## Abstract and Keywords

**Abstract**
The case of the Danish “cartoon war” was a premonition of things to come: accelerated social construction of inequalities and their accelerated symbolic communication, translation and negotiation. New uses of values in organizing and managing inequalities emerge. Values lead active social life as bourgeois virtues (McCloskey, 2006), their subversive alternatives or translated “memes” of cultural history. Since social life of values went global and online, tracing their hybrid manifestations requires cross-culturally competent domestication (Magala, 2005) as if they were “memes” manipulated for further reengineering. Hopes are linked to emergent concepts of “microstorias” (Boje, 2002), bottom-up, participative, open citizenship (Balibar, 2004), disruption of stereotypical branding in mass-media (Sennett, 2006). However, Kuhn’s opportunistic deviation from Popperian evolutionary epistemology should fade away with other hidden injuries of Cold War, to free our agenda for the future of social sciences in general and organizational sciences in particular (Fuller, 2000, 2003).

**Free Keywords**
Complex Identities, Political Paradigms, Cross-Cultural Competence, Professional Evolution, Managing Inequalities, Intersubjective Falsificationism

**Availability**
The ERIM Report Series is distributed through the following platforms:
- Academic Repository at Erasmus University (DEAR), [DEAR ERIM Series Portal](https://dear.erasmus.edu/)
- Social Science Research Network (SSRN), [SSRN ERIM Series Webpage](https://www.ssrn.com/)
- Research Papers in Economics (REPEC), [REPEC ERIM Series Webpage](https://www.repec.org/)

**Classifications**
The electronic versions of the papers in the ERIM report Series contain bibliographic metadata by the following classification systems:
- Library of Congress Classification, (LCC) [LCC Webpage](https://www.loc.gov/collections/classification/)
- Journal of Economic Literature, (JEL), [JEL Webpage](https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-economic-literature/)
- ACM Computing Classification System [CCS Webpage](https://www.acm.org/collaborate-with-acm/ccs)
- Inspec Classification scheme (ICS), [ICS Webpage](https://www.ipg.com/inspec)
Social Life of Values  
(*cross-cultural construction of realities*)

“The undermining of standards of seriousness is almost complete, with the ascendancy of a culture whose most intelligible, persuasive values are drawn from the entertainment industries” (Sontag, 2001, 273)

Abstract

The case of the Danish “cartoon war” was a premonition of things to come: accelerated social construction of inequalities and their accelerated symbolic communication, translation and negotiation. New uses of values in organizing and managing inequalities emerge. Values lead active social life as bourgeois virtues (McCloskey, 2006), their subversive alternatives or translated “memes” of cultural history. Since social life of values went global and online, tracing their hybrid manifestations requires cross-culturally competent domestication (Magala, 2005) as if they were “memes” manipulated for further reengineering. Hopes are linked to emergent concepts of “microstorias” (Boje, 2002), bottom-up, participative, open citizenship (Balibar, 2004), disruption of stereotypical branding in mass-media (Sennett, 2006). However, Kuhn’s opportunistic deviation from Popperian evolutionary epistemology should fade away with other hidden injuries of Cold War, to free our agenda for the future of social sciences in general and organizational sciences in particular (Fuller, 2000, 2003).

Key words: complex identities, political paradigms, cross-cultural competence, professional evolution, managing inequalities, intersubjective falsificationism
1. Introduction

