On Social Development: The Social Welfare Approach

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*Man is not a tool,*
*society is not a system.*

Alfred McClung Lee

I

The well-established preponderance of the economic approach to development corresponds to the dominance of an economistic *philosophie vécue* - a view of life in general and of development in particular. The prospect of this typically modern-Western thought complex is dim. Doubts are voiced on all sides, but at present it is solidly entrenched in liberalism as much as in Marxism, in countless institutions and in many routines of thinking and acting. Ours is an interesting period.

This preponderance is reflected in the marginal rating of other aspects, including the social one. It will be represented either as a side-effect or as a matter of adverse fall-out. As a result, the response is ambiguous. Some, including sociologists, content themselves with the crumbs that fall from the economists' table and, under this constraint, still manage to do a workmanlike job. Others cannot suppress their doubts and will occasionally ventilate these as criticisms of various kinds.2

The intent here is not to inspect these two responses, but rather to identify and consider yet a third, namely social development as a concern in its own right, to be approached in a fashion not unduly linked to economism and corresponding, mainly economic effort. Again, various options are open, one of which is to take off from mainstream social welfare.

This is not without risk. The impact of economism on Western Social Welfare is neatly distinguishable. Moreover, the social welfare complex is typically, even exclusively modern-Western notwithstanding its adoption - and adaptation - elsewhere. The ensuing risks must be faced, and may be reduced by duly accounting for their causes.

The emergence of the social welfare and social security complex during the Industrial Revolution, is an early instance of non-economic considerations being advanced in response to adverse fall-out from the unbridled sway of the economic ones. The concomitant initial interpretation
of 'social' will accordingly tend to be not so much negative, of course, as at once rejectionist and reconstructive: first conceptually-terminologically and then perhaps in a more far-reaching and more ambitious sense. In criticizing the economic pattern for its effects, one can but pre-suppose that its corrective or alternative, named social, will be something that is not merely residual and problematic but indeed positively significant: for both thought and action.

The purpose of this paper is to establish this positive meaning of 'social', as it emerged under Industrial Revolution conditions and as it became further articulated during the growth process of social welfare policies in the West. Eventually this should provide clues to the meaning of 'social' as it now occurs in the combination 'social development'.

No period of history starts from scratch, and an understanding of its features and significance requires some retrospect, however summary. Traditionally in Europe, poverty and sickness were recognized not just as facts of life but as conditions that required an ethically-based social response. This used to be compassionate action between individuals, whether kin or neighbours (the latter, whether in the common or in the biblical sense): each according to the particular obligation tying him to the person in distress. With reference to subsequent developments, three characteristics stand out. The action was alleviative rather than remedial, let alone preventive. The actors were individuals or what we would now call voluntary private agencies, notably the church, religious orders and the like; the beneficiaries were individuals. The agents were benevolent, i.e. ethically motivated in terms of live interpersonal relations.

In the wake of the Industrial Revolution poverty and sickness achieved high visibility and were seen as evils. What is more, it was felt to be possible, and indeed increasingly necessary, to ask about responsibility and perhaps even guilt with regard to these evils. With Dickens, a threshold was passed in that he identified questions that those who came after him had to face up to; and they did not have an easy time in doing so. The social, political and economic philosophy that accompanied, indeed fostered, the Industrial Revolution inevitably provided a climate in which concern with its adverse fall-out was bound to run against the tide.

Historically the roots of social planning lie in movements for social reform while the roots of economic analysis lie in the historic fact of the growth of national wealth. Over the last two centuries in the West the social reformers, who pressed for factory legislation, public health, educational opportunity, good housing, shorter working
hours, social insurance and family allowances, had found themselves for the most part opposed by those interested in economic growth and had had very little sympathetic support from economists.³

Thus, if the conditions of the Industrial Revolution were conducive to the emergence of a new awareness and appreciation of the evils of society, they were at the same time bound to hamper the proper elaboration and institutionalization of that awareness. The symptoms are clear. Poverty, once recognized, was branded an outrage by those who first responded to it. But if the 1834 Poor Law and the ensuing treatment of recognized paupers was one face of the coin, the other was the emergence of concern for workers' well-being. Of course, it is possible to argue that what initially linked the two was discrimination in favour of industry; but this is not what concerns us at this point. An equally significant ambiguity is that, as long ago as the Victorian era, the state assumed an active role in what would then have seemed to be the exclusive precinct of free enterprise - precisely by acting on behalf of workers.⁴

II

What matters most, at this point, is how to identify the clues that should be pursued in an attempt to clarify the meaning of 'social' in the perspective of mainstream social welfare policy. One pointer is social action, ranging from (i) alleviation, through (ii) remedy and (iii) prevention, to (iv) planning with plan implementation. A similar range can be suggested with respect to the actor or agent, namely from (i) the private individual, through (ii) the private agency and (iii) the public agency, all the way to (iv) the state and beyond, to (V) the international agency. In either case that which appears as a range if typologically considered may, to some extent, appear as a trend if considered historically.

Two more perspectives can be added, namely, field of action, and goals or objectives. The typological range here is perhaps less self-evident, nor is it likely to prove historically significant. The field of action can manifest itself in the relationship between agent and (a) a particular individual person; (b) a particular group or category of persons; (c) a well-defined and therefore purposely limited set of groups or categories of persons; (d) a potentially, perhaps intentionally, expanding set of groups or categories of persons; (e) society as a whole. The variation of objectives can be typified by distinguishing between (1) one single objective; (2) one particular objective with its corollaries;
(3) a distinct and limited set of objectives; (4) a potentially expanding configuration of objectives; (5) any number of congeries of objectives.

Between these four dimensions, the mutuality of perspectives is obvious, and can best be illustrated by reference to an oft used concept that in fact straddles fields of action and objectives, namely, 'target groups'. The attraction of this concept - but also its basic weakness - follows from the fact that whereas groups tend to be determined in terms of objectives, so conversely targets will occasionally be perceived in terms of groups and their needs or wants.

Now this interrelatedness of the four perspectives lends itself well to typological-classificatory use. On the basis provided, it is not difficult to design a comprehensive classificatory system composed of numerous well-ordered slots amenable to being filled in with pertinent historical case material illustrating any typological position. Starting out from groups and objectives, a two-dimensional grid or checkerboard can be constructed, as in chart 1.

In one respect, this chart is an oversimplification even as typologies go. It does not take into account which of the two dimensions has primacy: does the objective determine the group or does the group require the objective? What is needed is a pair of grids, one the mirror image of the other. A case of b-3, such as the blind and their special needs, is not the same as a case of 3-b, such as a group of farmers collectively buying seed.

