NOTIONS OF THE GOOD LIFE

Ruut Veenhoven

In: David, S.A., Boniwell, I & Ayers, A.C., (Eds.),The Oxford Handbook of Happiness*, *Chapter 12, p 161-173, 2013, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. ISBN 978-0-19-955725-7

The word "happiness" has many different meanings. In the broadest sense it denotes the quality of life as a whole and in the most limited sense it refers to a moment of bliss. This 'Handbook of Happiness" is about happiness in a broad sense and could as well have been entitled "Handbook of Quality of Life" or "Handbook of Well-being." Given the breadth of the topic, it is useful to start this section with an inspection of the more specific meanings of the word happiness and explain which of these meanings are used in the following chapters.

1 FOUR QUALITIES OF LIFE

Let us start with the term with the broadest connotation, that is, "quality of life." This term suggests that there is such a thing as a single quality of life, but we have never agreed on what that quality is. The term *quality* is easily used in rhetoric but the concept crumbles when analyzed scientifically, and it appears to be "multidimensional". After ages of fruitless discussion, it is time to acknowledge that we cannot meaningfully put all the good in one hat. So we ought to think of different *qualities* of life. In this context it is useful to distinguish between chances for a good life and outcomes of life, and between external and internal qualities of life.

Chances and outcomes

Much of the literature on the good life is about chances, the preconditions that act upon an individual's life, for example having loving parents or, conversely, losing one's parents in a car accident. These "chances" are not the same as "outcomes", or life results. Chances can fail to be cultivated, as in the cases of gifted people who squander their talents. Conversely, people sometimes make much of their life in spite of poor chances, as in the case of migrants who start with nothing and work hard to build successful lives.

Scheme 1
Four qualities of life

	Outer qualities	*Inner qualities*
Life chances	**Livability of environment**	**Life-ability of the person**
Life outcomes	**Utility of life**	**Appreciation of life**

Correspondence: Prof. Dr. Ruut Veenhoven Erasmus University Rotterdam, Faculty of Social Sciences, P.O.B. 1738 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands and North-West University in South Africa
www2.eur.nl/fsw/research/veenhoven

This distinction between chances and outcomes is quite common in the field of public health research. Preconditions for good health, such as adequate nutrition and professional care, are seldom mixed in with health itself. Much health research is aimed at assessing the relationships between chances and outcomes; for instance by checking whether common nutritional advice really yields extra years lived in good health. However, chances and outcomes are less well distinguished in other fields.

External and internal qualities A second difference is between "external" and "internal" qualities of life. In the first case the quality is in the environment, in the latter it is in the individual. Lane (1994) made this distinction clear by extricating "quality of society" from "quality of persons." This distinction is also quite commonly made in public health. External pathogens are distinguished from internal disorders, and researchers try to identify the mechanisms by which the former produce the latter and the conditions in which this is more and less likely. Yet again this bask insight is often lacking in discussions in other fields.

The combination of these two dichotomies yields a fourfold matrix. This classification is presented in Scheme 1. The distinction between chances and outcomes is presented vertically, the difference between external and internal qualities is shown horizontally.

1.1 Two kinds of life chances

In the upper half of the scheme in Scheme 1 we see two variants of potential quality of life: the external opportunities in ones environment and the internal capacities to exploit these. The external chances are denoted by the term *livability,* while the internal chances are identified by the term *life-ability*. This distinction is not new, however, the language used to describe these conditions is; in the literature on the psychology of stress these conditions often bear negative connotations, for example outer "burden" and inner "bearing power."

Livability of the environment

The top left quadrant represents the meaning of good living conditions. These can be physical conditions such as clean air or social conditions such as mutual trust. Often the terms "quality of life" and "well-being" are used in this particular meaning, especially in the writings of ecologists and sociologists. Economists (e.g. Allardt, 1976) sometimes use the term "welfare" while another term used by sociologists is "level of living." "Livability" is a better word, because it does not have the limited connotation of material conditions. It also refers explicitly to a ch aracteristic of the environment, for example, physical aspects of livability are moderate temperature and fresh air, while some social aspects are rule of law and freedom. Elsewhere I have explored the concept of livability in more detail (Veenhoven, 1996, pp. 7-9).