Contemporary complex societies and their increasingly complex processes of knowledge production and dissemination are imagined under the powerful shadow cast by the biological theories of evolution. While we do not believe in linear and inevitable Progress along the Enlightenment lines (having discovered empirical falsification of “grand narratives” in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany and having traced religious roots of secularized bureaucracies to the perseverance of professional corporate bureaucracies), we do tacitly believe that development and changes in our societies can ultimately be explained and brought under human control, at least to a certain – manageable – extent. Popper’s vision of “piecemeal social engineering” of an open society opposed to the utopian ideology of the closed ones remains philosophically attractive, but calls for a new defense in view of the relativistic uses of Kuhn’s concept of “Gestalt switch”. Imagining our societies and our knowledge about them we tend to accept tacitly or explicitly that even the most random changes ultimately can find meaningful interpretation according to a variant of causal explanation, perhaps at the price of accepting its sophisticated functional form. These evolutionary and biological explanations and analogies are resisted in social sciences, where ideas of ‘sociobiology’ had been discredited as an updated version of ‘social darwinism’ a la E.O. Wilson, but continue to re-emerge as neo-sociobiologies under various guises of ‘holistic darwinism’ (Corning, 2005) or ‘machiavellian intelligence’ (Byrne, Whiten, 1988, Whiten, Byrne, 1997). While they merit attention, they should be vigorously opposed, since their simplified and popularized versions disseminate a mistaken belief in profoundly false and potentially dangerous
analogy between biological ‘genes’ and sociocultural ‘memes’ (both of which presumably can be controlled by specific gatekeepers, for instance peer control, performing a role of artificial ‘natural selection’). This tacitly accepted analogy is misleading. History of human societies, sociocultural history of growing complexity and intensity of human cooperation and conflicts is not carried by “hidden core memes” of sociobiological, holistic evolution (no matter whether we call this hidden “core” meme a divine Revelation or a secular Reason and no matter how we explain the opening of the path of rational development of complex societies towards a more “perfect union” with itself or higher being). “Memes” – or what could possibly pass for their rough equivalents – are sociocultural constructs, which are continuously renegotiated, translated, reinterpreted, re-communicated and reconstructed throughout history. Sociocultural imagination - which stores and re-engineers such constructs for future uses - is fuelled by core values (embedded in social and individual memories as bourgeois virtues and as multiple types of alternative or counter-values: bohemian, heretic, subversive, protestant, etc.) which prompt multiple communities to redefine, retranslate and re-communicate speeches, texts and other cultural units, using them as resources in political, economic and cultural struggles. In the course of these multiple interactions, transmissions and translations - old and new inequalities generate both ‘renaissance’ of interest in inherited ‘memes’ and organized ‘deletion’ of other memes (or of their former custodians). Growth of knowledge requires some growth of social amnesia about selected (‘revived’, revised and subsequently forgotten) aspects of sociocultural memes. The forgotten role of the Islamic centers of learning in transmitting the ancient Greek and Roman heritage to the Latin Europe may serve as an illustration of the process of re-engineering stored
“memes” of “classical Greek and Roman heritage”. Historical deletion of the Arab and Muslim contribution to the recovery, preservation, refinement and transition of the ancient Greek and Roman texts for Christian Europeans before the outbreak of the Italian Renaissance is the first case in point (“The arabization of European Renaissance”). Had this deleting been prevented, we might have gained a better insight into the crucial role of communities of interpretative practice, into multi-linguistic and multicultural process of transmitting “memes” and into emergent regularities of apparently random ‘memic’ drift of meaning through translations and retranslations in the process of sociocultural evolution. Incommensurability does not emerge with the scientific research communities pursuing methodological puzzle-solving a la Kuhn. It puzzled the first translators of Aristotle from Greek into Syriac, from Syriac into Arabic, from Arabic into Latin, and from Latin into Italian, German or Polish. However, we are often prevented by our narrow-minded defense of existing political and cultural inequalities and parochial philosophy of knowledge (scientific, religious, political, moral, economic, etc.) from defusing potential growth of conflicts out of control. Contemporary international crisis caused by the Danish cartoons is a case in point (“Clash of Inequalities: Bourgeois Virtues and Global Immigrants”). In order to avoid triggering a potential spiral of violence and destruction one has to preserve the minimal consensus for the ongoing negotiations at the partially virtual agoras of the future – and minimal consensus of a professional research community is precisely the type of a community of scientific knowledge presupposed by the falsificationist and evolutionary epistemology of intersubjective scientific knowledge suggested by K.R. Popper. Popper’s falsificationist and evolutionary epistemology has to be recovered from behind the smokescreen of T.
Kuhn’s crudely sociobiological and Cold War – driven theory of scientific revolutions imagined as a sequence of paradigmatic dictatorships separated by sudden ‘Gestalt switches’. The resuscitation of Popper’s philosophy of science could help in developing more mature, moral, democratic and liberal communities of knowledge. The latter could turn out to tread a superior “third way” between communities led by two rival visions. Popperian vision is opposed to tacit acceptance of either the neopositivist dogmatism (cf. Wilson, 1998), as is usually the case in mainstream academic establishments, or to tacit acceptance of the relativist Kuhn, as tends to be the case in social sciences and the humanities, where postmodernists “adopted” Kuhn in their struggles against neopositivism as the dominant ideology of academic institutions (“Emergent cross-cultural competence: interdisciplinary, interparadigmatic, intermediating”). In their quest for defense weapon against neopositivism, these postmodern social constructivists had embraced radical incommensurability thesis (pronounced by Kuhn about two successive paradigms which cannot be compared along the single line) and applied it to their footholds in the academia, which they wanted to defend against the neopositivist onslaught. They pronounced Kuhn’s theory of Gestalt switch (scientific revolution) to be a defensive doctrine preventing different paradigmatic communities of learning from clashing while functioning within the same academic institutional environment:

“What we call progress in science, for Kuhn, is not then movement from a less to a more objectively accurate paradigm.(…) No longer was it possible to justify science as a quest for truth.” (Gergen, 1999, 54)
2. The arabization of the European Renaissance

Most historians of European culture agree that Greek writings – of which Ptolemy’s on astronomy and of Aristotle on philosophy are the most popular cases in point – did not resurface in hands of Italian monks busily preparing the cultural explosion of the Renaissance. From Plato’s times, when texts started to win against speech as the main “carrier” of transmitted cultural knowledge, they led a very intensive and turbulent life. In fact, what emerged from the workshops and monasteries of medieval translators, to be codified and accepted as standard versions of classical texts (the processes of this codification and acceptance continue until the present day) was a series of texts, all of which had already had a considerable and complex history and a very mixed, hybrid pedigree. First, most of the texts, which had been circulating in and among Greek cities, have been carried eastwards along with the process of cultural exports known as “hellenization”. This process involved, among others, frequent translations from Greek originals into Syriac, Pahlavi, or Sanskrit, and later on, into Arabic. One should not forget that the Greek scientific and philosophical texts from the Hellenistic period were in themselves often based on translations and imports from different, more ancient sources and languages. For instance, some elements of astronomic terminology, like names of the signs of Zodiac, came from Mesopotamia, others from Egypt, and some names of planets have been taken over from Sumerian or Akkadian. On top of that the ancient Greek, in which original texts had once been written down, differed already from the daily Greek used by the inhabitants of Byzantium, who spread them out eastwards – so that native
Greek speakers, usually linked to Christian communities, were translating into Arabic from what must have been a dead language for them. Moreover, the interest in Greek originals and market demand were sharply differentiated: philosophy, medicine and astronomy were by far the most popular, but even these texts have been transmitted with a number of changes and interventions, which make us wonder how many different communities and schools of translators, compilers, researchers, commentators and professionals left their mark on what we nowadays attribute to a single ancient author. What kind of classic Greek texts were Arab readers getting? How many collective Aristotles or Ptolemys left their imprint on the final product and who made vital decisions what to cut and what to leave before the final product had been launched and disseminated? This is not a purely historical question. What Arab readers were getting - had subsequently been retranslated into medieval Latin, only to be later rendered in European vernaculars, and thus what Arabs were getting then, we were getting “now”, that is during the ‘proper’ Renaissance. This cultural transmission or cross-cultural transfer was not a simple passage:

