‘PIONEERING THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REVOLUTION’
Analisysing the Trajectory of Mahbub ul Haq – A Review Essay

Des Gasper

International Institute of Social Studies (The Hague), Erasmus University Rotterdam
gasper@iss.nl


Abstract: Mahbub ul Haq’s work to coordinate, establish and propagate the Human Development Approach offers an example of effective leadership in promoting more ethical socio-economic development. The paper reviews Pioneering the Human Development Revolution -- An Intellectual Biography of Mahbub ul Haq (eds. Haq and Ponzio, 2008), and extends themes from the UN Intellectual History Project to examine Haq’s contributions in terms of four aspects of leadership: articulating and applying values that combine depth with broad appeal; providing a fruitful and vivid way of seeing, a ‘vision’, that reflects the values; embodying the values and vision in workable practical proposals; and supporting and communicating the previous aspects through wide and relevant networks. It suggests that the human development approach may need to update its values and vision, including through better integration of human security thinking, if it is to retain the leadership role it acquired thanks to Haq.

Introduction

Mahbub ul Haq (1934-98) was born in colonial India, becoming in 1947 a citizen of the new state of Pakistan. After spending much of the 1950s studying economics at the universities of Cambridge and Yale, he spent the 1960s applying it in the Government of Pakistan, coming to see a need to extend and transcend what he had learned. In the 1970s he steered the World Bank’s new programs on poverty and basic needs, and became a major figure in international development policy networks; and in the 1980s returned to Pakistan to seek to promote change as a government minister. In the 1990s he launched and guided the global Human Development approach for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in New York and later founded a South Asian Human Development Centre in Pakistan, before his death in 1998. Working for an organization, UNDP, with almost no financial muscle, he led a movement of thinking that has had substantial impact, including through global, regional, national and subnational Human Development Reports, well beyond the expectations of two decades ago. The surprising degree of impact—a sustained, worldwide, institutionalized stream of research and policy work on ‘human development’, in academic, governmental and inter-governmental worlds—is our starting point. It is discussed in various publications (e.g., Jolly et al., 2009; Murphy, 2006, 2007; UNDP, 2005a) and in a new book edited by Haq’s widow and collaborator, Khadija Haq, and Richard Ponzio: Pioneering the Human Development Revolution – An Intellectual Biography of Mahbub ul Haq (2008). This essay reviews and builds on the book’s materials and insights, and aims to go further in understanding how Haq promoted and achieved that impact.

Pioneering the Human Development Revolution (henceforth Pioneering) gives a picture of stages in Haq’s work and of the work he influenced. The contributors are nearly all from his close associates: the Preface describes some as ‘committed disciples’ and explains that ‘All of these friends and colleagues came together to pay tribute to the pioneering work of Mahbub ul Haq’ (p.xiii). He appears frequently simply as ‘Mahbub’. The personal closeness brings helpful detail, but the contributors hesitate to synthesise an overall picture to understand his influence and to place it in intellectual context. The present essay seeks to fill that gap and to strengthen the ingredient highlighted at the end of the book as essential in ‘policy change for human development’: a ‘coherent narrative’ (Fukuda Parr, 2008, p.252).

The following section outlines and assesses Pioneering. The next section raises questions about leadership roles in policy change, looks at the literatures on leadership and the influence of new ideas, and suggests a framework. The main part of the paper uses the framework to consider
Haq’s contribution to emergence of the human development approach, as a practically-oriented intellectual entrepreneur operating at the intersections of various scientific, activist, and policy-maker networks. It draws on, in addition to Pioneering, Haq’s own writings and the wealth of recent relevant material. The final section considers implications for maintaining vigour in the human development approach, by clarifying and reinforcing its values and vision, with special reference—as essayed by Haq in his final years—to the theme of human security.

**Haq’s career and the emergence of the human development approach: a new survey**

‘It is time to stand development theory on its head’, Haq announced in a 1970 speech on employment which rejected his own earlier views (published as Haq, 1971). He was an unlikely leader of ‘the human development revolution’. His first book (1963) had presented the conventional economic-growth-first strategy which he designed for Pakistan’s Second and Third Five Year Plans and which he followed as Chief Economist. His second book (1976) and Jillani and Bano’s opening chapter in Pioneering describe his apostasy in the late 1960s, as he came to accept that ‘trickle-down’ to the poor had hardly occurred from an economic strategy whose benefits went overwhelmingly to the affluent. Despite high aggregate income growth, real industrial wages in Pakistan fell by a third in the 1960s and unemployment grew (Haq 1976, pp. 6, 26). The country’s extreme and escalating inequalities, including between East and West Pakistan, contributed to its political disintegration in 1971.1 ‘Divorce between production and distribution policies is…dangerous: the distribution policies must be built into the very pattern and organization of production’, concluded Haq (1976, p.34). As he remarked, an economy that had concentrated on producing luxury goods for the affluent and providing arms for the military could not by a wave of a fiscal wand then redistribute this growth as education or health services. Jillani and Bano give special attention to Haq’s later efforts as a Minister in the 1980s: while he promoted some worthwhile distribution measures he lacked the power to enforce integration of production and distribution policies; instead he drew lessons about the political strategy required to match and support such an economic strategy.

In Pioneering’s longest chapter (Ch.7), Ranis, Stewart and Dong show through a set of country studies how the necessary integration of production and distribution strategies became understood in the human development approach. The ideas were presented in the 1996 Human Development Report, and their chapter updates that analysis. It concludes that strong economic growth and strong emphasis on human development can reinforce each other.2 Countries that emphasise economic growth alone, like Pakistan in the 1960s, cannot sustain that growth.
Countries that emphasise only human development may not be able to sustain that either; however, they are much more likely—if and when they adopt relevant economic reforms—to move into a virtuous spiral of high growth plus high human development than are the countries that emphasise only economic growth. Khadija Haq’s chapter restates this warning for South Asian countries.

