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2nd Cross-country comparison on knowledge sharing capabilities and best practice in police organisations.

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Abstract:

In this report we present the results from three studies of knowledge sharing within police organisations and with three other stakeholders (other forces in the same country, the public and forces in other countries). In the first study, 152 interviews were conducted with members from 17 police organisations drawn from all of the 10 countries involved in the COMPOSITE project. In the second study ten in-depth case studies of international knowledge sharing involving police organisations were carried out. The third study involved conducting a survey of 481 police members drawn from the ten member countries with the aim of developing an organisational knowledge sharing diagnostic tool. We present the findings in terms of the perceived effectiveness of knowledge sharing in different domains, the most frequent types of knowledge shared, the most and least effective methods of knowledge sharing and the most common perceived barriers and facilitators for knowledge sharing both within police organisations and between the aforementioned stakeholders. Analyses are summarised across all countries as well as pointing out differences between countries with concluding comments highlighting the main themes and recommendations emerging from the analyses. The findings are integrated into a conceptual framework of ten types of factors found to influence knowledge sharing effectiveness in different domains (staff capabilities, process capabilities, technology capabilities, financial resources,

information characteristics, timeliness of information sharing, organizational differences, political differences, public factors and international factors). Practical recommendations arising from this highlight the importance of building up the human factors of motivation, trust, knowledge, skills and experience of police personnel and facilitating methods for direct contact between different police and non-police stakeholders as a crucial set of knowledge sharing capabilities for police organisations. A new diagnostic tool designed specifically for police organisations (EKSPD-DI) based on this research is presented in this report as a means of helping benchmark knowledge sharing performance and areas for development.

Knowledge Sharing Capabilities and Best Practices in Police Organisations: Studies of Policing in Ten European Countries



2nd Cross-Country Comparison Interim Report
(COMPOSITE Work Package 3, Deliverable 3.3)

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Executive Summary

BACKGROUND AND PROJECT AIMS

- COMPOSITE (Comparative Police Studies in the EU) is a research project funded over a period of four years out of the FP 7 Framework Programme of the European Union. COMPOSITE is looking into large-scale change processes in police forces all over Europe and attempts to find out what factors contribute to the success or failure of these change processes. Through different work package streams, researchers will have a close look at organisational structures, organisational identities and cultures, leadership styles, and processes.
- COMPOSITE Work Package 3 'Knowledge Sharing Capabilities and Best Practices in Organisations' was tasked with investigating knowledge sharing practices at a number of levels to build a picture of organizational knowledge sharing capability at the local, regional, national and international level. Policing is increasingly an information-rich and knowledge intensive practice, hence the development of effective knowledge sharing capabilities are vital to operational success. Understanding how to do this is problematic since an earlier systematic review by this report's authors showed that the extant literature on knowledge sharing in policing contexts is relatively scarce (appearing to be entirely absent in a number of European countries), focused primarily on intra-organisational knowledge sharing and concerned with technological processes only (Allen & Birdi, 2011). The COMPOSITE project therefore provided a platform to fill the extensive gap in knowledge through the undertaking of three new empirical studies involving all 10 members of the consortium.
- This Executive Summary relates to the final report 'Deliverable 3.3. Knowledge Sharing Capabilities and Best Practices in Police Organisations: A Study of Policing in Ten European Countries. Second cross-country comparison', in which we present the results of empirical research across the 10 COMPOSITE countries (Belgium, The Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Macedonia, The Netherlands, Romania, Spain and The UK). The aims of this project were to investigate police organisations' knowledge sharing along

four dimensions: i) within the police organisation, ii) between police organisations in the same country, iii) between the police organisation and the public and iv) international knowledge sharing with forces in other countries or international police agencies with regards to four Research Questions:

1: How effective are police organisations at sharing knowledge both internally and with external bodies (other forces in the same country, with forces in other countries / international agencies and the public)?

2: What different types of knowledge are most commonly shared in the above four domains?

3: How effective are different methods of knowledge sharing in the above four domains?

4: What are the major antecedents (barriers and facilitators) of successful knowledge sharing in the four domains?

An additional key practical objective was to produce a knowledge sharing diagnostic tool for police organisations as a result of the research.

METHODOLOGY

A combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods were used in order to provide both richness of detail and allow the testing of relationships and differences. The three studies we report on are as follows:

1. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 152 police organisation members drawn from the COMPOSITE consortium countries. The sampling strategy was designed to include police members from junior, middle management and senior ranks in order to provide a broader perspective across the hierarchy. Since approximately 15 interviews were done within each country, it should be noted that the findings are more illustrative rather than representative of each country. Short questionnaires were also included within the interview protocol.

2. Ten case studies of international knowledge sharing between forces or agencies were produced by all COMPOSITE country research teams. Six of the case studies explored cross-border collaborative work, including projects and collaborative investigations which require cross-border sharing, and four of the case studies explored the work of international policing organisations. Each case study examined the following aspects: what knowledge is shared and how; facilitators of knowledge sharing; barriers to knowledge sharing; examples of best practice in knowledge sharing; and the future perspective, i.e. what knowledge sharing will be required in the future and what capabilities will be needed to facilitate this.
3. A questionnaire survey building on the findings of the first two studies was conducted with police forces in the consortium countries. In total, 481 police organisation members took part in this study. The questionnaire was the initial version of the diagnostic knowledge sharing tool EKSPD-DI and it allowed the analysis of quantitative responses from a much wider sample than in the other two studies.

KEY FINDINGS

RQ1: How effective are police organisations at sharing knowledge both internally and with external bodies (other forces in the same country, with forces in other countries / international agencies and the public)?

- Overall, participating police organisations felt on average they were effective, rather than outstanding, at internal knowledge sharing. Knowledge sharing within teams was rated as most effectively done, followed a way behind by sharing between teams and between functions. Although still very near the 'Effective' rating, knowledge sharing between ranks and between senior management was relatively rated a little lower indicating the vertical flows of knowledge up and down the hierarchy are not executed as well as horizontal flows between teams or functions.
- Internal knowledge sharing effectiveness overall was rated highest of the four domains we asked participants to rate, followed by interacting with the public, then with other

forces and least effectively internationally with forces in other countries or international agencies.

RQ2: What different types of knowledge are most commonly shared in the above four domains?

- Thematic analyses of the qualitative responses in the interview and case studies produced eight major categories of knowledge sharing conducted by police organisations: intelligence and related operational information; information on the workings of the police; police performance-related information; Crime prevention information; legislation and policy; Information about the region; learning; and rumours
- Analysis of the data gathered from piloting the diagnostic tool showed that internally, police participants felt the sharing of intelligence and operational information plus legislation issues were done the most effectively but that sharing strategic priorities and information on future directions was done somewhat less effectively. This does echo the earlier finding where information sharing hierarchically between ranks was rated as less effective than horizontal movement of knowledge between teams or functions.

RQ3: How effective are different methods of knowledge sharing in the above four domains?

- Interview participants were asked to describe the most and least effective methods of knowledge sharing they had experienced. Thematic analysis of the qualitative data generated a taxonomy of 13 methods: personal interactions; paper-based methods including letters, newsletters and posters; telephone; email; Web-based methods such as intranets, the internet or social media; videoconferencing; police radio; databases and online systems; group learning activities such as workshops and seminars; co-location of forces; exchanges and visits between forces; intermediary agencies like CEPOL; and the media (press, TV and radio).
- Most methods had their advantages and disadvantages and we highlight the specific issues in the report.

- The interview study in Section 2 also attempted to provide an overall perspective on preferred modes of communication in the participating police forces with regards to formality and virtual versus personal nature of the methods.
- As might be expected, overall formal face-to-face methods such as briefings and courses proved to be the most popular mode of knowledge sharing. Informal face-to-face methods such as conversations with colleagues or networking events came second overall, closely followed by formal virtual methods such as databases or online courses. The least popular mode was in terms of informal virtual methods such as online forums and social media.
- Interestingly, the pattern of second and third most popular modes varied from country to country. Informal face-to-face methods were the second most common method in Romania, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, Germany and Italy while the UK, Belgium and France put formal virtual methods second.

RQ4: What are the major antecedents (barriers and facilitators) of successful knowledge sharing in the four domains?

- Drawing across the three studies we produced a conceptual framework of antecedents to knowledge sharing in each of the four domains. The antecedents were grouped into 10 types of factors:
 - A. Staff Capabilities – personal experience and knowledge, motivation to share knowledge, the development of good relationships between institutions or the public, team effectiveness and co-operation and leadership
 - B. Process Capabilities - effective operational management, flexibility of working methods and location, clear responsibilities and goals, effective procedures and documentation for knowledge sharing and shared goals and responsibilities
 - C. Technology Capabilities – accessibility and reliability
 - D. Financial Resources

E. Information Characteristics – clarity of information, accessibility of information, sensitivity of information (e.g. legal restrictions) and accuracy and relevance of information

F. Timeliness and speed of information sharing

G. Organizational differences

H. Political differences – intraorganisational, interorganisational and national

I. Public factors – public image of police, police engagement with the public, the media (press, TV and radio)

J. International factors – different legal systems, joint legislation or written agreements on co-operation, strategic importance of issues in countries and visibility of international agencies with regular police forces

- Links were made between each of the above factors and the four domains of knowledge sharing, highlighting that certain factors were important for all modes of knowledge sharing but others were only relevant to specific contexts.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENT EKSPD-DI

This report also presents a new knowledge sharing diagnostic tool (EKSPD-DI) specifically designed for police organisations

- EKSPD-DI was developed, in collaboration with each of the consortium countries, to provide police forces with an opportunity to assess and benchmark their knowledge sharing capabilities.
- It consists of an assessment questionnaire and a manual which provides guidance on when and how to use the questionnaire, how to interpret the results and understand the findings, and also provide recommendations based on current research and best practice identified during the study. It also includes insights from earlier COMPOSITE projects.

- During development of the instrument, all countries were consulted on the first draft and their involvement and constructive feedback led to the development of the pilot version of the questionnaire. All countries were involved in piloting the questionnaire in some way, and despite some difficulties experienced by countries to engage forces with the questionnaire, an excellent 481 completed pilot questionnaires were received.
- As part of the pilot, countries and respondents were asked to provide feedback on the process and the questionnaire. The data analysis and the feedback then informed the design of the version of EKSPD-DI provided in the report.
- This current version of EKSPD-DI can be circulated by paper or circulated and completed via email; it can also be converted to an online survey, something a number of countries did during the pilot.
- The manual, developed to give guidance to forces carry out a self assessment of their knowledge sharing capabilities, can be found in a separate report (COMPOSITE Deliverable 3.4).

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The report provides general conclusions around the theoretical and methodological contributions of the project plus offers a number of practical recommendations for police organisations wishing to improve their internal and external knowledge sharing effectiveness:

1. Emphasis should be placed upon developing people skills in knowledge sharing.
2. Effective leadership and leading by example are clearly key factors that impact on the effectiveness of a police force.
3. Clear and efficient processes for quick knowledge sharing should be developed between forces,
4. Strategies should be developed in conjunction with other forces for how knowledge is to be shared and when, and contact lists for communication drawn up – barriers

to knowledge sharing included lack of process and strategy, as well as not knowing who to contact within other forces.

5. The possibilities for co-location of forces should be explored.
6. Build up better relationships between police officers from different forces (within the same country and other countries) through regular face-to-face activities such as cross-border meetings, workshops, seminars and exchange visits.
7. Standardised technological systems should be created / utilised.
8. Good working relationships should be established across countries.
9. Language skills should be improved in those who are required to share knowledge internationally
10. Awareness of organisational and legislative differences should be improved
11. Awareness of international centres / projects / organisations should be improved

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aims and Objectives

This report is the final output of COMPOSITE Work Package 3 (Knowledge Sharing Capabilities and Best Practices in Police Organisations) which had the following objectives:

1. Develop a framework for understanding knowledge sharing practices within and between police organisations across Europe.
2. Assess individual and organisational barriers and enablers to knowledge sharing.
3. Develop a diagnostic tool to assess the knowledge sharing capabilities of an organisation.

Objective 1 was met by conducting and reporting a systematic literature review of knowledge sharing within police contexts (Allen & Birdi, 2011; Deliverable 3.1). The literature review highlighted the paucity of research on the topic, with some COMPOSITE members finding that there were no academically-credible studies on police knowledge sharing within their own country. The review also highlighted the need to examine inter-organisational, as well as intra-organisational, knowledge sharing, with identification of concomitant barriers, enablers and examples of good practice.

Within this document we therefore present the next stage of our research, empirical research into knowledge sharing along four dimensions: i) within the police organisation, ii) between police organisations in the same country, iii) between the police organisation and the public and iv) international knowledge sharing with forces in other countries or international police agencies. This report will therefore provide a rounded view on the knowledge sharing capabilities of the police organisations taking part in the COMPOSITE consortium. No other study in the extant literature has looked systematically on a European level at the knowledge sharing practices of so many police forces. This report directly addresses Objectives 2 and 3 and provides additional insights into Objective 1.

It should be noted that our efforts on Work Package 3 (WP3) integrate with the other existing COMPOSITE projects. Work Package 1 investigated environmental opportunities and threats to European policing organisations and we focus our research on knowledge sharing with key partners in the environment. Work Package 2 set out to identify the major

internal capabilities of police organisations and we delve deeper into understanding in particular the area of knowledge sharing capabilities. Work Package 4 is investigating emerging trends and best practices in technology and we investigate the efficacy of technological versus non-technological methods with respect to the sharing of knowledge. We also help lay the foundations of better understanding of police functioning for the upcoming primary Work Packages. WP5 is investigating structural and cultural change in police forces and we address the relationship between knowledge sharing capabilities and organisational flexibility. WP6 is focusing on identity and legitimation in police forces and examine perspectives on knowledge sharing from different ranks of police officers. WP7 is profiling leadership and we investigate the role of leadership and management in promoting effective knowledge sharing.

Before we describe the empirical research which forms the basis of this report, we will provide the contextual and theoretical background underlying our work.

1.2. Contextual Background

Policing is increasingly an information-rich (Puonti, 2004) and knowledge intensive practice (Chen et al., 2002). Police work depends on turning complex information into evidence (Dean, 1995), and effective knowledge sharing not only within forces but also between police organisations is now essential for success in many aspects of performance. COMPOSITE Work Package 2 (Betteridge, Casey, Graham, Polos & Witteloostuijn, 2012, Deliverable WP2.2) has previously described the importance of knowledge sharing for successfully transferring best practices between police organisations. For example, in Italy, cooperation among and between Italian police forces has been reinforced to optimise the use of resources and the sharing of knowledge during times of financial pressure. A further example from police forces in the Netherlands was the development of skills and specific training in interrogation and tapping techniques that had been transferred from another police force within the country. In the United Kingdom, the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) has been responsible for the transfer of knowledge and skills between forces, acting as guardians of best practices. However, it was reported that transfer of such knowledge can also be problematic, with differences in size, culture and sometimes

unhealthy competition between forces becoming major barriers; in those cases the preferences is to share knowledge solely within the organisation.

Across Europe, police organisations must increasingly coordinate information, create communication networks and share policing expertise with each other and with other agencies. A greater emphasis on transnational policing also means that police organisations must operate across geographical boundaries to build an integrated understanding of security issues. Work Package 2 (Betteridge et al., 2012) highlighted a number of interesting recent instances where this has taken place. For example, for the installation and operation in Romania of SCOMAR (a complex system for the observation and management of traffic in the Black Sea area), as France and Spain were already operating similar systems, Romanian experts visited the Guardia Civil (in Spain) and the Gendarmerie (in France) to study the systems and their operation in the field. The main knowledge transfer was from the Spanish SCOMAR system, used by the Guardia Civil (Spanish Border Police) for several years mainly on the African border. Collaboration with the Spanish and French colleagues was essential since they later helped in training the Romanian SCOMAR personnel. Other cases that utilised external sources as a source of ideas or to develop knowledge and capabilities were the Republic of Macedonia's implementation of the Schengen Action Plan, where the working group used the experiences and the Schengen Action Plans from Croatia, Czech Republic and Bulgaria and Safety Houses in the Netherlands, where the initiative took some inspiration from France's 'Maison de la Justice' initiative following the visit of two Dutch civil servants at the French ministry. Since these are just a few specific instances of best practices being transferred, there is a need to gain a much deeper understanding of the capabilities required to transfer a variety of different types of knowledge.

Given the increasing demands of citizens for greater transparency and flexibility in their police organisations, another important domain is the effectiveness of knowledge sharing with the public. COMPOSITE Work Package 1 (WP1), in its investigation of environmental challenges facing European police organisations, identified the public as the third most important external stakeholder for the police (Born & Witteloostuijn, 2011). However, the WP1 research concluded that police members felt the public do not understand policing very well and that overall, forces were not felt to perform well according to public expectation. This provides an added impetus to include interactions with the public as an

added domain of knowledge sharing effectiveness that needs to be studied in more detail. Not surprisingly, therefore, knowledge sharing in general is high on the agenda for many national police organisations (e.g., UK Government green paper, 'From the Neighbourhood to the National', Home Office, 2008).

1.3. Theoretical background

From a theoretical standpoint, this Work Package draws from several sources. According to the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991) organisations can develop sustained competitive advantage by creating value through firm-specific resources that are rare and difficult for competitors to imitate. This resource-based competence perspective is increasingly emerging as a knowledge-based theory of the firm, with significant attention being given to knowledge as a significant resource for creating sustained competitive advantage (Starkey & Tempest, 2004). The same perspective can be applied to public sector organisations such as the police, where, for example, the possession of accurate knowledge regarding criminal activities is a crucial influence on security performance. The implication here is that the better the quantity and quality of knowledge possessed by police forces, the better should be their organisational outcomes compared to similar organisations. The question is how to best optimise the collation and distribution of such a resource.

The second theoretical perspective therefore draws from the broader paradigm of organisational learning, which covers the extent to which an organization generates, disseminates and retains knowledge about itself (Argote & Ophir, 2002; Firestone & McElroy, 2004; Huber, 1991; López, Peón, & Ordás, 2005). With respect to the *generation of new knowledge*, an organisation can look to both externally- and internally-focused initiatives (Levitt and March, 1988). For example, the organisation can acquire useful information from its customers (through market research methods) or through interacting with other organisations (e.g. by benchmarking or collaborative projects) (Ingram, 2002) or internally by actively experimenting with novel methods through pilot projects (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). However, if that knowledge is not shared with the relevant constituents of the organisation, then its effect may be limited (Bontis, Crossan & Hulland, 2002). Therefore,

organisations enabling the sharing of knowledge across functions and between levels and other institutions should cultivate greater degrees of organisational learning (Lähteenmäki, Toivonen and Mattila, 2001). Communication systems can be technology-based (e.g. e-mail) but this can also be done simply through having formal procedures in place (e.g. information cascades where networks of individuals are identified for sharing information) (Lehesvirta, 2004). Furthermore, it has been argued that organisations which specifically encourage the upward and downward hierarchical flow of knowledge regarding decision-making should enhance inter-level learning processes (Crossan, Lane and White, 1999). This can be seen top-down where management ensure all employees are aware of the aims and future direction of the organisation and in the opposite direction where there is open access to senior management (Vera and Crossan, 2004). The final aspect concerns the *retention of knowledge*. Knowledge can partly be stored in individuals in the form of experience, skills and behaviour but there is a danger that if significant individuals leave the organisation, the knowledge goes with them too (Huber, 1991). More so than organisational learning researchers, the knowledge management literature has therefore stressed the importance of implementing *systems which store knowledge* in non-human form and therefore aid organisational memory (e.g. best practice databases, documenting key information in company manuals) (Firestone and McElroy, 2004). This can influence organisational performance by ensuring expertise is not lost when individuals leave the organisation, it means new employees can learn quicker and it means the wheel is not being reinvented as best practice based on experience can be accessed immediately (Huber, 1991).

The focus of Work Package 3 is on knowledge sharing, defined in this report as the “exchange between two or more parties of potentially valuable information” and involves both seeking and providing knowledge (e.g. Davenport, 1997; Ipe, 2003). This has been identified by many researchers as the most practically important component of organisational learning (e.g. Small and Sage, 2005/6). If organisations are unable to move knowledge to where it is needed, then it will be of little value. Through effective knowledge sharing, police departments can draw upon broad expertise, including the latest advancements in policing techniques and best practice. Knowledge sharing has been shown to be vital in minimising the repetition of errors and ensuring that inefficiencies are not perpetuated in different branches of an organisation (e.g. McDermott and O’Dell, 2001).

The major underlying theme of COMPOSITE is examining the processes of change in police organisations and knowledge sharing can be regarded as influential in all stages of the change process, from helping different parties diagnose a shared understanding of the need for change, to generating alternative strategies for change to then aiding successful implementation of change processes. Work Package 2 on internal capabilities supported this view (Betteridge et al., 2012) since analysis of their interview data showed that the second most frequently mentioned enabler of change overall, and ranked most important in Italy and the Netherlands, was '*internal communications*'. For example, in the Italian report a '*strong communication capability*' was referred to '*as one of the most relevant triggers*' to raise awareness of change processes within the police force. In the Netherlands, it was suggested that the level of change acceptance amongst staff would be easier to achieve with good communication.

The knowledge sharing capabilities of police organisations are therefore an important topic for study and, we argue below, one that has not been widely or systematically enough investigated.

The starting point for Work Package 3 was to conduct a systematic literature review on studies concerning knowledge sharing in police organisations. The reader is asked to refer to the first WP3 deliverable (Allen & Birdi, 2011; WP3 Deliverable 3.1) for the detail of the review and its findings but we will summarise a number of its conclusions. First, the extant literature on the topic is fairly small. Our review found only 34 papers which addressed the topic with some level of decent empirical research (both from searches of the English language and from the partner countries' more limited searches in their own languages; indeed some partners could find no such studies conducted in their country). Second, the majority of studies only focused on knowledge sharing within the police organisation with little on liaison with other regional or international forces. An obvious future research theme arising from the reviewed articles concerned identifying the enablers and barriers related to inter-agency working. WP1 also identified knowledge interactions with the public as something that the police felt could be improved. Third, by the far the most common type of knowledge studied concerned sharing of criminal intelligence, with a neglect of other types of potentially useful knowledge such as new strategies, legislation, techniques or technological information. Haas and Hansen (2007) developed a differentiated

productivity model of knowledge sharing in organizations and concluded that sharing different knowledge explains differential task performance. Fourth, technology-based practices were the most common methods studied with relatively less on more traditional forms. Fifth, researchers stated a clear need for more research on the impact of leadership and management on knowledge sharing. Sixth, the vast majority of studies were only conducted within a single country, hence raising issues of generalisability. The ten partner countries of the COMPOSITE consortium thus provided a much richer contextual base for this type of research. Based on these types of critiques and the drive for COMPOSITE to develop a much deeper understanding of the capabilities of policing organisations in Europe we set out to empirically address the following research questions:

Research Question 1: How effective are police organisations at sharing knowledge both internally and with external bodies (other forces in the same country, with forces in other countries / international agencies and the public)?

Research Question 2: What different types of knowledge are most commonly shared in the above four domains?

Research Question 3: How effective are different methods of knowledge sharing in the above four domains?


Research Question 4: What are the major antecedents (barriers and facilitators) of successful knowledge sharing in the four domains?

It should be noted that we also address in a more limited fashion other aspects of organisational learning such as techniques for the storage and interpretation of knowledge in policing organisations.

We have taken an emergent theoretical perspective in this Work Package since there was no adequate existing theoretical framework for the policing context. General frameworks produced from the knowledge sharing literature such as that by Wang and Noe (2010) (see Figure 1.3.1) provide an interesting overview but miss out on the contextual complexities of the policing services. On the other hand, our systematic review (Allen & Birdi, 2011) found a dearth of knowledge sharing theories in the policing literature, with Gottschalk (2006) providing a good attempt but which only focused on knowledge sharing in criminal

investigations and the role of knowledge management systems in supporting that. We therefore set out to generate a more comprehensive conceptual framework of influences on knowledge sharing effectiveness in the context of policing organisations. Furthermore, we heed Small and Sage's (2005/6) call that 'Knowledge Management leadership and practitioners need enhanced tools to help them better understand what influences knowledge workers to share' (p.166) by also producing a new tool specifically designed to help police organisations benchmark their knowledge sharing effectiveness and diagnose barriers to improvement (the Effectiveness of Knowledge Sharing in Police Organisations Diagnostic Instrument – EKSPD-DI; see Section 4 of this report).

Figure 1.3.1. A framework of knowledge sharing research (from Wang and Noe, 2010).



In the next section, we describe our methodological strategy for addressing the Work Package objectives.

1.4. Methodological Overview of The Studies Conducted For This Report

We chose a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in order to capture both the richness of the phenomena in question and also allow statistical evaluation of differences and relationships between factors. The three phases of empirical research are as follows:

Phase 1: Qualitative research interviews

Interviews were conducted with police officers across all ten COMPOSITE countries (see section two of the report), with 152 interviews in total being conducted across the ten countries. The interviews were designed to explore the following aspects:

- The extent and effectiveness of knowledge sharing
- The types of knowledge most frequently shared
- The most and least effective methods of knowledge sharing
- The most common barriers to knowledge sharing within each domain
- The main reasons for success or failure of knowledge sharing initiatives
- The impact of leadership and management on knowledge sharing
- An additional issue was to examine the relationships between knowledge sharing capabilities (knowledge sharing climate, employee involvement, and use of knowledge storage and management systems) and a police organisation's perceived ability to cope with change.

The interviews explored the above topics according to four domains of knowledge sharing:

1. Within the police organisation
2. Between police organisations in the same country
3. Between the police organisation and the public and

4. International knowledge sharing with forces in other countries and international police agencies.

We chose these four dimensions since previous research on knowledge sharing in police contexts has predominantly focused on internal aspects only (Allen & Birdi, 2011). By adding in engagements with external institutions we were aiming to clarify those knowledge sharing capabilities that were required for any domain and those that were required for specific domains. The majority of questions were open-ended so participants in all countries could describe issues in their own words and which we then later categorised through thematic analysis into general factors. Short questionnaires and rating scales were also added to allow some comparative statistical analysis.

Phase 2: Case study research on international knowledge sharing

The interviews conducted in phase 1 of the research yielded only limited information about dimension 4 above, international knowledge sharing with forces in other countries and international police agencies. A second phase of empirical research was therefore designed with the aim to address this gap, and a case study approach allowed the research team to focus the research on this target area, selecting specific examples of international knowledge sharing to be studied.

All ten COMPOSITE country research teams produced a case study report based on one of the following areas of international knowledge sharing:

1. A cross-border collaboration between police forces in different countries. This could have been on a specific project, scheme of work, event, or particular criminal investigation that required cross-border knowledge sharing (six case studies were completed with a focus on this area of knowledge sharing)
2. A cross-border agency and the role it plays in facilitating knowledge sharing across country borders (four case studies were completed with a focus on this area of knowledge sharing).

A further aim of COMPOSITE Work Package 3 was to include Albania as an additional COMPOSITE country for the research. This was met by the case study completed by the Macedonian research team, who conducted a case study on the knowledge sharing

facilitated by the MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative), an international organisation which deals with the issues of migration management in the Western Balkans, including the countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.

Phase 3: The development of a knowledge sharing diagnostic tool (EKSPD-DI)

The research conducted for phases 1 and 2 increased our understanding of knowledge sharing across different dimensions, and one of the practical ways that this understanding can be applied to police forces is through the development of a diagnostic tool based on the evidence from our research. The diagnostic tool was developed by the UK research team in consultation with the other nine COMPOSITE research teams, and the first draft of the tool was piloted with police forces in all ten countries. In all, 481 police officers completed the questionnaire. The final version takes the form of a questionnaire, designed to be used by police organisations in order to help them to assess the knowledge sharing capabilities of their organisation, and a manual which is designed to support the use of the tool.

1.5. Structure of Report

The structure of this report is as follows:

- In section 2, we present the interviews with police organisations that form the first phase of the empirical research.
- In section 3, we present the second phase of the research, the international case studies.
- In section 4 we present phase 3, the diagnostic tool and manual.
- For each of these sections, we include the objectives of each phase of research, the methodology, findings, and conclusions.
- Finally, in section 5 we provide some general integrative conclusions and recommendations for enhancing knowledge sharing effectiveness in police organisations.

SECTION 2

**INTERVIEWS ON POLICE KNOWLEDGE
SHARING EFFECTIVENESS**

2.1. Aims

Before the interviews were conducted, a detailed interview protocol was developed together with a proposed sampling strategy. These were developed with the aim to build upon the findings of the systematic literature review which was conducted as part of deliverable 3.1 and which gives a theoretical background to this report (Allen and Birdi, 2011). The systematic literature review highlighted the key findings from previous research in the area of knowledge sharing in policing contexts and suggested some practical recommendations for police organisations.

2.2. Methodology

In this section, we discuss the methodology which was used to collect and analyse the interview data.

2.2.a. Interview Preparation and Sampling

Each of the ten country teams involved in the COMPOSITE consortium were asked to conduct 15 interviews during October-November 2011 with participants within each police force involved in the data collection. If more than one police force was involved in COMPOSITE, then country teams were asked to spread the interviews evenly, as much as possible, across the police forces. The intention was to interview within the police forces across different hierarchical levels and four levels of hierarchy were proposed to ensure that there was a good mix between higher and lower levels in the police forces:

1. Two officers from the top / strategic level – Chief Officer Group
2. Three officers from the senior leadership / management level
3. Five officers from supervisory / mid-management levels
4. Five officers from the front line / operational level

In total, this gives a proposed sample of 15 interviews per country, thus a grand potential total of 150 interviews across the ten countries.

In two of the countries, Netherlands and Romania, an additional interview was conducted, giving a total of 152 interviews conducted across the ten countries. The numbers of interviews for each country as well as mean age, gender and rankings are demonstrated in Table 2.2.1., and Table 2.2.2. provides the names of the police forces which were involved in the interviews in each country.

Table 2.2.1. Interviews included for the current report analyses from each country.

	No. of interviews	Age ^b	Gender ^b	Rank ^b
Belgium ^a	15	Range = 34 to 59 Mean = 47.7 N= 15	M = 13; F = 2.	R1 = 5; R2 = 2; R3 = 4; R4 = 4.
Czech Republic	15	Range = 28 to 52 Mean = 37.1 N= 14	M = 11; F = 4.	R1 = 2; R2 = 3; R3 = 5; R4 = 5.
France ^a	15	Range = 29 to 59 Mean = 42.8 N= 14	M = 11; F = 3.	R1 = 2; R2 = 2; R3 = 7; R4 = 3.
Germany	15	Range = 29 to 57 Mean = 41.5 N= 15	M = 11; F = 4.	R1 = 2; R2 = 3; R3 = 5; R4 = 5.
Italy ^a	15	Range = 35 to 56 Mean = 43.8 N= 15	M = 14; F = 1.	R1 = 4; R2 = 7; R3 = 2; R4 = 2.
Macedonia	15	Range = 29 to 51 Mean = 39.1 N= 15	M = 13; F = 2.	R1 = 2; R2 = 5; R3 = 8; R4 = 0.
Netherlands ^a	16	Range = 27 to 59 Mean = 45.7 N= 15	M = 11; F = 4.	R1 = 3; R2 = 5; R3 = 5; R4 = 1.
Romania	16	Range = 23 to 50 Mean = 35.5 N= 12	M = 13; F = 2.	R1 = 1; R2 = 4; R3 = 5; R4 = 5.

Spain	15	Range = 35 to 60 Mean = 46.0 N= 10	M = 10; F = 5.	R1 = 0; R2 = 4; R3 = 6; R4 = 5.
United Kingdom ^a	15	Range = 26 to 53 Mean = 40.4 N= 14	M = 11; F = 3.	R1 = 2; R2 = 2; R3 = 5; R4 = 4.
OVERALL	152	Range = 23 to 60 Mean = 42.00 N= 139	M = 118; F = 30	R1 = 23; R2 = 34; R3 = 52; R4 = 34.

^bThe age, gender and rank data was not available for all interviewees hence the sample sizes may not match up in some cases to the total number of interviews for each country.

Table 2.2.2. Police forces involved in each country

Country	Name of Police Force(s)
Belgium	Local and federal police active in two Belgian Euregions
Czech Republic	Municipal Police National Police
France	Police Nationale
Germany	Brandenburg Police Berlin Police
Italy	Corpo Forestale dello Stato Arma dei Carabinieri
Macedonia	National Police
Netherlands	Politie Amsterdam-Amstelland Politie Gelderland Zuid Politie Rotterdam-Rijnmond
Romania	Romanian Border Police
Spain	Mossos d'Esquadra Policia Municipal de Madrid
United Kingdom	South Yorkshire Police

2.2.b. Interview Schedule and Process

The interview schedule was devised by the work package 3 project team and pilot tested in the UK. This pilot testing experience was used to develop a slightly revised interview schedule. The interview schedule was presented on 21 September 2011 to the whole of the COMPOSITE consortium at the consortium team meeting held in Barcelona, for feedback

and comments. Subsequently, some amendments to the schedule were made on the basis of the feedback that was provided.

The interview schedule consisted of both semi-structured and structured parts, with a mixture of open-ended questions and survey questions with the use of Likert scales. The open-ended questions were used to collect rich and qualitative data, and the survey questions were used to generate quantitative data. The interviews took on average about two hours, and this time included the administration of two questionnaires based upon Likert scales which were to be self-completed by the interviewee.

The content of the interview schedule was as follows:

1. Interviewee Details – background information required on each interviewee
2. Knowledge Sharing Activities – general introductory questions on knowledge sharing activities that the interviewee is involved in, and on the main types of knowledge shared by the force
3. Knowledge Sharing Internally – questions on knowledge which is shared within the force internally between and across departments / units / staff. At the end of this section Knowledge Sharing Questionnaire One was self-completed by interviewees
4. Sharing Knowledge with Other Forces – questions on knowledge which is shared between the force and with other police forces in the country including local, regional and national forces
5. Sharing Knowledge with the Public – questions on knowledge which is shared between the organisation and the general public. At the end of this section Knowledge Sharing Questionnaire Two was self-completed by interviewees
6. Sharing Knowledge with Police Forces in other Countries and International Police Agencies – questions on knowledge which is shared between the force and police forces in other countries and / or with international police agencies
7. Further Questions – additional questions on barriers / enablers to knowledge sharing.

2.2. c. Analysis of Data

A template was developed on which country teams recorded the data collected from each interview, and these were submitted to the UK project team for analysis. Following the collation of these templates, the data from the 152 interviews were input into the computer software package NVivo 9. Using this package the project team conducted a thematic analysis via the development of codes across the key areas.

These areas of interest are explored in this report under each of the following four domains of knowledge sharing:

2.3. Sharing knowledge internally

2.4. Sharing knowledge with other forces (within the same country)

2.5. Sharing knowledge with the public

2.6. Sharing knowledge with police forces in other countries and international agencies

The interviews also explored the impact of leadership and management on knowledge sharing within police forces, with questions around the encouragement provided to staff, to share knowledge, and this is included in section 2.7.

The data from the questionnaire scales was analysed using the statistical package SPSS and is presented in the section 2.8. of this report on knowledge sharing capabilities and adapting to change. The tables generated from the qualitative data show the number of references made by participants to the most popular themes and are shown overall and also broken down by countries. Given that 152 interviews were conducted drawing from different ranks and police forces in 10 different countries, there should be a reasonable level of generalisability in the conclusions drawn from the analyses where all countries' data are combined. However, there should be a note of caution regarding those tables where the data are broken down by country since the sample sizes become much smaller at that level of analysis.

2.3. Sharing Knowledge Internally

This section focuses on internal knowledge sharing within the participants' force, between and across departments / units / staff.

2.3 a. Effectiveness of Knowledge Sharing

Participants were asked to state how effectively they felt their force shared knowledge between employees using a scale from 1 'Not at all' to 5 'A very great extent'.

Table 2.3.1. Effectiveness of knowledge sharing internally, by country.

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Belgium	15	1 to 5	3.40	0.986
Czech Republic	15	3 to 5	3.80	0.775
France	14	2 to 5	3.57	0.756
Germany	15	1 to 5	3.40	0.910
Italy	10	1 to 5	3.10	1.100
Macedonia	15	2 to 5	4.00	0.845
Netherlands	15	2 to 4	3.07	0.700
Romania	15	3 to 5	4.00	0.655
Spain	15	2 to 5	2.87	0.916
United Kingdom	14	2 to 4	2.93	0.829
OVERALL	143	1 to 5	3.43	0.916

Note: Scoring on single item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent

The overall mean score of 3.4 in table 2.3.1 above suggests that across the 10 countries, knowledge is shared internally to at least a fair extent with responses ranging between 1 and 5. This is slightly less effective than knowledge sharing with the public (3.6) and slightly more effective than knowledge sharing with forces in the same country (3.3) from other countries (2.6).

There are however clear differences between countries. Macedonia (4.00) and Romania's (4.00) results suggest knowledge is shared effectively to a higher extent than, for example, Spain (2.87), the United Kingdom (2.93) and in particular Italy (2.57). These results may well reflect cultural differences; they may also reflect different working practices.

An analysis of the reasons given for these scores is highlighted in the table below.

Table 2.3.2. Top ten reasons given for effectiveness rating of knowledge sharing

REASONS GIVEN FOR EFFECTIVENESS OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Effective methods	44
2. Motivation	28
3. Leadership and management	20
4. Accessibility of information	20
5. Availability of information	19
6. No sharing of information	17
7. Personal contact	13
8. Regularity	11
9. Loss of information	9
10. Resources	
Total no. of references made	224

The use of effective working methods for sharing knowledge internally was cited most frequently across the 10 countries. The motivation of employees to share knowledge was also seen as important and is clearly essential for a successful sharing of knowledge internally. Leadership and management are also clearly important and can influence effective sharing of knowledge by acting as role models and stressing the importance of knowledge sharing. The availability and accessibility of information was mentioned as a crucial aspect of an effective knowledge sharing internally by the participants. Additionally, personal contact and regularity of knowledge sharing were named as facilitating effective knowledge sharing.

In cases where participants judged knowledge sharing internally as ineffective the most frequently cited reason was where information was just not shared. There are many reasons for this, for example, ineffective knowledge sharing through the hierarchy, insular forces or because no formal methods for sharing knowledge exist so that consequently important knowledge gets lost. Another problem preventing effective knowledge sharing is a lack of resources e.g. a lack of time and people.

2.3.b. Types of Knowledge Shared within Forces

Participants were asked to identify the three types of knowledge most commonly shared internally by their force. Across all countries a total of 428 reference were made to types of knowledge shared.

Table 2 3.3. Top ten types of knowledge shared internally within forces *.

TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Intelligence and relevant information	115
2. Organisational information	76
3. Operational information	57
4. Governance and legislation	42
5. Force performance related information	17
6. Future priorities	15
7. Training	14
8. Sharing experience related knowledge	10
9. Best Practice	9
10. Information (non specific) held on databases	8
Total no. of references made	428

The findings in table 2.3.3* not surprisingly, suggest that, across the 10 countries, the most commonly shared type of knowledge is Intelligence and relevant information required to support crime management activity. This category includes information that is clearly labelled as intelligence; it also includes a range of information about people and situations that informs crime management activity. This picture is also broadly reflected within the country findings.

Organisational information, which includes policy information, relevant HR related knowledge sharing, information to support the 'business' and information relating to process, system and admin changes, is also, not surprisingly, frequently cited.

Operational information includes references that specified operational activity. In the majority of cases the term was not defined further but one interviewee did refer to it as the 'what, when and how'.

Clearly, as highlighted by the findings, it is also important that information relating to Governance, for example, relevant legislative information and operational rules, is shared across forces.

Knowledge about force priorities is also frequently shared, as is knowledge that helps to inform these priorities such as performance management and related information as well as intelligence and relevant information. Whilst the top four types of knowledge are clearly highlighted most frequently across the forces, other types are also commonly shared, such as knowledge sharing to improve practice, through sharing experience and knowledge, through training and through sharing best practice.

*Please note: In many cases the interview responses consisted of one-word answers. These have to be taken at face value, though may reflect different use in different cultures or in a local context.

Cross country data suggests that in six of the 10 countries, intelligence and relevant information is the most frequently identified type of knowledge shared, and in three of the four remaining it comes second. In the Netherlands this comes third, however this may reflect the nature of the people interviewed within the force.

2. 3.c. Knowledge Sharing Method Used Within Forces Overall

In this sub section, interviewees were asked to state the three most effective and the three least effective methods used by the force for sharing knowledge internally.

Most Effective Methods

Table 2.3.4 Top ten most effective methods of knowledge sharing within forces across all countries.

METHOD OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Knowledge shared person to person	76
2. Via internal intranet	52
3. Via written information of any form	48
4. Via email	45
5. Via Briefings	45
6. Via Meetings within the force	44
7. Via Databases and systems	32
8. Via Training and related activities	18
9. Via Electronic methods (non specific)	8
10. Post	5
Total no. of references made	389

Across the 10 countries, sharing knowledge person to person either through direct means such as face to face meetings, or through person to person technologies such as the telephone, was cited most frequently as a most effective method. The most frequently referenced reason given for effectiveness (Table 2.3.5) was personal contact which brings immediacy, the opportunity for immediate feedback and the increased certainty to be understood.

The country-by-country results for this method vary across the 10 countries. This might reflect different cultures and policing, for example current levels of access to effective technologies.

The intranet is also quite frequently referenced as one of the most effective method of knowledge sharing. This suggests that this form of technology has made a big impact in the relatively short time it has been available. In a similar way, knowledge sharing via email, although 4th on the list, is also seen as an effective method by many people across forces. Reasons given in table 2.3.5. indicate that speed of information sharing is important as is accessibility and the fact that it can reach many people effectively.

Written information, such as reports and memos people need to read to get information, is clearly seen as an effective way to share knowledge. It can be shared using a number of forms, both electronically and through more traditional methods using paper. As the reasons for effectiveness highlight below, it is important that the information contained in it is clear and understandable.

Meetings are also frequently cited as one of the most effective methods, as are Briefings, which will include any method whereby people are briefed about the following day's activities. Not surprisingly, given the rise of technology-based methods, post is referenced by only a few interviewees.

In additions to the reasons included above, the findings in Table 2 3.5 indicated that a method was effective if it allowed for sharing of all needed information, was clear and understandable.

Interestingly, a number of people suggested it was the complement of different methods that made knowledge sharing effective rather than one method in isolation, as the following quote highlights:

"These three methods are complementary. None of these three methods by themselves guarantee that the information will reach all staff members. Optimally, all relevant information must be transmitted through these three communication channels."

Table 2.3.5 Reasons for most effective methods of knowledge sharing within forces across all countries.

REASONS FOR EFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Personal contact	55
2. Speed	38
3. Accessibility	34
4. Reach many people	20
5. Clear and understandable information	19
6. Sharing of all needed information	17
7. Storage of information	14
8. Complement of different methods	12
9. Availability	12
10.Speed	38
Total no. of references made	251

In four countries, Czech Republic, Germany, Macedonia and Spain, the most frequently stated method of knowledge sharing is person to person, which can include face to face discussions or discussions with another person via the phone. Interestingly, it also appears to occur in the top 5 methods across all countries apart from the UK. Email is not highlighted as an effective method for Macedonia, Romania or Italy.

Least Effective Methods

The following section highlights the least effective methods for knowledge sharing and the reason for this.

Table 2.3.6. Top ten least effective methods of knowledge sharing within forces across all countries.

METHOD OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Written documents	26
2. Email	19
3. Verbal methods with no audit trail	15
4. Internet, intranet and web based	14
5. Briefing system	10
6. Anything paper related	9
7. Training and related activities	8
8. Electronic methods not specified	4
9. Post	4
10. Force Radio	3
Total no. of references made	126

The lower number of references for this section reflects the fact the many interviewees gave either only one method or gave none at all.

Interestingly, many of the most effective methods highlighted earlier in this section also reappear as least effective methods. This suggests that many methods have both pros and cons. For example, written documents are referenced towards the top of 'Most effective methods' and at the top of 'Least effective methods'. A similar situation occurs for email.

Reasons given (in Table 2.3.7) for choosing the least effective methods shown in table 2.3.6 include,

- Ineffective use of the methods, for example, the method itself might be suitable for effective knowledge sharing but in practice if it is not used properly it becomes ineffective.
- Overload or limited filtering of information which leads to too much information resulting in the possibility that important information may be missed.
- Once again a lack of resources, for example, time and people, contributes to the ineffectiveness of methods.
- Last but not least the speed of a method or the loss of information is a referenced reasons for ineffectiveness. Examples given included post and fax, because delivering information via post takes too much time and information sent by fax often gets lost.

Verbal methods without an audit trail, was also mentioned frequently. Whilst personal contact can be a very effective way to share information, the lack of an audit trail can be a problem for an intelligence led police force.

Table 2.3.7 Reasons for least effective methods of knowledge sharing within forces across all countries.

METHOD OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Ineffective use	35
2. Neglected information/ no interest	25
3. Overload/ no filtering	17
4. Lack of resources	16
5. Speed	14
6. Loss of information	10
Total no. of references made	126

The number of references, when compared across the 10 countries, is particularly small and there is no one method which can be said to dominate as the least effective method across each of the countries. This may suggest that the problems with methods of knowledge sharing are more specific to the country rather than there being one method which is less effective across all countries covered. For example, in some cases Romania has particular issues with electronic equipment because of poor reception in the mountainous terrain that it works in and the UK, reasons given for email being the least effective method include issues about being overloaded with emails.

2.3.d. Barriers To Knowledge Sharing Within Forces

In this sub section, interviewees were asked to identify any particular barriers or issues to knowledge sharing effectively within their force.

Table 2.3.8 Top ten barriers to knowledge sharing within forces across all countries.

BARRIERS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. People, Lack of skills and experience	23
2. Unwillingness to share	20
3. Resources	19
4. Silos between people and departments	18
5. Poor methods of transfer of relevant information	18
6. Poor management of volume of information (Overload)	16
7. Managing sensitive information	14
8. Technology related	13
9. Lack of access to relevant information	12
10. Organisational size and structures	11
Total no. of references made	185

185 references were made about barriers to knowledge sharing from 101 sources. Interestingly, around a third did not identify any barriers to knowledge sharing in their force. There may well be a number of reasons behind what on the surface might seem a surprising finding, for example, cultural differences in attitude towards interviews of this kind

The most frequently cited barriers to internal knowledge sharing (Table 2 3.8), focus on people as barriers either because they are inexperienced / lack the relevant skills or because they are not doing their job effectively, leading to human error, poor practice and unhelpful behaviours, as one quote summarises the importance of this “Human factor: you really depend on the will of the persons who receive or who provide the information”.

In addition, a number of people commented on the problems caused by people (or teams) who hold onto information because ‘information is power’ which creates competitive advantage in a performance related culture, as this quote suggests:

“Sometimes agents are reluctant to share intelligence because they prefer to conclude the inquiry by themselves and get the credit for the results. It happens when units are in competition on the same field”.

In some cases people are unwilling to share because, from experience, the behaviour of others leads to a lack of trust. Alternatively, they do not work in a culture that encourages sharing.

The problems highlighted above also relate to another frequently cited barrier which focuses on silo working within organisations. This is where people fail to share key information effectively outside their hierarchical structure within the organisation. Ineffective or non-existent knowledge sharing procedures and practices and problems with methods of transfer are also given as reasons for this barrier.

Poor methods of transfer of relevant information include references to lack of two way communication and reliance on gossip. Poor management of volume of information relates to comments about too much information passed without being filtered appropriately, although one comment did suggest that filtering itself may bring problems of bias.

Managing sensitive information was also referenced as a barrier, however, in some cases it was also seen as necessary to protect, for example, informants.

Importantly, whilst lack of access to relevant information only has 12 references, this, it's importance is strongly emphasised in 4e. and 4f. This is significant because in these cases the issue was raised when describing actual examples.

The following tables (2.3.9 and 2.3.10) highlight the key reasons for the barriers and identify a number of ways in which barriers can be removed.

Table 2.3.9. Reasons for barriers to knowledge sharing within forces across all countries.

REASONS FOR BARRIERS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Resources	22
2. Limited access to information	17
3. No sharing of information	10
4. Information is power	6
5. Insular forces	5
Total no. of references made	60

The most frequently referenced reason for highlighting particular barriers is a lack of resources. This could be a lack of people, a lack of time, a lack of money or a lack of technical equipment. A further reason for highlighting these barriers is a limited access to information and an unwillingness to pass on information. Connected with these reasons are insular forces or the belief “information is power” which also hinder an effective knowledge sharing internally.

Suggestions about how to remove these barriers, includes, not surprisingly, the investment of money and additional resources, which was referenced most frequently. Extended accessibility to information and the provision of modernised systems were mentioned for removing barriers. Suggestions to address Technology and systems problems caused by incompatible internal systems (cf. technical equipment) include consistent procedures and one central system. One solution for unwillingness to share was to improve training that stresses the importance of knowledge sharing and helps change people's attitude.

Table 2 3.10. Ways of removing barriers to knowledge sharing within forces across all countries.

REMOVING BARRIERS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Invest money/additional resources	13
2. Extend accessibility	10
3. Training	10
4. Modernize system	7
5. Consistent procedures	5
6. Central system	4
Total no. of references made	49

As with previous sections, the country findings seem to reflect a diverse range of barriers. This suggests they reflect different ways of working.

2.3.e. Reasons Knowledge Sharing Was Successful Within Forces.

In this sub section, interviewees were asked to identify a particular occasions when knowledge sharing was successfully shared within the force and identify the three most important reasons why this was successful.

Across the countries a number of successful examples were given which included successful management of knowledge sharing in the following situations:

- Catching a rape suspect (France)
- An eviction of squatters (Germany)
- Catching drug traffickers (Macedonia)
- Transfer of best practice (Spain)
- Management of border situations (Romania)
- Management of local drug dealing ((Netherlands)
- Catching an untouchable drug dealer (UK)
- Cascading training (Italy)
- Managing an external event of senior dignitaries (Czech Republic)
- (Merging of two police zones (Belgium)

Table 2.3.11. Top ten most important reasons knowledge sharing was successful within forces across all countries.

SUCCESSFUL REASON	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Accuracy and relevance of information	29
2. Effective knowledge sharing up and across the force	29
3. Effective systems and processes	24
4. Engaged and committed employees	22
5. Leadership	21
6. Professional approach	20
7. Team effectiveness	18
8. Timeliness and speed	17
9. Effective operational management of reaction	16
10. Experience and knowledge	15
Total no. of references made	278

The findings from this section are of particular value cause they highlight the reasons why a particular example given was successful. Information in Table 2 3.11 clearly suggests that success was achieved because of a number of factors. Key to success was the ability to access accurate and relevant knowledge, knowledge that is shared across the force amongst the people who need to know. It is clearly also not surprising that effective systems and processes have been referenced as supporting successful police activity. Also importantly, success seems to come from the actions of engaged and committed employees and those who demonstrate a professional approach and bring experience and knowledge.

Leadership and effective operational management of reactions, including timeliness and speed are given as further key reasons for success, as well as effective team working.

As with previous sections, the country findings seem to reflect a diverse range of reasons for success. This suggests they may reflect different ways of working. One issue, effective knowledge sharing up and across the force, does however come up either first or second in most countries which appear to emphasise the requirement for knowledge to be shared in this way to ensure successful policing.

2.3.f. Reasons Knowledge Sharing Was Unsuccessful Within Forces

In this sub section, interviewees were asked to identify a particular occasions when knowledge sharing was unsuccessfully shared within the force and identify the three most important reasons why this was unsuccessful.

There were less examples of unsuccessful knowledge sharing within forces given by interviewees and corresponding less reasons. This includes some of the following examples

- Management of a Burglary (France)
- Management of a political rally (Germany)
- Terrorist threat (Macedonia)
- Policing events (Spain)
- Situation relating to ID documents (Romania)
- Plane crash (Netherlands)
- Events management(UK)
- Process for developing “circularity of operational information” (Italy)
- Organisational change (Czech Republic)
- Issues relating to homeless people (Belgium)

Table 2.3.12. Top ten most important reasons knowledge sharing was un-successful within forces across all countries.

UN-SUCCESSFUL REASON	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Insufficient access to relevant and accurate information	31
2. Inexperienced or ineffective staff	26
3. Wrong methods used	16
4. Poor operational management	15
5. Poor systems and bureaucracy	14
6. Poor timing	8
7. Silo working	7
8. Poor leadership	6
9. Lack of formal requirement	5
10. Lack of engagement and commitment	4
Total no. of references made	146

As with the previous section, the findings are of particular value because they highlight the reasons why a particular example given was un-successful.

The most frequently referenced reason given in Table 2.3.12 was insufficient access to relevant and accurate knowledge, for example because the information was not available or was not shared willingly or effectively or was just inaccurate. As this was also the most cited reason for successful knowledge sharing, it is clearly a critical element of knowledge sharing.

Possibly related to this was the behaviour of staff who were judged to be ineffective, and in some cases inexperienced, an issue already highlighted under the section on Barrier (Table 2.3.8). Lack of success was also attributed, in some cases, to ineffective methods that were used to share knowledge which in all probability will impact on the point above relating to access of information; this may also apply to the problems caused by silo working. Poor support systems, and a bureaucratic culture or approach were also given as reasons why something did not succeed. Poor management and to some extent poor leadership were given as additional causes of failure, relating to issues such as planning and timing

2.3.g. How Forces Judge The Credibility Of The Source Of Knowledge Coming Into The Organisation

Table 2.3.13 Top eight ways that forces judge the credibility of the source of knowledge coming into the organisation.

JUDGEMENT OF SOURCE CREDIBILITY	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Analysis of the source	43
2. Evaluation system	33
3. Trust	30
4. Reliability of source	27
5. Cross-check information	27
6. Compare input from multiple sources	16
7. Intuition	14
8. 5x5x5 grading system	8
Total no. of references made	138

Participants were asked how their force judges the credibility of a source. Source analysis and an evaluation system were referenced most frequently indicating that most forces have a specialised team or department who is responsible for judging the credibility of the source of knowledge coming into the organisation. These departments have databases, systems and methods like the 5x5x5 grading system for analysing information and judging the credibility of a source. Trust and reliability of the source, were mentioned by the participants when being asked for judgement of source credibility. Many participants do not judge the credibility of a source themselves but receive information from a specialised department that enables them to act on that information.

If participants are at a crime scene and receive information they are uncertain about, they will try to crosscheck information and compare input from multiple sources themselves in order to judge the source credibility. Importantly, a number emphasised that they trust their intuition and experience.

2.3.h Useful Methods For Analysing Criminal Intelligence Or Other Important Information

Table 2.3.14 Top methods of intelligence analysis.

METHODS OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
No methods	17
Unaware or unsure of methods	20
Use of methods	99
1. Specialised department	51
2. Statistical analysis	32
3. Database/systems	22
4. Cross-check information	12
5. Filter information/ set priorities	3
Total no. of references made	136

Participants were asked for methods of intelligence analysis. Whilst the majority were aware of such methods, some were unaware if methods exist or unsure which methods

were used. A small number of participants also mentioned that there were no methods of intelligence analysis in their force.

As already indicated in the previous question most methods for analysing criminal intelligence concerned statistical analysis and the use of databases or systems by a specialised department. Beside the responsible departments also cross-check information, filter incoming information and set priorities.

2.3.i Awareness Of Knowledge Management Or Knowledge Sharing Strategy What Does It Involve

Knowledge Sharing Strategy

Table 2.3.15 Awareness of knowledge management strategy

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
No strategy	22
Unaware or unsure of strategy	33
Use of strategy	85
1. Database/System	41
2. Regular meetings	18
3. Intranet	15
4. Official instructions	13
Total no. of references made	140

Participants were further asked if their force have a knowledge management or knowledge sharing strategy and what this strategy involves. Again the majority knew of a force strategy for knowledge sharing but some participants did not know if such a strategy exists or were unsure what the strategy involves exactly. Furthermore there were forces without any strategy of knowledge sharing and knowledge management.

