

Stellingen

behorende bij het proefschrift

Agency Problems in Political Decision Making

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I

When an advisor can choose whether or not to participate in providing information, an introduction of a penalty for lying does not always help a policy maker to make a better decision.

(Chapter Two of this thesis)

II

The power to replace an advisor may harm a policy maker.

(Chapter Three of this thesis)

III

When reputational concerns are bad, a policy maker benefits from always keeping her advisor.

(Chapter Three of this thesis)

IV

Even if we take an optimistic view of deliberation, it may lead to a decrease in the quality of decision making. This is due to the fact that a free-rider problem may become more severe.

(Chapter Four of this thesis)

V

In a cynical equilibrium, bad politicians may act more in line with the public interest compared to good politicians.

(Chapter Five of the thesis)

VI

Learning how to listen is not less important than learning how to talk.
Learning how to listen is perhaps more difficult than learning how to talk.
Often while talking, not many people know what they are talking about.

VII

Scientific enquiries and acquisition of knowledge should aim for making a society a better place in which to live, for all mankind.

VIII

Asking the right questions to an existing problem is not less important or less difficult than finding a solution for it.

IX

In a way, conducting research and cooking are alike; knowledge and passion are not mutually exclusive.

X

One way to pay respect to a person we are intellectually admired and inspired by is an endeavour to be a part of one's inspiration.

XI



Voici mon secret. Il est très simple: on ne voit bien qu'avec le coeur.
L'essentiel est invisible pour les yeux. (It is only with the heart that one can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye.), *Le Petit Prince*, Antoine de Saint Exupéry, 1943.

