INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, WELL-BEING AND TRANSNATIONAL ETHICS

Des Gasper

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PRELUDE

Migration involves a search for well-being and security, but is not guaranteed to bring either. In the short run it quite often reduces both. What are the hoped for benefits for which the risks are undertaken? Insecurity can generate migration, and in the case of refugees from conflict, migration is primarily insecurity driven. But apart from people fleeing the most extreme physical insecurity, what motivates many migrants is something more than security. Migration can itself put people’s security in jeopardy, and migrants are often risk-takers, although sometimes they act on the basis of bad information, miscalculation or duress. It would be self-contradictory to risk everything for the hope of security alone. Some people even flee a security that is felt as stifling or dull. So migration involves considerable uncertainty. Some migrants achieve an acceptable or even admirable outcome while others end in situations of great insecurity and distress. Some lose their lives. The risks are greatest for illegal migrants.

This chapter looks, first, at migrant lives, at being—ill-being, well-being, and plain be-ing—as well as at their degree of security. Security concerns the security of holding goods, and also the risks associated. From looking at be-ing, the contents of migrant life, we can move to consider its evaluation, as well- and ill-being and the justice and injustice of their generation and distribution. One aspect that demands reflection is the frequent divergence between ‘subjective’ (personal intuitive self-assessments) and ‘objective’ judgements (assessments in terms of explicit socially validated criteria of advantage or disadvantage) by or for migrants. Justice concerns the interpersonal distribution of goods and of risks, as well as the nature of processes of distribution. The themes of justice and security overlap strongly with reference to distribution of risks.

From this examination of aspects of being, well-being and distributive justice, I will address, second, themes of transnational ethics. My interest is as much in the significance of migration for global ethics as in commenting on the global ethics of migration. Migration jumbles up the contents of the supposedly separate boxes, the national

1 International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; gasper@iss.nl. My thanks to two referees for valuable guidance, and to Thanh-Dam Truong for involving me in the field of migration research and for continued stimulation and support.
2 ‘Illegals’ is, except perhaps in China, a category in international rather than intranational relocation; this chapter like the book as a whole concentrates on international relocation, whether permanent, temporary, indefinite, or recurrent
3 The philosophical term ‘be-ing’ helps to promote our attentiveness to and reflection on the contents and character of daily life, both in routines and in crises.
‘societies’, that are assumed by ‘realist’ international relations and nationalist ethics. As David Harvey declared: ‘[We require] a more unified critical geographical understanding of the world to parallel the contemporary striving for a cosmopolitan ethic … The geographical point is not to reject cosmopolitanism but to ground it in a dynamics of historical-geographical transformation” (Harvey 2000: 557, 560). The topic of migration helps us in addition to consider the content and possible bases and barriers for the value changes required in evolution towards more humane global ethics.

The chapter aims to raise considerations relevant for ethical analyses of migration, with special reference to issues of well-being, not to build a normative model or methodology. It provides a background to such work. In reaction to much philosophical literature on international relations which lacks adequate empirical basis and reflection on its own categories—such as well-being, identity, community, peoples, and societies—it seeks to encourage empirical attention and more empirically grounded conceptual reflection as a basis for philosophical argument, let alone philosophical system building.

BEING, WELL-BEING AND DISTRIBUTIVE EQUITY IN MIGRATION

Be-ing

‘Home’ connotes security. Migration means leaving home, changing location. There are various types of home and of migration. Migration in space is central to economic development. It may be circular or permanent. Birds and nomads are circular migrants; and so, increasingly, are some other humans. It was the standard pattern in Southern Africa in the 20th century. Migration in time constitutes life’s story, from birth through to death. It includes both gradual evolutions and major life turning points, such as marriage and serious illness. Economic development and modernization, political conflict and cultural evolution frequently bring existential migrations: including major shifts in people’s life-worlds, social contexts, values and identities. In Marshall Berman’s words, modern urban environments promise us ‘adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world—and at the same time, [threaten] to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are’ (Berman 1983: 15). Migration in space typically involves existential migration too and thereby represents a life-turning point.

Migration is thus in a sense normal. So is a craving for security. In many cases migrants achieve security, an existential home, through religion; and in most cases through bonding into a new or old identity group.

Migration builds liminal identities, whether conscious or unconscious. Persons’ identity is inherently plural, a vector, as discussed for example by Sen (2006). Migration creates new liminal zones (liminal means at or on both sides of a margin, transition, boundary or threshold). It increases the plurality within identity. But in most cases a core group loyalty remains paramount at the level of conscious identification. And nowadays international migration is less decisive and irreversible, less of an indisputable shifting of one’s allegiance than in 19th and early 20th century moves to another continent.  

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4 South Asian migrants to East Africa provide an interesting test case. Because return to India was considerably easier physically and financially than for their compatriots in South Africa, Fiji and the
Movement to and fro is easier now. Even without movement back, migrants are retaining homeland identities and notions of the land of origin as ‘home’ on a greater scale. These generate calls for overseas voting rights and dual citizenship (see e.g. Espiritu 2004). More important than physical movement is the magic carpet of cheap, unlimited electronic communication, especially satellite- and cable-television. The residents of what Buruma (2006) calls (satellite) ‘dish-cities’ are mentally transported back ‘home’, or to an idealised version thereof, in the same way that American military personnel in foreign bases have long stayed secure in havens of taped Hollywood entertainment.

Liminal identities, created by migration, communications, trade and travel, could contribute to “The global spread of plural loyalties [which] is essential to the creation of a new world order: it is the psychic infrastructure without which the emergence of such an order remains impossible” (Goulet 1982: 127). The contribution is possible rather than inevitable. The Indian who has moved to the USA and gradually acquired a dual loyalty is certainly not necessarily a cosmopolitan with global loyalties. Goulet himself observed that people acquire additional identities in part because they find that it is the best way to maintain their original identities, through coping and succeeding in their new location. Dish-city society has taken us further in this direction. Even so, while a plural identity is not a global identity, communication and co-mingling and the sharing of universalist languages of development and human rights contribute to weakening the traditional domestic-versus-international dichotomy. Toni Erskine (2001), David Held (2004) and others discern a world system of a myriad of overlapping communities, not self-contained nation-states. Through the overlaps, individuals are simultaneously members of many communities, and this may promote a broadening of perspectives and sympathies.