Databases and systems the forces use for sharing knowledge were most frequently referenced. These were either databases or systems used by departments which analyse criminal intelligence or databases and systems everyone can access for getting needed

information and finding stored knowledge of the force. Next mentioned as knowledge sharing strategy by the force were regular meetings between for example supervisors who share information and exchange relevant knowledge. Another method of knowledge management is the intranet. Within the intranet everyone has access to relevant information and stored knowledge of the force. Some participants also mentioned a concrete force-wide instruction of how to share knowledge.

The Storage of Knowledge

Participants were asked how important knowledge is stored by their force. The table below shows the responses that were given by participants.

Table 2.3.16. Top five most frequent examples given for the ways in which participants were encouraged to share knowledge by their line manager or supervisor.

METHODS OF STORING KNOWLEDGE	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Digital Methods	70
2. Paper-Based Methods	44
3. No Methods	4
Total no. of references made	118

A small number of participants reported that there were no methods within their force for storing knowledge, however the majority stated that their force used either digital or paper-based methods. Most frequently was the use of digital methods for storing knowledge. Digital knowledge was most frequently stored in central or local databases. Further possibilities of digital knowledge storing are provided by the intranet, server or personal backups. Paper-based methods of storing knowledge include archives, reports and manuals.

Passing on Knowledge to Colleagues

Participants were asked how their force ensures that knowledge gained by more experienced police officers throughout the course of their career is captured and passed on to less experienced colleagues. The table below shows the most frequently cited methods that were provided by participants.

Table 2.3.17. Top eight most frequent examples given for the ways in which knowledge is passed onto less experienced colleagues.

METHODS OF PASSING ON KNOWLEDGE	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Teams made up of experienced and inexperienced police officers	34
2. Formal training sessions for less experienced officers	32
3. Informal sharing of advice and experiences	32
4. There is no process or method for passing on knowledge to less experienced officers in my force	24
5. Written documents	23
6. Mentoring scheme	21
7. Handover culture	17
8. Exit interviews	6
Total no. of references made	189

As can be seen from the table above, 24 interviewees reported that their force was lacking in any processes or methods for passing on knowledge from more to less experienced officers. There were, however, a large number of examples of methods provided by other participants. Most frequently, this was done by building teams of experienced and inexperienced police officers. Officers of different levels of experience would be partnered together in operations, and during this partnership there was an expectation that the more experienced police officer would pass his/her knowledge on to their less experienced colleague. Similarly, shared offices between police officers of different levels of experience and different rankings would have the same effect. Training was also mentioned highly as a method by which inexperienced police officers are taught in a formal setting by more experienced colleagues. Informal methods of passing on advice or experience, during lunch breaks and in informal conversations or discussions were also important. Written documents were used to capture information, for example guidelines and reports, which might be written by more experienced officers. In cases where an inexperienced colleague is due to replace a more experienced colleague e.g. due to retirement, mentoring and a handover culture were mentioned as playing an important role in capturing and passing on knowledge. Here the less experienced officer might shadow his/her more experienced colleague, who explains important things to his/her successor. Step by step the successor learns to take over responsibility and finally replace his mentor when he retires. Finally, exit interviews were described as a method for capturing knowledge. If experienced police

officers retire they have exit interviews in some forces to ensure that important knowledge is not lost.

2.4. Sharing knowledge with other forces (within the same country)

Within this section we focus on knowledge sharing externally with other police forces based within the same country, including local, regional and national forces.

2.4.a. Extent and effectiveness of knowledge sharing with other forces in the same country

Participants were asked to score their police force on, firstly, the extent to which knowledge was shared with other police forces within the same country and, secondly, on the effectiveness of this knowledge sharing, with the use of a single item scale where 1 indicated 'not at all' and 5 indicated 'to a very great extent'. Tables 2.4.1. and 2.4.2. demonstrate the results for each country.

Table 2.4.1. Extent of knowledge sharing with other forces in the same country.

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Belgium	14	2 to 5	3.50	1.019
Czech Republic	15	3 to 4	3.47	0.516
France	14	1 to 5	3.71	1.326
Germany	15	2 to 5	3.00	0.845
Italy	9	1 to 5	2.56	1.236
Macedonia	15	2 to 5	3.60	0.828
Netherlands	11	1 to 4	2.73	0.786
Romania	15	1 to 5	3.80	1.082
Spain	15	2 to 4	3.00	0.655
United Kingdom	14	2 to 5	3.14	1.027
OVERALL	137	1 to 5	3.29	0.994

Note: Scoring on single item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent

The overall mean score in Table 2.4.1. shows that across all 10 countries knowledge was considered to be shared with other forces 'to a fair extent' (scale item 3). Romania scored highest, with a mean of 3.80. This is perhaps unsurprising for the Romanian interviews were conducted with the Romanian Border Police, who have to frequently work with other police forces in order to solve crimes. The lowest score, a mean of 2.56, was provided by Italy, indicating that knowledge was shared with other forces 'to a small extent'. The interviews in Italy were conducted with the Arma dei Carabinieri and Corpo Forestale dello Stato. The latter is a police force with civil status, specialising in environment protection, in the prevention and prosecution of environmental crimes. The lower scores in particular came

from the interviews with the Corpo Forestale dello Stato members, but due to the small sample size this cannot be regarded as fully representative of the force as a whole.

Table 2.4.2. Effectiveness of knowledge sharing with other forces in the same country

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Belgium	13	3 to 4	3.69	0.481
Czech Republic	15	2 to 5	3.40	0.910
France	12	3 to 5	4.33	0.651
Germany	13	2 to 5	3.31	0.751
Italy	8	1 to 4	2.62	1.188
Macedonia	15	2 to 5	3.73	0.884
Netherlands	10	1 to 4	2.60	0.843
Romania	14	3 to 5	3.93	0.616
Spain	15	2 to 4	3.13	0.743
United Kingdom	13	2 to 5	3.15	0.899
OVERALL	120	1 to 5	3.44	0.911

Note: Scoring on single item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent

The overall mean score in Table 2.4.2 above shows that across all 10 countries knowledge sharing with other forces was considered to be effective 'to a fair extent' (scale item 3). On this scale, France scores as most effective, with a mean of 4.33, indicating that knowledge sharing is effective 'to a great extent' (scale item 4). For the other domains of knowledge sharing, France is scored at 'to a fair extent' (see Table 2.3.1., Table 2.5.2. and 2.6.2.), suggesting that knowledge sharing between French forces is the most effective domain of knowledge sharing. This could be explained by the fact that the French context is one of a nationalised police force, hence 'other police forces' would in fact belong to the same organisation (although in different regions). The Netherlands and Italy have the lowest mean scores, of 2.60 and 2.62, but again this could be explained by the low sample size as for this question, as there were only 10 responses from the interviews in the Netherlands, and 8 responses noted from the Italian interviews.

Participants were then asked to explain the reasons for the score that they had given their force for the level of effectiveness of knowledge sharing with other forces. Table 2.4.3. below indicates the most frequent reasons given by participants.

Table 2.4.3. Top eight most frequent reasons given for the effectiveness of knowledge sharing with other forces.

REASONS FOR EFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Effective working methods used	41
2. A lot of contact / regularity of contact	20
3. Motivation to share	19
4. Lack of formal procedures	15
5. Investment of time and energy	14
6. Leadership and management	13
7. It is mandatory to share	10
8. Lack of trust between forces	7
Total no. of references made	139

Most frequently referenced as a factor determining the success of knowledge sharing was the use of effective working methods. Clearly, knowledge sharing was deemed to be effective if the methods used were seen as appropriate. In section 2.4.c. we explore what are seen to be the most and least effective methods used to share knowledge with other forces. Additionally the amount of contact and frequency of contact with other forces was mentioned as important in determining the effectiveness of knowledge sharing, and thirdly the motivation of employees and their willingness to share information. Furthermore interviewees also stated that successful knowledge sharing with other forces depends on leadership and management, and whether or not it is mandatory for them to share information. In section 2.7. we explore further the impact of leadership and management on knowledge sharing.

In cases where participants explained knowledge sharing with other forces could still be improved, given reasons were a lack of formal procedures, not enough time and energy being invested and a lack of trust.

2.4.b. Types of knowledge shared with other forces in the same country

Participants were asked to identify three types of knowledge that were most commonly shared with other forces within their country. Table 2.4.4. below indicates the most frequent types of knowledge shared across all ten countries.

Table 2.4.4. Top ten most frequent types of knowledge shared with other forces across all countries.

TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Intelligence	92
2. Operational information	38
3. Preventative information and awareness	25
4. Crime trends and statistics	19
5. Best practice	13
6. Legislation and policy	12
7. Organisational information	11
8. Court orders and requests for information	7
9. Contextual information on local area	7
10. Advice, experiences and know-how	6
Total no. of references made	245

A total of 245 references were made to types of knowledge which were shared with other forces. The type of knowledge most frequently referenced across all interviews is intelligence, which includes details of specific criminal cases, details on people (suspects, witnesses and wanted persons) and details on vehicles. Often participants described intelligence sharing as being around cases which crossed the borders of different police authorities, and which therefore required communication between two or more forces. For example, in the UK one of the participants from South Yorkshire Police described communicating with other forces in the Yorkshire and Humber region with regard to metal theft, which is a crime that is increasing across the region. The second highest type of knowledge shared was operational information, which includes all types of knowledge regarding police operations including police tactics, plans and procedures, specific work practices, projects and schemes of work. Thirdly, preventative information and awareness includes all matters of safety or risks which needed to be communicated between police forces and which it was deemed that other forces would need to be aware of, including terrorist threats and risks of particular crimes. Other types of knowledge which were

common included crime trends and statistics, best practice, legislation and policy, organisational information (including human resources, staffing, force structures and finances), and court orders and requests for information in order to process cases. Interestingly more informal types of knowledge were also important – contextual background information on local areas, as well as advice, experiences and know-how, passed between officers and their equivalents in other forces.

2.4.c. Methods used for knowledge sharing with other forces in the same country

Participants were asked to identify three of the most effective methods used for sharing knowledge with other forces.

Table 2.4.5. Top ten most effective methods of sharing knowledge with other forces across all countries

KNOWLEDGE SHARING METHOD	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Telephone	65
2. Meetings	64
3. Email	39
4. Databases and electronic systems	35
5. Written documents	29
6. Internet and online forums	15
7. Fax	10
8. Radio	10
9. Joint training sessions	10
10. Co-location of forces – shared facilities	4
Total no. of references made	295

A total of 295 references were made to methods of knowledge sharing with other forces which were deemed to be effective. Table 2.4.5. shows the top 10 methods, along with the numbers of references made to each method.

Participants were also asked to explain the reasons for the most effective methods their force uses for sharing knowledge with other forces. The most frequently cited reasons are shown in table 2.4.6. below.

Table 2.4.6. Top five reasons given for the most effective methods of sharing knowledge with other forces across all countries

REASONS FOR EFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Speed	45
2. Efficient process	32
3. Personal contact	28
4. Easy to handle	14
5. Directness	14
Total no. of references made	133

Direct conversations via telephone calls, and secondly via meetings, were identified as the most effective methods of knowledge sharing. Meetings included both formal and informal meetings. These are methods of sharing which are potentially quick, allow for personal contact, and direct communication and information sharing to take place, all of which are provided as reasons for the effectiveness of methods used, with speed being most frequently referenced as reason for an effective method. Information needed to be shared in a fast way with other forces, particularly in the solving of crimes across regional borders, where the police needed to be able to act quickly in order to catch criminals as they travelled across borders. The use of email, databases and electronic systems between forces were also deemed to be effective, and other methods included written documents, the internet and online forums. In the UK, the online forum 'POLKA' (Police Online Knowledge Area) was seen to be effective. POLKA was launched by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), and replicates a social media site, allowing users from police forces across the UK to join communities and online discussions. Fax, radio, and joint training sessions with other forces were also highlighted as effective methods. The co-location of forces was indicated as an effective method of knowledge sharing in Spain, with shared co-ordination rooms used by the Mossos d'Esquadra, the local Barcelona police force, and the emergency services (e.g. fire brigade) who all work together in these rooms, allowing for the quick solving of coordination problems.

Table 2.4.7. Top ten least effective methods of sharing knowledge with other forces across countries.

KNOWLEDGE SHARING METHOD	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Written documents	16
2. Email	13
3. Meetings	12
4. Post	10
5. Telephone	5
6. Fax	4
7 Internet and online forums	3
8.Databases and online systems	3
9. Joint training sessions	2
10. Media outputs	1
Total no. of references made	71

Participants were also asked to provide examples of methods of knowledge sharing they deemed to be least effective. These are shown in Table 2.4.7. above. Participants were also asked to explain the reasons for the least effective methods their force uses for sharing knowledge with other forces. Table 2.4.8. below shows the reasons provided by participants for the least effective methods for knowledge sharing. The highest number of references was made to written documents as being an ineffective method of knowledge sharing. These could include formal reports, memos, and letters, and written documents were described as being a slow form of communication in comparison to direct conversations with other forces which was generally much quicker and thus more effective at times when information was needed to be transferred quickly between forces. As shown in table 2.4.8., most frequently referenced as a reason for the ineffectiveness of methods was the speed of information sharing.

Table 2.4.8. Top five reasons given for the most effective methods of sharing knowledge with other forces across all countries

REASONS FOR INEFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Speed	19
2. Loss of information	19
3. Unstructured information	14
4. Uncertain of the result	11
5. Overload	5
Total no. of references made	75

It is interesting to note that meetings and telephone calls feature as amongst the least effective methods of knowledge sharing, yet earlier in table 2.4.5. were shown to be some of the most effective methods of knowledge sharing. Participants suggested that speaking to someone via telephone could be effective as it was a quick and direct form of communication, however this relied on the individual knowing who to contact in other forces, which sometimes they did not, and also on the recipient they wished to speak to actually being available to talk via telephone and not having to leave a message. Meetings were deemed as sometimes being ineffective as they could be time-consuming, and face to face meetings were not always possible if there was some travelling distance between forces. It is unsurprising, therefore, that speed is given as a reason for methods of knowledge sharing being ineffective, in cases where the methods used were deemed to be too slow. If a method is not suitable for delivering information in a fast way it becomes an ineffective method. Furthermore unstructured information or the loss of information contributes to a large extent to ineffectiveness. Another factor referenced is an uncertainty of the result of some methods of knowledge sharing, for example, where knowledge is shared via email or a written document sent to another force, and no response is received, meaning that there is no guarantee that the information has been received or used by the other force. Information overload was also mentioned as reason for an ineffective method, and in particular this related to emails, with some participants explaining that they receive an excessive number of emails each day.

Generally participants described the effectiveness of particular methods of knowledge sharing as being dependent on a number of other factors, including the type of information to be shared, the people involved, and the urgency of the need for sharing. These factors were seen as determining the most appropriate method to be used.

2.4.d. Barriers to knowledge sharing with other forces in the same country

Participants were asked to identify any particular barriers or issues to them being able to share knowledge effectively with other forces and the results are shown in Table 2.4.9.

Table 2.4.9. Top ten barriers to sharing knowledge with other forces across countries.

BARRIERS TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Bureaucratic processes	14
2. Forces are insular	14
3. Legal requirements and sensitive information	13
4. Lack of processes or strategy for sharing	12
5. Lack of resources	11
6. Unwillingness to share	10
7. Hierarchical and / or lateral differences	8
8. Lack of trust between forces	6
9. Political barriers	5
10. Lack of skills and experience	5
Total no. of references made	104

Overall, 104 references were made to barriers to knowledge sharing, and of these the joint two most frequently referenced barriers were bureaucratic processes and forces being insular. Bureaucratic processes include instances where participants have commented on poor or slow processes and excessive paperwork as being barriers. Forces being insular is used to refer to cases where there is not a culture of sharing, where forces work in silo, having their own structures, objectives, processes and systems and not communicating with one another. Legal requirements and sensitive information was also regarded as a barrier, with data protection legislation placing restrictions on what information could be shared. Other barriers included a lack of processes or strategy for sharing, lack of resources (including a lack of time, staff, facilities and equipment). Unwillingness to share was cited 10 times, and refers to instances where knowledge is seen as inferring some kind of power, and thus retained, or where individuals do not wish to share information due to a desire to prove the success of a particular scheme or project, before going public with the initiative. Hierarchical and / or lateral differences refer to differences between police rankings and between forces. In the UK there are vast differences in the size, scale and scope of the 43 different forces across the country, and it was suggested that the bigger forces hold more power and are more forceful in collaborative work, leaving smaller forces more reluctant to

collaborate. Finally, a lack of trust between forces, political barriers, and the competency of those people involved in knowledge sharing were also highlighted as barriers to sharing between forces.

Participants were asked to explain the reasons for the barriers they had mentioned. The most frequently referenced reasons for barriers are shown in table 2.4.10. below. Most referenced are legal systems and formal procedures which place restrictions on how to share knowledge with other forces or on what knowledge can be shared. Another aspect mentioned is a lack of trust and no motivation or willingness to share information with other forces. Incompatible systems between forces also prevent the effective sharing of knowledge, along with insular forces and competition between forces, and a lack of resources, which may include a lack of people, a lack of time, a lack of money or a lack of technical equipment. For some forces there were budget cuts which meant that forces have to reduce their resources and work with out-dated systems.

Table 2.4.10. Top five reasons for barriers to sharing knowledge with other forces across countries.

REASONS FOR BARRIERS TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Legal systems / formal procedures	14
2. Motivation / lack of trust	12
3. Incompatible systems	9
4. Insular forces / competition	9
5. Resources	9
Total no. of references made	53

Participants were then asked to suggest ways of removing the barriers they had mentioned. It should be noted that a relatively small number of participants provided suggestions for removing barriers, with only 23 references made across all of the interviews. Table 2.4.11. shows the most frequent suggestions that were made by participants.

Table 2.4.11. Suggestions made for the removal of barriers to sharing knowledge with other forces across countries.

REMOVAL OF BARRIERS TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Creation of a central system for knowledge sharing	8
2. Making it mandatory to share knowledge	7
3. Financial investment in improving resources	4
4. Increase in communication	4
Total no. of references made	23

The introduction of a central system was proposed in order to overcome the problems with incompatible systems for sharing between forces. Furthermore making it mandatory to share knowledge was deemed to be likely to improve the willingness to share information and perhaps even dissolve the issue of insularity of forces. To overcome a lack of resources for knowledge sharing, financial investment was proposed, to improve and increase resources available for knowledge sharing. Finally, an increase in communication between forces was proposed in order to improve relationships between forces.

2.4.e. Reasons for successful knowledge sharing with other forces in the same country

Participants were asked to provide an example of a particular occasion where knowledge was successfully shared with other forces, either that they were involved with as part of their role or an example that they were aware of. Across the countries a number of examples were given which included successful knowledge sharing between forces in the following situations:

- Cooperation between three forces to provide security for a visit to Macedonia from the Prime Minister of Turkey (Macedonia)
- Quick information sharing between two forces during a spontaneous demonstration (Germany)
- Working with other forces to combat the growing crime of metal theft (United Kingdom)
- Sharing knowledge in order to successfully police football events (Belgium)

- Mutual training of officers from different police forces (Czech Republic)
- Sharing of intelligence in order to successfully arrest a murder suspect (France)
- National joint database accessed by Italian forces to share information (Italy)
- Sharing of intelligence in order to successfully arrest a suspect (Romania)
- Using the learning experiences of other forces in order to create a crime comparison map (Netherlands)
- Meetings attended by local police forces, the mayor and local security council workers, to plan joint actions (Spain)

Participants were then asked to provide the three most important reasons why the examples given had been successful. Table 2.4.12. shows the most important reasons that knowledge sharing had been successful from the examples that were given.

Table 2.4.12. Top nine most important reasons knowledge sharing was successful across countries.

REASONS FOR SUCCESSFUL KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Effective processes	35
2. Good relationships between forces	23
3. Motivated and committed people	20
4. Clear responsibilities and goals	16
5. It is mandatory to share	8
6. Accuracy of information	3
7. Speed and /or regularity of sharing information	3
8. Accessible information	3
9. Effective leadership	1
Total no. of references made	112

From our thematic analysis we have identified nine different reasons across the countries for the success of knowledge sharing. In section 2.4.d. earlier, it was shown that the joint most frequently mentioned barrier was bureaucratic processes for knowledge sharing between forces. It follows therefore that the most important reason why knowledge sharing had been successful in the examples that were given was where the processes used were deemed to be effective. The other most frequently mentioned barrier was the insularity of forces, and it is therefore not surprising that good relationships between forces and clear responsibilities and goals for sharing were also reasons for success. These factors are demonstrated in an example of successful knowledge sharing provided by one of the

participants in Macedonia, who described the need to cooperate with two other forces for a visit to Macedonia from the Prime Minister of Turkey. All three forces needed to work together to provide security during the visit and in particular during a speech provided by the Prime Minister. This was achieved through regular meetings, discussion and the exchange of experiences. A common plan was developed between the three forces which provided tasks, criteria and measures to be taken by all three forces, and having clear responsibilities and goals, as well as good relationships between the three forces were cited as key reasons for the successful delivery of the policing service during the Prime Minister's visit.

Other important reasons for the success of knowledge sharing include having motivated and committed people involved in sharing, whether it is mandatory to share information in the first place, accuracy of information, the speed and regularity of sharing, accessible information and effective leadership. The speed of information sharing was cited as important in the success of an example provided by a participant in Germany, who described a situation where information was shared between the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Water Police, when a person to be protected visited Berlin and there was a spontaneous demonstration involving around 100 to 150 people. The forces had to work together to plan and organise possible escape routes. This required knowledge to be easily accessible and shared quickly.

2.4.f. Reasons for unsuccessful knowledge sharing with other forces in the same country

Participants were asked to provide an example of a particular occasion where knowledge sharing with other forces was unsuccessful. This could potentially be where knowledge was not shared when it should have been, or where the process / methods of sharing knowledge were unsuitable. Fewer examples of unsuccessful knowledge sharing were provided than examples of successful knowledge sharing. Many participants stated that they could not give details of specific examples, but instead provided more general reasons for unsuccessful knowledge sharing. Those examples that were provided, including more general examples or reasons, included:

- Difficulties in sharing due to forces having different radio systems (Czech Republic)
- Decision made that information should not be shared, when it would have been useful for other forces for their policing operations (Germany)
- Databases of different forces are disparate (Romania)
- Slow intervention due to lack of preparation between forces (Belgium)
- Unwillingness of individuals to share information between forces (Netherlands)
- Generally there is a reluctance to share between forces (United Kingdom)
- Any police operations where police officers that are going to work together do not know each other (Spain)
- Tools and instruments are not fully accessible to all police forces (Italy)
- Police agent not asking for enough information (France)
- Information not being passed quickly (Macedonia)

Participants were then asked to provide the three most important reasons why the examples that they had provided were unsuccessful. Table 5.13 shows the most important reasons that knowledge sharing had been unsuccessful from the examples that were given.

Table 2.4.13. Top nine most important reasons knowledge sharing was unsuccessful across countries.

REASONS FOR UNSUCCESSFUL KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Lack of skills and experience	10
2. Bureaucratic processes	8
3. Lack of processes or strategy for sharing	8
4. Lack of trust between forces	5
5. Poor relationships between forces	4
6. Unclear responsibilities and goals	4
7. Unwillingness to share	4
8. Legal requirements and sensitive information	3
9. Lack of information available to share	2
10. Poor leadership	1
Total no. of references made	49

From our thematic analysis we have identified ten different reasons across the countries for knowledge sharing being unsuccessful. Six of these reasons were named in table 2.4.9. earlier as the most frequently mentioned barriers to knowledge sharing, and their reappearance here suggests therefore that these are barriers which have been experienced

in practice. These include lack of skills and experience, bureaucratic processes, lack of processes or strategy for sharing, lack of trust between forces, legal requirements and sensitive information and unwillingness to share. A lack of skills and experience was referenced most highly as the most important reason for knowledge sharing being unsuccessful, suggesting that the people involved in knowledge sharing are hugely important to ensure success. Similarly, in section 2.4.e. above, the third most important reason for success of knowledge sharing was cited as having motivated and committed people involved. In the interviews with the Czech Republic, issues were raised over disparate systems between the local level municipal police and the national police, where radio systems are different and make it difficult to communicate. Similarly, the Romanian Border Police reported difficulties with disparate computer systems, but they occasionally need to access identity data from the national police and the process in order for them to gain approval for accessing data can be very lengthy. In the UK, one participant commented on the lack of a strategy for knowledge sharing between forces, calling for a recognised and formal method for knowledge sharing across UK forces.

2.5. Sharing knowledge with the public

Within this section we focus on knowledge sharing with a key non-police stakeholder, the public. By definition, policing is a public service and it is therefore crucial to understand how knowledge is transferred between these two parties and the concomitant challenges.

2.5.a. Extent and effectiveness of knowledge sharing with the public.

As with the other sections, interviewees were asked to rate the overall extent and effectiveness of their police organisation with regards to knowledge sharing with the public. The ratings were done using two one-item scales from 1 = Not at all to 5 = A very great extent.

Table 2.5.1. Extent of knowledge sharing with the public.

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Belgium	13	1 to 4	2.38	1.044
Czech Republic	15	1 to 5	3.00	1.195
France	14	1 to 5	3.71	1.139
Germany	15	1 to 5	3.67	1.047
Italy	9	3 to 4	3.56	0.527
Macedonia	15	1 to 5	2.93	1.280
Netherlands	13	2 to 4	3.00	0.603
Romania	15	1 to 5	3.47	0.990
Spain	14	1 to 5	3.57	1.342
United Kingdom	13	3 to 5	3.54	0.660
OVERALL	136	1 to 5	3.28	1.087

Note: Scoring on single item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent

Table 2.5.1 shows that the rating for extent of knowledge sharing with the public had an overall mean of 3.28 from our 1 to 5 scale, indicating a reasonable amount of activity in the area. This score was about the same as knowledge sharing with other forces within the same country (mean = 3.29) but greater than with other forces in other countries (mean = 2.55). Participants from France and Germany had the highest scores (3.71 and 3.67 respectively), while Belgian and Macedonian forces had the lowest scores (2.38 and 2.93 respectively).

Table 2.5.2 shows that the rating for effectiveness of knowledge sharing with the public had an overall mean of 3.54 from our 1 to 5 scale, indicating a moderately good level of performance. Again, this score was greater than for knowledge sharing with other forces

within the same country (mean = 3.44) or with other forces in other countries (mean = 3.11); and even internal knowledge sharing (mean = 3.43). It should be borne in mind, though, that many participants did not actually answer this question since they felt public knowledge sharing was not part of their role. Participants from Germany and France had the highest scores (4.07 and 3.85 respectively), while Macedonian and Czech forces had the lowest scores (2.92 and 3.00 respectively).

Table 2.5.2. Effectiveness of knowledge sharing with the public.

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Belgium	7	3 to 5	3.71	0.756
Czech Republic	15	1 to 4	3.00	0.926
France	13	2 to 5	3.85	1.068
Germany	14	3 to 5	4.07	0.730
Italy	9	3 to 4	3.78	0.441
Macedonia	12	1 to 4	2.92	1.165
Netherlands	12	2 to 4	3.25	0.621
Romania	13	2 to 5	3.77	0.832
Spain	13	2 to 5	3.77	1.013
United Kingdom	13	2 to 5	3.46	0.967
OVERALL	121	1 to 5	3.54	0.940

Note: Scoring on single item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent

2.5.b. Types of knowledge shared with the public

Participants were asked to describe the three most common types of knowledge shared with the public either directly (e.g. through websites or face-to-face community meetings) or indirectly (through the media).

Table 2.5.3. Top ten most frequently mentioned types of knowledge shared with the public across all countries.

TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Police activities on crimes	66
2. Crime prevention information	47
3. General information about the area	35
4. Local priorities for the area	30
5. Legislation and regulations	28
6. General information about the police	22
7. Operational information	17
8. Police responsibilities	15
9. Public complaints	8
10. Police procedures for public to follow	8
Total no. of references made	281

Based on our thematic analysis, Table 2.5.3 shows the top ten types of knowledge shared with the public. A total of 281 answers were gathered and, as might be expected, the top theme that emerged concerned reporting police activities on crimes (66 references made or 23.5% of the total number of references). These included news of significant arrests, wanted notices or progress on specific crimes or police performance. Interestingly, in this category, the provision of 'good news stories' was mentioned by several participants as a means of promoting a positive image of the police. The second most common category was in terms of providing crime prevention information to the public, for example in terms of personal, home or vehicle safety. The third and fourth categories concerned providing general information about the local area (e.g. traffic, accidents, major demonstrations taking place) or local priorities for the area (e.g. crime rates for the neighbourhood, dialogue concerning community tensions). Telling the public about the law or judicial procedures came in fifth. Providing information about the police was also reasonably common, including reporting changes in the police force, hosting open house events for the public or providing recruitment literature. Operational information, such as initiatives on car crime or drugs, was the seventh most common category. A few participants mentioned needing to clarify to the public the responsibilities of what the police did and did not do and who to contact in other agencies, which came in eighth on our list. The final two themes concerned dealing with public complaints and following police procedures (e.g. for victims of crime).

2.5.c. Methods of knowledge sharing with the public

Participants were asked in this section to name the three most effective and least effective methods of knowledge sharing with the public. The emergent themes are outlined below.

Table 2.5.4. The ten most effective methods of sharing knowledge with the public across all countries.

KNOWLEDGE SHARING METHOD	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Press, TV and Radio	61
2. Face to face discussions with the public	52
3. Website and internet	36
4. Printed materials	33
5. Meetings	29
6. Hosting or making visits to civilian groups	27
7. Social media	20
8. Telephone	19
9. Public events	10
10. Email	9
Total no. of references made	307

Table 2.5.4 shows the ten most effective methods of knowledge sharing with the public. In total, 307 references were made and the most commonly cited approach was through the media of press, TV and Radio (61 references, 20% of the total). This included using both local and national media, as well as using prepared press releases and was felt to be useful as a means of reaching a wide audience. The next most popular strategy was quite different in terms of involving direct face to face discussions with the public. Using patrols and direct contact with civilians was seen as a means of establishing more direct lines of communication and building up trust, therefore contributing to a more positive image of the police. Third was using the website and the internet due to its speed and increasing accessibility to wider segments of the population. Printed materials such as leaflets, newsletters and posters were fifth and again seen as a means of reaching large parts of the population. Local neighbourhood meetings with groups were sixth and reported as effective in terms of directly and regularly engaging with regions. Another important strategy was in terms of making visits to civilian institutions such as schools or hosting similar visits to police stations in order to make presentations on police-related issues. Interestingly, use of social media such as Facebook or Twitter came in seventh, although this was reported as more

important in the UK and Netherlands compared to the other countries. The telephone, hosting public events (like conferences or lectures) and email rounded out the rest of the top ten. Table 2.5.5 summarises the main reasons cited for the effectiveness of the above methods. In addition to the explanations given above, it should be noted that appropriate usage of methods and a combination of different approaches was also seen as contributing to success.

Table 2.5.5. Reasons for the success of the most effective knowledge sharing methods.

REASONS FOR EFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Ability to reach a broad audience	41
2. Directness	38
3. Develop a good relationship with the public	28
4. Appropriate use of method	25
5. Combination of different methods	15
6. Speed	9
Total number of references made	156

Table 2.5.6. Least effective methods of sharing knowledge with the public across all countries.

KNOWLEDGE SHARING METHOD	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Press, TV and Radio	19
2. Printed materials	18
3. Local neighbourhood meetings	10
4. Website and internet	6
5. Telephone	4
6. Face to face discussion with public	3
7. Social media	3
8. Public events	1
9. Police surgeries	1
10. Intermediary agencies	1
Total no. of references made	70

Table 2.5.6 shows the methods rated least effective for knowledge sharing with the public. It is clear that participants were much less likely to rate methods ineffective as opposed to effective hence the number of references are much lower (70 in total). The Press, TV and Radio came out joint top in this list also (19 references, 27% of the total) and this was weighted by the opinion of police personnel that the media were only interested in negative stories. Printed materials were also rated least effective as participants felt that letters,

newsletters and posters may be too broadly targeted and not engaging enough for the public. The third least effective method was holding local neighbourhood meetings and one criticism here was about the small number of people who may turn up. The other methods were not mentioned very frequently but included telephones (e.g. not being sure who was on the other end of the line, being inefficient where documentation was needed), face to face discussions with the public (e.g. the issue of receiving many complaints from the public) and social media (e.g. potential misuse of twitter by officers). The general reasons given for lack of success of these methods are shown in Table 2.5.7. Most frequently referenced was the uncertain effectiveness of the methods used. A disadvantage of many methods was felt to be not knowing whether a TV report, newspaper article or newsletter was seen and read by the public or simply neglected. Another drawback was where a method attains just a limited audience e.g. the perception that the use of social media like Twitter is nearly exclusively by younger people. Other reasons included the possibility of some methods evoking different reactions in people (for example some may like a newspaper article and others do not) and this mixed reactions could contribute to a negative public image to the police and therefore hinder effective knowledge sharing with the public. Additionally incomplete information is seen as a further reason for an ineffective information sharing.

Table 2.5.7 Reasons for the failure of the least effective knowledge sharing methods.

REASONS FOR INEFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Uncertainty of effectiveness	27
2. Reaches a limited audience	14
3. Mixed reactions from the public	12
4. Incomplete information provided	6
Total number of references made	59

2.5.d. Barriers to knowledge sharing with the public

Participants were asked if there were any particular barriers or issues to sharing knowledge with the public. Table 2.5.8 shows the ten most common themes that emerged out of the 150 references made and Table 2.5.9. indicates the reasons behind the barriers.

Table 2.5.8. Ten most common barriers to sharing knowledge with the public across all countries.

TYPE OF BARRIER TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Legal requirements and sensitivity of information	39
2. Lack of interest from the public	19
3. Lack of resources	15
4. Problems of targeting the right audience	15
5. Communication procedures difficult for the police	7
6. Media desire for negative news stories	6
7. Public image of the police	6
8. Lack of skills and experience by police staff	5
9. Lack of understanding by the public	5
10. Technology shortcomings	5
Total no. of references made	150

As might be expected, by far the most common barrier regarded both data protection legislation and the sensitivity of giving information out about ongoing cases or operations (39 references, 26% of the total). Beside the need to protect sensitive information sometimes information was seen as power and not shared with the public e.g. in a murder investigation official instructions may forbid the release of details of the culprit's modus operandi. Second, however, was a lack of interest from the public, including lack of respect for authority or a lack of trust in the police. Third was the lack of resources such as money, personnel or time to engage in public knowledge sharing activities. An interesting issue came in fourth place, in terms of targeting knowledge sharing initiatives at the right audience. Several interviewees mentioned the challenge of trying to engage with different cultural or other types of groups in the community to ensure the right information got to the right people. Communication procedures being too difficult (due to bureaucracy and indirect flows of information) came next. The public image of the police with concerns about stereotypes, negative perceptions and the implications of wearing a uniform highlighted plus the media's desire for negative news stories had similar levels of reference. Lack of relevant knowledge exchange skills and experience by staff, lack of understanding of information or police responsibilities by the public and technological shortcomings (e.g. lack of ICT support) rounded out the top ten.

Table 2.5.9. Most common reasons for barriers to knowledge sharing with the public

REASONS FOR BARRIERS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Sensitivity of information	14
2. Official instructions to restrict information flow	11
3. Negative image of the police	8
4. Multiple cultures and languages	8
5. Lack of resources	5
Total number of references made	46

Participants were also asked how these barriers could be removed but few suggestions were forthcoming (see Table 2.5.10). Most interviewees agreed that some barriers like data protection legislation and official instructions must not be removed. Instead they suggested improving structures and standards for effective communication with the public. Furthermore extended communication would benefit the image of the police and facilitate collaboration with the public. All in all there were very few remarks concerning barriers for knowledge sharing with the public and suggestions of how to remove these barriers.

Table 2.5.10. Strategies for removing barriers to knowledge sharing with the public.

REMOVING BARRIERS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Improve structure/ standards of communication	9
2. Extend communication levels	5
Total number of references made	14

2.5.e. Reasons for success of knowledge sharing with the public

Participants were finally asked to give an example of a particular occasion where knowledge was successfully shared with the public (either that that they were involved with as part of their role or that they were aware of). An insightful array of examples were generated by each country and included the following:

- Dealing with local burglaries (Belgium)
- Running a 'Senior Academy' project for older citizens (Czech Republic)

- Conducting crime prevention work in schools (France)
- Dealing with the Dresden flood (Germany)
- Forest safety campaigns (Italy)
- Dealing with children living on the street (Macedonia)
- Setting up the 'Amber Alert' missing persons SMS text service (Netherlands)
- Running a joint agency public awareness event (Romania)
- Running mobile advice centres (Spain)
- The use of TV crime reconstruction programmes (UK)

Participants were then asked to describe three reasons why they thought the knowledge sharing example had been successful. Table 2.5.11 shows the ten most common themes for success that came out of the 186 references given.

The most common theme regarded the public being motivated to share or want the information from the police (30 references, 16% of the total references). Under this theme came a number of aspects such as trust in police being maintained, the public able to see the direct impact of policing operations, answering the questions they had directly, making the nature of incidents emotive for the public and situations where the public had a need to get information quickly (e.g. the floods in Sheffield, UK and Dresden, Germany). The second major theme was about providing information that was accurate. Useful points here were about information given to the public being specific and relevant to public requirements at the time, the practical applications of the knowledge being clear and that information from both the police and media being accurate. The third most common theme was about closely engaging with the public out in the community through proximity and visibility and building up personal contacts throughout the neighbourhood.

Table 2.5.11. Ten most important reasons knowledge sharing with the public was successful overall across all countries.

REASONS FOR SUCCESS OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Motivation of public	30
2. Accuracy of information	25
3. Close involvement with the public	20
4. Speed and regularity of information provision to public	16
5. Accessibility of information	16
6. Actively getting the public involved	11
7. Good use of press media	10
8. Effective operational management	10
9. Targeting the right audience	9
10. Good team-working and co-operation	9
Total no. of references made	186

The fourth reason was providing information quickly and regularly to communities while the fifth was ensuring information was easily accessible to the relevant stakeholders and the public was aware of the two-way nature of knowledge exchange. Actively getting the public involved through engaging types of activities (e.g. adventure games being used with children in the Czech Republic or organizing a joint Public Order Forces day in Romania) or being flexible in accommodating their needs was sixth. Constructive use of the media through national press coverage or crime reconstruction TV programmes was next. At the same level of frequency was effective operational management of knowledge sharing events and activities (e.g. the problem clearly identified, good organization and making it a strategic priority), followed by ensuring that the right or big enough audience had been targeted (e.g. the Italian participants using 'how to' brochures for forest safety campaigns). Finally, good team-working and co-operation within forces and with non-police agencies and the public rounded out the top ten.

2.6. Sharing knowledge with police forces in other countries and international agencies

The final dimension of knowledge sharing investigated was the sharing of knowledge internationally, either directly with forces from other countries or through intermediary international agencies such as Europol. The types of questions followed a similar format as with the other domains.

2.6.a. Extent and effectiveness of knowledge sharing internationally

Table 2.6.1. Extent of knowledge sharing with police forces in other countries or with international policing agencies

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Belgium	14	1 to 5	2.50	1.344
Czech Republic	10	1 to 3	2.00	0.816
France	14	1 to 4	1.43	0.852
Germany	15	1 to 5	2.73	1.335
Italy	9	1 to 3	3.44	1.740
Macedonia	13	1 to 5	2.92	1.498
Netherlands	10	2 to 4	2.50	0.707
Romania	11	1 to 5	3.18	1.401
Spain	14	1 to 5	2.64	0.929
United Kingdom	11	1 to 5	2.45	1.128
OVERALL	121	1 to 5	2.55	1.284

Note: Scoring on single item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent

Table 2.6.1 shows the extent to which participants said their force shared knowledge internationally. The overall mean score was only 2.55 out of the range from 1 to 5 and represented the lowest extent score across the four dimensions of knowledge sharing examined. It should be noted here that 23% of the interviewees reported a score of 1 ('Not at all') for this question and hence it was not as common an activity as other forces and therefore a quarter of the sample at least did not complete the subsequent questions. The highest scores were for Italy (3.44) and Romania (3.18). The lowest scores were for France (1.43) and the Czech Republic (2.00), reflecting their more regional focus (e.g. the French force sampled was in a district with no borders or airports). Interestingly, the low score for France could also be explained by the fact there is a specialist set of officers whose job is to deal with international contacts. Every police officer who needs international information or

contacts has to use them as they themselves do not have the means or permissions to contact international forces directly.

Table 2.6.2. Effectiveness of knowledge sharing with police forces in other countries or with international policing agencies.

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Belgium	11	1 to 5	3.45	1.214
Czech Republic	7	1 to 3	2.43	0.787
France	4	3 to 5	3.75	0.957
Germany	8	2 to 4	2.63	0.916
Italy	6	3 to 3	4.33	1.033
Macedonia	9	1 to 5	3.67	1.500
Netherlands	4	2 to 4	2.75	0.957
Romania	10	2 to 5	3.80	1.033
Spain	10	2 to 5	3.30	0.949
United Kingdom	6	1 to 3	2.17	0.753
OVERALL	75	1 to 5	3.11	1.147

Note: Scoring on single item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent

Table 2.6.2 shows the rated effectiveness of knowledge sharing internationally for those forces that did engage in the activity. The overall score was a moderate 3.11, which was the lowest effectiveness rating out of the four dimensions of knowledge sharing we examined (internally, with other forces in the same country, with the public and internationally). As might be expected with the nature of its Border Police, Romania had one of the highest scores (3.80). However, top was Italy (4.33), since a number of its interviewees were from the International Co-operation Office of the Arma dei Carabinieri. Surprisingly, given it had the lowest extent of knowledge sharing score, French participants who did engage in this type of knowledge sharing showed the third highest score for effectiveness (3.75). On the other side, the UK (2.17) and the Czech Republic (2.43) showed the lowest scores.

2.6.b. Types of knowledge shared internationally

Participants were asked to describe the three types of knowledge most commonly shared with forces in other countries or international policing agencies. Table 2.6.3 shows the ten most popular themes that emerged from the 146 references made by the participants.

Table 2.6.3. Ten most frequent types of knowledge shared internationally across all countries.

TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Intelligence-related information	71
2. Advice, experience and know-how	36
3. Organisation and working methods	21
4. Legislation and regulations	7
5. Governance	4
6. Research	3
7. Technology changes	2
8. Informal contacts	1
9. Rumours	1
10. Public Relations information	1
Total no. of references made	146

Nearly half the references made (71 references, 49% of the total) concerned the sharing of intelligence-related information. This included data on wanted individuals or groups of interest, vehicles, border security issues, profiles of crimes and criminal cases or records. The second most popular activity was forces sharing experience and advice with each other on how to tackle crime. This was contextualised as best practices, lessons learned, educational visits and offering crime prevention advice. Third was sharing information on organisational structures, processes and working methods including benchmarking of norms and comparing performance on key activities. The fourth aspect of legislation and regulations was significantly less common, with the remaining themes of governance (policy or political knowledge), research, changes in technology, informal personal contacts, rumours and public relations information having only occasional mentions.

2.6.c. Methods of international knowledge sharing.

Within this section, we describe the most and least effective methods of knowledge sharing internationally as reported by participants.

Table 2.6.4. Ten most effective methods of sharing knowledge internationally across all countries.

KNOWLEDGE SHARING METHOD	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Meetings with different force members	19
2. Workshops, seminars	19
3. Telephone	17
4. Email	16
5. Databases	12
6. Hosting or making visits	11
7. Using international agencies	9
8. Face to face discussion	8
9. Mail	7
10. Printed materials	4
Total no. of references made	133

Table 2.6.4 shows the ten most common themes that emerged when participants were asked to name the three most common methods of knowledge sharing. Joint top with 19 references each (14% of the total of 133 references) were having meetings with members of forces from other countries and attending workshops, seminars or lectures (e.g. organised by CEPOL or through other police training schools). Both involved direct personal contact between police personnel and were therefore seen as the most valuable approaches. Third and fourth were the technology-mediated mechanisms of telephone and email which enabled continued direct communication with peers in other forces. Fifth, was the use of international databases (e.g. the Schengen database was mentioned by French and Italian interviewees and FRONTEX Pulsar data statistics by a Macedonian participant). Sixth, was the useful activity of exchange visits, which was seen as not only a means of learning about another force's work but also a means of learning about its culture through an extended stay. Using international agencies (e.g. Interpol was mentioned by a UK interviewee and the SEKI centre by a Macedonian interviewee), having face to face discussions and sharing written correspondence with individuals plus using printed materials such as international magazines or official documents rounded off the top ten.

Participants were asked to explain the reasons for the most effective methods their force uses for sharing knowledge with police forces in other countries and/or international police agencies (Table 2.6.5). The most frequently referenced reason for effectiveness was the directness of certain methods in distributing the relevant information straight to the right people in a foreign force. Next, a method was declared as successful if it distributed information on a demand-oriented basis. Here “speed” was again mentioned as very important. Another important factor was developing good relationships with foreign police forces and international police agencies as well as experience with knowledge sharing across borders. In some cases participants explained a method to be the most successful because they only used that one method for sharing knowledge with police forces in other countries and international police agencies.

Table 2.6.5. Reasons for success of most effective knowledge sharing methods internationally.

REASONS FOR EFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Directness	30
2. Demand-oriented methods	21
3. Good relationships	17
4. Only-used method	8
Total number of references made	76

Table 2.6.6 shows the top ten least effective international knowledge sharing methods. As with the other domains, interviewees were much less able to give least effective methods since many thought all methods had potential benefits, hence only 25 references in total were made. However, the top four least effective methods all had at least four mentions with their respective reasons as follows: mail (the length of time it takes to receive post), meetings with different force members from other countries (the complaint that sometimes meetings had no specific goal and hence became a waste of time), attending workshops, seminars and courses (their lack of specific practical application at times) and having to go through dedicated staff or agencies to share information (the extra time and paperwork involved). The remaining methods were mentioned only once or twice so do not merit more substantive discussion.

Table 2.6.6. Least effective methods of sharing knowledge internationally across all countries.

KNOWLEDGE SHARING METHOD	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Mail	5
2. Meetings with different force members	4
3. Workshops, seminars, courses	4
4. Dedicated staff or agencies for international knowledge sharing	4
5. Using international agencies	2
6. Face to face discussion	1
7. Information going via non-police intermediary	1
8. Web forums	1
9. Formal ceremonies	1
10. Videoconferencing	1
Total no. of references made	25

Participants were then asked to explain the reasons for the least effective methods their force uses for sharing knowledge with police forces in other countries and/or international police agencies (Table 2.6.7). Most frequently referenced was a lack of resources. A lack of time was particularly mentioned as hindering effective information sharing across borders but also a lack of people and technical equipment complicated successful information exchange. Further reasons for the least effective methods used were the loss or change of information during the process of sharing. Language barriers, misunderstandings or not knowing the right contact person could lead to either a loss of information or an alteration of its content. Furthermore, due to sensitive information and data protection not all information could be shared with police forces in other countries while complicated processes of how to share information across borders were also a hindrance. Not knowing who to contact and which person to speak to in a foreign police force was the final issue.

Table 2.6.7. Reasons for failure of least effective methods of knowledge sharing internationally

REASONS FOR INEFFECTIVENESS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Lack resources	14
2. Possibility of loss/change of information	6
3. Sensitivity of information	5
4. Complicated process	4
5. Contacting the wrong person in the other force/agency	3
Total number of references made	32

2.6.d. Most common barriers to sharing knowledge internationally

Participants were asked to name any particular barriers they thought affected the sharing of knowledge with forces in other countries or with international policing agencies. Table 2.6.8 shows the ten most common types of barriers generated from the 93 references made. Since less participants were able to comment on the international frame of knowledge sharing, the comparatively lower number of references compared to the other three domains is understandable.

Table 2.6.8. Most common barriers to sharing knowledge internationally across all countries.

TYPE OF BARRIER TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Language barriers	21
2. Different legal systems	16
3. Organizational differences	15
4. Communication procedures too difficult	7
5. Lack of motivation by police	6
6. Technology shortcomings	6
7. Lack of resources	5
8. Lack of skills or experience by police personnel	4
9. Problems of targeting the right people in other forces	4
10. Different political systems	2
Total no. of references made	93

The obvious category of language barriers came out top with 21 references (22.6% of the total), followed by having different legal systems in various countries (16 mentions, 17% of the total). Organizational differences were third and covered issues such as: different cultures, policies and structures of forces; organizational knowledge sharing strategy lacking in forces; and the difficulty of transferring methods between forces due to context differences. Communication procedures being too difficult (e.g. rules too strict, bureaucratic complexity of knowledge sharing paperwork and different procedures in different countries) was next. Lack of motivation by police was reflected in issues such as: lack of support from senior management; unfavourable personality or attitude of individuals; unprofessional behaviour of police officers; different priorities in different countries; and lack of trust from police forces. Technological shortcomings (e.g. lack of relevant ICT, different systems used, no shared workspace for joint agency working or information being out of date on

databases) and lack of resources followed after. The lack of knowledge sharing skills by police personnel and not knowing who to contact in other forces both had four references each, with two people mentioning the presence of different political systems in countries as an issue.

A summary of the most common reasons for the existence of these barriers is shown in Table 2.6.9. The most frequently referenced reasons for barriers were different political systems and legal orders. This included not knowing how police forces in other countries are organised and structured, problems of finding the right contact person and the different authorities and competences of who is allowed to share what information. Another important reason for barriers is language. Different languages lead to misunderstandings, a loss of information and an ineffective collaboration with police forces in other countries. Less commonly, lack of motivation was mentioned as a further barrier for effective knowledge sharing. Some people or forces were seen as not wanting to share information and having an "information is power" attitude. Furthermore a lack of time, people, technical equipment and, especially, compatible systems hindered an effective exchange of information. Additionally, a lack of a formal system or knowledge sharing process was named as the other barrier for effective information sharing across borders. Participants were asked how these barriers could be removed but few suggestions were forthcoming (Table 2.6.10). Most participants agreed that learning foreign languages and a simplified process of how to share knowledge with police forces in other countries and international police agencies would contribute to more effective knowledge sharing across borders. Furthermore the introduction of compatible systems and improved technology were mentioned as helping to remove barriers. All in all there were again very few remarks concerning barriers for knowledge sharing with the public and suggestions of how to remove these barriers.

Table 2.6.9. Reasons for barriers to knowledge sharing internationally.

REASONS FOR BARRIERS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Different political and legal systems	10
2. Different languages	9
3. Poor motivation/attitude	4
4. Lack of resources	3
5. No system	2
Total number of references made	28

Table 2.6.10. Strategies for removing barriers to international knowledge sharing.

REMOVING BARRIERS	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Learn other languages	5
2. Simplify the communication process	5
3. Introduce compatible systems	3
4. Improve technology	2
Total number of references made	15

2.6 e. Reasons for success of knowledge sharing internationally

Participants were finally asked to give an example of a particular occasion where knowledge was successfully shared with police organisations in other countries or international agencies (either that that they were involved with as part of their role or that they were aware of). An intriguing array of examples were generated by the countries and included the following:

- Cross-border vehicle pursuit (Belgium)
- G8 summit liaison between British and German officers (Germany)
- International training workshops (Italy)
- International drug trafficking (Macedonia)
- Knowledge exchange visit with South African police (Netherlands)
- Daily border security meetings (Romania)

- European Capitals Police Network (Spain)

Participants were then asked to describe three reasons why they thought the knowledge sharing example had been successful. Table 2.6.11 shows the ten most common themes for success that came out of the 81 references given.

Table 2.6.11. Ten most important reasons knowledge sharing internationally was successful overall across all countries.

REASONS FOR SUCCESS OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. Building up good relationship with, and understanding of, other forces	16
2. Speed and regularity of information provision to other forces	11
3. Good teamworking and co-operation	10
4. Good knowledge and experience of police staff	9
5. Motivated and committed employees	6
6. Accuracy of information	6
7. Shared activities, procedures and facilities	5
8. Problem shared across countries	3
9. Strategic alignment	3
10. Effective operational management	3
Total no. of references made	81

Top of the list of reasons for success was in terms of building up a good relationship with, and understanding of, the other country's forces (16 references, 20% of the total). This was done through having personal contact through meetings and exchange visits in order to create a better understanding of culture, working methods and structure of other organizations. The second most common theme was sharing information in a regular and timely manner with international partners. Ensuring good teamworking and co-operation all along the hierarchies of the partner organisations plus having staff with a sufficient level of knowledge and experience had 10 and 9 references each, respectively. This was followed by 6 references each for having employees motivated to share knowledge (personal contacts are a good way to build up trust between partners) and ensuring information is detailed and accurate enough. Shared activities, procedures or facilities (e.g. a Romanian interviewee mentioned having shared patrols with Hungarian police and a Spanish participant described a shared co-ordination room for Spanish and French police in Southern France) came next. The final three reasons covered: the problem being shared across countries (e.g. scrap metal

theft was mentioned by a UK respondent and human trafficking by an Italian interviewee); strategic alignment (a communication strategy was in place and the initiative was relevant to the achievement of operational goals); and effective operational management (having good organisational support and being well prepared in advance to tackle the issue).

2.7. Leadership and Management

Within this section we focus on the impact of management upon knowledge sharing in police forces.

2.7.a. Encouragement to Share Knowledge by Line Managers and Supervisors

Participants were asked whether or not they felt that they were encouraged to share knowledge by their line manager or supervisor. Of those who answered this question, the majority confirmed that they felt that they were encouraged to sharing knowledge by their line manager or supervisor, with 118 answering 'yes' to this question. A relatively small number of just 9 interviewees answered 'no', they did not feel that they were encouraged in sharing knowledge by their line manager or supervisor.

Participants were then asked to explain the ways in which they were encouraged to share knowledge by their line manager or supervisor. Table 2.7.1. provides the most frequent examples given for ways in which participants were encouraged to share knowledge.

Table 2.7.1. Top five most frequent examples given for the ways in which participants were encouraged to share knowledge by their line manager or supervisor.

METHODS OF ENCOURAGEMENT	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. The need for knowledge sharing is made clear	27
2. I have a good relationship with my line manager/supervisor	24
3. Knowledge sharing is part of my job	22
4. I have regular meetings with my line manager/supervisor	21
5. I am rewarded by my line manager for sharing knowledge	4
Total no. of references made	98

Explaining the methods through which they were encouraged to share knowledge, participants indicated most frequently that the need for sharing knowledge was made clear by their line manager or supervisor. Thus the objectives, goals, and requirements for sharing knowledge were well communicated from line managers and supervisors to their staff. Secondly, participants were encouraged to share knowledge through having a good relationship to their line manager or supervisor, where managers were approachable and

easy to communicate with, making participants feel comfortable in sharing knowledge with them. Also important for some participants was that knowledge sharing was as an essential part of their job, by which it featured on their job descriptions and personal objectives at work, and / or they were required to share knowledge according to official instructions. Regular meetings with their line manager or supervisor also encouraged participants to share knowledge, giving them a formal opportunity to meet colleagues and exchange information. Finally, a small number of participants described that they were rewarded for sharing knowledge by their line manager or supervisor.

2.7.b. Line Managers and Supervisors' Methods to Encourage Staff to Share Knowledge

For those participants whose role was to supervise or line manage other members of staff, the interviews asked them to explain the ways by which they encourage their police staff to share knowledge. Table 2.7.2. provides the most frequently provided methods for encouraging staff.

Table 2.7.2. Top four most frequent examples given for the ways in which line managers or supervisors encouraged their staff to share knowledge.

METHODS OF ENCOURAGEMENT	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. I provide verbal or written encouragement to my staff	26
2. I have regular meetings with my staff	19
3. Knowledge sharing is part of their job	14
4. I use informal methods of knowledge sharing with my staff	9
Total no. of references made	68

The majority of participants stated that they provide encouragement to their staff to share knowledge verbally or in writing. Examples of verbal encouragement included asking their staff directly to provide an update or to share some information with their team. In writing, managers might email their staff and ask for a written update to be provided. Secondly, regular meetings with staff acted to encourage them to share knowledge, a method that was reported by members of staff in table 2.7.1. earlier to be successful in encouraging them to share knowledge. Some line managers and supervisors made knowledge sharing

part of the job description or objectives of their staff, and assessed the performance of their staff on the knowledge shared. Again in table 2.7.1., this was reported by participants as being a successful method of encouraging them to share knowledge. Finally, informal methods were used to encourage staff to share knowledge, through attempting to establish a good relationship with their staff, having an 'open door policy' and listening to the worries and problems of their staff.

