opposing views on the nature of the real problems of societies and the contradictions they generate into professionally and scientifically manageable items, seems to be an inevitable feature of international meetings insofar as such meetings are attended by participants assumed to be experts on particular questions who, in spite of divergencies of view, are somehow supposed to converge in their interpretations. In this sense the concept of expertise subtly suggests that societal problems can somehow be solved by outside intervention if, in terms of foresight and technical and professional capability, this is based on sufficient expertise. Such a view is necessarily rooted in the premise that, apart from individual subjective differences due to political and ideological variations, there is a core area in which experts, recognising the problems of society under discussion from an objective scientific or professional point of view, come to share common positions.

Pressures to legitimise an expert meeting and to save the claim of the objectivity of expertise may serve to explain the distance between material dissent and formally expressed consensus. If dissent persists, then divergencies of view may be ascribed to scientific interpretation which is then dissociated from political and ideological dimensions and roots.4

My intention in starting this paper by discussing the 'move-
ment' of the Stockholm meeting as a process from material dissent to formal consensus is not to express judgment from a moral point of view but to emphasise that consensus is often too easily and prematurely promoted or imposed in the name of expertise, and in that case tends to help obscure the nature of social and societal problems as manifestations of underlying contradictions. The appearance of dominant ideology in the garb of expertise will then not help to solve but rather to aggravate the solution of the problems under review.

1.3 The emergence and promotion of interest in the unified approach expresses the growing concern in governmental and international circles regarding the failure of official development policies and efforts. This not only qualified past decades and in particular the First United Nations Development Decade, i.e. the 1960s, but also characterises the way in which the second development decade is evolving. Features of this failure are the growing disparities in power and living conditions between a minority of industrially advanced countries and a majority of dependent societies, a disparity reproduced within the dependent societies as between minorities and majorities of the population. This disparity does not stand alone but expresses the growing concentration of control over political, social and economic processes in and between societies, reflected in the increasing imbalance in control on access to and use of resources and effective opportunities. It would seem that the policies declared to serve the objectives of increased welfare and equity for majority populations have either "proved irrelevant or have worked to the disadvantage of the groups to whose benefit they were formally intended." Increasing contradiction is observable between, on the one hand, the formal statements of intention and improvement policies carried out by governments and the hopes generated by them, and the actual results. The conclusion seems inescapable: attention has largely been "concentrated on symptoms more than on the processes which generate and produce the increasingly manifest contradictions in the pattern of growth and change," and on the mechanisms which lead to stagnation or regression in the conditions of dependent societies vis-à-vis the dominant ones or those of the majority populations in the former vis-à-vis the minorities controlling power and resources in the widest sense.

A complementary inverse relationship is observable between the decline in equity and opportunities for popular self-realisation and sharing in the control and benefits of societies and the call for more equity and opportunities in decision-making, work, income, as well as for structural transformations and other measures to bring about such conditions.

1.4 The concept of the unified approach is ambiguous; it reflects partly coinciding, partly divergent views on the process and concept of development, yet some underlying assumptions press for common interpretation. The emergence of the concept is a reaction to the failure of past development practices and theories. It implies first of all a reaction to the exclusive identification of growth (both in theory and practice) with development. It stresses the obsolescence of understanding development as essentially an economic process to which social aspects have to be added, and emphasises the unity, complementarity and indivisibility of all processes and policies, irrespective of their names which may reflect their past use and relevance for the purpose of dominant theory rather than their present or future relevance. Opposition to the exclusive identification of growth with development is not directed against
growth as such but against exclusive indiscriminate emphasis upon it at the expense of a majority population.

It was acknowledged at the Stockholm meeting that economic growth-rates in most countries of the world are too low to meet any standard of development. On the other hand, although some societies have high economic growth-rates they also have persistent and widening poverty. The real question was considered to be the content and composition of economic growth and the people for whose benefit production took place and was induced. Some participants warned against interpreting the unified approach as the balance of economic and social objectives, when it actually means the transformation of the whole productive and distributive process that may well be accompanied by widely shared benefits and well-being. They expressed also a certain suspicion against the tendency to emphasise social development rather than increased production and productivity, as such a policy might well lead to more poverty sharing. Societies in which a large share of resources is devoted to directly productive activities are often those which devote a proportionately large share to the expansion of social services. Non-acceptance of the western path as a necessary pattern would seem to imply both the dismissal of the separation of production and distribution as characteristic of western development theory and practice, and the facile assumption that the market mechanism can best serve to regulate production and distribution for the wellbeing and welfare of the population at large. It may be argued that the need for (re-)distribution may be an essential condition for increased production and productivity, as well as to widen opportunities for creative and productive work and thereby to improve the social and income structure which in turn may stimulate production. Production is here assumed to produce those goods which meet the basic requirements of the majority population. Choices as to what will be produced and for whom and how it will be distributed and the re-organisation of prevailing patterns of production, distribution and consumption, are not the fruit of rational concerns and decisions but of prevailing socio-economic formations and the distribution of social power therein.

1.5 The unified approach concept also rejects identification of development with modernisation as a process of absorption and adaption to imposed production and consumption patterns and an organisation of society which is not geared to satisfying the basic needs of a population in material terms and in terms of self-realisation. It implicitly recognises the legitimacy of people(s) to pursue their own style and pattern of development, irrespective of possible variance with the dominant patterns of social organisation and life styles characterising the advanced industrial countries which, by the very problems they engender, have become questionable as examples.

1.6 While the need and desirability of taking the western path as a normative pattern is therefore questioned, it is acknowledged that development of a society always reflects the valuations and preferences of the dominant social forces as well as the conflict between these and possible competing forces. The unified approach does not accept the assumption that development can adequately be represented by quantified models as these tend to omit factors which are difficult to quantify (structural and institutional characteristics of society and the process of its movement) and become arbitrary. The approach urges increased insight into dynamic sequences and interrelationships of the significant components of development processes, it being understood that significance varies
with concrete historical constellations of social forces characterising
the process of each society. 11

1.7 Acceptance of the need for each society to pursue its own style of de-
velopment implies rejection of the view that development is characterised
by a fixed sequence of stages and levels and the realisation that each
society is entitled to formulate and decide upon its own objectives and
means. The perspective of each society's development remains dependent
on the actual distribution of power and subjection to the forces of the
international order. It was argued at the meeting that a societal
planning process in a national society is in no way conceivable except
in its interdependence with the international power structure and process.
It was also recognised that this dependence by countries of the Third
World constituted the major bar to their development and that, for
authentic development to be pursued, autonomy was a principal condition
that affected all possibilities for self-development and self-realisation. 12

2. The unified approach and planning

2.1 The emergence of the unified approach concept is partly generated by
growing awareness of the failure of planning, which has created problems
rather than solved them. There is a crisis in planning: its effective-
ness and that of the planners is widely and seriously questioned. 13 The
assumption that planning is a rational exercise by a government capable
of acting in the general interest and beyond the variety and opposition
of interests, does not stand up to the test of practice. A government
always acts on behalf of specific interest groups, as becomes clear when
we examine the outcome of past policies. If it is recognised that planning
is a technical exercise but in its technical expression is always a
political activity, expressing a particular relationship and distribution
of power in society, "the myth of the detached objective a-political
planner" 14 and planning exercise has to be rejected.

It is more realistic to assume that, given a more or less pro-
nounced class structure, each class and, within the class structure,
each interest group has its own actual or potential planning objectives.
Its actual power depends on its degree of integration, organisation and
consciousness; that is to say, its effective societal power, whether or
not it is able to successfully negotiate, bargain or impose its demands.
It would seem that a more realistic perception of planning as a political
process and activity rather than as a technical intervention is itself a
fruit of the overall crisis characterising the world of today, in which
the ruling classes are less and less capable of managing society to their
advantage and the traditional mechanisms of social control by traditional
or new dominant classes and their representatives are breaking down and
can only be upheld with increasing difficulty. This crisis in planning
is produced by the process of economic growth and modernisation which
continues to be justified in terms of 'national' development and the
need for 'national' accumulation, so as to create the conditions for a
subsequent distribution of benefits. 15 Such a development ideology,
which has been supported by a variety of populist policies and measures
in terms of reforms and services, is implicitly based on the rejection
of any diagnosis indicating the need for overhaul and redistribution of
the prevailing power structure and pattern of societal control which
might also affect the power and way of life of the ruling classes. The
tendency to evaluate plans in terms of their overall effects ('the failure
of the development decade', 'of the fifth year plan') and not in terms
of their effects on and specific advantages to certain groups and their
negative consequences for other groups, helps to conceal the underlying
function of planning and its utilisation as an ideological instrument.

2.2 While it is recognised that any policy or strategy for development
entails disequilibria and costs, the question is which groups in society
will have to bear these costs? The postulate that no interest group is
in principle entitled to decide which costs should be made at the ex-
pense of other groups runs counter to the historical process of accumu-
lation as this has taken place in the 'free market' societies and in the
Socialist West and which, theoretically and practically, has been claimed
as an essential condition to development. Those groups which in the
past were represented by dominant interest groups have come to realise
that, in order to protect and promote their own interests, they should
take their defence into their own hands. This leads in most parts of
the world to increasing non-viability of the traditional systems of
political representation. Erosion of the traditional forms of interest
articulation and representation is directly induced by the polarising
influences of the modernisation process which help to break down tra-
ditional forms of patron-client relationship and respect for authority.

2.3 Increasing pressure for societal participation exercised by neglected
and evicted groups in urban and rural areas leads to a widening of
populist policies, to the segmentary partial incorporation of groups
into the sharing of privileges, and to mounting control and the use of
force, if not repression. The latter has to be regarded as an inevitable
need of the ruling classes in imposing their own pattern of development
at the expense of the mass of the population.

2.4 The increasing stress on advocacy planning as opposed to centralised,
technocratic, vertical planning, indicates awareness of the need to
accept the emergence of conflict between groups as legitimate and that
marginal groups should be allowed to achieve clearer insight into their
own needs and to organise themselves effectively to advance and press
their claims. However, such planning can easily turn into an instrument
with which the dominant classes can manage conflict and incorporate the
contending groups. This is designed to bypass or delay the emergence of
contradictions underlying the relations between classes and interest
groups.

2.5 Pursuit of the perfection and rationalisation of the planning process by
continuity, coherence, decentralisation, deconcentration and diffusion
does not advance development unless the constellation of social forces
in a society is moving in a direction which ensures more adequate re-
sponse to the actual basic needs of the majority population. Planning,
insofar as it is planning by dominant interest groups, cannot promote
such an orientation. Planning in function of development can best be
conceived as all those activities which in practice advance the interests
of the population at large. In such a view the distinction made between
the setting of objectives and the implementation of planning as separate
phases should be rejected. The failure of past planning experiences has
made it clear that it is this dichotomy by which the norm is separated
from actual practice and thereby shields the latter from the radical
nature and pressure for transformation contained in the norm, opening
the way for the evasion of commitment. Planning then becomes a substi-
tute for practical activity to introduce changes requested from below,
and serves as an instrument with which to promote maintenance of the prevailing order. Under circumstances in which planning leads to increasing inequality and deterioration of conditions and opportunities for the majority, only counterplanning, understood as those activities which advance the real interests of population, can be qualified as authentic planning.  

2.6 It may be concluded that planning is conceived by the author as a practical activity that influences the societal process and structure so that those groups which were hitherto not in a position to formulate and express their views and demands vis-à-vis society, acquire the capacity and experience to do so. This does not exclude recognition of planning as a technical activity but stresses its relevance insofar as it responds to, reflects, and supports the underlying process of societal transformation through which people achieve control over their own environment and can 'make their own history'; that is, develop effective opportunities for self-realisation. Such a view does not take the prevailing order for granted, whether in its legal, political and ideological forms or in its social and economic organisation; the assumption being that this order may only reflect, legitimise and impose its recognition as universally and eternally valid, rendered more and more questionable by the very type of processes which characterise present modernisation. In my view therefore, a unified approach to planning helps to emphasise its character as a societal political process.

2.7 While the emphasis on planning as a technical a-political activity rests on the assumption that equilibrium and stability are conditions of development and successful planning and should therefore be guaranteed, emphasis on planning as a process of societal transformation implies that instability may be necessary to development. As was observed at the Stockholm meeting, planning may have to serve to monitor instability and to stimulate protest and opposition. Such a role cannot be expected from a government, however, whose function is to preserve the prevailing order.

2.8 At the present, international assistance and aid programmes often make it more difficult for national planning in dependent societies to serve the interests of the majority. In other words, they tend to support and benefit the ruling classes and contribute unintentionally to the increasing instability of societies. This is then offset by making available instruments of control which tend to aggravate the dependency of the societies, a process which also enables their ruling classes to survive and to expand their position and benefits.

Once again it may be asked whether this process will not help to create conditions which will lead to their own overturn. It has in my view been rightly argued that, "it is questionable whether fast growth can be achieved without such heavy concentration on modern parts of the economy as to induce still greater dependence on foreign countries, still greater inequalities and a continued, or even accelerated increase in unemployment... This in turn raises the question whether fast growth will not, even if it is feasible, eventually produce political stresses so severe as to bring itself to an end."  

2.9 On the other hand, the even more basic question may be asked: whether the introduction of planning in a society, characterised by deeply entrenched and institutionalised inequality, is not bound to create even worse conditions in terms of efficiency and equity. It has been argued
not unconvincingly that, "the crucial fact rendering the realisation of a development programme illusory is the political and social structure of the government in power. The alliance of property-owing classes cannot be expected to design and to execute a set of measures running counter to each and all of their immediate vested interests... The injections of planning into a society living in the twilight between feudalism and capitalism cannot but result in additional corruption, larger and more artful evasions of the law, and more brazen abuses of authority."

2.10 This view serves to re-emphasise the conception of planning as a practical activity of societal transformation and warns against considering new planning approaches and theories such as that of regional planning as an advance per se. In my view, the recent emphasis on regional planning (both as reaction to the ideology, practice and problems of centralised planning and to the failure of too localised development planning frequently in function of the privileged groups and of maintenance of the status quo) may be primarily interpreted as a response to increasing pressure for participation by wider groups of the population, generated both by the patterns of centralised planning and by free market practices leading to over-concentration of investment and production activity, which in turn leads to social and political unviable conditions. Only a process of societal redistribution of power will give meaning to regional planning activity, to which the latter will have to contribute in order to claim and maintain relevance.

3. The unified approach and participation

The pressures which lead to reinterpretation of planning also lead to reconsideration of the meaning and scope of participation. It is necessary to recognise that the scope for participation in a societal process by classes and interest groups is determined by the nature of the social formation and the totality of the power structure and distribution, insofar as these are shaped by the relationship between groups or agents bent on preserving the prevailing order and those desirous of changing and transforming it.21 Such recognition prevents a too simple ideological approach to the quest for participation. It is the process of capitalist economic growth and modernisation which, by its penetration into dependent societies, creates conditions for the quest for participation. By its own dynamics this process limits people's independence and equitable access to resources and opportunities, simultaneously brings people together into one unified circuit, and promotes a process of concentration in which the majority of the population is increasingly submitted to its requirements.

3.1 It may be argued that the increasing adoption by dependent societies of capital-intensive production techniques in the industrial and agricultural sectors is causing a new phenomenon to emerge, namely, a group of people who are neither regular producers nor income earners and who have no direct relation to the productive system. While during the European and American industrial revolutions the unemployed were considered as potentially employable and derived therefrom their function as 'reserve army', the process of modernisation brings people into a position where they may become un-employable.22 In order to survive, however, they need to satisfy their basic needs and to make their claims. The scope for participation is then determined by the historical pro-
cesses of concentration of economic, political and social power as these create forms of economic and social organisation which prescribe the gauge of opportunities and, on the other hand, the possibilities for people to decide and act, to control their own lives and work and the products thereof. The dynamics of the capitalist expansion process then urge identification of participation as a problem and a need.

3.2 While any action by people in development used to be qualified as participation, it has become clear that most government programmes and policies for improvement of the conditions of the community have questionable or contrary effects. It may be appropriate to reserve the concept of participation for those activities "whereby any dependent interest group or class discovers its own identity and interest, becomes aware of them, and starts to organise itself to make its demands and claims heard", bargains and negotiates for their acceptance, and pursues the achievement of its interests. It is obvious that such an interpretation cannot remain limited to the condition that problems have to be solved within the prevailing social order when maintenance of such an order is the reason for the emergence of problems and consecutive claims. Participation must then imply "activities designed to transform the prevailing order and structure", so as to secure the interests and well-being of a majority population vis-à-vis minority interests.

3.3 From the point of view of the unified approach, practical action by the people is essential to the development process insofar as this implies the use of a society's resources for the whole community's wellbeing. In this context, movements of protest, rebellion or revolution which open-up opportunities for important segments of the population to survive and share in a society's resources and control so as to secure their basic needs, can legitimately be called forms of participation. They should primarily be understood as the outcome of the processes of modernisation insofar as these modify the societal process and give rise to new forms of consciousness and organisation. The argument that redistribution of resources by movements from below would prevent the necessary accumulation and concentration is misleading. There are no guarantees that the actual social product, appropriated from the peasantry and the working population, will necessarily be productively invested to the benefit of the majority population. Examples abound to the contrary, indicating that surplus product is usually either non-productively invested or conspicuously consumed. The distribution of this surplus among direct producers can create for them conditions in which to become more productive and creative. At the same time, a process of transformation should be considered conditional to opening-up the huge potential surplus product which remains dormant and un-utilised as long as the social structure prevents fuller utilisation of the labour potential. Thus, poverty does not derive from the inadequacy but from the inadequate use of the social surplus product, and can be eradicated only by a process of transformation which opens the way for proper use of the actual surplus product and for optimum mobilisation of the potential surplus product. Alleged resistance to productive activity and to participation is then to be interpreted as a rational instrument of a population with which to protect itself in a context that is hostile or even opposed to its well-being and advancement.

Rather than to ascribe to resistant and uncooperative people certain ontological or anthropological characteristics, their motivation has helped confine and disintegrate their human potential. There is
abundant evidence of their actual potential for change if and when structural conditions permit them to manage their own affairs and ensure that they can retain an equitable part of their surplus product in order to meet their own vital needs. Processes promoting the capacity of classes and interest groups to protect their own interests and to organise themselves should be clearly distinguished from those initiated and imposed from above in order to mobilise people, not primarily in function of their own wellbeing and welfare but to instrumentalise them in the accumulation and consumption by other groups. Such mobilisation activities inevitably lead to pseudo-forms of participation under the guise of national development, economic development, or progress. The use of human relations techniques to achieve incorporation and increased productivity by dependent groups, however, will only serve to aggravate existing contradictions insofar as they help to modernise but not to diminish dependence. In such a way only the form of the societal process becomes democratised and not the actual structure of the decision making process, reason why the dilemma of coercion or participation becomes ever more obvious.

3.4 The feasibility of forms and instruments of societal participation depends decisively on the environment into which they are inserted. Thus, the net performance of cooperatives, introduced into dependent societies with great structural inequalities and a concentration of power over the mechanisms of social control, has been "to prevent rather than to foster new local initiative or power groups and the creation of conditions of dependence where these did not exist before." Only insofar as cooperative organisations can stimulate people to "break with traditional bonds of exploitation" and to promote conflict that would contribute to structural transformation, can they be expected to contribute to development. Such an opening for participation depends again on transformation of the wider structure of society. Pre-industrial patterns of patronage and allegiance are gradually breaking down, as do still existing patterns of kinship and clan solidarity under the weight of modernisation. Traditionally, the capacity to challenge the prevailing order by those who believed in the inevitability of a social revolution, was attributed to industrial workers who were seen as the only pure class forming itself on the basis of the structural antagonisms into which it was carried by its struggle with the bourgeoisie. Nowadays, the changing nature of industrial relations and the impact of modernisation are creating conditions which give the peasantry a leading role in the process of social transformation; this may be considered as the evolving sequence of contradictions as they develop in dependent societies in which "development policies have mostly helped the minorities, have left the remainder worse off and have tended to heighten inequality and deprive part of the population of access to livelihood, the chief exceptions being those societies where revolutionary changes have swept away not only the pre-existing rural power structure but also the preexisting relations between urban and rural."29

3.5 Class consciousness, a necessary condition for initiating and supporting a process of transformation, may be expected to emerge among the present population of the dependent societies as their condition deteriorates and they are denied a more equitable share in the social product they produce. However, there is ample evidence that the formation of critical consciousness and its expression in practical action cannot be expected from the poorest, whose dependency leaves them no room to manoeuvre to
escape their dependency; in such areas, the process can only be initiated by the 'middle peasants' who have some margin for independent action. Successful pressure for transformation cannot be expected from one group or class except through alliance with other classes or social groups whose positions are also eroded or have been threatened. While the emergence of consciousness may be understood as the necessary outcome of a societal process as it creates increasing contradictions and produces the practical necessity for action for self-defence and self-realisation, the specific content and form of such action cannot be predicted and will emerge from the creativity of those who struggle to shape their own future, as did the people of Viet Nam. The feasibility of effective equality and people's full participation in society depends on whether they can achieve control over the structural mechanisms which promote inequality and dependence. While such control is a condition to development it depends in turn on the transformation of the people. "If people cannot become participants in the transformation, they will be involved as victims." It was observed at the Stockholm meeting that realisation of the unified approach means that development can only be given that name if it is realised "by and through people". This brings out the fact that a unified approach, if it supports such a process in its practical application, will inevitably help to make prevailing contradictions more manifest. It is, however, likely that the dynamic dimension of the unified approach concept, pointing towards the increasing inclusion of new groups in the development process, will receive less attention than its static dimension, focusing on the formal completion and consistency of needed inputs in the planning and programming of development, an objective promoted in what is known as the systems approach.

3.6 To postulate the need to overcome prevailing differentials and the inequalities they entail is to ask whether the historic accumulation process in Western and Eastern Europe is an inherent necessity to which any development process is bound, or whether there is an alternative to such an accumulation process based on large-scale capital concentration, transfers of accumulated surpluses from a major part of the population (both peasantry and industrial workers), centralised management and administration and the widespread use of coercion for a considerable period. If such a process is unavoidable, any discussion of participation by the population in the development process would not only be arbitrary and romantic but even irresponsible. It would seem that the method of socialist primitive accumulation followed by Russia, advocated by the Russian leadership at the time, and argued by such theoreticians as Preobrazhenski, was basically identical to the process of primitive accumulation in Western Europe's industrialisation, geared to maximising growth which in the Russian case necessarily entailed the centralisation of power and, in view of the reliance on material incentives, the emergence and promotion of inequality. It would seem that a policy of concentrated industrialisation inevitably promotes stratification such as presently prevails in Western and Eastern Europe in the spheres of production, distribution and consumption.

3.7 China is the first socialist society in which a Communist Party, faced by pressure to respond to the basic needs of the masses, took these as a starting point for its policies in order to preserve the process of revolutionary transformation. The Party promoted accumulation on the basis of development of agriculture, leaving an equitable share of the
social product to the peasantry and developing industrialisation progressively to serve agriculture and the population's basic needs, then taking both as a basis on which to develop heavy industry. Since the Cultural Revolution in particular, China has demonstrated that an alternative approach to accumulation does not need to be pursued at the expense of equality but must take it as the basis for development. There is abundant evidence that the orientation pursued in China not only optimises people's participation in the societal process but also relies on it. In my view, the Chinese experience shows that no government can afford to promote a process of people's self-mobilisation unless it accepts that people are the real source of all development but can only become so if they are liberated from all constraints and their creativity and productivity are released. A self-mobilisation process is only feasible if it promotes radical democratisation of society in all spheres.

3.8 The Chinese experience also illustrates the thesis that "the poorer a country is and the lower the standard of living of its producers, the more the rate of economic growth is a function of the producers' consumption." It supports the proposition that "there is no conflict between the goals of growth and social justice and that instead, radical egalitarian reforms are a necessary condition for sustained growth and development." Mao Tse-tung's view that "development is not worth much unless all people will become increasingly well off together" not only represents an alternative theoretical ideal of development and accumulation; it is proving to work in practice. Chinese achievements cannot be understood as a set of facts but only as the outcome of a long process in which a class struggle occurred between those opposing the development of socialist model of production and those pursuing the latter by relying on radical democratisation of social productive relations. The primacy given in China to politics-in-command over techniques-in-command as expressing the primacy given to the development of new social relations of production over productive forces and to distribution of access to and control over authority, resources and opportunities in order to release the optimum productive and creative potential among the people, has been a conditio sine qua non for launching a process of optimum labour utilisation and productive involvement of the people in political, economic and social life. In my view, this process is too easily interpreted as the pursuit by the Chinese of an idealistic utopia. It represents, firstly, the expression of a sheer necessity once the alternative of a socialist road was taken by a poor country whose chief resource was people, as is the case in all dependent societies. The implication of pursuing this road is that class struggle becomes crucial. "While the forces of production play a major role in determining the contours of human society, there are times when new productive relations are needed to release and develop new productive forces, when changes must be made in the superstructure to bring about changes in the base, times when consciousness determines being, rather than being consciousness; at such times, massive political transformation is a prerequisite for further productive development."
of needs, such sacrifices need to be distributed among and assumed by all groups of the population, implying that basic needs of the whole population be met before attention is given to other competitive demands. Such a sacrifice can only be required of the peasantry and workers if it is shared by other groups. The promotion of a consumers' society with its primary reliance on material stimuli and incentives which set people against each other in terms of competitive demands, seems incompatible with the development of an authentic socialist society in which priority would be given to the basic needs of the people as social beings, i.e. priority to vital collective and personal needs.

3.10 The perception of participation as shaped by the concrete historical process emphasises that, as with capital accumulation, it cannot be defined by and in itself but only as an expression of historically formed and conditioned social relationships.

A mode of production cannot by itself guarantee superior forms of participation as it cannot exist in abstracto. It is only in the historical movement of a particular society, the evolution and transformation of its class structure, that new possibilities and forms of participation emerge. Such a view excludes the idea of mechanistic transferability of experiences, forms of social organisation and capitalisation as a basis for development, it being posited that development is primarily an outcome of the way in which internal contradictions in a society develop and are resolved.38

3.11 The unified approach, if it implies that primary be given in development to man's needs and potential, must question prevailing social structures and the position and way of life of those groups which, intentionally or not, are involved in maintaining these structures. Some participants at the Stockholm meeting interpreted the unified approach as being identical with or signifying a socialist way of development. They emphasised the increasingly contradictory and problematic nature of the societal process in industrially advanced 'free market' societies and the need for new forms of societal control which, in turn, presuppose a new social structure which allows and promotes such control.39 The fact that the political premises and implications of such a position were not outlined suggests the limitations on the work of experts who, in a supposedly a-political framework, are expected to restrain themselves by looking at the development process in technical terms. Also, if they would understand it as a political process, they yet are expected to approach problems as subject matters which can be dealt with apolitically, neutrally and technically.

One participant, Gunnar Myrdal, insisted that the time for diplomatic habits and language had passed.40 He also insisted that in the study of positive experiences of a unified approach to development particular attention should be given to China. Since the acceptance of China by the international community and its acquisition of official respectability, studies multiply on the positive aspects and advantages of the Chinese approach to such issues as labour utilisation, productivity, cooperative organisation, education. However, the attention paid to the achievements of the Chinese people is inversely proportionate to that given to the historical process of revolution and class struggle from which present conditions emerged.41 While the overcoming of the major contradictions in Chinese society, expressed particularly in the inequalities of the 'three great differentials': the relationship between agriculture and industry, the cities and the rural areas, and the dif-
ferences resulting from manual and intellectual labour, is at the core of China's theory and practice of a unified approach and impressive advances have been made, substantive inequalities remain and "the struggle against a threatening polarisation will still require a heavy fight for a long period."\textsuperscript{42}

So far I have concentrated on analysing the concept of the unified approach in the context of development policies with regard to planning and participation and some implications of a unified approach to both as manifestations of the same societal process. In the following I shall analyse some implications of the unified approach with regard to the interdependence between theory and practice of development, especially the dialectical relations between social reality and the development of knowledge, action and consciousness. This is actually a search into some of the premises underlying thinking, valuations and action with regard to the processes, so far analysed.

4. Unified approach between social theory and social practice

4.1 The unified approach also gives rise to questions on the nature and function of social science. Social science exists only as the outcome of concrete historical processes in which particular classes, groups and societies give expression to (dominant) valuations of reality and society, and translate these into sets of propositions which are then attributed an independent universal value.\textsuperscript{43}

4.2 In its formation, social science reflects the evolving class structure. The separation of ideological positions and valuations from scientific propositions in the social sciences has been a necessity for dominant classes and societies with which to support societal structures and positions; interpretations of society as based on equilibrium and harmony have been and are reflective of movements to preserve the status quo.\textsuperscript{44}

The attempt not only to distinguish but also to separate value judgement from the domain of the social sciences expresses the assumption that social scientists could act as though they did not form part of the historical process, and that society can be explained by its factual appearance and constellation without these being conceived as outcomes of a historical process. Such a view relies in turn on the interpretation of society as an aggregate of individuals acting on the basis of independent rational behaviour. This is the outcome of a long historical process in which the movement of social forces and the evolving structure of a society, with its increasing division of labour, in Western Europe and the United States of America, the autonomy of economic forces, of capital, the capital market and entrepreneurial initiative, were assumed and individual freedom, rights and characteristics were asserted over and against the requirements of society as a whole and became crystallised as the dominant values of society.

While the process of individualisation may have coincided with conditions of historical crisis,\textsuperscript{45} pressing advance by breaking with the moulds of the past and its apparent harmony, it would seem that the prevailing world crisis in the relationship between the industrially advanced and the dependent societies seriously questions the assumptions of equilibrium, harmony and individuality, forcefully bringing out the reality of interdependence of societies and people, the unity of the historical process, and the necessity to understand what happens in the context of total world-societal relationships: it re-emphasises that
'human nature' is the total complex of social relations and the expression of all groups of people who presuppose each other and whose unity is dialectic, not formal.46

4.3 Unless relations between people are seen as a historical process and movement, they are taken to express human reality by and in themselves and are then defined in their actual appearance as normative: "the historical point of view is likely to remind us of the transitory nature of social institutions, generally an uncomfortable thought to an ancien régime."47 An ancien régime will be obliged to obstruct critical consciousness and analysis of how social relations have come into being. This is reflected in the development of the social sciences in the West; in the tendency to eliminate the historical approach from its analysis; to substitute abstract for concrete analysis of social phenomena; to avoid any interpretation of the human condition by explaining it in terms of class struggle, and to underplay the significance and weight of economic conditions.

4.4 The present search for a unified approach in the social sciences can perhaps be explained by the growing incapacity of scientists to deal with the increasing problems in the terms set by a specialised, departmentalised and disciplinary approach, and the pressure on them to serve the prevailing order and to respond to the problems this generates which implicitly question its validity. Erosion of the pretense of objectivity makes it more and more questionable to judge the relevance of social science on its own scientific terms; interpretation of its role in the function of specific interests of classes and societies which it serves becomes unavoidable. The ideology of the 'end of ideology' is breaking down, and the absolutist claim to the scientific nature of social sciences is more and more challenged. All of us participate "from our concrete position from where we develop our project of life and work, our interest and consciousness from where we develop our commitment and act. We are all ideologically and politically involved and neither in our practice or theory can we hope to be neutral."49 "Neutrality is also always commitment and choice."50

The end to the claim to objectivity by the social sciences may perhaps be related to a change in the position of intellectuals on whom increasing pressure is exercised in view of requirements of the productive structure which, previously, permitted then relative independence in their activity.51 Thus the search for independence would appear to be a response to increasing dependence, and the search for unity a reaction to the increasing process of fragmentation in the social sciences which are more and more forced to deal with society as if it were a composite of unrelated problems. This causes the social sciences to run counter to the interests of the people that the societal process meets their fundamental quest for a society which responds to their basic needs for self-realisation; this they can only find insofar as they achieve control over their own society, life and work and the forces which move these.

The movement of society forces the social sciences to become more atomised, as the increasing complexity of problems causes each set to be approached as if it existed by itself, a corollary to perceiving the society as basically in equilibrium so that problems cannot result from contradictions inherent in the changing dynamics of the total interrelationships and can therefore be dealt with as problems in themselves. This process is challenged as the social sciences cannot answer the problems with which they are confronted, their function being not to
contribute to the transformation of the social structure and environment which generate and multiply problems, but to solve the latter by seeking and promoting adaptation which will not challenge the social structure and environment that determine social relations. The increasing incapacity of the fragmented social sciences to deal effectively with basic social and human problems enhances in turn the search for unity by social scientists who feel the need to critically review the processes which have undermined the capacity of people and society to deal effectively with the problems which face them.

4.5 Such a critique can only be undertaken insofar as people are judged in terms of their virtualities and possibilities. The search for these, rooted in people's need for self-realisation, urges them to seek emancipation and liberation and to achieve control over themselves, their product, and their environment.

If development is understood to be self-realisation through self-liberation and emancipation, then the social sciences may best contribute to the extent that they identify obstructive conditions and indicate the ways in which these can be overcome. This implies the need for all social scientists to conceive their specialised activity as in function of common premisses and objectives, given the needs of people in search of emancipation, which is a necessary pursuit insofar as people may be assumed to be in a condition of alienation which they will have to overcome. This consciousness of alienation opens the way to radical criticism of the human condition in a particular societal context and of the fragmented social sciences insofar as they deny the needs of the people to overcome their alienation, and thus increase that alienation.52

Alienation can only be conceived as a particular quality of existence which emerges from a historical process. If the concept of alienation is taken seriously, it forces the social scientists to place their 'objects' in the context of the historical process and to perceive them in terms of 'subjects' to which they also belong. As objects/subjects they are submitted to the social forces which shape and transform society. Their science is a social product which responds to the needs of particular subjects in society. If it is admitted that this is essential, it becomes impossible to conceive of social science as dealing with facts as such, facts being always an outcome of a historical process and its transformation, and of the perception and interpretations that people acquire and shape, both as objects and subjects of the historical process. Taking facts as given and as fixed criteria for the exercise of science implies rejection of the historical nature of society and its development and acceptance of the prevailing order or the status quo as normative. Social science then easily converts itself to an art of management of the prevailing order, acquiring a conserving function by which it disassociates itself from service to emancipation and liberation.

4.6 The managerial trend in the social sciences, taking facts and factual trends as the norm, is particularly revealing in the rapid expansion of the systems approach. To the extent that the systems approach is dependent on isolation of the variables judged relevant and relies on a 'black box' premisses through which it has to prove its ability to successfully perform this operation, it cannot possibly pretend to achieve a theoretical foundation for its practical purposes.53 The black box approach assumes the independent autonomous functioning of the (sub)-system in the same way that Parsons conceives of the individual as a homo clausus with all properties stored and developed within himself.
and by himself (see Elias' analysis of Parsons' premisses, footnote 44). Thus such an appraisal disassociates itself from the most fundamental characteristic determining individual being and existence, namely, that all people live in and are defined by a context of interdependence.

4.7 If it is accepted "that all men are intellectuals but not all men exercise in society a function as an intellectual",\(^54\) such a function may or may not be exercised in service of the needs of the majority of people, that is in the service of the community. It may well be that such a function becomes functional to a lopsided social structure in which intellectuals directly or indirectly in service of a particular class exercise their profession in function of that class, in association with which they may maintain their privileged conditions and status, which need in no way correspond to their actual work or service to the community at large.\(^55\) It is unlikely that intellectuals in such a situation will easily contend the interests of the dominant class and it may be expected that they will put their knowledge, knowhow and science at the service of that class. Only in processes of societal crisis might they take distance from their commitments and seek new alliances. The formal monopolisation of intellectual work as a specialised professional activity implies a social structure that relies on and furthers the inequality and devaluation of all those who do not belong to the privileged class. The exercise of social science in service of policies and processes by which real agents in the societal process are turned from subjects into objects, to be studied, mobilised and planned from above and outside, reflects the subordination to the requirements of the dominant class. This class necessarily perceives the possibility for radical democratisation and the assumption by the population of control over their own environment, life and work (suggested by the incapacity of the prevailing order to protect people's elementary needs and wellbeing) as a threat to its 'legitimate' interests and their required expansion. However, there is ample historical evidence that "no status quo lasts indefinitely, not even the most partial and localised one."\(^56\)

4.8 If the history of a problem is the problem of history and the inverse is also true,\(^57\) the nature of a particular problem cannot be understood unless it is analysed within the totality of its historic, societal, economic, social and political conditions. This applies to problems with which the social sciences are supposed to deal as well as to the sciences' own structure and division. Thus, the tradition in psychiatric practice to understand schizophrenia as the outcome of a particular structure of social relationships and its exclusive imputation to the characteristics of particular individuals, is as much the expression of a view of the world as an aggregate of basically independent individuals (whose acts can only be explained by and in themselves\(^58\) as if they were things with certain fixed properties) as the psychological approach in which intelligence is assumed to be given and not environmentally conditioned. This view helps to divide a population into apt and non-apt on the basis of dominant abstract norms, and determines people's location in society not according to their needs and possibilities for self-realisation, but according to the dictates of particular groups and interests to which people are assumed to subordinate themselves although traumatised.\(^59\) The cruel effects of a social system which relies for its maintenance on a far-reaching hierarchisation and differentiation of people into specialists and non-specialists, intellec-
tuals and non-intellectuals, skilled and non-skilled, may cause people to lose their capacity and desire for intellectual development and to seek self-protection and satisfaction in a hostile environment in monotonous and creativity-destroying work. 61

4.9 In this context we should also consider the assumptions on the innate characteristics of the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial individual or group vs. those groups to whom are imputed lack of positive characteristics or of such qualities as self-reliance, responsibility, initiative, drive, devotion, and other expressions of progressiveness. The widespread application of theories of diffusion of innovation, which as a rule wholly bypass any analysis of differential resource-endowment as a decisive factor that determines people's capacities and opportunities to advance, causes personal characteristics to be considered as decisive and, by disregarding people's actual possibilities to respond, contributes to the making of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, if progress in farming is only expected from progressive farmers whose growth justifies additional inputs, concentration of resources and inputs becomes a natural condition and requirement for progress. 62

Thus, abstracting from the historical process which has made people what they are and taking what they are as the starting point for action, merely reinforces the trend toward inequality and the differential characteristics of people insofar as these are developed on the basis of opportunity. This helps to consolidate inequality, induces people to internalise their dominant or dependent status, and tends to reinforce their perception of their own position and of the organisation of the society in which they happen to live and work as being natural. 63

4.10 In perceiving the history of a problem as the problem of the historical process, as a societal process, that is to say, of the emergence, constitution and development of social relationships, it is not enough to evaluate phenomena in their societal context (which excludes their being understood as things or facts per se). They should at the same time be seen as the outcome of socially and societally-determined interpretations which, in turn, are expressions of particular forms of existence and existential conditions. 64 Thus, reality is not what it seems but is rather the underlying movement and structure as constituted by the totality of social relations. In this perspective, capital has to be conceived as the product of historically-determined relationships, while technology expresses the way in which social relationships have evolved. Similarly, a land tenure-system is to be understood as the formal expression of a structure of social relationships with regard to the use of a particular resource, namely, land, as this has historically evolved and taken shape. So also are forms of authority and management reflective of the way in which social relationships have taken shape. All are expressions of specific constellations of power concentration and distribution or, in other words, of a particular class structure, which turn into particular forms of domination and dependence.

It follows that any planning or action with regard to expressions of social relations necessarily affects the totality of these relations and the balance of social forces which they express. Activities such as economic planning, industrial programming, and agricultural, regional and physical planning, are always expressions of social and societal planning, determined by and in turn affecting the prevailing social structure. 65 As a consequence, economic planning, which bypasses the structure of power and proposes development as an outcome of
the expansion and accumulation of capital and technology, will necessarily contribute to the inequality of social relations. Similarly, industrial programming which takes as its point of departure the organisation of the individual enterprise in terms of its maximum rentability to the private investor, and not the advantages to the community at large, will promote production, consumption and employment patterns which may have negative effects on the social and income structure, particularly so in societies where, in order to maximise profit, capital-intensive industries are introduced although labour is abundantly available. In the same way, agriculture planning that focuses on the diffusion of innovation as such will enhance prevailing disparities. Regional planning will also do so if it only focuses on resource identification and infrastructural development.

In all these cases, where planning is supposed to contribute to development, the identity and homogeneity of interests is all too easily assumed; the ruling classes or dominant groups, however, can realise their objectives with as a consequence increasing polarisation, inducing growing disparity in power distribution and access to use of resources and opportunities.

The focus on planning problems as an expression of the total societal process suggests the need to examine specific forms of planning as ways in which to deal with a total problem. Thus, urban planning, which attempts to deal with the expansion of the city population that results from the rural exodus, is of little use without being accompanied by rural planning directed at the roots of the rural problems. Regional planning, directed at the development of backward regions, is of little validity unless carried out within the framework of central planning which attempts to modify the relationships between regions which tend to advance some at the expense of others. In both cases, development is frequently conceptualised in such a way that the prevailing inequalities and disparities, the accretion of multiple advantages of modernisation to specific interest groups, is presented as natural, inevitable and beneficial for the population at large; development theory thus acquires the nature of ideological justification in the cloth of universal science.

4.11 The above view reflects the "dialectical relationship between subject and object in the historical process". The actual structure of reality shapes people's consciousness and people in turn shape reality; that is to say, practice turns into theory and theory again into practice by changing reality. This clarifies the inner unity of thinking and action, and of action and reality, as indivisible and inseparable. With the changes in reality, the interpretation of reality also changes and then reality again. The interpretation of reality, the perception of the need for and direction of change and of the possibility and necessity to change reality, varies according to the position of people in the total social structure. "It is not sufficient that thought urges reality but reality itself must urge thought." In other words, consciousness has no basis for its dynamics in itself but in reality. This again gives rise to the question whether people's relationship to social reality is that of carriers of individual consciousness and action or whether they have to be perceived as being determined in their consciousness and actions by their position in the social structure; that is to say, by their belonging to particular classes through which their consciousness and actions are shaped.
The existence of classes cannot be assessed in terms of their factual objective existence. Their identification depends on the evaluation of social reality held within society by people. This evaluation in turn depends on their position in the structured social entity; that is to say, on the dialectic and structured interrelationship that shapes their social relations.

4.12 The contention that a particular concentration or distribution of power will promote or reduce inequality, and the view that basic interests of particular groups do not coincide but oppose each other, is not likely to be seen as relevant by people who are to lose their vested interests and privileges in a transformation process. Such people will tend to deny the existence of classes with antagonistic interests and will attribute differences in wealth and position to powers beyond society, to inherited rights, or to attributes such as values, intelligence, industriousness, entrepreneurial initiative and good luck. Denial of the existence of classes does not take them away. The tendency "to deduce social institutions from values" that is prominent today,71 and to interpret the emergence of conflict as the outcome of an inevitable process of plurality and value divergence, without rooting these values in the actual position of their bearers in the socio-economic structure, opens the way for an idealistic interpretation of the societal process which seeks to interpret emancipation not in terms of the internal contradictions within society but of the changing values of people as such.72

The assumption that these values and people's consciousness are rooted in economic conditions or the foundations of society does not signify a recurrence to a one-sided determinism insofar as the ultimate determinants are 'determined determinants'. The ultimate determinants do not exist "outside the complex of specific mediations, including the most spiritual ones".73 Such a position helps to explain why specific groups, located at particular points in the social structure, develop specific forms of consciousness and behaviour, from silent or open protest, rebellion and revolution, to conformity, apathy, submission and resignation. Analysis of any society (including the Chinese in which egalitarianism is high but in which the class structure is yet acknowledged to be the dynamic force, and in which processes of polarisation exist and may time and time again develop) shows the existence of many actual or potentially structural antagonistic relationships. There are many reasons why such antagonisms may not become manifest in class solidarity (patronage, religious tradition, factionalism, reliance on various forms of vertical interdependence, integration, the very conditions of total dependence of a poor peasantry, fear, the actual use of force, and the internalisation of dependence).74 Such structural antagonisms vary in nature and intensity from society to society and from place to place. Their identification with creative consciousness is essential to its development. While traditional Marxist theory saw industrial modernisation as the central process for societal transformation, the peasantry in dependent societies now plays a crucial role in the transformation process.75 Meanwhile, the assumed 'end of ideology' in the industrially advanced societies has come to an end. These societies have become the scene of increasingly acute contradiction and resulting conflict between interest groups. The emergence almost everywhere of strong executives, and the increasingly predominant role of the military, suggest that traditional forms of hegemony by political means, the ma-
Manipulation of socialisation and populist action, are coming to an end. A notable characteristic of the past decade, however, is that where revolutionary processes of transformation were widely projected and expected, these did not take place. This demonstrates the flexibility and absorptive capacity of the prevailing societal system and the dominant classes. The absence of internal integration and unity of the dependent classes opened the way for divide and rule tactics, promoted by dominant values in which personal conditions are perceived in terms of personal fortune, and individual social mobility and welfare as the only way by which to leave a state of misery and dependence.

It may be argued that the significance of the struggle between old and new dominant classes is too easily overlooked when the dichotomous relationship between dominant and dependent classes is focused upon as the source of transformation. This relationship is increasingly felt where the various components of the bourgeoisie in its industrial, rural, commercial and banking interests, rely upon and need each other. The convergence of processes of monopolisation not only leads to maintenance of the status quo but to deepening the disparities between rich and poor, haves and have nots, in both urban and rural areas, a situation of which there is ample evidence. It may be argued that the traditional non-identity and divergence in interests between industrial workers and peasantry is partly replaced by an increasingly manifest division between the comparatively privileged labour aristocracies in industry and agriculture and the rest. A characteristic feature of the present situation appears to be the frequent inter-penetration of capitalist and feudal relations of production; rather than to speak of the coexistence of the two as complementary and functional to each other, it may be desirable to speak of the emergence of a multiple mode of production in which feudal and capitalist modes of production are fused.

As structural antagonisms in the world of today seem to become increasingly manifest as a result of the mounting contradictions of dominant and dependent classes among and within societies, any assumption of equilibrium and harmony becomes increasingly ludicrous in view of factual developments. These structural antagonisms, however, are of a very varied nature and develop in numerous structural and cultural contexts. If the historical necessity of class consciousness is recognised, its development can in no way be a homogeneous process. The practical necessity for dependent groups to achieve social control over society so as to eradicate the roots of their subordination cannot imply mechanistic perception of this process, but recognition of a historical trend which opens the way for new societal formations through the emergence of new forms of social consciousness and action in response to new circumstances. The likelihood that any subordinate class can overcome its subordination depends entirely on its alliance with other classes that also suffer from foreign and internal domination. The perception of development as a process of liberation by those whose opportunities for self-realisation are blocked contains an implicit answer to the question whether the dominant classes can play a role in the abolition of the conditions which produced and reproduced their dominance. Such planning, in the final analysis, seems a contradiction in terms. As was observed at the Stockholm meeting, a persistent "dichotomy between objectives and means," declared norms, ideals and theories can be observed in prevailing plans. When under the weight of the increasing pressures for transformation it is now suggested that plans, rather than concentrating on growth as a condition for development should focus
on the abolishment of poverty and on equalisation," it should be kept in mind that, as the evidence of past development decades suggests, norms and ideals are no substitute for reality. While the need for a social revolution may be admitted unless deepgoing transformation takes place, it must at the same time be stressed that liberation is 'not a mental but a historical act', through which those who are objects of the societal process can become its conscious and active subjects and agents.

4.15 Recognition of the historical and political nature of the social sciences makes them a potential instrument in this liberation process through which they will achieve their unity. The thesis that prevailing systems and their underlying philosophies "have begun to display many symptoms of historical obsolescence" cannot be proven in theory but only in practice, insofar as such social systems lose their legitimacy and press the emergence of alternative forms of societal practice. Science does not exist by itself but only through its practitioners. This view implies that scientists further the cause of the unified approach insofar as they realise their work in service of the process and practice of emancipation and liberation of people from the bonds of exploitation and alienation. To the extent that they liberate themselves, will they become available to help in the liberation and emancipation of others. This means that, only insofar as they analyse and interpret the problems of society in the perspectives of the true interests and needs of those seeking liberation and self-realisation, will they be in a position to discover the true meaning of societal facts and phenomena, and be able to break with the tyranny of dominant norms and values which tend to condemn social science and its practitioners to submit to the dictates of dominant interests by defending and promoting the status quo. Thereby, they help to deny to people the meaning of their being; to become active agents and makers of their own history. Social science can play a truly humanising role only to the extent that its practitioners help to loosen it from its subservient role in confirming the fetishistic character of social reality as internalised by people. Only by their willingness to face and make manifest the contradictions that emerge and develop in social practice can social scientists develop theoretical knowledge that can in turn serve emancipation and liberation.

4.16 To associate with such an orientation social scientists must investigate their own origins and the nature of their work. What premises lie beneath our involvement? How are we conditioned? Why do we allow ourselves to be conditioned in a particular way and not in others? What are our taboos and those of the community at large? How are they maintained and promoted? Why do we develop obedience? What inspires us to this obedience? In what way are we in our social and intellectual being existentially determined by a one class view of society that leads us to consciously or unconsciously approach the problems of society in terms of a ruling elite and of a static stratification analysis serving perhaps a hidden need for self-protection, thereby a priori refusing a dialectical approach to the process of social transformation so that "non-elites are not considered as independent operative forces but are relegated to the status of a residual category"? Does not too easy a refutation of the proposition that a positive answer may be possible to the query "quis custodiet" who will be the custodians of those in charge, who will control the controllers, reveal a perhaps unwanted yet cherished elitist view of society which necessarily supports the claims
of the right to rule of those who have exercised their dominance in the past on the basis of self-defined attributes of intelligence, capacity, experience and specialised knowhow. If the possibility to overcome inequality and human misery is qualified as utopian, such a utopia has always been the expression of a social consciousness that precedes social transformation. "The existence of a utopia as a utopia is the necessary prerequisite for its eventually ceasing to be a utopia." 99

4.17 The emergence and persistence in the human consciousness of a utopian vision on future society has to be interpreted as the fruit of the dialectic relationship between necessity and freedom in which objective conditions limit and shape people's consciousness, and people within the limitations work out their project for future society, shaped and inspired by their concrete position in the total social structure. Emphasis on the dialectic nature of the relationship between objective conditions and subjective consciousness and action, rejects the view of historical processes as being cyclical and circular. If historical processes appear to be subject to cyclical movements, such movements are only cyclical and circular in abstracto, but not in the concrete struggle and experience of people seeking self-realisation through the development of productive forces, the transformation of productive relations and the growth of their creativity. The view that individual self-fulfilment should not, cannot and need not be realised at the expense of others need not be interpreted as a metaphysical norm. It conveys the tension inherent in the human condition between existence and being, between dependence and own control, alienation and de-alienation. Such a recognition, while utopian, is at the same time a realistic assessment of the potential of people who cannot be judged merely by their actual short-term motivations, valuations and interpretations of what is possible and desirable, but also by a new way of life and work for which they search in response to their present human condition.

The possibility to perceive society as a process of transformation and foresight into the probability of this process expressing itself in movements of emancipation and liberation, is not likely to be open to classes bent on maintaining the status quo. Their inability to discern beneath the surface of society those movements which carry it out of balance to the point where major alterations may take place, is the inevitable corollary of their being bound to maintenance of the prevailing order. They are condemned to cherish the present as the fruit of the past inasfar as the past protects them and makes them the heirs of accumulated wealth and the values that justify this wealth, and to be suspicious of the future inasfar as the future does not guarantee their present privileges. Their condition shapes their consciousness, their world view and their social science theories. Their lack of foresight and their 'ignorance' of what happens and can happen in the world is self-imposed. How could they accept that activities undertaken by interest organisations of the dependent working population "form part of a more general process to overcome class relations", and that such actions contribute to "the emergence of a type of society in which, at least in principle, creative consciousness reveals itself as implying the demand that whole social reality be considered as a product of labour"?

In such a vision, people and what they create and produce may be distinguished from each other but the attempt to separate people from their creation and product and to attribute to the latter an in-
dependent existence and value must inevitably lead to the devaluation of those who give their labour. Effective control by people over the product of their creativity and labour appears to be the foundation of a truly human society which helps people to realise themselves and their potentialities, not at the expense of, but in solidarity with, each other.
Notes and References

1. Report on the Unified Approach to Development, Analysis and Planning (Unrisd, Geneva, October, 1972) quoted hereunder as Unrisd Report. This report was largely written by the Director of the Social Development Division of the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) at Santiago de Chile and reflects in its theoretical analysis much of the creative thinking and work of this Division during past years.

The UNRISD project was given major impetus by the 1969 meeting of Experts on Social Policy and Planning in Stockholm. The views expressed there served as a base for Resolution 1494 of May 1970 of the Economic and Social Council of the UN and Resolution 2681 of December 1970 of the UN General Assembly, both of which express full support for the need to develop a unified approach to the problems of development, as follows:

- to leave no section of the population outside the scope of change and development,
- to effect structural change which favours national development and to activate all sectors of the population to participate in the development process,
- to aim at social equity, including the achievement of an equitable distribution of income and wealth in the nation,
- to give high priority to the development of human potentials, including vocational and technical training, and the provision of employment opportunities and meeting the needs of children.

2. The UNRISD document locates meaningful analysis of the need and feasibility of a unified approach in the context of the study of the nature and effects of the highly interdependent international order, as a consequence of which the processes of growth and change cannot possibly be studied as if taking place within sovereign States. In contrast to the strongest States, the Report says: "the smaller and poorer States face much more cramping restriction, predominantly external, on their capacity for autonomous developmental decisionmaking. These forces not only involve deliberate political and economic dominance from the world centres, but also increasingly pervading cultural influences, not deliberately intended by anyone, associated with innovations in consumption and masscommunications emanating from the world centres. These influences are completely internalized and reflected in diverse allegiances and expectations of domestic social forces."

Recognition of the interdependence of all processes in and between societies and the continuous transformation generated thereby that affects all relationships, implies a break with any theorizing on development which claims the feasibility of studying societies or part-societies as if somehow they function as closed systems. Such an approach implies rejection of the various forms of dualistic theories which consider problems of disequilibrated development in terms of a side-by-side analysis. The existence of a structure of universal and global relationships can only be understood in the context of the historical process of domination, as this resulted from expansion of the West and the colonial subordination of the rest of the world. The emergence of a world-market based on competition, and the coming into being of an international division of labour, not only implied increasing interdependence of people and States but the conversion of individual existence into a world-historical existence. Recognition of this fact has farreaching implications in the attempt to understand individual existence and development, since it leads to
considering individual existence and consciousness from the viewpoint of a global structure. Thus, divergencies between peoples, groups of people and individuals have to be approached in the context of total relationships of interdependence. See István Mézéföss, "Contingent and Necessary Class Consciousness" in Aspects of History and Class Consciousness (London, 1971), in particular his references to Marx's analysis in The German Ideology and the Poverty of Philosophy of the nature and implications of global interdependence.

3. Close interdependence exists between the emergence of the structural-functionalist approach to societal phenomena and the deductive-teleological types of analysis which tend to deduce the concrete existence of social institutions from values and to show a tendency to eliminate from liberal social science any reference to the class and political struggle, oppression and the historical process through which social relationships evolve. Such a tendency is expressive of the service function that social sciences have acquired regarding the needs of ruling classes. For an analysis of the relationship between the anti-historical nature of liberal social science and the process of abstract conceptualization, see Barrington Moore, "Strategy in the Social Science" in Political Power and Social Theory (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1958), and Lucien Goldmann, "La Méthod en Sciences Humaines" in Sciences Humaines et Philosophie, Pour un Structuralisme Génétilque (Paris, 1966). For an incisive Marxist critique of structural-functionalism see the analysis of the views of Talcott Parsons and of his incapacity to grasp the historical and contradictory nature of social processes Ernest Mandel, The Formation of Economic Thought of Karl Marx (New York, 1971), pp. 63-66. For an extensive systematic critique of structural-functionalism "from within" see Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York, 1970).

4. It must be asked how the emergence of the concept and phenomenon of experts has been reflective of structural relationships of dominance-dependence, not only in terms of the historical relationships between colonizing and colonized societies and the emergence of the concept of technical assistance by experts as a sequel to a new relationship after political independence was obtained by the dependent societies, but also insofar as their concept and function express dominant values and consciousness, in both dominant and dependent societies. Denis Goulet defines opposing tendencies in interpretations of social science between those who equate development with growth, increased productivity and managerial control and those who interpret development as a process of liberation from dependence and selfdevelopment as a battle between two conflicting interpretations of historical reality, as two competing principles of social organization in which the first values efficiency and control from above, and the second social justice and self-realization.

For an analysis of the function of social scientists in maintaining dependence or promoting processes towards autonomy and the premise of domination behind the technical assistance concept and practice as it has historically developed, see Denis Goulet, "Development or Liberation?, a clash between vocabularies, revealing two conflicting interpretations of history and society", International Development Review (XIII, 3, 1971). See also, for an analysis of intellectual dependence as nurtured through the internalization of value premises of dominant social science theories, Orlando Fals Borda, Ciencia Propria y Colonialismo Intellectual (Mexico, 1970).
5. UNRISD Report, p. 4.

7. Gunnar Myrdal has clearly analysed how, in the historical development of the West, economics as a specialized science to service the interests of the new bourgeoisie, acquired its autonomous status by branching off from philosophy which retained its radical postulates but was rendered harmless by breaking its direct link with and impact on the organization of society. See Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London, 1965) and "The Place of Values in Social Policy", Journal of Social Policy (Cambridge, January 1972). In his study on class structure in the social consciousness Stanislaw Ossowski analyses the class structure in historical perspective to show how both Marxist and Christian doctrine developed ways of reconciling their original radical premises and principles with the actual process of development of class structure and inequality, adapting themselves to the needs of the ruling classes or new regimes and thereby implicitly supporting newly acquired privileges and interest positions. "In its official interpretation Christianity justified the discrepancy between the principles of Christ's teaching and reality, on the grounds of the corruption of human nature, which made it impossible for the Kingdom of God to be realized here on earth." Marxist doctrine adopted the aprioristic thesis that "social classes are only possible in a situation where there exists private ownership of the means of production". The separation between words and practices that served revolutionary movement expressed itself in the ritualization of practices, thereby reconciling the material absence of equality and community with the creation of consciousness about an ideal community based on solidarity. The sharing of bread and wine continued to bear the name of communion when it was transformed into a sacrament given at the altar. On Maundy Thursday the bishop continued to carry out the ritual of washing the beggars' feet, but this action did not lessen the gap which divided them nor help to make relations between Church dignitaries and the Christian population more democratic. 


8. In his critique of the study by the Swedish economist Assar Lindbeck, Political Economy of the New Left, Bruce McFarlane suggests that behind the focus by liberal economics on marginal adjustment to the prevailing economic order is the epistemological assumption that "intellectual activity has no capacity to consider total change, the transformation of a totality of social relations". McFarlane rightly says that such an assumption guarantees that economic thinking will preserve the status quo by only proposing gradual reforms. "The Political Economy of the New Right", Review of Radical Political Economics (IV, 2, 1972).


10. For a fundamental critique of the assumptions underlying liberal economic planning and the use of mathematical models, see Paul Baran, "Economics of Two Worlds" in The Longer View, Essays toward a Critique of Political Economy (New York, 1969), p. 85: "We have then to ask which aspects of that reality are taken into account and which are abstracted from. If, as we believe the case, what is abstracted from, includes essential characteristics of capitalism, the models involved not only fail to advance our
understanding of the system but actually help to obscure them. For by postulating the existence of adequate direct or indirect controls over the behaviour of key variables when in fact none exist, by assuming the absence of monopoly when in fact it is ubiquitous and far-reaching in its effects... the currently fashionable models abstract from the most essential characteristics they seek to explain. Thus they substitute for the capitalist economy an imaginary national system which has nothing in common with capitalism but the name. The result is an apologetic defense of the status quo and this quite apart from the subjective intentions of the model builders. The apologetic role played by this kind of theorizing is by no means reduced by the apparent precision attained though the use of mathematics. In fact, it is the other way around. Both mathematical language and mathematical reasoning can be particularly treacherous in that they permit the drawing of logically impeccable conclusions from inadequate premises and create the appearance of a coordinated and cohesive system when in reality no such system exists."

See also the view of Georg Lucâks on the 'unscientific nature of the scientific approach' in the social sciences, which tends to identify the 'pure facts' which it registers by way of statistical and mathematical precision methods with reality itself, thereby bypassing reality as a process of continuous transformation of which facts are only momentary expressions. Thus, the major problem in the use of such methods is their a-historical character and their tendency to disregard facts as the expression of a totality of dynamic relationships. Lucâks also stresses the nature of these methods as a historical product of a particular (capitalist) mode of production and their use in its maintenance and continuity. *Was ist Orthodoxer Marxismus, Geschichte und Klassebewusstsein* (Berlin, 1971), pp. 64-65.

11. The values given to social phenomena and the transformations taking place in the process of societal change are rooted in the valuations by people which, in turn, are rooted in the experiences and form of consciousness which they have as belonging to a particular class. On the nature of social classes as the only historical subjects and the trans-individual nature of individual consciousness, see Lucien Goldmann, "Reflections on History and Class Consciousness", *Aspects of History and Class Consciousness* (London, 1971).

12. UNRISD Report, p. 19: "The capacity to choose an autonomous style of development conditions the possibility of making choices in all other areas." Here, the relationship should be stressed between autonomy as a condition for creative and independent thinking and action and the formation of self-consciousness and the development of authentic societal images of the future. See, on the relationship between the structure of underdevelopment and dependent consciousness and inauthenticity of motivation, an essay by the Peruvian philosopher-sociologist, Augusto Salazar Bondy, in *Peru Probleme* (Lima, 1969).


15. Mahbub ul Haq, Senior Economic Adviser to the World Bank, while recognizing the 'disastrous consequences' of a planning orientation in dependent free market societies which separates distribution from production, and while suggesting the invalidity and irrelevance of liberal economic thinking behind the assumption that somehow accumulation has to precede distribution and that somehow distribution
will result from and can be arranged for by policies of gradual reforms and correctives, ascribes the theoretical views dominant in liberal economic thinking to 'lack of insight' which "we, economists, unfortunately used to have". It should be clear to ul Haq and other economists, who attribute the deficiencies of their theoretical views to lack of insight, that such theoretical insights have not been formed in vacuo but in function of the needs and interests of the former and present ruling classes. The acquisition or admission of such an insight is incompatible with the scientific claim and need to allege scientific objectivity. The position of social science in claiming universal validity necessarily excludes the possibility of awareness of own ideological assumptions as these would make explicit the relationships of social science with the particular configuration of the power structure of society, and would therefore undermine its function in the service of society. Mahbub ul Haq, Report of the International Development Conference (April 19-21, 1972, Washington D.C.).


A similar position is taken by Dudley Seers who, while recognizing the relative futility of the traditional liberal economic approach to problems of underdevelopment, insists upon the urgency of radically new approaches to the problems of increasing inequality and poverty, but refuses to consider the subservient function that practitioners of liberal economics have to play. Thus, the necessity of new forms of social control through transformation of the prevailing social order and power structure as preconditional to development is evaded and it is concluded that the ruling classes instead of concentrating on maximization of growth ought now to give full attention to the eradication of poverty and inequality.


16. Consider the role of the public sector in realizing those infrastructural works needed by the private sector and which the private sector does not want to undertake in view of their low profitability and risky nature. It is not argued here that the State should not undertake those projects which are necessary for national development. What is suggested is that it is misleading to subsume such planning under national or even socialist planning and to claim its value in function of society and the community as such. It should be realized, however, that the emphasis on national development and national planning is a necessary aspect of the socialization process by the ruling classes insofar as socialization helps to facilitate and make viable the accumulation process, providing it with a moral basis in the consciousness of those who are not its principal beneficiaries.

See on India: Angus Maddison, Class Structure and Economic Growth, India and Pakistan since the Moghuls (London, 1971) and on Brazil: Theotonio dos Santos, "La nueva Dependencia" in La Nueva Dependencia (Series America Problema 2, Lima, 1988).

17. John Friedmann distinguishes "system maintaining actions which may be either adaptive or developmental and which intend both to accomplish their ends by non-violent means within an accepted set of governing rules", and "systems transforming actions" which will tend to appear when "important social groups are no longer satisfied in their basic claims against those who hold power in society or when the adaptive capacity of a societal system to
cope with external and internal changes is grossly insufficient."

The disaffected groups will eventually challenge the legitimacy of the rules by which society is governed and attempt to substitute for the existing institutional bases a new set of rules that will fundamentally alter the relationships of power in society." Friedmann calls planning which is joined to revolutionary activity counterplanning to distinguish it from adaptive or developmental planning. John Friedmann, Notes on Societal Action (The Ford Foundation, Santiago de Chile, December 1968).

As Friedmann suggests, the emergence of counterplanning can only be seen in terms of a process which originates in the conditions of a society which prevent the necessary transformations from taking place. His use in this context of the term developmental planning is confusing in that it might suggest that the transformations whose necessity he recognizes in a given historical process, are to be distinguished from development. Such a position is obviously based on an ideological position which favours equilibrium and stability over disequilibrium and instability, and tends to bypass unity and dialectical opposition in the historical process of evolution and revolution, adaptation and transformation, planning and counterplanning, construction and destruction. It seems inappropriate to associate counterplanning only with revolutionary action, it should stand for any action which helps people to realize and articulate their own interests, to organize in their promotion of defense and to take action as far as these interests are undermined and disfavoured in or through official governmental planning. Revolutionary action may become necessary as the resistance to change by those defending their vested interests and privileges does not allow for transformation, and they defend their interests in such a way that the prevailing order loses its legitimacy and action by force becomes inevitable.


Against the analysis of Jacoby who shows the serious discrepancy between statements, norms, objectives and the actual practice of loan policy of the World Bank stands the optimistic view of Tinbergen who recognizes the past mistakes of the Bank but argues that "like all intelligent persons or institutions, they have learned from experience and have adopted new policies", more suited to the needs of the developing countries. Tinbergen apparently believes that an aid policy may be expected to respond to the needs of the dependent societies (and the majority of their populations), thanks to the proper use of intelligence. He is apparently not willing to recognize that the Bank (as each Bank) functions in a historically-conditioned context that shapes the political premises and norms on which it formulates and implements its economic policy. This comes out clearly in his review of the Hayter study. Although Tinbergen agrees with her
thesis and a number of other important points, although he sympathizes with her view "that Western economists frequently are not in a position to employ the proper theories that could be beneficial to the development of the poor nations", although he also concedes that her book was written 'with careful effort', he nevertheless reproaches her for the use of "emotionally charged terms" and her polarized views although admitting that "South American polarisation is indeed mainly the fault of the ruling groups and ... has been often unintentionally fostered by the Bank and Fund." The implication of Tinbergen's view would seem to be that somehow Miss Hayter should have avoided bringing out the ideological and political premises on which International Agencies have to operate. Such an exercise leads to what Samir Amin in "L'Accumulation à l'Echelle mondiale" calls an economic science, based on the "idéologie des harmonies universelles". (Tinbergen, Review of Teresa Hayter's Aid as Imperialism in Development and Change, IV, 1, 1972-73.


24. See Fals Borda's historical analysis of the concept of subversion and his conclusion that, from a sociological standpoint, subversion is to be seen as "reflecting the internal contradictions of the social order, discovered by its members during a given historical period in the light of new, valued goals". Orlando Fals Borda, Subversion and Development, the Case of Latin America (Eleventh Annual John Knox Lecture, Europe Third World Center, Geneva, June 1970). See on opposite and changing interpretations of revolutionary processes: Joost Kuitenbrouwer, "On the Practice and Theory of Affluence and Poverty, Some Reflections" (Occasional Paper No. 33, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, February 1973).


28. The constraints with which a regional liberation movement is confronted as a result of the intricate interplay of forces at a wider national and international level are lucidly analysed by the American historian John Womack in Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (Penguin books, 1972).

29. UNRISD Report, pp. 33-34. This is an obvious reference to China and Cuba.

30. Istvan Meszaros, op.cit.

31. UNRISD Report, p. 31.

32. See the discussion by Bettelheim of two alternative approaches to accumulation represented by the Russian and Chinese approach which he relates to the development of divergent class structures in each of these societies, and of whose effects on the productive and social structure he analyses. Particularly interesting is his analysis of the persistent problems in Russian agriculture which he ascribes to the resistant and silent protest among the rural and agricultural population in view of the inequitable distribution of the social product. Charles Bettelheim, "Due tipi di Accumulazione, La differenza entre il modelo di sviluppo cinese e sovietico", il Manifesto (Numero 5, Maggio, 1970, p. 624). See also Alex Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (Pelican, 1969).


38. See the discussion by Stanislaw Ossowski (op.cit., p. 191) of how, in Eastern Europe, use was made in defense of the status quo of the demand for historical treatment of social processes (inherent in a Marxist approach to the problems of society), as such an approach may protect and support the contention that phenomena taken from different social orders are incomparable.

39. Istvan Meszaros, The Necessity of Social Control (Isaac Deutscher Memorial Lecture, London School of Economics, 1971), who demonstrates the futility of the attempt to solve the crisis within the prevailing societal framework and who cogently argues that the attempt to solve major problems in the industrially advanced countries within the terms of the status quo creates the very conditions which contribute to its breakdown and to action by those who increasingly lose control over the conditions of their
own life, work and environment to search and press for new forms of social control.

40. See the interview with Gunnar Myrdal in the FAO Review CERES, "No Diplomacy in Social Science", March 1971. Although one may wholeheartedly agree with Myrdal on the necessity for social scientists to break the rules of the game by which they demonstrate their subservience to the prevailing order and thereby become complices in the shaping of such an order, it is too simplistic to translate the problem into primarily moral terms and not to recognize the necessary incorporation of social scientists in the prevailing order as a structurally rooted phenomenon which produces its own immorality and corruption.

See Johan Galtung's analysis of the MIT study made for the Club of Rome, which wholly bypasses the political and social nature of the crisis in the West and implicitly suggests that solutions can be found within the given context of social relations by the use of appropriate techniques. Such an ideological approach based on the premises of identity and harmony of interest conceals the problems of exploitation and alienation, and sees the solution of the increasing non-viability of the industrially advanced societies basically as the concern and responsibility of a technocratic elite, without in any way touching upon the question in whose service such an elite (given the prevailing power structure) can be expected to act. Johan Galtung, "Christendom en Kapitalisme voeren de mens en natuur naar de Ondergang", (Christianity and Capitalism lead man and nature to perdition), De Groene Amsterdammer (7 februari 1973).

41. Mahbub ul Haq (op.cit.), after having made clear that China has proved that the eradication of poverty and full employment do not require high rates of growth, and after proposing (to representatives of free-market societies) that "we must get away from the tyranny of the demand concept and replace it by the concept of minimum needs", and that production and distribution "must be generated at the same time", proposes that much can be learned from China and that a detailed study of its experience be undertaken. The question is: can such an objective study be undertaken unless by those who accept that minimum needs have to replace the functioning of the market and distribution is as essential for development as production? As Joan Robinson in "Chinese Economic Policy", Modern China Series, no 2 (Anglo Chinese Educational Institute, London, 1971) says: "The excuse, usually advanced for ignoring China is that it is difficult to get information about what is going on there. In fact, anyone who wants to can find out a great deal." It is obvious that deeply-rooted ideological inhibitions and constraints continue to play a great role.

42. W.F. Wertheim "Rainbow Bridge Commune Revisited" in Dawning of an Asian Dream, Selected Articles on Modernization and Emancipation (Amsterdam, 1973). In this essay Wertheim shows the changes and advances which took place in a Chinese commune which he had visited in 1957, 1964 and 1970. While the positive results of the Cultural Revolution with its far-reaching effects on communal and county decentralization and self-reliance in the context of provincial decentralization are often stressed, particularly in terms of the widespread emergence of small and middle-scale industrial activity in the countryside and the integration of agriculture and industry (see the excellent analysis by Jon Sigurdson, "Rural Industry - a Traveller's View",...
China Quarterly, June 1972), there is also an opposite approach. Audrey Donnithorne, "China's Cellular Economy, Some Economic Trends Since the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly (Oct. - Dec. 1972), rather then emphasizing the balancing effects of this increased self-reliance, attempts to demonstrate the necessarily polarising consequences of a development policy if and when the State retains a limited capacity of intervention in order to balance out emerging inequalities and to transfer profits from wealthier and stronger to poorer and weaker communes and regions. It is suggested that an all-out emphasis on self-reliance will inevitably promote costly inefficiency. The concept of maximizing returns which would underlie a policy of optimum economies of scale as the principle for industrial development, however, runs wholly counter to the philosophy of egalitarianism that pervades the China of today as the increased consciousness by commune members of their right to decide their own needs and what to produce and consume within the context of the priorities indicated at the Provincial level. This last view, which opines that China would follow the most suitable policy for industrialization if it should return to the Western free-market or socialist path, does not really take seriously China's alternative approach and the enormous benefits derived therefrom in terms of labour utilisation, income distribution, speed and rate of internal (local) accumulation, exploitation of local resources in function of local needs, minimisation of transport costs and, above all, the diminution and eradication of the negative effects of the three great differentials: the inequalities between agriculture and industry, cities and countryside, and intellectual and manual labour. It should by now be clear that the Chinese are not slaves of the concepts of costs and efficiency as these rule the free enterprise or free market system. As Sigurdson makes clear, the Chinese have made substantial advances in integrating the various kinds of rural industries at the county level so that losses of industries which work at higher costs than prices are balanced by the profits of industries in which costs are usually below prices (costs in other industries usually being equal to prices). Most absent in the last analysis is the assumption that the Chinese are a highly pragmatic people who have time and time again proved able to resolve their problems and to be willing and capable of correcting mistakes. Rather than basing themselves on a prefabricated theoretical scheme, the Chinese formulate their theoretical views on the basis of whether a particular approach works in practice. Far from running the risk of becoming a metaphysical compulsive category, theory is constantly subject to change insofar as the well-being of the people requires such change and the needs for it crystallize and come forth from the unity and critical interaction between cadres, state, and people who, through their communes which function as local units of the State, have since the Cultural Revolution acquired a significant measure of control in matters concerning their own life, work, and the fruits of their work. In this sense, the Chinese are seriously attempting to put into practice the theoretical views of Marx on the necessity of doing away with the State, and on alienation, and they have actually left behind a dogmatic and distorted type of petrified Marxism which has eradicated from its core the author's basic insights on conditions for self-realization and radical democracy as undermining the position of the new ruling classes.
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43. Goethe, "Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst, das ist im Grund der Herren eigener Geist, in dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln", in Faust.

Karl Marx, The German Ideology: "If now in considering the course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute to them an independent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were dominant, without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of those ideas, if we thus ignore the individuals and world conditions which are the source of the ideas we can say that ... during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc. were dominant. This conception of history which is common to all historians, particularly since the eighteenth century, will necessarily come up against the phenomenon that increasingly abstract ideas hold sway, i.e. ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality. For each new class which puts itself in the place of the one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only national, universally valid ones."

Claude Meillassoux, "From Reproduction to Production", A Marxist Approach to Anthropology, Economy and Society, I.1: "Liberal economics was an historical and political attempt by the rising bourgeoisie to demonstrate that economics is ruled by 'natural' and 'universal' laws with which even the princes had to comply. Capitalism has dwelt since on the same doctrinal assumption, that is, that it is a natural and universal system and therefore immutable. This bias supports the same original purpose: to give the bourgeoisie apparent scientific ground for its political domination. To accept this premise is to accept (willingly or not) the ideology of domination of the capitalist class."

Also in Henry Bernstein and Brian van Arkadie (eds), Development and Underdevelopment (London, 1973).


47. Barrington Moore, Political Power and Social Theory (Harvard, 1958), p. 139.


See also: Samir Amin, L'accumulation à l'Echelle Mondiale (Paris-Dakar, 1971), p. 15, who argues that western economic theory, working with a-historical abstract concepts supposed to have universal validity (as the homo economicus), necessary relies on a theory of universal harmonies and has to necessarily disregard the dynamics of society and the transformation of structures, reason why it considers conflict as exogenous to the societies it deals with. Amin radically distinguishes between economic development theory (as an attempt to interpret the genesis and development of economic relations) and the "art of management" as the effort to make a system work and to maintain it.


55. Ibid., p. 22. Gramsci writes: "In the modern world the category of intellectuals expanded itself in an extraordinary way. The democratic-bureaucratic social system has produced an impressive mass of intellectuals who may be justified in their existence not so much from the point of view of the needs of production as from the point of view of the political needs of the ruling class." Gramsci emphasized here the expansion of state functions. He could not yet be aware of the massive incorporation of intellectuals in the productive structure of the (Multi-National) corporations which not only need them in the Planning, Management and Research but also in adapting society to its requirements (in government, advertisement, mass communication, education). See footnote 51.


58. See the findings of the psychiatrist Ronald J. Laing, among others, in The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (Penguin Books, 1965), in particular his thesis that expressions of psychosis may relate to the refusal to grant the possibility to assume own responsibility and autonomy as a condition for self-realization, their psychosis emerging as a protest against authoritarian repressive behaviour and as a form of desperate self-protection. See also Thomas S. Szasz, Ideology and Insanity (New York, 1970)

59. See the reference by Jan Foudraine in Wie is van Hout? to the successful move by the medical establishment in the 1920s to monopolize the field of psychiatry as a branch of the medical profession, and how this incorporation by a vested interest group prevented development of the treatment of psychosis as being reflective of social problems (Utrecht, 1912).

60. See the valedictory by W.F. Wertheim, "De eclips der Eliten", in which he analyzes the Chinese approach to the relationship between Intelligence, Elitism and Equality, and his answer to reactions: Intermediair (23 February and 6 April 1973). See also on the concept of human nature as "fixed endowment" vs. nature realized in self-transcendence through human activity: Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation London, 1970

61. See the analysis by the Dutch sociologist Abraham de Swaan of the perception Dutch factory workers have of their work, the world, and their place in Een Boterham met Tevredenheid (Amsterdam, 1972).

62. See the critical review by Rodolfo Stavenhagen in the FAO Review CERES, 16, July-August 1970, of the study by Venezian and Gamble, The Development of Mexican agriculture, in which Stavenhagen
illustrates their almost total disregard, when judging the success of different types of farming, of the support given to each type and the effects thereof. Such disregard for the development of the class structure is clearly demonstrated in Mexican policies which reversed a development which unambiguously showed the capacity of the peasantry who were traditionally regarded as resistant to change. See also "Collective Farming in Mexico" by Shlomo Eckstein in Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America, ed. Rodolfo Stavenhagen (New York, 1970).

See also the severe criticism by Andrew Pearse in Ceres, No. 18, Nov.-Dec., 1970, of the study by Everett Rogers, Modernization among Peasants, the Impact of Communication (New York, 1969).

Gunnar Myrdal has described the accumulative, mutually reinforcing dialectical nature and dynamics of such a process in his path-breaking study The American Dilemma, on the situation of the American negroes. For an analysis of the interdependence of structural dependency and limitations on consciousness and perception, based on field studies of the Peruvian peasantry, see William Whyte "Algunos Correlatos socio-sociales de los sistemas de dominación" in: Dominacion y Cambios en el Peru Rural (Lima, 1969).

Ernest Feder writes in The Rape of the Peasantry (New York, 1971), p. 111: "In a sense, the landed elite is prisoner of its own harsh system which it has fashioned because it cannot relax the rules regulating peasant treatment without sapping the foundation of the system. But the peasants too are prisoners of the system, because their attitudes and values have themselves become institutionalised over time and represent a significant obstacle to the process of self-liberation. They are part of the total cultural pattern of Latin American rural life. Their fear of the landlords, of their agents, the administrators (farm managers), and in fact all agents of authority associated with the elite, is a difficult obstacle for them to overcome. In their search for greater freedom and greater welfare, this fear manifests itself in submissiveness, evasiveness and a sense of frustration. In this manner, the peasants have become their own enemies."


See Manuel Castells, La Question Urbaine (Paris, 1972). Castells develops a theoretical approach to show how differences in the structure of urban-rural relationships express the prevailing modes of production and the social structure. He implicitly rejects current sociological interpretations of the urbanization phenomenon as a cultural phenomenon. His view leads him to the proposition that spatial and physical organization of society can only be understood in terms of the interpretation of the evolving class and social structure. His view has important implications insofar as it helps to distinguish between regional development as an activity of management in a given societal system and as a theory explaining regional disequilibria and the way to overcome them. See also the series of studies published on this problem in Tiers Monde (Avril-Juin 1972, No. 50), "Modernisations et espaces dérivés" in which an attempt is made to develop a historical, methodological approach to the problem of uneven regional development in dependent societies.
Consider how in community development and agricultural development programmes based on the assumption of harmony of interest between landlords and tenants or workers, the expansion of the road network, irrigation canals, and the supply of inputs and facilities, have largely benefitted the more well-to-do and powerful members of the community; a process which has particularly intensified with the promotion of the so-called Green Revolution. See among others: Erich Jacoby: Man and Land, The Fundamental Relationship (London, 1971); Gunnar Myrdal on India in Asian Drama; Barrington Moore, also on India in Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; and Harry M.Cleaver, "The Contradictions of the Green Revolution", Monthly Review (June 1972). What is to be observed are not only the emerging disparities but how the advantages actually accruing to a minority are conceptualized into a general theory, proposed to be universally valid and of benefit to the community as a whole. Partial structural reforms are likely to have limited or even retrogressive effects unless they form part of a total process of structural transformation. See the excellent analysis by Solon Barraclough of the need of the Chilean Government to conceive its Land Reform Policy in the framework of an overall policy for transformation. Barraclough says: "The key to the future of the new Government's Agrarian Reform will not be encountered in the agricultural sector but in the system of power relationships in the entire society. The fate of the Agrarian Reform will inevitably be determined in large measure by the relative success or failure of the Government's overall strategy of structural change" ("Agrarian Reform and Structural Change in Latin America: The Chilean Case" in the Journal of Development Studies, No. 2, 1972).

"The difficulty with regional plans is that unless they collectively cover the whole national territory, it is not possible to see the development problems and possibilities from a national point of view or to transfer resources from one region to another in order to achieve a judicious balance between them. In order for regional plans to reflect national priorities, they must be integrated in a national plan - which is not the practice in the majority of developing countries." FAO Fifth Report on Land Reform (UN, New York, 1970), p. 288. Examples of flaws in regional planning outside a structure of national central planning are given in the study by Albert Waterston, Development Planning, Lessons of Experience (Maryland, 1965). No mechanistic assumption can be made of the effects of central planning and regional planning in that context. If the national strategy for development favours and supports free enterprise development, and subsidizes private investors and industries rather than regions, while the role of the public sector is to provide basic social and economic infrastructure for private production, it is only to be expected that central planning will reinforce prevailing regional tendencies of economic and income concentration (see e.g. the case study on a Mexican region by David Bankin, in "Regional Socio-Economic Development", U.N. Social Development Review, No. 4 (New York, 1972).

Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Erroneous Theses on Latin America" in Latin America, Reform and Revolution, ed. by James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, 1968). Stavenhagen shows how modernization and traditional structures form a dialectical unity and, as opposites, presuppose each other. He shows also how the effects of the asymmetric relationships are substantiated in terms of the duality concept and lead to sets of sociological
and psychological characteristics being attributed to each of the interdependent and mutually conditioning parts of a society which are the outcome of an indivisible historical process.

69. Such a claim cannot only be attributed to the ideology under-lying the dualist premises of liberal economic thinking that the development of the modern sector implies ipso facto the development of the stagnant traditional sector which is actually the historical product of the development of the modern sector; it also characterises orthodox Marxist thinking which refuses to dissociate itself from once-taken positions on industrialization and the role of the industrial proletariat as the only pure class, thereby risking that "what they choose to call Marxism will have nothing to do with what happens in the world" (Aidon Foster-Carter, "New Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment" in Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol. 3, No. 1, 1973). Compare with footnote 32.

70. Georg Lukacs, op.cit., p. 63.

71. Barrington Moore, Political Power and Social Theory, p. 117.

72. This seems to be Wertheim's position in Evolutie en Revolutie (Amsterdam, 1971) in which he states: "The deepest ground of fundamental social change and of the dynamics of social evolution seems to lie in the leeway which remains necessarily available in each society for deviating values and norms which people adhere to either individually or in distinct social groups" (p. 143, my translation). Wertheim dismisses the validity of functionalist theory with its implication of homogeneity of values and its judgement of deviant values as anomic, in view of the cultural variety and heterogeneity characterizing each society (p. 159). See however also Wertheim's position in his paper on "Resistance to Change" (footnote 25), which presents a position which seems to contradict that cited above. In my view, the same can be said of other passages in the above study in which a direct relationship between the dynamics of emancipation and material interest position conditions is traced. It is likely that Wertheim in Evolutie en Revolutie has overemphasized the role of people's values in healthy reaction to the distorted mechanistic interpretations of Marx in which "consciousness is crudely subsumed under economy and is seen as a mere product of capitalist economic development" (Meszaros), a position which wholly bypasses the dialectical relationship between material conditions and consciousness and the nature of the economic structure as determined determinant.

73. Istvan Meszaros "Contingent and Necessary Class Consciousness", op.cit., p. 93.


75. Such a change in interpretation should be imputed less to a wrong judgement in the past but rather to the profound changes which have taken place in the objective conditions of the peasantry who, while seriously suffering from the negative effects of modernization, saw its isolation strongly diminished. The limited benefit derived by the peasantry from the process of change
becomes more obvious as its situation gradually deteriorates.
See, for instance, the report by the research and policy division of the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs on the causes and nature of agrarian tensions in India where the spread of conflict, as a result of increasing contradictions, is said to assume serious proportions. A remarkable feature of this report is the open recognition that increasing conflict and violence are principally due to the defense by the poor peasantry of its legitimate claims. See also the analysis by Anibal Quijano of the changing circumstances of the Latin American peasantry whose isolation, which impressed Marx so much, is ending and whose traditional feudal-religious perception of the world is changing, factors which lead them to gradually perceive their common interests and to organize around these. Anibal Quijano, "Contemporary Peasant Movements", Elites in Latin America (ed. by S.M. Lipset, Oxford, 1967).

76. The UNRISD Report mentions the following features as characterizing the situation in dependent societies: "The inability to offer productive and representative employment to an important part of the potential labour force. The inability to distribute the fruits of growth so as to relieve mass poverty and prevent the gap between minorities enjoying 'modern' consumption patterns and the rest of the production from widening, inability to accord to the masses of the population either the reality or the feeling of participation in developmental decision making, societal disruption and rising levels of violence of several kinds. Violation of basic human rights by groups holding power, squandering of irreplaceable natural resources and environmental degradation, unmanageable rapid population growth and concentration in cities."
The report adds, without hesitation, that many of these traits have become prominent in the advanced countries and weaken their credibility as an example for the poor countries. Attack on Mass Poverty and Unemployment (UN, 1972) opens its analysis of the problem, after having mentioned the increasing disparity in wealth and poverty, increasing productivity and underutilization of labour, by stating: "in a world, pulsating with improving communications, these growing disparities generate urges and pressures which cannot be contained for any length of time."

77. Marshall Wolfe, Director of the Social Division of UN ECLA, seminar session at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, in November 1972, when analyzing the Latin American situation.

78. See Ernest Feder's analysis of the way pressures for transformation are absorbed by an array of counterpolicies which are fed into governmental planning for agrarian reform, thus subverting authentic transformation; Ernest Feder, "Counter Reform" in Stavenhagen (ed.), Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America (Garden City, 1970). See, in the same study, the analysis by Henry Landsberger and Cynthia Hewitt: "Ten Sources of Weakness and Cleavage in Latin American Peasant Movements".

80. Norbert Elias, in "Processes of State Formation and Nation Building", emphasizes this point in an analysis of the formation of European States, in which he argues that "the main axis of social tensions and conflict of European societies was not that between workers and capitalists" but the outcome of a "three-cornered struggle between land-owning aristocracy and court elites, the rising industrial middle class groups and behind them, the rising industrial working classes."


82. As suggested by Rodolfo Stavenhagen in his "Seven Erroneous Theses on Latin America", in which he rejects the traditional orthodox Marxist thesis of identity of interests of these two groups.

83. See, for an analysis of the emergence of labour aristocracies in Africa: Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa" in: Modern African Studies (6, 2, 1968). Note in particular how the changing consumption pattern of this group promotes import and reduces the possibility for the indigenous peasantry to expand its production and thus to improve its conditions. This process exemplifies how modernization not only relies on the exploitation of the hinterland but also how it may lead to its elimination as a source of production for current needs and becomes in this process a-functional.

84. Hamza Alavi used this expression in lectures in the I.S.S. Rural Development Programme to describe the development of agricultural organizations in West Pakistan. His view may be seen as a reaction to the analysis by Ernest Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America", New Left Review, No. 67 (May–June 1971) who cogently argues that recognition of the persistence of the feudal mode of production in no way implies a dualist thesis (as Gunder Frank suggests), shows the interdependence of capitalism and feudalism but continues to distinguish them as two distinct modes of production.

85. UNRISD Report, p. 63: "The dychotomy between objectives and means and the supposition that the selection of objectives must precede the determination of means lies at the heart of much conventional planning", and planning exercises often "specify broad objectives of equity and structural change in the preamble but disregard them in the body of the plan", to which may be added 'in practice' (p. 62).

86. As suggested by Mahbub ul Haq and by Dudley Seers (footnote 15).

87. Karl Marx, The German Ideology.


Franco Ferrarotti: "to affirm the de-anthropomorphising character of science and at the same time to theorize about the self-creation of individuals acting historically strikes me as contradictory".

Georg Lukacs: "It is contradictory only from a non-dialectical point of view, or from that of naïve realism. The historicity of science discovered by Marxism, makes of it a human undertaking in the full sense, a potential instrument of liberation. Of course in this way science loses its halo of absolute and perennial certainty."

90. See Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach, "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, that is the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."

Mao Tse Tung: "The truth of any knowledge or theory is determined not by subjective feeling but by objective results in social practice. Only such social practice can be the criterium of truth", *On Practice* (1937).

91. See the analysis by Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, p. 220-21, of how in China the erosion of the established order was decisively influenced by the Reforms which ended stability and spelled the end of the legitimacy of the gentry and the Confucian value system which had supported it, so that the gentry had to recur to private violence in order to continue their squeeze on the peasantry, which in turn helped to deepen the legitimacy of the prevailing order. A similar situation is manifest in many societies, including India and Pakistan. See the paper on India mentioned in footnote 75, and the description of the interdependence and complementarity in Pakistan of the role of the public protectors of the law and the widespread exercise of private, violent, predatory practice, with the silent support of the forces of law and order: Hamza Alavi, "The Politics of Dependence, A Village in West Punjab", *South Asian Review* (Vo. 4, No. 2, January 1971).

92. See Antonio Gramsci, *Il Materialismo Storico*, p. 135, where he speaks of the need for the intellectual to know, understand and feel, and for the people not only to feel and understand but, also to know. He says: "The mistake of the intellectual lies herein that he believes that he can know without understanding and in particular without little feeling and without becoming deeply involved not only for knowledge's sake but in its object. The intellectual believes that he can be an intellectual even although he has no tie with the people, that is to say, without feeling the elementary feelings and concerns of the people, without understanding them and therefore explaining and justifying them in a particular historical situation. If such a relation is not there, the relations of intellectuals with the people are purely bureaucratic and formal or become so. The intellectuals become a priestly caste" (my translation).

93. Here the interpretation of the critical task of sociology and its responsibility to submit the facts to permanent critical review so as to elucidate their meaning comes in. "A positivist sociology prohibits itself from criticising the existing order of social reality. Sociology runs the risk of losing any critical capacity while it takes only factual conditions as its criterion. This leads to distrust in everything that is different, in any question about the legitimacy of society. The pressure to limit ourselves to what is given begins to have
absurd consequences. The real given, that is to say, the social relations which prescribe people's behaviour to a high degree, lies in the positivist conception of sociology outside the domain of sociology. Only through a critical position can social science be more than merely the duplication of reality; interpreting reality means at least breaking this claim. Such a critique is not subjectivism but the confrontation of the object with its own concept. Factual reality only becomes visible if one studies it from the perspective of true interest, the interest of a free society, of a just state, of human self-realization. He who refuses to measure reality on what it wants to signify, not only perceives reality superficially but also wrongly. ("Begriff der Soziologie", Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie IV, Soziologische Exkurse, 1965).


Adorno counterposes the dialectical method to the social science approach, based on the fetishism of the facts, in turn responding to the fetishism of objectivity. He stresses the total functionality of people in modern society to the productive apparatus which attempts to shape their needs and consciousness in accordance with its own requirements, inducing them to accept the social order as it is, as normative, so that they thereby consolidate their function as objects in the social process.

95. "La technocratie, aujourd'hui, a besoin d'une idéologie qui la justifie et permette l'intégration à la société qu'elle veut constituer. Or la mondialisation de la technique et de la conception technocratique présuppose une réduction et même une liquidation de l'histoire (considéré comme poids mort, résidu, encore plus gênant que pittoresque). Par contre, la pensée historique affirme qui les contenus ou autont et plus d'importance et d'intérêt que les formes. Elle dit que formes et structures se font et se défont, se dissolvent ou éclatent. Elle met sur le même plan, dans le temps, la formation des structures (structuration) et leur disparition (destructuration)...

L'irrationnel apparent réclame son intégration, non pas à une philosophie ou à des formes qui la repoussent, mais à une conception de l'homme tout entier. Faute de quoi il se révolte. La théorie de l'aliénation dénonce les féétichismes, les scissions, les mutilations de l'Être humain total. Elle dénonce en particulier l'alienation technique, technologique, technocratique, récemment promue on rang de grande alienation humaine". Henry Lefebvre in his essay "Réflexion sur le Structuralisme et l'Histoire, op.cit. See also the analysis by Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the Executive Bureau of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia on "the conflict between technocracy and the forces of self-management" as an expression of class struggle to which he attributes the rising tensions in his country and the world of today. Socialist Thought and Practice, No. 50, Jan.-Febr. 1973.


97. Barrington Moore, Reflections upon the Causes of Human Misery, (Boston, 1972), p. 71. It is surprising that Barrington Moore as an historian wholly bypasses experiences in new forms of socialist democracy as they have emerged in countries such as China and Vietnam, and bases his scepticism on experiences of societies which for particular historical reasons, as he argues, have not been able to pursue the originally taken road.
See views of Mao Tse Tung such as the following, expressed during the Cultural Revolution period, in Jerome Ch'en, Mao Papers, Anthology and Bibliography (London, 1970): "Politics must follow the mass line. It will not do to rely on leaders alone. How can the leaders do so much? The leaders can only cope with a fraction of everything, good and bad. Everyone has a pair of eyes and a mouth and he must be allowed to see and speak up. Democracy means allowing the masses to manage their own affairs. Here are two ways: one is to depend on a few individuals and the other is to mobilise the masses to manage affairs. Our politics is mass politics. Democracy is the rule of all, not the rule of a few. Everyone must be urged to open his mouth. He has a mouth. Therefore he has two responsibilities — to eat and to speak. He must speak up wherever he sees bad things or bad styles of work. He must follow his duty to fight." (3.6.1965, p. 101).
"It is to the advantage of despots to keep people ignorant; it is to our advantage to make them intelligent. We must lead all of them gradually away from ignorance" (11.2.1966, p. 103). "We must step forward to meet the masses, to accept their criticism, and to do our own self-criticism. This is to get ourselves near to the fire (so to speak)" (1967, p. 150). These and similar views have to be interpreted in the context of the views of the present Chinese leadership on the dialectical nature of democratic centralism in which the instrumental function of authority is emphasized. Compare these views with the elitist values underlying the traditional confucianist Chinese concept of authority. (See also footnote 60).

Leszek Kolakowski, Marxism and Beyond, on Historical Understanding and Individual Responsibility (London, 1969). In the same passage:
"The continuous influence of social consciousness is one of the necessary conditions for the maturation of history to the point of radical change."


The right to rebel has in China always found its ex-post facto legitimation in the theory of the Mandate of Heaven which in turn, by subsequent contenders of state power, was used to justify their challenge of established authority (see footnote 37). This attempt at legitimation has been fully formulated in one of the oldest books of the Chinese people, I Ching: "Political revolutions are extremely grave matters. They should be undertaken only under stress of direct necessity, when there is no other way out. Not everyone is called to this task, but only the man who has the confidence of the people, and even only when the time is ripe. He must then proceed in the right way, so that he gladdens the people and, by enlightening them, prevents excesses. Furthermore, he must be quite free of selfish aims and must really relieve the need of the people. Only then does he have nothing to regret. Times change and with them their demands. Thus the season changes in the course of the year. In the world cycle there are spring and autumn in the life of people and nations, and these call for social transformations." Striking in this ancient text is the fusion of the view on revolution as an inevitable phenomenon of nature and the voluntaristic stress on the initiative and task of an elite who can only legitimize itself by serving the people.

Compare this text with the views expressed by Mao Tse Tung on Revolution as a permanent and recurrent process and his stress on the need and obligation of the communist party cadres to go to the people, to identify with them, and to serve them.

101. See Norbert Elias, *op.cit.*


103. Joan Robinson on the occasion of a Symposium at the Free University, Amsterdam, on the Crisis in Economic Theory: "Strictly speaking, economic theory which is taught nearly everywhere and for which people receive Nobel prizes is untrue, nonsense, a pseudotheory. The corps of that theory has been to justify the existence of profits. Profit had to be as respectable as a wage: the worker is worth his wage, the capitalist is equally worth his profit. Therefore capital had to be a production factor side-by-side with labour. It is nonsense to pose that capital is a production factor. Capital is really nothing other than the power of the rich to reserve the advantages of progress for themselves. Neo-classical theory is therefore more a belief than a science. (Interview by Max Arian and Arnout Weerda, *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 16 May 1973, my translation). To the ideology of capital as (an independent) production factor corresponds the ideology which sets apart from the rest of the population a special group of people, endowed with a particular set of properties such as innovativeness, initiative, foresight, sense of risk and leadership. This observation is not intended to deny the emergence and availability of particular groups of people with special characteristics, but to emphasize this emergence and availability as the outcome of specific historical processes which favour and stimulate some groups over and at the expense of others. The attribution of capabilities to some and incapabilities to others is a necessary complement to an ideology that reserves the rewards for risk and initiative to those who control capital and prevents others from the exercise of such control.


On the logic of the maintenance of inequality in a free-market society and the necessity of a new type of society which is neither ruled by the forces of the free market nor by a bureaucratic socialist elite but by people in the context of a network of self-managed inter-dependent spheres of action: Jacques Attali and Marc Guillaume, *L'anti-Economique* (Presses universitaires de France, 1974).