Other-ing is the great counterforce. Creation of stereotyped simplified visions of perceived other groups is a standard feature in the processes of identity formation and maintenance of any group. ‘The other’ is typically seen as having a connected, incorrigible set of characteristics that are inferior, one by one and especially collectively, to the matching set of characteristics of the self-describer group (Connolly 2002; Hansen 2006; Kuus 2002). Such representation is central to the mutual antagonisms assumed in ‘realist’ theories of international relations (Odysseos 2002). Mushakoji (2007a/2010) notes the situation of minorities in strongly nationalistic countries like Japan (and one might perhaps add even the Netherlands). Othering of migrants by ‘host’ country groups reinforces any tendencies they may have to introspective and/or ‘home’ country-oriented identity formation.\(^5\)

The weakest migrant groups suffer loss of rights as well as loss of status. Their dominant identity in the recipient country can become one of identity-lessness as well as other-ness (see Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2003). A twilight, liminal zone of ‘illegals’ serves employers’ and governments’ interests: employers pay less and are restricted less; governments play innocent of the sin of admitting ‘the other’ and acquire no obligations to them; the voters who select governments have access to low-cost goods and services from groups without effective rights who can be summarily evicted when so desired. Sex

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\(^5\) Surveys show, for example, how extraordinarily little most native white/‘autochtoon’ Dutch residents know of the great diversity of ethnic and cultural backgrounds amongst immigrants to the Netherlands from Turkey and Morocco.
workers are invariably one major such group (see Chubu 2008?, Mushakoji 2004). Single migrants, especially single men, provide a demand for sex-work, to add to the clienteles generated by urbanism, liberalism, capitalism and affluence. Desperate, naïve or overly hopeful migrant women provide the supply: persons seeking alternatives and exits from their home country, those who swallow the promises of traffickers, and those who hoped for better things but now must take whatever unskilled work they can get (Truong & Barajas 2006: 16).

Nearly all the above could have been written two or three decades ago. Globalization has recently taken qualitatively major further steps, advises Thomas Friedman in *The World is Flat*, which was reportedly the bestselling nonfiction book worldwide in 2006-2007. ‘Flattening’ results from the Internet, the ease now of electronic uploading rather than only downloading, the seamless integration of computer technologies, and so on. Michael Sandel points out that the metaphor of flatness alludes to this elimination of barriers and not to the medieval notion of a flat world that ends somewhere, contrary to the cover picture for the American hardback edition (Friedman 2006: 236-7). A sphere is a better image for comprehensive interconnection than is a bounded plane.

One side-effect of the recent global unification is that some highly skilled labour has less need and wish to emigrate. The Indian or Chinese computer engineer can and generally now does choose to stay in Bangalore or Shanghai. The question arises: will this become true for other regions? Rwanda’s attempt to leapfrog electronically into the 21st century economy is perhaps one test case.

Will the ‘stay home’ transition ever occur for less skilled labour too? Perhaps not for a very long time. The sex trade, the care sectors and the other labour intensive service industries in rich countries appear unlikely to be substantially replaced by electronic services or displaced by other gadgetry. Instead at present we see the continuing operation of huge push factors and pull factors domestically, from west to east in China, or to Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore and other metropoli in India; including the pure push forces of compulsory displacement, enforced by the State and/or private muscle. Internationally we see sustained high flows, from the Sahel to Europe, from SubSaharan Africa to South Africa, from Central America and Mexico to the USA, and from Eastern to Western Europe; and still from most of the South to a North that is deliberately targeting higher-level knowledge workers and all levels of care workers (IOM 2008; UNDP 2009).

A trend more relevant than teleworking from home for less skilled labour migrants is ‘transnational’ multiple involvement and circulation. Transnationalism involves the intensive routine integration of what were previously largely separate national spaces. People, commodities, ideas and money now move much more readily, to and fro. Indian engineers come and go between India and the US, and Ghanaian traders and professionals move between Ghana and the Netherlands, according to opportunities. Often they maintain bases, operations and even companies in both. And so too now, even if to lesser degree, do individuals of many other types.

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6 'You know, most of the women that are working here have experience as prostitutes in their countries of origin. But other women come looking for another kind of job possibilities, cleaning houses or as nannies, but when they find difficulties to survive because the unemployment, for example, their circumstances force them to switch to the sexual work. Once they begin, it is very difficult to leave that activity. [C47]'; from one of the interviews reported in Truong & Barajas (2006:.16).
Well-Being: Risking Everything for the Sake of – Security?

“Look, I always want something better”; Latin American migrant to The Hague (Truong & Barajas 2006: 23)

Filipino and Nigerian migrants are known for their public cheerfulness. But cheerfulness cannot be taken as the primary measure of well-being or advantage. Some of the cheerful Filipinos and Nigerians may rank their lives far less favourably when asked a question like “How satisfactory are your life circumstances?”, not “How happy are you as an individual?”. There are differences between individuals, and differences on average between culture groups, in responding to the same circumstances. In all groups one is likely to find mental coping strategies, to greater or lesser degree, for living with stresses and difficulties. Religion is one great source of solace and strengthening, not least amongst Filipino and Nigerian emigrants. Depression and unhappiness can hinder rather than spur response to problems, so when one is objectively disadvantaged why should one let oneself suffer subjectively too? But successful subjective coping does not mean absence of objective disadvantage. As capability theory has insisted, this shows the inadequacy (not irrelevance) of happiness measures of well-being or advantage. We must look at more objective measures of well-being, including at capabilities (attainable valued functionings) and achieved functionings. People should be involved in specification of these ‘objective’ measures of their well-being—i.e., in prioritising functionings—since the measures are certainly not value-free and should, for use for public purposes, reflect careful and public valuation. Reference to functionings rather than capability has priority for children and the mentally infirm, and, ironically, for the dead. The capability to have a funeral that is considered decent is no longer sufficient when a person is dead; the actual functioning of a decent event is what is required.