2.7.c. Encouragement to Share Knowledge by other Colleagues

Participants were then asked to explain the ways in which they were encouraged to share knowledge by other colleagues or members of their team. Table 2.7.3. provides the most frequent examples given for ways in which participants were encouraged to share knowledge.

Table 2.7.3. Top five most frequent examples given for the ways in which participants were encouraged to share knowledge by their colleagues.

METHODS OF ENCOURAGEMENT	NO. OF REFERENCES MADE
1. I have regular meetings with colleagues	28
2. Knowledge sharing is part of the culture at work	27
3. There is a demand for information from colleagues	21
4. I have good relationships with my colleagues	17
5. Targeted enquiries/questions encourage me to share	15
Total no. of references made	108

Most frequently referenced by participants as way of how they feel encouraged to share information by their colleagues was by having regular meetings, through seeing their colleagues and having allocated time in which to exchange information. Having a 'culture' of knowledge sharing also encouraged participants to share, by which participants felt that they were expected to share knowledge and exchange information with their team and that this was an expectation and a part of being involved in the organisation. Furthermore for some participants, they reported that other colleagues might demand information that they required in order for them to complete their own work. Other methods of encouragement

were having a good relationship with colleagues, and through targeted enquiry and colleagues asking questions.

2.8. Knowledge Sharing Capabilities And Adapting To Change

One important assumption behind this work package is that better knowledge sharing capabilities are related to better organisational flexibility in terms of change management. In order to test this assumption more directly, participants were also asked to provide quantitative data through filling in a questionnaire during the interview (Knowledge Sharing Questionnaire One). Three aspects of participants' police force knowledge sharing capability were assessed as follows (all scale items were scored from from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent):

1. Knowledge sharing climate: This seven-item scale was taken from a paper on police management roles by Berg, Dean, Gottschalk & Karlsen (2008). It attempts to provide an overall evaluation of the extent to which knowledge sharing is valued and encouraged within the participants' police force. Example items include 'The police have effective routines about knowledge sharing within departments' and 'Knowledge sharing is a part of the culture'. The scale demonstrated good reliability (*Cronbach's alpha = .89*).
2. Employee involvement: This five item scale was taken from a study of organisational learning practices of over 500 organisations, including policing agencies (Birdi, Wood, Patterson & Wall, 2004). It focuses more specifically on knowledge sharing up and down the hierarchy within the police organisation. Example items include 'The force takes into account and reflects employees' views in policy statements' and 'Top management listen to the opinions of employees from all levels when developing its strategy'. The scale demonstrated good reliability (*Cronbach's alpha = .87*).
3. Knowledge storage and management systems: This five item scale was also taken from the above Birdi et al (2004) paper. The focus of the interviews was on knowledge sharing but initial discussions with police personnel highlighted the need to also consider the extent to which police organisations formally stored and managed their information. Example items include 'The force has reference systems which make it quick and easy to obtain stored information needed by employees' and 'The force stores key information in manuals or a central documentation centre'. The scale demonstrated good reliability (*Cronbach's alpha = .78*).

Our measure of organisational flexibility in adapting to change was based on the Patterson, West, Shackleton, Dawson, Lawthom, Maitlis, Robinson & Wallace (2005) paper on developing organisational measures. This 10 item scale again showed good reliability (*Cronbach's alpha* = .92). Example items include 'This police force is quick to respond when changes need to be made', 'The force easily makes changes based on new knowledge' and 'This force is good at managing changes to the way it works'.

The analyses below show the mean scores on these scales overall and also broken down by country. This will be followed by multivariate analysis showing the extent to which the knowledge sharing capability measures are related to the police organisation's flexibility.

Table 2.8.1. Knowledge sharing climate within participating police organisations.

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Netherlands	15	2.00 to 3.86	2.83	0.548
Spain	15	2.00 to 3.86	2.99	0.539
United Kingdom	13	1.57 to 4.00	3.29	0.675
Czech Republic	15	2.57 to 4.00	3.48	0.392
Germany	15	2.71 to 4.14	3.51	0.448
Belgium	15	2.43 to 4.14	3.61	0.640
Macedonia	14	2.57 to 4.83	3.62	0.704
Italy	15	1.86 to 4.57	3.68	0.805
France	15	2.86 to 4.86	3.76	0.552
Romania	13	2.29 to 4.86	4.14	0.675
OVERALL	145	1.57 to 4.86	3.48	0.688

Note: Scoring on 7 item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent (overall Cronbach's alpha of reliability = .84)

Table 2.8.2. Employee involvement within participating police organisations.

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Spain	15	1.25 to 3.40	2.34	0.587
Netherlands	14	1.60 to 3.20	2.59	0.594
France	15	1.80 to 3.80	2.67	0.603
United Kingdom	13	2.00 to 4.00	2.74	0.634
Czech Republic	15	1.60 to 4.60	2.87	0.919
Germany	15	2.20 to 3.50	2.91	0.394
Macedonia	15	1.40 to 4.80	3.12	1.026
Italy	15	2.00 to 4.60	3.39	0.423
Belgium	15	2.40 to 4.60	3.47	0.703
Romania	13	1.80 to 5.00	3.94	0.984
OVERALL	145	1.25 to 5.00	3.00	0.864

Note: Scoring on 5 item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent (overall Cronbach's alpha of reliability = .87)

Table 2.8.3. Use of knowledge storage/management systems within participating police organisations.

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Netherlands	15	2.00 to 4.00	3.04	0.586
United Kingdom	13	1.00 to 4.60	3.35	0.950
Spain	15	2.40 to 4.40	3.41	0.612
Italy	15	1.75 to 3.80	3.60	1.032
Belgium	15	2.40 to 4.20	3.60	0.650
Germany	15	3.20 to 4.80	3.69	0.506
Macedonia	15	2.40 to 4.60	3.71	0.630
France	15	3.00 to 4.80	3.88	0.570
Czech Republic	15	3.40 to 5.00	4.12	0.471
Romania	13	2.80 to 5.00	4.22	0.619
OVERALL	146	1.00 to 5.00	3.66	0.688

Note: Scoring on 5 item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent (overall Cronbach's alpha of reliability = .79)

Table 2.8.4. Adapting to change within participating police organisations.

	No. of responses	Range	Mean	S.D.
Spain	15	1.50 to 3.80	2.68	0.617
Netherlands	14	1.70 to 4.00	2.80	0.743
United Kingdom	13	2.10 to 3.60	2.88	0.463
Czech Republic	15	1.30 to 4.30	3.01	0.883
Belgium	15	2.10 to 4.10	3.07	0.526
Germany	15	2.10 to 4.00	3.11	0.511
France	15	2.50 to 4.10	3.19	0.496
Italy	15	2.00 to 4.33	3.21	0.609
Macedonia	15	1.40 to 4.50	3.30	0.945
Romania	13	3.30 to 4.80	4.00	0.447
OVERALL	145	1.30 to 4.80	3.12	0.713

Note: Scoring on 10 item scale from 1 = Not at all to 5 = To a very great extent (overall Cronbach's alpha of reliability = .91)

Table 2.8.1 shows a moderate overall mean score of 3.48 (between 'To a fair extent' and 'To a great extent') for knowledge sharing climate across the police forces. Romania (4.14) came out top along with France (3.76), with Netherlands (2.83) and Spain (2.99) coming out lowest. However, on the more focused dimension of employee involvement (i.e. the extent to which knowledge sharing was encouraged up and down the police hierarchy), the overall mean score was weaker (3.00, equivalent to 'To a fair extent', Table 2.8.2). Again, the Romanian force (3.94) came out top along with Belgium (3.47), with Spain (2.34) and Netherlands (2.59) coming out lowest. The use of knowledge storage and management systems was reported as more widespread than the aforementioned two knowledge sharing dimensions (overall mean score = 3.66, between 'To a fair extent' and 'To a great extent',

Table 2.8.3). Romania (4.22) came out top along with the Czech Republic (4.12), with Netherlands (3.04) and the UK (3.35) coming out lowest. Finally, our police organisations' flexibility in adapting to change showed a moderate mean of 3.12 (just above 'To a fair extent', Table 2.8.4). Romania (4.00) came out top along with Macedonia (3.30), with Spain (2.68) and Netherlands (2.80) coming out lowest.

Table 2.8.5 shows two sets of results outlining the relationship between the three knowledge sharing capabilities and organisational flexibility. The partial correlations (first column of results in the table) shows that flexibility is strongly, positively and significantly related to all three measures of knowledge sharing climate ($r = .55, p < .001$), employee involvement ($r = .66, p < .001$) and the use of knowledge storage and management systems ($r = .48, p < .001$). This is taking into account any differences between the countries. The multiple regression analysis shown in the second column of results shows what happens when all three knowledge measures are entered simultaneously, while again controlling for country. Interestingly, 38% of the variance in police organisational flexibility is accounted for by the knowledge capability measures but employee involvement is very much the key component ($\beta = .52, p < .001$). Knowledge storage and management systems are still significant but to a smaller extent ($\beta = .16, p < .05$), while the more general knowledge sharing climate becomes non-significant. The lesson from these analyses is that police organisations which have the capability to effectively share knowledge up and down the hierarchy, and formal knowledge management systems to support this, seem to be those who deal best with adapting to change.

Table 2.8.5. Partial correlation and multiple regression analyses showing the relationship between knowledge sharing capabilities (knowledge sharing climate, employee involvement and knowledge storage and management systems) and organisational flexibility (n = 144).

	1	2
	Partial correlations controlling for country	β regression weight after controlling for country
Knowledge sharing climate	.55***	.14
Employee involvement	.66***	.52***
Knowledge storage and management systems	.48***	.16*
<i>Overall R²</i>		.60***
<i>Change in R² due to knowledge sharing variables after country dummy variables entered</i>		.38***

* p<.05 *** p<.001

2.9. Conclusions from the interview study

The findings presented above are based on a substantive dataset of 152 interviews conducted with junior, middle and high ranking members from 17 police organisations in 10 European countries. We therefore feel we have gained a variety of useful initial insights into the challenges of effective knowledge sharing for police forces in the 21st Century. Based on the interview data, a number of conclusions can be identified regarding the four dimensions of police knowledge sharing we examined:

SHARING KNOWLEDGE INTERNALLY WITHIN THE FORCE

- Overall, country responses suggests that knowledge sharing internally is effective to 'a fair extent', with Romania and Macedonia suggesting that in their countries it is effective 'to a great extent' and with countries such as Spain, Italy and the UK tending more towards 'to a small extent'.
- Not surprisingly, the key type of knowledge shared within forces in all 10 countries is intelligence and related information, designed to support crime management activity. This includes specific forms of intelligence as well as information that will support and inform intelligence. Organisational and operational information are also frequently referenced again as would be expected. Also important is knowledge shared to improve practice , for example sharing best practice, sharing experience and sharing knowledge about practice through training.
- The most effective method identified most frequently across the 10 countries is direct person to person knowledge sharing (either face to face or using direct contact methods such as the phone) though this was also cited as one of the least effective because of the difficulty of ensuring an audit trail. The intranet and email are second and fourth in the top ten most effective methods suggesting that technology is making a big impact across the countries, but again these are also cited in the least successful list, though the findings suggest that the reasons may often be country specific.
- The most frequently stated barriers suggest that it is people and their behaviours within an organisation that are the biggest barriers, particularly where people are

considered ineffective or just lacking experience. Linked to this are problems raised when people are judged unwilling to share because, for example, knowledge is power, or they lack interest in sharing knowledge of the problems. It is not surprising therefore that another barrier relates to problems sharing knowledge between people and departments (silo working).

- When talking about particular successful examples of knowledge sharing, the most stated reasons for success are the accuracy and relevance of information shared and the effectiveness of sharing between key people. It is also clear that effective systems and processes have supported these successes, as has good leadership and team management, and the engaged and committed attitude of the staff.
- Conversely, where unsuccessful examples were given the most stated reasons relate to insufficient access to relevant and accurate information and secondly inexperienced and ineffective staff.
- The credibility of a knowledge source is judged by a variety of methods using criteria such as the reliability of the source and by cross checking other relevant information; many forces use system of grading to do this, managed by a specialised department. Criminal intelligence was also predominantly analysed by specialised departments before being circulated as appropriately within the force.
- The majority of participants were aware of their forces knowledge sharing strategy. These strategies involved the use of databases/ systems, predominantly via digital methods of storage, although paper based methods were also used. The strategies also emphasised the use of regular meetings, the intranet and official instructions to share knowledge
- Ensuring experience is captured, particularly in time of staff reduction is recognised as important, though not all forces had a strategy or process in place to manage this. Where knowledge was captured the approaches used included mixed teams of experienced and in-experienced officers, formal training and through informal methods of sharing knowledge and experience. Some forces did not have any process or method to capture this information.

SHARING KNOWLEDGE WITH OTHER FORCES (IN THE SAME COUNTRY)

- Overall across the countries knowledge is shared between forces 'to a fair extent' with Romania scoring highest on the mean scores. Overall knowledge sharing between forces is deemed effective 'to a fair extent', with France scoring 'to a great extent' and this being the type of knowledge sharing domain at which the French forces were scored as being the most effective. When asked to explain the reasons for the effectiveness of knowledge sharing, most frequently referenced by participants as a factor determining the success of knowledge sharing was the use of effective working methods. Clearly, knowledge sharing was deemed to be effective if the methods used were seen as appropriate.
- The type of knowledge most frequently shared across all countries is intelligence, which also appeared as the most frequent type of knowledge shared in eight of the ten countries. This relates to forces having to communicate on cross border crimes, regarding details of suspects, witnesses, vehicles, and wanted persons. Other types of knowledge which were frequently shared include operational information on specific tactics and schemes of work, and preventative information on risks and safety measures which it was felt other forces needed to be aware of.
- In terms of methods, direct communication with other forces via telephone or face to face meetings were deemed to be the most effective methods for knowledge sharing, with written documents regarded as the least effective method, due to the need for information to be shared quickly and written documents being slow to process. Speed was frequently referenced as an explanation for the effectiveness of methods. The co-location of forces in Spain via shared co-ordination rooms was deemed as conducive to effective knowledge sharing. Generally participants felt that the most appropriate methods for effective knowledge sharing were dependent upon the type of knowledge being shared and the urgency at which it needed to be shared.
- The biggest two barriers which were cited as impacting upon effective knowledge sharing were bureaucratic processes for sharing, including slow, complicated processes and excessive paperwork, and forces being insular, working in silo and

having incompatible structures, processes and systems which did not communicate with one another. Most referenced as reasons for barriers were legal systems and formal procedures which place restrictions on how to share knowledge with other forces or on what knowledge can be shared. Another aspect mentioned is a lack of trust and no motivation or willingness to share information with other forces.

- When asked to make suggestions for how barriers to knowledge sharing might be removed, the introduction of a central system was most frequently proposed in order to overcome the problems with incompatible systems for sharing between forces. Furthermore, making it mandatory to share knowledge was deemed to be likely to improve the willingness to share information and perhaps even dissolve the issue of insularity of forces. To overcome a lack of resources for knowledge sharing, financial investment was proposed, to improve and increase resources available for knowledge sharing. Finally, an increase in communication between forces was proposed in order to improve relationships between forces.
- In describing their examples of situations where knowledge had been successfully shared with other forces, participants highlighted that effective processes for sharing were key to success, and other reasons for success included having motivated and committed people involved in sharing as well as good relationships between the forces involved.
- The reasons for knowledge sharing being unsuccessful in the examples provided highlighted the importance of the people involved in knowledge sharing, for the biggest reason why knowledge sharing had been unsuccessful was where the people involved lacked in skills and experience. Other reasons for unsuccessful examples included bureaucratic processes and a lack of processes or strategies for sharing.

SHARING KNOWLEDGE WITH THE PUBLIC

- Moderate levels of extent and effectiveness of sharing knowledge with the public were reported overall across the countries.
- The most frequent types of knowledge shared with the public were police activities on crimes, crime prevention information and general information about the area.

- The most effective methods were considered to be Press, TV and Radio (wide coverage), having face to face discussions with the public (ability to build up personal relationships and trust), using the website and internet (speed and accessibility of information) plus the standard printed materials of letters, leaflets, brochures and posters (can get wide local coverage)
- The least effective methods of knowledge sharing were again Press, TV and Radio (the perception that the media were just interested in negative stories), the use of printed materials (not targeted or engaging enough for specific audiences) and having local neighbourhood meetings (not enough participants turning up). The potential limited audience (i.e. focused on young people) for social media like Twitter and being unable to evaluate the impact of these methods was also raised as an issue.
- The main barrier to knowledge sharing with the public was clearly due to data protection legislation and sensitivity of information, followed by a lack of interest from the public (including a lack of respect of, and trust in, authority from certain groups in the population). A lack of resources in time, personnel and money, together with the problems of being able to target the right audience were the next most common. The public image of the police came out as a stronger barrier in certain countries. Official instructions to restrict information flow and dealing with multiple cultures and languages were also given as reasons for low engagement. Improving the standards and structure of communication as well as higher levels were mentioned as strategies for removing some of these barriers.
- The main reason for the success of knowledge sharing initiatives was through the public being motivated to share or want information from the police. Providing information that was specific, accurate, timely and relevant to public needs plus getting the public actively involved were also seen to be major contributors to success.

SHARING KNOWLEDGE WITH FORCES IN OTHER COUNTRIES OR INTERNATIONAL POLICING AGENCIES

- Out of the four dimensions of knowledge sharing examined in this study, the extent and effectiveness of sharing knowledge with police forces in other countries or agencies scored the lowest, although it was still at a moderate level. A quarter of participants did not know of any such activities within their force.
- By far the most frequent type of knowledge shared internationally was intelligence-related information (e.g. wanted individuals or groups of interest, vehicles, border security issues, profiles of crimes and criminal cases or records). However, the next most common was exchanging advice, experience and best practices between forces, followed by learning about organisational structures, processes and working methods.
- The most effective methods for knowledge sharing reflected the desire for face to face interaction with peers through either having cross-force meetings or attending workshops, seminars or conferences. Third and fourth were the technology-mediated mechanisms of telephone and email which enabled continued direct communication with peers in other forces. Fifth was the useful activity of exchange visits, which was seen as not only a means of learning about another force's work but also a means of learning about its culture through an extended stay. Participants liked the directness of these methods and the potential to build up good relationships through extended contact with others.
- Interviewees struggled to come up with the least effective methods but the four most commonly mentioned were as follows: mail (the length of time it takes to receive post), meetings with different force members from other countries (the complaint that sometimes meetings had no specific goal and hence became a waste of time), attending workshops, seminars and courses (their lack of specific practical application at times) and having to go through dedicated staff or agencies to share information (the extra time and paperwork involved). A lack of resources was seen as an underlying reason for the poor application of these methods.

- The main barrier to knowledge sharing internationally was in terms of language barriers, followed by having different legal systems in various countries. Organizational differences were third and covered issues such as: different cultures, policies and structures of forces; organizational knowledge sharing strategy lacking in forces; and the difficulty of transferring methods between forces due to context differences. Communication procedures being too difficult (e.g. rules too strict, bureaucratic complexity of knowledge sharing paperwork and different procedures in different countries) was next. Lack of motivation by police was reflected in issues such as: lack of support from senior management; unfavourable personality or attitude of individuals; unprofessional behaviour of police officers; different priorities in different countries; and lack of trust from police forces. Incompatible systems and lack of resources were also highlighted.
- The main reason for the success of international knowledge sharing initiatives was in terms of building up a good relationship with, and understanding of, the other country's forces. This was done through having personal contact through meetings and exchange visits in order to create a better understanding of culture, working methods and structure of other organizations. The second most common theme was sharing information in a regular and timely manner with international partners. Having staff with a sufficient level of knowledge and experience plus ensuring good teamworking and co-operation all along the hierarchies of the partner organisations were also seen as important.

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

- Explaining the methods through which they were encouraged to share knowledge by their line managers or supervisors, participants indicated most frequently that the need for sharing knowledge was made clear by their line manager or supervisor, thus the objectives, goals, and requirements for sharing knowledge were well communicated from line managers and supervisors to their staff. Those participants who had a role in supervising other members of staff reported that this encouragement was facilitated via both verbal and written methods. Participants were encouraged to share knowledge through having a good relationship to their

line manager or supervisor, where managers were approachable and easy to communicate with, making participants feel comfortable in sharing knowledge with them. Also important for some participants was that knowledge sharing was as an essential part of their job, by which it featured on their job descriptions and personal objectives at work, and / or they were required to share knowledge according to official instructions. Regular meetings with their line manager or supervisor also encouraged participants to share knowledge, giving them a formal opportunity to meet colleagues and exchange information. Finally, a small number of participants described that they were rewarded for sharing knowledge by their line manager or supervisor.

- Most frequently referenced by participants as way of how they feel encouraged to share information by their colleagues was by having regular meetings, through seeing their colleagues and having allocated time in which to exchange information. Having a 'culture' of knowledge sharing also encouraged participants to share, by which participants felt that they were expected to share knowledge and exchange information with their team and that this was an expectation and a part of being involved in the organisation.

KNOWLEDGE SHARING CAPABILITIES AND ORGANISATIONAL FLEXIBILITY

- Analyses using questionnaire data showed that the three knowledge sharing capabilities of having a knowledge sharing climate, encouraging employee involvement and utilising knowledge storage and management systems were all positively correlated with being in a more flexible police force that was good at coping with change. However, multiple regression analyses indicated that police organisations which have the capability to involve employees by effectively sharing knowledge up and down the hierarchy, plus formal knowledge management systems to support this, seem to be those who deal best with adapting to change.

In summary

- Knowledge sharing within and between most forces was seen to be effective at least 'to a fair 'extent. Intelligence related information was the most frequently shared

type of knowledge, within and between forces either in the same country or abroad. The findings suggest that there was a strong preference for the more direct methods of communication amongst the forces, using either face to face or phone contact, or through the use of technologies such as email and the intranet and internet. However, in many cases the most effective methods were also seen to have a negative side, for example, emails were positively received but management of these was often a problem, causing 'overload'.

- The inclusion of successful and unsuccessful situations provided valuable and evidenced based insights into the key factors that impact on successful knowledge sharing, for example, the importance of effective processes, speedy access to accurate information, effective leadership and team management and skilled, motivated and committed staff. The majority of the barriers identified focused on the lack of these areas, as well identifying a lack of all types of resource.
- The findings demonstrated the importance of effective leadership and line management, particularly through activities that both supported and encouraged management activities. It also highlighted the importance of ensuring that knowledge management is an explicit element of performance management.
- The interviews have highlighted the importance of building up the human factors of motivation, trust, knowledge and experience of police personnel and facilitating methods for direct contact between police and non-police stakeholders as a crucial set of knowledge sharing capabilities for police organisations. The next sections of the report will describe the more detailed investigations into international knowledge sharing by police organisations through the undertaking of ten case studies and also introduce the practical knowledge sharing diagnostic tool that has been developed as a result of this research.

SECTION 3

CASE STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL KNOWLEDGE SHARING

3.1. Introduction

As reported in section 2, the first phase of the empirical research for work package three focused on interviews conducted with police organisations in order to explore knowledge sharing capabilities across four dimensions:

1. Sharing knowledge internally within the police organisation
2. Sharing knowledge with other forces in the same country
3. Sharing knowledge with the public
4. Sharing knowledge with forces in other countries or international policing agencies

The research provided a wealth of information about dimensions 1, 2 and 3, however it only yielded limited information about dimension 4, international knowledge sharing with forces in other countries or international police agencies. In section 2.6.a. we showed that a quarter of the interview sample at least did not complete the questions in this section of the interview, due to not having awareness of international knowledge sharing. A second phase of empirical research was therefore designed to address this gap. It was agreed that a case study approach would allow the research team to focus the research on this target area, selecting examples of international knowledge sharing to be studied.

3.2. Methodology

All ten COMPOSITE country research teams produced a case study based on one of the following two areas of international knowledge sharing:

- A cross-border collaboration between police forces in different countries. This could be on a specific project, scheme of work, event, or particular criminal investigation that has required cross-border knowledge sharing (six case studies were completed with a focus on this area of knowledge sharing)

- An international organisation and the role it plays in facilitating knowledge sharing across country borders (four case studies were completed with a focus on this area of knowledge sharing).

All ten country teams produced their case study based upon a combination of up to five in-depth interviews with police officers involved in cross-border collaborations or members of cross-border agencies, and desk-based research such as review of documentation and websites. Precise research methods differed slightly from country to country, depending upon the topic being studied and the ease of access to organisations in order to conduct the research.

Each country team produced a detailed case study report based upon their research, providing an overview of the methodology used, an understanding of the collaborative work or organisation and the way it facilitates knowledge sharing, in particular including the following information:

- What knowledge is shared and how
- Facilitators to knowledge sharing
- Barriers to knowledge sharing
- Best practice in knowledge sharing
- Future perspective: what knowledge sharing will be required in the future and what capabilities will be needed to facilitate this.

A further aim of COMPOSITE Work Package 3 was to include Albania as an additional COMPOSITE country for the research. This was met through the case study completed by the Macedonian research team, in their research which explores the knowledge sharing facilitated by the MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative), an international organisation which deals with the issues of migration management in the Western Balkans, including the countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. In order to conduct this case study, the research team in Macedonia spoke with the National representative of Albania in the MARRI Regional Centre, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (representing all national

authorities), alongside the use of knowledge gained from attending a number of meetings with Albanian law enforcement officers.

3.3. Summary of Case Studies

The full case study reports from all ten countries can be found in the appendix to this report.

The following table provides a brief summary of the content of each of the case studies.

Table 3.3.1. Summary of Case Studies

Title of Case Study	Authors	Details
CASE STUDIES ON CROSS-BORDER COLLABORATIONS		
1. Cross-Border Knowledge Sharing...from Cross-Border Police Patrols to Cross-Border Police Initiatives. West-Coast Police, Belgium	Ad van den Oord and Nathalie Vallet, University of Antwerp (Belgium)	Cross-border knowledge sharing between French and Belgian police organisations or on the so-called Cross-Border Police Initiatives in West Coast (CBPI), within the Euregion Eurometropool situated at the south-western border of Belgium with France.
2. Police Bilateral Cooperation in Europe. The role of the Police-Customs Cooperation Centre (CCPD) of Tournai (Belgium)	Christian Mouhanna and Joël Ficet, CNRS (France)	Police bilateral cooperation in Europe through the analysis of one specific case study: the Police-Customs Cooperation Centre of Tournai, whose function is to coordinate the exchange of information between French and Belgian Police institutions.
3. Cross-Border Collaborative Work: German-Polish Police And Customs Cooperation Centre In Świecko, Poland	Mario Gruschinske and Susanne Stein-Müller, FHPolBB (Germany)	The role of the German-Polish Police and Customs Cooperation Centre based in Świecko, in sharing knowledge on cross border crime and intelligence between Germany and Poland.
4. Emerging from crisis: police joint training as a key enabler. A case study on Arma dei Carabinieri international cooperation on civilian crisis management	Fabio Bisogni and Pietro Costanzo, FORMIT (Italy)	The "European Union Police Forces Training 2009" (EUPFT 2009), and its ongoing developments within the "European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013" (EUPST 2011-2013). Such initiatives, driven by Italian Arma dei Carabinieri, show how specific, skills-

		oriented knowledge is shared and how it generates direct benefits for the involved police forces, allowing for tangible skills sharing, harmonisation and interoperability at a national and international level.
5. Experience With Joint Investigation Teams In The Netherlands: A Pragmatic Approach	Henk Sollie, School of Investigation Science, and Theo Jochoms, School of Police Leadership, Police Academy of the Netherlands. P. Saskia Bayerl, Kate Horton and Gabriele Jacobs, Erasmus University Rotterdam (The Netherlands)	Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) in the Netherlands, in cooperation with the surrounding countries Germany, Belgium, England and France, addressing the value of JITs for the cross-border transfer of knowledge within investigations.
6. The Police and Customs Cooperation Centre In Le-Pertus: Cross-Border Collaboration Between Spain And France	Mila Gascó and Charlotte Fernández, ESADE (Spain)	Cross-border collaboration initiative, the Police and Customs Cooperation Centre at Le Pertús (France), demonstrating the value of the centre as a tool for direct cross-border cooperation.
CASE STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS		
7. A Case Study on Knowledge Sharing by the Police of the Czech Republic and INTERPOL	Zdenko Reguli and Michal Vit, Masaryk University (Czech Republic)	An example of how the Foreign Police of the Czech Republic requests information across the border via the Czech representation of INTERPOL, highlighting the role of INTERPOL offices and joint working places at the borders to neighbouring states in cross-border information sharing.
8. A Case Study on MARRI Regional Centre In Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative)	Trpe Stojanovski, Stojanka Mirceva, Katerina Krstevska, and Rade Rajkovcevski, University St Kliment Ohridski Bitola (Republic of Macedonia)	The role of MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje, in regional processes, including the role of knowledge sharing between the police organisations in the beneficiary countries. This case study incorporates Albania in the research, meeting the aims of Work Package 3 to include Albania as an additional COMPOSITE country.

<p>9. FRONTEX: Increasing Border Security Through Knowledge Sharing</p>	<p>Claudia Rus, Lucia Rațiu, Cătălina Oțoiu, Gabriel Vonaș, Daniela Andrei, and Adriana Băban, Babeș-Bolyai University (Romania)</p>	<p>FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) and its' role in facilitating cooperation and knowledge sharing regarding border control and surveillance among European Union countries.</p>
<p>10. A Case Study on CEPOL: European Police College</p>	<p>Kerry Allen and Christine Turgoose, University of Sheffield (United Kingdom)</p>	<p>The role of CEPOL, European Police College, in supporting the exchange and further development of knowledge and research in the field of policing via training and education for senior police officers at a European level.</p>

3.4. Findings

The case studies provide a wealth of information on knowledge sharing across EU borders. In this section, we outline some of the main findings drawn from the case studies.

3.4.a. What Knowledge is Shared and How

The following table summarises the types of knowledge that are shared, and how knowledge is shared, in each of the case studies.

Table 3.4.1. What Knowledge is Shared and How

Title of Case Study	What Knowledge is Shared and How
1. Cross-Border Knowledge Sharing...from Cross-Border Police Patrols to Cross-Border Police Initiatives. West-Coast Police, Belgium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence related information: information on wanted individuals or groups of interest, vehicles, border security issues, profiles of crimes and criminal records. • Safety-security advice: operational suggestions or guidelines on how to observe, control, pursuit and arrest “correctly” in joint actions. • Safety-security experience: perceptions and subjective evaluations of, for example, how cultural differences between the Belgian and French police forces within CBPP’s are experienced and dealt with? What is experienced as “enabling” or “obstructing” a smooth French-Belgian collaboration? What is experienced as the added value of the French-Belgian collaboration? • Evidence-based best practices: tested experiences on how to organise and structure these CBPP’s in a more effective and efficient way (What are the lessons learned? What are recommendations for policy makers involved?)
2. Police Bilateral Cooperation in Europe. The role of the Police-Customs Cooperation Centre (CCPD) of Tournai (Belgium)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criminal intelligence: The main function of the CCPD is to centralise the sharing of criminal intelligence between France and Belgium. • Illegal immigration: The CCPDs also contributes to the preparation of the transfers of illegal immigrants from one country to another. • Public order: The intelligence shared pertains also to maintaining public order, i.e. the management of public events such as demonstrations or strikes.

<p>3. Cross-Border Collaborative Work: German-Polish Police And Customs Cooperation Centre In Świecko, Poland</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Criminal intelligence: on criminal operations crossing the German-Polish border • Security information • Processing of requests for information • Crime prevention information • Training and schooling
<p>4. Emerging from crisis: police joint training as a key enabler. A case study on Arma dei Carabinieri international cooperation on civilian crisis management</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training information including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theoretical and practical learning, aimed at comparing best practices and procedures. • Monitoring, mentoring and advising functions for crisis management and stabilization (e.g. HQ's activities, crowd control, public order, criminal investigations - war crimes, organised crime, trans-national crime, scientific investigations, special weapons and tactics (SWAT), close protection, explosive ordnance devices (EOD), protection of human rights in policing). • Participating countries have been encouraged to present and compare their operating procedures.
<p>5. Experience With Joint Investigation Teams In The Netherlands: A Pragmatic Approach</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Each other's investigative methods (operating procedures). • Legal options in order to determine how to address suspects. • Building evidence by operational information about suspects and from information obtained by tapping, secretly monitoring and the interrogation of suspects. • Institutional, policy and political knowledge: practical information on how police systems work, including procedures for working with stakeholders, the role of stakeholders, policy and prosecution procedures, e.g. other countries should know that when working in a JIT with the Netherlands, it has to be decided by the JIT expert of the National Prosecution Office.
<p>6. The Police and Customs Cooperation Centre In Le-Pertus: Cross-Border Collaboration Between Spain And France</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information on petty and moderately serious crime, illegal migration flows and public order problems, e.g. identification of persons and vehicles undergoing checks or of telephone subscribers, or the verification of the appropriateness and authenticity of ID and travel documents. • The information that is exchanged is classified in eleven categories: 1) offences against people, 2) criminal damage, 3) economic offences, 4) customs offences (except drugs), 5) immigration offences, 6) traffic offences, 7) offences against public health (drug traffic), 8) ID falsification, 9) road control, 10) offences against public order, and 11) other offences

	(such as visits to prisoners, environment, or abandoned vehicles).
7. A Case Study on Knowledge Sharing by the Police of the Czech Republic and INTERPOL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Preventive action: as well as in detecting of violations and criminal acts. Generally, we can summarise the reasons for cross-border knowledge sharing as detection of crime, identification of persons and residence rules, and search for persons.
8. A Case Study on MARRI Regional Centre In Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommendations and best practices, lesson learned, making amendments in the existing national legal framework, thus establishing standards in the area of migration, but also improving the performances for enforcing the law, improving the capacities in promoting the ownership etc. • Research: an electronic database of all existing and ongoing research allows the dissemination of research documents or scientific findings related to migration and policing. MARRI identifies a list of institutions and experts engaged in the related research. • Conferences: MARRI organises thematically oriented conferences in which experts from the region as well as experts from the EU countries discuss the relevant topics in the field of migration, where the police issues are the most dominant.
9. FRONTEX: Increasing Border Security Through Knowledge Sharing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational information regarding border control and surveillance • Border police training: to ensure standardised instruction for training academies Europe-wide. The agency has established a Common Core Curriculum for basic border guard training that is already in place. • Risk analysis • Joint operations • Research and development of border control and surveillance
10. A Case Study on CEPOL: European Police College	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common curricular • Online learning modules • Best practice and policing issues: shared through the exchange programme • Research and good practice

The case studies show that intelligence and operational information are the main types of knowledge shared via cross-border collaborations, including data on wanted individuals or groups of interest, vehicles, border security issues, profiles of crimes and details of specific operations, activities, criminal cases or records.

Whilst intelligence and operational information are most commonly shared by cross-border collaborations, those case studies relating to international organisations show that police officers also need and rely on other types of information, the sharing of which is facilitated by international organisations, for example information on legal procedures, training information, research and information on systems and practices.

Best practice is frequently shared internationally, via both cross-border collaborations and international agencies. Best practice includes experience and advice on effectively tackling crime, educational and training information, organisational structures, processes, working methods and performance on key activities.

In the following sections, we explore the influences upon international knowledge sharing, including facilitators and barriers to knowledge sharing, examples of best practice, and the future perspective on the knowledge sharing that will be required in the future and what capabilities will be needed to facilitate this.

3.4.b. Facilitators of Knowledge Sharing

The following table summarises the facilitators to knowledge sharing demonstrated in each of the case studies.

Table 3.4.2. Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

Title of Case Study	Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing
<p>1. Cross-Border Knowledge Sharing...from Cross-Border Police Patrols to Cross-Border Police Initiatives. West-Coast Police, Belgium</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technology: including the internet, e-mail, and mobile phones. • Financial resources • Social events: providing opportunities to actually share and exchange knowledge and information, and allowing the building of stronger personal relationships. • Leadership • Culture: including the motivation to cooperate and share knowledge, open mindedness and awareness of the added value of cooperation generally creates a positive attitude towards cooperation and knowledge sharing. • Language skills
<p>2. Police Bilateral Cooperation in Europe. The role of the Police-Customs Cooperation Centre (CCPD) of Tournai (Belgium)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Location in the same building: direct access to databases; reduction in the delays in transferring external requests, analysing them and providing back the relevant information; daily personal interaction. • Experience of staff: officers of the centre have acquired an in-depth knowledge of the organisation and have built networks that are an asset in the process of information sharing.

<p>3. Cross-Border Collaborative Work: German-Polish Police And Customs Cooperation Centre In Świecko, Poland</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to work fast and efficiently: exchange of information happens directly and is thus fast and uncomplicated. There are no language barriers in the direct contact of the officers at the PCCC since every officer there has at least a basic knowledge of the other language. This adds to the fast and efficient work. Information gets passed without any loss of time. • Good working atmosphere: the cooperation between all colleagues is good and there is a mutual trust and understanding which contributes to it. • History of good contacts: built over a long period of time, many of the German officers at the centre have had good relations and contacts to Poland long before the centre was founded and even helped to establish the cooperation. • Technology: good handling of the existing technology like computers, internet or intranet is also seen as facilitator, although there is no common database to use yet. • Networks with other public authorities: such as the (municipal) registration office or the safety and public order office.
<p>4. Emerging from crisis: police joint training as a key enabler. A case study on Arma dei Carabinieri international cooperation on civilian crisis management</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Realistic and detailed scenarios of training exercises, encompassing a large spectrum of activities to be performed in a substitution / executive-type mission, allowing units, teams and individual police officers to directly test how to operate jointly, which is very useful in the sense of exchanging expertise and skills and acquiring knowledge. • Common documentation: facilitating common conceptual ground.
<p>5. Experience With Joint Investigation Teams In The Netherlands: A Pragmatic Approach</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New European and bilateral conventions: simplified the cross-border cooperation for criminal investigation and detection. • Flexibility: a JIT does not necessarily have to settle on one predetermined location. Instead investigators within the JIT can work and contribute from their own desk. They only have to travel abroad when absolutely necessary, e.g. to exchange information and / or conduct or coordinate an investigation. Investigators are thus no longer absent from their work location and residence for long stretches of time. There is also more flexibility with regards to the leadership of the JIT, in that the respective team leaders have the possibility to collectively manage the JIT. • Pragmatic solutions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of broader objectives: extending the focus beyond specific criminal groups gives the opportunity to address broader crime phenomena.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The focus is not solely on combating serious and organised crime, but also other, less serious forms of transnational crime (e.g. high volume crime). • Utilisation of the opportunities that enhance the legal basis of cross-border information exchange. • Discretion in the management and the structure of a JIT: Each participating country has a degree of freedom in managing the capacity and efforts during the investigation and is, in mutual consultation, able to tailor the JIT to match his/her own country's interests and needs. • These pragmatic solutions show that police organisations are increasingly experimenting with the deployment capabilities of a JIT and its knowledge/information sharing opportunities.
<p>6. The Police and Customs Cooperation Centre In Le-Pertus: Cross-Border Collaboration Between Spain And France</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The need to share knowledge: there is a huge need to exchange valuable and useful information that is decisive for police work. • Legislation: the exchange of information must comply with current data protection and data dissemination provisions in the respect of the national legislation. • Game rules: Having a document with specific rules for operating the PCCC has proved very useful. These rules balance expectations and, also, help the police officers to know the different police forces work procedures. • Will, trust and involvement: Despite the existence of an exchange information system, governed by certain rules, efficient cooperation depends on people. Therefore, the will to share, trust in other police forces, and involvement in knowledge sharing activities are key. • Clear information: information has to be clear and reliable.
<p>7. A Case Study on Knowledge Sharing by the Police of the Czech Republic and INTERPOL</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standardised and quick methods: information passed electronically through mails and telephone calls where there was practically no time delay. • Signed agreements on cooperation: in combating crime, protecting public order and cooperation in border areas with neighbouring countries.
<p>8. A Case Study on MARRI Regional Centre In Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building Networks: one of the most valuable ways in which MARRI was credited for establishing and facilitating knowledge sharing was via the creation of networks between law enforcement across borders. • National Contact Points: each country has its National Representative based in Skopje with full working mandate in the MARRI Regional centre. The role of the National Representative is to keep open the channel for

	<p>communication with the national institutions, on a daily basis.</p>
<p>9. FRONTEX: Increasing Border Security Through Knowledge Sharing</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation between EU member states: knowledge sharing based mainly on agreements, conventions and cooperation treaties between the member states, guiding the professional relations between police officers from different EU countries working together to organise joint operations. Besides those formal relations, the professional relationships developed into friendship relationships and could further facilitate the communication between police officers. • Technical support for knowledge sharing: different forms of technology development and advancements which have positively influenced knowledge sharing. • Personal and professional characteristics of police officers: the availability of the police officers to work in a multicultural framework, their flexibility, sense of humour and personal motivation were personal qualities which the interviewees mention as facilitators of knowledge sharing. Professionalism, commitment, professional experience and prior experience in the field of international cooperation, proficiency in English and the awareness of the common aim in the joint missions were described as professional resources for an efficient knowledge sharing.
<p>10. A Case Study on CEPOL: European Police College</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building Networks: one of the most valuable ways in which CEPOL was described as facilitating knowledge sharing was via the creation of networks between police officers across borders. This was facilitated via courses and the exchange programme, where people would meet, exchanging experiences, best practices, procedural regulations, laws and information about policing in their country, and making contacts in other countries. • Electronic methods of sharing: were also deemed important and the CEPOL e-net as a whole, including e-learning courses, webinars, research findings and publications, discussion boards, forums, films and case studies, etc, enables a pool of knowledge which individuals across the EU can access. • National Contact Points: have an important role in promoting the work of CEPOL, passing on information about the work done by CEPOL, as well as being an important source of knowledge for CEPOL, providing information on experts in each country, advising on member state priorities, legislation and policy, and helping CEPOL in devising training courses and work programmes relevant for each country.

The following table gives examples of different facilitators to knowledge sharing, and shows which of the ten case studies identified each of these as a facilitator.

Table 3.4.3. Facilitators to international knowledge sharing

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing	Case Studies									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
STAFF EXPERIENCE		X								
MOTIVATION TO SHARE KNOWLEDGE						X				
LANGUAGE SKILLS	X									
LEADERSHIP ISSUES	X									
DEVELOPING GOOD RELATIONSHIPS										
• Social events	X									
• Good working atmosphere, trust			X			X			X	
• History of good contacts			X							
• Culture	X									
• Networks with other public authorities			X							
• Building networks								X		X
• National contact points								X		X
TECHNOLOGY	X		X						X	X
FINANCIAL RESOURCES	X									
LEGISLATION AND WRITTEN AGREEMENTS										
• New European and bilateral conventions					X	X			X	
• Written rules on how to operate collaborations						X				
• Signed agreements on co-operation							X		X	
STANDARDISED PROCESSES AND DOCUMENTATION										
• Common documentation				X						
• Standardised and quick methods							X			
FLEXIBILITY OF LOCATION										
• Location in same building		X								
• Flexibility of location					X					
FLEXIBILITY OF WORKING METHODS										
• Ability to work fast and efficiently			X							
• Pragmatic solutions/ flexibility in management of teams					X					
• Need to share knowledge						X				
INFORMATION CLEAR AND RELIABLE						X				
REALISTIC AND DETAILED SCENARIOS OF TRAINING EXERCISES				X						

Table 3.4.3. above shows that the methods of knowledge sharing are seen as hugely important to its success. Knowledge sharing is often deemed to be effective if knowledge can be shared easily via quick, easy to access, uncomplicated communication systems, technology, processes and networks. Technology is seen as a key facilitator to knowledge sharing, with four of the case studies raising this as a facilitator. Individual case studies provide examples of where technology can facilitate knowledge sharing, for example the case study on CEPOL describes that the CEPOL online system for learning and training hosts a variety of information, making it quickly and easily accessible to police officers across Europe.

Good working relationships across borders are seen as a key facilitator of effective knowledge exchange, and table 3.4.3. shows that six of the ten case studies raise some aspect of good working relationships as being a facilitator, including having social events, a good working atmosphere and trust, history of good contacts with other organisations and / or forces, culture, networks with other public authorities, building networks and National Contact Points. The case study on FRONTEX shows that whilst formal agreements, conventions and cooperation treaties exist between the member states which offer guidance on knowledge sharing processes, informal relations are also important to facilitate communication between police officers and consequently the sharing of knowledge. Similarly, important facilitators to knowledge sharing in the German-Polish Police and Customs Cooperation Centre in Świecko, Poland, were the good working relationships between officers at the centre, and the networks and contacts which had been built up over time by senior police officers. The international agency CEPOL is described as facilitating knowledge sharing via the creation of networks between police officers across borders. This is via educational training courses and an exchange programme, where people would meet, exchanging experiences, best practices, procedural regulations, laws and information about policing in their country, and making contacts in other countries. National Contact Points were important for both CEPOL and MARRI, as facilitators of knowledge sharing between countries. National Contact Points are individuals who act as a point of contact and a source of information between parties who need to share knowledge.

3.4.c. Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

The following table summarises the barriers to knowledge sharing demonstrated in each of the case studies.

Table 3.4.4. Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

Title of Case Study	Barriers to Knowledge Sharing
<p>1. Cross-Border Knowledge Sharing...from Cross-Border Police Patrols to Cross-Border Police Initiatives. West-Coast Police, Belgium</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisation: Multiple police forces in France (e.g., police national, gendarmerie national, and PAF) that do not work together or operate in an integrated manner. • Technology: Different technological standards, plus the databases of the French police forces are not integrated. • Politics: According to the Chief of West Coast Police, one of the reasons for this lack of communication, coordination, and cooperation between the different French police forces is the absence of a mandate for the prefect in France to coordinate the French police forces. • Legal/institutional: the absence of a legal/institutional framework that requires police forces to participate in CBPP (or CBPI), which makes the occurrence of CBPIs completely dependent upon the individuals (and their priorities) involved. • Management: the management and staffing of police forces in France changes every three (i.e., for the Gendarmerie) or four (i.e., for the Police Nationale) years. This rotation of management was recognised by all interviewees as an important impediment to effective knowledge sharing and cooperation. • Language: different language skills and proficiencies. • Human Resource Management: training and education is mainly focused inwardly, on national laws, organisations, and procedures. Very little attention is paid to international issues, systems, laws, etc.
<p>2. Police Bilateral Cooperation in Europe. The role of the Police-Customs Cooperation Centre (CCPD) of Tournai (Belgium)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of visibility of CCPDs within the French police institution: Local police units inside the country were not keen on asking for information from foreign countries. This may result from a widespread ignorance of the facilitating role of the CCPDs. The French-Belgian police cooperation could be made more effective if the existence, the mission and the functioning of the CCPDs were better known. CCPD officers are aware of the problem: in order to promote the Centre, the coordinators or their deputies periodically attend conferences and training sessions in police and gendarmerie schools and local units.

<p>3. Cross-Border Collaborative Work: German-Polish Police And Customs Cooperation Centre In Świecko, Poland</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language: this was mentioned as a barrier but not as frequently as other barriers. The officers working at the centre are able to speak the opposite language rather well. But since the requests are usually coming from patrolling officers in the surrounding areas or even further away, language can still be a problem sometimes. In addition there is also the possibility of small translational mistakes which then can lead to poorer outcomes. • Different cultural or organisational factors: while the German police are federal, the Polish police are centrally organised. Directions from the central Polish police department are hence valid for the whole country. There is one main commandant's office with the function of a central department. This sometimes makes things difficult. • Different juridical situation (different laws and legislation): the PCCC can only handle cases which are criminal offences in both countries. Traffic offences for example are in Polish law an infraction when they occur without personal injury while in Germany they are always a criminal offence. • Lack of resources: including a lack of staff, and a lack of equipment. Sometimes the police stations alerted by the PCCC will have only a few radio cars available for duty and they may already have been called to another operation. • Technical barriers: there is no common software or database. Also the forces are not linked with each other. The transfer only works face-to-face. • Insufficient publicity of the PCCC: the centre needs to be better known everywhere as a supporting resource available when there is need. Even though the requests have steadily increased since the opening of the centre, many officers in the forces do still not know about its capabilities.
<p>4. Emerging from crisis: police joint training as a key enabler. A case study on Arma dei Carabinieri international cooperation on civilian crisis management</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language: differences in language skills can lead to misunderstandings in the interpretation of orders. This has led sometimes to incorrect execution, with a potential risk for trainees. Shortfalls were noticed in flow of information among the trainees, as well as in the use and interpretation of the tactical vocabulary. A typical language-related gap has been recognised in the use of radios. • Gaps in assets and procedures: including the absence of an integrated, centralised system, as well as a standard radio system. • Technical and procedural issues: these can affect the correct information flow, calling for joint training on information management. • Different styles of command: for example, order-type tactics vs. mission-type tactics, and different approaches to

	<p>proportionality and progressiveness in the use of force are critical elements for mutual understanding and can be identified as key topics in policing knowledge sharing.</p>
<p>5. Experience With Joint Investigation Teams In The Netherlands: A Pragmatic Approach</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differences in priorities and considerations on capacity: JITs in the Netherlands often do not get approved or are not even considered as a valuable instrument. Also, changes in running investigations that impact the duration, purpose, or the capacity of a JIT have to be approved by the TCG, which is not the case in other countries. These strategic considerations and processes are not recognised abroad and cause delays and distortions in the establishment or performance of JITs. • Lack of information sharing and analysis: decisions about whether or not a criminal phenomenon has priority, capacities for its investigation and considerations regarding the desirability of cooperation with foreign partners, require a considerable amount of information up front in order for decisions to be made. To obtain this knowledge, however, exchange of information is needed beforehand. To build a common investigative goal, detectives should exchange information with each other and jointly analyse criminal groups and/or phenomena. This structural exchange of information between countries hardly takes place. This is due to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisational conflicts in the manner and style of information exchanges. • Changing priorities with regards to types of crimes and therefore changing priorities for information. • Lack of legal knowledge about what information one is allowed to exchange with other countries. • Insufficient technical and / or financial resources to develop information exchange systems. • Language differences and differences in definitions in the recorded (registered) information with the consequence that information cannot be exchanged automatically and it therefore becomes time consuming and dependent on specific individuals. • The lack of information sharing and therefore shared understanding of common problems causes blindness to the needs of a JIT. Accordingly, no capacity is granted.
<p>6. The Police and Customs Cooperation Centre In Le-Pertus: Cross-Border Collaboration Between Spain And France</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technological barriers: problems with connectivity (the centre is in the middle of the Pyrenees) and cost (the phone calls are international because the centre is in France). • The French information systems: while France is a centralised country, the different French police forces

	<p>manage several databases which are not integrated. Even one specific police force might have different databases with different information. In this respect, there is no exact knowledge on the information available and who has it.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language: formal documents have to be precise. In this respect, certain expressions/words/concepts do not mean the same nor have the same implications. This might give rise to mistakes and misinterpretations. • Lack of recognition: the informal recognition of the value and responsibilities of the Catalan police force has not been formalised.
<p>7. A Case Study on Knowledge Sharing by the Police of the Czech Republic and INTERPOL</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language: requests for information are translated into a third language (English) and the responses back to Czech. These translations cause a certain time delay. • Differing regulations around knowledge sharing: some countries are not contractually bound to knowledge sharing. In those cases the Police of the Czech Republic contact the representation of that country. However, it can happen that the representation fails to comply with the requirements of Police of the Czech Republic. In addition representations for some of the countries are not located in the Czech Republic, which reduces the capacity for knowledge sharing. In this way lack of communication by one of the parties produces a barrier.
<p>8. A Case Study on MARRI Regional Centre In Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language: on the Western Balkans five out of six countries speak different languages, but they could understand each other, however the Initiative has six member states. English is the working language used by MARRI and the majority of the produced material is in English. For example, the web based documents are in English. However, when communication with the national authorities is necessary, translation is needed by the National Representative. For the meetings, seminars and other activities, when possible, the communication is in English, but for the events where the police officers are present, usually a translation service is needed. • Cultural diversity: this brings differences in philosophy of thinking, which brings additional difficulties. • Differences in methodology: different methods used for the analysis of statistics and other research work create additional difficulties in cooperation for the police (and other criminal justice bodies), on a national as well as on regional and international level.
<p>9. FRONTEX: Increasing Border</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language: One of the most common barriers mentioned in

<p>Security Through Knowledge Sharing</p>	<p>the interviews was that of communication in foreign languages. The interviewees mention that while English is the official language in FRONTEX, knowledge sharing is sometimes restricted by different levels of proficiency in English.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organisational differences: in some cases, there were reported differences in the training or the level of competence and responsibility of police officers from different member states within FRONTEX. The example given by one of the participants illustrated other differences and stressed the need for harmonization of the national legislation regarding the knowledge exchange and the access to classified information. It was mentioned that police officers with the same rank have access to different types of data in different countries. Also, different types of structures could hinder knowledge sharing. For example, there were situations where military and civil structures operate in joint missions. • Legal regulations: the lack of specific regulations regarding the data exchange with other authorities responsible for the border security (for example, Customs). Another legal aspect seen as a barrier to knowledge exchange was the lack of bilateral agreements between the European countries on the use of personal data. In that case, the data base in the national language added a difficulty to the issue of access to information. • Personal characteristics: lack of cohesion and of team spirit as well as scepticism in the development and implementation of new procedures, are personal characteristics that also constitute barriers to knowledge sharing.
<p>10. A Case Study on CEPOL: European Police College</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language: English is the working language used by CEPOL and all course material and online material is published in English. Research reports that are not written in English are published in the CEPOL e-library, and the abstracts are translated into English, but this means that the full article is not accessible to as wide an audience. Language barriers also may prevent people who cannot speak English being able to become involved in courses or in the exchange programme. It was described that sometimes people would be selected to participate in courses because they could speak English, and not necessarily because they were the most appropriate person for the course. • Police Structures: the effective sharing of knowledge was seen as potentially dependent upon policing structures across countries, for example, in the UK, where there are 43

	<p>different police forces, there was described to be some elements of insularity, for forces often developed their own in-house training and were in some cases less likely to access the common curricular. In those EU countries where there is one national police force there was seen to be greater chance to ensure involvement with the common curricular and having just one force to communicate with was assumed to make the work of the National Contact Points much easier.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motivation, Interest and Enthusiasm: countries were described as differing in their motivation, interest and enthusiasm for training, and similarly, countries differed in their stages of development of research.
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The following table gives examples of different barriers to knowledge sharing, and shows which of the ten case studies identified each of these as a barrier.

Table 3.4.5. Barriers to international knowledge sharing

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing	Case Studies									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
LACK OF MOTIVATION									X	X
LANGUAGE (NOT HAVING OR TIME DELAY FROM TRANSLATION OR MISINTERPRETATION)	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
STAFF EXPERIENCE AND SKILLS										
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Differences in staff experience and training 									X	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HRM not focused on international aspects 	X									
LEADERSHIP ISSUES										
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Different styles of command 				X						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Management required to change every three years 	X									
DEVELOPING GOOD RELATIONSHIPS										
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cultural diversity 								X		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of team spirit 									X	
TECHNOLOGY	X		X	X	X	X				
ORGANISATIONAL DIFFERENCES	X		X		X				X	X
LACK OF RESOURCES			X		X					
LACK OF INTEGRATION AND STANDARDISATION OF SYSTEMS										
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information systems not integrated 						X		X		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Different methodologies for analysing data 								X		
LACK OF RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE / IMPORTANCE OF THE ORGANISATION						X				
POLITICS	X									
LEGISLATION AND WRITTEN AGREEMENTS										
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of legal framework 	X									
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Different legal systems 			X				X			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of legal knowledge understanding about what can be shared 					X					
LACK OF VISIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES		X	X							
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE DIFFERS BETWEEN COUNTRIES					X					

The biggest barrier to knowledge sharing highlighted in the case studies is clearly that of language, with table 3.4.5 above showing that this was mentioned as a barrier in nine of the ten case studies. Language skills clearly play a highly important role in the sharing of knowledge across countries which speak different languages. Without the ability to communicate in a common language, effective knowledge sharing becomes virtually impossible. Also, if information needs to be translated or is misinterpreted, this causes time delays. English appears to be the most commonly used language in communicating across countries, however different levels of proficiency in English causes difficulties in sharing knowledge.

