DESIGNING AND MANAGING NETWORKS

Possibilities and limitations for network management

Erik-Hans Klijn

Published as:
E.H. Klijn (2005), Designing and managing networks: possibilities and limitations for network management, European Politicial Science 2005, 4: 328-339

Abstract
If most of our decision-making processes to solve societal problems have a network like character than the question how to deal with these networks so that they can achieve valuable solutions for societal problems is a key question. It is clear that managing networks differs very much from the management advises one can find in the organization textbooks which strongly focus on intra-organisational management.
Not surprisingly there is a large and growing literature on how to manage complex processes in networks. This article focuses on the managing question of networks. After a short elaboration on the emergence and characteristics of networks it focuses on managerial strategies both to mange the process within network, here called process management and attempts to change the characteristics of networks, which in this article are called strategies of institutional design. At the end the article pays attention to effects of network management and the evaluation of management strategies and discusses some future research questions concerning the topic of network management.

Dr. E.H. Klijn
Associate Professor
Department of Public Administration
Erasmus University Rotterdam
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
The Netherlands
e-mail: klijn@fsw.eur.nl
Tel: +31 10 4082069
+31 70 3558342 (home)

1. Introduction: managing networks

Modern decision-making is characterised by the need to offer new and often integral solutions for societal problems that cross-cut boundaries of organisations and sectors. Urban regeneration problems can not be solved by providing housing alone but need policy measures that also include attempts to improve economic factors and solve problems of lack of employment, but combine these measures with measures on social policy. This means that public actors can not achieve much without other actors. The need for new policy solutions and the growing specialisation in our network society (Castells, 2000) create a situation where policy problems have to be tackled in networks of interdependent organisations both public and private. These networks emerge out of the necessity to interact and are both conscious planned in the sense that actors deliberately interact and try to structure these interactions with organisations and rules but also unplanned as a result of coincidental interactions and strategies and past formed rules.

Complexity and networks

This leads to complex decision making processes in which the various actors' strategies clash. In most cases, insufficient organizational arrangements exist to accompany the interaction of actors. Essentially, our government is still organized as it was in the 19th century - with strongly hierarchical departmental and political lines - while society and the administrative reality have changed substantially. The reality of modern decision-making has drifted far away from the simple image of setting goals and policy programs by political actors and implementing them by means of a bureaucratic organisation. If we look at the empirical studies we see a situation in which a variety of actors, acting for different perceptions and choosing their own strategies, try to achieve joint action and influence the formation of policy[i]. Thus both the forming and the implementation of public policy and the tackling of societal problems take place within networks.

Networks can roughly be defined as "more or less stable patterns of social relations between mutual dependent actors, which form around policy program and/or cluster of means and which are formed, maintained and changed through series of games" (Klijn, 1996, pp.97; Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004 69-70). Crucial to the emergence and existence of networks are dependency relations between actors (Benson, 1982; Alter/Hage, 1993; Hanf/Scharpf, 1978). The resource dependencies require actors to interact with each other and create more intensive and longer enduring interactions (the 'patterns') (Laumann/Knoke, 1987; Alter/Hage, 1993). When these interactions sustain, rules (informal and formal) are formed which constitute the structure of the networks. The resource dependencies and rules are being used in sets of interactions around issues that are important in the network (Klijn, 2001). Each of these series of interactions could be called a game. So it is in concrete games or series of games that actors' strategies interact which each other and in which outcomes are realised. But in these games also the given rules of the network and the resource divisions are being used and changed (over a longer period). So the network structure, the rules and resource division, structure the interactions within the network (the games) but in the long run are affected themselves by these interactions in the sense that they are sustained, reinterpreted of changed.[ii]

And network management..

Not surprisingly there have been written a huge amount of literature, which also tries to understand this development theoretically. This literature which can be labelled as a network perspective on public policy and management does not focus on the action of a public actor alone but more on the actions of a network of actors. As such this literature tries to provide a

handle for analysing but also for managing contemporary steering processes (Scharpf, 1978; Rhodes, 1997; Mandell, 2001; Agranov/McGuire, 2001; Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). This management activity has been labelled by many terms- like meta governance (Sorenson/Torfing, ?). network governance or network facilitating - but the most popular term to label steering activities in and of networks has become network management (Friend et all, 1976; Agranov/McGuire, 2001; Gage and Mandell, 1990; Klijn, Kickert and Koppenjan (eds.), 1997; Mandell (ed.), 2001).
In this article we clarify the notion of network management as a governance form and look what the literature has to offer on this point. We start by clarifying the concept of network management (section 2). We then focus on the various types of strategies, which can be found in the literature (section 3) and pay attention to the effects of network management. We conclude which some interesting areas for research on network management.

