Human Security Analysis as a Framework for Social Accountability

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1 – Human-oriented Governance

Social accountability is important because, amongst other reasons, unaccountable powerholders are not perfectly diligent, perfectly benevolent, perfectly informed and perfectly competent. Social accountability, transparency and participation require more than only procedures for reporting and channels for communication. They require relevant ideas and principles, regarding the criteria in terms of which powerholders are to be held accountable. Perfect procedures remain empty if there are no notions about what—and who—should count.

Human rights principles should be central here. The ‘democracy audits’ of IDEA, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, for example, centre on a human rights philosophy, including human rights principles that cannot readily be turned into precisely justiciable rights but which should still carry weight in institutional design and practice (Beetham 2004; Beetham et al. 2008). Human rights standards and principles are often opposed by claims of ‘security’, presented as being the overriding requirements of the national collectivity, typically as interpreted by the national state. We should ask though ‘security for whom?’ and ‘security of which values for which people?’. Too often the security of the privileges of minorities, concealed behind a language of ‘national security’ or of the needs of ‘the economy’ or of equivalent abstracted notions, is given priority over the security of fulfilment of basic needs, basic rights and basic values for ordinary people. The work on ‘human security’ which has grown during the past two decades, as a broader-ranging partner of human rights thinking, tries to counteract such concealment and to place the spotlight on the lives of ordinary people and on respect for their basic needs and rights.

The human security approach provides a framework relevant for much of the post-2015 development agenda and for going beyond the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs; Koehler et al. 2012). After several years of preparatory discussion it was endorsed in late 2012 by the UN General Assembly. This paper indicates the character of the approach, and issues and experiences in converting its general framework into practical plans.

The MDGs have given a major impetus to steering national and international governance beyond only supporting economic expansion, and to focusing centrally on protection and promotion of basic human interests. They have done so though in a rather simplistic standardized way, and deserve to be refined to give space for situation-specific
analyses and accountability processes. A focus on both the purposes of governance and on governance procedures helps to avoid the comparable One-Style-Fits-All syndrome of promotion of a single model of governance that has similarly been conceived by leading aid donors. That syndrome led for many years to external donors kicking hedgehog- or turtle-like governments, without much effect. More appropriate and more effective is an approach that respects national specificity, national sovereignty, national-level knowledge and energies, but that provides an inspiring general vision and a framework for principled and creative local analysis.

The idea that there could be a single universally appropriate procedural and institutional framework for governance has been a fantasy of some international donor organisations and analysts during the past generation. The fantasy survived partly because of the vagueness around the term ‘governance’, and the failure to distinguish between: first, very general notions (Oberbegriffen in German; Colebatch 2009) that cover all forms of managing behaviour – for example notions that refer to all rule-setting and rule-application or to all exercises in guiding behaviour or all exercises in governing; and second, more specific notions (Gegenbegriffen) that in fact exclude some types of governing. Too often that failure to distinguish has meant that authors try to capture the general aura of authority and sophistication attached to the term ‘governance’, and transfer both the aura and the term to just one particular set of arrangements for governing—for example, working through multi-stakeholder networks or indirect ‘steering’ by a government or provision of support for private businesses—and thus advocate that particular set as forming ‘good governance’ universally.

Table 1 integrates and compares a series of these contemporary definitions of governance. It adds an intermediate level of specificity, illustrated by the well-known definition of governance as the ordering of the interplay of State, business and civil society, and by the popular ‘governance triangle’ visualization of that interplay. Snidal and Abbott (2009)’s elaboration of the triangle subdivides it into seven possible patterns of control:- three of those show sole control by one of the three actors/‘estates’; three show control shared by a pair of actors; and the seventh type involves all three actors.