Technology is also a significant barrier to knowledge sharing internationally. Table 3.4.5. shows that five of the case studies raised this as a barrier, and in particular this was due to differing technological systems being used in different countries, which could not communicate with one another or transfer information easily. The systematic literature review conducted earlier as part of Work Package 3 (Allen and Birdi, 2011, Deliverable 3.1) found that previous literature on knowledge sharing in policing had raised technology as being a key influence upon knowledge sharing. The presence of technology as both a facilitator and a barrier to international knowledge sharing (see tables 3.4.3. and 3.4.5.) reinforces the findings of this literature review, demonstrating the importance of technology as a key influence upon knowledge sharing across countries.

Other barriers to knowledge sharing highlighted in the comparison across the case studies include organisational differences across countries, with five of the case studies highlighting this as a barrier. Differing priorities, structures of forces, and differing methods and procedures for knowledge sharing, can be classed as organisational differences. Also, legal differences between countries are a key barrier. In examples of cross-border cases it is clear that joint operations / collaborative centres can only handle cases which are criminal offences in both countries. Also raised was the barrier of not knowing about the laws in other countries, i.e. not being aware of what information can be shared in another country.

3.4.d. Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

The following table provides brief details of the examples of best practice in knowledge sharing which are highlighted in the case studies. Full details of the best practice examples can be found in the individual case studies in the appendix of this report, and the relevant page numbers for each of the examples are given in the table below.

Table 3.4.6. Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

Title of Case Study	Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing	Page
1. Cross-Border Knowledge Sharing...from Cross-Border Police Patrols to Cross-Border Police Initiatives. West-Coast Police, Belgium	Example of informal information exchange between the French Police and the Belgian West Coast Police, resulting in the apprehension of a suspect who had committed car thefts on both sides of the border.	243
2. Police Bilateral Cooperation in Europe. The role of the Police-Customs Cooperation Centre (CCPD) of Tournai (Belgium)	Creation of an 'Analysis Unit' within the CCPD, acting as both a facilitator in terms of access to information and also as a stimulator that spontaneously provides police administration with expertise.	254
3. Cross-Border Collaborative Work: German-Polish Police And Customs Cooperation Centre In Świecko, Poland	Example of successful information sharing from the daily business of the PCCC in Świecko, where a stolen lorry was quickly located and seized across borders via face-to-face information sharing between Polish and German officers.	259
4. Emerging from crisis: police joint training as a key enabler. A case study on Arma dei Carabinieri international cooperation on civilian crisis management	Training exercises and assessment of exercise sessions, which contribute to the alignment of operational procedures, not only enhancing technical skills, safety and security of operators, but also the overall benefit of the local populations and authorities served by the Civil Crisis Management Missions.	268
5. Experience With Joint Investigation Teams In The Netherlands: A	Example of successful information sharing through a Joint Investigation Team between Dutch and Belgian Police, resulting in the arrest of criminals	273

Pragmatic Approach	committing a number of vehicle crimes across the Netherlands and Belgian border.	
6. The Police and Customs Cooperation Centre In Le-Pertus: Cross-Border Collaboration Between Spain And France	The Police and Customs Cooperation Centre as an example of best practice, enabling faster and more efficient information exchange, easier crime detection, earlier identification of criminals, and better quality knowledge on offences.	287
7. A Case Study on Knowledge Sharing by the Police of the Czech Republic and INTERPOL	An example of communication between a number of policing organisations, including the Patrol Police of the Czech Republic, the office of INTERPOL of the Czech Republic, the office of INTERPOL of Lithuania, and the Lithuanian police and Lithuanian prosecutor's office, in order to identify an individual and issue an arrest warrant. Whilst this case study required a longer time to resolve than the period during which the Police of the Czech Republic can lawfully detain a person, and the individual had to be released, on the other hand, the case study demonstrates that communication between the parties was carried out without problems.	293
8. A Case Study on MARRI Regional Centre In Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative)	The project 'Establishment of network for co-operation between border police on international airport border crossing points in MMS' which encompassed several activities and required mechanisms to be developed for the sharing of information, including regular meetings, formal and informal links for information sharing, joint programmes and mutual training and study visits.	302
9. FRONTEX: Increasing Border Security Through Knowledge Sharing	The organisation FRONTEX as an example of best practice, enabling effective information / data exchange between different member states, joint operations and training programs. Information exchange is generally swift and precise, and the personal relationships that develop in time between officers from different countries help speed the process even further.	312
10. A Case Study on CEPOL: European Police College	The use of 'webinars' by CEPOL, in order to reach a wide audience, offering great flexibility, for whilst face to face training courses are designed a year in advance, a webinar can be adapted and amended very quickly. Policies and priorities across the EU can change rapidly, for example, in the time of a	318

	<p>terror attack. Webinars can address these topics quickly and ensure that they are relevant to the moment in time.</p> <p>The exchange programme as an example of best practice in enabling both informal and formal knowledge to be shared, allowing police officers to establish relationships with their equivalents in another country, crucial for cross-border working, and enabling people to broaden their understanding of cultural differences.</p>	
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A great number of examples of best practices in knowledge sharing are demonstrated by the case studies, particularly in terms of joint operations and where having a common objective, common processes and procedures, and common management, as well as clear procedures for information sharing across borders, can improve the coordination of investigations. Joint Investigation Teams in the Netherlands, and the Police and Customs Cooperation Centres in Świecko, Tournai, and Le-Pertus clearly are key facilitators of knowledge sharing in joint operations.

International agencies also clearly play a key role in facilitating sharing of knowledge, in particular facilitating the sharing of best practice, and enabling stronger communication channels between countries to be developed. The case studies on MARRI, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and CEPOL all describe knowledge sharing across borders as a key objective of the organisation.

3.4.e. Future Perspective

The following table summarises from each case study the future perspective on what knowledge sharing will be required in the future and the capabilities that will be needed to facilitate this.

Table 3.4.7. Future Perspective

Title of Case Study	Future Perspective
<p>1. Cross-Border Knowledge Sharing...from Cross-Border Police Patrols to Cross-Border Police Initiatives. West-Coast Police, Belgium</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Chief of the Belgian local Police of West Coast argues that what is needed in the short term is a border safety and security plan to coordinate and integrate the partners in the safety and security chain across the border. After all, cooperation and knowledge sharing needs to be multidisciplinary (i.e. combine police and justice) to come to an efficient and effective solution to tackle cross-border crime. • He also argues that, due to the number of organisations present in the police landscape, a 'complex tangle' of information sharing exists. As a member of the fixed committee that represents the local police at the federal level, he is currently involved in the construction of a document that would untangle some of the currently complexity by creating more clarity with respect to what needs to be shared with whom, and who has access to what kind of knowledge.
<p>2. Police Bilateral Cooperation in Europe. The role of the Police-Customs Cooperation Centre (CCPD) of Tournai (Belgium)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As for now, the CCPD is only a bilateral institution, even though its existence is grounded in the Schengen Agreements. According to the French coordinator, the CCPDs could become the "<i>embryo of a European police</i>" for small to middle-size criminality (Europol being focused on major crimes). It would require a networking of the resources of all CCPDs and some kind of institutional link between them all at the EU level. However, the position of the French administration on this issue seems to be strictly bilateral at the moment.

<p>3. Cross-Border Collaborative Work: German-Polish Police And Customs Cooperation Centre In Świecko, Poland</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A need to increase the profile of the centre. Not only should the officers in the surrounding areas know about the centre, but also exactly what it is able to perform. Better public relations need to be implemented not only for Germany and Poland in general but on a more global basis too. A better knowledge of the centre and its work should be implemented to ensure that police officers of all state-forces, the Federal Police, Federal Custom Administration, Federal Criminal Police Office, State Criminal Police Office and so on know what to do and whom to contact when they need to. • A need for more trainings and schooling. One interviewee pointed out that the need for better language knowledge including English and a better intercultural understanding will be inevitable in the future and that authorities should put more effort in training officers in it. There will also be a requirement for greater legal and forensic knowledge in the future and therefore the training and transfer of such knowledge should be offered more widely.
<p>4. Emerging from crisis: police joint training as a key enabler. A case study on Arma dei Carabinieri international cooperation on civilian crisis management</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arma dei Carabinieri succeeded in their proposal for the European Union Police Services Training ((EUPST) 2011 – 2013) with the aim of widening the perspective and to spread practices and lessons learned. The global objective is to strengthen the civilian crisis management capacities of the participating countries. This will let the mentioned countries contribute more effectively to international stabilisation efforts in countries emerging from a situation of crisis, thus promoting peace and security. • They aim to advance towards harmonised approaches in the delivery of training and promoting a common approach (both at EU level, and as a contribution to wider international harmonisation in collaboration with partners such as the UN, OSCE and other international / regional organisations). To this end, the training sessions can provide a two-level knowledge transfer: the first level includes a theoretical part on different police issues; the second level is training for trainers. • The development and implementation of joint training will homogenise the level of skills of EU Police forces and their activities, in accordance with the European standards and the objectives of the Guidelines.
<p>5. Experience With Joint Investigation Teams In The Netherlands: A Pragmatic Approach</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The shared experience among experts is that the main synergy of a JIT comes from the conduct of the international investigators. If team leaders and members, as well as the organisations they work for, are ready to accept each other's differences and interests, pragmatic solutions can be brought forward. If these conditions are met, positive experiences and

	<p>results are possible; prime amongst them improvements in the sharing of knowledge.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the Netherlands (very) positive experiences have been gained from working with JITs. Still, one should not think lightly about the deployment of this legal instrument. After all, a JIT is a legally binding agreement with a foreign partner about knowledge sharing. At the start of an investigation it is not (entirely) clear, what research dynamics will occur and what effect this may have on mutual cooperation. Therefore, it is important that the partners are willing and able to cooperate. This means that it is important to take into account each other's interests with regards to the purpose, direction and location of the investigation, as well as with regards to the investigation period and the distribution of research activities. Further, in order to avoid ambiguities and false expectations, participant countries should agree on: information sharing procedures, the use of special investigative powers, how and where to arrest suspects, the seizure procedure, conducting of interrogations, recording of investigations and evidence, and the celebration of successes or coping with failures. It is also advisable to discuss and record how, where and when the prosecution will take place.
<p>6. The Police and Customs Cooperation Centre In Le-Pertus: Cross-Border Collaboration Between Spain And France</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to Mossos d'Esquadra, the PCCC of Le Pertús will keep operating as it has been operating up until now since this has proved to be effective. In this respect, it has to be noted that many of the changes that could enhance knowledge sharing at this centre are not under the control of the Catalan police force. For example, our interviewees stated that the centre should remain open 24 hours since there are many requests at night. Nevertheless, the centre is in France and, as a consequence, it is the French police who decide on the opening hours. Similarly, recognition of the work of Mossos d'Esquadra has legal implications which are beyond the police scope. • Still, there are certain small developments that could take place. Among other, our respondents referred to very different issues such as training, best practices exchange, improvement of the physical space, connectivity or transformation into a border emergency coordination centre. Yet, due to the current economic situation, there is no budget and it seems that the centre will not experience any major changes.
<p>7. A Case Study on Knowledge Sharing by the Police of the Czech Republic and INTERPOL</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the future no big changes are expected within the Police of the Czech Republic. Cross-border knowledge sharing would benefit from the activation of the Schengen Information

	<p>System. In terms of knowledge sharing the interconnection of information systems of individual countries would be an ideal state.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A simpler and faster possibility to transfer a foreigner who commits illegal activity to the home country would be another improvement. Such people tend to relapse and commit crimes again.
<p>8. A Case Study on MARRI Regional Centre In Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The partnerships between MARRI and other organisations, including FRONTEX, IOM, ICMPD, SEPCA, RCC, RACVIAC, PCC SEE, are highly important for the future of MARRI, and present as best choice for further sustainability of the project results. • However, MARRI is facing uncertainties in the current financial climate, having in mind that the Member States are responsible for financing the Initiative and some delays in transferring the funds exist.
<p>9. FRONTEX: Increasing Border Security Through Knowledge Sharing</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The strengthening of cooperation with third-party countries that have been identified within joint operations as being problematic areas for the EU • Strengthening the efforts to harmonise EU member states with regard to training standards, equipment and technology used, legislation and data bases.
<p>10. A Case Study on CEPOL: European Police College</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Readdressing of training at an EU level in order to create a systematic approach to training. CEPOL is currently conducting a mapping exercise which takes the form of a survey to establish what training activities currently exist across the EU and who is involved in this training. By the end of March 2012, CEPOL will be producing a strategic training needs analysis based upon this information. • All interviewees raised the importance of further developing electronic systems and agreed that in the future adaptations in technology would be extremely important for facilitating the sharing of knowledge. • Interviewees raised the importance of developing minimum standards for training across the EU and for officers to be at the same minimum level across all EU countries. • CEPOL is keen to ensure that as an organisation it develops to meet the needs of the future. Courses are revised and updated twice yearly and this is a process that will continue, in order to meet the requirements of the EU policy cycle. • CEPOL is also facing uncertainties in the current financial climate and may have to operate with reduced resources. It was also suggested that financial cuts in police organisations may have a negative impact upon the demand for training. A question was also raised over a possible merger with Europol

	and whether there may in the future be one large training centre for the EU, or one large organisation, with training existing as a part of it.
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Whilst the case studies highlight some important examples of best practices in international knowledge sharing, as shown in section 3.4.d., there are still some issues that the case studies describe as being in need of further development for the future:

Harmonisation of approaches across countries was described as important in a number of situations. The streamlining of organisational processes and procedures would make knowledge sharing in the case of cross-border collaborations much quicker and easier, and this could be facilitated via the sharing of best practices across countries. The case studies on Arma dei Carabinieri training programmes in Italy, and the European Training College CEPOL, suggest that advancing towards harmonised approaches in the delivery of training across the EU would improve cross-border understandings and the ease of working together. The case study on CEPOL raises the importance of developing minimum standards for training across the EU and for officers to be at the same minimum level across all EU countries. In sections 3.4.b. and 3.4.c. earlier, we showed technology to be of high importance for international knowledge sharing, and the streamlining of technological systems across countries would clearly have a positive impact upon knowledge sharing.

Continuing the work of building relationships and contacts across borders was seen as crucial for the future. Effective knowledge sharing clearly relies on good working relationships between the participants. A complex system of communication exists across the EU with police forces clearly working with a number of other forces and with international organisations. The relationships built up are very important for the effectiveness of police work in the future. These relationships need to be encouraged, and processes for communication need to be quick and smooth, in order to facilitate effective sharing of information (direct sharing, and in real time).

3.5. Conclusions

The following key conclusions regarding international knowledge sharing can be drawn from the case studies:

The importance of international knowledge sharing was highlighted by all of the case studies. It is imperative for intelligence and operational information to be shared quickly and efficiently between countries in situations of cross border operations, where the police need to be able to work as quickly as the criminals. Case studies also show the importance of sharing best practice across countries and in particular international organisations are described as having a key role in facilitating the sharing of best practice.

The case studies emphasise that working with other organisations is important and all organisations are required at some point to work with and share knowledge with other police forces or agencies in order to meet their goals. The case study on the Police of the Czech Republic and INTERPOL demonstrates the ways in which the two organisations need to work together, and the case study on the international agency MARRI shows that MARRI has partnerships with a wide number of other organisations. The case studies focusing on cross-border collaborations clearly demonstrate the need for police forces to work together and the reliance on other forces in cross-border operations.

As described in the case study focusing on cross-border police initiatives in the Belgian West Coast, *'According to the Chief of the Belgian local Police of West Coast the police are currently in a complex tangle with respect to knowledge sharing, due to the number of organisations (bodies) present in the police landscape (e.g., local police, federal police, district information crossroads, Europol, Interpol, Liaison officers, et cetera)'* (van den Oord and Vallet, Case Study 1). This suggests that a complex map of communication channels exists across the EU, made up of a network of organisations which need to work together. All ten case studies show, however, that this is not without challenges, and in particular language and organisational differences as well as different laws, legislations and technological procedures across countries create barriers to knowledge sharing.

In order to overcome these challenges, the following key recommendations can be made, which may be useful to any officers within police forces and policing organisations that are required to share knowledge internationally:

1. Standardised technological systems should be created / utilised: The case studies have shown that technology is of great importance in international knowledge sharing, and if it is used effectively, technology can be a key facilitator to knowledge sharing. However, it is also named as a barrier, for disparate technological systems across countries result in knowledge being difficult to share. Exploring the use of standardised systems, and making use of the internet and other systems which are accessible to a wide audience, is a key recommendation for improving international knowledge sharing. For instance, the case study on CEPOL describes the use of 'webinars' as an example of best practice, through an internet based system, where training sessions are easily accessible to police officers across EU countries.
2. Good working relationships should be established across countries: Clearly having good working relationships between those forces and organisations which need to share knowledge with one another is important in order to facilitate effective knowledge sharing, for this may increase trust, improve informal knowledge sharing, and create clearer communication channels. The examples of best practice in the case studies on the initiatives of the Belgian West Coast Police, and the German-Polish Police and Customs Co-operation Centre, demonstrate good working relationships between those involved in knowledge sharing, which were used in order to achieve a successful outcome on specific criminal investigations. The case studies describe good relationships being established through social events, networking, exchange programmes, and National Contact Points. The case study on the Belgian West Coast Police initiatives described social events as a key facilitator to knowledge sharing, providing opportunities to actually share and exchange knowledge and information, and allowing the building of stronger personal relationships. Exploration of these as methods for improving relationships is a further recommendation for improving international knowledge sharing.

3. Language skills should be improved in those who are required to share knowledge:
The case studies highlighted that language is a key barrier to knowledge sharing, with nine of the ten case studies naming a lack of language skills, or a lack of a common language, as a barrier. Thus a crucial step in improving international knowledge sharing is to ensure that those who are responsible for sharing knowledge internationally have the language skills they need in order to enable them to communicate with others effectively. Language training courses are widely available in all countries at universities or colleges, and they are also offered by international policing organisations, for example both CEPOL and FRONTEX offer language courses, with FRONTEX describing their language courses as being specific to a policing context, focusing on operational needs and related terminology.
4. Awareness of organisational and legislative differences should be improved:
Differing organisational structures and procedures, and differing laws and legislation across countries, have been shown to create barriers to knowledge sharing across countries, in particular due to a lack of awareness of the differences between countries. Those who are required to share knowledge across country borders would be advised to make themselves aware of organisational and legislative differences, and to explore the option of taking training courses or schemes which can facilitate this learning. CEPOL offers training courses with an aim to broaden knowledge of policing differences across the EU. In particular, the exchange programme offered by CEPOL, by which officers visit their equivalents in another country, and spend time working with another police force, is a method by which officers can learn in great detail about both policing differences and cultural differences in other countries.
5. Awareness of international centres / projects / organisations should be improved:
The case studies on the Police and Customs Co-operation Centres in Tournai, Świecko and Le-Pertus, all describe a lack of visibility of the centre, or a lack of recognition of the importance of the work of the centre, as being a barrier to knowledge sharing. A recommendation here would therefore be to undertake promotional work in order to raise awareness of the important work taking place, the aims and objectives of the centres, and to share examples of best practice from the centres, for example operations or investigations which have had a successful

outcome. Whilst this recommendation has been formulated as an outcome of this being raised as a specific barrier for Police and Customs Co-operation Centres, it should be noted that it is also important to improve the visibility of other international projects, operations, investigations, and the work of international organisations. In section 2.6 of this report, we described how international knowledge sharing was not seen to be as common an activity as other domains of knowledge sharing, with 23% of the interviewees reporting that knowledge was shared 'not at all' and a quarter of the sample at least not answering the interview questions on international knowledge sharing (see section 2.6.a.). Thus a further recommendation here is that further promotional work should take place in order to raise awareness of international police work more generally across EU police officers.

The final section of this report, section 5, will provide further synthesis of the findings and recommendations drawn from the international case studies, bringing these together with the other strands of the research presented in this report, in order to provide an overall theoretical framework of influences on the knowledge sharing effectiveness of police organisations.

SECTION 4

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENT: EKSPD-DI

Effectiveness of Knowledge Sharing in Police Organisations – Diagnostic Instrument

4. Knowledge sharing diagnostic instrument (EKSP0-DI)

4.1 Introduction

4.1.1 Context

The Effectiveness of Knowledge Sharing in Police Organisations – Diagnostic Instrument (EKSP0-DI) was developed to meet the deliverable requirements for WP3. The tool comprises of

- a questionnaire, designed to assess knowledge sharing capabilities on a range of dimensions
- a manual written to support the use of the tool

This section of the report outlines the purpose of the tool and the process by which the tool was developed. The tool itself is published as a separate report.

4.1.2 Purpose

EKSP0-DI has been developed to provide Police Organisations with the opportunity to assess how effectively knowledge is being shared in a range of situations. It was developed by the Institute of Work Psychology, following their research into knowledge sharing in police organisations, across 10 EU consortium countries, as part of the EU funded COMPOSITE project. EKSP0-DI is an outcome of research activity that included:

- A systematic literature review covering knowledge sharing within the police and between the police, and other forces and key stakeholders.
- Findings from 152 interviews with serving police officers from 17 police organisations in the 10 countries covering their experience of knowledge sharing across the 4 domains highlighted in the modules below.
- 10 Case studies focusing on International knowledge sharing.
- Collaborative development and pilot of the POLKS questionnaire involving all 10 countries.

- Analysis of responses to the pilot questionnaire (481 received) to help validate the tool.

The content of EKSPD-DI reflects the findings from this research and its purpose is to:

- a. Enable police organisations to assess the effectiveness of their own knowledge sharing capability and provide them with the opportunity to collect benchmark information
- b. Identify the most common barriers to effective knowledge sharing
- c. Provide recommendations of strategies for dealing with the barriers

4.2 Development of the instrument

4.2.1 Designing Version 1 of the questionnaire

Stage 1: Designing the tool

Initially, a 1st draft was developed by all members of the WP3 team, to ensure that the content reflected collective learning and experience.

The draft questionnaire contained:

- i. A demographics section, 'Questions about you'
- ii. Four main sections that reflected the 4 domains:
 1. Within forces,
 2. Between forces in the same country,
 3. With the public
 4. With international forces and agencies.
- iii. A leadership and management section

The questionnaire items were developed as follows:

Table 4.2.1 Outline of questionnaire items in draft questionnaire

<p>Demographics 'Questions about you'</p>	<p>In this section questions were based on an understanding of the relevant key demographics within multi-national forces and were designed to capture additional information, such as age, rank and tenure, to enable any analysis to be broken by relevant groups.</p>
<p>Four main sections reflecting the 4 dimensions</p>	<p>The findings from the literature review and the interviews, highlighted the importance of a set of core topics for each of the 4 domains:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Types of knowledge shared • Methods used to share knowledge • Barriers to knowledge sharing <p>Individual questions within each topic area reflected research findings for that domain. Therefore, whilst there is some similarity in the questions used across the domains, certain issues are specific to a particular domain.</p> <p>Additional items were then included for the internal knowledge sharing section, which focused on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategy • Knowledge management • Knowledge sharing with additional stakeholders
<p>Leadership and management section</p>	<p>This section included:</p> <p>a) Items from the structured interview questionnaire covering: knowledge management, employee involvement, change management, and knowledge sharing climate.</p> <p>b) Additional items reflecting issues identified from the systematic review and interviews. These focused on organisational and managerial activities that supported and encouraged knowledge sharing.</p>

Stage 2: Testing the draft with partner countries

Whilst the 1st draft of the questionnaire was being developed, each country was asked to nominate one person to become part of a virtual team, set up to support the development of the questionnaire. The purpose of this was to ensure that each country was able to assess and comment on the questionnaire from the perspective of their country and culture. All countries provided a named contact.

Draft 1 of the questionnaire was then sent to the virtual team for comment. They were asked to assess issues such as language, clarity, relevance of content. All countries responded in a very constructive way and proposed a number of changes; most countries also expressed concerns about the length of the questionnaire. This feedback then informed the development of the pilot version of the questionnaire.

Stage 3: Development of the pilot questionnaire

Changes made to the questionnaire included improving the clarity of certain terms by rewording or adding examples, re-positioning some questions to make the questionnaire flow better, removing unnecessary and duplicate items, and improving the design of some questions to make them easier to answer.

The questionnaire was also restructured and 'modularised' as follows

- a core module which included:
 - Demographic questions
 - Questions covering internal knowledge sharing
 - Additional questions covering leadership and management, knowledge management and knowledge sharing strategies.

- Three other modules each covering one of the three remaining domains

The purpose of this was to try to address concerns about the length and allow forces some flexibility about what they included in their pilot.

Stage 4: Setting up and running the pilot

Each country was asked to take part in the pilot to ensure the final product reflected, as far as possible, the views of all countries. We proposed a number of ways in which they could be involved.

Option 1: Sample of a whole force or sub-unit of a force.

Preferred option The purpose of this option was to ensure sufficient numbers to allow an effective statistical analysis of the pilot responses to enable the findings to inform the design of the final version of the questionnaire. It also provided the opportunity to ask for some feedback about the usability and suitability of the questionnaire.

The option asked for a sample size, between 50 and 100, which included people from each of the 5 Police Officer/staff categories and where possible, people with experience of working with the public, with other forces and / or with international police forces and agencies.

In return, a sample feedback report was offered for the unit or force involved, to be delivered once the WP3 project had been completed. This report was intended to give feedback to the forces concerned and not for wider circulation.

Option 2: Targeting individuals who meet the criteria

This approach was intended to assess the usability and suitability of the questionnaire in more depth. The option asked for a Sample of 5 individuals per each of the 5 Police officer / staff categories and where possible, up to 5 people with experience of working with the public, with other forces and / or with international police forces and agencies.

For this option, there was also the opportunity to have an illustrative feedback report to allow country teams to see what this report may look like.

Option 3: A mixture of the two previous approaches

This option provides countries with the chance to use both approaches to the pilot in a way that suits their circumstances.

Countries were asked to run the pilot in a way that was most appropriate way for their pilot population. All countries were then provided with an excel spreadsheet to input their responses and guidance to help them do this.

4.2.2 Countries experiences of running the pilot.

All but France were able to conduct a pilot of the questionnaire. France, unable to get permission to run the survey in the timeframe, in part because of force concerns about its value, contributed feedback collected from a focus group of senior force representative.

It is clear that some country teams found it easier to engage their relevant country force(s) than others. This seems to reflect both the structure of the country forces, the nature of the relationship and / or the value the forces placed on the idea of a diagnostic instrument.

Some forces felt that the instrument did not reflect the world of operational police and this made it harder to gain their involvement with the process.

It is clear that the opportunity to have an early discussion about the instrument, its purpose and its value, was important for most country teams in their approach to gaining commitment for the pilot.

The questionnaire was circulated in a number of ways:

- Some country teams sent the questionnaire to a central person who circulated it to individuals in the relevant force. This was done both via email and by circulating paper versions of the questionnaire.
- The emailed questionnaires were either circulated in the 'paper format' for printing, or circulated using an email version of the questionnaire which allowed respondents to complete them on a computer and return them by email.
- In at least two cases the questionnaire was placed online, using systems such as Lime Survey, a free and open source web based survey tool. In these cases the link was forwarded by a contact in the relevant force.
- One country completed the questionnaires during interviews

Survey were collected in some cases by the force and handed back to the country teams, in others the questionnaire was given or sent directly back to the country team to preserve anonymity and confidentiality. The former approach occasionally caused some difficulty when checking the progress of results because of the lack of 'control' over the process,

It was clear that country teams put a lot of effort into making the pilot a success. Thanks go to all countries for their considerable input.

4.2.3 Development of final version of the questionnaire

An excellent total of 481 completed pilot questionnaires were received.

Table 4.2.2 Questionnaires received by country

COUNTRY	RESPONSES RECIEVED
Belgium	15
Czech Republic	5
Germany	62
France	Focus group
Italy	33
Macedonia	25
Netherlands	62
Romania	100
Spain	132 (two forces)
UK	47
Total no. of responses	481

Responses were entered into SPSS and analysed. Comments about the questionnaire, including the comments made in the focus group, were collected and summarised.

These are explained in this sub section 4.2.3 alongside details about the changes that were made to address these issues. The final version of the questionnaire is shown at the end of this section (Section 4) of the report.

Changes made in the final version.

Limited direct feedback was received; this is detailed below. Concerns were expressed about:

- The length of the questionnaire e.g. too many questions, too many topics. (most comments)
- The vagueness of some of the questions, however, unfortunately, in most cases the actual questions themselves were not identified
- The relevance of the questions under management and leadership and a sense that they were repetitive, this included a request to limit this section
- The relevance of some of the topics to local staff or certain forces in some countries
- The language used being corporate-management and not relevant to the police
- The concept of 'Knowledge Sharing' or Organisational diagnosis' is not clear to traditional bureaucracies
- The relevance of the topic as a priority for forces in certain countries
- The questionnaire was reported to take between 15 minutes up to 35 minutes.

Initial analysis of the data suggested the following issues.

- Two part questions seem to confuse, particularly at the beginning of the questionnaire. This was demonstrated by the fact that in a sizeable proportion of cases the question was not completed as requested – in some cases one part was completed but not the other, in others the questions were completed but the instructions were ignored.
- The value of questions that simply asked about 'Type' of knowledge shared was limited without some value judgement about the effectiveness of the type itself.
- The management and leadership questions were primarily included as scales and they have been analysed as such.

Changes made as a result of feedback and the outcomes of the detailed analysis include:

- A simpler question design that replaces all two-part questions with a single question. This means that the questionnaire will be both easier and quicker to complete

- Examples added / changes in wording to improve clarity of questions
- The analysis identified some items that could be dropped; the items left are included because of their value individually, as well as items that are part of a scale. This will help limit corporate-management language.
- As far as possible, items that ask the same question in different ways have been taken out to help reduce length, increase face validity and usability.
- The management and leadership section has been reduced and restructured to make it clearer about its purpose and value.
- The questions referring to 'Type' of knowledge shared, in Modules C, D and E (see below) are now question about how effectively different types of knowledge are shared.
- In addition, to help manage concerns about length and relevance, the questionnaire is now clearly modular and organisations can chose to include only the sections that they wish to assess.
 - Module A – Demographic information (Core Module)
 - Module B – Internal Knowledge sharing (Core Module)
 - Module C- Knowledge sharing with other forces in the same country
 - Module D – Knowledge sharing with the public
 - Module E -Knowledge sharing with forces from other countries / international agencies

We strongly recommend that Module A is used in combination with one or more of the other modules.

The questionnaire is provided at the end of this section of the report

4.2.4 An example report based on findings from the pilot population

In this section we have provided an example report, based on the findings from the pilot population, to illustrate some of the value of the instrument and to indicate how it can help assess knowledge sharing capability.

Given the disparity in the numbers from each country we have chosen to highlight collective findings by reporting the frequency of responses at the level of the whole pilot population. Where appropriate we have also highlighted where these findings concur with or differ from the interview findings.

We have also included some graphs, based on mean values, simply for illustrative purposes to demonstrate the different ways that information can be presented.

More detailed analyses have been conducted to help refine the questionnaire; again these are reported on only at the level of the whole respondent group.

Example feedback report: COMPOSITE WP3 Diagnostic tool pilot population

This report is based on the findings from a pilot survey carried out across the 10 European Countries involved in the COMPOSITE project. A total of 481 questionnaires were completed across the 10 countries. Table 4.2.2 above highlights the breakdown of responses.

Please note: Frequency data and mean data presented for each question represents the people who responded to that question.

Demographic data: Of those that responded:

Table 4.2.3 Demographic data

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Age	Respondents' ages ranged from 20 to 59 years
Gender	78% were male, 22% were female
Tenure	Tenure ranged between 1 and 42 years. The most frequently occurring length of service was 5 years but this was only by a small margin.

Rank: Of those who gave their ranks, the breakdown, by ranks, was as follows:


Table 4.2.4 Percentage responses received by rank

RANK	% OF TOTAL
Chief Officer group	5
Senior level e.g. Chief Superintendent, Superintendent	11
Supervisory level	29
Front line operational level	48
Police staff / Civilian	7

Findings: Internal Knowledge sharing

i. Overall perceptions of internal knowledge sharing are quite encouraging and not surprisingly higher when talking about sharing knowledge within the immediate team (89% say this happens effectively, very effectively, or highly effectively). Particularly positive is that 78% suggest knowledge sharing with other teams, critical to their work, is either effective, very effective or highly effectively. 64% indicate that they think knowledge sharing between the ranks is effective, very effective or highly effectively. The following spider diagram describes the level of effectiveness by question (using mean values).

Table 4.2.5 Overall perceptions of internal knowledge sharing (using mean values)



ii. Types of knowledge shared: As well as being asked to rate the effectiveness of their forces shared different types of knowledge, respondents were also asked to indicate which they felt were the four most important types of knowledge for their job.

Table 4.2.6 Top most important types of knowledge

TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE	RATED AS IMPORTANT %	RATED AS EFFECTIVE AND ABOVE %
Operational knowledge	66	77 (38)
Legislation and other legal requirements	66	77 ((35)
Intelligence	57	73 (35)
Advice, guidance and best practice	51	72 (34)

(Figures in brackets represent the % responses stating very or highly effective)

The findings above present a clear list of what types of knowledge respondents collectively considered important to share. In the interviews, respondents were asked an open question about what types of information was most commonly shared (Section 2, Table 2.4.4) and interestingly, legislation and related information was only 6th on the list.

Positively, around three quarters indicate that these types of knowledge are shared, at least effectively.

The spider diagram below provides an overview of the levels of effectiveness of sharing the different types of knowledge used in the questionnaire (using mean data).

Table 4.2.7 Levels of effectiveness of sharing different types of knowledge (using mean values)



The diagram suggests there is a limited variation between the perceived levels of effectiveness of knowledge sharing across the different types of knowledge.

iii. Levels of competence in using key methods used to share knowledge: Respondents were asked to identify which methods they used to share knowledge and also to rate how competent they felt in using these methods.

Table 4.2.8 Levels of competence in top 6 methods of knowledge sharing

METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING	USE THIS %	RATED VERY COMPETENT AND ABOVE %
1. Computer	91	58
2. Intranet	90	62
3. Email	84	64
4. Force radio	82	69
5. Internet	80	64
6. Face to face briefings	73	53

The findings above are probably not surprising. Encouragingly, many people reported feeling competent to use the methods they used, although of some concern was the fact that 42% of staff feel that at best, they are only moderately competent at using their work based computer.


Interestingly, only

- 44% said they use social media with 50% stating they were very or extremely competent
- 40% said they used smart phones with 41% saying they were very or extremely competent

This might reflect the fact that the newer technology based methods currently being introduced are potentially more complex – smart phones have many features, and with social media, it is may be as much about the content as the competence in using the technology.

The following bar chart demonstrates the mean or average level of competence for each method. Interestingly, the responses suggest that people do not rate themselves as particularly competent in one to one meetings; it is not clear why this may be so but could be an issue to explore further.

Table 4.2.9 Levels of competence for all methods of knowledge sharing (using mean values)



iv. Barriers to knowledge sharing: Respondents were asked to identify whether particular situations impeded their ability to share knowledge.

Table 4.2.10 Top 6 barriers to knowledge sharing

BARRIERS TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING	RATED AS SOMETIMES, OFTEN AND ALWAYS A BARRIER %
1. Lack of staff resource / time	78 (42)
2. Ineffective or inaccessible technology	77 ((35)
3. Working practices that do not encourage sharing	69 (33)
4. Lack of access to relevant information	69 (28)
5. Lack of facilities or equipment	68 (33)
6. Organisational politics	66 (27)

(Figures in brackets represent the % responses stating the issues is 'often' or 'always' a barrier)


Again the overall findings above are not that surprising, however, given that 'ineffective or inaccessible technology' is the second most frequently cited barrier, this gives cause for concern when the previous section highlights that the most frequently used methods rely on technology.

Poor working practices are frequently cited in organisations as a key issue but it is an area where improvements can make a significant difference to both working life and business efficiency and may help to mitigate some problems caused by the lack of staff resource and time.

Lack of access to relevant information is a key issue, highlighted by our research which identified that access to relevant information was a critical part of successful knowledge sharing events and one of the key reasons why unsuccessful events failed.

Interestingly, if you broadly compare the bar chart on the following page findings (based on the mean pilot scores) with the findings from the interviews (Table 2.3.8), the picture is quite different. Whilst resources remain high on the list there is a greater emphasis on the impact of people related barriers from the interview findings than there is within this pilot population. This may reflect sample size and the nature of different methods.

Table 4.2.11 Barriers to knowledge sharing (by mean value)



v. Presence and effectiveness of strategies to support knowledge sharing: Respondents were asked to indicate their awareness of a range of knowledge sharing strategies and rate their effectiveness.

Table 4.2.12 Presence and effectiveness of strategies that direct knowledge sharing activities

STRATEGIES BT DOMAIN	STRATEGY PRESENT %	RATED AS EFFECTIVE OR BETTER. %
1. Internally between different functions	78	77
2. With other forces in the same country	62	64
3. With the public	56	69
4. With forces or agencies from other countries	46	60

Findings suggest that there are strategies in place in the majority of organisations included within the survey population, and they are judged to be effective, particularly for internal knowledge sharing. Earlier findings within this report, however, may suggest problems implementing strategies into effective action, for example, the 68% who indicated that ‘Working practices that do not encourage sharing’ are a barrier to knowledge sharing.

vi. Knowledge management within the force: The following question focuses on the management and storage of knowledge. Analysis indicates that they form a scale, however, for the purposes of this report the feedback will be against individual items.

Table 4.2.13 Level of agreement about presence of knowledge management activities

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT	AGREE / STRONGLY AGREE %
1. Important knowledge is always accessible when needed to solve police problems	54
2. This force carefully collects and documents key information	66
3. This force has formal procedures for recording solutions to problems or best practice	66
4. This force has formal knowledge management systems	64
5. This force stores key information in manuals or a central documentation centre	51
6. This force has reference systems which make it quick and easy to obtain stored information	48
7. The electronic systems designed to store and share knowledge are easy to use	50
8. This force has specific procedures regarding how to share knowledge	53

Findings suggest that whilst two thirds have agreed that key knowledge, including best practice, is collected and documented and that there are systems to manage this, people are less positive about being able to access it with only half of respondents reporting that their system is easy to use.

vii. Effectiveness of knowledge sharing with other agencies: Just over 60% of respondents have experience of working with 'local government' (62%) and judicial bodies (61%. In both cases 80% judge this to be effective or better. Experience of working with other agencies ranged from 36% of respondents to 49% with effectiveness ranging from 64% to 84% (Fire service).

Managing and leadership:

viii. Engagement Again, this set of questions forms a scale designed to identify the extent to which people feel involved and engaged with the organisation. The responses to individual items are also of interest and again for the purposes of the report feedback will focus on the individual items.

Table 4.2.14 Level of agreement about presence of engagement activities

ENGAGEMENT	AGREE / STRONGLY AGREE %
1. Employees are kept informed of decisions by senior management	44
2. This force ensure all employees are aware of the aims of the organisation	43
3. This force takes into account employees' opinions when making changes	26
4. Top management listen to the opinions of employees from all levels when developing a strategy	17
5. This force takes into account and reflects employees views in policy statement	15

The results are not that encouraging given the fact that across the population less than half judged their force to have kept their staff informed about decisions and made them aware of the aims of the organisation, and very few judge their forces to be consulting / listening to their staff. People are more likely to be motivated to work for an organisation if they feel engaged with the organisation. People are more likely to be engaged if they have the opportunity to contribute and influence and feel account is taken of their views.

ix. Organisational flexibility This scale assesses the extent to which an organisation is able to be flexible and respond to change. Again, the items form a scale but for the purposes of the report the findings are reported at an individual item level.

Table 4.2.15 Level of agreement about presence of organisational flexibility activities

ORGANISATIONAL FLEXIBILITY	AGREE / STRONGLY AGREE %
1. People in this police force are always searching for new ways of looking at problems	42
2. This force easily makes changes based on new knowledge	36
3. This force is good at managing changes to the way it works	36
4. This police force is quick to respond when changes need to be made	36
5. This police force is very flexible; it can quickly change procedures to meet new conditions and solve problems as they arise	35
6. This force adopts new processes quickly	34
7. Our police personnel take on board new ideas easily	33
8. New ideas are readily accepted here	26
9. Assistance in developing new ideas is readily available	26
10. Management here are quick to spot the need to do things differently	26

Whilst 42% suggest their force is always searching for new ways to look at problems, only 26% suggest their management are quick to spot the need to do things differently, that new ideas are readily accepted and that assistance is readily available to develop new ideas.

Around a third of respondents are positive about their forces ability to manage changes when required to, (36%), to react speedily to change the way it works when it needs to. This suggests that more needs to be done to improve both the ability and speed of forces to manage change.

x. Encouragement to share Whilst all the following three sections form scales, reporting is at the individual item level.

Table 4.2.16 Level of agreement about senior management / line management support and encouragement to share knowledge

	AGREE / STRONGLY AGREE %
<i>General encouragement to share</i>	
1. Police personnel are encouraged to share knowledge with close colleagues	63
2. Police personnel are encouraged to share knowledge with everybody in the organisation	43
<i>Line manager support for knowledge sharing</i>	
1. My line manager actively encourages me to share knowledge with colleagues in my team	71
2. I am encouraged to pass on knowledge in team meetings, briefings and in individual meetings with my line manager	62
3. My line manager actively encourages me to share knowledge with other teams	59
4. I am encouraged to pass on knowledge via informal conversations with my line manager	54
5. Knowledge sharing is part of my objectives set by my line manager	48
<i>Senior management support for knowledge sharing</i>	
1. Senior managers actively encourage knowledge sharing within teams	48
2. Senior management actively ensure that key knowledge is shared throughout the force	43
3. Senior managers actively encourage knowledge sharing between teams	42

Individual items suggest that, within the pilot population:

- Police personnel are broadly more likely to be encouraged to share information at an immediate level with close colleagues, than with everyone in the organisation. This is not a surprising finding and targeted encouragement may be essential to manage the volumes of knowledge and avoid 'overload'.
- In many cases line managers actions do support and encourage knowledge sharing
- Line managers seem more likely to encourage knowledge sharing between close colleagues than with other teams
- Only 48% of line managers set objectives around knowledge sharing
- Line managers may be more likely to be judged to encourage knowledge sharing than senior management

xi. Actions to promote sharing

Table 4.2.17 Level of agreement about activities designed to promote knowledge sharing

ACTIVITIES TO PROMOTE KNOWLEDGE SHARING	AGREE / STRONGLY AGREE %
<i>Specific actions to promote knowledge sharing</i>	
1. Knowledge sharing is built into my job description / it is a compulsory part of my job	58
2. My force has an effective meeting / briefing structure through which knowledge is passed from the bottom up and the top down	43
3. My force has a mentoring scheme where officers who are older in service mentor new recruits and pass on knowledge to them	40
4. My force has a reward system for sharing knowledge	9

Responses to the above suggest that within the pilot population:

- 58% of respondents have knowledge sharing built into their job description, although as question 6 in the previous section x. Highlights, only 48% have objectives set around knowledge sharing
- Only 9% of forces have a reward system for sharing knowledge which suggests a lack of incentive.
- Only 40% of forces have a mentoring scheme to help capture and use experience and knowledge from older officers.

Findings: Knowledge sharing with forces in the same country

Background

244 people indicated they had experience of knowledge sharing with other forces and of those, 76% indicated that their forces shared knowledge with other forces, effectively or better.

i. Types of knowledge shared: respondents were asked to identify which types of knowledge they had shared with other forces in the last two years. The following table highlights which types of knowledge were most frequently shared between forces.

Table 4.2.18 Top 4 types of knowledge shared

TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED	FREQUENCY OF TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED %
1. Intelligence	62
2. Operational information regarding police operations	56
3. Preventative information – matters of safety, security and risk	52
4. Advice, Experience and best practice	51

The responses do not provide any surprises. (Please note: The revised version of the questionnaire now includes an assessment of how effectively different types of knowledge is shared).

ii. Methods of knowledge sharing: Respondents were asked to identify which methods they used to share knowledge with forces in their own country, and how effective these methods are at sharing knowledge between forces.

Of those who responded the following methods were:

Table 4.2.19 Top 7 most frequently used methods of knowledge sharing

METHODS OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING	USE THIS %	RATED AS EFFECTIVE AND ABOVE %
1. Telephone	75	95
2. Written document	68	91
3. Email	62	95
4. Meetings	60	93
5. Databases and electronic systems	55	89
6. Fax	45	83
7. Joint training sessions	43	93

The telephone is clearly used most frequently and evidence suggests it is important in these situations because of a preference for personal contacts and because of its immediacy. It does however need to be backed up by written record and audit trails and therefore it is helpful to see that the second most frequently used method is written records and the third is email. The latter may well have taken over from Fax as the way to transfer information.

Meetings and Joint force training sessions can be very valuable tools to build relationships and contacts to support knowledge sharing as well as being effective methods for knowledge sharing.

iii. Barriers to knowledge sharing

Table 4.2.19 Top 6 barriers to knowledge sharing

BARRIERS TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING	RATED AS SOMETIMES, OFTEN AND ALWAYS A BARRIER %
1. Bureaucratic processes, e.g. poor or slow processes and excessive paperwork	85 (48)
2. Incompatible systems between forces	74 (38)
3. Lack of processes or strategy for sharing	68 (29)
4. Data protection legislation	62 (24)
5. Lack of staff time / resources	61 (27)
6. Organisational politics	58 (22)

(Figures in brackets represent the % responses stating the issues is 'often' or 'always' a barrier)


The existence of 'bureaucratic processes' and a 'lack of processes or strategy for sharing' is clearly of concern because of the impact this will have on effective knowledge sharing with colleagues in other forces.

This will not be helped by incompatible systems. However, the responses to the previous question which indicate that telephone is the most used method suggests that people may be tending to find ways to 'work around' the problems caused by the lack of effective procedures. Whilst there are benefits to the using the phone, evidence indicates that there are cons, namely, potential problems caused by unrecorded conversations and a lack of an audit trail. Interestingly, these issues were also identified as key barrier in the interviews.

Data protection and legislation is also highlighted as a barrier and this suggests that there is a lack of confidence and clarity about what can be shared and what cannot. This may suggest that there is a need to improve training in this area. This may link to the issues already raised about the lack of processes for sharing in that there may not be a clear procedure laid down about how to manage sensitive information.

The following bar chart provides an overview of the ranking (based on mean values) for all the barriers within this question.

Table 4.2.20 Barriers to knowledge sharing (by mean value)



Findings: Knowledge sharing with the public

Background

237 people indicated they had experience of knowledge sharing with the public and, of those, 85% indicated that their forces shared knowledge with the public, effectively or better.

i. Types of Knowledge shared: respondents were asked to identify which types of knowledge they had shared with members of the public. The following table highlights

which types of knowledge were most frequently shared across those who responded to the questions.

Table 4.2.21 Top 4 types of knowledge shared

TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED	FREQUENCY OF TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED %
1. Procedures for the public to follow, e.g. in contacting the police	64
2. Crime prevention information	58
3. General information about the police	57
4. Laws and regulations	51

The responses do not provide any particular surprises, although, interestingly, only 27% shared information on specific criminal investigations, e.g. wanted individuals, with the public. (Please note: The revised version of the questionnaire now includes an assessment of effectiveness).

ii. Methods of knowledge sharing: Respondents were asked to identify which methods they used to share knowledge the public, and how effective these methods are.

Of those who responded the following methods were:

Table 4.2.22 Top 6 most frequently used methods for knowledge sharing

METHODS FOR SHARING KNOWLEDGE	USE THIS %	RATED AS EFFECTIVE AND ABOVE %
1. Telephone	58	93 (47)
2. Printed materials, e.g. letter, flyers, brochures	57	85 (27)
3. Face to face discussions with members of the public	46	91 (50)
4. Meetings with key people in the community	45	93(51)
5. Attending public meetings arranged by others	39	92 (39)
6. Police website / internet	39	82(37)

(Figures in brackets represent the % responses stating the issues is 'very' or 'highly' effective)

It is clear that the police responding to this survey use a variety of methods to share knowledge with the public and they are all considered effective. The most effective methods cited involve direct contact with the public; printed materials, whilst frequently used, are seen as less effective than other methods shown in the table above. The personal touch,

where it can be used, therefore, appears to be the preferred approach, although, interestingly, levels of competence for one to one meetings was not rated that highly. It was also interesting to note that the media (e.g. the press (36%), TV (25%)) was not used more frequently; this might reflect country differences, not analysed for this report.

iii. Barriers to knowledge sharing:

Table 4.2.23 Top 6 barriers to knowledge sharing

BARRIERS TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING	RATED AS SOMETIMES, OFTEN AND ALWAYS A BARRIER %
1. Managing sensitive information	84 (49)
2. Data protection legislation	80 (41)
3. Lack of staff resources / time	77 (23)
4. Negative public perceptions of the police	72 (32)
5. Lack of public interest	63 (21)
6. Lack of understanding by the public	63 (21)

(Figures in brackets represent the % responses stating the issues is 'often' or 'always' a barrier)


Managing sensitive information often links closely with data protection legislation, for example, questions such as 'What can I share with the public?' and 'What am I allowed to share?'. To some extent this may be because of a lack of knowledge about how to handle these situations as this is highlighted as a barrier for internal knowledge sharing as well. Tackling poor public perceptions and their understanding of the police role as well as engaging them in collaborative ventures is also clearly an issue across the respondents. The wide range of methodologies used is clearly an attempt to be able to help address these issues

As with the previous section there appears to be a lack of confidence about the current data protection legislations and what can be shared with the public in order to gain their help in reducing criminal activity.

The ranking of the issues highlighted in the pilot study are very similar to the ranking found in the interviews.

The following bar chart again provides an overview of the ranking (based on mean values) for all the barriers for knowledge sharing with the public.

Table 4.2.24 Barriers to knowledge sharing (using mean values)



Findings: Knowledge sharing with forces from other countries and / or international agencies

Background

- 117 people indicated they had experience of knowledge sharing with forces from other countries and 87% indicated that their forces shared this knowledge effectively or better than effectively
- 73 said they had experience of sharing with international agencies, and 88% indicated that their forces shared this knowledge effectively or better than effectively

i. Types of Knowledge shared: Respondents were asked to identify which types of knowledge they had shared with forces from other countries and / or international

agencies. The following table highlights which types of knowledge were most frequently shared across those who responded to the questions.

Table 4.2.25 Top 5 types of knowledge shared

TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED	FREQUENCY OF TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE SHARED %
1. Information on wanted criminals	48
2. Advice, experience and best practice	48
3. Data on criminal activities or security issues	43
4. Operational data e.g. public order activities	40
5. Polices organisation and working methods	40

The spread and frequency of the findings suggest that people with experience in this field may well be working in specific areas and their knowledge sharing activities are therefore limited to of the areas that they are working in.

It is good to note that alongside sharing criminal knowledge some respondents there area are also respondents involved in sharing good practice and ways of working. (Please note: The revised version of the questionnaire now includes an assessment of effectiveness).

ii. Methods of knowledge sharing: Respondents were asked to identify which methods they used to share knowledge with forces from other countries and / or international agencies, and how effective these methods are.

Of those who responded the following methods were:

Table 4.2.26 Top 6 most frequently used methods for knowledge sharing

METHODS FOR SHARING KNOWLEDGE	USE THIS %	RATED AS EFFECTIVE AND ABOVE %
1. Telephone	48	82 (49)
2. Email	47	98 (60)
1. Cross-force group meetings	44	92 (60)
2. Exchange visits	43	95(62)
3. Attending workshops seminars or conferences	42	98 (66)
4. Printed material, e.g. brochures, reports	37	86(51)

(Figures in brackets represent the % responses stating the issues is 'very' or 'highly' effective)

It is clear that the police responding to this survey use a variety of methods to share knowledge with colleagues from international forces and agencies; they are all considered pretty effective. The most effective methods cited above involve direct contact with people and it is possible that these meetings, visits and workshops will enable contacts to be made which then increases the effectiveness of the phone as a method of sharing knowledge with these contacts.

Again, the personal touch, where it can be used, tends to be the most favoured approach; again, given stated levels of competence in one to one meetings, this may be a priority for further explorations personal development activity.

iii. Barriers to knowledge sharing:

Table 4.2.27 Top 6 barriers to knowledge sharing

BARRIERS TO KNOWLEDGE SHARING	RATED AS SOMETIMES, OFTEN AND ALWAYS A BARRIER %
3. Bureaucratic / complicated processes / excessive paperwork	75 (34)
4. Different legal systems	66(23)
5. Managing sensitive information	63 (23)
6. Incompatible systems and processes	60(19)
7. Different languages	59 (18)
8. Lack of internal resources / time	56 (18)

(Figures in brackets represent the % responses stating the issues is 'often' or 'always' a barrier)

Not surprisingly, one of the key barriers to knowledge sharing between forces in other countries and international agencies is caused by bureaucratic complicated processes, often devised to try to manage incompatible systems.

Another frequently cited barrier is caused by the need to work and manage different legal systems when sharing knowledge between countries. This can manifest itself in a number of ways, not least when a crime in one country is not a crime in another.

These barriers are faced by many cross-border centres who work collaboratively to develop ways to manage this and to minimise the impact.

Interestingly, only 59% identified different languages as a barrier, whereas, language was the most frequently cited barrier in the interviews.

Illustrative summary and recommendations

The summary and recommendations below are based on the example report above and is intended to be illustrative.

- It is clearly concerning that when many of the current key methods of knowledge sharing rely on reliable and accessible technology, many respondents highlight the lack of access to reliable technology as a barrier to effective knowledge sharing. Our findings suggest that whilst this problem may be linked to lack of resource, in some cases the problem may be exacerbated by ineffective working practices resulting in poor management of available resources.
- In addition, the results highlight a number of occasions when problems have been raised about ineffective or poor working practices, both in relation to internal and external knowledge sharing.
- We would recommend a systemic and systematic review of procedures that support knowledge sharing activities as a priority for action
- Recognising from research by the wider COMPOSITE programme that different types of knowledge require different capabilities, and based on the results above, we would recommend that you focus the review on procedures relating to either knowledge sharing of operational information or knowledge sharing about legislation and other legal requirements.
- We would also recommend that there is a second focus to the review, namely:
 - How can available technology help deliver the outcome required, and
 - How can available technology be better managed to ensure it remains available and accessible.

4.2.5 Revised questionnaire

The revised questionnaire is shown on the following pages



Knowledge Sharing Diagnostic Tool
**Effectiveness of Knowledge Sharing in Police
Organisations – Diagnostic Instrument**

EKSPO-DI

**Work Package 3: Knowledge Sharing Capabilities and
Best Practices in Police Organisations**

University of Sheffield, UK

INTRODUCTION

The EKSPD-DI (Effectiveness of Knowledge Sharing in Police Organisations – Diagnostic Instrument) is designed to provide police forces, and business units within forces, with a way of assessing how effective the force is at sharing important knowledge.

Alongside an assessment of knowledge sharing practice more generally, the tool also provides the opportunity for an assessment of knowledge sharing on four dimensions:

- Internally within the force
- With other forces within the same country
- With the public
- With other forces internationally and with international policing agencies

Your answers to these questions will allow your force to identify:

- Areas where knowledge sharing is working well
- Areas where knowledge sharing needs to improve to ensure strategic and operational effectiveness
- Key barriers that are affecting knowledge sharing

INSTRUCTIONS

You have been asked to complete the questionnaire because you are a member of (insert force name or sub unit within the force). Please complete all the answers to the best of your ability.

Please complete based on your recent experience, i.e. within the last two years.

Where the table contains numbers please circle the relevant number. Where the questionnaire contains boxes please tick the relevant box, following the instructions provided in each question.

MODULE A: QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU

Responses to this questionnaire are anonymous. If you are concerned that a particular question in this section may result in you being identified then please leave the question blank.

