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RURAL TRANSFORMATION IN CHINA

FROM REVOLT TO REVOLUTION

J.B.W. Kuitenbrouwer

The history of China is marked by peasant rebellions which, when they succeeded, occasionally led to mitigation of extreme inequality and oppression and a change in dynasty but without substantial reorganization of the social structure.

Peasant movements were as a rule impetuous and uncoordinated actions, intended to obtain direct redress of specific limited grievances. They did not strike at the roots of feudal society, but only brought it temporarily out of balance (Chesneaux 1973, McAleavy 1971).

In the late 19th century, the Government introduced limited changes in rural areas, such as new seeds to increase agricultural productivity. But the cost of capitalist modernization of Chinese society was discharged on the peasantry who remained tied to a feudal social structure. This generated pressures that led to the abolition of imperial rule and to the establishment of the Republic in 1911. From the inception of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1921, fundamental divergencies of view had existed in its leadership as to the revolutionary strategy to be followed. The majority group insisted that the revolution could only be successfully realized by and through the industrial proletariat. The other line, inspired by Mao Tse Tung (Suyin 1972), argued that the major revolutionary potential was in the mass of the Chinese people, the peasantry, which should form an alliance with the workers under the leadership of the Communist Party. It was during his investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan in 1927 that Mao Tse Tung realized the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. He called their upsurge 'a colossal event' (Mao 1971).

The Red Army established bases in various parts of China's interior, and from there moved into surrounding areas. Following the liberation of towns and villages, people's councils, called Soviets, were established. Old taxes were abolished, a single progressive tax was introduced, usury and opium were forbidden, debts lifted, land was distributed and schools, mutual aid groups and cooperatives were organized. The Red Army helped the rural masses to liberate themselves from feudal oppression. It recruited new forces from among the people and thus became the people's own army. In the liberated areas mass

movements were organized to promote village transformation by the people and by their democratically elected delegates (Smedley 1965).

Positive experiences and failures and mistakes gained in the liberated areas in the organization of the people by and with the people, were carefully studied and served for more extended experiments in the reorganization of rural life in the liberated territory of Shensi, where the Red Army ended its long march and where, in 1935, it established its headquarters in Yenan. The massive transfer and redistribution of land eliminated major concentrations of wealth and political power. It reduced polarization and gave new hope to poor peasants, tenants, sharecroppers and labourers. The Communist Party was called *Kung-Ch'an-Tang*, meaning share-property-party (Snow 1970). As it promised equality for all, a sharing of resources, of rewards for work, of security from starvation, of emancipation for women and of a perspective of purposeful activity to the young, it was able to acquire the confidence of the masses.[1]

From the mass organizations promoted in the villages emerged new leaders who became the nuclei of revolutionary committees, in charge of community development and management. These committees served to safeguard the gains of the agrarian revolution and to prevent the resurgence of domination by the former village elite. Within the CPC extreme left wing leaders pressed for violence against all those not belonging to the poor peasantry. Under Mao Tse Tung's leadership, a moderate policy was adopted. By proceeding prudently but firmly, the CPC was able to secure the sympathy of the large majority of peasants and could rely on them as secure allies. Instead of eliminating the rich peasants as a class, it limited itself to curbing their power. Disruption of production was thus minimized and food supplies for the people, the liberation army and the guerilla were safeguarded.

The Japanese offensive and the mounting pressure of the Kuo Min Tang blockade led in 1942 to the initiation of the Chong-Fen (reform and rectification movement), which created an environment of intensive contest. Self-criticism and mutual criticism proved vital instruments with which to examine each other's assumptions, values and positions, and the communities' changing needs, priorities and tasks. The movement served to break up deeply internalized values and submissiveness and blind obedience vis-à-vis authority.

A 'to-the-village movement' *(Hsia-Hsieng)* - was organized to bring cadres, intellectuals and students who had come to Yenan, 'down to earth'. They were asked to live and work with the peasants, share their experiences, to learn from them and to develop a sense of humility. The movement served to reduce the barriers between the educated and uneducated, between mental and manual labour. It stimulated those who had 'come down' to learn from the

masses about their struggles, concerns and aspirations. The poor, in turn, were able to learn from the cadres, intellectuals and young people. (Marc Selden)

To summarize: the basic orientation for the socialist transformation of China was experimentally worked out in the Yenan experience. Priority for agrarian transformation, new forms of cooperation, rural industrialization, transformation of the people by themselves in the day-to-day struggle, continuous reliance on the development of a dialectical unity of theory and practice, new revolutionary forms of education, the creation of a new style of work by the Party and its cadres 'from the masses to the masses', the unity of central planning and coordination and decentralized management and local initiative, the emancipation of women and new roles for young people, a new conception of authority and leadership, the unity of army and people - all these were developed during the struggle to ensure conditions for survival and for laying the foundations for dynamic sustained self-development.

At the start of the 1946-49 liberation war against the Japanese, the mass of the population in the liberated areas supported the Red Army which effectively promoted redistribution of land, power and opportunities. Ultra left leaders of the Party again demanded extreme forms of equalization but they were opposed by Mao.[2] These extreme tendencies supporting unreserved equalization, against middle peasants was even promoted by the 1947 land reform law. This abolished the provisions of the modified 1946 land reform law which had protected the middle peasants. However, the defeat of the ultra left and the success of moderate leadership resulted in a change of the 1947 law, to give protection to the middle peasants. This made it possible to work with and rely on the large majority of peasants.

In 1947 the liberation army abandoned its defensive position and moved into the offensive. Land reform was seen as the basic means by which the national revolution would be completed and on the basis of which socialist revolution and the process of socialist transformation could start. This was promised on the full release of the productive and creative potential of the masses and their participation in the process of local and national transformation. The problem and the task was summed up in the preamble of the 1947 land reform law which stated:

> China's agrarian system is unjust in the extreme. Speaking of general conditions, landlords and rich peasants who make up less than ten per cent of the rural population hold approximately seventy to eighty per cent of the land, cruelly exploiting the peasantry. Farm labourers, poor peasants, middle peasants, and other people, however, who make up over ninety per cent of the rural population hold a

> total of approximately only twenty to thirty per cent of the land, toiling throughout the whole year, knowing neither warmth nor full stomach. These grave conditions are the root of our country's being the victim of aggression, oppression, poverty, backwardness, and the basic obstacles to our country's democratization, industrialization, independence, unity, strength and prosperity. In order to change these conditions, it is necessary, on the basis of the demands of the peasantry, to wipe out the agrarian system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation, and realize the system of 'Land to the tillers (Hinton 1966:615).

THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

Transforming the agrarian structure

The land reform, generalized in 1949, was completed in 1952, and turned China into a country of very small landowners. On basis of the mistakes made and lessons learned since 1927, fullfledged equalization of landholdings was avoided. With the exception of those landlords who were condemned for seriously exploitative and oppressive practices and who had incurred the wrath of the villagers, a small minority, all received sufficient land for a livelihood.

The attainment of a strong dynamic agricultural system required that the highly atomized, fragmented and unproductive agricultural holdings, resistant to rational management, be transformed into a productive structure that would be conducive to rationally organized management, would allow for optimum resource use (land, water, inputs and equipment), and would promote at each stage of development the liberation of productive and creative energy of the mass of the rural people. If the peasants were given too long a time to work their private holdings, acquired thanks to the agrarian reform, they would inevitably develop and reproduce the culture and consciousness that was characteristic of the old society. The former productive structure had been broken up but its supporting values and ideology still existed. There was thus a need to involve the peasants in new practices to help them to change and widen their horizon. From 1949 on, therefore, the earlier practice of joint work organization by way of forming mutual aid teams was extended to the whole country.

From mutual aid to cooperation

During the rehabilitation period (1949-52), mutual aid was only practiced on a seasonal basis by small groups (an average of 6 to 8 families) for a limited land area (an average of 5 to 15 ha). Instruments of production were still in private ownership. Remuneration was based on the sales of produce by individual households. The practice of mutual aid proved to be helpful in lightening the burdens of individual families and improved the efficiency of work organization at critical times of land preparation, planting and harvesting. By 1952, over four per cent of all families had become members of these teams.

In December 1953, the Central Committee of the CPC outlined China's road to socialist agriculture as follows:

> According to China's experience, the gradual association of the peasants in production proceeds along a specific road, leading from the simple, temporary mutual aid teams with labour in common, and then the all-the-year-around mutual aid team with labour in common, some division of labour and a certain amount of property in common, to the agricultural producers' cooperative in which land is pooled as shares and there is unified management and still more common property, and then to the fully socialist producers' cooperative with collective ownership by the peasants.
> (Mao 1971:419)

In the period 1952-55, the mutual aid practice was extended to more neighbours (8 to 15 families), who pooled their labour on a permanent all-year basis on larger tracts of land (average 5 to 30 ha). Land remained in private ownership. Where it was felt that to change private ownership of animals and working tools to ownership by the whole team would be advantageous, this was done. Remuneration remained based on the sale of proceeds by each family. The practice developed, however, that the team would pay a bonus to an individual household for extra work performed. In this way a shift in emphasis took place from income derived from individual property to income from labour. As increased productivity benefited the whole team, the role of labour in creating wealth was enhanced.

By 1955 permanent mutual aid was common all over China. Nevertheless, the number of families who practiced mutual aid had not increased greatly. The relative stagnation was found to be due to a bureaucratic impositive attitude among many of the cadres, to the little developed political consciousness of many peasants, and to their

natural inclination to take a wait-and-see attitude and avoid taking risks.

The conviction grew in the Party that unless a further step were to be taken towards cooperative organization, the perspective of highly productive modern farming would be lost and the road to sustained industrial development would be blocked. It was at that critical juncture that Mao Tse Tung in 1953 launched a great drive for socialist cooperative farming and proposed an approach to generalize the cooperative movement. In *On the Question of Agricultural Cooperation*, he rallied support for the movement.

In that work Mao stressed the importance of persuasion through democratic methods for farming the cooperatives, and the principle that payment based on land shares and contributed labour should be recognized. Also, he elaborated a methodology by which to prevent that the cooperative movement would be jeopardized in the initial stages by indiscriminately admitting all peasants, irrespective of their class origin. As to landlords and rich peasants, his advice was that they should only be admitted when cooperation had been completed. This would preclude them from re-gaining their previous hold over the poor people and give them an effective chance to learn how to use their newly acquired power.

This 'Charter' for agricultural cooperation served to inspire and to guide a new powerful movement which led to the full cooperativization of China's agriculture in two stages. In the first stage from 1955 to 1956, the movement led to the creation of primary producer cooperatives, into which 20 to 50 families grouped themselves, pooling their resources and plots for joint operation on an average of 20 to 300 ha. Initially, private property was maintained but under unified management. Income was paid according to the number of working days, and rent *pro rata* to the share in the cooperative in land, animals and tools. The balance was then distributed on the basis of individual shares.

In a second campaign, from 1956 to 1958, the primary cooperatives were converted into advanced agricultural producer cooperatives (an average of 100-400 families). The private plots of land, animals and tools became the joint property of the cooperatives. No compensation was paid for land but animals and tools were taken over with compensation. Private ownership of home compounds was maintained. Income was distributed first according to the number of days worked, and in a further stage, according to the amount of work performed and calculated in working points. Gradually, the payment of dividends *pro rata* to individual capital assets pooled was stopped; distribution of income according to work performed became predominant and then the sole criterion. The cooperative movement rapidly gained in strength as its advantages became manifest.

The cooperatives proved to be vital instruments by which to mobilize the hitherto highly underutilized potential for productive work among the peasant masses. They were organized to carry out a variety of village works such as irrigation canals, drainage, levelling, terracing, afforestation, water reservoirs, dams, fishing ponds, construction. Each cooperative prepared its own plan of action. This helped the villagers to organize their work properly, to anticipate and to ensure the necessary material inputs and to coordinate activities. Hitherto unproductive periods in the year were made productive and work was spread more evenly throughout the year. The new approach allowed land and water use to be re-organized, permitted more rational management of resources and a more efficient organization and distribution of work. Joint farming also facilitated the pooling of individual savings for investment in common projects which were advantageous to all. Finally, cooperative farming not only broadened and strengthened the productive base but facilitated funding for urgently needed social provisions.

An educational drive was started in 1956. This was inspired by the common programme for education which had been elaborated at the Chinese People's Consultative Conference in 1949, synthesizing the educational experiences of the Yenan period and stressing the need for the democratization of culture and science.