Life-ability of the person

The top right quadrant in Scheme 1 denotes inner life chances, that is, how well we are equipped to cope with the problems of life. This involves physical abilities such as good sight, as well as mental abilities such as social intelligence. This aspect of the good life is also known by different names. The words "quality of life" and "well-being" are also used to denote this specific meaning, especially by doctors and psychologists. There are more names, however. In biology the phenomenon is referred to as "adaptive potential." On other occasions it is denoted by the medical term health," in the medium variant of the word,[1] or by psychological terms such as "efficacy" or potency" I prefer the simple term "life-ability " which contrasts elegantly with "livability''

1.2 Two kinds of life outcomes

The lower half of the scheme in Scheme 1 is about the quality of life with respect to its outcomes. These outcomes can be judged by the value they provide to one's environment as well is the value they provide to the self. The worth of a life for the external environment is denoted by the term "utility of life." The inner valuation is called "appreciation of life." These matters are, of course, related. Knowing that one's life is useful will typically add to the appreciation of it. Yet, not all useful lives are happy lives, and neither are all "useless" lives unhappy.

Utility of life

The bottom left quadrant represents the external outcomes of life, that is, the product or result of one's life endeavors. There is no current generic term for these effects of a persons life on his or her environment. Gerson (1976, p. 795) referred to "transcendental" conceptions of quality of life. Another appellation is "meaning of life," which denotes a universal sense of significance or purpose and is beyond a subjective sense of meaning (Frankl, 1946). I prefer the more simple "utility of life," admitting that this label may also give rise to misunderstanding.[2] Be aware that this external outcome does not require inner awareness. A person's life may be useful from some viewpoints, without them knowing, as demonstrated by Victor Frankl's logo-therapy, that aims to help people recognize and believe in the meanings of their life that they are not able to see for themselves.

Appreciation of life

Finally, the bottom right quadrant represents the internal outcomes of life. That is, how the individual judges or perceives the quality of their own life. This is commonly referred to by terms such as "subjective well-being," "life-satisfaction," and "happiness" in a limited sense of the word. Life has more of this quality, the more and the longer it is enjoyed. In fairy tales this combination of intensity and duration is denoted with the phrase "they lived long and happily ever after".

Scheme 2
Comparable concepts in biology

	Outer quality	*Inner quality*
Life chances	**Biotope**	**Fitness**
Life outcomes	**Adaptation:** **Continuation of species**	**Adaptation:** **Long and happy life**

1.3 Similar distinctions in biology

In evolutionary biology, external living conditions are referred to as the "biotope" or "habitat." A biotope can be more or less suitable (livable) for a species, depending on, for example, availability of food, shelter, and competition. Inner capabilities to survive in that environment are called "fitness." This latter term acknowledges that capabilities must meet (fit) environmental demand. Unlike moral philosophers, biologists see no quality in a capacity that is not functional.

This chance-constellation is seen to result in "adaptation," and good adaptation is seen to manifest in "survival," that is, a relatively long life. An organism that perishes prematurely has adapted less well than the one that completed its expected lifetime. In humans, good adaptation also reflects in increased hedonic experience. Continuous stress and pain are indicative of poor adaptation, while positive experiences, like pleasure and joy, denote good adaptation. As humans are capable of reflecting on their experiences, their feelings of pleasure and pain condense into overall appraisals of life satisfaction. So, human adaptation manifests in long and happy living. Though inner experience is no great issue in biology, this idea is implied in its logic. These biological concepts are summarized in Scheme 2.