Shahid Javed Burki’s memoir of Haq (Ch.2) guides us again along his career path but emphasises different aspects. Most significant is the discussion of Haq’s growing focus on human dignity. Dignity requires not only access to education and good health, but freedom of expression, freedom of association, mutual tolerance and respect, the rule of law, and the accountability of rulers; these are all independently as well as instrumentally important. Political democracy alone guarantees none of them, notes Burki. Khadija Haq underlines the message: ‘In many South Asian states, democracy is fast turning into an empty ritual’ (2008, p.163). ‘To make a democracy reach socially responsible outcomes, it must be constrained by a society-wide articulated set of social values and social norms…[that] respect human dignity’ (Burki, 2008, p.61).

In chapter 3, Khadija Haq and Richard Jolly trace Mahbub’s trajectory once more, now with main emphasis on his views on North-South relations, the international economic (dis)order, and long-term change. ‘The central issue is the organisation of real countervailing power [‘political, economic and intellectual’ (Haq 1980a: p.141; emphasis added)] by the South to accelerate the process of change in the world order’ (Haq 1980a: p.141). They sketch his work in cooperation with many others to prepare such change intellectually. We will return to this chapter several times.

Richard Ponzio’s chapter 4 on the emergence and early years (1990-6) of the global Human Development Reports supplements existing accounts by Haq himself (1999) and by several others. Khadija Haq’s chapter 6 provides a parallel account for the South Asia Human Development Reports that began in 1997, giving summaries of each annual report and how they have probed the region’s desperate inequities and governance deficits. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr’s chapter 8 surveys the global Human Development Reports 1999-2004, which tried to deepen attention to ‘issues related to participation and agency aspects of human development—human rights, cultural identity and freedom, political freedom, and political participation, [and explore] policy options to meet the challenges of globalization’ (Fukuda-Parr, pp. 224-5). The attention to political freedom and participation widens the policy agenda beyond that emphasised in most of the 1990s Human Development Reports (HDRs), which we saw in Ranis et al.’s chapter. That agenda had two pillars: ‘expanding primary health care and education, and pro-poor growth’ (Fukuda-Parr, p.240). Fukuda-Parr emphasises participation through democratic governance as a
third pillar; indeed Haq himself had come to stress this. His theme of human security likewise broadened the agenda in various ways beyond a two-pillar framework. It receives separate attention in Sharbanou Tadjbaksh’s chapter 5, which we explore later.

Pioneering the Human Development Revolution brings together valuable materials and insight. It could have benefited from tighter editing, including to strengthen links between the papers. While the ideas have nearly all appeared before, they are here conveniently assembled in one volume, ‘written as a tribute to Mahbub by his friends’ (p.xiv). It has sometimes an un-Haq-like hesitancy to probe, and a strangely limited use of Haq’s own writings. Some chapters have almost no explicit reference to them or cite without bibliographic details; the book provides no bibliography of his work; and some major pieces are not referred to. In that respect the volume disappoints, given its subtitle An Intellectual Biography of Mahbub ul Haq. It does not convey the zest and brio of his work.

Where the volume is perhaps most lacking substantively is in not trying more to theorise and explain Haq’s impact in his lifetime and after, with reference to relevant wider literatures. The exception is the chapter by Khadija Haq and Jolly, which draws from Jolly’s involvement in the UN Intellectual History Project. One feature of that project has been accumulation of testimony by individuals, a recurrent theme of which has been the major difference made by outstanding individuals (Weiss et al., 2005). Similar findings arise in other contexts. Study of organizations and policies that have had notable success typically shows at their heart, we are repeatedly told, a few dedicated and exceptional individuals. David Bornstein (2005), like Peter Drucker before him, even concludes that behind every successful innovation stands an obsessively committed advocate, who continued to propound and push despite opposition from defenders of the status quo and despite lukewarm or absent support from most other participants. But not every advocate succeeds. Success requires also a series of other favourable circumstances.

Leadership – helping systems to move ahead, through use of ideas

Ahead of the Curve? by Emmerij, Jolly and Weiss (2001) assessed the UN system’s leadership roles in development through its ability to generate and foster ideas. Like the book’s authors we can now drop the question mark (see Emmerij et al. 2005), for the contributions are demonstrably great (Jolly et al., 2004, 2005). In a subsequent paper on ‘Turning Points in Development Thinking and Practice’ Emmerij asks: Why and when do turning points occur? How are they prepared? He asserts the centrality of leadership, but offers no analysis other than that leaders require courage and good fortune (Emmerij 2006).
Social scientists are often ambivalent about the theme of leadership, far more than are historians or management scholars (see e.g., Wren et al., 2004). First, leadership can be bad in terms of the quality of ends by or to which it leads, and leadership cults cause great damage. A second source of hesitation is that individual agency is always constrained by societal and organizational structures. Yet opportunities for agency recur. Third, leadership in complex systems exists at numerous levels and can be exercised by many different people, not only the great (wo)man. It is found in all the actions of doing what was avoidable, undertaking something novel, giving a lead. Fourth, ‘good leaders’ need good contexts, that stimulate, prod, seed and discipline them, as well as good ‘followers’ and collaborators, and ability to make use of good luck. Finally, what is relevant leadership depends on the situation and the match of person to situation, including the match of ‘leader’ and ‘follower’. What works in one case flops or is even disastrous in the next (Grint, 2000).

Bornstein (2005, p.91) points out how insufficient it is to say that an idea triumphs because ‘its time has come’. Many ideas compete to gain attention and capture imaginations. He summarises the criteria that Bill Drayton and his Ashoka Foundation use for identifying likely social entrepreneurs, based on decades of trying to find them. These include: lifelong passion for a broadly defined cause not just a very local problem, and flexibility and innovativeness about the ways of pursuing that cause; ability to cross disciplinary boundaries; ability to self-correct; readiness to share credit; and a core of ethical motivation. We can observe how Haq fulfilled these requirements. But something more must be said concerning anyone whose major work is not through executive control of a particular organisation’s financial and other resources but through ideas and disseminating those ideas.

