



ISS DEN HAAG

8 3501 00023 2477

**ISS**

**OCCASIONAL PAPERS**

**Social Development-  
Supplement or Corrective  
to Economic Development?**

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No. 69, March 1979

- Investment in  
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to Economic Development?

What are the implications?

1987

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT - SUPPLEMENT OR CORRECTIVE  
TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT?

C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze

I

The preponderance of the economic approach to development has been achieved and maintained by this approach being embedded in an economic lifestyle. The dominance of economics as a discipline of the social sciences is a direct corollary to the sway of economism as the specifically Western philosophic *végue*. The discipline of economics and the specifically Western perception of public life, or life in general, in terms of economics have become closely interwoven. This has gone to such an extent that many of those concerned have tended to think little of the question whether any and every aspect or sector of life could receive equally adequate attention and equally fair treatment if approached in the manner of economic thinking.

Economism as a way of life has embraced, indeed recast, a number of aspects of human existence which, until its emergence, had been perceived in a different light, if at all. More and more goods and values, objectives and activities have become translated into, and then reduced to, their worth in money. In a sense, this is what the development of the West is all about.

This trend has resulted in magnificent gains as well as grave losses. Had the losses been perceived first, the trend might have slowed down and perhaps been corrected early in the game. As it was, the gains appeared first and enhanced the trend to the point that it became a self-propelling momentum. The losses took more time to be properly identified. The initial inclination, still persistent here and there, is to see them as no more than incidental lags or frictions, to be attended to by means of occasional adjustments. More recently, they are seen to be intrinsic rather than accidental. It is perhaps indicative of the sway of economism that it took the emergence of physical disadvantages, notably pollution and further threatening fall-out from an economically managed technology, to alert people sufficiently for some effective concern to arise. Under the physical threat of extinction by technology's dark side, inappropriately yet effectively dramatized so as to cause some widespread alarm and handsome political pay-off, a measure of willingness has emerged to reconsider the further implications of the prevailing pattern. More significant concern is arising about the manner in which prevailing economic orientations have affected

important sectors or aspects of life. Questions arise whether in order to flourish those sectors should perhaps be perceived and dealt with in a manner more congenial and adequate than can be done when one begins by reducing them to their economically relevant aspects.

For this process of reconsideration to be triggered by a major alarm is perhaps not the best start. Current attempts to identify the central issues are of uneven adequacy and correctness. They are accompanied by a cacophony of false and not-so-false prophets crying out: not in the wilderness but in town. High visibility is also achieved by those who, whilst demanding a new order, hope and pray that the further perfection (i.e. elaboration *cum* correction) of the economic life style may yet prove the proper way to achieve what is now being demanded. Accordingly, they will brazenly speak of a new economic order; at the same time some of them work hard to make it so. Thus, if the economic perception of life is under attack, it is yet being reinvigorated. The outcome is no foregone matter.

Still, as one desirable outcome of the reorientations that appears in order, one may look forward to the emergence of a further clarified economic perception of (the pertinent aspect of) reality. Optimally free from undue accretions of a philosophical or ideological, *a priori* nature, this would stand ready to contribute its share to a really multidisciplinary, perhaps interdisciplinary, effort at understanding reality and behaving in its regard (rather than manipulating it) accordingly. Of course, such an outcome is predicated on other disciplines being a fair match to economics. Therefore, more and better is needed on the part of the other disciplines than 'showing the economists their places'.

These developments are first and foremost occurrences in the rich countries. They are typical of the course taken by the West ever since, having deviated from the Common Human Pattern, it became 'developed'. Indeed one could justifiably wonder whether current developments in the West could be understood as harbingers of a new Common Human Pattern, simultaneously spearheaded by crucial corrections in the Western course and by a newly emergent pattern of Third World Development: the two together making the emergent One World.

Such prospects aside now, one recognizes that the significance of these western reorientations for the Third World is ambiguous. No doubt the relationship of nominal political equality, as between developing and rich countries, is increasingly affecting the web of economic relationships that has been carried over from the proto-One World of late colonialism. Indeed this is one of the factors contributing, directly as well as by devious routes, to the alarms in the West. The signal element is perhaps economic assistance, the ambiguous nature of which is increasingly exposed - with-

out, it seems, much creative drawing of consequences. Considering the matter from this angle one would expect the western attack against economism to be echoed, perhaps reinforced, by what is happening both within the developing countries and between these and the rich countries.

The other face of the coin is that there are at least two factors off-setting such a tendency. First, the very perception of development is economic. This is the one perception with which Western development experts and Western-trained leaders of the Third World can work, now and for some time to come. This may well continue to be the case for some time after their colleagues in the West will have changed their minds. Secondly, and more importantly, the sequence just mentioned, by which the advantages of the economic approach are felt earlier than the disadvantages, seems to apply *mutatis mutandis*, in most of the Third World equally as much as in the rich countries. Those concerned, certainly insofar as they are benefitting or are seeing benefits, would be ill advised to disdain needed immediate advantage on behalf of dim future prospects, the more so as it remains to be seen whether they are inevitable. After all, the fact that the West is now running into these adverse consequences need not mean that in achieving some wealth and material well-being, the others would have to run exactly the same course towards imminent disaster. On these counts, then, there is no reason to expect a rejection, by the Third World, of economism *per se*. Rather one notices a token rejection, mainly referring to some of its visibly adverse implications. Which ones, will depend by and large on culture contact and historical coincidence.

Taking the two counteracting tendencies together, enough concern remains to prompt stirrings in new directions. Here and there, discussions emerge on alternative or supplementary foci of developmental concern. One of these is labelled 'social development'. Terms like this one will usually be introduced in a manner begging the question as to their definition. This has clear disadvantages: but it has advantages as well. Terms that are too precise are seldom attractive or, for that matter, serviceable. Still the attempt at definition cannot be omitted. The purpose of this paper is to undertake not all but part of this attempt. Our first need at this point is to determine which part.

There are mainly three tributaries to the current meaning of 'social', as occurring in the terms 'social development' and 'social development planning'.

The oldest dates back, roughly, to the Industrial Revolution, with its adverse social fall-out from industrial-economic innovation. Its ethical features are perhaps

older than its intellectual ones. No doubt thanks to this lasting charitable orientation it has, in the course of time, not entirely lost sight of the multifaceted nature of that which carries the label 'social'. This is attested in the key manifestations of the tradition based on this perception, including social work, co-operatives, community development and, more recently, social action. Aid became pertinent to 'development', this perception of 'social' has retained this significant feature.

The next, hardly younger, relates to the emergence and growth of the social sciences, particularly sociology and anthropology. Their perceptions of what is 'social', inevitably more discipline-oriented, will determine how they will theorize: if not expressly then implicitly. It is customary these days to describe them, superciliously, as so many ideologies. Such labelling yields little pay-off. Particularly it does not help to determine what 'social' means to social scientists.

The third is recent. It relates to the disenchantment, just noted, with exclusively or predominantly economic interpretations of reality and concomitant policy-making. It occurs in rich as well as in developing countries; for present purposes, the latter setting is the more interesting one. Critically and to an extent negatively inspired, it risks culminating, for all practical purposes, in setting up an altar to the Unknown God, whose names are Non-economic,<sup>1</sup> Non-market, Non-productive, and, by the latest fad, Informal Sector. Upon closer inspection, the critical impulse does no more than phrase the lead question. What matters is which are the answers offered to this question, no doubt by making use of available clues.

It is proposed, for present purposes, to single out only one of these three approaches, namely, the third: the upsurge of interest in 'social development' in the aftermath of a period of unchallenged predominance of 'economic development', and also in reaction to the effects of this predominance. In the wave of criticisms addressed to 'economic development', one of the terms used to suggest alternatives is 'social'. The one thing that is clear off-hand is that 'social' equals 'non-economic'. Beyond that, what does it mean?

Challenged by a question like this, some wise people will tell you they know the answer and then proceed to give you a sermon. For them, we have no time here. It is more fitting to assume that the question may lead into largely uncharted territory, and to proceed with appropriate circumspection. This means, quite simply, to begin taking the critics, the real prompters of the suggestion that 'social development' deserves looking into, and thus of the query as to what it means, by their word. It is entirely reasonable that their critique, if and insofar as it is spelled out as it should



be, will contain preliminary information, in the form of identifiable, significant pointers.

Obviously, using these clues is no more than the beginning of the exercise that is required; but it is a step not to be skipped. From there onwards, the going may well become harder.

In undertaking this exercise, one looks for appropriate reference material. This will easily cause surprises. Not merely will any sample of the literature be a random sample inasmuch as the investigator's luck and perseverance in spotting materials are at play. In addition, it seems, there are other randomizing factors at work. This is subject matter that, in being more fashionable or less, will or will not attract the interest of particular networks of scholars and practitioners. By the same token it will be variably high or low on the investment plans for institutional production of reports, whether based on research or on something else. Speaking of organizations, moreover, it is a known fact that in the merry-go-round of international organizations, there is no predicting who will write about what, nor is it always evident why. Big names may adorn small topics, and weighty topics will be presented over the signatures of persons who may, for all one knows, be experts on the strength of some incidental official capacity rather than the other way round. This indeed is where some good minds can make a name for themselves if not doomed to anonymity. But this is, above all, where one must judge quality regardless of author's name: a tricky exercise not always cherished in academia. Of the reference material selected for use here, I do not claim that it is of even top quality and that therefore all of it must be considered as highly authoritative. My simple contention is that it is relevant to present purposes.

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## II

Using an intriguingly circumspect phrasing, J. Pajestka has stated that the predominant economic analysis of development is 'in no way unshakable'.<sup>2</sup> He postulates that,

since the human factor is of decisive importance for increasing the economic efficiency of each society, it is right that the transformation of man, of his behaviour, and of his socio-productive features (*sic*) - should become the point of concentration of any development strategy.

This, then, also

opens the possibility of harmonizing social and economic development objectives,

Expressing much the same in a different vein, W. Brand states that 'economic growth has no aim in itself'.

More outspoken, N. Erder - and the meeting which he has prepared reports on - criticizes the economic approach for a narrowness which disregards the basic fact that the social system is an integrated unity. To Erder, as to many others, this critique provides the jumping board for concern with social development.