Emigration contains innumerable different pathways and stories. I do not attempt to estimate an overall balance. That no doubt varies with time and place and sector. Also a favourable overall balance in some time-place-sector cases does not absolve us from understanding problem cases at sub-group and individual level. It would not justify inequitable distribution or inattention to areas of major stress and suffering. We need, first, to refine the system of accounting; second, to reflect on the common pattern of apparent rises in objective well-being accompanied by declines in subjective well-being; and third, to look at the distribution and justice of distribution of these costs and benefits.

Cortez (2007: 25) illustrates various of the types of effect in the case of Filipino temporary migrants, and also reports an attempt to draw an overall balance:

The negative long-term effects of temporary migration on the country and to the migrants’ families include disintegration of the family, disruption of family relationship, health issues of children as a result of the absence of migrant working parents, juvenile delinquency (early pregnancies, drug addiction, malnutrition) and school dropout. A four-country (Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Yunnan-China) study by the ESCAP proved that despite problems encountered by migrant workers, the positive outcomes outweigh the negative consequences (ESCAP 2002). The economic benefits that accrue to the migrant worker and his / her family according to Go (2002), is the single most tangible positive effect of migration. The effects are visible in the assets accumulated, small businesses acquired and the social status achieved
Go sees the Filipino family as stable because they have continued to be resilient and have been adaptive to changing situations. Caretakers and other relatives have been playing key roles in taking care of the children left behind (Migrant Watch 2002).

The gains mentioned are direct economic benefits to the worker and family. The possible losses are diverse serious forms of social damage (including euphemistically labelled ‘health issues’), especially affecting children who remain in the land of origin. The costs very possibly bring long-term repercussions, including far outside the family, but those are not mentioned and nor is the category of ‘community’. The dangers are reported as mitigated by coping strategies in which other family members typically compensate for absent parents. These other family members are described like shock-absorbers: ‘stable’, ‘resilient’, ‘adaptive’. The extra burdens on them are not mentioned as costs.

We must look too at the non-economic effects on the migrants themselves. Some can be favourable: perhaps access to better education and healthcare, especially for children who accompany their parents; sometimes access to many more ideas and opportunities, including for adult migrants. Some effects can be unfavourable: loss of friends and family life, especially separation from one’s children (though such losses do not apply in all cases); sometimes loss of respect, identity, meaningfulness and peace of mind, in a hostile or anomic ‘host’ country. “This society has lost it”, comments one Latin American immigrant in the Netherlands (Truong & Barajas 2006: 28). Sexwork in many cases offers significant economic gains but severe non-economic costs to the migrant and her children. There may be few or no economic gains if entry to the trade was chosen out of desperation, as a fallback, or if it was not chosen (thanks to human trafficking) or chosen on the basis of bad information or poor reasoning (see Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2003).

In some cases reports indicate rises in the migrant’s objective well-being indicators but not the subjective ones. This might reflect transference of many of the recorded benefits to other people. But even in cases where the reports are more informative about the content of a person’s own life, mental states can adapt; new advantages may become taken for granted, while some lacks may perhaps wisely become overlooked. Also the criteria used for ‘objective’ well-being could sometimes be misleading: overweighted and incomplete. People seek not only material comfort but security; they seek not only material comfort and security but also stimulation and respect. “Every person and society wants to be treated by others as a being of worth, for its own sake and on its own terms, regardless of its utility or attractiveness to others” (Goulet 1975: 232). And for many persons this involves ‘well-dying’ (Gasper 2007a) as a major concern, including even a wish to be buried in the land of origin. Many Ghanaian migrants to the Netherlands are able to fulfil this wish, though not necessarily through their own savings; rather through the contributions of family, friends and co-community members after the migrant’s death.

In reverse cases we find rises in the migrant’s subjective well-being indicators but not in the conventional objective ones. This could reflect: willing self-sacrifice for the benefit of others, at home; adaptation of mental states, to make the best of a bad job; or, again, the absence from the conventional well-being measures of aspects important to the migrant, perhaps such as felt stimulation and freedom from social restraint (see, e.g., Thiem’s...
Kirghiz case studies). Stability in subjective indicators despite decline in objective ones for the migrant (but perhaps not his or her dependants) can reflect adaptation. Some argue that migrants’ resilience here sustains injustice (Truong & Barajas, 2006: 32) – yet the alternative, lack of resilience, would be worse.

One can feel misgivings in some of the cases where both subjective and conventional objective well-being indicators rise. Much of the flattened global market’s unification is around trivia: world class Indian professionals working flat-out to produce escapist computer games for the US market, for example, as described at length in Friedman’s *The World is Flat* for some cases of mental rather than physical emigration. Talents are commanded by money power. Over time the directions in which they get pulled will change somewhat as money power accumulates in the South, but it will take something more fundamental for people to become pulled by morally weightier forces. Indeed organized wealth readily funds support for the claim that it is morally weighty, as expressed in certain forms of libertarian political theory. Let us move to the issues of distributive justice.

**Distributive Justice?**

“…they have nothing here or there” …

“We did it for the children”.

Migration raises many questions of justice. Are migrants coerced by traffickers? Are they mishandled by state officials? Are they misinformed of their rights by employers and officials? Besides those dimensions of culpable wrongdoing, how just are the outcomes of processes where there is no specific wrongdoer? Thinkers such as Hayek and Nozick, and disciples such as Thatcher, asserted that in such cases the concept of justice was inapplicable.

**The parties**

Let us first simply list the main groups of affected people, before looking at the redistributions than can arise.

