Regimes of secularity

Citizenship, religion and Muslimness in Rotterdam,
Leicester and Marseille

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1. Introduction

'It does not matter what I say I am: I am European and I am British. But it does matter how you see me. If you do not see me as a European, if you do not see me as a Brit, it does not matter what I say. Whatever I will say, I will be a Muslim.' (interview 26)

‘…our symbolic identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, and reduced mode of being.' (Taylor 1994, cited in Diken 1998)

‘[we must] discover how followers [of religion] instantiate, repeat, alter, adapt, argue over and diversify… particular ideas, attitudes, and practices… And so too with secularism. We have to discover what people do with and to ideas and practices before we can understand what is involved in the secularization of theological concepts in different times and places.” (Asad 2003: 194)

1.1. Muslimness

Western European nation-states are diverse and plural. Many Muslims are citizens of France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. While everybody seems to know to a certain extent who Muslims are and what Islam is, there is also disagreement about what this label implies. A wide variety of signifiers are attached to this name: when we think of Muslims we alternatively think of religion, we think of migrants and minorities, of populations with low socio-economic position, of terrorists and radicals and while many other images pop immediately to mind. These labels may be stereotypes. They may generalize. But they are also used as forms of self-identification. Furthermore, these meanings do not necessarily exclude each other, but together form a field of significance which is constructed by all the actors taking part in the construction of meaning: a field of Muslimness.

The liberal state looks at Muslims through two paradigms of subjectivization, one targeting their Otherness in terms of religion, namely the regime of secularity, which draws upon the concept of the secular and the way a certain understanding of the social relevance of religion was captured and minutely discussed in the theory of secularization; second, through the paradigm of citizenship, which deals with members of the nation-
state in a neutral and egalitarian manner through its different institutions, various levels of governing and many mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. In this book I am arguing that these two paradigms mentioned above are essential for understanding the position of European Muslims today. Although they can be seen as a double disadvantage Muslims as members of western liberal states encounter (Modood 2005, 2010), they can also present windows of opportunity for Muslims. While the opposition between the West and the East and the special negative attention given to Islam is not new but rather a permanent feature of the history of western thought (Wheatcroft 2004), Muslims can now engage with these images from the position of citizens. One of these windows of opportunity is the possibility to rethink and re-evaluate the role and place of religion in modern society.

Citizenship and secularity regimes are at the core of this book and will be explained theoretically and followed empirically in the following chapters: Muslims are encountering the power of two different paradigms, both rooted in the modern social imaginary (Taylor 2004, 2007) and tightly connected to each other. Inspired by Taylor, I am using the concept of modern social imaginaries as that which is summing up ‘our grasp on the wider predicament: how we continuously stand in relation to others and to power’ (Taylor 2004:27) while condensing the ideas people have about social reality. Besides orienting the attitude towards religion in general and Muslims in particular in an overarching and rather abstract way as part of the modern social imaginary, secularity and also citizenship work as instruments of governing taking the form of regimes of secularity and citizenship. However, Muslims are not only the recipients of different methods of governance but interpret and engage them with practices and discourses, giving way to diverse articulations of Muslimness. Once more, it is through the continuous meeting and negotiation of Muslims as subjects and objects of the nation-state and the state’s engagement with their religiousness that (part of) Muslimness is shaped as a field of significance. Within this space, many actors, among which the state (at different levels) and Muslims themselves articulate and conjugate the meaning of being Muslim, with or without direct reference to Islam. Muslimness, I insist, is an appropriate term for capturing the wide variety of positions that different actors construct regarding Muslims and being Muslims and the multitude of possible positions towards these constructions, as it will be explained in more detail in the following chapters.

The same mechanism that is producing subjects is also the starting point of subjectivity and agency - discourses and practices that name the subject are the same as the discourses and practices which are incorporated in the subject’s self-construction.
This dialectic process of identification and identity formation points out that while identity formation is influenced by discourses and practices which define, identification with the given discourses and practices is not a passive process. Muslims are more than passive receivers, or victims of their environment, they actively create their identity and reshape the discourses and practices affecting them. In the process of self-formation and construction they use labels, names and categories acquired top-down while they creatively relate to them and intersect them with bottom-up labels, categories and names.

The label Muslim is used as a form of self-identification and also as an identifier. ‘Muslim’ is a name with many connotations attached to it. However, each connotation is constructed and contextual. Behind each ‘proper name’ there is a complex dynamics of identification and a fine balance of categorization (Hansen 2001). A name is a ‘rigid designator’ that cannot be replaced by a description. In this way the name both describes and summarizes a context and also attracts a set of connotation each of which alone would not be able to describe properly the object (Kripke 1980). The name, the signifier supports the identity of the object and helps recreate it, partially or in totality, at all enunciation times.

Behind a name a complex process of selection and hyphenation takes place, which is then reconfirmed through repetition. A name exists in a temporal dimension, invoking or restructuring the past in order to construct a certain version of the future. Hansen’s argument, which is the starting point of this book is that the politics of identity are driven by “the paradox that no identity, no sense of community, and no imputed propriety or a place can be ever-evident or stable. There are always multiple meanings, many narratives, and inherent instabilities within such entities.” (Hansen 2001:2). Through attention to a name, to the use of the label we can hope to investigate a part of the complex interplay of circumstances and agencies in shaping reality. In this work I will investigate some aspects of the label of ‘Muslim’, the ways in which it is used in state governance on the national and local level and in the construction of meaning initiated at the grassroots level.

The state is co-producing the Muslim identity through its mechanisms of control (discourses and policy processes related to security, radicalization, integration, assimilation). It produces certain adjectives to the label of Muslim and with this contributes to the creation of the field of Muslimness from a power imbued perspective. Discursively, the state connects Muslims to its own goals, practices and population, relating and ‘forcing’ Muslims to engage with them all.
Names, labels and categories are performed, translated into practices. The way Muslims are described through policies and the way they are targeted by the implementation of the same policies may differ. Furthermore, what Muslims say about themselves can differ from what Muslims actually do. While discourse produces the reality it names, transforming it into performative language (Butler et al. 2000, Butler 2003), practices also inform and shape discourses. The transformation of discourse into action and practice can best be seen as a process of citation (Derrida 1982). All signs can be placed in citation marks, breaking away with previous contexts of meaning. Each citation can produce an infinite number of new citation contexts. As signs cannot exist out of context, citationability means that there is little core of essence to that what the meaning of the sign is. Taken to the levels of identities this means that essentialized identities and identifications do not exist prior to the moment of citation, of calling out a certain name in a certain context (Derrida 1982). When looking at names, labels and identifications, the above-mentioned arguments make the context of enunciation and formation of names, labels and categories extremely relevant.

The contexts in this book are multilayered: first is it considered that formations of secularity and citizenship and their articulations into regimes take shape, mostly in their ideological dimension at the level of the nation-state. The changes in attitude regarding Muslim immigrants will be explored on the basis of secondary literature and policy documents for France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Second, these formations are then further shaped on the local level, through discourses and practices that are attentive to the specific needs and problems encountered in an urban space. Local specific approached towards Muslims will be explored based on local policies and their implementation, targeting directly or indirectly the Muslim populations. These local circumstances are followed in Leicester, Marseille and Rotterdam with highlighted interest for what the label of Muslim entails. Third, grassroots initiatives in the three cities are identified and explored in their engagement with and as additions to the label ‘Muslim’. This last part is based on fieldwork in Leicester, Marseille and Rotterdam, consisting of participant observation and interviews.

Norms and citations are linked to each other through the act of performing. The way citation takes places reinforces the norm through giving it life and shape. This means that before being performed norms exist virtually, but through their invocation and (ritual) performance become concrete and present. Repetition means also reinforcement and consolidation of a norm. The process of citation is relevant to the translation of the modern social imaginary through symbols in reality.
While states interact with Muslim minorities through the symbol of the secular and that of the nation, they engage into citation with parts of the modern social imaginary: the secular gets in this way translated, through the power of context into secularities, the nation gets translated, also through the power of context in citizenships. Imbued with power, and transformed into mechanism of governing, secularities and citizenships are shaped into context sensitive regimes. While Muslims are subjected to and relate to these parts of the modern social imaginary they are also involved in the process of citation. They actively shape both the discourses and practices within which they are named and into which they are engaged, through a mirroring process of self-naming and through practices relating to it.

The last dimension of inquiry highlights that the label Muslim is used as a form of self-identification, being used by Muslims to designate as much their individual identity, as the actions made on behalf of a group. This needs to be understood as a form of collective agency, which can take the form of ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak et al. 1990). When considered in the context of collective action the term Muslim does not presuppose a monolithic and homogenous group with unified claims, wishes and ways of action. Besides, in this context, Muslim identification concerns not only religious identification but also the transformation of ethnic identity within different contexts. Besides, there is an important spatial dimension that should be highlighted: Muslim identification can be individual, local, national and transnational.

Agency should not be seen only as resistance. In line with Saba Mahmood I argue that agency should not become a synonym for resistance in relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that subordination facilitates, encourages and creates (Mahmood 2005). Agency can also be found in less progressive agendas that aim towards continuity, stasis and stability. There are ways in which subjects inhabit social structures that can be thought of as beyond conformity and beyond conflict. Both political and analytical approaches need to remain open to challenges arising from the multitude of socially specific sites.

1.2. Muslims and academic literature

The literature about Muslims in a European context can be divided as working either with emic or etic categories. Emic constructions are terms, accounts, descriptions and categories that make sense from an insider perspective while etic constructions are terms, accounts, descriptions and categories expressed as meaningful for an outsider
perspective (Harris 1976, Turner 1980). On the one hand we have studies that take for granted to a certain level the existence of the group, community of ‘Muslims’ and then look into the different aspects of organization, beliefs, politics, participation, etc. while on the other hand we have studies that enquire and try to describe what being a ‘Muslim’ is starting from self-definition and self-identification. This rift between different ways of academically engaging with Muslims is constructed roughly along the borders of different disciplines. While anthropologist prefer an emic perspective, historians, sociologists, migration scholars and political scientists feel more comfortable with an etic perspective.

Much has been written about Muslims (see Maussen 2006a). From 2006 onwards there has been an increase in comparative studies about Muslims living in western countries, a more focused contextualized approach on specific countries, but little studies have engaged with the local level of state governing. This work fills this gap, through proposing attention towards a comparative local context that is enriched with attention towards the national and the grassroots level.

To my knowledge, little academic work has been trying to explore the interrelation of emic and etic categories in a comparative manner. Many studies engage with a combination of emic and etic perspectives, but they mostly remain limited to a certain spatio-temporal context. A wealth of studies explore, for instance, the local meanings of the hijab for Muslim women, pitting these localized readings against essentialized readings of Islam and veiling as inherently oppressive. These studies engage with etic categories (‘oppression’, ‘freedom’, ‘emancipation’) and the negotiations of these constructs on a local (emic) level (see Meyer and Moors 2006). One of the most influential writers in this category, Saba Mahmood, shows how etic (Western) categories of oppression or compliance and resistance simply do not help us in understanding women’s involvement in the Islamic movements in Egypt (Mahmood 2005).

The added value of this book is that its engagement with etic and emic categories across time and space, creating a multilayered comparison of how these different positions in regard to a name change and influence each other. It should be read as a contribution to the anthropology of secularity proposed by Talal Asad (2003), combining a comparative perspective with an attention to contexts and interrelations between different levels of existence, different frames and formations of meaning and various actors involved in producing discourses and practices. It also can be read as an empirical test and application of Taylor’s ideas about the secular (2007), with a focus on different secular contexts as formed and interpreted both top-down and bottom-up.
1.3. The imaginary, the symbolic and the real

At this point it is useful to explain the structure of the book as a whole. I have used Lacan’s triangle of the imaginary, the symbolic and the real (Lacan 1998) to make clear the main argument that I construct based on Taylor’s work on secularity (Taylor 2004, 2007). Secularity and the idea of the nation are concepts pertaining to the way we imagine the modern social world in a social and political sense. These ideas are translated into the symbols of religion and citizenship that both refer to a moral set of ideas about truth and living together and are used to evoke the imaginary that inspires them. These symbols are then translated into governing strategies and are perceived as real and having real consequences by individuals and social groups. Before explaining how these concepts are put to work in my writing, I will explain these three main concepts through the work of Lacan as interpreted by Hansen (1999, 2001) and connect them to the work of Charles Taylor.

Hansen is concerned with the idea that the subject always experiences itself in terms of a ‘lack’ on being. He argues that the ‘impossibility of identities’ (1999: 60-65), is caused by different dimensions of the social world that are not sitting comfortably with each other. These dimensions he takes over from Lacan but defines them in a slightly different way: the Imaginary or the ‘more immediate and sensory experiences, desires, and imaginings’, the Symbolic defined as ‘the conventions of society and culture’ and the Real, ‘the central dimensions of experience that cannot be fathomed and symbolized fully’ (Hansen 2001:7-80). Hansen points out throughout his work that subjects are thorn between these different, and often opposed, registers of reality (Hansen 1999, 2001).

Hansen applies this analytical framework to the analysis of authorized discourses and ideological projects. Concerned with the precarious balance between domination and agency, he proposes that the impotence of domination does not come out of the resistance of subjects that are fully constituted and defy in one way or the other power, but is instead the result of the impossibility of producing stable subjects. Subjects are by definition unstable as they are torn between the different dimensions of the social world (Hansen 2001). Taking up his argument I contend that regimes of citizenship and secularity have influence on their subjects, not only because of the power that they employ, but also because these subjects are in continuous construction.

The framework Hansen uses allows us to engage with the role played by an abstract layer of reality, that he calls ideology, in the constitution of the subject, or the
‘politics of the unconscious’ (Hansen 1999). Ideology in his understanding is a part of the symbolic realms, related directly to the imaginary. Ideology exists and is reproduced through unconscious acts, while people are not aware of its essence. A good example of this linking mechanism is given by Zizek, inspired by Lacan (Zizek 1989, 1992, 1994). He argues that as long as people act according to the ideological grammar they reinforce its meaning. He gives the example that people do not have to believe in consumerism if all they do is buy. Hansen and (implicitly) Zizek, following Lacan, argue that practices are important and have a higher value of truth than discourses. Furthermore, both authors link imaginaries, symbols and reality to each other, as facts of the social world with different degrees of abstraction.

The concept of the modern social imaginary used by Charles Taylor also points to an abstract layer of reality, though in a slightly different sense. Taylor’s social imaginary is the corollary of ‘the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’ (2003:23). First, with this approach Taylor makes it clear that the modern social imaginary is created in interaction. This is at the basis of his absorbing work ‘A secular age’ that engages with many aspects of secularity. However, Taylor’s approach neglects the mundane level of everyday interactions and thus the level of what Lacan calls ‘the real’ and the persuasive and imposing form of power. As Taylor’s understanding of the social imaginary is as both a ‘factual and normative’ entity, I believe that this also implies that each social imaginary is implicitly political in nature. This means that power and interest back up each social imaginary. Engaging with the ideas of Taylor and taking them one step further, in this work I argue first that power shapes the importance and temporary relevance of the use of some parts of the social imaginary above others, and second, that practices are important because actions are translating discourses pregnant with meaning into direct or indirect action (idem.).

Second, Taylor aims at capturing the big picture that is shared as a collective assumption of people in general. Taylor translates the social imaginary as ‘the common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (2003:23). However, I believe that these practices and their legitimacy are continuously contested. Furthermore, the imaginary is never completely shared among people. One of the features of modernity is that it subjects individuals to insecurity and doubt (Giddens 1991, Beck 1992). However large the group sharing a collective understanding, groups having a different view and a different understanding of what is or should be collective
always exist. At most, between these different groups, there are great conceptual areas that overlap and form an agreement between what different people consider as true, self-understood, natural. This partial agreement leaves space for contestation and reconstruction, and as I will explain later on, for contextual citation.

I read Taylor’s work on the social imaginary (Taylor 2004, 2007) as an in-depth enrichment of the Lacanian imaginary conceived as a phenomenon individual in nature. Taylor points out the universality and high level of abstraction at which the social imaginary works. The work of Hansen (1999, 2001) and Zizek (1989, 1992, 1994), among others, further develops this perspective with a collective dimension.

In the case of Muslims, in this book I will apply the triangle proposed by Lacan (1998) and enriched by Taylor (2004, 2007) in the following way: I will elaborate on part of the modern social imaginary as formed of the interconnected and mutually constitutive strands of secularity, ideas about the nation and their relation to the state, with ideas about membership within the nation-state. I will look at how symbols such as nation, people and religion influence both the shape of the imaginary and the content and extent of regimes of citizenship and secularity. Finally I look at the real actions and their real consequences of imaginary categories and of the use of symbols on people, the way collective agency and action is mobilized at the grassroots of society.

These analytical dimensions are dialectical in nature, which means that while they are constituted, they simultaneously inform each other. Besides, it is important to point out that this scheme is analytical, while the categories used are reflections, aided by theoretical insights from various disciplines, rather than pure emic categories. Indeed, to the ‘subjects’ of the state, to migrants, the nation-state is not experienced as less real then the process of acquiring citizenship and the right and duties inherited through this process. Furthermore, policies are not more or less real than collective forms of grassroots mobilization, just as categories coming from above through institutions are just as real as self-identification. However, behind this reality there are dimensions of thought and collective that do not have a direct impact on social life, but rather shape and indirectly hold the patterns of social life as experienced.

1.4. Outline of the book

The starting point of this book is that religion and citizenship are crucial for migrants who are identified and who identify themselves as religious. They are both relevant for their collective identity, which is shaped through articulations of belonging
to geographical and ideological entities. Belonging is filtered through the concept and mechanism of citizenship and through the role that is assigned to religion in the modern social world. The possible role of religion in the modern social world will be discussed in chapter two. Chapter three will discuss citizenship in relation to the nation-state and migrants, in the light of the concept of regimes of secularity, introduced in chapter two.

Religion and citizenship are deeply connected and feed each other, secularity being an important part of the modern social imaginary, as the title of the section that encompasses chapter two suggests, offering the frames through which both religion and politics have their specific role in social life. Section two deals with citizenship as the main symbol of the social imaginary as expressed through secularity, presenting the modern trajectory for the individual as the way of maintaining the legitimacy of the nation-states and their claims on individuals. Section three deals with the domain of the real, using three case studies to show how regimes of secularity and citizenship relate to and influence grassroots initiatives allowing space to diverse dimensions of Muslimness.

Regimes of secularity will be defined as bearing the traits of the myth of secularization (section 2.2.1), especially in keeping intact the distinction between the secular and the religious and its necessary translation into the separation of the spheres of politics, the foremost ground of the state and the sphere of religion. Secularity is conditioned by the unthought of the modern social imaginary, that has been changing, influenced by secularization and the simultaneous birth of the nation-state against religion, towards a situation where belief is just one option among others (section 2.1.2.).

Secularity permeates the structure and discourse of western nation-states, as will be further argued. Depending on historical trajectories and specific conjunctures in the relationship between religion and the secular, tried on different challenges, several secularities have been produced. The historical trajectories of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France will be discussed (section 2.5.2.), providing the context for the case studies discussed in chapter five, six and seven.

From this point of view, religion, especially public religion, can be seen as a form of normative critique (section 2.4.). Taking further Talal Asad’s idea of secularism as an unfinished project at the heart of modernity, entailing particular ways of defining and relating to ‘religion’, ‘politics’, ‘nation’ and ‘self’ I will propose that regimes of secularity should be considered across two dimensions: an ideology of secularity that feeds on secularization theory, and secularity as a method of statecraft and way of governing (section 2.5.1.).
As a way of stepping over the normative power of regimes of secularity I will present ideas about post-secularism arguing that religion, one of the causes of more plurality and diversity in social life needs to be considered as a valuable contribution and as a way to improve the structures and the systems of thinking that form the collective imaginary that influences our lives (section 2.6). I will argue that regimes of secularity are intertwined with nation-states as they can only be articulated in social, physical and discursive spaces that are both social and political. However, regimes of secularity are not necessarily contained by nations.

Minorities are especially affected by the boundary making mechanism of the principle of citizenship, as they are both included and excluded by the nation-state (section 3.4). Religious minorities, I will argue, present a double challenge for the state as they both contest the nation and its people dialectics that is at the base of the modern nation-state and its ideology of binary separations that I have discussed beforehand. Furthermore I will propose that Muslims embody these two dimensions of the challenged met by modern nation-states, explaining the political attention received (section 3.6).

Chapter four deals with methods and explains the choice of spatial focus in the subsection national versus local (section 4.1), explains the case selection (section 4.2), population, method and data collection while making explicit the research questions. This chapter also addresses ethical questions of research conducted in a politicized field and gives details about the analysis of data.

Chapters five, six and seven are empirical enquiries into the field on Muslimness constructed in Rotterdam, Leicester and Marseille. These chapters are constructed symmetrically: a contextualization of the origins of the Muslim populations in the respective national and local contexts, a historical overview of national policies dealing with Muslims as migrants and then as minorities in the light of the concept of citizenship, local policies dealing with Muslims in the decade 1998-2008 and grassroots mobilizations of Muslims on the local level.

Chapter eight summarizes and compares the empirical findings of the three previous chapters along the axes of inquiry proposed in the two theoretical chapters. This is taken further to chapter nine, where the empirical findings are considered in the light of their significance to theory.
I. THE IMAGINARY
2. Secularization, secularity and the secular: religion and its place in social life

‘If before, it was the religious realm that appeared to be the all-encompassing reality within that the secular realm found its proper place, now the secular sphere will be the all encompassing reality, to that the religious sphere will have to adapt. To study what new systems of classification and differentiation emerge within this one secular world and what new place religion will have, if any, within the new differentiated system is precisely the analytical task of the theory of secularization’ (Casanova 1994:15)

2.1. Religion and its place in social life

Secularization, secularity and the secular are concepts that determine the place and role of religion in contemporary social life, especially in the western world and even more so in Europe. In a nutshell, secularization assumes that the secular and the religious are two categories that oppose each other, separated in different spheres of life. It maintains that religion has lost its importance while the secular took its place. It envisages religion to be of no more use, socially or individually. It is a collective imaginary and although the details vary from one continent to the other, from one country to the other, it is a familiar theme and we engage with it in one way or the other. Secularity represents the way secularization and the secular are dealt with, in that the secular is the domain where secularity and secularization have meaning. While the secular is mostly understood in opposition with the sacred and the transcendental, both secularity structures and orders the social imaginary and social experiences according to the principle of secularization. This conceptual triangle cannot be taken apart in practice: secularization, the secular and secularity are dependent on each other while they all define the role and meaning of religion.

The way we imagine the role of religion and belief has a direct effect on how we imagine the world in ontologic terms, how we account for the meaning of experiences, situations and people encountered, the social relations we have, the expectations and the moral ideas that give us a sense of right or wrong (Taylor 2007). Through secularity, we are touching both on the transcendental dimension of what human life can mean in relationship with a possible transcendence, and its immanent dimensions, that relates to
human life as experienced. The secular has an immense power of ordering and assigning meaning to the way human life is lived, and as such is one of the most potent imaginaries on which modern society is based.

I propose, following the ideas about our secular age of Charles Taylor, that the modern social imaginary is based on ideas of the secular and implicitly of secularity, that not only deal with ‘the removal of God or religion from public space’ (2004:93), but also feed the most general ideas and normative inclinations about human collective action standing at the basis of society, with no need for anything transcendent. The concepts of the public sphere as the ‘metatopical space’ and that of the ‘metatopical agency’ of people are the blueprint features of the imaginary that determine the contours of the social world as we know it (Burawoy 2005). This is the ‘natural way’ that is at the basis of most of our moral, social and political structures of social life.

The social imaginary has been shaped by the collective understanding and evaluation of historical changes considered important steps on the road to modernity. These ideas are purported by the philosophy of Enlightenment that is considered to form the basis of secularity and the way we think of rationality as opposed to fanaticism, emotions and the irrational (see Colas 1997, Tambiah 1990).

The distinction between immanent and transcendent is one of the main organizing principles in Taylor’s work (2007). This is a very useful distinction as it makes us sensitive not only to the way secularization and then secularity divide social existence in different and independent spheres of human activity, but also to the way the social is understood only in immanent terms while any reference to a possibility of transcendence is relegated to the realm of belief and religion. Thinking in terms of dimensions, we can analytically separate a vertical dimension of human life, that links or separates social reality and the (possibility of) transcendental from the horizontal dimension where experiences of social life unfold in their amazing complexity. This map of the universe makes sense only if we step out for a moment of the secular paradigm - the possibility of a vertical, transcendental dimension is a possibility that can only be articulated in an un-secular tradition. This tradition would be considered from a secular point of view as pre-secular, as secularity is understood as a necessary part of the social and moral evolution that ended in modernity, as we experience it now.

The secular lumps together all the traditions of thought that are excluding transcendence, such as realism, positivism, naturalism and humanism under its own umbrella. It is a wide angle of internally varied views that have but their worldly and
immanent focus in common (see McLennan 2007: 858). If we wish to step out of the secularist paradigm, we need to insist on the distinction between immanent and transcendental that helps us refocus on the way different traditions of thought have engaged with the questions of meaning, goal and the possible dimensions of human life.

This multidimensional model can be further enriched with the various dimensions in which secularity intersects the frames of our social imaginary: the personal, the collective and the moral. Taylor distinguishes between three features of secularity that impose on our social imaginary: a narrowing of the concept of self, a focus on the individual and limited idea about goodness. The focus on the individual neglects the collective social bodies the individual it is part of, isolating the individual and assigning him only individual and not collective responsibility. The flattening of the notion of goodness takes place through the restriction of the world to an immanence filled with a mesmerizing amount of goods possibilities of goodness, that can and should all be attained (Taylor 2007, Warner et al. 2010). Finally, the self is understood as an independent entity, filled with determination and agency, but working only for its own benefit.

In order to understand the power and depth of secularity as a social imaginary we need to understand the building blocks that made possible the transformation of an analytic model into naturalized wisdom. In the following I will look at the way ideas about secularization, secularity and the secular have been constructed in relation to objective truth in scientific discourse, pointing out the changes in the way the dimensions of secularization have been related to desacralization, diversification, pluralism, urbanization and most importantly, modernity. I will point out how scientific discourse delimited the various dimensions and possible causal powers of secular ideas, framing the limits of the secular discourse articulated on several social levels. Besides, I distinguish between the secular and the post-secular as epistemic categories, secularization as an analytical process of understanding changes in social history and secularity as a worldview. I also introduce the concept of regimes of secularity, paying attention to the role of secularity as a governance tool and as an ideology (compare Casanova 2009a), arguing that both religion and secularities need to be understood in relation to each other. Furthermore, this relation takes place in a field of power.
2.2. The conditions of secularity and the role of the ‘unthought’

Secularity was made possible by a series of changes in the tapestry of the world. Taylor argues that we live in a secular age as a consequence of changes in the conditions of beliefs (that he calls secularity 3). Secularity is not only a condition caused by the pragmatic shift in the cultural centrality of religion, manifested in the emptying of public spaces of reference to God or ultimate reality (secularity 1) or the diminution of religious beliefs and practices (secularity 2). The change in the conditions of belief, shift a society where belief in God is unchallenged and unproblematic to one in which belief is only one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace. Taylor builds up his argument from secularity 1 and 2, both considered only as partial explanations about the reason why the period in which we live now is considered as ‘a secular age’. Considered mere ‘subtraction theories’, secularity 1 and 2 point out that what we now experience is based on the lack of ingredients such as religion and belief, considered vital in the past (Taylor 2007).

Taking up the issues of ‘secularization’ he contests secularization theory on the basis of his threefold distinction. Secularization theory does not adequately account for the phenomena it describes, Taylor believes, and in order to substantiate his hunch he introduces the concept of ‘unthought’ (2007). Each theory and position is based on an unthought, a pre-theoretical perspective that influences the way we think about things, and the way we pay attention to details. Working with ‘tempers’ and ‘outlooks’ the unthought described by Taylor, seems to work in the field of visceral understandings, emotions and gut feelings, which then influence the complete field of human action. This dimension is comparable to the category of the real proposed by Lacan, mentioned in the introduction of this work.

Taylor further points out that secularization theory has the unthought that religion must necessarily decline because it is a false field of knowledge (as science has already pointed out), it does not solve the problems that we are dealing with every day and its structure of authority contradicts the modern focus on individuals (Taylor 2007:306). This unthought maintains that religion remains a belief about transcendence that is not compatible with the conditions of modernity - being unable to truly motivate human action. This unthought is to be found behind secularization theory in our common understanding of the secular and the religious as opposite categories and the emotional substrata which are mobilized by the political and the religious.
Taking this argument further, I propose that the way secularity is presently understood is built on the unthought of the findings of secularization theory, namely: (1) modernity causes disenchanted of religion and the triumph of rationality, (2) religion and other spheres of life are functionally and structurally separated from each other and (3) religion has but a weak influence on individual and collective life. Against all the critique received, secularization theory was and remains influential. Although secularization theory is hardly standing unchallenged in the academic world, this is not the case in society in Europe, where it is still considered to describe (and normatively formulate) the way things are (and should be).

As such the unthought has an impact on how we see religion in social life. The influence of what we perceive as ‘facts’ makes us see and identify causal relationship in a certain way. This modern reductionist account of religion builds on secularization theory, failing to see religion as a genuine, independent and irreducible motivator for human action and human life while the ‘transformation perspective’ that religion offers is completely neglected.

Taylor compares the role of the untought in the construction of a social imaginary to a three-storied building (Taylor 2007:431-433), where the ‘facts’ occupy the ground floor, as a diagnosis of the causes of secularization that are placed in the basement. This construction determines the dimensions of the upper floor, where the evaluations and the implications on the ‘facts’ are placed. Seen in this way, ‘the explanation one gives for the declines registered by ‘secularization’ relate closely to one’s picture of the place of religion today’ (Taylor 2007:433), as the unthought stabilizes the dividing lines between the different stories of the building. Thus secularization necessarily feeds our present understanding of the role and power of religion, providing the pillars on which the construction of what we believe as real and true may rest.

The influence of secularization theory is easy to see if we follow the argument of Taylor. Thinking about religion as something useless and incompatible with the modern reality influences the way we rationalize the causal chains that brought us to this situation, but also influences the role religion may have now and in the future. In other words, our thoughts and unthoughts form the conditions for the existence of belief and the dimensions of its authority, in Taylor’s words, secularity 3. To this day, the premises accepted and developed upon by secularization theory have been transcribed in our understanding of the secular as a separate domain, to be separated from any transcendental claim. This separation and the need for differentiation affect the institutions that claim a link with the transcendental and the collective agency of groups
motivated by belief. This distinction is descriptive, but also normative: it functions as a closed world system that is difficult, if not impossible to contest.

However, it is important to keep in mind the starting point of the argument: secularity as understood through the lenses of secularization theory is but one way of looking at the place of religion in social life. In informing this particular view, secularization theory remains influential. This calls for a detailed analysis of the arguments it contains, a task to which I will proceed in the following section. However, these ‘findings’ must also be historically related to both as foundations of secular ideology and stepping-stones of secular governing.

2.3. The ‘myth’ of secularization

An account of the role of religion in public life cannot start without mentioning the theory of secularization. Secularization theory has been the main lens through which (social) science(s) have been looking at religion. We can certainly say that it has been and remains to be a highly influential theory with a vast array of engaged scholars. Secularization theory predicted the disappearance of religion from the public sphere as an effect of modernization, individualization, urbanization and industrialization, forecasting its lack of importance for individuals and communities alike, its relegation to the private sphere and its transformation into a consumer choice.

It is not in my purpose to offer an overview of the way secularization has been described and interpreted so far, as this has been done in detail before (see Glasner 1977, Dobbelare 1981, Warner 2010). My intention is, without being oblivious of the vast diversity of interpretations and adjustments to secularization theory, to try to condense and re-arrange its complexity according to the different logics that proved to remain embedded in our collective normative understanding about the role of religion in social life in a conceptual map.

Secularization theory has never been a unitary field of analysis and has always had more than one direction of inquiry (Hadden 1987:598-9). As Karel Dobbelare rightfully observed, secularization has been a term used in scientific studies with multiple meanings (Dobbelare 1981). Empirically based on the study of the changes Christianity went through after the process of Reformation in Europe, it soon became a theory with universal claims. Together with its claims for universal validity came an almost complete covering possibility for a series of other concepts, often considered as necessarily and
causally related. Modernity, industrialization, urbanization and progress often travel conceptually joined by secularity.

In the following part I will detail the four main ideas that form classical secularization theory, on the basis of the work of Berger, Wilson, Martin and Bruce. Although more authors have contributed to this field of knowledge, this selection is based on the pillars of secularization theory.

2.3.1. **Dimensions of secularization theory**

In order to understand the contribution of secularization theory to how the secular is presently understood I will identify the main tenets of this theory on the basis on the most influential works in this domain. First I will present the dimensions of the disappearance, differentiation, co-existence and de-intensification thesis in details, in order to synthesize and compare their main findings in a later part.

The **disappearance thesis** of Berger claims that individuals, as a consequence of the secularization of consciousness, make less and less use of religion to make sense of their lives and the world (1967:108). Calling this phenomenon desacralization, Berger believes that religion is on the point of completely disappearing from the social scene, leaving space for processes that accompany the progressive rationalization of the world. For him, secularization is a social-structural process affecting all areas of life, from public life to the inner beliefs of individuals.

According to Berger the roots of the process of secularization are to be found in the economic sphere, in the changes brought about by the process of industrialization and the development of capitalism. Rationalization, the force operating behind both capitalism and industrialization seeps into society on a structural and also on a consciousness level. As the ordering logic of the political sphere is taken over by an economy based logic, the triumph of rationality is to be met on all public levels of society, without exception, providing a good foundation for arguments and forming a frame of reference that will replace and overpower any alternative.

Industrialization and the gradual rationalization of public life are also helped by changes in the religious sphere, namely the process of Reformation. Protestantism contests the overarching idea of truth or in Berger’s words, the ‘sacred canopy’ creating a situation of diversity and pluralism within the religious field. Competition ensues between churches and between religions, a rivalry that further fragments a religion that
has little public impact. The pluralization and fragmentation of the religious realm forces religions to market their tradition, submitting it to the rationale of capitalism. As the value of religion is not obvious anymore, it has to compete on the market with other possible options aiming at the minds and hearts of believers. This competition takes place on the individual and on the collective level. Both the fight for the attention of the individual and the recovering of the lost territory of claims to universal and eternal truth need separate attention and institutional effort. It further weakens the force of religion, exposing it more to the swords of rationality and capitalism that chop it down, making its claims relative, contextual and insignificant.

As a consequence, the differentiation of the religious from the political sphere, or the religious sphere and ‘all the rest’, can be considered ‘functional’ and instrumental for the maintenance of a ‘highly rationalized’ sphere of political and economic order. The private sphere is separated from the secularized and modern sectors of the society for the reason of the common good. This distinction between the private and the public encapsulates religion and family in the private sphere while the economy and politics remain public areas and collective affairs. An issue of contention remains the sphere of education, considered both private and public.

Luckmann has a similar view on secularization that he defines as ‘a process in which internal institutional ideologies replace, within their own domain, an overarching and transcendent universe of norms.’ (1967:107). In both accounts, Berger and Luckmann (1966) see rationality, capitalism and industrialization naturally replacing the functional role of religion, which at its turn leads to a shrinkage of the structural need for religion in social life.

Criticized for the way he uses the concept of secularization in his earlier work, using it to mean both the field of life in which decisions are made without reference to religion, and the way the church adapts to changes in social world (see DobBELaere 1981), Berger, one of the most fervent defenders of the secularization thesis, changed his position with time. Berger contended that while modernization has indeed some effects on secularization, these effects are contextual (1999). While causing secularization, modernity can also be seen as a cause of producing anti-secular movements, such as fundamentalism. Berger believes that secularization is something that has taken place, with variations in modality, speed and consequences of implementation and that now encounters opposition. Similar to the way in which the secular has stepped upon and contradicted a previous religious age, religion returns in order to oppose the order brought about by secularization.
Furthermore, Berger admitted that secularization on the collective social level does not need to be necessarily linked to secularization on the individual level. Individual religiosity may give rise to forms of institutional religion that are new and innovative, having a positive effect on collective religiosity. The institutional roles played by religion in the social or political realm can also be seen as separate from the actual beliefs of individuals, he further admits.

However, the link between religion and modernity remains uncontested in Berger’s work. He also regards ‘experiments’ with secularized religion as having failed, and explains the flourishing of religious communities by a lack of adaptation to what the conditions of modernity entail.

The differentiation thesis of Wilson does not see religion as disappearing, nevertheless foreshadows its decline of significance in social life and social consciousness, together with a reduced command over resources (1966, 1982). We can distinguish three main arguments in his take on the secularization thesis: first, a structural argument that describes secularization as the process of transition of goods, propriety, authority and power from institutions working with a transcendental frame to those operating by using an ‘empiric, rational and pragmatic frame’ (Wilson 1982:12). In a narrow sense he talks of secularization as the process of authority transition from elites claiming empowerment from transcendental sources to elites that have acquired political power. Second, an argument targeting the shift in human consciousness that makes religion superfluous in the modern age. Finally, Wilson talks about sociology as opposed to theology, a new objective way of describing religion and its place in the social world.

Structurally, changes in social stratification and organization are determined by changes in the way justice and moral norms have been conceptualized and the way they have influenced social cohesion, the epistemological impact of the natural sciences and the Freudian explanation of the irrational as part of the human psyche. All these factors are causing secularization to different degrees. While secularization is not understood as the corollary of these processes of social change, Wilson sees it as developing and influencing social life in tandem with them. Certain parts of social life are expected to change slower, while the pace of change is expectedly higher for areas such as religion.

In his early writing Wilson develops the idea that communities are essentially religious while the society is secular in nature (1966). As in the modern world the community ceases to be the main principle of social organization, the role of religion in sanctifying and reassuring the community does not have the same impact as before. The
community becomes one between other ‘social institutions’, while religion becomes a force of collective life that loses its value and power.

He insists that secularization does not mean the disappearance of religion, rather its decline in importance within the social system. In the process of structural differentiation of society religion has lost its overarching role, diminishing its functions. Secularization is thought to have general validity, being more than a process in the specific development of Christianity. Secularity is in Wilson’s opinion an irreversible process. However, a certain context dependency is recognized in relation to other religions. Secularization in other geographical areas will depend on the way influence from the West will translate and affect the historical and psychological features of each society (Wilson 1982:19).

Besides, Wilson believes that religion, a form of thinking that emphasizes love, affection, modesty and duty, virtues that Wilson considers ‘non-rational, substantive concerns’ and that form the spirit of religion, oppose rationality, that is the rationale of the secular sphere. As a consequence: ‘Religion in secular society will remain peripheral, relatively weak, providing comfort for men in the interstices of a soulless social system of that men are the half-willing, half-restless prisoners.’ (Wilson 1966:276). New forms of social organization, that are required by the changed nature of social ties and the values that are transported through these ties make religion an alternative for those who do not find their place. Concluding that religion will be of use to marginal social groups and individuals, Wilson clearly predicts the fading away of a consciousness based on values such as altruism and emphasizes the reign of calculating rationality.

Wilson also discusses the importance of secularity (understood in the sense of objectivity and neutrality) for the social sciences. Drawing on Comte’s distinction between religious and scientific ways of knowledge Wilson talks about the ‘inherited model’ of secularization and aligns sociology in the first line of soldiers who fought alongside the new paradigm (Wilson 1982). Constructed against theology, ‘sociology documented a secularization process’ (Wilson 1982:9, compare with Milbank 2006, McLennan 2007). Sociology is considered as an objective method of looking at society, different from ‘secularization’ or the process occurring within the social structure and also immune to ‘secularism’, ‘the ideology of those who want to promote the decline of religion and to hasten the process of secularization’ (Wilson 1982:11).

**Co-existence** theory assumes that the balance between secularity and religion depends on particular circumstances (Martin 1990). Martin unravels secularization by
looking at how the assumptions about the religious past make it hard, if not impossible, to think of following historical periods in other terms than secularization. He highlights that the religious past is represented through selected images such as ‘the temporal power of the church, extreme ascetism, realism in philosophy, and ecclesiastical dominance in the sphere of artistic patronage and learning’ (Martin 1969 in Dobbelaere 1981:32), painting an extreme and inherently negative picture of religion.

Martin sees secularization as a process that fluctuates in intensity. Individualism, along with pluralism and cultural identity are considered to explain the variation between different ways of relating to religion in different historical periods. Being concerned with the cultural and political context in which secularization unfolds, Martin is able to point out that secularities are plural. Describing the religious scene he refers to social actors (elites, religious groups and individuals, secular persons and clerics, etc.) and also to religious means (associations and organizations, pillarization, political parties and alliances, education, media, legal and administrative measures), making a clear distinction between religion as a set of beliefs and its institutional apparatus (Dobbelaere 1981:65).

Looking at various variables such as education, mass communication, discrimination against religion, legal and administrative boundaries, material opportunities and their use by elites in order to privatize religion, he paints a nuanced picture suggesting that both institutions and individuals have an important role in the process of secularization.

Martin talks about secularization as the process of change from a social control through morality and belief towards a control through technical and bureaucratic means. Communities, holding people together through a collective morality and through collective religious symbols and activities, do not need other forms of social control. Social control becomes relevant only at the point when collective belief and collective imageries of right and wrong disappear, and another order that is based on interest arises.

This need for a new order he connects to ideas about the nation-state. The historical links between religion and nationalism, the way religion (and the specific denomination in that context) is reacting (in his words resisting) to secularization, the relationship of control with forms of religion that are not necessarily public and the importance of religious elites and lay organization, make the state dependent on the power of religion. Thus, he points out that the secular and the religious need each other also in terms of sustenance of power, as both provide entry to social groups into the collective and neutral space of the state.
Taking one step further the argument of Berger about religion giving way to capitalist and rational influences, Bruce asserts that as a consequence of modernity, religion becomes a mere consumer product. In this process it loses most of its specific functions, becoming weak and unsubstantial on the individual and also on the collective level (Bruce 1995, 1996, 2002). Alongside Wilson, Bruce believes that modernization has produced an irreversible process that negatively determines the faith of religion. The increasing marginalization of the function of the church, joined by low church attendance both point to the irreversible decline of institutionalized religion. This decline he calls de-intensification. For Berger these are reasons to believe that secularity has durably gained an upper hand above religion. Faith and beliefs are lacking social relevance and importance, remaining indifferent for the majority of people, especially so for the youth.

Although new religious movements and new age spirituality evolve, this does not reverse the precarious balance. Even if religious phenomena and religion in general remain marginal, religion follows the patterns of privatization and individualization. Its role and function are further diluted by commodification, the laws of the market that make religion one option among others. According to Bruce, nothing can stop the secularization trend. Sooner or later nothing will stay in the way of a completely secular society.

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Berger, Wilson, Martin and Bruce can be considered the theorists that form the core of secularization theory (Dobbelaeere 1981) or of the secularization paradigm (Tschannen 1991). Around their work all further works dealing with secularity have centred. It is this fundamental cognitive core which became also the core of the social imaginary about secularity in general, features of which are still maintained as valid by society. Moreover, the core ideas of secularization theory translate into secularity, both as an ideology and as a statecraft method.

According to Tschannen, a tightly knit scholarly community reflected on the issues of secularity, with central intellectual figures in leading roles (Tschannen 1992). What has been considered an incoherent body of theory adding up to little systematic inquiry actually revolves, according to him, around a few core concepts concerning the role of religion in social life (1991).

The following concepts are central to secularization theory: differentiation, rationalization, worldliness, autonomization, pluralisation and decline in religious practice
(Tschannen 1991). There are similarities to be found in all the different positions concerning secularization. Secularity is always understood in relationship to religion, to be more precise, in an indirect relation with religion. Religion, its role and importance are understood to decrease in order to give way to secularity. However, it is interesting to note that what is considered as religion in these accounts differs (see also Casanova 2011a).

Second, all accounts build on the idea of differentiation between spheres. A dichotomy between religion and the secular, the political, public, rational, economic, urban is present in all authors' work. This separation can roughly be seen as between religion and everything else, or between religion and the secular. These ideas make religion a separate dimension of social life, independent in itself but also to be kept apart as something impure and contagious from all the other areas of social life. This process of separation of spheres is intensified by a demonization of the religious that, as pointed out before, is a category that allows irrationality, superstition and excessive emotionality to be lumped together.

Third, all accounts link directly or indirectly, through the use of intermediary causal mechanisms such as the processes of urbanization, individualization and the logic of capitalism, secularity with modernity. According to Wilson, Berger, Bruce and Martin as secularity gains momentum, the world is becoming less religious, but more modern. Instead of viewing secularization as equating modernity, a more fruitful approach is to see it as valid for a specific context of time and space (Berger et al. 2001). However, the causal relationship between modernity and secularity is far from clear. Moreover, the argument of the indisputable link between secularity and modernity is used circularly.

Furthermore, all accounts place religion in the domain of the irrational, claiming that rationality and its effects on modern social life impact negatively on the function and structure of religion, as a system of beliefs and an institutional formation. Rationality thus, remains the only tool in dealing with all the areas of immanent reality.

At this point it is important to note that in the four notions of secularization theory presented above (and also in the work of Tschannen) we can observe a tendency to conflate secularization with modernity while seeing as irreversible and unidirectional processes. Going back to the earlier distinction about transcendence versus immanence, this process of crude opposition relegates religion to dealing exclusively with the transcendental, while the secular remains in charge of the territory of the immanent. As I will point out in the following section, further claims of secularization theory, such as
universality, irreversibility and privatization, also central in the four theoretical approaches summed up above, are contested one by one by further theoretical insights.

2.3.2. Secularization theory revisited

The universality claims of classical secularization theory have been the first to be dismissed. Scholars have pointed out the importance of the geographical factor, claiming that in different geographical areas secularization is taking place at different speeds and in different ways (Berger 1999, Norris and Inglehart 2004). The most different cases are considered to be the US and Europe, where the role of religion in social life and the development of the importance of religion over time vary greatly. These empirical findings contradict the universality claims of secularization theory. The marginalization, disappearance of increasing loss of importance of religion is far from being a universal process, rather it can be seen as a specific case, relevant for European Christianity.

However, even in the case of western Christianity the process of secularization does not seem to be as irreversible as initially thought. Some scholars talk of survival (Berger et al. 2001), while others prefer the term revival to describe this phenomenon. Behind both concepts lies the assumption that religion was either inexistent or remained hidden for some time (Van de Donk et al. 2006). While the concept of return takes for granted the fact that religion has for some time disappeared, the concept of survival essentializes religion, transforming it into a category that is influenced neither by culture nor by history (Asad 1993:28, Vries and Sullivan 2006:1-3). Although religion has powerfully reappeared in the collective social tapestry, secularization is far from retreating or diminishing (Berger 2001: 445).

Scholars who believe that religion has never disappeared think that it has transformed and changed (Casanova 1994). Heelas and his colleagues talk about spirituality (Heelas et al. 2005) while studies of American religion point out inner transformations of religious beliefs, forms of civil religion (Bellah 1976, 1992b, see also Luchau 2009), believing without belonging (Davie 1994) and highlight the importance of new religious movements (Beckford 1986).

Dobbelare insisted that the use of the term secularization is imprecise because of the lack of attention towards the difference between processes taking place on the
macro, meso and the micro level (1981). He suggested that a **differentiated perspective** would make scientific inquiry more precise. Although a very important observation, his insight was taken into consideration only recently (Berger 2001:443).

The debate provoked by classical secularization theory has uncovered new directions of inquiry into the role of religion. Berger refined his ideas by pointing out that the dynamics of religion as in Europe are an exception rather than the norm when looking at the place of religion in public life. Thus, secularization theory gave birth to concepts such as ‘desecularization’, ‘neosecularization’ and ‘postsecularization’. ‘Neosecularization’ was used by Chaves and his colleagues, who talked about the general decrease in religious authority (2003). ‘Postsecularization’ was used by Habermas, who considered religion as a possible actor in the public sphere (2006). However, once again we see that these ‘new’ theories engaging with and opposing the concept of secularization while they do not try to build up a completely new theory.

Going back to the analysis of Tschannen (1991), I agree that differentiation remains the core of the secularization thesis and I also think, following Taylor, that it informs our ‘natural’ understanding of the role of religion in the modern world. In the first meaning of the term differentiation makes a distinction between the different spheres of life, the religious and the secular (also the political and the public) - separating religion from all the other symbolical subsystems. As a consequence religion loses its impact on other areas of social life, thus its influence diminishes, as different spheres develop their own logic and ideology of functioning (Casanova 1994: 19).

The **duality** that we see in all these accounts, the secular versus the religious, has been very influential on the way we think about religion to this day. All accounts mentioned here suggest that religion and secularity are in an inverse relationship with each other, where one’s increase means the decease of the other.

Indeed, the most influential trait of secularization theory that has remained ingrained in our social imaginary is the dichotomy between religion and the secular (sometimes framed in terms of politics versus religion). Most discussions start from the presumption that religion and the secular are two unchanging entities that are predetermined, rather than seeing their process of interaction as one of mutual formation and continual redefinition. By reinforcing the image of two essential categories, religion and the secular become exclusionary maps for the territory of the social, excluding each other.
2.4. The Secular

The secular can hardly be articulated without mentioning the religious. Both the religious and the secular are thus mutually defining, each of them inevitably constituting and structuring each other (Van de Veer 1995). The secular is also part and parcel of the dualist system of classification that structured pre-modern Western Europe, that distinguished between the realm of ‘this’ and the ‘other’ world, further splitting ‘this’ world into a religious and a secular sphere. The secular was understood to be equivalent to the mundane, the realm that lacks transcendence (Casanova 1994). This distinction is relevant to this day, indeed, it has become one of the main features of modernity (Taylor 2007).

This understanding of a dual space and time, divided into sacred and secular is a historical creation. In Europe it is informed by the way institutionalized religion delimited its own spheres of action and time, and distinguished its power and authority from the mundane. But the secular also existed beyond the binary in which in was closed together and opposed to religion. 19th Century freethinkers used the secular in order to distinguish themselves from ‘infidels’ and ‘atheists’ (Asad 2003). However, the way the secular is understood today is mainly in relation to religion and the sacred.

Taylor traces back the secular to the ‘earthly’ politics, ‘mundane’ pursuits and ‘the temporal’ as opposed to the *illo tempore* of the sacred (Taylor 2007). The sacred and secular divide is something that is considered to be present in different forms in all societies and cultures. All religions share an understanding of what is sacred and what is profane, also a way of creating an opening and closing mechanism between the two. At its turn the difference made between these two realms is translated in different understandings about the role and experience of time and space, and in different forms of social action, both by the religious person and by the non-believer (Eliade 1992, 2001). The boundary between the ordinary and transcendental, sacred and profane, is marked by symbols and rituals, formulae that reinforce the boundaries between the two territories (Turner 1977).

Talal Asad, in his quest for a genealogy of secularism discusses the importance of the renaissance doctrine of humanism, the Enlightenment concept of nature and Hegel’s philosophy of history. He observes that secularity consists of a series of ideological inversions, from meaning given to the transition from the monastic life to that of the canons, to signifying the transfer of propriety from church to private owners. In modernity however, the secular is presented as the ground from which theological
discourse generates itself in order to properly function as a universal basis of existence. The paradox inherent in this historical inversion is that while the secular produces the religious, they are also seen as necessarily separate from each other (Asad 1993). Thus, the way the secular and the religious are defined through reference to each other, reinforces their dependence on each other in terms of an indirect relationship: as they function as a pair of opposites, the one’s affirmation becomes necessarily the negation of the other.

However, we must not take this correlation as self-understood. As Asad argues, the secular cannot be reduced to being the opposite of religion. ‘The secular, I argue, is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred). I take the secular to be a concept that brings together certain behaviours, knowledges and sensibilities in modern life… It is a matter of showing how contingencies relate to changes in the grammar of concepts - that is, how the changes in concepts articulate changes in practices.’ (Asad 2003:25). Asad’s argument takes us a step further: besides proposing to cross over the dichotomy scared and secular in a historical and an ontological dimension, he calls upon the semantic dimension of this opposition and its position within the modern social imaginary. Asad hints that the tension between the scared and the secular, as formulated in a specific context articulates, when articulating power, what I will call a regime of secular, a specific balance of the social imaginary around concepts of truth (and belief), morality (and law) and equality (and difference) (Asad 2003).

Both the religious and the secular are dynamic, contested, inter-related and interdependent, but not necessarily each other’s opposites. By pointing out the multiple inversions in the meaning of the secular and its changing relationship to the religious Asad reminds us of the importance of practices which give shape and meaning to the secular and the religious (Asad 2003).

As the secular and the religious have a culturally specific function (Van de Donk et al. 2006), a universal definition of religion is impossible (Asad 1993:200, Drees and Koningsveld 2008). The same can be argued about the secular: because it is contingent on a particular definition of religion, it cannot be considered a term with universal value. Even if the religious and the secular do not necessarily function as opposites of each other, in many places and situations religion becomes the counterpublic (see Warner 2002) of the discourses and mechanisms of secularity. This places the religious in a position that enables a critical stance, as I will point out in the following section.
2.5. Religion as normative critique

The metanarrative of modernity, which places the secular and the religious in exclusive opposition, continues to inform in practice a view of separated spheres within the nation-state. This position is prescriptive and also normative in nature, and does not capture the intricacies in which reality actually unfolds. There is a big gap between the way secularity, as a statecraft principle and an ideology imagines social reality and the way the balance between religion and the secular is played out in different lifeworlds (see Bowen 2010, Meer 2010, Sunier 2009, Meyer and Moors 2009).

This gap has also a normative historical dimension: as a disparity between primitive and civilized religions and the relation of power in colonial times, as a dynamic relationship at the formation of the nation-states and as a principle legitimizing universal liberal categories of thought.

Colonial domination and the subjugation of new territories often happened in the name of progress, both a civilizatory mission with a strong religious undertone and a quest for material gain. Indeed, the beginning frictions between religion and what was later defined as the secular can be traced back to the colonial time, when authority was constructed upon a joint force of religion and political power, while the colonial ‘other’ was educated into the modern dimensions of ‘proper’ belief and into proper action. The conflicts and conundrums that were formulated in these early encounters, survive to the present moment through the dynamics of the boundaries between religion and the secular and their reformulation at the dissolution of colonialism in modern nation-state ideas. Reinforced by secularization, in the sense of diminishment of the salience of belief, the institutional changes that followed Reformation and their translation through colonial and post-colonial situations of dominance, the relation between secularity as a statecraft and secularity as an ideology is complex and intertwined.

Religion and the secular are sustained and sustain each other through a complex range of power relations both within the state and beyond it. Besides, ‘discourses of democratization, gender relations, nationalist projects and politics, religious and theological imperatives, and colonial and postcolonial interactions’ (Cady and Hurd 2010:7) all implode on specific articulations and ranges of secularity. Lately, the reformulation of the concept of citizenship, agendas influenced by security concerns, identity politics and the fear caused by possible transnational networks of loyalty also further complicate the picture.
Once present in social life, the active part religion visibly plays in public, threatens exactly the secularization that presumably replaced it. The anguish caused by the possibility of secularity loosing (back) ground to religion is magnified by the belief that secularity is one of the defining features of the nation-state and as such, a foremost expression of emancipated western modernity.

The contribution of Casanova to this discussion is that he points out that although the spheres exist separately and independently from each other, it does not necessarily mean that religion remains constricted to the private sphere with little influence besides the individual level. Instead, Casanova proposes that religion is a powerful social force that actively engages with the secular, transforming and being transformed in this interaction.

In order to criticize secularization theory from a sociological historical angle he distinguishes between three strands of the secularization theory: (1) the differentiation between the secular and the religious spheres and norms, (2) the decline of religious beliefs and practices and (3) the marginalization of religion to the private sphere (Casanova 1994). The first two positions of secularization theory he considers as tenable. However, he contests the third by pointing out that the deprivatization of religion is a dual, interrelated process. Deprivatization is taking place as a consequence of articulating politically both the private religious and moral spheres, while the public economic and political spheres are going through a process of re-normativization. In other words, by affirming that the differentiation between the religious and secular spheres can be considered correct, while denying that privatization is an unavoidable effect of this differentiation, he asserts that the process of deprivatization does not contradict the differentiation implied by modernity.