“They had to be adapted to educational requirements, and changing times necessitated certain changes in emphasis. Furthermore, many a great author appeared long-winged, so that abridgements and paraphrases were deemed more suitable… In the case of some authors, commentaries written on their works provided more information and had become more meaningful than the original text.” (Rosenthal, 1975, 10)
Some historians are thus posing a question about the actual ‘content’ of the classic Greek texts as they were received by the Muslim Arab communities of learning in the long period of “arabization” of the Greek heritage (8th to 11th centuries). What were the accepted results of translating, copying, editing, commenting, changing, modifying, amending and adapting on the ultimate text, which readers had been getting? If texts had been already circulating in their Syriac and Persian translations and had been studied along with the Greek originals found after five hundred years in Byzantium, what were the choices made by translators and editors? And what exactly was the input of Arab translators, editors, commentators and professionals on further evolution of these “memes” of sociocultural evolution, these “bodies of knowledge” to be studied and applied? To make matters worse, historians are quite conscious that speaking of the ‘arabization’ of the classic Greek heritage they are touching only the tip of an iceberg in truly cross-cultural archeology of knowledge:

“What took place between the eighth and eleventh centuries in Muslim intellectual society was something quite different from ‘the survival of Greek culture’. One might consider that historians have rarely, if ever, spoken of the ‘Arabization’ of late medieval Latin culture, the ‘Romanization’ of sixteenth and seventeenth century England, or the ‘Germanization’ of late nineteenth century European science. Yet all these designations must at least be considered if such immanent force be granted the ‘Hellenistic element’ during the era of Arabic translation and nativization.”(Montgomery, 2000, 91)
Montgomery speaks of the displacement; the original author, for instance, Greek astronomer and mathematician, Ptolemy, has been, according to him, displaced by a new collective body of successive translators and editors, ‘a community of translator-interpreter-revisers’, some of whose representatives openly stated their contribution to the final shape of the text, by claiming in the preface, as did Thabit ibn Qurrah, that:

“The work was translated from the Greek into the Arabic language by Ishaq ibn Hunyan ibn Ishaq al-Mutatabbib for Abu us-Saqr Ismail ibn Balbul and was corrected by Thabit ibn Qurra from Harran. Everything that appears in this book, wherever and in whatever place or margin it may occur, whether it constitute commentary, summary, expansion of the text, explanation, simplification, explication for the sake of clearer understanding, correction, allusion, improvement, and revision, derives from the hand of Thabit ibn Qurra al-Harrani.” (Kunitzsch, 1974, 68)

Since the European translations of Greek classics from their most accessible Arab versions (the reconquest of Granada, Cordoba, Toledo gave medieval European monks access to considerable libraries) became very numerous in the 12th century, some historians suggest that we should speak of moving the beginning of the European Renaissance, which owes its name to the re-birth of interest in ancient authors, to this period, or at least to speak of two renaissances. The first one started in the 12th century, mainly with the newly accelerated social mobility, economic growth (which brought about the emergence and gradual improvements of paper mills and increased demand for books), political turmoil and cultural innovation, of which public city schools and
translations of classics merit particular attention. This first renaissance paved the way for the second one, the one of the 15th and 16th centuries, codified in Jacob Burchardt’s “The Culture of Renaissance in Italy” and remembered for the achievements of Copernicus, Galileo, da Vinci or Michelangelo. Earlier heroes were mostly busy translating from the Arabic: Adelard of Bath, Gerard of Cremona, John of Seville, Hugh of Santalla, Burgundio of Pisa or William of Moerbecke or they were teachers at the first developing universities of Bologna and Paris, conscious that they are bringing the classic works, “hidden” in Greek and Arabic versions, out into the “open”, making them accessible to the Latin-speaking world. However, these translators and teachers, who had relied so heavily on Arab libraries in laying groundwork for the European cultural Renaissance, have developed an interesting cultural strategy of separating the Arab language and culture from religion and politics of Islam and of downplaying the role of Arab intellectual elites in preserving the classical heritage, not least for themselves. The deleting of the Arabs from cultural history of Europe had already started – exactly at the same moment that their contribution to the European growth was most crucial and unique. Historians point out that the conquered Arab cities in Spain represented a world of civilizational superiority and tolerant religious difference. Latin translators came from feudal societies and monastic social environments, suspicious of and hostile to what they must have perceived as decadent sophistication, tolerant intellectual atmosphere and sensual pleasures of complex urban environment (in a sense they must have looked at the glories of Cordoba as some Muslim religious thinkers look at London or New York today). Further, translators also set out to “nativize” texts they were rendering and thus after the first generation of Latin translations, in which translators hesitate between
Greek, Arab or Latin terms, a definite increase and stabilization of Latinized terminology become visible. Gradual ‘purging’ of Arab terms was not an organized and synchronized action, but it became particularly thorough in textbooks and it has been much more systematic than former “Arabization” of Greek originals. Gradually, even star names imported from the Arabic disappeared from the European sources. This de-Arabization of knowledge rested on two assumptions: that Greek (ancient) and Latin (contemporary) were the proper languages for developing and transmitting relevant knowledge, and second, that Arabs were simply temporary caretakers of the Greek legacy:

