New challenges for Brazilian civil society actors within the changing context of international cooperation

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The research conducted by the FGV about international cooperation and the architecture of funding for Brazilian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (CEAPG & ARTICULAÇÃO D3, 2013) generated significant results. These provide us with a better understanding about the national and global changes that have rapidly affected the development of civil society organizations in Brazil. The results broadly confirm the findings of research conducted a few years ago into changes, over past decades, in the direction of non-government aid flows within Latin America (BIEKART, 2005). We should note that, compared to its neighbouring countries, since the 1980s, Brazil has been recognized as the country that receives the most funding from all the private European aid agencies, followed (at some distance), by Peru (and, after 2002, by Bolivia). This finding serves to support the belief that the current retraction of international non-government aid flows to Brazil is actually a relatively recent phenomenon.

This chapter intends to comment on the results of research about “international cooperation”, primarily by providing a brief overview of the changing international context within which such results should be ana-

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lysed. For a better understanding of the global context, we will identify a series of current trends in debates about global policy and international cooperation. These developments also have implications for international donor NGOs, which we will discuss in the second part of the chapter. The third section explores the implications for Brazilian civil society organizations and considers how this so-called “retraction” affects future prospects. Finally, we present some suggestions about the potential future challenges for Brazilian civil society organizations within their current context.

We would like to start by providing a more general commentary regarding one of the central problems encountered by the researchers: the difficulty of finding reliable data about the flow of non-government aid. It is true that official flows of aid are generally well documented, for example, in statistics from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at the Development Centre in Paris. The efficiency and reliability of this data set is surprising, given its age, and the fact that it is frequently aggregated. We have only estimated aid flows aggregated to NGOs, since there are no authorized centres for the control of NGO statistics. We will provide two examples from previous years: the level of non-government aid flows and the total number of NGOs.

The total flow of aid to NGOs rose from 4 billion US dollars in 1989 to 10 billion in 1998 and 23 billion in 2004 (in other words from 5% to 12%, and then to almost 33% of total official development assistance or ODA) (RIDDELL, 2007). However, these estimated totals are based on gross figures from the OECD, combined with figures from the coordination agencies of national NGOs. These percentages remain quite problematic, given that ODA fell after the middle of the 1990s and then rose again in the 2000s and we advise extreme caution in interpretation. The second example of the estimated total number of NGOs is also very difficult to establish. Firstly, there is no consensus about what we understand to be an NGO: should unions, cooperatives and other associative organizations be included? Do we consider a wider group of non-profit organizations, or even the confusing category of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)? While UN estimates in 2000 accounted for approximately 35,000 NGOs, we would venture that the number of (relevant) international donors is between 800 and 1,000, of which only 150-180 have

(3) The term CSO – also frequently used in this study – is quite problematic, in part because the term “civil society” has not been clearly defined, but also because it is generalized to refer to highly varied organizations. If we defined civil society as “all the interested organizations between the state and the family (the private sphere), which are autonomous in relation to the state and generated voluntarily to serve and promote the interest of their members”, this would provide something quite different from the generally accepted definition of an NGO (“a non-profit organization, not owned by its members, providing development services for the poor and marginalized”) (BIEKART, 1999: 40). However, we agree that the term “Third Sector” is even less appropriate.
played an internationally important role over the last two decades. In fact, the word “relevant” is crucial here, given that we also know of a great many small activities conducted by private transnational donors.

The researchers approached NGOs in the Global North via e-mail, in order to request information, after navigating their websites (and frequently not finding the required information). In fact, international NGOs in the area of development did not provide many responses and/or were not very transparent. Should a researcher wish to obtain more detailed information about their budgets, the number of partner organizations, priority policies or views about changes, they need to knock on doors and ask directly. In our experience (when conducting a summary of changes to aid flows in Latin America in the middle of the 2000s), a great deal of valid and reliable information may be generated through this approach (BIEKART, 2005). Further, such an approach has recently become easier, since most NGOs in the Global North are moving their offices to the Global South, facilitating accessibility by local researchers.