Through this distinction he successfully creates distance between the concept of secularity and the theory of secularization. The dichotomy secular-religious works in different spheres of society. However, in considering the role of religion in social life we should be able to take distance from the relationships presumed by secularization theory. As pointed out earlier, secularization theory is a complex set of analytical distinctions that have been in most part invalidated by subsequent research. On the other hand secularity is a process that is normative and also ideological, thus politically and ideologically charged, serving as a normative point of view for the delimitation of the spheres of power. As he takes distance from secularization theory while building on its analytical heritage, Casanova goes further to explain the way secularity develops.
Casanova makes three observations regarding the process of transformation of the public and private spheres and the window of opportunity this transformation provides for the rethinking of the role of religion in social life. First, he observes, religious traditions in different parts of the world refuse to accept the place that is relegated to them according to secularist principles. Both theories of secularization and of modernity have reserved little if any place for religion.

Secondly, social movements that are either religious in nature or use the collective understanding of religion as a shared banner for collective mobilization and action are active across the world. These movements, through their goals, the collective identities they represent, and the way that translates these collective identities in collective action, contest the legitimacy and the autonomy of the secular. They offer a critique of the (secular) public spheres, but also an evaluation of the state in general.

Finally, he observes that religious institutions are not only taking action at the individual level but continue to be active at the macro and meso levels of society. Through their involvement in collective actions, they question issues of public morality and normativity. Religious institutions and groups of religious individuals, representing collective claims, through their presence in the public domain thus negotiate the border between private and public morality, and question the naturalized status of secular norms and values. In other words, if we look at religious organizations as particular subsystems, we can understand their struggle as a contestation of secularist frames and a reinforcement of the possibility of normative plurality.

Thus, Casanova points out that religions not only are defensively busy with fighting for their own rights in order to defend their ‘traditional turf’ but also ‘participate in the very struggle to define and set the modern boundaries between the private and the public spheres, between system and life-world, between legality and modernity’ (Casanova 1994:39). Implicit in this claim is also the idea that religion does not only make claims for the public and collective as part of an expansionist strategy at the loss of secularity, but also aims at linking transcendental aims while addressing the immanent realm.

Rising against the view that the process of deprivatization of religion is a fundamentalist reaction to processes of modern differentiation, Casanova argues that ‘public religion’ may be seen as having a dynamic similar to other normative critiques to dominant historical positions, such as the classical, Republican and feminist critiques. In the same way as these, religion raises questions about the legitimacy of the dominant discourses and frames of reference and their way of operating separated from some
collective norms and considerations. Certainly religion can serve as a basis for collective mobilization, it may contribute to existing public debates and thus may help redraw the boundaries between what is considered public and private.

Thus, the impact of religion should not be measured only in its ability to push its own agenda upon social life or to normatively influence any of the social spheres. Religion can rather be seen as a powerful social collective critique and possibility of contestation.

Although the privatization of religion is caused by (1) ideological pressure given by liberal categories of thought, (2) structural trends of differentiation that create a separate sphere for religion and (3) internal religious preferences caused by religious individuation and a reflexive turn of modern religion, religion steps out of its ascribed role and becomes an active actor in the public arena (Casanova 1994). The past years have shown more and more examples of such activity, especially in western countries, with issues concerning Muslims figuring high on the agenda.

Thus Casanova, working with the insights provided by secularization theory points out that as a consequence of globalization, pluralization and increasing heterogeneity of national populations both religious actors and institutions contest, and redefine, the boundaries of what can be considered as the secular and what as the religious. More to that, this contestation can be seen as a form of normative critique, that comes timely to join the changing social outlook on religion in general and on Muslims in particular.

2.5.1. Regimes of secularity

Research on secularization has pointed out that secularization theory describes a historically and geographically specific cluster of changes. Thus we can speak of spatially and temporarily contingent understandings of the secular that inform different articulations of secularity. Secularity is temporarily simultaneous with the formation of nation-states as ideological and physical entity provides ideological support for the nation-state. However, understandings about what secularity means and what its role is are diverse, thus we can speak about secularities in the plural.

Moreover, as different expressions of the relationship between the sacred and the religious are articulated at different points in time, according to the loss of meaning of a complex network of routines and institutions imbued with power, I plead for the
concept of regimes of secularity (compare with discussion of Aglietta and Brenner 1984 in Jessop 1990:44). Regimes of secularity I see as articulated across two dimensions, an ideology of secularity that feeds on secularization theory and secularity as a method of statecraft and a way of governing (compare with Casanova 1994).

Regimes of secularity articulate the management of the religious through secular power, something that Dobbelaere calls laicization (1981:15). Besides, regimes of secularity draw the discursive, administrative and institutional distinction between religion and politics. Thus we can talk of regimes of secularity in the plural.

If we talk about regimes of secularity, it is useful at this point to go back to Casanova’s view of the factors that push towards the privatization of religion. As mentioned before, he distinguishes between ideological pressure given by liberal categories of thought, structural trends of differentiation and internal religious preferences (1994). As a response to these pressures religion may choose roughly between three different modes of relationship between state and religion: (1) theocracy (where religion necessarily becomes entangled and transformed by the mundane), (2) the control and use of religion by the mundane, and (3) complete separation, detachment and distance between the two (Casanova 1994:49). However, in none of these cases are the tensions between religion and what Casanova calls the ‘world’ completely resolved, as secularity has a normative and also a prescriptive dimension when functioning as an ideology.

As statecraft and governing principle secularity is connected to the idea of the nation as a homogenous unit. Seen through the lenses of secularization, the struggle of power is the struggle of religion with the secular state over the scrip of social life. This struggle is implicit in the reduction of the sacred canopy and the separation between the spheres of the secular and religious, but also in the marginalization of religion from the public to the private and the questioning of the transcendental and moral functions of religion.

The constitutional separation between church and state is also at the heart of the distinction between the public and the private. ‘In accordance with the liberal tendency to limit the public sphere to the governmental public sector with all the rest lumped into a great ‘private’ sector, established state churches are designated as ‘public’ religions whereas all other religions are considered to be ‘private’. Since the liberal conception tends to conflate and confuse state, public and political, the disestablishment of religion is understood and prescribed as a simultaneous process of privatization and depolitization.’ (Casanova 1994:55). As religion is believed and wanted to be a private affair
the liberal fear of the politicization of religion is simultaneously the fear of an establishment that could endanger the individual freedom of conscience and the fear of a deprivatized ethical religion that could bring extraneous conceptions of justice, of the public interest, of the common good, and of solidarity into the 'neutral' deliberations of the liberal public sphere.' (Casanova 1994:55)

While religion is one of the actors of this struggle, the other is the modern state. Constructing its identity with reference to the philosophy of Enlightenment (invoked also in the case of secularization) and claiming modernity as its forming power, in order to authorize its supremacy the state also draws on the understating of the secular as a separate sphere. Establishing an alternative system of beliefs, symbols and rituals, the state creates its authority through the legal system, that promises equality to all who subscribe or are subscribed to its order.

As a method of governance, regimes of secularity help create and maintain a hierarchical relationship between the state and religion. Religion is restricted or separated from the public sphere through the dialectics of modernity and Enlightenment. Seen through the eyes of the state, the hierarchical relationship between the secular and the religious may equate religious citizens with a minority while preserving the distinction between them through different institutions and regulatory mechanisms.

Thus, any framing of religion and secularity is necessarily born in a power field, which necessarily leaves its imprint on it. More to that ‘A secular state is not one characterized by religious indifference, or rational politics, or political toleration. It is a complex arrangement of legal reasoning, moral practice, and political authority. This arrangement is not the simple outcome of the struggle of secular reason against the despotism of religious authority. We do not understand the arrangements I have tried to describe if we begin with the common assumption that the essence of secularism is the protection of civil freedoms from the tyranny of religious discourse, that the religious discourse seeks always to end discussion and secularism to create the conditions for its flourishing.’ (Asad 2003:256). The struggle between religion and the state is complex, and as I will explain in the following part, it changes from state to state.

2.5.2. Regimes of secularity and Muslims in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France

Dutch secularity has been understood as a process of pillarization. As Houkes argues, it was religious interest that mobilized reactions to liberal social arrangements in the Netherlands of 1853, and the new political freedoms were used to articulate marginalization through a conservative religious reaction. Protestantism, she argues,
reinterpreted the role of religion from a focus that was on the afterlife, on the life in heaven, to a focus on contemporary social problems. Among orthodox Protestants, the issue of the degree of involvement of religion with the political life produced division, on the one hand Kuyper’s choice for private religious institutions and on the other the conservative view of the church as the caretaker of the nation. While one thought in terms of Christian schools, the other promoted teaching Christian morals in public schools. As a response to secularism, the move of the Protestants towards ‘disenchantment’, towards the concerns of the everyday and a position in the social world can be seen as giving in (Houkes 2009).

The right to collective organization with maintenance of one's religion was stabilized in the Dutch Constitution in 1917. This meant the formation of several religious and ideological pillars of which Calvinism, Catholicism, Socialism, and Liberalism were the four major ones (Prins 2002). This implied access to equality in rights and duties but foremost in institutionalized political participation and distribution of resources: own political party, trade unions, social clubs, media, schools and universities. Indeed education, and the issue of religious schools run or financed by the state was one of the main achievements of pillarization. On the other hand, the process of pillarization permitted equality despite differences between social groups, blurring the divide between secular ideology and religious groups. However, the pillars were themselves hierarchical and little communication or mixing happened between them, except at the elite level of society, the national debate in the parliament (Spruyt 2007).

The process of depillarization caused by the erosion of the cultural foundation that kept the pillars in place and the imploded post-colonial critique, transformed the Dutch society profoundly (Spruyt 2007). Although the pillarization system is still in place in some areas of society (e.g. schools and the divisions in the TV media), the Netherlands after the 1950s thought of itself as a modern, centralized and homogenous secular state and embraced pluralism through multiculturalism (for a different position see Duyvendak and Scholten 2011).

However, after the influx of Muslim labour migrants in the late ’60s many Dutch believed that ‘parallel societies’ had emerged where Muslims created parallel structures to those already in place (Spruyt 2007). Since the 1990s migrant communities have started to make active use of the constitutional rights of consociational society, for example, by founding Hindu and Muslim schools. Talk and hope towards a self-emancipating Muslim pillar changed into resentment when Muslims started to be considered a burden on the Dutch welfare state. This process was amplified by international events starting 2001 and
national controversies following that, especially the discourse on Rotterdam’s Pim Fortuyn and the murder of Theo van Gogh. The predominant strand of present debate is in terms of the secular state that engages with its religious subjects, Muslim citizens, demanding their integration in society and scrutinizing the effects of their religious beliefs.

In France the republican model of secularity has long been considered to articulate the essence of what secularity is about (Dobbelaere 1981). Legally, institutionalized religion has been taken over by official secularity in 1905, preceded by a fierce quarrel between clerics and anti-clerics that lasted more than thirty years, centred on women and a colonial legacy of imperialism based on Catholic support. After the revolution all citizens were expected to develop similar values, orientations and views according to the guidelines they encountered through participation in public institutions. The ‘classical’ separation between religion and politics has been often exemplified with the influence the philosophy of Enlightenment had on everyday life in France and the way the French revolution instilled the universal values of liberty, equality and fraternity. Secularity, as Bauberot and Zuber write, constitutes the ‘founding myth of modernity’ and also the myth of origin for the French nation-state (Bauberot and Zuber 2000). To these day contact between the state and the citizen has remained bound by categories of living together as equals based on rational deliberation, a contact that is direct and does not need intermediary institutions (Bowen 2010).

The Catholic Church struggled in its own way with laïcité. The fight started in the 1960s over a Christian articulation of the ‘temporal’ sphere and a specific form of Christian politics instead of a neutral stance upon public life. An upheaval of religious pragmatism pointed out that the only force that kept people and communities together was religion, while politics only further divided people across different allegiances and preferences. The ‘70s brought forward the issue of re-validation of Christian faith in a world that was building upon the values of individualism, private interest and identitarian belonging. During the ‘80s these views were seen as contradicting the claims of universality on which the Republican tradition was built, forcing Catholic intellectuals to engage rationally with Republican values (McCaffrey 2009). Instead of opposing religion and modernity this new framework transferred religion in the middle of the paradox of modernity, claiming the key to its exclusion and production (Hervieu-Leger 1985).

Muslims have had a longer experience in France than in any other country in Western Europe (Bowen 2010, Cesari 2004, Rath 1999). Many were already citizens when entering the territory of France (Algerians) and most of them came from territories
where French was already spoken. However their past was not peaceful, but was based on turbulent colonial experiences and the Algerian wars, that still inform many of the experiences of today as it was visible also in the riots of 2005 (Bowen 2010). This also meant a long history of obstacles in creating an Islamic way of life, such as the creation of mosques – a principal concern since the ‘80s, within the framework of Republican integration or assimilation (Fregosi 2008, Tribalat 1995). Recently debates about the veils, the niqab and the display of other religious symbols have articulated concerns both in the individual and collective way of perceiving ‘minority religions’ (Kastoryano 2004, Cesari 1998, Souilamas 2000), remobilizing a powerful Republican discursive strategy. The Republican discourse of the past years is not a proof of the monolithic laïcité model still in place in France, it rather draws its power from the deep and conflicted roots of secularity within both French history and politics.

The British way of dealing with religion is also influenced by the colonial past, where a double stand of British nationalism that transcended religious, political, racial and class differences met a spiritual quest imbibed with a missionary zeal. But besides the missions, religious people in positions of power believed that the British Empire should be morally governing the colonies, while the churches provided the ideological support for expansion. As funding for the established Church of England came partly from the government (Carey 2011), the Church saw the Empire as a way of proliferating its doctrine. While religion has provided the justification for imperial expansion, once post-colonial transformations diminished the power of the Empire, churches continued a vigorous existence in the colonies (Carey 2008). Instead of opting for secularization, which was an available choice, most colonists and settlers chose instead for a religious identity that they tried to transplant and nourish through conversion in the new territories. However, in some parts of the Empire, colonial power was represented as modern and secular, in opposition to a religious and medieval society found among the natives.

With a transformation from a Protestant nation to a Christian Empire, the British founded the tradition that related religion to race. The Comaroff couple talks about ‘civilizing colonialism’, pointing out that imperial ambitions were often conducted across racial categories, with missions and churches acting as imperial institutions in order to deal with race (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997). Relations with race lie at the foundation of the Muslim experience in the United Kingdom to this day, and not relations with religion.
Islam, as all other religions besides the Church of England, was considered a minority religion. Muslims were treated as one community among the others, as part of the multicultural diversity. Multiculturalism was understood not only as a way of dealing with a number of minority groups, but also with different kinds of minority groups, categorized using race, colour and national origins as criteria (Modood 2010). The cultural needs of Muslims have been well accommodated by the state. The relevance of religion stems from the political mobilization of minorities that prioritized religion over ethnicity, race or nationality –drawing on the extension of multicultural rights, that otherwise are ‘group’ and ‘religion’ blind (Meer 2010). However, this self-identification rhetoric has also been increasingly mobilized in legitimating state initiated policies that target Muslims, policies that are mostly security and integration driven.

2.6. The post-secular

In order to understand all the ways secularity is present in our social imaginary it is important to consider the theoretical insights of a group of scholars that believe that the place of religion in social life does not depend on the way secularity is articulated in different contexts. A growing amount of scholarly work deals with the post-secular. Their starting point is the view that religion is present in social life and as such may bring an important contribution toward the collective dimension of the social, through reinforcing the quest for a more plural, democratic and morally open human society. They recognize the stage on which religion contests the secular and see it as more than the claim of religion for its own territory. Seeing a positive benefit for all society in the social involvement of religion, post-secular theories engage in different ways with religious agency.

McLennan distinguished several critical positions that in one way or the other try to distance themselves from the ideas that see the secular as the only possible social imaginary (2007). The break with the secular tradition happens at the border of the distinction between worldly and sacred issues, drawing attention to different aspects of social reality that contradict the naturalized assumptions of the secularist way of thought.

Postsecularity can be seen as a break from the naturalized dichotomies that secularity takes for granted, argues Connolly (1999). Distinctions between public and private are increasingly problematic while the neatly distinguished territories of rationality, morality and emotions transgress each other. Following these changes the relationship between the sphere of politics and religion cannot be understood anymore
as that of neatly distinguished social forces, but must be understood in terms of hibridity and crosspollination.

Connolly maintains that secularist thoughts are to be regarded as the search for a moral and epistemological cleanliness and simplicity, a sort of way of living religiously in our times (Rorty et al. 2005). If secularism makes sense as a way of ordering and dealing with the complexity of claims on the ontological, epistemological and axiological dimensions of life, the choices and cuts made in its name are increasingly under pressure in the social world. The solution of Connolly, which forms the core of his post-secularist stance, is a complete openness towards diversity of all kinds, which would then form the basis of a true democracy (Connolly 1999: 88).

From a multiculturalist point of view post-secularity is a necessity triggered by the increasing diversification and pluralization of the populations that are subjected to it. Secularization can be considered an obstacle to a truly multicultural society (Modood 2005 and Parakh 2000). However, a distinction between ‘radical secularism’ and ‘moderate secularism’ needs to be made (see Bhargava 1998, Bhargava 2011b). A tolerant ‘moderate’ secularism allows religious views to be expressed in political motivations and goals while its ‘radical’ variety considers all forms of religious expression as extreme and ideological. The postsecular turn fuelled by the multiculturalist tradition is the wishful increase in ‘moderate’ secularism, with an extension of rights previously secured only for Christianity to all other religions, especially Islam (compare with Bhargava 2011a). This debate is stronger in the United Kingdom, where the multiculturalist debate is most valid outside of academic circles.

An epistemic form of postsecularism is promoted by Habermas who points out that an asymmetry is created between citizens through the unequal burdens that are placed on religious citizens through the expectation that in the public sphere religious reasoning is to be translated in rational argumentation. The ‘cognitive dissonance’ is to be overcome by all citizens equally, meaning that religious consciousness and motivations need to be appreciated for what they are, and a dual learning process needs to take place in order to reach the ideal of epistemic reflexivity. This levelling of knowledge between citizens argues for a postsecular that looks at commonalities between people, across divisions created by religious belonging.

A different position on the epistemic postsecular stance is taken by Calhoun when he is arguing that once we understand the way religion argues about social life we can improve the quality of social life even if we do not necessarily become religious. The
relativization of what modernity and secularism have brought about may teach us to transcend the situations in which we find ourselves by wanting to improve them, by having non-instrumental human relationships and envisioning our role as agents contributing to the change of the social world we are part of (Calhoun 2011).

On the other hand, Christian theologians remind us of the limits of our scientific knowledge, of the transcendental dimensions that go beyond the immanent and the humane. Religion does not figure out models for public participation, it rather recognizes its own existence as the embodiment of justice and truth, stressing the importance of praxis. The role of religion from this perspective is different. Religiously and spiritually engaging spaces are needed as an antidote to the modern loss of meaning (Beaumont 2011).

Post-secular theories stress the multiple possible roles religion can have in social life, beyond the limited ones envisaged by regimes of secularity. These thinkers go against the idea that the return of religion necessarily means a step backwards in the evolution of western civilization. Religion can serve as a source of inspiration for the improvement of social life, may strengthen democracy and a stride towards a plural, multicultural society. Religion can also serve as a case that illustrated empirically the lack of a need of strictly differentiated spheres, allowing for more creative solutions for human problems.

2.7. Conclusions:

The collective belief in secularity is one of the most important features of the modern age. Modernity and secularity are in the general understanding walking hand in hand. Religion is considered a relic surviving from the past, found behind the closed door of our private spaces, tamed into recognizable rituals in specially assigned places and on special times, lost in the strenuous evolutionary journey to modernity.

Although highly influential, secularization theory proves inefficient when we try to understand the present role of religion in public life. On the basis of the assumptions of classical secularization theory religion should have either completely disappeared by now from social life, or it should have modestly retreated in the private and individual sphere, remaining one between the many options available on the market of entertainment and free time consumption. However, religion returns most visibly through the discussions around the presence of Muslims in Western European states and
contests the main internal claims on which the nation-state is built: the universal values, the equality between citizens, the value of tolerance and its indisputable modernity.

The imprints left by secularization theory have been taken over in the Western European social imaginary and continue to inform different regimes of secularity, articulated both as a mobilization of the collective imaginary and a way of governing religion. The increasing attention towards Muslims minorities in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom points out that secularity is used as a discursive strategy articulating the negotiations and conflicts present at the formation of the respective nation-states and the challenges they face in managing diversity and pluralism, from their historical legacy and in present situations.

The three main directions of criticism towards the domain of the secular as the extension of ideas about secularity distinguish between a simplifying and homogenizing structural and epistemological dimension of the social imaginary that the secular keeps in place. Combined with the particular way in which secularization has been moulded by post-colonial and national history in different nation-states, these challenges give rise to various forms of the secular, when imbued with power, that I have called regimes of secularity.

Religion, once again is central to the discussion about the identity of nations. Articulated through the debates and controversies about Muslims is the fear about a possible decline in the secularity of the state. Implied in this fear are all the other values that are connected to western nations: democracy, equality between citizens, the existence of a neutral public sphere and the use of rationality in reaching consensus over differences. In the following chapter I will look at how religious minorities and migrants are contextualized within the nation-state through the multiple roles performed by the concept of citizenship.
II. THE SYMBOLIC
3. Nation, citizenship and religious migrants

‘God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?’ (Nietzsche 1974:181)

‘The state is not the reality that stands behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask that prevents our seeing political practice as it is.’ (Abrams 1988:58)

We might expect that the state presupposes modes of juridical belonging, at least minimally, but since the state can be precisely what expels and suspends modes of legal protection and obligation, the state can put us, some of us, in quite a state.’ (Butler and Spivak 2007:3)

3.1. Regimes of secularity

Regimes of secularity do not take place in a vacuum. They are necessarily part of the matrix of the modern social imaginaries that guide social life and are articulated in concrete physical space and recognizable historical periods. As such, they form part of social imaginaries and inform symbols. Modern social imaginaries inform and are informed by social formations and they are more than a set of ideas. They enable and serve as basis for discourses and practices of the society, forming and being formed by social structures, informing and being informed by social functions, and structuring while being structured by social mechanisms. Furthermore, regimes of secularity are connected to physical nation-states and their concrete historical transformations.

The nation-state is seen as modern from different angles: socioeconomic (Gellner 1983), political (Tilly 1996) and cultural (Anderson 1983), but little attention has been given to religion as an important factor contributing to the modernity of the nation-state. If we understand regimes of secularity as specific equilibriums between separate spheres of existence, such as religious and political, private and public, as I have been suggesting in the previous chapter, we first need to consider their articulation within political and social units. Necessarily, regimes of secularity can only be articulated into a social,
physical and discursive space that is social and political in nature. As such, regimes of secularity are intertwined with nation-states and their institutional arrangements, but they are not contained by them. Rather, regimes of secularity are part of modernity, they are strongly intertwined with regimes of citizenship and they are visible in conjunctures that contain tension between the level of the imaginary, the symbols and the real dimensions of social life (Hansen 1999; Lacan 1998).

Along specific regimes of secularity, the modern social imaginary builds on blocks such as the nation-state and the community of ‘people’ it serves and represents. These building blocks have a mythological status, which legitimates human behaviour while creating cohesion (Malinowski 1926). They offer a key to the structures of the human mind (Lévi-Strauss 1958) and are transformed in institutions, ideological programs, policies and real consequences. The ideological dimension of the modern social imaginary is informed by liberalism, democracy and the idea of a neutral public sphere. Thus it carries along a certain understanding of the distinction between private and the public, and a certain way of dealing with plurality and universalism. In order to be able to grasp this complex and intertwined imaginary in the following chapter I will approach it through the following angles:

First, the articulation of a regime of secularity cannot take place without the nation-state. While the category of religion depends on that of the secular, the secular needs to be implemented into regimes of secularity, that is first of all a political project connected but not restricted to the nation-state. Several facets of the intertwined relationship between religion, secularity and the nation-state need to be distinguished. The birth of secularity regimes coincided with the birth of nation-states, against the religiously motivated wars of the past (Marx 2005). Thus religion was causally present at the origin of the secular nation-state, as it also shaped its later development (Smith 2003; Gorski 2000). Furthermore, the process of Reformation and confessionalization levelled the ideological terrain needed for the secular nation-state through new ways of imagining a community (Calhoun 1997), unifying it through language (Anderson 1983) and allowing a close relationship between culture and the polity based on secular control (Gorski 2000).

Second, as Durkheim argues, the nation-state can be considered a new religion of the people, a way of maintaining the function of religion while transferring it to another carrier of meaning (Durkheim 1976). Following this logic the nation and also its community are sacred entities, with powers beyond the collective agency of the individuals they contain. Also, in the same line of thought it is considered that religion
supplied the myths, metaphors and symbols necessary for the representation of the nation and the form of collective that the nation would transform into the idea of ‘the people’ (Calhoun 1997; Smith 2003).

Third, besides the direct connections explained above we can also see religion and secularity as mechanisms that further (1) social and cultural identification, (2) social organization and (3) the framing of political claims through the construction of a specific group (compare Brubaker 2012). As such religion is similar to other difference-based claims-making: culture, ethnicity and philosophical differences between groups of people (Taylor 2011) or normative critiques: classical, Republican and feminist (Casanova 1994). This angle makes both secularity and religion social and political positioning, strategic or not, meaningful in a larger pattern of horizontal distribution of power and authority.

Religion is functional in articulating belief and is also a significant social resource for its members (Bradney 2009). Religion and religious communities within a secular society transform the meaning of belonging and believing (see also Davie 1994). Religions are not only places where faith can be dealt with, for migrants or minorities they are also organizations and institutions on which one can depend, for example for money, work and social contacts. As such, religious communities are social as well as legal entities that provide support for their members (Bradney 2009). They offer places of interaction with people from the same religious and ethnic community, helping them as much in keeping in contact with the country of provenience as in dealing with the practical problem of living in a new environment. Religious communities are providing a way of creating meaningful collective identities that are not necessarily connected (only) to religion. ‘Migrant’ religions also compete between themselves: they do not only differ in size, but also in the activities they engage in (see Stepick et al. 2009). Differences in denomination, generation of immigrants, in the leadership of the religious communities and ‘the context of reception’ all have an impact on what role religion can play in the life of migrants and minority communities.

Aspect one, the articulation of regimes of secularity in the nation-state, and aspect two, the nation-state as the religion of the people, will help us historically reconstruct the specific way in which the nation-state imagines itself in terms of the nation working for and through its people. The third aspect, looking at religion and secularity as specific mechanisms, points out that religion is similar to other ways of social identification, organization and political claim making foundation. These three aspects are not contradictory, and they do not exclude each other, rather they form different dimensions of the intertwined relation of religion with modern society. First,
although modern society claims secularity, both its origin and its principles are inseparable in one way or the other from religion. Second, religion backs up contemporary social structures and political claims making, crossing above and beyond the spheres of society that should contain it.

In the following I will develop further point one, the creating of the nation-state and point two, the importance of the idea of the people in relation to religious migrants. I argue that religious migrants face a double exclusion from the nation-state (see also Modood et al. 2006a): first because they claim or are seen to represent a religion, they encounter the response of the regimes of secularity that are at the basis of the nation-state. Second, migrants are the natural ‘enemies’ of the territorial nation-state and as such both transgress and help shape the boundaries of the nation and of the people.

Not all religions are under the same pressure from the nation-state. Most states have some historical arrangement with certain religion(s), as the Anglican Church in the United Kingdom, the Catholic Church in France and the ‘traditional’ religions and ideologies in the Netherlands. Although tension between the state and these ‘recognized’ religions exists, if is by far not as deep and heated as the tension provoked by so called ‘migrant religions’, especially Islam.

The attention towards Islam creates the conditions for the formation of new regimes of secularity, engaging with or replacing the political secularism of the past. As Modood observes, political secularism became less firm. He does not attribute this to ‘…Christian desecularization of a ‘return of the oppressed’. Rather, the jolt [of political secularism] is created by the triple contingency of the arrival and settlement of a significant number of Muslims; a multiculturalist sensibility that respects ‘difference’; and a moderate secularism, namely, that the historical compromises between the state and a church or churches in relation to public recognition and accommodation are still in place to some extent.’ (Modood 2011:2).

The attention Islam and Muslims receive is taking place at the intersection of several tender conjunctions of history: the need for a change in the present regime of political secularism, the changes in the way nation-states relate to structures encouraged by the process of globalization and glocalization (understood as the tempering effects of local conditions on local pressures, see Robertson 1995), the shrinkage of the welfare state, new dimensions of the concept of citizenship and the need to address social plurality and diversity in a manner consistent with liberal and democratic ideas.

Discussions concerning Islam and Muslims have been passionate and over-reaching. But, from here onwards we have to proceed with caution, because although in
popular discourse the link between Islam and Muslims is taken for granted, we need to analytically distinguish between identifications of Muslims understood loosely as people coming from a geographical area where Islam is ‘at home’ and self-identified Muslims as believers and practitioners of Islam in one of its many forms. The category of Muslimness to delimit the discursive field that is created at the intersection of sociological categories of migrants from certain geographical areas as Muslims and practitioners of different forms of Islam becomes immediately useful. As religious discourses can hardly be differentiated from other ‘authorizing discourses’ (Asad 1993) I will use this semantic field as shorthand for all those identities and identifications that are articulated ‘in the name of’ being Muslim.

Returning to my argument from the introduction, Muslimness exists at the intersection of two regimes of governing that are intertwined in the imaginary of the modern social: a certain articulation of secularity and a certain way of the nation-state in dealing with the plurality brought about by processes of migration. What can be perceived as a double exclusion of both the migrant and the religious individual or group takes place through the specific articulations of universal ideals as related to particular and plural realities. As Butler was pointing out, universalism in order to work needs to be broken down into non-universals in order to address plurality, process that feeds on differentiation and identification of difference (Butler et al. 2000, Canovan 1999). Thus universal values such as human rights, democracy and equality meet the trinity of liberty, equality, fraternity and need to be translated into measures for dealing with diversity in diverse physical and historical setting, giving rise to diverse management strategies and ways of accommodation of difference (see conceptual triangles of Taylor 2007). Thus, the rights and duties implied by the status of citizenship transform these universal ideals into civil rights and duties that are connected to the entity of the nation-state, giving them meaning, voice and substance (Arendt 1958).

In a philosophical sense all nation-states rest on a specific articulation of the principles of freedom, unity and fraternity voiced foremost in the French revolution. Their utmost application we find in liberal theories emphasizing human rights, equality and democracy and in theories and practices of the public sphere that ideally provide the neutral space where these ideas are structuring the interaction. The theories of Rawls and Habermas, which I will discuss in a separate section of this chapter, provide insight into the way the public sphere is conceived its importance for the nation-state and the way the three ideals are employed in regard to religion.
However, the double exclusion I was talking about earlier is foremost taking place through the mechanism of citizenship: its legal, economic and social dimensions deal with the migration dimensions of Muslimness, while its cultural and moral dimensions deal with its religious side. Citizenship works as an inclusion and exclusion mechanism that through its dialectical nature defines the content of the inside and the outside of the container of the nation-state (Schinkel 2008, 2010b). As such, it expresses Muslimness in relation to various nation-states through specific regimes of secularity and citizenship regimes informed by migrant integration strategies. Through these it also articulates the territorial basis of the unity, the extent of the expected homogeneity of its people and the ‘fanaticism’ of its creeds (Colas 1997).

The principle of citizenship articulates, both in theory and practice, an adjusted and concrete version of the universal values that transpire through the modern social imaginary, transforming it into nation-state specific regimes. Besides, citizenship operates at the level of the state as an inclusion and exclusion mechanism and a form of labelling populations within the territory of the nation-state, but also locally as a logic of governing populations in concrete situations.

3.2. The modern social imaginary and the nation-state

Nietzsche’s enunciation of the death of God (see quote beginning of chapter) is well-known. However, less attention is given to sentences that elaborate on this statement. He does not only say that God is dead, as secularization theory also proposes, but gives the responsibility for his death to the collective social: it is our fault that God ceased to exist. Furthermore, he argues, something needs to be one in order to fill the void created by the absence of the divine presence in the world: the equilibrium needs to be reinstalled through ‘sacred games’ in that we must ourselves act as gods. Nietzsche’s ideas, I believe, illustrate concisely the replacement of the transcendental relationship between God and society, with horizontal and immanent ideas of the nation and the idea of the people. Transcendence transformed historically into immanence, changing the understanding of human agency, social interdependency and the ultimate meaning of collective associations (Taylor 2007).

The nation-state conceives itself as a secular political unit, where the power is distributed and legitimated by the people within a state, controlled by the mechanism of citizenship (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). This unit is understood as culturally homogenous (Anderson 1983; Calhoun 1994). The nation-state is considered
to be situated in between the universal, global system of relations between states and the local units that added together, make up to a state. Also, it functions as a bridge between universal categories of humanity and specific individualities by representing a unique collective. The collective proposed by the nation-state is unique because it proposes to transcend all ‘traditional’ forms of community formation: ethnicity, race, religion, gender, kin and kith. More to that, the hyphen between the nation and the state links together territory specific historical imaginaries about the role of sovereignty, unity and difference, translating them into a coherent ordering form that is a normative ordering claim about the world as a whole, and also a way of delimiting and defining population groups.

The nation-state is not ‘real’, but a construction based on myths that legitimate ritual action and a certain order and structuring of the social world. As such it is first of all a symbolic unit. It depends on political myths: the myth of secularity that I discussed in the previous chapter, the myth of the nation, the myth of ‘the people’ and the myth of universal values incorporated in liberalism. As Asad, discussing the work of Canovan points out: ‘the secular state depends crucially for its public virtues (equality, tolerance, liberty) on political myth – that is, on origin narratives that provide a foundation for its political virtues and a coherent framework for its public and private morality’ (Canovan 1990 as in Asad 2003). The myth of secularity feeds into nation-state specific articulations of regimes of secularity, ways of balancing the dialectical distinction between the religious and the political, the private and the public spheres of social life.

It is important to highlight that these myths are interconnected and feed into each other. Their interdependence creates the dimensions of the modern social imaginary. Furthermore, all these myths form the breeding ground of the principle and mechanism of citizenship – that gathers together all these imaginaries and transforms them into implemented reality. Thinking along with the terms of Lacan that I have described in the introduction, citizenship is the symbol that translates between the level of imaginaries of social existence such as secularity and the people or the nation as a collective at the core of the nation-state, and the world of reality. This translation takes place in part through intervention and control. Regimes of secularity allow a certain presence of religion in social life, with specific functions and channels of legitimation and collective agency. Besides, as Taylor has also been proposing, regimes of secularity need to be conceived as articulating besides a specific approach towards religion, also a way of dealing with plurality and diversity in the larger sense of the word (Taylor 2004). Thus, regimes of secularity should be seen in the light of the nation-state dealing with diversity and plurality in general, while trying to provide the basic goals of the nation-state: liberty,
equality and fraternity (Taylor 2011). Thus regimes of secularity and citizenship are intertwined with each other while both form the basis of the modern nation-state.

However different individual nation-states are from each other, however varied ways of governing they employ, in the case of the modern nation-state (thus also in the case of the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom) I propose to talk about a collective structure of political myth composed of an idea of the nation, an articulation of ‘the people’ who serve and are served by the nation and a certain positioning towards the universal values proposed by liberalism. The nation-state depends on the successful articulation of these registers, that, I argue are encompassed in the multiple dimensions of the concept and mechanism of citizenship.

Of course, the articulation of these above-mentioned dimensions of the collective imaginary makes sense if they have a function. I sustain that the function of the collective imaginary is to maintain the inner and outer order of the social world, continuing and rearticulating the legacy of the Westphalian peace while dealing with globalization and glocalization and successfully maintaining the internal coherence and order while dealing with the phenomena of migration. Thus, the generic cosmopolitan and the generic migrant trigger and endanger the coherent articulation and re-articulation of the imaginary (myth of nation, people and the concept of citizenship) and the real (the way the imaginary translated through symbols and shaped into regimes by power affects the lives of people) dimensions of the nation-state. However, while the cosmopolitan citizen is the desired actor of the transnational flow, the Muslim labour migrant, by now citizen of a western nation-state embodies the fears of the nation-state: on the one hand the religious individual or group that embodies the tension of belonging to the nation-state while contravening its ideological principles, on the other hand the migrant that transgresses the territorial limits of the state and its social entity.

Nation-states contain and are contained by the imaginary of secularity, nation, people and universality, but also possess a three-tiered reality of their own. First, the nation-state defines the social world in the narrow sense of distinguishing a distinctive form of spatiality as a follow-up to the Westphalian understanding of spatiality and sovereignty. Second, the nation-state mobilizes institutions and collective organizations in order to regulate and reorganize social and economic relations through intervention, both within and beyond the territorial limits of the nation-state. Third, the nation-state frames and sanctifies certain parts of the social imaginary, which distinguish states and political systems from each other. These three dimensions of nation-state connected practices continually shape and reshape subjectivities and the spatial dimensions of
everyday life in different ways. They are providing the basis of different scales of state intervention and politics, as previously mentioned, within and beyond the state (compare Brenner and Theodore 2002a).

European modern states can be best conceptualized as nations. Historically, the nation and also the state offered a solution against the fragmentation of society along ethnic, racial and religious ties. Indeed, the period from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century was filled with religious conflict and contrasting allegiances, class and freedom differences. However, the nation-state did not evolve only as a contrasting response to religious conflicts, but mobilized the disjunctions created by multiple disagreements (Greenfeld 1992; Marx 2005). The consolidation of unity on which the emerging nation-state was built used the conflicts that were tearing apart society, in order to gain legitimation and support from a large number of people. The unifying ideas of the European elites needed to be translated into intelligible terms that would elicit popular support. In other words the nation is an idea employed by state elites in order to consolidate the power of the nascent states (Marx 2005).

The state has a multiple interest in the nation, as neither ethnicity nor religion could provide the basis of unity the state needed in order to mobilize popular support. Most liberal states need a sense of national community constituted by restrictive loyalties, which are not ethnic in nature, to form their basis. With time, the state would turn against the features that could not provide a legitimate basis for its unity, believing that they also endanger it. Thus certain features of social life were to be pushed to the periphery of collective life through their transformation into private issues, while aspects formerly understood as private were to be controlled by the state (see discussion of family and population in Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, religion in Berger et al. 2001).

Second, certain forms of human association are considered more valuable than others. Within the nation-state contractual relations between citizens form the basis of the nation. These relations based on equality, fraternity and justice take distance from kinship based emotional and intrinsically hierarchical relations, also from forms of local belonging.

Third, values which are portrayed as universal need to be translated into particularities in order to be implemented. Moreover, most categories articulated by the liberal nation-state are descriptive and normative, representing an assessment of the social situations and a response to the problems identified. Canovan claims that while liberalism asserts that rights in a polity are natural, these rights are actually resting on
assumptions that are contestable (Canovan 1990). Engaging with the redemption promised by liberal secularity, it is necessary to point out that the freedom acclaimed by liberalism is posited against the slavery and despotism of history from which it redeems, while ‘we’ or ‘the people’ compensates for family, kin and clan relations based on obligation. In this case democracy redeems a past of sin and ascription, creating a new world of equality (Shulman 2006). Once more, the freedom, unity and equality promised are descriptive and normative terms: on the one hand they pretend to describe the reality as it is, while on the other hand they use the same concepts to describe the ideal situation we are striving towards.

Furthermore, the public sphere is considered to be the neutral space that is free from the influence of other spheres of existence, and as such can offer equal distance from all deliberation taking place in it. However, the public sphere also excludes certain forms and contents of social activity, as I will point out further on using the example of religion, it is not neutral.

Fourth, the idea of the nation was translated into the notion of citizenship as a mechanism of adherence to the nation-state, superseding other ‘traditional’ forms of loyalty such as religion, the clan or the family. This understanding rests on the transformation of different social layers. The turmoil caused by religious and ethnic conflicts gave rise to antagonism and exclusion and to general intolerance towards what was perceived as the other league. The nation-state mobilized these social forces by transforming them while keeping their vitality and the passion of the response they were receiving from people (Marx 2005). Antagonism and exclusion were transformed into a call for unity, while intolerance metamorphosed into an idea of civility based on manners and politeness, giving rise to the idea of ‘society’ (Taylor 2007). Indeed, the French revolution was the moment when the nation-state became the form of political organization and nationality. The French revolution codified the individual rights and freedoms and attributed them to national citizenship, linking individuals directly and instrumentally to the nation (Soysal 1994; Zolberg 2007). This was fertile ground for a newly articulated secular allegiance that was based on taking distance from religious sectarianism and divisiveness and a liberal view feeding on previous intolerance towards difference. The unity and homogeneity of secular thinking together with liberalism is a necessary condition for the birth of democracy (Rustow 1970; Dahl 1989; Marx 2005).
3.2.1. The myth of the nation

The relationship between the nation and the state is essentially a mutually constitutive and reciprocally formative one. As Connolly points out, the nation-state exists at the necessary enmeshment of three different threads: unity conceived as a significant set of identities and commonalities, allegiance understood in terms of identification with the centre (read: nation) and communication that is expressed in a common language, memories and shared victories or defeats (Connolly 1999). Without these holding pillars, the nation-state fails to acknowledge itself in terms of homogeneity.

Nation-states contain and are contained by the imaginary of secularity. Indeed, historically, the birth of the modern nation-state and the relationship between states took place in the same time when religion lost momentum. The monarchies fought against the universality of the Church and the power of the Empires and slowly also against feudalism (Van Creveld 2004). This movement implied a shift from both the claims of universality of religion and from the power of the local in which religion was embedded. The local dimension was present through churches and abbeys each with their own propriety, and was reinforced by the feudal nobility with local possessions and domains. The state developed in between and across these existing political formations, in what can be best described as an intermediary territory. Local power meant a relationship based on family connections of hierarchical oaths of subordination. The state, however, meant impersonal bureaucratic power placed beyond direct inter-human relations, and for that needed a different basis of collective loyalty, to be found in the idea of the nation.

The birth of the nation took place through a political reformulation of the relation between the secular and the religious, but also a series of changes within the domain of religion itself. The birth of the secular and the religious was not only simultaneous, but religion borrowed its function of sacredness to the nation and the people. Besides, the social changes made possible by the process of Reformation changed the social outlook towards the worth of any form of belief. As Taylor points out Reformation changed not only the structure of society towards the immanent, but also placed human agency at the top of the hierarchy, while simultaneously designing control mechanisms such as ideas about civility that would bound the newly acquired freedom (Taylor 2007).

The nation is not based on an ancient community, it does not reflect a long tradition or a coherent way of life, nor does it necessarily have at its basis a collective
language, a religion, ethnicity or a linear history – all these rather are effects of the nation-state, more so than its causes (Hobsbawm 1990). They are imagined, as Anderson pointed out. But contrary to Anderson, Hobsbawm believes that the imaginary nations replaced real forms of association, communities that are based in real communal life and that are incorporated by nations as a form of reaction and resentment to them.

According to Anthony Marx, the nation was not founded, as Anderson believes, upon a collective language or the emergence of print capitalism and the capitalist system of production. The plurality of languages was often given within the territory of the early nation-states while printed materials were in patchy distribution and had to compete with the high illiteracy rates. Furthermore the messages of the printed material reflected the multitude of opinions already present and voiced in the society, posing the possible readers face to face with even more plurality. Nations worked with external and internal conflicts and for that purpose they needed to design a mechanism that would allow them to keep simultaneously order and unity (Marx 2005).

The nation-state depends on the ‘fictive ethnicity’ that is presupposed in the idea of the people. Balibar uses this term to point out that there is no ethnic unity backing up the nation, either a representation of existing communities as having a unitary cultural shared base, with identical origins, interests and goals, that all transcend the individual. Besides ‘it is this fictive ethnicity that makes it possible for the expression of pre-existing unity to be seen in the state, and continually to measure the state against its ‘historic mission’ in the service of the nation and, as a consequence, to idealize politics.’ (Balibar 1991:96).

Nations can also be seen as containers produced through collective cultural practices, that then serve as reference points to all identities, be it collective or individual that position themselves in relationship to them. The idea of the nation thus serves as a reference point to other identities and self-understandings. More to that, it produces and reproduces a master narrative that incorporates the identities and self-understandings that are created through positioning and transforms them in a coherent narrative whole (Anderson 1983). The narrative of the nation is locating its place in history (Bhabha 1990).

In order to understand the persuasive force that the imaginary of the nation and that of ‘the people’ has, we need to consider the idea that nationalism and patriotism work as religions – and they can be considered the religion of modern times. The idea of the nation shares the individual basis of belonging that is then transformed into belonging into a community with a shared morality and the idealization and sacralisation of an idea that makes possible collective sacrifice and a content of truth and law as
normative (Balibar 1991). The difference between the two forms of collective organization is, according to Balibar, that the nation presupposes the existence of other forms of community, and mobilizes them while forming itself. The nation, in other words, focuses the ‘love, respect, sacrifice and fear that have cemented religious communities’ (Balibar 1991:89) and replaces their object forcing it into national, state related frames.

As a discursive formation, the nation shapes our consciousness and also forms a large array of other questions that are implicit in our understanding of society: it makes claims about space, boundedness, integrity, totality and completeness and place of identities, cultures and institutions. The understanding of the nation and the state united by a hyphen also implies a certain idea about what the society is, who are the people part of it and who is the political community. The rhetoric on nationalism, which imbues nations, forms at its turn citizenship and democracy as a collective social and cultural project (Cohen 1992).

According to Calhoun nationalism and nations matter not only because they have a deep influence on how large-scale identities and structures exist in the world, but also because they help imagine the world as composed of sovereign nation-states. The capacity of the state to hide its roots is connected to the fact that the state needs the nation, while the nation needs the state. This also connects the state in the narrow sense of the concept with the nation as an imaginary impacting on most aspects of human life. This imaginary has never been matched by the world, but this does not deprive nationalist imaginary of influence (Calhoun 2007:7). However, the world is structured hierarchically, with the nation-state still holding a central position in international terms and in the management of internal affairs. On the other hand, while the nation-state is responsible for the articulation and framing of the modern social imaginaries and regimes of secularity, its symbolic and imaginary dimensions can only be seen as transformed into reality if we look at the local level. This argument I will develop further in a following part.

The nation-state should not only be seen as a spatially and temporarily contextualized claim of collective identity but also as a collective actor with agency of its own. Influenced by the doctrine of individuality, as an abstract organization the state is an independent persona recognized by law, making contracts, owning propriety, defending itself (Van Creveld 1999). However, as Balibar reminds us ‘every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is imaginary’ (1991:93), thus the nation-state can be considered as both real and imagined.
3.2.2. The myth of the people

The nation cannot be imagined without the people. Indeed, the nation can be seen as the religion of the people (Smith 2003), the new collective belief that took the space reserved for transcendence in religious belief. The idea of the nation provided the possibility of a unitary basis of action, territorial, administrative and ideological in nature. Nations are based on the idea of ‘the people’ for their legitimacy (Calhoun 2007). This grounding is considered to be pre-political in nature and exist as a descriptive category for the collective of citizens that the nation contains, represents and also serves.

While the idea of the people sought to replace loyalties based on family, kinship and clan, it constructed identification with a symbolic family of those sharing the same geographic space. States differ in their distancing from the idea of kin as being replaced by the nation: the remnants of their logic can be seen in the preference in some countries of the *jus soli* principle of granting citizenship against the *jus sanguinis*. The substitution of one system of kinship for another eroded the existing structures of loyalty and transformed the idea of the family. With the distinction of boundary between private and public became superfluous in the face of ‘civic’ functions that the private life of individuals was supposed to fulfil. Children, the relation between sexes, the system of inheritance, the health and the morals of the family were invaded by the state once the idea of ‘the people’ was translated into that of ‘the population’ (Balibar 1991:101).

‘The people’ are the imaginary field on that the imaginary notion of the nation is built. The fundamental problem of the state is to produce the category of the people, to make them re-produce themselves as part of the national community. The field of people is ‘that of a community that recognizes itself in advance in the institutions of the state, that recognizes the state as ‘its own’ in opposition to other states and, in particular, inscribes its political struggles within the horizon of the state’ (Balibar 1991:93). Taking this argument one step further, Balibar argues that individuation and collectivization are needed as processes, to form the basis of the national. The nation does not oppose collective to individual identity, rather, it provides a model of unity that anticipates the construction of unity: it constructs the possibility of communication between citizens and social groups, while effecting ‘an interpellation of individuals as subjects’ (Althusser cited in Balibar 1991:94).

This change was made possible by the ideas of civility that emphasized norms expressed in terms of human rights, equality, non-discrimination and democracy (Taylor 2011). Civility as an ideal for social behaviour proposed equality to replace hierarchical relations between people – however, this meant that strict codes and prohibitions were
to govern society (Taylor 2007). Thus, control through the hierarchical social relations changed into control by norms, prohibitions and ideas with a universal value. Together with control institutions dealing with prohibitions as well as institutions needed to maintain the order appeared. The modern nation-state is a state based on law that transforms historical social relations, drawing the contours of possible forms of agency, both in the political and in the civil realm.

Besides civility, a second feature defined the new form of social community: its rationality. It was needed to ‘think’ rationality, closely associated with the adjacent concepts of harmony, commonality and welfare’ (Freeden 2005:45). This rationalizing process focused upon the personal and the individual, leaving intersubjectivity aside. In this construction, the collective would gain legitimation from a claim of collective rationality, logically faultless and shared.

The idea of the people draws on the power of the collective agency of the group, in other words, the ‘collective will’ of the people. The strong collective identity transforms into collective power, which then imbues the institutions of the nation-state. This collective power is multiplied through the collective deliberative unit people form – this is a necessity for the nation-state, as free societies need a higher level of commitment and loyalty than authoritarian societies (Arendt 1958). This also implies that collective agency is expected from the people, in the same way as an active contribution towards the polis is expected from the citizens of the democratic state (Taylor 2011). Thus political identity and political belonging are among the most important arenas of agency in the modern nation-state.

The process of national formation has also been followed by the process of the nationalization of society that came later in time. This process enabled the closure of the process of nationalization through an increasing control and through intervention in society. This took place through the reproduction of the economy but also through the formation of individuals and families, through intrusion in the private sphere. This tendency was present from the beginning of the nation-state, but it increased in time culminating in ‘the result…to subordinate the existence of the individuals of all classes to their status as citizens of the nation-state, to the fact of their being “nationals”’ (Balibar 1991:92). Although Balibar makes this argument for France, I believe it is equally true for the Netherlands and for the United Kingdom. Due to the increasing side-effects of migration, many Western European nation-states, including the ones mentioned above, have attempted to close their borders while they articulated a new way of national belonging expressed through the various facets of the principle of citizenship.
The nation needs to represent itself as homogenous and singular in order to be able to deal with the need of the state for a new basis of collective loyalty. As the nation provides the legitimization basis for the state, minorities that do not fit the model of the nation are considered ‘illegitimate’. Hannah Arendt has already pointed out how the nation depends structurally in its expulsion of national minorities. Thus, the nation-state can only draw on its basis of legitimation, the nation and the people, if it continuously creates it (Arendt 1958). The assumed correspondence between the state and the nation implies that the nation is able to express the content of what national identity means. More to that, based on this logic, the nation-state always walks behind itself, trying to reconstruct was has been proposed as the basis of the legitimacy of its existence. Thus while depending on the nation in order to legitimate itself, the state constructs and literally produces that what come to be defined as the nation (Butler and Spivak 2007).

One consequence of the process of homogenization based on civil relationships is that the link between the nation-state and its people functions as a double-edged sword. On the one hand it provides the unifying principle on which the idea of the nation can be based. On the other hand the same principle defines the category of those who are not the people of the nation. As Calhoun states: ‘Relying at least tacitly on the idea of ‘nation’ to give an account of why particular people belong together as the ‘people’ of a particular state has historically done the double work of explaining the primary loyalty of each to all within the state, and the legitimacy of ignoring or discriminating against those outside.’ (2007:22). The second aspect not only constructs a strict separation between the state that contains the nation and the people, and other states that contain their own nation and their own people, but allows for a nuanced hierarchy of the people within the nation.

Besides ordering the world through the principle of sameness and difference, the idea of ‘the people’ also makes claims to a collective ‘we’ that is performative in nature (Taylor 2002). The us-them grammar also constructs a dichotomy that is recognizable from our previous discussion of the secular versus religion – both dichotomies function with an exclusionary logic that defines both categories implied and points out their boundaries.

The nation depends as much on the state for its existence, as on the idea of the ‘other’. Exclusion is as much at the core of the nation-state as ideas of unity and equality. Historically, the formation of unity that attracted popular support was based on the exclusion of others be it in terms of linguistic diversity (Anderson 1983) or ethnic and cultural difference. This exclusion then worked as a new basis for social solidarity because it made membership into the alleged community special, through the promised
unity and homogeneity that went against all the discord and dangerous confrontations to that commoners were subjected to before (Marx 2005). In order to be convincing the nation needed to be exclusive.

### 3.3. Citizenship

Historically, citizenship has had the double function of protecting the inner boundaries of the nation-state through the inclusion and exclusion process that defined who was part of the national community – also through the reinforcing of the physical boundaries of the state through control of migration. In the same time, citizenship formation as a process of structuring and constructing a hierarchy within the diversity of the national community, by the dynamics of the rights and duties of the members as much as through the basis of equality that it implies between them. The nation-state’s use of citizenship as an internal and external control mechanism was historically a link between the need for the support of a large number of people and the changes of strategy in how to deal with them. Thus coercion was matched by the strategies of persuasion and bargaining in order to create loyal subjects.

This double articulation of citizenship as an ordering principle within and beyond the nation-state also makes sense from the view of the double articulation of frontiers, as ‘projection and protection of an internal collective personality’ and the identification with that delimited unit that is within the nature of the individuals participating in the collective (Balibar 1991).

Citizenship is a useful concept, both in the analytical and empirical sense if we want to link the abstract notions of the nation and the state with the notion of ‘the people’. It is useful to think of citizenship in a multi-dimensional model, with a vertical dimension determining the relationship between citizens and the state and a horizontal dimension determining the relationships of citizens with each other (Siim 2000). This can be compared with Taylor’s distinction between a vertical dimension articulating the relationship with transcendence and a horizontal dimension containing the dynamics of the immanent (2007).

Citizenship is the principle that informs the mechanism of exclusion and inclusion that is at the basis of the modern nation-state. Citizenship (1) maintains the meaning of the physical boundaries of the nation-state, (2) reinforces the idea of ‘people’ connected to ‘nations’ and (3) ritually connects crossing the boundaries of the nation-state to rites of initiation and rituals of belonging. Citizenship distinguishes between
people who are sharing a certain territory in relation to recognition and a balance of
duties and responsibilities as opposite to one of rights and entitlements, thus providing a
link between ‘people’, ‘nation’ and the ‘state’. This link is foremost, but not exclusively,
legal in nature. It needs to be mentioned here that the nation-state is a formation
generated by the people and meant to serve them (see Calhoun 2007).

Schinkel argues that citizenship contains elements that define the life of a person
within the state as well as elements that tackle into the definition of the social body
society is (Schinkel 2010a). Linking back this argument to the work of Foucault and
Agamben, Schinkel argues that the mechanism of citizenship distinguishes between
citizens and non-citizens, but also between good, active and responsible citizens and bad,
inactive and irresponsible citizens. The directions that these two dimensions of
citizenship take, determine the extent of the container what ‘society’ is (Schinkel 2008).

Citizenship, as a principle of equality is constructed against other forms of social
and cultural association. Looking back to the history of the concept of citizenship, we
may see that in the Roman Empire, citizenship was a form of loyalty meant to transcend
tribal loyalties (Pocock 1998) while eliminating magically sanctioned social divisions
(Weber 1998) in order to attain free association and equal solidarity between individuals.
Thus, it can be said that citizenship, historically, aims at transcending alternative social
bonds imposed either by belief or religion or by the family (nuclear family in the modern
western society, clan or ethnic group in other cases) or other forms of association
considered as impediments to equality, rationality and neutrality in the public sphere. In
this way, citizenship is drawing on the myth of the nation and the people as an alternative
form of strong collective identity legitimating mutual loyalty and ‘strong’ collective action.