Given this concern as the overriding motive, it is perhaps understandable that not much effort is made to be fully specific about what went wrong in applying the economic approach. An ECAFE working party and expert group, in 1970, simply took note of this kind of critique, in passing, as they worked their way into considering social development:

(...) it would be both erroneous and futile to place all the blame for past neglect of social factors in planning and development on the heads of the economists: many proponents of social development (...) had a tendency to criticize economic planners for neglecting social factors in development without themselves being able to indicate in concrete terms how such factors could be effectively accounted for in policymaking and planning.<sup>5</sup>

To the non-economist it is striking that critique of this kind, regardless whether voiced by economists or others, refers to the economic interpretation and handling of development as if it were one integral concern. Were a similar critique addressed to a discipline like sociology or political science, one would expect evidence of some - perhaps mutual - recrimination as between schools or factions. Upon

reflection, there is no reason to assume economics to be immune from such strife. Just think of the difference in style between econometrics and institutional economics. This might conceivably reflect in significantly different ways of perceiving and handling development; hence in different ways of criticizing economists' dealings with, say, development if these should prove to be unsatisfactory; and eventually in outright disagreement and debate. If such a debate has occurred, it has escaped this writer's attention. One would have liked to study it, inasmuch as it might provide pointers to the different ways of envisaging what is 'social', ensuing from the various ways in which economists will deal with 'economic development', and the critique thereof.

What remains possible is to set out from the critique of the economic approach, categorically, as a source of clues towards defining a potential 'social' alternative. Two procedures seem available. One follows from condemning the economic approach because it is found to be too narrow, insulated or segmentary. In the words of M. Holt,

(...) the economist, in order to increase the sophistication and integrity of his theories, has made assumptions about certain sociological, political, and psychological factors, and these assumptions constitute parameters of his theory. While these assumptions may aid the development of economic theory, they tend to hinder the establishment of firm theoretical relationships between economics and other social sciences.<sup>6</sup>

The natural alternative, then, is the fullness of reality, which some will not hesitate to label 'social'.

The other procedure responds to the rejection of the economic approach on account of its alleged inability to deliver the goods, and it consists of subsequently looking for a remedial, supplementing or competing approach, then called 'social', regardless of whether it be equally segmentary and narrow or not. This is a stance occasionally adopted by economists who, whether in irritation or desperation, will be tempted to shift the burden to others, for example the sociologists. In the conference report just quoted, K. de Schweinitz adopts an interestingly careful position in this regard,

(...) there is certainly a kernel of truth in the notion that responsibility for explaining how the mechanics of development, so copiously described by economists, are to be set in motion now rests with the sister disciplines. Let me acknowledge immediately that this statement is unfair.<sup>7</sup>

He then returns to his original position, about the limits

of economics, and how to overcome them by broadening one's scope. He does not elaborate on the concomitant problem he has recognized. If an issue is originally conceived in terms of economics and handled, up to a point, by economists, then to be referred perhaps to the sociologists for further attention, these will be at a loss, simply because the issue stands in terms of economics not sociology.

It is somewhat disquieting to note that the current acceptance of the term 'social' does not militate against its being used indifferently in either way, in clearly different meanings, according to which of the two procedures will be adopted. The crucial question, either way, remains how, in the absence of effective clues, to go about determining the precise meaning of 'social'.

Note, in passing, that as between the two options listed, there exists the usual third possibility; namely, first to move from economic segment to comprehensive fullness and then in a sudden turn-about, to take the social aspect as the preferred *pars pro toto* for this totality. The circumstance that this third way is logically less tidy need not mean that nobody will find it attractive.

All told, our first preliminary step is not particularly instructive. We shall have occasion though, to point out the importance of the difference between the segmentary and comprehensive meanings of 'social'.

### III

Let it be true, then, that out of the critique of the economic perspective emerges a glimpse of a social one. Then, the next matter to be investigated, always in the search for clues as to the nature of the 'social', is the relationship between 'economic' as an established and 'social' as an emerging category. For starters, we select testimony from two economists. Pajestka, already quoted, has this to say:

Economic factors are powerfully influenced by social considerations; they also have weighty social consequences. Therefore, the development process must be viewed as a process in which *progress results from changes in man's behaviour*. And because it is a social phenomenon, conditioned by interhuman relations and by socio-economic institutions, the development process must be seen in a special light and certain factors must be taken into account in working out a strategy for development. Thus, such a strategy must reckon with *social development forces, social development objectives, social and institutional solutions likely to contribute to economic efficiency*. To put it more precisely, *these social aspects must constitute the absolutely indispensable, integral element of any economic development strategy*.<sup>8</sup>

Myrdal, in the introduction to his second *magnum opus*, uses a less policy-oriented, more discipline-oriented approach. Having noted, not without pride, that

Economists have always been the cavalry of the social sciences (*and to them*) belongs the credit for spearheading the attack on the dynamic problems of underdevelopment, development and planning for development,

he argues that there is a need

for a fundamental change in approach. (...) there is room for more interdisciplinary research, and we should welcome efforts by sociologists and others to improve our system of theories and concepts.<sup>9</sup>

But his main hope remains for economists to remodel their own framework in an institutional direction. All the while, his interest is in an alternative theory of development.

Different as they sound, these two economists have im-

portant ideas in common; and it seems safe to say that they share them with many others. They set out from today's economics, however assailed, and they hope to contribute to to-morrow's improved and enriched economics. From the former to the latter, there is a sequence of steps. The triggering factor is critique of established economics, ensuing from, as well as leading to, concern for the social or human<sup>10</sup> aspects of reality - particularly inasmuch as these condition economic understanding and policy-making.

Note, in parenthesis, that in this phrasing, the term 'human' is roughly equivalent to 'social'; it is simply of more recent vintage. If a special significance is to be attributed to the addition of 'human', it may be that explicit attention is asked for the individual person. As first introduced, it could not yet reflect the subsequently emerged drive for fundamental human rights; but the link is readily available.

The decisive act is to account for the human and social realities: in what remains, in the last resort, an economics framework. One senses in all this an element of nostalgia. It reminds of the old days when economics was the one universal social science: an ideal that has, intriguingly, recurred in sociology when it first came into its own!<sup>12</sup> The question is, of course, whether present circumstances warrant recourse to this ideal as an effective remedy to difficulties encountered. There is the more cause for doubt as neither Pajestka's oblique reference to integration<sup>13</sup> nor Myrdal's plea in favour of institutional economics could be conclusive proof of the adequacy of emendated economics with respect to all the problems it is supposed to handle.

Such questions apart now, basic to this line of reasoning is the claim, on the part of many economists, as to the primacy of economics as a social science. To them, it is *the* social science. Many if not most economists appear to believe it but, as Myrdal reminds his readers, others do as well - and those not merely politicians. Besides, if matching claims on behalf of other social sciences could be said to exist, they are by no means equally emphatic, let alone successful.

The explanation of this claim cannot be just the scholar's identification with his discipline: there must be more. part of this may rest in the idea of a universal social science just referred to. This could conceivably be a matter of principle but it could equally well be seen as a matter of historical coincidence: taking off from philosophy, it was a new overture into a newly perceived universe. Either way, the perception will relate back to prior conditions when the distinction between normative and purely cognitive considerations was less marked.

More interesting for present purposes is the question whether the primacy claim for economics as a discipline must be taken to be paralleled, indeed supported, by a claim of primacy of things economic over things social. Does economic reality have primacy over social reality? Does economic action with regard to reality have primacy over social action? As every child knows, there exist two standpoints. One affirms the thesis that one sector or aspect of reality is pragmatically more important for people's lives - not just in particular given circumstances but categorically - than the others. The other standpoint will recognize that aspects being aspects, and the reality of which they are aspects being what really matters, the issue of primacy could hardly arise as a matter of principle, even though cases of apparent primacy may occur as a matter of historical coincidence.

Before entering into the discussion of these two positions, it should not be forgotten that both obviously assume reality to come in sectors or aspects. Now this perception of reality is demonstrably a peculiarity of post-medieval Western civilization. The selection or identification of any distinct sector or aspect for the purpose of making it feature in a position of primacy is only conceivable as a sequel to prior segmentation of reality: primarily conceptual and then perhaps *de facto*. By the same token it is obvious that there is no reason why just one particular aspect or segment should qualify for primacy. The ascription of primacy must needs follow criteria, whether explicit or latent. Indeed it is worth recalling that in the West, once the segmentation of reality had set in, the initial urge has been to single out religion for the primacy position. This, obviously, was the way to continue to play the old game, though by new rules. Largely due to progressing secularization, eventually other aspects of reality have come to hold primacy: such as the economic one.

The standpoint categorically affirming the primacy thesis, as instanced, e.g. in the assertion of the primacy of things economic, will entail resort to action aiming at sectorial, say economic, issues. However, neither the action nor the issues will remain defined for any length of time in exclusively and strictly economic terms. The back-up needed to effectuate this standpoint will irresistibly induce such broadening-out. Besides, it may elicit confirmation of a different kind, for example in ideological terms - witness the case of Marxism. The other standpoint, more analytic and with less ideological inclinations, will have to account in its own way for the need to ensure that action be concentrated, in order that it be effective. In other words, it is far

from immune against aspect-wise or sectorial concentration and limitation. Between the two standpoints, then, more convergence is likely in practice than could appear warranted in theory. As the narrow one tends to broaden, the broad one tends to narrow.

The same can be shown in yet another manner. Primacy accorded to any aspect or sector is never definitive. The inherently occasional nature - *a fortiori*, arbitrariness - of the ascription is something that no amount of legitimation, ideological or otherwise, will obliterate.

This non-definitive character will show in one of two ways. One is that in the course of time the singling out of one aspect will prove to entail, or to be unable to prevent, the re-emergence of some other aspect or aspects, as residual issues of what then turns out to be a problematic nature. These will, with increasing urgency, demand attention in their own right. This is the variant of the problematic counterpoint. The other is the variant of expansiveness unlimited. It shows in a relentless urge, indeed need, to broaden the scope of the aspect or segment that holds primacy, so as to absorb, one way or another, any further aspect or segment incidentally emerging from the obscurity that is the likely fate of any aspects not accorded primacy.