2 MEANINGS WITHIN QUALITY QUADRANTS

Most discussions of the good life deal with more specific values than the four qualities of life discerned here. Within each of the quadrants there is a myriad of submeanings, most of which are known under different names. It would require a voluminous book to record all the terms and meanings used in the literature. I present some of the main variants next. The main points are summarized in Scheme 3.

2.1 Aspects of livability

Livability is an umbrella term for the various qualities of the environment that seem relevant for meeting human needs. In rhetorical use, the word refers mostly to specific kinds of qualities which typically root in some broader perception of a good society. The circumstantial qualities that are emphasized differ widely across contexts and disciplines.

For example, ecologists see livability in the natural environment and describe it in terms of pollution, global warming, and degradation of nature. Currently, they associate livability typically with environmental preservation. City planners see livability in the built environment and associate it with such things as sewer systems, traffic jams, and ghetto formation. Here the good life is seen as a fruit of human Intervention.

In the sociological view, society is central. Firstly, livability is associated with the quality of society as a whole. Classic concepts of a good society stress material welfare and social equality, sometimes equating the concept more or less with the welfare state (Bellah et al.. Current notions emphasize close networks, strong norms, and active voluntary associations. The reverse of this livability concept is social fragmentation. Secondly, livability is seen in one's position in society and equated with one's position on the social ladder. For a long time the emphasis was on the "under-class," people at the bottom of the social ladder seen to be "deprived." Currently attentions have shifted from the "underclass" to what I call the "outer-class" where poor livability is seen as a matter of "social exclusion."

2.2 Kinds of life-ability

The most common depiction of this life-ability is the absence of functional defects. I his is health" in the limited sense, sometimes referred to as "negative health.” In this context doctors focus on unimpaired functioning of the body, while psychologists stress the absence of mental defect. In their language, of life and well being are often synonymous with mental health. I his use of words presupposes a "normal" level of functioning. Good quality of life is the body and mind working as designed. I his is the common meaning used in curative care.

Next to absence of disease one can consider excellence of function. I his is referred to as “positive health” and associated with energy and resilience. Psychological concepts of positive mental health also involve autonomy, reality control, creativity, and inner synergy of traits and strivings. A new term in this context is “emotional intelligence” (Goleman, 1998). Though originally meant for specific mental skills, this term has come to denote a broad range of mental capabilities. This broader definition is the favorite in training professions.

A further step is to evaluate capability in a developmental perspective and to include acquisition of new skills for living. This is commonly denoted by the term “self-actualization” (Maslow, 1970). From this point of view, a middle-aged man is not “well” if he behaves like an adolescent, even if he functions without problems at this level. Since abilities do not develop in idleness, this quality of life is close to the “activity” which is close to Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia that he defined as “virtuous activity in accordance with reason" (Ostenfelt, 1994). This quality concept is also currently used in the training professions.

Lastly, the term “art of living” denotes special life-abilities; in most contexts this quality is distinguished from mental health and sometimes even attributed to slightly disturbed persons. Art of living is associated with refined tastes, an ability to enjoy life, and an original style of life.

2.3 Criteria for utility of life

When evaluating the external effects of a life, one can consider its functionality for the environment. In this context, doctors stress how essential a patient’s life is to their intimates. The life of a mother with young children is valued more highly than the life of a woman of the same age without children.

At a higher level, quality of life is seen in contributions to society. Historians see quality in the addition an individual can make to human culture, and rate, for example, the lives of great inventors higher than those of anonymous peasants. Moralists see quality in the preservation of the moral order, and would deem the life of a saint to be better than that of a sinner.

In this vein the quality of a life is also linked to effects on the ecosystem. Ecologists see more quality in a life lived in a “sustainable” manner than in the life of a polluter. In a broader view, the utility of life can be seen in its consequences for long-term evolution. As an individual’s life can have many environmental effects, the number of such utilities is almost infinite.