**Trends within the international cooperation context**

It is evident that the global socio-economic context of 2013 is characterized by an increasingly polarized world in which the economic growth of many Asian and emerging economies is taking place alongside economic stagnation and crisis in the “old world”, particularly in Europe (specifically in the south). This has put pressure on the international monetary and financial infrastructure. Furthermore, we face limitations in our ecological and social systems: we are using more natural resources than the planet is capable of generating, while two billion people live on less than two dollars a day. In other words, we are exploiting the world, yet a considerable portion of the global population does not benefit from its surplus. Added to this, the growth of the global population has accelerated, due to a combination of increased life expectancy combined with a decline in fertility rates, expected to result in 9 billion inhabitants on Planet Earth by 2050 (KANBUR and SUMNER, 2012).

These changes to the international scene have been reflected in international cooperation practices – which have clearly also affected civil society organizations in both the Global North and South. Below we present a brief outline of the identified trends:

– **Economic change towards “new” or emerging economies**

Besides economic growth, BRIC countries have also experienced a relative reduction in their share of ODA compared to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and remittances. However, this varies by country: many
of the poorer countries still depend heavily on ODA – in 10% of the lowest income countries, ODA still represents 20% or more of GDP. However, remittances from immigrants from the South to countries in the South have also grown, and represent half of the total flow of remittances (UNDP 2013:15).

– Changes in poverty condition, from low-income country to middle-income country (BRICS – Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa)

Contrary to expectations, poverty has, in fact, become a more pressing problem in middle-income countries. Over the last 15 years, more than 75% of the world’s poor have begun to live in middle-income countries, principally in emerging economies such as India (34%), China (15%) and other BRICS (Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines). Kanbur and Sumner (2012) estimate that between 800-950 million people, the “new bottom billion”, are primarily located in these BRICS, with the remaining 25% (between 300-350 million) distributed across 35 low-income countries, mostly in Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Ethiopia.

– Growth in inequality in BRIC countries

Economic growth is associated with decline in both health and education inequalities, but an increase in income inequality, although differences between countries may also be observed. In Latin America over the last decade, inequality has become a more significant policy matter and has consequently grown more slowly (although it remains significant). As a consequence of this, BRIC country governments have been under pressure to institute measures against the growth of income inequality.

– The crisis in Global Public Goods requires an integrated approach

Many global problems can only be dealt with outside the national context. Problems such as climate change, financial instability and the exhaustion of natural resources are undermining efforts to reduce poverty and achieve social equity, since they affect the world’s poorest. These are very closely linked to standards of consumption, food prices and demographic growth and therefore require changes to standards of consumption and production, central to the post-2015 agenda.

– New forms of international cooperation with many new actors emerging

The BRIC countries are emerging as new donors (“in the network”), particularly in South-South
cooperation. Over the last decade, most BRIC countries (China, India and Brazil) have evolved from recipients of the international cooperation network (including in food aid) to donors. They have also endorsed the “Busan principles” for Effective Development Cooperation, although this occurred voluntarily in order to deal with domestic challenges. As the BRICs have grown in importance, the G20 has also become a more prominent participant on the global scene. Nevertheless, funds from BRIC donations remain limited, at an estimated annual 1.8 billion dollars – relatively small compared to the 133.5 billion US dollars in ODA (2012) for OECD countries. Moreover, although the BRICs remain unrepresented in the Bretton Woods institutions and at the United Nations, this is beginning to change. Within the BRIC countries, other international actors, such as private foundations, local businesses and bilateral civil initiatives have also assumed new formats through new standards.

– Traditional OECD donors are losing their prominent role

Despite the large share of the total flow of international DAC-OECD aid, bilateral programmes are increasingly stagnant and under pressure, particularly in traditional donor countries, such as Canada, Germany, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. More prominence is given to supporting a variety of multilateral projects and providing incentives to the private sector, particularly to open up new markets. NGOs from the Global North (the “bilateral civil channel”) in particular have been left with the role of working with fragile states and emerging economies.

