Due to a lack of time and expertise, policymakers often rely on others, such as bureaucrats, experts, or advisers, when policy decisions have to be made. A non-trivial problem is that those who possess information have a vested interest in the policy outcomes; this gives them an incentive to manipulate or conceal information. In this book, we examine a penalty for lying and the power to replace an advisor as a means of restraining information providers from information manipulation. We argue that these two institutional arrangements may not always help a policymaker to attain a better decision (Chapters 2 and 3). Inasmuch as consequences of policies are complicated and difficult to foresee, small groups like committees often assist policymakers to collect information, deliberate over policies, and devise policy recommendations. As information is not free, committee members must be motivated to collect it. We shed some light on how deliberation affects committee members’ incentives to gather the costly information, and thus the quality of collective decision making (Chapter 4). Outside the political arena, agency problems between politicians and voters also exist. In Chapter 5, we examine how elections play their role in disciplining and selecting politicians and how policy choices are made when politicians differ in their motivations in running for political office.

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