Apart from its functional utility, life is also judged on its moral or esthetic value. Most of us would attribute more quality to the life of Florence Nightingale than to that of a criminal, even if it appeared that her good works had a negative result in the end (for example, medical care for soldiers lowered the threshold for warfare). In classic moral philosophy this is called virtuous living, and is often presented as the essence of true happiness. This concept of exemplaric utility sometimes merges with notions of inner life-ability, in particular in the case of self-actualization. Self-development is deemed good, even if it might complicate life (Von Wright, 1963).

This quality criterion is external, that is, individuals need not be aware of their usefulness or may actually despise it. It is an outsider that appraises the quality of the individual's life on the basis of an external criterion. In religious thinking, such a judgment is made by God on the basis of eternal truth, in postmodern thought it is narrated by self-proclaimed experts on the basis of local conviction.

Clearly, the utility of life is not easy to grasp; both the criteria and those who would judge it, are multifarious and this prohibits comprehensive measurement of this quality of life.

2.4 Appreciations of life

Humans are capable of evaluating their life in different ways. As already noted, we appraise our situation affectively. We feel good or bad about particular things and our m level signals overall adaptation. As in animals, these affective appraisals are automatic, unlike other animals, humans can reflect on that experience. We have an idea of how have felt over the last year, while a cat does not. Humans can also judge life cognitively comparing life as it is with notions of how it should be.

Cognition and affect

Most human evaluations are based on two sources of information, that is, intuitive affective appraisal and cognitively guided evaluation. The mix depends mainly on the object. Tang things such as our income are typically evaluated by cognitive comparison; intangible n Iris such as sexual attractiveness are evaluated by how they feel, that is, intuitive affective appraisal. This dual evaluation system probably makes the human experiential repertoire richer than that of our fellow-creatures.

In evaluating our life we typically summarize this rich experience in overall appraisals. Instance we appreciate particular domains of life. When asked how we feel about our "wn or our "marriage," we will mostly have an opinion. Likewise, most people form ideas about separate qualities of their life, for instance, how "challenging" their life is and whether there is any "meaning" in it. Next to these appraisals of particular parts of our life, we also evaluate quality of our life as a whole. Such judgments are made in different time-perspectives. The past, the present, and the future. As the future is less palpable than the past and the present, hopes and fears depend more on affective inclination than on cognitive calculation.

Ruut Veenhoven Notions of the good life

Mostly such judgments are not very salient in our consciousness. Now and then they come to mind spontaneously, and they can be recalled and refreshed when needed. Sometimes, however, life-appraisals develop into pervasive mental syndromes such as depression.

Dominance of affect

Many scholars think of happiness as the result of a cognitive operation. For instance, utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1789/1983) spoke of a "mental calculus." More recent Andrews and Withey (1976) suggest that individuals compute a weighted average of earlier life-aspect evaluations, while Michalos's (1985) multiple discrepancy theory presumes that individuals compare life as it is with various standards of how it should be. Many philosophers see happiness as an estimate of success in realizing one's life plan (e.g., Nordenfelt, 1989).

Yet there are good reasons to assume that overall life satisfaction is mostly inferred from affective experience (Veenhoven, 2009). One reason is that life as a whole is not a suitable object for calculative evaluation. Life has many aspects and there is usually not one clear cut ideal model to compare it with. Another reason seems to be that affective signals tend to dominate, seemingly cognitive appraisals are often instigated by affective cues (Zajonc, 1980). This fits the theory that the affective system is the older in evolutionary terms, and that cognition works as an addition to that navigation system rather than as a replacement (Veenhoven, 2009).

This issue has important consequences for the significance of subjective appreciation as a criterion for quality of life. If appreciation is a matter of mere comparison with arbitrary standards, there is little of value in a positive evaluation; dissatisfaction is then an indication of high demands. If, however, life satisfaction signals the degree to which innate needs are met, it denotes how well we thrive.

Whatever the method of assessment, the fact that we are able to come to an overall evaluation of life is quite important. Later on in this chapter we will see that this is the only basis for encompassing judgments of the quality of life.