– The importance of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for Development (ICT4D)

Between 2000 and 2010, internet use grew by 30% in all 60 developing countries, with Brazil, the Russian Federation and China demonstrating the most spectacular growth (UNDP, 2013: 50). In addition, the Arab revolutions accentuated the importance of social media within change processes. ICT4D is therefore seen as an instrument able to rapidly expose the existence of inequality and disempowerment. ICT4D also facilitates North-South and South-South cooperation in education and research, where “open access” and “open data” can be key instruments in overcoming monopolies dominated by large institutions based in the North.

The transformation of private international “solidarity” agencies

The implications of these trends for non-government donor agencies from the North and their (traditional) partners in the South are quite diverse, as we shall see below. The categories “North” and “South” are
inherently inadequate, since differing development cases influence one another. We would also distance ourselves from the idea of a rich “Global North” and a poor and marginalized “Global South”. Instead, what is emerging is a series of countries that were recipients of Official Development Assistance (ODA) but have rapidly become middle-income. These have now become donors both to “developing countries” and (via their governments) to social development organizations within their own societies. Policies and activities by NGO donors from the North (or private international aid agencies) have experienced quite dramatic changes over the last decade. Since these processes are complex and inter-related, we need to dissect them carefully.

The first change is a gradual one in the composition of funds from donors. Many private international aid agencies started out with private donations and these still represent an important share of their revenue as a whole (see BIEKART, 1999). During the golden age of international cooperation in the 1980s and 90s, agency budgets increased significantly through government subsidies, frequently as part of high ODA allocations and strong International Cooperation ministries, but also through the larger budgets of NGOs from the European Union. In Northern Europe (the United Kingdom, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland), allocations to intermediary NGOs reached their high point at the end of the century, followed by an overall decline at the beginning of the new decade. The same process took place in Southern Europe some years later; this region was thus particularly affected by the onset of the financial crisis in 2007-8. With the decline in official international aid investment, new funding avenues were explored. These grew, in part, out of the emergence of populist lotteries (see FOWLER, 2011), as well as through new fundraising campaigns following the international humanitarian emergencies in the African Great Lakes, Haiti and Southern Asia (in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami). Campaign messages were generally populist in nature, and there was a gradual sense of the de-politicization of non-government donor aid. This translated into a shift from values based on solidarity towards values focused on charity.

A second reversal relates to the allocation of aid flows from international NGOs. In the past decade, there has been a gradual withdrawal of donor NGOs from middle-income countries, particularly in Latin America (see BIEKART, 2005). Over recent years, donors have tended to classify recipient countries according to various categories. The most recent Dutch international cooperation policy, for example, distinguishes between four different areas of non-government aid to recipients in the South: (i) low income countries, where the focus is on poverty reduction and traditional service provision programmes; (ii)
fragile states, where the focus is on the establishment of peace and human rights conflicts; (iii) middle-income countries, with a focus on income distribution and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); and (iv) more global programmes focused on advocacy, which deal with climate change, natural resources and financial instability. For Brazil, this obviously involves paying less heed to the flows of traditional international aid from NGOs, since their focus is now on the first two categories. This does not necessarily mean that all donor NGOs have withdrawn from Brazil, as we will explain later, since a series of new organizations have begun to initiate activities here.

A third repositioning involves a (lack of) accountability or responsibility amongst private international aid agencies. In the past, this was not a major issue, but as the agencies grew and criticisms of official agencies intensified, private international aid agencies also came under the spotlight. From the 1990s onwards, the results and impact of private international aid agencies (which, in fact, were largely financed by public funds) began to be inspected (see BIEKART, 1999; JORDAN and VAN TUIJL, 2006). Politicians, journalists and public servants believe that private international aid agencies must demonstrate greater responsibility, specifically through a more detailed demonstration of the results they achieve. This saw the beginning of a wave of results-based monitoring, which came about through the need to demonstrate aid effectiveness. Log frames and staff training in PME (planning, monitoring and evaluation) were introduced. One disadvantage of these developments was a fixation on short-term results and less concern about more long-term ones, which are likely to be more sustainable.