In contrast to the conception of leadership as heroic mastery is the image of engaging with others in order to mobilise their energies (Mintzberg, 2006). Good leaders need ideas, whether borrowed or their own, and the skills to present and use them; they need also access to power and resources in order to follow-up ideas. They see and use opportunities but must have opportunities: they must be in a good place at a good time. Part of good fortune is to encounter good potential collaborators and partners, which must be combined with ability to inspire and retain them. Haq’s and Sen’s work needed each other’s; Haq relied too on Khadija, on William Draper, the head of UNDP who recruited him and gave him much freedom (Murphy, 2006), and on colleagues like Paul Streeten who contributed much of the detailed intellectual synthesis. At the same time, we see the indispensable role of an inspirational coordinating figure with a vision. The inspiration and vision came in the form of a value-imbued framework of ideas.
In ‘human development’ work in the past two generations, some notable leaders have worked primarily in academe or research, such as Amartya Sen or Robert Chambers. Others were social entrepreneurs and development managers, like Fazle Hasan Abed (Smillie, 2009) or Jim Grant (Jolly, 2001). A smaller but vitally important set of leaders span research and administration, like Haq. Although never employed as an academic he was in constant interaction with academics on an equal intellectual basis; and unlike the pure social entrepreneurs or development managers his influence was not only through the executive positions he held but in great part through his writings.

In international human development work, requirements for successful leadership might include:-

- An ability to build bridges across disciplinary divisions. Provided it is combined with that ability, a formal affiliation to economics may be an advantage for a bridge-building leader, since economists are perhaps the largest and on average most insular (as revealed for example in citation patterns) of the relevant disciplinary groups, with the greatest needs for persuasion and reassurance in order to accept and use bridges.
- An ability to build South-North and South-South bridges. Both some Northerners and some Southerners can do this, but bridge-building has be acceptable to the more mistrustful—in this case perhaps the weaker—side. In a world of immense international disparities a Southerner may be a more plausible candidate.
- An ability to carry credibility among a range of audiences: with politicians, senior governmental and international administrators and managers, development professionals and activists. This in turn requires a wide range of experience and personal qualities.

Whatever Haq’s other strengths and weaknesses were, he was well qualified in each of these key respects. So were various others; something more is needed to explain his achievement.

For this purpose I will suggest a simple framework to highlight aspects of such leadership through ideas:-

1. Ideas have much more impact when they provide a way of seeing, a vision, rather than only isolated information or observations.
2. Value-ideas are amongst the key ideas, since they motivate and help to organize other thought and action. One leadership role is to express and even embody inspiring values.
3. Ideas about values may have little impact if not incorporated into practical frameworks, methodologies and proposals.
4. To have influence, ideas also must be propagated in places and ways accessible to significant audiences.
5. Lastly, ideas must have carriers and an institutional infrastructure. The five notions are interlinked; one builds, sustains and energizes a network in large part through values, vision, and inspiring ideas.

The framework represents a modification and extension of ideas in the UN Intellectual History Project, which are outlined in Pioneering’s chapter by Khadija Haq and Jolly. They suggest four ways ‘how ideas have had a practical impact’ (p.64). The first is ‘by changing how situations, problems, and issues of policy are perceived’ (p.64). We can put this more strongly, as provision of a way of seeing; the ideas should contain not just one snapshot, but a way of thinking that interconnects a system of perceptions and that guides new responses. The second is ‘by altering the ways in which governments and non-government groups assess their interests’ (p.64). This again can be reformulated, as providing inspiring values. Values influence not only how ‘interests’ are seen but also influence vision, how whole situations are seen, including the formulations of identity, ‘their’, ‘them’ and ‘us’. Third, Haq and Jolly stress achieving impact ‘by defining agendas for action’ (p.64). We need to extend this to cover methodologies not only policy proposals. Lastly, they specify: ‘by becoming embodied in institutions which have responsibilities for carrying the ideas forward’ (p.64). We can underline that the institutions involved include networks and networking organisations that connect diverse groups.

Haq and Jolly emphasise institutional infrastructure. For the human development approach the infrastructure created includes the Human Development Report Office, the South Asian Centre for Human Development, the Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, the Human Development and Capability Association, and so on. ‘If serious change begins with ideas, embedding the production of human development thinking in these many vehicles is likely to prove in the long run to have had the biggest impact of all.’ (K. Haq & Jolly, 2008, p.87). I suggest we give more attention to the first four aspects, since the required institutional infrastructure cannot be mobilised, maintained or have influence in the absence of vision, values, and a strong orientation to communication and practice. Let us look closer at those four aspects.

1. The roles of vision. Politics concerns more than maneuvering by different interest groups with fixed interests. A person’s or group’s ‘interests’ are not fixed in the same way as a person’s height. One’s values and vision determine what one perceives as one’s advantage, and even what one perceives as ‘me’ and ‘my’.

Because preferences are always being interpreted and because they can and do change, [policy] entrepreneurs are not limited to traditional brokering roles, but can and do trade in the currency of ideas and problem-solving strategies to build coalitions and promote change.
The lesson is that political conflict is less about negotiating clear interests and more about framing policy issues. (White, 1994, p.516)

By ‘vision’ we mean both an inspirational perspective, and more generally how people ‘see’: how they focus, frame and visualize situations. This includes their historical frame of reference, and thus the range of causal factors and options that they are aware of, and how they decide who is one of ‘us’. The UN Intellectual History Project shows ‘ways in which intellectual debates can have an impact on the framing of development issues’, including how ‘UN ideas…can often help states to define or redefine their interests to be more inclusive of common concerns’ (Emmerij et al., 2005, p.218). The Human Rights framework is perhaps the greatest example; here we consider its cousins, the Human Development and Human Security approaches (Gasper, 2009a).

2. The roles of values and exemplars. Values play a role in directing attention and selections and thus in framing thought, and in motivating effort and mobilizing energies. Some leadership theorists argue thus that while ideas and vision are important, emotional leadership is even more fundamental (Goleman et al., 2005).