Confusion arises from thinking of governance only in terms of the more specific Gegenbegriffen, for example equating governance to co-determination by state-society-business networks. Recognition that governance typically does and should involve numerous different arrangements, should be partnered by an evaluative picture of what are the shared general purposes by which the diverse possible arrangements are to be assessed, selected and reformed. The UN frameworks of human rights, human development and human security provide such a conception. Thus in contrast to notions of good governance which assert that a particular concrete form of governance arrangements constitutes good governance for all countries and circumstances, a more general and suitable notion of good governance is: governance that furthers human rights, human security and human development.
Table 1: Definitions of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEFINITIONS OF GOVERNANCE</th>
<th>Broader version</th>
<th>Narrower version</th>
<th>Notions of good governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>More general/abstract</strong> (Oberbegriff = master concept – see Colebatch 2009)</td>
<td>‘Conduct of conduct’ = guiding of behaviour, by many tools (governmentality). Governing, in all its forms</td>
<td>Including, as one area of tools: Setting and applying rules</td>
<td>Governing / Guiding of behavior, that well serve(s) human security, human rights and human development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediate degree of generality</strong></td>
<td>Ordering of the interplay of State, business and civil society (the basic ‘governance triangle’)</td>
<td>Snidal- &amp; Abbott 2009’s more complex governance triangle that indicates seven distinct spaces, of which four involve hybrid control (State-business; State-civil society; business-civil society; all three)</td>
<td>Assertion of particular spaces, and/or particular modes of operating in particular spaces, as better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>More specific/concrete</strong> (Gegenbegriff – a concept that highlights one case, contrasted with other cases)</td>
<td>Steering (not only rowing) by government Governing with and through networks (not hierarchy)</td>
<td>Setting the operating environment for markets</td>
<td>Presentation of steering / network governance / support of markets, as the universally appropriate form(s) for governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: author]

Section 2 of this paper reviews these ‘human’ frameworks, with special reference to human security analysis. Section 3 illustrates its application and importance for issues of climate change impacts and adaptation. Section 4 looks at ways to apply a human security framework in planning and evaluation.
2: Human Security and the related Human Discourses

“..anyone who speaks forcefully for human rights but does nothing about human security and human development—or vice versa—undermines both his credibility and his cause. So let us speak with one voice on all three issues” (Kofi Annan 2006)

The purposes and principles endorsed by the leaders of the world’s governments in the Millennium Declaration of 2000 extended well beyond only the MDGs, and reflected more broadly the values of human dignity that have been expressed across several decades via the United Nations through the ideas of human rights, basic human needs, and, since the early 1990s, human development and human security.iii The underlying unity of these ideas was well articulated by, for example, Kofi Annan when he was UN Secretary General, and before him by the Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq (1934-1998). Haq, the main creator of the theme of human security, in the 1994 Human Development Report which he led, had not coincidentally earlier headed the World Bank’s basic needs programmes in the 1970s and founded UNDP’s Human Development Report Office in 1989 (Gasper 2011).

Human security thinking takes forward and refines the theme of basic-needs priorities. We see this in its frequent use of the summary labels ‘freedom from want’, ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom to live in dignity’. Basic human needs are here understood more broadly than as only the ‘freedom from want’ basic material needs. These ‘freedoms’ labels came into prominence already in the 1940s, during the process of defining purposes for the envisaged United Nations system and new arrangements for global governance after the disasters of war and global economic depression in much of the first half of the 20th century. So the human security theme is anything but new. It was however reemphasised by Haq and others, to complement the themes of human rights, which had been prominent from 1948, and human development, which Haq had launched for UNDP in 1990.

As formulated by UNDP, under the influence of Indian economist Amartya Sen, ‘human development’ means expansion of the attainable doings and beings which people have good reason to value – in other words, expansion of their valuable freedoms and capacities. This reflects that development is not only about economic growth, and that while economic growth is one important possible means towards human well-being and fulfilment it does not necessarily and always promote those values and it excludes many other important aspects of life. Within the vast scope of the field of ‘human development’, the highlighting of basic needs as priorities to be secured helps to provide direction.

Further, often the required form for human security objectives is as a human right—such as when we talk of right to life, right to (sufficient) food, and right to basic health. As defined by the Global Environmental Change & Human Security research program (1999-2009) that ran as part of the global International Human Dimensions Program on climate change,
human security is where ‘individuals and communities have the options necessary to end, mitigate or [sufficiently] adapt to threats to their human, social and environmental rights; have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and actively participate in pursuing these options’ (http://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/Definitions.pdf).

Across this connected family of human discourses—human development, human needs, human rights, human security (Gasper 2007)—the following features deserve highlighting. They have received joint attention in the work on human security, for that emphasises the systemic interconnections that become expressed in terms of impacts on individual lives (e.g., CHS 2003, UNESCO 2008, Leichenko & O’Brien 2008, Gasper 2013a):-

- First, the use of a ‘zoom lens’, to look at how individual people, families and groups actually live and can live, including to look at their attainable, reasoningly valued, opportunities. This is the ‘human development’ reconceptualization of the meaning of ‘development’ and it rests on a human rights concern for each individual person.
- Second, exploration of the risks and pressures to which people’s lives are subject within transdisciplinary and global systems of interconnection, and thus the use at the same time of a ‘wide-angle lens’ that extends our field of vision beyond the bounds to analysis that are conventionally set by national frontiers and academic disciplinary divisions.