A fourth change to non-government agencies involved in international cooperation can be observed in growing competition between the international development actors who have since emerged on the global stage, such as citizen initiatives and corporate foundations. Smaller initiatives on the part of citizens, often as a result of personal relationships established during trips or through professional networking, are generally considered by donor NGOs to be complementary activities. Some NGOs may advise such initiatives or facilitate contact and local support, in order, for example, to set up a primary school or community health centre. On the other hand, some observers have been critical of private citizen initiatives, accusing them of a lack of professionalism and of negatively affecting the image of international cooperation in its country of origin (see KINSBERGEN and SCHULPEN, 2009). Another new competitor comes from the private sector, in the form of a new generation of corporate foundations: small and local foundations that operate in health and education, and larger foundations, such as the Bill Gates Foundation. Such foundations have also become more active in Brazil; this is examined in greater detail in another chapter.
A fifth point relates to the changes that have taken place in the internal organization of a number of private aid agencies over recent years. This has occurred in response to the persistent demands of new donors for greater effectiveness and more tangible results. All these changes within “solidarity agencies” from the North have profoundly affected relationships with “partners in the South”:

• Due to a reduction in government subsidies to private international aid agencies, a greater share of funds now derives from the “charity market”, leading to short-term populist strategies;
• Agencies have begun to decentralize their operations and organizations aimed at the South and, for reasons of efficiency, have increasingly begun to contract more local teams, while terminating the work contracts of teams from the North;
• The largest private international aid agencies (such as Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children and World Vision) are increasingly organized transnationally, in order to maximize fundraising based in the South (especially in the BRIC countries) and centralize global advocacy activities;
• Due to technocratic influences, an “accountancy culture” predominates, in which short-term tangible results are preferable to long-term, less tangible, but more significant, ones.

Overall, these trends have contributed to the de-politicization of the agendas of many NGOs from the North and this seems to have affected Brazilian partners (generally, more politically oriented) in a negative way, as we shall see below. Support from international cooperation to a number of Brazilian NGOs terminated (after decades of intense partnership) in the middle of the 2000s, while existing funds, for example those aimed at rights activities, have been reallocated to activities guided by the market, corporate social responsibility and environmental issues.

As a consequence of these trends, NGOs from the North have been confronted by a series of crucial choices. If they want to survive as private donor agencies, they have to invest more in raising public funds (which many already do), although they increasingly compete for the same funds with their partners in the South. Furthermore, they have to acquire the technical capability for quantification and evaluation. Another option is to reject this de-politicization and pursue other alternatives. Agencies such as Action Aid, Hivos and those that are more campaign-oriented (such as the Clean Clothes Campaign) prefer to extend their agendas towards generating transformative changes. Their focus has moved from an emphasis on service provision and sub-contracting for the implementation of cooperation policies to the exploration of new approaches, such as knowledge generation or training a support base in how to deal with global public issues within their countries of origin. The Dutch agency Hivos, for example, is now engaged with new develop-
ment actors, such as hackers, member of the digital generation and other activists, in order to explore new forms of global citizen action. Instead of establishing “projects”, the new role of the agency is to develop partners and “exploratory laboratories” focused on knowledge exchange and the development of new visions for the future of international cooperation. This work is chiefly funded by a broad spectrum of private sector foundations based in the USA, as well as by the Dutch government.

Implications for civil society recipients in the South (e.g. in Brazil)

The implications for partner organizations in the South and, by extension, for Brazilian partners, are quite drastic. After all, for more than two decades partnerships between international solidarity cooperation agencies were crucial to maintaining a political agenda focused on advocacy policy, rights-based approaches and training. This “golden age” has come to an end and it is unclear who will now take on the responsibility for funding such activities.