3. The roles of practical proposals that embody the values and reflect the vision. Value change by individuals is not sufficient or the end in itself. Further, it may often be easier to influence people by changing visions than by directly discussing values (de Bono, 1985), and practical proposals can sometimes be the best way to influence vision. A vision may anyway be of limited use if one cannot present concrete and striking proposals that convey and operationalize the values and vision. Particularly important are methodologies to structure recurrent practice.

4. The propagation of ideas in networks. Murphy (2005) has suggested lessons for justice-oriented groups drawn from careful review of the experience of movement-led social change in the last two centuries. At certain moments, political and organizational heads need new ideas in order to resolve or reduce crises, and they look around. Progressive social movements should have lots of ideas and proposals ready, in Hirschman (1973)’s spirit of ‘reform-mongering’, and should have maintained active contacts and cooperation with progressive segments of ruling groups. They need also to maintain their own transnational networks – to share and build ideas, give mutual support and lobbying, offer sanctuary when needed, and sustain morale, inspiration and momentum – and to connect to international organizations in order to spread their proposals.

In contrast to ‘Murphy’s Law’—that ‘Everything that can go wrong will go wrong’—on the inevitability of farce within complex human systems, Craig Murphy’s lessons offer encouragement. We see each of them exemplified in Haq’s Long March through the institutions.
The next section traces his achievement of the required combination: well communicated practical proposals that embody and convey motivating values and an inspiring vision.

**Haq and the emergence of the human development approach reconsidered**

Many elements of the Human Development approach are found already in work from the 1950s and 60s, for example by Paul Streeten, who became Haq’s lieutenant at the World Bank in the 1970s, and by Gunnar Myrdal, one of Streeten’s inspirations (see Gasper, 2008). But the breakthrough to a widely graspable, appealing and workable reformulation of development took a generation more. Haq’s role was pivotal, as a ‘man of affairs’ able to marshal, distil and synthesise the insights of a network of academics. In speeches from 1971-72 he declared that we should ‘build development around people rather than people around development’ (1976, p.28), and build a people-focus into each aspect of development design. However, his version of basic needs thinking in the 1970s remained close to basic material needs (‘the problem of development must be redefined as a selective attack on the worst forms of poverty’, 1976, p.43) rather than the richer ‘basic human needs’ version (e.g., Green, 1976) which considers meanings as well as objects. Basic material needs thinking became discredited, seen as technocratic and statist (Gasper, 2009b). During the 1980s, insights from basic human needs thinking were more widely absorbed under new banners like ‘human-scale development’. Khadija Haq edited a series of books in that decade, including several with Uner Kirdar from conferences that were co-organised by UNDP and the North-South Roundtable of SID (the Society for International Development). The books began with a World Bank style view of ‘human development’ predominantly as human resource development or ‘social sectors’, but gradually moved beyond that.

Although engaged as a Minister in Pakistan for most of this period, Mahbub ul Haq continued as main leader of this movement of ideas in the 1980s, as recorded in *Pioneering*. Besides strengths of mind, spirit and personality, he had several specifically relevant qualities. First, his combination of professional experiences helped credibility: a book-writing economist and battle-hardened planner and statesman in both national and international fora. He had a strong belief in markets (and declared for example that pollution can only be stopped by the price mechanism, not by agreements on paper; Haq 1994, p.4), which rendered him acceptable to market proponents; and little self-idealization – ‘I lived through that experience [as Finance and/or Planning Minister] for eight years and I was not able to do very much’ (1994, p.5). At the end of his career he declined Ministerial posts in Pakistan and essayed influence instead through moulding the climate of ideas.
Second, of the economist-statesmen in circulation (a profile shared, for example, earlier by Myrdal or contemporaneously by Jan Pronk), Haq better fulfilled the requirements which we noted earlier. As a man of the South, he could in some ways more effectively criticize it (as in his speech, ‘What is real VIP culture’; Haq, n.d.) as well as question a self-satisfied North: ‘...why do you make such handsome profits on your export of arms to poor, starved, disintegrating countries while giving them lectures all the time about human rights?’ (Haq, cited by Arias, 2000, p.12). He could position himself emphatically as of the South, as shown by his returns to live in Pakistan in the 1980s and again in the mid-1990s. He saw the necessity to avoid intellectual domination by the munificently funded North (Haq, 1976, 1980a), and led formation of the Third World Forum from 1972. He also stressed dialogue, and was co-Chair of the International Foundation for Development Alternatives and Chair of the North-South Roundtable. Khadija Haq and Jolly’s chapter in *Pioneering* describes this work. Haq saw the need to engage with and redirect, not vacate, centres of power. He drew lessons from the fruitlessness of the campaign for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s and 80s which was presented ‘as a “demand” of the South. It should have been presented, right from the start, as a global need since the existing economic order is not working very well for any side’ (Haq, 1980c, pp.273-4). Thus he proposed as a feasible framework for North-South negotiations a principle of mutual benefit, on a basis of mutual need, as well as an appeal to other shared principles: ‘...the North-South dialogue is presently concerned far too much with means rather than with ends’ (1980c, p.277); ‘The new order must be based squarely on the concept of equality of opportunity both within and among nations’ (1980c, p.276).

Third, Haq was a shrewd organiser, and drew lessons from the demise of his Basic Needs Approach work in the World Bank. It had lacked institutional protection and could be too easily put aside by a new Bank president; it had lacked a comprehensive vision that extended beyond the level of (material) basics, and thus failed to frame issues for the whole world (his 1980b paper tried without much success to counter this accusation); and it lacked a language that linked to the mainstreams of economic policy and development policy, to convince them that their underlying principles were served rather than threatened.