“The progressive deleting of the Arabs from their own ‘legacy’ is largely an untold story of medieval European history.(…) By 1400, questions surrounding the learning of Arabic were gone. (…) Arabic was never adopted, except on most temporary basis, as a topic of study within the universities. Such adoption, of course, would have made a great deal of practical sense, given the vast amount of material in this language – even today, more of Aristotle exists in Arabic than in Greek or Latin. But the ‘tongue of the Saracens’ was apparently seen as being too difficult, too foreign, and in the end too unnecessary to become an object of study among schoolmen.” (Montgomery, 2000, 172)

Is it possible that telling the untold story of the Arab share in the European Renaissance might contribute to the cultivation of a truly cross-cultural competence allowing to bridge the differences, which separate the “clashing civilizations” at present? If so, we should reconstruct the process of deleting of the Arab link in the process of a transmission, translation and development of the ideas expressed by ancient Greek and Roman in their
classical texts. Far from being a specialist quest limited to remote corners of academic institutions, it might become a significant contribution to a crucial contemporary discussion about multicultural society and management of inequalities.


On September 30, cartoons by twelve artists appeared in *Jyllands Posten* (a conservative Danish daily). One of the cartoons presented turbaned head of the Prophet, with a burning fuse protruding from it as if Muhammad was carrying a bomb on his head. Another showed the prophet trying to stop the crowd of martyrs from queuing before the gates of paradise by exclaiming that he had run out of virgins. Cartoons might have remained unnoticed by the Islamic population of Danish capital (ca. 5000), but their religious leaders made a case against what they perceived as de facto discrimination on educational and job markets.

These local religious leaders of Danish Muslims were presiding over a marginalized and discriminated segment of Danish population, which does not feel embedded in broader civil society nor is adequately represented by local political parties. When their protests failed to elicit responses they had initially counted on (on the part of local authorities, job agencies, employers’ organizations, trade unions, Christian communities and organizations, and state authorities), they lodged a formal complaint against a blasphemy intended to hurt their religious feelings, asking the regional public persecutor in Viborg to investigate the case and to punish the perpetrators. On January 6, 2006, the regional
public persecutor in Viborg announced that investigations into cartoons have been terminated since no evidence of illegal activity, i.e. punishable offense, has been found.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Abul-Gheit had publicly criticized anti-Islamic cartoons published in Denmark (November 2005) and made use of the Future Forum (a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of Muslim countries of the Middle East) in Bahrain, calling for joint diplomatic action. Their declarations had no immediate influence upon the course of Danish justice or European Union’s media policy, but they managed to mobilize shop owners and food retail chains in their own countries. Shop owners started boycotting Danish dairy products and symbolically trampled upon Danish flags spread on pavements outside of boycotting shops (which increased media visibility of the protests). Very soon crowds of fanatics, sometimes with governments’ approval (in Syria, Iran) and sometimes without (Libya, Pakistan, Afghanistan) attacked Danish diplomatic buildings, setting some of them on fire. People died. Could this be avoided, if local Danish authorities paid attention to their original declaration of Danish imams? In this declaration, we read, among others:

“We urge you – on behalf of thousands of believing Muslims – to give us an opportunity of having constructive contact with the press and particularly with the relevant decision-makers, not briefly, but with a scientific methodology and planned and long-term program seeking to make views approach each other and remove misunderstandings between the two parties involved. Since we do not wish for Muslims to be accused of being backward and narrow, likewise we do not wish for Danes to be accused of
ideological arrogance either. When this relationship is back on the track, the result will bring satisfaction, an underpinning of security and stable relations, and a flourishing Denmark for all that live here.

We call your attention to this case, and place it in your hands, in such a way that we together may think and have an objective dialogue regarding how an appropriate exit can be found for these crises in a way which does not violate the freedom of speech, but which at the same time does not offend the feelings of Muslims either.”(Jyllands Posten, 2006, 6)

Since the only response was prime minister’s stern reminder that they are free to turn to the courts, the imams started lobbying in the Middle East, where events soon got out of control. Fundamentalist newspapers in the Arab world (e.g. Al-Najaf al Balagh published by Shiites in Iraq or Jama’at-i Islami published by fundamentalists in Pakistan) supported the demand for a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the Danes and for a public apology. Pakistani newspaper mentioned above went further and offered financial reward for any true Muslim who would kill the cartoon artists defending honor of the entire community of the faithful. On November 14, 2005, a radical fundamentalist leader of Islamic youth in Pakistan, Shahid Pervez Gilani, allegedly promised half a million rupees for accomplishing this murder. His press spokesman had later denied those allegations, claiming that his party embraced democracy and rejected violence, but media managed to carry this message around the Islamic world.
At this point – from mid-January to mid-February 2006 – Muslim crowds turned violent during street manifestations destroying not only Danish diplomatic buildings (which had been burnt in Damascus and Beirut), but turning their wrath against symbols of “the West” in general and the United States and European Union in particular (young Palestinians torched the seat of the EU representative to the Palestinian Authority). Street demonstrations, most of them violent, some involving loss of life, took place in Iraq, Lebanon, Kashmir, Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the cartoon crisis turned out to be short lived. Egyptian government threatened with boycotting of Danish products but failed to implement the threat, while Saudi Arabia recalled their ambassador from Denmark. At the end of February demonstrations died down.