Before we enter into this question further, however, we should stress that international support (particularly from Europe and Canada) to Brazilian NGOs (largely linked to political opposition) was a critical element in the 1980s and 90s and contributed to fundamental political changes in the years that followed (see WILS and SCHUURMAN, 1991; LANDIM 1997; DAGNINO, 2008). This came about because of the relatively peaceful end to the military regime, the approval of the new Constitution and the electoral period that eventually led to the Lula presidency.

Compared to similar NGOs in other Latin American countries, what Brazilian NGOs did particularly well was to provide critical support to transformative social movements, which formed the basis for socio-political change in the new millennium. One key example is the organization of several, highly successful, “World Social Forums” in Porto Alegre. The relationship between these movements and NGOs is not straightforward, since they also created a great deal of tension, particularly in relation to the legitimacy of Brazilian NGOs “representing” such movements (DAGNINO, 2008; THAYER, 2010). Equally, a number of lessons were learnt about how to support social movements without creating dependency on external funds. From the 1990s onwards, this matter was also discussed in several Dutch documents about international aid policies (see WILS, 1999; DE KADT, 1997). The most important point, however, was that

(4) For information about this knowledge programme see the Hivos website: <http://www.hivos.net/Hivos-Knowledge-Programme/Themes/Civic-Explorations>.
Brazilian NGOs had a new role in relation to these movements, something also addressed by Dagnino (2008). The new context of international aid required a new policy agenda, as well as new forms of funding, although frequently the NGOs themselves categorically denied this, since they were unable to see that the political scenario was fundamentally different to the one 15 years earlier.

It came as a shock for many Brazilian NGOs to learn that the entire spectrum of private international aid agencies (from Oxfam to Christian Aid; from Bread for the World to the ICCO) had decided to “withdraw” their support to long-term Brazilian partner organizations. The partner agencies perceived this “withdrawal” as weakening the international solidarity relationship, yet for the international agencies this was a logical movement towards new political priorities. As some of the ICCO project agents expressed it:

> It is no longer power (based on a strong relationship with the ICCO and other donors) that will be important, but their ability to influence other stakeholders in the change process. This transformation from dependence on power to active influencer is a profound change, which has generated insecurity and resistance amongst certain partners (DERKSEN and VERHALLEN, 2008, p. 237).

It seems that a strong bond was established over the years, and breaking this bond was not easy for either party. The end of the FASE-ICCO relationship generated a wide-ranging discussion, about which we made the following comments:

> [...] at a certain point, there is probably a natural end to any partnership. Sometimes, this comes about after a decade, or as is the case of FASE, after many decades. It is clear from their emotional reactions that both partners considered the partnership to have absolute importance, which is accentuated by the levels of energy, transparency and innovation they invested. However, despite the various stages of “reinvention”, the two parties have been incapable of extricating themselves from a certain, fundamental logic. We believe that this refers to an internal (and probably quite comfortable) standard implicit in all donor-recipient relationships, which becomes unstable as soon as funds are no longer the driving force (BIEKART, 2009).
What became clear was that both the donor and the recipient were paralysed by the relationship; both were incapable of handling the changing situation.

As previously discussed, the end of such partnerships is part of a wider trend whereby many Canadian and European solidarity aid agencies have decided to reduce, or even totally close, their aid programmes in Latin America. This trend for the “withdrawal” of European agencies had been feared for a decade, but it actually materialized much more slowly than expected. In fact, instead of an effective withdrawal, what has occurred is a reorientation to other countries and sectors (BIEKART, 2005). However, the speed with which this process has been recently implemented has led to concerns across the entire Latin American region: will programmes in poorer countries, such as Bolivia, Honduras and Haiti, also be “deactivated”? The fact that many partners were surprised by this “withdrawal”, has also raised concerns that new forms of “civilateral” international cooperation are probably not emerging automatically.

This points to an interesting question that has emerged from the current discussion: why are Brazilian (and Latin American) NGOs not more active in the field of international advocacy? The social movements (such as, for example, the Landless Workers Movement – Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra: MST, and Unified Workers’ Central – Central Única dos Trabalhadores: CUT, etc.) are truly active at global level, yet Brazilian political NGOs appear to have ceased global expansion at the World Social Forum and in ABONG activities within the ALOP (the Latin American NGO Network). Why is there such a modest Brazilian NGO presence in global campaigns and political advocacy networks? This matter requires a more in-depth discussion, given that there are many opportunities for the development of a joint Euro-Latin-American agenda for international cooperation “beyond dependency aid”, for example. New international funding to support a more international role for experienced Brazilian civil actors is certainly available (as evidenced by NGOs in India, the Philippines, and South Africa), which leads us to the following question: are they really interested in getting involved?

Meanwhile, at a global level, changes are occurring to the way that the urgency of development aid is perceived; furthermore, in certain countries drastic changes are taking place. For example, the gradual imposition to demonstrate “visible results” (and frequently short-term ones) through the structural process of long-term change (which is practically impossible) has strongly influenced the strategies adopted by international solidarity agencies. Brazilian NGOs criticized this position twenty years ago, when they discovered that agencies in the North were not resolute in combating such pressure, although, at the time, private international aid was still in its heyday (see POELHEKKE, 1996). It is therefore cru-
cially important that Brazilian “partners” demonstrate more specifically the results they have attained over these thirty years. If we accept that structural changes occur slowly, we must also visualize how, and to what extent, – after decades of supporting social organization for the excluded – a new generation of effective social and political leaders will emerge. If Brazilian NGOs (as well as their donors) do not manage to demonstrate the relationship between their efforts and the results they attain, it will be very difficult to counter the neoliberal prophets of the “cooperation industry”, who continue to press for short-term tangible products.

This, often antagonistic, ending to the solidarity partnerships of Brazilian NGOs is, in some ways, a little surprising. After all, as we have described above, over this period Brazil has experienced spectacular economic growth compared to other Latin American countries. We would therefore expect much more favourable conditions for the development of new forms of international partnerships, no longer based on the transfer of funds, but rather supported by mutual learning, knowledge generation and transnational advocacy strategies. One could question, therefore, whether the end of solidarity partnerships was really so dramatic. After all, opening new avenues and allowing new opportunities to emerge may lead to new encounters and partnerships.

The challenge in the short term is to adjust to a new situation, in which Brazilian NGOs press for, and design, their own co-funding system and thus possibly (but not necessarily) incorporate lessons learnt from Europe. This new co-funding system will have to be funded partially by the Brazilian government and partially by funds from other sources, with funding raised by Brazilian NGOs from a variety of international donors and corporate foundations, as well as from other local sources (as suggested by other studies in this volume). The greatest challenge, in our opinion, is to prevent Brazilian NGOs from repeating the same mistakes as their solidarity partners from the North, who ended up committing to a co-funding system which almost strangled them at birth. There are valuable lessons to be learnt in terms of governance, accountability and fundraising, as well as more political and strategic lessons related to the construction of coalitions and advocacy campaigns. However, Brazilian NGOs should also focus on transnational South-South cooperation, systematizing the lessons learnt from Latin American (and/or Brazilian) efforts to deliver successful activities that combat exclusion and disempowerment. These lessons are still not accessible to African actors or other social transformation agents, since many evaluations and studies are not designed to incorporate such analyses. However, given that many former members of Brazilian NGO teams are now participating in evaluations of in-
international aid interventions in Africa, the systematization of such lessons and a guarantee that they are used to improve South-South cooperation should not be a complex matter.

**Challenges for Brazilian civil society actors**

All these trends have had an impact on the position of Brazil within the international donor community, as well as in relation to Brazilian civil society actors who previously depended on international aid. The FGV-Articulação D3 research project encountered numerous Brazilian confirmations of the above-mentioned trends, such as a drastic reduction in flows of solidarity aid; a trend to support Brazilian organizations in becoming more financially sustainable; the trend that reveals limited private sector resources to support more “political” civil society organizations; and the lack of a clear government policy to fund groups that operate in the defence of civil rights. These findings demonstrate the need to explore new pathways, so that Brazilian civil society organizations are able to reposition themselves and develop new long-term prospects. To this end, we believe that new pathways could be explored in line with the directions set out below.