Lastly, Haq was well equipped for negotiation. He exemplified the *Getting to Yes* principle of ‘hard on the problem, soft on the people’ (Fisher and Ury, 1983). Notably lacking in rancour, according to his mentor Barbara Ward (1976, p.xiii), he could yet be brilliantly sarcastic (see for example Haq, 1976, pp.140-142). These combinations—sarcasm without rancour, criticism equally of North and South, and emphasis on the responsibilities of both—conveyed self-confidence, mutuality and balance. In addition, he wrote with exceptional lucidity, combining
depth with accessibility for non-academic audiences. From ‘the Third World is not merely worried about the quality of life, it is worried about life itself’ (1976, p.107), through to his final insistence that ‘Security must be measured in the lives of the people, not by the weaponry of the state’, he had a flair for soundbites that truly bit and for finding and keeping collaborators who helped to provide them.\textsuperscript{8}

Catchy labels should package big ideas, otherwise they can become counterproductive. The ‘Human Development’ framework contains some very big ideas: the implicit claim that much previous development has been inhuman; ‘joined-up thinking’ not restricted within the mental boxes of ‘national economies’ and standard disciplinary boundaries; and ‘joined-up feeling’, a global sympathy, concern and commitment (Gasper and Truong, 2005). Let us explore its values further.

\textit{Values: plurality, deliberation, common humanity, mutuality}

The Human Development Approach (HDA) has a substantial but easily accessible value basis. Sen has presented its starting point as the rejection of ‘a monoconcentrationist field: “in terms of what one variable should we sensibly judge alternative possibilities”’ (Sen, 2000, p.20), and recognition instead of plurality when answering ‘the general question: “how should we value alternative possibilities”’ (loc. cit.). He noted how mono-concentrationism led to the triumph of utilitarianism. That was in practice then operationalized in money terms (‘moneytarianism’; Gasper, 2004); for behind utilitarianism’s triumph lay the spread of capitalist market society.

In opposition to moneytarianism, for HDA the variables to be included in public assessment, their weights and forms of measurement, and the format(s) of synthesis are all to be explicitly considered and publicly debated before selection. The same position is arrived at by some other streams in policy analysis, including multi-criteria evaluation and deliberative policy analysis (see e.g. Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003), to which HDA can profitably connect. Like those, HDA contains elements of an explanatory theory of politics besides its normative desiderata; namely, that public provision of data, as in Human Development Reports, generates and feeds debate and brings pressure for public action, as seen for example in use of the state-level Reports in India. The Human Development Reports in Vietnam have similarly introduced values into public policy discussion that have helped in steering the country away from a pure growth-and-market path (see, e.g., Murphy, 2006).

Haq’s own formulation of HDA's value-basis went beyond just value plurality and publicly deliberated prioritisation. He insisted that the Human Development movement required an emphatic humanistic basis: ‘… let me state quite clearly: building a compassionate society is not
a technocratic exercise. It requires solid ethical and moral foundations. It requires entirely a new way of thinking of ourselves as a human family, not just a collection of nation states. It requires a new concept of human security, which is founded on human dignity, not on weapons of war.’ (Haq, 1997, p.4). The stress on being human brings attention to all humans within each state, and often to all humans worldwide. Sen has written recently of Haq’s ‘comprehensive solidarity with every human being’ (2008a, p.xii), and labels such a stance ‘globally unrestricted coverage’ (2008b). It is explicit in the human rights movement, to which HDA has become increasingly connected. The offshoot Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) ‘explicitly commit world leaders to a collective responsibility for all people irrespective of national borders’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2004, p.397).

The Human Development Reports have had more worldwide perspective—and hence more insight into interconnections—than have the World Development Reports, despite the latter’s title. Even so, Ponzio’s chapter in Pioneering ends with a warning from Murphy and Ranis: human development work still receives much too little attention in, and must increase its attention to, economically affluent nations, not least in North America, if it aspires to more influence in many major centres of power. A base in the consumer heaven of Manhattan may conduce to a global perspective but, as reflected in the muted 1998 Human Development Report on consumption, also to insufficient extension as yet of human development analysis to rich countries. Pioneering does not move into that gap, though Haq welcomed such extension.

Operationally, Haq interpreted the principle of ‘humanity’ to mean equality of basic opportunity. He employed repeatedly the slogan of equality of opportunity in contrast to equality of outcome (e.g., Haq, 1977), but real equalization of opportunity would imply vastly more equalization of outcome than he proposed. His practice, from the basic needs work through the HDRs to the International Development Targets (the MDGs’ earlier name), was focused on ensuring some very basic—in both the material and ethical senses—but thereby agreeable and attainable opportunities for all. While one could probe this and other ambiguities and limits, Haq’s value framework was widely appealing, relatively robust and neither so minimal as to make no difference nor so demanding as to be sure to fail in the task of mobilization and alliance-building.

His rhetoric of humanity was accompanied by a constantly stressed mutuality, within and between nations. ‘The objectives of the 1970s were not wrong—of course we need more equity between nations and between people. But the tactics were wrong. Developing countries reached out for international justice while denying economic justice to their own people’ (Haq, 1994, p.2), rendering their claims far less convincing. Mutuality between nations, as well as within them,
requires compensation for damage inflicted, including the damage from trade barriers and migration barriers (1994, p.3). Haq drew these implications as Kantian-style requirements of consistency, stemming not from a presumption of uniform global citizenship but from the common humanity which means that those who interact and can harm each other are bound by principles of basic civility.

A framing that includes all human persons must be motivated and sustained by empathy, an awareness of others and a respect for their dignity. Purely intellectual acknowledgement of consistency requirements becomes easily forgotten or marginalised, as Gandhi observed. In the view of the Ashoka Foundation’s Bill Drayton, Gandhi therefore devised more visceral forms of appeal, ‘an ethics grounded not in rules, but in empathy’ (Bornstein, 2005, p.48), to match a world in which the rules inherited from more self-contained and slower-changing local societies are increasingly inadequate. These insights have implications for the manner in which human development thinking may exert, or lack, influence.