Meanwhile, responses on both sides of the Christian-Muslim divide became more differentiated and less clear-cut. On the one hand, the responses of the Arab societies have not been as one-sided and fundamentalist as TV images of arsonist crowds throwing Danish products out of supermarkets and fighting riot police would suggest. Although it was hard to find this information in Europe’s main dailies, there were brave Arab journalists - in Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt – who did reprint Danish cartoons in their newspapers and weeklies. In spite of the fact that cartoons were reproduced fuzzily in order to diminish their impact and in spite of the fact that they have been provided with condemning comments, some of these journalists had been arrested, and although all of them were eventually set free on bail, some of them still await their trials. The list of courageous Arab journalists includes Mohammad al-Asaadi (editor of “Yemen Observer”), Akram Sabra and Kamal al-Aalafi (editors of, respectively, “Al Hurryia”
and “Al-Rai al-Aam”, both in Yemen), Kahel Bousaad and Berkane Bouderbala (editors of, respectively “Errisala” and “Iqraa”, both of which are Algerian weeklies). One should stress the fact that these arrests and accompanying closure of publications happened in 2006, after street riots had spread. Originally, in October 2005, when two Jordanian weeklies (“Al-Mehwar” edited by Hisham Khalidi and “The Star”) and two newspapers – Jordan’s “Al Ghad” and Egypt’s “Al Fagr” reprinted the Danish cartoons, the reprints attracted little attention and have not yet been seized by any party framing them as a casus belli. However, when Jihad Momani reprinted the very same cartoons in Jordanian weekly “al-Shihan” on February 2, 2006, he was immediately arrested and had his weekly closed down by alarmed authorities.

On the other hand, the “Western” world had also been far from uniform in its response to the “Danish cartoon crisis”. The US media refused to reproduce the cartoons and so did the media in UK. On February 15, 2006, the European Parliament accepted a resolution condemning acts of violence against Danish diplomatic buildings and expressed solidarity with Danes and other attacked Europeans. The European Union upheld the rights of Danish press to exercise its right for free expression of opinion on all topics, including religion, but originally expressed concern with the “Danish satirical and offensive cartoons” (Xavier Solana). Gradually, the official position of the EU became more pro-Danish and less pro-Muslim and on February 26 ministers of foreign affairs issued a declaration after their meeting in Brussels. They regretted that Arab audiences had perceived these cartoons as offensive, but did not describe them as offensive themselves and offered no apologies.
Meanwhile, on February 25, Dutch minister of developmental aid and cooperation, Agnes van Ardenne – van der Hoeven, published an article in London-based Arab newspaper “Asharq Al-Awsat” (reprinted later by “Yemen Times”) under the title “The cartoon crisis, a distorted picture. According to her, the secular point of view, upheld by the Danish authors and publishers of Muhammad cartoons, is based on an assumption that religion is outdated and had been historically superseded by a superior – rational and secular culture. Secular fundamentalists pocket religion in marginal areas of individual social life, closer to personal hobbies than social and civil virtues. This is wrong, because it focuses on wrong aspect of the conflict. Arab world is suffering not because it is predominantly Muslim, but because it is predominantly ruled by undemocratic regimes, which waste chances for improvement. Agnes van Ardenne quoted president Roosevelt’s famous war speech (State of the Union address of 1941), in which the US president mentioned four basic liberties (which subsequently contributed to the creation of the Declaration on Universal Rights of Man); the first of them was indeed freedom of expression, but it was closely followed by freedom of religious worship. Exercising our rights according to the former we should not take undue liberties with the latter, since our enemy is not a “religious superstition” but “political tyranny” (no matter whether it is justified with a secular ideology or religious doctrine). Both her article and reprints of cartoons by Muslim journalists create a potential agora for discussing future ‘cartoon crises’ by demonstrating that there is a space for a re-negotiation of meaning of religious values in contemporary social life, even during a growing crisis. Such re-negotiation would require a comparative analysis of the role of religious values in social life and ana
analysis of the conflicting values (Danish choice of freedom of expression at the expense of stigmatized immigrants). Not many Western or Muslim intellectuals offer guidance in this respect. Rare positive cases in point include, for instance, a critical reconstruction of the role of Christianity and of Catholic Church in shaping western political institutions (cf. Mouffe, 1999), the role of organized religion in shaping contemporary political philosophy and managerial ideology of institutional science (cf. Fuller, 2003) and analyses of the dismantling of ideological walls (Said, 2000, Hussein, 2002). Mouffe edited a volume of critical essays on Carl Schmitt. Schmitt’s studies of “Political Theology” and “Roman Catholicism and Political Form” from the 1920ies. He reconstructed the “rationalism” of the Catholic Church and traced institutional logic of bureaucratic politics (which offers an institutional demonstration of this rationality) to contemporary political systems and especially to the uneasy relationship between the executive and legislative branch of government. According to his leftist commentators, he had recognized crucial role of “political management” in overcoming parliamentary crises and opposed “objective-economic” approach, which dominated both Marxist and neoliberal thinking, condemning them to either subversive conspiracy of a single party (Marxist core values of building a classless society at any cost) or to alienating parliamentary deal-making (liberal core values of continuing coercion-free dialogue no matter how coercive are the experienced constraints of inequalities by scapegoated groups):