The ‘emancipation’ of the nation from the imperial and the dynastic feudal
relations also went hand in hand with the emancipation of the individual from the
community and familial ties. The person could forget about its subjection to patriarchy,
religion and custom and as liberals argued, could in freedom enlarge his capacities as an
individual citizen and by doing so, could strength the nation. This was also a formula of
communist rhetoric, where the individual was expected to develop himself in order to be
of maximum benefit to the collective nation.

Looking back to history, we can see how citizenship was also devise as a
membership card of political participation, as an alternative to other forms of loyalty
such as loyalty within the family (or clan) and as a alternative form of collective belief to
belief in religious values. By avoiding these alternative forms of human association, citizenship was meant to create a basis for equality in the form of ideological commonality and non-preferential treatment, implying a balance of duties and rights stemming from membership. Marshall makes a vertical distinction between civil, political and social rights connected to citizenship (Marshall 1950). The state emphasizes the equality of the members in rights understood as liberties and opportunities, while the legal system forms the basis and mechanism of equality (Rawls and Freeman 2007).

While citizenship can only be assumed on an individual basis, it is also a form of collective identity that simultaneously mobilizes the individual and the group in the universal and particular aspects of the relationship between the nation-state and citizens, and between citizens. Oldfield points out that individuals are not alone, but exist embedded in communities, groups and other form of association. While citizenship gives them ‘true’ identity, it also implies duties attached to membership (Oldfield 1998). Feminist writers have also criticized the understanding of citizenship as an individual legal entitlemen by pointing out the social decontextualization of such an approach (Young 1990, Benhabib 1996, Siim 2000).

Citizenship is contextual. Not only does it depend on the nation-state for its existence, it is articulated in a specific time and space conjuncture with historically specific characteristics. Brubaker warns that there is no universal concept of citizenship, but different models shaped by different versions of nationalism, mediated by alternative legal systems (Brubaker 2004).

Moreover, the ideal neat distinction between nation-states and their citizens is not followed by reality. While people cannot escape being subject of a state (Butler and Spivak 2007), they often have membership links with more than one state. These links can be materialized in different forms of belonging, but also in multiple citizeships. Hammar contributes to this debate by coining the concept of denizen that is seen as a new model of membership for migrants based on universal human rights and national rights giving way to a transcendental, global view of citizenship that at its heart combines the tension between particular and universal (Hammar 1986).

Besides legal, social and moral dimensions of citizenship we can also talk about the economic dimension of belonging. This is most visible when talking about citizenship in terms of right or entitlements within the welfare state and duties to contribute. If we just look at the simple arguments prevalent in popular and political discourse about migrants draining the nation-state through welfare benefits while not
contributing to the collective wealth through the system of taxation, we touch on an important argument of inclusion and exclusion that is economic in nature. Sassen mentions the idea of economic citizenship, people who are subject to taxation, have some, even if limited access to legal and social resources but have no political rights whatsoever (Sassen 1996). The economic dimension of citizenship can also be emphasized in the double axis of the individual as member of the consumer society, a passive member for whom ‘work, public service and reproduction are no longer the fundamental bases of effective citizenship entitlement’ (Turner 2011:178). Turner argues that the meaning of being a citizen transforms into the dual axis of consuming and saving, while the state increasingly treats its citizens through marketing strategies and sales techniques. The Roman panem et circenses has in modernity been transformed into a modern citizenry controlled by the state and ‘entertained by a powerful mixture of secular culture, consumerism and popular religion’ (idem:178). This creates another axis of possible exclusion, as a consequence of the economic, social and political marginalization of some groups of citizens.

What these writers emphasize is that the idea of the nation encourages the formation of dominant groups that may organize social life around their cultural values, stressing their own authority (Walzer 1997). There can be no position that is entirely neutral, as all civic cultures are intertwined with ethnic, national and religious trajectories that are specific. Indeed, one of the main characteristics of modernity has been the determination of the question of membership within society through the prism of the concepts of citizenship and nationality, one determining the rights and duties of membership, the other their freedom of movement and territorial limitations (Holston and Appadurai 1996).

Citizenship works as an inclusionary and an exclusionary mechanism, redistributing resources while building collective solidarities and a common national identity (Turner 2011). Determining the boundaries of the philosophical, legal, social and political status of individuals, the dimensions of their loyalties and collective undertakings, it influences layers of identity such as gender and sexuality, religion, race, ethnicity and social status. Considering the connection between identity and citizenship Isin and Wood see citizenship as more than a legal and political membership in the nation-state and highlight its dimension of permitting and drawing the borders around the articulation of group rights that they see as an implicit challenge to the universality of the concept of citizenship (Isin and Wood 1999).
From the point of view of the state, migrants are seen as legal and cultural anomalies. However, as migrants become citizens, the rights and obligations that adhere to the status of a citizen create a possibility and an obstacle towards equality within the nation-state. It is the principle of citizenship that by creating the basis of equality also perpetuates inequality based on difference. This takes place in two ways: first, the citizen of a nation is differentiated from the citizens of other nations, second, the citizens within the nation are all equal in principle but still different from each other in terms of ethnicity, race, gender, social and economic status, etc. However, as Brubaker points out, differences are national, in the way that nation-states, depending on their own historical formation use different criteria to define equality and thus inequality, but also historical, in the sense that at different historical moments certain issues become more salient than others.

The tension of plurality and equality within the nation-state is addressed by the multiculturalist critique of citizenship. Once having acquired citizenship, the nation-states’ ‘others’ ask for the accommodation of cultural difference. Kymlicka is interested in migrants that become minorities and is concerned with the internal regulation of plurality. The model proposed by him deals with the accommodation of cultural distinctiveness on the basis of a group differentiated citizenship. This direction is followed by radical multiculturalists, who claim that citizenship as identity has precedence over citizenship as legal status (Kymlicka 1998). The multiculturalist approach presents ‘the dilemma of difference’ coined by Young, the dilemma of denying or affirming difference in relation to equality (Young 2000).

Plurality and its tension with the principle of citizenship can best be captured when looking at the demands of minority groups for recognition. These contestations take place at the boundaries of the articulation of the public and private sphere. As pointed out by Meer, while citizenship has a legal dimension that bounds individuals and collectivities to territories and collective polities (with a certain balance of sovereignty and a certain way of gaining legitimacy) it works socially through the rights and responsibilities that offer a civic status embodying the dimensions of equal opportunity, dignity and confidence (Meer 2010). The same field delimited by citizenship offers the possibility of legitimate reaction (that can be framed in different ways) through individual and collective action. This brings to the fore the tension that is inherent in the principle of citizenship, of being at the same time an inclusion and exclusion mechanism (Brubaker 2004).
The meeting between citizenship and collective identities is not always smooth, and often involve contestation on the division between private and public, the incorporation of difference in national identity (Young 1990) and the struggle between competing group demands. Moreover, the construction of a nation also implies the formation of a dominant majority group that then organizes several aspects of social life around the needs and perceptions of that group (Walzer 1997). All these approaches highlight that citizenship is based on and promotes a system of values that is a matter of social convention, and thus sensitive to imbalances of power. Moreover, the values promoted by the state and the way citizenship works as a mechanism that implements and recreates those values, changes over time.

The mechanism of citizenship that forms the basis of national identity is the product of its own historical time. Both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have moved away from a constellation of welfare state, social rights and class equality and have replaced it with nationality, immigration and security (Tyler 2010). Thus ‘Immigration is one of the reasons why Marshallian universalism is no longer plausible today’ (Joppke 1999:629). In Dutch and British multiculturalism, diversity has transformed into an uncomfortable plurality governed by policies with a polarizing approach. The culturalist assumption considers culture a ‘package’ of traits, tied to place and transmitted through generations, static, deterministic, shared by all members and constituting a ‘community’ that can be represented by a ‘leader’ (Vertovec 1999). Present political approaches to immigration, the accommodation of migrants and their descendants and their discourses of ‘integration’ share the same culturalist roots on which multiculturalism rested.

Calhoun also points out that multiple meanings of solidarity and identity need to be considered in looking for a concept of citizenship that is metaphorically located between local difference and national sameness that can be articulated in a public space understood as a space where discourse is made possible and where legal entitlements can be reinforced. This space would be separated from a society where interaction and communication are based on interpersonal relations between participants and one where ‘large categories of cultural identity’ are the only thing people have in common (Calhoun 2007).
3.4. Religion and secularity in the political sphere

Because the modern state has been built on the promise of equality, freedom and consent with the image of a homogenous community based on allegiance backing it up, plurality and diversity is a major issue for it. The legacy of liberalist thought institutionalized in different ways in various territorial units does not inspire effective social policies and institutions that can manage the tensions at the grassroots. Thus, conventional liberal solutions that are formulating the legacy of the peace of Westphalia prove to be insufficient – as the global structures of the nation-state embody the tension between global flows of capital and the need for territorialized unity, and as religion seems to escape the private sphere where it was until now, at least analytically confined (Turner 2011).

Muslim migrants and minorities bring up the issue of plurality and diversity within the nation-state so strongly because: ‘The Enlightenment language of democracy, citizenship, and respect for difference is taken up into a discursive structure that bends these terms into a nationalistic language of concern for the body politic and the need to protect it from the corrosive forces of a threatening internal other who does not share the essence of a democratic ‘culture’ (Ewing 2008:220).

Modern societies cannot take for granted anymore the conventional secular approach of division between politics and religion, rather they must get involved into direct management. However, this management of religion does not take place only at the level of the nation-state. Rather, through a trend of decentralization and delegation of state-power towards smaller units it increasingly takes place at the local level. Moreover, most migrants are concentrated in urban areas, making the management and accommodation of religious migrants foremost an urban issue.

Furthermore, state responses to religion, diversity and plurality are highly influenced by the political dimension of the struggle between the economic need for migrants, their transformation into minorities and the need to maintain the internal unity of the nation-state. This can be seen as an oscillation between the pluralisation of the population of the nation-state and the need to maintain the inner homogeneity as a source of legitimation and authority.

9/11 Has had an effect of restructuration of the political and social boundaries of the nation-state, through redefined and strengthened controls of immigration and improved mechanisms of selection. This has also influenced the inner management of plurality within the nation-states, with programs of accommodation and integration for ‘problematic’ minorities figuring high on the agenda. Plurality easily translated into
division from within, while policies failed to live up to the promise of equality in rights (especially in terms of equal shares of resources) (Joppke 2009).

Issues related to Muslims have intensified the process of direct involvement of the state in the management of religion. This has been an important move for the state from the point of view of asserting its authority over public society. The management of plurality has been articulated through the mechanism of citizenship, combining ideas of (active) membership and collective loyalty. In this way, religion and its accommodation help refine the re-definition of the nation-state and its population as a response to the challenges of modernity, especially plurality. Thus, religion can be rightfully seen as shaping the modernity of the nation-state.

Thus, managing religions must be seen as more than a response of modern liberal states to the challenge of terrorism or fundamentalism (Casanova 1994). The interest in religion may stem from a tendency of the sacred and transcendental to return to social life, but also from an increasing wave of identity politics, social structure argumentation with religion and religious claims groups framed in religious identities. Combined with a general panic towards terrorism, fundamentalism and security, it can also be caused by the effect of waves of migrations that have produced plural, diverse societies in a short span of time.

Furthermore, plurality and diversity is also to be found within religious traditions, and here I mean more than the fact that within one religious community we can find little if any consensus. Rather, religious traditions are competing between themselves for followers and resources. As such their internal dynamics can be compared to minority-majority struggles where freedom is increasingly a matter of regulation from above (see Gill 2008). Gill describes this process as having the consequence of majority religions seeking legitimacy through (cooperation with) the state, framing minority religions as illegitimate competitors. This also has an implication for politics, where the risk of ruling is minimized by politicians through little involvement in the internal religious conflict under the label of separation between spheres. While the management of religion is a necessary aspect of the modern state (Turner 2011), religion needs to be controlled by the state in order to keep the costs of management as little as possible (Gill 2008).

Management of religion, argues Brubaker, should be considered similar to management of minorities. He argues that from the point of view of the nation-state political mobilizations based on difference are not necessarily different in nature, rather, they serve to maintain a certain dichotomy of minority-majority relations (Brubaker
2012). In a similar vein, Taylor argues that religious, cultural, ethnic and philosophical differences are all in fact similar in nature (2011:67). Thus religious differences need not be articulated and resolved within a secular logic, rather, they need to be articulated in the framework of neutrality towards pluralism and diversity.

Thus policies dealing with religious minorities can be analytically compared with policies dealing with migration, further, as I have argued beforehand, since the label of migrant, minority, religious group are superimposed on each other, easily exchangeable while still delimiting the same collective formation – these policies are often, also empirically, one and the same.

The distinction made by Hammar between direct and indirect immigrant policies is useful at this point (1985). According to Hammar, policies that have the starting point in the taking for granted of difference between the immigrant population and the host population may be called direct policies, or special measures. Indirect policy measures, on the other hand are taken with the big picture of the population of the nation-state as a whole in mind. Here, immigrants are also falling under their umbrella by virtue of sharing a polity, while not necessarily the status of citizens. In the case of indirect policies, migrant rights can be looked at from a point of view of equality with all other individuals and groups affected. Hammar makes this distinction considering the tools of the state in dealing with immigrants. Besides he also distinguishes immigration laws and policies that deal with the regulation of immigration and their control: as nation-states have their own laws regarding the inclusion-exclusion of territorial others, these laws can be applied liberally or in a strict way, depending upon the needs of the state (Hammar 1996). The other issue regarding immigration is the process of ‘controlled’ residence connected to different legal status within the nation-state. This is where the issue of citizenship becomes relevant: citizenship ends the period of insecurity and uncertainty in which migrants are kept by the nation-state and implies a rite de passage that involves more than the crossing of the physical boundaries of the nation-state that are part of the first feature of immigration control. Indeed, from the point of view of the migrants, citizenship is the mechanism that allows entry into the category of ‘the people’ that is at the core of the nation-state.

As modern nation-states are liberal and democratic, citizens are not only subjects of the nation-state but also shape the form the nation-state takes. By embodying the limes of the nation-state, they learn how to use discourses and situations to their advantage: ‘The average migrant is the embodiment of the blurring of boundaries between nations, states and jurisdictions and of their contradictions. In order to survive, the average migrant must become an acrobat
in the manipulation of boundaries (in avoiding, exploiting, drawing, bridging boundaries, etc) and at any moment can fall from the tightrope on that he or she is balanced’ (Beck and Cronin 2006:103). This point is strongly linked to the way citizenship connects strategically to religious, ethnic, cultural and social claims. It also creates a possibility of political identification along the lines of diversity and equality offered by the same principle of citizenship.

Taking into consideration first the struggle of the nation-states with religion, second, the power struggles inherent to religious pluralism, third, Islam and Muslims as an example of cultural and religious otherness - this research questions the proclaimed neutrality of the state in religious matters. For the analysis of the policy documents and political field in the three countries and the fieldwork in the cities of Rotterdam, Leicester and Marseille the following ideas have been central. First, the nation-state is not neutral in regard to religion. Second, among other religions, Islam is a special case as it presents a double threat and confronts a double disadvantage (Modood 2007), as an ‘immigrant’ religion and a ‘fanatic’ religion (Colas 1997). This is in stark contrast with different forms of Christianity, which are ‘naturally’ present in the public sphere and in the political realm. Third, the state is co-producing Muslimness through its mechanisms of control (discourses and policy processes related to security, radicalization, integration, assimilation). Finally, through democratic practices such as debates (see Wedeen 2003, 2008), but also through normative and deliberative discussions as an alternative to state discourses (Hirschkind 2006) and through citizenship practices such as active citizenship, individuals bring religion into the public and political sphere. Muslims are necessarily partners in negotiating the accommodation of Islam, and Muslim leaders (civic, political and religious) play the role of representatives, unifying a wide diversity of religious, social, political and ideological positions under a collective identity or identification.

Is then conformity (or integration) the only response possible to increasing plurality and diversity? Should similarity be a pre-requisite to access the status of a citizen? The discussion about integration does not stop at the limits of legal citizenship, it only begins there. Arguing with the fact that citizens have duties and rights towards the nation-state of which they hold membership, states claim that the integration of citizens is a duty. Thus, the principle of citizenship is enriched with a new dimension, the moral dimension that makes a distinction between good and bad citizens.

Although the nations were constructed against empires and dynastic feudal relations, in their history-telling they neglected that they were often the seat of an imperial power themselves. Slowly, imperialism translated into colonialism, while the idea of the state gained prominence as a political formation. As the nation tried to take
distance ideologically from imperialism and colonialism, reframing and restraining the boundaries of the state, it still remained for a long time dependent on the resources that these forms of territorial expansion provided. Also, not only the economic boundaries of the nations were porous: migration and naturalization of subjects from the colonies ensured the fluidity of social and cultural homogeneity within the nation.

3.5. Religion and secularity in the public sphere

Secularists, according to Connolly, ‘convert the idea of a national centre into that of a public sphere’ (Connolly 1999:90). Because of this conceptual fluidity ‘The liberal fear of the politicization of religion is simultaneously the fear of an establishment that would endanger the individual freedom of conscience and the fear of a deprivatized ethical religion that could bring extraneous conceptions of justice, of the public interests, of the common good, and of solidarity into the ‘neutral’ deliberations of the liberal public sphere’ (Casanova 1994:55)

At the heart of the discussion about the place of religion in social life and the distinction between secular and religious we encounter the social space defined as public sphere. Based on Habermasian theories of political action, the public sphere can be seen as a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and to reach common judgment. In this sense the public sphere is also the place of normative constructions and development of new frameworks (Hauser 1998). The idea of the public sphere works with the assumption that publics create the dimensions of the public sphere through their participation and active involvement in rational deliberation. The end product of the deliberative process and the reason of the existence of the public sphere is the common understanding that is drawn from the collective discursive practices taking place.

The model of the public sphere emphasizes a structured dialogue that we can see as consisting of three different stages: identification of the problem, elicitation of opinions from the individuals and groups participating as publics in the debates and the collective understanding that is reached through deliberation. However, one of its most important and much discussed parts is the inclusion of marginalized voices into the deliberative process, with difference as a recognized feature (Benhabib 1992).

In his book ‘A Theory of Justice’ (1971) Rawls places the principle of justice at the basis of reasonable agreement. The political conception of justice proposed by Rawls addresses the essential collective understanding that a constitution is based on and is concerned with issues that are common to all citizens. Besides the political conception of
justice, individuals are endowed with a moral package of views about what counts as good, views that are informed from different sources, one of them being religion. Citizens are committed to these moral concepts to a lesser or greater degree. However, the individual must be able to navigate between these conceptions of good and justice and be able to change them according to the role he plays in a certain moment in social life. When in the garb of a religious person the individual may connect with the religious set of morals, but as a citizen he must adhere to the collective ideas of good and justice (Rawls 1999:578). The ‘duty of civility’ requires the citizen to think and act in collectively formulated ideas, while requiring at the same time the neglect of comprehensive doctrines of other moral systems that are not necessarily shared. Rawls uses the term ‘the veil of ignorance’ pleading that the knowledge of the difference between citizens must be left outside the door of the public sphere. The only knowledge available needs to be the general principle of justice.

According to Rawls citizens rely on politically shared values. Moral ideas that draw on different sources are to be excluded from the public sphere. But citizens might have more than one justification for their views, and some of the justifications might be religious in nature. The pre-existing consensus assumed by Rawls would split in this way the moral identity of a person between aims that draw on a political conception of justice and aims informed by other comprehensive doctrines. This slip would work to the benefit of the politically informed justice aims, with the effect that the collective would be benefited, while other aims would have to remain unvoiced or restrained. However, this leaves us with the question of how the reasonability of comprehensive doctrines is to be determined. The answer to this question has of course deep going implications, the acceptable rationality of aims determining also the possibility of their entry in the arena of deliberation.

Responding to initial criticism with ‘Political Liberalism’ in 1993, Rawls introduces the concept of ‘reasonable pluralism’ admitting pluralism into the public sphere, but maintaining his position that the validity of stances has to be evaluated according to a neutral method based on public reason. Shared principles are needed to have the hope of solving differences in moral views. Thus he formulates a further distinction between public and private reason, where private does not have bearing on the general public and public is concerned with general publics in terms of fundamental justice and reflects the socially accepted ideas and principles of justice. The citizens deliberating with the use of reason while putting aside their private considerations are in this view reasonable citizens.
Furthermore, religious reasons are not to be restrained from on moral grounds but rather in view of the duties of citizenship: ‘the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal duty - the duty of civility - to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason’ (Rawls 1993:217).

Intellectuals who criticize the constraint of religious arguments in the public sphere, such as Stout (2004), remark that the constitution of a hierarchical position between different types of moral systems serves only to promote one moral conception of life, namely secular liberalism. Indeed Rawls’s argument is based on the secular principle of equality between religions and moral systems and the individual freedom of belief. However, liberalism is not considered as just one between the available options, critics say, but as the moral choice superior to all others.

Moreover, this view has been criticized for putting too much pressure and expecting too much from the part of religious citizens. This can be seen as an unequal burden worn by faithful individuals who have to conform to secular ways (Habermas 2003). This goes against the principle of equality in rights, duties and obligations on which the principle of citizenship rests.

Responding to these challenges in ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) Rawls allows reasonable comprehensive doctrines to enter the political discussion, nevertheless supplemented by public reasons. Regarding his previous position, the revision is not substantial, at the fore remains the commitment to the principle of neutrality implying that the faithful individual must be able to translate his argument in rational terms.

While Rawls concentrates on the collective basis on which the public sphere is built, Habermas in ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ (1989) is concerned with the quality of the rational discourse on which the public sphere is based and its quantity, that is the degree of its openness to participants (see Calhoun 1992).

Considering the role of religion in the public sphere the argument of Habermas aims at articulating a distinction between attempts at redefining the role of religion to the detriment of the secular nature of the state and ‘objections to the secularist understanding of democracy and the rule of law’ (Habermas 2006:6). He engages with the Rawlsian concept of public reason, arguing that Rawls concentrates on the ethics of citizenship to the detriment of the idea of impartiality that remains at the basis of the liberal ideas. The state, Habermas mentions, reacted historically to the dangers of the religious wars by
taking first the step towards secularization and then towards the democratization of the political realm. Religious legitimation and state legitimation separated from each other, and the Constitution provided the new guidelines for the management of religious pluralism. Dealing with religion in a liberal constitutional way means first of all freedom of religion that is based on the rights of the individual and impartiality, or neutrality of the state towards all religions. The individual freedom of religion is based on the idea of tolerance that needs to be anchored in the idea of collective reason, as to establish the borders of what is collectively acceptable. Individual freedom is here contrasted with a collective normative idea about what is suitable and what is not, thus in a common moral order that is constructed through ‘compelling reasons’.

Instead of the legitimation being based on religious reasoning, Habermas distinguishes between the equal participation of all citizens and the rational outcomes of democratic deliberation as constructing liberal legitimacy. The ethics of citizenship presume an equal participation based on mutual respect. Indeed, the duty of civility formulated by Rawls draws on the ideas of interaction based on mutual respect and the duty of citizens to provide each other with rational arguments. Behind it all lays the assumption of a common collective reason, on which the secular state rests.

Habermas’s most important positioning against Rawls is that while he defends secularism in its institutional dimension of separation between religion and politics, especially arguing against religious justification within the legislative process, he argues against the burden of translation placed on religious citizens. Following the argument of Audi and Wolterstorff (Audi and Wolterstorff 1997) he sees secular justification as a possible burden. Religion cannot be artificially separated in the case of a religious person, Audi argues, as such an individual is most probable to see and experience most of life through the lenses that belief offers. It is therefore questionable whether secular and religious convictions and reasons can neatly be separated from each other. Furthermore if separable, the alternate use of religious and secular reasons may put religious convictions in danger, thus jeopardizing belief. Thus the analytical separation between belief and reason might actually contribute to the normative goal of secularity: the triumph of rational secular thought in collective life.

Religion can contribute most to social life through its moral solutions for what Habermas calls the ‘vulnerable forms of communal life’. Although not valuable per se, such contributions might be transporting ‘possible truth contents’ that after the process of filtering leave their religious residue behind and emerge as fitted for the political discussions (Habermas et al. 2006).
Habermas proposes to work with this inequality in two ways: first he translates this burden into the necessary move towards reflexivity that accompanies modernity. He invokes the sociological theme of the modernization of religious consciousness pointing out that the modern citizen needs to constantly relate to alternative ideas that come from secular doctrines or from the ideas of other religions about social life. Second, he makes a clear distinction between the public and the private by drawing the dividing line between the two concepts as between the informal public sphere and the institutionalized world of parliaments, courts, ministries and administrations, where only secular reasons count.

Participation in the public sphere is considered more important by Habermas than the use of ‘translation’ into rational arguments. Thus, religious or ‘private’ reasons, even if these cannot be expected to count as valid arguments in the public sphere, are nevertheless important as public utterances. They are important not only from the point of view of the equality on which the democratic state is based, but because they might constitute a living link between the state and its citizens. Thus private reason is important to exist politically as it forms part of the practice on which the liberal state is built, the practice of equal democratic deliberation. However, the content of the utterances (or the ‘truth content’ in Habermas’s own words) can only enter the institutionalized sphere if its translation takes place already in the political public sphere (Habermas et al. 2006). In this process of translation all citizens must be involved, in order to reduce the one sided burden.

Proposing self-reflexivity, stemming from the modern need for reflection as a possible solution for the equal distribution of the burden of translation, Habermas includes here all citizens, irrespective of their faith or belief systems. To the value of tolerance he adds the value of cognitive adaptation, by which he understands the readiness of individuals to reflect on their own convictions and beliefs, including those that are secular in nature. This cognitive position I understand as being close to a philosophical view on truth as relative and contingent. This means that a certain amount of ‘reasonably expected disagreement’ can be expected from all citizens. Habermas continues thinking about how the self-reflexive attitude can be attained by citizens. Since neither politics nor the juridical realm can influence this attitude a learning process is needed, in which the citizens should participate of their own will. The deliberative mode of democratic will formation is a way of teaching citizens through participation in the public sphere.
We can here identify two major lines of debate about the public sphere, one about the structure and another one about the nature of the public sphere. Following the transformation about the ideas of the public sphere and the discussion about the role of religion in it, we see that the public sphere changes from being a place of rational critical debate (as envisioned by Rawls) to a place where negotiation takes place (also see Calhoun 1992). However, Habermasian theory is oriented more towards the agreement that is reached during the negotiation process, and thus denies the possibility of the conflictual nature of politics. Moreover, if translation needs to take place in the public sphere so that the arguments articulated there can reach the institutional level of the state, we may catch a glimpse of a complex hierarchy of social strata that mediate the raw material of public opinion, while regulating the legitimacy and also the power of expression that some arguments have upon others.

However, democratic inclusiveness in not only a matter of the size of the public sphere or the proportion of the members who participate in it - besides the deliberative public sphere exist also tactical, consumptive and ideological alternatives. Thus the nation remains important when discussing equality within the nation, while it is also needed to consider the implementation of ideas on which the state is based, and which Connolly identifies as unity, allegiance and communication (1991), through the apparatus of the state. In addition, in the following section I will argue that the nation-state is not anymore the only necessary spatial dimension of inquiry.

3.6. The management of religion and secularity

The need for studies of migrant and minority accommodation, especially in relation to integration at the local level, has already been emphasized (see Favell 1998). Due to the increasing decentralization of state policies and neo-liberal methods of governance, the welfare state began to manage, rather than be responsible for its cities and its citizens (Clark and Newman 1997). Managerialism can be seen as a conglomerate of techniques and instruments for governance, based on the ideal of the entrepreneurial individual who is flexibly accommodating to the demands of the market. Through this process the individual meets risks and needs to profile himself as a product, while nation-states delegate responsibility. The utmost risk of the individual is that of exclusion that theoretically falls under the category of inequality. Decentralization to sub-national levels of governance is accompanied by program cutbacks, delegation to the private and non-profit sector. On the other hand, cities have been proactive in encountering their migrant
populations with ‘clear and pro-active integration policies, often in the absence of national policies, using their own instruments and thereby making pressure for national policies’ (Penninx et al. 2006).

Scholars in the field of immigration have successfully pointed out that besides their relation to the nation-state, cities are placed in complex networks of power that are often trans-national or even global in nature (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2009). This divergence between the local and the national level must not only be seen as the result of an implementation gap or an unsuccessful translation of national policy goals into local policies. What is at stake, according to Poppelaars and Scholten (2008), is a difference in problem framing. According to the authors, at the national level the state is concerned with ideological categories, its logic being driven by the need for centralization, politicization and response to events on a larger scale. On the national level the framework of citizenship makes sense, as it frames migrants and minorities as individual members of the national group. In this way integration and the management of minorities is seen as promoting the common values, rights, duties and responsibilities of this citizenship, on the basis of common (cultural) values such as language, national values and norms. The emphasis of the state on the national level remains on individual socio-economic adaptation and integration, and not on groups. However, at the local level, the need for pragmatic measures often means that migrants are dealt with as groups rather than individuals, leaving more space for self-identification and self-organization.

Parallel to changes in the way the concept of citizenship is being linked to national identity and national group membership, a change in the way the apparatus of the state works also influences the way minorities are dealt with. The literature on new governance highlights strategies adopted by the states that have led to a localization of the policy processes. The involvement of civil society and markets in policy and service delivery and the promotion of inclusive policymaking are all part of the new governance strategies that have accompanied decentralization (Reddel 2002a, 2002b).

Most importantly as a direct effect of decentralization, cities acquire new powers. As Brenner and Theodore suggest ‘… cities have become strategically crucial geographical arenas in that a variety of neoliberal initiatives—along with closely intertwined strategies of crisis displacement and crisis management—have been articulated.’ (2002:2)

The changes in the balance between the local and the national along with the process of fragmentation and sectorialization have transformed the role of national and local governments. This implies a change in the mode and method of policymaking, but also in the way the mobilization of migrants’ interests takes place, since new venues offer
new possibilities and strategies to influence policy making and policy outcomes at the local level. This also allows us to have a wider scope than focusing on political participation, as other forms of public participation and informal participation in the policy process also have influence on the policy process and on how participation, integration and citizenship of migrants are evaluated.

It has already been pointed out that migrant associations play an important role in the policy process at the local level (Van Heelsum 2005, Bousetta 2001). In the Netherlands this inclusive process is encouraged, through their incorporation in different councils as representatives of ethnic groups and associations (Soysal 1994; Fennema and Tillie 1999). The same process can be observed in France where ‘official’ representatives are mobilized to speak on behalf of the groups they represent (Grillo 1985; Kastoryano 2005). Looking back to a tradition of affirmative action, the United Kingdom also encourages if not requires members of different ethnic and racial groups to participate in formal institutions of the state (Saggar 2000).

Furthermore, studies that focus on the national level have been criticized for describing macro-processes without paying attention to either globalization and its effects, or glocalization. Thus, the agency of migrants is neglected. Local factors, especially in a comparative outlook explain better different outcomes of immigrant integration (Thomson and Crul 2007) and shed light on the dual process of accommodation between migrants and local governments, without neglecting the simultaneous influence of local, national and transnational factors (Favell 1998). Furthermore, institutional logics on the national and local levels often diverge, the latter approach often being more pragmatic than the former (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). Cities provide a good opportunity for contextual specificity and structural comparison, and by keeping attention on national and local policies we gain an important dimension of comparison: besides comparing cities with each other, we are implicitly comparing national levels, and the relationship between the national and the local in all cases. This suggests that instead of looking at national models of migrant and minority accommodation, a more fruitful approach is to look at how cities manage diversity. Besides, governing methods are most visible if we look at policies and their implementation process.

Policies are a product of the political culture to which they belong and they are articulated in policy documents and through policy practices, of which policy implementation is part. Both policy documents and policy practices can be read ‘as cultural texts, as classificatory devices with various meanings, as narratives that serve to justify or
condemn the past, or as rhetorical devices and discursive formations that function to empower some people and silence others’ (Shore and Wright 1997). Policies as such codify values and norms as they also carry with them models of society, larger visions about how things are or should be. These values and the ideology that promotes them are bodies of knowledge and complex systems of meaning. Trying to objectify and universalize ideas, policies are political phenomena. The language they use aims to transform them into objective, neutral, rational and legal facts, not showing them as products of their own system. Although the government uses policies in order to regulate people’s behaviour and to create and maintain order through the strategic use of sanctions and rewards, policies have a more diffuse impact, influencing not only what people do but also what people think and what they are.

Policy, more than being only discourse, implies courses of action that are unfolding over time. In time, it changes as much itself as it changes its environment. This happens on different levels, at changing degrees. Lipsky mentions that the outcomes of policy on ‘street-level’ are as much part of the process as explicit policy making and changes on higher levels of society (Lipsky 1980). By changing and being changed policy often creates and disseminates new meanings, be they of a moral, ethical value, or structures already existing clusters and categories.

The most important aspect of policy I consider to be that of representation, of production and reproduction of meaning. These processes can be investigated locally as an articulation between national and local representations and frameworks of meaning. As a matter of relationship between doctrine and representation and courses of action, policies capture the dynamics of tension between theory and practice, between ideology and action. Policy processes are worked out during interactions, through interpretation, resource allocation, evasion, subversion, but most importantly, policy processes offer a platform for relational discourses and practices.

3.7. Conclusion

Regimes of secularity are articulated through nation-states, though not restricted to them. Together with the myth of the nation and that of the people they form part of the modern social imaginary that orders social life. Furthermore, regimes of secularity become visible in conjunctures that contain tensions between the social imaginary, symbols and the real dimensions of social life. The attention given to Islam and Muslims
in the recent past in Western European countries is one of the conditions for the formation of new regimes of secularity.

Nation-states have a complex relationship with religion: both opposing and incorporating it. The nation borrowed religious symbols and myths, claiming their sacredness. Changes in the nature of religion enabled the transfer of sacredness to the immanent dimension of social life, allowing myths such as that of the nation and of the people to become intertwined in the modern social imaginary and to serve as the legitimation basis of the modern nation-state.

The nation-state exists as a collective structure based on the idea of a nation, an articulation of the ‘people’ on which the nation depends but which it also serves, and on a specific positioning towards values such as freedom, equality, fraternity, thus constructing the basis for modern liberal democracies. However, such universal principles need to be translated into particular right and duties, and this is only possible within the nation-state. This translation is dependent on the level of administration of the state. Measures taken on the national level differ from those taken on the local level. The local level is often more pragmatic as it has to deal with the ‘real’. Furthermore, the decentralization of the state gives the local more influence and responsibility in employing symbols, translating imaginaries and dealing with the real.

Citizenship translates between the levels of imaginary, symbol and real through its different dimensions – but should be seen as a multidimensional mechanism of inclusion and exclusion that defines and is defined by the implosion and explosion of the imaginary, symbol and real. Citizenship exists on the level of discourse and on that of practice; as such both levels need to be investigated. As citizenship articulates the dimensions of belonging but also serves as a basis for exclusion, the tensions inherent within the principle of citizenship and its application can be identified best in instances of minority groups fighting for recognition.

Equality is at the basis of the principle of citizenship, inherited through the legacy of the myth of the nation and of people. However, equality is relative, as we can see from the example of the discussion about the presence of religion and religious arguments in the public sphere. In this sense the Muslim population in Western European cities embodies the fears of the nation-state: religion contradicting the ideological basis on which the nation-state is built and offering pre-modern forms of belonging and collective association, and the migrant and minority axis transgressing the territorial entity of the state and articulating a different possibility of being part of ‘the people’.
4. Research question, methodology and data

“There are so many different layers to fieldwork. Issues multiply and intersect in exciting ways. I am forever in a state of trying to work out what I am doing with my methodology and why; and on top of that, the fieldwork and research is very often about me as well. Fieldwork is about me in that it requires a lot of integrity and self-justification for what I am doing and why, and the issues – like identity and feeling a sense of space – end up being issues in my life as well as in the lives of those in my study.’
(Cerwonka and Malkki 2007:32)

4.1. Research question:

This book has been constructed following an inductive research logic. Empirical data gathered in Rotterdam, namely local policies and informal unstructured interviews have been the entry point into the enquiry field. The interpretation of this first empirical data was based on the literature research concerning Muslims in a European context. The preliminary empirical findings have been contextualized in comparison with the national policies and their historical trajectory, an approach that has subsequently informed the choice of theory. The choice of theory has informed the research questions. The next step has been the operationalization of the research questions and their transformation in secondary questions that have served as a basis for the interview questions used. The template used for the analysis of the empirical data in Rotterdam has then been used as a model for empirical research in Leicester and Marseille, preliminary data from all three cities reflecting back on and fine-tuning the theoretical approach. As the Rotterdam chapter has been informing the theoretical framework, the construction of the argument and the data used differs slightly from the other two empirical chapters.

The main research questions that have been used during the whole study are:

When and to what effect does religion become a salient category of discourse and practice in the public and political spheres? How is Muslimness constructed at the intersection of national and local governments and local communities?

These main questions have been taken apart into secondary ones that also formed the basis of the questions I have used in interviews (see appendix 2). These
questions however, will not be individually answered in the following chapters, but they shed light on the process of conceptualization and methodological instrumentalization that guided my enquiry in the field.

On the process: What are the national and the local meanings of the concept of citizenship? How does citizenship relate to regimes of secularity? How are regimes of secularity expressed on the national and the local level? How are citizenship policies interpreted by governors and governed? What is the rationale that informs certain policy choices? How are citizenship policies implemented? How are policy discourses different from or similar to policy practices?

On the context: What are the ideological, political and institutional factors that promote or hinder a certain policy frame? What are the ideological, political and institutional factors that promote or hinder a collective religious or Muslim identity? How different or how similar are the city governments, urban politics and the content of collective Muslimness in Rotterdam, Leicester and Marseille? What are the factors that actors involved in the construction of Muslimness consider as relevant for shaping it?

On organizational development: How is the state organized in respect to governing of religious plurality? What are the developmental patterns of Muslim organization in the three cities? How do organizations and collective activities cut across the political opportunity structure? Which Muslim organizations do the local governments recognize and what community dynamics does the process of selection incur? How do Muslim organizations change or shape the policies and political decisions of the localities they reside in? What do organizations themselves report about their involvement in the policy process? What is the extent and effect of participation in the policy process?

On the outcome: How do regimes of secularity and regimes of citizenship affect the shape of the field of Muslimness in the three cities? Are there differences in the shape given to the field of Muslimness in the three cities and how can these be explained? What lessons can we draw from comparing the three cases?
4.2. Method and data collection

Secondary sources have been consulted (both theoretical and empirical) for an overview of the existing literature, identification of the main theoretical approaches and a contextualization of the existing knowledge. Among secondary sources should be mentioned: existing literature on Muslims with a general focus on Muslims in Europe and a specific focus on the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France along the theoretical focus: national immigrant integration and accommodation of minorities, citizenship and nation-state, studies of secularity, secularism, the secular and of religious groups, immigrant identity construction and organization, especially in a comparative format. This part of the study lies at the basis of chapters two and three.

Policy documents related to integration, migration and citizenship in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France, and respectively Rotterdam, Leicester and Marseille (for the period 1998 – 2008) have been consulted and analysed with the method of discourse analysis. Local policies provided the entry into the field through identification of ‘tension points’. The time frame 1998 – 2008 was chosen in order to cover also the policy period before 9/11, bearing in mind that policy changes might be influenced by global changes in attitude towards Muslims and Islam.

Comparative multisited ethnography between July 2009 and June 2012 provided the basis for mapping out and analyzing the development of the Muslim communities in the three cities. While fieldwork and participant observation constituted the core of the multisited ethnography approach, it also meant a process of immersion in the life of the cities studied. Knowing each city and its specific approach towards religious minority was an immersion in everyday reality, enhanced by participation in public events and the exploration of public, religiously significant urban space.

Multisited ethnography was based on fieldwork and participant observation: in Rotterdam between December 2009 and July 2010, in Leicester in July and August 2011 and in Marseille in November 2010. This implied taking part in activities and events organized by Muslim organizations and local councils regarding the topics identified through the analysis of secondary sources and policy documents. Such activities were seminars, workshops, crash-courses for civil servants, festivals, activities, celebrations, electoral campaigns, football matches and special events. Some communities were more open to my inquisitive presence, others offered me only the information and attention they thought a researcher would like to have.
Finally, the fieldwork was enhanced with in-depth, semi-structured and partially recorded interviews with policy administrators and civil servants, Muslim representatives, members and leaders of Muslim organizations. Interviews lasted 1.5 to 2.5 hours and they were conducted in the majority of cases in English, with exceptions in Dutch and French. In some cases one interview led to contacts for other interviews, other interviews lead to repeated formal and informal contact, in some cases to follow-up interviews. These discussions have been recorded in a field diary, while memos were written during and after each interview. The interviews and memos have been transcribed and analyzed with the use of the software AtlasTi. For a list of questions used as a basis for the interviews please consult Annex 2.

4.3. Multisited ethnography

The ethnographic inquiry begins with a curiosity about a social puzzle that cannot be quenched but by first-hand experience: in this case the puzzle was caused by the multiplicity of conflicting images around Muslims. While Muslims were demonized daily in the media and were targeted by specific policies around the globe, they were also my neighbours, their children were playing with mine and we were shopping in the same multicultural supermarket. But how could the Muslims that I met be so different from the Muslims mentioned in the public sphere? How were ‘my’ Muslims affected by all these images portraying them?

My choice of method has determined a specific relationship between theory and empirics. Fieldwork does often bring material that is valuable for knowledge in unexpected forms that can be best compared with found objects. Because the process is not neatly delimited: one reads secondary sources before interviews and comes up with possible new sites for research while reading policies, because thinking, talking, writing and other activities easily intersect and interrupt each other bringing unexpectedly moments when understanding moves forwards, moments of illumination. These nodal points in the course of research are also turning points: at such conjunctures one can and should change and adapt tactics and techniques (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007): such an approach has been guiding my repeated movement between empirics and theory and allowed them both to inform each other. In this way fieldwork can be seen as closest to informed improvisation, a permanent dialogic relationship with the field, population of research and the things already written (Geertz 1973, Rosaldo 1989).
Physical presence in the social situations one tries to understand is crucial, as through the five senses, the social atmosphere and a taste of the unspoken assumptions one can dive deeply in the reality of the social actors. I have chosen for a comparative design of multisited ethnography and fieldwork because this sort of unmediated inquiry allows one to sense through a limited amount of filters ‘important aspects of the context and of the material and institutional features of the enclosures and regimes through that subjects pass, seeing for yourself how they use and manipulate surrounding resource in their cultural practices.’ (Willis 2000:xiii). Moreover, through the multicultural reality of the cities where I worked and lived I was myself engaging daily with the different aspects of my inquiry. As myself a migrant I have also experienced the power stereotypes and frames have in shaping the individual and collective self.

In dealing with regimes, in this case regimes of secularity and citizenship, a field of research needs to be delimited. The contours of the field become clear only after guidance from preliminary empirical information that gives stable contours to the research questions. In this case the field is theoretically and empirically driven. The identification of the study object delimits the margins of the field(s). The different fields are selected for comparison: fields that are also geographically well defined, in this case three urban contexts. Marcus calls this strategic selection of one or more physical space for participant observation research ‘multi-sited’ ethnography (Marcus 1995).

Multi-sited ethnography is an efficient method, especially when dealing with fuzzy, blurred fields. Falzon, working with such a field, proposes a concept of the field as social world(s) constituted by a set of actors focused on a common concern (Falzon 2009). This methodological angle also fits the research question that lays at the basis of this book – indeed the field of Muslimness is a dialectical conglomerate formed at the intersection of discourses and practices, from the side of the communities that apply to themselves the label of Muslim, or from the part of the institutions involved in the process of governing that use the label of Muslims for their own purpose. What the actors playing a part in this conundrum have in common is that they all contribute to the construction of a generic, broad category of Muslim identity. In order to capture the interpenetration of these concepts in relation to the Muslim population, in practice and discursively, I have proposed the concept of Muslimness in order to delimit the field in which identity and identification as a Muslim occurs, regardless of the relationship with the tenets of Islam.

Muslims share a field of Muslimness formed also through different forms of knowledge stemming first of all from different positions vis-à-vis power. Such positions
necessarily influence the way social worlds are constructed and explained, but each of them throw light on another aspect of the social reality: thus in line with Willis ‘I argue that, like social scientists, social agents are, in their own way, concerned with larger structural questions, only in their case making sense of them as surviving and living out their consequences…’ (Willis 2000). This is the reason why looking at policy texts only through discourse analysis does not do justice to the complexity of the social world in which the effect of the policies is felt. Equal weight needs to be given to the view of governors and governed alike.

Besides, a historical perspective is essential. As Gerd Baumann has so eloquently portrayed in his account of Southall culture, terms used and their meanings change across groups but also shift according to circumstances (1996). The observant eye of the ethnographer is needed to point out the nuances and shifts in language and practice according to situation, a vision that comes from sharing lifeworlds. Besides interviews, it is the physical presence that allows one to interact while pursuing questions and answers that allows one to re-adjust the questions when discussions go in an unexpected direction, react on emotionally filled content or sense automatic, empty replies (compare Willis 2000).

4.4. Dimensions of inquiry

4.4.1. Local versus national

In the following I will proceed to point out the challenges of working on the macro, meso and micro levels in some detail. Besides the predominance of most literature on religion in general and Muslims, in particular on the national level, there are theoretical and empirical reasons that make the local more suitable as a site for inquiry. Contextualization through the history and political trajectory of the specific cities and countries where Muslims start their own initiatives is important from a methodological and theoretical point of view.

Migration and integration processes, political activities and religious practices as well as the formulation of integration and immigration policies mainly take place at three levels: local, national and international. The local context refers to cities, where the immediate settlement of migrants starts, where daily life takes place and where plurality takes a concrete form. Working on the local level is important for (1) an empirical reason: a study concerning the construction of a field of meaning needs to engage, besides discourses and practices on an abstract level, with the lifeworlds of individuals that are affected by the categories investigated; (2) a theoretical reason: lack of
comparative literature on the local level in what studies of religion in general and Muslims in particular are concerned; and (3) a methodological reason: preference for an in-depth inquiry.

Besides taking the comparative dimension of the national level into consideration, this book engages in depth with the local in a comparative way. This aspect of the research design responds to the fallacy of the temporal limits to the analysis that focused on nation-states. As pointed out by Anderson, nations have acquired a coherent self only recently, while religion and the relationship between the political and the religious realm looks back to a more distant history (Anderson 1983). Because the view on the causal mechanisms and the relationship between the political and the religious within the nation-state is temporarily fragmented and probably causally incomplete, the relationship between the processes of secularity and modernity can be questioned. The claim of some authors that modernity necessarily creates secularity and that different modern nation-states have developed different levels and methods of secularization as a response to their modernity remains an open question if one looks at the state at the local level. This is in line with authors such as Dobbelare (1981) who suggest looking into religion and its importance at the macro, meso and micro levels of the state.

By focusing on the local while not neglecting the national we also hope to escape the dangers of methodological nationalism (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2009), a perspective that narrowly focuses on social problems in exclusively national terms, seeing only those problems that fit the nation or state perspective. This would mean that, while focusing on the nation-state, other relevant dimensions of inquiry, such as the local or the transnational and global levels could easily be neglected. I argue, in line with recent migration studies research (Glick Schiller and Caglar 2009) that while ‘with their concentration of the nonlocal, the strange, the mixed and the public, cities engage most palpably the tumult of citizenship’ (Holston and Appadurai 2008:296), the city is also an important factor needing consideration when looking at migrant, citizen, state dynamics.

Cities deal with high concentrations of migrants, with organizations that are active on their behalf and with political demands that are local matters waiting for a decision from city councils. Cities are ports of entry and settlement areas for migrants, and as such have to cope with unique challenges and responsibilities that are different both in scope and in urgency from those of the national authorities. The tensions and problems of coordination between the national and the local play out on the local level of the cities. Furthermore, migrants, as pointed out by research, often feel more attached
and loyal to the city where they live than to the country in which they reside (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008).

4.4.2. Case selection: Rotterdam, Leicester, Marseille

Studies concerning Muslim migrants are numerous; however, limited comparative research engages with the level of the city. There is a need for more comparative approaches going beyond the nation-state. Although my work cannot claim to fill in both gaps in one attempt, it is certainly a step taken in that direction by taking into account the local, city level while not neglecting the relationship between the local and the national level. I think that by combining a macro, meso and micro perspective, we gain a more complete view over the complexity of processes involving regimes of citizenship and secularity.

Choosing appropriate cases is a challenge. Most case studies aim to make inferences about a larger population, from which the cases are strategically chosen. Case studies ideally aim at something larger than the cases themselves, and may end in generalization about the population they represent (Gerring 2007). In order for a comparative case study to work well we need a sample and variation across cases, with specificity for each case. While the relationship between cases and populations means that we are looking across cases, the specificity of each case makes us look within each case. Seawright and Gerring consider these as different perspectives on what work a case study can do (2008). However, I believe that these two aspects do not mutually exclude each other.

The specific balance between similarities and differences in what the research questions are concerned enforces the comparative dimension among cities. The most important dimension concerns the size of the Muslim communities as compared with the total population of the cities. Besides, in all three cases I have chosen the local governments engage closely, and also politically with the Muslim communities, reinforcing and encouraging a collective identity built upon religious belonging.

Another similarity between the three cities is that they found themselves embedded in national contexts where, as in most Western European countries, there has been a tendency towards neo-liberal governing, with a strong securitization of the immigration approach and an emphasis on the social and cultural integration of migrants and citizens of migrant origin. Furthermore, all three cities can be considered as
exceptional cases in their respective countries, embodying innovative approaches in migrant and minority integration (Open Society Institute 2009).

The similarities between the three cities are the similar percentages of Muslims, the local governments that are actively seeking modalities for Muslim accommodation and participation, national convergence on securitization of immigration approach as a reaction to violent attacks attributes worldwide to Muslims, and colonial ties with Muslim populations. Of these similarities the most important one is the number of Muslims living in the three cities, offering the same minority, majority balance. Up to date statistics regarding the number of Muslims living in the city are easily found in Rotterdam. For Leicester, data from British census data of the year 2001 is contrasted with the 2011 census. For Marseille, the problem of distinguishing based on ethnicity and religion has been encountered. To my knowledge there is no data about the number and ethnic composition of Muslims living in the city, although a percentage of 13 is estimated, based on self-identification. This is comparable with British statistics, which also use self-identification in the case of Muslims. This differs from Dutch statistics, where instead of self-identification, first and second generation migrants from countries with a ‘Muslim majority’ are also included in the numbers. However, because this book focuses on Muslimness, defined as a field created between self-identification and labelling, we can accept this number as a starting point for further investigation.

**Table 1:** Rotterdam population according to religious belonging 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion in Rotterdam</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslims</strong></td>
<td><strong>13%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Reformed</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformed</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Leefbaarheidsenquête Rotterdam, 2002 (COS/BOOM)
Table 2: Leicester population according to religious belonging: comparison between 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion in Leicester</th>
<th>Percent 2001</th>
<th>Percent 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>44.72%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>14.74%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>11.03%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>4.21%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>0.42%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>17.43%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion not stated</td>
<td>7.07%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2001 and 2011 Census, Key Statistics © Crown Copyright

The most relevant differences between the three cities are: different national contexts in historical patterns of accommodating migrants and religions, size of the cities, diverging ethnic and national provenience of Muslim population, different welfare systems and different institutionalizations of state-religion context. Of these the most important is the difference in ethnicity and national origins of the Muslim population, portrayed below. In what size is concerned the population of Rotterdam is approximately 616,000 inhabitants with the greater Rotterdam-Rijnmond area counting 1.3 million inhabitants. Rotterdam is the second largest city of the Netherlands, one of the largest ports in the world and an important commercial centre. Leicester counts approximately 330,000 inhabitants, with a Leicester Urban Area of 480,000. Leicester is the largest city in the East Midlands and a major commercial and manufacturing centre. Marseille counts approximately 825,000 inhabitants, with a metropolitan area of 1.6 million inhabitants. Marseille is the largest city of France on the Mediterranean coast and its largest commercial port. Due to its location is has served as a gate of entry for most the populations migrating from the Maghreb.
Table 3: Rotterdam population according to ethnic group: comparison between 2005 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rotterdam Ethnicity/Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>52521</td>
<td>52942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antilles</td>
<td>20026</td>
<td>22073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>15123</td>
<td>15302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>45029</td>
<td>47519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>36145</td>
<td>39708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-western</td>
<td>40675</td>
<td>46197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autochthonous</td>
<td>327761</td>
<td>319280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EU</td>
<td>31784</td>
<td>39057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other western</td>
<td>27533</td>
<td>28334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>596597</strong></td>
<td><strong>610412</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Publiekszaken Rotterdam, COS 2011

Table 4: Leicester population according to ethnic group: comparison between 2001 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leicester Ethnicity/Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White: British</td>
<td>169456</td>
<td>148629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White: Irish</td>
<td>3602</td>
<td>2524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White: Other White</td>
<td>5681</td>
<td>15066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: White and Black Caribbean</td>
<td>2841</td>
<td>4691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: White and Black African</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: White and Asian</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>3388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: Other Mixed</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>2340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian or Asian British: Indian</td>
<td>72033</td>
<td>93335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian or Asian British: Pakistani</td>
<td>4276</td>
<td>8067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian or Asian British: Bangladeshi</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>3642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian or Asian British: Other Asian</td>
<td>5516</td>
<td>13181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or Black British: Caribbean</td>
<td>4610</td>
<td>4790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or Black British: African</td>
<td>3432</td>
<td>12480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or Black British: Other Black</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>3315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1426</td>
<td>4245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>5257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ethnic Group: Arab</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>3311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White: Gypsy or Irish Traveller</td>
<td>Not measured</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>279921</strong></td>
<td><strong>329839</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** 2001 and 2011 Census, Key Statistics © Crown Copyright

4.5. Data analysis

In the analysis of data the information from interviews has been contrasted with other verbal claims (interviews, press conferences, press releases) and written materials (public letters, newsletters). Issues were categorized according to five broad topics: immigration issues, integration issues, anti-discrimination issues, religious issues, citizenship claims and grassroots initiatives.

These issues are then compared across cities, separately, but also pointing out how these issues intersect and change according to situation, political climate and interests of actors involved in the negotiation process through a detailed case study for each city. They have been analysed in the context of local and national policies, taking into account also the differences and similarities between local and national policies and the rationales behind them.

The first step in the analysis was to transcribe and translate (when necessary) the interviews, to code them by city and relate them to the research questions and sub-questions (with the use of the software Atlat.Ti). Each city constitutes a case study in my research, with the nationally specific patterns of accommodation and management of minorities, citizens, religious people as a contrasting background.

4.6. Conducting research on a politicized topic

During my research I repeatedly encountered the following problem: I often sensed that respondents were not interested in the questions I was asking, or they gave answers that seemed to be prepared in advance. Most of my respondents have been interviewed before, by either researchers or by the media. The respondents were all noticeably accustomed to thinking about issues of religion and citizenship, and most of
them, especially people with high social visibility, had already given in one way or another an opinion on some of these aspects. Besides, most were aware of the extensive discussion and possible positions in regard to the issues I was investigating, and many times they were literally trying out on me one or other position. After a few such experiences I understood that the respondents and also myself share the same discursive space that is oversaturated with discussion about Muslims across several subtopics. Both me and my respondents were reiterating the larger social discussions and through that, we were contributing, each in our own way to the social imaginary from different positions. Through me they were taking a position vis-à-vis society in general (they were politicizing my presence, which made me feel uneasy, although at that moment I could not identify the cause of discomfort).