**Vision - a historical perspective**

Haq situated his ethic in a historical perspective. His earlier writings regularly drew an analogy from the historical evolution within some countries of the relations between the rich and the poor—a gradual narrowing of gaps and building of political community—across to a predicted similar evolution of relations between rich and poor countries (e.g., Haq 1976, pp. 164, 169). Later, as the world did not follow that track but showed ever more dramatic inequalities, he re-thought. But even the automatic resource transfers he called for in the 1970s were seen as a temporary requirement (1976, p.209), analogous to the Marshall Plan. His main focus from the late 1970s was on trade and migration issues, not on aid. ‘The vision of the 1990s is totally different from that of the 1970s. Basically aid is going to be phased out—it’s a reality of the past and not of the future; you can’t base the future of nations on charity’ (Haq, 1994, p.3). The new vision aimed to inspire the South with a picture of the formation of self-respecting self-reliant agents, not permanent welfare clients, and to convince the North to promote this, on several grounds. First, that open markets represent the principles that the North enunciates, as well as what the South should espouse if it believes in itself—‘I believe that applying market principles internationally would favour developing countries’, he declared (1994, p.3), a stance now widely agreed in the South. Second, that the MDGs are a temporary and relatively modest call on the pockets of the North, for great human benefit. And thirdly, that this path represents the North’s enlightened self-interest, as compared to the path of indifference and short-run profit.
The historical vision derived from a belief in people’s potential and in the capacity of Southern societies, that was grounded in an assessment of fundamentals. People have intelligence, and the South has many more people (Haq, 1977). The barriers to unleashing the human potential in the South are major—thus in another familiar phrase, ‘if development is not engendered then it is endangered’—but they are not permanent. ‘I do not think that they [most people in the developed countries] realize that the Third World is the future international economic order and the developed countries have to start thinking today in terms of fashioning policies to come to some reasonable accommodation with it’ (Haq, 1976, p.144; a speech from 1973). With the rise of China and India, this realization finally dawned in the North a generation later.

Proposals: catching the eye and guiding the mind

Haq sought ideas that could attract support from various positions. He became a master of the concrete, visionary proposal: the family of Human Development indices; the 20/20 principle adopted at the 1995 Copenhagen summit on Social Development; the proposition that arms trafficking should be a criminal offence in the same way as drugs trafficking (Haq, 1997); and the MDGs, which converted the exhausted formula of ‘progressive realization’ of economic and social rights into concrete agendas. Often the practical proposals are methodologies that involve local elaboration within a general framework of human development principles; for example in the local specification of indicators and indexes. This approach is taken further in human security work, since security prioritisations are so evidently situation- and group-specific (Jolly and BasuRay, 2007) and in part a matter of interpretive judgement.

The principle behind such proposals was to generate public attention, commit public action, and then keep leaders accountable. Haq agreed that: what gets counted, counts. The role of the Human Development Index is as a tool in democratic politics, to open debate and dethrone moneytarianism, not as a precision tool of technocratic summation. He was central in creating what later became the MDGs language, including through the HDR 1994. Many worry that the MDGs are crude, top-down, and unreachable without rich country support that is not forthcoming. The assessment may read a political strategy as purely a technical action plan. One of Haq’s achievements, as in the HDR of 1991, was to make plain by attention to how existing national and aid budgets are allocated that in many cases lack of political commitment not lack of resources underlay the non-fulfilment of basic needs (Haq, 1999, Ch.15). Mass immunization of children in Pakistan and 100,000 fewer deaths per year were achieved in the 1980s by delaying the start of an expensive urban hospital by five years (Haq, 1987, p.18). The MDGs are a tool in
trying to generate and maintain required political commitment. They focus attention on basics, and open a public space for discussion on how to formulate, approach and implement the goals. And they provide a yardstick by which people will be judged, and against which if there is seen to be failure then there should be reaction.

Haq was clear about what he was doing: ‘It is true that we may never be able to eliminate all social and economic injustices or to provide equality of opportunity to all the people. But we certainly can take a few practical steps … which can become a reality only if all of us start a global civil society movement for their achievement. … Let us get organized. Let us monitor the progress of each nation and each donor towards these goals every year and let us publicize it through NGO efforts and through all civil society initiatives so that the world does not forget the commitments it made only recently [at the Copenhagen summit]’ (Haq, 1997, pp.2-3). His ‘few practical steps’ included thus the strengthening of global networks, to give ‘the world’ conscience and self-consciousness.

Vision, values, network and proposals: the United Nations and global civil society

Haq’s major achievement came in his United Nations period of 1989 to 1995: to design and launch the Human Development Reports program. He had worked steadily in many overlapping networks—the worlds of development planners and economists, the world of government policy makers, the worlds of development critics and of rethinking from the South—through the World Bank, the Third World Forum, the Society for International Development and more. When his moment of opportunity arrived at the end of the 1980s, he could use his network of networks for a breakthrough.

He acted on the lessons from the period in the World Bank. The Human Development Report Office (HDRO) obtained editorial independence. It could thus function as a genuine think tank and in turn help UNDP to learn. It presented a comprehensive vision beyond only the level of material basics. And it maintained a link to the mainstreams of economic and development policy—through its use of the languages of effective freedoms and choice—and has thereby been able to influence them. In the process, Haq’s HDRO contributed to the revival of the idea and principles of the United Nations. Pioneering’s chapter by Khadija Haq and Jolly touches on this last achievement.

The UN was created in 1945 as a follow-on to the association of wartime allies and friendly neutrals that had been known as ‘the United Nations’, to be a support and reference group for the new dominant power, the United States, and its closest allies. Tension arose between the rhetoric of the UN’s Charter and the intentions of the hegemons, the self-perceived ‘capable actors’ of the
global scene (Steele and Amoureux, 2006). Was the UN the world at work democratically setting rules and making decisions for itself, or was it the victorious wartime alliance continued, a committee of the big powers with their dependents in tow?

Haq took up the potential within the foundational rhetoric. He could do so, by the 1990s, thanks to the combination of qualities which we noted: as a Southerner who could more readily speak for the historically marginalized, but at the same time as an assured insider in the North, who criticized both sides forcefully and was a strong critic of the UN too for being so fragmented and disunited. He sought ‘to create a ferment of ideas’ in the UN ‘and to make policy makers uncomfortable’ (1994, p.4). He dared to speak for the organization, Hammarskjöld-like, and not only via UN channels: ‘I think the UN has to do a number of things’ (1994, p.2), for example ‘the UN must move aggressively on disarmament in the developing world’. He pointed at the permanent members of the Security Council who supply most of the vast global arms trade, often with state promotion and subsidy. Using the conception of the United Nations as the world’s democratic forum, not as the Great Powers’ consultative chamber to be ignored when it becomes unruly, he called for a two chamber UN: one for governments ‘and the other chamber elected directly by the people and by institutions of civil society’ (Haq, 1997, p.4).