3 MEANINGS DENOTED BY RELATED TERMS

With the help of the taxonomy given earlier, we can now clarify the substantive meaning of several terms that are commonly used for denoting qualities of life. This enumeration is not exhaustive; the goal is to illustrate this approach. The following diagrams refer to Scheme 1 and indicate which of the four qualities of life are at stake. The darker the shade of a quadrant, the more that particular quality of life is addressed.

Ruut Veenhoven Notions of the good life

Adjustment



This term came into use in the 1940s (see Cavan et al,, 1949), particularly in gerontological studies of "adjustment to old age," and was used interchangeably with "adaptation." These words were soon ousted by phrases like "morale," "psychological well-being," and "life-satisfaction." Adjustment refers to personal qualities; hence it belongs on the right side of our matrix. Adjustment denotes how well a person deals with life, and refers to both equipment and success. Hence the concept does not fit one quadrant, but covers both life-abilities and life-appraisals. In the diagram this is indicated by two equally dark quadrants.

Art of living



The expression "art of living" refers, first of all, to a person's life ability and therefore belongs in the top right quadrant. As noted earlier, the term depicts mostly the quality of a lifestyle, typically refined Epicureanism, but sometimes the wisdom of simple living is also valued as artistry. This main meaning is reflected in the dark colored quadrant. Yet the term In ,us other connotations, capacity is often associated with its intended results, hence art of living tends to be equated with happiness, or at least with sensory gratification. Further, the life of an artist is sometimes valued as a piece of art in itself, which has some external utility, for instance, we see quality in the life of Casanova, renowned for his love of life and refined enjoyments, even though the man himself seems not to have been particularly happy. The adjunct connotations of the word are indicated in gray.

Capability



In SEN'S (1985) work, the word "capability" denotes the abilities required to improve one's sit Million, typically in the context of developing countries. Nussbaum rather refers to capability if, being able to live a truly human life" in the context of affluent society. "Being able" requires both freedom from external restraints and personal skills. Freedom from external restrains belongs in the top left quadrant of the matrix, while the personal competency to use environmental chances belongs in the top right quadrant. In Sen's work, the emphasis is in the top left quadrant, in particular where he argues against discrimination. Yet he also highlights education, which is an individual quality. In Nussbaum and Sen's (1993) work the emphasis in the top right quadrant. Most of the capabilities on her list are inner aptitudes, e.g., practical reason and imagination. Yet she also mentions protection against violent assault, which is an environmental factor.[3]

Deprivation



The word "deprivation" refers to a shortfall of something. When used in an absolute sense it means failure to meet basic human needs, when used in a relative sense it means being less well off than others. The word is typically used in the latter meaning, while suggesting the former. Current specifications of this notion are "poverty" and "social exclusion."

In most contexts the lack is in external conditions of life, and concerns access to income, power, and prestige. In social policy this kind of deprivation is typically met with redistribution of these scarce resources. This main meaning belongs in the livability quadrant.

Sometimes the word also refers to deficiency in the capacity to stand up for oneself. The political cure for this problem is "empowerment," common ingredients of which are general education, political training, and boosting of self-esteem, The latter adjunct definition belongs in the life-ability quadrant.

Usually these conditions are associated with individual happiness. Hence measures of deprivation often include items on di ssatisfaction, depression, and suicidal ideation. Enjoyment of life in spite of objective deprivation is seen as an anomaly and referred to as "resignation" (Zapf, 1984).

Happiness



As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the word "happiness" has often been used as a generic for all worth and is, in this sense, synonymous with comprehensive quality of life or "well-being." I distinguished four qualities of life (Scheme 1), one of which "appreciation of life" (bottom right quadrant), typically indicates satisfaction with life as a whole. The latter use of the word is most common in present day "happiness studies" and is the conceptual focus of the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven, 2010a).

Beyond this main denotation of the word, there are still further adjunctive uses of the term. This appears for example in the well known definition of happiness given by Tatarkiewicz (1975, p. 16) as *justified* satisfaction with life." The adjective "justified" means that mere enjoyment of life does not constitute (true) happiness if it occurs in objective situations, for example a prisoner cannot be really happy. Similarly, Tatarkiewicz would not call someone happy when the evaluation is based on misperception, such as when the enjoyment is derived from a "useless" life.

4 NOTIONS OF HAPPINESS ADRESSED IN THIS VOLUME

What kinds of happiness are addressed in this section on "Definitions of Happiness"? Using the conceptual matrix we can place the meanings addressed in each of the chapters.

4.1 Eudaimonic happiness: Chapters 15 and 16



The term *Eudaimonic* happiness is commonly used in contrast with hedonic happiness, and denotes that simply feeling good is not everything. The essence of a good life is seen in living good" rather than in "enjoying life" and living good is seen as "psychological development." In the words of Niemiec and Ryan in this volume (Chapter 16**):** "Eudaimonia . . . describes a process of living based on contemplation, virtue, and realization of potentials." In this context, philosophers emphasize intellectual development, while psychologist associate it with "full functioning" and "living in accord with one's true nature" (cf. Huta).

In this view of the good life, the emphasis is on life-ability in the top right quadrant of our conceptual matrix. Still, subjective enjoyment of life is commonly seen as an inseparable by product of psychological thriving and for that reason the bottom right quadrant is colored gray. Likewise, individual thriving is often associated with living a useful life and for that reason the bottom left quadrant is colored gray as well.

4.2 Subjective well-being: Chapter 13

The term *subjective well-being* (SWB) is often used in one breath with "life-satisfaction" and "happiness" and denotes "appreciation of life" in the bottom right quadrant. Following Diener (1984), Miao, Koo, and Oishi use the term for the subjective appreciation of life of one's life as a whole. "Appreciation" is seen to involve both affective enjoyment and cognitive contentment. "A person who scores high on subjective well-being should experience many positive and few negative emotions, while also reporting high life and specific domain evaluations."

4.3 Happiness: Chapter 14

In Chapter 14, Cummins uses the term happiness in a wider meaning and incorporates both affective and cognitive appraisals of life. In that use of the word, happiness is synonymous with subjective well-being (SWB) as defined by Diener, discussed in Chapters 13 and 15.

4.4 Functional well-being: Chapter 17



In the last chapter of this section, Vitterso introduces the notion of "functional well being" He considers not only how well we feel, but also the effects of that experience on other qualities of life. In this view, well-being as such belongs in the bottom right quadrant. The functional effects are depicted with arrows pointing to the other quadrants.

5 CONCLUSION

The term happiness is used for four different notions of the good life. In this section on "Definitions of Happiness" the emphasis is on two of these: "life ability" and "life satisfaction." In other words: this section is about psychological well-being, both in the objective sense of thriving well and in the subjective sense of enjoying life.

NOTES

[1] There are three main meanings for health: The maxi variant is all the good (World Health Organization (W*HO***)** definition), the medium variant is life-ability, and the mini variant is absence of physical defect.

[2] A problem with this term is that the utilitarians used the word "utility" for subjective appreciation of life, the sum of pleasures and pains.

[3] These concepts are discussed in more detail in Veenhoven (2010b)

Scheme 3
Some submeanings within quality-quadrants

	Outer qualities	***Inner qualities***
Life chances	**Livability of environment:** · Ecological: e.g., moderate climate, clean air, spacious housing · Social: e.g., freedom, equality, and brotherhood · Economical: e.g.,wealthy nation, generous social security, smooth economic development · Cultural: e.g., flourishing of arts and sciences, mass education · Etc...	**Life-ability of the person:** · Physical health: negative: free of disease positive: energetic, resilient · Mental health: negative: free of mental defects positive: autonomous, creative · Knowledge: e.g., literacy, schooling · Skills: e.g., intelligence, manners · Art of living: e.g., varied lifestyle, differentiated taste · Etc...
Life outcomes	***Objective utility of life:***	***Subjective appreciation of life:***
	· External utility e.g., for intimates: rearing children, care for friends, e.g., for society: being a good citizen, e.g., for mankind: leaving an invention Moral perfection e.g. authenticity, compassion, originality Etc...	· Appraisal of life-aspects: e.g., satisfaction with job e.g., satisfaction with variety · Prevailing moods: e.g., depression, ennui, e.g., zest · Overall appraisals: Affective: general mood-level Cognitive: contentment with life

REFERENCES

Allardt, A. (1976).
Dimensions of welfare in a comparative Scandinavian study.
Acta Sociologica, 19,227-239.

Andrews, F., & Withey, S. (1976).
Social indicators of wellbeing: American perceptions of quality of life.
New York, NY: Plenum Press.

Bellah, R. N,, Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. R., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1992).
The good society.
New York, NY: Vintage books.

Bentham, J. (1983). *An introduction into the principles of morals and legislation*.
In: The collected works of Jeremy Bentham. Oxford,
UK: Clarendon Press. (Original work published 1789).

Cavan, R.S., Burgess, E.W., Goldhamer, H., & Havighurst, R.J. (1949).
Personal adjustment in old age.
Chicago, IL: Science Research Associates.

Diener, E. (1984).
Subjective wellbeing.
Psychological Bulletin, 95,542-575.

Frankl, V. (1946).
Mans search for meaning, an introduction to logo-therapy.
Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Gerson, E. M. (1976).
On quality of life.
American Sociological Review, 41,793-806.

Goleman, D. (1998).
Working with emotional intelligence.
New York, NY: Bantam Books.

Jahoda, M. (1958).
Current concepts of positive mental health.
New York, NY: Basic Books.

Lane, R. E. (1994).
Quality of life and quality of persons. A new role for government.
Political theory, 22,219-252.

Maslow, A. H. (1970).
Motivation and personality.
New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Michalos, A. (1985).
Multiple Discrepancy Theory (MDT).
Social Indicators Research, 16, 347-413

Nordenfelt, L. (1989)
Quality of life and happiness.
In S. Bjork & J. Vang, J. (Eds.), Assessing quality of life. Health service studies nr 1 (pp. 17-26).
Klintland, Sweden: Samhall.

Nussbaum, M. C., & Sen, A. (Eds.). (1993).
The quality of life.
Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press

Ostenfelt, E. (1994). *Aristotle on the good life and quality of life*.
In: Nordenfelt, L. (Ed.), Concepts and measurement of quality of life in healthcare (pp. 19-34).
Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.

Sen, A. (1985).
Commodities and capabilities.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Tatarkiewicz, W. (1975).
Analysis of happiness.
The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Veenhoven, R. (1984).
Conditions of happiness.
Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.

Veenhoven, R. (1996).
Happy life-expectancy.
Social Indicators Research, 39,1-58

Veenhoven, R. (2009).
How do we assess how happy we are?
In A. K. Dutt &B. Radcliff (Eds.), Happiness,economics and politics:
Towards a multi-disciplinary approach (pp. 45-69). Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar Publishers.

Veenhoven, R. (2010a).
World Database of Happiness: Continuous register of scientific research on subjective enjoyment of life.
Rotterdam, the Netherlands: Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Veenhoven, R. (2010b).
Capability and happiness: Conceptual difference and reality links.
Journal of Socio-Economics, 39,44-50.

Von Wright, G. H. (1963).
The varieties of goodness.
London, UK: Routledge & Kegan.

Zajonc, R. B. (1980).
Feeling and thinking: preference needs no inference.
American Psychologist, 35,151-175

Zapf, W. (1984).
Individuelle Wohlfahrt: Lebensbedingungen und wahrgenommene Lebensqualitat.
In W. Glatzer & W. Zapf (Eds.), Lebensqualitat in der Bundesrepublik. Objective Lebensbedingungen und subjectives Wohlbefnden (pp. 13-26).
Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Campus Verlag.