2. Network management: a different activity

If we observe that decision-making is complex, actors are interdependent and there is no single authority than governing these processes is not unproblematic. As has been mentioned there are various ways in which these governing processes have been labelled. The first important observation is that many interactions in networks occur because of strategic interaction between actors that negotiated about content of policy or desired measures. In that sense often is remarked that networks are self-steering (Rhodes, 1997). Because all the actors act strategically, that is they try to achieve their goals and values in a multi actor setting, outcomes are produced and effects are realised (although these may not be at their liking). Deliberately attempt to govern these processes, which are not solely directed to the own goals of an actor we can call network management. So simply speaking all management are strategies but not all strategies are management. But then the interesting question becomes what network management looks like.

Network management: a complex activity
The essential management image and strategies tuned to intra-organisational settings from the managing handbooks are not quite suited to handle this complex inter-organisational management task. In these handbooks one find the image of management as composed of three main activities. Management involves setting out strategies for the future by the top of the organisation (planning), (re)allocating resources to organisational subunits (designing) that fits the projected tasks and daily managing of the organisations interactions (leading). Note that the classical rational view on management is strongly an intra-organizational view of management (Hunt, 1972; Robbins, 1980).
In a network situation a single central authority, a hierarchical ordering and a single organisational goal do not exist. None of the actors has enough steering capacity to unilaterally control other actors. Network management is, in essence, an inter-organisational activity (Lynn, 1981; Mandell, 1990; Meier/O'Toole, 2001; Agranov/McGuire 2003). A top-down or holistic perspective of management is not likely to be very productive. If a central actor is missing there can be no `system controller'. There is no clear authority structure from which the manager can draw his (or her) steering resources (Mandell, 1990; 2001). This means that the manager has to handle complex interaction settings and work out strategies to deal with the different perceptions, preferences and strategies of the various actors involved.
Network management thus aims at initiating and facilitating interaction processes between actors (Friend et al., 1974), creating and changing network arrangements for better coordination (Rogers and Whetten, 1982; Scharpf, 1978) and guiding interactions (Mandell, 1990;

Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997). Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the `classical' and network perspectives of management.

Table 1. Two perspectives on management

Perspectives	**`Classical' perspective**	**Network perspective**
Dimensions		
Organisational setting	Single authority structure	Divided authority structure
Goals structure	Activities are guided by clear goals and well-defined problems	Various and changing definitions of problems and goals
Role of the manager	System controller	Mediator, process manager, network builder
Management tasks	Planning and guiding organisational processes	Guiding interactions and providing opportunities
Management activities	Planning, design and leading	Selecting actors and resources, influencing network conditions, and handling strategic complexity

Adapted from Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997

Why network management?

If we look at table 1 we see that network management is far from easy. So why do we engage in network management at all could be the question. The first observation that can be made on this topic is that most of the literature on networks claims that for a lot of societal problems hardly any other options exist other than steering by network-like strategies. Especially for wicked problems, problems where a lot of actors are involved and there is much uncertainty about knowledge and disagreement about what the problem is and what the best solutions are, conventional unilateral steering does not usually work very well (Hanf/Scharpf, 1978; Rhodes, 1997; Agranov/McGuire, 2001). Public actors who want to solve societal problems quite simply need the information and resources of other actors. Furthermore, simple strategies of top-down steering and contracting are based on the assumption that there is a clear goal or product that can be managed by top-down steering and contracting. But in many decision-making processes this assumption is not very realistic because sharp differences exist between actors on the nature of the problem, or efforts of actors can not easily be monitored. Public managers then have no alternative than to use all kinds of network-like strategies to achieve outcomes.