Just as a political strategy underlay his legacy of the MDGs, so a particular perspective of historical dynamics underlay Haq’s use of his period in the 1990s as spokesman not just for the South but for human development as a whole. The hypothesis was that, even when blocked directly in the worlds of the UN and Washington, his sort of language would resonate in the new corridors of global civil society, corridors that were almost totally absent when the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions were set up in 1944-45 by the victors in the world war, but which are now vibrant and able sometimes to influence global politics (Sen, 2004; Kennedy, 2007).

‘Human Security’

…a new concept of human security, which is founded on human dignity, not on weapons of war. (M. ul Haq, 1997, p.4).

He truly believed in Barbara Ward’s words: ‘The ultimate solution will lie in a new humanism— people realizing that they can only survive together or not survive at all’ (K. Haq & Jolly, 2008, p.68)

Haq tried to avoid the dangers of personalization and petrification of a movement of thought and action. In his 1976 book he enunciated an implied warning, in a picture of the three stages of a
successful idea: first it encounters organized resistance, because it endangers old distributions of authority; second it is adulated as the new orthodoxy; third it is tested and hopefully refined in application, and either reinvigorated or replaced.\(^9\) He repeated the warning in the second edition of his *Reflections on Human Development*, and called for vigorous debate, criticism and new departures in human development thinking (1999, pp. 225, 228 ff.).

Let us consider the new departure he himself pursued, with reference to our themes of values, vision, proposals and networks. Haq sought to extend human development thinking through the perspective of human security, to give a sharper and more vivid value grounding, a vision of human interconnectedness and vulnerability, an agenda of priority practical issues, and to extend the interfaces with other intellectual, professional and policy communities. The perspective reflects also the founding rationale of the UN system, ‘that military security without economic improvement was short-term and futile … [Likewise if these] did not produce ways of improving political and cultural understandings among peoples’ (Kennedy, 2007, pp.11-12). Haq argued that security means the security of persons, not only of states; including their security against all threats to fundamental values, not only armed threats to physical integrity; so security policy should consider all major ways of counteracting and diminishing those threats, not only weaponry.

We saw his view that human development thinking requires a vivid ethical core, a source of priorities and of ethical energy, based on respect for the core of each person’s life—an ethics grounded not solely in rules but also in empathy. We saw Burki’s observation of the increasing centrality of human dignity in Haq’s thinking, beyond just the idea of ‘freedoms we have reason to value’, and how this dignity requires far more than access to education and good health: in effect, a set of human rights. But as an economic planner Haq saw that the conventional long lists of declared human rights (or valued human freedoms) alone did not constitute a feasible development strategy. His use of a language of human security in the last years of his life, soon after launching the human development approach, was thus not an accident or a confusion. It combined the moral energy and focus on individuals of human rights thinking, with the focus on priorities from his basic needs background.

This human security thinking incorporated in addition the ‘joined-up thinking’ emphasis on intra- and inter-national connections that are missed by market calculations. In preparing the 1994 HDR on human security: ‘We looked back at 1980 to see which countries had the highest ratio [of military expenditure to expenditure on health and education]. Number one was Iraq—eight times more on military than on education and health…. Number two was Somalia… Number three was Nicaragua… Within a decade these countries could neither protect their national
security, for which they were getting all these arms, nor their human security. And the countries that supplied their weapons in 1980 were itching to get in a decade later to collect them’ (Haq, 1994, p.4). Selling arsenals of arms to Iraq in the 1980s no longer seemed such a smart idea. Intra-national impacts in Iraq were disastrous, as were the regional and eventual indirect global impacts.

Later, without Haq’s leadership, the human security perspective seems to have remained somewhat apart and unabsorbed within the human development mainstream, as seen also in Pioneering. The book leaves human security to a separate chapter by Sharbanou Tadjbaksh, except for brief discussion in the chapter by Khadija Haq and Jolly. The Introduction misunderstands Haq’s work on human security as simply an attempt ‘to extend ethical considerations associated with the human development school of thought from economics to the field of international relations’ (p.16). Human security thinking concerns much more than international relations (see for example the report of the Commission on Human Security, 2003); and it has been a channel not just for export of the ethics of HDA, but for deepening them, including with ideas from human rights and care ethics (Gasper and Truong, 2010). The unsatisfactory connection of thinking on human development and human security in much work since Haq, even sometimes in Human Development Reports, requires attention and remedy.

Defensibly the human security concept concerns a focus on the stability and assurance of (possible) attainment of priority values for everyone; rather than a concern with societal aggregates (across groups and across time) of (possible) attainment of all reasoned values (Commission on Human Security, 2003; Gasper, 2005). As eloquently expressed in the 2009 Arab Human Development Report, human security means ‘the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable’; it is ‘the “rearguard” of human development’ (UNDP, 2009: 23, 20). The focus on priority values matches the basic needs tradition from which Haq and key collaborators like Streeten and Frances Stewart came. The basic human needs of each person form an ethical priority, indeed are the basis of human rights. The attention to priorities brings a concern with the specifics of individual lives, and the attention to each person brings attention to subjective meanings. Tadjbaksh’s chapter remarks that human development thinking ‘is more aggregative and carries within it the potential justification to sacrifice the individual for the majority, [whereas] human security is a more personal, contextual concept. Human security is therefore more disaggregative’; it includes emphasis on ‘feelings of insecurity that individuals express…and seeks to establish guarantees for all individuals’ (p.122). Human security thinking’s
ethics bring an analytical advantage: a realistic attention to motivations, as diversely felt and expressed in different times and places.