1	Name of force			
2	Subregion / district			
3	Department			
4	Job Title			
5	Gender	Male	1	Female
6	Tenure (in years)			
7	Police Officer Rank	Chief officer Group, e.g. Chief Constable, Deputy Chief Constable		1
		Senior level, e.g. Chief Superintendent, Superintendent		2
		Supervisory level, e.g. Inspector, Sergeant		3
		Front line / Operational level, e.g. Police Constable, Warden		4
		Police staff / civilian		5

MODULE B: KNOWLEDGE SHARING WITHIN YOUR FORCE

The following questions focus on your experience of knowledge sharing within your force and identify barriers which might inhibit effective knowledge sharing.

PLEASE NOTE: by 'Effective' or 'Effectively', we mean how successful it is in producing a desired or intended outcome

1. In your experience how effectively does knowledge sharing take place...?

	Not at all Effectively	Not very Effectively	Effectively	Very Effectively	Highly Effectively
a) Within your own team	1	2	3	4	5
b) Between your team and other teams critical to your work	1	2	3	4	5
c) Between different functions / departments	1	2	3	4	5
d) Between different ranks within the force	1	2	3	4	5
e) Between different districts or regions within the organisation	1	2	3	4	5
f) Between the senior management within your force	1	2	3	4	5

2. How effectively does your force share the following types of knowledge

	Not at all effective	Not very effective	Effective	Very effective	Highly effective	Don't Know
g) Intelligence about criminal activity	1	2	3	4	5	0
h) Operational knowledge related to ongoing police activity	1	2	3	4	5	0
i) Advice, experiences and best practice	1	2	3	4	5	0
j) Legislation and other legal requirements	1	2	3	4	5	0
k) Force Strategy	1	2	3	4	5	0
l) Organisational information e.g. procedures, admin, and systems	1	2	3	4	5	0
m) Force Performance	1	2	3	4	5	0
n) Future priorities	1	2	3	4	5	0
o) Training	1	2	3	4	5	0
p) Other, please state	1	2	3	4	5	0

3. How competent do you feel in using the following methods of knowledge sharing?

	Do not use	Slightly competent, e.g. some awareness of how to use	Moderately competent, e.g. some basic skills	Very competent, e.g. can use to a skilled standard	Extremely competent, e.g. could train others
a) Computers	1	2	3	4	5
b) Smart phones	1	2	3	4	5
c) Email	1	2	3	4	5
d) Intranet	1	2	3	4	5
e) Internet	1	2	3	4	5
f) Meetings (groups)	1	2	3	4	5
g) Face to face briefings	1	2	3	4	5
h) Briefings via technology e.g. intranet, Skype	1	2	3	4	5
i) One to one meetings	1	2	3	4	5
j) Telephone	1	2	3	4	5
k) Force Radio	1	2	3	4	5
l) Social media e.g. Facebook	1	2	3	4	5
m) Databases and systems	1	2	3	4	5
n) Training and related activity	1	2	3	4	5
o) Paper based systems	1	2	3	4	5
p) Other, please state _____	1	2	3	4	5

If you have any comments relating to training in the methods above please include them in the box below

4. In your experience, please indicate the extent to which any of the following situations have stopped the effective sharing of knowledge within your force.

	Never a barrier	Rarely a barrier	Sometimes a barrier	Often a barrier	Always a barrier
a) Inability to deal with high volumes of information	1	2	3	4	5
b) Ineffective or inaccessible technology	1	2	3	4	5
c) Data protection legislation / managing sensitive information, which restricts what information can be shared	1	2	3	4	5
d) Working practices that do not encourage knowledge sharing	1	2	3	4	5
e) Lack of staff resource/ time	1	2	3	4	5
f) Lack of facilities and equipment	1	2	3	4	5
g) Lack of motivation to share	1	2	3	4	5
h) Lack of access to relevant information	1	2	3	4	5
i) Organisational politics	1	2	3	4	5
j) Lack of skills and experience by police personnel	1	2	3	4	5
k) Leadership shortcomings	1	2	3	4	5
l) Other, please state _____	1	2	3	4	5

STRATEGIES AND PROCESSES TO SUPPORT KNOWLEDGE SHARING

The following questions are designed to establish what strategies and processes support knowledge sharing in your force.

PLEASE NOTE:; by 'strategy', we mean a stated policy or formal document which explains how the force will share and manage knowledge and what the aims of sharing knowledge are for your force.

5. If you have a force strategy that explains how to go about sharing knowledge with the following groups, please state how effective you think the strategy is?

	Not aware / No strategy	Not at all Effective	Not very Effective	Effective	Very Effective	Highly effective
a) Internally, between different functions	0	1	2	3	4	5
b) With other forces in the same country	0	1	2	3	4	5
c) With the public	0	1	2	3	4	5
d) With forces or agencies from other countries	0	1	2	3	4	5

6. Please state the extent to which you agree / disagree with the following statements

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
a) Important knowledge is always accessible when needed to solve police problems	1	2	3	4	5
b) This force carefully collects and documents key information	1	2	3	4	5
c) This force has formal procedures for recording solutions to problems or best practice	1	2	3	4	5
d) This force has formal knowledge management systems	1	2	3	4	5
e) This force stores key information in manuals or a central documentation centre	1	2	3	4	5
f) This force has reference systems which make it quick and easy to obtain stored information	1	2	3	4	5
g) The electronic systems designed to store and share knowledge are easy to use	1	2	3	4	5
h) This force has specific procedures regarding how to share knowledge	1	2	3	4	5

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

This section asks about your experience of knowledge sharing between your organisation and other stakeholders.

Please note, by 'stakeholders', we mean external organisations or groups with whom it might be necessary for your force to share knowledge, for example those who rely on information from your force or who can be affected by the force's actions

7. In your experience, how effectively does knowledge sharing take place with these stakeholders?

	No contact	Not at all Effectively	Not very Effectively	Effectively	Very Effectively	Highly Effectively
a) Local government	0	1	2	3	4	5
b) National government	0	1	2	3	4	5
c) Other government	0	1	2	3	4	5
d) Judicial bodies	0	1	2	3	4	5
e) Health service	0	1	2	3	4	5
f) Fire service	0	1	2	3	4	5
g) Social services	0	1	2	3	4	5
h) Other partner organisations	0	1	2	3	4	5

MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP WITHIN YOUR FORCE

The following questions are designed to establish the extent to which management and leadership impacts upon knowledge sharing

Engagement

8. From your experience, please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about your force

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
a) This force takes into account employees' opinions when making changes	1	2	3	4	5
b) Top management listen to the opinions of employees from all levels when developing its strategy	1	2	3	4	5
c) This force takes into account and reflects employees' views in policy statements	1	2	3	4	5
d) This force ensures all employees are aware of the aims of the organisation	1	2	3	4	5
e) Employees are kept informed of decisions by senior management	1	2	3	4	5

Organisational flexibility

9. From your experience, please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
a) New ideas are readily accepted here	1	2	3	4	5
b) This police force is quick to respond when changes need to be made	1	2	3	4	5
c) Management here are quick to spot the need to do things differently	1	2	3	4	5
d) This police force is very flexible; it can quickly change procedures to meet new conditions and solve problems as they arise	1	2	3	4	5
e) Assistance in developing new ideas is readily available	1	2	3	4	5
f) People in this police force are always searching for new ways of looking at problems	1	2	3	4	5
g) This force easily makes changes based on new knowledge	1	2	3	4	5
h) This force adopts new processes quickly	1	2	3	4	5
i) Our police personnel take on board new ideas easily	1	2	3	4	5
j) This force is good at managing changes to the way it works	1	2	3	4	5

Encouragement to share

10. From your experience, please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements

Within my force...	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
<i>General encouragement to share</i>					
a) Police personnel are encouraged to share knowledge with everybody in the organisation	1	2	3	4	5
b) Police personnel are encouraged to share knowledge with close colleagues	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Line manager support for knowledge sharing</i>					
c) My line manager actively encourages me to share knowledge with colleagues in my team	1	2	3	4	5
d) My line manager actively encourages me to share knowledge with other teams	1	2	3	4	5
e) I am encouraged to pass on knowledge in team meetings, briefings and in individual meetings with my line manager	1	2	3	4	5
f) Knowledge sharing is part of my objectives set by my line manager	1	2	3	4	5
g) I am encouraged to pass on knowledge via informal conversations with my line manager	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Senior management support for knowledge sharing</i>					
h) Senior management actively ensure that key knowledge is shared throughout the force					
i) Senior managers actively encourage knowledge sharing <u>within</u> teams	1	2	3	4	5
j) Senior managers actively encourage knowledge sharing <u>between</u> teams	1	2	3	4	5

Specific actions to promote knowledge sharing

11. From your experience, please state the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements

Within my force...	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
a) Knowledge sharing is built into my job description / it is a compulsory part of my job	1	2	3	4	5
b) My force has a good reward system for sharing knowledge	1	2	3	4	5
c) My force has an effective mentoring scheme where officers who are older in service mentor new recruits and pass on knowledge to them	1	2	3	4	5
d) My force has an effective meeting / briefing structure through which knowledge is passed from the bottom up and the top down	1	2	3	4	5

MODULE C: KNOWLEDGE SHARING WITH OTHER FORCES IN THE SAME COUNTRY

The following questions focus on your experience of knowledge sharing with other forces in the same country and identify barriers which might inhibit effective knowledge sharing with these forces.

1. Have you had experience of sharing knowledge with other forces?

No	0	If no, please move to section G
Yes	1	If yes, please continue to answer the questions in this section

2. In your experience how effectively does knowledge sharing take place...?

	Not at all Effectively	Not very Effectively	Effectively	Very Effectively	Highly Effectively
a) Between your force and other forces you most frequently work with	1	2	3	4	5

3. How effectively does your force share the following types of knowledge with other forces in the same country

	Not at all effective	Not very effective	Effective	Very effective	Highly effective	Do not Know
a) Intelligence and related information on cases which require communication between two or more forces	1	2	3	4	5	0
b) Operational information regarding police operations e.g. tactics, plans, procedures, specific work practices, projects and schemes of work	1	2	3	4	5	0
c) Preventative information and awareness which need to be shared between e.g. matters of safety, security or risk	1	2	3	4	5	0
d) Crime trends and statistics	1	2	3	4	5	0
e) Advice, experiences and best practice	1	2	3	4	5	0
f) Legislation and policy	1	2	3	4	5	0
g) Organisational information, including human resources, staffing, force structures and finances	1	2	3	4	5	0
h) Court orders and requests for information in order to process cases	1	2	3	4	5	0
i) Contextual information on local area	1	2	3	4	5	0
j) Other, please state _____	1	2	3	4	5	0

4. How effectively do the following methods support knowledge sharing with other forces?

	Not at all Effectively	Not very Effectively	Effectively	Very Effectively	Highly effectively	Do not know
a) Telephone	1	2	3	4	5	0
b) Meetings	1	2	3	4	5	0
c) Email	1	2	3	4	5	0
d) Databases and electronic systems, e.g. intranet	1	2	3	4	5	0
e) Written documents	1	2	3	4	5	0
f) Internet and online forums	1	2	3	4	5	0
g) Force Radio	1	2	3	4	5	0
h) Fax	1	2	3	4	5	0
i) Joint force training sessions	1	2	3	4	5	0
j) Co-location of forces via shared facilities	1	2	3	4	5	0
k) Social media e.g. Facebook, Twitter	1	2	3	4	5	0
l) Other, please state	1	2	3	4	5	0

5. In your experience, please indicate the extent to which any of the following situations have stopped the effective sharing of knowledge within other forces?

	Never a barrier	Rarely a barrier	Sometimes a barrier	Often a barrier	Always a barrier
a) Bureaucratic processes, e.g. poor or slow processes, and excessive paperwork	1	2	3	4	5
b) It is not customary for forces to share information	1	2	3	4	5
c) Data protection legislation / managing sensitive information, which restricts what information can be shared	1	2	3	4	5
d) Lack of processes or strategy for sharing	1	2	3	4	5
e) Lack of staff resources / time	1	2	3	4	5
f) Incompatible systems between forces					
g) Lack of motivation to share	1	2	3	4	5

5. Cont.. In your experience, please indicate the extent to which any of the following situations have stopped the effective sharing of knowledge within other forces?

	Never a barrier	Rarely a barrier	Sometimes a barrier	Often a barrier	Always a barrier
h) Organisational differences e.g. structure and size	1	2	3	4	5
i) Organisational politics	1	2	3	4	5
j) Lack of skills and experience of those involved in knowledge sharing	1	2	3	4	5
k) Other, please state _____	1	2	3	4	5

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

If you have any additional comments regarding knowledge sharing please add them here.

MODULE D: KNOWLEDGE SHARING WITH THE PUBLIC

The following questions focus on your experience of knowledge sharing with the public and identify barriers which might inhibit effective knowledge sharing with the public.

1. Have you had experience of sharing knowledge with the public?

No	0	IF NO, please move to section H
Yes	1	IF YES, please continue to answer the questions in this section

2. In your experience how effectively does knowledge sharing take place...?

	Not at all Effectively	Not very Effectively	Effectively	Very Effectively	Highly Effectively
a) Between your force and members of the public	1	2	3	4	5

3. How effectively does your force share the following types of knowledge with other forces in the same country

	Not at all effective	Not very effective	Effective	Very effective	Highly effective	Do not Know
a) Information on specific criminal investigations, e.g. wanted individuals	1	2	3	4	5	0
b) Crime prevention information	1	2	3	4	5	0
c) General information about the local area, e.g. Traffic reports	1	2	3	4	5	0
d) Laws and regulations	1	2	3	4	5	0
e) General organisational information about the police	1	2	3	4	5	0
f) Information on ongoing police initiatives	1	2	3	4	5	0
g) The responsibilities of the police	1	2	3	4	5	0
h) Public complaints	1	2	3	4	5	0
i) Procedures for the public to follow, e.g. in contacting the police	1	2	3	4	5	0
j) Police performance	1	2	3	4	5	0
k) Other, please state -----	1	2	3	4	5	0

4. How effectively do the following methods support knowledge sharing with the public?

	Not at all Effectively	Not very Effectively	Effectively	Very Effectively	Highly effectively	Do not know
a) Printed material (e.g. letters, flyers, brochures)	1	2	3	4	5	0
b) Social media (e.g. Facebook and Twitter)	1	2	3	4	5	0
c) Email	1	2	3	4	5	0
d) Telephone	1	2	3	4	5	0
e) Press (Newspapers)	1	2	3	4	5	0
f) TV	1	2	3	4	5	0
g) Radio	1	2	3	4	5	0
h) Police website / internet	1	2	3	4	5	0
i) Meetings with key people within the community	1	2	3	4	5	0
j) Public meetings or events held by the police	1	2	3	4	5	0
k) Attending public meetings arranged by others	1	2	3	4	5	0
l) Face to face discussions with members of the public	1	2	3	4	5	0
m) Hosting or making visits to civilian groups	1	2	3	4	5	0
n) Other, please state	1	2	3	4	5	0

5. In your experience, please indicate the extent to which any of the following situations have stopped the effective sharing of knowledge within the public?

	Never a barrier	Rarely a barrier	Sometimes a barrier	Often a barrier	Always a barrier
a) Data protection legislation	1	2	3	4	5
b) Managing sensitive information	1	2	3	4	5
c) Lack of staff resources / time	1	2	3	4	5
d) Lack of facilities and equipment	1	2	3	4	5
e) Lack of public interest	1	2	3	4	5
f) Difficulty of targeting the right audience	1	2	3	4	5
g) Complex procedures for communicating with the public	1	2	3	4	5

5. Cont.. In your experience, please indicate the extent to which any of the following situations have stopped the effective sharing of knowledge within the public?

	Never a barrier	Rarely a barrier	Sometimes a barrier	Often a barrier	Always a barrier
a) Lack of skills and experience of police officers	1	2	3	4	5
b) Lack of understanding by the public	1	2	3	4	5
c) Ineffective technology	1	2	3	4	5
d) Negative public perception of the Police	1	2	3	4	5
e) Other, please state _____	1	2	3	4	5

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

If you have any additional comments regarding knowledge sharing please add them here.

MODEULE E: KNOWLEDGE SHARING WITH FORCES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND / OR INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

The following questions focus on your experience of knowledge sharing with forces from other countries and / or international agencies and identify barriers which might inhibit effective knowledge sharing with these organisations.

PLEASE NOTE: by 'International agencies' we mean external organisations or groups with whom it might be necessary for you to share knowledge on an international basis.

1. Have you had experience of sharing knowledge with forces in other countries or international agencies?

	Yes	No
a) With police forces in other countries	1	0
b) With international agencies	1	0

IF YES, to either a or b above, please continue to answer the questions in this section

IF NO to both a and b above, please move to the additional comments section

2. In your experience how effectively does knowledge sharing take place...?

	Not at all Effectively	Not very Effectively	Effectively	Very Effectively	Highly Effectively
a) Between your force and forces in other countries that you most frequently work with	1	2	3	4	5
b) Between your force and international agencies	1	2	3	4	5

3. How effectively does your force share the following types of knowledge with forces from other countries or international police agencies / bodies in the last 2 years?

	Not at all effective	Not very effective	Effective	Very effective	Highly effective	Do not Know
a) Evidence	1	2	3	4	5	0
b) Information on wanted criminals	1	2	3	4	5	0
c) Data on criminal activities or security issues	1	2	3	4	5	0
d) Operational data (e.g. public order activities, traffic)	1	2	3	4	5	0
e) Advice, experience and best practice	1	2	3	4	5	0
f) Police organization and working methods	1	2	3	4	5	0
g) Legislation and regulation in different countries	1	2	3	4	5	0
h) Research, e.g. latest studies, new project findings	1	2	3	4	5	0

3. Cont.. How effectively does your force share the following types of knowledge with forces from other countries or international police agencies / bodies?

	Not at all effective	Not very effective	Effective	Very effective	Highly effective	Do not know
i) Technology changes	1	2	3	4	5	0
j) Political information	1	2	3	4	5	0
k) Police performance	1	2	3	4	5	0
l) Other, please state _____	1	2	3	4	5	0

4. How effectively do the following methods support knowledge sharing with forces from other countries or international police agencies / bodies in the last 2 years

	Not at all Effectively	Not very Effectively	Effectively	Very Effectively	Highly effectively	Do not know
a) Telephone	1	2	3	4	5	0
b) Cross-force group meetings	1	2	3	4	5	0
c) Attending workshops, seminars or conferences	1	2	3	4	5	0
d) Co-located working space	1	2	3	4	5	0
e) Email	1	2	3	4	5	0
f) Internet	1	2	3	4	5	0
g) Exchange visits	1	2	3	4	5	0
h) Postal mail	1	2	3	4	5	0
i) International databases	1	2	3	4	5	0
j) Printed material (e.g. brochures, reports)	1	2	3	4	5	0
k) Other, please state _____	1	2	3	4	5	0

5. In your experience, please indicate the extent to which any of the following situations have stopped the effective sharing of knowledge with forces in other countries and / or international agencies?

	Never a barrier	Rarely a barrier	Sometimes a barrier	Often a barrier	Always a barrier
a) Different languages	1	2	3	4	5
b) Different legal systems	1	2	3	4	5
c) Incompatible systems and processes	1	2	3	4	5
d) Bureaucratic/ complicated processes / excessive paperwork	1	2	3	4	5
e) Lack of internal resources	1	2	3	4	5
f) Data protection legislation	1	2	3	4	5
g) Managing sensitive information	1	2	3	4	5
h) Lack of motivation by police personnel	1	2	3	4	5
i) Lack of skills by police personnel	1	2	3	4	5
j) Technology shortcomings	1	2	3	4	5
k) Not knowing who to talk to in other forces	1	2	3	4	5
l) Lack of trust between forces	1	2	3	4	5
m) Working relationship between forces	1	2	3	4	5
n) Other, please state _____	1	2	3	4	5

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

If you have any additional comments regarding knowledge sharing please add them here.

Thank you for your help in completing this questionnaire.

Please return your completed questionnaire to (insert name / address).

4.2.6 Development of the EKSP0-DI manual

The manual is written to support the use of the assessment questionnaire.

It is designed to:

- Help forces understand the purpose of the tool,
- Provide guidance on how and when to use the tool,
- Provide guidance on how to carry out a simple analyse of the results, and how to interpret the findings
- Provide recommendations about how to improve areas of weakness, based on best practice, which is informed by our research findings and research findings from all other completed COMPOSITE work activity.

It currently provides guidance on how to conduct a self- assessment exercise and then carry out a simple analysis of the results.

We suggest that where forces have access to analytical services, they make use of these services to provide a more detailed analysis of the results. This will allow forces to take a more focused and targeted approach to business development activity.

The manual can be found in a stand-alone report, delivered alongside this report.

4.3 Recommendations / Lessons learnt

Process of developing of the tool

The virtual team (a member from each country) was invaluable in supporting the design of the pilot questionnaire. It allowed the countries to help shape the questionnaire to make it suitable for their use, which in turn, produced a better pilot questionnaire. It ensured that country teams were aware of the questionnaire, its purpose and its content before it was sent out to them to pilot. We believe that this helped increased their commitment to be involved in the pilot, despite concerns, and to be involved in shaping the tool.

It is clear that some countries need much more time than others to allow them to gain commitment from their forces to be involved, because of the internal country protocols required to involve forces in their research. This needs to be taken account of at an early stage in future work. We took a decision at times not to overload country teams and spread the work requirements as far as possible, however, on occasions this may have led to a 'lack of sufficient notice' which inadvertently made thing harder for the country teams.

EKSPO-DI development

It is very difficult to ensure that language used in an instrument such as this is truly universal and in some cases it is a choice between simplification and losing the meaning. There is also the possibility of a slight change of emphasis when the questionnaire is translated in the different languages. We are not aware that this happened to any great extent and have felt that by involving the teams we have done a great deal to minimise this as far as possible.

The value of EKSPO-DI

Whilst effective knowledge sharing is fundamental to effective policing we recognise that there are obviously cultural and structural differences in the way that countries and forces within them manage knowledge sharing. Clearly, these differences will impact on the value placed by each country on the use of a 'diagnostic' instrument to evaluate the effectiveness of their knowledge sharing capability. However, we feel this report highlights the importance and complexity of knowledge sharing across all 10 countries and that most, if not all police organisations have aspects of knowledge sharing that they need to address to achieve their aims. This suggests, therefore, that there is a need for a method by which organisations can carry out a systematic self -assessment of capability in order to improve business effectiveness and we believe that the EKSPO-DI will meet this need.

What next for the EKSPO-DI

There is now an opportunity, through later work package activity (WP 10), to develop the EKSPO-DI by producing a package which will enable an automated analysis of the data generating more detailed results, based on the organisations requirement.

SECTION 5

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING KNOWLEDGE SHARING EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICE ORGANISATIONS

Work Package 3 set out to develop a more complete picture of the knowledge sharing effectiveness of police organisations. The specific objectives of this project were to:

1. Develop a framework for understanding knowledge sharing practices within and between police organisations across Europe.
2. Assess individual and organisational barriers and enablers to knowledge sharing.
3. Develop a diagnostic tool to assess the knowledge sharing capabilities of an organisation.

A substantive body of research and development work has been undertaken by the COMPOSITE consortium members to fulfil these objectives. First, a systematic literature review was conducted to identify the existing state of knowledge regarding the topic of knowledge sharing in police organisations (Allen & Birdi, 2011). This highlighted the lack of contextual understanding in this area and the predominant focus on knowledge sharing within forces. Consequently, we conducted an extensive study involving 152 interviews with officers from 17 police organisations in the ten consortium countries (see Section 2). The intention here was to expand the focus to external knowledge sharing with key stakeholders (other forces in the same country, the public and across international borders) as well as more in-depth internal considerations. The topics investigated included the types of knowledge shared, the most and least effective methods of knowledge sharing and barriers and facilitators to these information sharing processes. Analyses highlighted the variety of inputs into effective knowledge sharing and also supported the notion that certain factors were more important than others for particular domains of knowledge sharing. Although a rich set of data were generated by these interviews, there was a deficit around international knowledge sharing since many police participants reported they were not involved in such activities. Our third study therefore involved consortium members conducting ten case studies of knowledge sharing either directly between forces in different countries or through international agencies (see Section 3). This again resulted in significant insights into the challenges facing cross-border knowledge sharing activities. Finally, in Section 4, we presented the development of a questionnaire tool based on our research which aims to help police organisations benchmark their perceived knowledge sharing effectiveness with a variety

of stakeholders and identify major barriers to enhancing effectiveness. The questionnaire was piloted by the consortium countries with an impressive 481 police members filling it in. This enabled testing of scales and indications for modification for the final version presented in this report. The manual for the tool contains detailed descriptions of the instrument, instructions for its use and analysis and recommendations for overcoming particular types of barriers based on the experiences and views of police participants (see WP3 Deliverable 3.4).

Sections 2, 3 and 4 each contained a set of conclusions arising from the research activity described within them. The purpose of the following discussion is to draw together the different strands of research to present an integrative perspective on the research questions addressed by Work Package 3 and offer an overall theoretical framework of influences on the knowledge sharing effectiveness of police organisations.

5.1. Effectiveness of knowledge sharing in different domains

Research Question 1: How effective are police organisations at sharing knowledge both internally and with external bodies (other forces in the same country, with forces in other countries / international agencies and the public)?

This research question can be answered by looking at the data from two of the studies we conducted. The first source is from the interviews with 152 police members from across the ten consortium countries (see Section 1). Within the interviews, participants were asked to rate the effectiveness of their police organisations' knowledge sharing along the four domains (a five-point response scale was used from 1 = Not at all to 5 = A very great extent). The mean scores from these ratings indicated that internal knowledge sharing was classed as reasonably effective (mean = 3.43) and was very similar to the ratings for sharing knowledge with other forces in the same country (mean = 3.44). Interestingly, when it came to sharing information with the public, many interviewees said they did not engage this type of activity yet for those who did, the effectiveness rating was the highest out of the four domains (mean = 3.54). A good proportion of respondents (23%) also said they did not engage in sharing knowledge internationally (either with forces in other countries or with

international agencies such as INTERPOL) but those who did demonstrated the lowest rating score out of the four domains (mean = 3.11), which was still reasonable. Although we were quite careful in stipulating the sampling requirements for forces in the interview study, there were still only 15 interviews per country and some issues of generalisability of the findings could be made.

The second source of data for addressing this research question therefore came from the piloting of the knowledge sharing diagnostic tool (EKSPD-DI) which we describe in Section 4. We took the opportunity with this questionnaire to ask more detailed questions around internal knowledge sharing and also altered our response scale to make it easier to gauge effectiveness ratings (the scale was now represented by 1 = Not at all effective to 3 = Effective to 5 = Highly effective). An even more substantive sample of 481 police organisation members drawn from the consortium countries (excluding France) completed the survey and provided some intriguing insights.

We broke down within-force knowledge sharing along five dimensions. Knowledge sharing within teams was rated as most effectively done (mean = 3.56), followed a way behind by sharing between teams (mean = 3.05) and between functions (mean = 3.03). Although still very near the 'Effective' rating, knowledge sharing between ranks (mean = 2.8) and between senior management (mean = 2.9) was relatively rated a little lower. Given that our statistical analyses in Section 2.8 demonstrated that better knowledge sharing between the ranks (as assessed by our measure of employee involvement) was significantly related to better police organisations' ability to adapt to change, this could be an area to focus on improving in the future.

We averaged the scores across the five internal dimensions described above to provide an overall mean score of 3.07 for internal knowledge sharing. With this greater sample, internal knowledge sharing effectiveness was now rated higher than the other three domains we asked participants to rate i.e. interacting with other forces (mean = 2.79), with the public (mean = 2.82) and internationally with forces in other countries or international agencies (mean = 2.65). The cross-border dimension again came out the lowest rated.

Overall, our police organisations felt on average they were effective, rather than outstanding, at internal knowledge sharing and slightly weaker in the other areas. Police

organisations do indeed therefore seem to be stronger in certain domains of knowledge sharing compared to others. International knowledge sharing came out as relatively lower due a range of factors such as the challenges of working in different languages, overcoming procedural and legal barriers and lack of personal contacts. However, the 10 international case studies the consortium described in Section 3 were designed to include examples of best practice in promoting cross-border collaborations (see Appendices also for the full case studies). For example, the international agency CEPOL facilitates knowledge sharing via the creation of networks between police officers across borders. This is via educational training courses and an exchange programme, where people meet to exchanging experiences, best practices, procedural regulations, laws and information about policing in their country, and to make contacts in other countries. The case study from the Netherlands teams describes how successful information sharing was encouraged through setting up a Joint Investigation Team between Dutch and Belgian Police, resulting in the arrest of criminals committing a number of vehicle crimes across the Netherlands and Belgian border. Readers are advised to look at the case studies in the appendices for more detailed understanding of how a number of challenges to international knowledge sharing have been overcome. Later in this chapter we also summarise a number of our major practical recommendations for enhancing knowledge sharing effectiveness across the different domains.

It should be noted that due to the concerns of several of the police forces taking part in the piloting of the diagnostic tool that information about their own force should not be made publicly available, we are unable to present any cross-country comparison findings on effectiveness from the EKSPD-DI pilot.

5.2. Types of knowledge shared by police organisations

Research Question 2: What different types of knowledge are most commonly shared in the above four domains?

We discussed in the Introduction (Section 1) how our WP3 systematic literature review showed that research on knowledge sharing in policing contexts had been dominated by a focus on criminal intelligence (Allen & Birdi, 2011). However, within the policing context, potentially important types of knowledge to share go beyond criminal intelligence to aspects such as new policies and procedures, strategies, technology use, changes in legislation, major social events, good practices and organisational performance. Neglect of these other aspects can undermine performance so it is vital to understand what the most important types of knowledge are for police organisations. We decided to take an open-ended approach to this in our first interview study and just ask respondents to tell us the most important types of knowledge they shared in the four domains (see Section 2). Table 5.2.1 shows an integration of the answers into what we classified as eight categories across the four domains, with more specific examples under each heading.

Of course, the most common type of knowledge shared was with regards to intelligence and related operational information. This included information on criminal activities, the conducting of police operations to deal with specific issues and reporting to the public how the police were dealing with crimes. The second category could be classed as information on the workings of the police and included sharing strategic priorities within the organisation, clarifying police responsibilities with the public to exchanging descriptions of organisational structure and governance with other forces.

Table 5.2.1. Overall summary of the different types of knowledge shared by police organisations.

	Internal	Other forces in same country	Public	Internationally
1. INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED OPERATIONAL INFORMATION				
• Intelligence and relevant information	X	X		X
• Information held on databases	X			
• Operational information	X	X	X	
• Police activities on crimes			X	
• Court orders and requests for info		X		
2. INFORMATION ON THE WORKINGS OF THE POLICE				
• Organisational information	X	X	X	X
• Governance	X			X
• Police responsibilities			X	
• Procedures for the public to follow			X	
• Future priorities	X			
3. POLICE PERFORMANCE-RELATED INFORMATION				
• Force Performance related information	X			
• Crime trends and statistics		X	X	
• Public complaints			X	
• Public Relations information				X
4. CRIME PREVENTION INFORMATION				
• Preventative information and awareness		X		
• Crime prevention information			X	

5. LEGISLATION AND POLICY		X	X	X
6. INFORMATION ABOUT THE REGION				
• Contextual information on the area		X	X	
• Local priorities for the area			X	
7. LEARNING				
• Sharing experience, advice, know-how, best practice	X	X		X
• Research				X
• Training	X			
• Changes in technology				X
8. RUMOURS				X

The third category was classified as police performance-related information. Outside the force, this could be seen as making the public and other forces aware of crime trends and statistics or receiving complaints from the public. Crime prevention information was fourth and raising awareness of legislation and policy with external stakeholders came in fifth. Information about the region such as traffic situations, demographic profiles or local priorities was sixth. Our seventh category was the important one of learning i.e. sharing experience, research, training and best practice within and between forces; interestingly, this was the only category where the public were not mentioned. Finally, sharing knowledge through rumours was rarely mentioned.

Analysis of the data gathered from piloting the diagnostic tool showed that internally, police participants felt the sharing of intelligence and operational information plus legislation issues were done the most effectively but that sharing strategic priorities and information on future directions was done somewhat less effectively. This does echo the earlier finding where information sharing hierarchically between ranks was rated as less effective than horizontal movement of knowledge between teams or functions.

5.3. Effectiveness of different methods of knowledge sharing used by police organisations

Research Question 3: How effective are different methods of knowledge sharing in the four domains?

One of the primary aims of Work Package 3 was to evaluate the quality of knowledge sharing practices so in the interview study described in Section 2, we asked participants to describe the three most effective and one least effective method of knowledge sharing in each of the four domains. Table 5.3.1 shows the different types of methods mentioned by participants and our grouping of them into a taxonomy of 13 categories. The '+' and '-' symbols in the table columns show whether the method was mentioned as one of the most or least effective methods. As can be seen, most methods were portrayed as having both pros and cons.

Our first conceptual grouping we categorised as personal interactions, which involved one-to-one discussions, meetings or briefings. The advantages here were seen as the directness of the methods and the opportunity to build up significant and trusting relationships. For example, local neighbourhood meetings with groups were reported as effective in terms of directly and regularly engaging with regions. Downsides were in terms of having the resources to do this sufficiently with the public or the difficulties of doing this with forces in other countries. Paper-based methods are next and cover the exchange of written documents by post or fax and the use of newsletters, brochures, flyers and posters to engage with the public. Advantages here included the existence of an audit trail when working with forces and the possibility to reach a wide audience in the public through the use of printed materials. Problems associated with these approaches covered the slowness of the mail system, and when it came to posters or brochures for the public, the cost and police officers' unawareness of their reach were significant issues.

Methods 3 through to 8 represent technology-mediated communication approaches. Telephones were beneficial in their speed and directness but there could be difficulties in tracking down the right person to talk to in other forces and also being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of calls from the public. However, according to the data from the EKSP0-DI pilot, the telephone was the most commonly used method of communicating with external

parties. Emails showed a similar pattern, with concomitant complaints of overload. Web-based methods included use of intranets and the internet/ the police's own websites. Speed and accessibility of these methods were seen as beneficial but lack of time and resources to update material were problematic. The use of social media such as Twitter or Facebook varied from country to country but was favoured for its immediacy and potential to access large parts of the population. For example, we reported on the Belgian police's use of Twitter to gather the public's help in locating missing persons. In the UK, Greater Manchester Police used Twitter during the 2011 riots to monitor and reassure the public. Some concerns were raised that older members of the population would feel excluded from this means of communication and that officers needed the appropriate training to use the media appropriately. Work Package 4 of COMPOSITE is specifically looking at emerging technology trends in policing and has focused on usage of social media so readers are recommended to seek out the WP4 outputs for more detail on this topic (e.g. Deneff, 2011). Videoconferencing was only mentioned by one participant and it was in a negative fashion with regards to international knowledge sharing due to the difficulty of getting hold of reliable technology. Police radio was classed as a positive method in communicating with other forces in the same country due to its speed and directness. Databases and online systems (e.g. the Schengen database was mentioned by French and Italian interviewees and FRONTEX Pulsar data statistics by a Macedonian participant) were seen as another useful electronic means, although drawbacks included difficulty of accessing the technology and relevant information. The EKSPD-DI data reported in Section 4 showed that overall police participants reported themselves as much less competent in using technological methods compared to the more traditional persona contact approaches.

The remaining methods constitute a mix of approaches. Group learning activities such as seminars, workshops or joint training initiatives were seen as a good forum for enabling people to meet, share links and start establishing networks (especially on the international front); however the time and resources required to set them up plus unclear responsibility for co-ordinating these between forces could be issues. International organisations such as CEPOL therefore have an important role to play in this regard. The co-location of forces was indicated as an effective method of knowledge sharing in Spain, with shared co-ordination rooms used by the Mossos d'Esquadra, the local Barcelona police force, and the emergency

services (e.g. fire brigade) who all work together in these rooms, allowing for the quick solving of coordination problems. Another important strategy is in terms of exchanges e.g. making visits to civilian institutions such as schools or hosting similar visits to police stations in order to make presentations on police-related issues. Exchanges were seen as particularly valuable for international collaborations since officers would be able to absorb cultural understanding as well as sharing explicit information. With regards to the international knowledge sharing, a small number of participants mentioned in a negative context the use of intermediary agencies due to the extra time and paperwork required by their involvement. Finally, predominantly with regards to the public domain, the media (press, TV, public radio) were seen as important vehicles for knowledge sharing. This included using both local and national media, as well as using prepared press releases and was felt to be useful as a means of reaching a wide audience. However, a number of interviewees felt the media had a desire for negative news stories and this could compromise the image of the police. A practical implication here was to train police officers in dealing with the media more effectively.

Table 5.3.1. The most and least effective methods of knowledge sharing mentioned by police interview participants.

METHOD OF KNOWLEDGE SHARING	Internal	Other forces in same country	Public	Internationally
1. PERSONAL INTERACTIONS				
• Face to face discussions	+ -		+ -	+ -
• Meetings	+	+ -	+ -	+ -
• Briefings	+ -			
• Police surgeries			-	
2. PAPER-BASED METHODS				
• Written documents, newsletters, posters	+ -	+ -	+ -	
• Post	+ -	-		+ -
• Fax		+ -		
3. TELEPHONE				
		+ -	+ -	+
4. EMAIL				
	+ -	+ -	+	+
5. WEB-BASED METHODS				
• Intranet	+ -			
• Internet / online forums	-	+ -	+ -	-
• Social media			+ -	
6. VIDEOCONFERENCING				
				-
7. RADIO				
		+		

8. DATABASES AND ONLINE SYSTEMS	+ -	+ -		+
9. GROUP LEARNING ACTIVITIES				
• Training and related activities, workshops, seminars	+ -	-		+ -
• Joint training sessions		+		
• Public events			+ -	
10. CO-LOCATION				
• Shared facilities		+		+
11. EXCHANGES				
• Hosting or making visits			+	+
12. INTERMEDIARY AGENCIES				
• Non-police intermediaries				-
• International policing agencies				-
13. MEDIA				
• Press, TV and Radio		-	+ -	

+ = Mentioned as one of the top 10 most effective methods of knowledge sharing

- = Mentioned as one of the least effective methods of knowledge sharing

The interview study in Section 2 also attempted to provide an overall perspective on preferred modes of communication in the participating police forces. Digenti (2000) provided a useful perspective in distinguishing methods along two dimensions: formality – informality and face-to-face – virtual. Based on Digenti’s (2000) questionnaire, the interviewees were therefore asked to rate the extent to which their police organisation utilised the following four modes of knowledge sharing with examples given underneath:

1. FORMAL FACE-TO-FACE METHODS

Examples: courses, seminars, workshops, training, briefings, de-briefings

2. FORMAL VIRTUAL METHODS

Examples: tele/video conferences, e-meetings, online courses/training, computer databases, computer systems

3. INFORMAL FACE-TO-FACE METHODS


Examples: networking events, team projects, team building events, conversations with colleagues, social events

4. INFORMAL VIRTUAL METHODS

Examples: web-based collaborative spaces/ forums, internet, intranet, social media

The five-point rating scale went from 1 'Not at all' to 5 'To a very great extent'. Figure 5.3.1 shows the results from the interview sample in terms of overall profile and also broken down by country.

Figure 5.3.1. Preferences of police organisations for different methods of communication overall and broken down by country.



As might be expected, overall formal face-to-face methods such as briefings and courses proved to be the most popular mode of knowledge sharing (mean score = 3.62). However, the extent to which this was undertaken varied from country to country, with Germany showing by far the highest level (mean = 4.47), followed by the Czech Republic (mean = 4.2). Belgium, France and Spain showed the lowest levels (mean scores = 2.89, 3.07 and 3.08, respectively). Informal face-to-face methods such as conversations with colleagues or networking events came second overall (mean = 3.04), closely followed by formal virtual methods such as databases or online courses (mean = 2.96). The least popular mode was in terms of informal virtual methods such as online forums and social media (mean = 2.54).

Interestingly, Figure 5.3.1 also shows that the pattern of second and third most popular modes varied from country to country. Informal face-to-face methods were the second most common method in Romania, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, Germany and Italy while the UK, Belgium and France put formal virtual methods second (Spain put both at the same level).

In addressing Research Question 2, we have therefore identified the variety and complexity of knowledge sharing practices used by the police in the European organisations that took part in our research activities. Our taxonomy of 13 knowledge sharing methods was generated inductively from interviews with 152 police organisation members so it is directly relevant to the policing context. We also outlined in more specific detail the reasons for the effectiveness of various methods and illustrated that many of these approaches also had drawbacks. Practically, these insights are designed to help police organisations develop a more rounded and nuanced awareness of how to combine different methods to produce more impactful knowledge sharing strategies for different stakeholders. Despite the rising impact of technology as outlined in Work Package 4, the preference for police organisations still seems to be for personal face-to-face interactions as a means of sharing knowledge. Building up motivation, trust and good relationships between stakeholders came out consistently as precursors of effective knowledge sharing and this does seem to occur most successfully when people can meet each other. Interestingly, though, with certain countries, formal virtual methods are starting to be used more frequently than informal personal methods so it would be fruitful to repeat our benchmarking activities in the coming years to assess if virtual modes of information sharing overtake face-to-face approaches.

5.4. A conceptual framework of antecedents of knowledge sharing effectiveness

Research Question 4: What are the major antecedents (barriers and facilitators) of successful knowledge sharing in the four domains?

In the Introduction (Section 1) and our systematic literature review (Allen & Birdi, 2011), we criticised existing knowledge sharing research for either being too generic and missing out on the complexities of the policing context (e.g. Wang & Noe, 2010) or too narrow in its focus on policing activities (e.g. Gottschalk, 2006). We therefore took an emergent theoretical perspective in this Work Package since there was no adequate existing theoretical framework of knowledge sharing in the policing context. Within this section, we integrate our findings from the three studies we have presented in this report to offer a new conceptual framework. We illustrate this in terms of an overall map (Figure 5.4.1) and a more detailed table (Table 5.4.1). The model in Figure 5.4.1 shows the four domains of police knowledge sharing we examined in our research (internal, with other forces in the same country, with the public and internationally with other forces/agencies) and the factors we identified as influencing them. The twenty six separate factors were derived from drawing together the findings from the interview, questionnaire and case study research conducted for this research package. We have further grouped the factors into 10 types, labelled from Box A to J. Table 5.4.1 presents these factors with illustrations of representative barriers and facilitators derived from the research. No other research effort to our knowledge has provided this level of detail on police knowledge sharing effectiveness.

Figure 5.4.1. A conceptual framework of factors influencing the effectiveness of four domains of knowledge sharing.




Table 5.4.1. Major factors influencing the effectiveness of four domains of police knowledge sharing effectiveness with examples of barriers and facilitators.

		<i>Domain of Knowledge Sharing</i>			
		<i>Internal</i>	<i>Other forces in same country</i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>Internationally</i>
A	STAFF EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE	X	X	X	X
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inexperienced or ineffective staff • Differences in staff experience and training • HRM not focused on international aspects • Lack of legal knowledge understanding about what can be shared • Language skills absent(Not having, time delay for interpretation or misinterpretation) • Teams a mix of experienced and inexperienced people • Formal training sessions for less experienced officers • Mentoring scheme • Conducting exit interviews • Realistic and detailed scenarios of training exercises 	-	-	-	-
		+			
		+			
		+			
					+
A	MOTIVATION TO SHARE KNOWLEDGE	X	X		X
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of formal requirement • Engaged and committed employees • It is mandatory to share • KS as part of job description • Need for knowledge sharing made clear • Need to share knowledge • Handover culture • Reward for knowledge sharing 	-	+		+
		+	+		
			+		
		+			
					+
		+			
		+			
A	DEVELOPING GOOD RELATIONSHIPS	X	X	X	X
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of trust within, between forces 	-	-		

	• Silo working	-			
	• Poor relationship between forces		-		-
	• Good working atmosphere, trust				+
	• History of good contacts			+	+
	• Social events				+
	• KS as part of normal working culture				+
	• Building networks across forces				+
	• Networks with other public authorities				+
	• National contact points				+
A	TEAM EFFECTIVENESS AND COOPERATION	X		X	X
A	LEADERSHIP	X	X		X
	• Different styles of command				-
	• Management required to change every three years (France)				-
	• Regular meetings to share knowledge	+			
	• Verbal or written encouragement to share knowledge	+			
	• Targeted enquiries or questions	+			
	• Making KS part of the culture	+			
	• Encouraging employee involvement	+			
<i>Domain of Knowledge Sharing</i>					
		<i>Internal</i>	<i>Other forces in same country</i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>Internationally</i>
B	EFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT	X	X	x	x
	• Professional approach	+			
B	FLEXIBILITY OF WORKING METHODS				X
	• Ability to work fast and efficiently				+
	• Pragmatic solutions/ flexibility in management of teams				+
B	FLEXIBILITY OF LOCATION				X

	• Location in same building				+
	• Flexibility of location				+
B	CLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES AND GOALS		X		
	• Unclear responsibilities and goals		-		
B	EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENTATION	X	X	X	X
	• Bureaucratic / complex processes			-	-
	• Poor systems	-	-		
	• Lack of process or strategy for sharing		-		
	• Poor management of information	-			
	• Wrong methods used	-			
	• Problems of targeting the right people in other forces				-
	• Problems of targeting the right audience			-	
	• Information systems not integrated				-
	• Different methodologies for analysing data				-
	• Effective systems and processes	+	+		
	• Common documentation				+
	• Standardised and quick methods				+
B	SHARED GOALS, TASKS OR PROCEDURES		X		X
	• Shared activities, procedures and facilities				+
	• Problem shared across countries				+
	• Strategic alignment				+
C	TECHNOLOGY	X		X	X
D	FINANCIAL RESOURCES	X	X	X	X
E	INFORMATION CLARITY				X
E	ACCESSIBILITY OF INFORMATION	X	X	X	
E	SENSITIVITY OF INFORMATION	X	X	X	
E	ACCURACY AND RELEVANCE OF INFORMATION	X	x	x	x

F	TIMELINESS AND SPEED OF INFORMATION SHARING	X	X	X	X
G	ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES				X
H	POLITICAL DIFFERENCES	X	X		X
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political barriers 		-		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Silos between departments 	-	-		
<i>Domain of Knowledge Sharing</i>					
		<i>Internal</i>	<i>Other forces in same country</i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>Internationally</i>
I	PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE POLICE			X	
I	PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of understanding by the public 			-	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good motivation of public 			+	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Close involvement with the public 			+	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Actively getting the public involved 			+	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Targeting the right audience 			+	
I	MEDIA ROLE			X	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Media desire for negative news stories 			-	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Good use of press media 			+	
J	DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS				X
J	LEGISLATION AND WRITTEN AGREEMENTS ON CO-OPERATION				X
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of legal framework 				-
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Different legal systems 				-
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> New European and bilateral conventions 				+
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Written rules on how to operate collaborations 				+
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Signed agreements on co-operation 				+
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Managing sensitive information 	-	-	-	

	• Legal requirements	-	-
J	STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF ISSUES DIFFERS BETWEEN COUNTRIES		X
J	LACK OF VISIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO COUNTRY FORCES		X

X = major theme represented in the data

- = Example of barrier under theme + = Example of facilitator under theme

It is clear that not all factors influence all types of knowledge sharing and hence organisations need different types of capabilities if they are to optimise their efforts across different domains. We will now discuss the ten types of factors and the themes they represent.

A. STAFF CAPABILITIES.

- The level of staff experience and knowledge consistently came out as a strong influence on knowledge sharing effectiveness across all four domains. Typical people barriers were stated as having inexperienced staff, different levels of knowledge between different forces and when it came to international knowledge sharing, an absence of the relevant language skills, a lack of understanding the legal requirements of knowledge sharing. However, strategies to overcome these barriers included running formal training sessions for less experienced officers with realistic and detailed training scenarios, mixing experienced with less experienced individuals. An interesting point to note is certain forces set up mentoring schemes and conducted exit interviews with retiring staff in order to preserve and pass on knowledge to newer generations (a good example of the process of storing knowledge).
- The level of motivation of staff to engage in knowledge sharing activities also came out as important for all domains apart from with the public. Facilitators for enhancing motivation included making explicit the importance of knowledge sharing to staff (most effectively in terms of making it a part of their job description or a formal requirement), introducing related rewards and even establishing a handover culture within the workplace. Noe and Wang (2010) in their review of the knowledge sharing literature put motivation at the centre of their framework and our research supported to some extent that view. However,

our research showed that the level of knowledge, skills and experience of staff was equally important and this factor is barely addressed in the aforementioned theoretical overview.

- Since the intrinsic issue of interest here is the sharing of knowledge between individuals, groups or organisations, then the development of good relationships between those parties came out as influential across all domains. A lack of trust or silo working were seen by participants to undermine communication efforts. This echoed the findings of Work Package 2 (Betteridge et al., 2012, Deliverable 2.3) where in many of the best practice case studies it was emphasised that high quality relationships needed to be achieved with key stakeholders. In the *Adoption of a Nodal Orientation* case, for example the establishment of the informal relationship with the Dunkirk Police was essential for the provision of crucial information from outside of the West-Coast police zone. In *Project ZENTRAB* the preparations made in terms of achieving the support of the staff unions and the public prosecution department was a significant positive factor in the project. Our participants therefore recommended that a good working atmosphere could be built up through having regular social contacts with others (e.g. secondments with forces in other countries) and investing in setting up formal networks across forces and with other institutions.
- Team effectiveness and co-operation was a key element reported in all domains apart from sharing with other forces in the same country. The ability to work in a cross-functional or cross-organisational group could be developed through team-building or training activities.
- Interestingly, leadership in the police organisation did not come out particularly influential for public knowledge sharing, although it did for the other domains. We can distinguish here between senior management support for setting out the strategic importance of the issue and line management support for enabling exchange of knowledge to occur. Different styles of command between forces or the fact that management were required to change every three years in French regions were seen as inhibitors to free, continuous flow of information. Wang

and Noe (2010) in their review of the extant knowledge sharing literature stated 'it would be informative for future research to identify the specific managerial behaviors and actions that employees believe demonstrate support for knowledge sharing' (p126). We therefore directly asked participants in our interview study how managers encouraged knowledge sharing. It became apparent that line managers good at this internally were those who had regular meetings to encourage discussion, provided written or verbal encouragement and made the activity part of the working culture. Our statistical analyses also indicated that those police forces where management informed staff more regularly of what was happening in the organisation and also took their views into account were significantly more likely to deal successfully with change.

B. PROCESS CAPABILITIES

This group of factors reflected the abilities of organisations to operate knowledge sharing activities in an effective manner

- Effective operational management was noted as important for all domains and reflected the need to conduct activities in a professional and organised manner.
- Flexibility of working methods and location was seen as particularly important in international knowledge sharing since disparate groups of staff from different forces might need to work together for a short period of time (e.g. see the Joint Investigation Teams case study in Section 3). The ability to have flexibility in management of such teams was reported as being key to their working fast and efficiently. Also, having teams from different countries located in the same building or being able to move their location to where it was most appropriate were also highlighted as important facilitators of international knowledge exchange.
- Having clear responsibilities and goals with regards to inter-force knowledge sharing was seen as helping focus and co-ordinate efforts.
- Of course, having effective procedures and documentation for knowledge sharing were cited as important under all four domains. Common barriers

included having no formal knowledge sharing procedures, or alternately, excessive bureaucracy / complexity. In fact, in our pilot survey of the EKSPD-DI tool, bureaucracy of procedures came out as one of the most common barriers to knowledge sharing outside the force. Poor management of information, incompatible technology systems or different methodologies for analysing data of different forces were also seen as a hindrance. An interesting issue was around the problems of targeting the right audience, whether in police forces or with the public, with whom to exchange knowledge. Strategies for overcoming the above included having common documentation and standardised and quick methods.

- Finally, different forces having shared goals and responsibilities facilitated collaboration, particularly where a problem was shared across countries or issues were strategically important for partners.

C. TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES

- Work Package 4 is extensively investigating the role of technology in police operations (Denef, 2011) and this came up as a consistent theme for all domains apart from knowledge sharing with other forces. Issues here revolved around accessibility of technology to all partners, whether it would actually work and expertise in using it. In Sections 2, 3 and 4 we took a more detailed look at different technology versus non-technology based methods of knowledge sharing and the reader is recommended to read those sections for a more extensive insight than we have room for here. However, we do reiterate here our earlier point that police participants rated themselves as much less competent at using technology-based methods compared to more traditional approaches.

D. FINANCIAL RESOURCES

- Lack of resources was overall one of the most common complaints from our research activities. Knowledge sharing does take time and a degree of investment in finance and, given the feedback from some participants, is not seen as a priority.

E. INFORMATION CHARACTERISTICS

- Clarity of information was particularly highlighted as influencing effectiveness in international knowledge sharing. Since this will typically involve members with different languages interacting, it is crucial that there is little room for misinterpretation.
- Accessibility of information concerns the ease with which one can get hold of information and was important for most domains of knowledge sharing. Thus, the presence of knowledge management systems is not enough, they should also be usable.
- Sensitivity of information was a key issue in many domains. Participants often mentioned that legal requirements meant that they could not divulge information to others, particularly members of the public. Beyond that, there were also occasions where the information could be too sensitive to send out e.g. the modus operandi of a suspect still at large. The implication here is to help officers, and other stakeholders like the public, become aware of legally what they can and cannot share
- Accuracy and relevance of information came up in all four domains as might be expected. When asked to identify positive examples of knowledge sharing in our first reported interview study, the reliability and applicability of the knowledge provided often came as up a major contributor to success. Providing this type of information was also felt as a good way to build up trust with other partners.

F. TIMELINESS AND SPEED OF INFORMATION SHARING

- Beyond the quality of the information as discussed above, the regularity and rapidity of its distribution was highlighted as important for all aspects. If information came in too late, then it could not be considered an effective situation. Therefore, having regular communication vehicles such as newsletters or ensuring the use of technology to speed up processes would be recommended.

G. ORGANISATIONAL DIFFERENCES

- This issue came up in various guises under other sections but was more explicitly mentioned when it came to international knowledge sharing. This covered having different cultures, policies and structures of forces; organizational knowledge sharing strategy lacking in forces; and the difficulty of transferring methods between forces due to context differences. As above, developing shared and standardised procedures and goals should help overcome these differences.

H. POLITICAL DIFFERENCES

- This came up as an issue with all three domains involving police organisations. We can talk here about politics with a little 'p' and a big 'P'. In the first instance, we are talking about organisational politics and the sense that knowledge is seen as power by some individuals and hence they are reluctant to share either within the force or with others. The conception of staff working in 'silos' in their departments and therefore having little connection with others came out as a barrier. The other sense of the 'big P' was about international knowledge sharing and the potential impact of the different political systems in place in those countries.

I. PUBLIC FACTORS

Three sets of influences came out uniquely in relation to effectiveness of knowledge sharing with the public

- The public image of the police was seen as a key driver of the willingness of the public to exchange knowledge with the police. This was seen as a barrier in certain countries (e.g. France) more than others.
- The capabilities of the police to engage with the public were therefore seen as a means to overcome public prejudices. Good tactics here included building up personal contacts with key members of the neighbourhood, actively getting the public involved in activities (e.g. the recruitment in Belgium via Twitter of public help to find a missing person) and targeting the right audiences.

- The media (press, TV and radio) also had a key role to play. Participants felt the media had a strong desire for negative news stories but with the appropriate strategies, the police could make constructive use of them. For example, in the UK, there is a long-running primetime TV programme called Crimewatch where the public are shown reconstructions of crimes and asked to provide help. This has proven to be very successful.

J. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

The final set of factors were uniquely related to international aspects of knowledge.

- Different legal systems in countries were seen as a hindrance in terms of what could and could not be shared.
- However, introducing new joint legislation (European or bilateral conventions) or having written agreements on co-operation were seen as strategies for overcoming legal barriers. Having written rules for collaboration were also helpful to clarify different roles and responsibilities and easing processes.
- The strategic importance of issues differing between countries meant that certain countries would put more effort into knowledge exchange than others.
- Finally, a specific issue raised was the visibility of international agencies with regular police forces. For example, members of the Customs Cooperation Centre In Świecko, Poland which co-ordinated with German and Polish police felt that although it was steadily getting more requests for help, many officers in the forces still did not know about its capabilities.