This is enhanced by the fact that decision-making has become more complex in the sense that different value judgements are involved (environmental values , economic values) and various actors wants to be involved in decision-making (Castells, 2000;Agranov/McGuire, 2003;). So the question why network management can be answered by the simple statement: because society has become increasingly complex and problems demand solutions which require resources of various actors and in this situation classical top down steering is not very helpful or at least insufficient.

3. Strategies for managing or designing networks

So as a result of the complex interactions, which characterise networks, achieving mutually agreeable outcomes is not easy. During the interaction, sharp conflicts may emerge about, for instance, the distribution of the costs and benefits of a solution. But also the different

perceptions of the involved actors on the for instance the nature of the problems, the desired solution or the best organisational arrangements to use for cooperation can be a severe obstacle for achieving meaningful outcomes which satisfy the involved actors.
Since cooperation and the coordination of goals and interests do not occur on its own accord, it is necessary to steer interactions in policy games within networks. The (implicit) assumption is that a satisfactory outcome is often impossible without network management.
Various management strategies are distinguished in the literature. The available strategies can be categorized as strategies of process management and of institutional design (Gage/Mandell (eds.), 1990; Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). Process management has to facilitate the interaction between actors in policy games. This concerns steering strategies aimed at bringing different perceptions of actors together coordinating interactions and other activities. Crucial in this types of strategies is that although they are indirect in the sense that they try to facilitate interactions, they considered the structure of the network the rules as given. They are also direct strategies aimed at actors and interactions (hands on strategies see Sorenson/Torfing ?).
If management strategies are aimed at changing the institutional characteristics of thye network (like changing actors positions, entry rules or other more drastic ways to intervene in the structure of the network) we can label them as institutional design strategies. Both strategies are discussed below.

Guiding and steering the interaction: process management
The number of network management strategies that has been dealt with in the literature to guide interaction processes is impressive and this is not the place to describe them all or to even try to describe a number of them (see Gage/Mandell, 1990; O'Toole, 1988, Agranov/McGuire, 2001; 2003). It is clear, however, that if the network manager is to achieve interesting outcomes he has to implement a range of different strategies (see Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997; Agranov/McGuire, 2001). He has to activate actors and resources (see Scharpf, 1978, Mandell 1990), he has to co-ordinate goal achieving mechanisms which includes influencing the perceptions and goals of other actors , he has to foster or create organisational arrangements to facilitate and enable interactions between actors (Agranov/McGuire, 2003) and last but not least he has to co-ordinate the stream of actions and interactions between different actors (Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997).
Table 1 below summarizes these types of strategies and specifies them by giving examples of each of the category, while making no claims to be exhaustive (for an overview of the many different strategies of network management: Hanf/Scharpf, 1978; O'Toole, 1988; Gage/Mandell, 1990; Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997; Agranov/McGuire, 2001; Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). Not all the strategies mentioned in any one cell are mutually exclusive. One can, for instance, influence the perceptions of actors by activating new actors that bring in those new perceptions.

Table 2 Overview of process management strategies

Type of strategies	Activation of actors and resources	Goal achieving strategies	Organisational arrangements	Interaction guiding
Main strategies mentioned in the literature	Selective activation, resource mobilizing, stabilisation, deactivation of actors and resources, initiating new series of interaction, coalition building	Searching for goal congruency, creating variation in solutions, influencing (and explicating) perceptions, managing and collecting information and research, creating variation by creative competition	Creating new ad hoc organisational arrangements (boards, project organisations, etc.). agreement on a process design	Mediation, brokerage, appointing of process manager, removing obstacles to co-operation, creating incentives for co-operation