So, in the ‘human security’ elaboration of the agenda of ‘human development’ we try to look at the whole reality of people’s lives, as affected not only by those factors conventionally measured and described by any one particular scientific discipline—meteorology or economics or entomology, for example—but by the intersecting ensemble of all these factors (UNDP 1994; Haq 1999; Leichenko and O’Brien 2008).

Human security analysis’s concern with the sources of security and insecurity in daily lives helps it to consider ‘which qualities matter?’ in people’s lives and investigate how lives are affected by the intersections of diverse factors—economic, political, medical, gender, class, race, religious, sexual identity, and other factors—that jointly structure and affect people’s experiences. A human security framework thereby motivates and gives structure to listening-oriented fieldwork about daily lives. Often such fieldwork presents perspectives different from the expectations and perceptions of conventional ‘security providers’. We can see this in a book-length study of human (in)security in Bangladesh (Safeworld 2008).

In a survey of 2000 households carried out in 2007 by the Research Division of BRAC, many more people identified ‘freedom from want’ issues as big problems—poverty (69 percent), unemployment (65 percent), provision of utilities (56 percent) and vulnerability to natural disasters (51 percent)—than chose to highlight issues that are conventionally placed under a ‘freedom from fear’ heading (including crime, extortion, and availability of firearms).
‘...the level of insecurity relating to ‘freedom from fear’ is perceived as being relatively low compared to ‘freedom from want’. Bangladeshis consider issues such as poverty, employment, food security and health to be much greater concerns than crime.’ (Saferworld 2008, p.104.) ‘With 50 percent of Bangladeshis living below the poverty line, poverty and unemployment are the greatest concerns for most people. Poverty underlies many other problems. ... [including] access [to] basic services such as healthcare, sanitation and education. Poverty and unemployment are also seen as being the two most important drivers of crime and injustice.’ (Saferworld 2008: p.ii)

Similarly, when the interviews asked which sources of threat made people feel insecure:

‘[n]atural disasters were the most common concern (53 percent), followed closely by a lack of healthcare (48 percent). ... Worries about natural disasters are a much greater concern in rural areas [58 percent in rural areas, versus 37 percent in urban areas]... where the two most frequent responses are crime and drug abuse.’ (Saferworld 2008: p.ii)

Even when people were asked about who and what are the providers of security in relation to freedom from fear, the most common responses were not the conventional security apparatus: ‘...education institutions (43 percent) [and] NGOs/micro-finance institutions (34 percent) [ranked considerably above] police stations (28 percent), Union Parishads /municipalities (28 percent) and hospitals/healthcare facilities (20 percent). These results show that Bangladeshis understand human security to be about much more than crime and justice.’ (Saferworld 2008, p.vii).

‘Natural disasters’ were already in 2007 the greatest felt threat, and climate change is likely to seriously increase their frequency and magnitude. By the end of this century, ‘by some estimates, a one metre sea-level rise will submerge about one-third of the total area of Bangladesh, thereby uprooting 25-30 million of our people... They are most likely to become refugees of climate change’, declared the then head of government (Ahmed 2007). Even much smaller rises could uproot large numbers of people, and so too can the increasingly frequent extreme weather events (IPCC 2012). ‘Despite this, little serious analysis is available of possible scenarios for the effects of climate change on human security in Bangladesh’, at least as of a few years ago, declared the Saferworld report (2008: xvi). The sheer scale of the challenges faced, and of the demands for societal reorientation, may exceed the capacity of business-as-usual politics, particularly the divided party politics of Bangladesh. In addition, the relative lack of attention may reflect that the people at risk are predominantly from poorer groups, those on the lands most at risk of flooding, those with the least robust houses, those who feel they cannot risk to leave animals unattended even during a flood or cyclone.iv

Even less attention is likely in many global power centres implicated in the greenhouse gas emissions that drive the main climate trends. From those centres even the megalopolis of Dhaka may seem utterly mentally remote, including for relative progressives. Gilman et al. (2011), writing in The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society persistently and
exclusively speak of ‘Dakka’. The influential Mike Hulme, founder director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research in the UK and founder editor of the journal *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews (WIREs) Climate Change*, writes repeatedly of ‘Dacca’, the pre-1982 name (Hulme 2009). Strengthening accountability at global scale and national scale requires a change in perspective; and a human security framework can contribute toward this.