1. The relocated: men, women. Some of them drop contact with their place of origin; most maintain it and remit funds.
2. Their accompanying children. This group must be distinguished since their experiences may be quite different. Potentially they are a major beneficiary group, but they are also exposed to significant risks.³
3. Those whom the migrants leave behind:– family; government and taxpayers who in various ways paid for their education and upbringing; labour market competitors who now find it marginally easier to get jobs; … These groups’ costs and benefits depend on whether contact is retained and funds remitted, whether tasks must be taken over, and many other factors.
4. The intake country’s employers, consumers, and government, who may all gain.
5. Intake country workers, and cultural conservatives, who may feel threatened.⁸

³ See for example studies on the children of Japanese Brazilian migrants to Japan, including those in this volume by Harada & Kimura and Mushakoji.
Redistributions

Migrant workers often show enormous altruism for the benefit of their children and family back home. In cases of Latin American migrants in The Hague studied by Barajas and Truong, the sacrifices by some of the migrants were extreme. They had become other-ed from all sides: other-ed in the land of immigration; distanced by those whom they support back home—because seen as privileged, absent from their duties, and/or as dirty, corrupted, for example as sexworkers—and reduced to a ‘wallet’ function; and liable to be still mistrusted and distanced if they return (Truong & Barajas 2006).9 10

Migrant workers enrich the receiver country in various ways, including often culturally and emotionally. In the ‘heart trade’, skilled and sympathetic carers from poor countries leave behind their own children, parents and other intimates and dependants, to care for the elderly, the infirm, and the children of the well-to-do in rich countries. They invest affection, not only time and labour-power (Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2003). Highly attractive to rich countries, the arrangement brings financial benefits to poor countries but at great emotional and social cost. As in the case of the trade in human organs, neoclassical economics declares that the trade must be considered beneficial since entered into by willing sellers who know their own needs and preferences better than anyone else. The argument rests on numerous assumptions, including that choosers are capable, well-informed and not coerced; and the justice of the arrangement is partly conditional on the justice of the starting point. A kidney sale from a poor parent desperate to fund an operation for a child is unjust, when we view it in a broader perspective, even if it is entered into voluntarily and in full cognisance of the risks. Similarly, a life separated from one’s own children, due to absence of opportunities to fulfil social expectations and requirements by staying at home, is unjust, even if it were entered into voluntarily and in full cognisance of the implications, which is certainly not always the case.

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8 The Netherlands journal *The Broker* (issue 1, April 2007, p.13) reports that ‘Harvard economist George Borjas has calculated that in the United States immigration has resulted in a redistribution of wealth of some 2% of GDP from the poor to the rich’, since it keeps low-skill wages down. But World Bank estimates of such impact are far lower, for they include the indirect impacts which can include benefits for poorer groups too, via lower product prices, more investment and more readily available services.

9 A priest reported: “… these women [sex workers] work very hard here in order to support their families in their countries of origin, to save for their old age, and get company when they will go back. But the money disappears very easy and finally they have nothing. The remittances they do are used for their relatives in other things and are not spent as they wanted. … I know a lot of cases of women who returned to the country of origin and are rejected even by their relatives, because they suspect about their activity here. … There is a distrust factor about how they got the money. Generally they don’t find the investments they expected of the money they sent. … The rest of the family ask help for each thing they need in such a way that easily expects the woman who works here to solve all kind of needs of a wide network of relatives there. It’s very sad indeed. It’s the same case as the former Spanish labour migrants: they have nothing here or there” (priest from the Latin parish) (Truong & Barajas 2006: 23-24).

10 See also Barajas (2008) for a survey of all types of Latin American migrants to the Netherlands, including many who are more successful and fortunate, especially the large group who are recognised partners of Dutch nationals.
Criteria

In the case of universally other-ed migrant workers we used a desert criterion of equity: the migrant workers deserve more than they receive, given how much they have worked, sacrificed and given (Gasper 1986, section 6.1). Consistent with an emphasis on desert criteria, Bagchi (2007) notes critically the self-satisfaction of the privileged, such as in the historically immigrant nation of the USA, where present day indigenes enjoy not only the fruits of dispossession of others in the past but also benefit from the effort, ingenuity and good fortune of preceding generations, and thus further enjoy benefits not due to their own work or sacrifice. Rich countries also in general continue to reap benefits from attracting the skills of professionals whose education and training they did not contribute to; while the poorer countries that did contribute may barely enjoy the resulting services. This leads us to Jagdish Bhagwati’s notion of a tax on the earnings of ‘brain drain’ personnel, to be sent to the government of their country of origin.11

In the case of enforced separation from loved ones, we used a fair opportunity criterion of equity. People who have inherited too few entitlements to be able to maintain and stay with their closest family cannot be said to face fair opportunity in relation to others with lavish inherited entitlements. Extreme market-based ethics assert that whatever eventuates from voluntary market processes must be seen as a fair outcome, and consequently as providing a fair starting point for subsequent activity. This assertion requires supplementation by a very particular and peculiar morality of inheritance or theory of identity in order to become converted into a claim that, at this starting point for subsequent activity, those who inherit nothing from their parents are in a fair relation to those who have inherited enormously. Inheritance has nothing to do with desert.

These claims of process equity (which do not cover forced dispossession in the past) are typically combined with a claim that market operation in the long run benefits all, as compared to the benefits from the real alternatives to markets. (The claim is sometimes quietly dropped when the previous market leader’s competitors now appear to be stronger than him.) The two aspects of defence—the claim of mutual benefit and the way that past historical processes are conceptualised—interconnect. It is nearly always possible to posit a baseline for historical comparison that is so low that it makes an outcome appear to be an improvement even for less advantaged groups. Thus if we apply a veil of ignorance to the historical record of dispossession, domination and discrimination—as for example does the prominent American philosopher Thomas Nagel when writing on global justice (Nagel 2005; Gasper 2005a; Bagchi 2008)—and if we have no criterion of desert, then desperation behaviour in the organs trade, the ‘heart trade’ and the sex trade becomes morally unexceptionable.

We have identified some of the relevant dimensions in human lives that involve or are otherwise affected by international migration, and have tried to correspondingly frame evaluative discussion of the well-being and ill-being effects and their interpersonal, including intergenerational, distribution. Let us proceed to more formalised ideas in ethical theory.

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11 Cortez (2007) reports the explosive unpopularity amongst migrant workers and their families of such a proposal in the Philippines.
IDEAS FOR A GROUNDED TRANS-NATIONAL ETHICS

In the second half of the paper, I will not seek to create a separate and distinctive transnational ethics of migration, well-being or migrant wellbeing, but instead present and use selected ideas from transnational ethics and political ethics in general. First, I outline Nussbaum’s critique of the tradition of social contract theory in order to generate a central commitment instead to basic human rights. Second, I observe that the trend in much practice and some theory has been in another direction, towards unification of the globe as a moral arena, unlike in Rawls’s version of social contract theory, but unified as a moral arena that is dominated by market principles rather than principles of humanity. Third, I will extend the call for a cosmopolitan egalitarianism made by many other authors, in a direction indicated by Mushakoji: that of universal human rights but framed within the humanly richer and more conflict-aware perspectives of human security theory and pluralist cosmopolitanism.

As prelude, I draw out some underlying dimensions of this sort of ethical discourse. It arises out of the combination of perceptions of injustice and presumptions that alternatives exist. Relevant possible changes in attitudes include: re-interpretations of what instrumentally furthers one’s self-interest, based on deeper understanding of real interconnections and available options; and, more profoundly, re-interpretations of the character of the ‘self’ and the ‘we’, including of the constitutive content of one’s ‘interests’ and the span of one’s commitments.

The earlier parts of the chapter, on issues of be-ing, well-being and distribution in transnational migration, give us ideas on what are problems to be addressed. They can contribute too in the consideration of how to try to persuade and act, including how to influence perceptions of ‘self’, ‘we’, and even of ‘interest’, ‘being’, and ‘well’.

Finding alternatives to injustice, via re-interpretations of ‘self’ and of ‘interests’

People often do not reap as they have sown. Life contains considerable injustice and misfortune. So there is a role for ethically driven reconsideration and rectification. This is a theme in ethics in general, and certainly in development ethics and global ethics in particular. By development ethics I mean here, like Mushakoji (2007a/2010), the field that asks, in Nigel Dower’s terms: “How ought a society to exist and move into the future?”, as partner to the traditional field of personal ethics that asks “How ought one to live as an individual?” The emergent field of global ethics asks the former question in terms of world society (Dower 1988).

A partner theme in development ethics and global ethics is that responses to opportunities created by scientific, technical and economic change are not pre-fixed: a range of alternative possible responses exists. The space for alternatives gives the opportunity, not just desirability, for reconsiderations and rectifications. Societal trajectories will depend upon ethical perspectives, feelings of identity and security, concepts of humanity and rights. Mushakoji’s work (e.g., 2004, 2007a&b, 2010) illustrates this with reference to migration to Japan and the debates over Japanese national identity.
Using the space for ethical consideration of alternatives involves, amongst other aspects, building arguments in terms of enlightened self-interest, and eventual reconsideration also of ‘self’ and ‘interest’. In the former area, Mushakoji stresses how mainstream Japanese need to feel that it contributes to their own security to have secure and respected minority groups who will also help to link them to the rest of the world. Enlightened self-interest arguments connect to the theme in globalization and human security studies of ‘common security’: in other words, not respecting others’ security will undermine your own security. In an interconnected world, where one deals with intelligent others who have agency, ye reap as ye sow, at least sometimes. Others’ coping behaviour, moral outrage and reactions can mean that injustice sooner or later brings a cost for the perpetrators, and sometimes will be overthrown. This is our third theme. It is potentially encouraging, since any rethinking of the contents of ‘self’ and ‘interest’ cannot be rushed, and may be dependent on a prior phase of respectful coexistence motivated by enlightened self-interest.

Fourthly, another key theme in globalization and human security studies, next to appeals to enlightened self-interest based on understanding of complex interconnection, is that international relocation gradually changes the cast of actors—the ‘selves’—and makes it other than presumed in the conventional stories about justice. Thomas Nagel (2005) and many Northern philosophers and politicians propose that the notion of justice does not apply to contexts which lack a sovereign power: notably to relations with members of ‘other societies’. In contrast they presume that their own national societies are well-defined, cohesive and distinct. The rise of transnational society and the large scale presence of members of ‘other societies’ within one’s ‘own’ society destabilise this vision (which was anyway grossly idealised), as Mushakoji explores. The emergence under economic globalization of large immigrant communities in Japan in the past generation, for example, brings a confrontation with the Japanese state’s entrenched ideal of a culturally homogeneous Japanese nation unitedly striving for national development. While the developmentalist Japanese state insists on multi-culturalism in the international arena it rejects it internally. Mushakoji (2007a) discusses possibilities for how this impasse might evolve.

From social contract to human rights

John Rawls revived attention to the theory of justice in modern academic normative political philosophy. He returned to the notion of a fair social contract that all can accept, indeed that all do accept in a notional fair bargaining position in which none know what will be their eventual social identity. He explicitly limited his model to within nation-states of a certain type. A Theory of Justice considers closed societies: “…persons enter only by birth, and exit only by death” (1999: 26). Consider however a rather central feature of America’s historical and contemporary experience: international migration; and suppose, as is reasonable, that one does not know whether one will eventually become a cross-border migrant. But Rawls excluded migrants from his model; they overstrain it. Bagchi proposes that: “Since Rawls’s theory is based on the notion of a contract implicitly or explicitly entered into by citizens of a democratic state, it is
virtually impossible, without altering the structure of the basic axioms, to extend it into
the international arena” (2008: 199), or in other words extend it into the real world.

Let us distinguish social contract theory in its original territory, of the essentially isolated
nation-state; the attempts by other authors than Rawls to extend his principle of fairness
to the world arena; and Rawls’s own very different response. Even for social contract
theory’s original isolated national territory, Nussbaums shows how problematic are its
assumptions. The contractors are assumed to make arrangements only for themselves, not
others, or are taken to adequately represent the interests of those others; they are assumed
to value only their own concerns, and to be indifferent to each others’ wishes, gains or
losses. We saw that in reality many people (such as those involved in or affected by
domestic and international migration) make arrangements for others who are not part of
the contract discussion, sometimes with great altruism, sometimes with indifference or
hostility. Nussbaum argues persuasively that we should not exclude the typical human
motivation for fellowship with others from the set of basic principles that will guide a
theory of justice (2006: 37). The point applies for the international arena too, she argues,
and it undermines authors who seek to retain Rawls’s social contract perspective and to
envisage a self-interested bargain between all persons in a world community.