As a result of this bifurcation, the practice of primacy attributed to any sector or aspect will vary considerably. In other words, the apparently innocent question as to the primacy of things economic leads into deep waters. Curiously, publications on development do not always reflect this state of affairs. Quite a few appear to move within a general parameter of much more limited purport, that one can construe, in *ad hoc* fashion, out of two combined options. The first is, either the economic and the social are in balance (meaning, no effective primacy), or they are not (meaning, primacy for either). In case they are not, the second option is a chicken and egg problem: which is the means and which is the end?

Returning to Pajestka's essay for a moment, he opts confidently for balance or harmony on the former of these two options, but not with such force that he would feel exempted from considering the latter. On this, he seems to keep his options open. At one time he states a preference for an appreciation of matters social and behavioural as means towards economic goals. The italicized parts of the quote, above, offer conclusive evidence,<sup>14</sup> and this may well be the way he leans in the last resort. But elsewhere in the same essay, in discussing 'the structural development of production', he mentions 'social effects'. More explicitly, one of his concluding theses is that

the long-term objective of a development policy should be to achieve greater social justice.<sup>15</sup>

The perspective in which the latter quote is to be read ap-



pears as follows, -

(...) social justice must preside over the distribution of the benefits resulting from a development strategy (...). In the context of a General development strategy, social justice is indeed an indispensable condition (*sic*); it is not, however, a sufficient condition for imparting dynamism to socio-economic development. (...) does greater social justice contribute to an increase of economic efficiency or does it impede it?<sup>16</sup>

The author does not seem to wish to come down definitely on either side of the fence, notwithstanding an apparent preference. This may be due to considerations relating to 'other changes and reforms which have not been discussed', of the nature of 'political and institutional reforms' (*ibid.*); linking up, no doubt, with his thesis on 'progressive social forces'.<sup>17</sup> If so, the essay does not tell the author's whole story - a not unusual feature of essays. On the other hand it may also be due to a more profoundly intellectual problem, already noted. Singling out the economic side of development clearly results in neglected sides eventually emerging as residual, and *ipso facto* problematic, issues. Pajestka notices the social emerging in this way, and embraces it in a corrective effort. But he cannot really afford to single out the social at the expense of the economic lest the economic, or yet some other aspect, pop up as the next residual problem. Nor does the balance or equilibrium interpretation yield much satisfaction beyond the verbal level.

Not everybody is so even-handed and diplomatic; and for the sake of scholarly debate that may be just as well. But in one respect at least Pajestka's stand is typical of that of most. Even when avoiding coming down firmly in favour of primacy of things economic versus things social, or vice versa, he has no way of spelling out their equilibrium in such a manner that he would be absolved from considering the means-ends relationship as between the two, once he tries to come to grips with the policy implications of his theoretical stand. There is occasion to wonder whether, when the chips are down, the same does not hold true of the famous 1961 *U.N. Report on the World Social Situation*, generally known as the one that launched the fashion of balanced economic development.<sup>18</sup> A tell-tale phrase is the following,

while it is theoretically not possible to state what levels of development in the various social components *should* go with given levels of economic development, it is quite possible to state what levels do go with given economic levels. (p. 104)

Even more subtly, the same view seems to be upheld by

G. Zappa, in a paper for the Expert Group meeting in Dubrovnik that preceded the Kallvik Seminar,

There is no economic planning without social planning and vice versa, and (...) any distinction between them must be based not on a supposed difference in the matter on which action is taken, but only in a different operational criterion, economic planning referring to the field where production enterprises already operate, whereas social planning applies to the sphere where these do not find sufficient stimulus or opportunities (...) Planning as such (...) allow(s) no distinction between 'economic' and 'social'.<sup>19</sup>

Still in the same vein as the *Report*, the 1970 meetings of the ECAFE Working Party and Expert Group, already quoted, referred to the relations between economic and social with terms like 'unified' and 'integrated', that meanwhile have become standard verbiage; indeed the stress was on 'the closeness of interrelations.'<sup>20</sup>

Turning now to those who envisage the economic and the social as not being in balance, I propose that we abstain from harping any further on the theme of primacy of economics. No real purpose would be served by expanding the exercise so as to include a warming-over of the Marxian approach or, for that matter, of alternative approaches such as McClelland's<sup>21</sup> and Hagen's.<sup>22</sup> The effort of the latter is to identify, in the social or psychological orbits, leverage points towards the achievement of what remain essentially economic development goals.

We may quote at least one more example, out of many standing in the same tradition. J.H. Kunkel feels that,

Students of economic development have long recognized that industrialization cannot be separated from changes in the other facets of social life (...) In development analysis, the relevant questions center on the characteristics of industrialization, the operation of social prerequisites and concomitants, the role of economic and psychological factors, and the conditions under which particular combinations of elements are likely to result in social change or stagnation.

His somewhat astounding terminological ecumenism acts as a veil, which is however lifted in the statement that,

the major problem of economic development is not the alteration of character, values or attitudes, but the *change of those selected aspects of man's social environment which are relevant to the learning of new behaviour patterns.*<sup>23</sup>

In expanding his behaviourist approach into the realms of a structural and systems analysis, the author attempts to achieve, in a not unusual fashion, some disciplinary ecumenism in which such realities as are introduced will feature as illustrations of general abstractions or abstract generalities. The thesis that behaviour is a matter of the individual's learning history (p. 37) is an interesting device to support the basic specificity of the generalities advanced; unfortunately it cannot protect these generalities from being inherently Western-ethnocentric. Besides, the proposal (p. 134) to study behaviour patterns, whether detrimental or supportive to development, including their determinants, in a search for ways to eliminate the detrimental ones, sounds somewhat academic.

There are also instances of the obverse construct. Particularly useful is the set of UNRISD documents by N. Erder already referred to, consisting of a preparatory paper for a seminar and the report of the same seminar.<sup>24</sup> In keeping with an overriding concern with planning, his terminology differs somewhat from that of illustrations used thus far. Negatively phrased, the point of issue is the critique, indeed rejection, of what is called the narrow economic approach. This narrowness is repeatedly blamed for the failure to integrate social factors (pp. 4, 18, 73). Note that in discussions on broad versus narrow, it is often difficult to determine whether they take off from a concern with economic versus social aspects or sectors of reality, with economic versus social action, or perhaps even with economics versus more specifically social science. Positively phrased, the same point of issue appears in assertions to the effect that the social system is integrated and a unity.<sup>25</sup> The terminology link between these two phrasings is broadening'. Clearly, claims as to broadness relate to claims as to primacy and comprehensiveness. In a way the former are a toned-down variant of the latter. But regardless of their precise object, they risk remaining bogged down at a purely verbal level. Thus,

Social Planning covers a far wider and more complex field than economic planning. In the latter, the individual enters the picture only in an arbitrarily simplified way (...)  
economists are the first to admit that (...)  
economic theory does not explain even approximately the phenomena of economic growth.<sup>26</sup>

The idea of broadening is typical of a view that first identifies with economics and then will consider things social. It seems, however, to appear in various meanings. Erder favours the idea that development is fundamentally broader than what is subsumed under economic development.

But he appears to have encountered problems in spelling out the implications of this standpoint. Indeed he seems ready to adopt a more gradualist stance for practical purposes, in the sense that a cognitive-cum-planning effort to embrace the social could be undertaken by means of systematic if circumspect expansion of the economic (p. 3). In other words, he proposes additions to the range of (quantified) variables used in economic planning models. This, especially the quantification elements, is also the thesis, and the Achilles heel, of the social accounting 'school' of B.M. Gross and others.<sup>27</sup> It is again central to UNRISD's Levels of Living effort.<sup>28</sup> There can be little doubt that the meeting on which Erder reports was an occasion for UNRISD to promote the concept of Levels of Living, both for use and elaboration. However, the meeting did not go along with Erder's suggestion to broaden out gradually starting off from a basis in economics. It left undecided the question in which way, then, 'development' is broader than 'economic development' and how, accordingly, the desired broadening (pp. 7, 10, 30) must be done. It does not help, in this connection, to realize that it is never the totality of social process that is subject to planning (p. 17).

The interesting achievement of Erder and of the seminar he reports on is that they have reversed the perspective, using things social as a vantage point to consider things economic.<sup>29</sup> It is in this new perspective that the possibility arises to state that social development is not a residual category.<sup>30</sup> It is not what is left after economists have done their thing. It is a category in its own right, on a par with the economic one and perhaps a few others. Having reached this point, and avoiding the temptations of balance and integration, the argument proceeds to broach the chicken-and-egg problem also faced by Pajestka. While it refrains from deciding the issue (but betrays some preference for economic goals and social means), the *Report* does purport to take a decisive stand.

All final aims are essentially social. All economic targets are essentially means. But not all means are economic and not all social aims are final.<sup>31</sup>

This standpoint, as phrased in the first two sentences of the quote, echoes throughout the *Report*, especially in the recurrent discussion on objectives of development planning.<sup>32</sup> It is reinforced by the thesis that final aims must determine intermediate ones.<sup>33</sup>

Perhaps the most characteristic representation of this standpoint in terms of fully practical concerns can be found in the recurrent references to (non-consumption) welfare effects (pp. 50, 59). However, the third and last sentence of the quote tends to render the choice

rather less decisive than it first appears; an even more complete obverse of Pajestka's position is the result. There are at least three instances of this.

A clear concession to the 'economic goals - social means' construct is the suggestion that rather than up-setting economic development planning by the introduction of too many social concerns, the social concerns could be employed as means to evaluate the effect of economic development policies. Its implications, however, are not spelled out.<sup>34</sup> A similar attempt, but one where the economic and the social feature in a random configuration rather than in an evaluative confrontation, shows in the suggestion to phase planning in such a way that economic objectives take precedence and social ones follow later (clearly in the assumption that there must be an economic base to meet expenditures incurred in social activities). This again is an idea ventilated but not completed during the discussions (p. 41f).