Strategies for the activation of actors or resources are necessary to start the game. The network management literature stresses that the network manager has to identify the actors necessary for an initiative and actually create a situation in which they become interested in investing their resources (see also Lynn, 1981). Scharpf calls this selective activation and tells us that the correct identification of necessary participants and the lack of opposition from other actors who possess the resources to block the initiative is crucial for inter-organisational policy making (Scharpf, 1978). Sometimes the manager has to try to deactivate actors because their involvement is not productive. Once the game has been started it is necessary to clarify the goals and perceptions of actors (Forrester, 1989) and to try to invest time and money in developing solutions that create opportunities for actors' participation (Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). But the process sometimes is short of creative solutions, which can satisfy the various actors involve. Then more variation is needed for instance by using different teams of expert who compete against each other in making solutions (Teisman, 1997).
But creating temporary organisational arrangements to facilitate interactions is also important (Rogers/Whetten, 1982). Of course, the transaction costs of these arrangements have to be kept as low as possible (Williamson, 1996). But at the same time the arrangements have to be acceptable for the involved actors. An other important strategy mentioned in the literature is the drafting of a process design with temporarily set of rules for interaction which structure the interactions and protect each actors core values (De Bruijn/Ten Heuvelhof/in 't Veld, 1998). And last but not least, the interactions in the game itself have to be managed. This can be done by appointing a process manager who invests time and energy in connecting the actions and strategies of actors to each other during the interactions.

The strategies that are ultimately selected often depend upon the process. If the process stagnates because of conflicting perceptions, an investment must be made in developing a mutual perception. This can be done, for instance, by analysing differences, searching for common grounds for solutions, generating new solutions or changing and influencing existing perceptions. If the process stagnates because the interactions of actors are not linked, then organizational arrangements or intensive process management are necessary. Hence, one must invest in temporary organisational resources to improve interactions such as through project groups, consultation platforms or mediators who can regenerate the interaction between actors.

Institutional design: changing the network
Institutional design is focused on realising changes in the network. It is based on the assumption that the institutional characteristics of the network influence strategies and co-operation opportunities of actors, attempts can be made to change one or more of these characteristics (see Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). The literature on institutional design in networks is relative scarse and certainly a lot less than literature on process management.

Institutional design strategies are usually aimed at changing formal or informal rules in networks. One can think of rules that regulate access to the network, all kind of interaction rules like rules that regulate the exchange of information but also rules that regulate positions, (cost) benefits or evaluation (see Ostrom, 1986; Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). Because rules are mostly gradually formed over time or in the case of formal rules, created in complex institutional arenas, institutional design strategies are difficult to implement and usually take a lot of time. This makes them unsuitable for achieving changes in policy games that are already underway. Roughly one can observe three types of strategies of institutional design (Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004):

- Strategies aimed at the *network composition*; these are strategies, which focus on changing or influencing the composition of the network. This intervention is based on

the premise that the composition of the network (and changes made in the composition) has an influence on the interactions (and thus outcomes) occurring within it. There are various ways in which the composition of the network may be changed. For example, strategies aimed at consolidating or changing actors' positions or adding new actors. However, strategies may also be aimed at changing the access rules for actors or at influencing the network as a whole by promoting network formation, and self-regulation, or modifications to the system. The various strategies range from relatively light interventions, like lay down actors positions which only confirms achieved and existing rules, to more encompassing interventions like system modifications. An intervention like system modification not only involves a larger variety of rules affected, but also influences more deeply the position and identities of actors and thus mostly creates more resistance;

- Strategies aimed at the *network outcomes*; these are strategies, which try to influence the standards or the logic of costs and benefits in a sustainable way so that games within networks evolve in a different way because other strategic choices are made. The point of intervention here is thus not the actors as in the previous set of strategies but their choices. This means the sustainable influencing of actors' strategic choices and the outcomes resulting from them. The most important institutional design strategies in this category are strategies to change the pay-off structure (financial or other rewards that are connected to strategies and decisions), to change professional codes (standards by which actors see their professional activities and identities) and strategies, which are aimed at changing evaluation criteria (standards by which actor judge the achieved outcomes). The two last types of strategies are closely connected.
- Strategies aimed at *network interactions*; these are strategies, which try to influence the interactions between actors in a sustainable way. These strategies are thus aimed at influencing rules, which regulate the process in networks and in this way try to facilitate interactions, to put them in a framework or to make linkages. Strategies in this category include developing conflict settlement mechanisms (which regulate conflicts between actors) or introducing certain procedures into interactions (and thus fix certain interaction or decision sequence in the interaction). But strategies such as certification (standards of quality attached to the characteristics of an actor or his relation to other actors) or influencing supervisory relationships also fall into this category.

Network management: an active role

The literature on the network approach explicitly mentions that network management is far from easy. It requires knowledge of the network and numerous skills including negotiation skills since network management strategies are conducted in a situation of mutual dependency. Thus a network manager is not a central actor or director, but rather a mediator and stimulator (Forester, 1989; Gage/Mandell, 1990). This role is not necessarily intended for only one actor. Even though public actors often assume the role of network manager, other actors can do so as well. Which actor has the authority and possibility to fulfil the role of network manager is most certainly influenced by the strategic position of actors and the (behavioural) rules in use in the network (Ostrom, 1986, Burns and Flam, 1987).

Note that managing interactions in networks is a difficult job that requires a lot of effort, interaction and dedication. It also requires the manager to know his/her network. It is certainly not a retreat of the state although it often requires a different role for public actors than governance by top down steering or contracting after public actors have unilaterally defined the content (see: Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997; Agranov/McGuire, 2001; Mandell (ed.), 2001)

4. The effects of network management

What are the effects of these network management strategies on service delivery, outcomes of decision-making processes or the solving of wicked problems?
Network studies show that there are many obstacles to achieving interesting outcomes in complex decision processes. A lot of research has been conducted into various case studies of complex decision making in networks and the general picture that emerges from the research is that achieving interesting outcomes for the parties involved is not an easy job and a lot can and does go wrong. In particular, connecting the various actors' strategies to each other and reconciling differences in perceptions and goals requires a lot of energy on the part of the initiator/manager. An active role needs to be played by a network manager (or more than one network manager) in order to achieve interesting results (Gage/Mandell, 1990; Alter/Hage, 1993; Agranov/McGuire, 2003). But institutional obstacles can also prove a difficult element that hinders successful interaction (Klijn, 2001; Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). Many of these studies indicate that the lack of active strategies on the part of network management contribute to failures in interaction (Hanf/Scharpf, 1978; Hufen/Ringeling, 1990; Mandell (ed.), 2001; Bueren/Klijn/Koppenjan, 2003).
O'Toole and Meier, who collected data from a large number of Texas school superintendents in different educational districts, have done interesting research. Superintendents were asked how frequently they interacted with key environmental actors (school boards, local business leaders, other superintendents and the state education agency). These frequency rankings were used to produce a measurement of network management and were connected to indicators of success and failure in the different educational networks in the districts (Meier/O'Toole, 2001). They found that managerial networking was positively correlated with primary goals (they used standardised test scores of students to measure effectiveness) but also with other indicators of organisational performance. Although Meier and O'Toole did not look at specific managerial strategies (such as those mentioned earlier in this article) and thus were not able to assess the effect of certain types of strategies, their findings are nevertheless highly interesting and valuable.
The conclusion may be that the empirical research conducted so far points to the fact that network management does matter but that a lot of research still has to be done. The most interesting and necessary areas concern the question of which strategies seem to be most effective and further research on the choice of management strategies by network managers.

5. Conclusion: further research

So there is a lot of literature about how to mange complex processes in networks that stress that managing activities are crucial for achieving interesting results. We also have a fairly detailed list of what kind of strategies can be used and also are being used in networks.
On the other side the work has only just started in the sense that many questions are still unanswered. We have much case study material, which shows the importance of network management strategies but we have little information which strategies seem to be most important. In general several questions seem to be important to pay attention to:

- Focus on the manager; we need more information about actual behaviour of network managers and their choices. This is also important to get more insight in when managers do a good job at steering complex decision-making processes vin networks.

So what types of strategies managers use in various context and interesting what choices do they face in their managing activities and what do they choose in these situations;

- What are the effects of network management strategies? An interesting an only little examined question is which strategies are effective and what effects network management strategies have. This is not surprising since the difference in characteristics of networks and the large variety in strategies within the game makes it extremely difficult, maybe even impossible to draw general conclusions. Effectiveness of network management strategies is probably strongly tied to contextual factors like the rules of the network and the type of game the manager finds itself in.[iii]
- Normative questions of network management; This is an important set of questions which concern aspects like what rules is the manger obliged to follow in his actions (like choices in opening and closing decision-making arenas) and what values have to weighted in this managing process.

REFERENCES

- Alter, C., J. Hage, (1993), Organizations working together, Newbury Park: Sage
- Agranov, R., M. McGuire, (2001), Big questions in public network management research, Journal of Public administration research and Theory, vol 11 (2001), no. 3: 295-326
- Benson, J.K., (1982), A framework for policy analysis, in: Rogers/Whetten(eds.) 1982
- Castells, M., (1997), The Power and Identity, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers
- Castells. M. (2000, first edition 1996), The rise of the network society: economy, society and culture, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers
- Faulkner, D., (1995), International strategic alliances, Mc Graw Hill Book company
- Friend, J.K., J.M. Power & C.J.L. Yewlett (1974), *Public Planning: the Inter-corporate Dimension*, London: Travistock Publications.
- Gage, R.W., M.P. Mandell (eds.), (1990), Strategies for managing intergovernmental policies and networks, New York/London: Preager
- Graeber G. (1993), The embedded firm; understanding networks: actors, resources and processes in interfirm cooperation, London: Routledge
- Hanf, K, and F.W. Scharpf (eds.) (1978), Interorganisational Policy Making, London: sage
- Kickert, W.J.M., E.H. Klijn, J.F.M. Koppenjan (eds.) (1997), *Managing Complex Policy Networks*. London: Sage
- Klijn, E.H. (2001), Rules as institutional context for decission making in networks, Administration and Society, vol 33, no. 2 (pp. 133-164)
- Klijn, E.H., G.R. Teisman, (1997), Strategies and games in networks, in: Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan (eds.) 1997
- Klijn, E.H, and J.F.M. Koppenjan (2000), Public Management and Policy Networks. Foundations of a network approach to governance, in*: Public Management*, vol 2, nr. 2, pp. 135-158.
- Laumann, E.O., D. Knoke, (1987), The organisational state: Societal choice in National Policy Domains, Wisconsin,WI: University of Wisconsin Press
- Mandell, M.P. (ed.), 2001, Getting results trough collaboration, Westport: Quorum Books
- Marsh, D. (ed.), (1998), Comparing policy networks, Buckingham: Open University Press
- Marsh, D., Rhodes, R.A.W. (eds.), (1992), Policy networks in Britisch Government, Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Milward H. Brinton, K.G. Provan, (2000), Governing the hollow state, Journal of public Administration Research and Theory, vol 10 no. 2 pp. 359-379
- Nooteboom, B, (1998), Management van Partnerships [Managing of partnerships], Schoonhoven: Academic Service
- Osborne, S.P. (ed.), (2000), Public-Private Partnerships; theory and practice in international perspective, London: Routledge
- O' Toole, L.J. (1997), Treating networks seriously: practical and research based agendas in public administration, Public Administration Review, 57: 1 (pp. 43-57)

- Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, (2000), Sociaal Cultureel Rapport; Nederland in Europa (Social and Cultural Report; The Netherlands in Europe), Den Haag
- Rhodes, R.A.W., (1981), Control and power in central-local Government relations, Farnborough: Gower
- Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997), Understanding Government, Open University Press, Buckingham.
- Rogers, D.L., D.A. Whetten (eds.), 1982, Interorganizational coordination: theory, research and implementation, Iowa: Iowa State University Press
- Scharpf, F.W. , (1997), *Games real actors play; actor centred institutionalism in policy research*; Westview Press, Boulder (Co).
- Teisman, G.R. (1992/1995), Complex besluitvorming [complex decision making] 'S-Gravenhage: Eburon
-

[i] There is a large amount of literature that illustrates and analyses the empirical reality of modern decision-making and its network like character. For recent examples see Agranov/McGuire, 2003, Mandell (ed. 2001), Meir/O Toole, 2001;). Examples of older literature of course start with the famous Hanf/Schaprf (1978) publication but also includes Rhodes 1988, Hufen/Ringeling, 1990; Marsh/Rhodes 1992; Marsh 1998, Marin/Mayentz, 1991; Denters et all (eds.), 2003; Edelenbos/Klijn 2004.

[ii] This notion of structure being both context for interaction and result of interaction is taken from Giddens (1984) who calls this the 'duality of structure'

[iii] Scharpf tries to solve this problem by generalising to types of games and institutional contexts (Scharpf 1997). Although this is a very interesting thought, it will probably remain difficult to reduce the empirical variety of rules and strategies to the very limited number of games and rules Scharpf uses..