Also in 1956 a major campaign started that was intended to help intellectuals to find ways of putting their talents at the service of the people's and the country's needs. In February 1957, inspired by the Party leadership, a campaign was started against the 'three evils' within the Party: bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism. The hundred flower and anti-bureaucratic campaigns were intended to overcome tendencies shown by bureaucrats and intellectuals to stand aloof from the masses.

Departure from the Soviet approach

In April 1956 Mao Tse Tung presented a strategy which signified a radical break with the approach hitherto pursued. He argued in his speech, 'On the ten great relationships': 'To develop heavy industry requires an accumulation of capital. Where does capital come from? Heavy industries can accumulate capital; so can light industries and agriculture. However, light industries and agriculture can accumulate more capital and faster.' He proposed that investment in agriculture and light industry should be increased so as to accelerate the development of heavy industry, which remained the focal point. People cannot work or be motivated without adequate food, nor will the production of industrial raw materials have proper attention. Also, without adequate basic consumer goods, people will have no incentive to increase their productive capacity, and there will be a danger of inflation. Mao pointed to the danger of squeezing the peasantry, who might well with-

draw cooperation. This could result in agricultural and industrial stagnation as well as in the use of coercion against the peasantry. Mao proposed that force was to be used only against a foreign enemy and a small group of internal enemies who opposed socialist development. Among the people differences should be settled by democratic methods, discussion, mutual and self-criticism, persuasion and education and not coercion and repression.

The ground was thus prepared for the Great Leap Forward, according to the method advocated by Mao Tse Tung in an essay which he wrote at that time: 'First create public opinion and seize power; then remove the question of ownership. Later develop the forces of production in a big way.' (Levy 1975)

The communes are organized

The first communes were set up in the spring of 1958. Their expansion was facilitated by the support given by the local cadres, by the success of the cooperative movement, and the confidence of the masses in the Communist Party. From the summer of 1958 onward communes were organized all over China. Almost 175,000 advanced cooperatives were merged into 24,000 communes which became integrated all-round economic, social and political units, collectively governed, managed and owned by the people who lived in them. They organized agriculture, industry and all other types of productive activities. They also assumed responsibility for welfare, education, health, culture and defence, according to the principle 'from each to his abilities, to each according to his work'. Land and even animals and equipment were transferred from the advanced cooperatives to the communes. Administrative functions, which had been exercised by the old administrative units, the Hsiang, were also taken over, thus turning the communes into fully integrated self-administering units.

The exceptional harvest of 1958, due to very good weather as well as to hard work, made a number of communes decide to abolish the socialist principle of 'each according to his work' and to introduce the communist principle of 'each according to his need'. Free distribution of food was introduced. Canteens were set up for all people, thus obviating the need for private cooking. In a number of areas, people also started tearing down their old houses in the expectation that communism, which was just around the corner, would satisfy all their needs, including new dwellings. Local transport as well as other services were declared gratuitous. Private plots were in many places abolished and, in some cases, even the use of money. The working point system, according to which each peasant was

rewarded in accordance with his performance, was declared incompatible with the ideals of an egalitarian society. Fixed wages were introduced and income was equalized, irrespective of individual and collective work performance, differences in ecological conditions, and stage of development. The consequence of this levelling and distribution approach was that the more advanced, more committed and harder working people felt penalized by having to subsidize the poorer and the less hard-working. Thus, the incomes of the poor, less advanced and/or committed were automatically raised at the expense of the more wealthy, more advanced and/or committed. In certain cases, joint projects were organized (e.g. land management, animal management) to which all were expected to contribute by transferring their own labour or assets (e.g. pigs, manure). Thus some contributed much, others little or nothing. As a result, work on one's own fields was neglected and the fruits of initiative of some were simply taken away by others. Such projects only promoted distribution but neglected to increase productivity.

Equalization with moderation

The measures for wholesale equalization rapidly proved to have a negative effect on many people's motivation. They viewed such cooperation as a threat to individual or group advance. Instead of leading to sharing of wealth, cooperation under such conditions implied sharing poverty.

In order not to jeopardize the possibility of socialist advance, based on the voluntary wholehearted cooperation of the mass of the population, it became necessary to retreat from extreme equalitarianism as this undermined the morale of many of the peasants, often the most committed to socialist development. It became clear that the promotion of full equality without a corresponding productive base, ensuring abundance, was self-defeating and counter-productive.

The Party gradually realized that specific levels and forms of equality need to be adopted each time to the particular juncture and stage of development of productive forces in order to generate and release these forces.

In the three years following the great harvest and the Great Leap Forward of the second part of 1956, steps were taken to correct mistakes as their negative effects became manifest.

Thus a return was effected during 1959-61 from a structure of collective property which was yet too much in advance of the level of development of the productive forces and the scale of which was also experienced by most people as too large, too complex and too impersonal; there was also the risk that bureaucratic impositive management would be encouraged. The strategic retreat encouraged self-management on a smaller scale and on a face-to-face basis. The

new approach was based on central planning by the communes and decentralized programming and management by the brigades and teams. The working point system was reintroduced. Wage payment was limited to artisan and industrial activities; free distribution of food and services was ended. The five guarantees (food, clothes, housing, health and burial) were preserved but limited to those in need who were unable to work and earn a living (the aged, the sick, the handicapped).

Retreat and advance

The retreat, for the time being, to more adequate forms of collective living, property and organization was also dictated by the severe droughts and floods which struck China in the three years subsequent to 1958. Agricultural production then suffered a serious setback. Nevertheless, for the first time in China's history, marked by the periodical twin catastrophies of floods and droughts, there was no starvation.

The eight-point charter, drawn up by Mao Tse Tung in 1958 (soil improvement, use of fertilizer, irrigation, better seed strains, close planting, plant protection, better farm implements and field management), guided the cadres in introducing and stimulating scientific farming. Other than might have been expected, the crisis gave new impetus to agricultural development. The new creative and productive power released by the commune organization, manifested itself in the emergence all over the country of intra and inter-communal projects for water conservation, regulation and distribution, and land development. Large-scale capitalization occurred thanks to the intensive work of the mass of the peasants. Women, who already participated in production, now became fully engaged on a large scale, as their participation was urgently required.

Irrigation rapidly became mechanized, and the total horsepower of irrigation pumps almost doubled during 1960-61. The use of mechanical equipment in agriculture almost tripled between 1959 and 1964 (Burki 1960).

During these critical years a major move forward was made in rural industrialization. This went hand in hand with the decentralization and distribution of state enterprises away from the centre to and within the provinces.

Organizing rural industrialization

During this period, all over China, the people of the communes organized with the cadres of local industries for processing agricultural products, the production and repair of agricultural equipment, the production of simple consumer goods (e.g. clothes, furniture) and of such basic inputs as energy, steel, cement, fertilizers, and the extraction

of raw materials needed to produce these. The development of small-scale ventures based on local capitalization could generate great savings to the central government which could then use them for key investments. The spread of steel enterprises became possible when coal and iron deposits were discovered in various areas after liberation, as later also occurred with oil. These discoveries showed how resource identification was closely related to autonomy and the exercise of self-reliance and how the development of political consciousness could be a condition for the mobilization of material resources which cannot simply be assumed as a fixed datum. Due to the great enthusiasm many mistakes were naturally committed. Industries were often started without proper local conditions or preparation, leading to the decision that only those industries were to be started for which resources and labour were locally available.

The Great Leap Forward unquestionably created chaotic situations and disruption (e.g. in transport). Rather than its short-term deficiencies (such as the temporary drop in productivity and the start of basic industries without adequate preparation), which were inevitable in the radical transformation of the Great Leap Forward, its medium and long-term gains need to be taken into account: for example, the new institutional framework which was to serve as the basis for national self-sustained development of the creative and productive powers and faculties, both of people as individual persons and as collectivities, and the entrance of the peasant masses into the mainstream of national life.

The Soviet Union's withdrawal of aid in 1960, induced by ideological cleavages which intensified from them on, forced China to make a virtue out of necessity and the thrust towards national and local self-reliance was in every respect deepened.

The new emphasis on rural industrialization and small and medium industry did not imply a de-emphasis on the further build-up of large modern and heavy industry. Instead, the need for their simultaneous development and complementarity was stressed. 'Walking on two legs' became the approach. It was realized that emphasizing only small and medium-scale industry would condemn the country to very slow development and to low productivity. Relying mainly on heavy industry would imply concentrated uneven growth at the expense of the majority population.

Organizing ownership to free people's motivation and creativity

Recognition of the mistakes of premature communism, made during the Great Leap Forward, led to the gradual adoption

and consolidation of a new structure of multi-level ownership. Except for a limited number of big agricultural State enterprises (engaged in land development and production in sparsely inhabited areas), China did not introduce State socialization of agriculture as it was felt that such a step would put too large a burden on the State if it had to assume direct responsibility for people's livelihood and welfare. This would also lead to an administrative approach conducive to costly and inefficient bureaucratization. Its major danger in the eyes of the Chinese leaders was that it would prevent the development of creativity and initiative by the masses. People's subordination to the State, in their view, was likely to impede the growth of democratic practices and the possibility for people to achieve control over their own lives, working conditions, and the fruits of their work.

The search for the organization of different forms of collective ownership in the communes has been closely linked to development of a proper strategy and methodology for linking equalization to the increase of production and productivity.

In the stages of mutual aid and primary cooperative practices, interest in working together was raised by joint productive activity which increased accumulation and welfare for all families involved. The development of more advanced forms of cooperation towards collective ownership was *not* achieved by direct equalization of assets (the approach was recognized as a mistake and corrected), but by gradual rises in productivity, thanks to the organization of joint projects. The transition from private to socialist collective property was thus based on, and took place together with, a gradual rise in productivity. Former owners did not lose in absolute but only in relative income. The cooperatives did not directly redistribute income or wealth to the poor, but were vehicles in creating more distribution among all participating units (Gray 1974). Reliance on individual performance by the introduction and re-introduction of working points served to prevent indiscriminate sharing. The concrete value of a working point in each collective group is dependent on total production by the group so that there is an in-built natural pressure for all to achieve higher input. Equal and rising income was thus structurally linked to equal and rising work performance by all.

This methodology of equalization was subsequently also applied in the creation of new common assets and wealth through the more 'advanced' levels of collective organization and management, the advanced cooperatives. The new assets (e.g. dams, canals, reservoirs) thus serve to strengthen the productive base and to increase the wealth of the 'less advanced' smaller units of collective organization, the primary cooperatives. This approach has

been used by communes on a large scale in joint operations, creating new joint assets, as have the brigades on a smaller scale within the communes. Total productive power and assets have thus been raised and special consideration could be given to distributing the new assets to the less advanced poorer units without direct loss of income for the more advanced richer units.

Organizing for self-reliance

During the initial years of the establishment of communes, the state provided considerable direct material assistance, particularly to the poorer communes. There has since been increasing movement towards self-reliance whenever this proved feasible in practice. The State at the national level (which groups a number of communes) or at the Provincial level, limits itself to overall guidance, supervision and coordination, in order to ensure cooperation between communes and compatibility of initiatives by communes in the same county. Numerous large-scale capitalization projects are undertaken in this way at little cost to the state which only contributes some equipment if this cannot be produced locally. Thus, the creation on a vast scale of new capital, largely by direct human labour but increasingly combined with equipment (as labour shortages arise and it becomes cheaper to use capital-intensive methods which also reduce backbreaking work), is no burden for the state budget (Ullerich 1972). Inflation is also prevented in this way. The development of social provisions (e.g. education, health, recreation, child care, care of the old aged) is a community affair and the fruit of self-reliance, and not the product of a costly bureaucratic relief operation by the state.

The advance of the rural communities in China was favoured by the state's maintenance of a fair tax and price policy which serves to motivate the peasantry and facilitates internal accumulation. After Independence in 1949, a unified single tax in kind was instituted, based on the resource endowment of each community. This was subsequently transferred to the newly-created socialist units and is fixed periodically for the duration of a five-year plan. It does not change with changes in production, so that the community can keep the balance if production rises.

Variations from commune to commune, brigade to brigade, and even from team to team, in the relative proportions of what is distributed and what is accumulated, are considerable and change with the changes in productive capacity. The difference tends to be high when major investments are needed, and low when such investments have been carried out, when productivity is rising and

people feel they can afford to increase consumption. With increased pressure for the rapid mechanization of agriculture, to be financed by the communes, there is an urgent need to keep consumption under control and to prevent any move towards possible 'conspicuous' expenditure. In principle, however, as communes increase production more can be invested and consumed simultaneously.

The Chinese have not considered it advisable to promote equalization by way of such measures as a progressive income tax. The introduction of such a tax would be easy but perhaps has not been done because it would violate the practice and spirit of self-reliance as a vital source of new capital formation. Other indirect approaches to facilitate equalization appear more in accordance with the promotion of self-reliance.

One such approach is for the government to subsidize the purchase of basic grains (wheat and rice) and other agricultural products. While keeping the consumer price low and stable, it has steadily raised the purchase price from the producer. This has been possible thanks to the rising productivity and profit in the government-controlled modern industrial sector. Between 1950 and the present day, grain prices have doubled.

Support of rural development has also been ensured through low prices for inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, pesticides) and agricultural equipment, prices which have been considerably reduced in recent years. This has been possible because production is based on an integrated unified plan. Losses may be incurred by heavy and basic industries but can be evened-out by profits from light and consumer industries. The balanced proportional development of heavy, basic and light industries is therefore of crucial significance for rural and agricultural development.

Another vital instrument with which uneven development can be overcome is the all-round promotion of exchange of knowledge, expertise, and scientific and production research findings between enterprises and communes and between and within communes. These exchanges have developed considerably since the Cultural Revolution and reflect the increased integration in society, fruit of the new breakthrough in social relations and political and social consciousness engendered by the Cultural Revolution. A constant intense process of exchange can be observed in all fields of human activity. Workers go from urban enterprises to communes to help them develop their industries or equipment. Communes send teams to factories for in-service training or to other communes to learn from advances in agricultural and industrial production and management. Similarly, they learn from each other's advances in political, social and cultural development.

Significant changes have taken place in the distri-

bution of personal income. A major break with the patriarchal feudal family structure occurred in 1958 when income for work was no longer distributed to the family but to each individual, man or woman.

At present, two major approaches for income distribution prevail, each with many variations. Under the first, a basic allocation of grains and other food is made to each commune member, man, woman or child. The other half is distributed according to the work of each. The second approach, inspired by the Tachai brigade which has served as the example of an advanced socialist production unit in the campaign against capitalist farming, emphasizes the simplification of the accounting procedure. Tasks are rated against the time in which they can be achieved and the maximum of points which can be earned in one day is fixed. At periodic meetings, per quarter, per season or even once a year, all peasants are asked to assess themselves and are evaluated by the others. Sometimes a good worker is selected in advance as a 'pace setter' and others are asked to assess themselves against his performance. A final meeting takes place at the end of the year, to round off accounts; the balance of each person's income is then calculated against the advances received (Henle 1974: 200).

The recently introduced procedures, a fruit of the Cultural Revolution, not only minimize the need for bureaucratic supervision but also make it possible for the people to take charge of and to control their affairs.

This approach leaves room for significant differentiations in income. These are likely to be more articulated to the extent that the work performed is straight physical work (age, sex, muscular strength). With the advance in mechanization, such differences are likely to diminish.

Self-management or incorporation

Democratic self-government and self-management by the communes is rooted in elections of a People's Assembly. The Assembly or Council elects a Committee. Since the Cultural Revolution these Committees, consisting of five to seven people, have become Revolutionary Committees. With the rise in political consciousness and democratic practices, members are elected by the population in view of their commitment and service to the people's interests and to the socialist line of development. In the first period of the Cultural Revolution when, in many communes, there was a seizure of power by the masses, quite a few commandist, authoritarian cadres of the Community Party, who had been representatives in the existing People's Committees, were dismissed and their functions taken over by non-Party commune members. In several communes the tasks of the local Party cadres were also taken over

by the Revolutionary Committees.

The Party's resumption of the leading role was closely connected with the new selection procedures of Party members that had been developed since the Cultural Revolution. Members are most carefully screened by wide and intense consultation by the Party election committees with all representative groups of the population, as regards their history, political consciousness and practical commitment, reflected in their spirit and practice of service to the people and their capacity for democratic guidance. Within the communes the Communist Party has no executive power or responsibility; this is in the hands of the Revolutionary Committee. The Party exercises an overall role in providing political direction and guidance; the Revolutionary Committees carry out their executive and managerial tasks in accordance with the policies and programmes approved by the Assembly. These policies and programmes should be compatible with annual plans and approved by the County and Province.

All elected and appointed officers are required to do part time manual labour, spending two days per week with the people in the field or doing other physical work. Administrative and management costs are very low and may amount to only one or two percent of the communal budget (Henle 1974: 177).

Annual communal plans, which integrate plans prepared at team and brigade levels, apart from communal projects, are coordinated at the county level with those of other communes in the same area. County plans are again integrated at the provincial level. The county (inter-communal) plan serves to organize those projects which are too large in terms of manpower or financial requirements for the communes, such as irrigation, water control, electrification, communications and industries. The county thus plays the same role vis-à-vis the communes as the latter play vis-à-vis the brigades, and the brigades with regard to the teams. The county is not self-governed or self-managed but is an administrative organ directed by representation from the State (provincial government) and the communes. Its strategic role has grown with the need for joint planning between communes.

Annual plans are based on performances of the previous year. Since the Cultural Revolution it has become the rule that targets and ceilings of production are decided upon by the production units which have to be approve the inclusion in the plan.

The national annual plan is greatly simplified by the fact that only some of the activities at the local level are included. It is defined by the Central Planning Commission on the basis of the Five-year Plan which is only indicative in nature. The major item included is the production quota in order to ensure grains and inputs

for the state enterprises. Public works projects, which are organized on the basis of self-organization and self-finance out of internal accumulation, are not included. Also not included are contracts entered into by communes to supply food to nearby cities and towns, as well as the (small) sale of private production on the local market. Investments at the county and commune level, designed to directly support communal development, are also not included. Only those industrial investments are included which supply inputs for state enterprises and for the industrial market (Robinson 1973).

During the 1959-61 crisis a conservative group of Party leaders believed that socialist transformation needed compulsion and direction by the party cadre. Mao opposed this tendency. Making use of the confusion and insecurity in the Party as well as among the people, the opponents to socialist development attempted to re-orient the economy in a capitalist direction. The authority of the bureaucracy, managers and technocrats was strengthened and free market forces in agriculture and industry were given free play.

Mao Tse Tung unambiguously exposed their approach at the July 1959 Lushan Conference, warning them that unless they stopped their indiscriminate opposition to a socialist way of development: 'I will go to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If those of you in the Liberation Army won't follow me, then I will go and find a Red Army, and organize another Liberation Army, but I think that the Liberation Army will follow me.'

Centralism and democracy

The emphasis on expertness by technocrats and managers led to the promotion of authoritarian methods and non-accountability, which served as a cover for cadres to take advantage of their position. Non-accountability was compounded by fear of criticism by the people. The growth of such an orientation would make it impossible for the mass of the people to freely express themselves and to democratically manage their own affairs. It would also hinder central planning from being responsive to the people's needs. Mao opposed these tendencies in a talk in January 1962 he argued:

> It seems that some of our comrades still do not understand the democratic centralism which Marx and Lenin talked of. They are afraid of the masses talking about them, afraid of the masses criticizing them...I think one should not be afraid. What is there to be afraid of? Our attitude is to hold fast to the truth and to be ready at any time to correct our mistakes. The question of right and

> wrong, correct or incorrect has to do with the contradictions among the people. To resolve contradictions among the people we cannot use curses or fists, still less guns or knives. We can only use the method of discussion, reasoning, criticism and self-criticism. In short we can only use democratic methods, the method of letting the masses speak out. Both inside and outside the Party, there must be full democratic life, which means conscientiously putting democratic centralism into effect...In 1957 I said: 'We must bring about a political climate which has both centralism and democracy, discipline and freedom, unity of purpose and ease of mind for the individual, and which is lively and vigorous.' Unless we promote people's democracy and inner-Party democracy in our country, and unless we fully implement the system of proletarian democracy, it is impossible to achieve a high degree of centralism, and without a high degree of centralism, it is impossible to establish a socialist economy... When these two aspects are combined, this is then proletarian dictatorship... or it may be called people's dictatorship... We must not put hats on people indiscriminately. Some of our people are in the habit of persecuting people with hats. It is better that hats should be put on by people themselves rather than that they should be put on by others. If people put on a few hats and other people do not agree that they should wear those hats, then they should be removed. This will make for a very good democratic atmosphere. We advocate not to grasp at other's faults, not to put hats on people, not to flourish the big stick. The aim is to make people unafraid in their hearts and to let them express their opinions...Comrades... When you have gone back, you must build up democratic centralism (Mao Tse Tung).

In September 1962, in his speech to the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party, he analyzed the re-emergence of capitalist practices and stressed the imperative need to recognize the existence of classes in socialist countries; 'We must acknowledge the existence of a struggle of class against class, and admit the possibility of a restoration of the reactionary classes... Otherwise a country like ours cannot move to its opposite.' (Mao Tse Tung)

In the view of Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese who follow his theory and practice, by arguing that class struggle only exists in capitalist countries the Soviet Communist Party abandoned the Marxist-Leninist approach and prevented the masses from achieving democratic control over

their society, life and work. This position is clearly expressed in the response by the Chinese Communist Party in July 1964 to the letters of the Soviet Communist Party. It stresses that classes and class struggle remain, that a movement forward to communism means 'moving forward towards enhancing communist consciousness of the popular masses' and that 'in both socialist revolution and socialist construction it is necessary to adhere to the mass line, to boldly arouse the masses and to unfold mass movements on a large scale' (Carrere d'Encausse & Schram 1969, 336).

In 1962, the Communist Party formally adopted the policy of walking on two legs, taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor, drawing appropriate lessons from the over-emphasis on industrialization at the expense of agriculture that had been characteristic of the Great Leap Forward. Yet the implementation of this policy continued to be thwarted by those promoting and seeking short-term profit in both agriculture and industry.

Knowledge and science and people's transformation

Universities remained bulwarks of resistance to a new integrated approach in education. This would end 'academic freedom' as understood by many professors. It would also threaten their superior social status. In 1965 40 per cent of the students at universities and secondary schools in the cities were still from well-to-do families, although these constitute only five per cent of the population. Not only was it difficult for children from peasant and working families to enter high school; upon entrance, they were looked down upon and had a hard time in competing, as the study was unrelated to the environment from which they came.

In his talk on Questions of Philosophy in August 1964, Mao Tse Tung made a frontal attack on the prevailing class nature of education and upon its roots, the bourgeois conception of the genesis and development of knowledge. He stressed the unity of theory and practice: 'It is only when there is class struggle that there can be philosophy. It is a waste of time to discuss epistomology apart from practice. The comrades who study philosophy should go down to the countryside. To get some experience of class struggle - that's what I call a university' (Mao Tse Tung).

Mao Tse Tung thus proposed that the development of knowledge and science, rooted in active involvement in the transformation of production and social relations, should replace the approach rooted in the divorce between theory and practice. This also implied that the forms in which knowledge is produced, monopolized and distributed be transformed. The production structure of knowledge,

science and culture should be democratized so that the masses would become the producers of their own knowledge of the real world and thus be able to actively participate in its transformation.

This also entailed rejection of the contention that some people are superior and others inferior in view of certain inborn characteristics. Such a contention Mao considered an apology for the old class structure and society in which intellectuals as a rule served as the guardians and promoters of forms of consciousness, culture and values which legitimized and reinforced the *status quo*.

The great proletarian cultural revolution

With the sharpening of the struggle between the two lines in early 1960s, one implying a return to capitalism and practices, the other a deepening of socialist development, pressure to involve the mass of the people became more and more urgent on both sides. As the large majority of the people: peasants and workers and the youth, identified with socialist development, they were the ones who Mao or Party thought would safeguard the socialist line. The full development of democratic practices and control by the people was seen as the only guarantee for a society which was socialist not only in form but in reality. They must be aroused to participate in the struggle as this was the only way by which they could raise their socialist consciousness. In July 1965, Mao made another plea for mass participation, mutual criticism, self-management by the masses of their affairs, and for support of the Party leadership (Chen 1970: 102).

Advance in socialist development required that the masses should free themselves from what would impede their further self-development. This involved destruction of the power of those in the Party and government who used their position to oppose socialist development. It involved the transformation of the state to serve more as a genuine organ of service to the whole people, and the destruction of all forms of authority, organization and management which block people's emancipation and personal and collective self-realization. Political, social and ideological transformation was considered crucial to free the people's new creativity and productivity.

The official signal for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was given by the central committee of the Chinese communist party in August 1966. The Party considered it 'a new stage in the development of the Socialist Revolution'. It was directed against ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes by which they corrupted the masses and the creation of a culture of

the proletariat.

There is a good deal of evidence that in the process of the Cultural Revolution serious excesses were committed under the direct or indirect inspiration of those in the Party who attempted to shortcut the road to more advanced forms of socialist development by trying to move the masses beyond what they could comprehend and experience as useful and possible. Within the movement by the Party to oppose rightist tendencies to subvert socialist development, grew what were gradually identified as ultra-leftist currents, promoted and supported by leaders and cadres in the Party who created a climate in which physical threats, intimidation, terror, slander and humiliation were considered legitimate means to neutralize real or supposed opponents. A major dimension of this process was the pursuit of abstract ideals and norms, irrespective of the possibility for the people to perceive their real possibilities and usefulness. Thus, as at earlier critical times, people in a number of communes were pressed to give up the link between income and work and to substitute the socialist principle of each according to work by the communist principle of each according to need. From a theoretical point of view, the tendencies by the ultra-left to centre their pursuit of the ideal of socialist development by challenging the reputation of individual people may be linked to the view that the persistence of the old society is rooted in the pursuit of self-interest 'as such', thereby disregarding that people's behaviour, their ethos and inclinations have their roots in the objective world of their social being and social and production relations, and in the forms of consciousness and ideology that are rooted in these relations. By focusing all attention on the manifestations of these relations in individual people, the danger arises that the underlying social and production relations would be disregarded. An example of this approach is the attempt to reduce wage differentials. In the view of Marx (see the 'Introduction' to *Grundrisse)*, distribution relations are always the reverse side of production relations and their transformation is dependent on the transformation of the latter. Thus, a one-sided promotion of equality in income without a transformation of production relations, of which the class structure is the expression, serves to distract attention from the roots of the problem. (Bettelheim 1974, Postscript).

Gradually, alliances came to be formed which represented new forms of popular power and control. Mao Tse Tung suggested that these new organs, the Revolutionary Committees, be composed of delegates of the masses, of revolutionary cadres of the party (replacing those who had to withdraw) and of the People's Liberation Army. In the years prior to the Cultural Revolution the Liber-

ation Army had been engaged in an intense process of self-transformation to renew its unity with and service to the people, as it grew out of and developed during the Yenan period and the struggle for national liberation. It did not, however, participate as a military force in the Cultural Revolution, except at times to prevent clashes from developing into open and armed conflict.

During the high tide of the Cultural Revolution, millions of young people moved from the interior to the major centres or to nearby towns to join the Red Guards, answering Mao's call to the guards of Tshinghua University on 1 August 1966: 'It is right to rebel against reactionaries'. In this way he gave direction to the potentially anarchistic call of the red guards: 'It is right to rebel' (Schram 1973: 86-87). With the support of the revolutionary leadership of the Party, directed by Mao Tse Tung, the people's Revolutionary Committees seized power from the Party in all organs and spheres of society, denouncing capitalist tendencies, commandism and bureaucratism. In the struggle for the abolition of all forms of authority and organization which the masses experienced as oppressive and blocking self-development, new visions and ideas arose on how to organize society. A new road was broken open for people's creativity to develop.

As the process grew, Mao Tse Tung encouraged all people in the Party to face the people. 'We must step forward to meet the masses, to accept their criticism and to do our own self-criticism. This is to let oneself near the fire.' (Chen 1970: 150).

The primacy given in the Cultural Revolution to man's self-transformation and to the creation of a new morality, cannot be understood in isolation. The call to put man at the centre. Mao Tse Tung's contention that 'man is precious', is a reaction to the world view and practices which turn man into a commodity, only to serve in producing other commodities. In Mao's view, the full development of production depended crucially on the allround development of human beings and the release of their dormant, multiple creative and productive powers. As contradictions always arise between the development of productive forces and production and social relations, which people develop among themselves and which at a certain stage and time tend to block the further development of productive forces, these latter must be transformed to liberate people, so that new creative energy can be released and engendered. In evaluating the Cultural Revolution, Chou En-lai said that 'despite the 1967-68 decline the goals set for the 1966-70 Five-year Plan have been basically attained and some have even been exceeded'. Without minimizing the difficulties which were part of the process of the Cultural Revolution, he asserted: 'We still can say that what we gained was far, far more than we lost.' (Edgar Snow 1971).

Further transformation of state and the party

Effective decentralization was greatly reinforced during the Cultural Revolution. According to Chou En-Lai, of the 90 departments under central government before the start of the Cultural Revolution, only 26 were maintained; the administrative personnel of central government were drastically reduced; some 50,000 were pensioned off, others went to live and work with families in the communes or went to work in factories. About 80 per cent of them went for reform to 7th May cadre schools in the countryside: 'The ablest cadres will go or have already gone to strengthen leadership in various localities, and to help run industries and institutes formerly under the central government ministeries but now being turned over to local management' (Snow 1971).

Thus, the Cultural Revolution served to bring about a new organization of the state, removing obstacles towards effective communication, by enhancing decentralized management at the provincial and county levels and democratic self-management in the communes. By spreading competent cadres all over the country to serve provincial, county and local organs, a countervailing force was built up against the power of the Centre and a more even balance was promoted as the development of a common vision, ideology and approach in the exercise of combining central planning with decentralized programming and control.

The Cadre Schools, for which Mao Tse Tung gave the directive on May 7, 1966 became a major instrument in the transformation of the Party and Government cadres, and were gradually set up all over China, according to geographical area and professional activity. In the first stages, higher cadres went to these schools for periods of up to several years. Others usually went for shorter periods: a few months to a year. Cadre schools became a major instrument in the development of new socialist relations between Party, government and people, serving the same purpose as the down-to-the-countryside movements, the first of which was started during the Yenan period. Only the organizational set-up differed: instead of living with the peasant families, the cadres lived together at a centre.

The programme of the cadre schools has combined life and work with the peasants together with study and reflection. Engaging in manual labour with the peasants of surrounding villages was intended to help the cadres to understand the life, conditions and problems of the masses, to learn how the wealth of the country is created, to study the struggle between the two lines as it was waged in the villages, and to participate in the struggle for

the creation of new socialist relations. In this way, the cadres could overcome their pretentions and bourgeois ways of thought, and unify with the people. By coming to know the real world they could dissociate from their old selves and renew themselves, no longer 'overlords sitting on the backs of the people' and not 'radical in scope but bureaucratic in practice'.

The creation of these schools was in itself an expression of the struggle between the two lines within the Party. The group that was opposed to integration with the masses, tried to discredit the new approach by arguing that the schools merely served to disguise unemployment.

The struggle for feasible equalization continued

It took time during the Cultural Revolution to bring pressure to bear for straight 'levelling and transfer' in the communes and factories where some of the workers demanded the abolition of all management and of the wage-grade system under control; these included attempts to abolish the team as the accounting unit (within which people share work and income) and to make the brigade the accounting unit. Once again people were asked to transfer tools and animals to the brigade and again disproportions developed between work performance and reward. The maintenance of private plots was denounced and even in some places abolished. Small local markets, where peasants could sell the balance of their garden produce, came under attack. As on earlier occasions, peasants became demoralized. The more they were forced to follow the ultra-left socialist road, the more they turned against it. This helped those who were opposed to socialist development to discredit it and to profit from the confusion. As the same thing had occurred before, it was easier for most peasants to handle these pressures and to safeguard practices which would promote a proper cooperation and balance between individuals and their production units as well as between different types of unit.

Chou en-Lai pointed out, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, that there is no such thing as a collective without the self and that the two exist in dialectical relationship to each other, in unity and in contradiction. He argued that in socialist perspective, the community, i.e. all the people come first and self second; but self, he continued, cannot be left out any more than the community as that would mean the negation of the individual and of the free self-development of the individual, the very purpose of socialist development (Hinton 1975).

The earlier practice of cooperation between brigades (and teams) to engage in joint projects and proved an

effective way to raise the accumulation, productivity and livelihood of all units. Straight transfers were avoided and equalization was realized by ensuring that a larger share of increased productivity and value of the new assets was secured to less advanced units, in proportion to their contribution. This assured that the 'laggards' could catch up with the more advanced. During the Cultural Revolution this method was perfected and since then has raised and intensified the self-mobilization of the peasant mass, not only for intra-communal but also for new large inter-communal projects (dams, reservoirs, irrigation, terracing, levelling, reforestation) at the county level. The productive base was widened, new work and income created, and the scope for social development enhanced.

Organizing and unifying creativity and productivity

Scientific farming and mechanization has greatly increased since the Cultural Revolution. The communes are backed by agricultural research teams and centres at the provincial and county levels, and the communes in turn back scientific experiments carried out in brigades and teams. The three-in-one combination, which has become practice in all industrial enterprises, is also generalized in agricultural scientific research, as teams are composed of peasants, cadres and scientist-technicians. Teams are based on, and promote, the integration of practice and theory, field work and laboratory experiment, fundamental research and applied research. There is an in-built purpose to overcome the old separation of intellectual scientist from the people and this is therefore a dimension of the struggle to create new social relations. At the same time, new productive forces are released, and scientific agriculture is more systematically carried out.

Improved rice strains now account for 80 per cent of China's sown rice acreage and improved wheat upwards of 70 per cent. Multicropping has been greatly extended during the last few years. In the Southern warmer regions of the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtse, triple cropping is now becoming general practice. Intercropping increases the per unit yields in the northern regions where two or three crops are now reaped instead of one. The combination of intensifying agriculture and developing local industry requires a speed-up in mechanization.

Another new structure of cooperation and communication which helps to stimulate the integration of creative thinking with practice is the three-in-one combination of old, middle-aged and young which grew out of the Cultural Revolution. This represents the attempt to integrate wisdom and experience, stamina and knowhow, innovativeness and enthusiasm, realism and imagination. In such a way, initiatives for practical action are the outcome of a balanced

weighing of insights and proposals which take into account the qualities of the various age-groups in the community. The new communication structure also helps people to learn to understand each other and to work together. It forces the older to take the young seriously and not to be arrogant. It helps the young to see that there is more to the real world than that they dream of in their philosophy.

Since the Cultural Revolution, broadening of the productive base by land and waterworks and scientific farming has been accompanied by a rapid expansion of mechanization. In a market economy when land and equipment are privately owned, mechanization tends to cause unemployment as it leads to the eviction of tenants and workers and to increasing underutilization of people. This situation may change radically if and when the rural masses become joint owners of the land, water and equipment. Instead of being a threat to security and survival, mechanization, as all other forms of modernization, may become a powerful asset. It diminishes the pressure for labour which arises in peak periods, and thus helps to prevent the interruption of other productive activities. It is likely to increase total output as well as output per worker by speeding-up cultivation and harvesting; multiple cropping is then possible which creates new demands for labour. Inasfar as labour is saved, this becomes available for other activities in agriculture, industry, etc. Apart from its labour-saving implications, mechanization is essential for reducing the hard and often back-breaking work on the land. Making agricultural work easier is a crucial element in reducing differences in conditions between agricultural and industrial work. It is also a decisive factor in making rural life more attractive and in evening-out the differentials between city and village life.

Integrating agriculture, light industry and heavy industry

Over the past years rapid progress has been made in expanding light industry, which is the chief source of income for government at all levels to finance industrial investment and agriculture.

The development of light industry, made possible by the improvement of agriculture, has thus created conditions which render unnecessary an approach against which Mao Tse Tung warned, in the style of 'drying the pond to catch the fish'. The minor role which agriculture now plays in national accumulation, however, should not lead one to underestimate its strategic importance. It still furnishes 80 per cent of the raw materials for light industry. Thus, the progress of light and heavy and basic industries remain crucially dependent on the advance of industrial agriculture which in turn depends on securing a stable food supply. Both securing, expanding and diversifying the food

supply as well as agricultural inputs for industry require a rapid increase of productivity. If the target for industrial growth for the fifth-year plan which started in 1976, was set at 15 per cent *(Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 23, 1975), this would require a major advance in mechanization and the use of chemical fertilizer.

This interdependence between agriculture, light and heavy industry is reflected in the approach and sequence followed in the Chinese planning exercise at central and provincial levels: the first step is to calculate the available labour force and agricultural production. This serves to calculate rural purchasing power (80 per cent of the Chinese population live in the communes) and the raw material supply for the textile industry (which spearheads the light industry). From this the production of light industry is deduced. On that basis the requirements needed for the development of heavy industry are assessed. Industrial profits finally serve to (indirectly) enhance rural purchasing power (Attali 1973).

Major reliance on the innovativeness of the working people in industrial development implies a profound break with the traditional separation of scientific/intellectual work on the one hand, and manual labour on the other. It represents a new conception of development. Development is no longer decisively dependent on the prior concentration and accumulation of (physical) capital, but relies on the creative power of all workers in all places of work and on the way in which they combine and organize to give collective expression to their creativity (Bettelheim 1974).

Advancing and innovating rural industrialization

The excesses and mistakes which occurred during the Great Leap Forward in the industrialization of the rural areas were gradually redressed. The basic orientation, however, proved to be sound. Agriculture could never have developed so steadily without the development of local and communal industries.

A pattern for integrating rural industries gradually evolved. Basic industries are called the 'five industries', producing energy (coal and electricity), iron and steel, chemical fertilizers, equipment and cement. Their development obviously depends on the availability of local resources.

A second type of industry are those for the manufacturing and repair of farm equipment. These are organized at the country, commune and brigade level, minor repairs being done at the brigade level. The order of priority is: firstly, repair; secondly, produce spare parts for equipment already in use; and thirdly, produce new equipment. A third set of industries is that for processing local (agricultural)

and sideline products, handicrafts and basic consumer goods.

Most basic industries are set up at the country level, either as state enterprises or as collective enterprises jointly owned and run by communes within a county. At times they are commune enterprises but this is exceptional. The other two sets of industries are either county-state, or intercommunal or communal (collectively-owned) enterprises. The counties, whose coordinating role has considerably increased in recent years, acquire their income from county-run industries. Also, they receive part of the tax paid by the communes as well as a tax on goods produced in the communal and inter-communal factories. This is a percentage of the difference between the cost of production and the prices at which goods are sold (Berger 1974).

Each type of industry has its own cost-price ratio. The costs of production of the 'five industries' as a rule outweigh income. Prices have to be kept low in order that communes and brigades may purchase goods with ease. This speeds up productivity. The repair and manufacturing industries are as a rule able to balance costs and income. If prices were to be set too high, it would slow down agricultural production. The third set of industries as a rule make considerable profits; that is to say, costs are below prices. Thanks to this method, the three types of industry, whose growth simultaneously depend on and promote the development of agriculture, can grow together.

This requires that they take into account the need of society as a whole to advance. As a Chinese economist put it in 1962: 'Since socialist economy is a planned economy and since socialist profits are a condition for the maximum satisfaction of society as a whole, the question of profit must be considered from the viewpoint of the entire economy...for the sake of planned, proportional and high speed development of production...it is permissible for some production departments and newly operated enterprises to make little or no profits or even to sustain losses for a time' (Wheelwright and McFarlane 1970: 85). Such an approach is only possible if the workers in state enterprises learn to accept that all profits which 'their' enterprises make are entirely turned over to the state in order that the best use may be made of them, both in the cities and at the local county level.

The development of rural industrialization has in many ways meant a struggle against dogmatic and conservative positions and dominant values expressed in such views as: industry can only develop if and when the country first has a qualified industrial labour force; industry should be reserved to the urban centres; it should primarily consist of large sophisticated enterprises. The promotion of local self-reliance has been decisively dependent on faith in people and on the belief that advance could be realized gradually, by way of experiment and by learning from practice. It

implied the rejection of mainly relying on *yang fa*, meaning the 'foreign way of doing things'. It meant reliance on *thu fa* or 'earth methods', that is to say, starting from where the people are, making use of what is available. It also signified *hsin fa*, 'inventing entirely new methods'. Above all, self-reliance meant *yu pan fa* which means 'there is a way' (Needham 1971), by turning necessity into virtue and by combining the three approaches.

Towards new forms of cooperation

In the Chinese countryside, when the question is asked: 'Who made this equipment or who invented this method?', answers always point to the cooperative collective nature of the undertaking in which local and outside initiatives converge and the ideas and actions of peasants, technicians, cadres, industrial workers and scientists intertwine and become mutually supportive. Such a process of organic development of linkages back and forth, up and down, is only possible thanks to the growth of a cooperative, collective consciousness made possible by qualitatively new social relations.

The interchangeability of people from one production unit to the other, from city to countryside, the structure of diffusion of old and new knowledge and knowhow by people who are not bound to enterprise or territory, is a manifestation of a new socialist process of capital formation. This is made possible by a new structure of production relations but does not automatically follow from it. Apart from the profound changes which the Cultural Revolution brought about in the orientation and organization of production, and the use of science and technology, it also engendered pervasive qualitative change in all other spheres of society, such as education, health and culture. Under the leadership of the party, an inclusive process of democratization took place which encouraged the masses to become more active and conscious agents of their own society and communities as well as beneficiaries of the economic and social wealth they created.

THE REVOLUTION CONTINUED

Striving for equality

Great strides have been made since the Cultural Revolution, yet significant differentiations continue to mark social relations. Industrial wage workers have higher incomes than the peasants. Within the state-owned enterprises (owned by all the people) there are still differences in income between workers in heavy and those in light in-

dustry, the former earning more than the latter. An eight-grades wage scale still applies for all industries. However, in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, differentials have been reduced and the wages of the lowest paid workers have been increased. Considerable differences also remain between those who carry out intellectual work and those who carry out manual work, in spite of the multiple practical ways in which the division of labour between them has been reduced and activities have become integrated.

Differentials between agriculture and industry have been greatly reduced, but differences remain.

Within the countryside, there are still major inequalities in economic and social advance between coastal and hinterland communes, those close to cities and towns and those more distant. The intense process of rural industrialization has significantly increased overall levels of productivity and income in the communes. 1980 is the year by which they should be fully mechanized. Within the communes, family incomes have notably risen, not only because of increased productivity in agriculture but because many families have one or more members who earn a wage, in either the communal or state enterprises. As to individual income, income differentials remain considerable (Wertheim 1973). The socialist principles of 'he who does not work, neither shall he eat' and 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work' remain the basis for personal income distribution. Without legitimizing it, the socialist approach retains inequality in distribution, as it recognizes the provisional necessity to accept that people are rewarded in accordance with unequal performance (variations in personal history, opportunities, differentiations in output due to sex, age and physical strength).

Rural industrialization has brought major shifts in capital accumulation from the teams, to the brigades, and from brigades to communes. With the expansion of commune enterprises, there has been concomitant growth in accumulation, assets and income of the communes, their proportions rising vis-à-vis those of the smaller production units. In this way, the ownership of the whole people in the commune starts to predominate over the more limited forms of collective property which coincides with the borders of the 'natural' communities (hamlets, villages, or village quarters). Wage income starts to outweigh income in kind and on the basis of working points. Both mechanization and industrialization make this possible.

In his reading notes, containing a critique of the political economy of the Soviet Union written during the years of the Great Leap Forward, Mao Tse Tung argues: 'If there is only small-scale cooperation, the worker-peasant alliance cannot be consolidated...We must develop from the cooperative movement to the communes, and in the communes from basic ownership by the team to basic ownership by the commune...and to ownership by the state.

Then, on the basis of integrated nationalization with mechanization, we shall really be able to consolidate the worker-peasant alliance. Accordingly, the differences between workers and peasants will gradually disappear.' Mao Tse Tung goes further in these notes, by specifying a criterion at which the transition from team and brigade ownership to commune ownership will become possible. He proposes that the income of the commune must be greater than that of the total income of brigades, teams and from subsidiary activities. Another criterion is the doubling of peasant income (from 85 to 150 yuan) with the majority paid by the commune in the form of wages.

Although such conditions may (have) come about, they are not sufficient as no automatic correspondence or adjustment of consciousness can be assumed. The development and maturation of consciousness may take time and is not a simple linear process. It is intimately linked to the continued transformation of political, social and cultural relations which are still marked by values that were predominant in the old society and that correspond to the old production relations. The latter may have disappeared in their juridical institutional form but they still exercise much power. This power finds indirect support in the necessity to maintain for the time being (as relative scarcity still prevails and relative abundance is still distant) distribution according to work and exchange of goods as commodities through money. This inevitably implies tendencies for people to enter into or to maintain or develop social relations on the basis of money, career, status and rank. Such tendencies are likely to be stronger, when and where income differentials are greater, among those who still suffer from the loss of their privileges under the old feudal/capitalist order, and as long as scarcity is a dominant feature of society.

The campaign against Confucius and Lin Piao attempted to help people gain a deeper critical insight into the basic values and tenets of Chinese feudal culture which over the centuries have served to legitimize domination and inequality and are profoundly antagonistic to socialist development. Confucius's ideas and their crystallization in the values of the ruling classes have been denounced as they oppose social change, consider the lord-serve relationship and that between rulers and ruled to be 'natural', inevitable and beneficial, and conceive of intelligence as an inborn natural characteristic. The campaign was intended to help people to examine their own social relations, so as to be able to identify the contradictions between the old dominant values and new ones required by socialist development. The campaign particularly denounced the feudal respect of authority (people/government, lord/serf, landlord/tenant-labourer, husband/wife, man/woman, father/son, teacher/pupil, old/young).

The campaign was carried out to help people free themselves from their conditioning and inhibitions and to promote new relations; these are no longer characterized by slavish obedience and submissiveness but by mutual respect, cooperation and team work. Especially strong was the attack on the confucianist conception (not only typical of dominant culture in China) that intelligence is to be understood as the natural endowment of people who are born superior and therefore are superior to the masses who should accept their inferior position with resignation. To this view was opposed Marx's concept that man's nature is not fixed and given, but that he is shaped by the nature of his social relations and environment and that, by and through his own practice in participating in the transformation of the world including his social relations and his environment, he makes himself and history. Thus he liberates the potentialities of his consciousness, his intelligence and creativity and fulfils himself (Unesco: *Learning To Be:*149). Man is not his existence, he becomes himself by transforming his existence, so that he achieves freedom to realize himself. Self-criticism and mutual criticism in group meetings and discussions serve to improve and create new social relations (people/cadres, men/women, managers/workers, teachers/students).

Relations between the people and the Party were analyzed by Wang Hung-Wen, an industrial worker from Shanghai, who was elected Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party at its Tenth Congress in August 1973. In his speech introducing the revision of the Party Constitution, he said: 'Ours is a socialist country under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The working class, the poor and lower-middle peasants and the masses of the working people are the masters of our country. They have the right to exercise revolutionary supervision over cadres of all ranks of our party and state organs' (The Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, *China Now*, October 1973). In the new Chinese Constitution, new forms of mass action which emerged during the Cultural Revolution have been openly and formerly acknowledged: 'speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big-character posters are new forms of carrying the socialist revolution created by the masses of the people. The State shall ensure to the masses the right to use these forms to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness, and so will help consolidate the leadership of the Communist Party of China over the State and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat' *(China Reconstructs*, Special Supplement, March 1975). The right of the people to exercise revolutionary supervision over Party cadres and State organs has not been included in the Constitution, which reconfirms the leading role of the Party as the core of the leadership of the whole Chinese people.

Mountains beyond the mountains

The recent 'dictatorship of the proletariat' campaign served to bring into the open the contradictions which result from the need to maintain 'bourgeois rights' during the period of socialist development and the need to gradually restrict these. Their gradual restriction would enable an advance towards a society that would be ruled by the principle 'to each according to his needs'. Thus the campaign's purpose was to help people prepare themselves for a new society, characterized by ownership of all instruments of production by the whole people, and by new social relations and an ethos which is rooted in these production relations and supports them. This campaign, as all previous ones, reflected contending views within the Party and the attempt by one of the leading groups to move in a direction which they viewed as necessary and as an advance towards a new society.

An article in the Communist Party monthly *The Red Flag* by Yao Wen-Yuan, who played a major role in the development of the cultural revolution in Shanghai, stressed the need for elimination of 'bourgeois rights' such as payments of individuals on basis of work done rather than on the basis of personal needs, and opportunities for people to enjoy different income levels based on personal advantages. It also stressed the danger of tendencies by groups to strengthen their 'bourgeois rights'. 'A small number of people will acquire an increasing amount of commodities and money through certain legal channels and numerous illegal ones...public property will be turned into private property, and speculation, graft, corruption, theft and bribery will rise *(Far Eastern Economic Review,* 14 March 1975). These warnings were followed by similar ones made by Chang Chung-Chiao, who was chosen by the party to introduce the new Constitution and who had a leading role in the Party. In his article he attacks party technocrats who regard their skill as a commodity which they can offer for sale at the highest price to the state. 'They scramble for position and gain', he insists; 'They join the Communist Party and do some work for the proletariat merely for the sake of upgrading themselves as commodities and asking the proletariat for higher prices' *(Far Eastern Economic Review,* 11 April 1975). In several areas of China movements to restrict 'bourgeois rights' were initiated. Thus, in Kiangsi Province, authorities summed up their problems in a call to: eliminate the bourgeois work and lifestyle among our ranks, characterized by seeking fame and gain, putting on airs, showing off, seeking personal gain at the expense of public interests, inviting guests and giving them presents, love of gossip and news from the grapevine, disrupting unity, and so forth.'

This call serves to illustrate that human transformation towards a new way of life is long and arduous. While Chang Chung Chiao insists on the urgency of restricting bourgeois rights, he also stresses that this can only be done 'gradually, over a fairly long period'. He implicitly warns against 'extreme left' tendencies (e.g. elimination of money, wages, small-scale private property).

The process towards material equalization and the elimination of bourgeois rights would have to be closely linked to progressions in productivity and would need to be planned step-by-step. Mao Tse Tung gave an idea of such an approach in his Reading Notes: 'Of course to each according to need will be brought to fruition gradually. It is quite possible that when the supply of important goods is adequate, we shall first practice "to each according to his needs" with these goods and then push through to other products in accordance with the development of the productive forces' (Richard Levy). A first step is likely to be gradual nationalization of the collectively-owned factories *(Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 April 1975).

The upgrading of the incomes of the lower-paid workers in industry in the early 1970s might be an indication as to future procedure for income equalization. It may not be the change in absolute income but that in relative income which would be most likely to generate resistance in that they could experience it as loss of position, status and individual identity. It will be extremely difficult for them to accept genuine equality. 'Resistance movements' by higher cadres, intellectuals, professionals, managers, technocrats, scientists and administrators are likely to always engender counter-movements towards deepening of the democratization of social relations. This is likely to happen and would result from the theory and practice of those in the Chinese Communist movement who subscribe to Marx's vision that democracy is never an ideal form of government or an end term in human relations, but that it is a process of continuous struggle in which the contradictions engendered by the pursuit of new ways and forms of human self-realization express themselves. The workers and peasants move to further liberate themselves so as to further free their creative and productive power and develop into all-round philosophically, intellectually, scientifically and culturally active human beings. When pressure for the accelerated development of productive forces is given primacy ('economic growth'), and production and productivity (implying overemphasis on the role and impact of foreign technology) are promoted at the expense of the pursuit of new social and production relations (class struggle), it is likely that such counter-movements will be promoted by those in the Party who give genuine leadership to socialist development

and in doing so practice reliance on the masses and promote their awakening and development into fully active, critically conscious, creative human beings.

Inspiring such movements would be Mao's view that not only those who happen to exercise intellectual functions are intellectuals, but that all people are intellectuals, that is to say can be, if and when they have the opportunity to become one (Antonio Gramsci: 337).

Learning from China

China has been increasingly presented by non-Chinese as an example for other Third World countries, afflicted by famine, poverty and stagnation. There have even been political leaders and academicians from First and Second World countries who have suggested that the Chinese example would provide a way out of some of the evils which beset these countries.

The position taken in this study is that development is a process of inclusive indivisible transformation of society and people and that ideas of 'transferability' of development reflect a mechanistic conception of history. If a mechanistic conception of 'transferability' and 'applicability' of development is rejected, this does not exclude that each people in seeking its own original path to self-realization can learn from the experiences, mistakes and advances of other peoples. In fact, this would appear essential. It is assumed in this study that development is not a linear process but that it proceeds by twists and turns and ups and downs, by the development of its internal contradictions set in motion and stimulated by external contradictions. In this view, change is endogenously engendered and equilibruim is to be seen as the exception to disequilibruim as the rule.

At the same time, however, I suggest that China, upon its social revolution, has in some ways followed a process similar to that which all advanced industrialized countries (except for the recent settler countries USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), have followed.

The countries of Europe and also Japan embarked upon a process of accelerated industrialization, called the 'Industrial Revolution', only after their ruling classes, whether the old or a new bourgeoisie or a combination of both, had carried through an agricultural revolution. The latter led to a rapid increase in productivity and was instrumental in making possible the Industrial Revolution. In their case this was decisively activated and accelerated by the transfer of precious metals and resources from the colonies. The cheap supply of food enlarged the share that could be devoted to accumulation. Most countries of the Third World have a general level of productivity that is not far beyond and often even close to or below that of the

now advanced industrialized countries at the eve of their industrial revolution (Bairoch 1970).

It is submitted that as a result of their forced incorporation in the world market, the dominated countries were prevented from developing their agriculture to mobilize resources for self-reliant atuonomous development. Only export-agriculture was developed, not to serve internal development but to serve the requirements of the metropolis.

A growing alliance between landlords, industrialists and foreign interests in China led to a pattern of growth which, instead of being conducive to an allocation of resources in response to domestic requirements and the needs of the people, engendered an increasingly distorted pattern of uneven growth between agriculture and industry and within industry, as well as between urban and rural areas, the coast and the hinterland.

Sun Yat Sen's ideals on agrarian reform were blocked by the foreign-oriented coalition of industrialists and landlords. When national social forces would not or could not give leadership to the realization of agrarian transformation, the Communist Party of China took over the leadership. As Mao Tse Tung's views prevailed (after serious and prolonged struggle within the Party from which he was even ostracised at one stage), it was the policy of agrarian transformation which rallied the masses to support the Communist Party. This was actively resisted by the leadership of China's conservative ruling classes and thus acquired the nature of an agrarian revolution. This turned into a national revolution, due to the violence of the foreign occupying power and of the Kwo Min Tang army, fighting in defence of the *status quo*.

It is proposed that no government in Asia can set in motion a process of self-sustained dynamic national development unless it is able and willing to first effectuate a thorough transformation of the agrarian structure. Induced by market forces, it may choose to rapidly modernize its agriculture. While this may result in considerable short-term growth, the total final effect of proceeding in such a way is likely to be small. This undermines the basis for national self-reliant development and countries become increasingly dependent on First and Second World countries. By not giving primacy to agrarian transformation, a government prevents national accumulation for productive investment and blocks the liberation of the creative and productive power of the rural masses who form the large majority of the national population of all Asian countries. Consequently, a re-distribution and shift of control over resources and assets towards the majority of the population is blocked and, with that, any re-distribution of political, economic and social power as well as income. Such a policy inevitably leads to conditions of hunger and starvation, if under the pressure for profit and profitability, production by foreign

investment, in association with national industrialists, is increasingly directed towards goods and services not needed by the masses but wanted by the high income groups who become increasingly subject to a lifestyle based on the requirements of economic interests in the maximization of profit.

This is not to suggest that there is only one road, namely 'the' socialist road. Experience indicates rather that each people is likely to seek its own original path, if foreign interference does not prevent it from doing so.

Another way in which China has 'respected' the path followed by the advanced industrialized countries is that it has ensured its own protection and made this a basis for autonomous self-reliant development. All now advanced industrialized countries at the crucial stage of their industrial revolution, have introduced strong self-protection against foreign competition. In this way competition from the rest of the world was broken. Once conquest was achieved and/or conditions for political control had been secured, 'free trade' was imposed. This is how the textile industries of India and China were ruined and the way was opened to use the colonial market as an extension of the (still small) national market, thereby blocking the growth of indigenous industry as well as the development of agriculture and its integration with industry (Mandel 1970: 447). Loss of work by artisans led to rising pressure on the land and fomented speculation, dependency and usury and the development of a social structure that was inimical to self-sustained dynamic autonomous development.

Apart from the high tariffs which the then industrializing 'developing' countries set to protect themselves, conditions at the time more easily favoured national self-reliant development. The relative isolation between countries, the scarce development of communications and high transport costs acted as natural barriers. These forced the then developing countries to rely on themselves, and naturally induced a reliance on local resource mobilization, local people, skills and talent. It was conducive to the mobilization of small and local capital. Also, as people had to rely on themselves, 'science' grew out of practice. All this led to a broad involvement of people, not in a few concentrated and large but in a multiplicity of small centres. It may be argued that China has carried out in a planned way what spontaneously happened in the countries where the first industrial revolutions occurred, replacing the natural barriers of isolation and high transport costs by planning room in which local industries could develop.

New and more effective forms of international and regional cooperation by Third World Countries are a necessity (Correa 1975). The benefits which a country can derive from improvement of its terms of trade, however, are not determined by changes in exchange-relationships but by its

capacity to achieve autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant world productive structure. This requires the Third World countries to transform their internal productive structures, so as to eliminate their distortions and to gain internal and external strength (Bettelheim 1972).

This requires profound transformation. Classes which resist such transformation in the dominant and dominated countries are unintendedly bound to serve as the catalyzers of a social revolution, as they force the masses to defend themselves and to fight for their survival, their livelihood and minimum conditions for self-realization.

The realism of such a position is confirmed by the nature of the concern expressed by authoritative voices. A negation of the needs and aspirations of the masses, the large majority of whom in Asia still live in the rural areas, generates pressures and disparities which 'cannot be contained for any length of time' (United Nations 1972). 'It would be naive not to recognize that in Asia as in other quarters of the world "time" is running out' (McNamara 1972). However, if such a concern only serves to bring actual or potential 'unrest' under control and to convert development policies and action into holding operations designed to promote the preservation of the *status quo*, then it becomes inevitable that what could have been evolution turns into revolution, as this remains the only way for the masses to secure their liberation from the growing constraints to survival and self-realization under prevailing forms of social organization. This will permit them to liberate their hitherto contained potentialities of personal and collective self-development and to develop their creativity and productivity, both for the benefit of their communities as well as for themselves.

THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION

This essay was originally written well before the death of Mao Tse Tung. Since he died, profound changes have taken place in China. These changes have been interpreted by some analysts as the beginning of the end of the Chinese Revolution and the introduction to a process similar to that which characterized the first socialist society from which the founders of the Communist Party of China took their inspiration. They for whom China represented the new opening for mankind's future, have lost hope and are now full of grief, as if what they carried within them as most precious has been shattered. Other analysts are full of euphoria as they sense that China is finally 'coming of age' and that, after a quarter-of-a-century of youthful utopian experimentation, it is finally entering into the realm of 'rationality' in which the norms for economic growth, recognized as of 'universal' validity in the dominant capitalist societies, will be respected. Both these extreme

reactions seem to bypass the fact that China's present situation follows from the contradictions which characterize its own internal developments and the particular stage of development in which it finds itself. A brief attempt is made here to review some of these contradictions, insofar as they relate to China's rural transformation. But such an attempt to restrict the issues under consideration seems artificial, as the contradictions within rural development and those which transform rural society are only part of the contradictions which play in society and even the world at large.

To ascribe the elimination of the four from the leadership of the Party and from social life to the need for personal vengeance for the humiliation which many high cadres in the Party underwent during the Cultural Revolution would appear too simple. There is indeed evidence that the four have been associated with extreme-left tendencies and actions during the Cultural Revolution (Jaap Van Ginniken). Insofar as they helped to inspire the extreme left groups and were directly and indirectly responsible for the climate of terror which these spread around, to prevent a repetition of this must have played a role in their arrest (Jack Chen: 291-302). That they later, until Mao Tse Tung died, also engaged in manipulative, intimidating and repressive practices, we can only accept if we are willing to believe that what the present leadership communicates is truthful. This communication suggests that the eliminated four did not hesitate to recur to a multiplicity of doubtful techniques to discredit and neutralize those whom they perceived as their opponents by dogmatically counterposing class struggle to production and the dictatorship of the proletariat to socialist development, thus jeopardizing the development of productive forces and with that the advance towards a fully developed socialist society; and finally, that they tried to take over State power.

It may be assumed that the elimination of the four is the outcome of a deep-going struggle between contending groups within the Party leadership and that it was an attempt to resolve profoundly conflictive and radically opposite positions on the most vital issues.

If the present population growth rate of 2% per year (birth rate 3% and mortality rate 1%) remains constant, China will have a population of around one thousand million by the early 1980s. In spite of the great strides which have been made in China in population planning, the aim of stabilizing the population by the end of this decade seems to be only within reach of some of the major urban centres but not of the countryside.

It is assumed that a direct relation exists between the predominance of smaller families in the cities, a relatively high level of productivity in the State-owned urban industries and the comparatively high level of income, livelihood and security enjoyed by industrial workers

and their families. On the other hand, it may be assumed that the higher birth rate among the peasantry is directly related to the as yet relatively low level of development of productive forces, the concomitant low level of income and the less advanced forms of collective ownership which still characterize rural society. The teams are as a rule the basic accounting units; they are still the collective owners of the land. Thanks to the process of continuous accumulation, brigades and communes have become the collective owners of a growing amount of assets, but despite its integration into the global planning, the rural economy remains fundamentally marked by small-scale fragmented ownership and organization. It was a measure of realism after the attempts during the Great Leap Forward to change the basic collective ownership from team to brigade and commune, to shift it back again to the small community (the teams). Since then, no change has been attempted. Article 7 of the Constitution adopted in January 1975 points out the provisional nature of the organization of collective ownership in the countryside by qualifying that collective ownership in the rural people's communes 'at the present stage...generally' takes the form of three-level ownership (that is, of ownership by the commune, the productive brigade and the productive team, with the latter as basic accounting unit).

In his notes on the political economy of the Soviet Union, Mao Tse Tung pointed out that collectivization must not be consolidated too long, otherwise 'we will make the ideology which reflects the system inflexible, and the people unable to adjust their thoughts to new changes.' As long as collective ownership remained, so spontaneous capitalist tendencies would flourish in the countryside as at present appears to be the case ('La revolution chinoise en suspens', *Le Monde Hebdomadaire*, 14-20 April 1977), and the differentials between city and countryside, workers and peasants would tend to grow (Gittings, p. 8) If it is accepted that during the Great Leap Forward the attempt to make the commune the basic production unit was premature and a retreat was called for, it may be asked whether since then, with the rapid development of industry, prevailing production relations in the countryside have not lagged far behind and whether there is not a risk that the peasants become too 'settled' in their limited forms of consciousness and production organization. The old feudal ideology and even the classic values, although they have been broken up, still continue to have a hold over the peasants (Jack Chen 1973). This once again poses the strategic question to Chinese leadership of how to interweave changes in production relations, promotion of productive forces, and the transformation of consciousness and ideology.

Economic growth in China since liberation, except for the decline during the Great Leap Forward, has been quite

steady, although its rate has declined somewhat since the early 1970s. Growth in industry has been notably more rapid than in agriculture, that of heavy industry more so than of light industry. Both have supplied a growing stream of capital and consumer goods to meet the people's rise in income and expanding needs as well as the modernization of rural industry and agriculture. Yet if the rate of growth in food grains from 1965 to 1975 is calculated at close to 3 per cent and that of population at 2 per cent, the growth of food supply cannot be called spectacular. Consequently, security has still a small margin and abundance is not yet in sight. Clothing remains understandably rationed as cotton and other raw materials continue in short supply. The production of synthetic fibres, which requires further development of the petro-chemical industry, will do away with shortages and fluctuations of supply resulting from weather vagaries. A serious drought may force China to have to rely on imports of grains, particularly if reserves are dwindling as a result of poor weather conditions over more years. To ensure an abundant and secure food supply, to create conditions for a more rapid development of light industry, as well as to achieve more rapid accumulation for heavy industry, a breakthrough in agriculture is essential. Only then will there be a prospect that the growth rate of the rural population will slow down more rapidly.

In January 1975, at the first session of the National People's Congress, Chou En-lai presented an outline of long-term economic strategy which would lead China to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology before the end of the century, so that China's economy would advance 'in the front ranks of the world' *(Peking Review,* 24 January 1975). As far as the development of agriculture is concerned, which is to serve as the foundation of national development, this proposal has been elaborated during the conference on learning from Tachai, of which the discussions were summarized by Hua Kuo-feng in his speech on 15 October 1975 *(Peking Review,* 31 October 1975). His proposals were designed to achieve a breakthrough in agricultural production by promoting class struggle by the poor and middle peasants and a significant rise in production and income of all poor communes so that they can reach and surpass the present level of average communes in their respective areas. In this context, Hua proposed that organizational responsibility be shifted from communes to the counties and that it to be entrusted to the County Party Committees (the leading core). Hua Kuo-feng reiterated the view, earlier expressed by Mao Tse Tung, that the traditional influence of small-scale production still remains among the peasants and that it is a long-term task to constantly imbue the peasant masses with the socialist ideology and to criticize the tendency towards capitalism

(from which they suffer). He stressed that such tendencies towards capitalism as a rule have to be dealt with as problems among the people, to be solved by means of persuasion and education, criticism and self-criticism. It would seem that Hua Kuo-feng here made a plea against the extreme-leftist tendency in the Party to turn problems among the people into problems between the people and the enemy, as as result of which peasants may become discouraged and confused.

In line with the concepts developed by Mao Tse Tung in his report on the Question of Agricultural Co-operatives of 31 July 1955, that a shift from small-scale farming towards large-scale mechanical farming is essential for solving the contradiction between the ever-increasing need for marketable grain and for raw materials for industry, Hua Kuo-feng suggested that farm mechanization is vital for increased labour productivity in agriculture, diversification of the economy, the building of a rich and prosperous socialist country, and the narrowing of the great differentials of town and countryside: worker and peasant, intellectual and manual labour. Full mechanization would enable ownership to be shifted step-by-step towards the brigade and the commune, so that conditions are reached which, in the view of Mao Tse Tung, could serve as the basis for transition from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people. This approach requires intensified mass mobilization for capital construction (land reclamation, irrigation and drainage so as to create the necessary conditions for expanded mechanization), rapid growth of the county-based five small industries (iron, steel, coal, chemical fertilizers, cement and equipment), and further development of, systematic training in, and the application of basic agricultural sciences. Unless irrigation and water-control is significantly increased, agricultural development will remain too much subject to drought (especially in the North) and floods (especially in the South). Large-scale construction works demand both an increase in labour and capital-intensive work. However, to speed-up conditions for a rapid increase in productivity and to economize on manpower necessitates a shift from labour-intensive towards capital-intensive methods. This requires rapid expansion of heavy industry.

From the end of 1971 onwards, China started to import complete factories for the production of energy, petrochemicals, steel, fertilizers and oil. In 1975, this large-scale import sharply declined and practically dropped to zero early in 1976. China was faced with a serious trade deficit which served as the basis for an attack by those of the Party leadership who have since been eliminated, criticizing the slavish reliance on foreign technology and expertise at the expense of indigenous science and technology, as well as on the sell-out of China's natural resources, i.e. oil, which had to serve to pay the bill. Since the elimination of the four, the import of whole factories from Japan and

other industrialized countries has again started. It seems that China has no other way to temporarily speed-up the development of its heavy industry. In the words of Mao Tse Tung (in his speech on 'The Ten Great Relationships'), this is the 'centre of gravity' in the movement forward of the whole economy. In future, however, China may need more of its own oil production to meet the needs of its expanding industries. Moreover, the terms of trade which govern the exchange of its oil with Japan and which grew more unfavourable in the first half of the 1970s, are not likely to improve. This was one reason for the trade deficit, the others being the import of grains due to the poor harvest of 1972, the related need to accelerate the import of fertilizer plants, and the difficulty to find markets in view of world-wide recession and increased competition. A rise in internal demand will also limit export prospects.

The question arises here as to how self-reliance is to be understood. A society's requirements change with changes in its structure and level of production as well as the changing needs of the population. The practice of self-reliance, at the heart of genuine national development, may have to change accordingly. Imports of vital inputs may well be necessary for a socialist society at a particular juncture in order to speed up the development of productive forces. The critical question is whether such a society has become strong enough to ensure that the foreign interests which try to promote their exports do not impair its independence, self-reliance, and capacity to adapt such foreign interests to its own domestic requirements and priorities. Imports may well be useful at some point to strengthen and deepen self-reliance. The recent experience of the serious trade deficit which forced China to defer its payments (a concealed form of accepting aid) must have made the Chinese leadership cautious about the risks and limits of becoming 'integrated' into the as yet dominant patterns of the world economy. The development of own culture and science in support of the growth of a socialist society need not exclude learning from others. This may well strengthen scientific self-reliance and enrich the socialist way of life.

We have earlier indicated how, at the start of the land reform, after pressures for radical equalization by the extreme left had been overcome, a policy was followed in which prevailing internal class contradictions were temporarily de-emphasized to ensure accelerated development of productive forces, upon which new production relations were introduced. This policy was initiated only after the basic inequalities in private ownership had been removed.

A similar situation may well prevail at this juncture in China, with a need to de-emphasize internal contradictions so as to speed-up the development of productive forces in order to prepare the ground for a change in production

relations. The communes can then become the basic units of the collective economy. This would mean that the present leadership considers that the country cannot now afford that primary emphasis be given to a one-sided promotion of a change in production relations and on campaigns that are biased towards transformation of the superstructure. In hindsight, the major campaigns against Confucius and Lin Piao and on the dictatorship of the Proletariat may well have served as starting points of a process towards a new Cultural Revolution. In so far as this led towards a promotion of class struggle at the expense of production and reduced unity among the people, the present leadership may judge such an approach to be incompatible with present needs. One is reminded of an earlier moment in the process, when Mao Tse Tung wrote his 1957 essay on the 'Correct Handling of Contradictions'. He warned against the danger of left dogmatism and the methods of the extreme left who resorted to 'ruthless struggle' and merciless blows in inner-Party struggle and coercion and repression, instead of relying on democratic methods of discussion, persuasion, criticism and education. He emphasized that the essential thing is to start from a desire for unity, as without that, 'the struggle will certainly get out of hand', reason why it is necessary to apply the unity-criticism-unity method. During the Cultural Revolution which Mao Tse Tung unleashed, things certainly got out of hand under the instigation of Lin Piao and the extreme left. Mao Tse Tung then realized that he could become the captive of the extreme left as transpires from his letter to Chiang Ching, on July 8, 1966: 'It is the first time in my life that I unwillingly concur with others on major questions. I have to do things against my own will' (Jack Chen: p.295).

It may be argued that accelerated improvement of the livelihood of the Chinese is most pressing. This is suggested by the moves by workers in various parts of the country for improved wages. How else to explain the festive mood among the masses in the major cities upon the change of Party leadership? Or must we assume that these workers were all 'capitalist roaders seeking private gain'? It seems more reasonable to assume that they felt that the continuous campaigns diverted too much attention from concrete action towards improving production and their livelihoods; also, that they were so bombarded by abstract formulae for self-transformation that their personal freedom and initiative were too restricted. They may also have expressed their aversion against the insecurity and intimidation which apparently characterized the class struggle as promoted by the extreme-left, by which methods of dealing with the problems of the people were replaced by methods to fight the enemy. It is unrealistic to assume that the Chinese people could develop and deepen their socialist consciousness and change from a selfish individualistic

existence to one rooted in service to others and the community, unless conditions for both collective and personal well-being and livelihood are improved.

It is significant that the new Chinese leadership, to legitimize its emerging strategy, relied on Mao Tse Tung's 1956 speech on 'Ten great relationships' as its basic guideline. In discussing relationships between the state, the units of production and the individual producers, Mao took a quite 'pragmatic' position and proposed that a wage increase for factory workers should be linked to an increase in their labour productivity and the value of their daily production. He related the enthusiasm of the workers to the great improvement in their standard of living since Liberation, and finally wondered whether to give their due reward to individual producers and a certain amount of initiative to units of production would not benefit the industrialization of the whole country. He answered his own question by saying: 'It ought to result in some improvements. If it makes things worse, it should not be done. Mao's views at that moment reveal an undogmatic experimental attitude which might well have been condemned by radicals during the Cultural Revolution. He went on to question whether it is a good thing to centralize everything and to take away depreciation funds as units of production would then no longer have any initiative. His analysis clearly focused on ways to link increased production and improved livelihood. The approach by which all profits from industrial enterprises went to the state and the state handed over the welfare fund and the fixed wage fund irrespective of profit, was continued, however. A development towards some kind of market socialism as had emerged in the Soviet Union, was not initiated; it was apparently viewed as jeopardizing socialist advance as it would generate and accelerate uneven growth within industry and agriculture and between city and countryside, apart from subverting socialist consciousness and solidarity. If production units were to have direct interest in their own level of earnings and were free to determine the rates of profit to be included in the final price, the composition of output would inevitably tend to shift from responding to the composition of demand as defined by the real needs of the people and the community, to what would be profitable to produce.

During the Cultural Revolution, the practice of bonuses to individual workers had been abolished and the allocation of bonuses to individual enterprises objected to. Even the persistence of wage differentials was challenged by those who were later qualified as extreme left. In 1975, during the campaign to restrict bourgeois rights, wage differentials were again questioned. Again, the insistence on narrowing these differentials, in view of the balance of forces and concomitant dominant views in the Party, was

judged as premature and extreme-left. The practice of bonuses, although in a concealed way, apparently returned after the Cultural Revolution as a practice to raise production and personal income, although not on a wide scale. A move to put profit in command would indeed jeopardize the balanced development of agriculture and industry and undermine the alliance and unification of workers and peasants. Perhaps new incentives for production need to be invented, but they cannot be based on implicit or explicit competition on the market; this would irrevocably put production units, which internally may appear organized along socialist lines, into competitors for gain.

Insofar as the peasants are concerned, an increase in personal income has always been linked to the productivity and quality of work performed. It may be argued that the people's commitment to sacrifice themselves and to work for the community can only be brought into full play, except for limited periods of crisis, if their material conditions improve and they feel that, if they work hard, their livelihood will improve in the future.

If an acceleration in production implies more attention to planning and management, the question arises in which direction this process will go. If intensification of planning and management implies a move towards a 'command economy' and would lead to more direct centralized direction, imposition and control by managers and cadres, then it is unlikely to motivate the people unless it is rooted in the further development of democratic practices within the production units and in relations between these and the organs of management of the State from commune and county to the Provinces and the Centre. In this sense a move to promote production cannot lead towards improving the wellbeing and livelihood of the people unless class struggle is the key link, that is to say, that social relations are transformed in such a way that the workers and peasants can increase their mastery over society, the conditions under which they work, and the fruits of their work.

If the Party and the State and its cadres used the need for accelerated accumulation and production to introduce procedures and rules or norms which are assumed 'necessary' for efficiency, then unless these are genuinely accepted by the working people as useful and desirable they cannot be qualified as promoting socialist development, but rather as the expression of an evolution in the class structure which moves away from it. Re-inforcement and expansion of the State apparatus as well as such an orientation of economic policy can, from a Marxist point of view, only be viewed as an expression of antagonistic class relationships and as a product of sharpened contradictions between classes (Bettelheim, *La Lutte de Classes en URSS)*. The emergence of the communes as new

instruments of the people's power, and the deflation of the central state apparatus during the Cultural Revolution, can be seen as major steps towards a classless society. Mao Tse Tung, in his speech on democratic centralism, broke with the dominant Soviet conception of central planning as an instrument of centralized control and management by the State over society; he proposed central planning as a new practice and as a new form of social relations between the people and the state as the service organ of their communities, as in Marx's original concept. Extended centralized planning in the conventional sense would inevitably imply an expansion of the bureaucracy and more reliance on expertise at the expense of mass control and mass motivation. It seems that in the genesis of socialist development in China a new relation emerged between leadership and the masses. During the Cultural Revolution in particular, the Party, under the pressure of the masses who were inspired by Mao Tse Tung's vision, was forced to give up the claim of automatically acting as their representative. This would seem to be the core of socialist development: that the Party and the State become more and more the people's own organs to exercise their mastery over their own life and destiny. Otherwise, democratic centralism becomes a formula under which new ruling classes legitimize their domination over the lives of the people.

Methods of planning and management can therefore not be accepted as 'objective' instruments whose rationality is beyond social classes and relations. Rather it is suggested that they express the particular ideological forms of private and social rationality which accompany the evolving balance of social forces at a particular juncture. The fifth Five-year Plan, to be successful, requires a great upsurge in mass mobilization for production and in scientific experiment which both, in turn, require the growth of democratic mass organization. But the way in which class struggle is to be waged may have to differ from that which during the Cultural Revolution caused many good revolutionaries to be treated as traitors and which more recently, before Mao Tse Tung died, apparently has led to the people themselves being equated with their enemy.

One sphere in which class struggle is waged is that of education. The rapid growth of production requires that increased attention be given to more advanced forms of scientific and technological training. Since the Cultural Revolution a wide range of highly innovative forms of higher training have been introduced, particularly in the countryside, in which wholly new forms have flourished, of relating theory to practice and practice to theory. The growth of a new class of intellectuals, scientists and professionals may well lead to a growth in demand for higher income, status and prestige. Such a trend can only be countered by improved livelihood of the masses and in-

creased political consciousness, as well as by linking education to participation in the theory and practice of class struggle, in the people's life, and in work by young people.

Another contradiction could arise between what Mao Tse Tung, in his speech on the 'Ten Great Relationships', called the relation between economic construction and defence construction. The way in which this contradiction is resolved directly affects the scope and rate of rural transformation. Mao criticized the undue expenditure of 32% of the national budget in the First Five-year Plan on what he called 'unproductive expenditure', and proposed its reduction to 20%. If it is true that the People's Liberation Army has a dominant position in the present Chinese leadership, the publication of Mao Tse Tung's speech in early 1978 may suggest that they basically uphold the position of their old comrade-in-arms and will respect his view that increased defence expenditure must be preceded by an expansion of the economy and that priority should be given to agriculture and industry, both light and heavy, before investment in defence. Apart from the further development of the nuclear-missile-satellite programme, it thus seems unlikely that the large-scale modernization of the army (which would affect both internal resource allocation and the balance of payments) will take place. Thus, apart from the build-up of a sophisticated deterrent force, China will rely on the relatively cheap people's and guerrilla war approach which proved so effective against the Japanese and Tsang Kai Tsjek.

Perhaps what has most marked the development of socialism in China has been that it grew out of a deep confidence and trust in the masses, and in particular has helped the peasants to overcome the age-old constraints on their creative and productive power and on their self-realization. The Chinese revolution, unlike those that preceded it in the newly industrialized countries of Europe including the Soviet Union, as well as Japan, has been above all a peasant revolution. The leadership's confidence in the rural masses had to be conquered and before Mao Tse Tung was followed, he had to defy the Party which ostracized him.

It will always have to be conquered again by the leadership. 'The only way is to rely on the masses and trust the masses, go among them and be one with them' (Mao Tse Tung: Unrehearsed, 254-255). The implication for planning is that people must always be accepted as the active subjects and makers of their own society. This excludes their instrumentalization in the planning process to reach ends that are externally imposed and decided over their heads. Therefore, development can never be viewed as a linear process. The assumption of linearity is based on another one, that of equilibrium. 'We must oppose the theory of even development or the theory of equilibrium' (On Contradiction). There is no movement unless

in the union of opposites. Development never proceeds 'in a straight line, but in the shape of a wave or spiral', 'the development of things is always out of balance'. Hence the demand for balance: 'Imbalance is absolute and balance relative'. Trying to play it safe would mean trying to eliminate any imbalance, but with that, the vital relationship will also be destroyed which generates the contradictions from which creative initiative and action emerge among the people. Therefore, planning must always leave room for the people to bring new initiative and creativity into play. It basically means reliance by the leadership on the masses, in the belief that 'the people and the people alone are the motor of history'. Only then can they overcome their constraints and come to self-fulfillment and self-realization. This seems to be a major lesson of the Chinese revolution which hopefully will never finish.

It perhaps ironic that more and more people in industrialized capitalist societies are in search of a new way of life, seeking refuge from the alienation of an unceasingly homogenizing society in which they experience a growing sense of loss of own identity and of powerlessness, and looking for solutions such as small 'autonomous' communities while waiting for the great changes to come. In China, on the other hand, the creation of an alternative socialist society leads to integration of the small communities into the community at large so that all people become 'the whole people'. Is the elimination of the differentials between city and countryside, industry and agriculture, intellectual and manual labour, to shape a society in which the Chinese people are bound at some stage to also become alienated? As China advances to the 'front ranks of the world', will people have to lose control and power over their personal lives? Is the movement from the realm of necessity to freedom, as people move from an understanding of necessity to the transformation of necessity though class struggle, production and scientific experiment, only a utopian fiction, a science fiction? Surely one's understanding of necessity and freedom is shaped by the concrete historical modes of social practice and related forms of consciousness and dominant ideology. Conceptions of human freedom have different meanings in different kinds of societies. I do not refer to the ways in which oppression and repression in Third World countries are justified by elites, but I think of the right of the masses to secure a livelihood, to free thought, free speech and free movement. The lack of freedom to organize for self-defence and survival are natural corrolaries of their fundamental state of dependence.

One variant of the dominant concept of development inspired by the passage from feudal to modern industrial society, is that development inevitably implies the disappearance of the peasantry as the major group in society.

In that view, history is perceived as a linear process of universal scope. All societies are assumed to follow the same path which the West has followed. This is the price, it is implied, of their development. In one way Marx also tended to believe that progress was based on the inevitable unfolding of history stage by stage. He believed as a child of his time that industrial growth and expansion were bound to open the gates to human self-realization and that, as he wrote with Engels, in the Communist Manifesto: 'all nations will be compelled to become bourgeois themselves'. Only when productive forces had been fully developed would the old production relations burst. At the end of his life, Marx started to waver and moved at one point close to the Russian narodniki who believed that the peasant masses could make revolution and had the creative potential which only waited to be awakened and liberated. Li Ta Chao, who so deeply influenced Mao Tse Tung, was profoundly influenced by the vision of the narodniki.

There was, however, a qualitative difference. While the narodniki idealized peasant life and saw land distribution as the beginning and the end of a revolution which would secure peace and livelihood, Mao and his followers looked at the land-to-the-tiller and sharing-property movement, as the peasant hopefully called it, as a first phase in the conquest of power and the transformation of the old feudal society into a new socialist one (Snow 1961: 233).

Is the move in China from small-scale to large-scale organization and mechanization of agriculture and towards scale enlargement of industry, only a variant of the same process?

Any judgement would seem premature and aprioristic. Only the process of social practice can provide an answer. In the industrialized capitalized countries, material abundance does not seem to have advanced human freedom and self-realization. The prodigious development of productive forces has not yet transformed production relations, and the scope for people to develop into all-round intellectual, philosophic, scientific human beings with an even greater sense of well-being and fulfillment seems hindered under the present forms of dominant societal organization.

What is understood by technology? Must certain inherent properties be attributed to it in dissociation from specific historical social relations? The view that small is beautiful has obviously emerged in response to evolving capitalist production patterns and to the growth of mass poverty in the dominated countries, and the correspondence of highly centralized control, uniformity, loneliness and loss of identity to large-scale monopolistic enterprises. But are these phenomena natural and inevitable, or should we view them as the outcome of a specific

mode of production and its social and production relations and the forms of consciousness and dominant ideology (e.g. competition, profit) in these societies? If we take the latter position, then we will view the prevalence and elimination of the great differentials as a process which reflects an evolution in production relations and consequently of class struggle. Many new socialist creations have emerged in China, e.g. the communes, the growth of local self-reliance, decentralized area planning, the introduction of the three-in-one-combination (young, middle aged and old workers, technicians, cadres), and the change from specialization in the division of labour as 'imposed by the laws of production', towards cooperation and new forms of decentralized management. These may be viewed at the time of their emergence and growth as representing signs of progression in the transformation of the State, the relations between the Party and the people, and the rise of people's power. But will the process continue? Will democratic centralism be the instrument by which 'the whole people' through the State and the Party will protect themselves as 'small' people in their own self-managed and integrated communities and production units, and will it help them to become masters of their own lives? Or is it bound to end up serving as an instrument by which new elites can dominate? Thus the question shifts to whether development, as it has so far occurred in the world, can be superseded. Are there bound to be rulers and ruled, or can that contradiction be overcome and the ruled become their own rulers? Perhaps Mao gave a beginning of an answer when he said 'We must be prepared for the revolution to turn against us. The Party and the government should be prepared for this. There are some comrades who struggle fiercely against others, but cannot struggle with themselves. In this way, they will never be able to cross the pass [into socialism]. It is up to you to lead the fire towards your own bodies, to fan the flames to make them burn. Do you dare to do this? Because it will burn your own heads.' The comrades answered: 'We are prepared' (Mao Tse Tung: unrehearsed, 254).

Mao's view was that social practice not only implies the struggle against those classes who block the self-liberation of the people, but that the struggle has no perspective unless the people who have joined the struggle for a new society also struggle against themselves; that is, that they recognize and face the contradictions which they carry within themselves. One divides always into two, not only between people but also within people. But then how can a man come to 'lead the fire towards himself' without the masses?

Now that the Party is gearing up for another great leap forward, will it dare to rely on the masses? This is the great challenge. The Party will only be able to raise the people's will to come forward and give them-

selves if it is prepared to be challenged by them, to serve them, and to recognize them as the real masters over their own lives. Central planning can only be justified if it serves the purpose of human self-realization, but this cannot grow and flourish without a growth in democratic practice. But within that practice, human self-development only has a future if people learn to serve each other, to be for each other.

> They told me that the brigade members had re-elected me brigade chairman and the comrades still wanted me to be Party Secretary. This moved me much. As they talked, I realized that what they said about my mistakes was for my own good and not out of enmity... that only the class enemy, the landlord and rich peasants and some rascals hated me. I realized better my duty as a Communist: I must go on making revolution all my life and must not be afraid of making myself the target of the Revolution. Again, I remembered the past. I came back to the hamlet. I looked at the eight rooms I had for myself and my five children to live in, and I thought again of all my old mother had suffered from in the old society, just to bring up four boys, just to keep us alive. All this new happiness came to us because the Party had led us to liberation and cooperation. Even then Mother did not want me to be a cadre. 'Why do you have to take that job that only brings you criticism?', she asked me. She cried. But I reminded her too of the old life and the new, and I won her round. I told the masses at the meeting that from then on I would work hard, serve the people, and make revolution to the end of my days. (Jack Chen 1973: 143-144).

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