In the first place, a reduction in international philanthropic and/or solidarity funding is considered likely to weaken many organizations over the short term; however, over the long term this should be considered a real opportunity. As has been mentioned, instead of a shared, long-term political agenda, the agendas of partners from the South were often defined by those from the North, leading to a substantial loss of autonomy and little focus on technical information. As evidenced in many countries in the North, a gradual reduction in NGO budgets leads to a substantial reorientation of positions and priorities, which in turn frequently leads to an innovative (and quite healthy) debate about future prospects. It is clear that “solidarity or political funding” is necessary, but this should be derived from sources involving few ties, and could, in the near future, come from local sources.

In second place, we find the challenge to connect more horizontally and, therefore, collaboratively, with political/activist organizations based in both the North and the South, as well as with international networks. The aim is to promote a joint global agenda, supported by a clear division of labour in terms of the issues to be addressed in each country, in this case Brazil (in respect of climate change, water, energy, sexual and reproductive rights, etc.). This “Global Division for an Activist Agenda” may already be observed in global forums such as CIVICUS or the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development and an Enabling Environment, although very few Latin American organizations participate in them. Overloaded agendas
mean that NGOs in the South are often absent from such meetings, despite the availability of travel grants. Exposure to “transnational advocacy networks” and global partnerships will encourage Brazilian civil society actors to recognize that they can play an important and strategic role in an agenda that is post-international aid and post-2015.

In third place, it is no longer helpful to write, as researchers tend to in their reports, about “rich-poor”, “North-South” and/or “public-private”. Over the last decade, such distinctions have become much more specific and subtle, leading to more productive forms of strategic alliance. The last Human Development Report (UNDP, 2013) clearly explains how the Global North has grown and expanded into countries such as Brazil, India and China, and that the post-2015 agenda will, in large part, be defined by these new emerging global powers. Are Brazilian NGOs prepared to participate in this? Do they have a vision about how to intervene at government and/or corporate level? The growing Brazilian agenda about Corporate Social Responsibility, for example, came about as a result of the continuous support provided by international aid agencies, although it is true that many local organizations still have their doubts about the real impact of the long-term practices of transnational companies. Today, a vibrant agenda certainly exists – only ten years ago, many believed this to be extinct. Brazilian civil society groups have an important role to play, alongside similar foreign organizations, in monitoring the international performance of Brazilian corporations. This is a relatively new agenda, in which African NGOs (for example, in Nigeria in relation to Shell) as well as Indian ones (in relation to Monsanto), are already constructing highly valuable experiences.

In fourth place, the era of international cooperation is no longer dominated by funding flows but increasingly by flows of information and knowledge, due to the revolution promoted by the above-mentioned ICTs. The future format of cooperation is probably, therefore, one of transnational knowledge networks dealing with the generation and sharing of strategic knowledge, rather than one of private transnational aid agencies. The interest here, therefore, is not a connection with “aid agencies”, but rather with transnational knowledge networks and new forms of research of global relevance and with information systems in real time. In this sense, this FGV-Articulação D3 research project selected a central topic, which is expected to constitute the beginning of crucial changes to Brazilian international cooperation strategies.

Finally, our conclusion is that the conditions and context for international cooperation will change dramatically over a generation. Brazil is starting to occupy a leadership position at the G20, yet every-
thing indicates that Brazilian NGOs are not aware that they also need to readjust their role dramatically. Many opportunities exist, particularly because other Latin American organizations are closely watching how Brazilian civil society actors make their choices. Moreover, such choices are highly strategic, since they revolve around a world in which Brazil will play an increasingly dominant role, a role similar to that occupied by Europe when Brazil simply did not exist as a country. This is truly a great responsibility.
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