5.5. Theoretical and methodological contributions

This report has outlined the extensive research work undertaken by Work Package 3 and it is worth outlining here a number of its theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions. Our aforementioned systematic literature review of knowledge sharing research critiqued the lack of in-depth and comprehensive studies in policing contexts (Allen

& Birdi, 2011). Consequently the studies we reported here added value in a variety of ways. First, the qualitative interviews we undertook in the first study allowed us to inductively build up taxonomies of knowledge shared in police contexts, the practices used for moving that knowledge from actor to actor and antecedents of knowledge sharing. Second, by investigating external knowledge sharing with different parties as well as internal mechanisms we were able to separate those factors or capabilities that were important for all types of knowledge sharing from those that were domain specific. For example, the staff capabilities of motivation, knowledge and skills were influential for all dimensions but the role of the media and public image of the police was only seen as relevant with regards to public interactions. Third, the past literature has focused mainly on research within one country but our consortium allowed us to create the constructs from a cross-cultural sample, thus aiding claims of generalisability and also highlighting cultural differences. In Section 5.3 above we showed how formal face-to-face methods were the most popular modes of communication across all our countries but the second most popular varied. Informal face-to-face methods were the second most common method in Romania, the Czech Republic, Macedonia, Germany and Italy while the UK, Belgium and France put formal virtual methods second. Fourth, based on our research we presented a new conceptual framework of antecedents of knowledge sharing in the different domains which can now provide the basis for more specific hypothesis testing in follow-up studies. Fifth, we have generated a significant amount of empirical data from our studies against which participating forces can compare themselves in the future and other forces can compare themselves now.

We have also generated novel methodological contributions. For the first study, we developed a new set of interview protocols to elicit deeper understanding of knowledge sharing in policing contexts. The protocols were tested in many different cultural contexts to ensure their generalisability. These protocols will be made available to future researchers who wish to use them in their own work on the topic. The most significant contributions come from the development of the new EKSPD-DI instrument which we have specifically designed for evaluating levels of knowledge sharing effectiveness in police organisations and identifying major barriers to those activities. The tool is based on the extensive research we conducted in our cross-cultural interviews and has been piloted in nine of the

consortium countries, with 481 police organisation members completing it. We have developed a manual alongside the instrument to facilitate its application for both researchers and police organisations who wish to use the tool themselves (see Section 4 and WP3 Deliverable 3.4).

5. 6. Practical recommendations for police organisations wishing to enhance their knowledge sharing effectiveness

Throughout the report we have made suggestions for recommendations and here we will provide an indication of several themes. On the basis of our report findings we would suggest the following practical recommendations to police organisations wanting to improve their knowledge sharing competency:

1. Emphasis should be placed upon people skills in knowledge sharing. Having motivated and committed people involved in the sharing of knowledge were common reasons provided for successful knowledge sharing. Conversely, a lack of skills and experience were big reasons behind the examples of unsuccessful knowledge sharing. Examples of topics for training should include:
 - how to deal with the Press, TV and Radio effectively since the media came out as the most effective method of sharing knowledge with the public
 - using social networking applications such as Facebook and Twitter since certain countries found this a very effective approach for communicating with the public while other countries had little experience of it to date
 - data protection legislation in other countries to build up awareness of what can and cannot be shared across borders
2. Effective leadership and leading by example are clearly key factors that impact on the effectiveness of a police force, both operationally and in terms of staff wellbeing. Findings indicate that the perceived attitude and behavior of leaders to knowledge sharing is likely to impact on the behavior and attitude to knowledge sharing across the command, which will in turn affect the effectiveness with which it operates.

Therefore, it is important to involve and engage all staff, from the top to the bottom of the force when identifying and addressing issues relating to knowledge sharing. Line managers good at promoting knowledge sharing internally were those who had regular meetings to encourage discussion, incorporated information sharing in work objectives, provided written or verbal encouragement and made the activity part of the working culture.

3. Clear and efficient processes for quick knowledge sharing should be developed between forces, with speed often being crucial for knowledge sharing, particularly around the sharing of criminal intelligence on specific cross border cases. The use of direct methods of communication, including telephone and face-to-face meetings, should be explored for quick transfer of information.
4. Strategies should be developed in conjunction with other forces for how knowledge is to be shared and when, and contact lists for communication drawn up – barriers to knowledge sharing included lack of process and strategy, as well as not knowing who to contact within other forces.
5. The possibilities for co-location of forces should be explored. The insularity of forces, where forces worked in silo and did not communicate, was described as a key barrier to knowledge sharing. The co-location of forces in Spain via shared co-ordination rooms was deemed as conducive to effective knowledge sharing, and in the UK considerable emphasis has been put on the benefits of collaborative working, with South Yorkshire Police aiming to collaborate with Humberside Police from April 2012 to provide a shared human resources and training function at a single location. The lessons learnt from examples such as these could be explored for other countries.
6. Build up better relationships between police officers from different forces (within the same country and other countries) through regular face-to-face activities such as cross-border meetings, workshops, seminars and exchange visits.

7. Benchmark your knowledge sharing performance and identify barriers to effectiveness using the EKSPD-DI knowledge sharing diagnostic tool. Many forces are probably unaware at how well they do in the different domains of knowledge sharing and we would suggest they use the tool we have developed in the first instance to get a measure of their strengths and areas for further development. The manual we have provided in Deliverable 3.4 for Work Package 3 provides the details needed for police forces to utilise the instrument themselves.
8. Standardised technological systems should be created / utilised: The case studies have shown that technology is of great importance in international knowledge sharing, and if it is used effectively, technology can be a key facilitator to knowledge sharing. However, it is also named as a barrier, for disparate technological systems across countries result in knowledge being difficult to share. Exploring the use of standardised systems, and making use of the internet and other systems which are accessible to a wide audience, is a key recommendation for improving international knowledge sharing. For instance, the case study on CEPOL describes the use of 'webinars' as an example of best practice, through an internet based system, where training sessions are easily accessible to police officers across EU countries.
9. Good working relationships should be established across countries: Clearly having good working relationships between those forces and organisations which need to share knowledge with one another is important in order to facilitate effective knowledge sharing, for this may increase trust, improve informal knowledge sharing, and create clearer communication channels. The examples of best practice in the case studies on the initiatives of the Belgian West Coast Police, and the German-Polish Police and Customs Co-operation Centre, demonstrate good working relationships between those involved in knowledge sharing, which were used in order to achieve a successful outcome on specific criminal investigations. The case studies describe good relationships being established through social events, networking, exchange programmes, and National Contact Points. The case study on the Belgian West Coast Police initiatives described social events as a key facilitator to knowledge sharing, providing opportunities to actually share and exchange knowledge and information, and allowing the building of stronger personal

relationships. Exploration of these as methods for improving relationships is a further recommendation for improving international knowledge sharing.

10. Language skills should be improved in those who are required to share knowledge:

The case studies highlighted that language is a key barrier to knowledge sharing, with nine of the ten case studies naming a lack of language skills, or a lack of a common language, as a barrier. Thus a crucial step in improving international knowledge sharing is to ensure that those who are responsible for sharing knowledge internationally have the language skills they need in order to enable them to communicate with others effectively. Language training courses are widely available in all countries at universities or colleges, and they are also offered by international policing organisations, for example both CEPOL and FRONTEX offer language courses, with FRONTEX describing their language courses as being specific to a policing context, focusing on operational needs and related terminology.

11. Awareness of organisational and legislative differences should be improved:

Differing organisational structures and procedures, and differing laws and legislation across countries, have been shown to create barriers to knowledge sharing across countries, in particular due to a lack of awareness of the differences between countries. Those who are required to share knowledge across country borders would be advised to make themselves aware of organisational and legislative differences, and to explore the option of taking training courses or schemes which can facilitate this learning. CEPOL offers training courses with an aim to broaden knowledge of policing differences across the EU. In particular, the exchange programme offered by CEPOL, by which officers visit their equivalents in another country, and spend time working with another police force, is a method by which officers can learn in great detail about both policing differences and cultural differences in other countries.

12. Awareness of international centres / projects / organisations should be improved:

The case studies on the Police and Customs Co-operation Centres in Tournai, Świecko and Le-Pertus, all describe a lack of visibility of the centre, or a lack of recognition of the importance of the work of the centre, as being a barrier to knowledge sharing. A recommendation here would therefore be to undertake

promotional work in order to raise awareness of the important work taking place, the aims and objectives of the centres, and to share examples of best practice from the centres, for example operations or investigations which have had a successful outcome. Whilst this recommendation has been formulated as an outcome of this being raised as a specific barrier for Police and Customs Co-operation Centres, it should be noted that work to improve the visibility of other international projects, operations, investigations, and also the work of international organisations, is also important. In section 2.6 of this report, we described that international knowledge sharing was not seen to be as common an activity as other domains of knowledge sharing, with 23% of the interviewees reporting that knowledge was shared 'not at all' and a quarter of the sample at least not answering the interview questions on international knowledge sharing (see section 2.6.a.). Thus a further recommendation here is that further promotional work should take place in order to raise awareness of international police work more generally across EU police officers.

Further detailed recommendations can be found in the EKSPD-DI manual (see Section 4 and WP3 deliverable 3.4).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In summary, Work Package 3 set out to develop a greater understanding of the different influences on distinct types of police knowledge sharing. We feel we have achieved that through the dedicated efforts of the consortium members to generate an enormously rich database of qualitative and quantitative data collected from over 600 police members across the ten consortium countries plus input from the Albanian perspective. This has allowed us to make substantive contributions in a number of areas. Theoretically, we have used the cross-cultural data to develop a framework of factors influencing knowledge sharing both within police organisations and with other stakeholders. Methodologically, we have developed and tested new interview and questionnaire instruments to help researchers expand their work in their area of police research. Practically, we have identified a large number of strategies for improving knowledge sharing effectiveness, many of which have been generated from police organisations themselves. Furthermore, we have

used the research to develop a knowledge sharing diagnostic tool (EKSP-DI) which police organisations can use to benchmark their capabilities in the area and highlight aspects where this can be improved to enhance performance and the management of change.

A final point we would like to make is that the contributions of this report are themselves a testament to the power of effectively sharing knowledge across organisational, regional and cultural boundaries.

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Appendix

Case Studies on International Knowledge Sharing

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1. Cross-Border Knowledge Sharing...from Cross-Border Police Patrols to Cross-Border Police Initiatives.

West-Coast Police, Belgium

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Introduction

The Belgian case-study focuses on cross-border knowledge sharing within the Euregion Eurometropool situated at the south-western border of Belgium with France. In particular we focus on the Belgian Local Police Zone of West Coast (i.e., Politiezone Westkust in Dutch), a region composed of 3 municipalities, being Koksijde, Nieuwpoort, and De Panne. Located at the French-Belgian coast-side, it is a region with an outspoken touristic profile. Intense seasonal migrations of people with a variety of nationalities and cultural backgrounds are therefore part of the local "safety and security" scenery.

Our initial focus was on the knowledge sharing within the so-called Cross-Border Police Patrols (CBPP) active in West Coast. However, because interviewees pointed out that the activities of CBPP's are rather limited and represent only a small part of a much wider and extensive set of joint "Franco-Belge" Cross-Border Police Initiatives, we have adapted our initial research focus. By doing so, we have broadened our scope on cross-border knowledge sharing between French and Belgian police organisations or on the so-called Cross-Border Police Initiatives in West Coast (CBPI).

The central research question of the case-study is fourfold:

1. A general understanding of the CBPI in the Euregion Eurometropool/West Coast police and the way they facilitate international knowledge sharing between the French and Belgian police forces involved;

2. A general understanding of the effectiveness (i.e., enablers and barriers) of the knowledge sharing facilitated by the CBPI in the Euregion Eurometropool/West Coast police;
3. The identification of evidence based best practices in knowledge sharing facilitated by the CBPI in the Euregion Eurometropool/West Coast police;
4. An overview of important challenges for knowledge sharing facilitated by the CBPI in the Euregion Eurometropool/West Coast police (i.e., a future perspective).

The data-collection consists of four semi-structured interviews with senior and operational Belgian police agents directly involved in the Euregion Eurometropool/West Coast police CBPIs. Additionally we have consulted several, mostly national publications on CBPI's active in the Euregion Eurometropool/West Coast police. Finally, we have also interviewed an expert on Belgian Euregions within the federal Belgian police, to get an overall perspective on the general functioning of CBPPs within the Belgian territory.

The structure of the case-study is as follows. In the next paragraph, we describe the central concepts of our case-study, i.e., CBPPs and CBPIs. Additionally, we indicate the specific nature of these CBPI's in the region West Coast. Next, we focus on the characteristics of the institutional and cultural setting. We will then outline the different types of knowledge sharing that we have encountered within the CBPIs of West Coast police. Subsequently, we will identify the enablers and constraints in the knowledge sharing process. Finally, we will briefly reflect on the future needs of international knowledge sharing within the region West Coast. The essence can be summarised by the following quote of one of the interviewees: "Anything that is implemented top-down, must provide an answer to a bottom-up need"

Cross-Border Police Patrols in Belgium

As mentioned in the introduction, we initially focused on the activities of the so-called cross-border police patrols (CBPPs). The reason for this was the explicit mentioning of these CBPPs within the more general European safety and security context of the Belgian COMPOSITE research-project.¹ Several Belgian interviewees frequently referred to the existence of these so-called CBPP's. The perception and especially the evaluation of their impact and importance for knowledge sharing was however not always clear nor unanimously or convincingly positive. Moreover, some interviewees emphasized that their activities rather serve a political than a safety and security goal. Especially during the 1980s when criminal activities within the Euregion Eurometropool suddenly peaked (presumably caused by bands of criminals that abused the presence of different institutional settings at borderlines to commit violent "hit and run" incidents), politicians looked for visible and as such comforting and reassuring police interventions. Citizens had to "see" that effective actions were immediately undertaken. CBPP's with their explicit "patrol"-nature met and still meet these specific needs. Their effectiveness in terms of really solving and preventing these serious crime raids was and still is however "under discussion". According to several

¹ In Belgium, WP1, WP2 and WP4 were realised in six integrated police networks of two Belgian Euregions (i.e., Eurometropool and Maas-Rijn).

police agents involved, solving serious crime surely demands for a much wider and consistent set of so-called Cross-Border Police initiatives.

Cross-Border-Police-Patrols (CBPPs) can generally be defined as operational collaborations between the respective police forces of European countries at both sides of the border. In contrast to other European cross-border initiatives, such as, for instance, the so-called Joint Hit Teams (JHT) and Joint Investigation Teams (JIT), CBPPs do not involve members of other public safety and security organisations, such as justice or public governments (c.f., den Boer en Spapens, 2003; Van Noord, 2003; Van Puyvelde, 2010). In short, CBPPs only involve European police organisations. The CBPPs are focused on so-called cross-border crime, defined by Passas (2003: 20) as "... a conduct which jeopardizes legally protected interests in more than one national jurisdiction and which is criminalized in at least one of the states concerned". Cross-border crimes are distinct from international crimes, the latter being "... acts prohibited by international criminal law" (Passas, 2003: 20). The operational collaboration of CBPP's consists mainly of observation, controlling, pursuing and arresting (Bakker, 1995; Brammertz, 1997). When observation and controlling imply rather discrete interventions, pursuing and arresting evoke open and often aggressive activities that are associated with politically sensitive and therefore symbolic interventions (Brammertz, 1997). Especially the invasion of private housings, the use of weapons and the visibility/traceability of foreign police agents (e.g., identifiable uniforms and vehicles) are considered to be delicate matters. In order to fulfil the CBPP collaboration in an effective, efficient and acceptable way an accurate exchange of information and knowledge is therefore very important.

Based on the information received from our general expert on Belgian Euregions within the federal Belgian police, the Belgian CBPPs are no permanent but temporary and incident-driven teams. The nature of these incidents can vary from incidents related to drugs, alcohol, traffic, community policing, manifestations and local events (e.g., sports). In short, the formation of Belgian CBPPs is not fixed but changes over time. Related to this temporary formation, their mission is clearly specified and restricted. It relates to the previously mentioned activities of observation, controlling, pursuing and arresting. Investigating cross-border crime for instance, does not relate to their mission. This is realized by other cross-border initiatives such as for instance the JIT's and JHT's (see also before). As such, the mission of Belgian CBPPs only covers a limited set of mostly "classic" police functions. A third feature of the specific work-setting is that CBPP's realize mixed or joint actions, not (only) coordinated actions at both sides of the borderline. These mixed actions require an integrated or holistic management approach realized mainly by the Belgian local Chief of Police. As no specific institutional framework is present, the local Chief of Police will appoint the members of each CBPP, decide upon their training and coaching, facilitate their activities, provide the team-members with feedback and support the associated knowledge sharing. In short, it is the local Chief of Police that determines the local work-setting of the Belgian CBPPs. Consequently, the work-setting of the Belgian CBPP's throughout the entire Belgian territory is very heterogeneous.

Cross-Border Police Patrols at West Coast Police

The cross-border police patrols (CBPPs) in the Euregion Eurometropool were created by the Treaty of Doornik in 2001, as a response to the peaking criminal activities committed by French citizens in Belgium starting at the end of the eighties. In 2002 for example, 30% of the arrests and 20% of the apprehensions made by West Coast police were citizens with a French nationality (De Standaard, 2003). Although the CBPPs were created top down by the bilateral Treaty between the Belgian and French government, there also existed a considerable need at the operational level within the entire Euregion to work with intense and visible cross-border police teams. According to the interviewees, they increased the perception among citizens that crime was jointly taken care of by the Belgian and French police forces. This served two goals. On the one hand, this increased the so-called subjective perception or feeling of safety and security among citizens. On the other hand, this made potential criminals aware of the fact that they could not use or abuse the border easily to "prevent getting caught". In a newspaper article Daniël Ferrey, the vice-prefect of the North of France, formulates it as follows (De Standaard, 2003): "...If French delinquents in Belgium are confronted with a French police officer this will take away their feeling of impunity. [They] can no longer think that they can cross the border and be safe..." According to the local Chief of Police of West Coast, these patrols were a big success from the perspective of safety and security perception management. The amount of media coverage that these CBPPs have received during their introduction phase in Euregion Eurometropool supports this point of view (c.f., Vermeulen, de Busser, & Cruysveld, 2003). There were, however, also some critical and more negative reflections.

The original CPBBs of West Coast police were of a permanent or structural nature with both the National Police of Dunkerque and Gendarmerie National of Dunkerque.² However, these encountered considerable resistance for a number of reasons. First, as explained by the West Coast police chief, "the operational use or added value of the original CBPPs was extremely limited, as foreign police officers had no (real) formal authority outside their own national territory." This meant that the job of police officers participating in a CBPP was nothing more than observing how other police officers do their job. It thus should come as no surprise that the added value of CBPPs was highly questioned (c.f., Cap et. al, 2008). Vermeulen, de Busser, & Cruysveld (2003: 227) argued, for example, that the general opinion of for instance the judicial partners was very sceptic because "while being a good initiative, the CBPPs are an insufficient means to tackle border crime." Secondly, the CPBBs were basically a forced marriage without any formal obligation. Liaison manager and chief inspector explains, "This meant that there was no law or institutional framework that specified that CBPPs actually had to take place." Thirdly, with respect to the exchange of information and the use of communication channels, this can also be accomplished through other means (Vermeulen, de Busser, & Cruysveld, 2003). Because of these negative reflections and growing resistance, the original formula of the CBPPs at West Coast police

² The Police National has jurisdiction in cities and large towns and the Gendarmerie has jurisdiction in smaller towns and rural and border areas. The Dunkerque Police National has jurisdiction in the city of Dunkerque, while the Gendarmerie of Dunkerque has jurisdiction in the rural area between the city of Dunkerque and the French border with Belgium.

were replaced by two alternative cross-border initiatives (i.e., dynamic cross-border police patrols and thematic cross-border police patrols) that accomplish the same objectives but provide more operational added value. We discuss these initiatives in the next paragraph.

Cross-Border Police Initiatives at West Coast Police

As mentioned, due to the resistance against the original CBPPs, West Coast police decided to replace them with alternatives that provide more operational value, namely dynamic cross-border police patrols and thematic cross-border police patrols. Beside these two alternative cross-border police patrols, also several other cross-border police initiatives occurred between the French and Belgian police units in the region of West Coast. In short it concerns several meetings, prevention campaigns, work visits, JIT's and international rogoatoire committees. Let us look at the specific nature of each of these CBPIs.

Dynamic Cross-Border Police Patrols

Dynamic Cross-Border Police Patrols (DCBPPs) are CBPPs that take place twice a month when there are no incident-driven or thematic CBPPs (see below). DCBPPs consist of representatives of Dunkerque Gendarmerie and of West Coast police, and are basically selective border controls that alternate between both sides of the border (usually during the same shift). The main purpose of these patrols is to increase the visibility of foreign police forces on major access roads between France and Belgium. During these controls, both police offices have a clear function or operational use. That is, the local police officers selectively stops approaching vehicles while the foreign police officer verifies/checks the identity of the foreigners. Liaison manager and chief inspector Johan Verlynde, who is responsible for the organisation of the DCBPPs, explains: "Due to this operational use or value added, there is much less resistance among members of the CBPP". He adds: "DCBPP also facilitate on-the-spot mutual information exchange between the police agents and thus provide an efficient means to exchange information and get up-to-date information about the location and the environment." On the Belgian side of the borders, an added advantage is also the "peur de Gendarmerie" (i.e., fear of the Gendarmerie) by French citizens, which facilitates a smooth operation of these controls.

Thematic Cross-Border Police Patrols

As the name already reveals, thematic cross-border police patrols (TCBPPs) are patrols that focus on a certain theme or incident, and are therefore always related to a certain cross-border safety and security issue. Examples are numerous and include, amongst others, alcohol controls, controls of clubs and raves, patrols and controls at large event controls (e.g., the Cyclo-cross event at Koksijde, which is the World Championship of off-road cycling), and controls of public nudity controls at the French and Belgian beaches (and dunes). Furthermore, TCBPPs also include more specific or targeted activities. A recent example that has received a great deal of media attention took place during the summer of 2011. The chief of West Coast police explains: "On Friday nights, French skinheads took the bus from Dunkurque (FR) to Adinkerke (BE) to take the coastal tram in Belgium to visit a party in Ostend. After receiving numerous complaints about their behaviour, we decided to watch the security tapes from the cameras in the tram and were genuinely shocked. While

on the tram, these delinquents systematically intimidated people, urinated on and off the tram, made Hitler signs, and threatened people from minority ethnic groups. Obviously, we decided to tackle this problem, and asked our French colleagues for assistance. The next weeks, we escorted these delinquents on the tram and our French colleagues identified them. The presence of our French colleagues especially helped considerably to change their behaviour, and after several weeks, they no longer took the tram.

Formal meetings

With respect to the formal meetings, we need to make a distinction between operational and strategic meetings. Operational meetings are always related to a specific case file or incident, and are used to exchange information and to coordinate and plan operational activities (if needed). Strategic meetings are used to communicate and coordinate the strategic priorities of both police forces. Strategic meetings actually take place at many levels. For example, the Treaty of Doornik (art. 15.1) created the so-called Strategic Committee, a joint workgroup that evaluates and checks the working of the treaty and identifies, supplements, and updates the treaty if deemed necessary. However, according to the West Coast chief of police, who is also a member of this committee, "This committee includes so many participants that it becomes difficult to reach an agreement. Furthermore, because many of its members are not operationally involved, the agreements that are reached generally do not provide a real solution to our problems." This is confirmed by Cap et al. (2008), who observe too many partners from too many levels and diverging expectations.

Strategic meetings also take place between West Coast police and the Gendarmerie of Dunkerque. After each transfer of power (i.e., a change of management) within the Gendarmerie, which takes place every three years, strategic priorities are shared between both police forces and a coordination of traffic and judicial issues takes place. The participants of this meeting are generally the respective chiefs of police, its management, and the liaison officers (+/- 10 persons). West Coast police director of intervention Johan Segaert explains that these meetings are highly effective, which, according to him, is mainly due to the smaller number of participants and a better alignment of priorities and expectations.

Informal meetings

The informal meetings include receptions, ceremonies, commemorations, VIP visits (e.g., ministers), and dinners (e.g. of magistrate, prosecutors, and top of police).

Prevention campaigns

Another cross-border initiative between French and Belgian police forces is prevention on traffic. There are two main events, namely the week of prevention in Dunkerque and the day of prevention at the French-Belgian border. During the Dunkerque week of prevention, (mainly) children and elderly people are educated on traffic related safety and security issues. During this event, West Coast police has an information point to inform people about traffic related safety and security issues.³

³ This year, the week of prevention takes place from 21-25 may in Dunkerque.

The day of prevention is an event on which the French Gendarmerie and the Belgian local Police of Westkust demonstrate their joint equipment at a parking-side in France at the border with Belgium. This event is called the "Franco-Belge" day and takes place just before the summer holidays in France. This event was initiated because while the total number of accidents with wounded victims in the West Coast police zone was decreasing, the number of French victims was actually increasing at the same time. An evaluation led to the conclusion that the main reason for this phenomenon was that the Belgian traffic campaigns were highly effective but unfortunately stopped at the border. After a meeting with their French colleagues, they jointly decided to hold a traffic prevention campaign at the border side, where they would demonstrate their traffic joint equipment and educate people about traffic related safety and security issues. To increase the perception and awareness among citizens, there is ample communication to the French and Belgian press about this event.⁴

Work visits

Work visits are another CBPI that take place between the French Gendarmerie and the West Coast Police. These visits used to take place once every two year, but their frequency has recently been increased to four times per year. During these work visits, about six to seven police agents cross the border for two to three days to get more acquainted with the procedures and routines of their foreign colleagues. During these visits, it is demonstrated how "we/they" work in a certain safety and security domain or theme. Previous themes include the motor brigade, self-defence, collaboration with the public prosecutor, the police laboratory (e.g., DNA), and the nuclear power plant in Gravelines, France.

Joint Investigation Teams

Joint Investigation Teams are investigative teams where two or more European member states are involved (van Noord, 2003). According to Annie Verbeke, Director of Westcoast Judicial police, a Joint Investigation Team has been established only once in the Euregion Eurometropool, and was really a big success. The main reason was that the 'joint' character was only reflected in a meeting once every few weeks to jointly discuss general progress. She explains: "In such a setting, it is extremely difficult for team members to actually build strong informal relationships with the other team members. It would probably be different if the members would have worked together physically, like being located in the same building."

Joint Hit Teams

Joint Hit Teams are a combination of Dutch, Belgian, and French police organisations, and are considered to be the only permanent cross border patrol initiative since 2005 (van Puyvelde, 2010). The purpose of these teams is to join forces in specific safety and security topics such as drugs or narcotics. These JITs check more and more Belgians in the Netherlands, and if relevant, an information report (RIR) is created, which is then send to the relevant police units in Belgium. So, while West Coast police can also access these RIRs, they are not operationally involved within these JITs.

⁴ This year, this event will take place on July 8, 2012.

International Rogatory Commission

A final CBPI at West Coast police are the so-called International Rogatory Commissions. Basically, these concerns interrogations and house searches conducted by foreign police and judicial organisations commissioned by the national (e.g., Belgian) public prosecutor. These commissions occur in two forms, namely with and without physical presence of foreign police officers. According to the Director of West Coast Judicial police, the latter are an excellent tool to make contact with foreign police colleagues, who can be contacted on other dossiers to share knowledge and information. At the same time, these initiatives also provide an excellent opportunity to acquire knowledge, experience, and insight into the workings of the foreign police and judicial system

All these CBPIs provide ample opportunities to share knowledge, either directly or indirectly. This will be illustrated in the following paragraphs. Before doing so, we will however describe the specific institutional and cultural context of all these CBPIs.

The Institutional and Cultural Context

In this section we summarize the contextual setting of the CBPI in West Coast police. Subsequently we will highlight the general institutional framework of the Schengen agreement(s) and the institutional-cultural profile of the Euregion Eurometropool and West Coast police.

The existence of CBPIs - and of CBPPs in particular- is strategically linked to the implementation of the so-called Schengen agreement(s) in Europe, including the treaties of Doornik 2001, Senningen 2004 and 2011, Enschede 2005 and Prüm 2005 (De Weireld, 2005). As such, the working of these CBPIs is embedded in a complex European institutional safety and security framework of formal European police agencies (e.g. Frontex) and bi- or trilateral agreements (Kolesnikova, 2011). The complexity of this institutional framework is mainly caused by a high political concern for state sovereignty (Brammertz, 1997). A rather vague and general legal framework that creates a very divers and “vector”-wise implementation process throughout all member states is therefore inevitable (O’Neill, 2010). In this implementation process, cultural traditions - including differences in national safety and security values, norms and attitudes - lead to different forms of police collaboration (den Boer and Spapens, 2003). The specific institutional-cultural profile of a particular Euregion therefore determines the specific nature of the CBPI collaboration and knowledge sharing.

As far as the general safety and security attitude and profile of Belgium is concerned, CBPIs are considered to be important and valuable instruments to overcome cross-border criminality. Within the Belgian institutional framework, fundamental reforms are for instance considered to facilitate the activities of foreign police units on Belgian territory (e.g. the law on “het Belgisch Politieambt”). At present, heads of local Belgian police units can decide to work together with foreign police agents, but they can’t give (real) authority to them when they enter Belgian territory. This can only be done by the national Head of the Belgian police (i.e. centralization) which takes quite some time and effort. Future changes

within the national legal framework will alter this more rigid and centralized principle. Presumably they will stimulate and facilitate also future CBPIs.

As far as the more specific institutional-cultural profile of the Euregion Eurometropool is concerned, the collaboration and knowledge sharing of the CBPIs is based on a rather limited and restricted institutionalized formal framework between the Belgian and French police. This is mainly due to the rather strict interpretation of the French sovereignty when it comes to their national safety and security policy (Brammertz, 1997). Collaboration and knowledge sharing is however present, but is according to most interviewees rather based on strong informal and personal relationships between the Belgian and French police than on numerous and extensive bi-or trilateral policy agreements. Institutional arrangements are however not completely lacking. An important institution is for instance the so-called Common Police and Customs Office (CCDP) situated in Tournai or Doornik (Dupuis, 2010). This joint French-Belgian Police Office supports the coordination of international police interventions exceeding the French and/or Belgian territory. As such, the CCDP in Tournai can also support the CBPIs of the Euregion Eurometropool/West Coast police. In contrast to other Belgian Euregions, the Euregion Eurometropool does however not dispose of a specialized Police Information-crossroad Agency like EPICC in the Euregion Maas-Rijn at the border with the Netherlands, Germany and Luxemburg. Consequently, no institutionalized cross-border information exchange is available for the French-Belgian CBPIs in the Euregion Eurometropool/West Coast police.

What Knowledge is Shared and How

In this section we will specify the concept of shared knowledge between the Belgian and French police agents working together within the CBPIs of West Coast police. In line with the COMPOSITE-research project and its conceptual framework, the case-study combines four types of knowledge sharing:

- The exchange of intelligence related information: i.e., information on wanted individuals or groups of interest, vehicles, border security issues, profiles of crimes and criminal records;
- The exchange of safety-security advice: i.e., operational suggestions or guidelines on how to observe, control, pursuit and arrest “correctly” in joint CBPP actions (e.g., what to do in case of violent attacks that need armed police intervention? What to do when criminals seek shelter in private housings?);
- The exchange of safety-security experience: i.e., perceptions and subjective evaluations of, e.g., how cultural differences between the Belgian and French police forces within CBPP’s are experienced and dealt with? What is experienced as “enabling” or “obstructing” a smooth French-Belgian collaboration? What is experienced as the added value of the French-Belgian collaboration?;
- The exchange of evidence-based best practices: i.e., tested experiences on how to organize and structure these CBPP’s in a –more- effective and efficient way (What are the lessons learned? What are recommendations for policy makers involved?);

These four types of knowledge sharing appear throughout the entire set of CBPIs at West Coast police. Often, each particular CBPI combines more than one type of knowledge sharing. In short we can associate the following types of knowledge sharing for each CBPI at West Coast police.

The exchange of intelligence related information

Regarding the sharing of information, we can make a distinction between formal and informal exchange of information. Formal information exchange can be further subdivided into operational and strategic information. Operational information can be shared between West Coast police and the French Police Nationale of Dunkerque and the Gendarmerie of Dunkerque in a direct and in an indirect way. Direct information exchange is done either through telephone (fixed and mobile), internet (i.e., e-mail) and radio communication (with the Police Nationale⁵). Telephone and e-mail are used to inform oneself about certain case-related facts (e.g., persons or vehicles), and radio communication is used to inform the Police Nationale of (vehicle) pursuits heading towards the city of Dunkerque, or other phenomena with a high priority. A direct approach is usually taken in the case of a high sense of urgency. If this sense of urgency is not present, next to the direct approach, an alternative route is via the CCPD⁶ in Tournai (Belgium). At the CCPD, French and Belgian police officers work side by side in the same building, which makes it possible to bypass lengthy and difficult formal procedures to exchange information (c.f., Vermeulen, de Busser, & Cruysveld, 2003). Judicial director Annie Verbeke explains that an additional advantage of the CCPD is that the CCPD also stores meta-information regarding inquiries (i.e., the CCPD has an overview of all parties that have requested this information), and that this information can sometimes provide the key to solving for a specific case. Another alternative to exchange information is by means of the Belgian Federal Police liaison officers that are actually situated in the foreign country (e.g., one is currently situated in Paris). With respect to the exchange of information with Europol and Interpol, the district information crossroads (i.e., AIK) play a major role by acting as a kind of post box.

Strategic information is also shared between French and Belgium police, and in different platforms. On the one hand, there are strategic meetings between the Belgian local Police of West Coast and the French Gendarmerie of Dunkerque to inform each other on the priorities of both sides of the border, and to align the ones that are related to cross-border criminal phenomena. Furthermore, the Chief of police is also a member of the so-called Group of Flanders, which is a platform that connects magistrates and police agents from both sides of the border. He is also a member of the Strategic Committee, which brings together police and justice from France and Belgium to facilitate the cooperation between the two countries.

⁵ At this moment, there is no direct radio communication with the Gendarmerie National because the dispatching of the Gendarmerie switches between Ghyvelde (during the day) and Villeneuve-D'Ascq (at night).

⁶ CCPD stands for Centre de Coopération Policière et Douanière and is a Police Customs Cooperation Centre between France and Belgium, which has the explicit task to act as an intermediary in the exchange of information between French and Belgian police forces. The CCPD was created by the Doornik Agreement of 2001.

Informal information exchanges take place in different forms. During the CBPP, for example, the officers usually exchange information regarding specific phenomena and incidents in an informal setting. Below, we provide an example of how such an informal exchange of information between chief inspector and liaison manager Johan Verlynde and a French colleague has led to solving a cross-border crime.

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

Informal Information Exchange

During one of the CBPPs, Chief Inspector Verlynde told one of his French colleagues that they were currently experiencing a wave of car burglaries, and explained the particular modus operandi that was used to commit these crimes. His French colleague replied that they were experiencing the same phenomenon, which led them to believe that the crime waves at both sides of the border were related to one another, and most likely committed by the same perpetrator. Fortunately, the French police had an eye witness who was able to remember part of the number plate of the vehicle that was involved in these crimes. West Coast police used this partial number plate to conduct a query of their ANPR system to see whether this partial number plate was somehow connected to the incidents at the Belgian side of the border. They found that a specific vehicle that matched the partial number plate entered the West Coast police zone each time just a couple of minutes before the incidents happened. West Coast police then communicated the number plate of this vehicle back to their French colleagues. After inquiring their records, the French colleagues found that this specific vehicle belonged to someone they knew from similar crimes, and were thus able to apprehend the suspect.

During the other cross-border police initiatives (e.g., prevention, joint actions, et cetera), there is also an informal exchange of information. Furthermore, Chief Inspector Johan Verlynde is the liaison manager of the Belgian local Police of West Coast regarding all communication with the French Police. He often visits (or is visited by) his French colleagues to informally exchange information.

The exchange of safety-security advice

During the CBPIs, advice can also be exchanged, although this occurs much less frequently. One particular example is advice that was given to liaison officer Johan Verlynde regarding the Saldus Law⁷, that has recently become operational in Belgium. French police have more experience with the Saldus, because France implemented the Saldus law before Belgium did. Some of his French colleagues explained to him that because of this law, scientific policing becomes much more important (i.e., much more emphasis on gathering evidence). The interrogations generally occur at a later stage in the investigation, if significant evidence

⁷ This law stipulates that during interrogations regarding offenses with a sentence above one year, the client/suspect has the right that an attorney is present during the investigation.

is collected that can be used in the interrogation. One part of the advice was thus that it is better to make a solid case before the interrogation is conducted.

The exchange of safety-security experience

Experiences are exchanged and shared during all CBPIs, although some are a more effective vehicle for this than others. Chief inspector and liaison manager Johan Verlynde explains that work-visits are a perfect vehicle in this respect, as these are specifically designed to experience the operating procedures and routines within a specific safety and security domain at the other side of the border. Judicial police director Annie Verbeke also explains that International Rogatory Commissions are highly educational in the sense that they provide for ample opportunity to experience the workings of the foreign police and judicial system.

The exchange of evidence-based best practices

According to the interviewees, the exchange of best practices between French and Belgian police forces is rather limited, and can mainly be attributed to the difference between the French and Belgian institutional setting. However, exchanges of best practices do take place on occasion. For example, the French Gendarmerie of Dunkerque has adopted the nodal orientation of West Coast police, which has proven to be highly effective in combating the specific safety and security issues in the police zone (van den Oord & Vallet, 2012). The nodal orientation at West Coast police uses (fixed) cameras with automatic number plate recognition software (ANPR) to register all vehicles that enter the police zone. After several visits that were specifically designed to become acquainted with this methodology or system, the Gendarmerie of Dunkerque has adopted this practice in a slightly different format. That is, instead of fixed cameras, they decided to opt for a mobile variant, by using a vehicle with mounted cameras that are able to read number plates in all directions. The Chief of the Belgian local Police of West Coast explains that by using this system, the French Gendarmerie has actually been able to locate ten stolen cars in the period of a single month. Intrigued by the effectiveness of this approach and by the other possibilities that a mobile unit would provide (e.g., the ability to monitor the flow of vehicles at high risk locations in the police zone), the West Coast police chief has recently decided to implement this practice at his side of the border as well.

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

Several different enablers of the knowledge sharing process can be identified, which are explained below.

Technology

Technological developments such as the internet, e-mail, and mobile phones facilitate the sharing of information and knowledge by making the process of communication easier.

Financial resources

While the French Gendarmerie has limited financial means, West Coast police is relatively well-endowed, which enables them to pay for meals and social gathering to grease the cooperative machine.

Social events

On the one hand, social events create opportunities to actually share and exchange knowledge and information. On the other hand, social events also allow the building of stronger personal relationships, which facilitates the process of knowledge sharing in the future.

Leadership

Support of leadership plays an important role in the knowledge sharing process. Without the support of leadership, knowledge sharing becomes much more difficult. For example, lack of leadership support by the French National police of Dunkerque significantly reduces the sharing of information and knowledge with West Coast police.

Culture

An enabling factor is the motivation to cooperate and share knowledge. Open mindedness and awareness of the added value of cooperation generally creates a positive attitude towards cooperation and knowledge sharing.

Language

Language skills play a highly important role in the sharing of knowledge. Without the ability to communicate in a common language, effective (i.e., direct or real time) knowledge sharing becomes virtually impossible.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

Regarding the obstacles of the knowledge sharing process, we have observed the following:

Organisation

In France, there are multiple police forces (e.g., police national, gendarmerie national, and PAF) that do not work together or operate in an integrated manner (Cap et al., 2008), which hampers the process of knowledge sharing considerably. Instead of sharing information and knowledge with a single organisation, information and knowledge needs to be exchanged with multiple organisations to effectively combat cross-border safety and security issues.

Technology

While technological developments, such as the internet and mobile telephones facilitate the exchange of information and knowledge, technologies can also hamper the process of knowledge sharing. For example, different technological standards in radio communication hamper direct radio communication between French and Belgian police forces.⁸ Another technological obstacle is the fact that the databases of the French police forces are not integrated. The director the judicial West Coast police explains: "In some cases, we provide

⁸ Belgium uses Tetra technology for their radio communications while France uses Tetrapol. Despite the similarity in names, these two technological standards are not compatible with one another. West Coast police has partially solved this problem by installing a radio post at Dunkerque National Police. For the Dunkerque Gendarmerie, a solution is currently being developed.

the link in the sharing of information between the police national and the gendarmerie national, in the sense that information travels via Belgium from the French Police Nationale to the French Gendarmerie, and vice versa". Another technological obstacle is the fact that there is no national register in France like there is in Belgium, which keeps track of the location of citizens. This means that it is difficult to get personal information about a French citizen without his actual date of birth. Because perpetrators often do not carry official identification documents, it is virtually impossible for us to know the date of birth and to request (police) information from our French colleagues about this perpetrator.

Politics

According to the Chief of West Coast Police, one of the reasons of this lack of communication, coordination, and cooperation between the different French police forces is the absence of a mandate to the prefect in France to coordinate the French police forces, which was also observed by Cap et al. (2008) in their study on international cooperation between Belgium and French police forces.

Legal/institutional

Another obstacle to knowledge sharing is the absence of a legal/institutional framework that requires police forces to participate in CBPP (or CBPI), which makes the occurrence of CBPIs completely dependent upon the individuals (and their priorities) involved.

Management

Another obstacle is that the management and staffing of police forces in France changes every three (i.e., for the Gendarmerie) or four (i.e., for the Police Nationale) years. This rotation of management was recognized by all interviewees as an important impediment to effective knowledge sharing and cooperation. The Chief of West Coast police explains: "Every time a change in management occurs, we need to convince them of the importance of cooperation. If they do not see the added value, it becomes an extremely difficult process." What makes this process difficult is that Belgium benefits more from cooperation than France, as cross-border crime mainly consists of French citizens committing crimes on Belgium soil. This is reflected by the fact that the new Chief of the Police Nationale in Dunkerque does not see the added value in cooperating with West Coast police and is not interested to join the strategic meetings. The Chief of West Coast police does not understand this attitude, especially given the location of the Nuclear Power Station in Gravelines, which is the fifth largest nuclear power in the world. The Chief explains, "In the context of disaster control, I think some coordination is essential".

Language

Another barrier to knowledge sharing is one that is of a linguistic nature. Because French police officers are generally not able to speak Dutch, the only language that can be used is French. Although this should not be a problem for a bilingual country as Belgium, language is a real 'hot potato' (this is also reflected by the fact that the Brussel-Halle-Villevoorde conflict lingered on for more than a decade). Chief inspector Johan Verlyne explains: "According to the police statute, police officers of the Belgian local Police of West Coast do not need to be bilingual, which makes it impossible to 'make' them communicate with their French colleagues." Director of intervention of West Coast police adds: "Unfortunately,

some of our colleagues even have a prejudice against French people and French speakers in general." This language barrier was also observed in the study by Cap et al. (2008).

Human Resource Management

According to the Chief of the Belgian local Police of West Coast, human resource management forms another obstacle for knowledge sharing and cooperation. At this moment, training and education is mainly focused inwardly, on national laws, organisations, and procedures. Very little attention is paid to international issues, systems, laws, et cetera. Besides increasing insight into the working of international systems, exposure to different national systems, laws, and cultures would also lead to lessen prejudices, and would thus increase both the hard and soft cooperative skills of police officers.

Future Perspective

The future needs with respect to international knowledge sharing for the Belgian local Police of West Coast is largely dependent upon the strategy chosen to combat cross-border crimes.

As becomes clear from this case study, borders are still very real for police forces which provides an opportunity to criminals to exploit these borders to their advantage (i.e., to avoid getting caught or to minimize punishment). According to the chief of police, there are three basic options to combat cross-border crimes more effectively.

- Authorize foreign police forces: this implies authorizing foreign police forces through bilateral or multilateral agreements and treaties to enable them to more effectively fight cross-border crime⁹;
- Creation of a border zone: this implies creating a border zone where foreign police forces have shared authority and shared commissariats¹⁰;
- Operational Europolice: this implies creating an operational Europolice with authority across borders to tackle cross-border crime.

Obviously, these alternatives have large consequences for the knowledge sharing needs between the respective police forces. For example, the creation of an operational Europolice would require extensive knowledge sharing between the national forces and the Europolice, while an authorization of foreign police forces would place more emphasis on knowledge sharing among the national police forces.

⁹ At this moment, Belgian police forces do not even have the right to arrest or stop people in France. However, a creative interpretation of the Treaty of Prüm allows for a possible backdoor. According to the Treaty, stopping/arresting people abroad is possible if people are in (direct) danger.

¹⁰ At this moment, chief inspector and liaison manager Johan Verlynde is exploring the possibility of creating an autonomous service for knowledge sharing and cooperation between the police forces from France (Gendarmerie Dunkerque) and Belgium (West Coast police). This service would collect information from both sides of the border and take targeted actions to combat cross-border crime more efficiently.

The Chief of the Belgian local Police of West Coast further argues that what is needed in the short term is a border safety and security plan to coordinate and integrate the partners in the safety and security chain (much like the 'national' and 'zonal safety plans' that exist in Belgium) across the border. After all, cooperation and knowledge sharing needs to be multidisciplinary (i.e., combine police and justice) to come to an efficient and effective solution to tackle cross-border crime. In outlining a system for border supervision, de Jong (2011) also recognizes the need for an integrated system, which analyses stored information in a central database to properly assess safety and security issues for the planning of appropriate action. After all, with the right information, it is possible to create the situational awareness that is necessary to effectively combat the safety and security issues that exist. This view is supported by most interviewees, who argue for the creation of integrated systems and databases that facilitate knowledge sharing across the border.

According to the Chief of the Belgian local Police of West Coast the police are currently in a complex tangle with respect to knowledge sharing, due to the number of organisations (bodies) present in the police landscape (e.g., local police, federal police, district information crossroads, Europol, Interpol, Liaison officers, et cetera). As a member of the fixed committee that represents the local police at the federal level, he is currently involved in the construction of a document that would untangle some of the currently complexity by creating more clarity with respect to what needs to be shared with whom, and who has access to what kind of knowledge.

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2. Police Bilateral Cooperation in Europe. The role of the Police-Customs Cooperation Centre (CCPD) of Tournai (Belgium)

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Overview

This paper deals with Police bilateral cooperation in Europe through the analysis of one specific case study: the Police-Customs Cooperation Centre of Tournai¹¹, whose function is to coordinate the exchange of information between French and Belgian Police institutions.

It is based on interviews conducted on the 15 March 2012 with the French co-director of the CCPD and his deputy¹². Therefore, the analysis essentially focuses on the activities of the French team within the Centre.

Context

Origins

The CCPD has no legal links with EU institutions, but its existence is grounded in the Schengen Agreement of June 1985. Article 39 of the Convention implementing the Agreement provides that the signatory states "undertake to ensure that their police authorities shall (...) assist each other for the purposes of preventing and detecting criminal offences". The article mentions the exchange of information, the ability for national police to continue chasing criminals even they cross a border and the secondment of liaison officers in neighbouring countries. In the aftermath of Schengen, several agreements have been signed by France and its neighbours to organise bilateral police cooperation. One of those is the "Agreement of Tournai" signed by France and Belgium on the 5th of May 2001 and that created the CCPD of the same name. The CCPD was officially inaugurated on the 10th of September, 2002. Nine other CCPDs have been established at the borders with Spain, Italy, Switzerland (even though Switzerland is not a member of the Schengen system), Germany, and Luxemburg.

¹¹ A city south of Belgium located a few miles from French northern borders.

¹² Several other members of the CCPD have also been met on this occasion, including the Belgian co-director and his deputy. However, no formal interview was conducted with them.

Governance

Being a transnational institution, the CCPD is co-directed by two senior officers representing the two police systems involved in the cooperation process. The “Commissaire divisionnaire” who manages the French team answers to the Direction of the “Police de l’air et des frontières” (Air and Border Police) at the ministry of Home affairs.

The CCPD is also supervised by a “Strategic Committee” that convenes once a year to discuss the orientations of Centre’s activities. The Committee includes officials of the Administration and the Judiciary of both countries, notably the Préfet of the “Région Nord”, the Governor of the West Flanders Province and the Attorney general of Mons. Several working groups have been set up within the CCPD to elaborate proposals pertaining to bilateral cooperation. Such proposals are discussed by the Committee and transmitted to the ministry¹³.

Structure

The CCPD has 39 employees (25 French and 14 Belgians). The French team comprises members from each of the various agencies involved in the fight against crime: the gendarmerie, the customs administration, and several branches of the *Police nationale*. All these agents work in the same building (the headquarters of the Belgian federal police in Tournai).

What Knowledge is Shared and How

Criminal intelligence

The main function of the CCPD is to centralize the sharing of criminal intelligence between France and Belgium. Information on individuals or criminal issues may also be exchanged at the level of local police units but at a less formal level¹⁴. Indeed, officers on both sides of the border are accustomed to work together on a daily basis and often find it easier to phone their colleague when they need details on a suspect. However, only the information officially transmitted by the CCPD can be used in the framework of a criminal prosecution.

The centre has received 24418 requests for information in 2011. About 70% of them have been made by Belgian police authorities, and this imbalance is due to the asymmetric structure of criminal flows between the two countries, as much more offences are committed in Belgium by French citizens than the other way round. Belgium, whose legislation is more liberal, attracts notably prostitution clients and “clubbers”, who are likely to be involved in a variety of troubles such as drunk driving. Belgium is also a transit platform for French drug dealers buying their merchandise in the Netherlands. Differences in legislation in both countries make it also easy for French criminals to get official registration cards for stolen vehicles.

¹³ One such proposal made by the members of the CCPD relates to the extension of the Centre’s geographical area of jurisdiction so as to include the French *département* of the Pas-de-Calais.

¹⁴ Direct cooperation between local police units is legal under article 10 of the Tournai Agreement.

The requests revolve mainly around:

- The backgrounds of suspects arrested abroad
- The identification of stolen vehicles or the checking of license plates
- The checking of ID documents

Biometric data (DNA, fingerprints) cannot be transmitted by the CCPD, since the Treaty of Prüm allowing it has not been ratified by Belgium yet.

The official procedure for national police units that need such data is to contact their own colleagues inside the CCPD, who will, in turn, officially ask the officers representing the other country. The information can usually be collected quickly, since the members of the CCPD have immediate access to all their national police databases. On the French side, the databases mostly used are the SIV (file of license plates), STIC (police), Judex (gendarmerie), FVV (stolen vehicles), FPR (wanted persons' file), and FNE (national file of foreigners). The SIV itself accounts for about 58% of the requests.

The CCPD's jurisdiction is limited to the French *départements* and Belgian *provinces* that are along the border. However, in practice, the Centre answers requests from all over the territory and sometimes from other CCPDs (in 2011, 4% of the requests have been made by other CCPDs). 90% of requests are answered within four hours.

Illegal immigration

The CCPDs also contribute to the preparation of the transfers of illegal immigrants from one country to another. In 2011, the CCPD of Tournai has received 701 requests pertaining to illegal immigration.

Public order

The intelligence shared pertains also to maintaining public order, i.e. the management of public events such as demonstrations or strikes. Many transnational groups or social movements organize demonstrations in Brussels because of its symbolic status as "capital of Europe": workers' unions, farmers, extreme-rightists, anarchists, bikers... The French team of the CCPD keeps abreast of these events and provides either on request or spontaneously to the Belgian police information on the French citizens involved in such events: names or photographs of activists, description of their vehicle, meeting points in Brussels, etc.

Cross-border patrols

The CCPD is supposed to contribute to the coordination of cross-border police patrols. However, the local police forces are used to act autonomously in that domain and do not even always keep the Centre informed of their initiatives.

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

Location in the same building

The CCPD is literally a connecting point, a nod between several information systems. Its strength is to gather in one place agents having access to various criminal data sources that are usually geographically and technically separated. The point in creating CCPDs was to

bring together two networks of information from two different countries and also to pool the electronic resources of the French police, gendarmerie and customs administration. Usually, the members of any of these three institutions cannot have direct access to the databases of the two others. Being located in the same office greatly facilitates the sharing of information. Moreover, the officers seconded by the police and the gendarmerie to the CCPDs are the only ones in France to have directly access to the databases of both institutions.

The location of both national branches of the CCPD in the same building also reduces the delays in transferring external requests, analyzing them and providing back the relevant information. Indeed, officers have only to cross a lobby to explain a specific case or to speed up the process in case of emergency.

The daily personal interactions also lower the potential reluctance of CCPD members to share criminal information about their fellow citizens with policemen from another state. The members of the CCPD, whether French or Belgian, have learnt to perceive themselves as professionals pursuing common objectives and not as representatives of their respective national institutions.

Experience and networks

The personal background of the CCPD French members is another facilitating factor. As “insiders” who have held many positions in various parts of the country¹⁵, the senior officers of the Centre have acquired an in-depth knowledge of the organisation and have built networks that are an asset in the process of information sharing. The CCPD benefits from their ability to identify the right office or to directly contact a former colleague when it comes to collect details on a specific case or individual.

A background as an investigator is also useful to analyze and treat information requests from local police. For instance, the identification of a false license plate on the basis of a photograph may require know-how and initiative. The French coordinator of the Centre insists on the fact that his subordinates are not only computer operators, even though their mission does not involve field intervention; his perception of the CCPD as an investigation unit has been repeatedly asserted during the interview.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

Lack of visibility of the CCPDs

Strikingly, the head of the French team described his organisation as efficient and did not mention the barriers one could have expected, such as the language (the Belgian officers of the Centre all speak French, even when Dutch is their mother tongue) or the lack of human resources.

¹⁵ French policemen and gendarmes usually have to change region if they aspire to higher positions in their institutions. Most senior officers have been working all over the country during their career.

According to him, the main weakness of CCPDs at this point is their lack of visibility within the French police institution. Earlier interviews conducted in the framework of the WP3 have indeed shown that local police units inside the country were not keen on asking for information from foreign countries. This may result from a widespread ignorance of the facilitating role of the CCPDs. An interview recently conducted with a senior officer of the gendarmerie of Dunkerque pointed out that even in units very close to the border, direct cooperation with Belgian colleagues was usually preferred to the CCPD channel. The French-Belgian police cooperation could be made more effective if the existence, the mission and the functioning of the CCPDs were better known.

CCPD officers are aware of the problem: in order to promote the Centre, the coordinators or their deputies periodically attend conferences and training sessions in police and gendarmerie schools and local units.

Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

Analysis

Under the Agreements of Tournai, the CCPD is only an information collector and transmitter. The current French coordinator has started to develop a new function through the creation of an "analysis unit" within his team. The purpose of this unit is to elaborate memos based on the data collected daily by the CCPD on transnational criminal processes (for instance, the traffic of stolen metal from France to Belgium, where the law makes its selling easier). In the interview, the French coordinator referred to the CCPD as a "facilitator" in terms of access to information but also as a "stimulator" that spontaneously provides police administration with expertise.

Future Perspective

Towards a European police network?

As for now, the CCPD is only a bilateral institution, even though its existence is grounded in the Schengen Agreements. According to the French coordinator, the CCPDs could become the "*embryo of a European police*" for small to middle-size criminality (Europol being focused on major crimes). It would require a networking of the resources of all CCPDs and some kind of institutional link between them all at the EU level. However, the position of the French administration on this issue seems to be strictly bilateral at the moment.

3. Cross-border Collaborative Work: German-Polish Police and Customs Cooperation Centre in Świecko, Poland

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Overview

The ability of police forces to cross-border cooperative police work has become vital. In times of Europeanization, Globalisation and Schengen it is inevitable to work together fast and efficient. Therefore Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCCs) have been established all over Europe. This study examines the German-Polish Police and Customs Cooperation Centre in Świecko with the focus on knowledge sharing. The cooperation centre in Świecko is one out of 38 PCCCs in Europe.

What Knowledge is Shared and How

The German-Polish Police and Customs Cooperation Centre in Świecko started its service on December 17th 2007 and thus is one of the younger centres in Europe. The officer in charge of German-Polish relations of the police of the Land of Brandenburg, Mr. Lietsch stated: *‘The cooperation centre is the realization of a vision of Polish-German cooperation that has existed for a long time’* (2012)¹⁶. It was established to ensure fast cross-border operations, pooling of competencies of different security services, tightening and pooling of different communication channels and standardised processing of requests for information. The PCCC was also supposed to establish savings in personnel and material resources as well as having a specialist contact person available at all times for both sides. The cooperation is based on the German-Polish contract of February the 18th 2002. This contract specifies the juridical requirements and sets the boundaries in which the cooperative work is legal and uncomplicated. Both countries, Germany as well as Poland, regard the cooperative police work as essential for the future. The Ambassador of Poland in Germany, Mr. Prawda just recently stated: *‘Poland and Germany have built a common stable ground for a close, future*

¹⁶ „Das GZ ist die Umsetzung einer seit Langem bestehenden Vision der deutsch-polnischen Zusammenarbeit.“

oriented cooperation that is based on partnership over the last centuries. This cooperation has to be fostered and should help create trust and reliability. Brandenburg, which has rendered outstanding service in intensifying the good neighbourly relations, possesses a specific role in this case (...). (2012)¹⁷. The Minister of the Interior of the Land Brandenburg Mr Woidke complemented: "(...) This type of delinquency [cross-border crime is meant] can only be fought together – German and Polish safety authorities bear a common responsibility. We have been focusing on a close cooperation long-since. A lot has been reached, but the cooperation has to be intensified and enhanced even more (...). (2012)¹⁸.

Structure

The PCCC in Świecko has two Coordinators, one from the Polish and one from the German side. Together they coordinate the regular as well as the operational duty of the centre (see figure 1). Thirty-nine German police officers and 25 Polish officers work side by side and together at the PCCC. On the German side these are police officers from the Police of Brandenburg (15), Saxony (1) and Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania (1) as well as the Federal Police (20) and the Federal Customs Administration (2). On the Polish side there are officers from the Police of Poland (7), the Border Police (13) and the Customs Administration (5).

The basic tasks of the cooperation centre are:

- Ø Collection and sharing of basic information
- Ø Processing of requests for information
- Ø Supporting the coordination of police operations and the coverage of operational situations
- Ø Coordination of repatriations
- Ø Support and facilitation of Polish-German teamwork and cooperation in general

¹⁷ „Polen und Deutschland haben über Jahrzehnte hinweg gemeinsam standfeste Grundlagen für eine enge, partnerschaftliche und zukunftsorientierte Zusammenarbeit aufgebaut. Diese Zusammenarbeit muss gepflegt werden und dem Ziel dienen, Vertrauen und Zuverlässigkeit zu schaffen. Eine besondere Rolle kommt dem Land Brandenburg zu, das sich um die Vertiefung der gutnachbarschaftlichen Beziehungen besonders verdient hat (...).“

¹⁸ „(...) Diese Form von Kriminalität kann nur gemeinsam erfolgreich bekämpft werden – deutsche und polnische Sicherheitsbehörden stehen in einer gemeinsamen Verantwortung. Wir setzen mit unseren polnischen Kollegen seit langem auf eine enge Zusammenarbeit. Es wurde viel erreicht, aber wir müssen zu einer weiteren Intensivierung und Verbesserung der Kooperation kommen (...).“



Figure 1 Organisational structure of the PCCC in Świecko

Within the operational duty of the PCCC which takes place on a 24h/7d basis, Polish and German officers sit together at one desk. Every agency has its Polish or German counterpart of the other side directly across. Thus face-to-face exchange is fast and efficient. The daily work is based on mutual trust and respect and amicable cooperation. Legal foundation is set by the German-Polish cooperation contract of 2002, article 4 and 5.

Information get acquired, obtained, analysed and transferred. Such information can involve for example identification of individuals or vehicles, relatives, victims, repatriation logistics or GPS data.


Rarely there are research requests on systems of the Polish police coming from Germany. Requests from judicial authorities happen more occasionally. They like to use the fast and easy short but still official channel of the PCCC. Rogatory letters are frequently handled at the centre as well.

Other tasks of the centre are crime prevention as well as training and schooling.

Knowledge transfer processes

The process of knowledge transfer itself usually happens via telephone and email. Normally requests from German and Polish authorities come in per phone as pre-information. The face-to-face desk-contact between German and Polish colleagues allows a fast verbal consulting, coordination and agreement with the opposite colleagues. After that a written announcement and filing via email or fax follows. While the written announcement gets processed the execution has already started. This contributes to the fast actions.

The transfer process can look as follows:



And vice versa!

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

One major facilitator is the ability to work fast and efficient considering the simpler requests. The exchange happens directly, thus fast and uncomplicated. There are no language barriers in the direct contact of the officers at the PCCC since every officer there has at least basic knowledge of the other language. This adds to the fast and efficient work. Information gets passed without any loss of time.

Another facilitator is the good working atmosphere. The cooperation between all colleagues is good and there is a mutual trust and understanding which contributes to it. The officers at the PCCC work on first-name basis no matter what position. Since Polish and German colleagues work side by side and face-to-face, they know each other personally and there is no distance. *The readiness, the willingness to help the other person will be higher after all than when we would be No-Names (...). Normally there is a certain distance [when you don't know each other personally]*¹⁹. Common trust is seen as the crucial factor which also helps sometimes to get 'more' information than actually possible. Diverse juridical perceptions can often be resolved bilaterally on the basis of personal contacts.

One further reason for the effective knowledge transfer and work altogether at the PCCC may also lay in the history of good contacts that could be built up since the beginning of the 90s already. Many of the German officers at the centre have had good relations and contacts to Poland long before the centre was founded and even helped to establish the cooperation.

The commitment of the single person is seen as one other important contributing factor. People at the centre are quite dedicated. All officers are willing to reach the goals of the PCCC.

¹⁹ „Diese Bereitschaft, das Wollen, dem anderen zu helfen, wird doch bestimmt größer sein, als wenn wir so No-Names sind. (...) In der Regel ist das doch so, dass da eine gewisse Distanz da ist (wenn man sich nicht persönlich kennt)“

The selection of German personnel takes into account the record of the officers considering language abilities, relations to Poland, sympathy, intercultural competencies and such. This can also be seen as facilitator for the good cooperation and work altogether.

The good handling of the existing technology like computers, internet or intranet is also seen as facilitator, although there is no common database to use yet.

There are no technical or organisational barriers considering the accessibility and availability of the PCCC. The centre is reachable permanently at 24 hours.

There is cooperation with the University of Viadrina in Frankfurt on the Oder, Germany, where officers learn not only Polish but also specific police vocabulary.

The PCCC has also been able to establish good contact to other public authorities like the (municipal) registration office or the safety and public order office.

The centre itself offers trainings and schooling to other agencies.

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

The Stolen Lorry: An example from the daily business of the PCCC in Świecko
In Sweden a lorry load with one million Euro worth of electronics was stolen and on the way to the Ukraine via Poland. After a while the Swedish police informed the Federal Police in Kiel, Northern Germany. Since the officers in Kiel knew about the PCCC in Świecko, they put the Swedish police in touch with the PCCC. The Swedish Police transferred the case and the GPS data of the stolen lorry to the German Federal Police at the PCCC. Very fast the current position of the lorry could be localised with Google Maps. The Polish police officers at PCCC, who got the information face-to-face from their German colleagues, informed their colleagues at the responsible police stations. After the stolen lorry had already crossed Poland and several police districts with a changed registration number and a changed colour of the trailer it could be seized successfully near the Ukrainian border.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

One of the main barriers mentioned was the lack of staff. This seems to be one of the major problems not only the PCCC has to face. It was stated that the centre already works on its limits sometimes especially with sick days and likewise. If the PCCC in Świecko expanded its services in the scope of the other PCCCs in Europe, it would not be able to keep up the good work and performance but would probably collapse. It was also said that most of the police stations in the surrounding areas which the PCCC repeatedly has contact with are very often understaffed.

The probably most obvious barrier -the language barrier- was mentioned also but not as frequently. This does not seem to be an urgent barrier of the PCCC itself. The officers working at the centre are able to speak the opposite language rather good. But since the

requests are usually coming from patrolling officers of the surrounding areas or even further away language can still be a problem sometimes. In addition there is also the possibility of small translational mistakes which then can lead to poorer outcome.

Barriers can also be situated in different cultural or organisational factors. While the German police are federal the Polish police are centrally organised. Directions from the central Polish police department are hence valid for the whole country. There is one main commandant's office with the function of a central department. This sometimes makes things difficult. For example, if the main commandant's office decides that a request is not urgent according to article 39 of the Schengen Agreement, then the Polish police at the PCCC will not answer the request.

Another problem presents the different juridical situation (different laws and legislation). Thus the PCCC can only handle cases which are criminal offences in both countries. Traffic offences for example are by Polish law an infraction when happening without personal injury while in Germany being a criminal offence no matter what. Moreover administrative offence acts cannot be processed regularly by the PCCC only in case of urgency calls. The different agencies at the centre however have different opinions about what is urgent. The police force of Brandenburg acts when fast transfer of information is needed. The Polish police force only acts in cases of life and death while the Polish Border Police acts more flexible. This sometimes can make fast acting difficult. Besides administrative offence acts could not yet be handled on a regular basis because of lack of staff. The Polish police force also handles some tasks differently than the German force due to the different legal systems. It is difficult for the PCCC as well to process chain requests (start in one European country and run through several PCCCs to reach the responsible authority), mostly because of the restraints of the Polish police even though on some occasions they have already been handled well. Furthermore frequent processing of chain requests would lead to personal oversteering.

Besides the mentioned lack of staff organisational barriers can also involve lack of resources. Sometimes in the police stations which are alerted by the PCCC there are only few radio cars available for duty and they already got called to another operation.

Technical barriers are few but still should not be left out. There is no common software or database. Also the forces are not linked with each other. The transfer only works face-to-face.

One other barrier to acknowledge is the insufficient publicity of the PCCC. It was mentioned that the centre needs to be better known everywhere as to be able to support when there is need. Even though the requests have steadily increased since the opening of the centre (raise of 1734 from 2009 to 2010) many officers in the forces do still not know about its capabilities.

Future Perspective

As mentioned before, there is still a need to increase the publicity of the centre. Not only should the officers in the surrounding areas know about the centre, but also what it is

exactly able to perform. One officer said: "*The publicity of the centre must be increased, not only that we exist but also what capabilities we've got*".²⁰ Better public relations need to be implemented not only for Germany and Poland in general but on a more global basis too. A better knowledge of the centre and its work should be implemented to ensure that police officers of all state-forces, the Federal Police, Federal Custom Administration, Federal Criminal Police Office, State Criminal Police Office and so on know what to do and whom to contact in case they need to.

Apart from the need for better knowledge of PCCC like Świecko, there also seems to be a need for more trainings and schooling. One interviewee pointed out that better language knowledge including English and a better intercultural understanding will be inevitable in the future and that authorities should put more effort in training officers in it. In addition legal knowledge and forensic knowledge will be requiring more training in the future and the transfer of such knowledge respectively. Therefore more such trainings should be offered widely.

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²⁰ „Der Bekanntheitsgrad [des GZ] müsste erhöht werden, nicht nur das es uns gibt, sondern auch welche Möglichkeiten wir haben.“

4. Emerging from crisis: police joint training as a key enabler. A case study on Arma dei Carabinieri international cooperation on civilian crisis management

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Summary

The proposed case study aims to show how specific, skills-oriented knowledge is shared and how it will generate direct benefits for the involved police forces, allowing for tangible skills sharing, harmonization and interoperability at a national and international level.

The case study is focused on the analysis of the "European Union Police Forces Training 2009" (EUPFT 2009), and its ongoing developments within the "European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013" (EUPST 2011-2013). Such initiatives, driven by Italian Arma dei Carabinieri within the European Commission "Instrument for Stability" (IfS), can demonstrate how an interagency common approach is crucial to the alignment of policing practices in critical environments, not only enhancing technical skills, safety and security of operators, but also to the overall benefit of the local populations and authorities served by the Civil Crisis Management Missions. Such alignment in the use of techniques and procedures, corresponding to international policing best practices and standards, may enable the involved Countries to contribute more effectively to international stabilization efforts in Countries emerging from a situation of crisis, in settings where the shift from a military to a police mission is key to recovery and promote security and human rights.

Specific attention is posed on International synergies in terms of knowledge transfer opportunities; key factors are presented, with specific attention to training design and approach, to subjects and assets involved, to lessons learned and possible future developments.

Context

Within the framework of the European Instrument of Stability²¹, Arma dei Carabinieri obtained funding and leadership of two relevant joint training initiatives: the “European Union Police Forces Training 2009” (EUPFT 2009) and the following “European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013” (EUPST 2011-2013).

With the aim of comparing best practices at the European level, and also taking advantage from lessons learned during previous initiatives²², Arma dei Carabinieri conceived first a modular training project, aimed to train about six hundred European police experts in the field of international crisis management. Such programme has been proposed and funded under the European Union 2007-2009 Instrument for Stability.

As a step forward, to refine the successfully tested EUPFT 2008-10 training modules, Arma dei Carabinieri submitted a new proposal to the EC and obtained to manage the EUPST 2011-2013 programme; objective of this project is to enhance the international policing skills of around 2,400 police officers from the EU, non-EU countries contributing to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, and African Union countries, for participation in EU, UN and/or African Union and other international civilian missions as well as to draw lessons from this undertaking in order to contribute to wider international efforts in this field.

Both training programmes include practical exercises, and are oriented to develop a rapid deployment capability of police elements in crisis management operations. EUPFT 2009, concluded, already received feedbacks and generated recommendations²³; EUPST in an

²¹ The European Union's growing willingness to assert itself as a key player in the management of international crises, has led the European Commission to undertake a series of initiatives relating to the Peace Building Partnership policy aimed, firstly, at the prevention of conflicts. In this context, one of the main financial instruments made available by the European Commission is the "Instrument for Stability" (IFS), established by EC Regulation No. 1717/2006 of 15 November 2006 – European Parliament. Such instrument is focused on "capacity building" and it is aimed, in particular, to achieve four objectives:

- development of the operational capacity of non-state actors;
- improvement of the mechanisms of the "early warning" and access to political research on the field;
- adoption of common tools by the United Nations, World Bank and other international organisations, as well as by the EU Member States;
- identification of European training standards, compatible with those in use at the United Nations and other international organisations, to strengthen and widen the number of trained experts available for deployment in international missions.

²² See, e.g., the Training sessions organized in 2008 by the French National Gendarmerie at the National Training Centre of the Gendarmerie of Saint Astier. The 2010 programme has been developed under the lead of the German Bundespolizei in Brandenburg.

²³ See European External Action Service (EEAS), CIVCOM advice on the Lessons and best practices for CSDP from the European Union Police Force Training (EUPFT) 2008-2010, Brussels, 30 January 2012. Available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/feb/eu-eeas-csdp-police-training-2008-2010-18536-11.pdf>

ongoing programme, also aimed at receiving and testing the lessons from the previous programme.

The present case is aimed to show how specific, skills-oriented operational and organisational cooperation produced and will generate direct benefits for the involved police forces, fostering synergies at the national and international level, also by promoting human rights oriented approach.

What Knowledge is Shared and How

Specific activities

The "European Union Police Forces Training 2009" (EUPFT 2009) was conceived and articulated in three training sessions, each lasting two weeks. The first week of theoretical and practical learning, aimed at comparing best practices and procedures; the second week has been devoted to a complete role-playing game, for command posts and operational units, simulating the deployment of a multinational police coordination, responsible for replacement and strengthening of local police, in a fictional destabilized Country (State of "Ambria," self-proclaimed independent on the island of "Centria"), simulating investigations, as well as counter organized crime actions, forensic procedures and high risk arrest procedures with hostage liberation.

As for the following "European Union Police Services Training 2011-2013, the specific objective is to enhance the international policing skills of around 2,400 police officers from the EU, non-EU countries.

In particular, the training setting is based on 7 sessions, focused on Substitution or Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising functions for crisis management and stabilization (e.g. HQ's activities, Crowd Control, Public order, Criminal Investigations - war crimes, organised crime, trans-national crime, Scientific Investigations, Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT), Close Protection, Explosive Ordnance Devices (EOD), protection of Human Rights in policing). The training program, including both public security aspects and the wider rule of law sector simulating interactions with the criminal justice system and the Civil Society, is designed to pay particular attention to the sharing of know-how and best practices.

Subjects and assets involved

639 police officers have been trained within EUPFT 2009, from 19 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Romania, Slovenia and Spain) and from 25 police forces, both with military and civil status.

Activities have been also attended by representatives of the Department "Peacekeeping Operations" of the United Nations and the European Gendarmerie Force, and, as observers, officers of the Gendarmerie of Argentina and Turkey, representatives from the Organisation of African gendarmerie, and officers from the Gendarmerie of Algeria, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Senegal.

2400 will be trained during EUPST 2011-2013, with the participation of Guardia Civil – Spain, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs / Directorate of Security and Defense Cooperation (DCSD) – France, Ministry of Interior / National Gendarmerie directorate / International Cooperation Directorate (DCI) – France, The Royal Maréchausée – The Netherlands, Romanian Jandarmeria, European Police College – CEPOL, Egypt and Cameroun police and security forces.

The deployed assets outlined a model of the typical unit of stabilization (Multinational Specialized Unit / Integrated Police Units / Formed Police Unit), has been articulated providing staff members dedicated to the general prevention and public order (FPU / IPU), and the Specialized Police Element, consisting of teams for criminal investigations, forensic analysis, protection of witnesses and individuals who cooperates with the judicial process, the high-risk operations unit (SWAT) and anti-sabotage artificer function.

Moreover, the special unit for the evaluation on respect for human rights is deployed, in order to monitor and oversight activities conducted during the exercise, to detect possible violations of international standards on the preservation and protection of human rights.

The needs

The performance of police duties in destabilized contexts by multinational units requires a high degree of interoperability that balances the nature of the assets deployed and the typical emergency setting, and also calls for common operational procedures and shared tactics²⁴.

Specific problems in such context are:

- different legal framework/background;
- different operating procedures;
- different threat patterns characterizing the domestic environments (e.g. diffused crime, organized crime, terrorism, piracy, white collar crime);
- different approach to the victims;
- different operating tools (weapons, uniforms, cars, Communication and Information Technologies).

The needs can be summarized in:

- opportunities to directly experience the integration of many “police-identities” in a joint mission,
- increase the effectiveness, sharing and comparing capabilities and procedures.

²⁴ Arma dei Carabinieri is involved in several international operations (e.g. NTM-I - NATO Training Mission in Iraq, ISAF - International Security and Assistance Force and EUPOL - European Union Police in Afghanistan, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti - MINUSTAH), deploying its MSU (Multinational Specialized Unit) and IPU (Integrated Police Unit)- See Arma dei Carabinieri website for further details:

<http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Arma/Oggi/Missioni/Oggi/>

The approach

An innovative approach for knowledge sharing in police environments has been recognized starting from the EUPFT 2009 sessions: such approach placed the emphasis on specialist police components, in synergy with the traditional police components of public order maintenance and general prevention. Particularly appreciated was also the formula based on training modules, which has managed to combine the theoretical and doctrinal aspects with the eminently practical skills.

Operators from participating Countries have been encouraged to present and compare their operating procedures for the resolution of a series of events, simulated by specific scenarios within the "story line" of the exercise. Within this framework, e.g. the British "bobby" worked in close cooperation with investigators from Estonia, Spain and French Gendarmerie, as well as experts in forensics from Portugal, Poland and Greece had the opportunity to compare their practices and methods. Every level of the hierarchy has been involved.

In general a balance between theoretical and practical activities has been kept.

On one side, "best practices sharing" classes are adopted, in order to foster the face to face knowledge exchange and to build confidence; each class was (and will be) focused on a specific topic (e.g. public order, forensic, etc.).

On the practical side, role play was (and will be) key for the real testing of skills and practices; during EUPST 2009, an entire week of full immersion simulation has been carried out in the Italian city of Vicenza.

This common approach provided²⁵ and will provide an alignment of the whole participants in the use of the techniques and procedures corresponding to the international policing best practices and standards, and focusing on awareness of human rights compliant police procedures.

It is interesting to note that a dedicated steering committee²⁶ will identify the best practices, allowing a systematization of the outcomes.

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

Several facilitating elements have been recognized, by involved actors and CIVCOM²⁷. Among others, human rights and gender-perspective have been considered, also by Arma dei Carabinieri, as factors that improve effectiveness of operations and missions.

Realistic and detailed scenarios of the exercises, encompassing a large spectrum of

²⁵ See already mentioned CIVCOM advice on the Lessons and best practices for CSDP.

²⁶ The Joint Working Group on Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

²⁷ See already mentioned CIVCOM advice on the Lessons and best practices for CSDP

activities to be performed in an substitution/executive-type mission, allowing units, teams and individual police officers to directly test how to operate jointly, which is very useful in the sense of exchanging expertise and skills and acquiring knowledge.

Also the validity of the main doctrinal parameters as described in the EU document "Concept for Rapid Deployment of Police Elements"²⁸ has been confirmed as a facilitating common conceptual ground.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

With regard to factors that can hamper a proper knowledge sharing (and, therefore, a proper cooperation on the field), language skills are one of the main concerns.

During EUPFT 2009 misunderstandings in the interpretation of orders led sometime to wrong execution, with potential risk for trainees.

Shortfalls were noticed in the area of information management and flow of information among the trainees, as well as in the use and interpretation of the tactical vocabulary.

A typical language-related gap has been recognized in the use of radios.

Also communication and information flow showed some gaps, e.g. in terms of assets and procedures (the absence of an integrated, centralised system, as well as a standard radio system).

In general, both technical and procedural issues can affect the correct information flow, calling for joint training on information management.

Finally, also different styles of command (for example, order-type tactics vs. mission-type tactics) and different approaches to proportionality and progressiveness in the use of force are critical elements for the mutual understanding and can be identified as key topics in policing knowledge sharing.

²⁸ Doc.8508/2/05 - RESTREINT UE, by the Council of European Union/Secretariat

Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

Training Exercises

In the EUPFT 2008-2010 Exercises, their assessments found out inter alia that:

- appropriate Standing Operating Procedures, indicating relevant administrative, sectors tasks, and daily procedures, should be produced and applied, thus facilitating the interaction among trained participants. Lack of Standing Operating Procedures creates still the main problem;
- Commanders in charge should be given a dedicated period of time to sort out all necessary administrative matters, work out structures and chains of communications, assign tasks and responsibilities, create a "To Do List", etc;
- radio communication network should be provided at national level for the lesser units and in a common working mission language for the staff and main units;
- language skills should be improved (sometimes communication went slow/chaotic because of the hesitation/embarrassments to speak Mission language).

Related to that, in the EUPST 2011-2013 exercises:

- the presence of Rule of law will be foreseen, with a view of widening the scope of the exercise;
- could be considerable to establish a systematic approach of command and control routine using a standard model for sufficient information and work-flow and work division;
- the exercise documentation should include the main CSDP police guidelines as well as booklets on Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, Vulnerable Groups and radio communication procedures so that all the officers may be well prepared in advance of the exercise;
- personnel selection as to language skills should be improved;
- from a very early stage on, all units and components should have at least a dedicated period of time to get in contact with commanders and sub commanders as well as key positions in order to organize vital elements of performance, communications and responsibilities, etc.

Such considerations, coming from the assessment of the exercise sessions¹, contribute to the alignment of operational procedures, not only enhancing technical skills, safety and security of operators, but also the overall benefit of the local populations and authorities served by the Civil Crisis Management Missions.

Acknowledgments

The Arma dei Carabinieri EUPFT 2009 has met with unanimous approval, also recording a surplus of applications.

Flattering statements were made by senior officers who have covered the role of "Head of Mission" (belonging respectively to the French and Romanian Gendarmerie and to the German Federal Police), as well as by the Ambassador of the European Commission at the Political and Security Committee of the EU, Richard Wright, during his closing speech.

Also the Council of the European Union, in the framework of the 2974th External Relations Council meeting, held in Brussels on 17 November 2009, acknowledged the relevance for civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions of the Instrument for Stability project EUPFT 2009²⁹.

Future Perspective

Following the experience of EUPFT 2009, Arma dei Carabinieri submitted their proposal for the European Union Police Services Training (EUPST) 2011 – 2013, with the aim of widening the perspective and to spread practices and lessons learned.

The global objective is to strengthen the civilian crisis management capacities of the participating countries. This will let the mentioned countries contribute more effectively to international stabilization efforts in countries emerging from a situation of crisis, thus promoting peace and security. For these purposes the main issues to be fixed for the future are related to the following paths:

- Focusing the disparities in courses of action and procedures among participating police services, in order to achieve a real synergy and unity of action in a crisis situation, for EU Member States, non-EU countries contributing to CSDP missions, and African Union countries;
- To enhance the flexibility and the interoperability of police elements when deployed in the framework of civilian crisis management and stabilization missions either by the EU, the AU, the UN or other organisations such as the OSCE;
- Advancing towards "harmonized" approaches in the delivery of training and promoting a common approach (both at EU level, and as a contribution to wider international harmonization in collaboration with partners such as the UN, OSCE and other international/regional organisations). To this aim, the training sessions can provide a two-level knowledge transfer: the first level includes a theoretical part on different police issues; the second level is training for trainers.
- Mainstreaming human rights, including women's rights and children's rights and the protection of minorities, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups in civilian police missions, in line with relevant EU policy.

²⁹ The Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions Press Release, 2974th External Relations Council meeting. Available at:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111265.pdf

The development and implementation of joint training will homogenize the level of skills of EU Police forces and their activities, in accordance with the European standards and the objectives of the Guidelines.

5. Experience With Joint Investigation Teams In The Netherlands: A Pragmatic Approach

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Introduction

In October 1999, the European Council agreed the implementation of Joint Investigation Teams (JIT) to improve the international (European) police and judicial cooperation with respect to cross-border crime. The rationale behind this decision was that close cooperation among police officers from disparate countries facilitates the quicker sharing of information, as local knowledge and contacts are readily available. In addition, a common objective and central management improves the coordination and transparency of criminal investigations. This allows for more effective and efficient international collaboration and knowledge sharing in detecting and investigating crime ranging from the modus operandi of criminal offenders to the juridical possibilities of addressing them.

Although the objectives of JITs may sound as 'music to the ears' of crime fighters, the practical implementation of this promising instrument proved to be less simple than was expected in 1999. In fact, this tool for knowledge exchange on crime detection and investigation was hardly used in the Netherlands until 2009. Legal, cultural and organisational (*institutional*) differences and communication problems appeared to be the major barriers to achieve operational cooperation within a JIT.³⁰ Recently, the number of JITs in the Netherlands has increased dramatically. This implies that, to the extent that international cooperation for crime detection and investigation is inherently information gathering and exchange, recent years have seen a considerably increase in cross-border knowledge sharing. After all, a JIT *is*, inherently, the exchange of knowledge.

On the basis of police literature and 31 interviews with Dutch officials,³¹ this case study addresses the value of this tool for cross-border transfer of knowledge within investigations.³² It further addresses the reasons for the increased use of JITs in the

³⁰ Corten-Van der Sande and Martens (2006), Van Hasselt (2001), Prins (2008), Rijken and Vermeulen (2006), Rijken (2005), Willems (2007), Spapens (2011), Block (2011).

³¹ Officers of the police, Royal Dutch Marechaussee (Koninklijke Marechaussee / KMar), the Fiscal Intelligence and Detection Agency (Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst / FIOD), and Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie / OM).

³² The case study is based on data gathered by Sollie, Snel and Kop (2011) and Sollie and Kop (2012).

Netherlands in recent years, aiming to identify enablers and barriers for cross-national knowledge sharing. More specifically we will consider the following questions:

- i) What barriers hinder the implementation and effectiveness of JITs?
- ii) How can barriers be overcome (good practices)? and
- iii) How does a JIT facilitate cross-border knowledge sharing?

Before answering these questions, we provide background information about the practice of JITs and the frequency with which this instrument is used in the Netherlands to date. The focus is on JITs in the Netherlands in cooperation with surrounding countries Germany, Belgium, England and France.

What Knowledge is Shared and How

Since July 1, 2004, it is possible for Dutch law enforcement agencies to participate in a JIT.³³ A JIT is established between at least two countries. It is aimed to achieve a specific goal and restricted to a predetermined period (with potential extensions). The overall goal of a JIT is to carry out criminal investigations collectively across national borders,³⁴ and therefore the sharing of information. Basic criteria for the use of a JIT are:

- i) That the crime has a transnational character, i.e., the offenses relate to and / or disrupt the legal system(s) of at least one other Member State.
- ii) It is expected that multiple requests for cross-border assistance are needed in investigating these offenses.
- iii) The criminal offenses in different countries require a coordinated and joint action of investigation.
- iv) It is expected that the joint investigation in a common team will lead to benefits not obtainable in separate national investigations.

To set up a JIT, the respective national judicial authorities need to request the establishment of a JIT and sign a written agreement. The establishment of a JIT is based on two requirements: (1) an incoming or outgoing request for mutual legal assistance and (2) the permission of the Board of Prosecutors-General (requested via the national JIT expert at the National Prosecutors Office). In the Netherlands, the Chief Prosecutor, in whose jurisdiction the JIT must perform its acts of investigation, signs the agreement. Matters set out in this agreement are, for instance the duration and purpose of the team, the direction and number of participating members, its location, and its organisational and logistic facilities. It is also possible to set out limitations on the investigative and detective powers of Dutch

³³ On July 1st, 2004, the European rules on JITs (section 13 of the Agreement with regard to the mutual requests in international legal assistance in criminal cases between the member states of the EU) became operative in national (Dutch) laws, in sections 552qa up to 552qe of the Code (Act) of Criminal Procedures.

³⁴ Alongside the legislation, a "Designation international Joint Investigation Teams" of the College of Procurators-General is applicable in the Netherlands, in which the procedures regarding the establishment, scope, composition, and powers of JITs are listed.

investigators abroad, and vice versa. Finally, the agreement requires an operational action plan outlining in depth the contents of the investigation.

Up until March 1st, 2012, a total of 23 JITs were set up in the Netherlands (see Table 1).³⁵ The type of crimes addressed by the respective JITs varies, ranging from investigations on human trafficking, drug trafficking and financial crime to homicide, theft and handling of stolen motorbikes, piracy and hostage-taking. The last example (hostage taking) is a case that demonstrates that JITs may have a very narrow focus and may be set up as short-term initiatives. It started by an emergency procedure: the national JIT expert at the National Public Prosecutor's granted oral consent on behalf of the Board of Procurators-General, so the JIT could start immediately.

Table 1: Number of Dutch JITs in the period July 2004 – March 2012

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number	1	0	0	1	2	5	2	9	3

Information exchange and knowledge sharing among members in JITs focus mainly on:

- i) Each other's investigative methods (operating procedures).
- ii) Legal options in order to determine how to address suspects.
- iii) Building evidence by operational information about suspects and from information obtained by tapping, secretly monitoring and the interrogation of suspects.

Box 1 provides a concrete example of a Dutch JIT with Belgium. Most JITs in the Netherlands are performed in cooperation with Belgium. To this date, this amounts to twelve JITs. JITs were also established with England (5), Bulgaria (3), Germany (1), and France (3). All past JITs were bilateral, i.e., a cooperation between only two countries. In early 2012 the first multilateral JIT started including the Netherlands, Belgium and France.³⁶

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

JIT Netherlands – Belgium

In September 2008, the supra-regional Investigation Team Northwest Netherlands started an investigation into a group of people, who were guilty of committing car thefts in the luxury segment (often preceded by a burglary) and of committing car burglaries, which included the removal of registration certificates and number plates. In addition, this group was also responsible for the handling of stolen cars and giving stolen cars a false identity.

While conducting this investigation, the Dutch and Belgium investigation teams were in close consultation. Although there had already been frequent requests for mutual international legal assistance, the teams decided to establish a JIT. The aim was simple: arrest the criminal group and get them convicted.

³⁵ Situation as of March 1st, 2012: At this time 4 JITs are in the preparatory phase, including a multilateral JIT between The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.

³⁶ Resulting in the sum of 24.

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE...continued

JIT Netherlands – Belgium

The reason for the establishment of a JIT in this case was that during the investigation it became clear that the suspects were travelling to Belgium on a regular basis, where they also conducted similar crimes. Accordingly, a large number of requests for mutual international legal assistance would be needed to complete the planned investigative operations (i.e., for observations, tapping, house searches, seizure and arrests). This would have hindered the efficient exchange of information. It was also considered helpful to coordinate the investigation on this group between the Netherlands and Belgium.

After consultation, the JIT agreement was signed on February 6th, 2009, by the Chief Prosecutor of Haarlem and the investigating judge at the Court of First Instance in Antwerp. The JIT leader in the Netherlands was a prosecutor, in Belgium an investigating judge. Furthermore, from the Belgian side a 'prosecutor of the King' was attached to the JIT. On the Dutch side 13 investigators were included in the JIT agreement and three on the Belgian side. It was also agreed that Dutch investigators can carry out investigative actions in Belgium only under Belgian law, and must always be accompanied by a Belgian investigating officer, and vice versa. In addition, members who were posted abroad were not allowed to carry arms and could be called as witnesses in criminal cases in the other country. The working language was Dutch, and both countries were responsible for their own expenses. It was further agreed that although the investigation was originally based in the Netherlands, the Belgian members could work from Antwerp. The duration of the JIT was five months.

The objective of the investigation was achieved: the criminals were arrested. The team members from the JIT are very positive about the cooperation in this investigation. They indicate that the intensive contact within the JIT made it possible to exchange information easier and faster. The quality and completeness of the exchanged information was brought to a higher level. According to the team members, the (coordination of the) information exchange was difficult at the beginning, due to unfamiliarity with each other's operating methods and because of the different institutional roles and positions (e.g. the role of the investigating judge in Belgium is unknown in the Netherlands, also the way of recording investigative information differs). However, by pragmatic consultations with each other on how to proceed on these matters in the future, these obstacles could be removed easily.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

The aim of JITs is to make the detection and investigation of serious transnational crime more effective. Surprisingly, in the early years the instrument was seldom used in the Netherlands. According to studies by Sollie, Snel and Kop (2011) and Sollie and Kop (2012), three types of barriers are responsible for this fact:

1. Differences in priorities and considerations on capacity

The decision to investigate a crime in the Netherlands takes place in a structured manner based on the principle of opportunity.³⁷ If the police can gain insight into a criminal act or phenomenon, which requires further investigation, they write a project proposal that is submitted to a regional or national '*weeg- en stuurploeg*' (Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG)).³⁸ This committee deliberates whether or not it is opportune to perform the investigation and in what way (type of research, human and financial capacities allocated, duration, use of research methods, etc.). In this procedure, a JIT has to be approved by the relevant TCG. Since Dutch law enforcement authorities often make strategic choices based on local and regional criminal activities and process in terms of short-term investigations, JITs in the Netherlands often do not get approved – or are not even considered as a valuable instrument. Also, changes in running investigations that impact the duration, purpose, or the capacity of a JIT have to be approved by the TCG, which is not the case in other countries. These strategic considerations and processes are not recognized abroad and cause delays and distortions in the establishment or performance of JITs.

2. Lack of information sharing and analysis

Decisions about whether or not a criminal phenomenon has priority, capacities for its investigation and considerations regarding the desirability of cooperation with foreign partners, require a considerable amount of information up front in order for decisions to be made. This includes insights into what kinds and how many criminals are involved, what their role is, and what the consequences of their criminal activities are. Only on the basis of this information, can an operation plan for a JIT be written. To obtain this knowledge, however, exchange of information is needed beforehand. To build a common investigative goal, detectives should exchange information with each other and jointly analyze criminal groups and/or phenomena. This structural exchange of information between countries hardly takes place. This is due to³⁹

- i) Organisational conflicts in the way and style of information exchanges.
- ii) Changing priorities with regards to types of crimes and therefore changing priorities for information.
- iii) Lack of legal knowledge about what information one is allowed to exchange with other countries.
- iv) Insufficient technical and / or financial resources to develop information exchange systems.
- v) Language differences and differences in definitions in the recorded (registered) information with the consequence that information cannot be exchanged automatically and therefore becomes time consuming and dependent on specific individuals.

³⁷ With regard to criminal investigations most countries in Europe have adopted another philosophy based on the principle of legality.

³⁸ The Dutch '*weeg- en stuurploeg*' is the equivalent for Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG). TCG is mentioned in the Home Office Code of Practice with regard to the 'National Intelligence Model' (NIM) of the UK, 2005 (January 12), p. 9.

³⁹ Sollie & Kop, 2011

The lack of information sharing and therefore shared understanding of common problems causes blindness to the needs of a JIT. Accordingly, no capacity is granted.

3. Different operational considerations (procedures)

As highlighted above TCGs play a crucial role in authorizing an investigation. A TCG decides on whether or not it is opportune to carry out the investigation. Further, we outlined the importance of a-priori information on these decisions by TCGs. These two constraints apply to all investigations conducted in a Dutch context, so also for JITs. The considerations of Dutch investigators, when confronted with transnational crimes, thus depend on these limiting conditions. Moreover, there are three ways to set up and conduct international investigations:

- i) By submitting a written request for mutual legal assistance to foreign investigators, who then perform the requested research operations abroad.
- ii) Using a parallel or mirror investigation, in which investigators from two or more countries conduct the same criminal investigation on their own territory, but with mutual ties. The investigative activities between the detection teams are then aligned and free exchange of information takes place on the basis of legal requests.
- iii) Within a JIT, in which investigators carry out investigations within one team, on foreign territory, and share information freely among themselves.

The decision regarding which of these three tools to use is affected by the following five factors:

- i) Requests for mutual legal assistance and parallel investigations can be performed routinely based on years of experience in providing for today's local and regional investigative needs.
- ii) Because many investigations are conducted under time pressure, the tendency is to make decisions quickly for well-known processes.
- iii) There is still limited knowledge about JITs (e.g. how to establish a JIT, what are the options for goals, etc.) as well as negative stereotyping also with respect to the implementation of joint investigations (e.g., 'the process to create a JIT is too bureaucratic, 'performance is subject to complex legal regulations').
- iv) Because a JIT-partnership is not free of obligations, once established, no one has ultimate and complete discretion over the performance and staff.
- v) Due to the close cooperation a JIT demands, this instrument is subject to the standard constraints of international cooperation (such as language barriers, organisational, cultural and legal differences)⁴⁰, which clearly dampen the enthusiasm for JITs.

⁴⁰ E.g.: the competences of the police and the Prosecution Service (i.e. the prosecutor) in criminal investigations, the way of registration or reporting of investigations and the handling of evidence, the way to give / give not special powers to special investigation units, the way data are analyzed, dealing with information and whether or not to disclose it (i.e. disclosure rules - UK), dealing with the media in investigation, et cetera.

It should be noted that these factors are interrelated and together have a negative impact on the decision to conduct a JIT.

For joint investigations, it is necessary that countries attach similar priority to tackling a criminal phenomenon and are willing to release capacity. This is difficult to achieve in practice, given the limited information exchange and the differences in detection policies. A JIT is conducive to information sharing processes; yet, even before a JIT can be established, it is already necessary to share information. This issue is hard to overcome.

Still, despite these barriers, the use of JITs has increased considerably in the Netherlands, and investigators are excited about its possibilities. The next section describes how this change occurred.

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

A number of developments have contributed to the increased use of JITs in the Netherlands from the first JIT in 2004 and the most recent Dutch JIT in 2012:⁴¹

- i) New European and bilateral conventions simplified the cross-border cooperation for criminal investigation and detection.⁴² Also, jurisprudence arose regarding how European principles such as trust and mutual respect should be interpreted. The Tampere Program (1999) has been followed up by the programs of The Hague (2004) and Stockholm (2009). This has provided clarity about the deployment capabilities of JITs.
- ii) In European and national guidelines governing the use of JITs the directive of 'one team, one leader, one location' has been abandoned in practice.⁴³ This makes the deployment of JITs more flexible and therefore more attractive. This implies that a JIT does not necessarily have to settle on one predetermined location. Instead investigators within the JIT can work and contribute from their own desk. They only have to travel abroad when absolutely necessary, e.g. to exchange information and/or conduct or coordinate an investigation. Investigators are thus no longer absent from their work location and residence for long stretches of time. There is also more flexibility with regards to the leadership of the JIT, in that the respective team leaders

⁴¹ Take into account that JIT is information sharing as such!

⁴² Bruggeman (2011a, 2011b) provides an overview of key developments in the field of EU police and judicial cooperation in the past decade.

⁴³ In practice there are many pragmatic solutions to get around 'bureaucratic' barriers. Two examples are: 1) The names of the members of a JIT are not in the agreement itself, but in an addendum. Members can thus be changed during the JIT. 2) Confidential information is shared through the Dutch part of a Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIE), so that this information is known to the Dutch part of a JIT but not in a formal report (PV). It thus has not to become public.

have the possibility to collectively manage the JIT. This gives each chief the possibility to retain control over the personnel and research.

iii) Pragmatic solutions:

- a. Use of broader objectives: extending the focus beyond specific criminal groups gives the opportunity to address broader crime phenomena.
- b. The focus is not solely on combating serious and organized crime, but also other, less serious forms of transnational crime (e.g., high volume crime).
- c. Utilization of the opportunities that enhance the legal basis of cross-border information exchange.
- d. Discretion in the management and the structure of a JIT: Each participating country has a degree of freedom in managing the capacity and efforts *during* the investigation and is, in mutual consultation, able to tailor the JIT to match his/her own country's interests and needs.

These pragmatic solutions show that police organisations are increasingly experimenting with the deployment capabilities of a JIT and its knowledge/information sharing opportunities.

- iv) Different agencies are now expanding their focus on supporting JITs. Thus, the national JIT expert in the National Prosecution Office and the Hague-based European agencies such as Eurojust and Europol can play an important role in preparing and/or carrying out JITs. This allows the creation of a JIT to become easier and faster (using an emergency procedure even within one day!).⁴⁴

Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

Although the JIT instrument experienced a difficult start in the Netherlands, the number of JITs has increased considerably in recent years, and begin to win the trust of investigative officers. This is mainly due to the positive experiences of various Dutch law enforcement agencies gathered in joint investigations with Belgium, Britain, France and Germany. Regarding various obstacles – such as the preparation, legal differences, choice of location, the leadership and the content of investigations – pragmatic bottom up-solutions have popped up; solutions that were taken up by European and national institutions.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ The *JIT-expert* is able to provide the investigation officers with advice and tips, and can help in preparing the JIT agreement and the operational action plan. In addition, the JIT-expert is able to make the application procedure at the College of Prosecutor-General more flexible. *Eurojust* can provide financial and facility resources (such as meeting rooms and translations or financial support for travel and subsistence). Support capabilities of *Europol* provide analytical capacity and secure information exchange channels. Furthermore, the *Dutch Desks of Eurojust* and *Europol* mediate in establishing contacts with foreign law enforcement agencies and provide advice on international police and judicial cooperation.

⁴⁵ For instance, Eurojust has a written JIT manual and the Netherlands' National Prosecution Office made a new designation-note in both documents, in which the pragmatic working processes have been taken over and thus formalized.

The shared experience among experts is that the main synergy of a JIT comes from the conduct of the international investigators. If team leaders and members, as well as the organisations they work for, are ready to accept each other's differences and interests, pragmatic solutions can be brought forward. If these conditions are met, positive experiences and results are possible; prime amongst them:

- i) To easily exchange information, which means knowledge is collected more rapidly.
- ii) To react quickly to new developments in actual investigative research.
- iii) To be able to use the exchanged information in case files, without having to submit time-consuming requests for mutual legal assistance.
- iv) To carry out a greater number of research actions due to additional investigative capacity.
- v) To learn from and use each other's investigative tactics and techniques.
- vi) To gain knowledge about other cultures, organisations, procedures (Standard Operating Procedures) and legal systems, and thus to become more professional.

In the Netherlands (very) positive experiences have been gained from working with JITs. Still, one should not think lightly about the deployment of this legal instrument. After all, a JIT is a legally binding agreement with a foreign partner about knowledge sharing. At the start of an investigation it is not (entirely) clear, what research dynamics will occur and what effect this may have on mutual cooperation. Therefore, it is important that the partners are willing and able to cooperate. This means that it is important to take into account each other's interests with regards to the purpose, direction and location of the investigation, as well as with regards to the investigation period and the distribution of research activities. Further, in order to avoid ambiguities and false expectations, participant countries should agree on: information sharing procedures, the use of special investigative powers, how and where to arrest suspects, the seizure procedure, conducting of interrogations, recording of investigations and evidence, and the celebration of successes or coping with failures. It is also advisable to discuss and record how, where and when the prosecution will take place.

Conclusion

The European Council sought to create the JIT instrument to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of large-scale cross-border investigations. Also, the European Council sought improvement to the sharing and exchanging of information on criminals, and local operational practices. But as outlined in this text, this is easier said than done. Legal, organisational and cultural (institutional) differences, as well as barriers on language, make cross-border cooperation with regards to criminal investigation a complex undertaking. Common barriers are differences in priority and capacity, limited sharing of information and (results of) analyses, and different operational procedures and considerations. Also, the original top-down structure of JITs missed the connection with the operational investigative work. Nevertheless, some investigation officers pioneered the capabilities of the JIT. It was a pragmatic (bottom up) approach to deal with the aforementioned barriers that arose from the existing diversity regarding the organisation and functioning of law enforcement agencies in Europe. The sharing of best practices in using JITs in the Netherlands gradually increased enthusiasm (and still does!). The JIT instrument changed from a bureaucratic and

unpopular vehicle into a flexible form of cooperation to combat transnational crime. Currently, JITs are deployed in different ways with regards to different forms of transnational crime. The experiences with JITs, although no panacea, prove that international cooperation and thus knowledge transfer can take place effectively and efficiently.

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6. The Police and Customs Cooperation Centre In Le-Pertus: Cross-Border Collaboration Between Spain And France

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Introduction

This report aims at presenting the analysis of a cross-border collaboration initiative: the Police and Customs Cooperation Centre at Le Pertús (France). These centres, spread all over the Schengen Area, are a valuable local tool in the process of direct cross-border cooperation, taking to account recent and future developments, especially regarding to information exchanges. They bring together, on one site, all the security authorities of all participating States. The fact that staff from the agencies of different States work side by side with common objectives contributes to narrowing the gap between methods and administrative cultures and to a better understanding of the working procedures of each organisation.

Located in positions of strategic importance for observing cross-border crime, these centres play a key intelligence role for the operational services. Using a simple procedure they can deliver quick replies in all fields of the border agencies' activities. As a tool of local collaboration they are thus ideally suited to the day-to-day needs of cross-border cooperation. In this respect, we believe this case is of genuine interest and provides insights that others could find helpful.

In order to write this report, a lot of documentation was reviewed coming from the organisation itself (internal documents and legislation were studied). Also, several interviews were conducted⁴⁶. In particular, five semi-structured in-depth interviews were

⁴⁶ The research team tried to interview police officers from the different police forces that work in the Police Cooperation and Customs Centre of the Le Pertús. Nevertheless, such forces were reluctant to participate in

conducted in the Mossos d'Esquadra headquarters during the month of February 2012. All of them were very relevant and the sample was well chosen. These five interviewees were police officers within the police force and had different levels of experience regarding the centre. All the interviews lasted between one hour and one hour and a half. The interviewers were not allowed to record them but they were well documented.

The Police and Customs Cooperation Centre in Le Pertús

Background

In 1990, before the Schengen Agreement (signed in 1985) had been implemented, a Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement was signed. It was this Convention that created the Schengen Area through the complete abolition of border controls between Schengen states, common rules on visas, and police and judicial cooperation.

Cooperation between Member States' police forces and customs administrations became crucial to the maintenance of security within the Schengen Area. In this regard, the countries agreed that police services, in the field of police cooperation, would endeavour to foster and accelerate cooperation, especially: 1) to exchange information, needed to combat crime, as well as information in the field of crime prevention, 2) to render police and legal help when investigating and analyzing criminal cases, 3) to render the right to persecute the suspect under surveillance on both sides of the border, 4) to render the right to persecute criminals during commitment of crime, and 5) to introduce hotel registration cards in all Schengen countries.

One of the tools introduced in order to do so was the Police and Customs Cooperation Centres, support structures for exchanging information and providing support to the activities of the operational agencies responsible for police, border and customs tasks in the border area. These centres bring together staff from the authorities responsible for security in a single location.

In the case of Spain and France, the bilateral agreement on cross-border police and customs cooperation (Blois, July 7th, 1998) has so far resulted in four Police and Customs Cooperation Centres (PCCC from now on) on the Spanish-French border: Hendaya, Le Pertús, Melles, and Canfranc. The Catalan police force, Mossos d'Esquadra, joined the centres on the Catalan-French border, Le Pertús and Melles, in 2008.

Nowadays, five police forces and two customs agencies work at Le Pertús. Regarding the police forces, we find the Spanish National Police (Cuerpo de Policía Nacional), the Spanish Civil Guard (Guardia Civil), the Catalan police force (Mossos d'Esquadra), the French National Police (Police National), and the French National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale). Despite the agreements are bilateral (France-Spain), it is also possible, by means of these centres, to exchange information with a third country as long as this third country has signed a bilateral agreement either with France or with Spain.

the study and, in the end, it was not possible to interview any of them, neither the French police forces nor the Spanish ones (but Mossos d'Esquadra, our focal police force).

What Knowledge is Shared and How

According to the Council of the European Union (2011), generally speaking, a PCCC acts as a “facilitator” of information exchange between States: its staff are the interface between their national operational agencies and the representatives of the partner State in the PCCC. In this respect, their task is to rapidly provide the operational agencies on assignment with information requested, in accordance with Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of December 18th, 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States and article 46.3 of the Schengen Convention.

Information exchanged via PCCCs relates in particular to petty and moderately serious crime, illegal migration flows and public order problems. Such information may include identification of persons and vehicles undergoing checks of telephone subscribers, or the verification of the appropriateness and authenticity of ID and travel documents, just to give a few examples. More specifically, in the PCCCs, the information that is exchanged is classified in eleven categories: 1) offences against people, 2) criminal damage, 3) economic offences, 4) customs offences (except drugs), 5) immigration offences, 6) traffic offences, 7) offences against public health (drug traffic), 8) ID falsification, 9) road control, 10) offences against public order, and 11) other offences (such as visits to prisoners, environment, or abandoned vehicles).

In the particular case of Le Pertús, different type of knowledge is shared as long as this knowledge is of police and judicial interest. However, request of information might be a little different depending on the police force that is asking for it. For example, on one hand, Mossos d'Esquadra is specifically interested in crimes against people. Thus requests regarding this type of information take place more often than requests about other issues. On the other hand, the French police pay more attention to offences against public health and their demands are usually related to this kind of transgression.

Advice, experiences, and best practice knowledge exchange hardly takes place although informal comparison of work procedures or work conditions occurs regularly. In this respect, one of our interviewees stated: “it is difficult not to (compare) when there are people from different organisations sharing one office, which is relatively small”.

Knowledge exchange takes place differently depending on the urgency of the request. Regarding urgent demands, these are collected by phone/radio. In the case of Mossos d'Esquadra, they may get a call from any unit/section/department within the body. Immediately, the request is made aloud (“we move to the table where the French police officer is sitting at, and together with him, we look for the information we have been requested”). Once they have found out what they want (frequently in less than four hours), they call back the unit/section/department that needed the information. It is important to put any information exchange on record. That is why, after the knowledge exchange takes place, everything is reported and written down.

If the demand is not pressing, a request form has to be filled in by the unit/section/department that needs the information and sent to the PCCC (usually by e-

mail). The process is pretty similar but there is not an urgent need to collect the data and, therefore, the information exchange may take a little longer depending on the work overload. Once it is found, it is also sent back by e-mail.

It is worth noting that all the Mossos d'Esquadra comunicués (both the ones that are the result of French requests and the ones that are the result of Catalan requests) are sent to the Central Area of Criminality Analysis of the force⁴⁷. Last year, out of 561 comunicués, 202 turned out to be of interest for this area and the resulting information was introduced in the area database.

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

Our interviewees identified the following facilitators regarding knowledge sharing in Le Pertús.

- The need to share knowledge. According to our respondents, knowledge sharing takes place because there is a huge need to exchange valuable and useful information that is decisive for police work. In this respect, Le Pertús is on the Mediterranean axis and the border Spain (Cataluña for that matter)-France is particularly busy regarding certain types of offences such as those related to organised crime or illegal immigration. It is therefore imperative to share knowledge.
- Legislation. National laws and regulations, but also European legislation, matter. In this respect, the exchange of information must comply with current data protection and data dissemination provisions in the respect of the national legislation. In one of our respondents' words, "if your legal system does not allow it, you cannot give information".
- Game rules. Having a document with specific rules for operating the PCCC has proved very useful. With regard to Le Pertús, operating regulations were approved back in 2004 and they include issues such as the PCCC mission, coordination, borders surveillance, budget, logistics, or training. These rules balance expectations and, also, help the police officers to know the different police forces work procedures.
- Will, trust and involvement. Despite the existence of an exchange information system, governed by certain rules, efficient cooperation depends on people. Therefore, will to share, trust in other police forces, and involvement in knowledge sharing activities is key.

⁴⁷ This is a particularly relevant unit within the force because it has the responsibility of identifying, gathering, filtering, analyzing and disseminating both operative and strategic information. The former is the information related to complex cases (any type of cases/crimes) and the latter is the information related to global phenomena (in the case of Mossos d'Esquadra, basically, strategic information has to do with organized crime).

- Clear information. According to the police officers, in order to facilitate knowledge exchange, information has to be clear and reliable. "You cannot give information to other police forces which is not clear to you", one of our respondents said. On the other hand, it is also very important to know what is needed. What's more, it is essential to know how to explain to the counterpart police organisation what is needed.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

Actually, most of the acknowledged issues can be both enablers and barriers. For instance, legislation may promote or hold back information sharing. Regarding the latter, one of the police officers we talked to gave us an example: "the French police can easily give us the name of a telephone line holder. However, for us to do so, a judge's authorization is needed". Similarly, when there is will and trust, knowledge sharing is easier. Yet, will, trust and involvement is not always there because people change and the police teams that work at Le Pertús are not the same at all times. Still, there are specific obstacles that our interviewees referred to such as:

- Technological barriers. Even though technology was more of a problem when the PCCC started to work (to give an example, it took Mossos d'Esquadra one year and a half to have a computer), nowadays, there are certain problems that have to do with connectivity (the centre is in the middle of the Pyrenees) and cost (the phone calls are international because the centre is in France).
- The French information systems. While France is a centralized country, the different French police forces manage several databases which are not integrated. Even one specific police force might have different databases with different information. In this respect, there is not exact knowledge on which data is available and who has it. This situation hinders knowledge sharing. As one of our interviewees put it: "our applications are better than the French ones. As a result, when they make a request, they get more accurate and better quality information than we do".
- Language. Despite police officers that work at Le Pertús understand each other quite well ("we have a smattering of Spanish, Catalan and French and that helps communication among us"), the formal documents have to be precise. In this respect, certain expressions/words/concepts do not mean the same nor have the same implications. And this might give rise to mistakes and misinterpretations.
- Lack of recognition. Mossos d'Esquadra is a regional police force. According to the Spanish legislation, only national police forces can work at the PCCCs. However, since the information that is exchanged in Le Pertús had usually to do with offences that were committed in Catalan territory, the presence of Mossos d'Esquadra was accepted back in 2008. However, this informal recognition of the value and responsibilities of the Catalan police force has not formalized. One example may suffice: in order to facilitate the PCCC coordinator's activities, each state may set up a national coordination post. In the case of Le Pertús, the national coordination post is held by either the National Police Force or the Civil Guard. Mossos d'Esquadra is not entitled to play this role. This

situation does not directly hinder knowledge sharing but it has an impact on the Catalan police officers' motivation and, therefore, on their will and involvement when it comes to exchange information.

Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

The PCCC as an example of best practice

All of our interviewees considered the PCCC case was a best practice. They admitted that being at Le Pertús has given rise to numerous benefits. Among them, they referred to international recognition ("Le Pertús has been our window to France and to Europe"), faster and more efficient information exchange, easier crime detection, earlier criminals' identification, and better quality knowledge on offences. Actually, all these advantages could apply to other police forces as well. Yet, for Mossos d'Esquadra this has been a tremendous opportunity to interact with foreign police forces without needing the intermediation of national police forces or having to request the information by means of SIRENE.

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Future Perspective

According to Mossos d'Esquadra, the PCCC of Le Pertús will keep operating as it has been operating up until now since this has proved to be effective. In this respect, it has to be noticed that many of the changes that could enhance knowledge sharing at this centre are not under the control of the Catalan police force. For example, our interviewees stated that the centre should remain open 24 hours since there are many requests at night. Nevertheless, the centre is in France and, as a consequence, it is the French police who decide on the opening hours. Similarly, recognition of the work of Mossos d'Esquadra has legal implications which are beyond the police scope.

Still, there are certain small developments that could take place. Among other, our respondents referred to very different issues such as training, best practices exchange, improvement of the physical space, connectivity or transformation into a border emergency

⁴⁸ SIRENE stands for Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry and outlines the main task of the SIRENE Bureaux established in all Schengen states, which is the exchange of additional or supplementary information on alerts between the states. SIRENE Bureaux provide supplementary information on alerts and coordinate measures in relation to alerts in the Schengen Information System (SIS), and ensures that appropriate action is taken if a wanted person is arrested, a person who has been refused entry to the Schengen area tries to re-enter, a missing person found, a stolen car or ID document seized, etc. SIRENE Bureaux also exchange data important for police and judicial co-operation, conducts database queries, coordinates cross-border operations, etc.

coordination centre. Yet, due to the current economic situation, there is no budget and it seems that the centre will not experience any major changes.

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7. A Case Study on Knowledge Sharing by the Police of the Czech Republic and INTERPOL

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Introduction

This case study highlights the importance of cross-border information sharing. It also shows the possible barriers to information sharing, and proposes ways to solve potential problems.

The Czech team in the COMPOSITE project works mainly with the municipal police which, as follows from the nature of their activities, have not got much experience with cross-border information sharing. We therefore contacted the Police of the Czech Republic and Foreign Police. Foreign police not only have the most experience with cross-border cooperation, but also with control of foreigners in the Czech Republic. Foreign Police Service is a highly specialized component of the Police of the Czech Republic that carries out functions associated with the detection of illegal migration, application of punitive measures against foreigners staying in the Czech Republic in contravention of the Act No. 326/1999 Coll. on the Residence of Foreigners in the Territory of the Czech Republic and on Alterations to Some Acts, as amended, carrying out the tasks arising from international treaties and directly applicable European Community legislation and solving crimes committed in connection with the crossing of state borders and cross border crime.

The case study also highlights the role of INTERPOL offices and joint working places at the borders to neighbouring states in cross-border information sharing.

Overview /Summary

In this case study the Foreign Police of the Czech Republic requested information across the border via the Czech representation of INTERPOL. The Police of the Czech Republic highly value the cooperation with the police organisations of some states of the European Union.

Context

Foreign Police

The Police of the Czech Republic are a national police organisation. One of the services the Police of the Czech Republic is also the Foreign Police, which is one of thirteen police services nationwide.

Foreign Police Service was established by the regulation of the Ministry of Interior No. 67/2008 by which departments of Police of the Czech Republic are established nationwide.

Foreign police is governed by the act on Police. This police service is involved in the performance of basic tasks in protecting the external borders of the Czech Republic. Foreign police perform mainly the following tasks:

- ensure compliance with the obligations arising from international treaties
- take control of a residence
- manage and supervise the activities of foreign trade unions and their deployed workplaces
- operate detention facilities for foreigners
- realize escort connection with the deportation of foreigners or in connection with transit through the territory of foreigners
- perform operations related to providing for administrative deportation, an alien identification or performance of an obligation arising from international treaties
- decide in administrative proceedings as an appeal body
- decide to designate the person as undesirable
- run information systems operating within their scope
- provide travel and transport documents and gives an exit visa for foreigners expelled from the territory
- decide to grant a visa or entry permit in the case of applications for removal of hardness of administrative deportation

INTERPOL National Focal Point

International Criminal Police Organisation – INTERPOL - is the largest international police organisation. The members of INTERPOL are 190 countries that cooperate with the vision "Connecting police for a safer world". As an international intergovernmental organisation INTERPOL provides police cooperation in criminal-police area between the Contracting States of the organisation.

INTERPOL for its activity uses four official languages: English, French, Spanish, and Arabic. In accordance with the Statute of INTERPOL the main task is to ensure cooperation between Member States in the fight against crime, while fully respecting the priorities of the national legislation of a country and their obligations arising from international treaties.

Service standards

The International Criminal Police Organisation – INTERPOL- adopted a resolution which requires member countries to provide basic standards for the activities of National Focal Points in order to ensure quick and high-quality service. To such standards, inter alia, belong:

- definition of position and status of INTERPOL National Focal Points
- continuous operation of the National Focal Point
- linguistic coverage, introduction of a liaison officer function of National Focal Point
- the system of control, coordination, handling and supervision over criminally police information with regard to their severity and sharing
- ensuring of classification of messages
- ensuring of quality control reports
- monitoring and processing requests
- knowledge of the goals and methods of National Focal Point

- strategy of National Focal Point
- specialization within National Focal Point
- professional training and education
- safety measures
- integrity

Telecommunication network

International Criminal Police Organisation - INTERPOL - has a modern telecommunication network, providing a continuous connection between all Member States of the organisation. To ensure technical and operational connection the telecommunication network is divided into zones of communication that allow to keep costs of data transfer to a maximum possible rate and to speed up information flow as much as possible.

The global communication network of INTERPOL I-24/7 is an improved customer service and working tool of international police organisation and provides transmission of information in a user-oriented way. I-24/7 provides for international police forces easier and more efficient way of mutual communication. Via connection to the network I-24/7 we can gain access to INTERPOL databases (see ASF) and the information contained on the INTERPOL website, including important criminal information.

Canada became the first country that on 21st of January 2003 joined the I-24/7 network. In the same year the network was joined also by the Czech Republic.

e-ASF System

e-ASF is an automated computer search system (ASF = Automated Search Facility), through which via a communication network of INTERPOL (I-24/7) each Member State Focal Point can get information from available international databases in a very short real time. In this way based on differently entered criteria we can extract databases of:

- persons,
- lost and stolen travel documents or identification cards,
- stolen vehicles,
- stolen art objects.

Lustration in the e-ASF are performed automatically, directly from the INTERPOL National Headquarters Office in Prague or from authorized institutions of the Police of the Czech Republic to the extent of defined access permissions. Lustration in the e-ASF can be done only on request of state power authorities. In any case, the system cannot be used for the needs of private individuals (screening of vehicles purchased abroad, etc.).

What Knowledge is Shared and How

Knowledge sharing is one of the most important activities of Police of the Czech Republic. Knowledge sharing is important in terms of preventive action, as well as in detecting of violations and criminal acts. Generally, we can summarize the reasons for cross-border knowledge sharing as detection of crime, identification of persons and residence rules, and search for persons.

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

In this case study knowledge was shared among several entities:

- detained person
- Police of the Czech Republic (Foreign Police)
- INTERPOL of the Czech Republic
- INTERPOL of the Republic of Lithuania
- Prosecuting attorney's office of the Republic of Lithuania

A detained person communicated information to the Police of the Czech Republic. The Police of the Czech Republic (Foreign Police) wanted to verify the information from the detainee, but found no record in its databases. As it should have been a foreigner the Czech Foreign Police contacted the Czech representation of INTERPOL. The Czech representation of INTERPOL appealed in a standard way to the Lithuanian representation which further verified the identity of the person. Given that communication within the Police of the Czech Republic and with the Lithuanian representation of INTERPOL was realized electronically through mails and telephone calls there was practically no time delay.

The Czech Republic has signed agreements on cooperation in combating crime, protecting public order and cooperation in border areas with neighbouring countries. These agreements allow individual states e.g.:

- to communicate to each other information relating to specific crimes,
- to cooperate in the search for persons and property,
- to coordinate activities in the protection of state borders,
- to exchange information on the results of forensic and criminological research,
- to provide each other, if necessary, technical means,
- to develop and implement joint programs for crime prevention,
- to cooperate in the deepening professional knowledge,
- to exchange information on legislation,
- etc.

All neighbouring states are members of the European Union. Although the cooperation with Austria, Germany and Poland is smooth, the best cooperation is traditionally with Slovakia. Police officers explain that in terms of long-term friendly relations and also in terms of the fact that there is no language barrier. Requests to the Slovak police force need not be translated, whereas requests to other neighbouring countries are translated into English. The translations take up valuable time.

Besides the monitored case study the Czech Foreign Police communicates in the context of the cross-border sharing of knowledge also with other organisations, such as tax offices, labour offices, individual employers and so on.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

The standard barrier is the used language. Requests are translated into a third language (English) and the responses back to Czech. These translations cause a certain time delay. It is also important that the staff in some countries work in a limited way at night, weekends and public holidays or do not work at all.

Another problem is the countries that are not contractually bound to share knowledge. In this case the Police of the Czech Republic contact the representation of such country. It happens that the representation fails to comply with the requirement of Police of the Czech Republic. Some of these countries do not have their representations in the Czech Republic, which makes the availability of knowledge sharing difficult. Thus the barrier is the lack of communication of one of the parties.

Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

Communication between organisations

Patrol Police of the Czech Republic provided a foreigner who could not prove his identity in any way. Lustration in the available records of the Police of the Czech Republic was negative. The foreigner said about himself he was a citizen of the European Union and had nationality of Lithuania. For these reasons, a written request for verification of identity was via INTERPOL of the Czech Republic along with the photograph sent to INTERPOL of Lithuania. INTERPOL of Lithuania verified the identity of the foreigner according to the sent photograph and stated that the mentioned is wanted for committing a crime in Lithuania. For these reasons, the Czech Republic asked the police to ensure the foreigner until the European arrest warrant is issued.

The Foreign Police of the Czech Republic requested information from the Republic of Lithuania via the Czech representation of INTERPOL. In cooperation of The Lithuanian police and Lithuanian prosecutor's office it was proved that the detainee is searched for in their home country. The Republic of Lithuania took all steps to issue European arrest warrant for that person. Unfortunately, the European arrest warrant was not issued within 48 hours of detention of the person by the Police of the Czech Republic. The Police of the Czech Republic had to release the detained person.

As a general for the police in this case we can state that in the Czech Republic are persons who are sought in his home state. It is therefore important that the national police to actively cooperate in sharing knowledge.

This case study required a longer time to resolve than the period during which the Police of the Czech Republic can lawfully detain a person. On the other hand, the communication between the parties was carried out without problems. The Police of the Czech Republic highly value the cooperation with the police organisations of some states of the European Union. The required information is sent within a few hours since the first contact. In some cases the foreign partner even carries out the necessary investigation in his home state, which is arranged beyond the standard operations.

Future Perspective

The Police of the Czech Republic see no problem in communicating with the border states of the European Union. Communication with the States of the European Union is carried out according to set standards. Cooperation with neighbouring countries is realized via shared facilities, and is very narrow.

In the future no big changes are expected within the Police of the Czech Republic. Cross-border knowledge sharing would benefit from the activation of the Schengen Information System. In terms of knowledge sharing the interconnection of information systems of individual countries would be an ideal state.

A simpler and faster transfer of a foreigner who commits illegal activity to the home country would be another improvement. Such people tend to relapse and commit crimes again.

8. A Case Study on MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative)

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Overview

This case study explores the role of MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative) in regional processes, including the role of knowledge sharing between the police organisations in the beneficiary countries.

The case study is based upon in-depth knowledge of the organisation, their role in the implementation of the project activities, interviews conducted in February/March 2012 with four members of the MARRI Staff, as well as internet based research and review of documentation.

Context

MARRI Regional Centre (RC) is an international governmental organisation, which has acted as a legal entity since 2004. MARRI deals with the issues of migration management in the Western Balkans by promoting closer regional cooperation and a comprehensive, integrated approach to migration, asylum, border management, visa policies and consular cooperation, refugee return and settlement, in order to meet international and European standards.

MARRI organises about 20 conferences and its representatives attend more than 40 international events each year.

Governance

MARRI-RC is non-profit organisation and its connection with the MARRI MS Governments is established through the MARRI Committee and the MARRI Regional Forum.

MARRI RC gathers 6 State Officials, seconded by the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Ministries of Interior/Security from each MARRI Member State [MS] (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia), Director and technical personnel.

Since 2008 MARRI is under regional ownership, this means that the MS are responsible for the policy implementation and financing the Initiative. The MARRI Regional Forum, which is the steering body of the initiative and is composed of the ministers of Interior from the six member countries, has a meeting twice a year. Representatives from international partner organisations and donor countries are also invited to attend. The Regional Forum acts as a platform for co-ordination among the member countries and for consultation with its partners. The initiative is led by a Presidency, held by one of the member countries on a rotating basis.

The MARRI RC acts to support the implementation of the decisions taken by the Regional Forum, by carrying out practical co-operation and activities.

Structure

MARRI is ruled by the MARRI Committee, consisted by the Directors from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (the Committee covers the international and political dimension of the initiative) and MARRI Regional Forum, consisted by the Ministers of Interior/Security, responsible for the political dimension of the initiative, Human Resources Management, priorities for its work, harmonization of the migration with other EU and regional initiatives in the field of law enforcement and forms of cooperation.

MARRI RC, since it was established in 2004, is acting as a Secretariat. The RC is staffed with one representative from each member country. Currently, the Director and three national representatives are with police background, and other three representatives are with diplomatic background.

Regional ownership and regional co-operation as guiding principles

The MARRI RC works at the regional level on issues related to population movements: asylum, migration, border management, visa regime, consular co-operation and sustainable solutions for displaced populations. The RC intends to facilitate the establishment of appropriate legislation, strengthen institutional cohesion and work on capacity building and information exchange in the region in line with the Thessaloniki Agenda, in order to meet international and European standards.

MARRI's ultimate goal is to promote closer regional co-operation in the migration area. Its efforts are focused towards coherent and comprehensive national and regional policies in which regional co-operation are paramount. These objectives are in line with international and European standards. The main tools that MARRI is promoting to reach its goals are

policy harmonisation on a regional level, legislation reform, and state administration capacity building and awareness-raising.

MARRI RC institutionalised the cooperation with ICMPD (2007), IOM (2008), SEPCA (2008), RCC (2009), and FRONTEX (2011).

MARRI RC priority areas are:

- Migration,
- Asylum and Refugees,
- Integrated Border Management (IBM),
- Visa Policy and Consular Co-operation.

Each of these areas has its own set of objectives, determined by the member countries.

In the area of migration, the aim of the MARRI RC is to assist the countries of the region in building a co-ordinated migration management strategy at national and regional level. It also aims to increase knowledge and know-how of state administration with regard to migration issues and to conduct analyses of migration flows in the region. This includes labour migration and the possible establishment of bilateral agreements between sending and receiving countries. It also encompasses redirecting remittance flows into micro investment and micro crediting. The RC also deals with readmission issues, assisting countries in creating sustainable solutions for returnees and in reaching common ground for implementing readmission agreements in the MARRI region. Furthermore the RC works on irregular migration and countering trafficking, with the aims of establishing a sound common regional return policy, and of enhancing and co-ordinating activities against irregular migration and trafficking of human beings.

MARRI RC works to assist the member countries in establishing adequate legislation and structures for the protection and integration of asylum seekers and the return of refugees and IDPs, in line with international and EU standards. The RC also places great importance on the exchange of information between countries.

In the area of Integrated Border Management, the RC aims to promote regional co-operation by creating working groups on the development of national strategies and action plans for integrated border management. The RC also works on enhancing border clearance efficiency at jointly managed border crossing points in order to support the fight against trafficking of persons and goods.

Finally, in the area of visa and consular co-operation, MARRI RC assisted the countries of the region in reaching a regional free visa area. It strives to improve regional consular cooperation by facilitating the exchange of information to improve the region's response to anti-trafficking and irregular migration. It also implements the readmission agreements and all other adequate legislation with the ultimate aim of developing the standards of compliancy with the requirements for the visa free regime with the EU.

Projects initiated or implemented by MARRI RC

All MARRI RC projects are based on the priorities outlined by the MARRI Regional Forum. The projects are always implemented in co-operation with a donor. The financial support is crucial to MARRI RC projects. It also drives the RC to work in line with EU and international standards.

The RC is focused on several new projects:

- Building the capacity of MARRI member countries for successful implementation of Agreements on Visa Facilitation and Readmission;
- MARRI Interactive Migration Map;
- Assessment of Types of Identification Documents in MARRI member countries and
- Promoting a Regionally Integrated Approach for Successfully Preventing and Combating trafficking in human beings,
- MARRI Compilation of Migration Strategic Documents;
- Regional cooperation on circular labour migration in MARRI Member States;
- Draft Project "Common Regional Profiles of the Victims of THB and Traffickers in the MARRI Region";
- MARRI Migration Paper 2011-2012 (in a phase of implementation);
- "Joint Comprehensive approach in Building Cooperation between MARRI Member States and SEPCA Member States' Border Police on International Airports Border Crossing Points" (in a phase of implementation).

What Knowledge is Shared and How

With implementation of the MARRI Strategy documents and the MARRI Priorities, recommendations for the MARRI MS are provided focusing on specific subjects under the responsibility of the state institutions (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labour and other state agencies). Countries can use these recommendations as best practices, lesson learned, making amendments in the existing national legal framework, thus establishing standards in the area of migration, but also improving the performances for enforcing the law, improving the capacities in promoting the ownership etc.

The annual priorities are determined by the MARRI Presidency-in-Office by one of the Member State, on the rotational basis. The following are Common subjects which are currently either developed or under development:

- Migration, legal and irregular
- Asylum
- Visa liberalization
- Labour migration
- Police Cooperation, implementation of the Police Cooperation Convention for South East Europe
- Airport Police Cooperation
- Trafficking in Human Beings
- Citizenship
- Integrated border management

- Readmission
- Visa and consular issues
- Security and Irregular migration
- Document security.

Although MARRI RC's role is sometimes limited to providing assistance in projects, the Centre also looks towards establishing partnerships with international organisations and regional structures like the SEECP, EC, CoE, FRONTEX, RCC, SEPCA, PCC SEE, EUROPOL, WB, OSCE, RACVIAC, IOM, ICMPD and others.

Research

The research products are important for MARRI. Even though it does not have extensive research capacity, for specific migration issues it consults the relevant researchers to do it on contracted basis. MARRI RC in partnership with the relevant state departments collects the data based on questionnaires, which are fundament for the research process. The 'e-Library' and the printed versions are used by the member states and by other stakeholders. It is an electronic database of all existing and ongoing research which allows the dissemination of research documents or scientific findings related to migration & policing. MARRI identifies a list of institutions and experts engaged in the related research.

Conferences

Based on the Annual Document of the priorities, MARRI organises thematically oriented Conferences where experts from the region as well as experts from the EU countries discuss the relevant topics in the field of migration, where the police issues are the most dominant. The topics are initiated by MARRI staff and the national authorities. Usually, the topics come from the daily work-difficulties, which exist as remains of the dissolution of the previous state and the unresolved challenges in police and administrative cooperation, the differences in the legislature, and the existing residue of hostility from the events of recent history, etc.

In the last years the openness and cooperation between the MARRI MS is significantly improved and the countries are searching for the common solutions on 'how to increase the speed in EU integration journey'. It is evident that there is a new political climate, with proposals for common solutions, reducing the barriers in police and other forms of cooperation. MARRI has a role to be a catalyst of encouraging such process. MARRI is tasked to promote and to develop projects, which will develop the networks between the experts in the member states.

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

Building Networks

One of the most valuable ways in which MARRI was credited for establishing and facilitating knowledge sharing was via the creation of networks between law enforcement across borders. It was explained as a priority based on the MARRI Strategy Document (2011). This was facilitated both via project activities, workshops, conferences, meetings, study visits, but also via partnership with other regional and international organisations working on the

migration in the Western Balkans. One of the priorities in implementation of such mechanism is introducing the necessity to keep the involved police officers (and other professionals) for longer period of time on the same working position.

National Contact Points

MARRI Initiative is a best model for regional ownership. Each country has its National Representative based in Skopje with full working mandate in the MARRI Regional centre. The National Representatives are connected with their national authorities, but they are responsible to the MARRI Director. The RC performs their work regarding the mandate and the priorities promoted by the member state which is holding the Presidency-in-Office (the Presidency base on rotation principle is lasting for one year). The role of the National Representative is to keep the open channel for communication with the national institutions, on daily bases. They advise MARRI Management about the important activities regarding the migration in their respective country, and *vice versa*, they brief their authorities what MARRI is doing and what the MARRI initiative needs by any specific country, in term for improving the regional cooperation. They are also an important source of knowledge for preparing the priorities for the further work of MARRI. The role of the National Representatives is vital for the Initiative and for proper knowledge sharing.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

Language

The important barrier in knowledge sharing is the language; on the Western Balkans 5 out of six countries are speaking different languages, and they could understand each other, but the Initiative has 6 member states. English is the working language used by MARRI and the majority of the produced material is promoted on English. The web base documents are completely on English. However, for communication with the national authorities, if necessary, is supported by the National Representative. For the meetings, seminars and other activities, when possible, the communication is in English, but on the events where the police officers are present, usually the translation service is used.

Another barrier is cultural diversity. This brings differences in philosophy of thinking, which brings additional difficulties. All those differences must be recognised in advance, and solutions identified to overcome them.

The other barrier lies in the composition of the seconded staff. Half of them are coming from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the other half from the Ministry of Interior. However, this division of the professional background in MARRI could be seen as advantage, rather than barrier.

Police Structures

The MARRI MS are in the process (some of them already completed this circle) of developing the model of the state administration to be compatible with EU requirements. The police organisation in Macedonia and in the other counties already has new face, harmonised with the EU standards. Number of EC programmes, like PHARE, CARDS, Twinning,

TAIEX, IPA and others are implemented and the basic standards for the de-centralised police model are developed.

Different regional and international organisations dealing on concert programs and projects oriented to the region help to the national authorities, mostly to the Police and other Law Enforcement institution to developed "same" frequency of communication.

However, differences in the methodology on statistics and analytical work make additional difficulties during police (and other criminal justice bodies) cooperation, on national as well as on regional and international level. The presence of National representatives in MARRI RC significantly reduces the problem and very often it helps to the national authorities.

Motivation, Interest and Enthusiasm

The MARRI Member Countries are on different level of EU approach. Croatia is already EU Member. Macedonia has EU candidate country status since 2005, but because of the dispute for the name issue, the country is waiting on the start of the negotiation. Montenegro expects to start with the negotiations in summer 2012. Serbia recently (1st March, 2012) was granted with such status. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are working to be granted with such status, as well. But, the denominator for all six countries is that they want to be EU members. From this crucial issue, the motivation to improve internal capacity and standards is very evident. The interagency cooperation as well the international cooperation is paramount for all countries. The progress which is achieved in visa free region, better management of the migration processes, as well as in establishing and developing channels and networks for cooperation between police and other state institutions bring a new, positive perspective for the region, at whole.

From OSCE and other relevant organisations MARRI is promoted as positive model for regional cooperation in other geographical regions. Also, MARRI is approached in number of cases, as a part of the wanted solution (looking for the solution regarding the false asylum seekers from the WB in EU countries).

Having in mind the presented aspects, there is enormous space for further progress, where MARRI will be part of the solution.

Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

Project "Establishment of network for co-operation between border police on international airport border crossing points in MMS"

This project covered all MARRI's MS and had a very dynamic progress that encompassed several activities (Permanent Regional Working Group/Network for cooperation was established, so called "PRWG/NC"; Study Visit to Zurich International Airport - Kloten, March 25-27, 2010; Workshop "Monitoring and control of border crossing at the international airport border crossing points" Belgrade International Airport "Nikola Tesla", April 29-30, 2010; Workshop "Safety and Security on the International Airport" Zagreb International Airport, June 07-08, 2010; Operational Heads of Airports Forum including Western Balkans, FRONTEX, Warsaw, Poland, October 26-27, 2010; Ceremony of signing of MoU on Sustainability of Established Cooperation Network between Border Police Units on International Airport Border Crossing Points in MARRI Member States, Belgrade, Serbia, December 20-21, 2010).

In order for the Project to function properly, information mechanisms for network functioning were developed and number of statistical, operational data, risk analysis reports were exchanged. An important event for the Project's progress was the Workshop held in Zagreb, when two conclusions were agreed:

- a) Ways for communication and information exchange in the framework of the PRWG/NC
 1. Regular meetings on annual basis, where Members of the PRWG/NC will exchange information, risk analysis reports, good practices, identify gaps and possible solutions, maintain quality of cooperation, discuss new strategies, coordinate operations and working plans - if necessary;
 2. MARRI Member States to plan financial means for organisation of annual meetings, starting from 2012;
 3. Establishment of formal links among border police on IA BCP's in MMS - duty offices or shift leaders (telephone, fax, e-mail communication);
 4. Establishment of formal links among Members of the PRWG/NC (telephone, fax, e-mail communication);
 5. Joint programmes (inviting representatives of the other member states to participate to the special operations as observers, plan and carry out joint programmes concerning detection of false or forged documents, passports, visas, detection of THB and other cases relating to prevent crime and guarantee safety at IA, etc.);
 6. Mutual training and study visits (inviting representatives of the other MS to participate at the training relating to police and border guard works at airports);
- b) Tools used for exchange information
 1. Form/questionnaire for data collection and info exchange (using FRONTEX weekly data collection questionnaire);
 2. Exchange of bulletins or alerts on false documents.

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE...continued

Project "Establishment of network for co-operation between border police on international airport border crossing points in MMS"

3. Telephone, fax and e-mail communication for urgent cases (Telephone and fax numbers as well as e-mail addresses to be exchanged among Members of the PRWG/NC as well as on lower level which will be used during the absence of Members of the PRWG/NC; Designated focal points on lower level authorized for communication - duty officers or shift leaders; Production of manual with elaborated strict procedures which have to be followed in the cooperation process);

No problems or issues have been identified during the Project's implementation. The Project's Time-framework showed that all planned activities were completed on the projected date. However, due to the increased interest for the Project which led a number of additional activities, MARRI RC sent to Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation a letter of request for using of remainder of donor project budget - no-cost extension of closing date for use of planned financial resources for 3 months, until 30 December 2010. It is an honour to say that the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation recognized the Project's importance, and granted the MARRI RC's request.

Finally, it must be pointed out that as a result of expressed interest from some of the SEPCA Member States as well as from the other organisations such as customs departments, airline companies and companies managing the airports to join the PRWG/NC, MARRI RC devised follow up Project proposal "Joint comprehensive approach in building co-operation between MARRI and SEPCA Member States' border police on international airport border crossing points" aimed at establishment and setting to function of an extended PRWG/NC.

Future Perspective

The EU documents are important for MARRI, as a source for EU policy in the area of migration, which are 'a legislative destination' for the MARRI MS. Such is the Stockholm Programme 2010-2014.

The Regional Cooperation Council document "Strategy & Action Plan 2011-2013" is a good platform to recognize the regional dimension of the activities, even there, there is room for further improvement of the documents. The MARRI Strategy & Action Plan 2011-2013 identifies the priorities recognised from inside. The top priority is further development the networks between the experts from MARRI MS. The tools for achieving that goal are:

- To develop realistic projects regarding the needs of the beneficiaries - MARRI MS,
- To support and to play active role in all initiatives regarding the strengthening the regional partnership, based on standards,
- To organize regional workshops/round tables/conferences regarding the migration issue with concern for the MARRI MS,
- To initiate research regarding the migration issues of interest for the MARRI MS,
- To lead the field activities under the MARRI umbrella,

- To promote MARRI activities on local, regional and international level,
- To be transparent to the public and to the partners, regarding the MARRI Mission.

Role of MARRI in the Future

The MARRI initiative is recognised as an organisation from the region responsible for the policy aspect of migration. The interest presented by the national authorities through MARRI to search for the solution in migration policy makes the MARRI Forum pretty well known in the EU. Inviting MARRI on the EU Ministerial Meetings is good indicator of the role of MARRI. The orientation of the donor countries to delegate funds and give grants to MARRI for implementing its projects in the region is additional benefit for the Regional Initiative. The partnerships with FRONTEX, IOM, ICMPD, SEPCA, RCC, RACVIAC, PCC SEE and others are highly important for the future of MARRI, and present as best choice for further sustainability of the project results.

In recent years, MARRI is a successful story for networking in specific expert positions in the region. Additionally, the initiative brings the opportunity for the Member States to profit by presiding with the initiative and tend to bring new quality regarding the ownership in national and regional circumstances.

However, MARRI is facing uncertainties in the current financial climate, having in mind that the Member States are responsible for financing the Initiative and some delays in transferring the funds exist. The financial crisis additionally could affect the donor policy in the region.

9. FRONTEX: Increasing Border Security Through Knowledge Sharing

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Overview

The present case study explores the role that the European agency FRONTEX (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) has in facilitating cooperation and knowledge sharing regarding border control and surveillance among European Union countries.

The present case study is based upon content analysis of 212 documents, identified through a computerised search and describing the role and actions of FRONTEX in our country, as well as interviews conducted between 5th and 9th of March 2012 with 5 officers employed by the FRONTEX National Contact Point within the Romanian Border Police.

Introduction

FRONTEX is the EU agency created in 2005, by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004⁴⁹, as a specialized and independent body whose tasks are to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security and border management. Its main role is to strengthen border security by ensuring the coordination of Member States and their actions to implement the measures taken by the European Community in the area of external Border Management. The objective stipulated in the Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 states that the role of FRONTEX is *'to facilitate and render more*

⁴⁹ Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, L 349/1(Frontex Regulation)

effective the application of existing and future Community measures relating to the management of external borders.'

In order to attain this goal, the responsibilities and activities of FRONTEX are intelligence driven and are meant to complement and provide added value to the national border management systems of Member States. The main responsibility areas of FRONTEX are represented by the management of cooperation between member states at the operational level, with particular emphasis on risk analysis to assess threats, look at vulnerabilities and weigh consequences. It also provides assistance to all Member States, mostly in the area of training and improving the performance of border authorities but also by enhancing their ability to work together and to ensure the support necessary to organize joint operations. Moreover, FRONTEX plays an important part in keeping the border authorities informed about the latest research and technological developments which could impact their activities. Last, but not least, it provides a rapid crisis-response capability to all Member States.

In addition to the above mentioned activities FRONTEX also works closely together with other Community and EU partners involved in the development of the security of the external borders, such as EUROPOL, CEPOL, the customs co-operation and the cooperation on phytosanitary and veterinary controls, the objective being the promotion and achievement of overall coherency. The agency also actively promotes cooperation with other border-related law enforcement bodies responsible for internal security at EU level.

Governance

FRONTEX is a European Agency that has a legal identity and autonomy, both budgetary and operational. It is governed by a Management Board made up of European Commission Representatives and Operational Heads of national border services. The main responsibilities of this Board are in the area of setting the budget and verifying its execution, adopting appropriate financial rules and working procedures for decision making. The Management board also appoints the Executive Director and his/her Deputy.

Structure

FRONTEX is structured in three main divisions: Operations Division, Capacity Building Division and administration Division. The Operations Division contains three units specialized in Joint Operations, Risk analysis and FRONTEX Situation Centre. The Capacity Building Divisions also has three units: Training, Research and development and Pooled Resources, while the administration Division is made of four units: Finance and Procurement, Human resources and services, Legal affairs and ICT.

FRONTEX in Romania

In 2005 Romania was accepted as an observer state and was able to assist the works carried out by the FRONTEX Agency. After becoming a Member State, Romania became a full member of FRONTEX through the Romanian Border Police.

At the request of FRONTEX, the FRONTEX National Contact Point was founded within the Romanian Border Police. Its aim is to facilitate collaboration and communication with the Romanian Border Police and with other Romanian institutions involved in promoting and

ensuring a correct management of the European Union external borders. The National Contact Point has been active since February 15th 2007, at the General Inspectorate of the Border Police headquarters, within the Service of European Affairs and International Relations.

Frontex in Romania – Document analysis

In order to identify the main areas in which the knowledge sharing between FRONTEX Agency and Romanian Border Police takes place, we conducted a document analysis. To identify the relevant documents that were included in the analysis, a computerized search on the website of the Romanian Border Police was conducted. This search was performed using the keyword “FRONTEX” in the Search box of the website, and it generated a total of 146 links. From these links, 216 documents were downloaded, and 212 of these independent documents were considered in the subsequent analysis. The types of documents analysed were: press releases (78.3%, 167), laws or regulations (1.4%, 3), public acquisition contracts (2.4%, 5), the Magazine of the Romanian Border Police (17%, 36) and other documents such as presentations on the website (0.9%, 2).

The main areas of knowledge sharing that have been included in the coding scheme we developed for documents’ analysis were:

1. To ensure the operational coordination between Member States for the management of external borders
2. To provide assistance to the Member States in training the border policemen
3. To carry out risk analyses
4. To follow the development of relevant research for the control and surveillance of the external borders
5. To provide assistance to the Member States at the external borders and to ensure the support necessary to organize joint operations

The results of the analysis indicated that 43.9% of the documents only mentioned the cooperation between the FRONTEX Agency and the Romanian Border Police in a general way, or they included other topics that were non-relevant for knowledge sharing. More than half of the analysed documents (56.1%) mentioned knowledge sharing in the five main areas. Considering the frequencies with which these areas were mentioned, it was found that knowledge sharing between the FRONTEX Agency and the Romanian Border Police mainly concerns the assurance of the operational coordination between the Member States for the management of external borders (34.4%). This was followed by the assistance FRONTEX provides to the Member States at the external borders and the support necessary for organizing joint operations (24.5%) and by their assistance in training the border policemen (23.6%). Less knowledge sharing occurred in the area of carrying out the risk analysis related to the border crossing (18.4%) and the development of relevant research for the control and surveillance of the external borders of the European Union (19.3%).

What Knowledge is Shared and How

Operational information regarding border control and surveillance

The FRONTEX Agency facilitates the exchange of operational information regarding trans-border crime and organized crime such as: drug trafficking, stolen vehicles, weapons trafficking, information technology crimes, economic crimes, terrorism and others. All this is coordinated through the FRONTEX Situation Centre Unit which acts as the Single Point of Entry and Exit of information. In order to fulfil its objectives, the staff performs tasks and services such as:

- providing situation and crisis monitoring on a 9/7 basis, delivering early alerts and situation reports to internal and external customers;
- managing and processing all operational information proceeding from on-going joint operations;
- providing assistance to FRONTEX project managers in facilitating and evaluating incoming operational information;
- providing mission awareness support, namely through the preparation and delivery of country information reports;
- developing, implementing and managing an information exchange network with external actors, via the FRONTEX One-Stop-Shop web portal (FOSS: <https://foss.frontex.europa.eu/>);
- performing media monitoring activities, including the distribution of flash media reports and daily newsletters to a wide range of customers (at FRONTEX and within the European law enforcement community); (<http://www.frontex.europa.eu>)

Border police training

One of FRONTEX's central activities is the development of border-guard training curricula in order to ensure standardized instruction for training academies Europe-wide. The agency has established a Common Core Curriculum for basic border guard training that is already in place. In order to develop all training material, including common training standards, and to ensure a broad scope of training activities, FRONTEX has developed a network of Partnership Academies in nine Member States. These training centres, located in the 11 partner academies, that host FRONTEX - organize training courses—both theoretical and practical—as well as training development conferences.

FRONTEX also offers additional training courses and seminars in the field of border management, ensuring the sharing of experience and best practices between Member States:

- Language Training: focusing on operational needs and related terminology
- Virtual Aula: a common training overview module in English
- Falsified Document Detection
- Detection of Stolen Vehicles
- Common Training Tool for Third Countries' Border Guard Training
- RABIT (Rapid Border Intervention team) Training
- Air Crew Training: including night-flight and tactical skills
- Training for escort leaders on joint return flights etc.

Risk analysis

FRONTEX's first stage of core activity operations is risk analysis. The agency's situation centre gathers and collates information from partner countries, within and beyond the EU borders, as well as from open sources such as academic publications and the press, to create as clear a picture as possible of the on-going situation at Europe's frontiers. This information is then analyzed using FRONTEX's own system, CIRAM (Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model), which has been developed over the course of the agency's activities in close cooperation with its partners. The result of this is a comprehensive model of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats at the external borders that enables FRONTEX to balance resources and risks.

The FRONTEX Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) meetings provide a forum for exchange of ideas. They are also a platform to present current work on the revision of CIRAM to risk analysis experts from Member States. (<http://www.frontex.europa.eu>)

Joint operations

Like all FRONTEX activities, joint operations are based on risk analysis. The task of the Joint Operations Unit is to coordinate co-operation along the external borders of the European Union and the external Schengen borders. This cooperation is done at three separate levels: at the air, land and sea borders. There are three types of situations in which joint operations might be required: when FRONTEX itself proposes a joint operation based on the facts identified in a risk analysis, when a proposal for a joint operation or a pilot project comes from a member state and when a request comes from a member state facing a particular situation requiring assistance.

As a form of joint operations in cases of crisis situations at the external borders FRONTEX has established the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs), a Europe-wide network that operates with more than 700 people and a full range of technical equipment. The criteria for the deployment of RABITs specify that the circumstances be urgent and exceptional, so rather than being active units, these teams are kept in a constant state of readiness through on-going training to ensure a common emergency response capability should it ever be needed due to a major humanitarian crisis or natural disaster straining normal border-control mechanisms. This on-going training program for the RABITs facilitates the transfer of operational knowledge between the border policemen that are involved. (<http://www.frontex.europa.eu>)

Research and development of border control and surveillance

The Research and Development Unit follows up on developments in research that are relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders and further disseminates this information. A large part of its work consists in facilitating information exchange between border guard authorities, research institutes, universities and the industry, via the organisation of workshops and conferences.

Current projects include:

- assessing and testing biometric verification and/or identification solutions particularly for use by Automated Border Crossing (ABC) systems and the Visa Information System (VIS);
- following the development of detection technologies (for humans in closed compartments, illicit goods and forged documents);
- looking for new ideas on how border checks are performed in order to increase security while improving transit times;
- developing the European Surveillance system – EUROSUR;
- data mining;
- maritime communication interoperability;
- use of UAVs in surveillance. (<http://www.frontex.europa.eu>)

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

Analysing the interviews, we identified the most common facilitative influences on knowledge sharing that support the activity of FRONTEX with regard to border security and border management in the EU. The same facilitators were mentioned in the case of knowledge sharing both within the FRONTEX agency and transborder.

Cooperation between EU member states

The participants reported that the knowledge sharing was based mainly on agreements, conventions and cooperation treaties between the member states. Those kind of documents guided the professional relations between police officers from different EU countries working together to organize joint operations. Besides those formal relations, it was suggested in one of the interviews that the professional relationships developed into friendship relationships and could facilitate the communication between police officers and consequently the knowledge exchange. Trust was also deemed important by all the participants, since high levels of trust facilitated cooperation and the knowledge exchange not only between police officers of the same unit in FRONTEX, but also between those from different member states. Moreover, the availability of the outgoing officers to provide national data relevant for the border control in joint operations was suggested to be an important factor of efficient cooperation with the FRONTEX Agency.

Technical support for knowledge sharing

Regarding the technical support, the participants discussed different forms of technology development and advancements, mostly related to ICT which have positively influenced knowledge sharing. Communication and support platforms, databases, reporting systems, learning and teaching technologies are some of the enablers of knowledge sharing briefly described by the participants.

Personal and professional characteristics of police officers

An important category related to the facilitators of knowledge sharing were the personal and professional characteristics of the police officers involved in different operations initiated by FRONTEX. The availability of the police officers to work in a multicultural framework, their flexibility, sense of humour and personal motivation were personal qualities which the interviewees mention as facilitators of knowledge sharing.

Professionalism, commitment, professional experience and prior experience in the field of international cooperation, proficiency in English and the awareness of the common aim in the joint missions were described as professional resources for an efficient knowledge sharing. The training courses for the FRONTEX staff were indicated as an important activity for facilitating effective co-operation and a common sense of European “border-guardship” with a set of shared values and practices. For example, modern and interactive training methods stimulate active participation of the trainees and produce new knowledge in order to build a mutual compatibility and a European border-security culture.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

First of all, we noticed that 2 of the interviewees hadn’t found and explained any barriers to knowledge sharing.

Linguistic barriers

One of the most common barriers mentioned in the interviews was that of communication in foreign languages. The interviewees mention that while English is the official language in FRONTEX, knowledge sharing is sometimes restricted by different levels of proficiency in English.

Organisational differences

In some cases, there were reported differences in the training or the level of competence and responsibility of police officers from different member states within FRONTEX. The example given by one of the participants illustrated other differences and stressed the need for harmonization of the national legislation regarding the knowledge exchange and the access to classified information. It was mentioned that police officers with the same rank, but from different countries have access to different types of data. Also, different types of structures could hinder knowledge sharing. For example, there were situations of military and civil structures operating in a joint mission. Another example pointed out that some of the EU states didn’t use APIS (Advanced Passenger Information System). Besides those, the Romanian members of FRONTEX noticed that some of the more developed European countries manifested a lack of trust in border policemen from South-Eastern European countries. Lack of trust was also explained by cultural differences of the member states of FRONTEX.

Legal regulation

An important issue of knowledge sharing was the lack of specific regulations regarding the data exchange with other authorities responsible for the border security (for example, custom). Another legal aspect seen as a barrier to knowledge exchange was the lack of bilateral agreements between the European countries on the use of personal data. In that case, the data base in the national language added a difficulty to the issue of access to information.

The type of knowledge

Classified information and information regarding security was viewed by the interviewees as making knowledge sharing less successful.

Personal characteristics

Some interviewees mentioned the lack of cohesion and of team spirit as well as scepticism in developing and implementation of new procedures, as personal characteristics that also constitute barriers for knowledge sharing.

Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

FRONTEX as an example of best practice

Since FRONTEX was created specifically for increasing cooperation between member states and the efficiency of knowledge and best practices sharing across borders, the interviewees found it difficult to identify best practices *within* this more general FRONTEX activity. However, the analysis of the case studies provided by the interviewees offered three main best practices categories: information/ data exchange between different member states, joint operations and training programs. Information exchange is generally swift and precise, and the personal relationships that develop in time between officers from different countries help speed the process even further.

Joint operations and exchange programs are considered to be the activities that provide the most relevant learning opportunities and development outcomes. Moreover, it is through these operations that best practices are more efficiently shared. Aside from their personal growth and professional development, officers that benefit from these exchanges can help use this experience and the work they have done abroad to develop new products and projects in their own countries upon their return.

Finally, training programs, courses and seminars are considered a best practice due to their clear structure and the fact that they cover relevant aspects, but also because they provide a further opportunity for interaction with colleagues from other countries and hence develop networking within the European police forces that are essential for efficient cooperation.

Future Perspective

Even though FRONTEX is perceived as an example and facilitator of good practices, there are still a few issues that the interviewees mention as being in need of further development:

- the strengthening of cooperation with third-party countries that have been identified within joint operations as being problematic areas for the EU;
- strengthening the efforts to harmonize EU member states with regard to training standards, equipment and technology used, legislation and data bases.

10. A Case Study on CEPOL: European Police College

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Overview

This case study explores the role that CEPOL plays in facilitating knowledge sharing between police organisations in European Union (EU) countries.

The case study is based upon interviews conducted on 23-24 February 2012 with four CEPOL Secretariat Staff, and one with the UK CEPOL National Contact Point, as well as internet based research and review of documentation.

Context

CEPOL is an EU Agency, established in 2005. CEPOL's website describes that its' mission is to *'bring together senior police officers from police forces in Europe – essentially to support the development of a network – and encourage cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime, public security and law and order by organising training activities and research findings'*.

CEPOL aims to support the exchange and further development of knowledge and research in the field of policing via training and education for senior police officers at a European level. CEPOL organises between 80-100 courses, seminars and conferences each year on key topics which are deemed relevant to all police forces in Europe. Courses and seminars are provided through both online and face to face methods. CEPOL is also a repository for policing research and related science, and maintains a database of research, as well as discussion forums for police professionals.

Governance

CEPOL has a Governing Board, made up of representatives from the EU member states, usually the Directors of the National Police Training colleges. Each delegation has one voting member mandated to vote on behalf of their country. The Chair of the Governing Board is a representative of the member state holding the Presidency of the EU. The Governing Board

meets twice yearly and is responsible for driving CEPOL's strategy and making decisions. CEPOL is managed by a Director who is accountable to the Governing Board.

Structure

CEPOL is split into two departments, the Corporate Services Department, including finance and human resources, and the Learning, Science, Research and Development Department, with whom the interviews for this research were conducted. A number of full time staff are employed within the department, alongside seconded staff from member countries who have been brought into the organisation due to their expertise on a particular topic.

National Contact Points (NCPs)

A National Contact Point within each member state is the official link between each country and CEPOL. The NCPs work closely with CEPOL, operating as conduit between the member states and CEPOL, targeting CEPOL information within their country, managing participation on courses, and sharing policing policies and strategies to help focus CEPOL products.

What Knowledge is Shared and How

Common Curricular

CEPOL's 'Common Curricula' provides recommendations about police training on specific subjects. Countries can use these recommendations within their national police training programmes according to their individual needs. There are also a number of courses developed and under development by CEPOL, for use by member states, designed to encourage a common understanding about the subject areas within the Common Curricular. The subjects of the Common Curricula are determined by the Governing Board in line with priorities outlined at an EU level. The following are Common Curricular subjects which are currently either developed or under development:

- Counter Terrorism
- European Police Cooperation
- Europol
- Police Ethics and Prevention of Corruption
- Domestic Violence
- Money Laundering
- Trafficking in Human Beings
- Civilian Crisis Management
- Drug Trafficking
- Management of Diversity

Grant Agreement Programme

Relatively recently, a cross EU approach has been developed. Against certain themes, a country will bid to run a course, and bids are assessed according to their learning outcomes, and a grant provided to run the course. In these cases the country will then run the course in their country with support from CEPOL and experts from other countries. The courses are run for all member states and each country can send a representative to attend. Participants need to be embedded in the relevant specialism.

E-Net

CEPOL has many electronic 'e-learning' products available to police officers in the EU through the Learning Management System (LMS), part of CEPOL's 'e-net'. The LMS also hosts online learning modules. All of these modules are available to registered CEPOL web users. They are aimed at both self-directed individual learning, and also can be used by police colleges and academies as resources for the implementation of national police curricula. Users can track their progress by using each module's diagnostic self-test as well as watch and comment on a variety of learning materials, such as videos of practical cases. The following online learning modules are offered:

- CoPPRa (Community Policing Prevention of Radicalisation and Terrorism)
- Cyber Crime
- Europol
- Gender Based Violence
- Schengen

'Webinars' are a recent CEPOL tool. The word 'webinar' is derived from the words 'web-based' and 'seminar', and they are interactive discussions, lectures, presentations and workshops, which can involve a large number of people at one time, using their own computers and communicating via phone or microphone. These offer the possibility to present and exchange knowledge in real time.

The e-net also offers discussion forums where users can post, discuss and share topics and ask questions of other users.

There is also a user-led 'glossary' on police related topics, where users can add content and others rate it for usefulness.

Exchange Programme

The Exchange Programme is a scheme by which police officers are able to spend time with a counterpart in a police force in another country. The exchange programme appears to be extremely popular and in 2011, almost 300 people from 26 countries took part in an exchange. These exchanges typically take the form of a one-to-one exchange over 12 days and an officer will usually stay with his counterpart's family and become involved in information sharing around best practices and policing issues. Exchanges are organised around specific topics that have been identified as important to the safety and security of Europe and its citizens. Each topic should also have a European, or cross-border, dimension. Each year, a priority topic is identified for a group exchange. In 2012, this topic is trafficking in human beings.

Research

CEPOL describes another major role as being to disseminate research findings and good practice, maximising the promotion of research on police matters. CEPOL does not have a remit to commission research, but rather its' role is about the sharing and dissemination of research conducted by both policing and academic institutions. The 'e-Library' is an electronic database of all existing and ongoing research and allows the dissemination of research documents or scientific findings related to policing. CEPOL also identifies and collects a list of institutions and departments engaged in any kind of police-related research.

This list can be found on the CEPOL website, and is continually updated as new research is developed and initiated.

Conferences

CEPOL organises an annual European Research and Science Conference where experts discuss relevant topics in the field of police training and education at a European level.

The Research and Science Working Group (RSWG) is made up of experts from 10 member states. It was described that there is a large amount of knowledge around research and good practice, which needs to be shared and CEPOL, through the RSWG, offers a platform to do this, as well as a context, i.e. relating research findings to what this means for policing and what can be learnt from research, and disseminating this information through the annual conference.

Facilitators to Knowledge Sharing

Building Networks

One of the most valuable ways in which CEPOL was described as facilitating knowledge sharing was via the creation of networks between police officers across borders. It was explained that this is important for *'once you are involved in training, you become aware that you belong, as a police officer, to a bigger community than at just the local and regional level'* (Interview Four). This was facilitated via both courses and the exchange programme, where people would meet, exchanging experiences, best practices, procedural regulations, laws and information about policing in their country, and making contacts in other countries. It was suggested that any police officer who is required to work on a project with an international element should ideally participate in an international training course. *'What are the police systems in other countries? How is evidence dealt with in other countries? If you are working cross-border, this is imperative. If you don't know this, you've failed'* (Interview Three).

Electronic Methods of Knowledge Sharing

Electronic methods of sharing were also deemed important and the CEPOL e-net as a whole, including e-learning courses, webinars, research findings and publications, discussion boards, forums, films and case studies, etc, was described as enabling *'a pool of knowledge which people can use, access and add to'* (Interview One).

Electronic methods were described as a quick way of reaching a large number of people. Whilst a face to face course reaches 30 people per year, 400 people had been trained using e-learning between December 2011 and February 2012. An example was given of the EU Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), initiated to foster police cooperation in criminal investigations. CEPOL runs a course for JIT members, aimed to educate on how JITs can help countries in investigations. In 2011 this was supplemented by an e-learning course, as not all JIT members were physically able to attend a course.

National Contact Points

The National Contact Points were described by CEPOL as *'our eyes in the member states'* (Interview Three) and considered critical to CEPOL's work. Their role is to advertise CEPOL

courses and select participants for courses, and thus they have an important role in promoting the work of CEPOL and the passing on of information about the work done by CEPOL. They are also an important source of knowledge for CEPOL in providing information on experts on specific topics in each country, and advising on member state priorities, legislation and policy, and helping CEPOL in devising training courses and work programmes relevant for each country. The role of the NCPs was therefore highly important in the facilitation of knowledge sharing.

Barriers to Knowledge Sharing

Language

The biggest barrier raised was that of language. English is the working language used by CEPOL and all course material and online material is published in English. CEPOL recommends that those working on an international level should be able to speak English, and CEPOL run language training courses in English, Spanish, German and French. Research reports that are not written in English are published in the CEPOL e-library, and the abstracts are translated into English, but this means that the full article is not accessible to as wide an audience. Language barriers also may prevent people who cannot speak English being able to become involved in courses or in the exchange programme. It was described that sometimes people would be selected to participate in courses because they could speak English, and not necessarily because they were the most appropriate person for the course.

Police Structures

The effective sharing of knowledge was seen as potentially dependent upon policing structures across countries, for example, in the UK, where there are 43 different police forces, there was described to be some elements of insularity, for forces often developed their own in-house training and were in some cases less likely to access the common curricular. In those EU countries where there is one national police force there was seen to be greater chance to ensure involvement with the common curricular and having just one force to communicate with was assumed to make the work of the National Contact Points much easier.

Motivation, Interest and Enthusiasm

Countries also were described as differing in their motivation, interest and enthusiasm for training, and similarly, countries differed in their stages of development of research. CEPOL aims to tackle these differences by developing common standards and looking for ways to increase co-operation, via relating research findings to what they mean for policing, putting research into a context for it was described that *'information is useless unless it is put into context'* (Interview Four). This aimed to increase understanding, and to enable officers in different countries to see how information could be beneficial to them.

Best Practice in Knowledge Sharing

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

Webinars

It was agreed that webinars had great benefits for knowledge sharing and could be seen as an example of best practice. The ability to reach a wide audience was described as a huge benefit, for whilst a face to face course usually trains 30 people each year, the same topic can potentially be taught through a webinar and reach up to 200 people in one session. Webinars were also described as offering much greater flexibility, for whilst face to face courses are designed a year in advance, a webinar can be adapted and amended very quickly. Policies and priorities across the EU can change rapidly, for example, in the time of a terror attack. Webinars can address these topics quickly and ensure that they are relevant to the moment in time.

BEST PRACTICE EXAMPLE

Exchange Programme

The exchange programme was regarded as an example of best practice in enabling both informal and formal knowledge to be shared. It was described that living and working in another country was the best way to truly understand another countries' culture and ways of working, and the informal times spent over the 12 day exchange programme, for example, having dinner with host families, were seen as equally as important as working with another police force, for this is where informal information about cultural practices was shared. This was described as enabling people to establish relationships with their equivalents in another country, crucial for cross-border working, and enabling people to broaden their understanding of cultural differences. Each year, CEPOL runs a conference at which participants in the exchange programme share what they have learnt and this includes presentations and discussion groups, as well as an opportunity for participants to feedback and make proposals for the improvement of the exchange programme.

Future Perspective

Mapping of EU Training

The Stockholm Programme 2010-2014 is a five year plan with guidelines for justice and home affairs of the member states of the EU. It identified that the EU has to ensure training for at least one third of all law enforcement officers dealing with international crime. It stated that training must be readdressed at the EU level as there is currently no systematic approach to training. Training broadly deals with four areas of:

- Initial / basic training – this is a national responsibility and must include training on Schengen and Europol.

- Bilateral / regional training – this is a national responsibility.
- Specialised training – the EU has to play an important role in this.
- Training on EU missions, e.g. military training. Across the EU, a lot of money is spent on this type of training, but there appears to be no clear picture of what activities currently exist on this and little coherence between countries.

CEPOL is currently conducting a mapping exercise which takes the form of a survey to establish what training activities currently exist across the EU and who is involved in this training. By the end of March 2012, CEPOL will be producing a strategic training needs analysis based upon this information. It was reported that gathering this information was a challenge, due to the scale of the research and the volume and diversity of information to be gathered.

Electronic Methods of Knowledge Sharing

All interviewees raised the importance of further developing electronic systems and agreed that in the future adaptations in technology would be extremely important for facilitating the sharing of knowledge. The e-learning system, webinars, and other electronic systems including POLKA, the 'Police Online Knowledge Area', an online resource in the UK, were seen as crucial and described as a cost effective way of ensuring information is widely available and easily accessible. In light of financial cuts to police budgets, electronic methods were seen as increasingly important as a means of training police officers without the costs of them attending face to face courses.

Development of Standards

Interviewees raised the importance of developing minimum standards for training across the EU and for officers to be at the same minimum level across all EU countries. This involves developing minimum criteria across member states and the wider promotion of CEPOL courses. It was also suggested that standards on 'who is an expert?' should be developed (Interview Three), to establish certification of experts and for member states to know who is an expert in a particular field and how to access this information, with CEPOLs' role in this being to identify experts and to make people aware how they can access this expertise.

Role of CEPOL in the Future

CEPOL is keen to ensure that as an organisation it develops to meet the needs of the future. Courses are revised and updated twice yearly and this is a process that will continue, in order to meet the requirements of the EU policy cycle. The setting of priorities in all member states gives a framework for how CEPOL courses can be improved. Courses are updated through an expert group. The responsibility for leading on courses will in the future be co-ordinated by CEPOL. At present individual countries take the responsibility for leading on a course, but this can mean that the course is developed with a focus on that particular country. Instead, CEPOL sees its' responsibility as being to ensure that courses meet the needs of all countries.

CEPOL is also facing uncertainties in the current financial climate and may have to operate with reduced resources. It was also suggested that financial cuts in police organisations may have a negative impact upon the demand for training. Question was also raised over a

possible merger with Europol and whether there may in the future be one large training centre for the EU, or one large organisation, with training existing as a part of it.

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