3. Building accountability: the case of climate change

Compared to general human development analysis, which considers the entire range of attainable values, the focus in human security analysis is on the basics of being human. Interestingly, this narrower focus can generate in some respects more insight. The focus on basics, of various sorts, including on subjectivity and feelings, deepens recognition of the dignity and lived realities of individuals. Security and insecurity are inextricably concepts that have both objective and subjective versions. Further, human security thinking—in contrast to some work using only ideas of human rights or human development—leads to an emphasis also on the human species, not only on individuals; and to a stress on pervasive interconnection, which grows out of its attention to the complex causation of threats and opportunities.

These themes are all particularly apposite in relation to climate change, which has begun to seriously affect South Asia, not least Bangladesh. Much of the discussion of climate change’s possible and likely impacts remains too abstract and dehumanized. This diminishes the significance of particular shifts in conditions for some particular groups of people, especially when those shifts interact with other conditions and trends and trigger chains of knock-on effects. ‘...studies show that poverty and hunger are likely in places where multiple stressors [such as economic policy reforms, urban expansion, agricultural restructuring, etc.] interact with climate change (Eakin 2005; Leary et al. 2006; Leichenko and O’Brien 2008; Ziervogel et al. 2006)’ (Barnett 2011: 273). Besides the already apparent disruptive shift in average timing and character of the monsoon in Bangladesh, Routledge (2011) notes that increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events will have multiple impacts. As a result of the 2007 Cyclone Sidr followed by the 2009 Cyclone Aila, for example, some women in Satkhira district in southern Bangladesh were having to travel four hours a day to collect fresh water (ibid.: 389). In some cases such ‘one-off’ events have long term consequences, forcing out-migration and thus affecting much else, including relations between Bangladesh and India (Gilman et al. 2011; Routledge 2011).

Correspondingly, much of the discussion of policy for climate change adaptation also remains too abstract:

‘...in climate change terms [adaptation] means actions that are taken to reduce vulnerability. ... The precise goals of adaptation are rarely articulated, which is to say that it is rare to see an academic or policy discourse about adaptation which identifies the specific risks that adaptation seeks to avoid,'
and to whom those risks most apply (such as, for example, the risk of increased malnutrition among women in the [Chittagong Hill Tracts]. For this reason, among others, adaptation will not necessarily be effective, efficient, or equitable (Adger and Barnett 2009).’ (Barnett 2011: 270).

When real specific people are not foregrounded, discussion becomes dominated by the ‘needs’ of things, such as physical structures or ‘the economy’, and downgrades the needs of the mass of poorer people, who are those who are by far the most at risk. In contrast, human security thinking ‘specifies clearly that climate change poses risks to core needs, rights, and values of people and local communities, and in so doing establishes some clearer goals for and metrics to measure the success of decisions about mitigation and adaptation’ (Barnett 2011: 271).

Climate change is an extreme case, but not a marginal case. It will become centrally important for the countries of South Asia during the generation ahead, and is already centrally important for many socially marginal groups. It illustrates in extreme degree the need for intellectual and institutional frameworks that pay attention to socially marginal people, frameworks that help to make power systems and power holders take account of these fellow citizens (national and global) and be accountable to them too. This accountability will require enormous efforts of communication, publicity and pressure, to open eyes and ears and increase sympathetic and serious attention. Routledge (2011) describes the work of the Bangladesh Krishok Federation for landless peasants, at various levels: locally and nationally inside Bangladesh, in the South Asia and wider Asia regions, and globally, for example as a member of the La Via Campesina movement. It campaigns for not only national food security but also local food sovereignty. Lipschutz and McKendry (2011) examine how, at global level, networks of groups like Climate Action Network force some degree of transparency and accountability upon inter-governmental climate change negotiations.

The cooperation between the various levels relies upon clear, motivating and mutually acceptable ‘languages’. Shared, vivid, incisive languages for the communication, publicity and attention are essential, languages that are meaningful for widely separated parties, across divisions that are both physical and cultural. For these roles the languages of human rights and human security have great merits of accessibility, legitimacy and appropriate forcefulness (Gasper 2012, 2013c, 2014).

Political democracy as such shows no clear favourable correlation with the governance capacities and moral imagination required for equitable and effective responses to climate change challenges. This is notably true for the more markedly ‘liberal’ and market-centred democracies of the USA, Canada, and Australia, including when we compare them to non-liberal democratic China (Burnell 2012). Even if the performance of countries classified as democracies were a bit better on average, their average performance is still bad. However, there are important variations between supposedly similar countries, which reveals the influence of and interaction with many other factors besides democratic structures. This shows
the need for detailed retrospective case studies and prospective scenarios, in fact for every country given the importance of climate change.