“Schmitt takes up a position against what he sees as the dominant tendencies of Catholicism at the time; he criticizes its bending towards a private and subjective belief (…), he maintains Catholicism looses its way when it seeks only to bring another soul to
a world condemned to the grip of economic and technical rationality. (...) He seeks (...) a model which makes it possible to affirm the primacy of the political over economics, of decision over impersonal structural constraints, of the Idea over matter.”(Colliot-Thélène, 1999, 146-7)

Schmitt’s idea of a political democracy involved an assumed homogeneity of members of an imagined political community. It was very restrictive:

“For him democracy requires the exclusion and ‘if the need arises – the elimination or eradication of heterogeneity’.”(Preuss, 1999, 171)

This question of homogeneity and eliminated heterogeneity arose at the core of the Danish cartoon crisis. Global flows brought Muslim immigrants into an environment, where they stood out as “heterogeneous”. Persistent social inequalities forced immigrant Muslim communist into a defensive fold of imagined religious community. While discriminated against in housing, jobs and education, they could feel different but equal to their Danish hosts in their religious worship (which also legitimized their traditional family roles thus providing a buffer against secularization of the youth). When cartoons ridiculed even their religious community, without at the same time offering a consolation of increased care for them as “underdogs” and without genuine will to redress some of the other inequalities – Danish imams realized they were loosing the only trump they still had in their social game for recognition and acceptance. Can we organize a game, in which consequences of playing trump cards by imagined or real “underdogs” on a global scale will be less dangerous? In order to answer this question, let us examine knowledge
communities, which are responsible for producing socially acceptable knowledge, which, in turn, influences our behavior in crises.

4. Emergent cross-cultural competence: interdisciplinary, interparadigmatic, intermediating.

Not all religious values are lost in an interdisciplinary translation from principles of conduct for a religious sect in an originally hostile environment to universal principles of research community devoted to a scientific paradigm competing against other paradigms and other professional communities. Some of them survive in philosophies or historical reconstructions of ways and means of generating socially acceptable scientific knowledge. Commenting on Popper-Kuhn debate, which had taken place in early seventies and decided about further development of contemporary philosophy of science, Steve Fuller points out that the construction and maintenance of moral, legal and institutional preconditions for free inquiry and ongoing criticism depends on a generalized loyalty to this free inquiry but without blind commitment to any particular theory of paradigm. Upholding standards of criticism is more important than having one’s theory defended at their expense and these standards (linked to falsifiability, crucial experiments and the like) are maintained independently of theories, in the defense of which they are, with varying luck, evoked and applied. However, this Popperian “virtue” of a rational member of western research community (who remains faithful to the spirit of critical inquiry, even if their own theories suffer as a result of acting in this spirit), has eroded under the influence of both contradictions in Popper’s own philosophy of science
(expressed in a number of publications, of which the evolutionary epistemology presented in “Objective Knowledge” is the case in point) and under the influence of Thomas Kuhn’s cold war ideology of mobilization of the scientific elites disguised as a “theory of scientific revolutions”, which justifies defense of status quo by members of “normal science” (established professional communities in hierarchic academic bureaucracies) and unwillingness to subject one’s own and one’s colleagues’ theories to too much criticism (especially from the point of rival paradigms, which are stigmatized as ‘unscientific’ and ignored):

“Science policy has regressed from a struggle for recognition to a struggle for survival. As universities increasingly abandon, or attenuate, the institution of tenure, and researchers are forced to depend on external grants, scientists have become all too keenly aware that one bad decision can ruin the material basis of their entire career. (...) To Popper and his students, this strategic mentality, characteristic of Kuhnian normal science, revealed science’s captivity to its social and material conditions. Kierkegaard helped Popper forge the link between the critical spirit of classical Athens and the Protestant Reformation by making decision making central to his thought. Indeed, Popper is not unfairly been treated as a scientific existentialist.”(Fuller, 2003, 108-9)