My way to gain more space in our discussions was to let go, as much as possible, of the strict interview format with questions awaiting answers and transform it into an open discussion. This meant that often I would decide to turn off the recorder, would turn to a more informal tone of discussion, or would explicitly ask about the personal opinion on a certain point of tension. Turning off the recorder transformed also my position as a researcher needing information and the position of the respondent. See a list of interviewees below (missing numbers indicate individuals which were contacted, but no interview took place):

Table 5: Overview of respondent characteristics: city researched, date of interview with follow-up interviews, classification of respondents according to occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Number</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
<th>Type of respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>27.10.2009, 7.05.2010</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>15.01.2010</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>7.05.2010, 22.05.2010</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>18.01.2010</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>16.03.2010</td>
<td>Activist, civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>12.03.2010, 13.03.2010, 22.05.2010</td>
<td>Civil servant, NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>18.03.2010</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>17.12.2009</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>18.05.2010</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>9.03.2010</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>9.03.2010</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>2.05.2010, 25.05.2010</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>20.03.2010</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>26.01.2010, 3.07.2010</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>23.06.2010</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>24.07.2011</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>23.07.2011</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>21.07.2011</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>26.07.2011</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>15.07.2011, 24.07.2011</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>17.07.2011</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>18.07.2011</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>3.08.2011</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td>20.07.2011, 23.07.2011</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>13.10.2010</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>13.10.2010, 23.10.2010</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>15.10.2010</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>20.10.2010</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>20.10.2010, 22.10.2010</td>
<td>Civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Marseille</td>
<td>23.10.2010</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This strategy does not necessarily change the power relation between respondent and researcher, of which most respondents are very much aware. However, it helps ease up the situation, and it allows for a slow depoliticization of the dialogue between respondent and researcher and offers a way out of the standard pattern of question-answer. The use of dialogue during the interview meetings had the advantage of offering an informal platform for discussion, but it had the disadvantage of being time consuming.

Following the advice of Becker, during the interviews and informal discussions conducted I have paid special attention to the odd choices or words or odd turns of phrases that could signify a hidden assumption that respondents may find so important as to keep it to themselves, while the argument made with this premise in mind is either useful of necessary to make (Becker 1998:160). In the same discussion, or in some cases
in subsequent talks, I was able to get back and ask more information about the previously identified ‘points of tension’.

My presence as a researcher was enriched by my experience as a migrant, especially in the Dutch context. As limitations on what an observer and researcher perceives and witnesses are often related to the prerogatives and prescriptions of the role assumed in the field (McCall and Simmons 1969), I found that my position as a person enriched my understanding of the field and of the respondents, making my interactions broader and more meaningful.
III. THE REAL
5. Rotterdam – politicized religion

'It is the governing power of the state, as well as its hegemonic media and its dominant civic culture that determines the life chances of most people, be they counted as majorities or minorities through one criteria or the other. It is precisely these powers, in fact that often determines who is regarded as minority and on what construction of difference, be it ethnic or religious, civic or sexual, historic or mythical.' (Baumann 1999: 18)

5.1. Muslims in Rotterdam

‘Europe’s first immigrant mayor for a big city would be a ‘Moroccan job chaser’ who 'sleeps in an Ajax pajamas’ at home, according to Ronald Sørensen, chairman of the Leefbaar Rotterdam group in the Rotterdam city council’ reported NRC Handelsblad, one of the main Dutch newspapers in September 2009. ‘The first Muslim mayor of Europe’, as the Moroccan born Ahmed Aboutaleb was called during an incident close to his appointment as mayor of Rotterdam in 2008 by the president of the right wing nationalist party Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR) is a turn of phrase that captures the complex image on intertwined categories and collective identities relevant in the politics of contemporary liberal democracies. In the eyes of his political opponents, but also of the more general public and the media, it was a Muslim, the son of an imam and a former deputy-mayor of Amsterdam (hence the Ajax link), who was named responsible for the role of the state in the city of Rotterdam, orchestrating the local government, and linking the national and the local. But one of the tensions behind this rhetoric (which was soon revoked) was the lack of ease concerning issues of national loyalty and citizenship voiced through concerns raised by the mayor’s possession of both a Dutch and a Moroccan passport. ‘Should a Moroccan born mayor be considered one of us?’ asked LR, talking on behalf of the native working class population of Rotterdam (NRC, 2009 sept.11).

In the Netherlands, since 2001, after a long period of public and political disinterest in religion, the place of religion in society and the public sphere has been once more discussed with gusto, in the political and also in the public sphere (Van de Donk et al. 2006). This interest in religion was triggered by the global events and discourses regarding Muslims, but also by the national presence and visibility of religious communities with a migrant background and the special moralized discussions and
‘moral panic’ surrounding Islam in the Netherlands (Kennedy and Valenta 2006). As both the term Islam and Muslim have been transformed into nodal points of discussion, acting as symbols for a series of different social tensions such as the struggle for economic and social equality, individual and collective rights, the place of morality and religion in social life. Moreover, in many of these discourses the image created about Muslims and Islam was, as I will point out throughout this chapter, negative.

The ‘multicultural tragedy’, a term coined by publicist Paul Scheffer in his influential article that appeared in the NRC Handelsblad (2000), is probably the best description of how the issue of Islam and Muslims was perceived in the Netherlands. The basic assumption was that of an incompatibility between Western and Islamic values. However, this was not new in Dutch national politics. The same dimension had been freely embraced by influential politicians such as Bolkestein, the leader of the liberal party (VVD) already in the beginning of the 1990s (Bolkestein 1991). At the end of the ‘90s the link between incompatibility of cultures and a socio-cultural tragedy was discursively reinforced in a lecture of Paul Schnabel, the director of SCP - the national research agency, who asserted that the integration of migrants can be considered to have failed. His argument transformed migrants into a complex and multifaceted social problem (Schnabel 2000).

Although the same line of thought was already present for a while in the public discourse, its terminology changed with time. While the term ‘incompatibility of cultures’ signaled the need to protect the endangered Dutch culture with its norms and values from a cultural invasion and a process of corruption and hybridization, the later use of the word ‘tragedy’ accentuates the urgency of the situation. These perceptions were reinforced by numbers: low scores in financial independence from the state, low participation on the labour market, the lack of social cohesion and social problems such as delinquency, all related to ‘allochtoon’ population groups. These obvious problems ended up being blamed on the culture of migrants perceived to lack in all things Dutch: tolerance, emancipation, democratic attitudes. The solution of the perceived problem was deemed simple: once the migrants would integrate into the Dutch culture, once they would fully accept the nationally defined values, their social and cultural, economic problems would disappear.

An intensification of this attitude was to be observed in the city of Rotterdam. Islam as a subject of overt controversy and political debate entered the limelight together with Pim Fortuyn, the charismatic leader of the Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR), the right-wing populist party. Fortuyn himself did not like being compared ‘to European figures of the far-
right such as France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen or Austria’s Jörg Haider. He didn’t even regard himself as particularly right-wing (Buruma, 2006: 46). However, his discourse was based on the polarization of native Dutch and migrants, and an active promotion of Islam as the main problem, because ‘Islam is a backward culture’ (Volkskrant 2002). His approach hit home in Rotterdam, where a tribal nostalgia coexisted with a general distrust of outsiders and a hero worship ethos: the lifeworld of soccer fans (Buruma 2006: 44). The main assumption behind his populist discourse was that (un-integrated) Muslim immigrants were the main problem of the Netherlands, their presence and attitude endangering Western values and enjoyments. LR’s achievement was to become the biggest party in the city of Rotterdam in the period between 2002 and 2006. After Fortuyn’s assassination in 2002, LR continued to push a political agenda with the central theme of problematic ‘allochtonen’, connecting it to religion, to Islam.

This attitude was to take place against the background of a general turn of national and local policy towards a much more rigid form of integration. In order to understand this shift I will shortly present the main approaches towards migrants and minorities.

5.2. Muslims as migrants and minorities

Scholars distinguish different phases in the national policy-making concerning minorities and integration. The policies of the 1970s and before were destined for short-term labour migrants that were thought to reside only temporarily in the Netherlands. Policies dealt with autonomous groups and communities whose cultures were perceived as being valuable upon return to the native country. In the ‘80s the return of the migrants remained as an option, but it was not obvious anymore. Policies emphasized officially cultural relativism and focused upon the creation of a multicultural paradise. This cultural relativism provided the basis of what was later recognized as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion on the basis of culture. The ‘Immigrant Policy’ WRR report of 1989 would prove to be a turning point in changing the focus from minority ethnic groups towards individuals labelled as ‘allochtoon’ (WRR 1989). The same report recommended to consider culture a private affair while the state should emphasize the need for the socio-economic participation of migrants and minorities to Dutch society. These changes in thinking would be actually implemented from 1994 onwards, when minority policy changed into integration policy. This meant that integration became more clearly related to immigration and more restrictions upon the flow of migrants were put into effect.
Another shift took place around 2002 through Pim Fortuyn, with a culturalization and moralization of the concept of citizenship and a sharpening on integration demands towards immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. Integration is based on concepts such as ‘citizenship’ and ‘self-responsibility’, but in fact, its emphasis is more on more on problematizing the culture of the immigrants and their need to adapt to Dutch society (see also Entzinger 2006, Scholten 2011, Uitermark 2012).

Despite the fact that the Netherlands history of immigration started in the colonial times, the discourse on immigration is now dominated by a narrative which starts with what is known as the ‘guest worker migration’, the arrival of unskilled labour migrants at the end of the 1950s, initially from Spain and Italy, but then mostly from Turkey and Morocco (Wilterdink 1998). Moluccan migrants who came from the Indonesian colonies were actually among the first post-World War II migrants of the Netherlands: their presence was problematized throughout the ’70s and ’80s but has by now almost been forgotten.

In the beginning the accommodation of (ethnic) groups meant mostly recognition of self-identification and self-organization processes. This form of self-organization was encouraged by the existing accommodation structure, known as pillarization (Lijphart 1968) that favoured group-specific policies. In the Netherlands multiculturalism was built up on existing institutional arrangements for subsidizing organizations, based either on political or religious affiliation. Tolerance for the religious practices of migrants had little to do with national integration policies, nor was it a consequence of multiculturalism, Koopmans and his colleagues argue: 'To an important extent, the extension of multicultural rights to minorities in the Netherlands is based on the heritage of pillarization…and was meant to accommodate cultural conflicts between native religious groups. Muslims and other minorities have made use of this available institutional framework [...]’ (Koopmans et all. 2005:71).

The pillarization system, under the pressure of increasing secularization was ended by the revision of the Constitution in 1983: the so called ‘silver strings’ which granted certain privileges to churches were abolished, thus granting religious and non-religious beliefs equal rights and freedom (De Witte 2011). This also meant that the Dutch state increasingly made appeal to the principles of secularity. However, we need to question this secularity as a necessary condition for the liberal democratic state. As Bader has pointed out ‘only in opposition to old and new religious threats by fundamentalist, intending to replace state indifference or state autonomy with a theocratic regime, does the insistence on the secular character of law and the state make sense’ (Bader 2007:98).
As guests, the labour migrants had the right and were also encouraged to preserve their social, cultural and religious identity, in order to facilitate return when necessary. This pragmatic approach allowed a sort of cultural pluralism to develop, in which different ethnic groups attempted self-institutionalization through ethnic cultural and religious associations. These efforts were encouraged and sustained by so called multicultural policies. Although certain scholars argue that pluralism was the effect of the multiculturalist attempt to protect the identity of the guest workers (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, Koopmans et al. 2005), the result was not a Muslim or migrant pillar. Separating themselves from the Dutch population, migrants organized themselves into ethnic groups, with group-specific cultural, social and religious organizations, a fragmented and diverse plethora of social formations (see also Joppke 2004).

This approach was followed by the ‘ethnic minorities’ policies of the 1980s that used a multicultural approach to deal with autonomous groups and communities whose culture was an aspect taken for granted. Framed as minorities instead of guests, a special emphasis was brought upon those segments of the society where minorities were perceived as facing an accumulation of difficulties either in the socio-economic dimension, or in the cultural one (Rath 2001). The policy problem was being rephrased in terms of shortcomings in socio-cultural participation while the solution was seen as the process of emancipation of cultural minorities. Emancipation was perceived by policymakers as a national solution to the problem. This approach aimed at the amelioration of the backward or inappropriate socio-cultural position of the migrants, which once remedied would automatically affect also their socio-economic dimension. Emancipation was to be implemented through the institutions of the minority groups. While a tendency towards separatism from the majority group has been observed (Joppke 2004), the self-organization of migrants was into ethnic groups, with group-specific cultural, social and religious organizations. This self-organization of migrants was encouraged and sustained by the Dutch government.

It is important to note that it is during the ‘80s that the transition from a view on Muslims as migrants changed into a view of Muslims as minorities, even though in those days the minorities concerned were still framed in ethnic rather than religious terms. A frame of minorities is more advantageous in the light of citizenship and the rights citizens have in the nation-state. Indeed, the basis of multicultural policies is a view of equality between citizens with different backgrounds, on the basis of rights to cultural difference.

From the 1990s onwards the group-centred empowerment strategies, a legacy of
the pillarization system, transformed slowly into objectives of individual socio-economic integration and participation. This corresponds to changes in governmental attitude, which the Social and Cultural Planning Office has summarized as ‘In their totality the anticipated trends amount to individualization, critical scrutiny of the authorities and declining acceptance of closed groups and traditional structures’ (SCPO 1995:525 cited in Lechner 1996). Individual integration, the new focus, allows for the weight of responsibility that until now pressed on the shoulders of the state to be transferred to the individual itself. One of the main triggers of change from a focus on groups to a focus on individuals was the criticism that the former approach encouraged the separation of migrants (Entzinger 1984), leading in extreme cases to isolation and a lack of social cohesion in society. The individualization of the discourse went hand in hand with its culturalization. The discourse related low education, unemployment and crime to specific ethnic backgrounds, leading to a strong polarization and moralization of the discussion partners, reinforced by the unequal power balance between the two. Already ‘the underclass citizens of Dutch society’ (Ghorashi, 2003), migrants got the blame for the problems society was dealing with at the moment.

In the 2000s integration became more closely related to immigration and a restriction upon the flow of migrants was put into effect, with strict integration demands (Joppke 2004). For this policy shift the Netherlands is often given as the most outspoken European example (Entzinger 2003, Modood 2003, Joppke 2004). Integration was based on concepts such as ‘citizenship’ and ‘self-responsibility’, but in fact, it emphasized more and more the ‘problematic’ culture of migrants and their need to adapt to Dutch society. The peak of this approach was reached by the ‘integration policy new style’, as the new approach was called by the Minister of Aliens’ Affairs and Integration (TK 2003-2004 29203, nr. 1). The dominant problem inspiring this policy approach was the lack of social cohesion within the Dutch society, caused by the presumed failure of previous integration policies. As a solution, mandatory forms of cultural integration were coupled with a reinforced migration control, joined by a strong emphasis on the socio-cultural dimension of integration.

The changes in the immigration discourse and the coupling of immigration with integration had an effect on the dominant concept of citizenship. The focus on cultural aspects led to a culturalist discourse (Van den Berg and Schinkel 2009) or the culturalization of citizenship (Duyvendak et al 2010). This change had as a consequence that economic differences were considered cultural (Schinkel 2008). Integration became an individual matter for the migrants themselves, while culture was defined as problematic and seen as the cause of other problems (Schinkel 2008). As the focus on
culture emphasized the knowledge of norms and values of ‘Dutch culture’ and of Dutch language as a prerequisite of the integration process, citizenship acquired a moral dimension (Van Houdt and Schinkel 2009).

The replacement of differentiation based on ethnic marks with differentiation based on culture and religion was in fact little more than changing the tag of the policy target group. In a short time, being a Muslim became the label of religious as well as a cultural and ethnic identity, but also a way to speak about socio-economically disadvantaged groups in terms that neglected the core of the problem. This shift in policy language meant that ethnicity became redundant, even though an urgent need to reach out to these groups was still felt on the part of the government. De Zwart and Poppelaars distinguish two ways of dealing with this problem. The first mechanism they observe is that of replacement of categories, when ‘a government does not pursue group-specific redistribution, but purposely defines the beneficiaries in such a way that accommodation and its unwelcome effects are avoided.’(De Zwart and Poppelaars 2007:392). The second is the use of ethnic ‘self-organizations’ as intermediaries between the local government and the target groups, in order to reach out beyond the policy implementation gap (Poppelaars 2007).

In the following I will discuss the understanding of the role of religion (Islam) for the identity of non-native population groups (called ‘allochtonen’) as it has been defined by advisory reports to the government.

5.3. Religion, Muslims and emancipation

In the following section I will shortly discuss four reports published by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), whose task is to advice the Dutch Government and inform its decisions. ‘Immigrant Policy’ of 1989, ‘The Netherlands as an Immigration Society’ published in August 2001 and ‘The Future of the Rule of Law’ published in 2002 will be discussed in detail and compared with ‘Values, Norms and the Burden of Behaviour’ report of 2003. The reports need to be considered as recommendations to the government. While the view of the reports might not have been completely shared by the government, they represent an analysis and reflection on the state of affairs in fields that are relevant for this book and they propose suggestions for a policy approach. These reports have actually influenced policy making to various degrees: in this regard the ‘Immigrant Policy’ report can be considered as the most effective. However, the main reason why I have chosen these reports is that they reflect the main changes and shifts in attitudes towards Muslims and religion of that period, especially in
connection to ideas about the minorities, citizenship and emancipation.

Before discussing these reports, it is important to mention that, in contrast to most countries, most statistics in the Netherlands are up to today not based on nationality or country of birth, but on ethnicity which is defined on the basis of the country of birth of the individual or of his parents. The Dutch government distinguishes between ‘allochtoon’ and ‘autochtoon’ individuals. ‘Allochtoon’ or non-native persons are defined as having at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. This means that first generation non-indigenous persons were born abroad while second generation non-indigenous persons were born in the Netherlands. Yet most ‘allochtoon’ persons are Dutch citizens. A further distinction is made between Western and non-Western ‘allochtonen’, with the former defined as people from Turkey, Africa, Latin America and most of Asia. Most statistics and research focus on the non-Western group, as they are considered as having the most disadvantaged position in Dutch society. In everyday usage the term ‘allochtoon’ only covers the non-Western group, and more specifically Turks and Moroccans. Thus, in everyday usage, the term ‘allochtoon’ is often used and understood as referring to the same population as the term Muslim does (see also Geschiere 2009).

The term ‘allochtoon’ became popular through the influential ‘Allochtonenbeleid’ or ‘Immigrant Policy’ report of the WRR in 1989, which aimed to improve the labor participation of migrant and minority groups. Among other things, the report mentions the need for ‘creating conditions under which minorities can emancipate’ (WRR 1989:79), meaning here equal rights for all minorities and equal access to resources. The main dilemma addressed by the report was the individualization of the till then group oriented policies targeting ethnic and cultural minorities. In spite of divergent goals however, one of the main unintended and one could say perverse effects of the report has been to equal in popular understanding socio-economic problems with a population group. This perception would stick for a long time in the political and popular discourse.

‘The Netherlands as an Immigration Society’ begins with a definition of the Netherlands as a diverse society that receives numerous migrants with diverse backgrounds, each with ‘different cultures, customs, norms and values’ (WRR 2001:5). It proposes to recognize this diversity and to implement three principles which need to be central to a plural society: (1) a necessary contribution of migrants towards society in the form of employment and education, (2) ‘the realization that such participation makes demands on individual responsibility’ (idem:5) and (3) the fact that participation is needed from all
sharing the national space. The vision of the Netherlands in this report is that of a social state with a two-tiered role: a coercive state concerned with sanctions related to immigration and integration on the national level and a facilitating, encouraging and accommodating state on the local level (idem:9). The focus at the local level should be set on participation.

The report focuses upon social participation and integration, and within that category gives special attention to its socio-cultural dimension, where the institutional structure of Islam and the role of religion in civil society are discussed. The starting point when discussing Islam is that ‘the institutional framework on migrant religions does not necessarily fit in with the customary organization of church communities in the Netherlands and the related separation between church and state’ (WRR 2001:8). As such, the state should not be involved in religious issues ‘in a substantive way’ (idem).

This being the case, the report recognizes that ‘a wider Islamic framework is highly important for the participation of Muslims in the Netherlands’ (idem). Indeed one of the conclusions of the report is that Islam and its institutions ‘have a bearing on social participation’ (WRR 2001:49), which can be positive in so far as the Dutch government and other governments do not interfere with faith communities. A key issue is considered the training of Dutch imams, who can address Islam in a way appropriate for Dutch circumstances. The report advocates a pragmatic approach, to be implemented especially at the local level so that ‘unnecessary formalization and bureaucratization of informal mutual support can be prevented while at the same time sufficient new initiatives can be developed’ (idem:57). However, organization and financial support from the communities themselves is also considered as valuable as ‘it will promote the self-confidence of their members and strengthen their sense of independent worth’ (idem:51).

Self-confidence and self-reliance are mentioned several times in the report, as the effect of a good policy. This is equated with a process of ‘emancipation and fully fledged social participation’ (WRR 2001:7). Emancipation as used here diverges from the classical sense of gender emancipation as addressed in other national policies in the same period. Here emancipation means a process of ‘strengthening the individual resilience of each and every individual, rather than …the full scale cultural adjustment and assimilation of newcomers’ (idem:6).

As mentioned before, the report gives special attention to Muslims and the institutional structure of the Muslim communities. In the legacy of the promotion of self-organization, this paper argues that Islamic institutions can positively influence the
participation of Muslims in society and implicitly also their integration. However, neither the Dutch government, nor other governments should become involved in religious issues. What this involvement could mean remains unclear from the report, but the insistence on ‘home-grown’ imams reflects a fear of radicalization and a fear of the use of religion for political ends (WRR 2001:8).

The report also discusses the structure of responsibility regarding the allocation of resources and the accommodation of religious needs. This responsibility is to be dealt with at the local level, in a pragmatic way. The attention given to the education of imams within the Netherlands voices the fear of the political message that could be wrapped up in a religious content, if the imams would be trained abroad. Furthermore, it is important to note that the report refers to the principle of separation of church and state as the rule of thumb that is the basis of dealings with religious communities. As such, the report confirms the existing status quo of Muslims as religious communities, but slowly shifts towards a self-responsibilization and individualization in relation to integration. On the other hand, the principle of citizenship is not mentioned even once in the report. It will be the task of a different report, published one year later to express the meaning and the boundaries of what citizenship means.

‘The Future of the Rule of Law’ frames citizenship as the basis of interaction within the Netherlands: ‘Citizenship is to be empirically understood as the concrete content of the rights and obligations of citizens in their interactions with the government towards the formulation of public interests’ (WRR 2002:89). Citizenship is especially important in a secular and depillarized society, the report argues, where a collective moral language is needed. Citizenship has the role to fill in the moral gap most individuals experience, ‘except those who have a strong religious subculture’ (idem:97). In the case of religious citizens it is meant to replace religion-based morality, as Dutch society is secular and depillarized. As society has become secular and religious institutions have become less influential in civil society, religion, as an effect of depillarization, has lost its overall influence (idem:97). Both these gaps can be filled with the meaning given by citizenship, which remains at the basis of the rule of law.

This report proposes a replacement of the role and importance of religion and its institutions with those of citizenship and the rule of law. Thus, in the 2002 report we can speak of a superimposition between regimes of citizenship and secularity. The need for this exchange has been reinforced by ‘Values, Norms and the Burden of Behaviour’, another WRR report published in 2003. This report emphasizes the negative influence of
religion on participation and integration, especially in the case of Muslim women.

The report deals with cultural diversity and social change from the perspective of norms and values. It focuses on Muslims because ‘Muslims are (rightly or wrongly) at the centre of the debate about the multicultural society and the debate about values and norms… When we talk about differences in cultural norms and values de facto we refer to differences that are attributed to Islam. Secondly, the group of Muslims in the Netherlands is quantitatively significant and it seems that for many of them Islam is an important factor in determining their identity’ (WRR 2003:172). While speaking about Muslims, however, the report acknowledges an internal diversity based on differences between ethnic groups, cultures and levels of education, but also on differences between generations within this category. In this way, the report also argues against the generalizing effect of the use of the term ‘allochtoon’, while recognizing that this term has at times been transformed into a form of self-categorization. The report highlights that this process of self-identification ‘is used to justify a particular behaviour which is contrary to prevailing standards in the Netherlands’ (idem:174).

As an example of behavior which is against Dutch norms, the report discusses the position of women in ‘allochtoon’ communities, especially in the Turkish community: in the words of the report ‘the position of the Muslim women’ (idem:175). Little formal education and training, combined with an inappropriate command of the Dutch language and an improper or truncated knowledge of the ‘Dutch way’ are seen as obstacles towards achieving inclusion and accepting responsibility. Domestic violence, female circumcision and the use of covered dress are considered as examples of the problematic situation of this group.

The report highlights that while ‘a double emancipation of immigrant youth (from their parents on the one hand and towards the Dutch society on the other)’ (WRR 2003:181) is needed, emancipation for Muslim women needs to be triple. The third layer is ‘the 'classical' emancipation from the female image of their own group propagated and defended by men’ (idem:181).

In spite of efforts to depict a nuanced image of the diversity within Muslim communities, this report constructs an opposition between the Dutch norms and values and ‘Muslim’ norms and values. The focus is on Muslim women defined as a problem, while the solution is defined as emancipation. This view constructs a hierarchic relationship between the already emancipated Dutch society, with native women at the forefront, and the ‘culture’ of the minority groups, with women ‘lagging behind’. This report makes a distinction between three different layers of emancipation: gender emancipation, cultural emancipation and a religious emancipation. In its discussion of
religious emancipation, the report articulates a specific understanding of secularity, as part of developed modernity, yet to be attained by minorities.

While the report of 1989 contributed to a definition of policy target groups in terms of ‘allochtonen’, a term that became in everyday usage understood as standing for the Muslim population, it also implicitly defined certain aspects of the ‘problem with Islam’. The report of 2001 emphasized the role of religious institutions for participation in society, but only on the basis of a secularity defined in terms of separation between church and state. The report of 2003, on the other hand, defined religion as a barrier towards integration and participation, on the individual and the community level. As such it envisaged a secular society where the diminished role of religion would be a precursory for proper integration and participation.

It is especially its framing of Muslim women in the 2003 report that has been transformed into policy instruments. As the integration and minority portfolio moved from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice, a special plan aimed at the stimulation and social participation of migrant women was conceived, creating the possibility between cross-fertilization and mutual influence between different policy levels: ‘Accentuated by a similar move in integration policy, where migrant women are seen as the key to the integration of minorities, migrant women become the central subject of gender equality policy. As a result, minority policies become gendered, whereas emancipation policies become ‘ethnicized’’ (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007:280). During the process of defining who had to be integrated and into what exactly, I argue that besides a moral citizenship (Van Houdt and Schinkel 2009) a gendered outlook on citizenship emerged. This dynamic between different policy levels will also be visible, though in a different way, in the stratification and further development of local policies in Rotterdam.

In the following I will discuss through the analysis of policy documents three approaches towards Muslims predominant in the city of Rotterdam: (1) the approach of emancipation, as applied to Muslim women, migrants and religious minorities which follows the lines of the national integration policies (section 5.4), (2) the culturalization of citizenship, which will have as an effect the religionization of politics (section 5.5) and (3) the return towards an egalitarian citizenship, including all urban inhabitants (section 5.6).
5.4. Rotterdam, diversity and Muslim women

In what the relationship between states and local governments is concerned, in the case of Rotterdam we can see simultaneously convergence and distancing from the national models. Discursively, local governments have followed national integration models (see Entzinger 2006a, 2006b; Koopmans et al. 2005) – however, when these principles were actually applied we see that different cities have different approaches (Penninx 2004). Consistencies can be explained with the top-down power of implementing the state’s views, while inconsistencies may be accounted for as consequences of the growing gap between policy rhetoric and policy practice, the difference between local and national approaches and the expression of local political interests.

In Rotterdam, already in the beginning of the ‘80s three main lines of discourse developed that proved to be influential for the first decade of this century: the first one is that of the emancipation of migrant women, equal treatment and individual autonomy, the second calls for the participation of Muslims in the society at large, beyond and above religious and ethnic infrastructure, while the third is the call for dialogue that ideally should be (self)critical in nature on the part of the Muslims (Maussen 2006:111, Buijs 1993). Although analytically neatly distinguishable from each other, these three policy dimensions were actually convergent and similar, superimposing categories, frames and terms on one another. These dynamics are visible in the domain of emancipation (especially through the differentiation of the social levels where emancipation is called upon). The need for emancipation was based on the ideas that Islam, and as a consequence Muslims, has conservative ideas about gender equality (Maussen 2006). Because of this convergence of social goals of different social and political organization, emancipation policy in Rotterdam is a good example to point out the inherently contested and negotiated meaning of secularity in an urban context and to look at how citizenship with its multiple dimensions works in practice as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion.

In the ‘80s in Rotterdam, the place of Islam and the Muslim organizations in local society was regarded as a source of possible friction, especially in the following three domains: the emancipation of women, equal treatment and individual autonomy (Maussen 2006). This perception was reinforced by the feeling of an urgent, acute situation: ‘in comparison to other Dutch cities, Rotterdam scored worse in what education results are concerned, the general level of income being low and the interaction between different population groups is patchy’ (interview 1). In order to tackle these problems, policies talk about a ‘pragmatic
approach needed so as to deal with the problem of migrants’ (GBWR 1998) and later on stress the need to work on ‘communication among the various population groups’ (GBWR 2001). Migrant organizations are seen as possible intermediaries between the local government and the migrant population at large, also as helpful actors in the process of emancipation and social innovation (GBWR 2001).

2002, along with a change in the political composition of the City Council and the prominent role of Leefbaar Rotterdam, comes with an emphasis on active citizenship (CBWR 2002). In terms of ethnic or national community membership there is a strong emphasis on the inclusive as well as on the exclusive mechanism of membership. Emphasis falls on the formation of a control mechanism that would be able to distinguish between ‘different memberships and loyalties’ (CBWR 2002). The project of being a ‘good’ citizen is seen as a process of socialization. Interesting in the early documents is that there is much talk about integration in terms of a legal relationship (contract, sanctions and rewards, norms, rules, etc.). One of the main goals of the local politics following 2002 was the attainment of social integration. Security within the city was one of the points of concern voiced through social integration policies. Maintaining security and preventing future problems had to do first of all with the recognition of those segments of society that ‘do not follow the laws and rules of this country’ to help encourage those who ‘want to take their own responsibility in this issue’ (CBWR, 2002:6).

Between 2002 and 2008 the problem addressed by local policies in Rotterdam were ‘Muslims’. Islam became a topic of discussion on different levels of communication: from ‘internal’ debates meant to stimulate as much the policy process as the dialogue within the Muslim community, debates on the level of the neighbourhood and district, but also ‘information rounds’ and public debates. The goal of these debates, from the part of the local government, was to reveal and inform on ‘taboo’ topics such as the emancipation of women, integration and radicalization. ‘Islam must undergo a process of modernization’, was the approach of the City Council. In their view, this implied adopting the ‘division between church and state, the model of the secular state, gender equality and sexual freedom’ (CBWR 2003a).

From 2003 onwards the local government links integration and citizenship to the notion of emancipation. The policy documents stress once more the urgency of the situation, the gravity of the problem concerning migrants and suggest a pro-active approach (CBWR 2003d). The integration process needs to be speeded up and ‘the rules of membership have to be made clear’ (2003d). Integration has to be dealt with in schools as much as in migrant organizations, which are expected to transform themselves into
institutions for proper, urban citizenship (CBWR 2003e). Emphasis is on participation in society, on living together. The idea of working with role models is promoted; here successful migrants are seen as capable of doing the bridging work between people with different backgrounds. The need for dialogue is transformed into the sharing of knowledge and information, there is an increasing need felt for debates, round tables and other settings that enhance communication. This is combined with the expressed wish for more social diversity, social mixing, for the formation of networks that are ‘heterogeneous and inclusive’ (CBWR 2003e).

The year 2004, the middle of the local policy cycle, brings the implementation of policies and a stronger turn from a focus on integration towards a focus on Muslims and Islam. Under the banner of ‘Islam and the local government’ debates and information meetings focus on the core concepts of self-organization, education and economic situation, Islam as a religion and its place in the society, Muslim women, mosques and the role of media. The gatherings are mostly informal in character – and their general goal is communication ‘with’ and about Islam.

The problem with Islam was defined as the tension existing between Islamic and Western values and norms and the tension between cultures rooted in traditions and cultures rooted in modernity. However, the distinction between tradition and modernity is not innocent, but is deeply enmeshed in the struggle for power and supremacy. The debate portrays Western countries as unquestionably modern, and the Netherlands is portrayed as ‘individualist and secular’ (CBWR 2004b). Muslims are portrayed as maintaining their ‘roots in religion and tradition’ and thus as ‘not being able to pass the threshold of modernity’ (CBWR 2004b), which requires distance from religion as requested by the principles of secularism, and the relativization of traditional norms and values as promoted by liberal democratic ideas.

Muslim women are targeted by urban emancipation policies (CBWR 2004a). Besides the economic and social situation of these women, the policies formulate a need for debating cultural aspects of womanhood within the Islamic tradition (CBWR 2004b). In response to the low participation in the labour market, the problems posed by discrimination are brought forward by members of the Muslim communities. In other words, economic independence is not achieved because of a lack of personal incentives, but as a result of the dynamics of the labour market that discriminate against women with (recognizable) Islamic background. The difference between the culturally ascribed roles of the two genders was translated into the problem posed by minority – majority relations. The visibility of the hijab was one of the central topics of discussion, especially
the meaning it carried and the implications of wearing covered dress in public and at work. While the discussion targeted Muslim women in general, the policy document recognized that differentiation is needed between first and second generation migrants and young or old Muslims (idem). These differences, the local government argued, might not only be due to age or legal status, but also be an effect of loyalties to other nation-states and cultures (idem).

Towards 2005 the forms of communication are refined, ‘internal’ debates within the Muslim communities are combined with public debates, discussions on results and information rounds. The discussion touches upon topics such as loyalty and integration, values and standards of different cultures and topics that have to do with Islam: liberal Muslims versus Islamic extremism, the role of Islamic organizations, the loyalty of Muslim Dutch citizens and the importance of religious role models. These themes are decided by the City and defined as ‘problems’: discussion and debate around them is considered necessary in terms of ‘making groups aware of the problems’ and ‘finding solutions together’ (CBWR 2005a).

Before entering into details on the implementation of the policies targeting Muslims, I will explain how the local policies described earlier relate to the national discourse about the emancipation of minorities. Emancipation has been used in local policies in three distinguishable domains. First, as a legacy of the national policies of the 1980s and of the feminist movement’s emphasis on independence, emancipation has the meaning of economic independence. Across policies, the way this independence is seen changes from waged work to volunteer activities (CBWR 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005c, 2007a). Economic independence is considered the first step towards social independence. Social independence, at its turn, is defined as the freedom of the individual from groups such as the family, ethnic community and religion. Membership in the nation-state expressed through being a citizen, remains the membership that must give content to social relationships. This dimension of emancipation is targeted at women on the basis of their low economic position and their financial dependence from the state.

The social dimension is emphasized in what I distinguish as the second interpretation of emancipation, where the roles, responsibilities, duties and rights of the sexes are discussed. Here being a woman is defined in relation to, and sometimes in opposition to being a (breadwinner) male. The policy documents that use emancipation in this sense differentiate between on the one hand the traditionally perceived gender roles and their social implications and on the other hand the modern equality between
the social roles not necessarily related to gender (CBWR 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b). When talking about equality, the word citizenship is often used. However, the basic problem to be solved in order to achieve emancipation is seen as being located in the private sphere rather than the public sphere: relationships within the family, sexuality and the upbringing of children. Through signalling the need for intervention in the private sphere, policies define the private sphere of (some) citizens as a public ‘issue’, which should be treated accordingly (idem 2004a, 2004b, 2005c).

Last but not least, in the local policies we find a cultural dimension of emancipation articulated (CBWR 2004a, 2005c, 2005d). Here emancipation stands for integration, and its subject is as much the woman as the man, both of migrant background. Culture is conceptualized as the main reason behind the previous failing of integration and the natural answer to these is emancipation, (compulsory) exposure and (partial) assimilation to the values and core elements (that are defined in different ways) of the majority (Dutch) culture. While the problem is defined in terms of the culture of migrants, the disputed territory is that of religion, of Islam. This is the area where secular arguments are used against the background of a moral argument for the common good. Emancipation, when linked with the topic of integration draws upon many of the stereotypes on which the ‘problem’ of the ‘migrants’ has been defined.

Policies in Rotterdam should be understood as mobilizing the political and social power of the discourse around emancipation issues and as highlighting the importance of social participation and critical dialogue. Besides, the objects of emancipation policies are immigrant women, migrants as a group and Muslims as a religious group. These dimensions combine certain ideas about equality between citizens, but also transform equality into a duty of the citizen towards the nation-state. Also, this logic employs at will the distinction between migrant or minority groups, shifting the boundaries of the moral dimension of citizenship in accordance with governing practices. Last, but not least emancipation of religion mobilizes a certain understanding and implementation of secularity that also intersects with equality, in rights and duties.

Emancipation from a local perspective is an even broader concept than what we have seen unfold on the national level. Especially in Rotterdam, emancipation policies have been superimposed on the integration approach producing a shift in categories, but also a different stratification of the cultural, social and economic problems to be addressed: ‘On the national level the Ministry of Education started the program on emancipation, but because it was such an all-encompassing topic, it got transferred to other ministries as well. Here you could think of the participation in the labour market that deals with women in relationship to work, but
also in relation to ethnic groups, namely Turks and Moroccans and work, then also domestic violence and forced marriages, it is really very broad. In Rotterdam emancipation policies need to be seen as dealing specifically with the socially and economically deprived groups, especially Muslims. In this Rotterdam is an exception among cities, in other places emancipation as a policy is unrelated to migrant integration.’ (interview 1). This gendered outlook on citizenship and the coupling of emancipation with secularity can be considered as the specific approach of the city of Rotterdam towards its religious minority.

Through the use of the concept of emancipation in integration policies, gender imageries had the chance to confront each other in the political arena. Along with gender, religion was a contested area, considered in need of emancipation and ‘modernization’. By using the concept of emancipation when dealing with migrants, social and cultural, religious and sometimes economic aspects were emphasized. Through the politicization of the private sphere of the policy target group, the political arena became the site where political arguments were exchanged for cultural, social and economic ones even related to the private sphere. Policies dealing with immigration and minorities used the term ‘emancipation’ in order to express the need for change, change that was supposed to come from within the communities or sometimes from individuals, as an expression of their own responsible attitude towards the society they were part of. This change was also needed in order to reach a ‘normal’ level, a statistical average. However, the ‘area’ that was seen as needing change was differently defined in different policies over several policy cycles. In the following I will look in detail at how the discussion around ‘the problematic religion’ unfolded.

5.5. The ‘Islam Debates’

The ‘Islam and integration’ programme, which became later known as the ‘Islam Debates’ introduced religion in the public and political debate by encouraging dialogue between the citizens and the communities of Rotterdam. The goal of the Islam Debates was double. On the one hand they aimed at promoting civic participation of the target groups, on the other hand the mobilization of civil society actors on issues considered problematic by the City Council was targeted. The program was launched in the name of defining and solving the problem that Muslims were considered to be. As such, it constructed an opposition between ‘them’ (Muslims) and ‘us’ (the ‘autochtoon’ Rotterdammers). Even so, this opportunity allowed Muslims from different communities to make arguments in the political sphere in the name of religion, thus diminishing the
separation of politics and religion as proposed by secularism. Through this normative initiative, religion was given a platform, a voice in the democratic conversation and a chance to participate in governing. In the following summary of the content of the debates, based on interviews and documents, I will present the process of the events, focusing on how citizenship and religion were used in the discussions.

The political debate took place in different settings and with different participants from the end of 2003 until 2005. At first the City Council organized information meetings with invited experts and representatives of the Muslim population, who, in line with democratic practices, were also involved in the discussion. Even though not all of the latter participants identified themselves as Muslim believers, but rather as having links with Islam as an ethnicity, a culture or a tradition, their voices were still perceived as Muslim voices. Thus, although the Muslim community is far from homogenous, we may still argue that Islam, and with it religion in general, although a bit shy and a bit received on the back door, has made a re-entry as a discussion partner in the realm of secular power. This was certainly influenced by the presence and role of SPIOR, the umbrella organization representing all Muslim communities in Rotterdam. SPIOR offered an institutional platform to sustain the voice of individual Muslim participants.

The assumption behind the debates was that for migrants religion is a ‘sacred canopy’ that governs all forms and levels of social life. This assumption allowed for the line between culture and religion to be thinned and even completely removed, essentializing and linking causally culture and religion with all existing social problems. This position allowed Muslim voices to take a position in the name of religion on topics that would not necessarily be associated with religion. In response to the topics proposed by the debate framework, voices from the Muslim community, coming from different ethnic groups, with different social, cultural and economic positions and different interests in the discussion each made their own statements. Whoever the actors were, however, they were perceived ‘as speaking on behalf of the Muslim community, with a Muslim voice’ (interview 12). Their statements can be seen as an attempt to negotiate and redefine the dimensions of the ‘religion problem’ as seen by the state.

The way the meetings were framed reinforced the perception that Islam was the cause of integration problems. Religion, along with culture, received all the blame for the bad state of affairs with integration. The debates ended up being filled with top down ‘advice’ and problem definition, although the goal of the internal debates was to eliminate as much as possible ‘misconceptions and ignorance’ within the Muslim community.
The debates were a series of seminars and meetings meant only for the Muslim community that aimed at clarifying the position, aims and ambitions of Muslims within the society and their views about civil contribution and participation. At the same time, the debates were directly targeted towards the ‘sensitive’ issues, expressing the view of the City Council on what the problem was and how it was to be solved. Among the sensitive issues was the position of religious institutions within society, namely that mosques, the work of imams and some self-organizations pose obstacles to integration and provoke social separatism. In other words, religious organizations were perceived as possible loci for religious or ethnic separatism. As a solution, the City Council argued, religious institutions should be open to the larger society and should also become social centres besides their religious function (CBWR 2004a). Also, part of the solution was to oppose gender inequality within religious institutions and to change mosques from being the exclusive world of men, in terms of decision power. In this case, we see an attempt to intervene in the social functions of religious institutions and in the social hierarchy of belief and religious organization.

The red thread along the debates was the use of the concept of citizenship not only to call upon responsibilities and rights towards the state, but also as the preferred way of being involved in society. Along the debates the concept of active citizenship has been invoked by civil servants to pinpoint a possibility of social engagement, which is approved on the local and also on the national level. In the following I will focus on the points of discussion to which voices from the Muslim community reacted, distinguishing between arguments engaging with the meaning and role of religion and that of citizenship.

As citizenship was the central point of all debates, it comes hardly a surprise that it was also an important topic in the reactions of the Muslim community. Arguing that Islam and citizenship are not mutually exclusive, Muslim voices defended religion. They pointed out that besides the important function of securing belief, religion has important social functions. Religion has a positive effect as it serves as a socially binding force and a collective social identity (CBWR 2004c). In terms of citizenship, both functions are beneficial, as they include individuals in society, rather than exclude them. This is in concordance with the idea of citizenship. Religious norms permeate social life, and they encourage social activism and conformity to a norm that serves the common good, just as citizenship does. Criminal behaviour and neglecting the authority of the state are matters of personal ignorance, Muslims argued (idem). Young criminals with a Muslim background would do better if they were taught Islam with its values and principles, as
they would then be discouraged from engaging in behaviour that is contrary to religious norms. Religious norms and secular laws are similar in many aspects. Moreover, ‘a religious person is more likely to be concerned with the wellbeing of others around him than a non-religious person’ (interview 12).

The individualist approach central to the concept of citizenship was not foreign to the argumentation of Muslims either. Muslim participants argued that wearing the Islamic veil is also a matter of individual and personal choice. The veil is not the outer expression of religious dogmas and even less a symbol of oppression, but an individual and personal choice, signalling various degrees of religiosity (CBWR 2004a). Since most of the socially active Muslims are guided by principles founded in their religion, but chosen as valid by them as individuals, religion cannot be banned from the public domain. Religion is part of their identity as individuals, and as such it should be respected. If the West is true to its self-proclaimed values of equality and tolerance, then religion and religious people should receive their due respect (CBWR 2004c).

Also, Muslim participants deplored the excessive attention for cultural and religious differences. Muslims in Rotterdam, instead of equating religion with culture, try to differentiate between the two, making it clear that they talk from a religious point of view (CBWR 2004c). Muslims define themselves against tradition, culture and against memory – in this way creating a rupture between the first and second generation of migrants (see also Hervieu-Léger 2002). Some argued that if there is a problem with the Muslim minority, its source must not be looked for in the cultural or religious domain, but rather in the socio-economic realm that is not being addressed (idem). The realities of migration, that is the migrants' lower socio-economic position and discrimination, are to be blamed for the current state of affairs, but not religion. While the category of religion was used in the public discourse through the frequent reference to Islam, a clear conflation of culture, ethnicity and religion occurs.

The assumed homogeneity of the Muslim community was also questioned by participants (2004a). Indeed, the Muslim communities were represented only through their majority blocks: Turkish, Moroccan and Somali Muslims, the same groups that already had in one way or another a connection with the City Council. Although Muslims were considered a homogenous group in the debates, as the discussions progressed, it became clear that the Islamic community is far from homogenous. This presented evidence against the argument of the Muslim pillar, as it was targeted by the discourse.

As I have pointed out with the examples above, during the debates the
representatives of the Muslim community readily accepted the label given to them in advance while opposing homogeneity. Moreover, they defended religion against confusion with tradition and culture, and pointed out the common values of religion and citizenship. However, besides the discussion of values, the absolute truth was also mentioned: ‘we are responsible towards Allah and not towards each other’ (CBWR 2004c:15). This statement provided some space for reflection on the ultimate goal of achieving a harmonious society, of adhering to certain norms and values. If for the religious person, the struggle with the problems of the here and now makes sense in the perspective of the dialogue with transcendence, how can the values of the liberal democratic state and the way of dealing with the here and now, be accounted for?

Muslim participants and commentators felt disappointed: although their motivation was to participate in the discussions for the benefit of the larger social good, they felt ‘singled out and blamed for social problems’ (interview 3) that were ‘not within their reach to solve or approach’ (interview 9). Responsibility for the identified problems was laid on their shoulders without any help or involvement being promised to solve them. They were collectively called a problem although many ‘Turks and Moroccans are doing well in society, they are very well educated, they have a job and they participate – they are integrated’ (interview 9). Yet, as respondents repeatedly stressed that Islam is not a problem in itself, but ‘the economic circumstances, in other words, people from the low social classes’ are (interview 9). The City would do better to mobilize upon the social and cultural capital which Muslims as a religious group have. Muslims for example, are willing to do volunteer work for the society and not only for Muslims (interview 2). Thus, ‘religion can be used as a very important factor in the integration of Muslims, because they do identify with Islam and… the majority could reach much more positive results if they would stay open to what religion is saying’ (interview 9), ‘to work on it together instead of excluding religion’ (interview 11).

The Islam Debates introduced religion into the public and political sphere. Their advantage was that Islam as such was given a platform in the democratic conversation, and a chance to participate in the policy process. However, the approach was problem oriented and highly polarized from the beginning, although this was probably not the intention of the local authorities. Not only was the program launched in the name of defining a problem, but it also constructed an opposition between Muslims and ‘autochtoon’ Rotterdammers. While religion was used as a term in the public discourse through the frequent reference to Islam, there was a clear conflation of ethnicity and religion. While the debates targeted Muslims, it became clear that the Islamic community was far from homogenous, which presented evidence against the argument of one
Muslim pillar as it was targeted by the discourse.

The politicization of religion, even if temporary, allowed arguments given in the name of religion by people who were representing or perceived as representing a religious group to become heard in the public and political sphere on a range of topics, of which but a few fall under the secular jurisdiction of religion. Through this process, facilitated by the democratic practices encouraged by the nation-state and the local authorities as well as through changes in the understanding of the concept of citizenship, religion became politicized. This politicization of religion allowed for the interpenetration of the spheres of religion and politics, which secularity understands as necessarily separate.

Overall, although the activities around the Islam and integration program promoted dialogue, this dialogue seldom evolved into a real debate between citizens. One of the factors of this failure was the unequal participation of citizens from the different groups, with ‘autochtoon’ Rotterdammers participating in very small numbers. Furthermore, the shift towards a categorization of target groups in cultural (religious) categories rather than ethnic terms is in trend with the culturalization (Duyvendak et al 2010, Hurenkamp et al. 2012) and moralization of citizenship (Schinkel 2008) on the national level.

What was designed as a dialogue between citizens became a way of massively involving the Muslim minorities in local governance. The debates were not successful in provoking real dialogue between the participants. However, the debates were successful in mobilizing migrants, while the topic of religion remained a rallying point. This has had the effect of creating an awareness of the salience of a collective Muslim identity, made visible also in the high turnout at the 2006 local elections. In these elections LR lost several seats in the City Council. The debates provided the basis for the Social integration program initiated by the City of Rotterdam to promote social cohesion and active citizenship. However, as the political balance shifted away from LR the emphasis on Islam as religion slowly faded from the political focus. Before that, however, the Citizenship Charter, which I will discuss in the following section, was introduced by the City Council.

5.6. The Citizenship Charter – the link between politics and religion

Upon the initiative of the local government of which LR was still a leading partner, the main conclusions of the Islam debate were festively presented at a closing meeting. These conclusions were to become the building blocks for a Social Charter
meant to re-establish social cohesion in the city, especially as a solution to the perceived disturbed relationship between the Muslim and the non-Muslim population. But more than being a conclusion to the Islam Debates, the Social Charter grew into being an issue of its own in the relationship between the local government and the Muslim communities.

The joint involvement of policy makers, civil servants and representatives of the Muslim communities in the Islam Debates was seen by all participants as constructive and successful (interview 19). From the point of view of the local government the project was on one side a success as it was in tune with the need to target the Muslim population. On the other hand, LR had had quite a different expectation about what the debates would bring about. On the part of the communities, enthusiasm was lacking. There was a feeling among Muslims that they had been ‘singled out’ from the population (interview 3), frustration about the ‘agenda of the meeting being imposed from above’ (interview 3), about the ‘wrong format of the conversations’ (interview 18), about ‘second-order citizenship’ being imposed (interview 9).

Most of the representatives of the Muslim communities have been left with a bitter aftertaste regarding the debates. But the communities were even more disturbed by what came next. Although the last meeting was considered successful because of the presence of Tariq Ramadan, who after the debate would continue to remain a key figure in the city of Rotterdam for some years, the Citizenship Charter, the City’s own interpretation of the Islam Debates erased the moderately positive impact of the meetings on the communities.

In the following I will distinguish between the different stages of the charter, while pointing out how the norms and values of citizenship were used to highlight the problems caused by religion.

The idea of using the debates as building blocks for a local Social Charter came after the debates. Although the agenda of the Islam Debates was set by the City Council, with little control over its content by the communities, the headlines of the debates were transformed in the text of the charter. It is important to note that Muslim representatives and participants repeatedly protested and contested these debate headlines during the meetings, one by one. Furthermore, they believed the shorthand expressions used in the debates: living together, participation in education, work and volunteer work, equality of women and homosexuals, relationship between parent and child and aggression and radicalization, did not reflect the real problems they were facing, but were just part of the
political game in which the City Council was involved (interview 2). Moreover, the topics were reflecting the struggle between left and right parties ‘talking about Muslims just to put the straws on fire, so they can keep expressing their position on these politically charged themes’ (interview 2).

Furthermore, the end product was not a social charter reflecting citizenship in general, but a document targeted specifically at Muslims. This was not only the perception of the communities, but it was also reflected in the way the representatives were consulted and asked to sign the initial document, as a sign of acceptance (interview 18). The intermediary social charter encompassed the following ideas, listed in bullet-points: speak only Dutch in the streets and in public places, show respect for believers of other denominations and for non-believers, respect homosexuals, sustain gender equality, show no aggression, take co-responsibility for the street and the city which is shared propriety, ban discrimination, respect difference and not provoke fear among fellow citizens neither by words nor by actions.

The initial document was based on the differentiation between ‘autochtoon’ and ‘allochtoon’ people. Besides there was a conflation between ‘allochtonen’, migrants and Muslims implied throughout the document. A special part explained the role of Muslim organizations is society stating that they should abide by the Dutch law, should be oriented on the integration and participation of Muslims, especially women, should encourage learning Dutch and should ban religiously motivated aggression. Furthermore they should be open to the public and offer information about Islam, should be actively promoting the equality of women while aggression and disrespect towards homosexuals should be actively opposed. Children and their parents should be encouraged and sustained in education, while youngsters in danger of radicalization should be monitored.

The list for all other organizations is much shorter and states only that organizations should be open to all Rotterdammers (no discrimination), should employ more migrant women in top positions and should pay attention to radicalizing youngsters.

The Muslim community representatives felt that this charter was targeted specifically at Muslims as it used the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims that would not make sense otherwise (interview 3). Once more they raised the point that, although the city was happy with the results of the Islam Debates, the communities were not. They argued that by imposing such a charter, the City Council forced religious organizations to be active and open, although religious organizations should have the
right to isolate themselves. These comments not only contested the duty of religious organizations to be public, but also protested against the view expressed in the charter that religious organizations would have to enter the public space with a clear and predetermined position and task.

After having accounted for the comments, the City Council submitted a redrafted version of the charter, this time positioning Islam against Dutch norms and values, mentioning the growing islamization of the city, while the earlier version did not construct this opposition. In this draft the stated purpose of the charter was to make citizens agree on norms of behaviour and social interaction, on which the difference between a liveable and an unliveable Rotterdam depends. Agreement on these rules was understood as necessary for the promotion of social cohesion and trust between the different population groups. Thus, individual citizens were given the responsibility to do something for society and they were expected to take these values and norms as formulated in the citizenship charter seriously.

This follow-up document was publicly discussed with the larger group of representatives who were also present during the debates and also with other organizations not representing the Muslim communities. The comments received during the meeting were that the document was stigmatizing and too moralizing towards Muslims, with suggestions that dialogue and not debate is needed. A few more points were raised as being problematic. Many participants agreed that, for such a document to work, the tone should be positive. Also, responsibilities should be divided between different groups of citizens, organizations and the local government. Participants mentioned that while mosques and Muslim organizations were specifically called to open up and provide general social activities and information, there was no talk about the role to be played by the City Council or intermediary organizations. The use of the concept of cohesion was criticized: when talking about cohesion, it is not clear if cohesion is the ultimate goal or only a part of more elaborate demands. Finally, because the document focused too much on Muslims, the general arguments were criticized as lacking nuance and being discriminatory.

Finally, in January 2005, roughly half a year after the initiative for the Citizenship Charter had begun, the document ‘The Rotterdam Code of Citizenship’ was published with a few points added to the initial document. The starting point of the Rotterdam Code was that a norm (expressed through the document) is needed to which all citizens of Rotterdam are called to subscribe. The main points of the Rotterdam Code were: the importance to recognize freedom of religion as a valid right while each individual is free
to believe what he wants; participation in society must transgress ethnic and religious boundaries and must be in Dutch as otherwise ‘an unpleasant feeling, alienation, fear and in the end exclusion can take place’ (2006b:3). In most parts of the document Muslims are explicitly named. The social problems the Code addresses are Muslim youngsters’ criminality, lack of emancipation and equality between genders, forced marriages, lack of respect for same-gender marriages. Also, the Code emphasizes that secularization must be accepted and respected while religious traditions are to be lived in the private sphere. Religion must not stand in the way of collective and shared social identity.

The Rotterdam Code points out that the city continues to blame Islam and Muslims for a number of social problems. Through this document it calls upon Muslims to change their behaviour by adapting to Dutch norms and values while forgetting about their religious identity. Through this crude opposition the Rotterdam Code spells out a regime of secularity reinforced by a moralized and culturalized citizenship, where religion is blamed for many of the social ills of the city.

Following the 2006 elections and the already mentioned change in the position of LR within the City Council the Code was quickly abandoned. However, at the moment of the interviews conducted in the city, its memory was still painful among the Muslim communities. Nevertheless, while on the one hand the disappointment with the City Council in general and with LR in particular could still be felt, the positive impact of the debates and the Code was a stronger idea of a collective, urban Muslim identity.

5.7. Conclusions

In the city of Rotterdam the debates surrounding Islam point out new possibilities of engaging religion in the public sphere. Religion made an entry in the political arena against the background of local citizenship and immigrant integration policies. During the Islam Debates, democracy and its inclusive policy processes have been used as a platform where religious institutions and actors have had a public voice. However, the voice of religion was distorted by policy frames and parallel politicized discussions, such as the policies targeting emancipation on an individual and on a collective level. Using Islam as a category that defines policy target groups, religion has become highly politicized, inviting a discussion in terms of struggles of power and negotiation of religious authority. Similarly, discussions about topics falling under the territory of religion in the political sphere, ask for arguments that are political in nature on issues that fall under the jurisdiction of religion. As I will point out later on, this
process is made possible by changes in the way citizenship is conceptualized and put into practice: the moralization of citizenship can be seen, especially by religious citizens, as a process of interference with the private sphere and with religiously defined morality and virtue. As religion is politicized, a double process of hybridization takes place between religion and politics; if on the one hand religion becomes the object and subject of political debate, on the other hand politics become religionized.

In Rotterdam a specific conjuncture brought together a new understanding of the duties and rights of citizens. This was joined by a preoccupation with the integration of migrants and attention towards a diverse group, which could only be easily subsumed under the category of Muslims. Due to the combination of these two aspects, religion became present in and influenced by political and policy processes, to which it served both as a subject and object. This took place through the centrality of the concept of citizenship, in discussions about the accommodation of religious migrants or minorities, discussions initiated by the local government. Both dialogue and active citizenship act as reinforcements of democratic liberal ideas such as participation and equality in the public sphere. However, the presence of religion in the public and political sphere questions the universality of the values proposed as fundamental to the nation-state and presents a challenge to the ways of action proposed by the principle of citizenship.

Although we can see the Islam Debates as opening up place for religion, their intersection with citizenship and the focus on the legal, social, economic and moral characteristics of migrants makes this opening narrow and of little (immediate) impact. The focus is blurred by the multiplicity of positions that meet in the negotiation of physical, social and emotional spaces between the regimes of citizenship and secularity and their subjects. The triangle of culture, ethnicity and tradition dilutes the claims of (presumed) religious citizens, making the argument patchy. Indeed the negotiation opened up by the policy process and the political stakes at play take the subjects of policies into a space where a number of different and sometimes competing identifications play roles. However, it is the process of citizenship practice that opens up the space in which religious identities are simultaneously invited and given a voice, but also rejected and resisted against.

This means that in spite of the essentialization of religious identity through policy related practices and discourses and through the activity of civil society, the impact of religion, as well as its definition and its role are complex and fluid. As actors themselves argue, the registers of meaning that are formed at the confluence of religion, culture and tradition can be easily mobilized upon from diverging directions.
The main success of the project was the dual involvement, from the side of policy makers and administrators and also of communities of immigrant background. The comments on the debates and the Social Charter that came from the Muslim communities emphasized the lack of need to target the Muslim community as such. In the spirit of these conclusions the Citizenship Charter was designed as an instrument targeting citizens in general, through their bond of identification with their city of residence.

The presence of religion in the public and political sphere has little immediate impact. We have seen from the sequence of policy documents that not all discourses and practices are equally taken into consideration, while not all claims and stakes are given equal credit. First, this can take place because the religious identities whose public validity is questioned are too much essentialized and static, thus being unable to capture and reflect the fluid and complex needs and experiences expressed in the name of religion. Second, as members of the Muslim communities are often less skilled at politically defending their needs and choices, and as the heterogeneity of the community is made visible by the multitude of sometimes diverging positions, their position is inherently weak. Third, neither the public, nor the political space are neutral: as such religion enters into a field of power defined by a regime of secularity.

In the local dynamics we may observe the same tension between different forms of loyalty. The principles of active citizenship and equality, of being a true Rotterdammer are seen as conflicting with religious belonging to Islam, while the discourse of emancipation draws attention to the private sphere of the family and the traditional role of women. In the political discourse causality is blurred, it is not clear if religion per se, or culture in the larger sense of the word is to blame for the problematic integration.
6. Leicester – civic religion

‘In a very short space of time ‘Muslim’ became a key political minority identity, acknowledged by the Right and Left, bigots and the open-minded, the media and the government. {..} This politics has meant not just a recognition of a new religious diversity in Britain but a new or renewed policy importance for religion’ (Modood 2006:42)

6.1. Muslims in Leicester

In the 1970s newspaper advertisements advised migrants to go elsewhere as the city was already ‘full to the brim’, after the acceptance of more than 14,000 Asian Indian refugees, all expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin: ‘In your own interests and those of your family you should accept the advice of the Uganda Settlement Board and not come to Leicester, they said.’ (interview 26). Leicester was overwhelmed by its increased population and was desperately hoping to stop more massive immigration. However, by 1981 the migrant population had risen to 59,709, by 2001 to 100,000 (Open Society Institute, 2010: 32, Census 2001) and by 2011 to roughly 118,000 (one third of the whole population of the city)(Census 2011). This diversity had also implications for the religious balance of the city: while in 2001 Muslims were 13% from the total population of the city, by 2011 this percentage had increased to 19.6 (Census 2001, 2010)

Leicester is a good example of a city where migration and the colonial past encounter discussions of ethnicity and race, as a large proportion of the ethnic minority population of Leicester is Asian or Asian British, many of whom are ‘double migrants’ from African colonies. Because Leicester has essentially been one of the British cities of immigration, populated by citizens with different ethnic origins, it is a place where diversity and a multitude of cultures is a given of everyday reality. Besides, the local government of Leicester is proud of the multiculturalism of the city and believes its policies enhance plurality and the expression of difference.

In the following part I will discuss how different uses of the concept of citizenship are and have been shaped by the United Kingdom as a state and as a nation, continuing and at time creating distance from the idea of the British Empire.
Reconstructing historical changes within the idea of the state, nation and the people I will point out how the United Kingdom has dealt in different time periods with inner and outer diversity, issues relating to the territory of immigration and integration. In doing so, I will explain the main dimensions of the social and political imaginary in which religious migrants need to negotiate their place as reflected by policy documents on the national and local level. Furthermore, expanding configurations of religion and multiculturalism in relation to ideas of race and ethnicity will be developed using the formation of Muslim collective identity and grassroots movements as interpretative collective action. In the second part of this piece I will rely on ethnographic data collected in Leicester during the spring and summer of the year 2011 to point out how imaginaries of citizenship and secularity were mobilised and reinterpreted by local Muslim communities to their own advantage. In this, discourses of race and plurality were employed in creating space for religious collective identities that have a specific local, national and transnational dynamic.

The British challenge after the last days of the Empire was the management of its diversity and the finding of the right structure for the island state. These challenges were shaped by the need of immigration control in order to keep at bay the populations subject to the Queen but not part of the nation and simultaneously managing internal diversity. A solution that was conceptually rich and practical in nature was to be found in the concept of citizenship, linked to the idea of the nation imagined as a community.

Politically, citizenship and community have been historical points of struggle in British history, framed by a larger context of multiculturalism and its diverse positions: conservative, liberal, pluralist, commercial and corporate (Hall 2000: 210). This has been further complicated by different positions as far as the relationship of culture to race, ethnicity and religion is concerned. In recent years, a concern with security has tightened the debate and the discourse seems to have moved from ‘race’ to ‘religion’ (see also Allen 2005).

6.2. Migration and British citizenship

British citizenship has made a long journey from a contractual concept emphasising rights and duties to a ‘deal’ for active citizenship. Citizenship tells us more about the balance between the interior and exterior of the state and of the nation, and at the same time it informs us about the boundaries beyond which the state and the nation cease to exist. In what follows I will pursue changes in the concept of citizenship in
relation to migration and to internal population management. In the case of the United Kingdom, a concern with the people within the nation starts at the point where the legacy of the Empire wanes and is connected with the British idea of the island as the nation.

The beginnings of the British approach towards immigration control should be seen as managing the unexpected consequences of the dissolution of the Empire. In the 1950s the United Kingdom considered itself too small to accommodate the population, pouring onto the island from the various parts of the extensive territory that the British Empire had been. The result was increased immigration control and a shift in general attitudes towards race and colour (Freeman 1995). This was in response and in contrast to the ideas of equal legal, social and political rights for all citizens understood as subjects of the Crown.

From 1962 onwards, through the Commonwealth Immigration Act, differentiation between migrants was introduced, initially in terms of employment and skills, but from 1968 de facto in terms of race though without mentioning the concept as such (Murji and Solomos 2005). The postwar period already combined race relations, the interior management of populations of different provenance, with migration control. The rationale was that by reducing diversity and restraining further immigration, the integration of those already within the territory would become easier (Solomos 2003: 81).

From 1973 onwards, limiting migration from beyond the European economic zone reinforced earlier concerns with colour and race. It is important to note that the United Kingdom imposed immigration control a decade earlier than other European countries that waited for the economic troubles of the early ‘70s (Geddes 2005).

The year 1981 was a turning point for political and popular perceptions about migration and the role of British citizenship. British citizenship had been an almost inexistent concept until 1981, when the introduction of the British Nationality Act (BNA) led to a distinction between the native population and the postcolonial migrants from the Commonwealth territories. The BNA created ‘aliens’ within and also beyond the geographical territory of the United Kingdom. Persons with the right of abode were granted British citizenship, defined through its legal dimension but not through its social one.

As revocation of rights is characteristic of state building periods, Blitz considers 1981 the year from which we can speak of the United Kingdom as a state (Blitz 2006). Indeed, the British Nationality Act broke with the Marshallian liberal tradition based on
an equilibrium of rights and duties with a focus on social justice and made individuals responsible for earning protection and care by the state (Tyler 2010: 71). Beyond this dynamic was the need felt to reinforce the British nation-state, through the including and excluding role of a layered citizenship. Hansen understands the changes initiated by the BNA as a process of clarification and rationalisation (Hansen 2000). I would emphasise that this classification defined the territory while it also decided the relations of equality and sovereignty.

The British Nationality Act introduced the idea of citizenship and took it into two directions. First it articulated the problem of immigration control, defining the nation in ethnic terms, while denying the civic basis of citizenship. Secondly and simultaneously, citizenship was understood as the prism through which Commonwealth citizens were assigned a status with full civil and political rights but no social rights. Thus citizenship and its right became inclusive but not fully universal in what the ‘people’ were concerned.

On the other hand while migration control was one of the concerns of the state, internal management of populations was another. Since citizenship was articulated at the meeting point of civil, political and social rights it would also be the task of citizenship as applied to the welfare state to decide upon the right and entitlements of different population groups. Built on the rationale of individual need, the British welfare state sought to take care of the rights of its citizens by selecting at entry and stratifying the population through differential access to resources. While recognising racial difference, the principle of British citizenship maintained the tension between universal citizenship and (racial) group particularism.

By the early ‘80s citizenship in the United Kingdom distanced itself from the welfare state with its dynamics of social rights and class equality and was replaced with nationality and immigration as central concepts. The shift towards a neoliberal nation-state, cherished by the conservative Thatcher government created several categories of nationality and citizenship as well as ethnic and racial boundaries between white and coloured populations (Baucom 1999). The boundaries gained salience not in the area of immigration but between fellow-citizens, thus provoking waves of anger and unrest in cities with significant ‘coloured’ populations.

This double move has to be understood in the context of the intense and profound institutional reorganisation initiated by the Thatcher government that implied the revocation of rights connected to citizenship and residence, and a turn towards a
managerial state. The managerial turn in state administration implied the parallel bureaucratisation and professionalisation of the state, with an increased privatisation, competition, restructuring and a shift of responsibilities from the public to the private (Clarke and Newman 1997). It had further implications for the labour market through the processes of privatisation and outsourcing that were at the basis of many social and economic experiments (Wills 2010). This had a tightening effect on the rhetoric on individual responsibility and the needy to earn rights, while the continued shrinkage of the welfare state created further divisions between the populations. The ‘post-imperial class struggle over the resources of a diminished empire was underway’ (Tyler 2010: 64), combined ethnic and racial hierarchies and superimposed them on existing class divisions.

From 1997 onwards, when Labour had taken office once more, combating inequality became a key policy focus addressed through citizenship as a mechanism of internal population management. This was to be addressed by the Social Exclusion Unit. In this period, a distinction was made between ‘wide’ exclusion, as experienced at the general level of the society and ‘deep’ exclusion, as experienced by a specific group of people, mostly minorities (Finn and Schulte 2008). Policy responses to wide exclusion included from the mid-1990s onwards education, health, employment and access to information, resources and transport, while deep exclusion encountered policy responses that were more targeted and intensive. Towards the end of the ‘90s and in the following decade, combating deep exclusion through targeting groups that were ‘severely excluded’ and ‘at risk’ was the preferred strategy of the British government. The larger context in which this shift of policies was taking place was the need to ensure participation by guaranteeing equality between individual citizens.

The new millennium took migration and citizenship policies in the direction of responsibilisation, on an individual and a collective level. From 2000 onwards we notice a shift from a preoccupation for living with diversity and accommodating it to concerns for national security, with ‘failed citizens and outsiders’ as ‘problematic’ groups were mentioned already in the political rhetoric of the ‘90s, seen as a threat to national identity. Besides, the oppositions articulated by the different layers of citizenship closely followed distinctions already present in British society: existing frames of difference between population groups defined in terms of race, ethnicity and later, of religion.

The ‘failed populations’ frames were followed by the logic of ‘dangerous populations’, provoked by the riots around the Rushdie affair (1989) and the Bradford incidents (2005). These reinforced the perception of a conglomerate of social problems that could be associated with migrants and minorities in terms of race and religion and
come to be related to problems of national identity, belonging and integration. Moreover, after 2001, global events culminating in the London bombings of 7 July 2005 have caused a vitriolic inflamation of the causal connection between failed multiculturalism and bad citizens, highlighted as problems with certain groups of the population radicalised by religion. These global incidents confirmed the fear of the failure of the multicultural model and echoed the changes taking place in other Western European countries. ‘Problematic’ groups increasingly became labelled from this period onwards in terms of their religion, Muslims becoming almost overnight a public enemy. The policy and political discourses shifted from a focus on the unification of the nation through citizenship integration and the maintenance of boundaries through immigration control towards an agenda of security concerns.

Citizenship played a central role within the security discourse as it allowed for certain population groups to be the legitimate target of security policies, drawing on the moral distinction between ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ citizens. The consequence of securitisation was the criminalisation of segments of the population and the reinforcement of labels reproducing social and political stereotypes. The population of the nation-state was broken up in different groups labelled either as successful, as precarious or as failed (Tyler 2010). Whatever the label might have been, the individuals were tightly connected to the nation-state that constructs the label, through the inclusion and exclusion mechanism on which they depended. Moreover, in spite of this process of splintering through top-down moral judgment, the appeal was made for a united community of citizens, based on a shared, self-defined morality. Butler and Spivak understand this mechanism as a proof of the impossibility to evade the nation-state (Butler and Spivak 2007:17).

The nation needed a community with a strong connection and commitment to the United Kingdom, based on ‘a range of proposals that touch every stage of an individual’s life’ and a common bond: citizenship (Goldsmith 2008, cited in Tyler 2010). Communities based on ethnicity, race and religion were considered as active and voluntary forms of segregation from the national community. Moreover, the multicultural model that sees the national community as a ‘community of communities’ was questioned and policed.

Having explained the dynamics of the citizenship in the United Kingdom in relation to immigration and border control in the following section I proceed at explaining how citizenship has also become a tool in internal management of populations. In the case of the Muslim population, a self-identification in religious
categories will extend the political meaning of race, while citizenship will become embedded in discourses of race and religion.

If we consider the role and relevance of religion in the contemporary United Kingdom we need to think about the way the concept of citizenship has historically allowed different forms of identification, while regulating the way the community of the nation and communities within it were made relevant at different junctures. A context of narratives about Britishness joined by a historical vision on different citizenship regimes further needs to be considered in relation to external and internal diversity, through attention towards discourses and practices of immigration and integration.

Although it has never quite disappeared, religion has in the last decade made a visible comeback in the civil and in the political sphere in the United Kingdom, mostly through the attention given to Muslims and the active self-identification of different groups with that label. The Rushdie affair caused an awareness of Muslims as a religious group that ‘(re)discovered a new community solidarity’ (Modood 2005: 157). This collective force was effective as it could rest on the struggle for social and political recognition (Werbner 2002) and a consciousness of difference stemming from ‘political blackness’.

6.3. Race relations

Colour and race are both at the basis of the framing of British immigration and integration policies. As a matter of fact, integration in the British context is seen as a way of improving relations between different population groups called communities that are distinguished on the basis of race or colour (Favell 1998; Joppke 1999). Shifting in time from a multiculturalist discourse emphasising equality between communities and cultures, to allegiance and subordination to the idea of one national community, the United Kingdom showed signs of convergence with current integration policies of other Western European countries (Joppke 1999). However, as I will point out, distinctions made on the basis of race and culture remained important not only to define the national community in which the different communities need to dissolve, but also to enable, sometimes indirectly as in the case of the Muslim populations, self-identification and mobilisation for equality-based rights within the national community.

Distinctions based on race and the early management of plurality were an American import of the 1960s. The role of Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, the influence of
the Harvard Law School and the ‘race relations’ as studied by the Chicago School need to be mentioned here (Bleich 2011: 61-2). According to the American model, differences in skin colour and implicitly in cultures determine social conflict and problems, which are to be solved by civil law centred on the issue of discrimination (not by criminal law). This ‘colour racism’ (Gilroy 1991) continues to be influential to this day, especially through the predominance of racial dualism in legal as well as policy frameworks (Alexander 2002).

A shift in thinking about race took place between 1968 and 1976 when the notion that policy in a plural society should not be colour-blind gained terrain: racial prejudice was to be punished and affirmative action was to be introduced. This involved a change from thinking in terms of race relations to giving attention to acts of racism. Race consciousness became coupled with the issue of discrimination in the ‘70s, unintentionally linking the topic of race with that of gender (Sooben 1990; Bleich 2011: 65). Group specific policy targets were introduced as a much-welcomed alternative to formal legal equality. Affirmative action gained ground and race-conscious policies were given priority.

The first Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968 were designed to ensure equality, helping migrants through providing welfare, while white communities were educated about the migrants. The idea was to stop discrimination between population groups and promote equality through equal opportunity (Solomos 2003). The third and current Race Relations Act was passed in 1976 and amended in 2000 (published in 2001). The Act of 1976 did not cover Muslims as religion based discrimination was not considered unlawful. However, as a consequence of case law, two religious groups, namely Sikhs and Jews did become covered by this Act (Anwar et al 2004). The ‘90s saw the extension of policies to the religious discrimination of Muslims along the implementation of the Human Rights Act in 1998 and the Greater London Authority Act in 1999 (Anwar et al 2004). The amendment of 2000 did not extent to Muslims, but brought local authorities and the police under the scope of the Act, ensuring that their policies reflected the principle of equal treatment for all.

While Race Relations did not recognize and protect Muslims as a religious group, collective public self-identification underwent both growth and strengthening. Collective claims were already voiced around the Rushdie affair: Muslims as a group needed to be included under diversity categories. Through the Rushdie affair, Muslimness became a salient collective identity that was increasingly pushed forward from the grassroots and from academia (Modood 1990; Asad 1990). The possibility for deeply ingrained patterns
of exclusion, discursive and institutional (related to an incident where police discriminated against people on the basis of their skin colour) pointed to a need to shift away from the multicultural rhetoric. Muslims felt the need to unite under a category that would encounter less discrimination than those based on race and ethnicity. Modood argued that discrimination is a sword with two edges, one making distinctions based on race, the other dividing on the basis of culture (Modood 1992).

Since the Rushdie affair, Muslims have been recognised increasingly as a religious group by civil society groups. It was the Anglican church in particular that moderated between the government and Muslim representatives rather than other ‘racially different groups’ (Modood et al. 2006a). However, Muslim voices at that moment were mixed, pointing out a heterogeneous population that was divided in many respects. While some made claims in the name of Islam and argued against issues of blasphemy, others wanted recognition as a collective group in the name of religion in order to transcend differentiation of ethnic and racial groups. A similar ambiguity can be found in the example of the Muslim Council of Britain formed in 1997 as a direct consequence of the Rushdie Affair that had difficulties addressing with one voice both the government and the Muslim communities (McLoughlin 2005).

It is important to recognise that the concept of collective identity based on religion as claimed by Muslims throughout and after the Rushdie affair, is in contrast not only to the secular basis of the nation-state and also to the universalistic concepts of justice and resource management inherent in liberal citizenship as understood in the United Kingdom. But it is just as important to emphasize that the new collective identity formed through religion transgressed community and kin (for example biraderi networks) allegiances, and connected Muslims through their adherence to Islam to the ummah. This new identification would prove especially salient in the British Muslim position regarding international conflicts, such as the positions towards the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Until 2003, however, the courts did not accept Muslims as a group, although other religious groups such as Jews and Sikhs had been previously recognised. Discrimination of Muslims as Muslims was not punishable under the law up to that moment. Muslims could invoke antidiscrimination measures indirectly, that is as members of an ethnic group, such as Pakistani, Arabs, etc. This caused resentment and enhanced Muslim activism (Modood et al. 2006a). Along recognition, collective identification became stronger, with the claim that difference was a right that needed to be accommodated by the government. Muslims assertively claimed recognition and argued that Race Relations are ineffective tools for accommodating religion.
Although a series of other committees have been influencing race relations since the ‘80s, the Cantle Committee and the resulting report were to prove extremely influential. The Cantle report can be considered as having set the tone for the dimensions of the concept of citizenship in relation to racial and ethnic groups. Following the process of increasing relevance of Muslimness as a form of collective identification we see that public space is necessarily contested, and that groups making claims in this space need to negotiate. Religion becomes an option across and against racial and ethnic categories and is (re)created through political struggle and processes of contestation (see also Benhabib 1992).

In the following section we will look closely to the rationale of the Cantle report that was extremely influential on the national and on the local level. Besides, the Cantle report will introduce the local dimension in our inquiry as it draws, in its descriptive and in its normative dimensions, on the experience gained from local plurality governing strategies in the city of Leicester.

6.4. The Cantle Report

The Cantle report (2001) was named after the former Chief Executive of Nottingham City Council, Ted Cantle, who became the head of the government’s Community Cohesion Review team. It was commissioned by the Home Secretary after the race riots in Leeds, Bradford, Oldham and Burnley by 2000 with the purpose of revealing the cause and also the solution to the riots. The report’s main finding was a high degree of polarization in communities living ‘parallel lives’. Separation and segregation were identified as the cause of violence bursting free during riots and as a possible source of further social distress. Implicitly, these findings blamed multiculturalism for a lack of cohesion between racial, ethnic and religious communities, highlighted plurality as a negative social feature and focused on the growing social distances between different segments of the population. In the following I will provide a detailed overview of the main ideas formulated in the Cantle report, keeping a focus on the way the document related directly or indirectly to Muslims and the way it frames citizenship.

Published in 2001, the report is a reaction to the racial ‘disturbances’ in several British cities, events mentioned before. Besides aiming at identifying the reasons behind these collective upheavals, the report also contains a normative instrument offering a solution to the ills of the nation. Central in the report’s focus stays the principle of
citizenship distilled as the main umbrella solution: ‘It is also essential to establish a greater sense of citizenship, based on (a few) common principles that are shared and observed by all sections of the community. This concept of citizenship would place higher value on cultural difference’ (Cantle 2001:10). Defined as the knowledge, contact and respect between various cultures that make up ‘Great Britain such a rich and diverse nation’ (idem:10), citizenship is meant to transcend above differences and create the possibility of a shared space.

The social ills could be treated, according to the report, with a higher degree of community cohesion based on a ‘meaningful concept of citizenship’. A meaningful concept of citizenship recognizes ‘the contribution of all cultures to this Nation’s development …establishes a clear primary loyalty to this Nation’ (Cantle 2001:20). Citizenship was meant to invoke a collective that is based on the idea of the Nation as a unit, with citizens transcending other forms of loyalty and allegiance. More specific, for new citizens the report proposes an oath of allegiance that ‘might help future race relations’ (idem:21), while for school children it aimed to introduce an oath of allegiance to the Queen, as a corollary of civic education courses. Besides promoting a specific idea of citizenship, defined as an allegiance to the nation as opposed to other ‘cultures’, the report also clearly had specific populations in mind, population that could have a problem of deciding in terms of loyalty.

The Cantle report argued that the proposed ‘meaningful citizenship’ needs to be actively promoted by politicians, community leaders and the media, in order for it to be properly and evenly dispersed throughout the population. There needs to be pride in a diverse community, but the final aim is the ultimate community of the nation. Pride in the communities needs to become an active way of engaging different population groups and especially their elites and institutions in the process of governance, politically and in a civic way. The new citizenship approach calls for a cooperation between political, civic and faith leaders, while it requires discussion, debate and communication among them. This aspect of the report draws on Cantle’s professional experience and research in Leicester, where a positive approach towards diverse (faith) communities had been already the official local policy.

The meaningful citizenship approach proposed by the Cantle report reframed the Marshallian ideas of citizenship, from an exclusive focus on rights to multiple dimensions of rights and responsibilities. It insisted that the duties and rights of citizens needed to be made clear: in particular, responsibilities need to be more clearly established and agreed upon.
The Cantle report was innovative from the managerial solutions it proposed in terms of task differentiation in three aspects: (1) it changed the relationship between the local and the national level of state administration, (2) it emphasized that civil society groups need to be part of governing and implementation, and (3) it adopted inclusive policy targets aimed at society as a whole, going beyond specific policy areas. First, arguing that the local level had innovative ‘examples of good practice’ and that a good knowledge of local conditions was needed in order to be able to implement the new ideas, the report transferred the responsibility of race relation management from the national to the local level. The ‘municipal drift’ of earlier multicultural policies enhanced this transfer of responsibility. Second, this initiative of localization initiated the process of incorporation, where culturally and religiously defined organizations were encouraged to become incorporated (mostly on a temporary basis) in the local state (Baumann 1999: 77). This relation built upon the already existing tradition of ‘municipal drift’, where multiculturalist policies have been seen as falling under the responsibility of sub-state actors, responsible for the settlement of migrants and their equality in public life (Meer and Modood 2009).

This transfer of responsibility had already been prepared through the Race Relations Amendment of 2000 that expanded the role of the police and public authorities in the area of discrimination, special cases and national security issues. Calling upon an implementation of these changes, the report pleads for a ‘comprehensive mapping of community needs and … a means of addressing them with specific or over-arching strategies’ (Cantle 2001:21). A further suggestion of the report is the fluidity of different policy fields, in order to better be able to adapt to the changing needs of the community. Especially the areas of education, policing and service need to stay ready for the possibility of change.

However much freedom and responsibility the Cantle report leaves to the local governments, the relationship between the national and the local level remains hierarchical. The local government is encouraged in its ‘commitment to community cohesion {as} a pre-condition of funding and other support from central government and other agencies’ (Cantle 2001:21). Thus, through its funding powers, the nation-state remains in control of the policy process while it transfers the responsibility to the local level. This feature is not surprising, as neoliberal political and economic measures prefer outsourcing as a governing strategy (Clarke and Newman 1997).

Besides, the report states, the local government is to work in coalition and partnership with the local community, allowing for community dictated and thus locality specific frames, problems, solutions and implementations. Local factors and actors need
to be taken in consideration, and need to be mobilized. This requires ‘the establishment of various cross community fora, involving representatives of the community and charged with developing new approaches to fostering understanding and collaboration’ (Cantle 2001:46). An example of fluid community mobilization is the extension of community policing initiatives through the involvement of community counselling, informal meetings with community members and development of general intercultural sensitivity for the police officers. Volunteering is considered the best approach in engaging the local representatives as partners and as seen as ‘an intensely practical way to promote social cohesion without resorting to authoritarianism’ (idem:72).

The ideas of the Cantle report, especially in relation to the malfunctioning of Muslim communities and the specific attention needed for Muslim young men were picked up by many local governments from 2003 onwards. This was made possible through the legacy of earlier reports that had created a sense of moral panic connected to notions of diverse cultures in relation to shared citizenship, and that have criticized multiculturalism from different positions (Kundnani 2002). However, it was not multiculturalism itself that was the focus of the critical position: rather, the starting point was the multitude of separate cultures that create the multicultural British landscape. The ‘new Asian folk devil’ (Alexander 2000), as the problematic communities were perceived, was convicted of being a problem, to be fought at the local level. Community cohesion, based on the community tradition of Labour meant to re-evaluate and remobilize civil society. This approach was seen by various communities as being closer to assimilation than to integration as a two way process (Modood 2007).

The Cantle report has added different layers to an until then insignificant concept of British citizenship: first, it emphasized the importance of citizenship as delimiting and controlling the core of the nation, an idea that was new in the citizenship discourse. The Cantle report is relevant because it shapes a new understanding of British citizenship as a tool of internal population control. In this way citizenship is not only articulated through immigration policies and statuses (the legal dimension of citizenship) and redistribution of resources (economic dimension) but it is also mobilized in the domain of integration (moral dimension) and management of populations (strategic social citizenship). Second, the report linked a new articulation of citizenship to the idea of community cohesion that translates the ideal community of the people on the nation, which in spite of differences in culture need to get unified under a collective loyalty. Third, it linked citizenship and community cohesion to the idea of national security that would remain the main point on the national British agenda for the decade to follow. Fourth, Cantle also linked
citizenship and implicitly community cohesion to other policy areas such as education, housing, regeneration and employment, pointing out that strategic partnerships are needed to reach out to communities that are disadvantaged and disaffected. Fifth, it shifted the arena of management from the national to the local level, where community cohesion would engage groups that live locally and defend or promote local interests. The Cantle report stressed the multicultural ‘municipal drift’ as needing implementation in other policy areas. Finally, the Cantle report is important for me because of the special connection it has with the city of Leicester, seen as a good policy example for managing and mobilizing diversity.

6.5. Leicester policy

Within the United Kingdom, Leicester has become well known for its innovative management of diversity and its strong community relations (Bonney and Le Goff 2007). Traditionally diversity and tolerance are considered to be core values that form the approach of the local government, diversity being accepted as one of the defining features of the city – indeed, this is how Leicester describes itself on the City website. Changes in the national discourse, with more emphasis on community cohesion fitted Leicester well and encouraged its ambitious administrators to aim that by 2025 the city becomes ‘the most cohesive city in Europe, with safe and strong communities where people successfully live, work and learn together, new arrivals are made welcome, and where diverse cultural traditions enrich one another and the lives of all its citizens.’ (Leicester City Council 2006:2). This section will provide an overview of the main policy lines in Leicester, emphasizing the way how different documents have engaged and targeted Muslim communities.

The discourse of community cohesion to combat social segregation has been the red thread of local policies in Leicester from 2001 onwards. However, these policies had success because they were based on a tradition of localized multicultural policies meant to give equal opportunities to each community (interview 43). Although based on a perception of diversity as being rooted positively in different cultures, each having a different take on social life in general, multicultural policies provided a fertile ground for the accommodation of group demands and thus for the recognition of different racial and ethnic groups.

Already in policy documents of 2001 culture is seen as a means of ‘tackling social disadvantage, revitalizing neighbourhoods, regenerating the city and helping to reinforce Leicester’s position as a cultural and economic hub of the surrounding county’ (Leicester City Council
2001:41), ideas which will stay with the City Council until 2008. Attention to culture in 2001 also brings along the idea that more cultural sensitivity is needed, especially among service providers such as healthcare workers. These demands do not go short of demanding ‘integration both ways’, asking for concessions and sensitivity to specific issues, while returning collaboration and cooperation.

‘Taking Forward Community Cohesion’, another policy paper written by the Leicester City Council and published in 2003 meant to address the problems related to race, poverty, class, faith, geography and heritage that exist across the wide range of human experience. Calling upon the value of common humanity (and not citizenship) it proposed to fight against disrespect, fear, injustice and racial intolerance, highlighting a number of issues on which the city needs further discussion, reflection and self-criticism. The policy document used the term ‘community’ when talking about community cohesion, and ‘communities’ when talking about the plural and diverse reality and the dimensions of the problems that were addressed through policy measures. It further made a distinction between racial communities, mentioning white, black and minority ethnic people and the continuous changes in their aspirations and needs for the future.

The starting point of this approach was the tradition of the city, its celebration of diversity and promotion of strong community relations. Community cohesion was defined as ‘the dynamic relationship between and within communities’ (Leicester City Council 2003:5) and aimed at working beyond current concepts of race equality and social inclusion, creating and strengthening a shared, local community. It envisaged a strong and positive relationship between people at work, in schools and neighbourhoods, based on a common sense of belonging and a common vision based on the appreciation and positive value of the diversity inherent in the population. With young people as a special focus, the policy document of 2003 is not only oriented towards stopping segregation in schools, but also towards more youth initiatives in the celebration of difference, shared activities between schools (coupling of schools with different profiles), the introduction of a citizenship course ‘promoting understanding between different cultures’ (Leicester City Council 2003:9) and faiths, also promoting employment and training opportunities. This platform means that in practice intercultural and interfaith exchange has often been initialized in schools.

Examples of good practice as well as possible ideas of partnership involving voluntary, community and faith community sectors, were to be developed in their interaction with the local government and wider public sectors, the policy document suggests (Leicester City Council 2003). In this way formal or informal partnerships
concerned with diversity could be linked together. The implementation of the community cohesion policies, because of their stress on the social capital held by religion had started a whole ‘faith relations industry’ (McLoughlin 2005), with religion and religious communities at the heart of the collectivities. Interfaith and inter-religious dialogue was (re)invented, and with it, new possibilities for faiths appeared in the civic and in the political domain. Although Muslim groups have made the most advantage of these policies, other faiths rooted in migrant communities have profited as well.

Leicester is presented in the 2003 policy papers as a special case in what spatial segregation is concerned. In other cities tensions have occurred at those junctures where black and minority ethnic (BME) neighbourhoods meet predominantly white neighbourhoods, but this is not the case in Leicester where the BME and white dividing line is mediated by wealthier wards or industrial areas. The minority population is larger in the central parts of the city, which can also be observed in schools there. Leisure, sports and cultural activities tend to be concentrated only in specific local neighbourhoods, as an achievement of the earlier policy goals (interview 22). Furthermore, as a consequence of the lack of harmony between community needs and allocation of resources separation is enhanced, as communities compete which each other for mainstream and also for regeneration resources.

Community workshops on the topic of ‘community cohesion’ held between September and October 2003 with neighbourhood residents and people interested in community cohesion were organized by the City Council for consultation. Although good practices like interfaith dialogue and festivals were certainly noticed by the City, parallel lives, residential housing segregation, competition for resources and internal tensions were also recognized. These issues were gathered under the umbrella term ‘community cohesion’ and related to poverty and deprivation, fear of crime, cleaning up the physical environment and improving social housing and education services.

The participants were asked what they think would contribute to social cohesion. They recognized that Leicester was a multi-racial and multi-cultural city, and saw the opportunity of being accepted as different and the general acceptance of diversity as positive. They also felt that a lot of people were fearful of joining the workshops due to cultural and religious differences and the lack of facilities for all age groups. The importance of media, sports and collective activities that bring people together was highlighted, as were cross-faith activities and inter-faith networks.
For the voluntary sector - public sector relationship, community cohesion was perceived as a problem due to the existing competition for resources and founding: ‘groups struggled from often conflicting demands including their own aspirations and perceptions of need, the attitudes of authorities, and from a lack of interest on behalf of the general public. All wanted recognition of the role that they played and long term funding.’ (Leicester City Council 2003b:9)

The City Council report on community cohesion of 2004 moved away from mapping the facts within the city and was instead more concerned about how the city feels, giving special attention to collective emotions: ‘what is unique to community cohesion in Leicester is the concern about the emotional temperature of the city; about how people feel about the city, about how the different communities get along and how tensions are managed; about how different communities can share issues and concerns, whether they can be from different geographical areas or community groups; and about how young people are acknowledged and supported in their place in the city…[so that] Leicester will be a more harmonious city in which to live.’ (Leicester City Council 2004:4).

The discourse changed radically after 2007, as local policies shifted along national ones towards a concern with security expressed through counter-terrorism measures. Its implementation, the ‘Prevent’ agenda, was designed as an instrument ‘to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism’ (HM 2008:4) and it targeted Muslims. Muslims as a category gains a renewed resonance in local policies: as we have noted before, in previous years the categories employed had been BME communities versus the white community. ‘Prevent’ had five goals: challenge violent extremist ideology, disrupt the promotion of extremism, support targeted individuals, increase the resilience of communities and address the grievances that are built up by extremism. The strategy is described as ‘understanding, analysis and information and strategic communications’ (HM 2008:16), which in practice often translates as the active monitoring of Muslim organizations and individuals (interview 23).

Young Muslim people were and felt targeted by the ‘Prevent’ agenda. Community efforts were concentrated upon them, as they were seen as possibly being exposed to radicalization. The City counted on the support of civil society to reach this group, but this attention came with a lot of resentment from the part of the youths, as one of my respondents emphasized. Young Muslims felt ‘singled out, feeling continuously besieged and watched by the state, media and the police’ (interview 23). The ‘Prevent’ approach also met the criticism of the Muslim communities in the larger sense, leaving them feeling singled out and exposed to measures that could be considered radical (detention, forced identification, house searching) and unpredictable in nature.
On a more positive tone, local policy documents translated the ‘Prevent’ agenda to specific local circumstances. Policies stressed, in line with the cooperation between civil society and the City Council, already ‘tradition’ in Leicester, the need for the communities to play an integral part in the process of policy implementation and the need of involving a wide range of (Muslim) collective actors (interview 43). Called ‘Mainstreaming Moderation’ in order to take local sensitivities into account, it specifically tried to ‘help the community itself to promote moderation and strong values of tolerance, democracy and equality, and to play their own part in safeguarding against supporting violent ideologies’ (Leicester City Council 2009:31). This document made clear that community cohesion is not understood only for BME communities but is equally applicable to the white community.

The approach of the community cohesion program in Leicester was based upon the theory of social capital: by improving the relationship between different communities their mutual understanding and acceptance would increase. From there, cohesion is seen as only the next step to take: by allegiance to the urban community loyalties to communities that differ between themselves should easily be bridged. Thus, in implementing the goal of these policies into practice, the document builds on the cooperation between the local government and voluntary, community, faith groups and organizations within the city in supporting people and communities in need. The rationale for this cooperation is to improve access to the communities in question and build relations of trust between different institutions (interview 43).

Ultimately, community cohesion is explicitly connected to integration (2009). The 2009 document also makes a difference between the equality program of the City and the red thread of community cohesion that has run explicitly through the municipal approach since 2001, and implicitly already since the early ‘90s. Mainstream equality programs aimed at eliminating discrimination in connection with gender, race, disability, age, sexuality and belief. However, after 2001 discrimination was discussed in the light of the connection between the individual and collective level. The rationale, I was reminded, is that if discrimination happens on the personal level it is more likely to appear on the community level (interview 23).

Interviewees highlighted that through partnership with imams and mosques, this approach has reached deep into the Muslim community. It has provided much needed resources to the community, through youth and women centred activities (interview 34). However the attention received comes with a specific stigma that restricts the enthusiasm of associations and collectivities which are in need of these funds and which creates distrust from Muslim communities that are not recognized or co-adopted in the policy
process (interview 23). Other ethnic or racial communities that do not fall under the category of Muslims, but struggle with the same structural problems are also neglected. Distrust from other communities and within the Muslim community is voiced in complaints about disparity and inequality caused by the privilege and priority for some visible groups of Muslims. This competition for resources is seen as the ‘main’ problem of Leicester’s community (Open Society 2010).

One of the main implementation points of the security agenda is the cooperation of communities with the police. The support, trust and confidence of local communities were seen as key points in counter-terrorism strategy, especially as the method of policing is policing by consent, through community policing. As a direct effect of ‘Prevent’ direct and regular contact has been established between the constabulary and the Muslim community. However, community leaders remain concerned about the way police use disproportionate power when dealing with Muslims (interview 23), especially the effect of tight security measures on high profile members of the community such as imams. While frictions with the community have continued to occur, even though high profile anti-terror raids and arrests are now beforehand announced to the community, the police are also showing more sensitivity to community concerns and experiences. The policy of ‘affirmative action’ has influenced the recruitment of community members to the police force, a position that is not easy for community members. Because of the climate of doubt, police officers with a minority or migration background often have their loyalty questioned from two sides: the community that feels that the police are often too intrusive and do not understand certain forms of cultural practice of communication (interview 23) and the police, who aim at successful interventions.

Also, I was told that initiatives were taken from the part of the police to regularly communicate with the communities. The objective of the communication events was to spread information about their identity and work and to recruit officers from the communities (interview 23). These initiatives were transformed into informal forms of collective action that because of their popularity did not only structure informal the contact between the police and different communities but also provided a template for further collaboration based on shared, informal experiences. Events organized in community centres and mosques have extended to sports events, where cricket and football are played between Muslim representatives of different communities, imams, religious leaders of other minorities and police officers alike. Easing up the tension caused by policy frameworks, one of my respondents argued, these events reach informally the goal of ‘community cohesion’ (interview 36).
Besides sports, there are also other initiatives that start from policy objectives but are shaped through the specific interests of the groups they address. Within the police force minority advisory groups run programs of information and education on culturally sensitive issues. An appointed community officer gives talks and seminars regarding ‘community sensitive issues’ to police officers of all ranks. Special attention is given to those joining the police force through attachment posts, where a senior officer is guiding and counselling, especially on approaching diversity issues. The police are reminded by the same advisory groups about policies of ‘affirmative action’ and minority representation and the need for their implementation in practice. The specificity of British police forces is conducive to this form of tighter contact between institutions and citizens: ‘Here we are still doing policing by consent and community policing, so it is very important that we have people who understand what problems are really about. When there will be a raid these officers will inform the community beforehand, bringing them into their confidence and establishing a relationship of trust’ (interview 23).

To sum up, the importance of the diverse communities in general, and of the Muslim community in particular has been growing from 2000 onwards to the point that now Muslim organizations and individuals are involved at almost all stages of the policy process. As I have described, policies dealing with diversity and plurality management have encouraged such cooperation between governmental institutions, the civil society and grassroots initiatives. The rationale of such policy approaches has been an inclusive approach based on equality between citizens and the need to deal with the specific problems of specific groups. Furthermore, policies dealing with security and cohesion issues have often singled out population groups, such as Muslims. In the following part I will describe the effect these policies have had on the Muslim communities in Leicester, attempting to show the wide range of forms of identification with Muslimness.

6.6. Leicester Muslims – ‘a pragmatic community’

In this section I will point out the specific instances that have been growing out of grassroots initiatives in the city of Leicester. Besides the processes of collective identification that have been triggered by national and local discourses and the implementation of policies concerning race and citizenship, there are also efforts of embodiment taking place at the local level. For this I will follow closely the logic of the Prevent agenda (Home Office 2007) and the Community Cohesion policies (Leicester
City Council 2009a) pointing out specific interpretations of citizenship, race, religion and plurality that affect the way Muslim groups organise and define themselves.

The Prevent agenda and the programmes centred on community cohesion have been important for the Muslim community in Leicester. They singled out the Muslim community and focused on those Muslim groups considered moderate. The effect has been a competition between Muslim groups within the city for the limited resources provided under Prevent, and an uneasy feeling in regard to other faith communities that did not receive financial help, I have been told (interview 23). Furthermore, Prevent came attached with the stigma of the special needs of the populations it was designed for, and the attention given to preventing terrorism. Muslims participating in one way or the other in Prevent needed to situate themselves actively in relation to issues of national security and the perceived Islamic danger: radicalisation.

The community centred approach caused difficulties for Muslims, though in a different manner than those caused by the Prevent agenda. This approach presented opportunities for engagement and funding but ‘it is about religion or culture, but not about class and economy related problems’ (interview 22). As such it encouraged the claims of Muslims as a group, especially as a religious group, but it was not concerned with social class problems. Satisfied with a cultural explanation for existing social inequalities, the community agenda did not go deep into tackling fundamental inequalities between different population segments.

The focus on culture and religion remained present during the Prevent policies. High profile community leaders and especially religious leaders are often exposed to the actions informed by general security concerns. Being singled out for general security concerns is unpleasant, I was reminded: ‘It is not easy to be on a plane and to be the only one singled out for special control out of 200 people. And that only because I have a beard and I look different.’ (interview 26). These feelings are part of a more general perception that Muslims always have to defend themselves against different forms of accusations, they need to react and respond to multiple social challenges: as a Muslim ‘you have to prove all the time your intentions, your loyalty’, a painful and exhausting experience in the short and in the long run (interview 22).

However uncomfortable this focus on Muslims, it can also be seen and experienced in positive terms. Prevent also ‘presents an opportunity, as the community receives funding, but also an entry point on cohesion and safety that can then be used to keep in touch with the Local authorities’ (interview 22). Community leaders are aware of the advantages and
disadvantages of policy attention. Besides being aware, they are skilfully negotiating and employing the possibilities they have, using them as opportunities. The securitisation of religion repeatedly invites Muslims as a religious group to defend itself in the public scene and thus offers a possibility for visibility and audibility. Besides, although policies come attached with certain forms of social stigma, they do provide access to resources, although not for all parts of the Muslim communities.

The interaction between Muslims and the local government has initiated a double process of change and accommodation that can be seen in the context of the hope of the two-sided process of integration that Muslims expected. While Islam itself is not changing, the way it is understood and the way Muslims behave do (interview 21). This often means a creative process of interpretation and adjustment, triggered by the ‘need to accommodate to the British society and this means that there are things that need to be understood in a different way than they were when the Qur’an was written’ (interview 22). However, this creative and accommodated position makes Muslims fragile as they can be criticised from two different positions: first, from the point of view of the state that believes that Muslims could and should give up more of their identity and second, from the side of radical and traditionalist schools of thought that say that European Muslims cannot be considered Muslims anymore, as they pervert the teachings (interview 21). For British Muslims this often implies ‘a fear of not belonging, of not being accepted in the society and a continuous doubt about the ‘right way’’ (interview 22).

Interviews pointed out that for some British Muslims the dilemma of accommodation involves the continuous need to be reflexive and assertive, a strong need for being responsive to society and it calls for a certain position of the believer in relation to the object of faith (interview 22). As such the contours and social relevance of Islam are changing. But can these changes be understood as a shift in religion under the pressure of regimes of secularity, or should they be seen as an ‘organic process of change and adaptation inherent in the nature of religion’, as some Muslim practitioners suggest (interview 23).

The process of adjustment is often about things that may seem insignificant. When elaborating on this point, one of my respondents talked about cultural rather than religious accommodation when explaining the adjustments needed for a dinner: in the seating arrangements neither a women dressed in niqab nor one dressed in a short skirt would be seated across from a Muslim man: the first one would not be able to eat without revealing her face, while the second would not be able to sit in a position that is not offensive. Similarly, he argued further, sensitivities need to be taken into account in
society at large and accommodations need to be made (interview 22). In line with these thoughts, most Muslims believe that integration and accommodation needs to be a two-way process, organic and mutual in nature. While many are prepared to compromise, they feel the need to be assured that what is given will also be returned, even if in different ways (interview 26).

The community agenda, based on its identification of communities that lead ‘separate lives’, by not adhering to the national community neither in thought nor in deed presented a challenge to the philosophy of multiculturalism, as well as a challenge for Muslim communities. Multiculturalism converged on the idea expressed from the side of Muslim communities portraying integration as a two-way process. However, both the focus on the community and on national security shifted the national and local discussion towards a reformulation in terms of integration as a one-way avenue. The point of view of one of my respondents was that the dialectic of moral categories attached to citizenship alienated Muslims, as it demanded cooperation and input while giving little in return (interview 23). Also, the importance given to official representation enhanced the process of elite segmentation that is well captured by Bonney and Le Goff: ‘from the perspective of the national debate over multiculturalism in 2006, two weaknesses might be observed. The first is that where the links between communities have developed, they were largely at the level of community leaders or opinion formers, not at the grassroots of the society’ (Bonney and Le Goff 2007:43). What is at stake is the vision of a ‘community of communities and citizens’ and the shape the Muslim communities can publicly take.

In Leicester integration takes on a specific dimension due to the demographics of the city. Because of the changing demography, the minority-majority balance in the city is likely to change in the near future. This feeds a continuous tension between different segments of the population within the city and a sense of fear for the white community, as one of my respondents explained: ‘This is also why I think many people are getting scared, what will happen if it turns out in the coming census that Muslims are a majority in the city? I would expect quite a reaction’ (interview 21). However, this dynamic based on demographics can also be expected to reverse, as wealthier Muslims move towards the periphery (interview 29).

Although scholars have shown that the Muslim community has made the greatest advances on the local political level (Joppke 2009: 455), in Leicester Muslims pride themselves more on civic initiatives. In Leicester, politics is not considered an important issue by representatives of the Muslim communities: Muslim identity is seen as better represented through initiatives stemming from grassroots that provide a template for
national and even international forms of Muslim identification and access to specific resources, such as the case of Muslim burial provisions, mediated through the Muslim Burial Council of Leicestershire. This institution is important for Muslims in Leicester because it builds on membership in the transnational *ummah*, without being political in nature. At the same time it started as a grassroots organisation, but is now active on the national level as the expert on Muslim burials and is consulted by other countries as well.

The sense of pride (this pride I have encountered only in Leicester) coming from the grassroots of the society is made clear in processes such as contribution from an Islamic engagement to the society as a whole, cooperation with other faiths and the development of a collective religious Muslim consciousness that goes across sectarian divides and the development of specific Muslim provisions. The latter point is connected also with issues of cultural sensitivity towards specific religious needs and, as I will point out further on, it is also an example of the powerful connections between the local, national and global religious and (trans)national levels.

Muslims in Leicester are proud of the organisations they have, the institutions that work on the local and the national level. Different organisational shapes have been tried over the years, from associations, councils and advisory groups to federations. However, from the point of view of Muslims in Leicester federations work best as an institutionalised form of the community because ‘the federation has a structure where people are selected for two-year positions and then have committees underneath that are thematic. Because it is elected it is responsible to the membership of 50,000 Muslims in Leicester, there is transparency and the mandate to speak for the community’ (interview 22). Moreover, federations work across many smaller community organisations, unifying their voice and constructing a clear message. Because Muslim organisations are often co-opted in governing processes, or given specific tasks in inclusive policies such as Community Cohesion and Prevent, it is important for them to be able to claim legitimacy for the community they are representing. Thus, election of elites is taking place at all levels and a clear organisational structure is adopted. However, in Leicester most of the important functions are held by a handful of people, most of them managing multiple tasks. From such representatives it is expected to be critical, towards the government but also towards their communities (interview 23). However, certain segments of the Muslim communities are better represented at the elite level, and thus have a better chance of turning negotiations in the civil sphere in their favour.

Indeed, some Muslim groups feel neglected, not only because of the unequal distribution of material resources, but also because they feel left out from places of
power. The smaller Ismaili community feels neglected by the local government and by the national branch office. Because they do not participate officially in policy implementation, they lack the necessary resources to make a visible social impact and they have less access to appropriate housing for their centre or mosque (interview 28).

Keeping together the communities requires effort ‘because there are differences in every faith and there are differences in Islam as well, so we have to find a way to hold people together’ (interview 22). An informal form of community bonding are football and cricket matches, with a team of Muslim imams playing against Christian clergy under the association of the Federation of Muslim Organisations and the St. Philips centre. In these events Muslim clergy have to form a team together, against ‘sectarian divides’ and play with representatives of other faith(s). The Muslim communities ‘gel together’ with the help of informal activities and this translates into a possibility for cooperation beyond the sports field. This model of Muslim community consolidation and interaction with other faith groups has been so successful that it has been exported to Sweden and Germany, across ummah networks, I have been told (interview 22). These sports events are also organised between police and imams so that ‘fear of the role is removed, they are seen as human beings and not met only at the police station, when you have a need, when you have a problem’ (interview 21).

Muslims in Leicester are positive about the role of religion in British society. In general, they believe that religion is considered a positive social force, in spite of society’s secular character. ‘Brits are not shy about religion, you can also see this from the big advertisements hanging visibly on churches with the time of the mass’ (interview 29). The church has also proved to be an ally since the Rushdie affair, considering Muslims a religious group and sharing many interfaith initiatives. However, Muslims often argue publicly that equal opportunities should be given to various religious groups. The historic heritage of the Anglican Church is something to be emulated by other faith institutions as well, through required equality in opportunities and treatment.

Besides the church, alliances are also forged on specific issues and in different power relations. The relationship between the Muslim communities and the Jewish community in Leicester is illustrative: they work together because ‘our dietary requirements, our burials, our prayers and other issues like circumcision are common to both faiths. The Jewish community is very small, 450 people as compared to 50,000 Muslims, so we take the lead, but we work in cooperation with them to make sure we help them whatever their needs are’ (interview 23). Of course besides help and support, it also counts that an interfaith or across-faiths claim is
often more likely to succeed when considered by the secular nation-state and the different governmental institutions.

Thus, Muslimness in the context of Leicester can be seen to evolve together with multiculturalist approaches arguing for equality (with other religions, lack of discrimination, inclusion). However, at the national level these Muslim claims are seen as ‘politics of difference’ that stress the exceptionality of Muslim communities. While Muslims are often perceived as going against liberal individualism and secularism, from the example of Leicester we see that Muslims proceed according to British standards and discourses and engage with local policy frameworks. Those Muslim communities that do not actively take part as partners in actions initiated by the Local authorities are independent, manage themselves and raise their own funding. As Vertovec suggests, we can talk about a ‘horizontal spread’ of the Muslim community in Leicester, with diversity running both across a complexly organized and fractured community and a distinct pattern of localised need catering (Vertovec and Peach 1997).

6.7. Conclusion

The examples above suggest that religion in Leicester is more than a personal and private affair. As it is at the basis of a negotiated collective identity and informs a series of collective actions, it functions as civil religion (Bellah 1976). Muslims in Leicester are visible and active as Muslims, forging interfaith alliances as well as providing mobilisation examples beyond the urban space they live in. Furthermore, the specific interpretation of the way civility as understood by Muslims in Leicester is filtered through policies on the local and national level. These policies, in their turn, build the concept of citizenship from a collective British imaginary of the nation and the people.

Muslims in Leicester are making use of local and national policies and grassroots resources. They interpret and actively engage with discourses of citizenship, race, ethnicity and multiculturalism, but they see themselves, as most Muslims in the United Kingdom, foremost as a religious group. As such they see advantages and disadvantages in the way group targeted policies work: on the one hand, through group specific policies much needed resources are distributed and institutionalisation is enhanced, on the other hand, all benefits come at the cost of the stigma attached to the group: the stigma of being suspected of terrorism, radicalism and separatism.

The revival of religion, if we can thus label the high social and political importance Muslimness enjoys in Leicester, has been made possible by the conceptual
language of multiculturalism from the early 1970s onwards, especially the stress on equality of all cultures. In the name of religion Muslims fight for equality seen as evenhandedness between different religions and ethnic groups but also for faith-specific rights, such as the right to die and be buried according to specific religious guidelines. Muslims also recognise the political significance of a collective united by religion, and thus, they are also active in the political sphere. Besides, many organisations, local and national populate the territory between civic and political, pointing out that faith is much more than an individual and personal affair.

Muslims fight for a lack of discrimination on the basis of religion: this aim was already achieved in 2003 in the area of employment, while specific questions introduced in the Census point out that awareness of the importance of religion is growing. Moreover, through interfaith activities and informal sports meetings between religious groups a collective idea of religion as an important part of social life is constructed, as community members argue, for the collective good.
7. Marseille – symbolic religion

‘In France, you can be of any descent but if you are a French citizen you cannot be an Arab. Composite identities like Arab French are ideologically impossible. The giving-up of pre-French identities and assimilation into French culture is thought to go hand in hand with the acceptance of French citizenship.’ (Modood 2003:102)

7.1. Muslims in Marseille

When the riots erupted all over France, Marseille was calm. I mean there were a few incidents here and there but nothing substantial. And why? We are one of the large cities of France, we have a large population of Muslim immigrants, thus why not here? Because we went to the streets, we talked to the people, we said that Paris is acting foolishly, why should we follow? Our city works in a different way, you know’ (interview 52). Marseille remained indeed relatively calm among all the distress caused in other cities by the revolts of 2005 that provoked a national state of emergency. During the riots the international media commented on the perpetrators of the riots as the ‘majority of the youths committing attacks are Muslims, and of African and North-African origin’. Internal comments coming from the National Front further aggravated the negative image by stating that French rioters should have their citizenship revoked. As violence, destruction and protest dispersed from the Parisian suburbs throughout the country, France’s second largest city was only marginally affected. Although home for a large percentage of ‘beurs’ (term used to designate French-born children of North-African migrants), Muslims or migrants, according to the labels that were exchanged in the public discourse, Marseille proved to be an exception from the ‘natural’ dissatisfaction of this population group, growing as a consequence of encountered discrimination and illegality. The problems that were given as explanation for the explosive character of riots elsewhere in France all exist in Marseille: unemployment, spatial segregation among different population groups and a large percentage of young Muslim citizens of migrant origin. However, Marseille contested the national image about the riots through its calm,
testing through its example the validity of the problems identified as causes for the urban problems: radicalizing Muslim youth.

Although Marseille presents a high degree of residential segregation between different populations, we can talk neither of ghettoization, or of banlieues, or of a complete separation between different population groups (Cesari 1994). Indeed, youths from the northern neighbourhoods of Marseille circulate more freely and use most of the city in a regular way: the boundary between neighbourhoods with high concentrations of ethnic minorities and the centre of the city is not rigid.

In France, Marseille is often seen as an exception, as a large multicultural city that by its southern geographical position and its function as a port has always been the frontier between France and the rest of the world, especially the colonies. Marseille itself is proud of showing its rich history of migration and its continuous influx of people, its Phoenician roots and its layered culture (Tozy 2009). Most of the people that I have been talking to make reference to a ‘Mediterranean culture’ that influences relationships among people and among people and institutions: more time and more willingness to talk, an openness towards solving problems together, a more serene atmosphere (interview 40). This characteristic of Marseille is a feature of the Mediterranean character of the city (interview 52): populations of migrant origin mix and use the same urban spaces (Parodi 2002). The same Mediterranean character is held responsible for the good communication between different population groups, its tendency towards tolerance and acceptance of diversity, its pluralist and multicultural tendency in policies (interview 40). Although this view is shared by most of my respondents, it is important to note that not everybody believes that Marseille is the multicultural city of tolerance. This divergence of opinions in the public sphere is most visible in the local media.

However, even as Marseille portrays itself as welcoming and accommodating to migration and diversity, it has experienced stormy political times. There were times when Marseille was considered racist and its policies as following a ‘pied-noir mentality’ similar to the French living in French Algeria before the time of independence. Although undeniably one of the most multicultural cities of France, the city is ambiguous towards embracing plurality and difference in practice. Thus, as in most of France, I was told, the local government in Marseille experiences Muslims, irrespective if they are migrants or French citizens with migrant origins, as ‘diverse’ and constituting a challenge for the city (interview 40).
Indeed, as Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux argues, the growth and visibility of Islam challenge the socio-religious constellation of France, placing through Islam, religion in the centre of the debate about laïcité (Costa-Lascoux 1996). Marseille is no exception in this regard – Islam is the second largest religion in the city. The argument that Islam represents a challenge for the Republic has two different normative levels, both connected to the concept of citizenship. First, foreigners need to be assimilated into French values and culture in order to lose their ‘otherness’. Second, religion is to be kept private and Republican values reign in the public sphere. Thus a visible religious otherness, sometimes complemented by a perceived or imputed ethnic and cultural otherness are twice offensive to the Republic, and thus twice a proof of limited internalization of Republican values.

Beside an ideological side of the conflict between diversity and Republican values that has at its centre the idea of religion looked at through the lenses of laïcité, we can also identify a political issue, related to the notion of the French nation and its sacredness, rooted in the French Revolution. The birth of the French nation was a conscious move away from feudal, aristocratic and religious privileges. These were to be replaced by the trinity of freedom, equality and fraternity, the supreme values of the citizens forming the national collective body. This time Republican citizenship itself has acquired a mythical, sacred aura by becoming the corollary and guarantor of the highest values of the new nation-state (see also Brubaker 1992).

In the 1980’s, as I will point out in the following section, this all-encompassing quality of the concept of citizenship was put once more on the political table of the Republic again in relation with sacrality and religion. This time the conflict was with an outsider religion whose believers would or could not accept the moral values that French citizenship brought about. Laïcité was invoked to remind these unruly citizens that the Republic was created through distance from religion and the religious, as it constituted its own systems of beliefs and its own trinity. The image of Islam was mobilized against the sanctity of Republican citizenship and implicitly of the Republic, in a discussion that was about a nation-state in need of reconfiguration and collective identity. Islam and its institutionalization at the national level through the formation of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (further CFCM), was becoming visible in the same time as debates about integration were demonizing it as a foreign religion.

A double articulation of the principle of Republican citizenship has been expressed, as I will point out in the following section, through national debates on nationality and laïcité. Although to some extent superimposed on each other, these
debates have followed each other in time, concerns about immigration turning into discussions about nationality and the value of citizenship, later transformed into debates about the rights, and even more the duties of citizens, articulated through the principle of laïcité and monitored through the concept of integration. In the following sections I will explain how Muslims have been at the centre of these debates. Starting with the colonial times, the understanding of Muslims and Islam in France can be taken as a mirror for the changes in the role given to secularity and citizenship in contemporary France.

France has a tradition of assimilating immigrants into Republican values and transforming them into citizens (Brubaker 1992). As Republican values are at the core of becoming a citizen, French citizenship is necessarily moral in character (Favell 1998): it demands allegiance to the values of liberty, equality and fraternity. Citizenship in this tradition is the final destination of a process of moral, individual transformation. Citizenship is also seen as voluntary in nature and a consequence of the individual free will. An emphasis on duties is at the heart of the French citizenship idea, through the continuation of Rousseau’s social contract (Van Houdt et al. 2011) and its emphasis is on the division of tasks in the political community.

National membership is based on French citizenship and on its duties (Gellner 1983), and under the cover of assimilation it holds the promise of universality and of equal rights among all citizens. But while citizenship is by definition inclusive, integration discourses point out that it is also exclusive. Moreover, the lines along which exclusion takes place are changing at different historical moments as a consequence of the political climate that influences policy frames. It is the state, through the invocation of moral values and through the contact it makes with its members, that provides a remedy, restores solidarity and the social bonds that sustain it.

As the nation-state fights to keep its centrality, to maintain its authority and function it invokes the collective imaginary of the Republican values to call upon the collective French national identity expressed through the ideal and the mechanism of citizenship. As such ‘the state has become the new foyer of moral and collective unity, with traditional religious expression banished to the margins of communitarianism’ (McCaffrey 2009). As an ideal, French citizenship embodies ideas about individuality, freedom and equality with a lacquer of moral and ethnic values attached to them. As a mechanism, French citizenship distinguishes between members of the nation-state and also constructs a moral ladder among them: it is not enough to be a citizen, one has to be a good, active citizen.
As I will point out in the following section, citizenship is the seed at the core of the imaginary about French national identity, applied in practice through immigration discourses and then translated into debates on integration, assimilation and belonging. As immigration control is defined by migration frames, it is deeply connected, and often superimposed, on integration or assimilation debates and policies. Besides, integration frames often are built upon discussions of what nationality and national belonging means and, more recently, upon debates of secularism and religion. Consequently, citizenship, nationality, secularity and integration debates are deeply connected. Through these shifting frames religious identity gets transformed into minority identity (McCaffrey 2009). But as religion becomes transformed through the secular frames of the Republican model into a minority status, populations labelled as such encounter another inner tension of the Republican model: as Modood points out, dual identities such as ‘French Arab’ are illegible to the state (Modood 2006). Thus, in a French context otherness and plurality cannot be expressed in other ways but through a lack of belonging, a deficit of integration or an improper, dented citizenship.

French tradition does not distinguish between different ethnicities, but sees citizenship as a contractual relationship between the nation-state and its subjects. However, assimilation has always been understood in cultural terms, cultural belonging determining the integration in the national community (Brubaker 1992). Thus a culturalization of citizenship, through the proxy of nationality and of laïcité, draws on the included values of an assimilation or integration approach that is based on distinguishing registers within the national membership category. The ‘French community coherence’ in the Republican tradition is based on a common language and a shared history and culture written in their political institutions inherited from the past. 

Although in the course of history the imaginary of French citizenship has been politically invoked at many times, the way it mobilizes other social and philosophical ideas has changed in different political regimes. Citizenship in France meant different things at different moments, and is connected, as I will point out below, to different discourses and debates: more recently to debates of nationality and laïcité. Through debates of nationality and secularity, citizenship invokes the political potential of the areas of immigration and integration and redefines the collective understanding about the national community and its values.

In the following part I provide an overview of the changing frames through which migration after World War II has been looked at, paying attention to the changes in attitudes towards their inclusion in the Republic. Moreover I will point out how a
rhetoric of assimilation and integration have been alternating, and how the attention of
the nation-state has shifted from concerns of immigration towards concerns of inner
diversity management.

7.2. French citizenship, nationality and laïcité

Questions concerning migrants and integration of minorities have been, maybe
even more than in other Western European countries, explicitly framed in terms of
national political unity, Republican values and citizenship, the French cornerstones of
identification with the nation. These terms have been explicitly used in political, policy
and public discussions in the public sphere from the 1980s onwards. In this period
discussions about integration and immigration became superimposed upon debates
about national identity (Favell 1998).

Republican citizenship is important in the French national imaginary. Historically
it is rooted in the Third Republic (1870–1940) when regional identities, social classes
(Weber 1976) and immigrants were unified under the ideal of citizenship, jointly forming
the national community. French citizenship should be seen as the unification of different
ideas: French nationality as a voluntary adherence, the separation of church and state and
the integration of different minority populations through inclusive nationality laws
(Favell 1998:44).

These ideas constitute the legacy of the current models of citizenship and
integration that stress belonging and identity as mechanisms of maintaining the social
and political order. Moreover, at the present, citizenship is articulated more in terms of
belonging, and being part of that implies a mechanism of exclusion and inclusion. This
mechanism affect immigrants, but also minorities, through a stronger stress on the
already present idea of moral citizenship: adherence to French norms and values. We can
thus define the change French citizenship has been going through as from an inclusive
and unifying moral citizenship to an excluding and separating moral citizenship. Besides
the shift in its functions, the target of French citizenship has also changed in focus: from
being centred on the transformation of otherness into sameness, it now points out
otherness and further separates it hierarchically from sameness.

The beginning of the ‘50s meant a substantive wave of immigration for France,
with ‘North Africans’ ‘French Muslims and ‘Algerians’, according to official labels and
categories, embodying the figure of the migrant (Sayad 1977). Immigration was seen
mainly as a consequence of colonialism and perceived as a responsibility of the state,
even more so as Algerians entered the French territory as citizens. The Algerian immigration also constituted the starting point of institutions managing migration, later that developed into the accommodation of more diverse migration flows. In this period migrants are primarily seen as worker and are considered to remain temporarily.

A logic of insertion with privileged sites such as self-help associations and trade unions predominated in policies. Policies that were loosely interconnected and were oriented on the welfare and needs of migrants, played down the issue of integration. The responsibility of these policies was set mainly at the local level, as they were addressing social problems that needed to be solved through concrete measures. A few examples of such concrete problems are housing and social security (Favell 1998:47).

By the late ‘70s the myth of return gradually vanished and the analytical framework that looked at migrants shifted as well. The migrants were taken into consideration also outside of the work related issues and the economic sphere, and were increasingly seen in cultural and social terms. The consequence of this shift can be observed in the opposition between cultures: French and ‘other’, and in a call for integration.

In 1973 nationality rights were equalized for men, women and children (Weil 1995). Nationality again became a disputed issue in the middle of the ‘80s, when former migrants, especially from Algeria who had been automatically transformed into French citizens began to be seen as a problem due to their lack of assimilation (Brubaker 1992). This is also the moment when nationality law becomes a highly politicized issue, partly due to the success of Le Pen’s National Front.

The colonial past and the need to account for the consequences of the former ‘French Empire’, became embedded in discussions about French nationality and integration through the legacy of the naturalization of Algerian citizens. Because of the socio-economic characteristics of the Algerian segment of the French population the discussions about citizenship became intricately linked with a rhetoric pointing out the need of integration on the part of the new populations. Thus integration was linked to discussions about nationality on the behalf of the new citizens of the Republic and with discussions about social exclusion.

This takes us back to one of the main pillars of Republican citizenship, the idea of equality. Equality in the French context has different dimensions, among which also an economic one that, until the late ‘80s, was stressed in relation to migrants and minorities. A minimum income as a condition for social integration (revenue minimum
was introduced in 1988. However, this equality came with the condition of an extended social contract that facilitated ‘insertion’ into the society. The rationale behind this mechanism was that vulnerability created exclusion that was to be combated through equality. Besides, citizens were assisted in meeting their contract conditions and re-entering social life through support provided by not-for-profit organizations and social workers.

The late ‘80s brought a general concern with a completely different set of social and political questions about national identity, in which citizenship acquired a central place. At the same time the politics of insertion were criticized for being too lenient. Simultaneously and in a close relationship to the concern with citizenship and national identity the question of Muslims and Islam as a threat to French values and cultural integrity appeared in the public discourse. Immigrants had already been Muslim before the debate erupted in France, and Muslims and religious representatives of Islam had been mobilized both through unions and local political representation. By the end of the ‘80s however, this collective identity was transformed into a danger, while discussions about migration and belonging were instrumentalized in the debates concerning the shared French norms and values.

By the 1990s, Le Pen's extreme-right National Front party's success had become built upon the discourse of expelling Muslim immigrants from France. This success was translated into a general political consensus for restrictions on further migration. The Pasqua law of 1993 translated these ideas into practice, restricting immigration almost completely.

Opposing such measures, political scientist and historian Patrick Weil argued in ‘L'immigration et la nationalité’ that the Pasqua law deterred foreign students and young professionals from settling in France, depriving the country of valuable human capital, and that it undermined its national interests (Weil 1995). As Weil softened the national debate about the need for a more restrictive migration policy, public attention, stirred by the National Front, turned towards the migrants already present in France, especially towards Muslims.

The Nationality Act of 1998 that followed is best understood as a ‘rupture in the public conception of the ‘problem with integration’ in France’: from blaming citizens with no allegiance to French values for the failure of French society to an egalitarian frame, aiming at providing equal treatment and opportunities for the new citizens (Weil et al. 2009:20). Meanwhile immigration measures tightened and the political attention turned
inwards, towards the nation-state and the migrants and minorities within, focusing again on integration.

From 2002 onwards, Muslims were once more taken into the focus of political debates. The matters aroused by the National Front corresponded in time with the creation of a national Muslim representative body, discussions about affirmative action, culminating in the veiling discussion and the more general debates about secularity (Weil et al. 2009:21). The problem with integration concerning Muslims as a group was further intensified by the 2005 riots in the banlieues that, although not religious by nature, were seen as an expression of the growing problems of and with marginal population groups that were not being integrated in the French state, in the moral sense.

As many migrant, due to the increasingly strict laws on temporary residence and on returns had a stronger incentive to adhere to French nationality, the number of citizenship claims increased during the ‘80s and the ‘90s, together with the diversity of applicants. To meet these challenges, nationality law was restricted in 1993. Its most controversial aspects were reformed in 1998. New restrictions such as language requirements and knowledge of French citizenship rights and duties were introduced in 2003. With the removing of the double jus soli right in 1993, French nationality policies increasingly became concerned with developing a filter of migration and population monitoring. However, it is the Nationality Act of 2003 that refines nationality in terms of citizenship linked explicitly with the idea of assimilation in the national community (Weil et al. 2009).

After the connection of the idea of citizenship with ideas of nationality and immigration, we observe from 2002 onwards the politicization of citizens with migrant backgrounds under the label of a religious group while the issue became increasingly discussed under the umbrella term of laïcité, making reference to the law of 1905, but interpreting it in different ways. The laïcité debates, the negotiations around the meaning laïcité could take, engulfed the field of citizenship, a field that was previously occupied by debates on nationality. These changes have been described as an evolution towards a culturalized nationality in the context of the crisis of the Republican model (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). As suggested before, the discussions about laïcité and Islam hide a nation-state in search for a stronger collective identity.

Islam became a ‘major variable in understanding the failure of the Republican model’ (Amiraux and Simon 2006:202). This echoes the treatment of Algerians during colonization, the expectation of the state that citizens will renounce their status as
Muslim, in order to become members of the state. Muslims however have not given up their cultural, social and religious identity. Thus the contemporary strongly visible presence of Islam in France, together with its visibility, has triggered once more political discussions about national identity in the light of the Republican ideals.

The difference between a French citizen and a French subject in French colonial days can best be understood by making reference to the indirect rule (indigénat), a specific form of administration that was the first to be abolished, at the request of the indigenous people, when the French colonial Empire began to crumble. One of the features of indirect rule was the administration of colonial populations through intermediary, representative bodies, without demanding assimilation from all the members of the population or without applying direct rule through a complete institutional apparatus. Thus the French subject had a certain freedom when his or her cultural and social position was at stake and dealt with the French state through the buffer of intermediary institutions (Barkat 2005). The French citizen, by contrast, could not escape the obligation of similarity that was to be attained through assimilation. It also needs to be mentioned that, while the indirect rule was discriminatory in its effects towards subjects, the concept of equality among citizens excluded discrimination among the citizens of the Republic.

Some scholars argue that the modern citizenship debates in France need to be interpreted in the light of her colonial legacy and the racial dynamics it was built upon (Jugé and Perez 2006). The paradox of otherness is, according to Bhabha, the use of racial stereotype on the structural and functional level, in an oscillation between opposed categories (Bhabha 1994). The French colonial translation of racial differences was into culture and tradition. Jugé and Perez argue that this colonial process comes forward in the present as a consequence of the amnesia of the state. The state does not want to remember its historical past in all its completeness, and unsolved issues keep popping up at the tension points of history (2006). The continuity of the discourse of the past and that of the present builds thus on the same categories of sameness and otherness. However, French discourse claims are insensitive to distinctions based on race, ethnicity, religion or any sort of difference as long as equality is provided under the protection of the concept of citizenship. But there is a mechanism of otherization that works even through the concept of citizenship. This is expressed in debates and applications of concepts such as nationality and laïcité that define belonging, one in national, the other in moral terms. These dimensions have been well expressed and intensively mobilized in the politics of the National Front.
For a better understanding of the dynamics between citizenship, nationality and laïcité in contemporary France it is necessary to look closely at the political debate about laïcité. In the following section, I will point out how laïcité is used in public and political discourse.

7.2.1. Laïcité

Considered as one of the main components of national identity, with cultural and historical constituents, French secularism is much more than its legal understanding (Laborde 2008). In its official acceptance, it is the principle of rigorous separation of church (or religion) and state.

Already in the Third Republic (1870-1940), the 1905 law separated and distanced the church from education through the principles of the neutrality of the state towards religion(s), the freedom of religious exercise, and public powers related to the church (Bauberot 2003). The public and political discourse of laïcité in France today and in the recent past builds upon the law of 1905 that was added to the Constitution in 1958, with the creation of the Fifth Republic. Although laïcité is considered as one of the main guiding principles of recent French history, the word itself is absent from the law of 1905, but appears first in the Constitution of 1946 and then, again in 1958 (Bowen 2007:107). Even in these cases, the concept is not defined: thus, up to the present, different views and interpretations exist about what laïcité implies.

This process of secularization is generally seen as the perfect example of how secularity works. As I have mentioned before, education has been one of the last debated territories where the boundary between the secular and the religious has been disputed at many occasions.

As a contested concept, laïcité has been much employed in recent political debates. I was reminded by my respondents that laïcité, being part of the social imaginary, invokes a series of images recognizable for different population groups and is perceived ‘as central both structurally and ideologically to French reality’ (interview 55, 47). Laïcité functions in social and political terms as a historical explanation and a normative managerial tool.

In the following I do not aim at providing an overview of the complete social and political discussion centred on the concept of laïcité, but I will stop at two important

### 7.2.2. Islam in the Republic

Discussions about laïcité in relation to principles of the Republic have been most clearly formulated in deliberations concerning the role and place of Islam and Muslims in France. As I have pointed out before, laïcité in this perspective is entangled with negotiations about the role of religion versus a secular state, the place of migrants within the nation-state and the assimilation and integration of minorities in the national community. The High Council of Integration, founded in 1989, is an advisory commission to the President of the Republic that presents annual reports and advice at the demand of the government on issues related to integration. The members of the council are appointed by a presidential decree from among French personalities in different social fields. In order to take a close look at how the dimensions of discourse about laïcité have been articulated I will look closely at the report ‘Islam in the Republic’ published in 2000.

In the report ‘Islam in the Republic’ of the High Council of Integration, Islam is presented as a problem with multiple facets, an issue central to the harmonious integration of a ‘very large’ number of foreigners and minorities. Islam is portrayed as the domain where questions of immigration, integration and religion come together, first of all because Islam is something foreign, coming from outside the national territory, an import that determined both the life and culture of migrants and the way they integrate into the Republic (HCI 2000:3). Needless to say, the starting point of the report is narrow: besides numerous migrants, who are indeed Muslims, French citizens with and without a migration background can be Muslims. The report uses a triple filter built at the confluence of the areas of migration, integration and religion that determines and reifies the Muslim population under question.

The report proposes that due to the ‘new phenomenon of long term presence of a large category of Muslims’ (HCI 2000:3) fundamental concepts of French and Republican traditions such as laïcité, citizenship and equality need rethinking. First, laïcité needs to be reconsidered in the light of the law of 1905, which is called a ‘surprisingly modern text, inspired by tolerance’ (idem:5). The laws themselves do not need to be changed, rather, they have to be made known to the Muslim communities. In this respect the report mentions that it is important to stress that equality in education and in the content of learning is
necessary, while equality between sexes and freedom of expression are fundamental. As emancipation is important, a clear-cut application of the law of laïcité needs to be made in regard to the ‘hijab problem’.

Second, as citizenship is of extreme importance to the French tradition, all citizens need to understand that citizenship ‘implies active membership and values that form the national community’ (HCI 2000:7) without erasing cultural and religious diversity and plurality. A right balance needs to be found between citizenship, the equality it entails and the different groups of people that are part of the nation. Adherence to communities needs to be renounced for the sake of adherence to the state, while at its turn, the state will erase discrimination produced by unjust categorization. The report mentions that although ‘our national community is not defined as a mosaic of communities’ (idem:7) labels such as Muslim, Arab, and Maghrebian are still often used. These labels are exaggerating, abusing and homogenizing: culture is important from the point of view of integration, is the standpoint taken by the report.

Third, equality needs to be reformulated because formal citizenship lacks meaning if it does not also mean a process of cultural, social and economic integration: this is a question of equality and dignity (HCI 2000:8). Basic equality needs to be attained through employment and housing. These changes need to be considered as ‘our society has rigidities as old people have: [and] may immigration help us transgress them’ (idem:9).

Having identified the three conceptual dimensions that the report draws I will further summarize the main steps of the argument that concerns the treatment of French Muslims and Islam under the law of laïcité. The argument reveals the turning points of the debate regarding laïcité, as a method of governing and a moral instrument related to a population seen through the changing frames of migration control, migrant integration and minority accommodation.

The report recognizes that the law of 1905 was driven by a desire to limit the social impact of the Catholic Church. The politics of French dechristianization have ‘deep historical roots, containing the separation between church and state, the freedom of belief and religious practice and the close supervision of religious affairs’ (HCI 2000:10). Moreover, it was motivated by philosophical and also political rationale: a belief in civil freedom and equality and the unacceptable status of a state religion, subordinated to Rome. This conflict between the Catholic Church and the Republic gave birth to the law of 1905 that now affects all religions in France, without exception. However, since this is a specific historical law,
embedded in specific social struggles, ‘it may be allowed to make a few concessions to Islam in a more liberal frame’, without contradicting the principles of laïcité (idem:13).

As such, the report stresses that the law of 1905 needs to be understood in terms of the freedoms it offers that must be seen as positive rights: the right to believe, the freedom of conscience and the collective freedom for religious practice. Moreover, it is a positive law because it ensures that all religions are seen as equal by the state, preventing discrimination on religious grounds. Separation is considered to be in a direct relationship with neutrality, a distance helped by the separation of real estates and funds: state and church propriety are separated from each other, the state cannot intervene in the economic sphere of any religion and direct subsidies are forbidden.

However, the law of 1905 has been used at different times in different ways, the report mentions. While in the beginning it served to regulate the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Republic, later it was used as a tool of civilian management in colonial Algeria. In this case ‘religion was made dependent on the state, so that colonial management would have a better control of the population’ (HCI 2000:17).

Muslims now present on the territory of France can be considered as coming from different main flows: colonial migration, before and between the World Wars, and economic migrants after the World War II, followed by family migrants and refugees later on. The community of French Muslims (note the singular form) is made up of citizens with Algerian background, stabilized economic migrants giving birth to a specific French Islam born out of the accommodation of Muslims and Islam to the Republic. The point of view of the report is that while Muslims in France today are clearly rooted in the colonial past and subsequent migration streams, by now we can distinguish a specific French phenomenon that is not only religious and spiritual in nature, but also has a strong cultural and social dimension. In this sense, Islam, the French Islam or the Islam of the Republic can legitimately serve as an instrument of integration as it is not only a religion: it is a hybrid born out of the meeting of two socio-political constellations.

The terms of French Islam or the Islam of France are highly debatable. On the one hand the Republic aims at moulding Islam in order to fit the values proposed by a secular state, encouraging a moderate, civic religion that remains invisible in the public sphere. On the other hand Muslims increasingly stress that as they are French citizens living on the French soil their religion must without doubt also be French (see Bowen 2007).
Thus, the report continues, as the Republic cannot integrate religions, it is important to recognize the social and cultural function of religion and of its institutions and representatives. As such, also the migration or colonial trajectory can be recognized and employed by the Republic: it is the shared history that makes an integration approach towards religion possible.

The demands Muslims have, such as mosques and prayer halls, Muslim cemetery slots, respect for dietary needs in public facilities all need to be considered in the light of the changing relationship of Muslims with the Republic and not as the intensification and expansion of Islam. The demands are the reflection of the permanent nature of Muslim presence. This permanent nature is not reflected by the current Muslim institutional structure that is characterized by heterogeneity and multiple representative bodies. The reason for this fragmentation is that Muslims are connected to a multitude of national origins, each with cultural, social and linguistic particularities. The legacies of the colonial and migratory past contribute to fragmentation and diversity that is sometimes also reflected in partial claims, although there is no political or theological directive that prohibits modalities of cooperation and dialogue.

If needed, these claims and the associations making them can be encouraged, especially if they correspond with or help realise the goals of integration (HCI 2000:32). Mosques are not only used for prayer but they are also important cultural, educational and social spaces that shape solidarity. In the same way imams are guiding prayer, teaching Arabic and giving moral and spiritual advice. Muslims are in this regard, compared to other religious communities in disadvantage: there are not enough praying facilities. Furthermore, the need for adequate mosques and prayer rooms is urgent: many of the spaces already used pose security threats to the people using them. This situation needs to be remedied as it can hamper religious freedom and the integration of Islam. It can create a feeling of injustice among the Muslim populations. These claims should be addressed locally, through the possible use of ‘disguised subsidies’: buildings can be rented out at market price to avoid direct subsidies, mixed cultural and religious organizations can receive benefits for cultural activities and subsidies can be received for repair activities. Besides, specific institutions can accommodate Muslims without direct state intervention. Through an attentive approach hospitals can also individually accommodate religious practices and the wishes of religious persons. Such measures should be considered for Islam but need to be seen as a right of equality with other religions. These measures allow for a flexible approach towards religious claims.
The report emphasizes the importance of the law of 1905 in framing laïcité. It presents it as a product of history that needs to get adapted to the conditions encountered by religious communities today. As such it pleads for continuity, but also for change with a ‘laïcité tradition’ it both identifies and constructs. Towards Muslims the report is ambiguous: on the one hand it tends to see Islam as an exception to the relationship between state and church, on the other hand it reminds Muslims of their duties towards the French state. According to the authors, some claims coming from the Muslim communities should not be accommodated by the state: halal provisions should not be made obligatory in public restaurants, school schedules should not accommodate any Islamic holidays, separation of genders should not be allowed to endanger the equality between them and no concessions should be made on obligatory school attendance. The refusal of these concessions should be considered in the light of the existing laïcité arrangements.

The advantages for an open and strategic approach towards Islam are multiple according to the report. Besides attaining the goal of integration, laïcité as defined through legal provisions such as the law of 1905, should be observed. Accommodating demands should never go against the law, but creative modalities, which comply with European law should be found. Yet, the report recognizes that the equilibrium between ensuring freedom of conscience and the necessary instrumentalization of religion for integration purposes is hard to find.

In making this task easier Muslim representatives have to be appointed for an easier and more transparent process and the local level of administration and policy formation should be allowed more freedom, however much that could be contaminated by electoral concerns (HCl 2000:61). Networks should be constructed at the local level between community representatives and the authorities, to ensure consultancy on general and community specific topics, institutional relationships, public manifestations of religious claims and to facilitate inter-religious dialogue (idem:66). The report clearly points out that it is at the local level where concrete claims can be accommodated and a process of two-way integration can be started up. Local institutions are more capable of providing information for organizations, especially when the advantages and disadvantages of cultural over religious associations are at stake. A pragmatic take on specific religious issues needs to be monitored in order to ensure that it is in line with other legislation; for example with norms of security.

The ‘Islam in the Republic’ report summarizes the specificities of the French way of dealing with religion in general and the particularities of Islam and Muslims in France.
More to that, it tries to find ways in which Islam can be accommodated creatively by the Republic: for this purpose it provides a lot of practical examples, many of them from the city of Marseille. First, it builds the argument that Islam as a religion and Muslims in France are the product of historical circumstances such as the colonial past and migration. This places them in a different situation than the Catholic Church in relation to which most of the principles of laïcité have been built. Besides, as Islam is not only a source of belief and spirituality to Muslims but also an important social and cultural source, the Republic may legitimately intervene and accommodate to order to integrate this segment of the population, if necessary through the explicit and strategic use of religion. On the other hand the Republic may refuse the accommodation of Islamic holidays in school schedules on the basis of the already existing concessions. These concessions are made towards the Christian French citizens, whose holidays are included in the school schedule. Thus, while the report argues on the one hand that laïcité is contextual to the dechristianization process and that concessions need to be made to Islam as a new religion, it sees on the other hand Christianity and its holidays as part of the French culture and as necessary rites for the French citizen.

The report contextualizes laïcité, placing it in a historical perspective and from that perspective it argues for a liberal approach towards Islam, as a ‘new’ religion. Its incorporation and cooperation with institutionalized Islam are regarded as beneficial for French citizenship, especially in regard to ideas of equality and integration. Laïcité needs to be considered as a principle that allows for equality between religions and citizens and that calls for the neutrality of the state. Muslim claims for equality should thus be respected and granted, without allowing for ‘special concessions’. Cooperation and accommodation of Islam is especially important in the light of the integration that it would promote. Thus, this report sees laïcité as an opportunity for allowing space for religion, within the limits of equality. Moreover, it advocates a liberal take on laïcité, which is argued in the light of integration through equal opportunities.

In order to see the other side of the coin of discussions of laïcité, we also need to take a look at a less lenient report that links Muslims with laïcité and citizenship, the Stasi report of 2003.

### 7.2.3. The Stasi report

The Stasi report, named after the chair of the commission Bernard Stasi, appeared a few months before the law banning religious symbols in public schools was
passed. The law was introduced with the argument that it implemented the principles of laïcité as appropriate to that day. The Stasi report is based on discussions between French intellectuals, but no Muslim representatives were part of the debate. The Stasi commission was set up by president Jacques Chirac to reflect upon the application of the laïcité principle in 2003. The report was published at the end of 2003 and led to the introduction of the French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools of 2004. The report and the law of 2004 that it inspired advocate a ‘more religion-free public sphere and reassertion of the principles of laïcité under contemporary circumstances’ (Akan, 2009). In the following I will resume the main arguments of this report, linking it to earlier debates about laïcité.

However, before entering into details it is important to remark that the Stasi report reflects the post 9/11 changes in attitudes towards Muslims and Islam, reinforced by a shift in French politics. As such, the ‘Islam in the Republic’ and the ‘Stasi report’ are representatives of two opposed approaches towards the position of religious minorities, especially Muslims in France, which is reflected by two formulations of what laïcité means.

Like ‘Islam in the Republic’ the Stasi report sets laïcité at the centre of the Republic, considering it ‘a French specialty’. As an important cornerstone that is placed at the foundation of the Republican agreement, it expresses values that cannot be separated from each other: freedom of conscience, equality and the right of spiritual and religious choice, the neutrality of the political power (Stasi 2003:9). Laïcité is the construct of collective French history (idem:10), and as such should not be reduced to the neutrality of the nation-state: respect and living together are also its cardinal principles (idem:12).

Thus, in the French meaning, laïcité should not be seen as ‘a border-keeping principle’ regulating only the separation between state and religions, politics and the religious or spiritual sphere, the report contends. Rather, laïcité should be understood as an ongoing dialogue that reflects an equilibrium needed in society (Stasi 2003:9). Laïcité is a principle that has been adapting to the metamorphoses of the French situation, historically oscillating between ‘the nostalgic influence of religion on society and the confusion of secularism with a militant atheism’ (idem, 12). However, these changes should be seen as part of the historical trajectory and parts of the process of accommodation of laïcité to the specific conditions of French reality. As such it needs to be seen as the product of the alchemy among history, political philosophy and personal ethics.
Laïcité demands an effort of adaptation from the side of all religions, without exception. Because it guarantees national cohesion and the respect of all differences, it is one of the higher values in the hierarchy of national norms and the majority of French citizens are naturally attached to it as a principle (Stasi 2003: 3).

At this point the report seems to take for granted the relationship between French citizens and the values represented by the Republic. It is considered natural that through citizenship a shared understanding is reached throughout the population concerning national norms and values. These principles are not only the framework with which the nation-state operates and in which the citizens are disciplined, but it is also a consequence of the choices of individuals and their free will to choose exactly the same norms and values as the nation-state. In this way, the population of the Republic is seen as a homogenous group of people with experiences permeated by the same concerns and the same hierarchies. Such a view does limit considerably the role and power of diversity and pluralism, as it considers it non-existent.

This attachment of citizens and the natural place of the principle of laïcité in the Republic makes the development of a law of laïcité and the adoption of a laïcité chart desirable, mapping the rights and duties of citizens. ‘That would be delivered on different occasions: the delivery of a voter registration card, the initial training of public servants, the start of the new school year, the reception of migrants, when an integration contract is signed, at the acquisition of nationality’ (Stasi 2003:67) and it could be displayed publicly in all public spaces. Further, laïcité could be a major theme of civil instruction, celebrated with the day of Marianne. Laïcité needs to be re-learned and re-affirmed.

These changes need to be made in the light of the ‘continuous guerrilla’ that takes place against laïcité. Here the use of laïcité is closely linked with equality between religions as related to the neutrality of the nation-state. Thus, the existence of discrimination and racism contributes to the fragility of the concept of laïcité, while anti-Maghrebian racist attitudes are the building blocks of racism against Muslims. ‘In the eyes of some, people of foreign origin ...are reduced to a supposed religious identity, skipping over all other aspects of their cultural affiliation. This amalgam is coupled with an identification of Islam with political-religious radicalism, forgetting that the vast majority of Muslims profess a faith and a belief fully consistent with the laws of the Republic’ (Stasi 2003: 48). A double mechanism of inequality is started if not enough attention is given to the application in practice of the principle of citizenship: a double process of discrimination based on differentiation between racial and ethnic characteristics and based on religious adherence.
This confusion between different categories, the report argues, stems from the colonial history, where the meeting between Islam and the Republican politics was often ambiguous. However, Republican values should not be seen as being against religion per se. As historical examples point out, secularism can also be favourable to the development of Islamic thought: Islam and the ‘Muslim culture’ must find resources to cope also with the present secular framework.

Muslims need to be seen as citizens: ‘the Republic is composed of citizens and it cannot be segmented into communities’ (Stasi 2003: 2). Through laïcité the relationship between citizenship and religious affiliation can be made clear: ‘religion loses its function as a forum for formal socialization, France finally ceases to define itself as a catholic nation and renounces the project of a Republican civil religion’ (idem:11). Citizenship should transcend religious or ethnic community affiliations, creating through secularism obligations of the citizens towards the state. Through laïcité, the citizen wins the secular protection of freedom of conscience but he must return it by respecting the neutrality of the public space that is shared with all other citizens. In this way the French secular concept of identity balances between individual needs and convictions and social ties. Applying citizenship means learning to live together through the ‘set of images, values, dreams and desires that underlie the Republic’ (idem:18) and that are expressed through laïcité. It needs be recognized that while laïcité originally referred to the rights and duties of citizens, by now it is ‘the embodiment of the citizen’s sense of loss due to the existence of ghettos on French soil’ (idem:52).

A new place needs to be made for religion, especially Islam, if integration is to succeed. This goal can be achieved through dialogue with religious communities that should develop their own committees, suitable for consultation on specific matters, such as burials, dietary requirements. As a next step, concessions must be made that respect these religious requirements in conjunction with specific leaders.

While accommodation of demands can be practiced to a certain point, the report makes clear that individual freedom with regard to culture, customs and traditions must be attained. This means that Republican values, including laïcité, need to be recognized as higher than other cultures, customs and traditions and need to be adhered to correspondingly. Religious freedom tempers thus the requirements of absolute neutrality and gives way to ‘reasonable accommodation’. Thus, there are two requirements that should always be considered: on the one hand the neutrality of the state and on the other had the protection of the individual freedom of conscience. These are further amplified by a twofold danger: the drift towards a community focus and the denial of diversity and
plurality: ‘secularism today is challenged to forge unity while respecting diversity of society’ (Stasi 2003: 18).

Thus laïcité must become a more outspoken way of structuring community life, a dynamic, attractive and unifying model: ‘secularism is not a rule of the institutional game but a core value of the Republican pact, the possibility of living together and reconciling pluralism and diversity’ (Stasi 2003: 36).

The Stasi report portrays laïcité as one of the most important values of the Republic, in a similar way as the ‘Muslims in the Republic’ report does. Besides it links secularity to the French ideas of citizenship, pointing out that citizens are morally obliged to adhere to the values of the Republic. As religion causes closure into splintered communities, public and collective religious identities need to be left out of the public space. Citizenship provides an alternative avenue of collective identification. If concessions need to be made towards specific needs, this needs to be done through institutionalized representation mechanisms.

National policies and a close look at the different positions regarding laïcité can illustrate the ambiguous territory in which Muslims and Islam are considered in France. In order to see what this context means for being a Muslim we need to ‘take into consideration the constraints and stimuli resulting from French policies regarding the institutionalization of Islam’ (Frank 2006:708). I have analyzed the debates because they are public, visible and the most institutionalized form of regulation of Islam. I have not focused here on specific issues such as the veil, cemeteries and mosques, but I have shown how Muslims are perceived through the changing lenses of laïcité. We now need to see how these discussions that take place on the national level are influencing local policies. We will see how local policies may engage with the national discussions, and look into how these policies affect grassroots organizations and Muslim initiatives at the local level.

7.3. Marseille and urban social cohesion

Marseille’s policy corresponds formally to the French Republican model, breaking up matters concerning migrants, integration and minorities in subcategories such as employment, education and social affairs, while some aspects are discussed under a more general politique de la ville. Institutionally this takes place in a multilayered structure, with different levels and areas of responsibility shared between the state, the department, the neighbouring municipalities and the city. The city is further divided into districts and neighbourhoods. At the level of the neighbourhood, intercultural mediation is organized
through district centres (centres d’animation de quartier) in neighbourhoods in need, such as the northern part of Marseille. The urban contract (contract de ville) is the main form of communication between the city government and the population.

Singular in France is the dialogue with the communities within the city, institutionalized through the Service des Relations avec les Communautés, of which Marseille Espérance, an interreligious commission, is part. The city of Marseille has created a strong network across and with its populations. In this way, it recognizes and uses to a certain degree the plurality that is characteristic of the city strategically and in a ritual way: to appease conflicts and to add colour and diversity to special events.

The pluralist direction taken by Marseille from the late ‘90s onwards up to today needs to be considered in the light of its racist history in the ‘70s and it being up to present one of the strongholds of the National Front, with radical positions on questions of migration and migrant integration (OSI 2011). Three mayors who have shaped Marseille need also to be mentioned, in the way local memory draws their almost satiric portrait: Gaston Defferre who was concerned with Muslim fundamentalism in the urban area and blamed Maghrebians and especially Algerians for social problems, Robert-Paul Vigouroux who favoured multiculturalism and dialogue, and Jean-Paul Gaudin who continues to this moment the work and approach of Vigouroux, although in a more ambiguous way (Peraldi and Samson 2005).

7.3.1. Contrat de ville 2000-2006

The Urban Contract included action programs across the local authorities and the city, then contributing to the fight against urban and social segregation. The urban projects were in the form of a contract between the nation-state, local authorities and their partners on the areas of housing, environment, education, transport, security, culture, sports equipment or social services. As such, the Urban Contract laid down the possibilities of the thematic engagements for all population groups and administrative agencies across the city, and also defined the modalities so that these different structures could work together. In the following, I will point out the specific dimensions of the Urban Contract of Marseille, to identify the central ‘theme’ of the city and the approach it takes in tackling it.

The Urban Contract of the city of Marseille that was in force between 2000 and 2006, focused on the development of community life, the civic participation of inhabitants, the integration of individuals with a migrant background, and on a general
fight against discrimination. All these activities were to take place and to be coordinated at the level of the neighbourhood, where a joint feeling of responsibility would inspire choice making over the priorities of local action. In order to reach the goal of participation a network of groups of inhabitants that are familiar with and make use of public services was needed. As the growth of socio-spatial segregation characterized the city of Marseille, attention was given in this document to social mixing and possibilities of a better integration of segregated populations.

The integration of immigrants was a cross-city priority in the Urban Contract. The aim of the Contract was the equal and active participation of the populations targeted. The integration approach covered all fields of policy intervention and was implemented through various thematic programs of action and territorial conventions: providing equal access to employment and education, ensuring equality between genders, helping those in need to mastering the French language and fighting against general illiteracy. Moreover, specific and focused policies, claimed the Urban Contract, should support young people through educational and cultural activities, stimulating their sense of community and promoting the exercise of active citizenship.

The Urban Contract of 2000-2006 continued the implementation strategy introduced by the Urban Contract for 1994-1999, which made associations key partners in policy implementation. As stated in the document of 2000-2006 this approach has been successful. By their diversity, the variety of their scope and the quality of the people behind them, a range of associations have proved the importance of their contribution for the maintenance and development of social ties in areas of urban policy intervention. On the one hand, their presence on the ground allowed effective responses to local needs. On the other hand, associative practices were ‘schools of democracy’ (CdV 2000:13).

In order to learn from the recent past, the Contract further proposed the development of a project logic between policy actors of the city that not only guaranteed the quality of partnership, but also was an essential vehicle for citizenship and participation. The city had the responsibility to define the requirements and resources it could place at the disposal of interested associations, so that citizenship and participation became effective tools for decision support. The democratic challenge underlying the objectives of the Urban Contract rested on the support of the largest number of partners to agreed principles and modes of organization in place. Therefore, public policy intervention could not do without the participation of residents. Thus the document proposed that the participation of residents, through citizenship and community life
programs, could be a major tool for policy reform. With these benefits in mind Marseille wished to ‘work in the service of people, to renewed and modernize from the experience gained and develop city policy through citizen participation’. (CdV 2000:43-44)

The associations the Urban Contract talked about are grassroots organizations and associations based on cultural, ethnic or thematic identification that have become the partners of the local authorities across several policy areas such as employment, youth, and gender equality. Sometimes these associations had been formed at the initiative of the local government, as for example Marseille Espérance. They served the goal of reaching out to populations that are not directly in the target of the local policies. The use of intermediary associations can be linked back to the colonial practice of indirect rule, where associations and organizations that were considered representative by the French government were used to reach out and implement governing strategies.

In the context of the Urban Contract, local public partners have encouraged the development of different associations in order to promote the gradual emergence of a partnership between them and to balance their geographical location so as to ensure continuous social networking. Earlier such contracts however, were not free of adverse effects. The framework of calls for projects led certain associations into an endless search of eligible actions and, conversely, the use of certain associations as an operator or holder of a public policy mandate ‘could lead to exploitation, without sufficient reflection on their objectives and without performance evaluation’ (interview 52).

The Urban Contract focused on the area of citizenship participation. Most importantly, it proposed a method of management through intermediaries: associations and organizations that can tackle different social problems and reach out to different segments of the population. As the Republican values and the principle of laïcité did not allow for direct policies towards religious groups, we can see how policies use strategic targeting, both through general policy areas such as social segregation, and specific ones, in order to reach the population groups in need of attention. Another important policy document that I will introduce in the following section, builds upon this method of management with a specific goal in mind: social cohesion.

7.3.2. CUCS

The other policy area that needs to be considered when talking about the local management of diversity is the Contrat urbain de cohésion sociale de Marseille (CUCS) that was introduced in 2006 and appeared in its first version as valid for the period 2007-2009.
CUCS replaced the Urban Contract policies, which were in line with national urban policies and focused them on the specific problems the city of Marseille experienced. CUCS needs to be understood both in terms of continuity with the Urban Contract and as different. This document is used to these days in Marseille and it is currently under revision. The Urban Social Cohesion Contract (CUCS) follows up on the Urban Contract and is part of a local project developed for the benefit of deprived neighbourhoods. The French government has decided to establish a new contractual framework of urban policy following upon the Urban Contract framework with a special focus on disadvantaged neighbourhoods, but including the general framework and guidelines that were previously developed. As such the CUCS need to be understood as an applied and focused form of urban policy, which has defined and reached migrants populations in a slightly different way than the previous set of policies.

In contrast to the previous Urban Contract, the CUCS deals with social cohesion through the areas of employment, education, prevention of crime and delinquency, citizenship and access to rights, culture and health. It further draws guidelines for the allocation of funds across the city, delimits geographical areas in need of attention and in general proposes a model of governance that in the name of promoting social cohesion allows intervention in most policy areas. Thus this document can be seen as outlining a general and broad policy of the city of Marseille. Its major dimensions, important for the construction of a local Muslimness are the emphasis on the role of citizenship in urban governing, the use of culture for the promotion of social cohesion and the local use of associations and networks for policy implementation. In the following I will present these main points in more detail, as spelt out by the CUCS document.

Setting the tone of the discussion the document identifies the challenges and problems to be addressed, but also the aspects of which Marseille can be proud. As major problems it sees: economic hardship and social exclusion, lack of access to employment and health care, housing and social segregation, educational problems at young age and an environment marked by ‘rising incivility’, violence against persons and property ‘that generates a feeling of insecurity felt strongly in the poorest neighbourhoods’ (CUCS 2007:3-4).

On a more positive tone, the document presents Marseille as having the advantage of a city which has preserved the fabric of older neighbourhoods, without extensive suburbs, with ‘an individual and collective social wealth, lending dynamism to the fabric of the city and an ability to respond’ (CUCS 2007:4). The city functions as a ‘Mediterranean crossroads’ and has a demonstrated capacity for assimilation, social integration and
collective solidarity due to the contribution of its successive historical immigrations. Finally, Marseille is a network of associations, rich in their diversity, where vitality is tested regularly during social events, which are ‘cultural, innovative and mixed’ (idem:4). Associations remain important in the governing process and fulfill a real public service in the social field: they are indispensable elements of a network of facilities across the city (idem:3). These association and facilities, with their intermediary function ‘translate’ between population groups and the administration of the city while using culture and citizenship as the terrain of interaction.

One of the novelties of the approach taken in the CUCS is the reference to the specific local culture. Culture is recognized as a tool for promoting social cohesion in neighbourhoods, while associations and cultural facilities function as intermediaries. Cultural activities and events, organized by (cultural) associations have the power of bringing people together in an informal way, states the document. Besides, as culture is a commodity, an object of consumption that ranges from exotic food to different types of music and dances, culture can be enjoyed, shared, devoured collectively.

This view on culture is something I would like to stop at for a moment. The notion of ‘culture’ as used in this document is a way to differentiate between cultures (other cultures as opposed to French culture) and also a way to reach people. Thus we can distinguish several different orientations of the discourse about culture: (1) culture is used as category that lumps population groups together without being offensive, (2) a way of managing populations and interaction among them through different forms of urban consumption and (3) a way of connecting policy objectives to associations that can at their turn use culture to reach out to population groups.

The structure that enhances ‘work on culture’ involves associations, cultural facilities, schools and entertainment centres at the neighbourhood level that become ‘cultural operators’. Funds are made available for the financial support of these intermediaries, through formalized partnerships and contract objectives. Culture allows space to issues of language, heritage and collective identity, with a focus on French culture but also accounting for ‘creations promoting the expression of the people and valuing their own culture’ (CUCS 2007:73).

Central in the document is the importance of citizenship in urban governing. Associations and networks need to actively promote ‘the social bond’ that citizenship is in order to achieve social cohesion. Activities dealing with citizenship and social cohesion are financed by the city.
Citizens are expected to contribute to governing. Residents’ participation needs to support public decision making through communication. This includes support for local newspapers and radio stations and initiatives coming from inhabitants such as meetings organized by associations, neighbourhood parties and citizen participation. For this purpose new policy tools need to be developed and encouraged. Thus a policy of communication needs to start from the local authorities downwards towards the populations, but also from the citizens towards the institutions: this latter feature must be understood as each citizen’s duty of participating. Also associations must contribute to this priority ‘by their action programs, their expertise and experience on that the territorial operational teams must simultaneously build and extend in outreach’ (CUCS 2007:62).

A specific feature of the citizenship approach in the document is the attention given to integration, ‘for people … immigrant origin, who do not speak the cultural code the host society, exclusion is causing a feeling of incomprehension, inhospitality, indifference and even discrimination’ (CUCS 2007:63). As a good understanding of integration issues is needed, the professional skills of local actors need to be trained though close and formal cooperation and inter-institutional communication, the document contends.

Although integration itself is not defined in this document, indirectly we see the contours of the integrated citizen appearing through adherence to values such as tolerance, broadmindedness, responsiveness, sociability, understanding and a general knowledge of ‘cultural codes’. The ideal French citizen of Marseille is an active and open person who embodies actively the ideals of the Republic: fraternity and equality, through the freedom of choice.

Central to the specific Marseille approach is the informal use of associations and networks for consultation, policy implementation and representation purposes. This approach where associations are proactive in between the state and the citizens, acting as intermediaries and helping individuals to become more active in the public sphere, is an important feature both of this document and of the Urban Contract. Associations need to contribute with their expertise and experience so as to reach out to marginal populations, but they should also have a signalling function, informing political initiatives of the problems and issues that are important at grassroots level.

As neither the Republican values nor the principle of laïcité allow for direct policies towards religious groups, we can see how policies use strategic targeting, both in general policy areas such as social segregation, and in specific ones, in order to reach the population groups in need of attention. As religion cannot become a partner in
governing, it is culture that is used to reach out. Culture thus acts as a proxy for differences in race, nationality and religion, as we have seen from the examples on the national as well as the local level.

Furthermore, through provisions made available for culture and citizenship, not only policy goals and cooperative relationships are streamlined with representation groups and grassroots organization, but also their funding is arranged. Some of these informal relationships become permanent, while some are institutionalized. In the following part I will provide a few examples of how the Muslim communities in Marseille mobilize upon the resources made available through the local government, or are gathered together by the local government as in the case of Marseille Espérance that I will discuss below.

7.4. Muslims in Marseille – symbolic versus real

The ‘Mediterranean urban culture’ of Marseille is praised but also blamed for all the deviations from the Republican model: it allows for more communication among people, both on the social and the political level (interview 55). In the public sphere, representatives of population groups advice the interests of their community groups, representing them on a formal or informal basis. Such a group of representatives, a ‘unique formula’ with a more formal format is Marseille Espérance, a group that represents the religions present in the city, delegated by the religious communities and given space by the local government.

The structure of Marseille Espérance is in line with the trend of a laïcité which has ‘partly reoriented the fundamental objectives of Islam policies towards the authorization of Muslim power structures that are today to disseminate what I call ‘civil Islam’’ (Frank 2006:708). But more than being just a representative of Islam and Muslims, as many organizations active on the national level and in Marseille such as UOIF and CFCM are, Marseille Espérance is unique through its attempt to unify and represent religion in its plural aspects.

7.4.1. Marseille Espérance

The birth and meaning of Marseille Espérance needs to be considered in the light of the history of the different approaches towards plurality of the three mayors of Marseille, already mentioned before. Vigouroux, the founder of Marseille Espérance followed as a mayor after Gaston Defferre, who considered Muslims as temporary
migrants and Islam a foreign religion. At his turn, Vigouroux had a radically different attitude towards diversity and plurality. He preferred policies that allowed space for pluralism and difference and recognized officially the Muslim communities as part of the city of Marseille (Peraldi and Samson 2005). Since he conceived it in 1990, Marseille Espérance has been a group of representatives of all religions in the city, with a religious dignitary and a secular representative for each religion. This structure would reflect in a convenient way the plurality of religious faiths present in the city, having religion as a common denominator. It would provide a needed structure of representation of the religious communities and would act, symbolically at least, on their behalf. But even if the image of the group is that of religious plurality, it is not a place for interreligious dialogue or an intercommunity meeting-place, but rather a place of secular dialogue (Parodi 2002). Thus it was the secular state, I was reminded, in its local form that invited the representatives of the religious groups in the city for a dialogue on issues of common interest that would not touch on theological issues of truth, but would try to find a pragmatic solution to the everyday problems that the city or different communities encounter (interview 40).

In the secular space in which governing takes place, Marseille Espérance enters as the group of religious representatives, but on the condition that issue relating to faith itself are not the topic of discussion. Thus, although the people who are part of the group are considered religious dignitaries and representatives of religious communities, they need to act as citizens, leaving their religiousness behind. Discussions within the group and between the group and the representatives of the city can only deal with collective, universal concerns affecting population groups in the city in the most inclusive way possible. There are two tensions that I would like to highlight: on the one hand the strategic use of religion and religious representatives in a space defined as secular, and on the other hand the aim to reach the population of the city as a whole through individual citizenship but also through the mobilization of communities, which has a negative connotation in French discourse. Religion in this sense stands as representative for marginal groups in terms of beliefs and values.

Marseille Espérance has foremost a symbolic function: it functions as an illustrative example of cooperation with associations and representatives of ‘different’ populations. The keyword of the group, especially during the time of mayor Gaudin has been integration: invoking the long history of immigration in Marseille, it builds upon the heritage of integrating diversity to point out that each individual and each religion can have a place in the city. This image, an interviewee emphasized, is in tune with the
multicultural and pluralist approach Marseille calls its own, especially in order to attract visitors and to have a specific image in France (interview 56).

Its symbolic and representative functions were made clear in 2009 after the plane crash of Yemenia Airways in which 152 Comorians of Marseille and Paris lost their lives. Marseille Espérance organized a commemoration of the event to honour the deceased, thus publicly supporting the Comorian community.

The dialogue between Marseille Espérance and the local authorities is without any formal or legal constraints: Marseille Espérance is not a legal body and does not function as an association, delegation or administration. It is an advisory body on issues related to the represented communities, in all policy fields. Besides, tensions among communities are often softened through dialogue between the representatives. Standing for cohesion and unity within the city, the group often holds ceremonial and symbolic speeches and organizes events in times of crisis or unrest. Situated in the institutional grey area that makes its collective definition difficult and its power dependent on tolerance from above, Marseille Espérance is nevertheless a powerful symbol producing its own rituals (interview 56). From its own point of view, this organization intervenes in the name of religion in the secular sphere where governing takes place: ‘as religion has been entering again in the public sphere, religious representatives have to be in dialogue with the public space of the Town Hall’ (interview 47).

However, the representativeness and the role that Marseille Espérance fulfils are contested. Already in the beginning, when the representatives of each faith needed to be selected, there were problems: how to select one religious representative and one delegate from a Muslim community fragmented across ethnic and racial lines? From the six imams who were considered three were not up to the task, while one did not speak French. From the remaining two, the one with a higher public profile was chosen, standing for the first generation of migrant workers (Peraldi and Samson 2005). Thus some Muslim communities feel only partially, if at all, represented.

Moreover, the issue of monolithic and homogenous faith groups is also problematic. Again, with the example of Muslims, the differences that exist between Muslim communities, their different ethnic backgrounds and religious practices but also their diverse social problems are downplayed in the effort of presenting a unitary picture (interview 47). However, across these differences, the organization has also a unifying function that is often successful.
The Tree of Hope project, for example, initiated by Marseille Espérance, introduced a larger, playful and informal form of social contract among the citizens of Marseille: a symbolic signature of 350,000 inhabitants for tolerance and hospitality on an urban monument. It can be compared with a contract because it contains the names of local inhabitants who implicitly agree with the message of tolerance the tree stands for. Indeed, the tree and the park behind it (with different parts structured so as to represent different regions of the globe and their specific gardens) stand in the name of plurality and diversity, but also of equality between cultures: an approach that the city of Marseille uses as a branding strategy and a guideline for its policies.

However, in practice, the pluralist and multicultural position that the local authorities communicate through initiatives such as the Tree of Hope and the structure of Marseille Espérance do not lack ambiguity. The local authorities often ‘talk about the fact that the diversity of cultures is good, but that appreciation is not transformed into action’ (interview 41). A good example for the diverging attitudes towards culture and religion and the gap between discourse and practice is the project of the Grand Mosque of Marseille that I will discuss in the following.

**7.4.2. The Grand Mosque of Marseille**

The Grand Mosque in Marseille has a long history starting with the initiative of a real estate group funder in 1937. The Grand Mosque of Marseille was meant to emulate the example set by the mosque of Paris inaugurated in 1926. Meant as a place for colonial workers, the mosque was seen as a recognition of the social bonds established through the colonial times. Although initially praised, the project was soon forgotten due to local political power struggles (Maussen 2005).

In 1989 the issue of a grand mosque was opened again. Mayor Vigouroux agreed that Marseille should have a grand mosque, but he saw it less as a functional religious space and rather as a symbol of the city. The mosque was conceived as a cultural institute that besides its religious functions would cater to a larger segment of the population through diverse cultural programs, open for all without distinction. The Mosque of Paris and the Arab World Institute served as inspiration for the mayor. This was a disappointment to the Muslim communities that envisaged it as ‘just as on one side of the port of Marseille a grand cathedral welcomes and bids farewell to travellers, a mosque would have the same function’, I was told (interview 41). A plan was then proposed for an ‘extended’ mosque; a space with commercial, cultural and religious functions. However, this project
encountered the criticism of Muslim associations. As negotiations started between the mayor’s office and representatives of Muslim communities, conditions were imposed on the project: it had to be only a place of worship, the imam had to be of French nationality and financing had to be diverse and mostly domestic. These conditions, respondents highlighted, reflected the fears that were present in the city regarding Islam: on the one side the fear of Muslims of having their own initiatives hijacked and used for political purposes, while on the side the local authorities feared segregation among cultures and a relaxed attitude towards integration that would be aggravated by a foreign imam and the involvement of finance from outside bringing in radical groups with political motivation (interview 48). In their own way all actors involved mistrusted each other and thought that the plan for the mosque was used as a façade for other purposes (interview 47). During the project it became clear that division and differences existed among the different Muslim communities and associations and that the political terrain was made difficult by differing electoral interests. Unable to rise above these differences the project was discontinued.

In 2000 another project was handed in. The local authorities reacted with a request for Muslim agreement on the project. This was no easy issue, as the struggle for social and political legitimacy is powerful in Marseille. This struggle is strongly connected, according to an interviewee, to the ‘power issues of the Algerian community around the Paris Mosque’ (interview 40). The core of the discussion was about the purpose of the mosque: on the one hand arguments about a higher institute attached to the mosque, allowing religious and cultural activities within the compound and mirroring the template provided by the Paris Mosque, and on the other hand a mosque meant only for the religious practice of the different Muslim communities. The difference expressed in the different visions about the possible function of the mosque was expressed through allegiance to Islam as a religion and Islam as a culture. While the local authorities would have wished an emphasis on the cultural aspects of Islam, a place of worship was the priority of the Muslim representatives involved. Besides, there was a discussion about which Muslim groups should assume leading roles and have an influence during the process of negotiation. As Muslim elites continued the power struggle for local influence through the mosque, they cared less about the religious potential of the project. Unifying the Muslims communities could have been one of the main goals of the project of having a ‘Cathedral Mosque’ in Marseille, was the critique of the Comorian community (OSP 2011:102).
In 2007, with the aid of the Association of the Mosque of Marseille, the issue of the mosque emerged with more concrete contours: a plot of land and a project with a large mosque. It then looked as if the mosque would finally be built. However, lack of funding further delayed the project and, presently, insufficient space to build a parking lot presents a further obstacle.

The issue of the Grand Mosque of Marseille, dubbed the ‘Cathedral Mosque’ as I was reminded (interview 47), allows us a glimpse into the conflicts that are present in the city: the tensions between the different Muslim communities, with different representation structures and different political, social and religious ambitions, the political climate with a changing intensity of National Front rhetoric that have put up administrative and political barriers to the various mosque projects.

During the different attempts towards the construction of the mosque a few things became clear: although at times the local authorities were supportive of the project, support came with additional demands regarding the function of the mosque, the finance that could not come from abroad, and its ‘moderate’ and ‘French’ profile (interview 47). Most importantly the local authorities wanted a mosque that would be able to stand as a symbol for the Muslim community in the city, a task far from easy given the diversity between multiple Muslim communities and the tensions and competition between them. Moreover, when the local authorities were against the mosque they did not invoke the principle of secularism but rather built their arguments on practical issues such as finance, space and services.

From the Muslim side, the mosque required a constant effort on representation and unification that ‘was not easy at all times’ (interview 47). Besides overcoming inner divisions, the way to deal with official and formal requests had to be learned. Even at this moment there is still hope that the Grand Mosque of Marseille will someday become reality.

7.5. Conclusions

Laïcité is the principle that allows for a special treatment of indigenous religious groups within the Republic. Thus in its French understanding secularism is a way of dealing with citizenship that, depending on the political context in which it is mobilized, either can give rights through invoking the principles of equality and neutrality or can emphasize duties, drawing upon the dynamics of separation and neutrality understood as
a lack of involvement. Because the concept of laïcité is not clearly defined, it allows for a multiplicity of positions in relation to faith and religion.

Besides, because laïcité permits a multiplicity of positions, when combined with local approaches towards diversity it encourages the formation of intermediary structures and representative bodies, even explicitly religious ones. On the other hand, as a whole we see that Islam as a culture is prioritized over Islam as a faith. Exceptions are ritualistic, symbolic actions that most often take place through Marseille Espérance. Through this strategic choice, religious representatives form a unitary group that can solve the tensions of their communities behind closed doors. Besides, they can act as informal informants on religious issues and on community issues, both of which do not have a formal entry into French politics. Thus, by creating a group the local authorities can deal with religion as a package, allowing some diversity within, while the moral values sustaining the group are similar.

Following the incentives of the Urban Contract and the Social Cohesion policies, community problems are often dealt with through grassroots organizations. While this procedure makes some organizations visible, as we see in the case of the Grand Mosque, issues of representation can cause tension and misunderstanding. The associations and representatives the local authorities may choose to cooperate with might not be appreciated by some parts of the population, or might only serve the interests of a small population group. Moreover, many representatives and associations have their own agenda and their own networks and are not able to act as neutral intermediaries.

Besides, through Marseille Espérance, culture and citizenship, two important areas of local policy making are linked to the Republican ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity in a specific way: equality becomes a possibility for discursive plurality, fraternity stands for tolerance and freedom is the choice of each individual to be a morally sound citizen.
8. Comparing regimes of secularity, citizenships and fields of Muslimness

‘Let us agree on this: we live in pluralistic societies and pluralism is an unavoidable fact. We are equal citizens, but with different cultural and religious backgrounds. So, how can we, instead of being obsessed with potential “conflicts of identity” within communities, change that viewpoint to define and promote a common ethical framework, nurtured by the richness of diverse religious and cultural backgrounds? After all, a pluralistic society needs a strong and effective ethics of citizenship in order to face up to both its internal challenges (diversity, equal rights, racism, corruption, etc.) and international challenges (economic crisis, global warming, migrations, etc.).’ (Ramadan 2010)

8.1. Muslimness: the hyper-sensitivity with religion

This work is based on the idea that the modern nation-state depends on myths and concepts: citizenship is translating between the level of imaginaries and the people as a collective. The nation-state provides a collective structure based on the idea of the nation, an articulation of the ‘people’ who belong to the nation and a positioning towards the nation-state through rights and duties. All these aspects are to be mirrored in the principle of citizenship and its different aspects: the ideal and utopian nation and its cultural and moral content, the pragmatic mechanism of inclusion and exclusion on which the management of the people is based and citizenship as a governing tool that makes clear the connection between people and the nation.

This chapter answers comparatively the two research questions that have guided this book: When and to what effect does religion become a salient category of discourse and practice in the public and political spheres? How is Muslimness constructed at the intersection of national and local governments and local communities?

The nation-state is as such a spatial entity that mobilizes institutions in order to regulate internal and external affairs and that frames and specifies certain parts of the modern social imaginary in order to be able to distinguish itself from other nation-states. The people who form the nation are a community based on civility that articulates the possibility of belonging, but also serves as a basis for exclusion. Besides, ‘the people’ are a ‘matrix of subject formation’, a way of consolidating cultural and social patterns against difference and plurality. This means also that ‘the people’ form the majority against which each minority necessarily needs to position itself. As the nation and its people are the basis of legitimization for the state, minorities that do not fit the model of the state are considered problematic. On the other hand, the state is continuously creating its nation
and its people, through the inclusion and exclusion mechanism that citizenship creates. The tensions within the principle of citizenship are foremost voiced through the claims minority groups make for recognition.

From this point of view each nation-state is unique, inspired by different historical paths of becoming, but also by different positions and compromises regarding essential questions such as equality and freedom. This uniqueness has also been suggested by literature looking at nationally specific approaches of dealing with migrants and minorities in general and Muslim migrants and minorities in particular that I have discussed in detail in chapter three. My research, especially the review of national policies regarding citizenship, migration and integration comes to the same conclusion. Although we can identify a general tendency for national citizenship ideas to converge, especially in a general tightening of migration control and an increased attention towards integration, national citizenship approaches also diverge.

On the national level we can also identify a convergence tendency in the slow turn towards a culturalization of politics, where cultural differences are dealt with as straw men rather than economic and social problems. When economic and social problems are addressed at all, this is being done through universal categories such as equal rights and opportunities and emancipation of women, minorities and Muslims as the ‘cultural’ traits that need to be worked upon. This is also the meeting point between regimes of citizenship and articulations of secularity: a clear delimitation between the sphere of politics constructed upon the principle of equality based on citizenship and that of religion. Citizenship is sustaining the universal notions mentioned above (or the universal notions are a prerequisite for the individual or group in question) so that it can attain the qualities necessary for ‘citizenship’.

The culturalization of politics turns into the politicization of culture that gives way to the discourse that constructs a moralistic universal platform using the fight against the negative aspects of humanity (across cultures). This coalition against the ‘bad’ is not made across cultures as identities but with principles deemed universal: human rights, equality, democracy, and in the nation-state: citizenship. The particular in this case are cultural traits, specific divagations from the principle of universality. In the Netherlands a pragmatic approach towards citizenship can be identified, while in the United Kingdom a contradictory citizenship and in France a sacralised citizenship are to be found. These differences are, as I have pointed out in each empirical chapter, a consequence of the specific paths of formation of the nation-state and the specific role homogeneity and unity has had in the national symbolism.
In the following I will resume the main findings from all three fieldwork sites, comparing them along the way. I will also relate the empirical findings to the theoretical models presented in the first two chapters.

8.2. National citizenship and belonging

Recently religion has made a re-entry in the public and political sphere through the intensity of discussion about Muslims and Islam. However, this attention is not only due to religion, but has been facilitated by changes within the nation-states themselves. Among the main factors facilitating a public voice of religion I have identified neo-liberal techniques of governing with an emphasis on individual responsibility as engaged by individual human rights and the rights and duties of citizens within a nation-state. Besides, a general tendency towards decentralization within the nation-state has moved responsibility from the national to the local level, and as a consequence, has involved a myriad of actors in the governing process. Among the civil society, due to specific policy targets, many minority, ethnic and religious organizations have been involved in governing.

Besides, minority group claims in general have been further encouraged by already established structures, characteristic for dealing with plurality within each nation-state: the remains of the pillarisation system in the Netherlands, the specificities of the affirmative action quotas in the United Kingdom and the system of mobilization of elite representatives in France. All these have provided avenues of possible accommodation and public and political visibility.

On the level of policies, religion has become active and visible as an effect of new citizenship policies in the Netherlands, while in Rotterdam emancipation programs with a special attention to Muslims as citizens have presented an opportunity. The various re-formulations of the principle of laïcité that reflect the French understanding of secularity have provided a way for French Muslims to come to the fore, and an opportunity for formal institutionalization and the formation of national (although contested) forms of representation. In Marseille, the will of local administrators to differentiate themselves from the national model created an opportunity for elite plural representation, while processes of thorough accommodation have been taking place without the expected measures of parity and equality between religions and minorities. The racially based multicultural policies of the United Kingdom and the concern with community cohesion have given an opportunity for Muslims and Islam already for a
longer time, while at present the national security concerns and the local diversity policies in Leicester have focused intensely on the social participation of Muslims and their representation at most levels of society.

8.2.1. The Netherlands – pragmatic, applied citizenship

In the Netherlands the centrality of the concept of citizenship in discussions about minorities and migrants and their rights and duties in regard to the nation-state has opened up a unique position for Muslims. As pointed out before, regimes of citizenship allow for different tones of discourse and different modes of action that are deeply connected to symbols such as the nation and its people and are transformed into methods of governing. These symbols are made possible by a layered concept of citizenship that has a legal, social, economic, cultural and moral dimension, all endowed with real and symbolic power.

The layers of citizenship constitute the inclusion and exclusion mechanism that defines the people of the nation and its boundaries, and also defines the relevant criteria on which equality can be measured. Citizenship is the inclusion and exclusion mechanism through which the belonging of Muslims in the Netherlands is measured, but also the tool through which their presence is accounted for and governed.

Coupled with a neo-liberal discourse on individual responsibility, citizenship as understood in the new citizenship policies is a swift turn away from the citizenship as understood in earlier policies. The turn is from a collective grammar of rights and accommodation possibilities towards an approach stressing individual activities, participation and responsibility as duties towards the nation-state. This turn also presents a shift from the previous freedom of self-identification and self-organization to a process of labelling and strategic mobilization controlled through access to resources.

The culturalization of citizenship in the Netherlands has led to an emphasis on tolerance, emancipation and democratic attitudes, but the same values have also been used to create a basis of distinction between different population groups. Muslims and Islam, on the basis of their ethnicity, religion and culture interchangeably have been considered as needing emancipation, having yet to become modern and lacking democratic abilities. The solution was to integrate them, through socialization, participation and exposure to ‘Dutch’ norms and values. The culturalization of citizenship has been aiming at the empowerment and agency of Muslims, but in the way and following the terms determined by the nation-state or the local government: dialogue
about themes thought to be taboo, participation in activities deemed worthy by administrators of associations involved in the governing process, posing as role models.

On the other hand, the moralization of citizenship has been operating with the moral distinction between good and bad citizens and has been at the basis of all forms of activation to be gathered under the banner of active citizenship. The mechanism behind this moralizing dimension is the moral dichotomy behind all possible forms of action: participation against isolation, dialogue versus dogmatism, loyalty versus disloyalty, self-criticism versus self-assurance and integration versus isolation in ethnic or religious groups. The moral dimension of citizenship has interfered with religiously defined morality and virtue and has disrupted the distinction between the private and public sphere of ‘bad’ citizens. In this sense, the private sphere of Muslims has been brought out in the open with issues of family, sexuality, children, education and upbringing being the focus of public policies – especially through gendered policies and discussion on the local level in Rotterdam. Moreover, the issue of belief, also part of the individual public sphere has been open to public and political scrutiny.

8.2.2. The United Kingdom – contradictory citizenship

The principle of citizenship in the United Kingdom is connected to the birth of a nation-state as a replacement for diversity and plurality of the Empire. In this context citizenship is necessarily a homogenizing and restricting mechanism, also in what concerns the boundaries of the nation-state. Historically the British concept of citizenship has been changing from a contractual concept emphasizing rights and duties of citizens in relation to the nation-state to a ‘deal’ for active citizenship emphasizing duties and responsibilities.

The nation, the community that serves but is also served by the state depends on the ideological content of Britishness in the moral sense of shared values and is expressed through different dimensions. British citizenship is best seen as operating along the areas of migration, border control, integration and race management, in each of these areas articulated along axes of neoliberal governing and multicultural legacies of management of plurality and diversity.

Historically, the concept of citizenship in the United Kingdom has been struggling with the tension produced by the lack of internal homogeneity of the nation, addressed by the concerns of multiculturalism that believed that citizenship should be the basis of equality characterized by the recognition of plurality and diversity.
Multiculturalism inspired policies to talk about the removal of barriers in the exercise of citizenship and to ensure participation through equal opportunity chances. Lack of discrimination is one of the keywords of such a vision on society.

On the other hand there is a tendency to look for a generic Britishness that is as much cultural as racial and to define it against other groups. In this case citizenship, especially through its moral dimension that differentiates between good and bad citizens, serves as the basis upon which inequality is determined. In this case citizenship not only recognizes the differences that exist between the members of the same nation, but also maintains the tension between an egalitarian universalism expressed through the principle of citizenship and (racial) group particularism. These boundaries gain meaning not only in migration control but also between citizens sharing the same national territory and get translated into a minority-majority dialectic.

Citizenship in the British case has been further shaped by concerns with migration, integration and national security that led to a series of approaches aiming at the construction of a community. This national community was shaped by a shared purpose and shared values. An underlying rhetoric has been the moral dimension of citizenship, distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate or ‘failed’ citizens and outsiders. The boundaries between these categories shift according to political climate, strategic considerations and the needs of the populations affected, but continue to follow closely distinctions based on race, ethnicity and religion, already present in the British society.

Security concerns have further built upon the moral dimension of citizenship, employing the distinctions between population groups as a basis for specific group policies. This was a top-down process of splintering caused by the introduction of moral categories but also an appeal for a united and homogenous community of citizens, with a strong connection and commitment to Britain and the United Kingdom.

The practical application of this citizenship did not develop into a governing tool, as in the case of the Netherlands. British citizenship rather remains discursive and symbolic and has a role in calling upon the imaginary of the nation and of presenting a link between different policy areas. Citizenship has been linked with community cohesion, security and other policy areas targeting social and economic disadvantage. This has been previously portrayed with citizenship as framing the explanation and the solution of causes for the ‘racial disturbances’ of the past (see Cantle 2001). Its second
sense, citizenship as a solution for social problems, comes back in the idea of a collective and individual pact for citizenship.

Citizenship presented a solution to the moral panic in regard to different cultures sharing the same national space: as a meaningful and unifying concept it offered the possibility of allegiance and loyalty to the nation as a commonly shared space beyond culture(s), transcending above differences. An active promotion of citizenship turned into the promotion of an active form of citizenship envisaging a community where cooperation, communication and sharing would be the collective norm. Against the background of a double influence between the national and the local governing levels, a greater agency was attributed to citizenship, without transforming it into a tool meant for governing. British citizenship remained in this way conceptual and symbolic.

**8.2.3. France – sacralised citizenship**

In France we encounter citizenship as an ideal and as a mechanism. As an ideal French citizenship embodies values about freedom and equality while as a mechanism it distinguishes between the members of the nation-state and all others, creating a moral ladder between all citizens. In the French interpretation of citizenship otherness and plurality are best understood as a lack of conformity, thus a deficit in belonging, an incomplete integration and a dented citizenship.

Historically, the present ideas about citizenship are rooted in the Republican tradition that melted regional identities and migrants into the nation, unifying them through adherence to an ideal. French citizenship has a mythical, sacred aura that is connected to nationality and the value of belonging to the people of the nation.

Through citizenship a collective understanding is shared throughout the national community: a recognition and acceptance of the core values of the nation. This understanding is joined by an acceptance out of free will and an individual adherence to these values, an assimilation that is considered as natural and self-understood from the point of view of the state. The possibilities of belonging to the nation are twofold: as a citizen or as a subject, a distinction taken over from the colonial practice of indirect rule.

This view informs the tradition of assimilation of migrants through citizenship into Republican values – French citizenship is necessarily moral in character, as it requires allegiance to the values of liberty, equality and fraternity. Because it is voluntary and rational it functions as a social contract: the citizen receives incorporation into the
collective body of the nation but also rights and duties that come attached. While citizenship is inclusive, a way of accepting and making to belong, it is also exclusive in the meaning of being reserved to the deserving few and in the meaning of creating forms of inequality and difference. These inequalities and differences will be the responsibility of the state that has the duty to remedy them in order to restore the initial or primordial equality between citizens.

Although French discourse claims a pure concept of citizenship, reaching equality by transcending above categories such as race, ethnicity or religion, a process of differentiation is at the basis of French citizenship. Because the separation between state and religion has been one of the main features of the Republican pact and an important aspect from a unifying and inclusive moral citizenship to an excluding and separating moral citizenship, religion is one of the main issues that challenge the French concept of citizenship. Citizenship has not only transcended religion, but has aimed at replacing it, together with other ‘traditional’ forms of allegiance.

This is the main reason why Islam and Muslims are a challenge to the Republic: they challenge the idea of assimilation and ‘becoming French’ through citizenship and the distinction between private and public, with religion assigned to the private and invisible sphere. This challenge was foremost verbalized in the tumult of the 2005 riots where participants were threatened with the removal of their French citizenship as a punishment for civil disobedience. The rationale behind this was that their religion and ethnicity nurtured values contrasting with those backing French citizenship. French citizens have the moral obligation of adhering to norms and values that are seen as belonging to the territory of citizenship, and laïcité, with its multiple aspects has been considered as one of the central values. However, in the case of the 2005 riots religion did not play a role, but was rather used as an ‘excuse’ by the authorities.

Laïcité has been seen as a reminder for unruly citizens that the Republic has created by distancing itself from religious thought and religious institutions, while replacing its values with its own sacred trinity and system of beliefs. Laïcité debates engulfed the field of citizenship, previously occupied by discussions of nationality – politicizing in this way religious citizens.

8.2.4. Local convergences – active citizenship and participation

In the previous chapters I have pointed out how in spite of national ideologies of secularism and a morally and culturally sensitive concept of citizenship that circulates on
the national level, locally religion becomes politicized through the replacement of ethnic and racial categories with categories that concern religion. This process of categorization has at its turn been accepted by the population concerned and has been transformed and shaped to forms of auto-identification that are constructed around religion. It is not surprising that in this process religion becomes politicized. Topics such as the content of religious messages and their possible influence, the role of religious institutions and of religious authority are discussed in public and often politicized settings, while a moral argument is constructed around the appropriateness of certain practices or ideas in the given environment. This process of censoring religious thought and action opposes the presumed distance between the territory of religion and that of politics.

Based on the literature discussed in chapter three, I have expected that a pragmatic approach will characterize local policies towards migrants and minorities. This expectation has proved legitimate – all three cities call for an active citizenship based on participation, not hesitating to involve religious organizations, religious representatives and religious citizens in the governing process or in policy implementation. All three cities prefer to work with representative bodies that speak for communities, often for a body that they deem representative for ‘the’ Muslim community. As I have been highlighting, this approach is often problematic, as heterogeneity rather than homogeneity characterizes urban Muslim communities and the process of representation is often arduous. Whole communities can be neglected and marginalized through the appointment of certain bodies of individuals as representatives, aggravating an already existing tension and competition between the diverse Muslim communities.

Citizenship has been used in Rotterdam as a tool to extract public commitment within the city as a whole and at the neighbourhood level. The idea of a locally shared identity through shared principles within the nation-state based on the distinction between aspiring and ‘real’ citizens has been a tool that called upon responsibilities. This way of being involved in the polis, based on the principle of citizenship as equality but in the form of a contract only for those seen as not yet possessing the proper attributes that form the basis of this equality, has met opposition from the Muslim population and representative organizations. If agreement is reached on the norms of behaviour and social interaction, these tasks and duties should be equally divided through the entire population: an equal distribution of duties should form the basis of equality.

Muslims have been stressing as a response that citizenship should rather be a tool of inclusion in the nation-state. Further, the principle of citizenship can be contested: as civil contribution and participation are also called upon as duties of the believer from the
religious point of view, the basis of motivation for certain behaviour can differ between population groups, even if the methods appear to be the same.

In Leicester the discourse of citizenship is only present when talking about membership in the community, when community cohesion is called one of the main goals of the city. It is the active citizen that is the dream of the urban space, the citizen that celebrates diversity and participates in civil programs. Besides, citizenship is invoked by citizens when the equal distribution of resources is requested, and when Muslim colonial ‘double-migrants’ from Western Africa recall that they are citizens of the Empire.

In Marseille citizenship is foremost connected to a discourse of integration and participation. The essential vehicle of citizenship is considered to be partnership, where citizenship works as the social bond promoting social cohesion. As the local government considers equal and active participation to be the key to an active citizenship enabling individuals to fulfil their duty of expressing themselves and participating, the areas of education and cultural activities have been gaining importance. Integration, a tool against social exclusion is to be achieved through the aid of intermediary associations, seen as essential tools for participation and consensual decision-making. However, this mechanism of representation based on an ideal of citizenship involves mainly elites, bringing up issues of representativeness and diversity within the populations concerned.

While local policies and their implementation call for an active citizenship practiced through civil participation in all three cities researched they do have different recipients in mind: while Rotterdam targets citizens, especially Muslim women, Leicester calls civil society to collaborate with the institutions of the state and Marseille calls for elites to mediate between ‘their’ communities and the local authorities. This accounts for differences in the way citizens are actually empowered to participate and the area that is defined as appropriate for participation.

8.3. Secularities and the nation-states

Muslims and Islam have become, with some differences in different national and local settings, the symbol for a series of struggles of which I will mention a few in the following. First of all Muslims and Islam have become a mirror for the identity and trajectory of European nation-states by reflecting their own entangled relationship with religion, religions different from Christianity, the specificity of their pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history with Islam, but also with plurality and diversity in general.
Besides, religion and Islam also constitute a mirror for the process of ideological formation of the nation-state, and its internal struggle in defining a neutral public sphere, a political sphere and a private sphere. The struggle for the balance between these spheres has been historically complicated by the different claims for power and truth, some of them fuelled by the antagonism between religion and the state and two regimes of knowledge: belief versus rationality.

However, the politicization of religion does not necessarily imply that Islam as a theological field has anything to do with the claims and actions of the individual and collective actors. Indeed in a scarce competition over resources certain forms of collective identity are strategically used. The relationship between Islam as a religion and the politicized form of Islam that comes to the fore of western liberal democracies is not a simple one, but moves between the territory of creed and faith and political activism.

Also, the secular state, by politicizing religion, problematizes its own foundations through the new dimensions of the concept of citizenship, namely the principle of secularism on which it rests and which has legitimized it throughout modernity. In other words, it is not only the comeback of religion as such that questions the authority of the state, but it is also the state’s perceived menace of religion that is challenging the very ideological structure of the nation.

Other deep-grained issues that come up in discussions concerning Muslims and Islam are touching upon the place of ethics and morality in social life and, more importantly, on the source that may prescribe the nature of this public morality. This emphasis on authority and power is discussed in religious and in political circles.

From the point of view of minorities and migrants the issues upon which the discussion about Muslims and Islam touches are less important than the topic of economic and social inequality. These inequalities and not religion or the secularity of the state are identified as the cause for the problems that citizens (minorities) have within the nation-state, not religion or the secularity of the state. This discussion is connected to the distinction between individual and collective rights of minorities within a state, and is especially relevant in the case of religious minorities.

All these aspects are intricately defining the identity of modern nation-states, including their ideas about what modernity is and how it works and the relationship they have at present with Muslims and Islam. In this book these aspects have been considered as part of regimes of secularity and regimes of citizenship. Regimes of secularity have been defined as contextual equilibriums between religion and politics pertaining to the
definition and practices relegated to different spheres, a specific balance of power and authority and an instrument of governing religion. Regimes of citizenship have been considered the discursive and applied formulations of ideas of equality, participation and belonging to the nation-state and the specific contextual formulation of rights and duties of citizens in relation to that nation-state. Both regimes of secularity and regimes of citizenship are made possible within the cadre of a social imaginary that conceives of religion and politics as two distinct and opposed categories, that sees the nation-state as a unit imbued with authority and power within and beyond its borders and that enables thinking about equality as opposed to difference and plurality.

 Muslims in European countries necessarily relate to the collective imaginary that considers the secular and secularity as one of the foremost characteristics of modern democratic states. However, secularity takes different shapes, being formed by historical and social patterns that are specific to each national space. Within this national space secularity regimes are articulated in a close relation with mechanisms and ideologies of belonging, the most important of which, citizenship, has several dimensions. Muslims as appearing to the nation-state stand at the border of the nation as migrants or descendants of migrants and at the border of the state through their religious identity. As such they are triggering and mirroring a double process of self-reflection of the nation-state. This self-reflection takes place through the concepts of secularity and citizenship. Both give content to regimes, which subsequently them to the governance of population groups.

 Regimes of secularity are articulated and implemented at the national and the local level. Besides, the populations that are subjected to governance through these regimes use their agency to further involve and shape them, engaging with regimes at different levels. The working of this complex mechanism I have pointed out in the previous chapters.

 8.3.1. The Netherlands

 In the Dutch context, a strong culturalization and moralization of the concept of citizenship, reinforced by a combination of neoliberal individualism and community-focused ideas and combined with the remains of a tradition of pillarisation where religions would independently be responsible and in charge of the institutions serving the lives of the believers, have allowed policies targeting migrant and minority groups to
target also religious groups. This was made possible from the late ‘90s onwards by the superimposition of the labels such as migrant and ‘allochtoon’ subject on ethnic categories that were then substituted in the public and media discourse by religious categories.

In the context of the Netherlands we observed a general ‘hypersensitivity for religion’ with a strong use of democratic ways of discursive inclusion and dialogue. The self-inquiry of the Dutch state is based on an expectation that minorities and migrants are capable of reproducing forms of self-organization inherited from the tradition of pillarisation. However, we noticed that the expectations of the national and local governments towards a well-organized and homogenous Muslim community were met by plural and splintered communities and a similarly diverse form of organization that accounted for ethnic differences, differences in interest and life-style.

Religious groups, including Muslims, have benefited from the transfer of state responsibilities to the local level: local policies are often more in tune with the needs of the urban populations, and often find ways to make concessions. In the case of Rotterdam, this has taken place through policies encouraging emancipation, through the distinction created between different groups: emancipation for women as the emancipation program was initially designed at the national level, but also emancipation for men and for religious groups at the local level. This policy transfer shows the ingenuity and creativity of local governments in using national policies by adjusting them to local circumstances and the problems experienced on the local level.

From a top-down perspective the invocation of the principle of secularity rests in the Dutch case on the connections made in the social imaginary between the image of religion as a pre-modern system of thought and secularization as a process. Religion, culture and ethnicity are often confused with each other while they are used as labels for the same population groups in a random way. For example, Islam is considered to be backward, Muslims are in need of emancipation and ‘modernization’, while they need to be taught (self)reflexivity and cooperation in the nation through the principle of (active) citizenship.

More particularly, in the city of Rotterdam religion becomes politicized, but it is also offered a possibility to enter the public and political discussion. Religion, Islam in this case, is offered a voice in the public sphere through dialogues targeting the Muslim population. In the context of secularity the political discussion is more important than the public one: through neo-liberal ways of governing that transfer responsibility from
the state to civil society and the populations targeted, Muslims and Islam are included in the policy process. This inclusion needs to be understood from two different points: inclusion in the implementation process and also as an ideological inclusion. Inclusion in the implementation process can be divided first into a process of outsourcing of state responsibility from the national to the local and secondly into a process of outsourcing from the local government to a competing civil society. As most of the Muslim participants in public and political debates are seen as talking from a religious point of view, religious opinions or opinions that are perceived as religious by public servants and representatives of the state as religious make their way in the public and political discussions. Both these forms of participation contest the possibility of a neat distinction and separation between the secular, the political and the religious. Both religion and secularity remain political issues in the Dutch case, thus we can talk about a 

**politicized secularity.**

In the local context we see the principle of secularity being invoked as a way of empowering and limiting authority. While imams are welcome to work together with the local authorities on programs addressing the challenges defined by policies, religious initiatives are tempered and kept under surveillance. In the Islam Debates secularity becomes a point around which discussions revolve. For the religious population secularity is the symbol of the struggle against forms of inequality as secularity invokes the principle of equality between all religions and creeds within the state. However, in a top-down approach, secularity becomes also a way of limiting, organizing and refusing claims of populations (self)defined through religion. In both cases, the concept of secularity works in conjunction with images of citizenship, based on different perceptions about rights and duties.

The emancipation of religion, as proposed by policy practices, mobilizes a specific understanding of secularity that goes against plurality based on equality (between cultures or religions) and instead insists on a hierarchical approach. The discourse and practices of emancipation in Rotterdam insist on two dimensions. First they emphasize the social independence to be gained through emancipation, meaning a need to distance oneself from the family, the community and religion. Second, they emphasize an ideological independence, best attained through a critical process of self-reflection that changes not only the locus of loyalty, as in the case of social independence, but also its nature. Loyalty is transformed from an emotional to a rational process. Representatives of the communities and spokespersons often find themselves in a difficult position as
they have to negotiate across very different articulations of loyalty, especially as religion is considered to have and give its believers a faulty vision upon reality and society.

There is a different strand of discourse that calls upon the incompatibility of cultures that cause the tensions in the city. On the one side there is an ‘Islamic culture’ that Muslims presumably endorse, which is a culture based on and determined by religion. Dutch culture on the other hand is not seen as determined or influenced by religion, but it is thought to be secular in nature. In this case the broadening of a religious tradition to a culture increases the limits of the territory where secularity can intervene, in the name of the majoritarian and ‘native’ population group. As it can be argued that culture pervades all areas of life, if religion is equated to culture, there are no limits to the intervention the state can make in the name of secularity. This has consequences for the privacy of (some) religious citizens, as the private sphere can be defined as a public issue and treated accordingly.

Indeed, as regimes of secularity meet the neoliberal individual responsibilization they also reconfigure the divide between public and private. One of these contested areas is the family, an alternative ancient locus of loyalties that the nation-state attempts to rechannel towards the nation. Here again, in Rotterdam, emancipation policies mobilize the differences and functions of gender roles within the family in a cross-cultural perspective to serve the interests of the state in creating good citizens.

As differences in culture, values and morality are considered to cause problems connected to integration, arguments for a collective nation formed of citizens magnify the weight of difference, plurality and diversity, investing them with a negative aura. Invoking the moral argument of the common good, arguments stressing citizenship as an individual responsibility and the nation as the highest moral collective meet and oppose arguments employing community logics of social cohesion and belonging, mobilization and agency. Besides, religiously motivated action takes place in the power-laden context of the secular norms and values. The Islam Debates, where the Muslims were called upon to contribute to different discussions were organized and thematically controlled by the local authorities.

From a secularity point of view the ‘problem with religion’ has had serious effects: it has encouraged segregation between different population groups and it has had a negative effect on gender roles, education and general socio-economic position. Please note that while Dutch secularity goes against segregation of population groups it considers the separation between religion and politics to be necessary and even
encourages it. How can these dividing lines within the society aiming at equality between its members be better understood?

The attempt to introduce a Citizenship Charter in the city of Rotterdam must be understood as an attempt to intervene in the social functions that religious institutions have and in the social hierarchy of belief within the religious organizations. The community associations targeted by the charter were pushed towards cooperation in the secular agenda. One of the main aspects of this cooperation was to take religion out of the private sphere, thus forcing religious organizations to become socially active and open their doors for others than believers. As I have pointed out before, this approach had, from the point of view of the communities positive and negative consequences. The collaboration of religious organizations and individuals in the secular agenda meant that religion could not enter the public and political space on its own terms, but that it could only adjust to secular demands. This approach is visible in the dynamics of the Islam Debates and also in the financial dependence and project-related financial bond between some religious organizations and the local authorities.

While religion was in this way adopted as a partner, the discourse in the background was that of **secularity inspired by secularism**: religious traditions must be lived in the private sphere and they must not stand in the way of a collective and shared society.

### 8.3.2. The United Kingdom

In the context of the United Kingdom, secularity is expressed in the context of the oppositions articulated by different logics of citizenship and belonging that follow distinctions present in the social fabric of British society: differences between population groups defined through race, ethnicity and later religion. Religion in the United Kingdom is historically not an existing structure of social and political contestations, but it provides opportunity for differentiation and collective claims-making when categories such as race and ethnicity are losing impact.

In this case opportunities used by the categories of race and ethnicity as part of different cultures, and the political ideology that creates a relativist but egalitarian basis for multicultural policies have articulated an entry point for collective identifications on religious grounds. The Rushdie affair echoes negatively the claim of difference and the plea for rights of migrants and minorities categorized in terms of race and religion, adding a layer of meaning connected to problems of national identity, belonging and
integration. While in a multicultural sense religion is a part of culture that constitutes the natural ground of diversity and difference, in a multicultural critique religion becomes the ground that creates divisions, segregation and lack of loyalty and belonging.

The multiculturalist idea of equality among communities in the United Kingdom is transformed into a hierarchical model of moral values attached to communities and cultures, and within that, to certain practices. This enables a differentiation between good and bad communities, differentiation articulated through examples of good practice related to an ideal citizenship. The new hierarchy does not search for equality while trying to combat discrimination, but it rather focuses on security.

In parallel a ‘faith relations industry’ encouraged by the government embraced and sustained a budding religious collective identity, born out of grassroots activism and a process of contestation. This perspective places religious communities at the heart of the plural and diverse communities that shared the same urban space, encouraging dialogue in an interfaith and intercommunity way. Culture in these policies is mobilized as an instrument of governing, a way of promoting integration in the sense of regenerating the city and improving the cultural competencies and sensibility of service providers. Promoting understanding among faiths and communities enters the areas of education, but also the public sphere of festivities and public urban space. Against segregation, considered as one of the main causes of lack of security in daily life, cultural and racial mixing, contact and dialogue are encouraged.

Bringing people together becomes the motto of a plural society troubled by the possibilities of dangerous social deviance and religion is encouraged to step out of what is thought of as the confines of ethnic and racial communities. Crossfaith and interfaith activities and communication are encouraged, but more restrictive measures are taken and Muslim organizations and individuals are monitored, while subsidies ensure cooperation and loyalty. The positive effect of policies that deal with religious groups, as we see in Leicester, under the label of plurality policies encouraging and managing multiculturalism in the urban space is the way secularity leaves space for engaging with and between different faiths. This makes religion visible in the public domain, in territories that would not be normally associated with religious activity. It is this opportunity that makes football matches a political and ideological opportunity for voicing the accomplished need for interaction, communication and play. When the same football matches are taking place between the local police and the religious communities there is a collective human base that is shared and taken as the ground for public, collective interaction. In the case of the United Kingdom we see that secularity and
religion are not necessarily complementary to each other. There exists the possibility of a space that is neither religious nor secular in nature, but is based on a collective need for interaction at the level of everyday life.

This presents an opportunity to form a visible, audible collective identity that is perceived as a homogenous community and that has (conditioned) access to resources. Within the context of concerns with (national) secularity, religion is portrayed as the enemy within. Thus measures meant to alleviate the negative effect of religion on society are stigmatizing religion, seeing it as a cause for all social ills. This demonization of religion might be strategically effective, allowing for measures to be taken to closely monitor and follow a population group perceived as problematic. However, for the people affected, this approach is experienced as problematic and uncomfortable.

At the same time approaches looking at religion from the angle of the need to govern also interfere in the structure and hierarchy of religion as such. The preference of the state for a moderate form of Islam practiced by religious communities inclined towards civic participation and dialogue shapes a hierarchy among Muslim communities. This is reinforced by the practice that communities of religious groups that seem ‘good Muslims’ are adopted as partners for policy processes and policy practices. The preferred communities also enjoy an eased access to collective benefits such as funding and cooperation on governing projects, which makes them visible and saluted. As I have pointed out, in Leicester, but also in Rotterdam and Marseille, this encourages competition between Muslim communities, in the struggle for scarce resources. The Muslim groups and communities which for different reasons do not participate in this competition remain even more marginalized.

This side of secularity, involved with the governing of religious groups points to a pragmatic side of how the state at its different levels of administration chooses to deal with religion: on the one hand religious groups that are considered ‘radical’ are allowed to retreat to the private sphere, while on the other hand groups that are strategically matching governing programs are activated, encouraged and protected. Such a selective secularity serves well as a governing strategy that allows some religious groups to enter the limelight of the public and political sphere. Through a regime of secularity the nation-state retains the power of defining the groups in question and the terms of the debate about the role of religion in modern public life and the rights and responsibilities of religious citizens.
Thus, one effect of a **selective secularity** is that religion appears to believers also as a political opportunity. Although inequality, discrimination, class and general socio-economic factors are considered by believers to be more suitable for the political struggle, religion is considered a more powerful form of identification. As religion is easily caught up by the political debate it becomes a strategically powerful way of framing collective action. However, in this case, the label of a religious group does not reflect the religiosity of the group as such – the arguments put forward politically by this group, as we have seen for the three cities researched, are socio-economic in nature. The political mobilization of Muslimness is in many cases based on issues of migrant integration and minority accommodation rather than on discussions about truth and beliefs. The attention given to Muslims and Islam in the public and political sphere reflects the neurosis of states concerned with their own boundaries and powers, expressed through regimes of secularity and citizenship, rather than the powerful voice of religion. This is not to say that religion, as a form of voicing collective claims, is only used by minority groups strategically. Rather, I am pointing out that secularity blurs the distinction between action based on belief and rational action (that are of course not mutually exclusive).

For the Muslim community in Leicester, the above mentioned process involves a double course of change and accommodation. It makes religion public but it also offers a surface for criticism, from the part of the state that prefers ‘moderate’ and ‘talkative’ religious groups and from the point of view of the Muslim ummah that is concerned with the purity of the trans-national community. In turn, this has an effect of doubt about the right way for the religious communities themselves. But as doubt is one of the key features of modernity (Giddens 1991) we could argue that religious communities are becoming more modern. Taking the argument further, regimes of secularity and the pressure they set on contemporary forms of religion cause a shift not only in the importance of religion on an individual and collective level, as secularization theory has been arguing, but also a different way of expression and a different emphasis on priorities. The importance of civic participation that is addressed by religious groups pushes forward one more time religion as a positive social force.

**8.3.3. France**

In France the tolerance of religious traditions is at the basis of the concept of laïcité that informs the regimes of secularity. Regimes of secularity are almost inseparable
from regimes of citizenship in this case. In the case of Marseille the regime of secularity based on a joint articulation of citizenship and laïcité constitutes the main method of governing the Muslim population. As such it is a moral instrument related to a population seen through the changing frames of migration control, integration and minority accommodation.

French secularity is articulated at the ideological meeting point of a need for freedom of conscience understood as the individual freedom to belief and religious practice, the collective freedom of religious practice to be exercised in the private sphere, and the right to believe. As such the French idea of secular freedoms comes close to present ideas of human rights. However, such rights are rather abstract and contestable when looked at in practice.

At the level of the state, the social, educational and cultural function of religion is recognized and mobilized if suitable for the ultimate goal of integration of migrants or citizens with non-French ethnic origin in the Republic. Besides, the networks provided by religious institutions are mobilized and the religious elites are placed into representative positions, serving as mediators between the state at the national and local level and the different religious communities. Such representative bodies have a highly symbolic function.

The paradox of laïcité is that it is based on the idea of tolerance and equality among religions. However, when laïcité becomes an instrument of governing that creates inequality through its focus on the Muslim groups Muslims become an exception in the relationship between the state and religions, inducing a preferential secularity. As secularity and citizenship are closely connected we see that also the perceived duties of Muslims towards the state are assessed differently than those of other religious citizens. Because this preferential treatment is argued with a need to remedy the lack of knowledge and the incomplete application of the principle of laïcité among this specific population segment, and because laïcité is the tool that disciplines, these features are all part of a regime of secularity.

When it comes to applying its ideas on secularity the French state refuses to make concessions to Muslims and Islam, arguing that religion reinforces segregation and an undesired lack of identification of French citizens with the nation. This argument builds on the classical separation between the secular and the religious that are seen as competing over the authority of social life, each trying to ensure the complete loyalty of their subjects. However, the French state, in order to ensure equality between religious
groups and between different minorities within the state also needs to make concessions to the Muslim populations. This argument has been at the core of most Muslim contestation of existing practices and requests for preferential treatment, such as halal food provisions, burial practices and the need for places for worship.

Laïcité articulates the instrumentalization and the facilitation of religion in relation to the public sphere. On the one hand religion is used explicitly and strategically in order to reach a population of diverse ethnic origins, but of similar socio-economic background and a similar minority status. On the other hand, this can also be read as an invitation to participate in the public sphere, making religion stop being confined to the private sphere and extending its influence to the public and political ones. This ambiguity makes the conceptual field of laïcité a political one: the same hand is used to give and to take away. I would like to highlight that it is the same principle that is used in different ways in different situations and that creates a field of ‘semantic’ power.

If we go back to the semantic field defined by the Stasi commission we see that laïcité is placed at the foundation of the Republican agreement as one of the core values for every citizen. Laïcité is connected to other values such as freedom of conscience, equality, the right of a spiritual and religious choice, neutrality of political power, respect and tolerance and shared responsibilities concerning living together, defining and linking them.

However, laïcité is also seen in the same discursive field as an on-going dialogue that remains open to the needs and aspirations of religious traditions. On the other hand the same principle requires an effort of adaptation from all religions, defining a territory where religious claims and ideas can be considered as legitimate. While in the case of the United Kingdom we see a preoccupation with a detailed definition of the boundaries of legitimation, this is not necessarily at the forefront of the French secularity debates. Rather, the laïcité ideas that feed secularity are based on ambiguity and paradox: on the one hand secularity is portrayed as a natural choice of the people that are part of the nation, as one of the core values that are not being questioned, while on the other hand there is consideration for laïcité being transformed into a law or a chart mapping out rights and duties. From this perspective laïcité needs to be reinforced, relearned and reaffirmed and surfaces as a civic instruction theme. This paradoxical secularity calls upon citizens to respect the neutrality of the public space while it also expects religion to hierarchically organize and become an institution that can continue dialogue and negotiation with the national and local representatives of the state in an efficient manner.
While citizens are morally bound to adhere to the values of the Republic, laïcité is a way of structuring community life dynamics, presenting an attractive and unifying governing model. This is why religion, through the distance taken from real religion by the employment of religious representatives (in the case of Marseille Espérance balanced by secular representatives of the religious group) is co-opted in conflict resolution and problem solving capacities. In the French situation there is place for secular dialogue with religious representatives, based on issues of common interest. Issues of truth and belief are actively excluded and replaced with pragmatic concerns and everyday problems. Inter-religious and inter-community interaction is not encouraged, because the state turns a blind eye towards communities and religions, refusing to find common ground besides the one created by the shared principle of (secular) citizenship.

In the laïcité logic religion becomes a symbol that contains the socio-economic denominators of the marginal groups. In this way it acquires a symbolic function, with a front role in the integration of ‘diverse’ populations and management of plurality. But as such it runs into the problem of the populations that are assumed to be homogenous but are torn apart by inner diversity and the problem of representativeness. Most representatives are recognized either by one or more communities or by the state.

In Marseille, the understanding of laïcité as a strict separation between state and religion prevails. Catholicism is an exception to the rule, as the main feasts are public festivals and an imposing cathedral guards over the city and the port. The catholic laïcité is most present here, while Islam and Muslims are approached indirectly through policies targeting culture. As religion cannot become a partner in governing, except through institutions of representation, culture is needed to reach out to the populations in need of specific target policies. As such culture in Marseille becomes a proxy for race, nationality and religion, especially in the case of Muslims.

Regimes of secularity are contextual: they do not depend only on specific national articulations of the relationship between the state and religion, but also on local conditions, on the size, creativity and sensitivities of the religious groups, on the political balance that decides the governing of religious minorities.

Several features of secularity have been identified in the previous part: a politicized and a secularism inspired secularity in the Netherlands, a preferential, a paradoxical and a Catholic secularity in France and a selective secularity in the United Kingdom. Although each of these aspects has been discussed in relation to the specific geographic locations, they all coexist in each place – however, one or more aspects are
more pronounced. These regimes of secularity are transformed and adapted to the national and local conditions through a general blindness towards religion in France coupled with a wish to make Marseille a welcoming, multicultural city, a moral panic caused by Islam in the Netherlands combined with a gendered approach specific to Rotterdam and a security obsessed view on radicalization in the United Kingdom coupled with a plural, diversity-oriented multicultural Leicester. At the meeting point of all these conjunctions Muslimness is shaped by regimes of secularity and citizenship, but also through the agency of Muslim groups and communities living in the cities. This aspect I will discuss in the following.

8.4. Local forms of Muslimness

In chapter one I argue that specific forms of Muslimness exist at the intersection of two regimes of governing that are both articulations of parts of the modern social imaginary. One regime articulates a relationship to the transcendental, empowering to a certain degree beliefs and belief-based values and practices and the other regime articulates individual and collective forms of belonging in relation to the nation-state, its institutions and administrative structure. I have been arguing that this intersection of regimes can be best observed in the case of Muslim minorities, who present a challenge for regimes of secularity through their visible and different religiosity. Muslim minorities are also a challenge to regimes of citizenship as migrants, minorities and ‘different’ citizens.

While in the previous part I have compared and summarized the main dimensions of Muslimness from a top-down perspective, on the national and the local level, in this part I will summarize and compare the grassroots initiatives and concerns of the Muslim communities in the urban settings studied.

8.4.1. Rotterdam – reactive, emerging Muslimness

In Rotterdam religion has been part of the debate about the integration of migrants and their participation as citizens. Especially through the Islam Debates and the subsequent Citizenship Charter, Muslim voices have been activated as religious voices in the public and the private sphere. The presence of religion, through voices considered as speaking from a religious point of view and making arguments and claims in the name of
religion draws attention to a change in the constellation of the role of religion vis-à-vis politics and the state. Besides, the politicized discussion about the role of religion in public life and the extent to which religious citizens can make specific claims on the nation-state has delimited the extent to which the distinction between public and private has been re-defined.

As a response to policies proposing a concept of citizenship that I have called pragmatic and applied, as well as to a politicized regime of secularity inspired by secularism, Muslimness has been defined from the grassroots through a reactive, top-down initiated engagement with specific policy areas. Due to the heterogeneity of the Muslim communities and their splintered form of collective organization, combined with a changing role for umbrella associations, identification has taken place mainly as a response to political and social pressure. This can also be a sign of a young community, an effort to find a collective way of identification across ethnic and cultural differences and strategic interests.

As a result of local policies in Rotterdam local migrants, including Muslims as religious groups, could become active as groups on the social level. Differences between groups were accommodated by local administrators driven by a rationale of managing populations considered problematic. These policies in turn required the participation of Muslims, beyond and above religious and ethnic boundaries and existing infrastructures.

While targeting a religious group, the understanding behind the above-mentioned policy discourses and practices was that religion needs to change in essence, in order to conform to the requirements of citizenship participation. Islam must adapt, by recognizing the division between church and state and through changing its inner values in order to accommodate and accept gender equality and sexual freedom, considered important aspects of Dutch culture. Besides, the role and authority of religious leaders needs to be reconsidered. Ideally, religious leaders ought to be co-opted by the state for the different stages of the governing process.

Local policymakers would like Muslims to be more self-reflexive about the nature, contents and mechanisms of their belief and to be able to take distance, and if necessary, to renounce these beliefs in the public of political sphere. Besides a shift for religion itself, described as secularization, this move towards self-criticism would prepare citizens for the neo-liberal discourse of self-responsibility.

In Rotterdam the Islam Debates and also the Citizenship Charter dispute, under the disguise of concerns with culture and tradition a preoccupation with beliefs,
especially in their connexion with loyalty (towards religious groups). Tradition and culture are easily superimposed discursively on categories of ethnicity and nationality and they are applied in practice to the same groups: former migrants and their children, mostly with low socio-economic profile. As a consequence of this we have observed a ‘religionization’ effect: voices speaking in the debates are perceived as coming from the Muslim population and as being made in the name of Islam. Although this process was perceived as a nuisance by representatives of the Muslim community it also presented an opportunity to build up a collective Muslim identity.

The conflation of ethnicity, nationality, religious beliefs, social marginality and social problems was reflected in the topics that the local authorities considered relevant dialogue topics when ‘Muslims’ were invited to become visibly active in the political or public sphere. The emancipation of women, the integration of migrants and minorities and the radicalization of faith were focal points, all directed towards ‘the’ Muslim community. The individuals and representatives present in these events protested: there was no homogeneous Muslim community to be found. However, there was agreement regarding the difference between tradition, cultural habits and religion: religion cannot be blamed for customs that have evolved culturally. Along these lines a request has also been pushed forward: both Muslims and non-Muslims are in need of education about what Islam is in order to be able to make a difference between customs and ‘proper forms’ of religious practice. This request for education about religion can be considered as a step towards establishing a ‘pure’ knowledge of Islam, based on a shared definition of Muslimness.

In order to argue the contemporary usefulness of religion, mainstream representatives of the Muslim communities have compared it to citizenship: in providing a basis for collective identity and thus for collective action, and as a moral force focusing on the collective good. Religion has an important social function, it was argued, being a binding force and presenting the possibility of a collective identity. Besides, religion encourages social activism and conformity to a norm that focuses on the collective benefit, Islamic values being against criminality and social deviance. Although Islam aims at including individuals in society, while combating social isolation, it respects individuality: religious practices are a choice and an expression of free will. Besides engaging with the dimensions of citizenship as proposed by the state, Muslimness here also engages with the individuality and the agency discourses of modernity.

Muslimness as defined from the grassroots thus emphasizes strongly a changed religiosity, adapted to the requirements of a modern society: self-reflexivity as a
possibility, social activism and engagement as a function and individuality in one’s freedom of conscience and in one’s degree of religiosity. On the other hand stigmatization, strong top-down approaches driven by political agendas and distinguishing labels are rejected and opposed.

Muslimness in this context is mainly reactive: reactive to the political and administrative context. Policies and policy frames are of more concern than initiatives stemming from the grassroots. These are considered the characteristics of an emerging form of collective identity, looking for possibilities of growth and self-expression.

8.4.2. Leicester – civil, transnational Muslimness

In Leicester Muslim individuals and organizations are involved in all stages of the policy process. This incorporation in the state apparatus has been made possible by affirmative action policies on the one hand and by more recent security concerns transformed into community cohesion frames on the other. The process of participation, at its turn, reinforced the need for competition for existing resources and gave birth to strong grassroots initiatives.

Muslims in Leicester pride themselves on the civic initiatives they have started from a religious perspective. These local initiatives have been taken as models to the national level, but also exist as products of cooperation and crossfertilization between Muslim communities in different countries. Because initiatives such as the form of community mobilization and institutional cooperation as exemplified in the development of the Muslim Burial Council, and the idea to use sports as a form of creating a strong bond between different population groups travel across national boundaries; they can be considered transnational. They are also transnational because the patterns migrate within the global Muslim communities. The sense of pride stems from the fact that it is felt that civic religion empowers religious communities beyond the boundaries of their own group, enabling them able to contribute to the larger society and by doing so to show the power of Islam.

The contribution from an Islamic engagement to society as a whole is built on cooperation with the state at different levels, constituting networks in other countries that are based upon the ummah, but also go beyond it, through cooperation with other faiths. Most importantly, this Islamic engagement takes Muslimness towards a collective consciousness that is beyond ‘sectarian divide’ and develops Muslim provisions on a civic
Informal activities and networks that can be mobilized upon in times of need are part of the process of ‘gelling together’.

A concern is raised about Muslims being required to be active citizens. In Leicester the need to be self-reflexive, assertive and apologetic is lamented. Self-reflexivity is required especially in regard to religious beliefs, their nature and their application in practice. Assertiveness is needed in order to face the situation that has placed the Muslim communities under a strong security oriented focus. An apologetic stance is encountered in situations where religious difference is not accommodated in the same way as ethnic and racial difference would. All these aspects are felt as calling for a certain position in regard to the object and practice of faith – and are collectively seen as a pressure to secularize.

Muslims in Leicester resent culture and religion being blamed when the nature of the problems is economic. Careful to point out that inequality persists beyond diversity they try to fight against the rhetoric that they perceive as noxious. As such they feel that they have to defend themselves in front of different kinds of accusations and have to prove all the time their innocence – especially under the influence of security-based policies. Muslims who were interviewed for this book feel singled out, while their religion is exposed to critiques from many angles: other Muslim communities might always question their purity, while the state might always question their moderation.

However, many Muslims in Leicester construct Muslimness around the idea of religion as a positive social force, in spite of the secular character of society. Thus, taking religious individuals and forms of collective organization on board different alliances are forged on different issues and in different constellations.

8.4.3. Marseille – symbolic and conflicted Muslimness

Policies in Marseille have introduced a model of management of populations through intermediaries. Associations and organizations that represent certain segments of the population and that are able to reach out to them have been encouraged in their growth. Where needed, such associations were created on the basis of an initiative from above. This strategy I have called ‘indirect targeting’.

Religion is not present at a practical level on the part of the state. While there is a strong national discourse regulating the regime of secularity through the principle of laïcité, policies on the local level do not address religion or deal with it. Instead, culture is
used as a label for targeting groups with specific needs. Thus culture becomes a proxy for differences in nationality, ethnicity and religion. The only presence of religion and religious representatives is on the symbolic level, in cases when religious representatives, orchestrated by the local government, speak in the public sphere. Otherwise no interreligious dialogues or intercommunity meetings are encouraged from above, rather contacts with religious representatives need to be based on a secular, pragmatic and problem oriented dialogue. This also means that questions of faith and belief are not to be discussed in the public sphere.

The religious representative structure is symbolic, at least for minority faiths. While a Catholic secularity is taken for granted, only an emblematic Muslimness is to be seen as emerging from the grassroots. Although producing its own urban rituals and being a form of institutionalized religious participation, this form of representation engages only elites in the governing process, and also on a superficial level.

Because it is elitist in nature, the structure of representation needs to deal with issues of authority and embodiment. The heterogeneity and plurality within Muslim communities is played down in favour of an image of a fairly homogenous and structured community. However, at the grassroots Muslim communities compete with each other, for influence within the city – gained through access to the process of community representation and for influence on the believers. As diversity is considered important in the city on the discursive level but not in practice, the structure and the needs of the Muslim communities are simplified and homogenized.

The competition and rivalry between Muslim communities allows for a conflicted Muslimness to develop, on the one side influenced by the struggle for social and political legitimacy between different groups, while on the other side formed by politicized local interests. While some grassroots groups struggle for local visibility and influence, other Muslims feel that their initiatives are hijacked and transformed into political projects. This leads to mistrust, among communities and between communities and the local authorities.

Muslimness in Marseille remains private, even in its collective forms. Regarding faith, conditions are imposed once religious practices become visible. In the example of the Mosque of Marseille we saw that it is the magnitude of the project that is considered the biggest problem, followed by the nature of religious institutions that should resemble secular institutions as much as possible.
8.5. Conclusions:

This chapter has explored and compared the extent to which regimes of citizenship and secularity in their particular forms, national and local, together with the grassroots identification of Muslims as a religious group shape a semantic field of possible identifications. It has also focused on Muslimness as constructed in different settings, relating data gathered through ethnographic research to broader historical perspectives that shape each of the research contexts.

Regimes of citizenship represent modern trajectories of believing, belonging and acting together. They are connected to the idea of states, based on nations and articulating the idea of ‘the people’. Nation-states are myths that legitimate action and present a certain order and structure of the social world, and as such they contain and are contained by the social imaginary, especially in what secularity is concerned. Citizenship becomes the symbol of this relationship, while regimes of citizenship provide a collective identity and a inclusion and exclusion mechanism on which the nation and the community of the people is based.

Citizenship is articulated at different levels of the state apparatus, nationally and locally. However, its most important function is defining boundaries and limits, in the physical and the social sense: the boundaries of the state and of the nation through the legal sense of citizenship, the boundaries of the groups of people at the base of the nation by its social and cultural dimensions and the boundaries of its cultural and ethic sense by its moral dimension. Minorities are especially affected by the boundary making mechanism of the principle of citizenship, as they are included and excluded by the nation-state. Religious minorities, I have been arguing, present a double challenge as they both contest the nation and its people dialectics that is at the base of the modern nation-state and its ideology of binary separations that I have discussed before. I have also proposed that Muslims embody these two dimensions of the challenge met by modern nation-states, while explaining the political and media attention received.

Citizenship has been defined as contextual. As nation-states mobilize institutions to regulate internal and external affairs while framing and constructing parts of the social imaginary in order to distinguish themselves from one another, tensions present within the principle of citizenship and its application in practice are becoming visible. I have distinguished between an applied pragmatic citizenship in the Netherlands, a contradictory citizenship predominant in the United Kingdom and a sacralised citizenship in France. Moreover, I have looked into how national citizenship discourses
translate into local citizenship practices. Rotterdam was the setting where citizenship was transformed into an explicit instrument of governing through participation. In Leicester citizenship inherited the security discourse prevalent on the national level but allowed for innovations in the method of governing, while in Marseille local citizenship took over completely the national discourse. Although a general tendency of decentralization has been identified, with a larger responsibility given to local administrators in the governing of (religious) minorities, the localities differ in the use of citizenship, conceptually as well as practically, and in the coupling of citizenship with other policy areas. While in Rotterdam citizenship is coupled first and foremost with social policies and the area of integration, in Leicester local multiculturalism and national security policies build upon it, while in Marseille local citizenship in its moral dimensions draws the contours of belonging.

Regimes of secularity are more difficult to pinpoint. With the exception of France, where the principle of laïcité continuously feeds political and social discussions about the role of religion in public life, secularities can only be identified in the legacy of institutional arrangements catering for religious diversity in the Netherlands and in more general structures accommodating plurality in general, through multicultural policies in the United Kingdom. All three cities investigated have an open and cooperative attitude towards Muslim minorities. However, only in Rotterdam this is encouraged positively by a certain understanding of secularity. In the case of Marseille, laïcité constitutes a barrier towards religious visibility, while in Leicester secularity contradicts multicultural policies. In particular, Muslims living in Rotterdam encounter a politicized regime of secularity inspired by secularization, those living in the United Kingdom a selective secularity, while the Muslims of Marseille are faced with a preferential and paradoxical secularity.

Through the examples of Rotterdam, Leicester and Marseille I have been pointing out that regimes of secularity and of citizenship can best be understood as normative projects. Both are discursively, epistemologically and socially constructed and negotiated and therefore cannot be considered as stable. These dynamic concepts also defy territorial boundaries: I have found differences in regimes of secularity between national levels, between local levels and between national and local levels in each country. The same holds for citizenship regimes.

Although an analytical differentiation between regimes of secularity and regimes of citizenship is appropriate, empirically the two are often blurred. Fissured and aporias within and between regimes become exposed. This challenges also the neat separation between religion and the secular. This is also exemplified by the blurred contours of collective identification as reflected by grassroots initiatives. Although all local initiatives
mentioned in this book have been described as Islamic in nature and have been made by Muslims, it is impossible to distinguish between their religious and their secular purposes. All forms of local Muslimness presented here are formed and negotiated in relation to secular demands and policies giving rise to a reactive emerging Muslimness in Rotterdam, a civil and transnational one in Leicester and a symbolic and conflicted Muslimness in Marseille. Although in all local and national contexts there is a fear of Muslim radicalization all examples brought to my attention during fieldwork point out that Muslim communities are engaging with national and local discourses and practices and shape their demands accordingly. Besides, all initiatives have been developed more or less voluntarily through engagement or participation in the governing and policy-making process. This takes place through representation in Marseille, dialogue in Rotterdam and cooperation in Leicester, involving to different degrees Muslim communities and their organizations and representatives.

Although the analytic model that emerges from the comparison of these three dimensions across three cities seems neat and precise, in reality regimes of secularity and citizenship as well as fields of Muslimness are more diffuse. Certainly, the categories proposed in this chapter should be considered as characteristics rather than as ideal types.
9. Concluding reflections

Religion has become a set of institutions that function to support the secular world rather than a set of institutions that shapes and directs the world. ... In short, the religion-society complex is only parasitic on the sacred-social foundation' (Turner 2011:31)

9.1. Muslimness and public religion

What does the construction of Muslimness in Rotterdam, Leicester and Marseille tell us about the role of religion and citizenship in modern nation-states? This chapter takes the answers given to the research question further, entering into dialogue with the theoretical frames elaborated in the first two chapters and points out the implications of the main findings.

The top-down and bottom-up identification of different populations with Muslimness has initiated discussions about Muslims and Islam in liberal democracies in the domain of secularity and citizenship. Muslims have encountered a double mechanism of Otherization, as being the Other of modern secular societies and also as being the Other of western liberal nation-states. However, this image is not static. Over time ideas on Islam as well as on the role of the state in managing religious minorities have changed, as has the way Muslims identify themselves as religious citizens. This has led to a growing individual and collective identification with Islam among citizens of Western European nation-states, to the detriment of previous categorizations that stressed ethnicity. At the same time, religion as a category has also been embraced by scientific research, which has led to an increased academic interest in Islam as a religion and in Muslims as religious individuals and groups, to the detriment of studies considering this population from other angles. Besides, politics and state administrations have also engaged with the phenomenon of religion. Along this process, not only specific fields of Muslimness have been defined through a changing Islam and Muslim dialectic, but also a more general attitude towards (public) religion and its role in society has been reformulated.

The separation of spheres needs to be understood in its multiple dimensions, as it is highlighted by different parts of the collective social imaginary. On the one hand regimes of secularity work with distinctions between the religious and the political, each
attributed to a separate realm: politics master the public sphere, while religion is relegated as an option for the private sphere. All these categories are constituted and defined through their interrelatedness. While the nation-state seems to separate spheres, the collective arena of the nation and the individual sphere are also related, though in a more fluid way to the private and the public sphere. These are constituted and bounded as such through the defining effort of the nation-state. In the same time it is the nation-state itself that is shaped by its action of naming and delimiting: in relation to its different spheres and the functions with which they are invested. The intersection between these different kinds of ideas about functional separation of social life creates rifts, aporias and tensions such as the ones that encourage the formation of specific forms of Muslimness in the three cities studied.

The case of Islam illuminates the interdependence of the secular and the religious and the processes that take place at their intersection. Moving attention away from Christianity and its relationship to the secular, as already initiated by Casanova, the emergence of Islam sheds a new light on the conceptualization of religion and of secularity. By looking at what Muslimness, that is Muslims and Islam, means in the context of secular western democracies I have highlighted that regimes of secularity develop within the boundaries of one geographical and historical context but also surpass these, as they are part of the modern social imaginary. I have also shown that secularization is a constitutive part of regimes of secularity, nurturing their political nature that has the management of religious populations as its core.

In the case of Islam in Western European democracies the concept of religion is contextual in two ways. First, it matters about what religion we talk and second, it matters in what (national, local) context we are looking at it. There is an enormous difference between the role assigned to ‘home-grown’ religions and ‘other’ ones. A wide variety of approaches can be found towards different religions: while some religions and beliefs are considered harmless and private by the state, others are considered dangerous and public. Islam has been labelled as dangerous and fanatic, as a consequence of global changes in attitude towards Muslims, and as a local and national response to specific contexts. We might believe that this attitude towards Islam is a recent development, caused by recent, global events. However, it is important to realize that this attitude is embedded in a longer history of enmity between Islam and Christianity, between East and West. This relationship is historical and colonial in nature. Thus we need to distinguish between two different dimensions of inquiry: first that of Islam as a religion appearing from the ‘outside’ in the constellation of secular democracies and secondly,
that of the role and position of religion in general, in which Islam is only one example. Going one step further, the argument of this book has been that the existence of the categories we use while contributing to the field of Muslimness is contextual. Beside the fact that contextual understandings of what Islam is and who Muslims are exist locally and nationally, these understandings are reacted upon and created also by the groups that identify themselves with these labels. Categories such as religion, the secular, the state, migrant, minorities and the specific ways in which these categories intersect allowing for their contestation is historical and a result of specific articulations of the social imaginary.

This interdependence between categories has been exemplified in the case of Islam, through a fluid differentiation between the public and the private, the religious and the political sphere. This does not mean, however that secularization does not matter – although the boundaries between spheres are fluid, differentiation is maintained. The fluidity of spheres is caused by several factors: democratic practices of equal participation, practices of governance through representative bodies, the change of the institutional apparatus of the state caused by decentralization, a shift in responsibilities from the national to the local, the increasing importance of the civil society and an emphasis on active, participatory citizenship. All these practices are also corridors that make various forms of engagement possible, and allow for their interpretation by citizens, minorities or religious individuals.

The fluid differentiation of spheres has two consequences: on the one hand Islam and Muslims can enter into the secular sphere of political discussions and policy processes, they can become partners in governing populations considered problematic or hard to reach, and they can also represent a population that does not necessarily share faith, but rather ethnicity or nationality. This can be seen as a simultaneous top-down and bottom up attempt to homogenize an otherwise diverse group. On the other hand, because of the same fluid boundaries, the secular can penetrate into the private, interfering in gender roles, education and morality through normative regulation. Religious institutions and organizations, collective actions and initiatives that are started by Muslims are kept under the vigilance of the state, with possibilities of interference when it is believed that they go against integration, cohesion, security or the radicalization of faith. Thus the secular intrudes into the world of religious institutions and into the world of the believers through its administrative ambitions and moral claims. As such it does not penetrate only into the semi-private world of institutions and associations but also into the individual personal space, contesting matters of individual and collective belief. However, these penetrations and entrances need to be understood.
less in terms of structures than in terms of reformulation and reconstruction: it is not the secular that penetrates the private sphere, but it is top down power using the argument of secularity as differentiation that redefines where the boundary of the private needs to retreat. In the same way it is not only religion that becomes public, but there are certain arguments which are taken from under the umbrella of exclusive religious thought and are reformulated as concerns of the public, irrespective of religious inclination. The secular is neither external to the private, nor to the private and public distinction: instead the grammar of regimes of secularity enables the articulations and applications of publicness and privateness.

**Regimes of secularity determine the publicness of religion.** This public dimension of what is considered religion is encouraged top-down by the state that wants to make sure that the collective activities of its citizens and minorities are visible and thus to a certain extent controllable. This visibility, however, is a controlled and disciplined democratic visibility and not necessarily the visual presence of Islam that has been lamented upon in discussions about mosques, *bijabs* and other ‘religious symbols’. A public dimension of Islam is also encouraged bottom-up, through grassroots initiatives that go beyond individuals and communities and target local change, sometimes even national and transnational change. The field of Muslimness is by definition moralized: different actors favour different labels and prefer different delimitations of structures and their roles.

While the state, through its inclusive democratic practices and the ideological pressure given by liberal categories of thought (see Casanova 1994) encourages Muslims to take part publicly in the civic and the political sphere, activities that start from the grassroots are targeted towards the civic sphere in ways different from those envisaged by the state. Islam and Muslims refuse to accept the place that is relegated to them according to secular principles, and rather embrace the possibilities offered by regimes of citizenship that call for the active participation of citizens. In this way both marginality and privatization are contested, and possibilities for going public are embraced. By becoming public Muslims have the opportunity that they use in different ways, of taking Islam out of the private sphere and making it relevant as a collective force and as a social factor. As religion becomes the main identification of citizens entering individually, but also collectively into the public sphere, it becomes central to identities and processes of (democratic) participation. As such it is not only a marginal and private feature of individual life anymore, but rather a central issue of belief and its place in the modern world.
The role of belief in public encounters remains contextual. For minorities, the top-down, politically motivated policy approaches towards Islam provide an opportunity for collective action and identity. Collective identity and action influenced by top-down frames can be strategic and political in nature. The top-down approach of the state imposes and demands specific bottom-up practices. Difference based on religion is seen as important from the point of view of the nation-state while state attention goes specifically towards Muslims as a religious group (neglecting or minimizing (heterogenous) ethnicity, national provenience and socio-economic position). As a consequence, otherwise heterogenous minorities can be expected to collectively identify and mobilize as a religious group. With the state encouraging active citizenship, religious citizens will necessarily bring their beliefs to the public and to the political sphere.

Most Muslims who have been interviewed for this book turn the idea of active citizenship and religion on its head, using the bottom-up demand of the state for their own purposes that differ according to circumstances. Bottom-up goals can be ranging, as explained in more detail in the empirical chapters, from a defensive, reactive form of community structuring in formation, to symbolic public engagements that protect the privacy of religious life, to civically oriented initiatives motivated by religious belief.

Religion becomes truly public on the local and not on the national level. As a consequence of diversity within Muslim groups and the concentration of Muslim populations in certain, mostly urban areas, the true mobilization of Islam in a public sense takes place at the local level, addressing locally specific circumstances and engaging locally specific regimes. These specific circumstances include the political climate, the heterogeneity of the Muslim population and its degree of institutionalization. The changes and opportunities in the civil society shape the nature of its public profile of Muslimness, but also its extent. While some Muslim initiatives are local in nature, focused on the management of provisions and amenities and the growth of the local Muslim groups, other initiatives engage with national discourses and build upon transnational networks. However, even transnational initiatives are nested and take shape in a specific local context. Religion and religious institutions are active not only at the individual level but also at the macro and meso levels of society. This increases the social relevance of religion in general and of Islam in particular.

The consequences of a public religion focused on the civic sphere are manifold. First, as a consequence of the relationship between religion and the secular there is a clear fluidity of boundaries between private and public, political and religious. This fluidity is caused by the contextual and interdependent nature of religion and the secular.
As the secular and the religious are defined in relationship to each other, the way one is shaped through discourses and practices influences the other. This mutual dependence also has a temporal dimension, as the definition of what counts as religious or as secular changes over time.

Secondly, the different fields of Muslimness tackle issues of individual visibility, such as wearing dress considered Islamic, as well as a community visibility, exemplified through the dimensions and spatial placement of places of worship. Here it is useful to distinguish between an accepted and encouraged visibility and a shunned, feared one.

Thirdly, and most importantly, religion acquires a position in which it can negotiate from a collective middle ground that is neither exclusively religious, nor exclusively secular. Thus social movements that are either religious in nature or use the collective understanding of religion as a banner can mobilize both forms of visibility. Such movements, through their goal, the collective identity they represent, and their ways of translating this collective identity into collective action, contest the legitimacy and the autonomy of the secular, especially through a critique of the (secular) public spheres, but also through an evaluation of the nation-state in general. Through their involvement in collective actions, they question issues of public morality and secular normativity. Through their presence in the public domain religious institutions, representing collective claims, negotiate the border between private and public morality, and question the natural status of secular norms and values. But in this process, the structure of religious institutions is changed: for example issues of uncontested Islamic leadership come to the fore. Not only the structure of religious institutions is challenged, but also their content: as different values are confronted in social life, there is a constant need of reflection and relating, a need to apply religion to circumstances of life. Thus public religion challenges and shapes not only the secular but also the religious.

Fourthly, because Islam is becoming public and civic, in some cases, after having established itself to a certain degree, it steps beyond defending its own interests and cooperates with other religions, fighting for similar provisions, thereby moving from a defensive to an outward orientation.

9.2. Religions, secularities and Muslims

Do the secular and the religious continuously and mutually shape each other? In his ‘Formations of the Secular’ Talal Asad suggested that the secular and the religious need to be historically deconstructed to point out their mutual dependency. Far from
being universal sociological facts, these terms were born in post-Reformation Europe and America, as the account of modernity itself. It is in this context that both terms have acquired universal connotations, and have become tightly interwoven with each other (Asad 2003).

Secularism for Asad is a conceptual domain that implies particular ways of both defining and relating to religion, politics, the public, the private, the self and the nation. This implies that multiple secularities will be created in various contexts. The tool Asad proposed for deconstructing and reconstructing the specific balance between what came to be defined as secular and what as religious is an anthropology of secularism. This approach offers the possibility for an in-depth inquiry into the effects of a certain social and historical context as much as it allows for comparative studies.

Neither the religious nor the secular are stable categories but they are continuously negotiated, disputed and redefined. Through pointing out the different actors and their claims in the field of Muslimness I have shown how states have interest in a domesticized, secularized form of representative Islam that can reach out and mediate between Muslims and the state. These preferences define and construct differences within and between groups that can identify with these labels and they give the freedom of selection (following upon the freedom of naming) to the state. Cities, on the other hand, deal with plurality as a fact of everyday life and they deal with it in a pragmatic manner: they prefer an involved, civically accommodating religious structure, feeding into the various needs of the collective urban life. Besides, Muslim communities would like an Islam that is visible and collective: in all three cities there is a voiced need of cooperation between the different, competing Muslim communities. In reality these positions are much more nuanced, as I have presented in the empirical chapters. However, they are not necessarily contradictory and as such they present an opportunity for negotiation and redefinition, as claimed beforehand, that needs to be understood as a specific articulation of what religion can and may mean.

Regimes of secularity cannot be articulated in a vacuum and in order to be able to pinpoint their plurality and their diverse discourses and practices we have considered their relation to nation-states at different administrative levels. This book has offered a novel point of view by investigating regimes of secularity as contextual and dialectical, with an increased attention towards nation-states, their administrative differences between the local and the national levels and their connection with the principle of citizenship.
Secularities are always plural and when connected to nation-states they give birth to regimes of secularity. This implies that understandings of religion are always plural as well. The conditions of practicing religion, as a constitutive and a regulative process, influence the substance of religion. However, their influence on each other takes place in a field of power – while regimes of secularity serve the identity of the nation-state, religion seldom does. This implies that although secularities and religions have an impact on each other, shape each other and negotiate between themselves their role in social life, in practice their relationship is unequal. In all three cities, the fact that religious representatives and religious individuals join the political or public debate is seen as a political and not as a religious act. Furthermore, all arguments made by Muslims that point towards convergence with secular goals are taken as wishes of citizens, while problems and tensions are seen as having a religious background.

This implies that regimes of secularity, feeding on specific understandings of secularization are a form of persuasion and, in some cases of coercion, that is obscured by its tendency to present secular citizenship as the natural development of modernity. Muslim participation is seen as citizenship when it converges with the goals of the state, and seen as religion when it does not. The state acknowledges what fits as citizenship and marginalizes what deviates as religious. In this way secularity not only recreates itself and its authority, but also shapes a certain regime of citizenship.

Besides the fact that religions and secularities interpenetrate and shape each other, they are both historically constituted. Secularities are historically transforming, closely following other changes of the nation-state. At present, a diminishing and transforming welfare-state, a tendency towards decentralization and a leaning towards liberal values connected with worries about national identity in increasingly plural societies are the main intervening factors. In the case of minority religions, questions concerning migration, integration and minority accommodation also influence the regimes of secularity that shape religion and are shaped by it.

Muslims happen to be both religious and citizens, and in their interaction with the different states, in different local contexts we can see that religion and citizenship do not exclude each other but rather shape and inform one another. Muslim participation is seen as citizenship when it converges with the needs of the state, and seen as religion when it does not. The state naturalizes what fits in as citizenship and what doesn’t fit as religious. Regimes of secularity thus shape both citizenship and religion.
Besides all these factors that are mainly national in nature, globalization also has its say. 9/11 was foremost a global event that has changed the perception about religion and Islam in a radical way. Although national transformations are somewhat independent of these global events, they nevertheless have an impact on the level of the social imaginary, in this case mapping out the probabilities for aggressive and fanatic religiosity in the modern world. It is maybe not such events themselves but the collective emotions that they invoke that become part of our collective perception and understanding. The image of the Muslim terrorist motivated by fanatic faith has permeated the public imaginary and has provoked and in some cases excuses a plethora of political approaches, across the world. In terms of influence on policies, the United Kingdom has been most affected of the three countries studied. Although security concerns were intensified by the 7/7 events, they already fell on the fertile ground of the policy changes following 9/11. The Netherlands and France had a more distant reaction to the same global events, without drastic direct influence being visible in policies targeting the accommodation of religious minorities after 9/11. In the Netherlands however, where national events took place more or less simultaneously (such as the influence of Pim Fortuyn and the murder of Theo van Gogh), it is difficult to point out clear causal connections.

Regimes of secularity need to be understood as normative projects. These projects are shaped and based on political reasoning that is different from state to state, from locality to locality and probably even from community to community. As they are infused with power they function as regimes, defining and regulating the secular and the religious. A state that recognizes different religions and gives them equal public space, such as the Dutch system of pillarisation, constructs a different form of secularity than a state that recognizes one established religion while treating the rest as part of culture, as in the United Kingdom, and a state that is aggressively antireligious but considers all religious dignitaries as state employees, as France does. All these secularities grapple with their own inner contradictions and their own exceptions: the Dutch worry about equality, the British about plurality while the French seem to be concerned with purity. But besides an influence of national specific concerns, demographic balances and political and social struggles at the local level also affect regimes of secularity and religions. Different cities engage in different ways with global and national discourses and practices and relate them to different parts of the social imaginary.

The needs of migrant or minority Muslims in Europe depend on their social and economic background and on conditions they encounter in the receiving country. The
needs of the various Muslim communities have changed continuously. Their approach towards religion and society has changed as well, as it has adapted to the needs of followers and to the demands of receiving nation-states. Thus, diversity within communities and the development of communities matter.

The way religion is governed matters. In the case of Islam the institutionalization of religion is encouraged by the state, on the national and the local level. The state needs a partner in the process of decentralized governance and reliable representatives who can speak for and with a substantial segment of the population. Thus, the privatization of religion is in part a state-encouraged process.

On the other hand, religious organizations need to reach out in novel ways towards believers and to find ways of cooperation with state institutions in order to gain access to resources. For this purpose grassroots initiatives are developed that often address local and national conditions, but sometimes have transnational links. As resources and the number of possible believers and followers are limited, a process of competition ensues between the different religious groups and communities. Thus, the privatization of religion is also a community sustained process, from the point of view of organization and of ultimate goals. The relationship among Muslims is also shaped by claims to ‘true Islam’ that need to be seen as an expression of belief, a way of negotiating authority but also as a reflection of the priorities of different Muslim groups. Religious authority influences the interpretation of religion and its role in public life: multiple authorities speak in the name of Islam while competing among themselves for resources and for followers.

How citizenship is understood and applied matters. This is especially so for minorities with a migrant background, for whom the concept of citizenship has a highlighted legal dimension linked to belonging. Citizenship matters also in the governing of religion. Regimes of active, participatory citizenship have an impact on most of the population of the nation-states in which they are implemented, while presenting a public opportunity for groups working at the border between the private and the public. This is especially relevant for religious groups that are normatively expected to remain in the private sphere while their effect and their collectively based activities are often public in nature.

Once we renounce the binary of secular, religious we can explore the interpenetrations and the superimpositions between these two categories. Are Muslims who take part in citizenship activities and debates involved in a secular process of
governing or do they take religious arguments to the public sphere? From the three local cases discussed we can see that both processes can occur simultaneously, as they show that the secular and the religious need each other in order to ensure their own existence, while their territories are far from exclusive.

### 9.3. Politicizing beliefs

What is the role of religion once public? Does it function as a normative critique?

Charles Taylor (2007) has suggested that an epistemology that ‘buffers’ the individual from the spiritual exists in modern times. This epistemological buffering has been identified in this book as the parts of the modern social imaginary that deal with the distinction between the secular and the religious and the constructions of the nation, the state and its people. Taking the argument of Taylor one step further, I have proposed that besides an epistemological buffering mechanism we can identify a complex social and political mechanism that keeps belief, religion and, along with it, the transcendental at bay. This has been explored in this work through different articulations of regimes, different regimes of citizenship and different regimes of secularity. Because social imaginaries inform structures of power and are informed by them, while they are regulated and implemented through governing strategies and mechanisms, the social-political dimension is crucial. Citizenship and its regimes perpetuate the secularity part of the social imaginary, forming secularity regimes according to circumstances. In the same way, secularity regimes are informed by the state, by the nation and the people that are part of the social imaginary. While developing their practices they form, depending to circumstances, regimes of citizenship. In the case of Islam in general, and in western democracies in particular, we encounter not only a deprivatization of religion but also its **politicization**.

As the state calls upon modernity and rationality, pairing these with regimes of secularity, religion can be considered traditional, irrational and certainly not secular from the perspective of the state. The state creates its own myths and sustains them with particular beliefs. The nation, citizenship and the individual, democracy, tolerance and human rights are beliefs on which regimes of secularity, and beyond that, nation-states rest.

Secularities and religions are interacting in a field of power that favours secularity. As secularity is one of the myths that legitimize the nation-state, religions are necessarily subjected to and shaping secularization regimes. Thus, although regimes of secularity and
regimes of citizenship have an effect on each other, their influence is far from similar. The influence of regimes of secularity on religion can be expected to be considerable larger, given the interest nation-states have in keeping the myth of secularity alive, in discourse and in practice. Religions will have a more limited impact on states and their instruments of governance. Besides, when religious and political goals match, religious actions are mostly considered secular, while if goals diverge they are considered to be religious.

But ideas of nations, as well as ideas of religions increasingly come under pressure of the plurality and multiculturalism that modern societies experience. This does not take place only in western democracies, but may be more visible there. There are no universal solutions to such challenges in a plural society. A secular approach has its own limitations and cannot claim universal validity. In any case, a common language and an all-inclusive shared space is needed for further discussion.

Furthermore, we must not forget that religion opens up probably the only possibility of escaping the immanent world in which we live, by making sacredness and transcendence possible. The current approaches towards religious minorities, especially when governed through regimes of citizenship, neglect and actively diminish this function of religion. By this we are in fact reducing and impoverishing our social world, amputating it from one of its vital dimensions: the possibility of belief in something that is not immanent.

9.4. Immanence and transcendence

Does Islam in its present public forms offer an alternative to the immanent dimension proposed by the secular? As religion is formed and transformed through regimes of secularity it continuously changes, just as the regimes shaping it change. This is why we can talk about an Islam of France, an Islam of the United Kingdom and an Islam of the Netherlands. Also, we can talk about locally specific religious formations as adaptations to local regimes of secularity and specific fields of Muslimness created at the intersection of national and local policies with grassroots initiatives.

But how is this specific and contextual Islam different from a generic, general Islam? On the public level, contextual Muslimness makes Islam lose its reference to the sacred and its claim to be a system addressing all aspects of existence. It becomes a civil religion, filling gaps in the social system: a form of bonding and bridging. Islam transforms into a collective belief. This is not to say that the sacred and the
transcendental are completely lost in the encounter with the secular. Rather, these central aspects of faith are not the norm anymore. As religion can no longer publicly claim an all-encompassing view on social life, it gets fragmented.

It is worthwhile to pause for a while considering two extreme scenarios about the role and place of religion in our modern world. On the one hand we could consider a perspective where freedom of religion allows it to become public and socially oriented, civically minded and immanence focused. This would imply a fluidity, if not a complete unification of the spheres of social life with possibilities of mutual interpenetration and hybridization between the private and the public, the secular and the religious and the political and civic. This would also mean that the difference between the secular and the religious would disappear with time. Religion could in this scenario have more social impact while its institutions would both adapt to and be shaped by other social structures. As such, religion, without differentiating itself as an independent social system, would be a collective force. The social critique exercised by a civic, public religion would be within the immanent realm.

On the other hand, a restrictive take on religion would make it more private and secluded, less socially inclined but more internally and transcendentally oriented. The separation between the spheres of existence would be strict, with religion being assigned a limited and restricted public social role. Institutionalization would also be internalized, while belief would be an individual matter, if not the specificity of a limited group of people. However, the social critique religion could have from this position would be a transcendental social critique, coming from a complete vision upon society.

The consequence of the present regimes of secularity has been a shift in the nature of belief: they have brought about a civic, public religion that serves not only as a way of collective identification for a population trying to escape racial and ethnic difference, but also as a way of governing populations. The consequence of this move has been a Muslimness that serves the strategic goals of national and local governments and of Muslim populations: an immanent religion that is concerned with worldly things. This is the position of religion that different regimes of secularity encourage, be it through democratic participation, an equality approach or through the creating of representative bodies. Present approaches to Muslims and Islam are creating specific Islamic responses to local and national circumstances. As such, because the management of plurality and diversity is targeted, plurality and diversity are recognized and maintained.
9.5. Suggestions for further research

In this book I have been arguing that a field of Muslimness is constructed through the direct and indirect interaction between the state and its discourses and institutions, its policies and interventions and the Muslim populations, their representative bodies and their grassroots activities. As I have pointed out, in different urban contexts the dimensions of Muslimness are shaped by modern imaginaries, national historical trajectories, nationally and locally specific political and social constellations and the nature and amount of grassroots initiatives. In order to point out the role of specific articulation of secularity that I have called secularity regimes, I have looked at a religious minority with migrant origins, the Muslims.

First of all, in order to increase the existing knowledge about how regimes of secularity work and what are the similarities and differences between national, local and sub-local regimes of secularity I would suggest extending the study population with another religious group with migrant origins, either Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, Jains or Buddhists. I expect that a different degree of politicization of religion in this case would mean a different articulation of religiousness and also a different relation to regimes of secularity and citizenship in each local setting. Above all, I expect differences in the way religious groups are constrained or supported by policies dealing with citizenship and secularity and in the way grassroots initiatives are developed.

It would also be interesting for the study population to be contrasted with a religious group without a migrant background. Looking at the religious identification and grassroots activities of this group in comparison with our Muslim minority with migrant origins, I would expect a difference in the way religion is used publicly. With regard to the population of the study I would recommend using a control group, in this case a religious population without a migrant background.

A comparison of regimes of secularity in different nation-states in Europe and Asia would also be of interest. While secularity is considered as essential for the existence of the modern nation-state in Western Europe, in Southeast Asia the proper place of religion is not a state monopoly anymore (Bubandt and Beek 2012). A comparison between religion as treated in the Netherlands and in Indonesia, a former colony where Dutch ideas about the management of religious populations have been implemented, would be interesting, looking only at Muslims in both countries, or at Muslims and Hindus in both countries. In the same way, comparing Muslims, or Muslims and Hindus in the United Kingdom and India and Muslims, or Muslims and Buddhists in France and
Cambodia would be of great interest. Moreover, the comparison between nation-states in Europe and Asia could be deepened through a focus on urban areas on both continents.

These research directions could further explore if the differences found in this book are caused by (1) the position of minority religions considered as the Others of secular nation-states, such as Islam and Muslims, as compared to traditional ‘native’ religion, in this case Christianity, or (2) religions themselves (that is the content of each religion).

Regimes of secularity can best be investigated by giving attention to rifts, problems and tensions. Looking at secularism as a particular discourse, I have been proposing that regimes of secularism need to be considered as contextualized enunciations and applications in practice of this particular discourse. As Talal Asad has suggested, a large variety of competing perceptions exist about what counts as politics and what counts as religion. The oppositions have grown out of particular discourses about society, public social life and the role of religion and politics. Also differing visions compete between different population groups that share the same national space and the same historical period. Thus, secularisms need to be researched in their contexts and in comparison. My approach has been to combine a historical comparison within countries, a comparison between national and local levels and a comparison between local levels. All these aspects contribute empirical flesh but also refine what Talal Asad has called an anthropology of the secular.

The way religion and its public form are shaped depends first on national historically determined attitudes towards religion in general and towards migrants and Muslim minorities in particular. This affects the institutionalization of religious groups and their structure of representation, but also influences the general public discourse about religion and its role in modern life. In other words, specific, historically informed regimes of secularity determine the salience and also the possible forms that (public) religion may take. At the same time however, specific local contexts and specific social problems further influence religion, as a response to specific life-worlds of believers and as initiatives transcending specific concerns.

The powerful and global stigmatization of Muslims must not be confounded with the way Muslim citizens and their political representatives have helped loosen the boundary between public and private through the blurring of boundaries between religion and politics. Their discursive transformation into the perpetrators of numerous
nameable and un-nameable crimes against the West, and the speed with which the public discourse proliferates around these points of tension feeding on the sensationalism they provide must not be attributed to Muslims as such.

The specific constellation of minority status that comes with an inferior position in a precarious balance of power combined with the perception of religious and cultural differences (based on specific ideas about the relation between religion and culture) create a specific field of Muslimness. This has been further complicated through adding a position of ethnic and racial others, as the offspring of colonial subjects, as individuals perhaps endowed with poor material, educational and relational resources.

The boundary between religion and politics is defined through the superimposition of distinct ways of looking at the many different connotations the name or label ‘Muslim’ has. Together with the expansion of the concept of citizenship from its legal meaning to added psychological, social, economic, cultural and racial dimensions, the mechanisms of exclusion and thus of defining otherness multiplied. The plurality of blurred and often fluid categories allows for a multiplicity of possible approaches, for different routes of identification and different ways of engaging with and creating the category of religion. The word ‘Muslim’ has many more connotations than one can describe. As such, this work needs to be seen as a modest engagement with two dimensions of meaning formation. First we have analysed top-down discourses initiated by the state and practices that target directly or indirectly the Muslim population. Secondly we have looked at engagements, interpretations and initiatives considered as ‘Muslim’ in Leicester, Marseille and Rotterdam and initiated at the grassroots level. Together these dimensions form part of specific fields of Muslimness.

This book has engaged comparatively with Asad’s idea of an anthropology of the secular, building upon the work of Casanova and Taylor concerning the role of religion in modern social life. By taking the case of Islam and Muslims, it has circumvented classical studies of secularization that look at the role of ‘native’ religions in modern liberal nation-states. Besides, it has argued that religion and citizenship are both informed by the collective social imaginary and inform regimes of secularity and citizenship, concerned with governing. Looking at the mutual influence of secularity and religion on each other, it has pointed out that Muslims transform Islam into a public religion, changing the way religion is defined while shaping also the understanding of secularity. In this way religion and the secular become politicized, confronting each other as particular beliefs.
Annex 1. Overview of policy documents discussed:

**Rotterdam**


College van B & W Rotterdam (2002) Samen leven in Rotterdam’ Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam.


College van B & W Rotterdam (2003e). ‘Mensen maken de stad... zo gaan we dat doen in Rotterdam : plan voor straataanpak’ Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam.

College van B & W Rotterdam (2004a) ‘Sociale Integratie... zo denken we erover’ Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam


College van B & W Rotterdam (2005b) ‘Sociale Integratie...zo informeerden wij elkaar’ Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam.

College van B & W Rotterdam (2005c) ‘Sociale Integratie...de stad als mozaiek’ Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam.

College van B & W Rotterdam (2005d) ‘Sociale Integratie...geloof is (g)een privé-zaak’ Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam.

College van B & W Rotterdam (2005) « Sociale Integratie...scheiding van kerk en staat’ Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam.


College van B & W Rotterdam (2007b). ‘Uitvoeringsprogramma Dialoog Bruggen Bouwen’

**Leicester**


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Leicester City Council. (2004) ‘Community and Sector Consultation on Community Cohesion in Leicester, Leicester City Council’


Leicester City Council. (2007a) ‘Evidence to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion’


Leicester City Council (2009) Community Cohesion in Leicester (booklet) Leicester: Leicester City Council

Marseille


Annex 2: Overview of questions used as guidance for interviews:

City/civil servants

• Do you work in your area with Muslims/Muslim communities? Could you tell me more about them?
• Do you work with specific communities/organizations/representatives?
• How do you select them?
• What sort of problems/challenges are institutionalized?
• What is the attitude of the local authorities towards the Muslim communities? (changes over time?)
• What is the relationship between the local authorities and the Muslims communities? (changes over time?)
• Is there any dependency on any side in this relationship?
• Is there a special department/policy areas dealing with Muslims? (changes over time?)
• Could you give me examples of specific policies that you consider representative? (changes over time?)
• How are policies implemented? (changes over time?)
• What is according to you the effect of these policies? (changes over time?)
• What are the differences/similarities between how the national and the local government deals with Muslims? (changes over time?)
• Are there any channels of communication between the local authorities and the Muslim communities?

Grassroots

• How is it to be a Muslim in this country? Why?
• How is it to be a Muslim in this city? Why?
• Do you think that Muslims have special problems? If not why? If so that ones
• What are the challenges/problems met by Muslims in these days?
• Did these problems/challenges change over time?
• What are the main challenges/problems of Muslims in this city?
• Are they different from other cities?
• Did these challenges/problems change over time?

• What is the relation between the local government and the Muslim communities (issues, actors, stakes, systems of exchange)
• How do you feel about the government? What about the local government?
• How do you feel about the present policies? Are there policies made for Muslims?
• Do policies affect/help Muslims? Do they affect/help you?
• How accommodating are the local authorities towards Muslim needs? Could you give an example?
• Is Islam flourishing in this country/city?
• Could you give me an example of a successful Muslim initiative?
• Could you give an example of an unsuccessful Muslim initiative?
• What would you identify as the cause of success/ lack of success?

• What is your role/idea of participation in the society?
• In what way are you politically/socially active? Why?
• What is the relationship between what you do and Islam?

• What are the initiatives that you support/helped create/encourage?
• Why is this initiative important?
• Do others support your work?
• Do others have problems with your approach?
• Who else is taking position on this issue?
• How do you manage to finance your initiative?
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Volkskrant (2002) *Het fenomeen Fortuyn*


Random House.


Regimes of Secularity
Citizenship, Religion and Muslimness in Rotterdam, Leicester and Marseille

Summary

Western European nation-states thought that they had solved their ‘problem’ with religion by opting for secularity and for a separation of spheres of influence. This equilibrium, however, proves to be fragile. As Muslim migrants have become Muslim minorities, the delicate and complex balance between religion and secularity, between private and public and between the civic and the political has become unstable once again. This is not to blame entirely on Muslim populations. In fact, the trouble with religion is partly caused by the fascination of nation-states with religion. Their interdependence forms a complex quandary and the ensuing dilemmas are reinforced by the way nation-states frame certain ‘problematic’ population groups and their behaviour as ‘religious’.

Dealing with plurality has become an important part of everyday reality in most of Europe. Along with the growing numbers of European Muslim citizens, the accommodation of internal ethnic, cultural and religious diversity by secular liberal nation-states has become a major issue. How state authorities on the national and local level see and accommodate Muslim minorities depends on specific understandings of the role of religion in social life as encompassed in regimes of secularity, and on specific articulations of equality as implied by the concept of citizenship. Regimes of secularity, a term coined in this book, will be explained later. Because France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are secular, when considering the situation of Muslim minorities and their collective identity in these countries it is important to ask: *When and to what effect does religion become a salient category of discourse and practice in the public and political spheres?*

While everybody seems to know to a certain extent who Muslims are and what Islam is, there is disagreement about what this implies. Furthermore, the category of ‘Muslim’ is used as a form of identification by others as much as a form of self-identification. These meanings and labels do not necessarily exclude each other, but together they form a field of significance to which all actors taking part in the construction of meaning contribute: a field of Muslimness. Muslimness is a concept coined in this book to cover the dialectical conglomerate formed at the intersection of
discourses and practices, from the side of the communities concerned that apply the label of ‘Muslim’ to themselves as well as from the side of authorities and civil society, which use the label of ‘Muslim’ to their own purposes. What the actors who play a part in this conundrum have in common is that they all contribute to the construction of a generic, broad category of Muslimness. This is why the second research question guiding this book is: How is Muslimness constructed at the intersection of national and local governments and local communities?

In order to understand the role of religion in modern liberal nation-states literature concerning the general trend of secularization has been contrasted with critical approaches towards it. Besides, literature concerned with the birth of the nation in contrast and in opposition to religion and its institutions has been consulted. As a consequence the constructed and dependent nature of the nation and of its people has been highlighted in the light of the distinction between the religious and the political. Secularity and citizenship are central concepts throughout the book. Secularity is understood and experienced today as built on the thought of secularization theory, which implies that:

- modernity causes disenchantment of religion and the triumph of rationality;
- religion and other spheres of life are functionally and structurally separated;
- religion has but a weak influence on individual and collective life.

Secularity has been understood as a concept which necessarily relates to religion and which is also dependent upon it (see also Asad 2003). Although modern society claims secularity, both its origins and its principles are inseparable in one way or the other from religion. Also, religion backs up contemporary social structures and political claims-making, crossing above and beyond the spheres of society that should contain it. Citizenship has been understood as the principle that defines the boundaries of the nation and the limits of the community of those who belong to it. As such, citizenship transforms universal ideals into civil rights and duties that are connected to the entity of the nation-state, giving them meaning, voice and substance (Arendt 1958).

The added value of this book is its engagement with etic and emic categories of what counts as being a Muslim, and implicitly what counts as being religious across time and space. On this basis a multilayered comparison has been created of how these different positions in regard to the label of Muslim change and influence each other. This book aims to contribute to the anthropology of secularity initiated by Talal Asad (2003). With that aim it combines a comparative perspective with an attention to:
- contexts and interrelations between different levels of existence;
- different frames and formations of meaning;
- various actors involved in producing discourses and practices.

This book can also be read as an empirical test and an application of Taylor’s ideas about the secular as part of the modern social imaginary (2007). Inspired by him I focus on different secular contexts as formed and interpreted both top-down and bottom-up. More than Taylor, I am drawing attention to the political context in which secularity is embedded and the use of the secular in governance.

The levels of analysis of this study are rather complex: on the one hand the formation of secularity and citizenship and their articulation into regimes take shape in their ideological dimension at the level of the nation-state. On the other hand, as a consequence of the decentralization of the state their interpretation and implementation occurs mostly at the level of the city. Finally, Muslim minorities themselves also make use of secularity and citizenship and critically engage with them through collective claims-making on religious grounds. While the opposition between the West and the East and the special negative attention given to Islam is not new but rather a permanent feature of the history of Western thought (Wheatcroft 2004), Muslims can now engage with this from the position of citizens of Western nation-states. As Muslim minorities feel the precarious and charged balance between religion and the secular: while state authorities and civil society increasingly see them as a religious group, they emphasize their religious self-identification and use it to their advantage.

These diverse contexts asked for varied types of data. First, on the basis of secondary literature I have explored changes in attitude regarding religion and Muslim immigrants in order to construct a historical perspective. Besides, I have analysed national policy documents and advisory reports for France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Secondly, the attitudes mentioned here are further shaped on the local level. Therefore, I have explored local approaches targeting Muslim populations directly or indirectly in the multicultural cities of Leicester, Marseille and Rotterdam through an analysis of local policies regarding the specific needs and problems encountered in an urban space. I have also given attention to their implementation, emphasising what the label of Muslim entails. The period covered is between 1998 and 2008. Thirdly, grassroots initiatives in the three cities have been identified and explored in their engagement with the field of Muslimness. This has been done through ethnographic
fieldwork conducted in Leicester, Marseille and Rotterdam, consisting of participant observation and interviews with local administrators, NGOs and Muslim activists.

**Fieldwork findings in Rotterdam, Leicester and Marseille**

Nation-states are co-producing the Muslim identity through their mechanisms of control, such as discourses and policy processes related to security, radicalization, integration and assimilation. They adjoin certain adjectives to the label of Muslim and through this they contribute to the creation of the field of Muslimness from a power-imbued perspective. Discursively, nation-states connect Muslims to their own goals, practices and populations, relating and ‘forcing’ Muslims to engage with them all. Muslim minorities share a field of Muslimness that reflects different forms of knowledge stemming first of all from different positions vis-à-vis power. While the nation-state expresses the ideology of the state and of its nation at the national level, the local level is more concerned with solving problems in a pragmatic way.

In Rotterdam citizenship is used as a tool to generate public commitment in the city as a whole and at the neighbourhood level. The idea of a shared local identity based on shared principles at the level of the nation-state is a tool that is supposed to invoke a sense of responsibility. Only those who endorse this idea can be considered ‘real’ citizens. Aspiring citizens can become involved in the polis, which is based on the principle of citizenship as equality, but those seen as not yet possessing the proper attributes that form the basis of this equality should be required to conclude a contract. This approach has met opposition from the Muslim population and representative organizations. If an agreement on the norms of behaviour and social interaction can be reached at all, the tasks and duties to achieve more involvement should be equally divided across the entire population. Only this can form a true basis for equality, Muslims in Rotterdam argue. They see citizenship primarily as a tool for inclusion in the nation-state, rather than as a pledge to a set on norms and behaviour. In their view, the principle of citizenship can be looked at from different angles: civil contribution and participation may also be called upon from the religious point of view, that is as duties of the believer. The basis of motivation for certain behaviour can differ between population groups, even if their actual behaviour may have very similar effects.

In Leicester the citizenship discourse only refers to membership in the community, while community cohesion is called one of the main goals of the city. It is the active citizen that is the dream of the local authorities, the citizen who celebrates diversity and participates in civil programs. Citizens themselves invoke citizenship when
the equal distribution of resources is at stake and when Muslim colonial ‘double-migrants’ recall that they were citizens of the Empire. In this tradition the principle of citizenship is not contradicted by internal diversity, rather it is meant to accommodate diversity by distinguishing between its various dimensions.

In Marseille citizenship is foremost connected to a discourse of integration and participation. The essential vehicle of citizenship is considered to be partnership, where citizenship would work as the social bond promoting social cohesion. As the local government considers equal and active participation to be the key to an active citizenship that enables individuals to fulfil their duty of expressing themselves and participating, the areas of education and cultural activities have been gaining importance. Integration, a tool against social exclusion is to be achieved through the aid of intermediary associations, seen as essential tools for participation and consensual decision-making. However, this mechanism of representation based on an ideal of citizenship involves mainly elites and therefore raises issues of representativeness and diversity within the populations concerned.

All three cities call for an active citizenship based on participation and do not hesitate to involve religious organizations, religious representatives and/or religious citizens in the governing process or in policy implementation. The three cities prefer to work with representative bodies that speak for communities, often with bodies that they deem representative for ‘the’ Muslim community. This approach is often problematic, as heterogeneity rather than homogeneity characterizes urban Muslim communities and the process of representation is often arduous. Whole communities can be neglected and marginalized through the appointment of certain bodies as representatives, thus aggravating an already existing tension and competition between the diverse Muslim communities.

While local policies and their implementation call for an active citizenship practiced through civil participation in all three cities researched, they do have different recipients in mind. Rotterdam targets citizens, especially Muslim women, Leicester calls upon civil society to collaborate with the institutions of the local state and Marseille calls for elites to mediate between ‘their’ communities and the local authorities. This accounts for differences in the way citizens are actually empowered to participate and to the areas that are defined as appropriate for participation.

Several features of secularity have also been identified: a politicized secularity inspired by secularism in the Netherlands, a preferential, paradoxical and Catholic
secularity in France and a selective secularity in the United Kingdom. Although each of these aspects has been discussed in relation to the specific geographic locations, they coexist in each place, although their weight varies from one city to another. In France, these regimes of secularity are transformed and adapted to the national and local conditions through a general blindness towards religion coupled with a wish to make Marseille a welcoming, multicultural city. In the Netherlands we observe a moral panic caused by Islam combined with a gendered approach specific to Rotterdam. Finally, the United Kingdom displays a security obsessed view on radicalization coupled with a plural, diversity-oriented multicultural Leicester. At the meeting point of all these conjunctions Muslimness is shaped by regimes of secularity, but also through the agency of Muslim groups and communities living in the cities.

Muslimness in Rotterdam has been mainly reactive so far: reactive to the political and administrative context. Policies and policy frames have had more impact than initiatives that stem from the grassroots. Yet, together they form the causes of an emerging form of collective identity among Muslims, who are looking for possibilities of growth and self-expression. Muslimness as defined from the grassroots strongly emphasizes a changed religiosity, adapted to the requirements of a modern society: self-reflexivity, social activism and social engagement, and individuality in one’s freedom of conscience and in one’s degree of religiosity. Stigmatization, strong top-down approaches driven by political agendas and distinguishing labels are increasingly opposed to and even rejected and by the Muslim minorities.

Muslims in Leicester construct Muslimness around the idea of religion as a positive social force, in spite of the secular character of society. Thus, taking religious individuals and forms of collective organization on board, different alliances are forged on different issues and in different constellations. Muslims in Leicester resent culture and religion being blamed as the causes of the problems whose nature, in fact, is economic. Careful to point out that inequality persists beyond diversity they try to fight against a rhetoric that they perceive as noxious. Muslims who responded to this study feel singled out while their religion is exposed to critiques from many angles: other Muslim communities may always question their purity, while the state may always question their moderation.

Muslimness in Marseille remains private, even in its collective forms. Regarding faith, conditions are imposed once religious practices become visible. In the example of the Mosque of Marseille we have seen that it is the magnitude of the project that is considered the biggest problem, followed by the nature of religious institutions, which
should resemble secular institutions as much as possible. The competition and rivalry between Muslim communities allows for a conflicted Muslimness to develop, on the one side influenced by the struggle for social and political legitimacy between different groups, while on the other side formed by politicized local interests. While some grassroots groups struggle for local visibility and influence, other Muslims feel that their initiatives are hijacked and transformed into political projects. This leads to mistrust among communities, and also between communities and the local authorities.

Conclusions: Citizenship, secularity and Muslimness

Under the influence of world events reflected and interpreted through national and local circumstances Muslims have been increasingly targeted in terms of their religiosity by authorities and civil society. This meant that almost all aspects of these population groups have been seen as an expression of their religion. This has made it difficult to deal with these groups and their demands for accommodation, given the secular nature of the nation-states in which they have acquired membership, often on the basis of (legal) citizenship.

In this book I argue that regimes of secularity and citizenship, both rooted in the modern social imaginary, are essential to understand the position of European Muslims today. Muslimness, I insist, is an appropriate term to capture the wide variety of positions that different actors construct regarding Muslims and being a Muslim, and the multitude of possible positions towards these constructions. Most importantly, the insights of this book highlight present a window of opportunity to rethink and re-evaluate the role and place of religion in modern society. The findings inform us about the immanent struggle in which religious minority groups are caught up, while the importance of their relationship to transcendence decreases as a consequence of this.

Western European nation-states look at religious migrants or minorities through two paradigms of subjectivization, first by defining Otherness in terms of religion and secondly, by filtering Otherness through the paradigm of citizenship. One of the insights of this book is that a focus on citizenship and secularity as two separate entities is not satisfactory. Citizenship and secularity are both articulated in a field of power and used for the purpose of governance. In the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom religion is understood and governed through regimes of secularity. Regimes of secularity, a term coined in this book, are normative systems built upon a separation between immanence and transcendence, religion and the secular. This distinction is a historical construct that stemming from the specific relationship between religious institutions and
the state in each of the three countries studied. Besides, regimes of secularity have a political side. As secularity is at the basis of the nation-state, dealings with religion within the state necessarily take place in a field of power.

Besides affecting the attitude towards religion in general and the studied group in particular in an overarching and rather abstract way as part of the modern social imaginary, secularity and also citizenship work as instruments of governing. However, citizens not only are the recipients of different methods of governance but also respond to these with different practices and discourses, thus giving way to diverse articulations and interpretations of citizenship, secularity and religion. Once more, it is through the continuous meeting and negotiation of citizens as subjects and objects of the nation-state and through the state’s engagement with their religiousness that (part of) religion is shaped as a field of significance. Within this space many actors, among which the state (at different levels) and religious citizens themselves, articulate and conjugate what it means to be religious. More importantly, secularity, religion and citizenship are three concepts that can never be reconciled with each other, as they are born in opposition. While secularity and religion depend and define each other, they are also in an indirect relationship. Citizenship at its turn defines the relationship between the individual and the (secular) nation-state and proposes the nation as an exclusive recipient of loyalty and membership. By proposing an immanent order citizenship, calling upon secularity, formulates two important points of tension for religious citizens.

The same mechanism that produces subjects is also the starting point of subjectivity and agency - discourses and practices that name the subject are the same as the discourses and practices which are incorporated in the subject's self-construction. This dialectic process of identification and identity formation points out that while identity formation is influenced by discourses and practices that define, identification with the given discourses and practices is not a passive process. Religious citizens are neither passive receivers, nor victims of their environment, but they actively create their identity and reshape the discourses and practices that affect them. In the process of self-formation and construction they use labels, names and categories acquired top-down, while they creatively relate and intersect these with bottom-up labels, categories and names. These different positions necessarily influence the way in which social worlds are constructed and explained, but each of them throws light on a different aspect of social reality.