There remain reasons to consider that some aspects of democracy are important for equity and effectiveness in, and through, responses to climate change. Even if we accept that full deliberative democracy is not a feasible target, elements of participation and of deliberation are important for well-informed, legitimate and equitable decision-making, and thus for coping better with the stresses produced by climate change. They would reduce the risks of conflict, that could lead even to chaos. Burnell suggests that while democracy may be weak for climate change mitigation, it is important for adaptation. One can add that it may be important too for due consideration of the value choices involved in determining responses to climate change, regarding who will bear costs, who bears which risks, and which values will be prioritised. Further, as mentioned earlier, democracy should not be conceived of as only adult franchise in a market-dominated society. It can better be viewed as a human rights based approach that respects the dignity of all persons; as in the work of IDEA and by David Beetham (Beetham and Boyle 1996; Beetham et al. 2008).

For climate change, a central issue about societal responsibility is: What determines the capacity of a society/state to adopt a broad and long-run perspective, that respects the rights and interests of 1. Children (who typically have little voice), 2. Future generations (who have no voice), and 3. People in other countries (who have little or no voice outside their own nation-state). Running counter to adopting such a perspective are the reality of individual mortality and the uncertainties and lags between actions and effect; added to which may be hostility towards other countries, or simply indifference, including to the future: ‘What did the future ever do for me?’ Market systems using market rates of interest heavily discount future generations, and the old age of presently-born children too. Nation-based systems may not consider the rights and interests of people in other countries. Market-based national systems may heavily discount all of these categories.

Determinants of how broad or narrow, short-term or long-term oriented, is behaviour in a society could include the nature of its deliberative institutions and structures, including their deliberative quality (Fishkin 2011), and its systems of thought. Sen argues that public information counters selfishness – because of electoral logics, because of ‘naming and shaming’, and because of arousal of sympathy. But this may sometimes work only for extreme cases, and then not always: in India routine starvation by some marginal groups (e.g. tribals) does not become a shaming political issue. So, also important are appropriate societal ‘language(s)’ and systems of thought, as a precondition for the effectiveness of providing information. Particularly important is the degree to which the ability and habit to sympathetically imagine the lives of others is cultivated – what Martha Nussbaum (1997) calls ‘the narrative imagination’.
In the acclaimed 2009 book by leading British climate researcher Mike Hulme, *Why We Disagree About Climate Change*, he explores in each chapter a further reason why people disagree about climate change. Missing from its 400 pages is mention of the funding provided by corporations and individuals with immense stakes in the fossil-fuel economy. Missing too is much perspective from and for the global South. Hulme notes that which risks get stressed depends on who has voice, and he claims that those who can and do exercise ‘voice’ are the Green affluent classes in the North (Ch.6: The Things We Fear). Implied then as lacking voice are the poor in Africa, South Asia and the Pacific, but in fact the book does not highlight their risks. Hulme quotes Steve Yearley’s view that ‘we are concerned about climate change not so much because of any substantive diminution of human or non-human welfare that might ensue, but because of the strong element of symbolism involved’ (Hulme, 2009:343). The ‘we’ here evidently encompasses rich Northerners, and not Bangladeshis, Ethiopians or Pacific islanders.

The prospective costs discussed in Hulme’s chapter on valuation concern the loss of bits of the natural environment and associated aesthetic values (pp. 114-5, 134): what is ‘the worth of a songbird’, he asks (p.134) ? The examples are not about retaining one’s life and health. Yet, to quote a projection in the World Development Report 2010, business-as-usual warming might bring another three million deaths per year from malnutrition (World Bank 2010: 5). The associated rights-based arguments against global warming concern present generations in the South, not merely the unborn, for the negative impacts will not start only in 2100. Bangladeshi babies today face lives of seriously increased risk of fundamental dangers. Hulme moves on to present the arguments for a high discount rate, that give no weight to the chance that some members of future generations (especially those in Bangladesh, more than those in Britain) may be at risk of devastation, not merely of reduction of a super-affluence far above present day standards (p.122). His discussion of chances of disaster (p.123) does not ask disaster for whom. Its examples are airport security and the risk of a cooker malfunctioning; not drought or flood or famine affecting poor families who are unable to cope with them.

Hulme treats ‘development’ in a separate chapter. After noting that issues look different when seen from ‘Dacca’ (p.252), he spends the chapter on a re-run of the Bruntland-and-beyond debates on ‘sustainable development’, territory that is covered under different labels in his earlier chapters, not on an attempt to see how the world looks from Dhaka (the name adopted in 1982). Bangladesh is a leading centre for the movement around climate justice, and for preparations for adaptation against prospective sea level rises, increased rainfall variability, increased glacial melt, and more frequent tropical storms. It is not mentioned in Hulme’s twelve page index, nor in his Preface’s list of many countries visited. Forty years ago, during a famine in Bangladesh, the philosopher Peter Singer raised the profile of the field of global ethics by arguing that rich individuals and rich countries have a moral obligation to help if they can, even if they have no immediate causal responsibility for the famine. Climate change raises even more compelling claims: the actions of rich countries affect the climate in poor
countries and jeopardise the lives and livelihoods of their peoples and imply obligations to avoid, prevent and compensate for damage caused. In that spirit, Bangladeshi scientist Atiq Rahman argues that: ‘From now on we need to have a system where, for every 10,000 tonnes of carbon you emit, you have to take a Bangladeshi family to live with you.’ Hulme, in contrast, presents the world as viewed from the rich North, looking down on or simply overlooking ‘Dacca’. Arguing in terms of human security and human rights are important parts of counteracting this sort of myopia and for building accountability.

4 – Operationalising Human Security ideas: levels of analysis and action

The final part of this paper looks at work on how to convert a stimulating general conception into practical additions to the tools of governance. In the first decade after the 1994 launch of the human security concept in the Human Development Report (HDR), much effort went into disputes over the concept, including heated arguments over what range of threats should be considered in terms of the language of ‘security’. Some critics of the ‘human security’ notion claimed that the term ‘security’ was, and should be, linked exclusively to state security. They argued that security is a term for prioritization, and that priority must go to the security of the national state since achievement of all other objectives critically depends upon this, as the state (supposedly) ensures the conditions required for pursuit of everything else. Some others accepted a notion of ‘human security’, that refers to security for selected priority aspects of people’s lives, but claimed that a broad interpretation there will lead to analytical confusion, unmanageability and lack of policy focus, so that ‘human security’ should only refer to people’s safety from intentional physical violence (e.g., MacFarlane and Kheong 2006).

Gradually acceptance has spread that, first, state security is only a means, that does not always and necessarily promote people’s security, for which much else is required, so that independent attention to human security, the security of persons, is essential; second, that prioritization, and hence the term ‘security’, apply and have always applied to much more than physical safety, including to food security, ‘social security’, livelihood security, environmental security, and more; and third, that what are relevant priorities must be a matter partly for situation-specific analysis and political choice in each given time and place.

Initially after the 1994 HDR, most attempts to apply the human security concept tended to stick to a few key ideas: ix

1. A people-centered perspective. This gave an answer to the question: whose security?
2. Two or three central, very broad, freedoms: freedoms from want and fear; and, less commonly, freedom from indignity. These gave answers to the question: security of what?
3. Seven areas of security/insecurity specified in the 1994 HDR: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security/insecurity. These constituted more specific answers to the question: security of what?
4. The importance both of protection—the promotion of security from above—and empowerment, which promotes security from below. These themes constituted initial answers to the question: security how?—provided by whom or through what means?

Later, from the 2001-3 Commission on Human Security chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen that reported to the UN Secretary-General, came the idea of priority to ensuring a ‘vital core’ of freedoms and rights, and acceptance that this would inevitably be specified in a way that was partly relative to a particular place and time (CHS 2003). This gave an important element of flexibility in answers to the question ‘security of what?’. Barnett explains how the idea of a “vital core” recognizes that there are some non-instrumental values (such as love, as sense of community, and identity) that are critical to a meaningful life, and which are neither basis needs (in the [economic] development sense of this term) nor necessarily human rights (in the legal sense of the term’) (Barnett 2011: 269).

We can see that the four conventionally highlighted ideas above each represent answers to one of the basic questions about human security. Table 2 presents these and other basic questions in its first column. The second column summarises typical responses and emphases in human security thinking, for each of these aspects.

Table 2: Some general features of human security discourse (from Gasper 2013b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTIONS/ISSUES</th>
<th>SOME EMPHASES/FEATURES IN HUMAN SECURITY DISCOURSE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Whose security? – I</td>
<td>Human persons [and communities] not only bigger systems. Downwards shift of focus, from the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Whose security? – II</td>
<td>Human species, not only national systems. Upwards shift of focus from the state, including to the physical environment that sustains human society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Security of what (which values / which sectors)?</td>
<td>In terms of sectors: focus on basic sectors. The conventional list of Freedoms ('freedom from want', 'freedom from fear', 'freedom from indignity'). Meanings of ‘human’ → what priorities? → bodily safety, health, …., but also beyond bare survival. Securing of human rights Securing of present levels? - a concern with stability but in only some respects: stability of basic needs fulfilment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Provision by whom?</td>
<td>Ideas of securitability and empowerment, not only protection and treatment. The idea of a ‘constellation of providers’ (UNDP 2003), not only a single provider, introduces a complex governance perspective, with attention to many different elements of government, mass media, self-help and family help, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Security as perceived by whom?</td>
<td>Both ‘objective’ (as perceived by experts and/or authorized decision-makers) and ‘subjective’ (as perceived by people themselves)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Security against what threats?</td>
<td>Not only against threats of physical violence. An ontology of interconnection and Intersectionality. Attention to nexuses that link conventionally sectorally separated concerns (e.g. macro-economics and health), and to possible thresholds and danger points.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. How much security?</td>
<td>Within sectors: to ensure attainment of at least basic levels. The issue of whether to ensure capability (the potential to be secure), or to ensure functioning (actual security) Principle of harm avoidance, and Precautionary principle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. By what instruments?</td>
<td>Human rights as instruments as well as goals</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
By prevention not only palliation→use also of diverse and unorthodox instruments
Promoting securitability [the ability to defend and promote one’s own security]

All these ideas are general principles, which are not in themselves sufficient for designing a strategy or a project. For doing that, one needs to move from theory to operational criteria and then through to situationally appropriate details of design. Latvia’s 2003 Human Development Report on themes of human security provides an excellent example of applying principles in human security thinking to a specific time and place (UNDP 2003). The same can be seen in various other strong HDRs that have adopted a human security approach, for example for Chile (1998), Afghanistan (2004), Costa Rica (2005), the Arab Region (UNDP 2009), Benin (2011) and Africa (2012).

‘Operationalise’ can mean various things, from narrower to broader: 1. Measure; 2. Institutionalise/design at project level; 3. Institutionalise/design at strategy level (as a sector strategy, or a multi- and cross-sector strategy); 4. Institutionalise, in one’s entire approach, from broad perception and motivation, through agenda-setting and framing, to detailed policy analysis and evaluation. While operationalisation should not be equated to measurement, the latter is important and can be very fruitful. Numerous human security indexes have been devised, for example for worldwide comparisons in some basic dimensions by David Hastings, working for UNESCAP (Hastings 2010), and more tailor-made for particular local situations, as in various national Human Development Reports (e.g. for Benin: UNDP 2011) and in work in the Philippines (Gomez 2011). Scholars in Bangladesh have developed a human security index for South Asia (Khan and Sabur 2011). A typical and very significant finding is large divergence between ‘objective’ (expert-assessed) and subjective (local resident assessed) measures of security. Resident-assessed measures of crime are frequently far higher than expert measures.

Operationalisation in project design has been pursued for years by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (Gomez 2012). Operationalisation in sector-level strategy is illustrated by the work of Mary Kaldor and Marlies Glasius on partly reorienting the ‘security sector’, to respect human physical security concerns (e.g. Glasius and Kaldor 2005); and again by work in the Philippines, done for its Human Security Act (Gomez 2011).

Some work to collect lessons from the past two decades of experiments and experience has been done, for example in a series of regional surveys led by UNESCO (see e.g. Burgess et al., 2007, and the global synthesis report, UNESCO 2008), and in two reviews of the series of national and regional human development reports which have consciously adopted a human security approach: a 2006 review led by Richard Jolly (Jolly and BasuRay, 2006, 2007) and a more recent update (Gomez et al., 2013).

The study led by Jolly looked at the book-length reports prepared for UNDP in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste. It examined how far
the criticisms that had been voiced against (first generation) human security thinking applied to the reports: that the approach is merely re-branding that adds no insight; that it has no clear definition and can cover anything, thus simply muddling policy-making; that it militarizes civilian issues; and that it raises excessive hopes, through vague lofty talk. Jolly and BasuRay found these criticisms firmly refuted by the set of substantial studies that they examined. Instead, use of the approach we described earlier—direct attention to the diverse factors and threats that in combination determine the fulfilment and vulnerability of basic needs, rights and values of ordinary people in their particular and diverse circumstances—added distinctive and novel insights. From the work reviewed, Jolly and BasuRay provided advice for future studies, including the following:

- Do not analyse only in terms of the seven areas of possible insecurity suggested in the 1994 HDR (economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, political); focus and formulate in terms of the distinctive challenges encountered in each specific case. Some subsequent studies follow this advice; many though continue to find the checklist of seven areas a helpful framework.
- Include public opinion surveys, to add ‘subjective’ measures/indicators of security to ‘objective’ ones. This has been widely and fruitfully done in subsequent Reports, for example in those on Benin, Thailand and the Arab Region.
- Compare the security benefits of various sorts from alternative possible expenditures, in order to examine cost-effectiveness and trade-offs.
- Use both human security ideas and human development ideas and draw the connections. This is illustrated in the later Kenya and Thailand reports. Human security analyses illuminate threats which at the same time often indicate opportunities; and central to promoting human security is to strengthen ‘securitability’, the capabilities relevant for responding to insecurities (UNDP 2003).

A recent follow-up study (Gomez et al. 2013) has reviewed over twenty such Human Development Reports, including again the 2003 Latvia and 2004 Afghanistan reports because of their special quality. Most of the reports are listed in Table 3. Findings from this new study parallel those of Jolly and Basu Ray. It shows also how a number of design options have emerged, in addition to the ‘comprehensive mapping’ type of report that tries to survey all the major types of threat to human security. The study identifies three main supplementary options: reports that centre on crime and physical security; reports that centre on State-building; and reports that take up a single specific type of threat or threatened value that has priority relevance in the particular country or region and period—for example, food security, as examined in the Africa regional report of 2012. Studies of climate change and its human implications, and the options for strengthening adaptive capacity, could fall into this last category, though within the UNDP system these have so far been labelled separately as climate or environment studies.
Table 3. Categorization of some of the National Human Development Reports that have explicitly adopted a human security theme. (Based on Gomez et al. 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPREHENSIVE FOCUS</th>
<th>NARROWER FOCUS</th>
<th>(three of the possible variants)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investigation of the context-specific range of primary threats to primary values, done without restriction in terms of how to organize security provision</td>
<td>Focus on one priority set of threatened values: ‘citizen security’, often with main attention given to use of conventional security instruments</td>
<td>Focus on a priority threatened means: the State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on one or two selected, context-specific threatened values or primary threats, without restriction in terms of how to organize security provision</td>
<td>Comprehensive mapping reports:</td>
<td>‘Citizen security’ reports:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td> Djibouti 2012/13</td>
<td> Philippines (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td> Latvia (2003)</td>
<td>State-building reports:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td> Democratic Republic of Congo (2008)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td> Occupied Palestinian Territories (2009/10)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Lead-challenge driven reports:</td>
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<td></td>
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<td> Africa (2012)</td>
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<td> Chile (1998)</td>
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<td> Senegal (2010)</td>
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<td> Uruguay (2012/13)</td>
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Numerous further issues arise in operationalisation: in elaborating methods and in establishing partnerships with existing approaches that already contain relevant methods, such as with empowerment approaches and human rights work; and in evolving skills and procedures for the complex types of ‘boundary work’ that human security thinking leads us into, crossing conventional sectoral and professional boundaries. This sort of exploration is actively underway. It reflects the vigour and value-added of a human security perspective.

REFERENCES


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iii See the books from the UN Intellectual History Project, e.g.: Jolly et al. 2005; Weiss et al. 2005; Jolly et al. 2009.

iv ‘In the 2007 Cyclone Sidr [in Bangladesh] some people died who declined to go to shelters because that would leave their animals unattended, since some who went to shelters during a previous warning were robbed at home.’ (Saferworld 2008: p.iii).

v Unlike in many democracy assessments, which select criteria ad hoc, IDEA ‘derive our assessment norms from clearly defined democratic principles’: popular control (direct or mediated), and equality between citizens in relation to public decisions (Beetham 2004:6). IDEA tries to justify its universal framework (of principles, not structures), by reference to worldwide support for such principles, and reference to normative philosophy and some claimed universals about human nature: ‘it is human equality that makes democracy desirable, human capacities that make it possible, and all-too human limitations that make it necessary’ (ibid:12). IDEA uses a long set of criteria: ‘a functioning democracy requires many interdependent elements’ (p.8). These include economic and social rights: both as the the outcome that people expect from effective democracy and as its necessary preconditions. Choices in interpreting and balancing the different, partly competing, criteria are made by the national assessment teams, including through explicit consultation and public debate. IDEA rejects reducing democracy assessments to a single index because that oversimplifies, hides vital information, and is misused politically.


vii Bangladesh is mentioned once, with reference to an NGO project to help ‘vulnerable delta communities’ (Hulme, 2009: 258).

viii In The Independent newspaper, June 20, 2008; quoted by Dyer (2010:56).

ix Parts of the rest of this section draw on Gasper & Gomez 2011.

x The book appears as part of the South Asia Human Security book series directed by the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies.