




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**Rural Development Policies
and
Performance in Zambia :
a critical inventory**



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As Zambia's Second National Plan gradually comes to an end and the country prepares to embark on its Third Plan in January 1978, both regime members and policy planners will more than ever before be confronted with the ominous task of matching intentions with performance.

The purpose of this article is to study the political economy of rural development in Zambia and to analyse some of the basic factors which affected the realization of the postulated objectives. More specifically, the article examines the political economy of policy formulation and strategy of development as well as the way such major variables as the performance of the decentralized institutional structures, poor infrastructural and marketing limitations, elite values, and mass participatory orientations have affected the implementation of rural development policies within the context of the First and Second National Development Plans (1966-1976), and by extension the theoretical expectations of the rural masses since the attainment of independence in October 1964.

Rural Development in the Context of National Development Plans and Policies

Under the benevolent despotism of British colonial governments in what used to be known as Northern Rhodesia there was almost a total neglect of rural development. Strictly speaking, there was no defined set of policies or goals which guided the actions and orientations of

This essay is based on documentary research and field work undertaken in Zambia between 1975 and 1976. The field work was a part of a larger research project made possible through a fellowship grant from the Ford foundation, which the author wishes to acknowledge. A number of people have helped to facilitate my access to major policy documents on rural development in Zambia. I am particularly grateful to the Directors of the Departments of Agriculture, Marketing and Co-operatives in the Ministry of Rural Development as well as to the Managing Director of Rural Development Corporation for their assistance and informative discussion. All interpretations and conclusions in this paper are solely my responsibility.

the colonial administrators towards incorporating the rural sector in the overall framework of economic and political development.¹ Not only were economic activities and socio-economic infrastructural investments concentrated in the urban centres along the line of rail provinces (Southern, Central and Copperbelt provinces), but also in the rural sector itself within this limited geographical area productive or commercialized agriculture was carried out by a small privileged minority of European settler farmers who benefited directly and extensively from extension services and credit facilities, while the role of the African was restricted 'either to a semi-subsistence agriculture, or to providing a reserve of unskilled manpower, and a limited market for consumer goods'.² Another interesting aspect of this colonial development policy was that, although over 50 per cent of Zambia's total population, numbering about 3.5 million in 1963, lived in rural provinces outside the line of rail, such as the Northern, Luapula, Barotse (now Western Province) and North-Western Provinces, there was almost a total absence of any form of modern industry in these rural provinces and less than 2 per cent of Zambia's total work force were employed within this vast geographical area.³

This structural imbalance between the urban and rural sectors, which was further compounded by interracial inequalities in the allocation of resources as well as the inherited differential impact of modernization and economic development within the rural sector itself, largely determined the pattern of development orientation and the broad outlines of national policy issues which Zambia followed immediately after independence.

The Social and Political Objectives of Rural Development

For Zambia the ultimate goal of development, as succinctly expressed by President Kaunda in the preface to Zambia's Second National Development Plan (hereafter SNDP), 'is to ensure economic and social justice between rural and urban populations.... For us all, ...the major goal is a better life for all the people.... The emphasis is on rural development because it is the rural areas where the majority of our people live... We believe in people. Our health, education and social programmes are designed to improve the people's performance.' And in pursuance of this goal, 'there is no sub-

stitution for the people's own participation and hard work for achieving permanent development.⁴ It is clear that whatever other purpose development may have for the leaders of Zambia, the central objectives seem to cluster around the achievement of economic progress, employment and mobility opportunities in the rural sector as well as the promotion of social justice both in terms of equitable (re-)distribution of income and in terms of fostering humanist productive relations throughout the economy. These normative objectives, which served as guidelines for the formulation of the national and rural development policies incorporated into the framework of the First National Development Plan (hereafter FNDP) and the SNDP⁵ as well as the Party's 'National Policies for the Next Decade',⁶ may be specified as follows:

- (1) improvement of the rural standard of living and the creation of a self-reliant and progressive rural society;
- (2) redressing the imbalance between the urban and rural sectors through more equitable allocation of investment funds;
- (3) the elimination of inequalities between geographical areas;
- (4) the development of the rural areas as a whole, including massive expansion of agricultural production, small-scale rural enterprises and the transformation of the rural population into productive agents;
- (5) self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs and other essential agricultural products;
- (6) creation of new employment and mobility opportunities in the rural areas and the improvement of the social and economic infrastructure in the rural areas necessary for rural productivity in order to stem large-scale drift of rural labour to the urban centres.

THE STRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT

The issue of rural development is not exhausted merely in an elaborate propagation of lofty goals and ideals. In order to translate the idea of change and development in the rural sector into practical terms both the political and administrative structures as well as the mobilization of developmental resources must be geared

towards establishing a dynamic interaction between public policies and popular aspirations of the masses in the rural areas. Basically, this involves the practical issue of choosing the means to attain the desired goals. Choice is related to development in that logically, once societal goals are determined by the regime members, it dictates the strategy considered appropriate for the attainment of the set objectives. In the broadest sense, the choice of development strategies is not ethically neutral. Indeed, it is usually the product of the interaction between structural and behavioural variables. Structural variables define the ecological conditions and specific historical circumstances under which the choice of a particular strategy is conceived, whereas behavioural factors circumscribe the political orientations or the ideological reasons for the selection of specific options.⁷

*The Conditioning Structural Variables of
Zambia's Development Strategy*

Like most states in Tropical Africa, the social and economic structures which Zambia inherited at the time of independence have prompted a distinct pattern of development orientation with the rural dimension reflecting not only the underlying contradictions and uneven process of change that are characteristic of the less developed countries but also the choice of developmental strategy. Thus, despite many appearances to the contrary, the FNDP and SNDP have largely followed a distinct pattern of development orientation: namely, the underlying assumption that economic development is tantamount to urban industrial growth measured in terms of gross national product or per capita income.⁸ And that, moreover, the most appropriate strategy for realizing this objective is that of 'unbalanced growth',⁹ which envisages an improved rate of national economic growth through a sustained, balanced and simultaneous development of all sectors of the economy.

That Zambian political leaders and policy-planners attached great importance to the theory of balanced economic growth is perhaps most vividly stated in the SNDP as follows: 'The Second National Development Plan 1972-76 seeks to continue the building up of the country's economic and social infrastructure while at the same time laying the foundations for a more balanced economic development of the country'.¹⁰ However, despite the of-

ficial priority attached to this strategy, the pattern of sectoral investment allocation showed little evidence of a conscious policy purposely directed towards rectifying some of the inherited inequities and imbalance between the modern-urban and rural sectors. Thus, only about 15.43 per cent of the total public investment outlay of K563.67 million in the FNDP went to the rural sector.¹¹ Much of the capital expenditure envisaged in the rural sector was directed towards providing:

- (1) governmental inputs in the form of fertilizers, pesticides, extension services, research, storage and credit facilities, irrigation and water-works, co-operatives;
- (2) improvement of crops and livestock;
- (3) the expansion of forestry, game and fisheries.

Even less impressive is the proportion of public funds in the total outlay of capital investment allocated to the rural sector in the SNDP. Despite the noticeable increment in the total capital investment of the SNDP over the FNDP, it is striking to note that only K152.5 million out of a total investment outlay of K1,956 million (i.e. 7.79 per cent) was allocated for the development of the rural sector, as opposed to K655 million (i.e. 34.48 per cent) for mining and industry. Even if allowance is made for the addition of other public capital expenditures in the economic and social infrastructural sectors, some of which were to be undertaken in the rural areas, the total investment devoted to rural development did not exceed 11 per cent of the total outlay in the public sector.¹²

In contrast, 38.25 per cent and 45.15 per cent of the total capital expenditure in the public sector under the FNDP and SNDP respectively were devoted to economic infrastructural facilities. The priority given to the development of economic infrastructure in the two plans had both sound economic reasons and political justifications, especially considering the urgent necessity to establish alternative transport links independent of Rhodesia and South Africa. The potential impact of such economic infrastructure on agriculture and on rural development as a whole is no doubt quite important if the rural areas are to be fully integrated within the orbit of commercialized market economy. However, the economic and social infrastructural facilities envisaged in the two plans were not evenly distributed between the urban and rural sectors, but rather

er located in the modern urban centres or their peripheries. It is important to bear this point in mind, in order to appreciate fully some of the major constraints on rural developments in Zambia. In both the FNDP and SNDP the shares of capital allocation of mining and industry were 21.47 per cent and 34.48 respectively. The assumption underlying this strategy is that: 'Massive capital investment, as foreseen, will generate increased incomes and markets for food supplies and consumer goods. It is here that industrial development will play an important part in preventing a rapid expansion of imports of consumer as opposed to capital goods or raw materials.'¹³

The heavy emphasis placed on the development of economic infrastructure, quite apart from its positive political implications, had an important interdependency orientation in the minds of policy-makers. In an address to the National Council of UNIP in March 1972 the Vice-President noted that although the amount allocated to the Ministry of Rural Development under the SNDP 'is smaller than that proposed for the Ministry of Power, Transport and Works... the physical benefits expected from the investment in rural development are substantial. Moreover, apart from the direct outlay proposed for rural development as such, the programmes in respect of other sectors (including the Ministry of Power, Transport and Works) have been drawn up, keeping in mind the priority accorded to rural development.'¹⁴

The major reason why Zambia adopted the balanced growth approach was based on the assumption that massive investments in the heavy industrial sector and in economic infrastructure would generate high economic growth rates which in turn would eliminate poverty, provide employment on a large scale and contribute effectively towards redressing the inherited regional imbalance and bridging the income distribution gap and/or inequalities between the urban and rural sectors through a 'trickle-effect'.¹⁵ With specific reference to the rural sector the strategy 'is to apply scarce resources - particularly capital and skilled manpower - to those developments promising to be most productive',¹⁶ concentrating thereby on developing a system of agricultural production priorities that are 'related to the Nation's needs'.¹⁷ In this process, the direct participation of the state in providing certain technical inputs as well as in promoting farm settlement schemes and intensive development zones in the rural areas is an important aspect of the rural development strategy.

Another aspect of the overall development strategy is Zambia's dependence on one major mineral resource - copper - and on expatriate manpower skills in order to promote its development policies.

Zambia, unlike many other African countries, is relatively well endowed with natural resources, especially copper which makes up about 90 per cent of the country's total exports and until 1974 was the most important single contributor to Zambia's GDP (38 per cent in 1974). Although the Mulungushi Economic Reforms of 1968, the Matero Reforms of August 1969 and other subsequent nationalization measures brought the 'commanding heights' of the economy under state control, the excessive dependence on one major mineral resource and its vulnerability to the vicissitudes of world economic and political forces has made Zambia's dependence on foreign aid or foreign capital investment in order to promote its development policies an imperative of existence rationality in the choice of development strategy. For instance, during the period of the FNDP, external loans to the tune of K116 million were anticipated for financing major development projects in the economic and social infrastructures.¹⁸ By late 1969 the country had already concluded agreements for external loans amounting to K125 million.¹⁹ And the SNDP stated that: 'Zambia is, in view of its development potentials, capable of attracting, making use of and arranging for repayment of more foreign aid in the SNDP than in the past Plan period. It is recognised that during the SNDP the country will spend considerable foreign exchange resources for meeting repayment obligations emanating in particular from the taking over of the copper mining industry in 1969. It will be necessary to conclude fresh foreign loans during the SNDP period. A major part of these loans will continue to be channelled, as in the past, to infrastructural development. Tourism and manufacturing industry will also absorb a part of these loans.'²⁰

No less important in conditioning the choice of Zambia's development strategy is the country's excessive dependence on expatriate manpower skills. A combination of the colonial restrictive and discriminatory policy towards African education and the mass exodus of European skills at the time of Independence in 1964 has meant that, despite impressive strides during the FNDP, expatriate skills are still required to keep the machinery for implementing the nation's development policies running. This point is clearly stated in the SNDP: 'While the education and training of Zambians... will speed up

the process of Zambianization, it is impossible to produce sufficient numbers of highly skilled and experienced experts in a short period of time and Zambia will still be compelled to employ a substantial number of highly skilled expatriate experts in the immediate future... for the implementation of the basic development objectives of the country...²¹ And here, of course, quite apart from the problem of incompatibility of interests between expatriate advisers or their home countries and those of Zambia, excessive reliance on imported skills and foreign aid introduces elements of uncertainty into the implementation of various aspects of national development plans.²² Cases abound in which expatriate experts initiate development projects and depart at the end of their contract period (or in some cases even earlier) before the projects become self-sustaining, or even before local manpower are fully trained or equipped to assume autonomous responsibility. The withdrawal of Israeli rural development experts in 1973, consequent to the disrapture in diplomatic relations between Israel and Zambia which left many rural development projects financed and promoted by the Israelis hanging in the balance, is illustrative of this situation. An equally precarious situation surrounds the reliance on external capital aid. Even the availability of external sources of capital accumulation does not necessarily imply that its employment in the process of development is always to the benefit of the masses of the recipient country. Another way of stating the same problem is that in most cases the institutions which provide investment capital for economic growth are invariably closely tied to external interests which are not neutral either as to the range of inputs in investment policies²³ or as to the disposal of the investible surpluses derived from their capital. Most capital industrial investments undertaken in Zambia illustrate this maxim. They are either too capital-intensive (e.g. the Zambia Clay industries in the rural districts of Nega-Nega and Kalulushi) or excessively dependent upon imported inputs, and render the idea of self-reliance and maximum utilization of abundant local manpower and resources nugatory.

The Ideological Component of Zambia's Development Strategy

Any assessment of Zambia's development strategy will be

incomplete without relating it to the value system inherent in the Party's official ideology of Humanism.²⁴ Although when evaluated in its proper historical and contextual perspectives it is easy to identify strong tension between the central values of the ideology and elite perception on the one hand and between the former and the strategy of economic development which Zambia has adopted on the other, the importance of the ideology lies in its implications in relation to the mobilizational and participatory aspects of rural development. In other words, what makes the ideological components of Zambian Humanism interesting within the context of national policy goals is that they are based on explicit recognition that an authentic transformation of the rural sector involves a fundamental restructuring of the rural economy in order to meet concrete needs and aspirations for improved levels of living; also, they recognize the necessity of change in the existing political administrative structures, the psychological orientation of the masses, and the need for active involvement of the latter in the planning and implementation of development projects. It is in this light that the institutional and organizational arrangements which were introduced after 1968 to strengthen the local level political and administrative structures will be examined.

Decentralization of Local Government and Institutional Framework for Change in the Rural Sector

Initially, there were very few pressures for extensive reform of the inherited political and administrative structures at the local level. But with the launching of the FNDP, coupled with the newly promulgated socio-political and economic objectives, it became apparent to the ruling political leaders that the inherited colonial administrative structures were too rigid and inadequate to handle the party's radical policies.²⁵ Firstly, the national leaders assumed that the inherited colonial structures lacked horizontal integration for planning, financing, administering and implementing programmes at the local level. Government officials sent to the rural areas by their various ministries or departments owed responsibility to their parent organizations with little or no co-ordination even in overlapping fields. Secondly, the inherited local administration was ineffective in eliciting the orientation and response of the broad masses towards revolutionized agricultural production.

Their organizational structures were skewed towards extreme centralization with little flexible avenues for local inputs, thus stifling local incentive, initiative and co-operation. The third and perhaps most important reason for restructuring local administration was that policy change was necessary to assert the political supremacy and control of the Party over local level decisions and the implementation of its developmental objectives. Prior to the local administration reform measures in 1968 and 1969 the Party had had to put up with constant friction between party officials and civil servants at the local level. Many radical UNIP-sponsored development programmes met with strong resistance by civil servants and local administrators who were more interested in protecting their spheres of influence than in promoting change. One repercussion was that issues requiring urgent attention got buried in bureaucratic 'self-defence', leading to tardiness in implementation.

From the Party's point of view, it seemed obvious that the inherited local administrative structures must be reformed if they were to keep pace with the changing requirements of their environment. As President Kaunda put it: 'Development... programmes and participatory democracy require an administrative machinery which is efficient and effective as a means of not only transferring power and responsibility to the people but of guaranteeing that such power and responsibility are exercised fully by the people for their own individual social and economic welfare.'²⁶ In 1968²⁷ and again in 1969 the Party responded to the challenges posed by these concerns by introducing radical programmes of administrative decentralization in order to 'increase and widen the scope of liaison between local administration on the one hand and Party Government administration and parastatal organizations on the other'.²⁸

More specifically, the policy of administrative decentralization which followed the 1969 local government reforms placed a Cabinet Minister at the head of each Province with a permanent secretary as the chief civil servant in the Province to assist him. The Cabinet Minister is charged with overall political responsibility for policy formulation and implementation in his Province and assumes the chairmanship of the Provincial Development Committee.

At the district level, the post of District Governor was created. The Governor serves as the political head and chief coordinator of Party/government policies in the district. He is chairman of the various district

committees, including the District Development Committee, and supervises the activities of the Village Productivity Committee (WDC) and the Ward Development Committee.²⁹

Under the new local administrative system the District Governor is directly responsible to the Cabinet Minister of his Province. Simultaneously, he is directly linked to the State House and by implication to the Party through the President who appoints him. Similarly, the Provincial Cabinet Minister is linked with the Party and government by virtue of his appointment by the President and by the fact that he attends Cabinet meetings with other government ministers located in Lusaka. Until the posting of Central Committee Members to the Provinces in 1976, the sheer weight of the PCM's responsibilities, which cut across and/or integrate the activities of the various government ministries located in Lusaka, made him the most important representative of the Party and government responsible for ensuring accelerated implementation of developmental policy-objectives in the rural area.

Village Productivity and Ward Development Committees

In addition to the 1968-1969 reform measures, new grass roots political institutions, namely the Village Productivity, Ward Councils and Ward Development Committees, were created to strengthen the re-organized administrative structures. These grass-roots participatory structures came into effect in 1971 with the introduction of the Registration and Development of Villages Act.³⁰ The functions of the WDCs, Ward Councils and WDCs cover a wide range of activities which may be briefly summarized as follows.³¹

Administratively the structures serve as the basic units of local administration in the rural areas, responsible for:

- (1) the maintenance of law and order and the promotion of communal services and community interests;
- (2) structuring local activities within established channels of communication so that local leadership will not only be able to interpret national directives or policies in terms of their applicability to local interests and aspirations but also to transmit the latter to the national decision-making structures.

The political and administrative objectives of the local organizations overlap somewhat. Politically, their major function is to serve as the institutional framework for mass mobilization, or what the Party terms 'participatory democracy'.

Economically, they are expected to promote rural development and the spirit of self-reliance, including the employment of the institutions and facilities provided by the government to achieve this objective. They also participate actively in formulating and implementing rural development policies.

Socially, they assist in the promotion of health services, education of the masses, dissemination of information on rural policies and on personal hygiene, establishment and maintenance of local welfare services or amenities, and recreational facilities.

The Performance of the Rural Sector

The FNDP and SNDP and the Party's national policy objectives expected the rural sector to play a dominant role in the overall development of the country. During the first decade of independence, however, the performance of the agricultural sector proved disappointing. Not only did the anticipated integration or linkages between agricultural production and modern industrial development fail to materialize as a result of the modern sector's excessive dependence on imported inputs, but also as a result of the relatively low productivity of rural labour coupled with the high costs of locally-produced agricultural commodities vis-à-vis imports. The attraction of the high urban wage structure, especially in the mines and parastatal organizations, induced large-scale migration of enterprising individuals to the urban centres, thus depriving the rural sector of potential commercial farmers. This, coupled with the steadily decreasing number of expatriate farmers since Independence, made rapid expansion of agriculture difficult. While the total Zambian population increased at roughly 3.6 per cent per annum or by 42.4 per cent over a ten-year period, total agricultural production for the period 1964-1973 increased by barely 28.5 per cent (using 1966 values as a base). Comparison of estimated and actual quantities of marketed production of the major agricultural commodities, and of the targets set for and the actual generation of employment opportunities in the rural sector as well as agriculture's contribution to

GDP, shows that the rural sector not only lags behind the modern industrial and mining sectors, but also falls far below the rate of total population increase and hence the anticipated attainment of self-sufficiency in food and agricultural commodity production by 1976.³²

This is despite the fact that governmental inputs in credit, fertilizers, extension services and direct government investments in some farming projects and settlement schemes have increased considerably since independence. Efforts have been made to extend credit facilities to hitherto neglected rural provincial capitals and some rural districts, albeit still weighted in favour of those located along the line of rail.³³ Limited progress has been made in extending farm-loans although many of them have benefited the rural elite rather than the peasants or small-scale farmers. Before its liquidation in 1970, the Credit Organization of Zambia (COZ) extended an estimated K20 million loan to over 50,000 borrowers.³⁴ The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) which took over COZ's activities in 1970 has also made limited progress in providing agricultural credit to farmers. In the period 1970-1974 AFC gave financial assistance to a total of 16,443 individual farmers amounting to approximately K23.4 million.³⁵ The government subsidizes such items as fertilizers (in 1973/74 at 14 per cent) and has greatly expanded existing extension services and the Intensive Development Zone (IDZ) programme in the Eastern, Northern and North-Western Provinces (each IDZ area covers approximately 12,000 hectares). Special development projects boosting the production of bananas, tea and coffee have been established.

One major repercussion of the startlingly low level of agricultural productivity is increasing dependence on imported food materials. Thus, for example, while only K14.3 million was spent on food imports in 1964, the figure rose to K43.8 million by 1974, i.e. by an index of 306.2 if 1964 is taken as base year (100).

Other Factors Affecting Increased Agricultural Productivity

I shall address myself in this section to some of the major constraints on greater agricultural productivity in Zambia. The first of these is ecological in nature. Given Zambia's extensive land area of about 751,096.6 sq. km. with a population of approximately 5 million, there is no doubt that the country is very sparsely pop-

ulated. However, this apparent potentiality in terms of land space has serious development problems in relation to agriculture. While Zambia, unlike Nigeria, has no population problems on arable land, it nevertheless faces other serious ecological constraints.

Only 11.72 per cent of Zambia's total land area can be described as good agricultural land in terms of quality of soil and adequate rainfall. About 9.01 per cent of the remaining land is suited for crop production, but is located in parts of the country where at certain times of the year rainfall is inadequate, thereby contributing to crop failure in the absence of irrigation or other kinds of water supply or water conservation methods. Finally, about 13.45 per cent of the remaining land is suited mainly for stock breeding at varying degrees of intensity, without irrigation or other forms of water conservation and depending largely on rainfall and the quality of the soil.

Given these limitations and the size of Zambia's land surface, increased agricultural productivity can only be achieved at a cost of massive investment in infrastructural facilities such as water conservation systems, irrigation, transportation, roads and markets. However, public capital expenditure allocated to this purpose in the FNDP and SNDP was clearly below the threshold needed to exert considerable impact upon extensive agricultural development. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that financial and manpower resources required to construct adequate water supply-points - be they boreholes, waterwells, or pipeborne water - are currently beyond the capability of most rural councils, and are not within the reach of even the most prosperous commercial farmers. A major consequence is that of the total land area of 74.4 million hectares of which over 41.1 million hectares are potential arable land, only 12 million hectares are currently under active cultivation; and most of this area is concentrated in areas along the line of rail which are traditionally endowed with relatively good infrastructural facilities. This situation naturally places heavy strain on the limited facilities available within this geographical area, quite apart from the constraint it has on the expansion of agricultural production.

Some Problems Concerning Reliance on Large-Scale Commercial Farmers

As noted above, most of Zambia's agricultural commod-

ities have been and continue to be produced by white expatriate commercial farmers, although their number has dwindled steadily from 700 in 1964 to about 475 in 1975. Of a total of about 600 large-scale commercial farmers now in Zambia, only 25 per cent are Zambians. In 1964 there were about 140 white expatriate commercial dairy farmers in Zambia; as of 31st December 1974 only 70 of these remained. Although the number of white expatriate commercial farmers has steadily declined, the remainder, together with their Zambian counterparts, are responsible for most of Zambia's major agricultural products. For instance, over 55 per cent of maize output, 60 per cent of beef, close to 70 per cent of fruits and vegetables, more than 65 per cent of poultry and pigs, and well over 45 per cent of tobacco, are produced by these commercial farmers. Yet despite their massive contribution to agricultural productivity their manpower size is relatively too small to meet all of Zambia's food needs.

Two other problems are associated with this excessive reliance on large-scale commercial farmers. The first concerns the question of their insecurity. To understand this problem one has to relate their economic orientations to the ideological imperatives of the political system within which they have to operate. Zambia has adopted an official ideology with socialist implications which in its widest sense, is directed towards achieving the goals of equality and income redistribution. In contrast, large-scale commercial farmers operate, strictly speaking, on purely capitalist lines, and there is inevitable tension between their development orientations and those of the state. Two consequences flow from this. Firstly, that given the ongoing process of socialist reform measures aimed at attaining a humanist society, many if not all large-scale commercial farmers appear to feel too insecure to engage in massive new investments in relatively untried agricultural sectors or to indulge in long-term agricultural development planning. Secondly, that lacking any sufficiently long-term agricultural development plan, Zambia is faced with a major dilemma. Namely, how to reconcile the short-term necessity of boosting agricultural production through large-scale commercial farmers in order to alleviate the immediate repercussions of excessive food imports on the country's limited foreign exchange reserves, on the one hand; and the need to stimulate and encourage small-scale peasant farmers in order to build the basis for long-term self-sustaining agricultural production



units and to promote the ideological goal of spreading the benefits of development to the wider section of the rural community, on the other. Thus, while long-term policies seem to be oriented towards promoting the ultimate goals of development the FNDP and SNDP have followed a strategy of development which tends to subvert the postulated objectives.

Another problem emanating from this excessive dependence on large-scale commercial farmers is closely related to the first. Lacking a sense of security and commitment to the party's socialist goals, most large-scale farmers in their search for quick profits have tended to lower production of a particular commodity or set of commodities in which prices are low and have moved to those with higher prices; that is, those in which they expect higher and quicker profit returns. Some agricultural commodities are therefore forcibly neglected while the prices of others soar.

*Extension Services and Marketing Facilities:
Some Major Constraints*

Despite serious efforts by the government to improve the lot of the rural farmers by providing information and technical advice, extension services in the rural sector still suffer from severe shortages of manpower and resources. Aside from the lack of experienced field officers of various categories, which limits the applicability of appropriate extension advice to the problems facing the peasant farming community, a major impediment is the lack of transport. Most roads in the rural areas are very poorly maintained and are almost impassable during the rainy season. This situation is further aggravated by lack of transport vehicles and funds to maintain those that are available. In its annual report for 1973 the Department of Agriculture stated that: '... the Department was not provided with money for the purchase of new vehicles; and most of the vehicles were in old condition, the transport position was very bad with the majority of landrovers continually undergoing mechanical repairs',³⁶ This situation has obvious consequences for the performance of the extension service workers. Firstly, it severely restricts the amount of contact hours between them (especially Commodity Demonstrators) and peasant farmers. Secondly, it creates difficulties for senior field officers charged with the supervision of junior extension service workers. This not

only generates frustration, lack of enthusiasm and low morale, but encourages both senior and junior extension service workers to spend much of their time indoors - in their agricultural camps. As a result, many rural projects are not effectively monitored.

Almost as serious are the bottle-necks produced by inadequate marketing facilities. Central to the marketing problems is the combined interaction of two factors: the geographical position of the country and the nature of governmental inputs.

The geographical position of Zambia as a landlocked country creates both external and internal marketing problems. Externally, it underscores the problem of high costs associated with the transportation of imported agricultural commodities, farm tools and fertilizers, as well as the delays encountered in receiving supplies as a result of port congestion in neighbouring and friendly states. At times this problem is accentuated by unpredictable geo-political instability such as that of UDI and the Angolan civil war. Recently, the Secretary-General of the Party, Mr. Grey Zulu, disclosed that Zambia had spent over K320 million since 1973 in financing alternative trade routes to and from the sea.³⁷ All these factors combine to push up the prices of imported commodities, thereby forcing the government in turn to divert large sums of money into subsidizing inputs in order to keep prices within the reach of the peasant farmers, and to stabilize the prices of produced agricultural commodities in terms of consumer incomes. This, of course, reduces the resources at the disposal of government which could have been more profitably deployed in promoting agricultural expansion. In addition, the considerable delays frequently experienced at neighbouring ports have often meant that most large-scale commercial farmers and the rural peasants do not receive inputs such as new seeds, fertilizers and farming equipment at the right time, before the beginning of the seasonal planting, thereby contributing to the non-maintenance of given levels of agricultural production.

Perhaps the most important aspects of the size-factor concern questions of spatial relations between market points and the locality served by the markets on the one hand, and the constraints imposed on the marketing of agricultural outputs as a result of inadequate transport facilities and poor road conditions, coupled with fragmented network of rural depots and storage facilities, on the other.

While it is true that the statutory body charged with agricultural marketing in Zambia, NAMBOARD, has expanded its activities considerably since it was established and has now brought marketing facilities to most rural areas, the inadequacy of skilled manpower, poor administrative capacity and lack of transport have often made it difficult for NAMBOARD to extend its services to scattered supply centres far removed from its operational market points.

Given the poor conditions of the rural roads, and the limited transport facilities at the disposal of peasant farmers, many find it extremely expensive to move their crops to the market points provided by NAMBOARD. As a result, a considerable portion of the yield of agricultural commodities is left unpurchased; a situation which in turn dissuades many small peasant farmers from increasing their agricultural production.

Another serious problem affecting the marketing of agricultural output is the fragmentary nature of rural depots and storage facilities. Limited resources, lack of manpower and operational costs all combine to reduce the effectiveness of the depots and storage facilities provided by NAMBOARD in boosting agricultural production. Not only are depots and storage facilities costly to maintain, thereby making NAMBOARD a big financial loser, but their spatial location is too fragmentary, thus hindering the development of adequate linkages between production centres and operational points. This problem is further aggravated by lack of efficient management staff as well as the non-availability of the requisite seeds and fertilizers and other governmental inputs at the right time, in the right place and in the required quantity. In addition, many farmers have narrated cases in which harvested crops have been left at depots or collection stations for as long as 20 days without being delivered.³⁸

Such frustrating experiences affect not only the morale of emergent farmers but contribute to low agricultural yields, precisely because many farmers feel reluctant to invest new capital in boosting the production of agricultural commodities about whose disposal they are uncertain.

Rural Cooperatives and Rural Development

Aside from providing avenues for the restructuring of the social nexus of local level interaction, the main

objective for setting up rural cooperative societies in Zambia was to employ them as mobilizational agents and as participatory structures for rural development. In this sense they were expected to contribute to increased agricultural productivity by promoting long-term development of family and communal farms as basic production programmes, training management staff and co-operative leadership, marketing and supply facilities to assist family and communal farmers in realizing better remuneration for their crops. In many respects, the activities of the co-operative societies were envisaged as supplementing those of the statutory organizations charged with marketing agricultural commodities and the provision of related services. Considerable energy and resources were employed by the government during the period of the FNDP to re-organize and consolidate existing co-operative societies and to set up new ones wherever necessary. Furthermore, to encourage economies-of-scale in the provision of certain services, the setting-up of several multi-purpose or service co-operatives and the revitalization of existing primary marketing and supply co-operative societies were undertaken in the Southern, Eastern and Northern Provinces in the course of the SNDP.

As of 31st December 1973 the largest rural co-operatives in terms of membership and operational capital were the producer marketing societies; followed by the artisan co-operative societies, the family farming societies and farm settlement co-operatives, and the consumer stores co-operatives, in that order.

Generally speaking, the performance of rural co-operatives in promoting productivity, the structural change of the rural sector and the diffusion of agricultural innovation has had a mixed record of successes and failures.³⁹ Since 1964 some societies have become moribund as a result of diminished membership or voluntary liquidation; others have been amalgamated to form larger, viable multi-purpose societies. In 1975, for instance, over 668 communal agricultural co-operatives were replaced by farming units. Perhaps the least successful of the rural co-operatives are those that restrict their activities to thrift and loan, and those such as the Professional Charcoal Burners' Co-operatives in which constant misunderstandings occur among members. Other co-operatives have been successful in some areas but have failed or show little progress in others. For example, Consumer Co-operatives have proved remarkably successful with the Zambian Defence Forces, but not

quite so among other social groups. Similarly, rural agricultural co-operatives which amalgamated to form multi-purpose co-operatives offering a wide variety of services to their members appear to have had their greatest impact in the Southern Province; they are least successful in the Luapula Province, and, are very much saddled with management and organizational problems in the Eastern and Northern Provinces.

The overall effectiveness of the various co-operative societies in Zambia appears in the final analysis to be closely associated with the extent of central governmental inputs⁴⁰ and the strength of linkages to external (mostly parastatal) agencies offering the requisite trained staff and supervisory control, technology, credits and other facilities, such as new seeds and tractors. The issue of qualified staff and the overall staffing position within the co-operative societies as well as the problem of adequate training facilities has significantly affected the performance of these societies. Almost all co-operatives continue to operate under severe restrictions imposed by shortage of qualified staff. Even the Department of Co-operatives, which undertakes the overall supervision of most activities of rural co-operatives, is not free of this constraint.⁴¹

Other obstacles which impede the effectiveness of rural co-operatives in promoting their objectives are not unlike those identifiable in the operations of the Village Productivity and Ward Development Committees. A survey of farming co-operatives carried out by the Department of Co-operatives, which was discussed at the First National Co-operative Conference in 1970 and at the Second National Co-operative Conference in April 1973, revealed that the effectiveness of large marketing societies had been undermined because the Southern Province Co-operative Marketing Union (SPCMU), Eastern Province Co-operative Marketing Union (EPCMA), and Northern Province Co-operative Marketing Union (NPCMU) have dealt with individual farmers instead of availing themselves of the services of the primary co-operative societies.⁴² The operations of these large marketing societies, all located in the provincial capitals, have consequently stagnated as contact with members of primary societies in remote parts of their respective provinces has been lost.

It was noted that most farming co-operatives were sited without due consideration to the agricultural potential of areas and with the membership essentially

made up of subsistence farmers'.⁴³ The originally conceived membership category for co-operative services was supposed to have been drawn largely from 'commercially-minded farmers'. In addition, 'most farming societies were inspired and promoted from above and fostered by the Department of Co-operatives, with little attempt to assess how these societies could develop into self-sufficient independent organizations with emphasis on self-reliance'.⁴⁴ There is no doubt that the excessive dependence of rural co-operative societies on outside agencies for services (especially on governmental inputs in the form of credit, supplies, machinery repairs, marketing, seeds and fertilizers) rather than creating much of their own social overheads on responding autonomously to the challenges in their environment, rendered them ineffective as instruments for rural development.

Reflections on the Role of Decentralized Structures in Promoting Rural Development

One of the main objectives of the 'decentralized structure approach' which followed the local administrative reform measures in the period 1968-1971 was to create mass organization at the village level which in turn will increase the Party's capability to mobilize and motivate the rural masses for authentic participation in the political process and rural production. Emphasizing the ideological component of this objective in somewhat different terms, President Kaunda pointed out that the intention is to maximize active mass support 'through hard work, through organization, through co-operation' and through active involvement of the rural masses in various self-help projects.⁴⁵

The most important mass organizations at the grass-roots level for the participation of the rural masses in rural development are the Village Production Committees. In many districts the process of Village Regrouping which the Party has devised as a means of bringing scattered villagers into a central location to facilitate mobilization and to allow economies of scale in the provision of health and community centres, schools, transport and water supplies, as well as technical inputs such as marketing, storage and extension services, have often been hastily implemented, leading either to poor organization or lack of popular enthusiasm in maintaining them. It has been observed, for example, that many

regrouped villages are so small in numbers of residents (sometimes less than 20 households, the minimum for the formation of a VPC) that they accentuate administrative problems and render the development of economies of scale nugatory. In many other districts the organizational format taken by the regrouped villages ranges from fairly-well established structures to the more loosely organized units. In many more these local level organizations are non-existent except on paper. Thus, of the 25,000 anticipated VPCs and 1,500 WDCs needed to boost rural development throughout the country less than one-half were in existence in October 1976.

Performance

Because of the relatively short period of the existence of most of the Village-Regroupings, VPCs and WDCs, very little is known about their actual pattern of decision-making, or the basic ideological or economic principles which underlie their choice of development projects and allocation of resources. Limited researches carried out into the operations of local structures in Mkushi, Serenje, Chilanga and Namwala Districts suggest that many members do not fully understand the roles which their committees are expected to play in the rural development process. In some cases differing emphasis on the proper interpretation of 'self-reliance' has led to confusion and mistakes in the initiation and implementation of decisions.⁴⁶ This is partly attributable to the fact that most VPC members including the village headmen who serve as Chairmen are illiterate and consequently cannot properly follow the organizational procedures outlined in the Pocket Manual, at present only available in English. It is also partly due to the lack of 'fit' between the prescribed roles of the VPCs and the social structural environment in which they are supposed to operate.

Although fairly adequate linkages are supposed to exist between the various Development Committees at the grass-roots level and government ministries, the various departments in the Ministry of Rural Development and parastatal agencies, there is little attempt to promote interministerial, or interdepartmental co-operation and co-ordination vital to the success of many development programmes. As one observer has commented, it was not uncommon for officials to form programmes designed specifically for their own speciality. Natural resources would have its programme, as would NAMBOARD, the Poultry

Officer, Nutrition, Animal Husbandry, AFC Co-operatives, Community Development.⁴⁷ One major consequence was that 'the Committees were loaded with unco-ordinated specialist information and objectives, and there was no real common programme for the members to take back to the people which was easy and simple for all to understand'.⁴⁸

Interplay between Traditional Factors and Economic Imperatives in Village Re-grouping

Perhaps one cannot appreciate the operational problems confronting the new grass-roots structures without relating them to the environmental setting of a traditional rural community. In trying to do this, one is confronted with a number of unresolved methodological issues. Conservative anthropologists and many liberal scholars - the so-called modernization school - have argued that the problems of political and economic development depend more on socio-psychological variables than on economic factors. An extreme example is perhaps best summarized by Everett Hagen who has argued that broader social and psychological variables are more pertinent in the explanation of economic growth than economic theory.⁴⁹ Although such views have been largely discarded as too simplistic and one-sided because they fail to relate socio-psychological constraints on development to the consequences of colonialism, there is little doubt that some aspects of the social setting in which African rural inhabitants interact generate certain behavioural patterns which have negative conditioning effects on development orientation. In this setting, the power relationships between actors are diffusely structured, i.e. are defined largely in terms of face-to-face or interpersonal relationships linked by a multiplicity of traditional bonds of sentiment and kinship dependency.⁵⁰ Because of this, political interaction is either oriented towards highly particularized goals, or ends that are so narrowly defined as to foster suspicion of impersonal political institutions. This is quite visible in the recruitment pattern of most VPCs. At present, most village headmen who serve as VPC chairmen bring with them practically no other qualification to their office than their ingrained attachment to the existing traditional social structure. Although there is a semblance of electoral recruitment, what happens is that village elders by virtue of their

position are more or less automatically elected to the office of headman. In this way, traditional ties are reinforced and the destabilizing effect of change averted, at the expense of the operational effectivity of the newly-created local level organization. These structural and behavioural perspectives are not restricted to political interaction, they also have their empirical manifestations in organizations that are predominantly economically-oriented. For instance, the structural perspective is manifested in the form and pattern of social pressures which condition the range of economic activities.⁵¹ This is illustrated by the fact that in a typical rural community the person with whom a local inhabitant is willing or prepared to co-operate in economic matters and/or agricultural production is usually a fellow kinsman, a co-villager or a person with whom he shares traditional bonds or values. There are numerous cases in which villagers resettled in village-regroupings have resented having to operate under a chairman from another area with whom they had no traditional links. In many other cases peasant farmers have invariably resisted efforts to regroup with villagers from different areas because of the lack of traditional bonds. And there are still other cases in which for various reasons - such as fear of conflict arising from accusations of witchcraft -⁵² peasants were not enthusiastic about venturing into village-regroupings.

However, although these traditional factors have significant implications for development orientation, one should not place exaggerated emphasis on socio-psychological variables. As Frederick Barth has observed, '...people make allocations in terms of the pay-offs that they hope to obtain and their most adequate bases of predicting these pay-offs are found in their previous experiences or that of others in their community'.⁵³ This suggests that, in assessing the perception and attitude of the people towards joining the village regrouping units attempts must not only be made to relate the analysis to the degree to which the movement to a new organizational and social framework would disrupt the existing relationship patterns but also the extent to which people's decisions to act depend upon their assessment of the pay-offs of their alternative choices of action. This point is very important in considering the reluctance of rural people to join the regrouped villages. To make life in regrouped villages economically viable a villager needs a new house, farming land and in some cases cattle grazing land. For most villa-

gers this means an unbearable economic burden since they have to leave established villages - with personal houses and gardens - to make a new start in regrouped villages.

Evidence drawn from this author's field research in various rural areas of Zambia shows that many village headmen of the traditional village units strongly resent the idea of regrouping their villages with others for fear of losing their headmanship. To this must be added another factor which not only discourages many villagers from regrouping but actually induces many who have been regrouped to leave, i.e. unfulfilled political promises concerning the provision of social amenities, such as water supply points, clinics and schools. Many villagers interviewed in Mumbwa, Kasama, Feira and Mazabuka districts gave as their major reason for refusing to regroup the demonstration-effect of experiences in many regrouped villages in which political promises concerning the provision of basic social amenities had been made but not fulfilled. Many villagers had heard about other regrouped villages that for various reasons had foundered. Such experiences, implicitly or explicitly, generate negative expectations with regard to the maximization of satisfaction in regrouped villages. Thus, after weighting the pay-offs many villagers may not find the idea of moving to regrouped villages sufficiently attractive to justify the risks involved.

*Elite Values and Development Participation
within Decentralized Structures*

Another major factor that affects the performance of grass-roots committees stems from the nature of elite value orientation in the political system.

Paradoxically, the main ideological assumption underlying the creation of the grass-roots structure was the necessity to link mass participation in rural development in terms of shared influence in decentralized structures with Party/governmental outputs that are specifically directed towards promoting such a participation. Theoretically, the major implication of this strategy is that the rural masses should not only initiate and implement development programmes, but that their activities should be structured within established channels so that local leadership would be able to interpret national policies and directives in terms of their applicability to local conditions and to transmit local

interests and aspirations through institutionalized national frameworks for political participation and decision-making with adequate linkages to the ruling elite. In practice, however, the decentralized structures have proved (a) to contain elements of contradictions to the philosophical guidelines oriented towards the production of self-reliant citizens, and (b) to encourage the sustenance of elite value orientations which subvert some of the basic ideological components underlying the principle of Humanism and self-reliance at the grass-roots level.

The Simmance Report⁵⁴ has noted:

- (1) despite decentralization, the power and authority for planning, the preparation of the development budget and plan implementation for rural areas do not reside with the local level development committees but still remain at the centre;
- (2) the Provincial Minister and the District Governor do not have effective co-ordinating control over the administrative and technical staff or the budget for development in their areas of responsibility;
- (3) apart from lacking administrative and technical staff of high calibre, the Provincial and District Development Committees lack effective co-ordinating authority over their subunits because most major decisions are imposed from outside.

Evidence drawn from the operations of the various Development Committees at the district level⁵⁵ indicates that the ability of the Party and government to foster the central values of Zambian Humanism among the people has been severely constrained by the following factors:

- (1) Highly placed individuals and dominant social groups very often find it more rewarding to by-pass the local level development committee-system in pursuance of their own interests.
- (2) Development projects and schemes are sometimes set up without assigning operational responsibility to the districts in which they are located.
- (3) Provincial Heads of Department touring development projects often fail to meet local villagers in order to discuss their major problems. Similarly, visiting Ministers accompanied by senior district officials have

been known to listen to the rural masses and discuss their problems without offering solutions or making concrete suggestions, and without bringing the problems to the attention of the appropriate VPC or WDC, merely 'promising to look into the matter' or to refer it to their Ministerial colleague responsible for that particular issue .

(4) Some politicians or highly-placed Party/government officials attempt to capitalise on their role in bringing particular development projects to a given area, thereby insinuating to the rural peoples that the development of their respective areas depends not so much on the activities or influence of the local Development Committees as on whom you know.

(5) For the most part, those who benefit from development programmes or from the technical and extension service of the government, including loan and credit facilities, are not the masses but a small rural elite such as the relatively more prosperous commercial farmers, poultry keepers, members of co-operatives, businessmen, etc. who do not form more than 10 per cent of the rural population. It is estimated that they not only absorb the majority of the distributive outputs of the district, but also 'most District Governors and indeed Regional Officers and officers of the Public Services all have a similar experience of finding that about 80% of their efforts go to serving the needs of about 10% of the people'.⁵⁶

The seriousness of this situation is illuminated by a recent address by President Kaunda to the National Council of UNIP that met in Lusaka, 27th - 28th April 1976. He expressed his dismay at the slow progress of the decentralized structures in promoting rural development and then said that he was particularly shocked to observe the degree of contradictions that have been deliberately created by highly-placed Party/government officials of the parastatal organizations to thwart the implementation of Humanism. 'We have discovered', the President added, 'that there is so much abuse of office in granting of loans... We cannot encourage a loans policy which contradicts Humanism and promotes capitalism instead. This is not UNIP's political line... I have been shocked to note that only individual businessmen have been able to borrow so much money to expand their capitalist enterprises at the expense of peasants and workers. Some loans have not been repaid and yet the

same people are allowed to borrow even more.⁵⁷

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in any detail the reasons for elite ambivalence towards the value system inherent in the official ideology of Humanism, but a few points must be mentioned. Empirical evidence drawn from this author's ongoing research⁵⁸ suggests that the fact that a high degree of consensus exists among members of the elite on the necessity to decentralize participatory structures as well as on political system goals does not necessarily mean that there is a high correlation between elite perception of the political system and elite values. Indeed, this conflict of value orientations is not resolved merely by adopting an official ideology and by decentralizing the participatory structures, but appear to be intensified within this framework. Thus, as data from survey responses to questions on ideological goals illustrate, elite value-orientations or attitudes towards Zambian Humanism are inversely related to attitudes towards wealth. In other words, while most elite-members tend to support other major goals of Humanism they appear to de-emphasize or evaluate negatively those aspects of the ideology which strive towards economic and power control, being less concerned with the efficacy of the ideology as an instrument of economic redistribution and shared influence in binding decision-making process and more with its national integrative aspects. Thus, while the elite accept the notion of a 'classless society' in principle, empirical evidence tends to suggest that a wide gulf still exists between what is preached or what the Party believes is there, or at least hopes will be achieved someday, and what actually happens at the moment. These value conflicts can be fully understood and appreciated if they are placed within the ambit of the historical and political circumstances conditioning economic interaction in Zambia since independence, and more specifically the success of the Zambianization policy, the 1968 Mulungushi and other economic reform measures between 1969 and 1972,⁵⁹ which led to the assumption of key positions in administration, business and politics by educated Zambians. This in turn has led to the emergence of a new breed of indigenous businessmen, administrative class and power elite with vested interests in the maintenance of the distributive outputs and the power structures of the system. If we adopt the neo-Marxist theoretical perspective which views the choices, policies and strategies of development as the product of concrete interest groups within

the political system, then the interpretation of constraints on the decentralized structures identified above assumes a radically different dimension. From this point of view there is inevitable tension or conflict between the interests which a dominant group in society will protect and the aspirations of the masses. This paradigm is significant to an understanding of how the value-orientations of the Zambian elite influence their attitude towards the decentralized structures and towards the official ideology of Humanism. If we operationalize elite value-orientations in the context of this analysis as the sum total of appurtenances of political and economic control (e.g. physical comfort, economic advancement, security, public esteem, the maintenance of power, prestige and status) which structure perception during the decision-making process, it is fairly easy to establish a linkage between them and the sources of ideological conflict. Members of the elite cannot simultaneously maximize their value-orientations, given their public stand on the official ideology of Humanism. It is not surprising that although certain changes are promoted they are implemented in such a way as not to seriously undermine the control of the elite over political power and the economy. Viewed from this perspective, the contextual meaning of what the Party terms 'participatory democracy' can be more precisely stated. It is not defined in terms of shared influence which the masses can wield in determining policy-formulation on rural developmental change, but rather by the extent to which regime members can mobilize the masses in support of Party/government policies and development objectives. Consequently, all activities of provincial party leaders and local administrative officers are assigned a definite role in the process of rural development, i.e. to maximize unified or symbolic support for the Party. A major problem of this notion of participation is that in the practical context of the rural areas, it has actively helped to discourage the promotion of the ideological values that the decentralized structures were meant to foster, namely, self-reliance and active involvement of the masses in the process of rural development.

*Self-Reliance and Community Development: Attitude and
and Expectations about Governmental Outputs and
Mass Participation*

While the degree and nature of government inputs of technical and extension services and control over the allocation of financial resources are vital determinants of the success or failure of rural development, programmes of planned change are more likely to succeed or fail dependent upon the extent to which the rural masses respond to the challenges posed by their changing environment, and their willingness to assume major autonomous responsibility in promoting locally-based projects capable of aiding the realization of the desired change. It is a basic assumption of this paper that the extent of positive or negative response of the masses in this respect will depend upon the prevailing attitude towards self-reliance and upon their expectations and image of the national government and its distributive outputs.

In order to appreciate the magnitude of this problem I shall first review some aspects of community development in the rural areas based on self-help projects and then move on to examine the attitudinal orientations and value expectations which affect the direction and intensity of mass commitment.

According to the Annual Report of the Department of Community Development,⁶⁰ one of the most popular self-help projects undertaken in 1973 was the Aided Group Housing Scheme, under which 2647 families were involved in constructing improved brick houses. Out of this number 1221 families completed their houses; the rest had their projects at various stages of construction at the end of 1973. In other words, more than half the projects remained uncompleted. Other popular self-help projects, poultry schemes and minor self-help schemes such as the construction of water wells, access to feeder roads, small bridges and rural health centres, had varying degrees of success and failure. While it is arguable that other factors might have helped to delay the realization of the projects, empirical evidence suggests that attitudinal variables have been more crucial. For instance, numerous cases have surfaced in which loans received by local farmers for purchasing agricultural machinery, tractors, etc. were employed for completely different and mostly non-productive purposes. The repayment record of loans extended by COZ is estimated at 25 per cent.⁶¹ Official accounts of

financial loans extended to individual farmers by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) state that about 10 per cent of all loans due for repayment in the 1970-71 and 1971-72 seasons totalling K15,282,192 were not recovered at the end of 1973, while 30 per cent of loans granted during the 1972-73 season amounting to K8,319,519 and due for repayment at the end of 1973 season, remained unrecovered.⁶²

This low repayment record is attributable in large part to the misconception of the nature of government inputs and the purposes for which they may be employed. Discussions held with a number of beneficiaries in the rural areas and with loan processing officials in Lusaka and in the rural districts revealed that most people considered farm or agricultural loans and credits as a reward for their support of the nationalist leaders in the fight for independence.⁶³ Similarly, peasant farmers are reported to have bought fertilizers from NAMBOARD at highly subsidized prices and re-selling them to commercial farmers (who are not allowed to buy subsidized fertilizers and maize seeds) or to neighbouring countries such as Zaire where the prices of such items are relatively high. Furthermore, many self-help projects have foundered because local participants refused to contribute money or to give their labour to promote them. For instance, roads, small bridges and community houses in urgent need of repair have often been left unattended to, in the expectation that government officials will repair them.

In addition, the success of many co-operative societies and other self-help projects vary in direct proportion to the degree of fulfilled versus unfulfilled political promises and government actions.⁶⁴ This may lead one to hypothesize that co-operatives or other self-help projects which operate on the initiative of the participants and are not sponsored or induced by political promises are more likely to produce good results; while sponsored self-help projects or co-operatives whose organizations are induced from outside are more likely to fail if the expected inputs or political promises from the government do not materialize.

In an effort to relate this to a concrete empirical situation I shall tap some examples from my research experiences in the rural areas of Zambia. For instance, UNIP-branch officials in Chilanga were interviewed in December 1974 concerning their difficulties in building a branch office on a self-help basis; the uniform answer was that since 1970, when the Branch

Committee decided to raise money for this purpose through donations and voluntary contributions, not more than K3 had been realised in the campaign. In answer to the question, 'what attempts have you made to run adult-literacy classes?', almost all shifted responsibility away from the branch office. While they support the idea in principle, they consider the promotion of adult-literacy activities to be the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and the Department of Community Development. Similarly, in other rural districts (e.g. Feira and Mazabuka in August and September 1975), where residents and officials were interviewed concerning their efforts in promoting certain self-help projects, their major reasons for failure were generally given as assumed financial inability but not unwillingness to promote the projects.

These observations suggest that there is an explicit attitude-formation on the part of the masses which is highly skewed towards initiative and self-reliance (responsibility-orientation). Benefit-orientation and dependence-expectation variables are more likely to be pervasive, however, if as a result of the increasing penetration of Party/government activities into the remote parts of the country, the masses come to believe that government is financially able to do everything and hence should actually be responsible for solving all their economic and social needs. This expectation-dependency orientation is well illustrated by the following responses derived from a field survey carried out in Mazabuka in August and September 1975.⁶⁵ Respondents were asked: (1) 'What do you think are the main problems facing Zambia today?' (for each problem mentioned) 'Would you say that the Party/government is doing well in dealing with it?'; (2) 'Who is responsible for the emergence of this problem?'; (3) 'Which of these problems do you think requires urgent attention?' Most of the respondents identified economic problems as the main problems facing Zambia. 108 of the 174 respondents (i.e. 62 per cent) who identified specific economic problems believed that the Party/government was responsible for their emergence; and only 36 (20.7 per cent) thought that the Party/government had done well in dealing with the problems cited.

With regard to the third question, 125 of 180 people interviewed (69.4 per cent) considered the high cost of living and the shortage of basic commodities to be the most important problem requiring urgent attention; 26 (14.4 per cent) cited the need to help farmers with loans, fertilizers, transport and farming tools,

15 (8.3 per cent) mentioned unemployment, 6 (3.3 per cent) thought it was biased development which favoured the urban centres, 1 (0.5 per cent) believed excessive beer-drinking was at fault, while 2 (1 per cent) had no opinion.

Finally, when the respondents were asked if they thought the Party/government was in the position to help all Zambians in tackling their economic problems in the way they wished, 160 of the 180 (88.9 per cent) interviewed responded in the positive. Only 20 (11.1 per cent) respondents believed that hard work is necessary to support the efforts of the Party/government; 6 (3.3 per cent) thought that the Party/government had been trying, while 8 (4.4 per cent) had no idea.

When the respondents were asked what role they thought the ordinary citizen should play in local affairs, 29 (16.1 per cent) of the 180 interviewed suggested joining the local branch of the Party; 33 (18.3 per cent) alluded to the importance of taking part in self-help projects; 24 (13.9 per cent) preferred to keep informed about local events; 25 (13.9 per cent) suggested participation in local elections, while 43 (23.9 per cent) preferred to do nothing. 30 (16.7 per cent) gave no specific answer.

It is interesting that in all these responses few respondents felt that the task of development is the joint responsibility of government and the people. Or that the major task of developing their local areas was the responsibility of the villagers. Another striking feature is that the replies are accompanied, at least implicitly, by an underestimation of individual capabilities and lack of the sense of personal initiative in dealing with one's economic and social problems. On the whole, it would appear as if the general feeling is one of 'another man's responsibility'. In other words, the common feeling is that the government is not only responsible for the emergence of all economic ills but possesses the power and the resources to solve them, so why should one 'bother oneself unnecessarily?' This attitude formation may be further reinforced by situational political promises which, although designed to achieve one end, eventually have different and probably unintended consequences. A demonstrative example of this is the classic historical case of 'an egg and a pint of milk a day for every Zambian by 1970' which President Kaunda publically pledged on Independence Day, 24 October 1964. There is little doubt that this and similar political promises had been intended to boost the working morale of the masses, but if the desired

goals are to be realised closer examination of the understanding and interpretation by the ordinary people of such promises is necessary. One finds that they are frequently taken quite literally or interpreted to mean anticipated benefits which the government ought to bequeath on the people as a reward for supporting independence. Under such circumstances it appears difficult for them to accept the idea that self-help or developmental participation should involve them in voluntarily sacrificing their labour or the little resources at their disposal.

Conclusion

The above analysis has clearly shown that a fundamental problem of rural development in Zambia is that of establishing dynamic interaction between public policies and popular aspirations in the rural areas.

More recently, party leaders and policy planners have advanced a plethora of proposals designed to overcome the bottlenecks of rural development. Some of the more basic ones are concerned with setting new targets for agricultural production which would be capable of making Zambia self-sufficient in food supplies. Other proposals have included restructuring the operational conditions of credit and financial institutions as well as the co-operative societies. Still others have emphasized the importance of establishing more reconstruction centres, and if possible, the rounding-up of 'urban-loafers' and returning them to their villages of origin so that they can help to boost agricultural production. Finally, one of the latest policy proposals adopted by Government in late 1975 is induced rural industrialization. Under this scheme private firms are encouraged to invest in the rural areas by means of added incentives such as tax rebates and inexpensive availability of capital.

However, much as these proposals appear to have good economic reasoning behind them, they reflect sporadic attempts to come to grips with immediate pressing problems rather than long-term development plans based on well-researched propositions.

Strictly speaking, Zambia's main problem is not so much one of lack of policies as the primacy of politics that characterize the mode of national policy-making and by implication the choice of developmental instrumentalities and conditions for which they may be employed in

pursuance of rural development goals. Many policy issues are not operationalized first within a proper research context in order to obtain detailed knowledge of the range of policy options, including the probable implications of their implementation or non-implementation, but rather represent political addresses and declarations delivered in different contexts to satisfy divergent psychological needs and expectations. More often than not such policy issues and decisions focus primarily on dramatic shortrun innovations to deal with immediate pressing problems, rather than on long-range programmes designed to tackle the various aspects of rural development. Perhaps the most important feature of this style of decision-making can be summarized in terms of what Hirschman has referred to as 'the motivation-outruns-understanding' approach.⁶⁶

The peculiarity of this approach is that major policies are promulgated without advance exploration of the probability of their implementation, given existing circumstances and available resources. Instead, the political decision is publically announced with the explicit and implicit assumption that the aspiration to maximize the principle objective will serve to galvanize the mobilization of the requisite resources for its attainment. This is well-illustrated by the rural reconstruction scheme launched in March 1975. The rationale behind the scheme appears laudable, but closer examination of the timing, the form in which it evolved coupled with the structural weakness of the initial operational conditions, as well as some of the major organizational problems which accompanied the early stage of its implementation, make it difficult to avoid the impression that the public announcement and launching of the scheme were the products of spontaneous or ad hoc decisions lacking adequate commitment and preparation on the part of the national leadership. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the first batch of recruits were admitted to these centres few of them knew why they were there in the first place or what was expected of them. Many deserted, thinking that the rural reconstruction centres were military camps;⁶⁷ a few compared them to concentration camps.⁶⁸ Furthermore, most recruits had expected to earn wages for their services in the centres contrary to the directives of the Party/government.⁶⁹ Matters were not helped by the attitude of the general public towards these rural reconstruction centres. Thus, despite the massive sum of K17.5 million injected into the scheme, few Zambians, least of all the recruits themselves, actually under-

stood the purpose and objectives of the rural construction centres. Given such circumstances, it is not surprising that despite the potentiality of rural construction centres as instruments of change and development, the scheme as a whole is saddled with teething problems imposed by inadequate planning and structural deficiency. Much the same criticisms could be levelled against the decentralized structures, the setting of agricultural production targets, and agricultural commodity prices. Little wonder that their contribution to rural development has been fragmentary and inconsequential.

NOTES

1. For useful accounts of sectoral activities in the rural areas of Zambia during the colonial period see J. Hadfield, 'Peasant Farming Survey Report' (Lusaka: Department of Agriculture, 1961); G. Kay, 'Social Aspects of Village Regrouping in Zambia' (Lusaka: Institute of Social Research, University of Zambia, 1967); John A. Hellen, *Rural Development in Zambia 1890-1964* (Muenchen: Weltforum Verlag, 1968).
2. Republic of Zambia, *First National Development Plan 1966-1970* (Lusaka: Office of National Development and Planning, July 1966) p.2.
3. A. Young, *Industrial Diversification in Zambia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).
4. Republic of Zambia, *Second National Development Plan, January 1972 - December 1976* (Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance, Lusaka, December 1971), pp. iv-v.
5. *First National Development Plan*, pp. 2-8; *Second National Development Plan*, pp. 33-36; and also pp. 61-62.
6. United National Independence Party (UNIP), *National Policies for the Next Decade 1974-1984* (Lusaka: Freedom House, August 1973) pp. 28-32.
7. David E. Apter, *Choice and the Politics of Allocation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
8. For an elaborate discussion of the subject and a critical review of the relevant literature see P.E. Ollawa, 'Towards a Dynamic Model for Rural Development in Africa: Concepts, Issues, and Methodology' (A discussion paper presented to the Conference of the Eastern Africa Social Science Research Consultative Group on 'Rural Transport or Rural Development: Concepts, Issues and Methodology', Nazareth, Ethiopia, 14-19th April 1976). See also P.E. Ollawa, 'National Development and Rural Transformation in Africa, Some Methodological and Substantive Issues', in *African Review*

(forthcoming); and Idem, 'On a Dynamic Model for Rural Development in Africa' (forthcoming).

9. For a good treatment of this subject see A.O. Hirschman, *A Strategy of Economic Growth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958). An excellent analysis of the various theories of economic development with direct application to the developing countries is to be found in H. Myint, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Countries* (London: OUP, 1971). See also Paul Streeten, *The Frontiers of Development Studies* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1972).
10. *Second National Development Plan*, p. 33.
11. *First National Development Plan*, p. 12.
12. *Second National Development Plan*, p. 43.
13. *First National Development Plan*, p. 33.
14. Vice-President, 'Outline of Second National Development Plan', in *The Nation is YOU* (Address to, and Resolutions of, United National Independence Party at Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka, 4th to 6th March, 1972), p. 52.
15. For an excellent clarification of this term see Lloyd Fallers, 'A Note on the Trickle Effect', in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1954), pp. 314-321.
16. *Second National Development Plan*, p. 61.
17. *Ibidem*, p. 61.
18. *First National Development Plan*, p. 11.
19. *Second National Development Plan*, p. 8.
20. *Ibidem*, p. 47-48.
21. *Ibidem*, p. 196.
22. For an elaborate discussion of this problem see this author's works cited above.

23. For useful discussion of the subject with reference to the Tropical African countries see Timothy T. Thahance, 'The Impact of Major Factors of International Economy on African Economic Development', in Dieter Bielenstein (ed), *Perspectives in Afro-German Relations* (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1975) pp. 111-125.
24. See K.D. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation*, Part I (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, n.d.); K.D. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation*, Part II (Lusaka: Government Printer, n.d.); H.S. Meebelo, *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought* (Lusaka: OUP, 1973).
25. D.L. Dresang, 'Entrepreneurialism and Development Administration in Zambia', in *The African Review*, Vol. I, No. 3 (January 1972), pp. 91-117.
26. Republic of Zambia, 'A Path for the Future', an address by Dr. K.D. Kaunda at Mulungushi, 8 May 1971 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, 1971), p. 34.
27. Republic of Zambia, 'Zambia's Guideline for the Next Decade', address by Dr. K.D. Kaunda to the National Council of UNIP at Mulungushi, 9th November 1968 (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1968), p. 46.
28. For an elaborate description of the functions of the new administrative structures see Cabinet Circular No. 13 of 1969 issued in Lusaka on 1st February 1969. For a brief discussion of the new set-up see W. Tordoff, 'Provincial and Local Government in Zambia', in *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. IX, No. 1 (1970).
29. For a review of both colonial and Post-Independence District Administration in Zambia see P.L. Taylor, *District Administration: The Colonial Pattern and Post-Colonial Problems* (Lusaka: NIPA, January 1972).
30. Supplement to the 'Republic of Zambia Government Gazette' dated the 19th of October 1971 (No. 30 of 1971).
31. For an elaborate outline of the objectives, organ-

- izational structure and functions of these see Republic of Zambia, *Village Productivity and Ward Development Committees - A Pocket Manual* (Lusaka: The Government Printer, 1971).
32. For the relevant statistical figures see Republic of Zambia, *Economic Report 1973* (Lusaka: Ministry of Planning and Finance, 1974); Republic of Zambia, 'Mid-Term Review of the Second National Development Plan' in *Performance of the Zambian Economy, 1972-1974* (Lusaka: Ministry of Planning and Finance, Development Division, December 1974).
 33. For an excellent discussion of this, see Charles Harvey, 'Rural Credit in Zambia: Access and Exit', *Development and Change*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (April 1975), pp. 89-105.
 34. Ibidem, p. 94.
 35. Rural Development Corporation of Zambia Ltd. 1964-1974 (Bulletin).
 36. Republic of Zambia, Department of Agriculture, 'Annual Report of Extension Branch, 1st October 1972 to 30th September 1973' (Lusaka: Ministry of Rural Development, 1975), p. 5.
 37. *Times of Zambia*, Thursday, 13th May 1976, p. 1.
 38. See *Times of Zambia*, 25th November 1975, p. 6; and the issue of 6th March 1976, p. 7.
 39. In this connection see an earlier study by C.S. Lombard, *The Growth of Co-operatives in Zambia 1914-1971* (Manchester University Press 1971).
 40. In 1975 the Government injected over K6.7 million to revitalize ailing co-operative societies. See *Times of Zambia*, Monday, 3rd February 1975, p. 1.
 41. Republic of Zambia, Department of Co-operatives, *Annual Report for 1973* (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1975), pp. 4-5.
 42. Ministry of Rural Development, *National Co-operative Development Plan* (Lusaka: Department of Co-operatives, 1976) p. 4.

43. Ibidem, p. 8.
44. Ibidem, p. 8.
45. Republic of Zambia, 'You Hold The Key To The Success of Participatory Democracy' (address by Dr. K.D. Kaunda to the Lusaka-based United Independence Party Leaders at Mulungushi Hall, 24th June 1972), p. 2.
46. See discussion paper in Programme for the National Rural Development Seminar 9th-12th September 1974, pp. 56-68; see also S.S. Longo, 'Village and Ward Committee Set-up in Mkushi District' (Lusaka: NIPA Case Studies in Development, May 1972); NIPA, 'Serenje Local Authority' (Lusaka: NIPA Case Studies in Development, May 1972).
47. 'Programme for National Rural Development Seminar', p. 60.
48. Ibidem, p. 60.
49. E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1962).
50. Elizabeth Colson/Max Gluckman (eds), *Seven Tribes of Central Africa* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968); See also E. Colson, *Social Organization of the Gwenbe Tonga* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1960).
51. See J. Van Velsen, *The Politics of Kinship: A Study in Social Manipulation among the Lakeside Tonga of Nyasaland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964); A.D. Jones, 'Social Networks of Farmers among the Plateau of Zambia', in P.C. Lloyd (ed), *The New Elites of Tropical Africa* (London: OUP, 1966) pp. 272-285.
52. E. Colson, *The Social Consequences of Resettlement*, pp. 160-162.
53. F. Barth, 'On the Study of Social Change', in *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 69 (1967), p. 668.
54. For an elaborate critical evaluation of the decentralized structures see Republic of Zambia, *Report*

of the Working Party Appointed to Review the System of Decentralized Administration (*Simmance Report*) (Lusaka: Cabinet Office, 1972).

55. *Programme for The National Rural Development Seminar*, pp. 63-67; NIPA, 'Research Project on Administration for Rural Development', *The Party* (May 1972).
56. *Programme for the National Rural Development Seminar*, p. 67.
57. Address by Dr. K.D. Kaunda at the opening of the 8th National Council of the United National Independence Party, Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka 27th April 1976, Reprinted in full, in *Times of Zambia*, 28th April 1976.
58. This is a larger project dealing with Political Setting, Participation and Development in Zambia. All following references concern this research project except when otherwise indicated.
59. See A.A. Beveridge, 'Economic Independence, Indigenization, and The African Businessman: Some Effects of Zambia's Economic Reforms', in *African Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (December 1974), pp. 477-490.
60. Republic of Zambia, Department of Community Development, *Annual Report For the Year 1973* (Lusaka: Ministry of Labour and Social Services, 1975) pp. 4-5.
61. Charles Harvey, *Rural Credit in Zambia*, p. 94.
62. Rural Development Corporation of Zambia Ltd. 1964-1974 (Bulletin).
63. Also recently, a member of the Central Committee for Southern Province, Mr. Samuel Mbilishi, cited some examples in which the purpose of financial credits and loans were misunderstood and abused by farmers, thus resulting in high rates of default in loan repayment. See *Times of Zambia* 19th March 1976, p. 7.
64. I am grateful to Mr. S.B. Chiwala, Director of Co-

operatives, for this information during the course of my interviews and discussions with him in Mulungushi on 1st March 1976.

65. The total sample on which the field survey was based comprised both the local elite (Party officials, local administrators, councillors and prosperous businessmen and commercial farmers) and the masses. The above questions were put only to the masses. The local elite had slightly different questions. A sample size of 186 of the masses was randomly selected for interviewing. However, only 180 of the selected sample could be interviewed.
66. A.O. Hirschman, *Journeys Towards Progress* (New York: Doubleday and Co. 1965).
67. A situation which prompted President Kaunda to charge that to equate the rural reconstruction centres with concentration camps is criminal. See *Times of Zambia* and *Zambia Daily Mail* 16 February 1976.
68. For a brief review of some of the points mentioned here see Robinson Makayi, 'There's Nothing About Our Rural Camps', in *Sunday Times* of Zambia 14th September 1975, p. 7.
69. In October 1976 the Party finally decided that 50 per cent of the proceeds from the rural reconstruction centres will be shared by the members.