The second manner in which the thesis that the final aims of development are social rather than economic is retracted to an extent, is the admission - if that is what it is - that the distinction between economic and social is a transitional matter; in other words a temporary corrective to narrow economism (pp.10, 31, 34, 66). In more or less the same vein, the term complementarity is introduced (*e.g.* pp.41, 59) to show interdependence between the requirements of the productive system (as representative of the economic approach) and those of social needs satisfaction (standing for the social approach). Again, the thought was left unfinished. It will be clear that between the concepts of balance and integration and these concepts of transition and complementarity there is not much to choose: certainly not as long as none of them is spelled out for its practical implications.

Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, there is the recognition that besides social aims there may also be social means (p. 64) or, in different phrasing, that besides final social aims there may also be intermediate ones (p. 13). There is repeated reference, in this connection, to anticipation of any social problems ensuing from economic development policies, in order to minimize social cost (pp.30, 70), and to the introduction of social variables, of the human resource type, into economic analysis (pp. 4, 28, 59).

There are, of course, perceptions of the relationship between things economic and things social that will not fit so easily in the analytic frame that we have adopted to facilitate our reconnoitring. By way of conclusion to this section, two more instances may be referred to, one accentuating differences, the other relationships.

A rather curious listing of opinions on the difference between the social and the economic occurs in the summing-up of the 1963 Dubrovnik expert group.<sup>35</sup> Four approaches are listed. According to one,

social planning differs from more specifically economic planning primarily in the character of the norms to which it is related. (...) Another approach (...) would distinguish social and economic objectives by beginning at the level of the individual and the household (...). [The] third approach treats problems of social policy as concerned in the first instance with the distribution of national income. [A fourth] emphasizes the territorial character of social planning,

and differentiates between national, regional and local levels.

With so much preoccupation with the difference between the two, their interconnectedness often receives little more than verbal recognition - regardless of the fact that once the distinction is accepted, here lies the moot issue. One standpoint that has at least the virtue of stolid realism occurs in another UN secretariat document. It points to the role of the state as the one that takes responsibility for both economic and social policies. It is no doubt against the background of this hard fact of life that the author could afford to state,

While, in general, economic and social factors support each other, this should not be exaggerated or over-simplified. Not all economic advance will provide commensurate social benefit. Not all social expenditures will be of economic benefit.<sup>36</sup>

#### IV

It is time to summarize the impressions gained by inspecting our two preliminary moves, namely envisaging the implications for the meaning of 'social' arising from (1) the critique of the all-economic approach to development, and (2) statements, ensuing from this critique, about the relationship between 'economic' and 'social'.

Neither move appears very helpful. The theoretical critique of the economic approach to development is, on the whole, less incisive and enlightening than the run-of-the-mill criticisms any one school of economics will on any occasion address to the next. The operational critique, in voicing disappointment with results achieved, is inconclusive whenever it judges in terms of indefinite and unspecified expectations. Neither way is a firm base established towards ascertaining the meaning and the significance of non-economic approaches, including the social one.

For this state of affairs, economists are to be blamed no more than any others - and no less, either. There is no reason to doubt that the natural inertia<sup>37</sup> of economics as a mature discipline, perhaps rather than the entirely human self-interest of the economic profession, could be an obstacle. Upon closer inspection, however, a major cause of trouble appears to reside in a coincidence: one that makes little sense and which cannot be put to much use. It occurs between a logical - if you prefer, methodological - idea and a historical complex.

The logical idea is a device to account for the plurality of sciences, more especially of social sciences. In simplest rendition, it says that each discipline envisages its particular aspect or segment of reality. For all its simplicity, this idea is hard to translate into effective harmonization of sciences, whether as between science and humanities<sup>38</sup> or as between any of the social sciences. The reasons are historical and factual. This is where the historical complex enters the scene. The emergence and establishment of sciences and disciplines represents in no way a balanced multiplicity of aspect-wise approaches. Most disciplines have started off on incidental issues, and have only subsequently bothered to stake claims to a slice of reality as their proper domain.<sup>39</sup> In addressing issues, moreover, particularly social scientists have often omitted to determine at the outset what was general and universal and what was time-and-place-conditioned. Hence, the disconcerting fact that especially the social sciences are historically ill-matched: in terms of focus, of basic conceptualization and of goals. All our craving for interdisciplinarity and integration is bound to remain so much utopia for so long as, in order to promote it, we have to move against a major historical current with no better foothold than one relatively flimsy idea.

With expectations thus lowered, we can now consider some attempts to identify the meaning of 'social', emerging from a broad developmental concern which, though initially economistic, is currently in a phase of re-orientation. First we return to some of the sources already used.

Pajestka proves a less than eager guide for this stretch of the road. He limits himself to two broad hints. One is a listing of agricultural health, educational and cultural needs, vocational training and housing.<sup>40</sup> The second is his belief that greater social justice will be achieved by a general development policy with 'structural, economic, institutional and other components', including integration.

Economically, the importance of social integration indeed deserves special attention if successful development is to be achieved.<sup>41</sup>

This 'social integration (...) brings with it a more stable social equilibrium', but is otherwise treated as virtually synonymous with national integration (p. 117). So far as most developing countries are concerned, this is preaching to the converted. The real question, which we have already broached above, is what national integration, interpreted as social integration, could really mean, whether as a means towards or as an objective of development. This is not specified by Dr Pajestka.

Some sociologists appear more ready to meet this challenge. Thus, integration is a central concept in Parsons's presentation of society.<sup>42</sup> Shills, Parsons's one-time collaborator, presents a view according to which, for all practical purposes, 'integration' is the operational (not to say, functional) concept truly matching 'society' as a qualitative (not to say, structural) concept.<sup>43</sup> R.T. Holt, already quoted, finds that in trying to apply the Parsonian constructs to development situations, he has to modify them if they are to suit his desire to describe the adjustment of a developing society to its environment.<sup>44</sup>

The 1970 ECAFE Working Party and Expert Group meetings, having avoided excessive concern with the problems of the economic approach, also steered clear of entrenchment in dogmatic social stances.

(...) the accurate identification of social problems and needs (...) had been retarded by a widespread disposition to view social development as essentially coterminous with the development of public and voluntary social services.

(...) another important weakness (...) was the (...) disposition of planning authorities to interpret social planning strictly in conventional sectoral terms.



In another respect, again, the meetings came out with viewpoints that have only later received support, specifically a critique of a tendency amongst (in this case Asian) planners and policy makers to think of development in their own countries as an extension of that which took place in western countries during the 19th century.<sup>45</sup> The prevailing tone of common sense lends credibility to their listing of social development issues,

(...) additional to the field of social services (...): population growth and movement; regional, rural/urban and industrial/agricultural development; distribution of income, wealth, goods, services, and other developmental benefits; mobilization of development resources - material and financial, as well as human; popular participation in development; public administration; motivational and attitudinal change; and negative effects of development, such as environmental pollution.

and allocation of priorities,

(i) the promotion of institutional and social structural change, (ii) the raising of levels of living (...), (iii) the purposeful treatment of known or anticipated social problems arising in other sectors of development, (iv) the prevention of socially undesirable consequences of economic growth.<sup>46</sup>

As is perhaps typical of any collective effort, an attempt is being made here to avoid any unwarranted narrowness of approach, by gross-listing any aspects or items it may take to achieve comprehensiveness. Even the subsequent concentration induced by the priorities will not prevent questions arising about practicability. These are difficult to handle. If non-economic means nothing but 'comprehensive', a bad problem may have been superseded by a worse one.

The difficulty of identifying the substance of social development (and social development planning) is emphatically recognized in Erder's *Report*.<sup>47</sup> Here once again, what with the final aim of development perceived as social, 'social' appears as broad and general, not narrow or specific. It is illustrative that planning is said to be the creation (doubtlessly meaning promotion) of social change in a desired direction, with the debatable addition that it is therefore normative. This is said to be so on two accounts, namely inasmuch as there is (1) dissatisfaction with the status quo and (2) a choice of objectives.

By the same token, it is bound to elude attempts at general, *a priori* definition. The prevailing political and other conditions of a specific situation, as well as the achieved level of development, are parameters in both regards. They cause variation from case to case; they may also prove to be a built-in conservative element.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, the analysis of development is said to relate to structures, institutions and values and attitudes.<sup>49</sup>

The position taken up in the *Report* has thus two characteristics, namely (1) a readiness to see 'social' as broad if not comprehensive, and (2) the implicit recognition that spelling it out is possible only with explicit reference to a given, specific development situation. Between the horns of this dilemma, the natural concern must be to avoid being trapped in vagueness. The *Report* uses two different ways to meet this need, namely the introduction of a central idea and - very different approach - enumeration.

The central notion is 'the conditions under which people live'. At the verbal level this sounds attractive, as it seems to link conceptual generality with actual, situated-and-dated specificity.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, it appears readily amenable to elaboration in various directions, perhaps straddling the fence between academic concerns and institutionalized public policies. The link with the Levels of Living concept is too obvious to need special mention. Further links are established: with need satisfaction and also with improved relations between individuals and groups.<sup>51</sup> That done, the matter rests.

The enumerative approach appears in two variants. One, sophisticated but somewhat disappointing for purposes of general discussion, is to provide the conceptual means towards specific identification and enumeration in any concrete situation. The suggestion to use a two-step procedure for identification of 'social' is certainly not a case of bashfulness or of beating around the bush. It is a positive contribution, also in view of the fact that in a report like this one is necessarily limited to the first step, i.e. providing general clues. One such clue is given in the suggestion to anticipate emergent social problems; another is the concept of target groups.<sup>52</sup> In a way this approach is somewhat better than its alternative, the gross-list as encountered in Pajestka.

The *Report* contains many references to such historically and institutionally grown listings. Examples include, (1) structures (stratification, mobility), institutions (patterns of relationships between individuals and groups) and values affecting attitudes and behaviour (motivation towards work, consumption, etc.); (2) reconsidering administrative machinery, introducing change at local level, land reform, population policies: all of

them new social variables to be introduced into planning (p. 29); (3) education, housing, food consumption and nutrition, employment and work conditions, social security, social services, social defence: all of them established social fields or sectors and as such institutionalized in government machineries (p. 31).<sup>54</sup>

Note, in parenthesis, that the Levels of Living approach, to be discussed below, could be seen as an attempt to join the two alternatives of enumeration. It improves upon the former in that it pushes anticipation forward into tentative identification, though within limits, and upon the latter by the effort to systematize. Quantification, already referred to, is one element here; operationalization is the other.<sup>55</sup>

Two more samples will bring our reconnoitring to the point where this section can be concluded with some tentative findings. One comes from sociology; the other is economically inspired.

A little-known essay by K.H. Hoerning, on what he calls secondary modernization (a term he prefers to development) is directly pertinent. Referring to the critique of the usual assumption that the West is the paradigm of Third World development, and at the same time sharpening it, the author feels, with regard to

Today's developmental situation or (...) secondary modernization, [that] the contemporary world confronting developing societies today is very different from the primary, western modernization more than a century ago.

He defines development as 'goal-directed societal change'.<sup>56</sup> The term 'economism' gives his assessment of the mainstream economic approach to development; in the same phrase he rejects 'pragmatic instrumentalism, functionalistic evolutionism (...) ethno- and temporocentrism'. The terms convey disgust. All this is, perhaps, the privilege of the non-economist; but he does not spare mainstream sociology either. Under the label 'system-evolutionists', he particularly attacks modernization theory (for its base in the comparative statics of the dualism of traditional and modern, its hidden Western ethnocentrism, and its operational uselessness), as well as the theory of structural differentiation with accompanying - indeed legitimizing - integration (for its assumptions of interdependency, stable equilibrium and unidimensionality in development). At best, he feels, such theories can yield indicators of levels of complexity and serve purposes of description or perhaps classification.

By universalizing 'modernity' to an invariant social structural phenomenon it becomes, by means of tautological deductions (e.g., by

reification of the 'prerequisites' or of 'obstacles' to modernization), a *doctrina perennis* with normative elements.<sup>57</sup>

Social modernization, to Hoerner, is guided social change. Its parameter is at once intrasocietal and intersocietal: a recognition not found equally explicit in the other sources quoted.

Social modernization may (...) be defined as the process in which a national society [*sic*], more or less the national elite(s), perceive(s) deprivation in the status of social modernity relative to specific other societies and acts successfully, by means of adaptation of social structure and process, to reduce the degree of deprivation and to approximate equality or similarity in certain social aspects with these reference societies. 'Social modernization' is then a process which is manifested in social changes but whose focus is on societal strategies and implementations toward societal transformations.<sup>58</sup>

Its thrust is determined by perceived deprivation in the status of social modernity: a hazardous statement inasmuch as it risks circular definition. For our purpose it means that Hoerner will define 'social' implicitly rather than explicitly, namely in trying to spell out the meaning of its modernization - an inevitable if uneasy procedure. Its features are identified as follows,

The structural qualities of modernizing societies have to be constantly related to and interpreted in the light of possible, multiple simultaneous modernities, that is in the light of the different modernity goals, references and strategies for different purposes at any one time. With regard then to this definition of modernization many of the usually enumerated socio-cultural factors can be only applied as secondary indices of modernization, shaped by the more meaningful orientational and actional indices of social modernization; the former gain modernity significance in the particular usage contexts of self-evaluation and goal-seeking.<sup>59</sup>

But he explicitly states what he considers most important to study, namely '(1) the inter- and intra-societal power and communication structures and networks, and (2) the modernization goals and strategies' which, as he puts it, 'serve simultaneously as aspired goal patterns and as

an instrument of modernization'.<sup>60</sup>

Throughout the essay, society is identified with the nation-state: a customary yet by no means self-evident delimitation of the 'social' as an optimal unit. Development goals are said to be neither fully known nor compulsorily pre-established in the Western model. Developmental procedures may thus include adoption, to a degree not determined in advance, alongside with other efforts. Likewise, the given features of a society play no less of a determining role than the way in which they are marshalled. With respect to goals the role of elites, notably national political elites - including the power they bring to bear upon modernization - is crucial. This in its turn evokes the significance of social structures, dual or otherwise, in which these elites function: in interaction with, for example, a middle class, bureaucrats, and/or intellectuals. A helpful rider here is that stratification is seen to play intrasocietally as well as intersocietally. The same is true of modernization interests and values, norms and goals. Their relevance and significance are perceived in either perspective, and not necessarily the same way in each case. Besides, there is interplay between traditional and modern elements of society. A listing of pertinent considerations is offered, including national unity and autonomy, industrialization, urbanization, population control, social equalization.

Studies about influence and communication, power, leadership, and conformity reveal that societal change is not only a matter of cultural consistency or inconsistency but also (...) of social structures of various types and levels; these structures reflect the norms, pressures, and processes, in and between groups, elites, communities, organizations, institutions and societies. The relevant dimensions of these social units may include: (1) the structure of power and influence; (2) the extent and nature of social contact and communication within the units and between units and subunits; and (3) social and other cleavages based upon characteristics of various distinctions and interests.<sup>61</sup>

This rather lengthy summary of Hoerning's argument will serve to show that he suggests a very broad meaning of 'social' and that he has little inclination to limit it, whether vis-à-vis other sectors or otherwise. The attempt to determine key elements remains subsidiary and inconclusive, as if this were not really what matters.

By way of a second sample, a few more words now about the effort by certain economists to broaden the scope of their activities in such a manner as to embrace,

in gradually expanding fashion, things social. The work I am referring to, by J. Drewnowski, has marked an earlier stage of the work of UNRISD; it has been recast fairly recently. The title of this definitive version,<sup>62</sup> in identifying the effort, veils it at the same time: measuring and planning something recognizedly elusive, namely the quality of life. As identified, the effort carries risks coming under the criticism of R. Nisbet,<sup>63</sup> who blames the social sciences for preferring the logic of demonstration to that of discovery: a substantive problem is identified in terms of the method proposed to handle it.<sup>64</sup> The substantive problem, veiled by the postulate that quantification can handle them both, is that yet the economic and the social sides of development are not in close harmony. Professor Drewnowski is not the man to hide his awareness that, if it be true that quantification can be carried to a point where certain social factors can be envisaged in conjunction with economic ones, some others may yet continue to elude the effort. At the same time he is wise enough not to raise the question whether, in terms of development planning, these might prove to be the hot potatoes.<sup>65</sup> He is wary of over-accentuating the difference between economic conditions and social conditions, inasmuch as there is only one process of development; but he is attracted by the possibility of using two yardsticks to measure it, hoping for more effective evaluation.<sup>66</sup>

Social conditions are said to have four aspects: demographic, economic, social relations and welfare or quality of life.<sup>67</sup> For all practical purposes this listing could be seen to imply three different meanings of social, namely a comprehensive one, including things economic, and two limited, perhaps segmentary ones, distinct each from the other and both from the economic one. The author will not be detained by this complexity. He concentrates on what he calls the measurable welfare aspect of social conditions; and this, for all practical purposes, is the clue that he pursues to the (manageable) meaning of 'social'. It links up immediately with the concept of human needs.<sup>69</sup>

He then recognizes nine components of a measurable welfare index, five of them relating to consumption - nutrition, clothing, shelter, health and education; two to protection - namely leisure and security; and two to the environment, social and physical.<sup>69</sup> The listing clearly differs from other such lists by items identified. More significant are two other differences, namely the attempt at systematics that is being made - regardless of how successful it is<sup>70</sup> and the fact that the listing of social elements is made in full sight of the economic aspect.

From our findings thus far, it does not appear that from the meaning of 'economic', once criticized, a self-evident move could lead towards determining the meaning of 'social' as its counterpart and/or corrective. Rather, it seems a move in the dark, with variable outcome. The range of variation, on the other hand, appears fairly limited. This however may mean no more than that here is a case of the usual effect of the availability, by historical coincidence, of a certain asserment of paradigms and the lack of readily available additional ones.

The main thrust appears to be to assume the 'social' to be all or virtually all of reality minus that which is recognized and specifically economic. A broader, potentially comprehensive category, but definitionally speaking a residual one: even in such cases where people will speak of economic means towards social goals. There is an undercurrent of willingness to perceive the social side by side with the economic as two out of possibly several aspects of reality; but its effect appears limited.

For purposes of conceptualization, there are two variants to the main thrust. One is the reliance on one key concept or set of concepts as a catch-all device, such as social integration, participation, distribution or 'inter and intra-societal power and communication structures and networks'. The other is the use of gross-lists, whether systematically designed or reflecting historical growth complexes. (We return to the latter in the next section.) Apparently straddling the fence between the two, but actually aiming at something better than elaboration of the former variant into the latter, one finds two-step procedures, setting out from one single concept or conceptual complex - e.g., levels of living, (anticipation of) emergent social problems, need satisfaction - and explicitly meant to be spelt out. The purpose here is not merely the eventual achievement of optimally adequate detail, but on top of this the guarantee of relevance to specific actual conditions. All told, it would be unduly optimistic to suggest that the critique of the predilection for economic development is directly conducive to a firm grasp of social development. There are hunches and clues but nothing decisive.

Having gone this far, one had better be prepared to envisage an even further swing of the pendulum, caused by the resulting disappointment. Can there be a real pay-off from recognizing social development as being separate from yet standing side by side with, economic development (and perhaps alongside other aspects, e.g. management development): not just on the spur of the moment (i.e.

to mark the transition from, say, the first to the second, or from the second to the third development decade), but on a permanent basis, as a matter of principle?

There is a trend afoot, notably in some UN agencies (including UNRISD) and similar 'central' bodies, towards a verdict to the effect that the distinction is not really helpful and perhaps had better be forgotten. Of course it plays into the cards of ever vigilant economic expansionism. At the same time it will be bolstered by the philosophy of the unified approach, itself not exempt from economic bias. Besides, there appear to be stronger, more practical considerations in its favour. Two of these are particularly appealing. One says that most concrete issues in development have both social and economic aspects, and that there must be better ways of breaking such issues down into manageable components than the attempt to separate the social from the economic. The other says that effective dealings with development will relate to small-scale situations, such as regions or zones, where one can afford to account for the multifaceted, not to say comprehensive, nature of the development problem.

Note that each of these contentions implies an attempt to limit the scope of the problem prior to attempting to handle it: a procedure already mentioned in the preceding. Will they hold more promise than the procedure of taking totality apart into aspects or segments? For one thing, micro or middle range comprehensiveness implies a complexity not really different from that of macro comprehensiveness. It is perhaps convenient, but deceptive, to think otherwise. For another, the problem approach to specific, practical developmental issues is a mixed bag. There is reduction of scope, coupled to reduction of component elements of complexity. In view of their theoretical and procedural implications both reductions are uncomfortably elusive, especially the first elements to be eliminated by way of reduction are the sensitive ones, politically or otherwise.

Thus, if it may seem convenient at the verbal level to declare a close harmony, perhaps a virtual identity, between 'social' and 'economic', no major gains are likely to be scored.

There is yet a further reason for restraint and circumspection. Concerning aspects of development, we should not ignore the often neglected fact that the profile of developmental problems varies from case to case. Some cases feature, to those concerned, in terms of predominance of economic concerns; but in other cases, political, social or yet other concerns may hold precedence. In other words, to him who remains willing to recognize the usual aspects, the configurations in which they will appear are variable, from case to case, and also in the course of time.



The refusal to differentiate between aspects, notably between the economic and the social ones, has a negative effect. One ends up deprived of what may be a useful tool, for description and perhaps for the allocation of priorities for policy purposes.

What remains worth investigating is whether the meaning of 'social', envisaged in the manner of a *contrario* definition vis-à-vis 'economic', would prove equally elusive if more effort were spent, by way of a preliminary exercise, upon specifying the meaning of 'economic'. Thus far, in following the general mood of the debate, we have taken the definition of 'economic' for granted; but it should be a valid question to ask whether one can afford to.

Of course I am not about to evoke the diversity of definitions of 'economic' according to the various economic, political and philosophical schools of thought. Rather I am interested in the meaning or meanings of 'economic' insofar as it is - or they are - likely to be time-and-place-conditioned and, as such, the expression of a specific perception of reality or *Weltanschauung*.<sup>71</sup>

Of course there are writings - not many for sure - that shows how particular bits and pieces - including major elements - of economic thinking correlate immediately to the prevailing concerns of the day. Indeed the discipline of economics, in aggregate, could perhaps be argued to be time-and-place-conditioned in this manner. Beyond that, however, there is the more profound theme that served to open this essay - the interrelatedness of the discipline of economics and the life style setting off the West from 'the rest of the world' - or rather most of the world, a life style or *philosophie vécue* for which the label economism is quite fitting.

One can readily see that an interest in this inter-relatedness should have been late in emerging. Indeed it is the kind of interest that will mark the decline of the life style concerned. Its self-evident nature is lost along with its vigour. The very fact that people will inspect it signals its erosion.

However, the factors conditioning interest rising and waning, however much they are bound to set the ebb and fluxtides, and the fads and foibles of scholarship, are by no means basic to determining which questions scholarship will validly ask. If the interest I am now evincing is not necessarily self-evident to those brought up in an *ambiance* of economism, that in itself will not invalidate it.

Be this as it may, the current inclination towards introspection and collective self-doubting in the West will soon enough prove a fertile ground, not merely for alarmists but for serious historians of intellectual effort to probe into these more profound relationships. Their

task is by no means lightened by the circumstance that in this regard a good deal of allegedly scholarly prejudice has thus far added its bit to the general inclination to hold back on this effort: to those tempted to inspect it, the matter might appear to have been definitively settled in advance, thanks to Marxist and other doctrines. What all this would amount to is a new readiness to take into consideration the perspective of culture history, or, in more specifically sociological parlance, the sociology of knowledge.

Thus considered, the economic approach to reality signifies a quite particular way of appreciating resources - natural as well as human - and of how they are put to human use. In briefest phrasing, this is the persistent maximization of returns upon systematic and relentless effort. Opportunities are not just grasped: they are purposely created. In a sense, all this amounts to a state of mind, complete with supporting ethic.

In discussing the attitude that takes 'the world as a means towards one's self-realization', Van Baal refers especially to the maximization of action coupled to a perception of human relations in terms of commerce: trade instead of exchange of gifts, resulting in depersonalization of human relationships.<sup>72</sup> His search for the built-in restraint leads him to a plea in favour of a redress of the balance between these two models. In this respect, he argues, social security has nothing to contribute as it derives fully from the commerce or market model.<sup>73</sup>

F. Hirsch follows a parallel line of argument and in so doing refers to religion.<sup>74</sup> Douglas Roche, a Canadian M.P., speaks of the need to develop 'a new global ethic', which is 'primarily an attitude toward the integrity of the human person and the harmony of organic growth': an interesting proposition even though its terms raise more questions than they answer.<sup>75</sup> But we are anticipating.

The full manifestation of this Western specificity can be said to coincide with the Industrial Revolution. The question which caused which, must be a chicken-and-egg problem. Perhaps one could say that the crucial concept is exploitation: something of a tabu term until it became a demagogic indictment. If so, it certainly is exploitation *à outrance*, if not in its inception then in ultimate consequence. Any new product is a desired configuration of properties: its substance is nothing but their carrier. In human intercourse, ends turn out to be means.

A central notion like this, once matured to the point where all the implications will show, evokes its own countervailing responses. In fact, the reaction has more than one dimension. For one thing, it features in the developed-underdeveloped dichotomy: those underdeveloped

fail to use their resources 'properly'. For another, it appears in scares like the one whipped up by the first Club of Rome report<sup>76</sup>, and in the kind of anxieties that will give environmental concerns - realistic enough by themselves - their popular, activist appeal. It is tempting to think that the third dimension of the response is 'social', as an emergent concept countervailing 'economic' whether as supplement or alternative or perhaps both. If so, it should imply the rejection, certainly not of exploitation as a way to sustain life (that would be collective suicide) but of indiscriminate, unbounded exploitation, and this for the only valid reason, namely that it ends up being counterproductive.

'Social', then, would not necessarily mean altruistic, in Sorokin's sense.<sup>77</sup> To spell it out using available clues, is an exercise that by and large remains to be done. Some of the clues may be mentioned now.

Crucial is the restoration of built-in restraints in exploitation. This is a matter of technology to an extent: no *rücksichtslose* exploitation without a technology rendering it possible. At the same time it is very much a matter of ethics. It is indecent to shoot bald eagles near Denver whilst flying next to them in a helicopter,<sup>78</sup> or gazelles in the Arabian desert from a Landrover. The fact that it is so easily possible is no excuse: on the contrary. I choose these examples on purpose, as the ethics of hunting - which, after all, is perhaps the oldest form of exploitation - seems to provide one of the clues we are searching. The modern hunter and fisher are equipped in such a manner that the extermination of any hunted species is a matter of time. It is not just the pleasure of future hunting parties, but in certain cases the survival of man the consumer, that requires hunting to be optimized not maximized.

Restraints need to be built into hunting and fishing. Hence, the introduction of 200 mile zones, limitations in fishing and hunting rights, limitations in gear. Hardly any of these formal provisions will work unless either or both of two conditions are met: the general adoption of a code of ethics by hunters and fishers (including industrial ones),<sup>79</sup> or of an outlook in public opinion that will refrain from sacrificing the long term to the short term, the future to the present. Here is a topic on which preaching comes quite easily. Indeed we are being preached at *ad nauseam*; but preaching may not be enough.

Current environmental concerns, as internationally pursued by UNEP, represent this very kind of concern, in the obverse, complementary perspective. Of course, the subject in these examples is man's natural context; therefore one may not expect easy pointers here towards the true meaning of 'social'.<sup>80</sup>

I chose this example because it will bring home that the search is on for the proper built-in restraints in ex-

plotation, as a necessary aspect of life. If the ethics of restraint matter vis-à-vis nature, how much more will it matter as between people. Nor is it a matter of ethics only. More broadly, it is a matter of self-restraint being required where earlier restraints and constraints have been over-run by the tide of economism.

Returning to the more specifically social aspect, the real problem may well be the divorce between ethics and human relations that has been the outcome of functionalization and rationalization.<sup>81</sup> Of course, in this regard there is a good deal of retracing of steps. The indictment of Charley Chaplin's 'Modern Times' has found its positive response, so to speak, in to-day's effort, by ILO and other agencies, to humanize human labour.<sup>82</sup> A less limited approach to the matter can be found in a most significant plea by M.R. Jafar, to expand any set of Levels of Living indicators in such a manner as to include '(a) economic, social and cultural rights; (b) civil and political rights; and (c) minorities' rights'.<sup>83</sup>

I am not saying that any of these attempts does more than offering clues; but they certainly succeed in suggesting the kind of clues needed and thus in pointing into the proper direction.

## VI

With economism as a *philosophie* - or rather, its consequences - in increasingly hot water, the query about alternative approaches to development is natural. To answer it is not very easy: this is the old problem of the missing paradigm. This may well be the occasion for a demand for a revision; not so much of the discipline of economics as of the claims made on its behalf. In this connection it is to be remembered that these claims are by no means made by the economic profession solely. Such a revision, however, cannot be more than a preliminary to the effort to provide the needed answer. As to this effort, the survey made in these papers suggests one simple and clear conclusion. If you need to know about social development, don't bother the majority of economists. They are busy. Worse, those of them ready to help will, with the best of intentions, do 'their own thing' and aggravate your problem. What is more, avoid all those who think economistically, however impressive their numbers and however effective their control over what is acceptable reasoning. Their philosophy of life is increasingly full of holes and before too long this emperor will be seen to stand revealed. Worse, they do not begin to see what you are talking about: so eager are they to encapsulate your concern into their paradigms. For all the great things the economic life style has achieved, its inability, in the days of Dickens, to pay proper attention to the socio-cultural dimension of life has not been remedied. It has worsened and spread to the point where those critical minds in search of a countervailing outlook, vociferous enough in their critique, will be found tongue-tied in explicating what they stand for.

Thus far the effort in this essay has been to convince the reader of the desirability, and then again of the possibility, to consider social development as a subject matter in its own right. He may be more completely convinced by additional argument to the effect that we are in no danger of overshooting our mark, than to fall for the very temptations to which economics, pushed along by economism, has succumbed. There are mainly two of these arguments.

First, if the gist of the present argument is to make room for a sociology of development, consistent and autonomous, as well as for a perception of social development as a primary, not a residual concern, the reference is to a means, not to an end. To dream of a solipsistic sociology of development, or of sociology as the one dominant discipline for any dealings with development, is not just preposterous: it is unrealistic. However, for sociology to better prepare itself to contribute its fair share to the multidisciplinary effort needed, more elbow room seems indispensable. To this intermediate purpose a move to 'go it alone' for a while can hardly be objectionable.

Secondly, there is no cause for special pleading on behalf of sociology. Few people today will say, after Comte, that sociology is the queen of the sciences; but some will suggest that, unlike the economic realm, the social realm is marked by a normative or ethical core. Therefore, if the Marxists and a few others will, for whatever reasons, claim primacy for things economic, then one could, for good reason, file a counter-claim on behalf of the social side of reality. If Dickens's description of social conditions reads as an indictment of economic practice, this is because he shows how social norms are being flouted. Similarly, the Rochdale record has strong ethical overtones. Still, were the argument valid, the result would be at least two countervailing claims to primacy on behalf of aspects or segments of total sociocultural reality, singled out for the purpose. The prospects of any of them being vindicated would be dim. Rather, one would have to look forward to a dialogue of the deaf.

The matter is perhaps too important not to argue it in some detail. First off, it is in order to reject, out of hand, the suggestion implied in the claim about the normative specificity of the social realm, namely that the difference between things social and things economic would equal or parallel that between mind and matter. Whatever the difference, it is not this. Were one to try once again what many have attempted in vain,<sup>84</sup> namely to pinpoint the difference in one criterion or set of criteria, then one would have to arbitrate between the idea of different-yet-equivalent aspects of reality on the one hand and, on the other, the incidental - and therefore virtually unaccountable - identification and subsequent institutionalization of each - always in the Western culture context, in consequence of which one is never effectively matched to the other. Let us assume nonetheless and merely for argument's sake, that one could, in this manner, arrive at a tentative distinction: to the effect that, say, the hallmark of the economic realm is man's marshalling of resources both natural and human, and that the social realm is signalled by man's bond with fellow man.<sup>85</sup> Ideally, this difference should be presentable as a complementarity; to present it that way is, however, a *tour de force*. Of course, it is a known fact that some sociologists make a good deal of noise about values and that economists will use 'value' in a rather more subdued meaning whilst leaving the normative content of economic life largely implied in economic practice interpreted as rationality: but little can be concluded from this circumstance beyond underscoring that much of the difference is fortuitous. Indeed it should be hard to argue a decision to attribute a normative core to the social realm and to deny it to the economic one.

The same can be argued in yet another way, to make it even more convincing. Those singling out the social realm on account of its attributed normative core are implicitly postulating a dilemma to exist between norms or values and some opposite number remaining to be defined. Let us pursue this line for a moment. Assume, then, that in reality one may analytically distinguish between two phenomenal appearances (in more customary, yet not necessarily better, terms, levels). Tentatively labelled, the one would be 'values' and the other, 'actual goings-on'. By the way, this distinction would, at face value, have to apply to the social realm as much as to the economic or, for that matter, to any such realm; but that is neither here nor there at this point of the argument. What matters here is a catch to be avoided. One falls into a trap when giving in to the temptation to ask the philosophical-metaphysical question, which of the two is the primary one. Assuming the distinction to be a binary one, there is, in other words, no way to determine which of the two can be left to be defined in residual fashion, given prior definition of the other one. In actual fact, no primacy is demonstrable. Occasionally, norms or values will be seen or claimed to determine, motivate or guide action, *a priori*; at other occasions they will appear to legitimize, vindicate or bolster it, *a posteriori*. Take up either side in oblivion of the other, and you end up in the same dialogue of the deaf already signalled. Let us rule out, then, any interpretation of this binarity in terms of a dilemma, an ineluctable choice of either side at the cost of the other. If in so doing we run counter against standing Western preference, that price may be worth paying.<sup>86</sup> The option remaining, less customary perhaps, is the alternative reading of the binarity, namely as countervailance: complementarity, logically speaking, equalling interaction, operationally speaking. But this is precisely the reading that will preclude primacy being assigned to any realm, whether 'values' as against 'actual goings-on' or, for that matter, things social as against things economic.

In sum, it is worth nothing that the reasons why no special plea can be made for the social realm, nor for sociology as its alleged guardian, are, to the contrary, reasons why an interactive pattern as between both sectors of society and pertinent disciplines is the only one viable.

## NOTES

1. Comp. R. Cartier: *Non-economic Factors in the Study of Economic Development* (Houston, Texas: Rice U. Progr. Devel. Studies, 1975).
2. J. Pajestka: 'Social Dimensions of Development', in his *The Case for Development: Six Studies* (New York: Praeger, for UN Centre for Economic and Social Information 1973), 85-120; quotes from pp. 93, 100 (my italics). In developing his own view Pajestka claims that it is contrary to both the actual development policies of most developing countries and the more influential patterns of economic thinking (p. 101). '(...) the rather simplistic and primitive approach to economic analysis is a fairly frequent hindrance to a full understanding of the development process and the working out of a development strategy' (p. 96).
3. *European Seminar on the Problems and Methods of Social Planning* (Kallvik, 1964; UN: SOA/ESWP/1964/3), 18.
4. *The Scope and Method of Social Planning* (Report on UNRISD Social Planning Study Group Meeting, 21-30 June 1967, Geneva; April 1968, mimeo). For this meeting, the rapporteur, N. Erder, had submitted an internal preparatory document: *Social Planning in Development Planning*, part of the substance of which can be traced in the Report.
5. Report of the [ECAFE] Working Party on Social Development (8-10 Dec. 1970) and Report of the Expert Group on Social Development (30 Nov.-5 Dec. 1970) (New York, United Nations: E/CN.11/990, 1971), 27.
6. A.H. Whiteford (ed): *A Reappraisal of Economic Development, Perspectives for Cooperative Research* (Chicago, Aldine, 1967), 89.
7. *Ibidem*, 45.
8. Pajestka: 'Social Dimensions', 97 (my italics).
9. G. Myrdal: *Asian Drama, An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations* (New York: Random House, Pantheon, 1968), Vol. I, 28f.
10. Comp. P. Wignaraja: 'A New Strategy for Development', *International Development Review* 18/3 (1976), 2-7, with a reference to a Report of the United Nations University Expert Group on Human and Social Development.



11. Comp. G. Gusdorf: *Les sciences humaines et la conscience occidentale*, Vol. VI: *L'Avènement des sciences humaines au siècle des lumières* (Paris: Payot, 1973), 551,555.
12. Comp. D. Martindale: *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 63. Comte wrote of the Queen of the social sciences.
13. Comp. also this statement: '(...) we should like to demonstrate that the social objectives can be integrated with the economic ones, and that both these sets can be mutually supportive (...)' (p. 99).
14. Another emphatic statement to the same effect in Pajestka: 'Social Dimensions', 101, para 2.
15. Ibidem, 110, 119.
16. Ibidem, 107.
17. Ibidem, 120; thesis 7, p. 119.
18. UN: E/CN.5/346 (1961).
19. *The Problems and Methods of Social Planning, Report of the Expert Group, Dubrovnik 1963* (UN: SOA/ESWP/EG/Rep.4), 35.
20. UN: E/CN.11/990 (1971), 29, comp. 5-7, 28. In the many pertinent UN documents there is never a shortage of attempts to mark the difference between the economic and the social approaches to, and aspects of, development. It is not always easy to discount sheer diplomacy or, for that matter, rhetoric. The attempt to do so nonetheless will bear fruit at least to the extent that identifiable elements of substance remain, mostly asking questions rather than answering them. It is their fate not to be pursued - perhaps one of the basic weaknesses in the otherwise impressive UN effort in matters like this.
21. D.C. McClelland: *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961). Comp. H. Heckhausen: *The Anatomy of Achievement Motivation* (1966).
22. E.E. Hagen: *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey, 1962); *id.*: *The Economics of Development* (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey, 1972).
23. J.H. Kunkel: *Society and Economic Growth: A Behavioral Perspective of Social Change* (New York: Oxford U.P., 1970), 133, 184, 76; my italics.

24. N. Erder: *Social Planning in Development Planning, Working Paper*; *id: The Scope and Method of Social Planning, Report (...)* *Social Planning Study Group Meeting* (Geneva: UNRISD June 1967; Mimeo), 7f, 10, 21, 26, 43f, 47, 49, 57f, 60.
25. Erder, *Report*, 1, 13, 26. The terms 'balanced social and economic development' (p.2), 'integrated approach' (pp. 33, 47) and 'comprehensive approach' (p. 73) appear inevitably, but little is done with them, nor would they seem to be of much help as conceptual bases. The same is true of allegations of 'lack of homogeneity' and the like in the customary approach (pp. 10, 30f, 34, 54, 67).
26. U.N. Secretariat document on *Administrative Aspects of Social Planning* (UN: E/CN.5/393 ST/TAO/M26, 5 April 1965), 4.
27. Comp. Erder: *Report* 17, 40, 47, 48, 50, 52, 57.
28. Comp. J. Drewnowski, W. Scott; *The Level of Living Index* (Geneva, UNRISD, Report 4, 1966).
29. This tacitly presumes the 'social' to be a known entity: an assumption that remains to be substantiated. Yet as a tactical move for building up an argument it appears unassailable.
30. Erder: *Report*, 3, 29, 43.
31. *Ibidem*, 9, 27.
32. *Ibidem*, 5, 7f, 27, 44, 69.
33. *Ibidem*, 9, 46.
34. This, at least, is my reading of a discussion in which the Levels of Living concept played the central role. The reference is to 'the proposal made for the use of this [i.e. *Levels of Living*] scheme as a yardstick to evaluate the impact of development on social aims without integrating it into the actual planning process' (p.51). In the introductory paper there is explicit reference to social change for economic efficiency.
35. SOA/ESWP/EG/Rep. 4; 5, 6.
36. *Methods of Determining Social Allocations*, E/CN.5/387 (31 March 1965), 6, 8. Quote from 11.

37. In referring to inertia one is once more reminded of the standpoint about normal science upheld by Kuhn in the face of an attack by Popper inspired by the tenet that scholarly work is necessarily innovative. Comp. I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (eds.): *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge; Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science* (London: 1965, 4, Cambridge: 1970) 51ff, 231ff.
38. C.P. Snow: *Public Affairs* (London: Macmillan, 1971). Comp. C. Davy: *Towards a Third Culture* (London: Faber & Faber, 1961); W.T. Jones: *The Sciences and the Humanities: Conflict and Reconciliation* (Berkeley: California U.P., 1966). For the opposite viewpoint see R. Nisbet: *Sociology as an Art form* (London: Heinemann, 1976), esp. 9f.
39. G. Gusdorf: *Introduction aux sciences humaines*.
40. Pajestka: 'Social Dimensions', 99, 106. This kind of listings, common as it is, will be discussed in the next section.
41. *Ibidem*, 109, 117.
42. See, for example, T. Parsons: *The Social System* (London: Tavistock, 1952), 27, 36, 136f; *Essays in Sociological Theory* (rev. ed., New York: Free Press, 1964), *passim*; *Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966), 22, 25, 29.
43. E. Shills: *Center and Periphery, Essays in Macro-sociology* (Chicago U.P., 1975), xliiii, 3.
44. See A.H. Whiteford, (ed.): *A Reappraisal of Economic Development, o.c.*, 91. Independently, J.P. Nettl and R. Robertson have grappled with much the same problem: *International Systems and the Modernization of Societies: The Formation of National Goals and Attitudes* (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 145-51, 164.
45. See note 5. ECAFE: Report of the Expert Group on Social Development, 4, 27, 28.
46. *Ibidem*, 4, 5.
47. Erder: *Social Planning in Development Planning*, 4, 73.
48. *Ibidem*, 5, 6, 14, 44, 60, 77, 86.
49. *Ibidem*, 7, 9f.

50. *Ibidem*, 11, 27.
51. On needs satisfaction, *ibidem*, 11, 38, 60. In the preparatory document Erder notes the difference, obliterated in many planning exercises, between increased production and increased needs satisfaction: a problem of distribution and access as much as a problem of what he calls the non-consumption aspects of welfare. On individuals vs. groups, see *ibidem*, 11, 39, 50, 59.
52. *Ibidem*, 30, 70 for emergent problems; 37, 39, 51, 72 for target groups.
53. *Ibidem*, 99, 106.
54. A listing of examples of social costs to be minimized is given on page 72; a listing of social planning tasks or fields on pp. 33f. In the *Report* there is little concern as to the number of lists and the differences between one and the next. This may be explained by the tendency, in the *Report*, to deem them unsatisfactory anyway: at once too heterogeneous (p. 65) and too restrictive (p. 67).
55. *Ibidem*, 4, 51.
56. K.M. Hoerning: *Secondary Modernization, Societal Changes of Newly Developing Nations - A Theoretical Essay in Comparative Sociology* (Denver, U. of Denver: Monogr. Ser. World Aff. 7/4; 1969-70).
57. *Ibidem*, 6. Preceding references are to pp. 2-4, 6f.
58. *Ibidem*, 17. Comp. also 25.
59. *Ibidem*, 28.
60. *Ibidem*, 25, 27.
61. Preceding para. summarizes Hoerning, 17-24. Quote from p. 23.
62. J. Drewnowski: *On Measuring and Planning the Quality of Life* (The Hague, Mouton, 1974). It does not seem useful at this point to refer back to earlier versions published by UNRISD, some of which are mentioned above.
63. R. Nisbet: *Sociology as an Art Form* (London, Heinemann, 1976), 16, 21. Comp. Drewnowski: *On Measuring and Planning*, 50.
64. C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze: 'Recent Developments in Development Studies: Some Reflections on the Message of Futuribles, Social Accounting and Social Indicators',

*Cultures et développement*, 4/4 (1972), 227-74.

65. This is not the problem - if problem it be - that no social conditions are totally quantifiable inasmuch as only some of their aspects are (Drewnowski, 5f), but that crucial matters like social relations are deliberately not considered (*Ibidem*, 7).

66. *Ibidem*, 1f, 94f. Even so, Drewnowski continues to speak (p. 96) of broadening the (economic) concept of development.

67. *Ibidem*, 6f.

68. *Ibidem*, 11, 13, A notable refinement is the distinction between level of welfare, a flow concept, and state of welfare, a stock concept: see 17ff. Economic lines of reasoning and sets of concepts are constantly provided with, or, as the case may require, set off against, their analogues or counterparts relating to measurable welfare. The analogy breaks down, however, in the kind of reduction that will allow measurement (13ff, 9ff).

69. *Ibidem*, 51-68, esp. table opposite 68. The elaboration of each of the items listed into actual indicators is not without its surprises to the sociologist. Thus, security is signified by security of the person and security of the way of life (i.e. 'the assurance of being able to maintain a given level of living once it has been achieved'). Social environment is indicated by labour relations (i.e. 'fair treatment'); conditions for social and political activity; information and communication; recreation: cultural activities; recreation: travel; recreation: sports and physical exercise. The state of welfare index differs rather markedly (p. 88ff), with only three components, i.e. somatic status, educational status and social status - the latter term in a meaning no sociologist could guess, namely the relationship between individual and society. Each has more than one indicator, with integration and participation announced as 'certainly not yet operative' ones (p. 92) for the third.

70. Both the identification of variables and the choice of indicators, each in limited numbers (12), retain a degree of arbitrariness in several respects. The author's way out, namely, by referral to expert judgement (11, 22) and to the determinants inherent in a given situation ('social origin'; 22) may not be fully satisfactory in that it begs the question.

71. Perception of reality as such, making it appear as a - limited - aspect, potentially a segment. I use the term *Weltanschauung* in the sense of K. Jaspers: *Philosophie der Weltanschauungen* (Berlin, Springer, 1954), 4. On the *situè et datè* nature of mainstream economics, a classical statement comes from A. Löwe; *Economics and Sociology: A Plea of Cooperation in the Social Sciences* (London, Allan & Unwin, 1935). Cf also J. Robinson: *Economic Philosophy* (London, Watts, 1962; Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1964); T.W. Hutchison: *On Revolutions and Progress in Economic Knowledge* (Cambridge U. P., 1978). Perhaps a rider should be added to the effect that I am using the word in a meaning close to, but not necessarily identical with, ideology as currently decried as a basic distortion or, as the case may be, advocated as true inspiration, by segments of academia where for one reason or another malaise about the traditional hallmarks of Western scholarship is fashionable.
72. J. van Ba 1: *De aggressie der gelijken* (The Aggression of Equals; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1974), 60f, 64-66.
73. *Ibidem*, 39f, 70; 97; 39.
74. F. Hirsch: *Social Limits to Growth* (Harvard University Press), 138, 141, 153.
75. D. Roche: 'The world is not necessarily hurtling to hell', in *Canada and the Third World: what are the choices?* (44th Couchiching Conference, Canadian Institute of Public Affairs, Toronto; Yorkminster Publ., 1975, 1976<sup>2</sup>) 171.
76. D. Meadows, c.s: *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe, Potomac Associates, 1972).
77. P.A. Sorokin: *Society, Culture and Personality, their Structure and Dynamics* (New York: Harper, 1947), Ch. 5, 6. Comp. F. Hirsch: *Social Limits to Growth*, 146ff.
78. J. Michener: *Centennial* (New York: Random House, 1974). His tale of the bison, in the same novel, is equally pertinent.
79. Note, however, that the 'European canon of respect and fair play for the hunted' that corresponds to the differentiation between hunting for sport and hunting for food (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Chicago, 1974; *Macropaedia*, IX, 47f) is no more than a possible starting point towards developing the kind of code now needed.

The hunting canon itself is very much alive both as a norm for desired practice and as a topic of ongoing, lively discussion. During season 1975-76, a working group of the Royal Netherlands Hunters' Association drafted a discussion paper on hunters' ethics, spelling out the canon in great detail. It defines sportmanship (*weidelijkheid*) as 'an attitude towards game and nature in general, based on ethical norms, that is gradually developed by aptitude, custom, tradition, training and example, grows continuously in step with human development, and adjusts itself to the positive virtues of society.' (Quoted by permission of the Secretary of the Association.) Many of the items of the code turn out to be explicit restraints.

80. But in matters like settlement or habitat, things physical do have immediate social significance. Nor is it all that remote in the effects of industrial fall-out.
81. A. Heath: 'The Rational Model of Man', *Archives européennes de Sociologie*, XV/2 (1974), 184-205. He pinpoints 'utility maximization, expected utility maximization and mini-max loss' (p. 182).
82. B.I.T., Conférence Internationale du Travail, 60e session, Genève 1975: *Rapport du Directeur Général: Pour un travail plus humain. Les conditions et le milieu du travail*. Comp. H. Günther: 'Humanization of Work and Social Policy: A Sketch', *Labour and Society*, 2/1 (Genève 1977), 89-98.
83. M.R. Jafar: *Under-underdevelopment, A Regional Case Study of the Kurdish Area in Turkey* (Helsinki: Painoprint OY, 1976).
84. Why is it that one finds so preciously few classics to quote on this issue? Because proto-social science did not make the distinction.
85. Remember the title of R. Nisbet's sociology text, *The Social Bond, An Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York: Knopf, Borzoi, 1970). For the benefit of those women's libbers who like to play political games with words, I should perhaps point out that I insist upon using the word 'man' in the dictionary sense of a gender-less (article-less) categorical concept. Their preferred term, 'person', cannot be properly used in this meaning - not even when one would take recourse to its original, largely forgotten, meaning of 'mask'.

(By the same token, the dreadful-sounding term 'chair-person' does make sense.)

86. Question - why will some sociologists fail to recognize this option and consequently move in a fog if it comes to putting 'paired concepts' to use? (On 'paired concepts', comp. R. Bendix: *Embattled Reason, Essays on Social Knowledge* [New York, Oxford U.P., 1970], 122ff.) Because they stop their inspection of these constructs short of identifying the variety of possible elaborations. (Comp. T. Parsons: 'Some Considerations on the Theory of Social Change', in S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.): *Readings in Social Evolution and Development* [Oxford, Pergamon, 1970], 96.) Further question - does one have to choose between the two readings here identified; The answer depends upon one's preference for either. The 'dichotomist' will assume that a choice is in order; the 'complementarist' will tend to assign to each its proper use. If a middle road there be, it may well have to be complementarity all over again.