Tadjbaksh traces the tangled story of the use and adaptation of Haq’s notion. For some rich countries, ‘human security’ became a theme to focus or legitimize their foreign policy, but was not considered as having domestic relevance.10 ‘Human security’ policy understood as management of the alien ‘other’ was taken a step further by some bodies, to become a justification for special external interventions in states considered to be problem cases. Abuse of such reasoning—including finding reasons to destructively intervene, rather than recognizing duties to pre-emptively seek to prevent crises—has made the ‘human security’ banner suspect in other quarters. Tadjbaksh even asserts, perhaps naively, that ‘the advent of conditional, selective, and militarized aid were the unintended outcomes of [Haq’s] broadening of the meaning of “security”’ (p.138), as if such forms of aid would not have happened anyway under the governments in power at the time. Regarding the claim of ‘broadening’, the term ‘security’ has always applied to individuals not only to states, and not only for threats of physical violence (Gasper, 2010). Concerning the claim of unintended outcomes, the effect of Haq’s contribution has not been to create but to make open and to query the implicit prioritisation of elite interests, within and between countries, that is often associated with attempted narrowing of the application of the term ‘security’. Tadjbaksh appears though to despair of humanizing security language: ‘We should perhaps respond instead by inventing a new non-military term, such as “human dignity”’ (p.141). As we saw from Haq and Burki, that term has been at the heart of the perspective from the beginning; we have seen also that ‘human dignity’ does not subsume all its important themes.

Human security thinking continues to spread, in many and diverse channels, academic, governmental, inter- and non-governmental, as a perspective that is open to the interconnectedness, subjectivity and fragility in human lives and deaths (see e.g.: UNESCO, 2008; Goucha and Crowley, 2008; UNDP, 2009; Gasper, 2009c). The paper by Khadija Haq and Jolly provides more insight into this spread, and is the piece in Pioneering which best captures Mahbub ul Haq’s intellectual journey. Beginning as a technocrat for planned industrialisation within his country, Pakistan, Haq ended as a visionary spokesman for human-centred development on a global scale, for only with a global perspective and global sympathies can sustainable human-centred development be motivated and effected. The 1990 version of the concept of ‘human development’ proved not to be the end of intellectual history. The approach requires, Haq insisted, continuing critical evaluation and evolution, not only routine professionalization. It has to maintain energy and focus by renewing its values and vision. If economic development is only (at best) a means towards the attainment of reasoned human
values, then attention must go to the notions of ‘human’ and the processes of valuing and reasoning. So as we saw the concepts of human security, human rights and democracy have risen in prominence. The idea of human security, in particular, may contribute not a marginal add-on to human development thinking, but part of a needed basis of vision and values, as a perspective on global interconnection and human dignity.

REFERENCES


---

1 That Khadija Haq came from East Pakistan and Mahbub from West Pakistan would have contributed to lively awareness of this dimension.

2 Ranis et al. use reductions in infant mortality shortfalls compared to the best performing country as their main measure of ‘human development’, and refer much to total health and education expenditures. This reflects however not a conception of human development centred on human resource development, as in the World Bank, but a pragmatic response to what data is broadly available.

3 Krznaric’s extensive 2007 review of many social science literatures on ‘How Change Happens’ thus contains very little on leadership.

4 For example, Streeten (1954) formulated key methodological principles for a human development approach, some of which were reflected in the later work led by Myrdal (notably Myrdal 1968; see
Angresano 1997, Dykema 1986; also discussion in Gasper (2008, sections 2.2 and 3). The principles did not acquire the more extended and vivid articulation required for them to ‘fly’ until the work led by Haq and Sen from the 1980s.

5 Haq sometimes used the ‘basic human needs’ label (e.g., 1976, Ch.4) but often without yet its full content.

6 The Istanbul Roundtable of 1983, recorded in Haq ed. (1984), focused on defending human resource development in a context of international economic crises. The successor meeting of 1985, recorded in Haq and Kirdar (eds., 1986) moved in the direction of a broad synthesising conception of human development, but the papers which clearly express this (Jolly and Stewart; Nudler; Stewart; Jolly) were greatly outnumbered by others that discuss ‘the human factor’, ‘the human dimension’ and ‘the human element’ largely as human resource development (health and education, viewed especially as instruments towards economic growth). The book and declaration from the 1986 Salzburg meeting (Haq and Kirdar, eds. 1987) have the same character. The 1987 Budapest meeting (Haq and Kirdar, eds. 1988) again produced a hybrid. After an emphatic foreword by ul Haq and an overview by him and Jolly (in which ‘the field of human development’ could still have a sectoral meaning as ‘education, health and other basic needs programs’; Jolly and Haq, 1988, p.5), most papers remained far from the conception of human development we see since 1990 in the Human Development Reports. This arrived only in the Declaration of the 1988 Amman Roundtable (Haq and Kirdar, eds. 1989, Ch.3), which adopted Haq’s concept of human development and Sen’s capabilities approach, as expounded vigorously and at length by Griffin and Knight (1989). After reviewing ‘many decades of struggle for development’, Kirdar concluded that ‘we are today rediscovering the obvious truth—as Mahbub ul Haq puts it [in the 1988 Paul Hoffmann Lecture ‘People in Development’]—“that people are both the means and the end of economic development”’ (Kirdar, 1989, p.199).

7 A somewhat comparable case was Raul Prebisch. Prebisch perhaps remained a spokesman of the South, whereas Haq came to articulate a strong global perspective. Extended comparison of Haq’s career with those of Myrdal, Prebisch, et al. would be rewarding, but exceeds the scope of this review essay. Useful short overviews of their careers are found in Simon (2006).

8 Paul Streeten in particular provided some of the best known sound bites.

9 William James’s older version is also apposite here: ‘First, you know, a new theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true, but obvious and insignificant; finally it is seen to be so important that its adversaries claim that they themselves discovered it.’ From his Pragmatism (1907, New York: Longman Green), http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/articles/pragmatism-a.pdf (June 4, 2010).

10 Tadjbaksh goes on to state that ‘No country, neither in the developed nor developing world, has adopted human security as a national policy principle’ (pp. 133-4). This judges by labels rather than contents; but in terms of labels too, Thailand has a Ministry of Social Development and Human Security.