Rawls himself tried to handle the international arena with instead the assumption that the
sole relevant moral agents there are self-sufficient states, or, in his later work, emotionally united ‘peoples’ (Rawls 1999). ‘Peoples’ are in reality not so strongly internally united and externally indifferent. Instead we see a spectrum, and as in the
‘heart transplants’ in parts of the care sector, quite a lot of affective trade.

Preserving analytic convenience, Rawls dealt with international migration in
extraordinarily cavalier fashion. The Law of Peoples lists the following causes of
migration: persecution of religious and ethnic minorities and political oppression; and
flight from starvation or population pressure, both of which he declared to be typically
related to profound political failures (1999: 8-9). None of these causes are present in
‘well-ordered states’, he declared, those states amongst whom a global social contract can
be arranged. Migration was therefore explicitly ignored in his elaboration of such a
contract (1999: 8). In the case of population pressure, his notion, as articulated by
Seglow, was that: “Pressure to emigrate can only mean that a people has not sufficiently
taken care of its territorial asset” (Seglow 2005: 323); “…[peoples have] to recognize that
they cannot make up for their irresponsibility in caring for their land and its natural
resources by conquest in war or by migrating into other people’s territory without their
consent” (Rawls 1999: 39). Such a conclusion delegitimates the colonization by
Europeans of the present-day United States. The inadequacy of its framework of
explanation becomes apparent as U.S. led global warming drives increasing numbers of
people in other countries out of their coastal or otherwise environmentally marginal
homes.

Nussbaum comes to the conclusion that: “Rawls’s theory of international justice neglects
the inviolability of each person that is a key to Rawls’s domestic theory” and to its
contains no reference to literatures on migration in the social sciences, arts and humanities or journalism, despite the centrality of migration in American history and contemporary life. Whereas his own life experience and exposure could serve him to some degree in providing raw materials for essaying *A Theory of Justice* he had far less grounding for his essay in global ethics. Respect for each person, based in some informed awareness of the contents of their lives, is what the sort of existential survey illustrated in the first half of this paper could contribute to. Fuller examples are seen in studies such as by Ehrenreich and Hochschild, Jordan and Düvell, Mushakoji, Truong and Barajas, Truong and Gasper, as well as in novels such as Tremain’s *The Road Home*.

The way to capture that intuitive appeal of offering respect for each person while dropping Rawls’s misleading contractualist infrastructure is, Nussbaum argues, a human rights approach, reformulated and justified in the language of capabilities theory. She offers a conception of basic human rights, specified in the form of basic capabilities, and grounded in identification of basic needs, those needs prerequisite for human dignity. Her own brand of philosophy relies on intense existential immersion, drawing from life testimonies, literature, biography and legal cases.

Nussbaum applies her theory of basic rights/capabilities in some detail in several arenas, but not yet that of international migration. One could envisage such an application, and could then compare it with for example Benhabib’s or Piper’s work on the rights of migrants. As part of his cosmopolitan egalitarianism (2007: 24-26) Bagchi specifies that “The right to migrate voluntarily is a human right” (2007: 5). He hints at the hypocrisy of any historically immigrant nations, nations indeed of immigration against the wishes of the original inhabitants, which would then control immigration with an iron rod. He contrasts too, as does Thomas Pogge (2005), the prevention of legal immigration of people from poor countries with, on the other hand, the emigration of capital from those countries often without even basic checks on propriety and legality, and on a scale that dwarfs international assistance and in some cases indirectly forces the migration of people.

**Or from national social contract to global market contract?**

As Bagchi observes, not merely have rights declared within national boundaries not been extended to a global context, basic rights within national boundaries are often flouted, even in cases of sustained and strong international attention like the forced displacement of population in India’s Sardar Sarovar Project (2007: 6-7). Pushing contrary to the international human rights movement are a global system of property rights and the influence that property can buy. While the international human rights movement is a form of egalitarian cosmopolitanism, more powerful so far are forms of non-egalitarian

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12 Jordan and Düvell’s book deserves special mention, for its rich investigation into the lives of Brazilian, Polish and Turkish/Kurdish ‘irregular migrants’ (people working without a work permit) in London, and the work of the UK agencies and officials that deal with them, is used to ground a detailed proposal for a long-term goal of open borders combined with a system of unconditional ‘basic income’ in each country. Mushakoji’s work too builds an ethical perspective around careful ethnography and historical study in addition to broad philosophical reading.
cosmopolitanism. These treat the world as a single moral arena but one in which mutual obligations extend at best to contract observance, and then only for actual contracts, including contracts agreed in conditions of great inequality and not from an ideal Rawlsian starting point (Gasper 2005a). Generalised tax evasion and organised opposition to redistributive expenditure are two symptoms of rejection of more extensive public obligations, especially to the poor, let alone to immigrants. “The affluent [in India] seem to have become semi-detached in their own country, inhabitants of a quasi-apartheid system moving further in the direction of Brazil or South Africa. In effect they declare that if the elites and middle classes of other parts of the globe are entitled to live in a certain way, then so are they — by the principle of equal real income (post-taxation) for equal work. … The principle espoused by many has become: ‘If we are obligated to the poor here in India [no longer ‘our poor’], then so are you. Since you are not, then nor are we.’” (Gasper 2005a: 7; see also Gasper 1986, section 7). And in the global market vision, nobody is responsible for emigrants.

Forms of redistribution exist however within many communities, outside the nation-state framework; including of course through networks that involve emigrants. Various factors act counter to the construction and maintenance of national social contracts. Large scale migration could itself be one, but it is a response not only a cause. Emigrants who do not return, and immigrants who do not integrate, both arguably weaken national social contracts or the prospects for them. But more significant than the physical migration of some is the mental and financial emigration of many, notably the better-off, as is eminently possible and perhaps increasingly common in our flattened globe of unlimited communications.

We see diverse competing global projects: the system of a world of separate national homes, in which international migrants are a complication, useful but also felt as a threat; the project of the global market, in which migrants are a mobile factor of production, with few rights; and the vision of a world of international human rights, in which migrants are considered to rightfully share and belong.

**Furthering ethics of compassion, plural identity and human security**

Bagchi’s starting point is a global frame for undertaking explanatory analyses, part of what I elsewhere call ‘joined-up thinking’ (e.g., Gasper 2007b). The levels of migration from developing and transition economies cannot be understood without reference to the enormously increased income gaps between many pairs of countries (Bagchi 2008: 202 ff.). One can refer in addition to the collapse of basic social provision in some countries and global spread of aspirations. Only within an acceptance of a shared moral universe does the enormously increased inequality have a moral significance. How is such an acceptance to be argued for and promoted, in a project of cosmopolitan egalitarianism? To this long-term project we now turn our attention. Most of Bagchi’s concrete proposals to sustain an egalitarian cosmopolitanism—notably, regulation of the export and import of capital in all countries—can be argued for on other grounds too, as done for example by Stiglitz (2007). But underlying such arguments, and evident at last in Stiglitz’s final pages is acceptance of a shared moral universe: “[the American] Declaration of
Independence does not say ‘all Americans are created equal’, but ‘all men are created equal’ ” (p.292).

Mushakoji warns that it would be futile to simply tell Japanese schoolchildren that persecuting their ethnic minority schoolmates violates universal human rights. It could even become counterproductive. How to motivate concern for others, and specifically for migrants, depends on changing people’s imaginations and touching their feelings. The growth of acceptance of ideas of universal human rights owes less to philosophers and academics than to the horrors of the 20th century and the increasing spread of vivid reportage in newspapers, television, biography and other forms of life narrative, suggest Schaffer and Smith (2004). Like Mushakoji, I see helpful potential in a ‘human security’ framework of ideas, to complement, motivate and focus the notions of human rights. His version of the framework goes deeper than that present in most international development agencies, and interconnects reflections on being, well-being, justice and security (Mushakoji 2004, 2007a/2010).

In other work I have articulated the human security framework as containing far more than just the concept from which it takes its name (Gasper 2005b, 2007b; 2008; Gasper & Truong 2010). The set of ideas forms a discourse which has a variety of roles and effects. Like its partner discourse of human rights, it gives moral weight to all humans, as persons, not in proportion to nationality, religion or bank balance; we might call this ‘joined-up feeling’. Like its second partner discourse, that of human development, it essays ‘joined-up thinking’ that transgresses national boundaries, disciplinary conventions and organisational mandates. It goes further than discourses of human development in some areas. In particular, it brings a concern for stability not just expansion, and especially a prioritising focus on basic needs, including for physical security, giving them a status of basic rights. It essays this same necessary prioritising role within the human rights discourse, which is otherwise prone to unhelpful proliferation. The focus on basic requisites for human dignity is vivid, clearly imaginable, and more compelling than more abstracted or generalised languages. It helps to deepen and mobilise awareness and sympathy for concrete other human persons and their life-projects.

Mushakoji argues that a multicultural perspective is vital here: firstly, to avoid the counterproductive “imposition through external pressures of an essentialist universalism [as in some types of human rights doctrine] which only adds to the reactionary virulence of essentialist State nationalism” in those countries which feel themselves pressured by use of what they consider Western doctrines manipulated by dominant powers (Mushakoji, 2007b). But secondly, those same countries should in the same way recognise the collective right of an internal minority to its physical and social reproduction; otherwise they too risk virulent reaction.

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13 For a related discussion, see a set of papers in Development and Change, 37(6), 2006, especially those by Giri and Truong.
14 See also parallel work by scholars at the universities of Duisburg and Marburg in Germany: Bosold and Werthes (2005), Debiel and Werthes (eds., 2006), Werthes and Bosold (2006).
Here, human security discourse can valuably complement human rights language, which can be too individualistic, necessary but not sufficient. Human security thinking connects to realities of vulnerability and feelings of compassion. It stresses relatedness, and thus reconceives who are the relevant actors and groups, and supports the notion of common security: that you cannot be secure unless your neighbours are. Mushakoji notes that, ironically, the Japanese developmentalist state’s quest for identity security through use of an exclusivist notion of Japanese identity undermines the identity security of migrant groups and ultimately weakens Japanese security: “…the Japanese system of identity reproduction represented by its educational system, so carefully dedicated to guaranteeing the social reproduction of human security among the Japanese [is] causing different kinds of insecurity to the migrant communities” (Mushakoji 2007a: 15). “So long as the security of the Japanese majority society is based on the insecurity of the diaspora communities, there will be a social reproduction of the informal sector [in education and in later employment and social organisation] which is not to the benefit of the informal migrant communities nor of the majority civil society” (ibid.: 13).

Like Truong in various papers (e.g., Truong 2005; Gasper & Truong 2009) Mushakoji proposes Buddhist epistemology as helpful, “where the ‘self’ and the ‘others’ are not separated by the law of excluded middle, and where they can develop a relationship of ‘contradictory identification’ … [including for example] hybridization among different identities … [and also the possibility] for both the ‘self’ and the ‘others’ to be negated and transcended by a higher level identity… A ‘global identity’ can thus be built not [of] identical human individuals, but by diverse identity communities preserving while negating their respective differences inside a global identity community” (Mushakoji 2007b). He presents the potential of human security discourse to contribute to a feasible path of advance: starting from where we are; promoting acceptance of plurality of identity, and the perception that one’s identity can be enriched rather than threatened by that of others; and with an endorsement of gentle evolution of identity, towards a human identity, unified but not homogeneous.

SYNTHESISING DISCUSSION

Issues of international relocation deserve a key role in discussions of global ethics because, to adapt Goulet’s phrase, relocation potentially helps to provide the psychic infrastructure for a more cosmopolitan world order. It fundamentally increases mutual exposure and creates more complex liminal identities; and, potentially, can counter the other-ing processes that render identities crude and mutually antagonistic.

Both for understanding migration’s impact on ethics and for better ethical understanding of migration, we need to immerse ourselves in its experience. The paper has emphasised not philosophical system building but the essential prior stage of exposure to the range of key considerations, with reference to diverse types of evidence, testimony and reflection. As basis for discussion of migrants’ well-being and the justice of the generation and distribution of well-being, earlier parts of the paper looked at characteristic elements in migrants’ lives: including risk-taking, existential migration, and migration in identity. The existential migration that spatial migration brings affects of course not only the
spatial migrants but also the people they leave behind and those where they arrive; in that sense all are migrants.

Such immersion and reflection gives not a single story nor a single balance-sheet like that of evaluation in terms of GNP. Emigration contains innumerable different pathways and stories. The balance of advantage or disadvantage varies according to time and place and sector and group. Rather than estimate some ‘overall balance sheet’, I attempted to refine the system of accounting; reflect on the common pattern of apparent rises in objective well-being accompanied by declines in subjective well-being; and raise considerations on the distribution and the justice of distribution of these costs and benefits.

The ‘system of accounting’ is also a system of recounting, of telling the stories. We must see well-being as more than a quest for security. I suggested we should use a formulation of well-being that more particularly looks at authoritatively valued functionings, and especially at fulfilment of basic human rights (interpreted with reference both to capabilities and actual functionings); in other words, to refer primarily to ‘objective well-being’. It remains essential for both evaluation and understanding to look also at subjective states and issues of identity. We must attend too to themes of justice not only aggregate well-being, and observe the workings of the virtues of care, compassion and solidarity.

To judge the fairness of different distributive patterns requires criteria, such as those of appropriate desert and fair opportunity, whether or not the latter is seen as equal opportunity, equal basic opportunities or some other interpretation. Judgement often requires also a comparison case, of what is assumed to be the relevant alternative for the parties involved. Here it is too easy to specify the comparison case so minimally that whatever has happened is thereby vindicated: the heart trade, the organs trade, the sex trade, even the slave trade. Dr. Pangloss’s Law declares that these are all not merely Pareto improvements but win-win arrangements for human betterment.

Using more relevant comparison cases in evaluation, we see that unfairness exists; often people do not reap in proportion to what they have sown. Awareness of relevant alternatives can affect action, not only evaluation; injustice can bring resistance, not only resignation, and unfairness is not immutable. Amongst the mechanisms of progress towards justice is threat: the threat of resistance to injustices, and the recognition of other threats too in an interconnected world, including spillover effects from health catastrophes, economic stresses and environmental decline in ‘far-off’ corners. Public-bads cannot be indefinitely confined to within the worlds of the deprived but will spread and affect the worlds of the privileged. So, sometimes, injustice reaps as it sows, eventually. A social contract can arise from a perception that a system of mutual benefit would be more advantageous to each contractor. Social contract theory based only on self-interest, even enlightened self-interest, is for several reasons too narrow though, and unnecessarily narrow. As Nussbaum suggests, it arbitrarily excludes the typical human motivation or potential for fellowship with others, or arbitrarily restricts it to only within national boundaries.
In the move beyond the confined national boxes of Rawlsian and most other social contract theory, in which international migrants are felt as a threatening complication, two types of cosmopolitanism compete. First and now predominant is the global market, in which migrants are a mobile factor of production with few rights. Second is the vision of a world of international human rights in which migrants are considered to share and belong. Which vision will predominate in the long run depends, in part, on which of the potentials of international migration is most fulfilled. Ideally, relocation could enrich the range of identities, connections and loyalties away from that presumed in the traditional international relations picture of separate national boxes.

I have sketched a case for a transnational ethics in terms of objective well-being that includes major elements of human rights thinking and is complemented by care ethics and sensitivity to subjectivities. The human security framework has promise here. It combines a number of needed features, by its use of both ‘joined-up thinking’ and ‘joined-up feeling’. A critique of predominant European perspectives made some years back by Kishore Mahbubani, then permanent secretary in Singapore’s Foreign Ministry, illustrates the centrality of these two dimensions. (He makes similar points regarding the USA in his other writings.) He diagnosed as Europe’s fundamental weakness “an inability to accept the simple proposition that other cultures or social forms may have equal validity”, that can be seen in part as stemming from a failure of empathy and ‘joined-up feeling’.15 The judgement remains largely relevant, notwithstanding some signs of gradually increasing European humility. Failures in ‘joined-up thinking’—lack of a global frame for conceptualisation and causal analysis—were seen in rich Northern countries’ fantasies of disconnection from their global environment. Mahbubani, now Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, pointed to the ideas and practices of ‘Fortress Europe’, including the unwillingness to seriously engage with Turkey and to foresee the dynamics that could be encouraged thereby. He stressed also the failure to envisage that in the absence of economic arrangements that are widely perceived by Africa and other low-income countries as just—including allowing them to utilise their potential comparative advantage in agriculture and in low-skill manufacturing—migration into Europe could be unstoppable (Mahbubani 1994; see also Mahbubani 2001, 2008).

Joined-up thinking, a perspective of pervasive interconnection and interdependence, is vital for identifying and inspiring required social change. Arguably there is more chance of getting people to accept joined-up thinking than joined-up feeling, but the two can be mutually reinforcing. Integrated analyses can conduce to joined-up feeling, including through effects on the perception of ‘we’. Joined-up feeling in turn increases the likelihood and wholeheartedness of immersion in the explanatory perspective of interconnectedness.

The human security approach complements human rights thinking, as less individualistic and as giving emphasis and space for the significance of community, identity, and

15 See Code (2008: 198 ff) for a similar discussion on identities and reductive stereotyping. It draws from a book (Code, 2006) which elaborates an ecology-inspired philosophy that highlights interdependence, mutual constitution and local specificity.
complex and liminal identities. Its concern with distinct and substantive areas of being, well-being and security—including physical security, identity security, uniting children and parents, or repatriating bodies—takes us in the direction of a transnational ethics of well-being and migration that has substance and insight beyond what will be found in an abstract general international or global ethic.

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Chubu 2008 = the final project report [if it covers sex workers]


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