By adding a third dimension, for example the type of actor or agent, the grid becomes a block of cubes, as in chart 2.

The addition of the fourth dimension, the types of action, puts the designer under duress. He will resort to a set of four blocks of cubes, properly numbered, as in chart 3.

As regards the range of variables pertaining to type of action, it should be noted that the set remedy-prevention-planning is in fact one of two possible alternatives, the other being revolution-reconstruction. The intended discontinuity element inherent in revolution is so crucial (even though subsequent reconstruction tends to reintroduce continuity across the evolutionary chasm represented by revolution) that for present typological purposes little benefit can be expected from including this alternative in the scheme.

The resulting typological construct consists of 500 slots, not counting the inherent duplication of the original grid. This clearly is more than one can efficiently use, if the intent were to be to point up case material to illustrate each slot. The result would be too subtle, and at once too rich and too meagre. It might be difficult
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one objective with its corollaries

one objective

any objectives

potentially expanding configuration of objectives

a distinct and limited set of objectives

set of groups of expanding set of groups of expanding configuration of objectives

individual

specific group

the whole as a society
CHART 3

(i) alleviation
(ii) remedy
(iii) prevention
(iv) planning & plan implementation
to unearth case material for certain slots while there may be an abundance for others, ultimately making it difficult to properly differentiate between them. On the other hand, to show where a case fits the typology will help in identifying its signal features. Now and then it may also prove possible to suggest dynamics by pointing out how, in the course of a historical process, a given case or instance moves from one typological slot to another. Efficient use of this typology, then, will avoid undue attempts at perfectionist completeness. Were the full exercise to be undertaken, the pay-off is unlikely to be commensurate to the effort. The use of the typology had better be selective and mainly geared to keeping the balance and a sense of proportion. It can only be classificatory. It should decidedly not be analytic, prognosticative or evaluative. This point can be further clarified by means of a somewhat arbitrary selection of illustrative instances of the mainstream tradition of social welfare.

The main instance, of course, is the standard package of social welfare and social security policy for which a number of countries in North Western Europe have become particularly noted, but which shows a spread-effect first into other Western countries and then also into the developing countries. In the typology, this complex is situated in rubric IV of Chart 2. In Chart 3 it originates in position (ii) but develops its signal features as belonging in position (iii). In rich countries there is a slight tendency for it to shift further into position (iv). There could be reason to argue, however, that a typical difference between rich and developing countries could well be that whereas in the former position (iii) is fairly typical and for all practical purposes appropriate, the very conditions of development would seem to indicate that position (iv) would be the only appropriate one for developing countries, lest those who prefer the revolutionary alternative should be vindicated. Referring back again to Chart 2, the typical position would seem to be the combination of 4 with d, variably as 4-d or as d-4. Sometimes there are urges to shift from position 4 to 5 and from d to e, as when 'social', in opposition to 'economic', is seen to be comprehensive and non-segmentary; on the whole, however, the practical implications of such shifts provide effective restraints in rich countries. But the question could arise whether the e-5 (not 5-e) position could be seen as appropriate - whether ideally or actually - to developing countries where a concern with social development is recognized.

Other instances will necessarily be more limited, one way or another. Three of these will be pinpointed here, namely, co-operatives, community development, and provisions for workers. The latter will be seen as one case of special interest groups, other instances of which include women, children, youth, and senior citizens.
The typical position of the co-operative organization (not referring to the co-operative movement) in the typology would seem to be b-2-II-(ii). Looking at the broadly educative philosophy of the co-operative movement, however, there is reason to accept that position 2 may have to be seen as immediate, as against position 3 or even 4 as ultimate, characteristics. Similarly, position b is not a hard-and-fast identification, inasmuch as position c or even d may be the one for which those engaged upon co-operative action may strive. Again, if (ii) could be seen as immediate, (iii) may well appear as desirable. Here, the typological device appears a convenient means to suggest the inherent dynamism of co-operatives as living goal-oriented organizations.

The typological position of community development is e-5 (not 5-e); with e identified not as the nation-state but rather as a much lesser social universe, for example a village or a cluster of villages. Accordingly, it may sometimes turn out that instead of position 5 the identification could be more realistically 4. In Chart 3, the customary position is III but occasionally it may be II, without any real difference between the two in practice. In Chart 4, the position is unequivocally IV. The comparison between co-operatives and community development is particularly interesting as it appears to relate to typological differences that are pertinent to differences between developing and rich countries.

In determining the typological nexus of social measures and activities relating to workers, one must first remember an underlying ambiguity which perhaps is best illustrated in the transition from the old to the new Poor Law in England, 1834. According to the earliest perception the workers are an actually under-privileged category whose condition demands corrective provisions. According to another, they are a potentially underprivileged category, liable to see their existence jeopardized by illness, accident or lay-off, whether temporary or definitive. As it happens, the new Poor Law opted for the latter view, in reaction to allegedly undesirable implications of that seen to be represented by preceding legislation. The typological locus, then, would be c-4 (note the non-symmetry: not c-3, nor 3-c or 4-c)-IV-(iii). The (iii) category is a subsequent improvement over initial (ii); for IV one may occasionally read V (think of ILO) or, on the other hand, II (i.e. trade unions).

On the basis of the presentation and discussion of a selection of pertinent materials, it should eventually be possible to consider the matter of social development. Typologically this should be e-5-IV-(iv).
The broad concern of the state with social welfare and social security deserves now to be considered first. This takes the argument back to the opening remarks on the Industrial Revolution.

Once more it is proper to invoke the viewpoint of the history of culture or, if you prefer, the sociology of knowledge. Considered in this way, the Industrial Revolution constitutes a watershed as regards the dominant conceptualization of some of the main features of society. It is caused by the emergence, amongst other things, of a double set of distinct sociocultural categories. The spearhead is the concept of work, meaning systematic activity, employing a measure of skill and supported by a dose of technology, in a location especially assigned to it, regularly during definite time periods, for a return mostly in money, to an amount determined in advance. (Note that the materials and the product are omitted from the definition. There are variables to be specified case by case. This is why, to some, work in the modern sense connotes alienation). In emerging, this concept constitutes a clear departure from an inherited set of concepts that covered roughly the same ground in a different manner. In its wake, or concomitantly, a double triad of further concepts has been either refocussed or newly adopted, further substantiating the broader ramifications of the meaning of 'work'. These are health, skill and wage, and, countervailing, disease, ignorance and poverty. The elements of this complex are obviously not entirely new, but the complex as such, in being articulated with reference to 'work', is decidedly innovative. In laying it bare, one identifies the determinants of a new lifestyle, not to say a new instalment in the history of a culture pattern.

At first blush it could seem as if for present purposes one of the two wings of this complex should be singled out. It could seem justifiable to posit that poverty, ignorance and disease, the abominable three, mark the point of issue for the specific identification of 'social' that dates back to the Industrial Revolution. They symbolize the emergent awareness that certain evils of society are not just part of the human condition: they are identifiable, indeed attributable, conceivably to agents liable to be called to account. They are events or conditions that must be dealt with by means of appropriate action, which then will be styled 'social'. At the same time they offer clues to both the goals and the frame of reference of pertinent action.

Closer consideration, however, shows that such a simple presentation of things is a trap that should be avoided. Indeed, it makes no sense to take the one set of
concepts in isolation from its opposite number. The period we are considering was one of transition, a time of contrast and contradictions. The two opposite sets of notions illustrate this quite well. The prevailing social philosophy of the day according to which, to put it briefly, individual self-promotion results in collective well-being, provides even better illustration. It is the very contrast or ambiguity hidden within this basic thesis (and brought out here by rephrasing it in today's terminology) that is crucial to the emergent identification of social problems and concerns. Accordingly, it is the nature of this contrast, and of further concomitant contrasts, that needs to be studied.

In considering early liberalism, questions are apt to be asked about the juxtaposition of self-help and common wealth. We ask, perhaps superciliously, which mechanism will prevent individual self-help from resulting in total chaos between the individuals who constitute the collectivity, and will cause it instead to have collective well-being as its aggregate outcome. The customary thesis is that the early liberals resorted to a deus ex machina that, for the sake of philosophical decency, they kept largely invisible, namely the state. Having inherited it, all they had to do was redesign, ad hoc, some of its functions and give it a low profile. This was not particularly difficult. The philosophical contrast between the acting and self-promoting individual and the facilitating state was largely blurred by an intervening range of actors that were neither the one nor the other but a bit of both, such as the private agency, the parish, the local authority.

There existed at least two further perceptions of this benign mechanism. They had the added advantage that, being better in tune with the contemporary outlook and mood, they could conveniently be highlighted.

One is work as a newly emergent sociocultural category, or, as Fraser puts it, the gospel of work: the prevailing modality and the ideological maximization of action. While it clearly pertains to the orbit of the individual, work is essentially geared to at least two instances of the comprehensive, overall 'system' (as we now call it), namely, the market and technology. These external determinants bestow its main characteristics upon work in the modern sense. There are, however, further characteristics, to which we shall turn presently.

The other consideration in consequence of which the workings of the societal system of liberalism were considered to be benign was charity as a redistributional and corrective procedure. Amateurish in principle and of dubious impact in practice, it was conceptually crucial. Its practice meant that if, and to the extent to which, self-help does not result in collective wealth for all, the exception to the rule need not be lost. Those not carried
by the system, whether because they fail to play the game or because of hard luck, are not left to perish: they are rescued and potentially (re-)integrated into the system.

If these various devices helped to obfuscate the rift within the basic liberal construct, they did not put an end to the prevailing pattern of point and counterpoint. Indeed, each one somehow evoked its own countervailing concept, feature or issue. If their occurrence marks contrast and potential contradiction or ambiguity conceptually, it may well appear as friction or malfunction operationally. Four instances of this state of affairs deserve to be mentioned here.

First, public well-being as the intended result of the liberal-industrial system. There was no rising tide of expectation, as is now the case in some developing countries. Nevertheless, in the eyes of some beholders, some of whom were well-off, the welfare that resulted from the Industrial Revolution contrasted ever more sharply with the poverty, dismal working and living conditions, and disenchantment. Not all these phenomena were new. Many had existed prior to the Industrial Revolution, but they now became more conspicuous. Besides, new and more acute issues also emerged in consequence of the Industrial Revolution.

Secondly, work proved to elicit its counterpoint, partly in the form of moral and psychological alienation that resulted from the vicissitudes of the market and from the dictates of technology aggravated, in some cases, by human disciplinarians in factories. Worse than that, it entailed grave hazards such as accidents, ill health, moral depravity, unemployment. Nor were wages always adequate to stave off poverty or need. Indeed, poverty became newly 'revealed'. These are the additional characteristics alluded to in the preceding.

No sharp distinction can be drawn between the former and the latter. Work and poverty play a role in each. This results in some ambiguities that deserve special notice, not merely because they are contrasts within contrasts. Doubts about the willingness of potential workers to embrace the new gospel of work were strong enough to turn the 1834 Poor Law into a device that used poverty as an inducement for people to take up industrial employment - at wages convenient to industry. But other legislation, both earlier and later, testifies to the awareness that industry does not end poverty or, for that matter, abominable conditions and disillusionment. Small wonder: the incidence of poverty, among the agricultural population as well as among the industrially employed and unemployed, remained at levels high enough to warrant concern on the part of those, whether in private or official capacities, who felt responsible.
The third contrast occurs in connection with the apparently self-propelling, irreversible process of the growth of state power as a corollary to the economic development that began with the Industrial Revolution. The power that was meant primarily to facilitate had, under the pressure of actual developments, to shape up, secondarily and by way of counterpoint, in such a way as to control, restrain and remedy. What is more, this amalgam of contrasting orientations has, in the course of a century, shown a vitality and growth that appear inversely proportional to its intrinsic solidity. If over the years the state has not wiped out all the entities that intervene between itself and the private individual, this can only be on account of its own convenience.

Fourth, liberalism as a social philosophy proved open to challenge. Socialism emerged, first in reaction against some of liberalism's alleged consequences and then as a competing doctrine. This is not the occasion to draw a profile of socialism. But it is of interest to note its stand in regard to the basic rift in the liberal conception of the operation of the social system. For one thing, the perception of man as being the resultant of the interplay of societal forces may verbally bridge the rift between individual and society but has little chance of substantiation or operationalization. It also appears to reverse the primacy between individual and society in favour of the latter; but again the elaboration and operationalization leave to be desired, and the individual by and large keeps a crucial role even in subjugation to the collectivity. The rift remains: it runs now between the two roles of the individual, representing two contrasting variants of ideological identification with the collectivity, namely control over it versus subservience to it - a fact to which the current debate on fundamental human rights fails to do justice.

There is yet another aspect, namely the tenets about control over the means of production. By introducing an intervening abstract-analytical rather than an effectively operational category, they fail to come to grips with the problems of effective linkage between individual or group effort (i.e. with regard to means of production) and the collective well-being (and the slice thereof for the individual or group concerned) that results from aggregated efforts.

Schematically presented, the reasoning is as follows: (1) there is alleged malfunction between individual self-help and common wealth; (2) those who intend to apply the doctrine will start by siding with the alienated majority; (3) as a result the minority who control the means of production will be wiped out; (4) society will then be re-integrated by allocating this control to the majority who henceforth will be the totality anyway; (5) but effective
control over the means of production, now a much more hard-and-fast category than it was previously, can only be safeguarded by re-institutionalization and the only possible way of doing so is by assigning it to a more or less bureaucratic category of people who, in assuming it, turn into a new minority, however well-intended and communicative. This closes the circle: we are back at the construct in which the effective link between individual effort and collective well-being eludes both the analyst and the social engineer. However, the state is the institution that gains at the expense of both individuals and society. Whether the state that will be the ultimate product of so much growth can continue to correspond to the characteristic Western perception of which both liberalism and socialism are initially variants, is an open question. If not, will the alternative perception for which it might stand be able to co-exist with that typical of the West hitherto? It is towards this issue that the fundamental human rights debate seems to be directed. Apart from such ultimate issues it remains to conclude that if socialism's reading of the basic rift seems different, it is still a variant of the typically Western perception of the complex individual: society.

IV

Against the backdrop of these contrasts and the ensuing issues, notably the first three, an increasingly distinguishable complex has developed, known under the label 'social'. In addition to being (a) complex, it has at least three other salient features. (b) It is residual but tends to appear as crucial. (c) It is limited as a matter of principle yet expansive in an agglomerative fashion. (d) It is institutionalized in a variety of asymmetrical ways. Each of these four features is necessary, and to some extent necessarily problematic. They will now be discussed in more detail.

(a) Complex

There is complexity (1) in that the label 'social' applies equally and indiscriminately to a category of issues or problems and to action meant to cope with them. This suggests that the link between identification or analysis on the one hand and corresponding action on the other hand is immediate and is a crucial element of the entire proposition. This is why perhaps it has proven so extremely difficult, if not impossible, to build a self-contained,
self-supporting theory of social action, let alone of social development.

There is complexity once more (2) in that the category of issues just referred to is not identified in one major act of appropriate conceptualization but is enumerated in the course of time, responding in fundamentally occasionalist fashion to actual occurrences. At this point one may pick up a thread that is often left hanging: the enumerative approach to the substance of 'social' is one of the firm characteristics of the complex we are now describing. Such a sequential-enumerative procedure of definition could hardly enhance consistent theoretical effort. What tends to be included in the listing is a range of more or less symptomatic phenomena, each of which will relate somehow to such contrasts, frictions or malfunctions in society as will strike those concerned. The label 'social', then, will apply to virtually any flaw in the practice of the accepted economistic model of society (regardless whether spelled out in the liberal or in the socialist style). Moreover, such flaws are implicitly taken to be incidental and historical, not essential. Accordingly the concept 'social' refers to a variable collection of items, each basically contingent in a countervailing way. It does not stand for a firm category in its own right. For it to be a fundamental concept, a vision or model of society would have to be presupposed basically different from the modern Western, economistic one. To Westerners and to others imbued with Western thinking, such a model is not readily available. (But there is a budding uneasy awareness that it is needed.)

Even during the Industrial Revolution, this range was complex in yet another way (3). It comprised objective conditions of life - distress in a variety of manifestations, such as poverty, squalor, illness, ignorance - as well as their 'interiorization' by those affected, including its symptoms, such as disillusionment, resentment, alienation, anomie, and occasionally rioting. Insofar as the various manifestations of social evil were identified with particular categories or groups of actual or potential victims, the complexity also showed in (4) a range of variously-defined categories or groups of people, 'target populations' for social action, each perceived as relating either to society as a whole or to particular other groups within it. Sometimes, the particular problems faced by certain individuals will define them as a group or category together; sometimes an existing group will be seen to suffer a particular common fate. Often, there will be mutual definition between a particular category of people and the kind of distress to which they are subject or prone.
This, then, is the broad profile of that which is labelled 'social'. The customary terms are slightly more elaborate but hardly less elusive. Depending upon the angle of approach, people will refer to it as social problems or as social welfare, social security or again as social work, social policy. Its three further characteristics remain now to be reviewed.

(b) Residual yet crucial

This is a residual complex. Its emergence and the modalities of its manifestation relate to, and are decisively conditioned by, certain pre-existing realities. The 'economic-political complex' (to adapt a modern term) of the Industrial Revolution is given as a pre-existent, self-sustained and self-propelling entity. The emergence of the countervailing but, as such, problematic 'social' complex is the inevitable implication of the maximization of particular elements and aspects of life that are characteristic of the economic-political complex and indeed bestow upon it its enormous vitality and successes. The emergent social issues are leftovers, things not so much forgotten as eliminated from consideration, perhaps sacrificed in favour of what appeared as higher values (mainly to those who set the pace and dominate the scene). Note that in this connection it is not the critique of the economic pre-occupation that serves as a guideline. It is the actually emergent complex of issues and responses thereto: basically residual but increasingly countervailing to the economic-political one.

The countervailance is far from being merely a contrast in terms of logic. Its practical significance is marked by high urgency. The forgotten social realm does not pop up as just another topic worthy of some intellectual or perhaps practical interest, but has all the characteristics of an emergency. In pursuing the values of the economic-political complex, great success has been achieved, but almost surreptitiously; something has gone dangerously wrong at an increasing rate, and needs to be remedied. How?

Theoretically speaking, a bifurcation opens up at this point of the argument. One option is to try and develop remedial, corrective, perhaps preventive action. To the extent to which the system will bear such interference in its functioning, this should obviate its adverse consequences, preferably even eliminate their causes. The other option is to condemn the system for its inability to function without adverse fall-out at increasingly unacceptable levels: allegedly, of course, in order to substitute a satisfactory one. The dilemma is not so much substantive as a matter of common verbal stylization. Take again the case of Marxism. Its emphatic claim is to reject the former and stand squarely for the latter option. But its persistent and ineluctable
frame of reference, with no effective alternative in sight, is the modern - by now fully dated - Western economistic model of society. Marxist regimes here and there will tinker with it one way or another, with no demonstrably better overall effect than is achieved by the late or post-liberal polities they condemn so vehemently all the time. On the strength of this one example, the dilemma is a no-go. This need not come as a surprise. Its apparently logical neatness is blurred, to the extent of being given the lie by a vital consideration, not of a logical but of a historical, purely incidental and variable nature. It says that, as the Marxists have shown to be deeply aware, very much depends on whose experience and values will, or will be made to, decide which levels of adverse fall-out are tolerable. It is intrinsically blurred once more because there is no saying precisely how the processes that mark the life of human collectivities are affected by the action - or, for that matter, passivity - of human groups and individuals therein.

Nor does it help to restate the dilemma as the contrast between the power of argument, standing for gradualist meliorism, and brute force, perhaps violence, standing for revolution and its aftermath. The same objections hold true. In gaining distance from upheavals such as the French and Russian revolutions, successive generations of historians, whilst continuing to recognize incidental discontinuities in more or less significant respects, appear increasingly ready to point out continuities in equally or more significant respects. A fortiori this suggests the inability of such revolutions to produce, or usher in, an essentially new pattern, corresponding to a basically different conceptualization of the realities of collective human existence.

Be all this as it may, the fact is that, urgency or no urgency, ever since the Industrial Revolution, mainstream social action in what we now call the rich countries has represented the gradualist option. The same applies to the East Bloc pattern ever since it became established on a post-revolutionary base. However crucial the problems, their residual character retains its effect.

The residual nature of the social complex shows in yet another manner. This is not customarily considered to be problematic, but by its ultimate consequences it may be very problematic indeed. Many people customarily tend to perceive social needs in terms of economics, and to a much lesser extent of politics: wealth and power, or rather their absence. Thus, ill health will feature as the consequence of inadequate sanitary and safety provisions and medical facilities; health can accordingly be presented as the consequence of their introduction (a thesis that Grosso modo may even be true). Inasmuch as all of these can allegedly be figured in terms of moneys invested or spent, they will
appear amenable to being introduced into the overall economic system, primarily as cost factors but, with some accountant's luck, even as benefits. Likewise education, once seen as the inculcation of skills that make for employability and, by way of ulterior effect, for social mobility, is amenable to quantification both as regards skills inculcated and costs incurred in the process, perhaps even in terms of effects. The list can easily be lengthened. What matters for present purposes is that the very possibility to perceive and present these things as residual to the economic realm ensues from the predominance of the economic-political style of reasoning and acting, indeed living: Economism as the *philosophie vécue* of the modern West. This in itself is another case of the reductionism discussed above in connection with the emergence of the social complex, countervailing to the primary economic-political one, and by the same token necessarily problematic. It is liable to show the same implications: the 'social' perceived as residually economic or economic-by-expansion is liable to leave unnoticed a segment that, as it is less amenable to being handled in terms of economics and accordingly perhaps more specifically social, will eventually pop up as an unforeseen problem.

*(c) Limited yet expansive*

A further characteristic of 'social' is that it is a limited yet ever-expanding complex. Its essential limitation follows from its residual origin. With the economic-political complex a given in its own right, the social is intrinsically restricted: out of the full round of life, it denotes only so much. The question is: how much. As it happens, there is no way of determining how much this will be. The residual nature of the complex connives with the enumerative identification procedure that has to be followed to keep its scope indefinite. At the same time it is rendered necessarily expansive. Beyond the latest social problem to have been revealed, the next waits to be recognized; beyond the latest social policy device or social work approach a new one promises more or better results. A social issue that has been attended to, will not prevent the emergence of new and more problematic symptoms of the hidden side of the economic-political system.

Ultimately then, the realm of the social could apparently be described as coterminous with the full round of life minus the economic-political and perhaps the technological complex. Even this much clarity cannot be achieved, however. Just as some social matters can, to an extent, be conceived, presented and even handled in terms of economics, so there are bound to be economic, political and even technical matters, elements of predominant subsystems, that are amenable
to being dealt with in terms social.\textsuperscript{15}

The net result is that, in being necessarily expansive, social concern need not be halted at the door of the economic-political complex. On the other hand, as its forays penetrate deeper into that complex, the more subject they become to attrition (unless a revolutionary stance is adopted: but this is not part of the mainstream phenomena now under review). The frontiers between the subsystems are blurred. As subsystems they are not merely products of systematic consideration and purposive design; to some extent they resemble living entities in their own right and in mutual interaction. If this enhances the expansiveness of the social, it will also reconfirm its limited nature.

\textbf{(d) Asymmetry}

Fourthly, the characteristic asymmetry in matters social, according to the prevailing perception. The root of the matter is the primacy relationship between the economic-political and the social sectors or aspects of life which, in the Industrial Revolution, was superimposed upon the normal features of any relationship between the several aspects of one totality, namely, equivalence allowing for specific differences. The differences can sometimes be presented as privative opposition, so that the relationship appears as a simple binary one. The logical implication is that whatever the primary sector undertakes to amend the disadvantages of the secondary one will be inadequate. It is nowadays and in some countries grudgingly recognized that the sky is the limit in matters of social welfare and security provisions;\textsuperscript{16} but it is seldom recognized that the cause is fundamental rather than accidental. Referring again to binary formulae: at face value 'haves - have-nots' is a binary pair; but in terms of social-economic-political presuppositions and implications it may well be a complicated causal nexus combined with an ethical quanyard.

One illustration of this intrinsic asymmetry is charity. The unequal roles of donor and recipient are crucial and lasting: they do not alter during or in consequence of the charitable act or series of acts. Perhaps they do in rare individual cases, but never categorically. \textit{Mutatis mutandis} this feature reoccurs in the much discussed problem of development aid.

The most crucial illustration is the situation where the state is the main dispenser of social welfare and security and accordingly will play an umpire role between two allegedly conflicting parties, namely the economic wealth and power sector - apparently minus its political ramifi-
cations - and the social sector: the former often identified, for the sake of easy recognizability, as capitalists and employers and the latter as workers and other underprivileged groups. In this model, the original primacy relationship between two categories has spawned a subsidiary one due to growing differentiation (in consequence of the struggle between liberalism and socialism) between economic power and political power. Thus, the state appears increasingly as a wedge between the two other categories, capable of achieving an apparent primacy. It is the redistributive agent and potentially the setter of norms, eroding the liberty of action of any other entities in society. Its justification is that this is the price to pay for social justice. In fact full social justice continues to beckon beyond the horizon, and optimal social justice is increasingly paid for in loss of liberty.

All this suggests a problem of fundamental inadequacy, the root cause of which remains unaffected and obscure. The persistence of this problem, perhaps rather than anything else, is the main factor of the self-aggrandizement of the state, its politicians and its bureaucracy. There exists a demonstrable similarity, in this regard, between rich and developing countries but the conditioning factors may not be fully the same.

It is also possible to argue that the disproportionate nature of the institutionalization of social policy and social welfare, respective to needs identified and goals achieved, relates back to the way in which these needs and goals are perceived. They tend to appear in terms of proliferating causal linkages, both backward and forward, rather than as neatly determined issues. In responding to a given issue, people feel that they are tackling much that is wrong in society: behind that issue stands a partially hidden, broad and broadening causal nexus. Beyond the act of coming to grips with the issue beckons the prospect of making society a better place to live in. Thus, 'heavy' institutionalization, regardless of the size and limitations of the issues at hand, will seem acceptable, even desirable.

After identification of the main features of 'social' in terms of the Western mainstream concern with social welfare and social policy, the argument can follow two courses, which may well be mutually complementary. One is to further substantiate the cluster just identified, by pursuing its manifestations and significance through the history of national social policies in a number of countries. It may make some difference whether, in doing so, one deals with free market or mixed economy situations or alternatively with centrally-planned economies of the socialist type.
The other course is to inspect more closely some selected instances of social concern not identified with the state. As a rule these will appear more limited, whether by selective concern with a particular category of people in need of social relief or justice, or with the achievement of some or any social goals in a limited setting, such as a particular community.

The latter approach is likely to prove quite instructive, but it would require a separate paper. Here we have room only for some incidental comments on the former. It is proposed to consider some glimpses of the history of national social policies in the West, as illustrations of the concern with broadly defined target population, responding to any changes in circumstances as it continues in the course of time.

In considering national histories of social policy, what matters here is whether and how the configuration of the four signal features listed has been affected by historical developments. In answering this question it seems convenient to continue to refer to the British case, on the perhaps too easy assumption that other cases are comparable mutatis mutandis, or at any rate not different in a manner significant for present purposes.

The complexity of social concern remains unaltered, and the best proof in this case is perhaps negative. The Poor Law has remained in force for far too long as an allegedly comprehensive provision of which, however, it was undesirable to avail oneself. The tendency has consequently been to design ad hoc limited provisions with which to meet particular recognized needs while impeding effective application of the Law. When this was at last repealed in 1948, it was replaced by no less than four basic Acts. There can be little doubt that whatever comprehensiveness the Poor Law may have had - sacrificed by the piecemeal nature of supplanting provisions - was more than adequately matched by the thinking of William Beveridge. Even so, his Report (1942) is said to tackle only one of five evils, namely want; the four others, equally well recognized, being disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness. Government action in the wake of the Report took the form of diverse White Papers and subsequent Acts. Later developments have not altered this basic complexity even though, most of the time, they have tended to broaden the total scope.

As regards the residual nature of social concern, the evidence is more scattered and less easily identifiable. The Beveridge Report is particularly intriguing: insofar as want was its target, it followed the tradition of perceiving
social concerns as residual; but to the extent to which, under the impact of World War II, it set out to enable society to combat all its five evils, it was potentially of a different kind. This was not to much avail, however, as Fraser suggests in labelling public response 'utopian', and as appears in Churchill's implementation of the Report, impressive though it was. By and large, the dream of a just society which had inspired so many leading champions of social policy - for example during the period of the Poor Law Commission 1906-09 - continued to be basically no more than a corrective to an ongoing, and recognizedly deplorable, state of affairs.23

Two riders to the above are necessary. First, if social concern continues to be basically residual, it is not certain that primacy is necessarily and at all times vested in the economic 'sector' of reality. The political sector deserves careful watching in this connection - the more so as the role of the state increases in matters social. As suggested, social needs, properly identified, interpreted and handled, are a potential power base for politicians and a *raison d'être* for bureaucrats and institutions, both private and public. So are economic problems in their own way, particularly those acute problems characteristic of war, post-war and developmental emergencies. Between social and economic requirements, the arbiter is almost inevitably political.

This configuration throws new light on the residuality of the social concern. It also provides a rather interesting view of the alleged differences, briefly referred to, between the free market and the socialist approaches to social policy. If Galbraith's prognosis for Western economies is more or less correct, some of these alleged differences may lose part of their actual significance.

The second rider, very different from the first, refers to the recent wave of anti-'economic' utopianism, of the social critics who want to remake society by undoing the economy. Borrowing Nisbet's terminology,25 one might say that these critics attack the residual nature of social concern by rejecting equality of opportunity in favour of (prospective) achieved equality as the norm. Whether they can, in the end, be more effective than all their predecessors and succeed in doing away with the inherently contingent nature of any utopia remains open to speculation.

More is involved in this dispute than a mere reversal of perspective. The social critic aims at equality as a more or less distinct, utopian target, for approximation rather than for formal implementation within determined and limited time lapses, thus leaving many inherent substantive and definitional problems to be handled as the occasion arises. The social policy maker purposely determines the criteria for equality as of now, and sets about to achieve it accordingly within fixed time limits; in so
doing he has to face questions as to means to be employed and sacrifices to be required. Were Nisbet aware of present conditions in a country like the Netherlands, he would realize that he sounds even more ominous than he does with regard to conditions in the USA.

To return to the apparent inevitability of the contingent nature of utopia, this seems like a 'divine trick'. For one thing, the prevailing state of affairs is the only possible and therefore ineluctable, frame of reference for conceiving a utopia: if not in being affirmed then in being rejected. For another, in order to gain a chance of implementation, any utopia is bound to begin by actually confronting the prevailing state of affairs which it fundamentally rejects. In the inevitable confrontation, fundamental rejection is bound to be superseded by *de facto* recognition if only in order to engage in combat. But recognition can only be in terms of an emergent entity vis-à-vis an established one: an inequality that virtually connotes residuality of the one versus the other. The critique is almost doomed to be in terms of that which is criticized, and thus from the start potentially alienated from what was intended to be its true nature. It is generally assumed that this barrier can only be broken by the emergent entity taking shape as a revolution; but the history of revolutions in turn shows significant continuities.

Thirdly the limited yet ever broadening nature of the social concern. A century of social welfare policy confirms its significance. An increasing configuration of categories of people who are considered to qualify for care in one way or another. From women and juvenile labourers, it has expanded to include the sick, by an ever-widening definition, the unemployed, the uncared-for, and eventually all aged people and families in any kind of distress.

This scope has been further broadened by the simultaneous inclusion of diverse ways of caring for such groups. The provisions and techniques used for the implementation of social policies have proliferated. The complicating effect can be realized if it is considered how operational categories such as education, health care and housing provisions are bound to interact with categories of target populations.

If instances of change-over - as from charity to insurance, from voluntary to obligatory insurance, from social assistance on account of need to assistance by right, from proportionality according to premiums paid to a flat rate guaranteeing subsistence, or even the increasingly redistributive use of taxation - may have seemed to be cases of dramatic turn-over when being discussed, they in turn have in fact resulted in little more than a growing and ever more varied package.

At face value, some of the salient terms used in pertinent discussions seem to suggest that this prolifer-
ation has overcome the limited nature of the complex. Take, for example, 'universalism'. But the universe of those to whom this is meant to cater is clearly circumscribed quantitatively and/or qualitatively: those members of the national society who fail to achieve subsistence as currently defined, a subsistence which is achieved by sufficient other members of the same society to make it possible for the state to extract the means with which to sustain the former at subsistence level.

Curiously, much the same argument applies to a recent Dutch addition to the broadening spectrum of social provisions, namely participation. The notion is not very precise, being applied with equal emphasis to private enterprise, publicly-owned enterprise and public affairs. In the first two cases, the workers are to participate in the decisions of management. (Apparently this is regardless whether managers are seen, in traditional perspective, as representatives of capital or, more contemporary, as a third force in their own right; but in fact it presupposes and in effect upholds, the former, obsolescent reading of the state of affairs.) In the case of public affairs, pertinent segments or units of the public are to participate in policy making and the administrative execution of policies which are expected to affect them. Implicitly, the formal patterns and procedures of parliamentary and similar decision making stand condemned, presumably for being either inadequate to cope with specific newly-rising needs, or for being effective only in sectors other than the social. The foreseeable upshot is a shake-up in the division of power. Where on the one hand parliament legislates and government plus bureaucracy administers, but at the same time public authorities and agencies rule and the interested public have a say, or an opinion to contribute, room has been created for overlap, possibly confusion and lack of efficacy, conceivably conflict. The prospect of such an unattractive and no doubt unintended effect looks the more grim if it is realized that the new institution of participation (including, maybe, the 'extraparliamentary democracy' of demonstrations and action groups) is by and large superimposed upon structures that are not simultaneously being rearranged for the purpose: perhaps in the optimistic assumption that needed adjustments will follow of their own accord in due course.

Lastly, institutionalization and its disproportion.

There are two main trends, the first of which is the steady expansion of the orbit of state activity and the increased intensity of this activity, often at the expense of private agencies and their amalgamated vested interests. State interference in working conditions, notably for women and children, was the wedge that opened up the privileged domain of private enterprise and private charity to active
public authority, deemed warranted even in Victorian days. When individual entrepreneurs were seen as neglecting what they were the last to recognize as their own responsibility. In the caustic phrase of Aneurin Bevan, quoted by Marshall, 'capitalism proudly displays medals won in the battles it has lost'. We have already pointed out the potentially ominous implication of this trend.

The other trend is the proliferation of agencies, both public and private, which deal with one aspect or another of social welfare policy in its many ramifications, and concomitantly of pertinent skills, studies, professions and all the rest. If it be true, as some claim, that the growing range and intensity of social needs relates directly to drastic social change, then there is an interesting lesson in store for those who care to learn it. It is about institutionalization phenomena which, as intended responses to disintegration, could perhaps be seen as attempts at reintegration. In terms of net effect, they certainly appear ill-matched to this disintegration, even if they only are meant, quite modestly, to facilitate reintegration efforts. The practice of the bureaucratic variant of this institutionalization in particular, abounds with illustrations of how adverse can be the results of such ill-matching.

The provisional conclusion is that the cluster of four features, problematic individually and together, has held firmly through the years. The various milestones passed in the history of Western social policies have not resulted in important changes in the perception and definition of the social realm, especially vis-à-vis the economic one. True, the scope of the 'social' has grown constantly, but even this has not necessarily led to much questioning regarding the relationship between the two, as determined by the assumed primacy of the economic. Nor has there been much discussion on their relationship, separately or jointly, to a third sector, such as the political or perhaps the cultural. Westerners segmentize their world, they are occasionally plagued by the way the segments show friction, and fail to reconstitute true totality, and they leave it at that.

Until recently, there has been little probing into the relationship between the just society of which all social policy makers dream, and the actual, imperfect and problem-ridden society. Indeed, at every turn of the road of mainstream social thinking, one tacit premiss seems to be left intact, namely that of the existing society, with its basic structure (power, opportunity, and what not) as a given. It does not feature as an unchangeable or unchanging given: those pursuing social policies will at least assume society to be amenable to improvement and therefore susceptible to change. But there has been little to indicate any intent,
on their part, to consider society as such as their main
or ultimate target: for policies, that is, aiming at real, effective change.

Plus ga change, plus ga reste la même chose? Not quite. Very gradual changes, which for long do not really affect the continuity of a given status quo, may yet turn out to have a cumulative effect whereby, at a given moment, the situation may prove to have changed significantly. The true significance of the changes will show only in retrospect. Apart from the impossibility of assessing the future significance of today's 'social critics', at least three considerations can be read as so many symptoms that this continuity is not necessarily everlasting.

Fraser, in summing up his historical sketch and attempting to delineate a prospect, points out firstly, that inflation (economic factor or something else?) has upset some of the basic notions underlying Beveridge's conception of social security. Secondly, he find himself in the company of P. Townsend in pointing out that social policy has not managed to do away with poverty, whether absolute or relative. Remember also Hirsch, whose ideas amounted to saying it could not do so. In the third place, there is J. van Baal's thesis that social security contributes precious little to meeting the immaterial aspect of social needs, inasmuch as it derives from the market model (a sort of quadrature of the residuality discussed earlier).

Taken together, these questions may mean no less than that some people at least are ready to challenge the basic notions that underly the Western philosophy and practice of social welfare, social security and social policy. No doubt ecological concerns, the urge to humanize labour (whatever verdict on labour this may imply), and several more will add their bit to the challenge if and when it begins to shape up. These will probably be joined by increasingly urgent questions about the cost of social security as well as about possible correlations between the practice of social policy in certain countries and the occurrence of unemployment, notably hard core unemployment, the incidence of crime and addiction, and the like. But the if is a big one: there are powerful vested interests in the prevailing state of affairs, and given the four main features analyzed, there is no reason to assume that as of now the flexibility of the existing pattern should end and impair its capability to survive.
NOTES


2. They include, for example, the 'new philosophers' in France – authors, largely of Marxist pedigree, such as B.H. Lévy, J.M. Bénoist, J.P. Dollé, A. Glucksmann, G. Lardreau. With special regard to development, comp. C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze: 'The Study of Development and the Alleged Need for an Interdisciplinary Approach' (ISS Occasional Paper No. 67, The Hague, 1979).


6. By 'distinct sociocultural categories' I mean specific concepts or sets of concepts, invented or redefined for the purpose of identifying aspects or elements of reality that will henceforth be readily referred to as constituents or determinants of the prevailing frame of reference for human thought and action. The underlying assumption is that this frame of reference, being in time and place conditioned (*situé et daté*), is variable in more ways than just on account of its being culture-conditioned. The concept draws upon the reasoning underlying Jaspers's notion of *Weltanschauung* and Kuhn's notion of paradigm. P.L. Berger and T. Luckmann, in *The Social Construction of Reality, A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City NY, Doubleday: Anchor, 1967), p. 34ff., come close to the point where their argument might have benefited by the introduction of this concept. In *Embattled Reason, Essays on Social Knowledge* (New York, Oxford U.P. 1970), p.103, R. Bendix discusses Weber's concern with conceptual constructions in a manner that suggests that he in fact uses the concept without naming it.

8. J. van Baal, pointing to this aspect of the phenomenon, observes that labour has become a commodity in a trade situation (*De boodschap der drie illustres*; Assen, van Gorcum, 1977). This clearly is a crucial, perhaps the most crucial aspect of this new development.

9. Of these, only one has achieved full distinctness, namely leisure. Its counterpart, namely toil, although very real has tended to remain more or less faceless: understandably so, given the prevailing appreciation of the contrast between the two. Comp. H. Arendt: *The Human Condition, A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man* (Chicago U.P., 1958; paperb. Garden City NY, Doubleday: Anchor, 1958);

J. André: *L'otium dans la vie morale et intellectuelle romaine, des origines à l'époque augustéenne* (1966). It has taken some time for the category 'work', which so drastically upset the duality of toil and leisure, to be equipped with its proper opposite number, in keeping with the normal tendency for conceptual pairs rather than singles to be used in dealing with reality. Comp. R. Bendix: *o.c.*; S.K. Langer: *Philosophical Sketches* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1962; paperb. New York, New Amer. Libr.: Mentor, 1964); id: *Mind, An Essay on Human Feeling*, I (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1967), Ch. 6, 8, 9; M. Heidegger: *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen, Neske, 1957); H. Rickert: *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (1915), p. 30. When this finally happened, the concept 'leisure' was reinstated for the purpose, obviously in a properly adjusted meaning. But it was not so definitively adjusted that its further upsurge could not affect the meaning of 'work', in such a manner that in the eyes of some it currently begins to approximate that of 'toil' in the earlier set. Comp. N. Anderson: *Work and Leisure* (London, Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1961); D. Bell: *Work and Its Discontents, The Cult of Efficiency in America* (New York, League for Industrial Democracy, 1970; orig. ed. 1956);


10. As yet, the meaning of 'leisure' has not affected that of 'work' to such an extent that as a pair they could be aligned, on grounds of parallel contrast, with the double set of three now listed. Intriguingly, as van Baal points out (*o.c.*, p.61f) the term 'leisure', thus recast, connotes an important novel element, namely boredom. Comp. also S.B. Linder: *The Harried Leisure Class* (New York, Columbia U.P., 1970).
11. As the reader will note, the use of today's terminology in describing phenomena a century old is not felicitous. If our terms could seem to hold up classical liberal philosophy to ridicule, it should be remembered that contemporary terminology certainly did not.

12. D. Fraser, o.c., p.95. The discussion that follows here draws freely upon the first six chapters of his study.

13. Ibid., p.123.

14. It remains to be seen, of course, whether under the impact of today's problems as currently perceived, the social critique of the 1960s and '70s can achieve greater effect in its by no means novel effort to turn adverse social implications into ammunition against the economic-political system, including its social base. More specifically the question is whether those voicing it could face up to the need to 'translate' its rejection of the inherited paradigm into a truly new, truly alternative model whether in preparation for a revolution or under pressure of the void that would be left after a successful one. Comp. V. George & P. Wilding: Ideology and Social Welfare (London, Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1976); R. Holman: Poverty, Explanations of Social Deprivation (London, Robertson, 1978); A. de Vos van Steenwijk: Il fera beau... le jour où le sousprolétaire sera entendu (Pierrelaye, Science et Service, 1977).

15. The specialism known as sociology of economics, identified with the names of Parsons and Smelzer, is one of the more salient intellectual exercises that are feasible in this connection.


19. J. Fraser, o.c., p.213.

20. Ibid., 199f.
23. It is curious, to say the least, that the dilemma of actuary versus moral approach in the matter of covering social risks, whether through insurance or otherwise, does not really seem to have had any significance for the fundamental problem of residuality of the social concern. Comp. Fraser, o.c., p.160, 201, 227f, 291.
26. Perhaps by a poorly integrated set of partial definitions. An interesting illustration of the endurance of the 'limited yet expanding' characteristic is P. Townsend's argument in his collection of essays just quoted. To Townsend, social policy is "a kind of blueprint for the management of society towards social ends" (p.6, also p.7), and "the means whereby societies prevent, postpone, introduce and manage changes in structure" (p.2). Venturing a much broader conception of social services than he claims is usual (p.28), he maintains that "social policy is the underlying as well as the professed rationale by which they are controlled and use to bring about social development" (p.29). This leads to a plea in favour of a comprehensive, consistent social policy (p.31, 47, 54f) and indeed a social plan (p.56). The resulting concentration in the state and concomitant bureaucratization are matters that do not seem to bother him (p. 4, 7, 62, 350). As against so much expansiveness it is interesting to note the explicit maintenance of the fundamentally limited scope of the social concern: "This view of social policy is very broad but not so broad as to totally absorb economic institutions and policies as well" (p.30).

From this type of argument, two moot questions seem to emerge, neither of which is answered to the full. One is whether social services and underlying policy are, as such, crucial and essential elements of the social order. The second, closely correlated, is how to base such social policies. "We need a theory of social development" (p. 31) is a slogan that some will perhaps underwrite; but from what the sociologist in this author has to say about social change theory (p.8, 13, 20, 23, 29, 64) all the way to such a general theory, is a very long haul. Moreover, unless the indecisive manner in which he deals with social structure (p. 20, 23, 64) could be improved, it also looks like a very difficult exercise. In this perspective, a plea for morality of government (p.55) may be apposite, but is unlikely to be
of much help.

27. Fraser, *o.c.*, p.192, 194, 201.


30. One important dimension of this disorganization is, recognizedly, secularization: "trust the Lord and hobble your camel." To this, social policy is no countervailing but rather a consummating force. Comp. S.H. Gruner, *Economic Materialism and Social Moralism*, A Study in the history of ideas in France from the latter part of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th century. (The Hague Mouton) 1973; O. Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* Cambridge U.P.) 1977.

31. Except in the Dutch case where, largely for reasons of budgetary and political expediency (artists as a depressed group), culture has been brought into the fold of the same ministry (but social affairs and social policy are two ministries!)

32. Comp. V. George and P. Wilding, *Ideology and Social Welfare*, *o.c.*, p. viii: "the central element in [the failure of social policy since 1945 to achieve its stated aims] is the nature of capitalism as a set of values and as an economic system, for the ethic of welfare and the ethic of capitalism are in basic opposition."

33. Fraser, *o.c.* 227f.


35. Fraser, *o.c.*, p.230.