Fuller’s use of religious analogy merits attention, because it continues some intuitions expressed by Feyerabend (who traced analogies between “progress” in arts and sciences of the 18th century trying to demonstrate their shared underlying “mechanism” for ensuring professional peer control and creating impression of “progress”) and compares
directly episodes from institutional history of Christianity and cases from institutional
history of western academic establishments. Fuller believes that Popper’s “Catholic”
approach (falsificationism being the tacit “dogma” of anti-dogmatic academic
bureaucracies) with “Protestant” rebellions of his students (Paul Feyerabend springs to
mind, as an anarchist, and as a true heir to Rousseau’s comparison of arts, sciences and
morality) has been a much more fortunate translation of the religious message into a
philosophical guide for methodology of scientific inquiry than Kuhnian “sectarian” vision
of paradigmatic and generational plots disturbing the continuity of “normal science’s”
historical development. Kuhn’s theory of rival paradigms succeeding each other for
periods of domination over rival paradigms in fact turned out to be a convenient
ideological alibi both for the established neopositivists unwilling to rock the academic
boat (and willing to freeze too much interparadigmatic rivalry) and for the representatives
of the postmodernist coalitions fighting for survival within these academic bureaucracies
(willing to protects themselves from the dominant neopositivist orthodoxy in feminist,
multicultural, postcolonial and other niches). Fuller reconstructs Popper’s philosophy of
science as a variant of ‘scientific existentialism’ and attributes the origins of this
philosophical doctrine to the attempted synthesis between the critical spirit of the ancient
Greeks (‘classical Athens’) and the Protestant Reformation (as the reform of an organized
religion, which gave individual more chances than a professional bureaucracy of a
Catholic church would be willing to concede). This is the genesis of the Kierkegaard
connection:
“Kierkegaard characterized Christianity as a ‘hypothesis’ that one voluntarily undertakes in the full knowledge that the consequences are solely one’s own – not God’s – responsibility. (...) Similarly, for Popper, when a scientific knowledge claim is falsified, the responsibility lies solely with the scientist who proposed it – and not nature’s failure to act in some desired fashion. The appropriate response is to hypothesise and test anew, not to rationalize the situation by claiming that the old hypothesis was ‘really’ true, but somehow the test fell victim to factors beyond the scientist’s control. (...) If this appears too high a standard, then science is in *stasis*. For Popper, science is indeed in *stasis* – a ‘fallen’ state, a closed society, much as the Roman Catholic Church was when Martin Luther launched what became the protestant Reformation.”(Fuller, 2003, 110)

Feyerabend’s call against this *stasis*, this ‘fallen’ state of scientific establishment, which arrogantly imposes a monopoly of academically produced knowledge on contemporary complex societies to the exclusion of all other types of knowledge (expressed in “Against Method” and discussed in the 1970ies, but forgotten shortly afterwards, cf. Feyerabend, 1975, 1979) should thus, according to Fuller, be seen as the call for Protestant-like decentralization of scientific corporations (including universities, research institutes, think tanks and educational institutions), a passionate plea for ‘devolution’ of support for scientific projects to local communities and authorities, away from centralized megabureaucracies. No wonder that Fuller appeared as a witness in a recent trial in Pennsylvania, in which the claim of a board of education to equal treatment of intelligent design theory and theory of biological evolution during biology lessons in a public school (demanded by parents making use of their democratic rights) has been challenged by
those, who believe that public education should be limited to the theories approved of by academic establishments (and theory of intelligent design is not).

There are limits to analogy between religious movement of Protestantism within Christianity dominated institutionally by the Catholic Church in Western Europe of the 16th century and schools and polemics in contemporary philosophy of science (although the present revival of interest among scholars and scientists in the Popper-Kuhn, Lakatos-Feyerabend debates is fairly symptomatic for a renewed interest in “criticism and the growth of knowledge”). These limits can best be summarized as a debate on relativism and are closely connected to social life of values. From the point of epistemological and methodological criticism of Popper’s philosophy of science two charges brought by philosophers of science stand out and will continue to stand out even if Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions is refuted and looses its popularity. The first is that Popper embraced evolutionary epistemology, which tacitly identifies an ability of an amoeba or of an Einstein to (biological) survival with this agent’s (Einstein’s or amoeba’s) rationality. Thus one assumes what should become known only after we understand evolutionary processes – rationality of carriers of ability to survive is measured with their survival and survival is then explained as a manifestation of their (superior) rationality” (cf., Chmielewski, 1995). A vicious circle becomes a real threat to our explanation: why do agents survive? Because they are rational. Why are they rational? Because they survive. The second charge is that theory of evolutionary epistemology with elements of falsificationism may be granted a status, which makes it immune to the very criticism it advocates with respect to every other theory:
“There are no reasons to believe that Popper’s critical theory is criticizable, from which it follows that Popper’s theory of rationality, that made criticizability a condition of rational acceptance of a theory in science, and which denied such status to Marxism and psychoanalytical theories, turns out to be guilty of the same sin, is not distinguishable from them in this regard, and as a result, according to its own requirements, has to be – like them – rejected.” (Chmielewski, 1995, 229)

This double trouble with relativism has been a permanent companion of contemporary philosophy of science. Apparent incompatibility of a theory of scientific rationality (the logic of scientific discovery based on falsificationism) and of a theory of sociocultural evolution (objective, or rather intersubjective knowledge based on evolutionary epistemology) is one of the more recent, Popperian, cases in point. One of the Polish critics of Popper, Adam Chmielewski, elegantly expresses his view on this incompatibility by defining it as Popperian attempt to harmonize Platonic vision of superior methodology of acquiring (scientific) knowledge with Darwinian vision of a superior reconstruction of the origins of evolving life, changing societies and developing knowledge. Complex societies deal with this danger of relativism by establishing formal procedures rather than imposing content-bound core dogmas. Some of the ambiguities can, indeed, be procedurally decided upon in a formal way. On December 20, 2005, the US court decided that theory of intelligent design does not have a scientific status and should not be part of a biological curriculum in public schools. Religious motivation of the followers of the theory of intelligent design had been quoted in justification of the
ruling. What would have been the outcome if Muslim complaint about Danish cartoons did result in the court case in Viborg?

Pursuing the flawed rationalism of scientific communities (scientific rationality is supposedly based on logic, empiricism and falsificationism, but their clustering and applications evolve), one wonders what would be the community of knowledge, which could discuss the Danish cartoon incident as a relatively impartial third party equally acceptable to the Danish imams and Danish cartoon artists, Irish Catholics and Arab Muslims alike? Fuller quotes Popper as trying to persuade scientists to sign a version of a Hippocratic Oath in order to diminish harm they could inflict on mankind (as suppliers of military industrial complexes) and Feyerabend as suggesting “devolution of science funding from nation-states to local communities.” (Fuller, 2003, 213) These suggestions would indicate a necessity to search for methods of influencing, managing and embedding academic communities. However, followers of Popper and Feyerabend, or of Lakatos and Toulmin (to mention just some of the authors, who had contributed to the growing literature on principled behavior in spite of relativist shadow) do not seem to share their masters’ ambitions to act as public intellectuals. Kuhn had been conspicuously silent after the popper-Kuhn debate and stayed away from public intellectual’s platforms and media. Feyerabend did not, but remained an enfant terrible of a relatively narrow academic circle of post-Popperian philosophers of science and some postmodernists. Perhaps politicians and human rights activists could form a panel for cases like the one involving cartoons to defuse its latent terrorist potential? Agnes van Ardenne quotes actually existing networks of entrepreneurs, human rights activists, politicians, business
people, intellectuals, and media people, who come together in temporary projects (she quotes an anti-HIV virus campaign launched in Yemen’s capital Sana) or who are selected as laureates of an annual “freedom award” (she mentions the one granted by the Dutch city of Middleburg). Would a panel composed of people from diverse religious, ethnic, professional, gender and age groups offer sufficient neutrality and command sufficient authority to be considered binding by the involved parties? These are pragmatic questions, but answers to both political (how to manage reconciliation of offenses and neutralization of inequalities) and cognitive (how to arrive at acceptable and critically legitimized knowledge about cross-cultural construction of social realities) questions depend on our ability to extend our cross-cultural competence to embrace “otherness” and heterogeneity, which had been doomed to exclusion in previous rounds of conflicts, clashes and incidents. Networking social spaces one has to remember about including those which had been systematically neglected. The latter include predominantly ethnically and religiously “different” (different, that is, from the former working classes, which consisted mostly of peasants migrating to industrial cities) underclasses of EU urban centers. Immigrant labor filled the gaps in urban spaces and social care system left by upwardly mobile working class; but cannot fit into the same channels of upward mobility and does not have the resources to oppose dismantling of welfare state (whose former beneficiaries, working classes, moved up to the middle class and do not oppose it strongly enough either). Can management of secular and religious identities facilitate integration by a promise of palpable upward mobility? Tracing social life of political values we should not forget those values, which may lead clandestine existence as religious ones and thus remain in need of cultural, political and managerial translation, or
do so in ways we do not “officially” acknowledge or respond to. In both cases, we need a new approach to the interparadigmatic, intercultural, interdisciplinary translation, which can be accomplished:

“by stretching the idea of ‘translation’ from the merely linguistic to the broader cultural level. This is a decisive but still enigmatic task, one that involves acknowledging certain impossibilities (‘nontranslatable’ ideas and forms) and looking for equivalences; scientific, literary, legal and religious ‘universals’.”(Balibar, 2004, 235)

Thus having started with the idea of translation as a crucial “link” in the sociocultural evolution (the Arab input into the European Renaissance), which transmits “memes” through time and space, we arrive at the idea of intercultural translation (which goes beyond linguistic equivalents) and a plea to embrace the Popperian search for universals in spite of empirical failure to rescue them from the shadow of relativism, as a much more ambitious and promising alternative to Kuhn’s facile paradigmatic sectarianism. Let us repeat it once again. Social life of values is better served by Popperian ambiguities and incommensurabilities (which beg the question, but allow begging) than by Kuhnian enclosures (which question the beggars, but limit questioning). Threat of relativism looms larger, but agenda is less restrictive. Are our professional communities able to face this challenge of revived Popper and Feyerabend or will they fall back upon Kuhnian alibis?
Literature:

Balibar, Étienne, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004


Publications in the ERIM Report Series Research* in Management

ERIM Research Program: “Organizing for Performance”

2006

*IPRs, Technological Development, and Economic Development
Wilfred Dolfsma
ERS-2006-004-ORG
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7301

Institution Building and Change in China
Barbara Krug and Hans Hendrischke
ERS-2006-008-ORG
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7331

Rational Entrepreneurship in Local China: Exit Plus Voice for Preferential Tax Treatments
Ze Zhu, George W.J. Hendrikse and Barbara Krug
ERS-2006-010-ORG
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7577

A Process Model of Locational Change in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Evolutionary Perspective
Erik Stam
ERS-2006-014-ORG
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7633

Starting Anew: Entrepreneurial Intentions and Realizations Subsequent to Business Closure
Veronique Schutjens and Erik Stam
ERS-2006-015-ORG
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7638

Agglomeration Economies and Entrepreneurship in the ICT Industry
Frank G. van Oort and Erik Stam
ERS-2006-016-ORG
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7639

Renascent Entrepreneurship
Erik Stam, David Audretsch and Joris Meijaard
ERS-2006-017-ORG
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7640

Social Life of Values
Slawomir Magala
ERS-2006-019-ORG

* A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management:
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1

ERIM Research Programs:
LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems
ORG Organizing for Performance
MKT Marketing
F&A Finance and Accounting
STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship